Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security

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Preface by Antonio Vigilante
Director of the UN in Brussels
The United Nations University - Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) is a research and training unit of the United Nations University, a global network of centers engaged in research and capacity development to support the universal goals of the UN and generate new knowledge and ideas.

Based in Bruges, Belgium, UNU-CRIS specializes in the processes and consequences of regional integration and cooperation. It acts as a resource for the UN system with particular links to the UN bodies dealing with regional integration and works in partnership with initiatives and centers throughout the world that are concerned with issues of integration and cooperation. The mission of UNU-CRIS is to contribute towards achieving the universal goals of the UN and the UNU through comparative and interdisciplinary research and training for better understanding of the processes and impact of intra- and inter-regional integration. The aim is to act as a think tank that generates policy-relevant knowledge about new forms of governance and cooperation, and to contribute to capacity building on issues of integration and cooperation particularly in developing countries.

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The complexity of the international peace and development agenda in our times and the multiplication of different international networks, configured in different ways according to the subject matters, highlight the need for a renewed multilateralism. The increased presence and activism on the international scene of non-state actors - working alongside nation States - such as transnational corporations, civil society networks, local authorities, regional organizations, intergovernmental organizations, clearly shows that state sovereignty is no longer the Alfa and the omega of international negotiations and international actions.

When dealing with global challenges, such as climate change, pandemics, environmental biodiversity, terrorism, human trafficking, international financial and currency stability, it is clear that state boundaries constitute neither a defining element of the challenges nor the sole element of the solutions. States are no longer the only necessary entity to define and implement responses to global challenges. Without the involvement of the private sector, of different expressions of civil society and of regional groupings, it may prove impossible to devise effective international actions in many domains, chief among them the provision of global public goods.

While the UN remains the legitimate and global forum and the framework where global challenges are and should be tackled, it is becoming ever more clear that the participation of other actors in global policy definition and in the application of concrete international measures is not only desirable but also indispensable. Fortunately and with great foresight, the UN charter already identified this need and envisaged the collaboration of the UN and regional organizations in its Chapter VIII.

Among non-state actors, regional and other inter-governmental organizations have particularly and progressively come to participate, in different ways, to the definition of the necessary responses to global challenges and in the application of concrete international actions, such as peacekeeping operations. In the last few years, just to give an example, the collaboration between the United Nations and the European Union has increasingly acquired a breadth and an intensity that benefits development and humanitarian international work very significantly, as shown in the annual publication “Improving lives”, prepared by the UN Team in Brussels.

The United Nations University (UNU) is a UN entity that combines sound academic work with a policy-advice mandate. The Bruges based UNU research and training program on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) has with this new impressive publication, helped to provide a scientific underpinning to the collaboration between the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organizations in the critical area of peace and security. The data collected and the analysis carried out in this publication constitute an important reference document to understand the mandate and capacities of these institutions, at a moment when the opportunities for wider cooperation are multiplying.

Antonio Vigilante

Director of the United Nations in Brussels
Regional organizations are an inescapable feature of international politics. Virtually all countries in the world are members of at least one regional or other intergovernmental organization. In a globalized era of assertive competition and porous borders, the orthodox notion of nation-state is undergoing a major overhauling, which creates conditions for alternative political actors, such as regional organizations, to come to the forefront. Since the end of the Second World War, regional organizations have traditionally been formed around economic, political or environmental objectives. However, over the last decades these organizations have gradually penetrated into the peace and security sphere and developed their capacities in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, or post-war reconstruction. In Europe, Africa, Asia, or the Americas, regional and other intergovernmental organizations have been empowered by the UN and national governments to maintain peace and security concurrently.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in his report ‘A Regional-Global Security Partnership – Challenges and Opportunities’\(^1\) (2006) that, “even in a future situation in which the various roles of partner organizations are clarified, the partnership [with the UN] will not be effective if the vast discrepancy in the capacities of the regional and other organizations around the world is allowed to continue.” But what are their capacities?

In order to answer this question, the UN Department of Political Affairs – Unit on Cooperation with Regional Organizations has mandated the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) to conduct the first systematic study of the integral capacities of all regional organizations with a security mandate. In the view of the project team, this included assessing the (i) organizational capacity (legal mandate and organic structure), (ii) resource capacity (financial and human assets), and (iii) operational experience (ground record) of each organization. The team has conducted interviews in the field, submitted a questionnaire to the organizations and carried out desk research in order to be able to survey the capacities of 21 organizations that are regularly invited to partake in the High Level Meetings between the UN and regional and other governmental organizations. The general conclusions of the Survey follow:

**Organizational Capacity**

1. The organizational capacity of the organizations surveyed is generally satisfactory and undergoing rapid change. There exist, however, fundamental differences of outlook and style among the organizations, reflecting different perceptions of threat, historical experience and cultural background, with correspondingly different strategies towards the maintenance of peace and security and the respective roles of the UN and regional (and sub-regional) organizations.

2. All organizations (except CARICOM, COMSEC, and CPLP) have a **legal mandate** in peace and security issues. Either established in their founding documents or provided by in specific protocols, most organizations have adopted legal provisions that guide them in the operationalization of their security-related activities. As far as the organic structure of the organizations is concerned the capacities are heterogeneous. The most developed capacity is in early warning, conflict prevention and (non-military) peacemaking.

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\(^1\) A/61/204 (paragraph 85).
3. In organizations such as ECOWAS, EU, and IGAD, the conflict prevention and early warning capacities are notable, even if the formation of a continental early-warning mechanism in Africa, the “Continental Early Warning System”, has been lagging behind. Other organizations such as ECCAS, IOF, LAS, PIF, OAS, and SADC are planning to establish early warning mechanisms. Nevertheless, due to lack of political will or financial resources, they are not yet fully operational.

4. Other organizations have adopted a code of conduct and established mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes (mediation, good offices, arbitration). Organizations such as COMSEC, EU, IOF, and OAS have a very substantial peacemaking capacity (both in terms of legal mandate and organizational structure). Others, however, are less structurally prepared (ASEAN, CPLP, ECCAS) and their interventions are normally limited to either temporary or politically insignificant actions.

5. The peacekeeping and enforcement capacity is being developed currently by only a few regional agencies for their regions, most notably in Africa (e.g. ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD [EASBRICOM], SADC) but also by CIS, CSTO, LAS, or PIF. Only the AU, in collaboration with sub-regional organizations, to date has commenced the process of building a structured regional/sub-regional standby capacity of national forces, while some others rely on directly-contributed national force capacity for crisis management. However, the African security architecture is still marked by financial constraints, lack of military training, and poor national coordination. Some organizations – CIS, CSTO, EU and NATO - have the resources and the political will to undertake global enforcement responsibilities on behalf of the UN outside their membership zones when required and authorized to do so.

6. As far as peacebuilding is concerned most organizations still lack a clear strategy on post-war reconstruction that goes beyond the mere exercise of election observation. Exceptions are the AU, which has adopted recently a new peacebuilding program, and the EU, OAS, and OSCE which have deployed missions to help countries recuperating from a violent conflict (reconstruction and reconciliation).

Resource Capacity

7. In so far as resource capacity is concerned, it was concluded that there exists a vast discrepancy in resources between regional/sub-regional and some of the other intergovernmental organizations. This pertains in particular to financial capacity which affects human capacity and thus operational capacity. The result is a highly-skewed regional-global security mechanism that reflects global imbalances in wealth and power. As to financial capacity, some organizations have very scarce resources. The meager budgets of CPLP, ECCAS, or IGAD impose severe constraints on the work of these organizations. The same applies to human resources. Some organizations are run by 20-50 staff (CPLP, ECCAS, IGAD), whereas others reach 25,000 (EU). Moreover, if we evaluate not only the quantitative but also the qualitative human capacity of the organizations, it stands out that in several of them, but mainly in the African ones, the staff is poorly trained and often lacks motivation.

8. Furthermore, the financial and human resources have to be studied and analyzed as a very relative factor in the survey of the organizations, as they differ largely in nature and mandate. It is very difficult to compare organizations devoted solely to regional cooperation in peace and security, with others devoted to regional integration (using large parts of their budgets for the creation of a Single Market, or integrating their national agricultures).
Operational Experience

9. Finally, most organizations have a long operational experience on the ground. In *peacekeeping*, for instance, regional and other intergovernmental organizations have deployed approximately 30 missions since the end of the Second World War. These missions, carried out by the AU, COMSEC, CIS, ECOWAS, EU, LAS, NATO, OAS, OSCE, PIF, and SADC have been deployed in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Pacific.

10. All organizations surveyed have some experience in *peacemaking*. Even when not supported by a clear mandate or by effective organizational capacities, regional organizations have engaged in mediation, arbitration, and good offices. COMSEC, ECOWAS, EU, IOF, OAS for instance have ample experience in peacemaking. It would be difficult to envisage the outbreak of a conflict in Latin America, Europe, or Africa which would not spark an immediate response from a regional or sub-regional organization.

11. As regards *peacebuilding* missions, AU, EU, OAS, and OSCE have large experience: either through the implementation of structural programs that are targeted to prevent post-conflict societies to fall back into a pattern of violence (e.g. good governance, poverty eradication, democratization) or, more narrowly, through the deployment of election observation missions.

There exists potential for regional and other governmental organizations to engage in effective collaboration with the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The full potential of that partnership, however, has yet to be realized. A sustained and collective effort will be required through rational planning and mutual assistance to reach the Secretary-General’s vision of an effective ‘regional-global security mechanism’.
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<td>ACP - African-Caribbean-Pacific Group</td>
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<td>AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM – African Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASEAN - Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM – Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>ASF – African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU - African Union</td>
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<td>BSECC - Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>CARICOM - Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CARIFTA – Conference of the Caribbean Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>CDC – Community of Democratic Choice</td>
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<td>CFSP – Common Foreign Security Policy</td>
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<td>CEMAC – Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD - Community of Sahelo-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWARN – Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD)</td>
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<td>CEWERUS - Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (IGAD)</td>
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<td>CEWS – Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CIAV-OAS – OAS International Support and Verification Mission</td>
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<td>CIS - Common wealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>COE - Council of Europe</td>
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<td>COMSEC – Commonwealth Secretariat</td>
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<td>COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COPAX – Conseil de Paix et Securité de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
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<td>CPLP - Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries</td>
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<td>CRIS – Comparative Regional Integration Studies</td>
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<td>CFRD – Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment (CSTO)</td>
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<td>CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>DPA – Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC - East African Community</td>
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<td>EASBRIG – East African Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>EC - European Commission</td>
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<td>ECA – Economic Commission for Africa (UN)</td>
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<td>ECCAS - Economic Community for Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOMIL – ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG – ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECOWARN – ECOWAS Early Warning and Early Response</td>
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<td>EDA – European Defense Agency</td>
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<td>ERRF – European Union Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESCAP – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<td>ESF – ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>ESDP - European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU - European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR – European Union Military Mission</td>
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<td>EUPOL – European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUISS – European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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EUJUST – European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUPAT – European Union Police Advisory Team
EUSC – European Union’s Satellite Centre
EUSEC – European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EW – Early Warning
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWER – Forum for Early Warning and Early Response
FOMUC / FOMAC – Central African Multinational Force
FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council
GUAM - Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
HLM – High-Level Meeting
HR – Human Rights
HRR – Humanitarian & Refugee Relief
IADC – Inter-American Democratic Charter
IC/GLR – International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICJ – International Court of Justice
ICPAT – IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism
IFOR – Implementation Force (NATO)
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGADD - Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGO – Intergovernmental Organization
ILO – International Labour Organization
IOF - International Organization of Francophonie
IOM – International Organization for Migration
ISAF – International Assistance Force
ISEESCO – Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
ISIS - Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN)
KFOR – Kosovo Force (NATO)
LAS - League of Arab States
MAES - African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MAPP - Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (OAS)
MARAC – Central African Early Warning System
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
MICIVIH – International Civilian Mission for Haiti
MINUGUA – United Nations Mission in Guatemala
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding
MONUC – United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MRU - Mano River Union
NAC – North Atlantic Council
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRS – NATO Crisis Response System
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NFP – National Focal Points
NIS – Newly Independent States
NIWS – NATO Intelligence Warning System
NRF – NATO Response Force
OAS - Organization of American States
PROPAZ – Programme on Development of Resources for Peacebuilding in Guatemala (OAS)
OAU – Organization of African Unity
OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OECS - Organization of East Caribbean States
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ODIHR – OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OBJECTIVES

The objective of the present project is to survey the capacities of the different regional and other intergovernmental organizations cooperating with the UN in its goal of developing a regional-global security mechanism, as stated by the UN Secretary General in the 5th High Level Meeting (HLM) between the UN and Regional and other Intergovernmental Organizations, in 2003.

The need to develop a detailed survey of the capacities (organizational and resources) and operational experience of regional and other intergovernmental organizations in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding, emanates from recognition that, within the UN System, there is a considerable lack of knowledge, based on reliable data, pertaining to regional organizations.

The goal of the present survey is to rectify this problem eventually aiming at the establishment of a permanent regional database, through which, the developments of each organization can be documented and updated.

METHODS

This Survey is based on the results of a combination of a questionnaire, desk research and interviews.

Questionnaire

The Questionnaire was composed of twenty nine questions pertaining to the size of the organizations' human and financial resources, legal identity, organizational structure, decision-making processes, operational capacities and their historical experience in the maintenance of peace and security, acting in their own capacity and in cooperation with the United Nations. It was designed by UNU-CRIS, UN-DPA and UN-DPKO and submitted to the organizations between May and November 2005. Some of the answers are still pertinent today and were thus integrated into the second version of the Survey.

Desk Research

The project team (composed of five researchers and one research assistant) undertook coordinated research into various aspects of the capacities of UN partners. It was judged more appropriate to keep such research distinct from the response information, in order to preserve the integrity of each.

Interviews

In addition, in 2007 the Project Team visited the following countries for discussions pertaining to the second version of the survey or for general information-gathering: Belgium, China, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe. In the first version of the Survey, the project coordinator Dr. Kennedy Graham had visited the following organizations: African Union (Addis Ababa), League of Arab States (Cairo), Council of Europe (Strasbourg), Association of South-East Asian Nations (Jakarta), Pacific Islands Forum (Suva), Organization of American States (Washington, DC), Economic Community of West African States (Abuja), European Union/European Commission (Brussels). Some of the data collected for the purpose of the first version of the Survey was still pertinent and therefore included in the second version.
CONCEPTS

In the course of the study, it became apparent that some clarification of concepts and terminology was required if any degree of consistency were to be achieved among all participating organizations. The difficulty encountered, as with other UN studies on similar subjects, is that many of the concepts employed in the official conduct of international relations are left undefined, often for good political reason. Nonetheless, this does not assist in clarifying a common position on issues that are inherently complex and dynamic. The project team has therefore sought to add clarity to the conceptual dimension of the issues involved, or at the least to record the conceptual basis on which it felt bound to proceed. It is recognized that no official pronouncement exists regarding the use of these concepts. Indeed, it became apparent in the course of the study that, to some extent, UN partners are employing concepts of peace and security and an associated terminology in different ways. If left unresolved, this situation will militate against a common understanding that should underpin an effective operational regional-global partnership. It is, moreover, imperative that any concepts and terms employed are compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and are able to be ‘placed’ within its various chapters and articles.

Capacity

It was judged important to be clear about what elements of capacity were involved in a ‘capacity survey’. In the view of the project team, this included organizational capacity, resource capacity (both human and financial), and operational experience. These elements are deemed to be necessary features of the ability of a regional organization to partner effectively with the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

• Organizational Capacity

It indicates the general structural ability of a UN partner to make decisions and ensure their implementation from headquarters – for purposeful action in the maintenance of peace and security. The mandate to act in peace and security, the decision-making capacity of its principal organs, and its secretariat capacity to implement decisions (both its own decisions and those taken collectively in the high-level meetings) are central to the overall effectiveness of the relationship between the UN and a regional organization.

• Resource Capacity

This term refers to the size of a UN partner to undertake effective and sustained action in the maintenance of international peace and security. Sufficient human resources, in terms of numbers and expertise, and sufficient financial resources to cover the costs of peace and security operations of various kinds, are each a sine qua non conditions for effectiveness in such a partnership. The United Nations, itself confronting problems of financial capacity, nonetheless has minimum capacity to undertake some peace operation missions. Its limitations, however, force it to seek partnerships with regional and other intergovernmental organizations, which in some cases face even greater limitations themselves.

• Operational Experience

This term encapsulates the procedural ability of a UN partner to undertake action in-the-field in the maintenance of peace and security. This depends on the mandate and mechanism (through legal instrumentation) that the partner has developed to put into action the decisions it may have taken in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peacebuilding.

2 The ‘conceptual structure of peace’ adopted in this study is therefore as follows: pre-conflict: (a) Conflict Prevention (early warning, strategic analysis, preventive diplomacy; preventive deployment); mid-conflict: (b) peacemaking (through pacific settlement, without the use of armed force), (c) Peacekeeping (inter-state truce monitoring, based on consent), (d) peace enforcement (intra-state missions, with enforcement mandates), (e) collective security (against inter-state aggression); and, finally, post-conflict: peacebuilding. It is understood that events on-the-ground and the progression of policy do not respond to any rigid sequence that might be implied above. Such events and policy tend to be historically cyclical rather than linear. No society has been without conflict and many harbor memories
Early Warning

The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) defines early warning as the “systematic collection and analysis of information coming from the areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violence; development of strategic responses to these crises; and presentation of options to the critical actors for the purpose of decision making”.

Conflict Prevention

‘Conflict prevention’ has been defined as “Actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times in order to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups, as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change.” It includes: (a) preventive diplomacy: mediation, conciliation, negotiation; (b) preventive deployment: the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall probable conflict; (c) preventive disarmament: destroying old weapons and reducing small arms in conflict areas; and (d) structural prevention: political, institutional and developmental efforts at root causes.

Peacemaking

‘Peacemaking’ refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a pacific settlement of their dispute. It involves negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, good offices – applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict.

Peace Enforcement

‘Peace Enforcement’ signifies the use of force by a UN or UN partner against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities or maintain stability once hostilities have ended. On several occasions the Security Council has authorized member states to use ‘all necessary means’, including force, to achieve a stated objective (within the mission’s mandate contained in the Security Council resolution under Chapter VII) in situations where consent of the parties is not required.

Peace enforcement is often referred to as ‘robust peacekeeping’ but it is suggested here that, for the sake of clarity, the term ‘peacekeeping’ should be confined to missions with a Chapter VI (or ‘six-and-a-half’) mandate as described below.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is distinguished from peace enforcement in two fundamental ways: (i) the mission is dependent on the consent of the host member state; and (ii) the mission has a mandate to use force only in self-defense. Peacekeeping may be seen as of two types:

Traditional Peacekeeping – usually pertaining to interstate conflict:
- Conflict Prevention: deployment of troops to prevent the outbreak of conflict or spill-over of conflict across borders;
- Ceasefire Verification: stabilization of conflict situations after a ceasefire, creation of an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;

Modern Peacekeeping:
- Peace Implementation: assistance in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
- Governmental Transition: leading States or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.

and grievances that regenerate continuing tension, whether inter- or intra-state. For that reason peacebuilding and conflict prevention are operationally joined, completing the ‘cycle of peace’ (and, if the structures and techniques fail, the ‘cycle of violence’).

Peacebuilding

‘Peacebuilding’ refers to “post-hostility actions, military and civilian, taken to forestall future eruptions by strengthening structures capable of consolidating a political settlement”. This term pertains to assistance to countries and regions in the transition from war to peace. It includes:

- Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation
- Security Sector Reform
- Institution-building, including police and judicial systems
- Good governance and human rights promotion
- Election-monitoring and political participation
- Economic and social development

SELECTION OF ORGANIZATIONS

The organizations surveyed comprised those which have been invited for the High Level Meetings between the United Nations and Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations, and which have been working in the peace and security field.

Some 21 such partners were thus selected, of which 11 responded to the Questionnaire (identified with *).

- African Union (AU)
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
- Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
- Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) *
- Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC) *
- Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) *
- Council of Europe (COE) *
- Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- European Union⁶ (EU) *
- Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
- International Organization of Francophonie (IOF)
- League of Arab States (LAS) *
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) *
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) *
- Organization of American States (OAS) *
- Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) *
- Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) *
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
- Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Some other organizations involved in regional integration or cooperation activities of various kinds have a security mandate, but have not, to date, attended any High-Level Meeting. The project team identified thirteen such organizations.⁷ These have not been included in this Survey since they have not participated in the high-level meetings.

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⁶ The EU is comprised of the Presidency, the Council and the Commission, and all three entities are represented separately in the high level meetings. The Commission responded to the Questionnaire.

⁷ African–Caribbean–Pacific Group (ACP); Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council (BSECC)*; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Community of Democratic Choice (CDC); Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA); East African Community (EAC); Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa States (CEMAC); Georgia,
CLASSIFICATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

Central to the development of a formal partnership between the United Nations and regional and other intergovernmental organizations is the constitutional basis of the relationship. This section considers the founding documents of each UN partner in the Survey, to consider the nature of its identity in order that the potential comparative advantage of each partner within the overall partnership can be more clearly understood. Two questions arise in this respect:

• Whether a UN partner is an ‘agency’ or ‘arrangement’ as laid down in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter; and

• Whether the partner is ‘regional’ or ‘other inter-governmental’ as the terms are now employed by the United Nations in the High-Level Meetings.

Distinction between ‘Agencies’ and ‘Arrangements’

The accepted distinction between ‘agency’ and ‘arrangement’ concerns the degree of formality of the entity in question. A regional agency is a recognized organization with legal personality and an organizational structure (i.e. secretariat) located in a member country. A ‘regional arrangement’ is a grouping of States under a treaty for a specified common purpose without any organization to ‘personify’ that arrangement. In this second case, organizational functions are carried out by the member states themselves.9

The above distinction has to date carried limited significance in international diplomacy but it is likely to have legal significance in the future as the United Nations and its partners seek to formalize and strengthen the operational partnership for peace and security. The capacity of a UN partner to conclude formal agreements with the United Nations and otherwise to act as an independent entity in international law is a sine qua non of a strengthened operational partnership over the longer term.

Distinction between ‘Regional’ and ‘Other Intergovernmental’ Partners

The distinction between Chapter VIII and other chapters of the Charter has recently been brought into focus in the course of the review of UN practices and procedures undertaken over the past years:

• The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, of November 2004, stressed the need to make fuller and more productive use of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.10 It noted the distinction between ‘regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII’ and alliance organizations.11

• At the Sixth High-Level Meeting between the UN and regional and other Intergovernmental Organizations (2005), participants recognized that:

“interested regional and sub-regional organizations will pursue joint activities under the umbrella of high-level meetings under Chapter VIII of the Charter while other intergovernmental organizations will

Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUAM); Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR); Mano River Union (MRU); and Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS).

* The BSECC attended the 3rd UN Security Meeting with Regional Organizations (October 2005) but has not, to date, attended the high-level meetings.

8 The terms ‘agency’ and ‘organization’ are taken here to be synonymous.

9 This distinction between a ‘regional agency’ and a ‘regional arrangement’ is based on Simma B et al, eds. The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford; 1995); see especially p.694.

10 “The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more productive use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than has hitherto been the case.” A More Secure World: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 29 November 2004, para 270.

11 “In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually been considered regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter but have some similar characteristics) have undertaken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these operations are authorized by and accountable to the Security Council. In the case of NATO, there may also be a constructive role for it to play in assisting in the training and equipping of less well resourced regional organizations and States.” A More Secure World, para 273.
In view of these comments, it was judged appropriate to identify, for the purposes of the Survey, those organizations whose activities may be regarded as within the meaning of Chapter VIII and those other organizations that will engage in partnerships with UN under other provisions of the Charter. For the purpose of this Survey, ‘other intergovernmental organizations’ diverge from ‘Chapter VIII organizations’ in the sense that they either (a) have a mandate to operate outside their geographical area of jurisdiction, (b) have a collective defense mandate and are, therefore, geared to defuse extra-regional threats, or (c) their membership coverage clearly does not abide by regional geographical parameters.

### CLASSIFICATION OF PARTNERS

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#### Regional and Sub-regional (Chapter VIII)

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Table 1. Classification of Partners

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12 Conclusions of the Chairman of the Sixth High-Level Meeting Between the United Nations and Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations, A/60/341 and S/2005/567, Annex I, para. 7.

13 In the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (12 December 2005), ASEAN leaders recognized the importance of having ‘an appropriate institutional framework’ to confer legal personality, determine the functions and develop the areas of competence of ASEAN’s key bodies. The ASEAN Charter was finally signed on 20 November 2007 and will enter into force after ratification by the 10 member states. Then, ASEAN will become a regional ‘agency’.

14 PIF was established as an arrangement by the 1971 communiqué. At its 36th Leaders Meeting in October 2005, PIF adopted a formal Agreement establishing the Forum as an international organization. This will come into force when ratified by all 16 Forum members and at that stage the PIF will become a ‘regional agency’.
Although the Charter does not address the issue, it may be a natural inference to regard the activities of sub-regional organizations as also falling within the meaning of Chapter VIII. For the purpose of conceptual clarity, this study has applied consistent terminology in distinguishing regional, sub-regional, and ‘other intergovernmental’ organizations. The term ‘partners’ is used to refer to all organizations and arrangements (regional, sub-regional and other intergovernmental), which have a partner relationship with the United Nations, and have attended the high-level meetings.

As is evidenced from the responses to the Questionnaire, the nature of the various partners differs widely and thus their potential cooperation with the United Nations, in terms of comparative advantage and the ‘added value’ they bring to bear on the partnership, will differ. These differences are likely to become more apparent, and more productive and efficacious, over time as the partnership strengthens and becomes streamlined. Different partners will perform different functions in the overall fabric of peace and security – conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.

It needs to be noted, however, that there is no such clarity or consistency in the policy-making sphere of intergovernmental relationships, at the United Nations or elsewhere. The task ahead is to determine, on the basis of their respective mandates and capacities, which partners have the potential to cooperate most effectively with the United Nations in which areas, both geographically and functionally. None is excluded; each has a role to play.

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15 In the absence of any explicit guidance from the UN Charter, the whether such activities of sub-regional organizations might come within the meaning of Chapter VIII as of right or through delegation of a regional organization remains an open question. Legal guidance on this point could perhaps be sought from the UN’s Legal Counsel. There is, however, no clarity over any hierarchical relationship between regional and sub-regional organizations in terms of their relationship to the United Nations; and it would be beneficial to the strengthening of the ‘regional-global partnership’ if this were achieved. Work is underway through dialogue between the African Union and the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in streamlining the relationship between regional and sub-regional agencies.
PART II
THE ORGANIZATIONS
In 2000, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) transformed itself into the African Union (AU). The OAU, founded in 1963 on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, drew criticism throughout the 1990s for its lack of intervention as conflicts erupted in several African countries. Frustration at its ineptness led African leaders to launch the AU, an organization with a structure modeled on that of the European Union. Fifty-three countries in Africa are members of the AU. According to the Constitutive Act of the AU (signed in 2000) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (signed in 2002), the organs of the organization are:

- **The Assembly**, comprises the heads of state. It meets at least once a year and is the AU’s main decision-making body. Assembly members elect an AU chairperson, who holds office for one year. The current chairman is President John Kufuor of Ghana.

- **The Executive Council** is composed of foreign affairs ministers of individual states. The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly.

- **The Commission**, comprises ten commissioners holding individual portfolios who manage the day-to-day tasks of the AU and implement AU policies. The Commission reports to the Executive Council. In 2008 Jean Ping, former Foreign Minister of Gabon was elected as AU’s chairperson for a 4-year term. The Commission includes the Departments of Peace and Security, and the Department of Political Affairs.

- **The Peace and Security Council (PSC)**, set up in 2004, is a collective security and early-warning body mandated to respond to conflicts and crisis (preventive diplomacy, early warning, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian action). It has fifteen member states representing all five sub-regions of the AU (Central, North, East, South and West), elected for two or three year terms, with equal voting rights. The PSC should meet at least twice a month. There have been months, however, when it met much more often.

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16 Morocco is the only African country that does not belong to the AU.
17 DPS includes the following Divisions: Conflict Management Division (CMD), Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and the Defense and Security Division (DSD).
18 The decision-making process of the P&S Council is as follows: (1) Situation: conflict that requires attention; (2) Report: the Chairperson of the AU Commission produces a report on the situation. It receives inputs from several AU officials and from field staff; (3) Meeting of the PSC Committee of Experts: the Experts (1 representative per member state represented in the P&S Council + 2 members of the Commission) meet informally/formally up to 3 days
• The Pan-African Parliament was established in 2004 to “ensure the full participation of African peoples in governance, development, and economic integration of the Continent.” This body debates continent-wide issues and advises AU heads of state. It currently has advisory powers only, but there are plans to grant it legislative powers in the future. It is composed of 265 parliamentarians selected by the member state parliaments. The Pan-African Parliament is based in Midrand (Johannesburg).

• The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Established in 2005, ECOSOCC seeks to build partnerships between African governments and civil society. It will include African social groups, professional groups, NGOs, and cultural organizations. ECOSOCC currently has interim members serving two-year terms - it is expected to become fully operational in 2007-2008.

• The Court of Justice. In 2004, the AU agreed that the regional African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights would be merged with the Court of Justice. A draft protocol for the merger is presently under consideration. The Court is located in Arusha, Tanzania.

• The Financial Institutions. The AU charter names three bodies: the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank. Of these, only the African Investment Bank has been established, but it is not yet functional. It will be based in Tripoli, Libya.

Drawing from the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, also known as the Cairo Declaration (adopted by the OAU in 1993), the AU adopted, in 2002, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Besides the Peace and Security Council, the Protocol also established a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and a Peace Fund.

• The Panel of the Wise is composed of five highly respected African personalities, each representing one of the AU sub-regions, and plays a conflict prevention and peacemaking role. After the approval by the PSC in November of the “Modalities for the Function of the Panel”, it has been officially launched in December 2007.

• The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) consists of an observation and monitoring center (the Situation Room), responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an indicators module; before the P&S Council meeting scheduled to address the situation. Their role is to engage in constructive dialogue in order to produce a framework at the end. Conventionally, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt (even if not members of PSC) are contacted and their opinion is taken into consideration; (4) Meeting of PSC: final decision is taken (normally the framework is approved); (5) Publication.

19 According to an AU official the most salient shortcoming of the PSC is “the laziness of P&S Council members”. Generally, members come to the meetings without background preparation. They lack knowledge and sometimes true motivation. The embassies are poorly equipped with human resources and lack research capacity for P&S Council members to prepare themselves conveniently before the discussions.

20 The five members of the Panel, which includes Salim Ahmed Salim, Brigalia Bam, Ahmed Ben Bella, Elisabeth K. Pognon and Miguel Trovoada, have been appointed in January 2007 for a three-year period.

21 A workshop with the presence of several experts in mediation was also held in December 2007 in order to help the AU in framing the work of the Panel.

22 The Situation Room uses primarily open media sources and emphasizes potential, actual and post-conflict situations, elections, and humanitarian problems. In addition, it also uses data generated by AU’s 12 field missions, although the briefings are often hindered by communication problems. The Situation Room is funded by German GTZ, British DFID, Danish DANIDA, and USAid. The staff is 13 people (2 communication assistants and 11 analysts), who work on a 3-shift basis. It produces two types of reports on a daily basis: Daily News Highlights (compiled by open media sources and distributed to a large audience), and Daily Report (compiled using field mission data and distributed only internally). Periodically, it also issues Flash Reports whenever there is breaking news, Weekly Updates on Somalia and Sudan, and Compiled Reports on particular issues when requested by Commission staff. A roadmap has been produced for the development of the CEWS. However, the roadmap still needs to be costed and programmed to allow for monitoring and evaluation of its implementation.
and the monitoring centers of the African sub-regional organizations (ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD). However, the circulation of data between the AU and the sub-regional organizations is still non-existent due to lack of political motivation and funding constraints. The MoU between the AU and the sub-regional organizations (signed in January 2008), and the creation of liaison offices at the AU by the sub-regional organizations (operational since early 2008) will likely remove some of these obstacles. Despite these impediments, CEWS is not paralyzed and some progress, even if limited, has been attained. According to the AU Early-Warning Expert, Mr. Charles Mwaura, the harmonization of the different early-warning mechanism is not problematic. The only possible exception could be the integration of SADC’s data since it is based upon intelligence sources.

• The AU Standby Force (ASF) will be constituted by multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military capacity. It will be composed of five or six brigades of 3,000 to 5,000 troops stationed around Africa by 2010. At the 3rd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS), held in Addis Ababa in 2003, a ‘Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC)’ was adopted. The establishment of ASF, however, is lagging behind schedule. Most sub-regional organizations are setting up their brigades with no clear supervision from the AU, whereas others – namely the central and the northern brigades – are in a standstill.

• The Peace Fund provides financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. It funded, for instance, parts of AU’s peace efforts in Darfur.

Finally, in terms of organizational capacity, it is important to retain that, based on the recommendations of the 2001 report from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, the AU has recognized the right to intervene in internal conflicts, in case circumstances are grave “namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (Protocol, Article 4-j; Constitutive Act, article 4-h).

RESOURCE CAPACITY

In total the AU has presently a staff of approximately 700, of which roughly 30 work in peace and security related issues (in headquarters). The number of staff and the level of qualifications is visibly inadequate to deal effectively with the new work being generated by the wider mandate of the AU compared to the OAU and the demands of member states. AU’s expansion has outgrown the physical capacity of the headquarters to sustain it. To the initial complex founded in the 1960s, a new Congress Center was added in 2003 and, in 2009, a new 23-stories office building will be finalized (built by China at a cost of USD $150 million).

The budget of the AU for the year 2007 amounted to USD $133 million. A total amount of USD $96 million is to be contributed by member states on the basis of the approved scale of assessment; whereas USD $36 million is earmarked for specific programs secured from partners. Of the assessed contributions of member states, 75 percent of the budget is paid by Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa. The African Union finances are hampered by the importance of payment arrears. In 2007, AU finances experts estimated that a total of US$106.8 million in payments was still

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23 The AU seems to be making some progress both in terms of data collection (acquisition of software and hardware) and in terms of analysis (the ‘Strategy for Conflict Assessment Handbook’ has been drafted). The Conflict Management Division has also organized a meeting, in 2007, with civil society groups to assess what kind of input they could give to CEWS.

24 The Framework Document calls for the establishment of the ASF in two phases: in phase one (up to 30 June 2005), the objective was to establish a strategic level management capacity, whereas in phase two (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), it is envisaged that the AU would have the capacity to deploy and to manage complex peacekeeping operations.


26 The exact number seems to be unknown for all AU officials interviewed. These figures are estimative.
outstanding. Moreover, only seven member states were up to date with their payments while 21 member states were a year or more in arrears.

Major donors to the AU Commission include the European Union. The support of the EU to the AU is centered on the African Peace Facility\(^\text{27}\). It was agreed upon at the EU/ACP Council of Ministers (11 December 2003), and it allows EUR €250 million to be used in (a) support to African-led peace support operations, (b) capacity building of African peace and security architecture. According to EU guidelines, “each operation to be financed from the Peace Facility will have to be initiated by the AU and/or the sub-regional organizations (…). As a general rule, when a sub-regional organization takes an initiative, this initiative shall have the political approval of the AU.”\(^\text{28}\) The Peace Facility has been used to fund the AU missions in Sudan (AMIS I and AMIS II), AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC), the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community - CEMAC (FOMUC), staff recruitment and training in the REC’s, and for capacity building of the Peace and Security Department of the AU – namely the organization of ASF workshops, staff recruitment, and creation of liaison offices between the AU and REC’s (located in Addis Ababa and inaugurated in early 2008)\(^\text{29}\). Despite the budget initially earmarked, the Peace Facility ended up disbursing up to EUR €375 million until the end of 2007. Aware of the need to increase its financial commitment, the EU agreed in April 2006 to provide EUR €300 million under the 10\(^{th}\) European Development Fund so that the African Peace Facility can continue its activities for another three-year period (2008-2010).

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

**Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking**

The AU has been instrumental in conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts. In Sudan, it helped negotiate an initial ceasefire and hosted peace talks from 2004 onwards between the Sudanese government and representatives of Darfur's rebel groups in Abuja, Nigeria. The talks which proceeded with the support and close cooperation of international partners, including the United Nations, resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. In Togo, the AU reacted forcefully to the unlawful takeover of the Togolese presidency by Faure Gnassingbé following the death of his father, President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, in February 2005. Similarly, it intervened with peacemaking efforts following the military coup in Mauritania, in August 2005. In Sudan, in 2005-2006, the AU Special Envoy and Chief Mediator for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, Salim Ahmed Salim, has worked diligently (although not successfully) in bringing the parties together. In Côte d'Ivoire Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, in their capacities of AU Mediators, have carried out numerous initiatives to move forward the peace process. During 2005, the African Union was also instrumental in deterring tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. The AU even envisaged at one point sending peacekeepers to eastern-DRC. In Chad, in December 2005, shortly after the government declared a 'state of belligerency' with Sudan, the AU sent delegates to both nations and the AU’s chairman proposed a five-way, one-day summit grouping the leaders of Egypt, Libya, Chad, Sudan and Nigeria to solve the conflict. In 2007, AU mediators visited Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic to try to ease tensions created by the Darfur crisis. In 2008, the AU attempted to mediate between government and opposition parties in Kenya.

**Peacebuilding**

The Conflict Management Division (CMD) has adopted a *Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Program* and has produced a ‘Handbook on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development’, which

\(^{27}\) The legal basis for the Peace Facility derives from the Cotonou Agreement (Article 11).

\(^{28}\) Paragraph 7.2.2. of the Financing Proposal. AIDCO/12/04-EN (Rev.2), page 13.

\(^{29}\) The African peace support operations have received the bulk of the Peace Facility’s budget: AMIS, €305.6 million; FOMUC, €23.4 million; AMISOM, €15million; Comoros, €5million.
serves as the guidelines for the program’s application. According to CMD’s Expert in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building, Dr. Naison Ngoma, the Program was designed to be a flexible document that is adjustable to the environment of the country (or sub-region) where it is meant to be employed. The Program has received inputs from the sub-regional organizations. AU officials acknowledge that AU’s post-war reconstruction capacity is still not robust, but the new Handbook will aid the organization in being more pragmatic and more targeted.


Peacekeeping and Enforcement

- **Burundi** (April 2003 - May 2004) - the mandate was to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement (also known as Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi), signed in August 2000, in order to further consolidate the peace process in Burundi. In 2004, the UN took over the peacekeeping operations from the AU (ONUB).

- **Sudan/Darfur** (August 2004 - ) - it helped broker a cease-fire between the government of Sudan and rebel groups. It initially had fewer than one hundred observers in Darfur to monitor the agreement, but gradually increased its presence to include soldiers and police. By 2005, the AU had nearly 7,000 troops in Darfur. A more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for September 2006, but due to Sudanese government opposition, it was not implemented. AMIS' mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006 and 2007, while the situation in Darfur continued to escalate. On January 1st 2008, AMIS was finally replaced by the United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

- **Burundi** (January 2007 - ) – The mandate of the AU Special Task Force in Burundi is to facilitate the implementation of the Dar es Salaam peace agreement of June 2006, between the government and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL (commonly known as “FNL”) - the most extreme Hutu group, which had not taken part in the Arusha Agreement. The force is composed of the South African Battalion that served under the UN Mission in Burundi. It has been re-hatted under the AU mandate when the UN mandate came to an end on 31 December 2006.

- **Somalia** (March 2007 - ) – the objective is to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders. It includes assistance with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, and contribution to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The mission has a Chapter VII mandate. AMISOM is expected to comprise 8,000 troops but by January 2008 only a batch of 1,500 AU peacekeepers from Uganda and around 400 from Burundi have been deployed.

- **Comoros** (May 2007 - ) – the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) is composed of approximately 300 soldiers and police. The objective is to re-establish peace and security to the archipelago. The fighting was sparked when Mohamed Bacar, the leader of one of the islands (Anjouan) refused to stand down as the constitution demands if he wants to run again for president. The AU condemned the attacks on Anjouan “as well as acts of harassment that have been committed in the island.” In October 2007, the AU also decided to

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30 The original budget that the AU drew up for AMIB was USD $225 million, eventually reduced to USD $135 million for the first year.
impose individual sanctions on 168 leaders of Anjouan by freezing their foreign accounts and restricting their ability to travel. The AU’s first engagement in Comoros, in order to prevent the fragmentation of the Comoros federation, dates back to 1997-1999 when it was still the OAU. To date it has deployed 6 missions to stop electoral processes from mutating into political turmoil. According to Peace Support Operation Division’s officials interviewed (PSOD), all missions in Comoros have been deployed under the Cairo Declaration and not the AU Constitutive Act. They are not, therefore, peacekeeping operations but rather military observation missions.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The World Summit Outcome Document (2005), the report of the Secretary General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1631 entitled “A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Solutions” (2006), and the UN Security Council “Presidential Statement on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security” (28 March 2007) provide information about the interaction between the AU and the UN. The World Summit Outcome Document pledged to “support the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building with the AU” (italics added), in recognition that, of all regions worldwide, African is in the greatest need. The Plan constitutes the central element of UN-AU strategic partnership. The program, which nurses African’s native ambitions, will cover ongoing partnerships and a wide range of areas including conflict prevention, early warning and electoral assistance, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, governance, human rights, and the rule of law; disarmament, humanitarian response, economic, social, trade and development, human settlements, recovery and food security, education, culture and health.

Consultations to agree on a framework for enhancing the UN’s support to the AU under the aegis of the capacity building plan are ongoing. In 2006, a high level delegation of UN staff, composed of all relevant UN Department and agencies visited Addis Ababa, to discuss a strategic framework. In November 2006, the UN and the AU signed a Declaration on Enhancing AU-UN cooperation in the fields of peace and security. In June 2007 it was agreed to hold, at least once a year, joint meetings between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council either in Addis Ababa or New York.

Also of interest, actions were taken at the regional level to organize the activities of the agencies and programs of the UN system around 9 thematic clusters covering the priority areas of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The goal was to enhance the coordinated response of the UN system in support of NEPAD. This Regional Consultations Mechanism (RCMs) is a framework for consultations aiming to fast-track program implementation system-wide by the United Nations. Those meetings are convened by the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and held on an annual basis, at the headquarters of the Commission, in Addis Ababa. So far 8 regional consultations have been organized (last one in November 2007). Since 2006, one of the thematic clusters is dedicated to peace and security (sub-divided in peacebuilding, human rights/reconciliation, and peace and security architecture). UN-DPA has been designated to convene this cluster.

Moreover, a number of important multilateral initiatives have been launched in recent years, aimed at promoting peace and development in Africa. They include the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s, the UN System-wide Special Initiative on Africa, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, the United Nations Program of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1990s, and Commitment 7 of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development.

In the spirit of partnership, the UN has cooperated with the AU and its sub-regional organizations, which are playing an increasingly prominent role in the maintenance of peace and security, electoral

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31 Other participants include UNLO, UNHCR, ILO, OHCHR, FAO, IOM, DPKO, WFP, UNAIDS, and WHO.
assistance and the promotion of good governance in Africa. Four out of the seven current United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa are composed of “re-hatted” African troops originally deployed under the auspices of either ECOWAS or the African Union. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has carried out a number of activities aimed at assisting the AU Commission to develop its long-term institutional capacity to plan, deploy and manage complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations, including the establishment in Addis Ababa of a UN Assistance Cell in support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); and participated in AU consultations and workshops in connection with the operationalization of an African Standby Force (ASF). DPKO has been involved in peacekeeping training exercises for African troops and police at various African Centers of Excellence - the units responsible for the strategic and operational training of the sub-regional peacekeeping forces. It has also provided technical advice for the enhancement of the operations of the AU’s Situation Room. The UN has also established a small assistance cell at the headquarters of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Sudan, with the primary task of supporting AMIS.

Despite these important milestones, the AU and the UN still need to agree on a clear division of roles and responsibilities. There are pertinent questions on the degree of the collaboration between both organizations (e.g. the UN logistic assets that could be put at the disposal of the AU). Unsurprisingly, the AU Peace and Security Council issued on its 98th meeting (November 2007), a document entitled “Contribution of the AU to the Report to be Submitted by the UN Secretary-General in Pursuance of UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”. There, AU’s PSC contends that in order to develop a stronger and more structured relationship between the UN and the AU in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, there is a need to “support effectively the efforts made in the continent to operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as provided for by the PSC Protocol, and strengthen the institutional, logistical and operational capacity of the various components of the APSA”.

**SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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33 For an elaborated analysis see, for instance, IPA Meeting Note “The United Nations Contribution to African Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping” (April 2006).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967, in Jakarta, by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, as a regional arrangement with the objective of fostering economic cooperation, social progress, cultural development, and regional peace. The ASEAN’s predecessor was the Association of Southeast Asia – an alliance of three countries (the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia) created in 1961. In the 1980s and 1990s ASEAN grew both in mandate and membership, counting now 10 member states. In order to fulfill its objectives, ASEAN is organized according to the following structure:

- The Meeting of Heads of Government/States of member states – or ASEAN Summit, is the main decision-making body governing the organization. It is held every year.

- The Annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) of foreign ministers is responsible for the overall coordination of the organization’s activities.

- The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) coordinates economic cooperation. Foreign and Economy ministers also meet regularly through the Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM) before the ASEAN Summits.

- Numerous other ministerial groups also meet regularly. ASEAN has developed over the years a high number of sectoral ministerial meetings (28 in total at present) focused on coordinating regional cooperation and more recently, the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme 2004-2010 and the Blueprints for ASEAN Community Building.

- The Standing Committee, chaired by the foreign minister of the country holding the AMM, develops organizational policy and coordinates ASEAN’s activities.

- The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta provides advice, initiates actions, and implements cooperation activities. For the moment, the ASEAN Secretariat does not have any unit or department on peace and security. The mandate of the current Secretary General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (from Thailand), will last until 2012.

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34 ASEAN’s member states are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

35 The Vientiane Action Programme is a six-year plan (adopted on the 29th of November of 2004), put forward by the ASEAN leaders in order to establish the ASEAN Community, which is the end goal of the organization for 2015.
• As for peace and security-related structures, *ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* (TAC) (see below) envisages the constitution of a *High Council* at ministerial level for peaceful settlement of regional disputes (Article 15 of the TAC). This is an ad-hoc mechanism for conflict prevention and peacemaking, but no mechanism exists pertaining to peacekeeping or enforcement;

• The *ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting* (ADMM) is one of the above-mentioned ministerial meetings, which had its inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006. The ADMM was created by the *Working Group on Security Cooperation* of the Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (Special SOM) to complement regional efforts for the promotion of security dialogue and cooperation.

In the Kuala Lumpur *Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter* (12 December 2005), ASEAN leaders recognized the importance of having ‘an appropriate institutional framework’ – to confer legal personality, determine the functions, and develop areas of competence of ASEAN’s key bodies. The ASEAN Charter was eventually signed on 20 November 2007, establishing the group as a legal entity. The Charter creates a permanent representation for its members (at its Secretariat in Jakarta), and commits Heads of Government/State to meeting twice a year. The Charter will enter into force 30 days after ratification by the 10th member state. The ASEAN structures will be transformed and enlarged to include:

• *Coordination Council*, composed of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and mandated to assist ASEAN leaders in the preparation of Summits, with support from the Secretary General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat. It meets twice a year.

• *Community Councils* with relevant sectoral ministerial bodies (meeting twice a year), include the ASEAN Political and Security Council (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community Council (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council (ASCC).

• The Ministerial Meeting (AMM of Foreign Ministers) will be renamed as *ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting* and will be one of the four Sectoral Ministerial Bodies of the APSC Council.

• A *Committee of Permanent Representatives* to ASEAN will be established in Jakarta – comprised of one permanent representative from each ASEAN member state. Essentially the new Committee will take over many of the regional functions of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), including external relations and supervising the ASEAN Secretariat.

• An ASEAN *Human Rights Body* will be created as a new organ of ASEAN. The Terms of Reference are yet to be formulated.

• The *ASEAN Foundation*, which is located in Jakarta, will be accountable to the Secretary-General of ASEAN. It used to be directly supervised by the Board of Trustees, consisting mainly of ASEAN Ambassadors to Indonesia in Jakarta.

**Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

In a region where the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are of central importance, ASEAN has been successful in preventing intra-regional conflicts for the part forty years. Regarding its political objective of peace and stability, ASEAN’s Declaration speaks only of ‘respect for justice and the rule of law’ and ‘adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’. But security concerns and political cooperation were never far from the ASEAN founders’ intentions. By fostering unity and solidarity through international cooperation, the member states attempt to prevent, contain, and solve any intra-regional conflict.

The mandate of ASEAN in peace and security is stated in its founding Declaration (1967), where the maintenance peace and security is declared to be one of the objectives of the organization.
Furthermore, the Association has specified a set of norms to govern the conduct of relations among its members and has established procedures and institutions for conflict management and control in three major documents: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality – ZOPFAN (1971), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (1976).

The ZOPFAN commits all ASEAN members to “exert efforts to secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any manner of interference by outside powers”, and to “make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation”.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord I (1976) determines the enlargement of ASEAN political cooperation. It also adopted principles for regional stability and a program of action for political cooperation which included settling regional disputes “by peaceful means as soon as possible” and strengthening political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordination of positions and, where possible and desirable, taking common action.

The Treaty of Amity (1976) provides guiding principles for cooperation, stating that political and security dialogue should “promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience” (articles 2.d and 13-17). For the resolution of disputes through regional processes, the TAC envisages the creation of a High Council, comprising a representative at ministerial level from each of the ASEAN members. The High Council is to recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation and may offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council can recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of deterioration of the dispute or the situation. To this day, TAC remains the only indigenous regional diplomatic instrument providing a mechanism and processes, and a code of conduct for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The practice of this mandate is made mainly through good offices.

All decisions on peace and security issues are made at the intergovernmental level and on the basis of consensus, although this is not explicitly stated in the founding or following documents on peace and security issues.

ASEAN’s role as a security forum increased in the 1990s. In 1992, member states issued the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, which called for a peaceful resolution of disputes over the South China Sea territory claimed by several ASEAN members and by China. A 1995 Treaty (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone or SEANWFZ) declared the region a nuclear free zone and banned the possession, use or testing of nuclear weapons.

In more recent years, ASEAN has put forward new documents and forms of cooperation in this field: ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN or Bali Concord II (2003), the Action Plan for the ASEAN Community (2005) and the ASEAN Charter (2007).

Currently, ASEAN is preparing the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Blueprint, which will be adopted by its Leaders at the 14th ASEAN Summit at the end of 2008. The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint has already been adopted by ASEAN Leaders at its 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF was created in 1994 and presently comprises the ten ASEAN states, plus the ten ASEAN Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia.

and the United States), one ASEAN Observer (Papua New Guinea) as well as North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The ARF was created with a mandate to discuss political and security and is now the principal forum for security dialogue in Asia, complementing the various bilateral alliances and dialogues. The ARF is characterized by consensus decision-making and minimal institutionalization. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a three-stage, evolutionary approach to the ARF’s development, moving from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy and, in the long term, towards a conflict resolution capability.

Having a policy of minimal institutionalization, ARF’s only permanent body is the ARF Unit, which was established inside the ASEAN Secretariat (June 2004) with the objectives: (i) to support the enhanced role of the ARF Chair, including interaction with other regional and international organizations, defense officials dialogue and Track II organizations; (ii) to function as depository of ARF documents/papers; (iii) to manage database/registry; and (iv) to provide secretarial works and administrative support, including serving as ARF’s institutional memory.

Since it was created, ARF has focused on confidence building measures and has had modest gains in building a sense of strategic community. Presently, the preventive diplomacy tools accepted by ARF members include mandating the ARF Chair to coordinate, during the period between Ministerial meetings, ARF’s response to situations affecting the security of its members. Another instrument is the ARF Register of Experts and Eminent Persons, which provides a pool of expertise on regional security issues that may be drawn upon by the ARF Chair or individual ARF members. In July 2001 ARF adopted principles of preventive diplomacy in a three-stage process: (i) promotional/confidence building measures; (ii) development of preventive diplomacy; and (iii) elaboration of approaches to conflicts. A definition of preventive diplomacy was also accorded\(^\text{39}\). A non-official ‘Track II’ process led by non-governmental institutes complements its work.

The ARF preventive diplomacy role has been further enhanced by the establishment of the Friends of the ARF Chair mechanism at the 14th ARF in Manila in August 2007. The mechanism is an ad-hoc group to support the ARF Chair in terms of its good offices role and in facilitating discussions on issues of critical significance for regional peace and security.

The ARF remains the premier security forum in the region and its evolutionary process, which moves at “a pace comfortable to all”, considered too slow or passive by some authors but also as the reason for the increasing comfort level among its participants. Such enhanced comfort level has enabled the Forum’s participants to exchange views and discuss issues of common concern in a frank and open manner and thereby encouraging transparency and mutual understanding.

**ASEAN Concord II**

ASEAN Concord I was followed by *ASEAN Concord II or Bali Concord II* (signed in Bali in October 2003). BCII reaffirms the basic principles and policies underlying ASEAN’s approach to issues of regional security: peaceful settlement of disputes; renunciation of the use or threat of force to resolving differences; respect for the sovereignty of nations; and non-interference in internal affairs. It also reaffirms the other principles embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality: consensus-based decision-making; the comprehensive nature of security; a nuclear weapons-free Southeast Asia; the importance of the High Council of the TAC as a reflection of ASEAN’s commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Finally, BCII reiterates the primacy of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as

\(^{39}\) The accepted definition of preventive diplomacy was the following: “Consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties to help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between states that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability; to help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and to help minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts in the region”. It includes the following instruments: confidence building efforts; norms building; enhancing channels of communication; and the role of the ARF chair.
a venue for enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; and the role of ASEAN as ARF’s primary driving force.

Beyond the reaffirmation of these well-known ASEAN principles, policies and commitments, BCII charts the future direction of ASEAN security cooperation, namely the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 - with the new motto of “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”. The ASEAN Community will comprise three integrated pillars – ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action envisages the strengthening of regional cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding, including the establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, promoting technical cooperation with the UN and relevant regional organizations; and establishing a network among existing ASEAN member states’ peacekeeping centers to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability40.

ASEAN Charter

Finally, with the ASEAN Charter, peace and security are established together constituting a primary objective. A mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes is envisaged in chapter VII (‘Settlement of Disputes’). However, the Charter does not recognize the need to establish conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms at the regional level.

Military Cooperation and Peacekeeping

Since ASEAN’s foundation, numerous suggestions have been put forward to provide the regional grouping with a military-security role. Such ideas have included formal/informal commitments by its member states to assist each other in the event of armed aggression; ASEAN-wide military exercises; regular meetings of ASEAN defense and interior ministers; standardization of weapons; and the creation of an ASEAN defense industry. The ASEAN members have not only rejected the idea of a military pact but have also opposed any form of military-security cooperation, agreeing that bilateral arrangements undertaken outside the ASEAN framework were the most desirable form of military-security cooperation41. In this context, the organization also discussed an Indonesian proposal to create regional peacekeeping cooperation under its auspices. While some of its members suggest that this proposal is “too early”, individual ASEAN countries, including Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore have all contributed contingents to either the UN-authorized or the UN-led peace operation in East Timor.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The ASEAN Secretariat staff now consists of the Secretary General, two Deputies Secretary General (from Cambodia and Indonesia - Lao PDR and Myanmar are next in line to nominate theirs), 60 openly-recruited staff from 9 member states (none from Brunei Darussalam), and about 200 support staff (almost all are Indonesians)42. There is no specific staff allocated to conflict prevention, peacebuilding or peace and security in general. The ARF’s Unit, its only permanent structure, is placed under the Office of the Secretary-General.

For the financial year of 2007, the organizational core budget is USD $9 million. Currently, members’ contribution to the operating budget is equally distributed - about 0.005% of the total sum of members’ government revenues. In 2007 each member state contributed USD $905 thousand to the budget. In comparison, the EU budget is about 1 to 2% of total government revenues.

According to the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the ASEAN budget should be increased. This could be done gradually to reach 0.025% of total government revenues. Furthermore, some member states give ad-hoc contributions. In the 13th ASEAN Summit (20 November 2007), Singapore committed to contribute to the Secretariat to upgrade its information systems.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

ASEAN leaders have maintained their traditional respect for the principle of non-interference. Nevertheless, in practice, ASEAN adopts a more subtle approach that entails “actual interference” in each other’s affairs. For instance, ASEAN leaders adhere publicly to the vaunted “ASEAN way” of non-interference while privately - behind-the-scenes - quiet diplomacy take place to resolve issues causing tension between states. ASEAN’s activities in the field of peace and security have therefore been limited to good offices, official declarations and political statements on conflict situations, or confidence-building measures (such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone) with very little publicity made to the Association’s endeavors in this field.

Indeed, in its first 25 years of existence ASEAN concentrated primarily on economic issues, maintaining a strict ‘hands-off’ policy vis-à-vis its own ‘membership area’ (secessionist movements in Philippines and Indonesia) and left the mediation efforts over the Indonesian province of Aceh to a Finnish-based non-governmental organization and over the Mindanao secession in Philippines to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The other major conflict issue, East-Timor, was left to the UN.

In the post Cold War this policy went through significant, yet cautious, changes and ASEAN has gradually developed a regional security policy, tested in its policy towards Myanmar. Some examples are the diplomatic initiative for the political settlement of the Cambodian conflict; the observer Mission to the Cambodian elections; and a policy of cooperation in seeking the settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea (Manila Declaration of 1992).

One of the most important chapters in the history of ASEAN’s diplomacy took place in the 1980s and 1990s during the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN sponsored resolutions at the UN General Assembly with constant support from the international community and maintained a dialogue with all parties of the conflict. This eventually led to the Jakarta Informal Meetings at which the four Cambodian factions discussed peace and national reconciliation. The process extended to the early 1990s culminating in the 19-nation Paris Conference on Cambodia (chaired by France and Indonesia), which produced the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, leading to the holding of elections supervised by the UN, to which the ASEAN sent an observation mission.

ASEAN has consistently pursued a policy of cooperation in seeking peaceful settlement of disputes in the common territorial disputes faced by Southeast Asia member states. With reference to the South China Sea dispute, ASEAN recognized that the escalation of the conflict could directly affect peace and stability in the region, and therefore issued a declaration on this matter urging all parties to solve all disputes peacefully, without resort to force. The Manila Declaration of 1992 proposed a modus vivendi in the South China Sea, and ASEAN and China are currently working on a Code of Conduct to govern state behavior in the disputed territories. Furthermore, ASEAN has made an additional Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in the 8th ASEAN Summit (4 November 2002) reaffirming member states’ commitment to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means.

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44 See www.aseansec.org/13163.htm
In the case of self-determination of East Timor, ASEAN made several official declarations and political statements supporting the implementation of the agreements between the United Nations and the Indonesian and Portuguese governments on modalities for the popular consultations of the East Timorese (held in August 1999). As violence shook the territory following the referendum, ASEAN leaders gathered to address the problem and some of them agreed to contribute to an International Force for East Timor. Other ASEAN members extended humanitarian and other forms of assistance. ASEAN has also called on the international community to help East Timor achieve peace, stability and prosperity during its transition to full independence, which would contribute to the stability of the region.

ASEAN has also shown interest in its membership’s neighborhood, whose stability naturally influences its own. The participation of North Korea in the ARF for the first time in 2000 was an important step in this direction. ASEAN expressed support for the historic summit between North and South Korea leaders, held in Pyongyang on 13-15 June 2000. It also commended the North-South Joint Declaration, the first agreement signed at the highest level since the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945.

Respect to the principle of non-interference seems to be the main explanation for the lack of overt intervention by the ASEAN in Myanmar (a member of ASEAN since 1997). ASEAN’s policy on Myanmar was first derived from the policy of “constructive engagement” initiated in 1991 by the Thai government and later regionalized as an ASEAN policy. However, talks on Myanmar’s possible expulsion of ASEAN have been common since the Junta’s detention of democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi at the end of May 2003. The threat of expulsion from ASEAN is in any case unlikely, as the decision-making rule for the Association is based on consensus.

During the 13th ASEAN Summit (2007), the ASEAN Chairman produced a Statement on Myanmar wherein member states accepted that this is an internal affair of Myanmar not to be dealt with by ASEAN but directly between Myanmar and the UN. ASEAN continues to urge the Myanmar Government to continue working with the UN (in its ‘good offices’ Mission led by Prof. Ibrahim Gambari) towards the peaceful transition to democracy. Furthermore, ASEAN emphasizes that this issue should not obstruct ASEAN’s integration efforts, especially the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

ASEAN has a long-lasting relationship with the UN, namely through its Development Program (UNDP), which was designated ASEAN Dialogue Partner already in 1977. This cooperation is mainly in the economic field - UNDP has assisted ASEAN in its economic cooperation initiatives since the inception of the partnership. More recently it supported ASEAN’s goal of realizing the ASEAN Community. More specifically in the field of peace and security, ASEAN and the UN have held an annual conference on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding since 2001. This conference is jointly organized by UN-DPA, UNDP, the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), ASEAN Secretariat, and the host country of ASEAN. This conference continues to serve as a non-official venue for exchanging views, information, and experiences in anticipating and mediating conflicts.

Furthermore, ASEAN has participated in the High-level Meetings Between the UN and Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since 1996 and in the UN Security-Council meetings with the regional organizations since 2003. ASEAN has not been present in the past two HLMs

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46 Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has indicated her country’s Congress might not ratify the ASEAN Charter since the document had been watered down from the original draft so that Myanmar could accept it. See Bunn Nagara, “ASEAN Charter Reflect’s Grouping’s chequered History”, The Start Online, January 23, 2008.
(2005 and 2006) without giving particular justifications for its absence. At the same time ASEAN and the UN have been holding bilateral High-Level meetings – the first one held in Bangkok in February 2000 and the second one held in New York in September 2005. The last bilateral high-level meeting focused on issues of development and poverty eradication, health, disaster management, trade and investment as well as peace and security. One can speculate that this shift from the multilateral to the bilateral forum of dialogue might be due to ASEAN’s willingness to maintain a bilateral and general cooperation with the UN, without focusing too much on security issues. ASEAN has also signed a MoU with the UN (27 September 2007), encompassing the full range of cooperation (political, economic and social-cultural areas) between the two organizations, including in the implementation of programs for the maintenance of regional and international peace and security.

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47 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations (UN) on ASEAN-UN Cooperation, New York, 27 September 2007, available at www.aseansec.org/4984.htm
In 1972, at the Seventh Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), Caribbean leaders decided to transform CARIFTA into a Common Market and establish the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which is today composed of 15 member states—Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago.

Moreover, CARICOM has organized itself into a state-like government structure composed of executive, legislative, and judiciary bodies:

- The Executive comprises a rotating Prime Ministerial Chairmanship, the CARICOM Secretary-General, and the CARICOM Headquarters Secretariat. The current Secretary General is Edwin Wilberforce Carrington (from Trinidad and Tobago), who was appointed in 1992, for a mandate of 5 years, and who has been continuously reappointed by the Conference of Heads of Government. There is also a quasi Cabinet of individual Heads of Government who are given responsibility over specific portfolios. The principal administrative organ is the Secretariat, directed by the Secretary General, (who acts as the administrator or the Chief Executive Officer of the Caribbean Community) – and including directorates of Foreign and Community Relations, Human and Social Development; Regional Trade and Economic Integration.

- The legislative bodies are the Conference of Heads of Government, the highest authority, responsible for setting the Community policy, overseeing the CARICOM Supreme Court and also directing other organs, institutions and the Secretariat. The Common Market Council of Ministers, is the second highest authority, responsible for developing operational plans and setting priorities, mobilizing and allocating resources, and monitoring project implementation. These legislative structures are supported by a number of organs (the Council for Finance and Planning, the Council for Trade and Economic Development, the Council for Foreign and Community Relations, and the Council for Human and Social Development) and bodies (Legal Affairs Committee, Budget Committee, Committee of Central Bank Governors).
• The Judiciary is the Caribbean Court of Justice, acting as the original jurisdiction for settlement of disputes on the functioning of the Caribbean (CARICOM) Single Market and Economy. It is based in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.

• The Regional Task Force on Crime and Security is the organ mostly associated to security issues. It is tasked to tackle non-traditional threats, including political, economic, social, health and environmental. It promotes multilateral activities for international security; capacity-building through institutional strengthening and shared surveillance; and other forms of cooperation both among member states, and between CARICOM, the wider Caribbean, and the international community.

CARICOM is structured similarly to other regional organizations such as the African Union or the Organization of American States, and like them uses mediation as its main instrument for conflict prevention and settlement of disputes. The use of the Court of Justice – a step further to formalize mechanisms similar to the international legal processes for managing conflicts – is however used almost solely for trade issues. CARICOM’s mediators are invariably the organization’s senior officials or heads of Government of its member states, who have not received formal training in this function. Some authors put forward recommendations for the development of CARICOM’s mediation capacities, as this is, as mentioned, its main instrument to deal with member states’ instability and conflicts in the region.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The staff of CARICOM is quite limited for the integrative nature of the organization, involving deeply integrative processes in the agricultural, economic and trade fields (Single Market and Economy, Common Passport, Visa and Single Domestic Space). It has approximately 180 staff members (only available numbers are from 2002).

The yearly budget for the small Secretariat and programs is approved by the Community Council of Ministers and met from government contributions and external support from development banks and bilateral donors. The last available budget found is for the year of 2002 and is of approximately USD $10 million. As above-mentioned in relation to the staff of the organization, its budget is clearly very limited for the nature and competences of the Caribbean Community. There is no budget formally devoted to conflict prevention and resolution.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

In the area of peace and security, CARICOM actions have been ad-hoc and case-related, mostly through preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, confidence building, and good offices.

Haiti was accepted as a CARICOM provisional member in 1998 (full membership in 2002). Since then, CARICOM has taken important efforts to help the country find a pacific settlement to its internal instability. In 2000, CARICOM sent fact-finding and electoral observation missions to the country, with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency. In 2001, CARICOM undertook a joint conciliation and negotiation mission with the OAS in order to further attempts at a resolution of the political instability. Subsequently the organization adopted a resolution in support of strengthening democracy in Haiti. In 2004, following reports of a deteriorating political situation in Haiti, a fact-finding mission was sent to the country, followed by a ministerial mission for mediation, negotiation and sustained dialogue between all parties. Later in 2006, CARICOM also sent an election observation mission. After the elections, CARICOM’s efforts were focused on reconstruction, peacebuilding and development efforts for the full integration of Haiti in CARICOM.
Furthermore, CARICOM was involved in Guyana’s explosive racial conflict (following the December 1997 general elections). It sent electoral observation, fact-finding, and several Chairman’s reconciliation missions to the country in 1998 followed by efforts for the support of constitutional reforms in Guyana. Since then, CARICOM has sent electoral observation missions to the country (2001 and 2006).

Finally, in 2001, CARICOM played a mediation role, together with the OAS, in the territorial controversy between Venezuela and Guyana (Venezuela claimed parts of Guyana’s territory), encouraging dialogue between the two countries for a peaceful resolution of the controversy and supporting the Good Officer Process of the UN Secretary General for political reconciliation.

Although not a security organization by nature, the authors Knight and Persaud consider that CARICOM’s involvement attests for the potential for a regional security structure, and in some circumstances, for regional multilateral intervention under the broader principles and institutional authority of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.


COOPERATION WITH THE UN

The CARICOM was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly in 1991 (A/Res/46/8, 16 October). The organization has also signed a general Cooperation Agreement with the UN Secretariat in 1997. This is a general cooperation agreement between the secretariats of the organizations, enhancing information sharing and consultations, as well as CARICOM’s invitations to UN meetings where observers are allowed. CARICOM has been cooperating closer with the UN on sustainable development, focused namely on the Caribbean Sea, but also in the fields of health (HIV/AIDS), disaster relief, and political and humanitarian affairs.

In the field of security, there was some cooperation at the operational level in Haiti (the election observation, fact finding and reconciliation missions above mentioned were undertaken in cooperation with UN’s missions to Haiti), Guyana and Venezuela (as described above).

CARICOM has been a participant in the High-Level Meetings since 1996, but has not been invited to the UN Security Council Meetings. Since 1991, the UN General Assembly adopts biannual resolutions for the strengthening of the cooperation between the two organizations.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the 15th May 1992. The Treaty, originally conceived as a military component of the CIS, came into force in 1994. After the dissolution of the USSR, the leaders of the Newly Independent States (NIS) had to solve the problem concerning the future of the Soviet nuclear and conventional arsenal, which was scattered around the former USSR territory. The intention of the Russian Federation was to put the former Soviet army under a joint CIS command, but the leaders of the NIS were interested in establishing their own armed forces. Moreover, by then the civil war in Tajikistan had begun and the situation was worsening. The leaders of the former Soviet Republics recognized the need to consolidate their positions and prevent spillover of the Tajik crisis into the region.

In reaction to this development, the Collective Security Treaty was concluded. The signatories confirmed their commitments to refrain from the threat or use of force in inter-state relations and agreed to settle all differences by peaceful means. The collective security orientation is stressed in Article 4 of the Treaty: “if an aggression is committed against one of the State Parties by any state or group of states, it will be considered as an aggression against all the State Parties to this Treaty.” The Treaty established the Council of Collective Security to coordinate the defense policies of its signatories.

The CST, set-up to last for a 5-year period, was first signed by nine CIS member states on the assumption that all CIS countries would join. This ambition was not fulfilled – not all the CIS members signed the Treaty, and three of the initial signatories (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan) actually withdrew from the Treaty in 1999 when the renewing protocol was signed by the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

In 2002, the member states of the CST decided to transform the treaty into an international regional organization. In Chisinau, Moldova, they signed the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, granting legal status to the new entity, with effect in 18 October 2003. The organization was declared to be the response of the member states to the new threats to regional and international security in

51 The member states of the CSTO are: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan.
52 In fact, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine formed GUAM in 1997 - a political, economic, and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these former Soviet Union Republics. The creation of the Organization is often seen as an attempt to form a counterweight to Russian influence in the region, although the member states refuse these claims.
21st century, acting in strict accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter. The member states also reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and purposes of the CST. The stated aims of the organization are to ensure the collective defense of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of the member states, and to develop and intensify military and political cooperation. In this sense, CSTO member states committed themselves to provide immediate military assistance to one another in the event of an attack, but also to strengthen cooperation in their foreign policy, military, and technology fields. Furthermore, CSTO members pledged to cooperate on transnational security challenges, such as drug trafficking, trans-border criminality, terrorism and extremism.

Since its creation CSTO profiles itself as an international regional organization whose objectives fall not only into the military-political sphere but also cover ‘soft security.’ The main ambition of the representatives of the organization is to create a system of collective security that protects its seven member states from external military aggression as well as any other threats and challenges. The internal structure of the CSTO is as follows:

- The highest decision making body of the CSTO is the Collective Security Council, consisting of the Heads of the member states chaired by the Head of the State where the Council is taking place. The Council decides on the CSTO actions and ensures coordination and joint actions between member states.

- Other decision making bodies of the CSTO are the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers of Defense and the Committee of Secretaries of the Security Council. The decisions of all CSTO bodies are taken by consensus.

Besides its legislative bodies, the CSTO has three permanent executive bodies:

- The Permanent Committee - takes decisions between the Council sessions, it is comprised of permanent representatives of member states.

- The Joint Staff - responsible for operational command and monitoring of the Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment (CFRD) and for developing suggestions on strengthening the military components of cooperation. It is the working body of the Council of Ministers of Defense, with 55 officers.

- The Secretariat of the Organization (set up in 2003), headquartered in Moscow, is led by a Secretary General, who is appointed for a three year period (renewable). Its main task is to coordinate the cooperation of member states in the field of political and military relations and cooperation in countering the threats and challenges faced by the organization. The Secretariat undertakes organizational, information-sharing, and consultative assignments and is also responsible for budget coordination. Nikolai Bordyuzha (Russian) was appointed as the first Secretary-General of the CSTO in April 2003.

In May 2001, the Council of Heads of States took the decision to create the so-called Forces of Rapid Response (FRR). These were to be deployed in the case of environmental or technological emergencies. After the formal creation of CSTO in 2002, the issue was discussed again. CSTO representatives, taking into account the existence of a similar mechanism operating within the CIS framework, adopted the decision to create a coordinative CSTO body dealing with these matters in order not to duplicate the work of CIS.

In May 2000, the CSTO divided its territory into three distinct security regions: 1) European/Eastern European, 2) Caucasus, and 3) Central Asia; establishing three military groupings for these regions. The European military grouping comprises armed forces from Belarus and Russia, whereas the Caucasus grouping comprises armed forces from Russia and Armenia. For the Central Asia

53 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
grouping, in August 2001, the Collective Security Council created the Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment (CFRD).

**Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment**

The Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment have been created to provide military security to the member states located in the Central Asia security region in cases of external aggression. These forces are also participating in joint anti-terrorist operations. Presently CFRD consists of 10 battalions (troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) with a total military force of around 4,000 soldiers. All the battalions comprising the CFRD are stationed in the territory of their national states and under national command. The only exception is Russia’s elite 201st Motorized Rifle Division, stationed in Tajikistan. Additionally, the Russian air base situated in Kant, Kyrgyzstan has become part of the CFRD since April 2003, with around 150 military and civilian personnel, and planning to grow up to 500 permanently stationed personnel.

In its June 2004 Summit, the Collective Security Council set the direction of the organization for the next six years by adopting a series of documents: the *Plan for Construction of CSTO’s Military Coalition Forces* until 2010, the *Plan for CSTO Military Coalition Building* and the *Concept for Developing a Unified Military System*. According to these documents, the next task for the Organization will be to integrate the military forces of the participating countries and to create permanent peacekeeping forces, ready to deploy at any moment. This is one step further from the creation of military groupings for each of CSTO’s security regions. The collective peacekeeping forces will be created in order to prevent and settle conflicts which may emerge anywhere within the territory of member states or beyond their borders. The leaders also agreed on the need to establish a joint air defense system, to improve communication, increased intelligence gathering capabilities and intelligence sharing.

In the last summit meeting of the CSTO in Dushanbe (October 2007) member states decided to move forward with the creation of the organization’s peacekeeping forces and adopted the *Agreement on Peacekeeping Operations* and the *Statute on the Collective Peacekeeping Forces* – both to be implemented following ratification by all member states. According to the provisions of the Statute and other working documents, each member state should create permanent military, police, and other contingents in order to create the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF)54. Every contingent shall be stationed at its member state territory and participate in collective programs and regular military drills. According to the CSTO’s Secretariat, the peacekeeping forces are special bodies tasked to counter drug-trafficking and illegal migration. Steps will also be taken to create coordinating high-level mechanisms on countering terrorism and other contemporary threats. The Statute on the Collective Peacekeeping Forces does not provide any rigorous demarcation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement which might indicate that the CSTO is able to carry out both types of operation.

The decision to whether deploy any CSTO peacekeeping operation will be adopted by the Council upon the request of a member state to carry out the peacekeeping operation in its territory. The UN Security Council will be informed immediately after the decision is adopted. All the contingents sent to create the CPF will, in the period of conducting the operation, serve under a united command, while every member state will be responsible for armament and other military equipment of its national contingent. The operations will be financed by the member states on the basis of shared financing according to national budget resources. In case of peacekeeping operations outside the CSTO’s borders, the operations will be conducted under the UN Security Council’s, or other empowered international body’s, mandate.

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54 All CSTO member states have created their national peacekeeping contingents.
RESOURCE CAPACITY

According to Chapter IX of the CSTO Charter, the CSTO Secretariat shall be financed from the budget of the organization, through assessed contributions from member states approved by the Council. The direct expenses of the CSTO Secretariat, covering its day-to-day household expenditures and the staff wages were in 2007 around USD $3.5 million. The activities of the CSTO Joint Staff and major expenses for such operations as “Canal”, “Boundary” and others are covered separately by CSTO member states.

Presently, 48 personnel are working for the CSTO Secretariat, of which 14 officials are employed in the units dealing with conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The CSTO has organized several military drills as well as different kinds of trainings and conferences for the military officers. The first drill was the South Anti-terror 2002 – a series of operational tactical exercises, taking place in Kyrgyzstan. Since 2001 military drills including the CRDF are taking part on different member states’ territories, under the name of Rabez (‘Boundary’). The last exercise took place in April 2007 in Tajikistan.

In order to respond to the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in areas bordering CSTO member states territories which are threatened by drug trafficking and misused by the extremist organizations, a Working Group was set up within the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 2006. The main tasks of the Afghan Working Group are: i) to monitor the development of the situation in Afghanistan, ii) to ensure opinion exchange with the Afghan side and iii) to promote cooperation on a wide range of security issues, economic projects, and countering the threat posed by drugs trafficking. In order to prevent drugs trafficking, CSTO undertakes a yearly operation called Canal, since 2003, based on cooperation between member states’ law-enforcement agencies. In the field of countering illegal migration from third countries several operations have been conducted, the last one in June 2007 under the name Illegal CSTO-2007 which was carried out simultaneously in all member states.

COOPERATION WITH THE UN

The CSTO’s commitment to the UN Charter is stressed in the introduction of its founding Charter, according to which the Organization acts “in strict accordance with the obligations (of member states) under the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of the United Nations Security Council.” The Organization was registered as a regional international organization according to the UN Charter on 19 September 2003 and gained observer status to UN General Assembly on 12 December 2004.

The CSTO has been a participant in the High-level Meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since 2003 and took part in the UN Security Council Meeting with the Regional Organizations in September 2006.

One of the CSTO’s main stated goals for the near future is to promote cooperation with the UN structures, above all with its Counter-Terrorism Committee. Furthermore, in 2006, the Secretary General of the CSTO signed a Protocol on cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), according to which the organizations will develop joint projects against drugs and crime and share information about their objectives.

In October 2007 the CSTO signed a MoU with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which calls for cooperation in the areas of regional and international security and stability, counteraction against terrorism, fight against drug and arms trafficking and counteraction against transnational organized
crime. The MoU stresses the importance of consultation and information sharing between two organizations as well as their interest in the realization of joint programs and activities.

The Secretary General of the CSTO participates regularly in the OSCE Ministerial Council. Lately, he expressed the interest of CSTO member states to cooperate with the OSCE in specific areas, such as fighting drug trafficking from Afghanistan, antiterrorist activities, or in the field of conflict prevention.

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The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991, when the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed the Agreement Establishing the CIS (aka Minsk Agreement), which assured cooperation between its member states after the dissolution of the USSR. Soon after, on 21 December 1991 eleven former Soviet Republics signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, which confirmed the formation of CIS and the formal dissolution of the USSR. These two documents lay down the basic principles and stipulate the areas of cooperation of the CIS. The Commonwealth has 11 member states.56

The CIS Charter (adopted by the Council of Heads of State on 22 January 1993), expounds the main objectives of the Organization: “cooperation between member states in political, economic, environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other spheres; cooperation in assuring human rights and fundamental liberties; maintenance of international peace and security and peaceful resolution of disputes between the member states of the Commonwealth” (art. 2). The relations between the member states are based on the principles of “respect for the sovereignty of member states, territorial integrity, inviolability of state borders, and resolution of disputes by peaceful means in such a way that international peace, security and fairness are not threatened” (art. 3).

Section III of the Charter (‘Collective Security and Military-political Cooperation’), determines as CIS priorities the prevention, localization, and settlement of conflicts arising in the territory of the organization. Further on, the Charter stipulates that in the eventuality of a threat to the security, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a member state; or in the eventuality of a threat to international peace and security, the organization immediately initiates a mechanism of joint consultation to coordinate positions and further action (art. 12). Section IV (‘Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts’), calls on member states to “undertake all possible measures for the prevention of conflicts, and to try to achieve a fair and peaceful resolution to disputes through negotiations, or reach agreement on an appropriate alternative solution” (art. 16-17).

The CIS has two different groups of operational bodies: the so-called constitutional bodies (created according to the provisions of the Charter) and the bodies of cooperation (created according to the developing fields of cooperation).

55 The three Baltic States have not signed the Declaration.
56 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Constitutional Bodies:

- The supreme body of the CIS is the **Council of Heads of State**. The Council discusses and decides fundamental questions connected with the activities of member states in the sphere of their common interests. It is the highest decision-making body concerning usage of military force and the issues of collective security, military, and political cooperation of member states. It can also offer assistance in terms of conflict resolution to conflicting parties. The Council decides on the basis of consensus. The meetings take place twice a year.

- The **Council of Heads of Government** meets four times a year, and coordinates the economic and social cooperation of member states.

- The **Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs** is the executive body that ensures cooperation in the foreign policy field. In-between meetings of the highest bodies, (Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government) it is the highest decision-making body. The Council is responsible for foreign policy cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes among member states and peace and security in the territory of the CIS. It pays special attention to the CIS’s peacekeeping activities.

- The **Council of Ministers of Defense** was established in February 1992. The meetings of the Council are held at least every four months and whenever else it is considered necessary. The main task of the Council is to coordinate military cooperation (including legal harmonization in the field of development of armed forces and conflict prevention). The Council has several executive bodies working on a permanent or temporary basis.

- The other institutional bodies include the **Council of Commanders-in-chief of Border Troops**, the **Economic Court**, the **Commission on Human Rights**, and the **Inter-parliamentary Assembly**.

Bodies of Sectoral Cooperation:

- Approximately 70 bodies of sectoral cooperation have been established within the Commonwealth framework. Their main goal is to further promote multilateral cooperation between the member states (in the fields of economy, science, humanitarian affairs and development of armed forces), and to coordinate the rules and principles of this cooperation. These ‘intergovernmental councils’, as they are called within the CIS framework, coordinate cooperation in the field of economy, science, ecology, transport, industry, agriculture, education, energy, trade and finances.

- The **Executive Committee** is the executive, administrative, and coordinating body of the CIS – it is its only permanent structure. Jointly with the member states and the other bodies of the Commonwealth, the Executive Committee develops proposals and draft documents aimed at broadening cooperation in the political, economic, social and other spheres. The Chairman of the Committee is the Executive Secretary of the CIS elected for three years. Sergey N. Lebedev (from Russia) is the CIS Chairman since 5 October 2007.

Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping Mechanisms

The conflict prevention mechanism of the CIS is governed by Section IV of the Charter and by the **Concept of Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the Territory of Member States of the CIS** (adopted on 19

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57 Representatives of three CIS member states, namely Moldova, Ukraine and Turkmenistan are participating at Council sessions only as observers. In January 2006 Georgia announced withdrawal of its participation in CIS sessions. (source: CIS official web page in Russian)

58 Some of the bodies of sectoral cooperation include: Joint Staff of Military Policy Coordination; Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of Defense; Intergovernmental Statistical Committee; Anti-terrorism Center; Office for the Coordination of the Fight Against organized crime and other dangerous types of crime in CIS Member States’ territory; Temporary Operational Working Group to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia; CIS Commission for the peaceful usage of atomic energy.
January, 1996). The Concept provides the framework for conflict prevention and resolution, but also for post-conflict peacebuilding and the interaction with the UN and the OSCE in these fields.

According to the Concept, the preferable means for resolving disputes and preventing conflicts is the use of preventive political and diplomatic efforts. In this sense, the Concept names preventive diplomacy measures (good offices, mediation, negotiations between parties) and confidence-building measures (agreement on non-use of force or threat of force, the exchange of information on issues of concern, mediation missions or observers from either neutral parties or the conflicting parties themselves), which may be applied. In certain cases the Concept envisages the possibility of preventive deployment of police, civilian, and military personnel in the region of possible confrontation.

Settlement of conflicts is interpreted as a set of methods of political, social, legal, economic or military nature used with the aim to resolve conflicts. The basic task is to keep the peace after the conflicting parties have reached a cease-fire agreement through the establishment of a peacekeeping operation (the features of a peacekeeping operation are listed at the end of this section). The Concept envisages the possibility to carry out enforcement actions, but only with a mandate from the UN Security Council. However, none of the adopted documents provide any legal or political criteria to differentiate between peacekeeping operations and enforcement action (similarly to the CSTO).

Similarly to UN doctrine, CIS approaches post-conflict peacebuilding as a methodology that encompasses measures of political, social, economic and legal nature, which are taken after the settlement of a military conflict (e.g. restoration of the state authority institutions, return of refugees and displaced persons, humanitarian assistance).

The peacekeeping mechanism of the CIS is based on the following documents, adopted by the Council of Heads of State in the early 1990s:

• Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping forces of the CIS member states (aka Kyiv Agreement) (20 March 1992);
• Protocol on the Temporary Procedure for the Formation and Use of Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Zones of Conflict between or within member-states of the CIS (16 August 1992);

According to the above-mentioned documents, the CIS’ peacekeeping operations conducted by peacekeeping groups composed of Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces are to be deployed through the following steps:

i) The decision to deploy the peacekeeping operation is made by the Council of Heads of State by consensus. This decision is preceded by the appropriate request of the parties to the conflict for the deployment of peacekeeping forces and by a cease-fire agreement reached between the conflicting parties. Furthermore, the conflicting parties have to commit to respecting the international status, neutrality, privileges and immunities of the peacekeeping personnel;
ii) The Council of Heads of State immediately informs the UN Security Council and the Secretary General of the OSCE about the decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation;
iii) CIS Peacekeeping Forces are created by member states, except for conflicting parties, on a voluntary basis as temporary coalitional formations established for the period of conducting the peacekeeping operation. The Groups are entrusted to carry out the following tasks: separation of conflicting parties; monitoring of cease-fire and armistice agreements; and supervision of agreements on disarmament and humanitarian assistance. The Peacekeeping Forces cannot be used to participate in military actions. All the forces participating on a peacekeeping operation shall be subordinate to the United Headquarters;
iv) In accordance with the decision of the UN the activity of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces may go beyond the CIS area.
RESOURCE CAPACITY

The CIS activities are financed through member state’s contributions (Russia is the highest contributor). The general budget of the organization is adopted by the Council of Heads of State of the CIS. The latest available information on the CIS's budget is from 2001, according to which the budget was approximately USD $8.54 million.59

The Executive Committee has a staff of about 220 employees. This includes approximately 120 people attached to the Executive Committee in Minsk, and roughly 100 staff working at an affiliated branch of the Executive Committee, located in Moscow.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Peacekeeping operations

Since its creation the CIS has carried out four peacekeeping operations in the territories of the former USSR. All operations were deployed after the conflicting parties had signed a cease-fire agreement. All the conflicts have the character of inter-group power-struggles in the newly independent states. Some of the conflicts were worsened by the intervention of the former Soviet army troops that were still deployed in the territories of these states, which found themselves without any national command. In fact only one of these operations (Tajikistan) was completed successfully, leading to the stabilization of the internal situation. The following description of the operations shows some discrepancies between the above-mentioned mechanism for peacekeeping operations and their practical realization.

- **Moldova** (since 1992) The deployment of this peacekeeping operation was preceded by the signature of the Yeltsin-Snegur Agreement (21 July 1992), according to which a cease-fire was achieved (between the Moldavian national armed forces and the Transdnisteria separatist group, which was supported by the former Soviet 14th Army) and security zones have been created on both sides of the Nistru (Dniester) river. The joint Russian, Moldavian and Dniesterian peacekeeping force was deployed under a Joint Control Commission command in August 1992. The Peacekeeping Forces are still deployed, composed of Moldavian, Russian, Ukrainian and Trans-Dniesterian soldiers, and comprises 1199 troops.

- **Georgia, Abkhazia** (since 1994) The CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia were deployed under the provisions of the so-called Moscow Agreement, or Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces between Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed on 14 May 1994. The main agreed tasks for CIS peacekeepers were maintaining the cease-fire, implementing the conditions of the Agreement, supervising the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and promoting safe conditions for the returning of displaced persons. Under the Agreement, a coordinating commission has been established in order to discuss requirements from both sides. CIS Peacekeeping Forces are still present in Georgian territory, and some clashes between peacekeepers and Georgian authorities have been reported. The main problem is linked to the fact that the Peacekeeping Forces are composed purely of Russian troops, presently 2000 soldiers. The CIS peacekeepers are under the supervision of the UN Observation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which was deployed in August 1993 and its mandate has recently been extended until 15 April 2008. The UN and CIS missions act independently but keep close contact.

- **Tajikistan** (1993-2000) this operation has been the largest operation carried out by CIS in the former Soviet space.60 The Peacekeeping Forces were deployed according to a decision of the

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59 Even if the CIS's official website (in Russian) mentions the decision-making process involved in the adoption of the annual budget, the updated budget figure is not provided. The latest figure is from 2001 (237,901,000 Rubles). The CIS officials contacted by UNU-CRIS were not able to provide the most up to date figures.

60 According to the CIS commander-in-chief there were 25,000 peacekeepers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Former Prime Minister Abdullojonov estimated that 30,000 people died in the climax of civil war. See John Mackinlay and Peter Cross (2003). *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*. Tokyo and New
Council of Heads of State adopted in September 1993. CIS leaders regarded the civil war between political factions of Tajikistan (the fight started in May 1992) as a serious threat to the stability of the entire CIS. The forces included the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz battalions, which were operationally subordinated to the Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF). In fact, the Russian ground troops’ commander was directly in command of the 201st MRD, while subunits from the other CIS states were under the command of their respective Ministries of Defense. In February 1994 the CIS’ role was formally extended when nine CIS defense ministers (excluding Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) signed a document committing each to send peacekeeping troops to Tajikistan. In March 1994 a Standing Consultative Commission on Peacekeeping Activity was established under the CIS Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The UN decided to deploy its own peacekeeping mission in the country - UN Mission in Tajikistan, UNMOT (adopted by UNSC Resolution 963) on 16 December 1994. UNMOT, which completed its mandate on 15 May 2000, collaborated with the CIS Peacekeeping Forces. After the end of the Tajik civil war and the disbanding of peacekeeping forces, Russia and Tajikistan agreed on transforming the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, stationed in the country, into a military base. Although the agreement was not implemented, the Division is still stationed in Tajik territory and has become part of the Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment, which operates within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

**Peacemaking**

Concerning the civil war in Tajikistan, the CIS and its member states were involved in political and diplomatic mediation with the aim to settle the conflict in a peaceful way. In 1995-1997 the Councils’ (of Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense) representatives and the CIS Special Representative on conflict resolution in Tajikistan, participated in the negotiation between the Tajik government and United Tajik Opposition which resulted in the Tajik Peace Agreement in 1997. This CIS non-military operation was carried out in coordination with the UN and OSCE missions.

**Election Observation Missions**


**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The intentions of the CIS to cooperate with the UN are stressed in the Charter of the CIS, which refers to the UN Charter several times. The other important document adopted by CIS which deals with the relation with the UN and the OSCE is the Concept on Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the Territory of Member States of CIS. Chapter 4 of the Concept states: “When working to settle conflicts in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States shall interact closely with other international organizations and particularly with

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61 “Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States”. Online at www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai18e.html#chap3

the United Nations and OSCE.” The concept further sets up the forms of cooperation: consultation among representatives on various levels; assistance in peacekeeping efforts; submission of information to the UN Security Council or the UN Secretary General. The other form of cooperation is the Exchange of Letters with the UN Secretariat.

On 24 March 1994 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/48/237 which granted observer status to the CIS. In August 1994 the CIS participated at the 1st High Level Meeting. On 11 October 2004 the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding and Partnership was signed between the Executive Committee of the CIS and the UN Secretariat. Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the CIS created a department on interaction with international organizations, which is responsible for international cooperation, namely with the UN.

The CIS also developed close cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and in January 2005 hosted the special meeting of the CTC with international, regional and sub-regional organizations in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

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The Commonwealth of Nations (or Commonwealth) is a voluntary association of independent sovereign states—successor to the British Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth II is the symbol of the free association of members and the Head of the Commonwealth. She is also Head of State, separately, for sixteen of the Commonwealth countries, called Commonwealth Realms. As each Realm is an independent kingdom, Elizabeth as monarch holds a separate title for each. Beyond the Realms, the majority of member states are republics or indigenous monarchies that have their own Heads of State. The key organs of COMSEC are:

- The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) provides a forum for consultation at the highest level of government. They are held every other year. Meetings of associated committees usually take place in the weeks preceding CHOGM. These include:

  - The Committee of the Whole, which consists of senior officials and considers Commonwealth functional cooperation.

  - The Commonwealth Ministers’ Action Group on the Harare Declaration deals with serious or persistent violations of the Harare Declaration (see below). The Group is convened by the Secretary-General and is composed of the Foreign Ministers of eight Commonwealth member countries

  - The Ministerial Group on Small States is also comprised of senior officials and addresses the challenges faced by small states.

The Commonwealth should not be confused with the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Commonwealth of Australia and eight other states with that title, i.e. Bahamas, Jamaica, Dominica, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Northern Marianas, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia. The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa were the Commonwealth’s six original members. Their ‘position and mutual relation’ was defined in 1926 as autonomous, equal in status, owing common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated. This formula was incorporated in the preamble to the Statute of Westminster of 1931 which also declared that the crown was the symbol of their free association. The modern Commonwealth took shape from the 1949 Declaration of London which facilitated India’s membership as a republic. The member states of COMSEC are: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, and Zambia.
Parallel special events involving people, business, and youth forums now coincide with each
CHOGM. Action plans are developed at these events to complement official Commonwealth
statements. The last CHOGM was held in Kampala (Uganda) from 23 to 25 November 2007.

Though the Commonwealth has no constitution or charter it does have a coordinating arm, the
Secretariat, based in London and established since 1965. This is headed by a Secretary-General,
currently Donald McKinnon, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand (until April
2008). The Commonwealth Secretariat is the main intergovernmental agency of the Commonwealth,
facilitating consultation and cooperation. It is responsible to member governments collectively.

Following the CHOGM 2002 in Coolum (Australia), the Secretariat has a Board of Governors and
an Executive Committee. All member governments are represented on the Board of Governors, and a
17-member Executive Committee was constituted by the Board in June 2002. The Executive Committee
meets every three months, makes policy recommendations to the Board and oversees budgets and
audit functions. The Committee includes the eight largest contributors to the Secretariat’s total
resources: Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Singapore, South Africa and the United
Kingdom. Other member countries are elected to the Executive Committee on a regional basis, to
serve two-year terms.65

All of the member states, except for Mozambique, have experienced direct or indirect British rule, or
have been linked administratively to another Commonwealth country. At the 2007 CHOGM in
Kampala Heads of Government reviewed the recommendations of the Committee on
Commonwealth membership and agreed on the following criteria for membership: (i) an applicant
country should, as a general rule, have had an historic constitutional association with an existing
Commonwealth member, save in exceptional circumstances. (ii) In exceptional circumstances,
applicants should be considered on a case-by-case basis. (iii) Applicants should accept and comply
with Commonwealth fundamental values, principles and priorities as set out in the 1971
Commonwealth Declaration of Principles and Subsequent Declarations. (iv) An applicant must demonstrate
commitment to democracy and democratic processes, including free and fair elections and
representative legislatures; the rule of law and independence of the judiciary; good governance,
including a well-trained public service and transparent public accounts; and, protection of human
rights, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity. (v) An applicant should accept
Commonwealth norms and conventions such as use of the English language as the medium of inter-
Commonwealth relations and acknowledge Queen Elizabeth II as Head of the Commonwealth. (vi)
New member should be encourage to join the Commonwealth Fund, and to promote vigorous civil
society and business organizations within their country and to foster participatory democracy
through regular civil society consultations.

Since the Commonwealth has no constitution it is guided by a series of agreements on its principles
and aims, generally known as Declarations or Statements, issued by Commonwealth Heads of
Government at various summits. Together, they constitute a foundation of Commonwealth values
and a history of concern in global affairs. The first, fundamental statement of core beliefs is the
Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which was issued at the 1971 summit in Singapore. The
Declaration defines the voluntary character and consensual working methods of the Commonwealth,
specifying the goals and objectives of the association. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991
sets out the Commonwealth’s commitment to democracy, rule of law and good governance. In 1995
Commonwealth Heads of Government adopted an action program to fulfill more effectively their
commitment to the Harare Principles with the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Program on the Harare
Declaration. In earlier decades the Commonwealth focused much of its attention on apartheid in
South Africa.66 Its modern agenda derives from the 1991 Commonwealth Harare Declaration.

65 The current regional representatives on the Committee are: Botswana, Mozambique, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Antigua
and Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Papua New Guinea
66 Until the beginning of the 1990s apartheid in South Africa was of primary attention of the Commonwealth. During many CHOGM meetings this item was high on the agenda. At the 1985 CHOGM in Nassau (the Bahamas)
The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) was established to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Commonwealth's fundamental political values. The CMAG was established by the Commonwealth Heads of Government in November 1995 to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare Declaration. The Group is convened by the Secretary-General and is composed of the Foreign Ministers of nine Commonwealth member countries, supplemented as appropriate by one or two additional ministerial representatives from the region concerned; it currently includes the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Lesotho, Malaysia (vice-chair), Malta (chair), Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and United Kingdom. Their task is to assess the nature of the infringement and recommend measures for collective Commonwealth action aimed at the speedy restoration of democracy and constitutional rule.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The Commonwealth Secretariat currently has a staff of approximately 250. The Secretariat and its activities are supported by an assessed budget and two specialized funds. The assessed budget, to which all full members are obliged to contribute, covers the Secretariat's core functions. Governments contribute to the funding of the Secretariat's assessed budget according to an agreed scale based on Gross National Product and population size. Each year a proposed budget for the Secretariat is agreed by a Finance Committee composed of Commonwealth High Commissioners in London and a representative of the UK Government. Governments make voluntary contributions to the two specialized funds, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and the Commonwealth Youth Program (CYP). For 2007/08, the Secretariat’s budget is UK£13.9 million (USD $27.1 million), the CFTC’s UK£27.4 million (USD $53.6 million) and the CYP’s UK£0.8 million (USD $1.6 million). The largest financial contributors are the UK, Canada, and Australia.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The Commonwealth Secretariat has significant experience in the field of conflict prevention and peacemaking. In 1969-1970 the Secretariat provided a Secretary (in the person of Chief Anyaoku) and administrative support to a Commission that was set up to propose terms of settlement in a dispute between Anguilla and St Kitts and Nevis. Every Secretary-General since then was involved in mediation and good offices efforts. Apart from the ones below, one can refer to the Falkland war, Zimbabwe, the Nigerian civil war or the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan.

The good offices role of the Secretary-General is the Commonwealth’s primary mechanism for addressing political problems and conflicts where they arise. In 2007, the report of the Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding ‘Civil Paths to Peace’, under the chairmanship of Amartya Sen was presented. The Commission suggests in its report to extend the good offices work of the Secretary-General to address grievance internationally. More particularly, the Commission urges the Commonwealth to use its experience to advocate greater use of multilateral approaches in international disputes and confrontations, working with the United Nations and other international organizations. At the 2002 Meeting in Coolum, Heads of Government approved the conclusions of the Commonwealth High Level Review Group (HLRG) which included a call for more proactive use of the good offices role. In line with the Group’s recommendations, a Good Offices Section was subsequently established within the Secretariat’s Political Affairs Division (PAD) in 2003. The Secretariat’s Good Offices Section provides an early warning mechanism, proposes measures for preventive action, and is responsible for coordinating integrated approaches to conflict and political tensions within member states. Since its establishment there has been a significant increase in the number of joint statements, including calling on the South African Government to end apartheid, release Nelson Mandela and begin a ‘dialogue across lines of color, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government’. To support this process, the Eminent Persons’ Group was established, drawn from seven countries. The Commonwealth Secretariat gave extensive support to this Group. The Group visited South Africa and in its report Mission to South Africa proposed among others the abolition of apartheid.

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scope and depth of the Secretary-General’s good offices role. The Commonwealth Secretary-General has used his good offices to successfully defuse crises or tensions in a number of Commonwealth countries in recent years. He is assisted by several Special Envoys. A historical precedent for this practice was the initiative taken by Secretary-General Arnold Smith to mediate in the dispute over the independence claim of Biafra (Nigeria) in 1967. In 1975 a Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus was established to assist the UN. This initiative was accompanied by good offices from the Commonwealth Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was in 1983 involved in finding solutions for the conflict in Grenada. During the last decade, good offices were used to promote dialogue between the United Kingdom and Mauritius over the Chagos Islands (2004). On the Solomon Islands Hon. Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka was instrumental in 1999-2000 in resolving tensions which eventually led to the mobilization of a Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group (see below). On the Fiji Islands, Special Envoy Justice Pius Langa facilitated dialogue between key stakeholders to encourage the formation of a government in accordance with the Constitution (2000). In 1999 the Commonwealth Secretariat tried to broker and implement a peace agreement that led to the Honiara Peace Accord. In Lesotho facilitation efforts occurred after 1998 elections between the government and opposition. In Swaziland, Special Envoy Ketumile Masire facilitated the adoption of a new constitution in 2005. In Zanzibar, the Commonwealth facilitated the implementation of the Muañaka peace agreement (2001). In Cameroon, Special Envoy Joe Clark is assisting with the implementation of a wide range of reforms (since 2002). In the Gambia, Special Envoy Abdulsalamu Akubakar is promoting dialogue between political parties (since 2005). In Guyana Special Envoy Paul Reeves is promoting dialogue between political parties (since 2002). In Kenya, Special Envoy Adebayo Adekeye is facilitating dialogue between political parties (since 2004). In the Maldives, Special Envoy Tun Musa Hitam is supporting the implementation of constitutional and electoral reform (since 2005). In Tonga, Special Envoy Douglas Graham has been working to strengthen the authority and capacity of the Legislative Assembly and the constitutional reform process (since 2002).

The Commonwealth has undertaken peacekeeping missions involving police and armed forces with a ‘soft mandate’ but has not undertaken, and is not designed to undertake, any enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

- **Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe** (1979-1980) In 1979 a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (around 1,300 troops) was set up to address the intrastate conflict in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. The role of the multi-national force was to keep peace between independence groups and the Rhodesian forces during the cease-fire in the run-up to the 1980 elections in independent Zimbabwe.

- **Solomon Islands** (2000) A Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group addressed intrastate conflict in the Solomon Islands in 2000. The previous year, the Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group addressed the same conflict. The latter was composed of ten Fiji and ten Vanuatu policemen. New Zealand provided transport assistance for this Group.


**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

All Commonwealth members also belong to the UN and the Secretariat has observer status at the UN General Assembly (A/RES/31/3). The association strongly supports the work of the UN – which is listed as one of the Harare Principles. The Commonwealth funds and administers since 1983 a “Joint Office for Commonwealth Permanent Missions to the United Nations” for eleven small Commonwealth member states. The Commonwealth has a formalized agreement – a MoU with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1 December 1998, no. 1219) and with UNDP. On 6 February 2007 at the meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary-General and his counterpart at the United Nations, they discussed potential collaboration between the UN and the Commonwealth in Sierra Leone and other countries in support of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The Commonwealth has participated in every High-Level Meeting between the UN Secretary-General and the Heads of Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since their inception (1994) but has not been invited to the Security Council Meetings.

**SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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67 The eleven small states are Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Maldives, Nauru, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP)

[Statutes of CPLP (art.5-e)]

Mandate in Peace and Security:

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

CPLP was created in 1996 by the seven official Portuguese-speaking countries\(^{68}\) (East Timor joined in 2002 after gaining independence)\(^{69}\). Although CPLP participates in the High Level Meetings between the UN and Regional Organizations and has engaged in conflict prevention and peacemaking, it has never adopted any legal document that would accord it a legal mandate and operational guidance in the fields of peace and security. According to the CPLP Statutes, the goals of the organization are political-diplomatic coordination amongst its members (namely in international fora), cooperation in economic, social, cultural, legal, and technical-scientific areas, also promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese language. From the outset, CPLP has been reticent about entering the peace and security area. To fulfill its goals CPLP is structured around four central organs:

- **Conference of Heads of State and Government**, which determines and supervises the policies and strategies of the organization and meets ordinarily every two years;

- **Council of Ministers**, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states. It coordinates CPLP’s activities, approves the budget, and adopts action plans;

- **Permanent Coordination Committee** (CCP in Portuguese), comprised of one representative of each member state. It monitors whether the Executive Secretariat has implemented the decisions and recommendations laid out by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. The CCP, as an organ specifically designed to facilitate political and diplomatic cooperation, has the capacity to (i) collect and analyze all information related to potential conflict situations, and (ii) plan conflict prevention strategies;

- **Executive Secretariat**, the main executive body of the organization. The current Executive Secretary is Mr. Domingos Simões Pereira of Guinea-Bissau. He was nominated in 2008.

At the 12th meeting of the Council of Ministers, held in Lisbon on 31 October 2007, it was decided to formalize the establishment of a **Parliamentary Assembly** with a mandate to supervise the orientation and the political strategy of CPLP. It will also set up working groups that could be deployed on election observation missions. The Assembly, it is believed, will inject new political oxygen to the organization and increase its political weight.

Even though CPLP has no legal mandate in peace and security, **defense issues** have been discussed since its inception in 1996. For instance the Ministers of Defense regularly attend summit to discuss new avenues of cooperation and coordination of their national defense plans. In 2005, the Ministers of Defense adopted a **Protocol of Cooperation in the Area of Defense**. Within this framework CPLP has

\(^{68}\) CPLP members are: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and Sao Tomé and Principe.

\(^{69}\) In July 2006, during the Bissau summit, Equatorial Guinea and Mauritius were admitted as Associate Observers.
also established the think-tank *Center for Strategic Analysis on Defense Issues*, with headquarters in Maputo, in which the role of the CPLP in the prevention of conflicts and management of regional crisis has been debated. In a document elaborated by the Center and discussed at the 7th Meeting of Ministers of Defense (2004), the creation of an *early warning mechanism* was suggested. The proposal has not yet materialized. Yet, CPLP has a temporary Mission in Guinea-Bissau, which although it is not exclusively geared towards early warning, it can operate as such. The Secretariat follows the situation in Guinea-Bissau through its resident representative.

In 2006, at the 6th CPLP Summit of Heads of State, member states approved the ‘Bissau Declaration’ where it is underscored that the CPLP should regularly monitor the situation in the member states in order to identify problems and reinforce the capacity of CPLP in the prevention of conflicts, humanitarian aid, and the support to democratic institutions. So far, this has been carried out to a very limited extent.

In June 2007, CPLP members that take part in the *South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone* decided to engage in diplomatic talks with counter-parts to revitalize the dormant zone of peace, established in 1986. At the end of a CPLP Ministerial Meeting, the Defense Minister of Cape Verde declared that, “CPLP needed to be more ambitious in order to actively create new solutions for security and defense in light of new non-conventional threats, such as traffic of people, arms, drugs, and organized criminality”. Thus far, CPLP diplomatic efforts have not reached any breakthrough.

CPLP’s regulations do not endow the Organization with peace enforcement authority. Nonetheless, at the Meeting of CPLP’s Defense Ministers in 2000 a light military force was created. Battalion-like, whose joint military exercises (aka ‘Felino’) have reached its eighth edition. Felino exercises started in 2000 with the aim of improving the response capacity of a CPLP light military force in the eventuality of a conflict situation in one of CPLP member states. According to CPLP deliberations, a possible intervention will have to be requested by the UN. The 2008 ‘Felino’ exercise will be carried out in Mozambique.

CPLP’s involvement in peacemaking efforts is decided by member states or when other interested states call upon CPLP to act in that regard. Either way, the aim is always to reestablish dialogue, knowing that, *inter alia*, this is one of the essential initial steps. Funding has been CPLP’s main constraint in peacemaking efforts, along with the lack of coordination with actions undertaken by other organizations.

In June 2007, CPLP organized an international conference on “International Security Challenges and Cooperation within CPLP”. The conference was high-profile and counted on the presence of senior representatives from the EU, NATO, and ECOWAS to discuss the role of regional organizations – and specifically CPLP – in the “prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa”. However, the conference seems to have been led by an aspiration to showcase CPLP as a security organization, rather than the outcome of a serious internal effort to accord to the organization capacity in the security sphere.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

CPLP staff is limited. The Executive Secretary’s Office is composed of Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive Secretary, Chief of Staff and three assistants; whereas the Advisors’ Office includes ten advisors. In total, CPLP has approximately 20 staff members.

According to the CPLP Statutes, the budget is generated by contributions from the member states. The Secretariat’s 2006 Budget was EUR €1,167,169 (USD $1,7 million).

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70 Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and São Tomé and Principe.
CPLP is also provided with a *Special Fund*, composed of volunteer, public and private financial contributions, exclusively dedicated to support specific activities within the frame of CPLP's goals.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

Even though CPLP does not possess any specific mechanism purposely for dispute settlement, its intervention in dispute situations happens through *mediation* efforts and/or the promotion of dialogue among all the parties involved. CPLP’s functioning, in partnership with other organizations, made possible the reestablishment of peace in *Guinea-Bissau* in 1998, and the reinstatement of constitutional order in both *São Tomé and Príncipe* and *Guinea-Bissau*, in 2002 and 2004, respectively.

Pertaining to *peacebuilding*, the organization does have some experience in the areas of (a) truth, justice and reconciliation, (b) rule of law, (c) human rights and (d) good governance, public administration and electoral assistance. Some examples include CPLP’s involvement in *Mozambique* and *Guinea-Bissau*.

In 1999 CPLP deployed its first *election observation* mission to the self-determination referendum in Timor Leste, which was followed, in 2001, by the observation of the elections which led to the formation of the Constitutive Assembly of the same country. Later CPLP observed electoral processes in East Timor (2002 and 2007), Guinea Bissau (2004 and 2006), Mozambique (2003 and 2004), and Sao Tomé and Principe (2002 and 2006).

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The UN granted observer status to CPLP on 26 October 1999. In addition, General Assembly Resolution 59/21 of 8 November 2004, encourages the UN Secretary General to undertake consultations with the Executive Secretary of CPLP and requests the specialized agencies of the UN system to cooperate to this end with the Secretary-General and the Executive Secretary.

On 20 December 2006, the General Plenary of the UN General Assembly discussed the cooperation between the UN and CPLP. The resolution that was approved, (i) welcomed the signature of the Agreement between the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and CPLP in November 2006, regarding consultation, exchange of information and technical cooperation on their respective activities in the field of human rights; (ii) invited the UN Secretary-General to continue to undertake consultations with CPLP Executive Secretary, with a view to promoting cooperation between the Secretariats of the two bodies, in particular by encouraging meetings that enable their representatives to consult one another on projects, measures and procedures that will facilitate and expand their mutual cooperation and coordination.

CPLP first joined the High Level Meetings between the UN and Regional Organizations in 2003 (*5th HLM*). For an organization with a very limited security profile and low organizational capacity, the participation seems to be sparked more by the will to be in high profile gatherings where similar organizations already participate – such as the Commonwealth and Francophonie – rather than by political and operational legitimacy. According to the Secretariat, even though CPLP has only recently been involved in the High-Level meetings, it believes that it is possible to improve coordination between the UN and CPLP, particularly through CPLP’s increased attendance of consultation gatherings and improved access to timely information on related events. CPLP has not been invited to the Security Council Meetings.

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71 ECOWAS and CPLP arranged for a meeting, which took place in Praia, Cape Verde in August 1998, where representatives of the disputing parties, President Vieira and General Mané, signed a ceasefire agreement and pledged to reopen the national airport and allow the deployment of international observers.
In 2006, the 6th CPLP Conference of Heads of State and Government, held with the theme ‘The Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Contribution of CPLP’, adopted a specific declaration on the issue. The CPLP Heads of State and Government considered that in order to reach the goals set in the Declaration, member states should pursue efforts to strengthen ties among them. Furthermore, it was decided to concentrate resources - human and material - in the eradication of hunger and extreme poverty in the member states.

The former Presidency of CPLP, held by Guinea-Bissau (2005-2006), decided to hold a Forum dedicated to the MDG in the CPLP space, to make an assessment of its fulfillment and try to mobilize additional resources. The current Presidency, held by Angola (2007-2008) still has to follow up on this.

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- UNGA Resolution A/RES/54/10 (18 Nov. 1999) on “Observer Status” (in the UN General Assembly);

Council of Europe (CoE)

“The United Nations seeks to promote the same values throughout the world, which is why our two great organizations [CoE and UN] work closely together.”

KOFI ANNAN
Former UN Secretary-General (2005)

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**

The CoE formed on 5 May 1949, when ten countries signed the treaty constituting the Statute of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts concerning the protection of individuals. The CoE has a genuine pan-European dimension, which can be read from its membership. There are five observers to the CoE, namely the Holy See, the United States, Canada, Japan, Mexico. The CoE’s main aims are (i) to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law; (ii) to promote awareness and encourage the development of Europe's cultural identity and diversity; (iii) to find common solutions to the challenges facing European society: such as discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, bioethics and cloning, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organized crime and corruption, cyber-crime, violence against children; and (iv) to consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform.

The CoE’s concept of peace and security is based on democratic security (as opposed to security through the use of force) and was defined at the first CoE Summit in 1993. The concept encapsulates pluralist parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. The 1993 Vienna Declaration also identifies the protection of national minorities as an essential element of stability and democratic security. The concept of “human rights” within the CoE refers to the aggregate of fundamental rights and freedoms set out in a range of CoE instruments, as developed by their respective supervisory mechanisms, which again find their sources in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The concept is therefore not different from that of the UN, in accordance with the principle of universality. However, the methods of protection may differ. Minority rights are considered to be an integral part of human rights.

The main component parts of the Council of Europe are:

- The **Committee of Ministers** is the Council of Europe’s decision-making body. It comprises the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the member states, or their Permanent Representatives in Strasbourg. The Committee meets at ministerial level once a year, and on Permanent Representatives level once a week. It is both a governmental body, where national approaches to problems facing European

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72 The member states of CoE are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
society can be discussed on an equal footing, and a collective forum, where Europe-wide responses to such challenges are formulated. In collaboration with the Parliamentary Assembly, it is the guardian of the Council's fundamental values, and monitors member states' compliance with their undertakings;

- The Parliamentary Assembly, is a grouping of 636 members (318 representatives and 318 substitutes) from the 47 national parliaments. Its powers extend only to the ability to investigate, recommend and advise. Even so, its recommendations on issues such as human rights have significant weight in the European political context. One important function of the Parliamentary Assembly is the election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights. The sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly are divided into four part-sessions, each lasting for about a week;

- The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is a political assembly composed of representatives holding an electoral mandate as members of a local or regional authority appointed each by a specific procedure. Its 315 full members and 315 substitute members, representing over 200,000 European municipalities and regions, are grouped by national delegation and by political group. The Congress offers a forum for dialogue where representatives of local and regional authorities discuss common problems, compare notes about their experiences and then put their points of view to the national governments;

- The European Court of Human Rights was created as an instrument to enforce the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by ruling over complaints against human rights violations committed by States Parties. Complaints can be brought to the Court either by other States Parties or by individuals subject to national jurisdiction. The Court consists of a number of judges equal to the number of States Parties. Each judge is elected in respect of a State Party;

- The Commissioner for Human Rights is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. His/her mandate is to foster the effective observance of human rights, and to assist member states in the implementation of CoE human rights standards. The Commissioner promotes education in and awareness of human rights and identifies possible shortcomings in the law and practice concerning human rights. He/she facilitates the activities of national ombudsperson institutions and other human rights structures and provides advice and information regarding the protection of human rights across the region. The current Commissioner is Thomas Hammarberg (Sweden), who took up his position on 1 April 2006.

- The CoE-Secretariat is recruited from member states. It is headed by a Secretary General, elected by the Parliamentary Assembly. The current SG is Terry Davis (UK), who was elected in 2004 for a period of 5 years; and the present Deputy Secretary General is Maud de Boer-Buquicchio (Netherlands), elected in 2002.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

The ordinary budget amounts to EUR €197.2 million (USD $288 million). The main part of the additional resources is applied to the European Court of Human Rights, to face its increasing needs. The follow-up to the May 2005 Warsaw Summit Plan of Action will be financed by the redeployment of internal resources. Together with the Partial Agreements and other budgets, the CoE total budget amounts to EUR €270.1 million (USD $395 million). In 2007, the CoE has approximately 2,140 staff employed either on posts or fixed term positions.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

The whole statutory and political concept of the CoE is based on the concept of conflict prevention, not least indirectly through the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Three Conventions were adopted to that end: the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1957), and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987).

The pursuance of conflict prevention by the CoE is undertaken mainly through political channels and can be categorized as “operational experience” only to a limited extend and in a few instances. Examples for concrete activities on the ground are:

• Assistance and cooperation programs for the development of democratic stability in order to help member states (in particular those of Central and Eastern Europe) to build up and consolidate their democratic systems;

• The work of the “Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities”, offering guidance on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

• The program for “Assistance and Technical Cooperation in the Media Field”, set up in order to promote the functioning of professional, independent and pluralistic media in current and potential member states. It covers a wide range of issues such as the rights and responsibilities of journalists, access to information, the regulation of the press, radio and television sectors;

• The various programs of the Human Rights Cooperation and Awareness Division (HRCAD), such as the human rights training for legal professionals and law enforcement officials, support to Ombudspersons and independent national human rights institutions, and the ‘Police and Human Rights’ program;

• The Technical Cooperation and Consultancy Program, which provides technical, legal or institutional support to member states in solving complex sustainable development problems linked to the protection, conservation, promotion, management, use and re-use of the architectural and archaeological heritage, the protection and development of sites and landscapes, together with resulting urban planning problems;

• The Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project, established to help policymakers (at local, regional and national levels), civil society and all who play a part in culture to devise a policy of dialogue which respects every aspect of cultural diversity, to analyze the sources of conflict between cultural and religious communities and the mechanisms which stir such conflict, to define cultural activities with a preventive aim and to identify actions to promote reconciliation.

Under the CoE Statute the Organization does not deal with military or defense issues. It is therefore not involved in peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

However, the CoE can and does contribute to peacebuilding. It has helped building up post-conflict and post-totalitarian countries, starting with Germany in 1950, then Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, and since 1989 the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The CoE has considerable experience in standard-setting, monitoring and supervision of compliance on human rights and good governance issues. It also runs assistance activities (providing expertise on the compatibility of draft laws with European human rights standards, training, and awareness-raising activities). More specifically regarding peacebuilding, the CoE has made significant efforts in South-Eastern-European countries. Agreements were concluded recently in Kosovo between UNMIK and the CoE on two important CoE mechanisms covering the prevention of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment on the one hand, and the protection of national minorities on the other.
COOPERATION WITH THE UN

Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe has long existed. It has continued to develop over the years, in particular since the signing of an Agreement between both Organizations on 15 December 1951 and the Arrangement on Cooperation and Liaison between the Secretariats of the UN and the CoE of 19 November 1971. The Council of Europe was granted observer status at the United Nations in 1989, enabling it to take an active part in the fields of activity which they have in common. This applies in the first instance to the defense and promotion of human rights, but also to the unremitting search for peace and international security. A new stage in the partnership between both organizations was initiated with the initial adoption of a Resolution by the UN General Assembly on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe in October 2000 (A/RES/55/3).

Close cooperation and a good relationship between the Organizations have developed particularly in the issue areas of human rights, humanitarian affairs, refugee matters, culture and education. An intense exchange of views and frequent meetings take place both on highest political levels but also on working level of officials from UN and CoE Secretariats. Some UN-bodies and autonomous agencies concluded formal agreements with the CoE, creating an independent framework for cooperation with the CoE. These are FAO, ILO, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO. Fruitful cooperation has also developed between the CoE and the International Law Commission of the UN.

The CoE has been a constant participant to the High-Level Meetings between the UN and Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since 1998 and has been invited to join the Security Council in the past two meetings with Regional Organizations (2005 and 2006).

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Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

“...It shall be in the aim of the Community to promote and strengthen harmonious cooperation and balanced and self-sustained development in all fields of economic and social activity (…) in order to (…) foster closer and peaceful relations between Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent”

Treaty Establishing ECCAS, Art. 4

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

ECCAS’ role in peace and security has been hindered by the internal animosity involving some members of the Organization. ECCAS began functioning in 1985, but it was inactive for several years because of financial difficulties (non-payment of membership fees) and the conflict in the Great Lakes region. The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo was particularly divisive, as Rwanda and Angola fought on opposing sides. ECCAS efficiency has also been hampered by the fact that some member countries have given more value to their membership to other regional organizations. Rwanda withdrew its membership from ECCAS in June 2007 while it had already briefly suspended ties to the organization during 2001-2002. Despite these obstacles, in September 1994, Central African states adopted a pact of non-aggression at the end of the 5th meeting of the UN Consultative Committee on Security in Central Africa held in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

In late 1990s ECCAS received new political oxygen. At the Malabo Heads of State and Government Conference (1999), four priority fields for the organization were identified: (i) to develop capacities to maintain peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic and social development; (ii) to develop physical, economic and monetary integration; (iii) to develop a culture of human integration; and (iv) to establish an autonomous financing mechanism for ECCAS. The institutions of ECCAS are as follows:

- **Conference of Heads of State and Government**, which defines the general policy and major guidelines of the Community. The Conference meets once a year in regular session.

- **Council of Ministers** composed of Ministers responsible for economic development matters or any other Minister appointed for the purpose by each member state. The Council is responsible for the functioning and development of ECCAS. It meets twice a year.

- **Court of Justice**, which ensures the legality of the decisions, directives and regulations of ECCAS, the Court is yet to be operational.

- **General Secretariat** comprised of the Secretary General, three Deputy Secretaries General, a Financial Controller, an Accountant and other staff required for the functioning of the organization. The

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73 The member states of ECCAS are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe.

74 Angola and the DRC are also members of COMESA and SADC; Burundi is a member of COMESA and the East African Community (EAC); Chad is member of CEN-SAD.
Secretary General, since 1998, Louis Sylvain Goma (from the Republic of the Congo), is the chief executive of ECCAS. The post of Secretary General is appointed for a four-year mandate. The three Deputy Secretaries General are each in charge of one department: (i) Human Integration, Peace, Security and Stability (IHPSS); (ii) Physical, Economic and Monetary Integration (IPEM); (iii) Program, Budget, Administration and Human Resources

- **Consultative Commission** responsible for studying or investigating questions and projects submitted to it by the other Community institutions.

At a summit conference of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, which took place in Yaoundé on 25-26 February 1999, member states decided to create a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, which would be called the *Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX)*. The *COPAX Protocol*, approved one year later, has now entered into force and is headed by the Deputy Secretary General in charge of Peace and Security. The objectives of COPAX are: (i) to prevent, manage and settle conflicts; (ii) to reduce the sources of tensions and prevent the eruption of armed conflicts; (iii) to develop confidence-building measures between member states; (iv) to promote peaceful dispute resolution measures; and (v) to facilitate mediation efforts in cases of crises and conflicts between member states and with third parties. The technical organs of the council are:

- **The Defense and Security Commission (CDS)**, which is the meeting of Chiefs of Staff of national armies and Commanders-in-Chief of police and gendarmerie forces from the different member states. Its role is to plan, organize and provide advice to the decision-making bodies of the community in order to initiate military operations if needed.

- **The Central African Early-Warning System (MARAC)**, which collects and analyses data for the early detection and prevention of crises. On 17 June 2002, ECCAS’ Heads of State and Government adopted the ‘Standing Orders of the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC)’. According to these standing orders, “the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) is a mechanism for the observation, monitoring and prevention of crises and conflicts, which shall work within the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)” and that “shall be responsible for data collection and analysis in order to prevent crises and conflicts”.

Currently MARAC suffers from a number of staffing, financial, logistic and other problems and the system is, for all practical purposes, not yet operational although it has its own office and limited infrastructure. When fully operational MARAC is expected to have a staff of 24, with interdisciplinary experts covering thematic areas (the position of Director was recently announced and filled). In the short term (until the end of 2008), MARAC will establish a Situation Room and develop operating standards and procedures – drawing lessons from IGAD and ECOWAS’ similar mechanisms. ECCAS has evolved a plan for the further development of MARAC (until 2010). The Mechanism is supported by the European Union. The EU also funded a training session for MARAC’s staff held in Kinshasa in December 2007.

- **The Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC)**, which is a non-permanent force consisting of military contingents from member states, whose purpose is to accomplish missions of peace, security and humanitarian relief. In 2004, ECCAS members have agreed on an Action Plan for the establishment of an ECCAS Standby Brigade and a Planning Element. FOMAC standby force will be composed of army, naval and air force units, police, gendarmerie contingents and civilian modules from the 11 member states.

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75 According to the ECCAS Treaty the mandate is only renewable once. But Louis Sylvain Goma’s mandate was renewed again in 2007. This is currently his third mandate.
In January 2000, Gabon hosted a regional peacekeeping exercise “Gabon 2000” with the objective of increasing the capacity of ECCAS states in the field of peacekeeping and conflict prevention and management. Similar exercises were undertaken in Gabon in 2003 and in Cameroon in 2006. These exercises represented a direct application of the French reinforcement of African peacekeeping capacities (Recamp) concept. However, this training exercise was not limited to the ECCAS member states and other countries also took part in it.

A Meeting of Defense Chiefs of Staff was held in Brazzaville in October 2003. The meeting decided to create a brigade-size peacekeeping force for intervention in zones of instability in Central Africa, in line with the African Union’s plans to establish an African Standby Force. It recommended that military planners from each of the ECCAS states form a group to work out the details for the force. They also suggested the establishment of a joint peacekeeping training centre and military exercises every two years, the first of which, known as “Biyongho-2003”, took place in Gabon in 2003. A second military exercise, “Bahr El-Gazel”, was held in Chad in November 2007 despite being initially scheduled for 2005. The “Bahr El-Gazel” exercise was the first one to be held independently from the RECAMP framework.

In 2006, as a follow-up to the recommendations made by the working groups, the Defense and Security Commission decided to create a Regional Chief of Staff to overview the establishment and management of FOMAC. The headquarters have temporarily been located in Libreville in Gabon. The Regional Chief of Staff was appointed during the year 2007 and is composed of one Chief of Staff assisted by four Joint Chiefs of Staff and one assistant for information gathering and public relations. Each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in charge of a particular domain: Operations, Training and Doctrine; Regional Logistics; Budget, Finances and Administrative matters and Regional System for Communication and Information.

ECCAS remains, nevertheless, a weak organization marred by technical and infrastructural problems and punctuated by the pursuit of narrow national interests. The general lack of political will and the security environment in the region has made it difficult for ECCAS to emerge as a robust organization in the field of peace and security.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

Budget revenues originate from the annual contributions of member states. In October 2007, at the 13th Summit meeting in Angola, five countries agreed to each assume 13 percent of the organization’s budget (Angola, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea), making up 65 percent of the total general budget, which is around USD $17-18 million. In terms of staff, no source has been able to supply the exact figure, it could be estimated to be approximately 50 people.

Moreover, ECCAS has also established a Development Fund whose goal is to provide financial and technical assistance to promote the economic and social development of member states.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

Recently, ECCAS has started deploying election observation missions in its member states. ECCAS sent electoral observers to supervise the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Gabon (2005), and the Republic of the Congo (2007). To date ECCAS does not have a single document on which it can base its governance assessment.

In 2003, in Sao Tome and Principe, ECCAS was involved in the mediation team between Major Fernando Pereira who attempted a coup and President Fradique de Menezes. The initial mediation efforts were first led by CPLP, under the leadership of Angolan Deputy Foreign Relations Minister Francisco Romão. Later, the leadership of the mediation team was given to Rodolphe Adada, the
Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo, the country that held the presidency of ECCAS. The large mediation team was able to secure an initial agenda with the ‘Junta’, which included provisions for the return to constitutional normality. Later on the Special Representative of ECCAS would also head the international monitoring commission after the crisis settled down. The commission also included one representative each from CPLP and the AU.

In July 2008, the peacekeeping Multinational Force Central African Republic (FOMUC)\(^{76}\) of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) was renamed to Mission of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (MICOPAX 1) and put under the authority of ECCAS. This mission, in addition to the combat troops, will incorporate a civilian branch, which is intended to help with the revival of political dialogue in the Central African Republic. The relation between FOMAC and MICOPAX 1 is not clear, however.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The United Nations and ECCAS have been engaged for over a decade in a constructive partnership in the critical areas of peace and security, human rights and institutional building. In July 2003, ECCAS, with the assistance of France and of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, organized a multinational military maneuver called “Biyongho 2003” in Gabon.

The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa is the main framework at the ministerial level for discussions of sub-regional peace and security issues in Central Africa, in particular on arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building measures. The Department for Disarmament Affairs serves as the Secretariat of the Committee and works closely with member states of the sub-region and with the ECCAS secretariat in Libreville. Moreover, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) contributed to the drafting of the joint ECCAS and ECOWAS Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons, which was adopted in Nigeria in July 2006.

The ECCAS Secretariat and the Yaounde-based United Nations Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa have continued their cooperation on a number of issues of common concern, including early warning and conflict prevention, and the role of civil society organizations in the consolidation of democracy and human rights in Central Africa. In this context, ECCAS has participated in several workshops organized by the Centre. The workshops focused on military justice, human rights and democracy, relations between civilians and the military, and the role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Central Africa.

ECCAS has been a participant in the last three High-level Meetings between the UN and Regional Organizations (2003, 2005 and 2006) but has not been invited for the Security Council Meetings.

\(^{76}\) Originally, FOMUC was mooted and designed with the intention of protecting President Ange-Felix Patasse, former head of state of the Central African Republic, who, at the time was facing a rebellion in his country. After he was overthrown by General Francois Bozize in March 15, 2003, the mandate of the mission was transformed into a security mission that was also tasked with reforming and helping the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) in its fight against highway bandits and armed gangs operating in the northern part of the country.
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Organizational Capacity

In the African context, the sub-regional organization, which has arguably the most robust security mechanism is ECOWAS. Founded by treaty in May 1975, ECOWAS was conceived as a means towards economic integration and development intended to lead to the eventual establishment of an economic union in West Africa, fostering economic stability and enhancing relations between its member states. However, soon after its establishment, ECOWAS entered the security domain with the adoption of a non-aggression pact. A recent UN mission to ECOWAS has reiterated that, “in the past 15 years ECOWAS has developed the political will, accorded itself the legal authority, established the instrumental mechanisms and begun to build the organizational capacity to maintain regional peace and security.”

In 1999, the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted at the ECOWAS summit in Lomé, reinforced ECOWAS’ role as a security organization. The Mechanism expanded two previous sub-regional security initiatives: the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in 1978, and a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense in 1981. It is comprised of the following bodies:

- **The Authority of Heads of State and Government**, is the supreme institution of the Community and is composed of Heads of State and/or Government of member states;

- **Council of Ministers**, it comprises the Minister in charge of ECOWAS Affairs and any other Minister of each member state. It is responsible for the functioning and development of the Community;

- **Commission**, which in January 2007 replaced the Executive Secretariat. It supervises the activities of the various bodies of the ‘Mechanism’ and it is constituted by a President, a Vice-President and seven Commissioners. The current President Mohamed Ibn Chambas (from Ghana) was re-elected in 2007 for a 4-year term. The Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security contributes to achieving the goals of ECOWAS through the Implementation of the ‘Mechanism’. It supervises the Political Affairs Department, the Peacekeeping and Regional Security Department,

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77 ECOWAS member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

and the Observation and Monitoring Center (the headquarters body of the early warning system - ECOWARN);

- **Mediation and Security Council**, composed of 10 members, it decides and implements all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security, the Council is also responsible for authorizing military interventions. It oversees the activities of the following organs:

- **Defense and Security Commission**, comprises Chiefs of Defense Staff of ECOWAS. It examines all technical and administrative issues and evaluates the prerequisites for peacekeeping operations;

- **Council of Elders**, a group of eminent persons (15) mandated to use their good offices in the prevention of violent conflict;

- **ECOMOG/ECOWAS Standby Force**, a body that consists of standby military forces;

- **Court of Justice**, composed of seven Judges and is based in Abuja, it was set up to ensure the legality of the interpretation and application of the Treaty, a provisional amendment to the Protocol in 2005 allowed individuals to seize the Court and extended the jurisdiction of the Court to include violation of Human Rights in all member states.

- **ECOWARN**, which collects and transmits data on imminent conflicts.

The organizational capacity of ECOWAS in the sphere of peace and security is primarily focused on conflict prevention/early warning and peacekeeping and enforcement:

**Conflict Prevention**

ECOWARN, which collects and transmits data on imminent conflicts, comprises a situation room at ECOWAS headquarters, field stations in all member states and four zonal bureaus of early warning (in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou) mandated to assess political (human rights, democracy), economic (food shortages), social (unemployment), security (arms flows, civil-military relations), and environment (drought, flooding) indicators on a daily basis. ECOWAS work in the

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79 The OMC is responsible for data collection and analysis, and the drafting of up-to-date reports on behalf of the Deputy Executive Secretary for the Executive Secretary that identify/outline possible emerging crises, monitor on-going crises and post-crisis transitions. Currently, the ECOWAS team is tasked with producing three types of reports: Situation Reports, Incident Reports and Country Profiles but it only produces daily Situation Reports and occasionally, Incident Reports. The Country Profiles are meant to provide the situational context and background for analysis, thereby presenting the structural mapping of potential causes of conflict. At the ECOWAS Secretariat, the Director of the Centre compiles the Situation Reports and Incident Reports. The OMC also has responsibilities regarding establishing and maintaining collaboration with the member states, the African Union, the UN, research centers, major NGOs active in the sub-region, and all relevant international and regional organizations (see Jakkie Cilliers, *Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa*, ISS Occasional Paper 102, 2005).

80 The current ten members are the Foreign Ministers of the following states: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

81 The first Council of Elders was inaugurated in July 2001 in Niamey, Niger and count election monitoring in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo as well as Zimbabwe among their achievements. This Council was constituted as a 32-member organ drawn from the ten members of the Mediation and Security Council. At the Dakar Summit in January 2003, the Council of Elders was recomposed as a 15-member body, one from each member state of ECOWAS. On 23 April 2003, a new Council of Elders was inaugurated in Accra, Ghana. At their first meeting the new Council recommended that exploratory or preliminary missions in certain conflict situations be carried by the Elders before the intervention of the Heads of State. The current members for 2005 are: General Abdulsalam Abubakar, former president of Nigeria; Gactan Nitchama, former minister of Guinea Bissau; Bitokotipou Yagnimim, former minister of Togo; Elizabeth Alpha-Lavalie, vice speaker of Sierra Leonean parliament; Bernadine Do-Rego, Benin; Debra Ebenezer Moses, Ghana; Dieudonne Essiennze, Côte d'Ivoire; Abdourahmane Sow, Guinea; Mbaye Mbengue, Senegal; Bahou Ousmane Jole, Gambia; Leopold Andre Ouedrago, Burkina Faso; Emmanuel Gbalaze, Liberia; Sira Diop, Mali; Amirou Garba, Niger.

82 The ECOWAS early warning system, similarly to IGAD’s and AU’s native systems, is being developed by Virtual Research Associates, Inc., USA.
area of early warning is carried out in close partnership with civil society, and is being coordinated mainly through two West African civil society networks: the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). The Zonal Bureaus are, however, not yet functional. There is still a lack of technical and qualified staff to convert raw data into useful and predictive information. Nevertheless, ECOWARN is making some steady progress towards achieving a fully integrated early warning system by 2010.

**Peacekeeping and Enforcement**

The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) consists of 6,500 troops pledged by contributing nations. The troops are sub-divided between an ECOWAS Task Force composed of 1,500 troops that could be deployed within 30 days and an ECOWAS Main Brigade of 5,000 troops that could be deployed within 90 days. The ESF is to be coordinated through a Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC). The MPMC has a working group of 5 people nominated by member states. This working group is responsible for planning for the operation of ESF. The Taskforce should be made of 15 staff members (so far 8 positions have been filled).

Three training centers have been designated to offer ECOWAS troops training in peacekeeping operations. The National War College in Nigeria is aimed at the strategic level, a training center in Mali operates at the tactical level, and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana is focused on the operational level. As a recent Capacity Needs Assessment Report pointed out, apart from funding for selected courses, these institutions particularly need substantial support in respect of their respective Work Production Facilities/centers, which constitute the workhouse of the institutions. Additionally, two ECOWAS military exercises have been held. In 2004 an exercise under the Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) framework was organized for ECOWAS member states in Benin. In December 2007, some 1,600 troops from West Africa and France participated in Exercise DEGGO XXVII, a command post and field training exercise starting at Thies, Senegal. The exercise would strengthen the capacity of the Task Force component of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) towards making it functional by 2008.

An interesting aspect of the Protocol is that it calls for intervention not only in inter-state conflicts, but also in internal disputes that “threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster” or that pose “a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region.” Intervention is also authorized in situations of “serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law”, or “in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government” (art. 25).

The organic and operational record of ECOWAS is, however, not faultless. The organization has only demonstrated a modest interest from the military/security side in drawing out the linkages between their work and development programs for conflict prevention. Indeed, the defense and security staff still regard peace and security as a mainly military responsibility involving the ECOWAS Standby Force and other techniques involving military forces supported by formal structures. ECOWAS should therefore enhance the conceptual basis for peace and security in general, and conflict prevention in particular, so that a distinction between operational prevention and structural prevention becomes visible, and should increase understanding of conflict prevention related opportunities, tools and resources at technical and political levels. Indeed, ECOWAS has mostly focused on identifying operational and strategic partners that could collaborate in actualizing the 1999 Protocol rather than on creating synergies to develop a strategic vision or a sense of prioritization that is informed by the current needs of the region.

84 Analogously, the Report of the Joint EU-UN Assessment Mission to ECOWAS has pointed out that “Despite its broad mandate, ECOWAS has yet to articulate a strategic policy framework for sustainable peacebuilding and conflict prevention”. Also a report supervised by the UN Office for West Africa, recommended ECOWAS to “develop and publish an ECOWAS peace support operations, vision, concept and doctrine (see Report of the ECOWAS Workshop, Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990-2004, Accra, February 2005).
Nevertheless, ECOWAS is currently in the process of developing a Strategic Framework aimed at mainstreaming conflict prevention into ECOWAS policies and programs, enhancing the conceptual basis for conflict prevention, and bolstering ECOWAS’ anticipation and planning capabilities in relation to regional tensions.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

Several assessments carried out by independent consultants have indicated that the ECOWAS Secretariat is in need of training and equipment to operationalize the framework set up by the Protocol. The recent UN assessment mission to ECOWAS has concluded that ECOWAS still lacks the “resource capacity (both human and financial) to complete the organization’s institutional capability to maintain regional stability over the long-term.”

ECOWAS staff dealing with peace and security need to enhance their capacity in program/project identification, formulation, practical and financial management. Additionally, ECOWAS still needs to balance peace/security with development activities.

Financial administration remains weak and needs to be strengthened. Only five countries are up to date in the payment of their contributions, some member countries like Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and the Gambia have accumulated arrears over more than 10 years. The ECOWAS Secretariat’s move from Lagos to Abuja in 1998 was delayed by seven years due to lack of funds, and its staff have sometimes been irregularly paid. Dependence on external funding is growing as an increased number of donors show interest in fostering the capacity of the Secretariat. Such funding is either channeled through the ECOWAS internal budget or allocated directly to the department concerned. The Joint EU-UN Assessment Mission to ECOWAS has concluded, however, that no central source appeared to be aware of the entire range of assistance being provided to ECOWAS. And it added that the assistance is more based on the availability of funds and budgetary deadlines from donors rather than on systematically assessed needs.

Additionally, human resource management is still often driven by political appointments and promotions, hindering the progressive professionalization of ECOWAS staff.

Finally, in what financial resources are concerned, ECOWAS announced, in November 2005, the launch of the Peace and Development Project whose overall aim is to contribute to promoting peace in the region through the Peace Fund. This project has three key components, namely (i) capacity building, (ii) support to the Peace and Development Program, and (iii) project management. The Project is under implementation.

Although there is no reliable source that could indicate the exact figure of ECOWAS staff, it is estimated to be approximately 300 people. In 2006, it approved a budget of USD $121 million for the operations of the Secretariat and institutions of the Community.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

ECOWAS experience in issues of peace and security has mostly been attained in peacekeeping and enforcement, conflict prevention and peacemaking, and peacebuilding (election observation).

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86 See for example ‘ECOWAS Training Needs Assessment for the ECOWAS Dept. of Political Affairs, Defense and Security’ carried out by the Training Program on Peacebuilding and Good Governance for African Civilian Personnel based at LECIA, University of Ghana (February 2004).
87 See debriefing of ‘ECOWAS/Development Partners Annual Coordination Meeting and Launch of the Peace and Development Project’ (Abuja, 21-22 November, 2005).
Peacekeeping and Enforcement

Arguably, ECOWAS is the African regional organization with the most experience in military deployment. Nevertheless, a critical analysis will demonstrate that specific weaknesses of ECOWAS missions included: the lack of unified command and control, since troop contributing countries kept close national control on their forces; major differences in training and capabilities of contingents; the absence of a central logistic system, leading to a lack of coherence and predictability in logistic support; and lack of capacity to transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. ECOWAS has deployed military missions in the following countries:

• **Liberia I (1990-1997).** Following the outbreak of civil war that pitted Charles Taylor (NPFL) against governmental forces (led by President Samuel Doe), ECOWAS deployed a mission with the mandate “to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire” and restore “law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections.” ECOMOG, however, soon found its mandate complicated by the violent capacity of the warring factions. Not long after its deployment, ECOMOG shifted from being a peacekeeper to performing peace enforcement tasks.

• **Liberia II (2003).** After President Taylor resigned office and departed into exile in Nigeria, conditions were created for the deployment by ECOWAS, in August 2003, of what became a 3,600-strong peacekeeping mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). The UN took over security in Liberia in October 2003, subsuming ECOMIL into the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a force that grew to its present size of nearly 15,000.

• **Sierra Leone I (1997-1999).** It was established after Nigerian leader, General Sani Abacha, diverted peacekeepers from the successful Liberia mission to Sierra Leone in an attempt to crush a military coup by the Sierra Leonean army in May 1997. Nigerian troops reversed the coup in February 1998 and restored President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power.

• **Guinea Bissau (1998-1999).** The goal was to end civil conflict between President João Vieira (backed by Senegalese and Guinean military forces), and his former army chief, Ansumane Mané. Given the continuous degradation of the conflict and its poor capacity to cope with it, ECOWAS withdrew its forces before the conflict was resolved.

• **Côte d’Ivoire (2003-2004).** Deployed in order to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement that put an end to the civil war that had broken out in September 2002. On 27 February 2004, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution authorizing a full peacekeeping operation for Côte d’Ivoire, and mandating nearly 7,000 UN troops to monitor and help implement the peace agreement. The ECOWAS forces have been, as a result, subsumed within the UN mandated operation.

Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking

As a joint EU-UN assessment mission to ECOWAS observed, the West African organization has been more effective in crisis management through the deployment of peacekeepers than in conflict prevention. Nonetheless ECOWAS has field experience in conflict prevention and peacemaking. In Guinea Bissau (1998), mediation efforts (in collaboration with CPLP) led to a ceasefire agreement between President Vieira and dissident General Mané. In Sierra Leone (2000), it was directly involved in securing the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, and a subsequent meeting in Abuja in May 2001, which committed the RUF and government to start disarming. In Côte d’Ivoire (2002), ECOWAS dispatched a high-level ministerial delegation to Abidjan to begin efforts to restore peace between the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and rebel soldiers. ECOWAS also became a

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88 See IPA Meeting Note “The United Nations Contribution to African Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping” (April, 2006).
member of the Follow-Up Committee established to monitor the implementation of the agreement reached between the government and rebel groups. In Liberia (2003), ECOWAS facilitated peace talks among the Government of Liberia, civil society, and the LURD and MODEL rebel groups. In Togo (2005) special envoys were sent in order to mediate disputes and to prevent the outbreak of armed violence. In 2005, ECOWAS was also instrumental in appeasing tensions between Senegal and The Gambia that were sparked by the conflict in Casamance. A report supervised by the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) has clarified that “ECOWAS mediation has led to the signing of nearly two dozen peace agreements to end destructive wars in West Africa”\(^{90}\). Despite this, ECOWAS has not yet fully capitalized on the potential of its Council of Elders as many of the Council members lack training and knowledge in conflict prevention, resolution and management.

**Peacebuilding**

Finally, ECOWAS has deployed election observation missions, such as those in Benin (2006), Cape Verde (2006), Mali (2007), Nigeria (2007), Senegal (2007), Sierra Leone (2002 and 2007) and Togo (2005). ECOWAS has recently requested the support of the donor community to establish an Electoral Assistance Unit, and a Democratization and Good Governance Unit. So far, ECOWAS still does not have a single methodology to assess elections. Moreover, the elections observations undertaken by ECOWAS are generally limited to election day and not the entire electoral process.

**COORDINATION WITH THE UN**

The UN Department of Political Affairs oversees UNOWA, created in 2002 to bring a regional and integrated dimension to the wide-ranging UN peace efforts in the area. Headed by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, UNOWA is the first such regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding office of the United Nations. The Office works closely with ECOWAS to develop programs that address a wide range of issues affecting peace and security in and between countries in the region. The UNOWA mandate is to enhance ‘the contribution of the United Nations towards the achievement of peace and security priorities in West Africa’.

Furthermore, ECOWAS and UN senior staff meet regularly to exchange views on how to encourage cooperation between both organizations. In the case of Sierra Leone, a coordination mechanism between UN agencies and ECOWAS was implemented in 2000 to harmonize the UN and ECOWAS strategies. Also, the UN has cooperated with ECOWAS in efforts to compile the list of persons to be appointed to the Council of Elders for mediation purposes.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

With the founding of the European Union (EU) in 1992, an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created. The CFSP incorporates all activities and policies of the EU in the international arena, and therefore provides the central EU framework for foreign and security affairs. The CFSP has five key objectives: (i) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of its member states in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter; (ii) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; (iii) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; (iv) to promote international cooperation; and (v) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Part of the CFSP is the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which deals with questions of peace and security. In the second half of the 1990s life was breathed into the ESDP in a gradual, but rapid process: in 1997, crisis management tasks (known as the “Petersberg tasks”) were incorporated into the ESDP (Amsterdam Treaty). These crisis management tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In 1999, it was decided that the EU should develop the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. In the years thereafter, an EU Military Rapid Response Concept was developed and implemented. In June 2003, the first autonomous EU military crisis management operation took place. And a European Security Strategy was adopted for the first time in December 2003.

Regarding the civilian aspects of crisis management, the EU aims to be capable of carrying out any police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substituting local police forces. Since 2003, EU member states have undertaken to provide up to 5,000 police officers, of which up to 1,400 can be deployed in under 30 days. As regards civil protection, three different assets can be provided by the EU: 2 or 3 assessment and/or coordination teams, consisting of 10 experts, can be dispatched within 3 to 7 hours; intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons for deployment at short notice can be provided; additional or more specialized means can be dispatched within 2 to 7 days, depending on the particular needs of a crisis. In addition, the EU has Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) with almost 100 pre-identified and trained experts. The rule of law can be strengthened within crisis-management operations by nearly 300 officers with backgrounds in the judicial and

91 The member states of the EU are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
penitentiary system (prosecutors, judges, prison officers). Additional experts on civil administration can be deployed at very short notice.

The current formulation and implementation of ESDP policies is undertaken by a number of different actors within the institutional framework of the EU. Four different hierarchical layers can be distinguished:

- The first layer is constituted of the European Council, composed of the Heads of State and Government of the EU member states and the President of the European Commission. This body lays down the principles and general guidelines for the ESDP. The current President of the European Commission is José Manuel Barroso (from Portugal), who was elected in 2004 for a 5-year term.

- The second layer is the General Affairs and External Relations Council with Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 27 EU member states and the External Relations Commissioner of the European Commission. The Council adopts joint actions and common positions, and can present recommendations for common strategies. The Presidency of the Council, rotating every six months, is the driving force in the legislative and political decision-making process. Within the second layer, a High Representative (HR) for CFSP acts as a central contact person for third parties and gives the Union a continuous face in global politics. The HR assists the Council and especially the EU Presidency within CFSP and ESDP matters by ‘contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions’ and by acting on behalf of the Council ‘through conducting political dialogue with third parties’.

- At senior officials level (third hierarchical layer) one body is of particular relevance in ESDP matters: Ambassadors of the EU member states meet in the Political and Security Committee (PSC – commonly referred to by the French acronym COPS). The PSC is the linchpin of the CFSP and the ESDP and deals with management and policy-making on political and security issues on a daily basis, including the handling of crises. The PSC also supports the General Affairs and External Relations Council in its decision-making. Furthermore, Special Representatives pursue CFSP and ESDP policies in clearly designated matters, such as the Middle East or the Kosovo.

- Less senior experts on the fourth layer discuss CFSP issues in different constellations, most importantly within the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) (composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the member states, often represented by their permanent military representatives), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (military and civilian personnel), the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

Also the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council of the EU play a role in EU policy-making concerning peace and security. While the European Commission is involved predominantly in the social, economical, diplomatic and environmental dimension of security, the Council and its officials focus on diplomatic and military aspects.

Outside the policy-making structures stand three institutions providing scientific and technical input:

- The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) conducts security-related research and analysis, feeding into the policy-making processes;
- The European Defense Agency (EDA) is involved in developing defense capabilities, in promoting defense research and technology, as well as in armaments cooperation;
- The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) supports decision-making within the ESDP by providing analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data.
The ESDP functions within the same regulatory framework as the CFSP as outlined in Articles 11-28 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, two notable exceptions exist:

- Invariably, decisions on ESDP have to be taken unanimously (Article 23 [2] TEU);
- Operating expenditures for ESDP are covered by the EU member states and not charged to the general budget (Article 28 [3] TEU).

In December 2007, Heads of State or Government of the EU member states signed the Lisbon Treaty (ratification pending), which will have implications for policy-making in the field of peace and security. Particularly important for the ESDP are four of the Treaty’s proposals: 1) giving legal personality to the Union; 2) the establishment of the position of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘EU foreign minister’) by amalgamating the positions of the HR and the Commissioner for External Affairs; 3) the creation of an EU External Action Service; and 4) the implementation of new regulations on defense policy, allowing the EU member states to become more active outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The EU does not have its own army. Instead, it has to fall back on the troops and military capabilities of the EU member states, which again decide autonomously on the participation in a mission.

Nevertheless, two key instruments are at the Union’s disposal, with which it can act in fulfillment of the Petersberg tasks: the EU Battle Groups and the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). While the former are intended to be deployable more rapidly and for shorter periods in crisis situations, the ERRF are to be used in longer-term missions.

In January 2007 the EU Battlegroup Concept reached full operational capability. Up to fifteen battlegroups, composed of 1,500 combat soldiers each plus support, are to be formed. Currently, the EU has the capacity to undertake two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously. Forces should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. The battlegroups are sustainable for 30 days in initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately.

The ERRF is still in the process of creation, even though its first utilization took place already in 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Once fully operational, the ERRF will comprise 50,000-60,000 troops plus support, grouped in units of some 1,500 soldiers. These troops are deployable within sixty days for at least one year, fulfilling the whole range of Petersberg tasks.

A total of around 500 people work in the three above-mentioned ESDP-related EU institutes and agencies (EUISS, EDA, EUSC). The EU Council Secretariat has about 2,500 personnel, of which a couple of hundred civil servants work on security issues. About 22,000 people work within the European Commission, a majority of which on issues with a soft security dimension. The EU budget for 2008 is EUR €129.1 billion (USD $188.5 billion). The biggest resources, however, exist in the form of military and political personnel, as well as military equipment and financial resources, in the EU member states, on which the EU can fall back on.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is undertaken by the EU through seven main channels:

- Development cooperation and external assistance;
• Trade policy instruments;
• Humanitarian aid;
• Social and environmental policies;
• Diplomatic instruments and political dialogue;
• Cooperation with international partners and NGOs;
• New crisis management instruments.

The operational experience in those channels certainly goes beyond the four sub-complexes of conflict prevention identified above (i.e. preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and structural prevention).

The EU has been – or still is – involved in preventive diplomacy in various theatres. Particularly important in that regard is the work of the High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, virtually on the whole range of political and security crises occurring worldwide. The EU also acts through its Special Representatives. Currently ten such senior diplomats focus on different regions, such as the Middle East, the Great Lakes and the South Caucasus. Preventive Diplomacy is also undertaken within specifically designed policy-frameworks, such as the European Neighborhood Policy.

The EU has little experience in preventive deployment. The only operation to be mentioned in this context is the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (since 2005). Within this mission the EU helps to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud, by providing advice and training to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services.

The EU is pro-actively involved in preventive disarmament all over the world. Concerning small arms and light weapons such initiatives have been undertaken in Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Asia, and the Balkans. Examples of such involvement are projects in Tanzania, ECOWAS countries, Ukraine and Albania. In the nuclear and chemical disarmament field, the EU was associated with and involved in the bilateral US-Russia disarmament process.

Structural prevention is a key facet of EU external action. About half the money spent to help poor countries worldwide comes from the EU or its individual member states, making the EU the world’s biggest aid donor, paying out more than €30 billion a year in official aid. EU priorities are to attack the sources of the countries’ vulnerability: ensuring better food and clean water; improving access to education, healthcare, employment, land and social services; providing better infrastructure and a better environment. The EU also helps developing countries build institutional capacities and apply principles of good governance.

Peacemaking

The EU has experience in peacemaking in a number of conflicts. It has used diplomatic means to ease hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1992), Kosovo (from 1998) and Macedonia (2001). The same is true for Cyprus (since 1974), Democratic Republic of the Congo (since 2003), Sudan (Darfur) (since 2003), and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (since 1980).

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

The EU has conducted or still conducts three peacekeeping missions in its own right (Chad/Central African Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia), and was party to a joint mission in Indonesia:

• EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) (2003).

Contributed further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operation played a role in achieving a more peaceful, democratic and prosperous country.
• EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) (since 2004). Military deployment to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement; does have police duties against organized crime.

• EU Military Operation in Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) (since 2008). The goal is to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel; and to contribute to protecting UN personnel, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and UN and associated personnel.

• Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) (2005-2006). The EU participated in AMM monitoring the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the MoU signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Peacebuilding
So far, the EU has gained its most comprehensive operational experience in the field of peacebuilding. Since 2003, the EU completed five peacebuilding missions, and is still involved in nine such missions.

• EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) (since 2003). It aims to help in establishing a sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police force. EUPM assists the local police, fights large-scale organized crime and helps with police reform.

• EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) (since 2005). It monitors the operations of this crossing point on the Palestinian-Egyptian border.

• EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex) (since 2005). It has integrated training in the fields of management and criminal investigation, for a representative group of senior officials and executive staff from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary.

• EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa) (since 2005). It monitors, mentors, and advises the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) to be operational under a Congolese chain of command.

• EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DR Congo) (since 2005). It provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.

• EU Support to AMIS II (since 2005). It provides civilian-military supporting action to the African Union (AU) Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan; It was also established to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to back the AMIS II enhancement and supporting action; support the AU and its political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.

• EU Planning Team in Kosovo (since 2006). It has initiated planning to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas.

• EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) (since 2006). It contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership.
• **EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)** (since 2007). It aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards.

• **EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia** (since 2008): the goal is to monitor and analyze the situation pertaining to the stabilization process, centered on full compliance of the six-point Agreement.

• **EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo** (since 2008): The mission includes 2,000 police and judicial personnel.

• **EU SSR Guinea Bissau** (since 2008): The mission will provide advice and assistance on reform of the security sector in Guinea Bissau.

The completed missions are:

• **EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima)** (2003-2005). It monitored, mentored and advised the country's police thus helping to fight organized crime as well as promoting European policing standards.

• **EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis)** (2003). It contributed to the stabilization of the security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia.

• **EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (Eujust Themis)** (2004-2005). It supported, mentored and advised Ministers, senior officials and appropriate bodies at the level of the central government in addressing urgent challenges in the criminal justice system and in developing a coordinated overall approach to the reform process.

• **EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)** (2005-2006). It supported the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing.


**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

There has been a sea change in the relationship between the EU and the UN in recent years. What had been a benevolent co-existence for decades has turned into a promising partnership in most of the issues the UN is involved in, resulting in a steady increase of interaction and cooperation between both organizations at all levels.

EU member states provide 38 per cent of the UN’s regular budget, at least 40 per cent of funding for peacekeeping operations and about 50 per cent of contributions to voluntarily funded UN agencies, funds and programs. In addition, significant contributions to the UN-system (UN agencies, funds and programs) are provided by the European Community (around EUR €874 million in 2004 alone).

Strategic partnerships have been concluded in the field of development and humanitarian aid with several UN agencies, funds and programs (UNDP, WHO, FAO, ILO, UNHCR) with the aim of further developing policy dialogue and cooperation. Other agreements /exchanges of letters (ILO,
WHO, UNODC, UNEP, UNHCR) have been signed and facilitate regular policy dialogue and cooperation. Discussions are ongoing about enhanced cooperation between the Commission and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).

Intensified EU-UN cooperation extends also to conflict prevention and crisis management. Examples are the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from the UN task force, as well as the MONUC take-over from the EU military operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Further momentum was gained by the signing of the “Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management” in 2003, focusing on practical cooperation in the field of crisis management and related issues such as planning, training, communication and best practices. An overall increase in cooperation extends to exchange of information, coordination of activities and priorities as well as an increase of contacts at all levels, including implementation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding support, desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention and field level cooperation.

The EU has been attending the High-Level Meetings between the UN and Regional and other Intergovernmental Organizations since their inception in 1994, being the only organization (in its sui generis nature) that holds more that one seat. In fact, the EU is represented at the HLMs by the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The EU has also been attending the UNSC meetings with the regional organizations since 2003, represented by the member state holding its Presidency.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

IGAD is the successor organization to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), created in 1986 by six drought-stricken East African countries to coordinate development in the Horn of Africa. IGAD headquarters are in Djibouti. In April 1996, at the recommendation of the Heads of State and Government, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified three priority areas of cooperation: conflict prevention, management and resolution, and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development (transport and communications); and food security and environment protection. In its foundation treaty, IGAD has clearly accorded itself a role in peace and security. Article 18a determines that “Member States shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress”. To reach this goal, IGAD members shall take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability; establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of disputes; and accept to deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations.

The efficiency of IGAD has been hampered by several factors. In the words of IGAD’s Executive Secretary, H.B. Attalla, the region is idiosyncratic in the sense that “first, it often suffers from natural calamities (floods, famine, water shortages, droughts), second, IGAD countries are devastated by civil wars and political instability, third, they are the most poor countries in the world, finally, the illiteracy rate reaches 80%”. In addition to this problematic scenario, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000 and the still volatile tensions between the two Member States also affected the work of the organization. In April 2007, Eritrea decided to suspend its membership from IGAD ‘due to the fact that a number of repeated and irresponsible resolutions that undermine regional peace and security have been adopted in the guise of IGAD’. The internal structure of IGAD is as follows:

• The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme policy-making organ of the Authority. It determines the objectives, guidelines and programs for IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is elected from among the Member States in rotation.

92 The member states of IGAD are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.
93 Eritrea suspended its membership when the IGAD Council of Ministers, which met in Nairobi in April 2007, issued a communiqué highlighting the accomplishments Ethiopia had made in Somalia in its support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). The communiqué was approved by consensus, but Eritrea, later, claimed that the communiqué was a demonstration that IGAD was no longer a neutral organization. According to Eritrea, IGAD has been used by the US and by Ethiopia to advance their interests.
• The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for a term of four years renewable once. The Secretariat assists member states in formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonization of development policies, mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by the Council, and reinforces national infrastructures necessary for implementing regional projects and policies. The current Executive Secretary is Dr. Hamad Bashir Attalla of Sudan (since 8 April 2000). On 22 March 2004, he was elected for his second and final term and it was agreed that the next Executive Secretary would come from Kenya.

Within the Secretariat the Peace and Security Division is mandated to deal with issues related to peace and security and humanitarian affairs. The division has three main program components, namely: (i) Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR), (ii) Political Affairs, and (iii) Humanitarian Affairs.

• The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Minister designated by each member state. The Council formulates policy and approves the work program and annual budget of the Secretariat during its biannual sessions. Moreover, one of its functions is to promote peace and security in the sub-region and to make recommendations to the Assembly;

• The Committee of Ambassadors is composed of IGAD member states’ Ambassadors or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters. It convenes to advise and guide the Executive Secretary, as often as the need arises.

IGAD’s organizational capacity in security issues is primarily centered around early-warning/conflict prevention, peacekeeping and enforcement, and counter-terrorism

Early-Warning/Conflict Prevention

In 1998, IGAD Heads of State mandated the Secretariat in Djibouti to establish a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. Four years later, at the 9th Summit in Khartoum, IGAD Heads of State and Government signed the ‘Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)’. Following a consultative process, the subsequent central hub of the CEWARN Unit, located in Addis Ababa, was set up in June 2003 with funding from Germany (GTZ) and the United States (USAid). The Unit now has approximately 20 professional staff and a resource centre. It is intended to act as the hub and clearing-house for early warning in East Africa. Apart from secretarial duties, it creates and manages the conflict databases, provides shared internet communication for the national units, develops guidelines for users, sets standards and harmonizes information policies and systems, provides training, and recommends mechanisms for regional responses to cross-border and trans-border conflicts.

The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is responsible for the actual exchange of information, encoding of information and support of the national units, known as CEWERUs (Conflict Early Warning and Response Units)\(^4\). Once fully mature, each IGAD member state will have a CEWERU and an optional operational steering committee that could include a wide range of stakeholders\(^5\).

\(^{4}\) CEWARN uses a sophisticated methodology and reporting tool originally developed by Virtual Research Associates Inc (VRA). With funding from Germany and the United States, and assistance of the Swiss Peace Foundation who had been using much of this since 1998, the technology was embedded and customized at the CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa.

\(^{5}\) Unlike AU’s Situation Room, CEWARN’s uses primary sources. Data is usually generated by ‘field monitors’ (currently there are roughly 30 field monitors). They submit different types of reports, namely Situation Report (once a week) and Incident Reports (only when an event occurs). As CEWARN is on a pilot phase, the reporting areas do not cover all pastoral areas, but Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Somalia are each a reporting area. Civil Society organizations quality-control the data. They are in contact with the field monitors.
Part II of the Annex to the Protocol stipulates that, “CEWARN shall rely for its operations on information that is collected from the public domain, particularly in the following areas: livestock rustling; conflicts over grazing and water points; smuggling and illegal trade; nomadic movements; refugees; landmines; banditry” (52 variables in total). The focus on these variables sets aside the fact that the major causes of inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the IGAD region are centered on governance and political power within the member states, issues the Mechanism does not yet address. As pointed out by Daniel Yifru, Director of IGAD’s Peace and Security Division, “monitoring pastoral conflicts was the easiest entry point into the field of conflict prevention in East Africa. As most countries in the region are in tension with one another, embracing hardcore inter-state or intra-state armed conflicts was considered a premature and impudent step”. Nevertheless, IGAD is planning to adopt a new strategic concept for CEWARN that would allow monitoring hardcore security issues from 2012 onwards (end of pilot phase).

Yet, early warning presupposes early action and IGAD is not logistically fully prepared to respond to pastoral conflicts. The decision to intervene (or not) in conflicts is taken by the Assembly, which generally takes a long time to reach a decision due to divergent state interests, and it meets only once a year. IGAD officials seem to be aware of this problem. To address this issue, the organization is considering a responsive capacity through the implementation of tribal mediation projects. This idea is under consideration, and it has not yet been implemented.

Another shortcoming of early warning practices in East Africa is that although CEWARN is a complex and authoritative system it still requires the establishment of a single, integrated and comprehensive conflict prevention, management and reconstruction framework. Although IGAD launched the IGAD Strategy on Peace and Security in October 2005, it has not yet been properly formulated and implemented. The aim of the Strategy will be to enable IGAD member states, the IGAD Secretariat, and the citizens of IGAD countries actively to contribute to developing and maintaining a robust peace and security order throughout the sub-region. IGAD officials recognize that the organization’s involvements in Somalia and Sudan were spontaneous and did not follow any doctrine. In July 2007, IGAD organized a workshop on lessons learnt for future IGAD mediation efforts. The goal of the Strategy on Peace and Security is to formulate how and when to intervene.

**Peacekeeping and Enforcement**

The organizational capacity of IGAD is not solely concentrated on early warning but also on peacekeeping and enforcement. In 2003, IGAD was requested by the African Union to spearhead the conceptualization and formation of the Eastern Brigade of the African Standby Force (ASF). In February 2004, IGAD convened a meeting of Experts on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and in the same month the Eastern African Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) drafted a Policy Framework and a Legal Framework to operationalize EASBRIG. In April 2005, during the first EASBRIG Assembly of Heads of State and Government (held in Addis Ababa), the Policy Framework, Memorandum of Understanding, and Budget for the establishment of EASBRIG were adopted. The EASBRIG has three components: the Brigade headquarters located in Addis Ababa, the Planning Element based in Nairobi, and the Logistics Base located with the Brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa96. EASBRIG uses the Karen training centre in Nairobi to train the troops for peace support operation. In May 2007, as previously determined, IGAD handed over the responsibility of operationalizing EASBRIG to an independent organ, EASBRICOM, which is administratively attached to the Planning Cell in Nairobi97 and has been formed in full consensus with AU and IGAD’s decision-making bodies. The reason why IGAD is not taking up the responsibility is centered on the fact that some members of the Eastern Africa sub-region are not

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96 In 2005, a budget of USD $2,564 million for EASBRIG was agreed. It included the functioning budget for the EASBRIG headquarters (USD $873,813), the Logistics Base (USD $391,775), the Planning Element (USD $860,684) and Program and Coordination activities (USD $400,000). EASBRIG is expected to comprise 5,500 members composed of military personnel and civilians.

97 EASBRICOM Secretariat has a staff of 5 people.
part of IGAD: Rwanda, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, Malawi, and Mozambique (Tanzania and Mauritius have decided to contribute to SADC rather than EASBRIG).

In the absence of a legal framework EASBRICOM is governed by a MoU that provides for an Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, a Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff, a Standby Brigade and Logistics Base located in Addis Ababa and a Planning Element based in Nairobi. Member states supporting EASBRIG have contributed sufficient troops to make up the Brigade as required by the ASF framework. The Planning Cell is adequately staffed from a military point of view. The only handicap is the lack of civil/police and other civilian elements.

Counter-Terrorism

Finally, IGAD is also involved in counter-terrorism through the IGAD Capacity-Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT, created in 2002). There are four aspects to the program: legal area (adoption by member states of an adequate legislative network to prevent terrorism), system of interdepartmental cooperation (enhancement of national cooperation between the Ministries of Defense, Justice and External Relations, central banks, tourism agencies and chambers of commerce), border control (governance enhancement, electronic surveillance, and training of border police), and institutional linkages with other agencies to avoid duplication (namely extra-regional agents such as the UN). The Institute of Security Studies is the implementation agency of the Program and, in this sense, it provides technical administration. The Program is being funded by external donors (e.g. Canada, Holland, Sweden), whereas the Commonwealth provides training.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The finances of the Authority are derived from contributions of member states as well as assistance from other sources. The IGAD Partner Forum (IPF) is the mean through which contacts between IGAD and potential funding external actors are organized. The UN, the World Bank, the EU and various governments take part in the IPF meeting. It is subdivided into working groups focused on specific issues through which IGAD can gather external support and resources for its programs and operations. The regular yearly budget of IGAD is approximately USD $3 million, which is invested in running the Secretariat in Djibouti. CEWARN and ICPAT are externally funded by donors (primarily GTZ, USAid and EU). Also IGAD’s peace initiatives for Somalia and Sudan are donor dependent. Out of IGAD’s seven members, three regularly do not pay their levies: Uganda, Eritrea and Somalia, which create serious difficulties to the organization.

The Secretariat, based in Djibouti City, has a staff of 46, including 23 professionals and 23 support staff. In addition there are 7 technical advisors and other project staff. As far as peace and security issues are concerned, there are 2 people working on this portfolio in the headquarters, 20 people working at CEWARN, and 5 at ICPAT (both located in Addis Ababa).

Even though the physical and administrative conditions of the Secretariat are poor and the organization is under-resourced financially, the staff is entrepreneurial and diligent in capitalizing on the scarce resources available. Despite all limitations, the relation between IGAD and donors seems to be based more on pragmatic partnerships than on hierarchical financial directives.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

As stated in the ‘Agreement Establishing IGAD’, one of the objectives is to “promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue” (Art.7-g). In March 2005, IGAD proposed a Peace Support Mission to Somalia involving 10,000 troops, at a cost of USD $500 million for the first year. However, the plan never materialized and in 2006 it was decided that the deployment would be undertaken by the AU rather than IGAD. IGAD’s availability, unlike
AU’s, was not followed by international commitment to support logistically and financially the intervention.\footnote{IGAD officials believe that the lack of international support was a result of the US’ deliberate intention not to have any country or organization intervening in Somalia. However, when Islamists took power in Somalia, in 2006, the US put the country on the map of the global war on terrorism and withdrew its reservations over an intervention.}

In the field of peacemaking IGAD has a better record. Since 1993, it has been involved in negotiating a peace settlement in Sudan. In 1999, a Secretariat was created in Nairobi to ensure continued engagement with the parties to the conflict. The process, however, has been stalled over the question of the separation of state and religion and the right to self-determination of the South. In 2002, the Machakos Protocol agreed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A under the auspice of IGAD opened the way for the signing of a peace agreement in 2005.

Besides Sudan, IGAD is also involved in Somalia. In 1998, in cooperation with the IGAD Forum Partners Liaison Group, IGAD members created a Standing Committee on the Somali peace process, chaired by Ethiopia. This committee was mandated to organize a peace process in Somalia by providing a consultative forum for negotiations aimed at reconciliation and restoration of a government in Somalia. The current Transitional Federal Government is a result of Ethiopia’s effort in finding a solution for Somalia, and it received the approval of IGAD.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

In the case of Sudan, the United Nations has closely followed and supported the regional peace initiative carried out by IGAD. The Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, and other senior officials represented the UN at summit meetings of the IGAD countries, and carried out consultations with regional governments and organizations in support of the peace process. They also took part in meetings of the IGAD-Partners Forum, composed of donor countries and organizations supporting the IGAD peace process and assisting the regional organization to enhance its capacity in several areas. The UN Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was set up in order to prepare for a fully fledged UN peace support mission to be deployed during the interim period following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) as the result of the IGAD-led negotiations. UNAMIS was transformed into the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005, after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1590, which tasked UNMIS with supporting the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in the implementation of the CPA.

The UN also offered its backing on the settlement of the Somalia situation. The Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, accompanied by his Representative for Somalia, Winston Tubman, collaborated actively with IGAD leaders in efforts to re-energize the stalled reconciliation process during 2003-2004.

In 2005 the UN Security Council had approved the deployment of IGAD and AU troops in the Darfur region of Sudan. Similarly, in 2006 the UNSC approved a partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia to allow a deployment of IGAD troops under Chapter VIII of the Charter. However this deployment never occurred and was replaced by a deployment of AU troops.

The UN has also been collaborating with IGAD on various issues. In general, the relationship between IGAD and the UN has focused on specific issues with ad hoc UN agencies, such as for health (WHO), desertification (UNCCD), livestock and agriculture (FAO).
IGAD has not been a participant in the High-level Meetings between the UN and the Regional Organizations (although it was invited to attend the past two meetings). IGAD has also not been invited to participate in the UN Security Council meetings with the regional organizations.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Francophonie organization was first initiated through the establishment of the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique in 1970 between French-speaking countries, in order to promote cooperation among themselves. The first Summit of Head of States only occurred in 1986 and the organization truly became an intergovernmental institution following the Cotonou Summit in 2001, where it was renamed as the Agency of the Francophonie and its General Secretariat was established. Following the tenth Summit of the Francophonie, the Heads of State decided to empower the organization further and assign it new tasks. The decision prompted the adoption of the Charter of the Francophonie at the Antananarivo Summit in 2005. The new Charter specifically assigns functions linked to democracy, sustainable development, conflict prevention and human security. The Francophonie organization now includes 55 member and 13 observer states. The following organs were instituted after the adoption of the 2005 Charter:

- The **Summit**, comprising Heads of State and Government, convenes every two years. It is the supreme organ of the Francophonie and it decides, on the basis of unanimity, on the strategic plan of the organization.

- The **Ministerial Conference of the Francophonie**, which brings together the member states’ Foreign Ministers or the Ministers in charge of the Francophonie. The Ministerial Conference aims at ensuring the political continuity and sustainability of the decision adopted at the Summit. The Ministerial Conferences can focus on a specific theme, such as Information Society (Rabat, 2003), or Conflict Prevention and Human Security (Manitoba, 2006). The Organization also has two permanent Ministerial Conferences: the Conference of Ministers of Education of French-speaking Countries (Confémen) and the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports of French-speaking Countries (Conféjes).

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99 “Si la Francophonie, ces dernières années s’est développée, renforcée, rénovée, réorganisée avec votre appui clairvoyant, n’est-ce pas avant tout pour répondre à ce besoin criant de paix, d’égalité, de liberté?” (Statement in the original French version).

100 The members are: Albania, Andorra, Belgium, French-speaking Community of Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Canada – Province of Nouveau-Brunswick, Canada – Province of Quebec, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Moldavia, Monaco, Morocco, Niger, Romania, Rwanda, Saint-Lucia, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Vietnam. The observer states are: Armenia, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, Lithuania, Mozambique, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
• The Permanent Council of the Francophonie, presided over by the Secretary General, brings together the representatives of all the different member states. The Permanent Council is the Francophonie’s executive organ, ensuring the proper implementation of decisions adopted at the Summits and at the Ministerial Conferences. The Permanent Council is also responsible for approving, awarding and evaluating projects in the political and economic domain as well as cooperation. It has three different commissions working respectively on political issues, economic issues and cooperation.

• The General Secretariat is the executive body of the organization, also in charge of representing and promoting the organization. Similarly, it is in charge of coordinating multilateral cooperation. The General Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General who is the official representative of the Francophonie. The current Secretary General, Abdou Diouf, was elected during the 2002 Summit and re-elected again in 2006 for a second four-year mandate.

• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie acts as the consultative institution of the organization. It is composed of parliamentarians coming from 74 different states and inter-parliamentarian organizations. The Parliamentary Assembly is in charge of promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and cultural diversity.

Following the adoption of the Bamako Declaration at the tenth Summit of the Francophonie in 2000, new institutions were created to deal directly with the issues of peace, human rights and democracy. The newly established Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights falls under the direct authority of the Secretary General. It is composed of:
  • The Democracy, Human Rights and State of Rights Division, which is further divided into sections dealing respectively with Justice and Rights, Elections, Human Rights and Democratic Culture.
  • The Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace Consolidation Division, which includes a bureau for Prevention and Conflict Management, and one for Peace Consolidation and Transition.
  • An Observatory in charge of reporting to the Secretary General the advancement of democracy, rights and freedoms in the francophone area.

The Francophonie also expects to establish a conflict early alert mechanism working in a similar way to the observatory on democracy. However, this mechanism is yet to be implemented.

In 2006 as a follow up to the adoption of the new Charter in Antananarivo, and in order to strengthen the capacity of the Francophonie in the field of conflict prevention and security, the member states adopted during the Ministerial Conference the Saint Boniface Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Human Security. The Saint Boniface Declaration emphasizes the role of the Francophonie in regard to election observation, mediation and conflict prevention and at the same time calls for a greater involvement of francophone countries in peacekeeping operations.

Both the Ouagadougou Declaration, adopted during the tenth Summit, and the Saint Boniface Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Human Security, recognize the ‘responsibility to protect’ human security and the responsibility of the international community to act, with a UN mandate, in case of gross violations of human rights.

The Secretary General, who is the key actor in the peace and security strategy of the organization, also has the possibility to use other means in order to mediate a conflict or find an agreement in a crisis situation. The Secretary General can thus nominate a facilitator, who will be responsible for finding a suitable solution for all parties.

In regard to election monitoring, the Francophonie adopted in Marrakech in December 1996 its Defining Principles Guiding Election Observation. The Observation missions are dispatched after a request is formulated by the state holding the elections. The sending of these missions is the responsibility of
the Permanent Council of the Francophonie. The report of the election observation missions is in the end transmitted to the Permanent Council and the Secretary General.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

The budget of the International Organization of the Francophonie is composed of the contributions of the member states. The size of each member state’s contribution is agreed during the Ministerial Conferences. The preparation of the budget is the responsibility of the Permanent Council who is also in charge of drafting the financial reports.

In 2007, the Francophonie’s overall budget was USD $101,3 million. A bit more than half of the budget comes from the statutory contribution of France (54,5%), Canada and Québec (25,6%), the French Community of Belgium (8,6%), Switzerland (6,6%) while the other members together only account for 4,4% of the budget.

The Francophonie is also provided with a *Multilateral Fund*, composed of volunteer public financial contributions, exclusively dedicated to support specific activities within the framework of the Organization’s goals, especially in the domain of development and technical cooperation.

Out of the overall budget of USD $101,3 million, 36,8% (approximately USD $37,2 million) was used for the running of the organization while the rest was used to finance the various projects undertaken by the Francophonie. However, the Organization decided in 2007 to recalibrate the budget in order to allocate 75% of the money to the projects and only 25% to the administrative costs of the organization. The Francophonie is also expected to review in 2008 the size of the member states’ contributions as well as finding a solution to recover payment arrears, which reached 10 million euros in 2007.

In its strategic plan for 2007-2009, the Francophonie has decided to allocate USD $18,29 million to its programs in peace, democracy and human rights. This includes USD $8,56 million for the various projects that are part of the Strategic Goal to Consolidate Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, and USD $9,72 million for the Strategic Goal for Conflict Prevention, Post-Conflict rebuilding, Democratic Transition and Peace Consolidation.

As of June 2006, the staff working with the International Organization of the Francophonie totaled 327 employees.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

**Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention**

Since the adoption of the Bamako Declaration in 2000, the Francophonie has tried to become more operational in the consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights. The Francophonie’s action in this regard can be divided in two parts. On the one hand the *Observatory* has so far published two reports on the state of democracy and human rights in the francophone world. On the other hand, the organization (mainly through the Secretary-General) has tried to find solutions to political crises or in cases where the democratic order was disturbed. These included:

- In *Côte d'Ivoire*, the Francophonie participated as an observer, in the talks between the government and the rebel forces which ended with the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in January 2003. The Organization was represented by its delegate for human rights and democracy and by Lansana Kouyaté, its special representative for Côte d'Ivoire. A working group was also instituted to monitor the follow up of the agreement. The Secretary General also met on numerous occasions with Ivorian government officials in order to find a solution to the crisis.
• In the Comoros, The Francophonie involved itself in the talks between the conflicting parties. In collaboration with other international actors it helped in reaching an agreement signed by all the parties in December 2003. The Francophonie was also a member of the committee monitoring the implementation of the provisions made in the Agreement. The Organization is also involved in the reconstruction of the Comorian state institutions including its Court and its Parliament.

• The Secretary General of The Francophonie delegated a fact-finding mission in 2004-2005 to the Central African Republic following the political unrest in the country. The Francophonie became involved in the capacity-building effort for the National Dialogue, a conference aiming at resolving the political tension in the country. Later on, the Francophonie was elected a member of the follow-up committee on the implementation of the National dialogue provisions. A more or less similar pattern was used with regard to Burundi (2005) and to Chad (2005-2006).

• With regard to the political situation in Haiti, the Secretary General convened in 2004 an ad-hoc committee to monitor the evolution of the political situation in the country and to investigate the cases of human rights violations. A special High Level Mission was also delegated to Haiti in order to identify the areas where the Francophonie could play a positive role. Thus, the Organization became involved in projects aiming at consolidation the State’s institutions and ensuring good governance.

Peacebuilding

• The Democratic Republic of the Congo also benefited from the Francophonie’s support in its transition process. The Francophonie organized an International Seminar on the management of the transitional institutions in Kinshasa in 2004, which paralleled its capacity building effort towards the Congolese institutions.

• Following the coup in Mauritania in 2005, the Permanent Council decided, after convening an extra-ordinary meeting, to suspend part of the projects the Francophonie was carrying out in Mauritania. Nevertheless, the Francophonie expressed its readiness to resume these projects and provide support to the democratic transition after the military junta announced its intention to hold democratic elections. A fact-finding mission was thus delegated to Mauritania and was to be followed by full support from the Francophonie for the transition process. The support included an effort to increase the capacity of various institutions, including the Mauritanian Constitutional Council, and promoting good governance. A similar framework was also used for Togo in 2005 including the suspension of its membership to the International Organization of the Francophonie.


Peacekeeping

Despite not having the capacity to deploy forces under the francophone banner, the Francophonie has called through the Saint Boniface Declaration in 2006 for the organization to be involved in various projects aiming at building the capacity of peacekeepers. The Francophonie could thus provide capacity-building in the areas of human rights and institution rebuilding by taking part in the
RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) and PAIM (Program d’Aide à l’Instruction Militaire) programs.

COOPERATION WITH THE UN

The Francophonie is an observer at the UN General Assembly and has a permanent office in New York. The Francophonie has also participated in the High-Level Meetings between the UN and regional organizations since 1998. The Francophonie has also taken part in the Standing Committee (set up to act as a link between high-level plenary meetings). While the IOF has become a constant participant in the HLMs, it has not been invited to participate in the UNSC meetings with the regional organizations.

Meetings between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the missions of the francophone countries were held in March 2006 to initiate a dialogue between DPKO and IOF in order to increase the participation of the Francophonie member states and observers in peacekeeping operations. The IOF is also pushing for a greater usage of the French language in UN peacekeeping operations. A group of francophone experts was dispatched in May-June 2006 to participate in DPKO’s pilot project for the training and recruitment of police officers for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Dakar and Yaoundé.

IOF collaborated with the UN on various electoral timetables in French-speaking areas. Thus, the Francophonie collaborated extensively with the UN offices and missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. It was also involved in the review of a draft text on harmonizing the electoral observation rules and practices of international organizations adopted by the UN on 27 October 2005.

The Francophonie and the High Commissioner for Human Rights signed an agreement in 1997 which makes provision for a commission bringing together officials from both institutions. The Commission is in charge of ensuring the realization of the joint projects undertaken by the High Commissioner and the Francophonie. Furthermore, the two institutions have agreed in 2007 on a common program focusing on conflict prevention, conflict resolution, elimination of discrimination and the promotion of diversity. The program, running from the end of 2007 till 2009, will be jointly financed and benefit from extensive exchanges between the High Commissioner and the Francophonie.

Additionally, the Francophonie is involved in a vast array of projects and development programs in which the organization also collaborates with UN organs. For example, The Francophonie has been participating in the UNDP Millennium Development Goals.

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The League of Arab States (LAS) was established when the Charter of the League of Arab States was signed by Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen in Cairo, Egypt, on 22 March 1945. The creation of the League of Arab States results from the October 1944 Alexandria Protocol, an agreement reached between five of the League’s founding members. The League was established in order to bring the member states closer and coordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them. The League also aims to foster cooperation in economic, cultural, and financial issues; infrastructure; and matters concerned with nationality, social welfare and health.

Article 5 of the Charter ensures that member states should not resort to force in the settlement of disputes among them but should refer the dispute to the League to act as mediator and arbitrator. The member states also signed a Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League on 17 June 1950. The Treaty provides a framework for collective security between the member states and calls for increased cooperation in the security and military fields.

In March 2000 during the 113th session of the League’s Council at the Foreign Ministerial level, the member states agreed on the League of Arab States Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Between the Arab States. The Mechanism opened the way for the adoption of the Statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council during the 18th ordinary session of the Council of the League at Summit level held in Khartoum in March 2006. The Statutes entered into force in June 2007 after one third of the member states ratified it. The League is an intergovernmental organization, its main bodies are:

- The Council of the League, which convokes the representatives of the member states. The Council can meet at the Summit level, when it brings together the Heads of State and Government, or at Ministerial level. The Council holds ordinary sessions twice a year (in March and in October) at the League’s headquarters in Cairo. The function of the Council is to realize the purposes of the League and supervise the execution of the agreements concluded between the member states. During the meetings, decisions are adopted by a simple majority vote (in which case the decision is only binding to the states who voted in favor) or unanimously (in which case the decision is binding for all member states). Each state only has one vote. Chairmanship of the Council follows a rotation among member states.

101 The current member states are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
• The Special Committees is responsible for establishing the basis and scope of cooperation by drafting agreements that will subsequently be submitted to the Council. The Charter of the League of Arab States provides for the establishment of Special Committees on a series of matters to be dealt with by the League. These include the Political Committee, the Social Committee, the Permanent Committee for Administrative and Financial Affairs, and the Legal Committee. Non-member Arab countries may also participate in the Special Committees upon decision by the Council. Some of the Special Committees have evolved so as to become Ministerial Councils bringing together Ministers from the member states. Twelve such councils have been established working on issues such as internal affairs, justice, health, transport, information and environment.

• The General Secretariat is composed of a Secretary General and Assistant Secretaries. The Secretariat is the administrative body of the League. It provides support for the Councils (Summit and Ministerial level) and for the Special Committees. The General Secretariat is subdivided into the Conference Secretariat, responsible for protocol affairs related to the Councils meeting, and seven other departments. These departments cover respectively: Finances and Administration, Political affairs, Economic and Communication affairs, Social and Health affairs, Legal matters, Information and Publication, Cultural affairs. The Secretary General is appointed by the Council upon the vote of two-thirds of the member states for a five-year renewable term. The current Secretary General is the Egyptian diplomat Amr Moussa who was elected to the post in 2001.

The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League signed in 1950 also establishes special bodies which include:

• A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of the Contracting States. The main task of the Permanent Military Commission is to draw up plans of joint defense and their implementation in order to encourage the cooperation and coordination of the Contracting States' armed forces. The Permanent Military Commission is headquartered in Cairo.

• The Joint Defense Council is under the supervision of the Arab League Council and is composed of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States. It is in charge of ensuring the collective security of the Contracting States, facilitating the cooperation and coordination of the armed forces and it supervises the work of the Permanent Military Commission. The Joint Defense Council adopts decisions by vote. A two-thirds majority is considered binding to all the Contracting States.

In March 2006 the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at Summit level in Khartoum agreed on the Statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council, which paves the way for the creation of new security organs. The Council, instituted by the Statutes, is composed of five member states (the two previous states chairing the League’s Council, the current Chair, and the two states due to chair the following sessions) represented by their Foreign Ministers. The League’s Secretary General also participates in the meetings of the Council. The Council meets twice a year at ministerial level prior to the meetings of the League’s Council or in extraordinary session upon request by a member state or by the Secretary General. It held its first meeting on 13 December 2007 where it discussed the rules of procedure of the Council and urged the Arab states that have not ratified the Statutes to do so.

The Arab Peace and Security Council is responsible for proposing collective measures in case of aggression, developing an early warning system and exercising good offices, conciliation and mediation to prevent the escalation of disputes. It is also expected to make efforts with regard to post-conflict efforts and reconstruction, humanitarian action and cooperation as well as making proposals for the establishment of an Arab peacekeeping force when deemed necessary. The Council provides for the following organs:
• The Data Bank established by the Secretary General. The aim of the Data Bank is to collect information provided by member states and regional and international organizations to help the Council assess a situation.

• An Early Warning System, which is to be composed of experts from the staff of the General Secretariat who will analyze the available data and information, monitor the evolution of a situation and submit their report to the Council.

• A Board of Wise Personalities composed of prominent Arab personalities. Members of the Board are designated by the Chairperson of the Council and then chosen by the Secretary General, to undertake mediation, conciliation or good offices missions between conflicting parties.

The Council can also be made responsible for setting up and dispatching civil or military observer missions to conflict areas.

In 2004, the Resolution on Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons was adopted during a ministerial council of the League in order to control the flow of arms in the Arab world. According to the resolution, member states are to coordinate their policies with regard to arms flow and more specifically illicit cross border arm trade in the region. The implementation of the program also gives an important role to the multiple national focal points as they need to monitor arm flows and disseminate information on small arms and light weapons to the other member states and to the Organization.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The League of Arab States’ budget is drafted by the Secretary General before being submitted to the League’s Council. Each member state’s share of the budget is decided by a resolution adopted by the League’s Council. The budget of the General Secretariat in 2007 was around USD $35.7 million. Some of the institutions affiliated to the League of Arab States have autonomous budgets relying on the voluntary contribution of the member states. However, the Statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council clearly indicate that the Council’s budget is to be drawn from the already strained budget of the General Secretariat. The League’s budget also suffers from arrear payments as some member states do not pay their full share to the Organization.

The League also has two affiliated institutions, through which it carries out development projects. Since 1974 the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development has been lending money to finance economic and social projects. These projects aim to assist member countries in providing basic infrastructure services, institutional support and capacity building, promoting social development, developing educational and health services, and implementing emergency programs. In 2006 the Fund awarded loans for a total of USD $1138 millions. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa was established in order to strengthen economic, financial and technical cooperation between Arab and African countries (including those who are not members of the League). In 2007, the Bank extended loans and technical assistance operations to some African countries for a total amount of USD $68 million.

The General Secretariat currently employs an estimated staff of 500 and a similar number of consultants working on a regular basis for the League. Moreover, the staff working for the Peace and Security Council is expected to be drawn from the staff of the Secretariat.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Peacekeeping

The League has already been involved in different instances of issues pertaining to peace and security. Despite not having had specific provisions for the deployment of a peacekeeping force
before the adoption of the Statutes, the LAS deployed troops under the League’s umbrella. These peacekeeping operations are:

- **Palestine** (1948 – 1949) – the refusal by Arab States to accept the partition of Palestine led them to consider the deployment of their armies in Palestine. The Israeli declaration of independence sparked the intervention by the member states under the League’s aegis. Contingents from Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, as well as a small number of troops from Saudi Arabia and Yemen fought under the League’s umbrella. The intervening forces peaked at around 25,000 troops, with the majority being drawn from the Egyptian army (around 10,000). The Arab League also sponsored and supported the Arab Liberation Army, a military corps made up of volunteers coming from different Arab countries. In a cablegram sent by the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the UN Secretary-General it was stated that the aim of the intervention was the creation of a united Palestinian state. However, the intervention was marred by inter-Arab rivalries and failed to reach the goal set by the League. In 1949, Israel signed a set of armistices with the Arab states in which they agreed to withdraw their forces behind the Armistice Demarcation Line.

- **Kuwait** (1961 – 1963) – an Arab League Force was deployed following the departure of the British troops whom had been present in Kuwait until it gained its independence. The League deployed its force following concerns expressed by the Kuwaiti head of state that Iraq would try to annex the former British protectorate. 3,000 men, consisting of troops from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, Tunisia and Jordan, were deployed to protect the independence of Kuwait until 1963 following Iraq’s recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

- **Lebanon** (1976 – 1982) – originally known as the Arab Security Force (ASF), it became the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) after a change in its mandate. The decision to deploy an Arab Force followed the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in June 1976. The League’s Council at ministerial level adopted a resolution to establish an Arab Force responsible for enforcing a ceasefire and promoting national reconciliation. Later on, a resolution was passed to transform the ongoing operation into a deterrent force. According to the resolution the ADF was to be composed of 30,000 men mainly drawn from Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, North and South Yemen and Sudan.

Additionally the League of Arab States also set up a **military commission** in 1980 to monitor the ceasefire between North and South Yemen which it had helped reach in 1979. A similar mission had already been established earlier for the same conflict in 1972. A Joint military commission set up by the league also worked on Yemen following the intrastate conflict in 1994.

**Peacemaking and Peacebuilding**

The League of Arab States has also gained experience in **peacemaking** by undertaking mediation attempts to stop conflicts involving some of its member states. The League was thus involved in multiple mediation efforts on several occasions between Kuwait and Iraq (1961, 1973 and 1990) as well as between the warring factions in Somalia (the most notable efforts being in 1997 and 2006-2007). The Arab League has also attempted to carry out a disarmament program in Somalia. In 1961 the Secretary-General of the League mediated in the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, which resulted in the deployment of an Arab League Force (see further). In 1962, a tripartite commission was found to facilitate the Agreement of Jeddah after the civil war in Yemen. In 1963 the League mediated in a dispute between Algeria and Morocco. In 1980, a commission was set up to facilitate the normalization of relations between Libya and Tunisia. In 1994 delegations from the League were sent to facilitate talks between armed forces in North and South Yemen. In 1948, and later also in 1962, the League sent a commission of inquiry to Yemen to examine the internal situation. Good offices by the Secretary-General were used in 1961 in fostering dialogue after Syria’s secession from the United Arab Republic. This was also the case in 1961 for tensions between Iraq and Kuwait, in 1976 in Lebanon, in 1972 between North and South Yemen, and in 1992 with tensions between Sudan and Egypt.
Since 1948, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also ranked high among its priorities. In March 2002, the League endorsed the Beirut Declaration based on the proposal by Saudi Arabia. According to the declaration, the League’s member states would offer Israel formal recognition, normalization of relations, and peace agreements, should Israel withdraw from all territories occupied since 1967. It would also solve the Palestinian refugee problem and recognize the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

In 2002 ‘the Arab peace initiative’ was proposed by crown prince Abdullah from Saudi Arabia at the Beirut Summit of the League. The initiative obtained unanimous consent of all member states and was endorsed at the Riyadh Summit in March 2007. Jordan and Egypt were appointed by the League as its representatives to promote the initiative in meetings with Israeli officials. In July 2007, a delegation from the League visited Israel for the very first time.

The League also involved itself in the recent political crisis in Lebanon. During their extraordinary meeting in the League’s ministerial council at the beginning of January 2008, the Arab ministers of foreign affairs charged the League’s Secretary General with activating the Arab initiative to end the dangerous crisis in Lebanon resulting from the dispute over the nomination of the President of the Republic. Mr. Moussa visited Beirut and Damascus on several occasions before reporting back to the Arab delegations to the League on the outcome of his contacts and visits.


**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The League of Arab States was set up before the United Nations was established. However, the Charter establishing the League already made provision for the future international organization. Nevertheless, it was only in 1950 that the League obtained Observer status at the United Nations General Assembly. Since then, exchanges and collaboration between the League and the UN have been frequent. The UN Secretary General regularly attends the League’s Summit to discuss with member states and officials of the organization.

The various institutions that are affiliated with the Arab League, such as the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, the Arab Women’s Organization or the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, have also a long tradition of collaborating with their UN equivalent. The UN and the League have also agreed to hold sectoral meetings between their affiliated institutions on a biennial basis to address priority areas of major importance to the development of Arab States.

The UN and the League of Arab States held a General Meeting on Cooperation in Vienna in April 2006, where the various areas of cooperation between the two organizations were discussed by senior officials. The topics discussed during the meeting included the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as economic and social issues. The League also expressed its interest in benefiting from UN expertise in the domain of peace and security, especially in regard to conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The two organizations agreed to strengthen their cooperation in a large variety of domains and to work together on projects linked to peace and security as well as development. This type of General Meeting on Cooperation is expected to be held once every two years in order to assess the level of collaboration between the two organizations and the progress of the projects that are being jointly implemented.

In December 2003, in Cairo, the UN, through the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), and the League of Arab States organized a joined conference on small arms and light weapons and on disarmament in the Arab states. The conference also offered an opportunity to review and discuss the implementation of the UN Program of Action on small arms in the Arab world that had been agreed with the League’s secretariat in 2001. The conference also paved the way
for the adoption of the Resolution on Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons by the League in 2004. On the ground, the League and the UN have also been cooperating in implementing a disarmament program in Somalia and in ensuring a better monitoring of arms trade across borders in the Arab world.

In October 1999, the League signed a cooperation agreement with the UNDP, which enforces cooperation in the fields of common interest. The agreement also enables the League to participate in UNDP meetings as an observer and gives the UNDP the possibility to participate as an observer in the meetings of the Arab Economic and Social Council and the technical and specialized committees, as well as conferences about issues of common interest.

The Secretary General of the League has on various occasions expressed its interest in benefiting from UN expertise in a variety of fields including issues pertaining to peace and security. The League recognized information exchange, trainings, exchange of expertise and technical assistance as some of the areas through which the UN could improve the League’s efficiency. Capacity-building programs were also called for during the General Meeting on Cooperation between the two organizations, and on different occasions such programs have already been taking place, even if not yet in the field of peace and security.

The LAS has been playing a very active role in UN High Level Meetings with the Regional Organizations since their inception, and namely through the work of its Secretary-General, Mr. Amr Moussa, who is a very strong supporter of the Regional-Global Security Mechanism. LAS has also been an active participant in the UNSC meetings with the Regional Organizations since their inception in 2003.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The organization was established in April 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by representatives of 12 countries. Primarily NATO was formed to counter the threat of communist expansion in the post-World War II era. After the end of the Cold War, the organization has undergone a process of transformation, adapting to the changes in the security environment so as to continue ensuring the defense and security of its members. At the beginning of the 1990s, NATO started to cooperate with states from the former Soviet Republic. Most of the former Soviet block countries signed the Partnership for Peace and showed interest to join NATO later on. Nowadays NATO counts 26 member countries (there is a possibility of membership enlargement in 2008). Its fundamental role is to safeguard the “freedom and security” of its member states by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the UN Charter. The cooperation and commitment of member states is based on the common values of democracy, individual liberty, rule of law, and peaceful resolution of disputes. With the signing of the Treaty, the member states agreed that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (Art. 5 of Treaty). The guiding principle by which NATO works is common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all its members.

The fundamental security tasks of NATO are described in NATO’s Strategic Concept, which is an authoritative statement of the objectives of the organization, and which provides the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, recognizing the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace and enhancing security and stability as set out in the Strategic Concept, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law. This also includes the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

NATO has a double-layered structure, consisting of civilian and military bodies. However, the key political decision-making body and the only body established by the North Atlantic Treaty is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Council brings together representatives of all member countries to discuss policy or operational issues. It provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their security. Meetings of the Council are chaired by the Secretary-General. The Council meets at least every week at the level of permanent representatives, twice a year at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as at the level of Ministers of Defense, and

Organizational Capacity

Founded in 1949 (North Atlantic Treaty/Treaty of Washington)
Headquarters in Brussels. 26 Members.
www.nato.int

Mandate in Peace and Security:
- North Atlantic Treaty, art. 2 and 5 (1949)
- NATO Strategic Concept (1999)

“... To develop such a culture of cooperation, we all need to show pragmatism, imagination, and a greater understanding of each other’s capabilities”.

JAAP DE HOOP SCHIEFFER
NATO Secretary-General (2006)

102 The member states of NATO are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
occasionally at the Summit level with the participation of Prime Ministers and Heads of State and Government. The work of the NAC is prepared by subordinate committees like the Senior Political Committee, the Defense Planning Committee or the Nuclear Planning Group. There are more than 300 committees supporting the three main committees.

Civilian Structure

- The Secretary General has three main roles: first and foremost, he is the chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group as well as the chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. Secondly, he is the principal spokesman of the organization and represents it in public on behalf of the member countries. Thirdly, he is the senior executive officer of the NATO International Staff. He is nominated by member governments for an initial period of four years. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Netherlands) took up his duties as NATO Secretary General on 5 January 2004, beginning an initial four-year term in office. The Secretary General is supported by a Deputy Secretary General and six Assistant Secretary Generals (NATO Handbook, 2007)

The Secretary General is based at NATO headquarters in Brussels. National delegations and their permanent representatives, and diplomatic missions of partner countries, are also represented at the headquarters. Moreover, the International Staff works as an advisory and administrative body that supports the work of the national delegations at NATO headquarters at different committee levels.

Military Structure

- The Military Committee is the senior military authority in NATO under the overall political authority of the North Atlantic Council. It meets normally every Thursday, following the regular Wednesday meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The Military Committee is under the chairmanship of an elected chairman (CMC) and is the primary source of military advice to the North Atlantic Council, Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group. It brings together senior military officers who serve as their country’s military representative to NATO. The Committee is responsible for recommending to NATO’s political authorities measures considered necessary for the common defense of the NATO area and for the implementation of operations and missions. Its principal role is to provide military guidance to NATO’s two Strategic Commanders – Supreme Allied Commander Operations and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO Handbook, 2007)

- Allied Command Operations (ACO), with its headquarters, SHAPE, near Mons, Belgium, is under the responsibility of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The main tasks are: contributing to the peace, security and territorial integrity of member states by assessing risks and threats, conducting military planning, and identifying and requesting the forces needed to undertake the full range of NATO missions. It contributes to the crisis management arrangements. In the case of aggression SACEUR executes all the military measures within the authority and capabilities of its command.

- Allied Command Transformation (ACT) comes under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), whose responsibilities can be summarized as follows: integrating, synchronizing and promoting NATO’s transformation efforts, in cooperation with ACO, with the operational activities and other elements of the command structure; conducting operational analysis at the strategic level, in cooperation with ACO, in order to identify and prioritize the type and scale of future capability and interoperability requirements and to channel the results into NATO’s overall defense planning process; exploring concepts and promoting doctrine development; conducting experiments and supporting the research and acquisition processes involved in the development of new technologies; managing resources allocated for NATO’s transformation programs; conducting training and education programs.
Both the SACEUR and the SACT are United States Flag or General Officers appointed by the US President and approved by the North Atlantic Council.

The new command and control structure of NATO, agreed in 2003, functions on three levels: a) strategic level – in charge of the operational aspects including planning and conducting operations; b) component/tactical level – has six Joint Force Component Commands providing service-specific expertise to the operational level; and c) a specific transformation command level – oversees the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities.

By adopting the 1999 Strategic Concept, crisis management is considered to be a fundamental security task of NATO. It can involve both military and non-military measures of response to a threat. NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises: the top decision-making body - the North Atlantic Council - exchanges intelligence, information and other data, compares different perceptions and approaches, and harmonizes its views. The NATO Crisis Management Process represents a number of systems and structures which are available to deal with crises. The Process consists of four principal elements: the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS), NATO’s Operational Planning System and NATO Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Agreements. Depending on the nature of the crisis, different types of crisis management operations may be required: (i) collective defense crises: are referred to as “Article 5 operations”; (ii) crisis response operations: all military operations conducted by NATO in a non-Article 5 situation. They support the peace process in a conflict area and are also called peace support operations and include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations; (iii) natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations: to assist member and partner countries who are victims of disasters.

The authority to initiate formal considerations on a possible NATO involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking lies with the North Atlantic Council. This procedure takes place following the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution. The political basis for a NATO peacekeeping operation was established by a decision at an Oslo meeting of Foreign Minister in 1992. They announced the readiness of NATO to support the peacekeeping operations.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

The financing of NATO is based on the member states’ direct contributions. The resources are allocated in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula broadly calculated in relation to member states’ ability to pay. Contributions of member states follow the principle of common funding. The common funding structure is diverse and decentralized. Certain multinational cooperative activities related to research, development, production and logistic support do not involve all and, in some instance, may only involve a small number of member countries. Common funding includes the NATO Civil and Military Budgets and NATO Security Investment Program.

The Civil Budget for 2007 is USD $364,18 million and covers the operating costs of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters; the execution of approved civilian programs and activities; and the construction, running and maintenance costs of facilities including the personnel costs. The Civil Budget is funded by the contributions of the member country.

The Military budget for 2007 is around USD $2 billion largely financed from the appropriations of Ministries of Defense. It covers the operating and maintenance costs of the international military structure. This includes the Military Committee, the International Military Staff, military agencies, the two Strategic Commands and Associated Command, Control and Information Systems, research and development agencies and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Forces.

The NATO Security Investment Program covers the major construction and control system investments needed to support the roles of the NATO Strategic Commands, which are beyond the national
defense requirements of individual member countries. In 2007, the NSIP budget was USD $1252,45 million.

The United States, Britain, Germany and France are the largest contributors to each segment, with payments ranging from 15 percent to over 23 percent into those budgets, while Belgium, Turkey, Denmark, Poland and the Netherlands pay under 2.75 percent.

The civilian and military budgets, however, do not cover the cost of missions, which are financed under the principle that “costs lies where they fall”. In reality, this means that any country that sends a soldier or equipment on a NATO mission is responsible for meeting its own costs.

There are approximately 4,200 people working at the NATO Headquarters: 2,100 members of national delegations and staff of national military representatives, 400 members of missions of NATO’s partner countries, 1,200 civilian members of the international staff or agencies located in the headquarters and 500 members of the International Military Staff.

The process establishing the 25,000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF) was launched on 15 October 2003 and reached full operational capability in November 2006. The NRF is a joint, multinational force with advanced technological capabilities, which is on alert and able to be deployed within five days notice, sustainable for up to thirty days or longer if re-supplied.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Peacekeeping

From 1992 onwards NATO participated in several peacekeeping operations:

• **Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR)** (1995 - 2004) The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was responsible for implementation of the military aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement with 60,000 troops. IFOR contributed substantially to the creation of a secure environment conducive to civil and political reconstruction. In 1996 IFOR was succeeded by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which contained 32,000 troops. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1088, SFOR became the legal successor to IFOR, its primary task being to contribute to the development of the secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. This operation was led by NATO for 9 years from December 1995 until December 2004, when responsibility was handed over to the EU.

• **Kosovo, Serbia (KFOR)** (since 1999) The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed in the wake of a 78-day air campaign launched by NATO in March 1999 with the aim to stop and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding. NATO’s initial mandate was to deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Serbian forces; to establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; to support the international humanitarian effort; and to coordinate with and support the international civil presence. Today, KFOR focuses on building a secure environment in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, can live in peace, and, with international aid, democracy and civil society, it is gradually gaining strength. At present, NATO has approximately 15,600 troops deployed in Kosovo – 16% are formed from the troops of NATO’s Partner Countries. KFOR’s presence remains crucial to guarantee security and stability in Kosovo as the diplomatic process led by the UN to define its future status moves forward. NATO has promised to support the security provisions of any final settlement.

• **Afghanistan (ISAF)** (since 2003) It is the first NATO operation beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created following the UN Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444 to enable the Afghan Transitional Administration and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to operate in the area around the capital Kabul. Later on the
mission was expanded to cover other parts of the country via Provincial Reconstruction Teams. NATO is seeking to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security within its area of operation, to support the government in expanding its authority over the whole country and to help provide a safe and secure environment. The troops under NATO command number 33,460 members.

• NATO became involved in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the request of the Skopje authorities to help defuse an escalating conflict between the government and ethnic Albanian rebels to head off what might have degenerated into a full-scale war. Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski asked in June 2001 for NATO assistance to help disarm and demilitarize the National Liberation Army (NLA) and ethnic Albanian groups. NATO troops entered the country after signing a peace plan, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (13 August 2001). NATO’s presence in the country was divided into three operations. First – Essential Harvest was aimed at collecting and destroying of all weapons voluntarily handed in by the NLA. This operation included 3500 NATO troops. Second – Amber Fox, which included around 1000 troops, provided protection for international monitors from EU and OSCE who were overseeing the implementation of peace plan. Third – Allied Harmony was deployed in December 2002, aiming to minimize the risk of destabilization in the country, provide support to the monitors and assist to the government in assuming responsibility for security. The responsibility for these tasks was handed to the EU in March 2003, though NATO maintains its military and civilian presence. The Headquarters in Skopje has 120 personnel.

• Between 1992 and 1995, NATO participated on operations to monitor, and subsequently enforce, a UN embargo and sanctions in the Adriatic, and to monitor and then to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO also provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and authorized air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened areas designated by the UN as safe areas.

• Since May 2003 NATO has been involved in various ways in helping with Iraq’s transformation. On the request from the Iraqi Interim Government and under UN Security Council Resolution 1546, NATO agreed to assist to the Interim Government with training Iraqi personnel inside as well as outside the country, and to support the development of security institutions in Iraq, which includes helping to build effective armed forces and providing equipment and technical assistance to them. In July 2004 NATO established a Training Implementation Mission. Today the Mission’s staff counts 200 members.

• Together with the European Union, NATO has been assisting the African Union in expanding its peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Sudan) since July 2005, in an attempt to halt continuing violence. NATO is also providing staff capacity-building workshops for AU officers within the Deployed Integrated Task Force headquartered in Ethiopia. The training is based on strategic-level planning and focuses on technologies and techniques to create an overall analysis and understanding of Darfur, and to identify the areas where the application of AU assets can influence and shape the operating environment to deter crises.

COOPERATION WITH THE UN

The character of the relationship between NATO and the UN is expressed in the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, which makes it clear that NATO operates within the framework of the UN Charter. Reference to the Charter can also be found in Articles 1, 5, 7, 12 of the Treaty.

NATO has a permanently deployed Liaison Officer to the UN Headquarters in New York, working within the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The relations between the two organizations remained limited until the beginning of the 1990s when both started to cooperate in crisis management operations in the western Balkans. Since then a
strong collaboration between both organizations has begun (see section on operational experience). NATO has been an active participant in the High-level Meetings process since its inception, namely in the preparation of these meetings through the Working Groups. Its Secretary-Generals have been consistent in attending every High-level Meeting since 1994, and NATO’s representation in the UNSC meetings has also been assured at the highest level since 2003.

Cooperation between NATO and the UN has gradually increased during the 1990s and 2000s. Nowadays, the cooperation between the two institutions covers a variety of issues. Consultations between NATO and the UN’s specialized bodies now cover issues such as civil emergency planning, civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, action against mines and the fight against terrorism. For example, OCHA maintains a Liaison Officer on a permanent basis at NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre.

Staff-level meetings between NATO and the UN have become frequent and a number of high-level visits take place each year. In 2004, a NATO-UN Round Table was held in New York. The same year, NATO’s Secretary General addressed the UN Security Council.

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Organization of American States (OAS)

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Organization of American States (OAS) was established in 1948 (replacing the earlier Pan-American Union) with the adoption of the OAS Charter (in effect since December 1951). Following the League of Arab States, it is the oldest regional organization in the world covering the totality of the American continent’s 35 member states. In fact, the idea of regionalism in the Americas has its roots as far as the 1820s when Simon Bolivar envisioned an American region “united at heart”. The OAS explicitly states in its Charter that it is a regional agency for UN purposes (Chapter VIII).

Among its main objectives are achieving an order of peace and justice; strengthening collaboration among states while defending sovereignty and territorial integrity; and promoting social, economic and cultural development in the continent. The internal structure of OAS is as follows:

- The **General Assembly** is the principal decision-making body, convening annually to establish the work plan and the political agenda of the OAS.

- The **Permanent Council** consists of the permanent ambassadors to the OAS. It is accountable to the General Assembly (GA) and responsible for implementing GA resolutions, which are passed by consensus.

- The **General Secretariat** is the main coordination and implementation body, with its units managed under the office of the Secretary-General. José Miguel Insulza (from Chile) was elected for a five-year term as OAS Secretary General on 2 May 2005.

- Furthermore, the OAS has established several specialized organizations such as the **Inter-American Human Rights system** (Commission and Court) and the **Inter-American Defense Board**, all of these bodies being accountable to the General Assembly.

Beyond these organs, OAS has a number of other structures, through which it can operate in the field of peace and security:

- The **Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts** (OPRC), part of the Department for Democratic and Political Affairs (under the Secretariat of Political Affairs in the General Secretariat) is the main body responsible for peace and security. The OPRC is responsible for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution activities. The goal of the OPRC is to provide strategic political

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103 The OAS Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (excluded from participation since 1962), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela.
analysis of complex situations (which may lead to the eruption of violent conflict). This office provides support and technical assistance to create and strengthen the national institutional capacity of member states, so that they can efficiently and successfully manage internal conflicts. As part of the OAS’ new preventive strategy, the OPRC is currently working on the development of a conflict analysis tool that will help the organization identify potential conflicts in the region and provide member states with improved technical assistance.

• The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, under the General Secretariat, coordinates OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs and other threats to public security.

• The Permanent Council and the Secretary General both have ‘good offices’ capacity, and can therefore deploy missions for conflict prevention or peaceful settlement of disputes.

The OAS can also use several of the mechanisms related to the application of Resolution 1080\(^4\). Resolution 1080 states that, “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region” and includes an automatic procedure to respond to democratic breakdown - allowing the OAS to undertake a wide range of collective activity so long as these actions are approved by the foreign ministers of its member states and/or the General Assembly. This resolution was enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001.

Moreover, the OAS can equally use the mechanisms related to the application of the Washington Protocol concerning breaches against democracy and constitutional continuity; and the Inter-American System of Human Rights protection (includes the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights).

Beyond these organs, the OAS has a number of other structures, through which it can operate in the field of peace and security. The most significant body is the Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts (OPRC), part of the Department for Democratic and Political Affairs (under the Secretariat of Political Affairs in the General Secretariat). The OPRC is responsible for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution activities. Its goal is to provide support and technical assistance to create and strengthen the national institutional capacity of member states, so that they can efficiently and successfully manage internal conflicts.

**Structural Prevention**

One of the principal contributions that the OAS makes towards structural conflict prevention is through democratic institution-building in member states. In 1991, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) was created within the General Secretariat to support the consolidation of democracy in the region. The creation of the UPD opened up an institutional space within the Organization for the topic of conflict prevention and resolution and allowed for the development of programs aimed at responding to the member states’ specific needs. In the more than ten years since it was established, the UPD has become a key regional source of support for the efforts made by countries in the Inter-American system to defend, consolidate, and advance democracy. During this time, political conditions in the Americas have evolved, as have the challenges to democracy. The UPD, through specific actions in response to the mandates outlined for the Organization by the member governments, contributed to creating stable and lasting conditions for democracy in the hemisphere.

**Dispute Settlement**

The OAS Charter includes a mandate for peaceful settlement of disputes. In article 3.i it is stated that, “controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States shall

\(^4\) AGRES 1080, June 5th 1991. Resolution 1080, on Representative Democracy stipulates the actions that the organization can take in case of “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states”. Available at www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm.
be settled by peaceful procedures”. This mandate is further developed in Chapter V (“Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, art. 24-27), which stipulates as peaceful procedures for the settlement of disputes: “direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time” (art. 25).

Early Warning

The General Secretariat of OAS does not have a specialized EW centre and/or unit at the time of writing. However, the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs through its Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts (OPRC), is working to enhance OAS’ capacity for early warning and response. The new preventive strategy aims at designing and implementing a comprehensive early warning mechanism, including the use of political analyses, data banks as well as the development and use of early warning indicators. It could be said, however, that the Inter-American Human Rights System serves as an early warning mechanism that monitors human rights violations and draws attention to potential failures in the rule of law and/or democratic processes in the region.

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

The OAS focuses on peacebuilding initiatives (undertaken by order of the political bodies of the OAS or upon the specific request of a member state) in preference over enforcement measures. The Organization has no peacekeeping or peace enforcement capability and may only initiate a peace mission in a member state if invited by its government. Over the past few years, the OAS has worked towards the development of actions and institutional capacity for dealing with the internal problems of member states. This support comes through new agreements, direct assistance for dialogue processes (including special ad-hoc missions), and local capacity building measures, which focus on direct support to assist member states in constructively managing conflict and consensus building (GOI).

Collective Security

The OAS Charter also envisages a collective defense mechanism, set out in article 3 h), which states that, “an act of aggression against one American state is an act of aggression against all the American states” and is further elaborated in Chapter VI (“Collective Security”, art. 28-29).

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The OAS is one of the largest intergovernmental organizations in the world – if measured in terms of membership. However, the organization remains in a relatively weak financial position. Frozen in the mid-1990s, the OAS’ total budget remained until 2006 at a modest USD $78 million. Its operations and programming are further hurt by the fact that a significant number of its members continue to be in arrears on their annual contributions (including the USA, Brazil and Argentina). The election monitoring missions of the OAS, a cornerstone of its operations, are funded precariously by voluntary contributions at the national level instead of a permanent fund within the OAS105.

For the year 2008, OAS’s programmed budget has risen to USD $87,5 million. This regular budget is supplemented by USD $63,8 million in specific Funds and USD $6 million in Voluntary Funds, in a total of USD $157,3 million, of which USD $25,6 million is allocated to Democracy and Governance (including Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts) and USD $23,4 million is allocated to Multidimensional Security (terrorism, drugs and other threats to public security106.

The weak financial position has also led to a reduction of the human resources. From 676 staff in 1996, the Organization went down to 506 employees in 2006\textsuperscript{107}.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

Even if the OAS Charter envisaged a ‘collective security’ mandate for the Organization, in practice the OAS is mainly concerned with preventive diplomacy and has no collective mechanism to undertake military operations. Its mechanisms for prevention and resolution of conflicts have developed mainly through its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, i.e. via the promotion of democratization and human rights. Since its inception and during the first two decades of its existence, the OAS was frequently used as a forum for peaceful settlement of disputes (usually by consensus or compromise), seen as an optimal forum for addressing security concerns. The Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter were invoked in several cases (e.g. territorial disputes, missile crisis, military coups). This trend decreased in the 1970s and 1980s but its influence reappeared in the aftermath of the Cold War, now also with the invoking of Resolution 1080 on Democracy (mentioned above). More recently, the OAS has been undertaking peace and security activities in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, human rights monitoring, and peace-building. In the past, however, the OAS has also deployed peacekeeping operations.

**Peacekeeping**

In 1955, the OAS dispatched a committee of investigation (OAS Committee of Military Experts – Observers) to Costa Rica, who claimed that it was being “invaded” by Nicaragua. In 1957, the OAS also sent a Military Observers Group to address the interstate conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua. In 1965, after the US unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Organization (although condemning the US intervention) ended up sponsoring a regional peacekeeping force to the country, which formed the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) with troops from the US, Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El Salvador. In 1969, in the so-called “Soccer War” between Honduras and El Salvador, the OAS used heavy diplomatic pressure to bring the parties to a cease-fire, and deployed a peace commission (military observers) that moved back and forth between Tegucigalpa and San Salvador seeking to end the conflict. A new group of military observers was sent once again between 1976 and 1981 to supervise disarmament efforts. More recently, the OAS has also facilitated the cease-fire in Suriname through the OAS Special Mission to Suriname (1992-2000).

**Structural Prevention**

In 2001, the UPD established the *Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution* to assist member states in developing national and sub-regional capacities in dialogue, consensus building and conflict resolution. The mission of the Special Program is to contribute to the development of responses to deep-rooted socio-political conflicts and critical challenges facing member states and their societies. During the 2001-2004 period, the Special Program, among other activities, provided technical assistance to the Government of Bolivia for the “Design and Implementation of a Conflict Prevention and Resolution System in Bolivia”. Furthermore, it provided technical assistance in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding to the governments of Guatemala, Panama and El Salvador, amongst others, within the framework of the “Central American Program for the Strengthening of Democratic Dialogue”.

**Pacific Settlement of Disputes**

The OAS promoted political reconciliation in Venezuela, along with CARICOM (territorial disputes between Venezuela and Guyana) in 1997. It also established a mission to support the peace process.

in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) in 2004, and has sponsored discussions between Honduras and Nicaragua (2001) and Belize and Guatemala (2005) to help them resolve their territorial differences (confidence-building measures, brokering of agreements, envoy of civil verification missions).

**Peacebuilding**

The OAS has been heavily involved in peacebuilding activities, namely in the fields of DDR, truth, justice and reconciliation, rule of law, human rights, good governance and electoral assistance, criminal law, counter-terrorism and disaster relief.

The OAS’ involvement in DDR activities includes past experiences in Suriname, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Furthermore, the OAS Mission to support the Peace Process in Colombia is currently undertaking DDR activities in that country (since 2004). In Nicaragua, the OAS International Support and Verification Mission (CIAV-OAS, 1990-1997) demobilized 22,000 ex-combatants and developed programs to help combatants and others affected by the conflict to reintegrate into the economic and political life of the country. In Suriname, the OAS Special Mission (1992-2000) facilitated a cease-fire, promoted the demobilization of former combatants, provided electoral and legislative assistance, mediated disputes between ethnic groups and the government over economic rights, and developed job-training programs for young people. Through the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, the OAS has been furthering the peace process in Guatemala since 1995 (Program “Culture and Dialogue: Development of Resources for Peacebuilding in Guatemala – OAS/PROPAZ”).

In Haiti, the International Civilian Mission for Haiti (MICIVIH, 1992-1999), in cooperation with the UN, monitored the human rights situation, provided technical assistance in judicial reform, facilitated human rights training for police officers, and organized civic education programs on citizen’s rights to local NGOs.

The OAS has also managed several de-mining operations in Central America in the last 15 years, through its Mine Action Program (AICMA). AICMA’s first mandate was given in 1995 and since then the Program has operated in Ecuador (completion by 2004), Guatemala (concluded in 2005), Honduras (concluded in 2004), Nicaragua (2003-2005), Peru (completion by 2003), and Colombia (ongoing since 2003).


The effectiveness of the OAS to cope with its wide mandate and agenda must be assessed, considering the Organization’s limited resource capacity, as it has no common funding facility for emergency operations of any kind. The most serious challenge to OAS’s credibility concerns the issue of rapid response to democratic crises. The OAS tradition of consensual decision-making within a club-like atmosphere is particularly salient. On higher-profile issues where there are profound differences of opinion (as on the question of how to resolve a crisis) the process is prone to some considerable stalling if not immobilization. This was most obvious in the case of Haiti in

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1994, over the issue of coercive intervention after the overthrow of President Aristide and the invocation of Resolution 1080. The OAS was only able to send a small grouping (18 members) of a civilian mission known as OAS-DEMOC.

While the Organization has stepped up its efforts and made a series of amendments and changes to various juridical instruments in order to play a more central role in the resolution and prevention of intra-state conflict, there are several constraints remaining:

- The lack of a coherent policy regarding the possible extent and role that the Organization should have in intra-state conflict prevention and resolution at various levels;
- The funds and administrative capacity to undertake complex or comprehensive peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in the region;
- The need to increase public awareness (among its member states as well as the international community) of the Organization’s acquired expertise and successes in the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconciliation arenas.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

Cooperation between the OAS and the UN was already foreseen when the Organization was created in 1948 (the OAS Charter declares the Organization as a regional agency according to the UN Charter). This cooperation is anchored in six formalized agreements:

- The General Cooperation Agreement with the UN Secretariat on 17 April 1995 (basic information sharing and collaboration between the two organizations);
- The Cooperation Agreement with the UN Secretariat’s Disaster Relief Coordinator;
- Two MoUs with the Secretariat through DDA (2001) and DPA (2004 – electoral mission in Haiti);
- Two MoUs with the Secretariat regarding the Mission in Haiti (1995 and 1997).

Cooperation with the UN started strengthening in 1994 after UNGA’s resolution 49/5 (21 October 1994) which called for further cooperation between the two organizations. Since then the OAS has been gradually developing and maintains a close operational relationship with the UN in the major peace and security thematic areas – peacekeeping (with DPKO), peace-building with (DPA) and humanitarian affairs (with OCHA). The Office of the Assistant Secretary General is the liaison link between the OAS and the UN at the political level. At the operational level, the Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts of the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs is the liaison link with the UN in the fields of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. Some activities of cooperation include: staff training exchanges; joint international conferences; cooperation in field missions. The joint OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) could offer one possible model for future cooperation. In addition, the deployment of separate but complementary missions (i.e. case of OAS/PROPAZ and MINUGUA in Guatemala), with one civilian mission providing assistance to implement peace accords and one peacekeeping/verification mission including DDR, human rights and verification functions could offer another model for future cooperation.

Furthermore, the OAS has developed some collegial relations with other regional organizations even if not in a systematic way (e.g. liaison relationship with the AU every few years; working closely with the Francophonie in Haiti, with ASEAN on the ‘Community of Democracies’, and more recently, liaison has been established with CIS on counter-terrorism). The most regular and substantive contact is with the sub-regional CARICOM, through summit meetings and liaison between the secretariat heads.
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Founded in 1994 (predecessor founded in 1975). Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. 56 member states. www.osce.org

Mandate in Peace and Security:
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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The OSCE is the successor of the CSCE – the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. After years of negotiations in the early 1970s, the 35 participating states of the CSCE adopted the Helsinki Final Act at a Summit Meeting in 1975. It was a breakthrough in the relationship between East and West and marked an important step towards the end of the Cold War. The collapse of Soviet communism in 1989-90 also changed the CSCE. At a Summit Meeting in Paris in November 1990, the participants adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe which represented a decisive step towards a new era of East-West cooperation. At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, the institutionalization process was punctuated by the renaming of the CSCE to the OSCE, marking its transition from a Conference to a regional arrangement. A permanent secretariat was established and new institutions set up. With 56 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America, the OSCE forms the largest regional security arrangement in the world.\(^{109}\)

The OSCE is a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in its area. It has 19 ongoing missions or field operations in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Organization deals with three dimensions of security – the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimension. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism as well as economic and environmental activities. All 56 participating states enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis. The institutional structure of the OSCE can be divided into (i) negotiating and decision-making bodies, (ii) operational structures and institutions, and (iii) OSCE related bodies:

\(^{109}\) The OSCE member states are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, FYR of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UK, USA, and Uzbekistan.

“[O]ur two Organizations were born to work together. (...) The United Nations and the OSCE have jointly confronted challenges to peace and security. Such collaborations complement our respective strengths, and enable us to learn from each other’s experiences.”

KOFI ANNAN
Former UN Secretary-General (2006)
Negotiating and Decision-Making Bodies

- **Summits/Ministerial Councils** Summits are periodic meetings of heads of state or government of OSCE participating states that set priorities and guidelines at the highest political level. In between summits, decision-making and governing power lies with the Ministerial Council whose members are the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating states. The Ministerial Council usually meets once a year;

- The **Permanent Council** is the main regular decision-making body of the Organization. It convenes weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions;

- The **Forum for Security Cooperation** meets weekly to discuss and take decisions on military aspects of security in the OSCE area, in particular Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs);

- High-level representatives of OSCE participating states meet once a year at the **Economic and Environmental Forum** to provide an annual focus for activities targeting major issues of economic or environmental concern.

Operational Structures and Institutions

- The **OSCE Chairmanship** rotates annually. The Foreign Minister of the country chairing the Organization also holds the post of Chairman-in-Office. The Chairman-in-Office (CiO) is assisted by the previous and succeeding Chairpersons to assure continuity of the Organization's activities. Together, the three Chairmen – present, past and future – form the OSCE Troika;

- The 320 parliamentarians of the **OSCE Parliamentary Assembly** are appointed by their national parliaments. The Assembly convenes several times each year to debate a wide variety of issues linked to human security in the OSCE region. Its main tasks are the promotion of parliamentary involvement in the activities of the OSCE and the facilitation of inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation;

- The **OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights** (ODIHR) is active throughout the OSCE area in the fields of election observation, democratic development, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and the rule of law;

- The **OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities** was established in 1992 to identify and seek early resolution of tensions involving national minority issues that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations between OSCE participating states. The High Commissioner is required to act in confidence, through silent diplomacy. The task of the High Commissioner is to prevent conflict by identifying and addressing tensions and risks of tensions involving national minority issues, through dialogue with governments and minorities, advice and recommendations on legislation and policies, and assistance through programs and projects. Knut Vollebaek (Norway) was appointed to the post for a three-year term on 4 July, 2007;

- The **OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media** observes media developments in all OSCE participating states. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and promotes full compliance with OSCE press freedom commitments. Miklos Haraszti (Hungary) was appointed Representative effective from 10 March, 2004;

- The **OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit** is the Organization’s focal point for the coordination and facilitation of OSCE initiatives and capacity-building programs relevant to the struggle against terrorism;
• The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) supports the Chairman-in-Office and other OSCE bodies in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. It plays a key role in supporting OSCE field operations;

• The Section for External Cooperation is involved in dialogue and cooperation with partner states, and in maintaining institutional cooperation with partner organizations at headquarter level. In doing so, it employs the Platform for Cooperative Security, a tool aimed at further strengthening and developing mutual cooperation with competent organizations.

OSCE Related Bodies

• The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was established in 1995. It provides a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Currently, thirty-three states are party to the Convention;

• The Joint Consultative Group deals with questions relating to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 1990;

• The central focus of the Open Skies Consultative Committee is to discuss all questions relating to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies of March 1992. The Treaty, which is designed to promote openness and transparency in military activities, established a regime of observation flights over the territory of its signatories.

The OSCE also offers several additional tools and instruments relevant in the field of security:

• The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994) is used as a point of reference by several Organizations and in the framework of the Partnership for Peace;

• The OSCE Communications Network links capitals of participating states to foster timely information exchange and implementation of the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and other military treaties;

• The OSCE fosters the exchange of information on armed forces and defense planning within different frameworks, such as the Annual exchange of military information (AEMI), the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), and the Annual Exchange of Information on Defense Planning.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

On 2 February, 2007, the Permanent Council approved the OSCE Unified Budget for 2007, amounting to EUR €168.2 million (USD $246 million). In 2006, the approved budget amounted to approximately EUR €163 million (USD $236 million), nearly 72 percent of which went to field activities. In 2006, extra-budgetary contributions for additional activities amounted to approximately EUR €25 million (USD $37 million).

The OSCE employs some 450 people in its various institutions and around 3000 in its field operations. Locally-contracted employees outnumber international seconded employees by roughly five to one. Seconded staff members are funded by their national administrations.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The OSCE is one of the regional bodies in the world with largest field experience. OSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina began their work on 8 September, 1992, making them the first of the Organization’s numerous field operations to be deployed. Since then,
the OSCE has gathered ample experience in preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

**Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Deployment**

- **Macedonia, OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje** (since 1992): is the Organization's longest-serving field mission. Originally established to help prevent the tension and conflicts in the former socialist Republic of Yugoslavia from spreading, it is now also involved in police matters and confidence-building activities;

- **OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine** (since 1994): was established for the purpose of carrying out tasks related to the new form of cooperation between Ukraine and the OSCE. This cooperation consists of the planning, implementation and monitoring of projects between relevant authorities of Ukraine and the OSCE and its institutions;

- **Uzbekistan, OSCE Centre in Tashkent** (1995-2005): promoted the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as the cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan within the OSCE framework; maintained contacts with local authorities, universities, research institutions and non-governmental organizations;

- **Kazakhstan, OSCE Centre in Almaty** (since 1998): monitors political, legal and economic developments with a view to maintaining stability in the country and the region. It also promotes OSCE standards and commitments within Kazakhstan;

- **Kyrgyzstan, OSCE Centre in Bishkek** (since 1998): offers support in the economic, environmental, human and political aspects of security;

- **Azerbaijan, OSCE Office in Baku** (since 1999): possesses a broad mandate which covers major areas of concern in all OSCE dimensions including the human, political, economic and environmental aspects of security and stability;

- **Turkmenistan, OSCE Centre in Ashgabad** (since 1999): facilitates contacts and promotes information exchange with the Chairman-in-Office, other OSCE Institutions and OSCE participating states. The Centre also cooperates with international and local organizations and institutions;

- **Belarus, OSCE Office in Minsk** (since 2003): the Office assists the Government of Belarus in the following areas: promoting institution building; consolidating the rule of law; developing relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments; developing economic and environmental activities;

- **OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan** (since 2006): promotes the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments and the cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan within the OSCE framework.

**Preventive Disarmament**

The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) contributes to efforts of preventive disarmament by developing documents regulating transfers of conventional arms and establishing principles for non-proliferation. Due to its legal status, the OSCE does not deal with arms control issues directly. However, it is currently involved in various politico-military activities ranging from Confidence-and Security-Building Measures aimed at fostering trust among member states, to projects providing assistance on the destruction of small arms and light weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles (known as MANPADS), as well as conventional ammunition.
While the FSC in Vienna provides a forum for political dialogue for diplomats from OSCE states, most of the practical work, including training and assistance in the safeguarding and destruction of ammunition and stockpiles of small arms, is conducted through the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) at OSCE headquarters and OSCE field operations in such countries as Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan.

**Structural Prevention**

The OSCE has a number of tools at its disposal to collect and analyze the root causes of conflicts. These include its participating states, its various institutions, field missions on the ground, and a small analytical cell in the Secretariat within the Conflict Prevention Centre. Regional desks are a key analytical and programmatic tool, essential to the development of an integrated conflict prevention strategy.

**Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement**

Active peacemaking and peace enforcement is not permitted by OSCE regulations. The OSCE can only partake in Chapter 6 operations. Furthermore, the OSCE can only get involved with the full agreement of all parties.

**Peacekeeping**

- **OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission** (1992-1993): embarked upon verification activities related to compliance of all parties in Kosovo with the requirements set forth by the international community with regard to the solution of the crisis in Kosovo.

**Peacebuilding**

- **OSCE Mission to Estonia** (1992-2001): supported integration and better understanding between the communities in Estonia;

- **OSCE Mission to Georgia** (since 1992): assists the Government of Georgia in the fields of conflict settlement, democratization, human rights and the rule of law;

- **OSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina** (1992-1993): promoted dialogue between the concerned authorities and the representatives of the populations and communities in the three regions. It collected information on all aspects relevant to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and promoted solutions to such problems. It also established contact points for solving problems;

- **OSCE Mission to Latvia** (1993-2001): addressed citizenship issues and other related matters and offered advice on such issues to the Latvian government and authorities, as well as to other institutions and individuals;

- **OSCE Mission to Moldova** (since 1993): facilitates the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects, based on the consolidation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its current borders. The reinforcement of the territorial integrity of the state goes along with an understanding on a special status for the Trans-Dniester region;

- **Tajikistan, OSCE Centre in Dushanbe** (since 1994): assists in the implementation of the peace process and acted as a guarantor of the Tajik Peace Agreement reached in June 1997. In this capacity, it works more particularly on political issues, return of refugees, and military questions;
• **OSCE Mission to Ukraine** (1994-1999): supported the work of the OSCE experts on constitutional and economic matters and reported on the situation in the Crimea;

• **OSCE Representative to the Joint Committee on the Skrunda Radar Station** (1995-1999): monitored and coordinated the implementation of the Agreement between Latvia and Russia; participated in establishing the procedural and organizational modalities for the functioning of the Joint Committee;

• **OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya** (1995-2003): promoted respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; fostered the development of democratic institutions and processes; facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis in that region by international and non-governmental organizations; supported the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law, public safety and law and order; promoted the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation;

• **OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina** (since 1995): the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords assigned to the mission the responsibility for elections, and human rights and regional military stabilization, with democracy-building added subsequently. These areas remain at the heart of its work today;

• **OSCE Mission to Croatia** (since 1996): assists the government and other relevant civil-society groups in the fields of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law and supports the consolidation of internal peace;

• **OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus** (1997-2002): assisted the Belarus authorities in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments;

• **OSCE Mission in Kosovo** (since 1999): being the largest OSCE field operation, the mission forms a distinct component of the United Nations Interim Administration. It is mandated with institution and democracy-building and promoting human rights and the rule of law;

• **Armenia, OSCE Office in Yerevan** (since 1999): contributes to the development of democratic institutions in Armenia, strengthening civil society and promoting OSCE standards and principles;

• **OSCE Mission to Serbia** (since 2001): advises on the implementation of laws and monitors the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions and processes in Serbia. It assists law enforcement bodies and the judiciary in training and restructuring;

• **OSCE Presence in Albania** (since 2003): provides assistance to Albanian authorities and civil society by promoting democratization, rule of law, human rights and by consolidating democratic institutions;

• **OSCE Mission to Montenegro** (since 2006): provides support with the policy reform priorities and maintains a strategic partnership with civil society. It is engaged in supporting the reform processes, particularly on democratization, legislative reform, institution-building, police reform, and media reform.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The OSCE recognizes that the UN Security Council bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, the UN is the OSCE’s primary partner organization. In 1992, the participating states declared the OSCE (at that time the CSCE) to be “a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations”. In 1993, a Framework for Cooperation and Co-ordination between the United Nations Secretariat and the
CSCE was agreed upon, and in the same year the UN granted the CSCE observer status. Other arrangements between the two organizations include: a MoU (1993) on preventing and settling conflicts and practical implications of the OSCE as a regional arrangement; several MoUs (1998) between OSCE and UNHCR, OSCE and UNDP, as well as OSCE and IOM to act jointly on special arrangements; and a MoU between the OSCE, UNEP and UNDP on the Environment and Security Initiative (2003) establishing the ENVSEC Project Management Unit (PMU) for the overall administration and management activities.

An OSCE document on the Cooperation between UN and Regional Organizations (SEC GAL/85/03 Vienna, 14 May, 2003) proposed a flexible framework for cooperation and suggested to develop a global approach to deal with current common challenges, with the UN being the coordinating centre. After 11 September, 2001, cooperation has been further enhanced to include active OSCE support for the work of the UN and its specialized bodies in the global efforts against terrorism.

The shared UN-OSCE agenda includes: (i) ratification and implementation of the 12 Universal Anti-terrorism Instruments and other initiatives to combat terrorism; (ii) conflict settlement and peacebuilding; (iii) early warning and conflict prevention; (iv) small arms and light weapons; (v) border management; (vi) environmental and economic aspects of security; (vii) anti-trafficking; (viii) democratization and human rights; and (iv) freedom of the media.

The two organizations maintain close contacts and cooperation through elaborate mechanisms of high-level dialogue, as well as coordination and information-sharing at staff-level:

• OSCE takes part in the annual high-level tripartite meetings between the respective Chairpersons and Secretaries General of the OSCE and the COE, and since 1993 with the Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, which is preceded by target-oriented meetings at staff level;
• The organization is a constant participant, at the highest level, in the High Level Meetings between the UN and regional organizations, since their inception in 1994; and equally in the annual UN Security Council meetings with regional organizations on thematic issues related to peace and security, since 2003;
• OSCE has observer status in the UN General Assembly, while the UN is invited to participate in the OSCE Ministerial Council and in the Summit meetings. UN representatives are frequently invited to address the OSCE Permanent Council. For instance, the UNSG regularly addresses the Committee of Senior Officials and OSCE Summits;
• Representatives of relevant UN entities are invited to participate in main annual OSCE events, including the Permanent Council, the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, the Economic Forum and the Annual Security Review Conference;
• Annual UN-OSCE staff-level meetings serve as a venue for exchanging information and coordinating activities; and informally, there are direct contacts between both Secretariats on joint statements;
• OSCE proposals are submitted to UN Committees (contributions to reports) and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office reports to the UN Security Council (e.g. on Nagorno-Karabakh, Ossetia) and to the UNGA;
• Furthermore, at the operational level, OSCE field operations cooperate closely with UN agencies and missions. For example, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo is an integral part of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the OSCE Mission to Georgia supports the United Nations conflict settlement efforts in Abkhazia, Georgia.

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Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC)

Founded in 1969 (First Islamic Summit Conference).
Headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 57 member states
www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/home.asp

Mandate in Peace and Security:

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was established in Rabat, Morocco, on 25 September, 1969. The Charter of the organization was adopted three years later during the third Islamic Foreign Minister Conference, held in Rabat in February 1972. According to the Charter, the organization aims to take necessary measures to support international peace and security, founded on the principle of justice. It also aims at strengthening Islamic solidarity among member states; promoting cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields; and encouraging “the struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity, independence and national rights”. The principles guiding the Charter of the Organization include non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states, the observation of the sovereignty, the independence and territorial integrity of each state, and the peaceful settlement of any dispute arising between member states through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. OIC members also pledge to refrain from resorting to force or threatening to resort to the use of force against the unity and territorial integrity or the political independence of any one of them. The OIC currently has 57 member states and 5 observer states coming from South America, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia. In March 2008, in Dakar, the OIC adopted a new charter unanimously set to replace the 1972 version and it includes the principles of democracy, good governance and human rights. The main bodies of the OIC are:

• The Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government, or Islamic Summit Conference, convenes every three years but it may also decide to meet whenever the interest of Muslim Nations warrants. It is the supreme authority of the OIC. It determines the policy of the organization and elects the Chairman of the organization who holds office until the next Summit;

• The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) is conveyed every year and brings together Ministers of Foreign Affairs or their officially accredited representatives. An extraordinary conference can be held at the request of any member state or at the request of the Secretary General, if approved by two-thirds of the member states. The ICFM adopts resolutions on matters of common interests and supervises the implementation and progress made in regard to the policies adopted by the

10 The current member states are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei-Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen. The observer states are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Thailand, Russia, and Turkish-Cyprus.
Conference. The ICFM also adopts the OIC budget and appoints the Secretary General, for a four-year mandate renewable once, and the assistant Secretaries General. Decision are reached by a two-thirds majority vote;

- The General Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General and also comprises four Assistant Secretary General. The current Secretary General is Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu of Turkey, who started his 4-year term in January 2005. The Secretariat is the executive organ of the OIC and is charged of the actual implementation of the decisions adopted at the Islamic Summit Conference and of the ICFM resolutions. The Secretariat supervises multiples specialized committees and organs that are established on an ad hoc basis, as well as the affiliated institutions and the standing committees. The Ten-year Plan of Action adopted in Mecca in 2005 empowered the Secretary General to prepare a new Charter in order to reform the OIC. It also established a mechanism for the follow-up of adopted resolutions by creating an Executive Body, comprising the Summit and Ministerial Troikas, the OIC host country, and the General Secretariat.

Within the Secretariat a series of Specialized Committees have also been established in order to deal with specific conflicts and political issues. These Specialized Committees act as technical organs through which the OIC involves itself in peacemaking efforts either under its own initiative, upon the request of any of its member states, or under a decision of its Summit or Ministerial Conferences. The Specialized Committees include:

- Ad-hoc Committee on Afghanistan, the OIC also has an external office for Afghanistan located in Kabul;
- Ministerial Committee of Seven on Muslims in Southern Philippines, which manages the negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF);
- Six Member Committee on Palestine, which is chaired by the Secretary General of OIC;
- Various Contact-Groups working on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jammu and Kashmir, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the reform of the UN and the expansion of the Security Council.

The OIC also has various different subsidiary organs that engage in a wide variety of activities, ranging from research centers and universities, to the Islamic Solidarity Fund and its waqf (religious endowment).

Following its first Conference for Combating International Terrorism in 1999, the OIC adopted the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. This convention pushes for more collaboration among member states to prevent and combat international terrorism. The provisions made by the Convention include the development and the strengthening of measures to control arm flows between the member states. The Convention also calls for increased intelligence exchange among OIC members. The contracting states are also required to establish and share databases that collect and analyze data on terrorist elements, groups, movements and organizations, and monitor developments of the phenomenon of terrorism and successful experiences in combating it.

The Ten-year Plan of Action adopted in Mecca in 2005 also makes specific calls for strengthening the role of the OIC in conflict prevention, confidence-building, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation. Moreover, the current Secretary General, the Open Ended Working Group on the Review of the Charter, and some member states such as Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan have appealed for the creation of a peacekeeping force operating under the chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

The finances of the OIC are derived from contributions from member states. The Permanent Financial Committee prepares and controls budgets in accordance with the rules adopted by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. In 2007, a budget of USD $17.6 million for the General
Secretariat was agreed. This amount excludes the budget of the subsidiary organs such as the Islamic Fiqh Academy (USD $2.1 million), the Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries (USD $2.5 million), and the Islamic Center for Development and Trade (USD $1.5 million).

The Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development, a subsidiary organ of the organization established in May 2007, is financed through voluntary contribution from the member states. The capital of the Fund is targeted to be USD $10 billion in the form of a Trust. The Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development aims at combating poverty and its causes and tries to help Islamic countries in the world, and more specifically in Africa, to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference, alongside its various subsidiary organs and affiliated institutions, accounts for a staff of around 1500 persons. The Secretariat, based in Jeddah, has a staff of 140.

Despite encompassing some of the countries contributing the highest number of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, the OIC does not have any peacekeeping facility or staff working specifically on peacekeeping.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Peacemaking

Given the absence of a clear mandate, the operational experience of the OIC is limited in regard to peacekeeping. However, the OIC has been much more successful in peacemaking through the usage of quiet diplomacy including good offices and mediation by the Secretary General, the appointment of special envoys, as well as by convening emergency meetings on a case-by-case basis. The OIC has thus managed to be involved in conflict resolution through the establishment of specific committees to tackle with issues affecting member states or Muslim communities in non-member states. The OIC has used this mechanism to mediate in the following conflicts:

• **Israel-Palestine:** the OIC was historically founded in reaction to events in Jerusalem, and the organization has given special attention to the Israel-Palestine issue since its inception. The OIC has mostly supported the Palestinian Authority, but it has also stressed the need for both parties to comply with UN resolutions and has made an effort to get the two parties to negotiate and implement a peace process;

• **Southern Philippines:** the OIC became involved in the peace process to solve the conflict between the Moro separatists and the Government of the Philippines in 1972. The Secretary General and the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee (later to become the Ministerial Committee of Seven on Muslims in Southern Philippines) produced fact-finding reports and also called upon other international organizations to mediate the conflict. The OIC benefited in this instance from the important involvement of Libya;

• **Iran-Iraq war:** a special committee, which became known as the Islamic Peace Committee, was set up after the third Islamic Summit in 1981. The inflexibility of the warring states did not help the work of the committee, and the OIC was unsuccessful in its mediation endeavors;

• **Afghanistan:** in 1980, and following the first extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, the OIC established a ministerial committee with a mandate to promote peace and national reconciliation among the Afghan people. The Ad-Hoc Committee on Afghanistan also aims at promoting an intra-Afghan peace process and mobilizing assistance for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-torn Afghan society;
**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 1992, provided support to the peace process to resolve the conflict in the Balkans. The Sarajevo Declaration of the Friendship and Partnership adopted by the Enlarged Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Declaration on Bosnia adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the Contact Group, both supported the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as the Action Program of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, the mandate of the Contact Group was enlarged to tackle the issue of Kosovo;

**Jammu and Kashmir:** the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir has been involved in the resolution of the disagreement between India and Pakistan and has been promoting peace negotiations between the two countries since 1994. The Contact Group also delegated fact-finding missions to Jammu and Kashmir. The OIC has repeatedly called for the implementation of UN resolutions on the Jammu and Kashmir conflict.

**Peacebuilding**

The OIC has also been involved in peacebuilding effort in countries affected by conflicts. Through the Contact Groups on Sierra Leone and on Somalia, the OIC has involved itself in various humanitarian aid and development projects to help the local population. The ICFM created a Sierra Leone Reconstruction Fund to which OIC member states can make voluntary contributions in order to aid the Government of Sierra Leone in the domains of reconstruction, capacity-building, and rebuilding state structures in Sierra Leone.

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

The OIC has a long history of cooperating with the UN. The UN enjoys observer status at the OIC. In 1975, the OIC became an observer at the General Assembly and has opened offices in New York and in Geneva. Moreover, regular consultations between UN agencies and the OIC have taken place at different levels on important economic, political, social and humanitarian matters. For example, a MoU on technical cooperation in the field of Human Rights was signed between the OIC and UNHCR in 2006. The OIC had already signed a MoU with the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing states (UN-OHRLLS) in 2005. Similarly, UNESCO, UNICEF and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) have been collaborating and working together on various programs and projects.

A General Meeting on Cooperation between the UN and the OIC was held in Rabat in July 2006. The meeting allowed the two organizations to review existing cooperation as well as the political issues of mutual concern. Special attention was given to the question of conflict prevention and resolution, countering terrorism, promotion of human rights, and the building of a culture of peace and dialogue between civilizations. With regard to the implementation of its Ten-year Plan of Action, the OIC has also stressed the importance of collaborating with the various UN organs and agencies.

The UN has reached an understanding to provide capacity-building support to the OIC General Secretariat in the domain of human rights, electoral assistance, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, disarmament, terrorism, human trafficking, refugees, drug trafficking, organized crime and early warning. In this regard, the OIC and the OHCHR have finalized a draft agreement prepared by the OHCHR to assist the General Secretariat in building its capacity in the human rights area. Additionally, the UNHCR has organized training workshops and seminars on human rights and refugees issues. The OIC and the UN agreed to improve their coordination through the OIC’s participation in inter-agency missions; the first such missions were established with regard to the situation in Sudan and in Darfur. Moreover, the OIC and the UN have agreed on staff exchanges at the directorial and desk officer level on an annual basis. The first exchanges were expected to occur
in 2007. Additionally, it was agreed that Consultative Meetings between the OIC, the Department of Political Affairs and the UN Mission to NY would be held no less than three times per year.

Furthermore, the OIC has been a constant participant in the High Level Meetings between the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organizations since their inception in 1994, and also a participant in some UNSC meetings (namely in 2003, 2006, and 2007).

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“Our limited economic resource base and our remote location across the Pacific Ocean (…) make it imperative that we collaborate with the United Nations system (…)”
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Founded in 1971 (as South Pacific Forum). In 2000 it was named Pacific Islands Forum (Agreement Establishing PIF Secretariat) Headquarters in Suva, Fiji. 16 member states. www.forumsec.org

Mandate for Peace and Security:
- Biketawa Declaration, Article II (2000)
- Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security (2002)
- Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration (2005)
- Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum (2005, ratification pending)

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Pacific Islands Forum is an intergovernmental organization, aiming to enhance cooperation between the independent countries of the Pacific Ocean and represent their interests. It was founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum, but in 2000 the name was changed to better reflect the geographic location of its 16 member states which are located in both the north and south Pacific. The decisions of the Forum are implemented by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), which grew out of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). Together with its role in harmonizing regional positions on various political and policy issues, the Forum Secretariat has adopted technical programs in economic development, transport and trade.

The constitutive treaty for the PIF Secretariat currently in force is the Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (30 October, 2000). In 2004, as part of a range of recommendations to reform the Forum and strengthen regional cooperation and integration, leaders decided that its constitutive Agreement should be reviewed to reflect the new purposes and functions of the Forum (Auckland Declaration). As a result, the Pacific Plan was endorsed in October 2005, as was the new Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum (27 October, 2005), which enshrined in law what had been agreed in policy and providing the needed legal basis. It also clearly established the PIF as an intergovernmental organization in accordance with international law. This Agreement will, however, only be in force when it is ratified by all sixteen members of the Forum—a process that is still pending.

In the 1970s and 1980s, security was not on the agenda of the Pacific organization. It was the Solomon Islands crisis and the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 that made the organization take a turn. Following the events in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, a special Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting was held in August 2000 in Apia, Samoa, to discuss the Fiji and Solomon Islands crises and to examine how the Forum could respond to similar problems in the future. This led to the establishment of a regional mechanism to respond to conflict situations in the region. As such, the Biketawa Declaration is a regional response to emerging threats to democratic principles, governance, human rights and the rule of law, having significantly broadened the organization’s mandate and widened its focus by placing regional security policy issues as a top priority. It is the premier regional mechanism that mandates a regional approach in meeting the challenge of long term peacebuilding and preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflicts.

111 The Forum’s member states are: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Since 2006, associate members territories are New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
With the Pacific Plan and the Agreement Establishing the PIF, the Forum established as its main purpose the strengthening of regional cooperation and integration with the shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, global governance and security. The concept used is the human, multidimensional one, with no specific reference to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking or peacebuilding. The decision-making organs of PIF are:

- The **Forum Leader’s Meeting** is the pre-eminent decision-making body of the Forum, meeting annually. Special meetings can also be convened by the member states as necessary;

- The PIF’s administrative arm is the **PIF Secretariat** (headed by the Secretary General), based in Suva, Fiji. It implements the decisions formulated by the leaders, facilitates the delivery of development assistance to member states, and undertakes the political and legal mandates of the organization’s meetings. The current Secretary General is Greg Urwin (from Australia) serving his second three-year mandate since 2007. The divisional structure of the PIF Secretariat is comprised of four main sections: Political, Legal and International; Economic and Social Development; Trade and Investment; and Corporate Services. The Political, Legal and International Division is also divided into four sections: Governance, Political Security, Law Enforcement, and International Relations. As a result of the Pacific Plan, however, the PIF is undergoing a restructuring towards eight programs, viz. Political and Security Governance; Good Governance; Sustainable Development; Enabling Mechanisms; Communications and Information; Trade; Economic Growth; and Corporate Services;

- The **Forum’s Official Committee** (made up of representatives from all Forum governments) gives general policy directions to the Secretariat and oversees its activities, while reporting and giving recommendations to the Forum Leaders;

- The Council of **Regional Organizations in the Pacific** (where the Secretary General is a permanent chair), brings together eleven main regional organizations in the Pacific Region (the Fiji School of Medicine, the PIF Fisheries Agency, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the University of the South Pacific, and the PIF Secretariat, among others).

The Forum has no formal rules governing its operations or the conduct of its meetings. The agenda is based on reports from the Secretariat and decisions by the leaders are reached by consensus and are outlined in a Forum communiqué, from which policies are developed and a work program is prepared. The annual Forum meetings are chaired by the heads of government of the host country, who remain as Forum Chair until the next meeting.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

The Suva-based Secretariat has close to 100 employees who are responsible for facilitating, developing, and maintaining cooperation and consultation between the member states. The Secretariat is funded by contributions from member governments and donors, with a total budget of FJ $36 million (USD $23 million) in 2006.

The organization’s capacity to take on an intensive peacemaking exercise is limited in what concerns personnel, expertise and financial matters. The PIF does not have or plan to have access to a standing regional armed force or police force capacity, and has no rapid deployment capacity.

**OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE**

**Structural Prevention**

The PIF’s capacity to collect and analyze information regarding the ‘root causes’ of conflicts before they erupt is limited. However, a recent initiative to launch a comprehensive multifaceted study of land management issues in the context of conflict prevention is being undertaken (Land Management and Conflict Minimization Project). That is conceivably a 5-10 year multi-stakeholder
exercise, and will require extensive resources from within and outside the region. One individual within the organization has capacity in conflict analysis for particular situations and efforts will be made to extend that capacity throughout the organization, and within the region. In addition, efforts are being made to develop a conflict minimization strategy which includes a conflict impact assessment framework for all of the organization’s development activities. It could potentially expand to other Forum agencies, a peacebuilding and conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy, and development of a database of actors engaged in assistance activities in this arena.

**Early-warning**

The PIF has a mandate to monitor security issues as they develop, but currently, its mechanisms to provide early warning is ineffectual. Efforts to improve early warning mechanisms are being developed, essentially through the use of indicators. However, there are ongoing discussions on the direct applicability of early warning indicators for the type of low-level conflicts that arise in the region (i.e. indicators might not provide the nuanced approach required to identify small scale but potentially high consequence incidents). Also, indicators rely to a high degree on good data, whose availability is a major problem in this region). Accordingly, the improvement of political analysis and assessment from both within the organization and from external networks, and possibly through retainer with an academic institution, is being considered. However, the PIF needs assistance in developing its Early Warning information system.

**Preventive Deployment**

Preventive deployment of troops or police personnel in times of crisis is not directly authorized under the constitution of the Forum, however it could be a measure agreed to if necessary by leaders under the Biketawa Declaration, or by an individual member on request of the member state concerned. The Forum has not deployed any troops and/or police into a crisis situation. However, police officers were assigned by individual countries to the Solomon Islands prior to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as part of the ‘regional’ solidarity to bring normalcy to the country.

**RAMSI: Solomon Islands**

RAMSI is seen both as a conflict prevention and a peacemaking measure (securing law and order, disarmament, prosecution of conflict offenders), developed to address structural prevention issues (strengthening of core institutions – finance and budget control, courts, prisons and police services) moving eventually into a development phase of capacity building. Conceived as an intervention under the Biketawa Declaration, RAMSI was always intended to be a regional operation, under the auspices of the Forum and led by Australia. In terms of representation in the Mission, RAMSI has achieved a strong regional nature, particularly in the police and military arms. As of late 2006, all Forum members were contributing personnel to RAMSI. There have been a number of mechanisms through which RAMSI has been accountable to the Forum, including through regular reporting to Forum leaders and Foreign Ministers.\(^\text{112}\)

**Peacemaking and Dispute Settlement**

Inter-state disputes are rare, and if they arise they tend to do so over specific issues which are most often dealt with bilaterally (e.g. the delimitation of maritime/continental shelf boundaries; trade issues). The Forum takes decisions on inter-state disputes by consensus. Meetings can be called by heads of government, Foreign Ministers or at official’s levels.

The PIF has had limited engagement in peacemaking per se, in that up until the Biketawa Declaration, any intervention was, and still is to a great degree, dependant upon an invitation from the member state concerned. Under the Biketawa Declaration, there is an increased potential to intervene without the request of a member state, but to invoke this option against the will of the

\(^{112}\text{RAMSI Review Task Force Final Report, 17 June 2007.}\)
member state concerned would be an unlikely event. Peacemaking efforts are addressed at a bilateral level or through a small group of regional actors independently of the PIF, e.g. the Bougainville and Solomon Islands peace processes were both initiated bilaterally (New Zealand in Bougainville and Australia in the Solomon Islands).

The Good Offices function has been employed on many occasions, mainly through the establishment of _ad-hoc_ Eminent Persons Groups (to undertake situation analyses) and Ministerial Missions (e.g. the Forum Ministerial Mission to New Caledonia, ongoing since 1993). Where appropriate, the collective support of neighbors of the region is encouraged to address security concerns and to provide a framework to address state failure.

**Peace Enforcement**

The PIF Secretariat does not have a specific “statutory” authority for robust peacekeeping in member countries, but it is given constitutional authority through members' ratification of its constituent Agreement, and a declaratory authority as agreed by its members. The Biketawa Declaration of 2000 was used to engage in peace enforcement in the Solomon Islands, under the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. It was initially deployed as a conflict prevention mission, but its mandate was extended to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

**Peacebuilding – Election Monitoring**

The major peacebuilding operation was carried out in Nauru. In 2004, at the PIF Summit in Apia, the Forum “strongly supported Nauru’s request for Forum assistance under the Biketawa Declaration recognizing Nauru’s economic crisis and the threats this posed to its security and national stability”\(^{113}\) and established the Pacific Regional Assistance for Nauru (PRAN) covering many aspects of governance, economy and finances, social development and environment and population.

Election observation activities have also been a current activity of the Forum, namely in Nauru and in Papua New Guinea in 2007, and in the Solomon Islands in 2006. In 2007, the PIF has also carried out a technical assessment of the election to be held in Fiji in 2009).

**COOPERATION WITH THE UN**

In the past, the PIF experienced some difficulties in getting attention from the UN and, thus, PIF-UN relationship is still in its early stages. Contact tended to run along sectoral lines, such as climate change and development issues, and less on the overall institution-to-institution relationship. The Biketawa Declaration however, provides prospects for cooperation between the Forum and other international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the Commonwealth in the areas of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding and other related activities.

Liaison with the UN is managed through an International and Regional Issues Adviser (formerly International Issues Adviser), but substantive issues are often dealt with at an individual Adviser level. This has led to increased and more regular consultation between the Forum and the UN.

Furthermore, the PIF has become a regular participant in the High Level Meetings since 2001, although not in the Security Council meetings with regional organizations (the PIF has not been invited to attend these meetings). The UN attends Forum-related meetings and vice-versa. Concerted effort from both the UNDP and the PIF resulted in the first regional officials’ meeting on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in April 2005. This was the first such engagement emanating from the High Level Meeting between the UNDP and the PIF.

There have been no joint field operations between the UN and the PIF specific to a post-conflict area. The recent electoral monitoring mission to Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, was, however, a multi-organizational effort. Coordination and collaboration on that exercise could have been improved. Furthermore, a common conflict prevention database is currently being developed internally within the PIF and will later engage with UN agencies.

The PIF has not engaged with other regional or sub-regional organizations on peace and security missions, with exception to short-term assignments (electoral monitoring) with the Commonwealth of Nations and UN Staff in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Nauru and the Solomon Islands.

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established on 15 June, 2001 in Shanghai, China. The organization was formed on the basis of the so-called “Shanghai Five”, a forum which was created in 1996 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with the aim to start a dialogue on trust and disarmament in the border regions of the five countries. The five signed the Shanghai Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Fields in the Border Area (26 April, 1996) and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas (24 April, 1997). The cooperation among the states gradually extended to cooperation in the sphere of politics, security, diplomacy, trade, and culture. At the summit on the occasion of the Fifth anniversary of the organization, the leaders of the Shanghai Five and the president of Uzbekistan decided to strengthen their cooperation and signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Charter of the newly established organization was signed in St. Petersburg (Russia) on 7 June, 2002. Mongolia (since 2004) and India, Iran and Pakistan (since July 2005) are observers to the organization. On 16 August, 2007, the member states signed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborly, Friendship and Cooperation. For the moment, it is still unclear what the significance of this Treaty is since the text has not been made public.

The main goals of SCO are: i) strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship among the member states; ii) encouraging effective cooperation among the member states in political, economic and trade, scientific and technological, cultural, educational, energy, communications, environment and other fields; ii) devoting themselves jointly to preserving and safeguarding regional peace, security and stability; and iv) establishing a democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order. The main areas of cooperation are security and the economy. The security cooperation used to encompass mainly border safety, but nowadays it include the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, which is described in documents as a fight against “three evils”.

The Organization is based on the so-called “Shanghai Spirit”, which is mentioned in the Declaration on the establishment of SCO, and explained as a model of inter-state relations and regional cooperation with as its main principles: non-alignment, openness to the rest of the world, mutual trust and benefits, equality, consultations, respect for diversified civilizations, and mutual development. SCO organs are:

• The Council of Heads of State is the supreme, decision-making body of the organization. It determines the SCO’s priorities and major areas of activity, and it holds its regular meeting once a year;

114 The request by the USA for observer status was turned down.
115 The SCO holds regular meetings with Afghanistan through the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group.

“"The goals proclaimed by the Organization in the fields of security, regional and world politics echo the most pressing tasks facing the international community. Therefore it is no accident that the SCO appears attractive to many partners.”
BOLAT NURGALIEV
SCO Secretary-General
• The *Council of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)* adopts the budget and takes decisions on key economic issues. The Council meets once a year;

• The *Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs* is responsible for the day-to-day activities of the organization. The Council is also responsible for the preparation of the meetings of the Council of Heads of State. The Council meets a month prior to the meeting of Council of Heads of States;

• The *Council of National Coordinators* serves as the coordination mechanism within the SCO framework. It coordinates and manages the routine activities of the Organization. The Council makes preparations for the meetings of all the other Councils’ meetings. The Council holds a meeting at least three times a year.

According to the decision of the Council of Heads of States and the Council of Heads of Government, the meeting of heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the member states will take place on regular basis.

The organization has two permanent bodies:

• *The Secretariat*, which is in charge of the budget, personnel, institutional functions, operating procedures, and technical support of the organization's activities. It was launched on 15 January, 2004. It is headed by a Secretary-General, who is appointed for a three-year term; and four Deputy Secretaries General. Since 1 January, 2007, the Secretary-General is Bolat Kabdylkhamitovich Nurgaliev (Kazakhstan). The headquarters of Secretariat are in Beijing, China;

• The *Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS)* with its headquarters in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) was launched on 17 June, 2004. The Council is the decision-making and leading body of RATS. Its main objectives and functions are: i) maintaining working contacts with the main administrative body of the SCO member-states and strengthening coordination with international organizations on matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism; ii) participating in preparing drafts of international legal documents on matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism, and taking measures to establish, together with the UN Security Council and its antiterrorist committee, international and regional organizations, the mechanism of effective regulation of global challenges and threats; iii) gathering and analyzing information, provided by the member states, on matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism, creating a databank of antiterrorist structure, and presenting considerations on building up cooperation by the Organization in struggle against “three evils”; and iv) preparing and holding scientific-research conferences, and exchanging experience on matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

**RESOURCE CAPACITY**

In 2004, Zhang Deguang, Secretary-General of the new SCO Secretariat, told the press that the SCO annual budget totaled USD $3.5 million, of which USD $2.16 million was allocated to the Secretariat. The rest was the budget of the SCO regional anti-terror center, the other permanent SCO organ. According to Zhang, China and Russia shoulder 24 percent of the annual fee each, while Kazakhstan bears 21 percent, Uzbekistan 15 percent, Kyrgyzstan 10 percent, and Tajikistan 6 percent.

The Secretariat has 30 permanent employees.

The financing of RATS is shared between the member states, with Russia and China providing 25 percent each, Kazakhstan 21 percent, and the other members proportionally less. The initial 2004 budget was USD $3.1 million. The RATS has 30 staff members.
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The activity which has been most elaborated by the organization is collaboration on defense issues, energy security, and the fight against terrorism, where the latter is guided by the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (2001). To strengthen the efforts and aims of the SCO to combat terrorism, the organization undertook a joint anti-terror drill named "Peace Mission 2007" in the beginning of August 2007 (9-17 August). The mission began in Urumqi, the capital of China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and then moved to Chelyabinsk in the Ural mountain region of Russia. It was the first drill in the history of the organization attended by the troops of all member states. Previous drills were undertaken on bilateral level between China and Russia, particularly "Peace Mission 2005", attended by the other SCO members, acting as observers. The trilateral antiterrorism exercise “Vostok-Antiterror 2006” was carried out in July 2006 between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and administered by RATS.

On 15 May, 2006 the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted regulations on SCO Observer missions at presidential and/or parliamentary elections, as well as referendums. Observers are dispatched according to a decision of Secretary General and after obtaining an invitation from a particular member state. In October 2007, the Observers Mission participated in the referendum undertaken in Kyrgyzstan. In November/December 2007 the preparation and conduct of parliamentary elections in Russia was monitored by SCO observers.

COOPERATION WITH THE UN

The SCO acquired the status of General Assembly observer on 2 December, 2004 (GA Resolution 59/48). Afterwards, the SCO established contacts with ESCAP, UNDP and other subordinate UN departments.

Besides its presence in the UN General Assembly Meetings as an observer, the SCO has also participated in the High Level Meetings between the UN and the Regional and other Intergovernmental Organizations since 2003. As for the Security Council Meetings with the Regional Organizations, the SCO has not yet been invited to attend. However, the organization is mentioned often by UNSC members (such as China and Russia) and might be invited to future meetings.

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Southern African Development Community (SADC)

“The political and security agendas of SADC and the African Union are not mutually exclusive”

PAKALITHA BETHUEL MOSISILI
Chairperson of the SADC Organ (2004)

Headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. 14 member states.
www.sadc.int

Mandate in Peace and Security:
- Treaty of SADC, art. 11(1992);
- Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (2001);
- Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (2001)

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The Treaty that laid the foundation for the SADC was signed in Windhoek, Namibia, on 17 August, 1992, and entered into force on 30 September, 1993. SADC replaced the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which was established in April 1980 by the governments of the nine Southern African countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The goal of the SADCC was to foster regional economic cooperation, and diminish economic dependence to apartheid states.

The resolutions of the ‘SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security’, held in Windhoek in July, 1994, paved the way for the formal involvement of the SADC in the field of security, conflict mediation and military cooperation. Two years later, SADC Foreign Ministers recommended the establishment of a SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and Security, which would allow for more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations. The Organ was formalized in the Gaborone Communiqué of 28 June, 1996. According to its mandate, the Organ operates in seven clusters: in military issues; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; conflict prevention, management and resolution; crime prevention; intelligence; foreign policy; and human rights. In 2001, once tension abated amongst SADC members, the heads of state and government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation at a Summit in Blantyre, Malawi, which clarified the goals and determined the structure of the Organ. According to the Preamble of the Protocol, the SADC operates in peace and security under Chapter 116

The current member states of SADC are: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles (withdrew in 2003 and re-joined in 2008), Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Between 1992 and 1994, the SADC Secretariat coordinated the formulation of a regional policy on peace and security. The SADC’s Framework and Strategy document called for the forging of common political values based on democratic norms, the creation of a non-militaristic security order, and the establishment of mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. This process culminated in the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security.

For instance, at the SADC Summit in August 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela, then acting Chairman of the SADC, threatened to resign if the SADC Organ was not brought under the control of the central SADC Chair. This dispute between Mandela and Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, who headed the SADC Organ, led the SADC Summit to suspend its Organ. Laurie Nathan describes the reasons for the early straitjacketing of the Organ: absence of common values, institutional weakness, and lack of commitment. See “Organ Failure: A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security” in Liisa Laakso (ed.), Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Africa: Europe, SADC and ECOWAS, Helsinki: University of Helsinki. See also L.M.Fisher and N.Ngoma (2005). “The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New Millennium”, ISS Occasional Paper 114.
VIII of the UN Charter. In this light, it reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

In order to give some strategic direction and fulfill the Organ's capacity, the SADC has produced, in 2001, an Indicative Strategic Plan, divided into four sectors: political, defense, state security, and public security, which pinpoints the challenges, determines the objectives, and suggests strategies/activities to address them. As concerns the prevention and resolution of conflicts, the Plan encourages the contribution of civil society, suggests the development of appropriate policies for the social reintegration of ex-combatants, and recommends the definition of common standards to identify conflicts. In the field of democratization and human rights protection, the Plan suggests establishing an SADC Electoral Commission, and indicates the need to create a Regional Commission for the promotion of, and the respect for, human rights. Finally, the Plan establishes a new sub-structure within the SADC Secretariat: the Department for Politics, Defense and Security, which is comprised of a Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy, a Directorate for Defense and Security, and a Strategic Analysis Unit, also responsible for the early warning Situation Room.

Also, in 2003, the SADC adopted a Mutual Defense Pact, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, whereby, “An arm attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action” (Art.6-1). By taking this step, the SADC became constitutionally equipped to operate not only as a Chapter VIII organization, but also as an alliance organization, with latitude of action under Art.51 of the UN Charter.

The main decision-making bodies of SADC are:

• The **Summit of Heads of State and Government** is the ultimate policy-making institution of the SADC. It is responsible for the overall policy direction and controls the functions of the Community;

• The **Troika system**, effective since the 1999 Maputo Summit, consists of the Chair, Incoming Chair and the Outgoing Chair of the SADC. Other member states may be co-opted into the Troika as and when necessary. This system has enabled the Community to execute tasks and implement decisions expeditiously, as well as provide a policy direction to SADC institutions in between regular SADC meetings;

• The **Council of Ministers** consists of ministers from each member state, usually from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Planning or Finance. The Council is responsible for overseeing the functioning and development of the SADC, and ensuring that policies are properly implemented. The Council usually meets twice a year in January, and just before the Summit in August or September;

• The **Integrated Committee of Ministers** had its inaugural meeting in March 2003 in Luanda, Angola. It is mandated by the Summit to oversee the work of the Secretariat. It serves as an umbrella policy organ for all SADC Program of Action activities and bears responsibility for the implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. It reports directly to the Council of Ministers. At least two ministers from each member state are expected to attend the Integrated Committee of Ministers meetings. The Integrated Committee of Ministers is expected to meet at least twice a year;

• The **Secretariat** is the principal executive institution of the SADC, responsible for the strategic planning, coordination and management of SADC programs. It is headed by an Executive Secretary, Tomáz Augusto Salomão from Mozambique (who was appointed at the Botswana Summit in August 2005 for a period of four years). The Botswana Summit also appointed João Samuel Caholo of Angola as Deputy Executive Secretary, for a period of four years;

• The **Organ on Defense, Politics and Security Cooperation** is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region. It reports to the SADC Summit and is headed by a troika. The SADC Summit and Organ Troikas are mutually exclusive. A Ministerial Committee comprised of the ministers responsible
for foreign affairs, defense, public security and state security from each of the member states reports to the Chairperson, and is responsible for the coordination of the work of the Organ and its structures. Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each member state perform the functions of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy within the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Ministers for Defense, Public Security and State Security work through the Inter-state Defense and Security Committee.

The Organ is currently chaired by Angola (until mid-2008), and will be followed by Lesotho. Associated with these institutions, the Regional Peackeeping Training Center, located in Harare, became a full-fledged SADC organ in August 2005. The SADC's goal is to transform it into a Center of Excellence for training in peace support operations, thus enhancing its capacity to respond to conflict and to maintain stability within the region. So far, however, the Center is almost at a standstill because of a lack of funding, even if some courses have been held in 2007-2008\textsuperscript{119}.

Unlike the AU and ECOWAS, the SADC does not, therefore, have a Peace and Security Council, or a committee with reduced membership that acts on behalf of member states. Instead, all countries are involved within its peace and security framework below the heads of state level. The function of the SADC and Organ troikas is to serve as a ‘steering committee’ so that decisions ultimately depend upon agreement at Summit level. These security institutions are important steps towards the operationalization of peace and security in the sub-region, but they remain mostly empty structures waiting to be filled through the implementation of policies and actions.

**Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement**

Although the organization recognizes the strict respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each member state (Preamble of Protocol), it has a mandate to prevent, contain and resolve not only inter-state, but also intra-state conflicts (Protocol, Art.2-e; Art.11-1c), through peacekeeping or peace enforcement. This enforcement capacity derives from Article 53 of the UN Charter and it presupposes authorization from the UN Security Council (Protocol, Art.11-3d). In 2004, the Interstate Defense and Security Committee met in Maseru, Lesotho, and mandated the Ministerial Defense Sub-Committee to assemble a technical team to plan the setting up of an *SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG)*. The SADC is currently preparing procedures for the establishment of this joint military unit. Although this Standby Brigade, created under the framework of the African Standby Force, was officially launched in Zambia, in August 2007, it faces some obstacles: (i) a lack of physical headquarters; (ii) largely dysfunctional national armies with different military doctrines; (iii) a lack of civilian a dimension (e.g. police, rule of law); and (iv) a lack of a clear cut strategy and doctrine (the size and type of national contributions abide more by national constrains than by any SADCBRIG strategy). Even though some states in the southern region have engaged in common regional military exercises\textsuperscript{120}, none has been conducted under the frame of SADCBRIG.

Currently, SADCBRIG is led by a South African General. The only physical structure of SADCBRIG is the Planning Element. Currently, it has a staff of 12, even though the goal is to add 3 people from the Troika/Presidency and 3 from the Troika/Organ (18 in total). The Planning Element is subdivided in different sections: operations, logistics and communications. Although it is difficult to forecast the shape of SADCBRIG, it is likely to become a loose force that will only be mustered when there is a compelling need to do so. If so, it will often be dependent on the national interests of the major players in the region.

\textsuperscript{119} According to the Center, the following considerations have been taken into account during the planning of this year’s training calendar: (i) avoidance of duplication between national training and regionally coordinated training; (ii) answer the SADC’s Standby Force’s training needs; (iii) deepening integration in the region in the area of Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation; and (iv) preparations for possible deployment as provided in deployment scenarios of the SADC Standby Force. In 2007-2008, the Center held the following courses: civil military coordination; conflict management and resolution; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR); the SADC peace support course; basic French for peacekeepers; and the law of armed conflict.

Conflict Prevention

The SADC is also mandated to engage in operational conflict prevention through “preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication by an international tribunal” (Protocol, Art. 11-3a). However, it still lacks a conflict prevention strategy based on its endogenous security dynamics. On the contrary, some embassies in the region—such as UK and US—have developed their own conflict prevention guidelines. No major conflict prevention activity has been carried out by the SADC.

In the late 1980s, the SADC created a regional early warning system (REWS) to advance information on food security through analysis and monitoring of food crop production prospects, food supplies, and requirements in order to alert member states and the humanitarian community of impending food shortages in sufficient time for appropriate interventions to be made. Later in 2001, the SADC Organ adopted a new agenda and provided for the establishment of an, “Early warning system in order to facilitate timely action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict” (Protocol, Art.11-3b). This conflict warning system is to be linked with REWS. Presently, the system is being developed and it is based on classified intelligence information. However, no involvement of civil society has been established. The SADC is in the process of creating a Situation Room and recruiting the necessary analysts.

Overall, the organizational capacity of the SADC in peace and security is lukewarm. First, it still lacks a clear vision on how to address the insecurity facing the region and, second, it has been wrecked by divisions among its members. In addition, none of the potential leaders in the region—South Africa and Zimbabwe—are playing a leading role. The first is because of its apartheid history and short experience in the international scene, while the latter is due to its severe national problems.

RESOURCE CAPACITY

The SADC Secretariat is small, politically weak, and donor dependent. Yet the SADC is in the process of rapid expansion of its staff, headquarters, and budget plan. In the Council of Ministers Meeting held in Lesotho in March 2007, the Secretariat budget for the year 2007/2008 was approved in the amount of USD $45.3 million. For the year 2006/07, the estimated revenue and expenditure for SADC institutions totaled USD $40.4 million, financed by a contribution of USD $16.5 million from the member states, and through grants of USD $23.8 million from the international community.

The headquarters of the organization, in Gaborone, are going through a significant overhaul. Upon its completion, it will house 250 personnel, and is expected to cost the SADC USD $25 million, which will be amortized over 15 years through member state contributions. However, for the time being, the staff of the SADC include approximately 200 people, of which only about 30-40 are committed to issues of peace and security.

It is equally important to retain the fact that the European Commission will make EUR €135 million available to the SADC, under a joint regional indicative program to support regional economic integration. EU support for hard infrastructure will be through national indicative programs as well as the EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure, which is presently under development. Approximately 80 percent of the SADC’s budget comes from external donors, largely from the EU. Despite the fact that peace and security are not focal sectors in EC interventions, the EC planned to fund an Integrated Peace and Security Program (with a nominal allocation under RIP 6 million). The proposed intervention is supposed to have 2-3 components: a successor of the SADC Regional Drug

121 Following an instruction from the Ministerial Committee of the Organ meeting in Maputo in July 2003, the ISDSC approved the conceptual principles on which the SADC early warning system is to be based. In July 2004, the 25th meeting of the ISDSC mandated a team of experts from the SADC and Organ troikas to initiate the establishment of the regional early warning system, which has not yet been finalized.

122 X EDF RSP/RIP (2007-2013)
Control Program; assistance to the regional peacekeeping training centre; and measures for controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in southern Africa.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Peacekeeping and enforcement

Although the SADC has adopted a comprehensive and fairly agile organizational structure to handle issues of peace and security, it still has a limited record in the field. In the area of peacekeeping and enforcement, SADC’s interventions have been as follows:

• Lesotho (1998): on 22 September, 1998, South African troops entered Lesotho to prevent mutinous soldiers of the Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF) from staging a military coup. The South African contingent was part of a SADC Combined Task Force. Their objectives were to prevent a military coup, to disarm the mutineers, and to create a safe and stable environment for the diplomatic initiative to find a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Lesotho. However, because of the way in which the intervention was authorized, structured and deployed, it has been marred by overall criticism. Critics point out that the intervention was a South African intervention aimed at entrenching the rule of the governing Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party. The intervention in Lesotho did not have the approval of the UN Security Council;

• Democratic Republic of Congo (1998): the military intervention in DRC by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe has also been widely discussed, and views differ as to the appropriateness of the action. The participating countries argued that they were acting on the basis of collective self-defense. The fact that only some members of SADC participated has sparked controversy. There were claims of an intense internal rivalry in SADC. The intervention by only three member states was facilitated by the fact that until its 2002 restructuring, the Organ had more independence from the rest of the SADC’s institutions. The military intervention was only retroactively recognized by the SADC. The intervention in DRC did not have the approval of the UN Security Council.

Peacemaking

Besides peacekeeping and enforcement, the SADC has also been active in peacemaking. For instance, in October 1994, SADC members strongly pressured Mozambican RENAMO leader Afonso Dlakham to not withdraw from the elections in Mozambique. Also in the late 1990s, the presidents of South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe paid ‘fatherly visits’ to King Mswati III of Swaziland to advice him not to curb popular democratic demands.


COOPERATION WITH THE UN

The SADC participates in the High Level Meetings between the UN and Regional Organizations (for the first time in the 4th HLM in 2001). Additionally, the UN Department of Political Affairs has the practice of holding consultations with the SADC delegation during the regular session of the General Assembly, when SADC sends a delegation. The SADC gained observer status at the UN General Assembly on 2 December, 2004 (A/RES/59/49).

In 2001, the Department for disarmament Affairs consulted with the SADC to establish an appropriate framework of cooperation between the two organizations in disarmament-related issues. This cooperation covers the following areas: the establishment of regional transparency mechanisms
with respect to small arms and light weapons holdings and transfers, including databases for information sharing; the social reintegration of ex-combatants and the implementation of weapons collection projects; the provision of specialized disarmament training to government officials in the region; and assistance in the mobilization of financial and technical resources to implement the above activities.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to strengthen its cooperation with SADC in support of peace efforts in the sub-region, including those aimed at enhancing the African peacekeeping capacity. The Department participated in a number of sub-regional peacekeeping seminars and exercises. In March 2000, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), in collaboration with the SADC’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, implemented an annual UNITAR-RPTC Training Program to Enhance Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Harare, Zimbabwe. Following the contested elections in Zimbabwe, however, donors withdrew support for the Centre.

In addition, the FAO is cooperating at the regional level with the SADC’s Early Warning System, the SADC Food Security Unit, and its Regional Communication for Development Centre. The FAO also launched a regional program covering SADC member states on the preparation of drought mitigation and prevention strategies. The World Food Program’s (WFP) sub-regional office in Mozambique provides technical and financial support to SADC countries in the area of vulnerability assessment and the building of disaster management capacity. The WFP has provided food aid to some one million people in Angola and to some 70,000 Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to implementing a large program of food aid and development projects for over a million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself.

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PART III
CONCLUSIONS
a) ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

The organizational capacity of a UN partner to undertake peace and security depends on two aspects: (i) the constitutional provisions according it the mandate to become active; and (ii) the institutional mechanisms through which it can function and exercise that mandate. All organizations surveyed, with the exception of CPLP, CARICOM, and the Commonwealth, have adopted constitutional provisions to engage in peace and security. Often, it is the founding document of the organization that accords it the capacity to operate in this area (e.g. the Constitutive Act of the AU; the Charter of the CSTO; the Treaty of the EU; or the Charter of the OIC). However, most organizations have adopted more specific legal protocols that supervise and establish benchmarks on how the organizations operate in peace and security. For instance, in Africa, the AU has adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council; and ECOWAS the Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, whereas in other regions, PIF has adopted the “Biketawa Declaration”, CIS has signed the Concept of Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the Territory of CIS Member States, and LAS has adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Between Arab States. These specific conventions either cover the full spectrum of conflict or focus on specific sectors. Of all organizations surveyed, only the CPLP, CARICOM and COMSEC have not adopted any legal framework to engage in peace and security. Even if they have operational experience in these areas, the organizations have neglected the need to adopt constitutional provisions. There are no indications that they will rectify the situation soon.

In terms of structure, all organizations surveyed in this study have proved to have an appropriate organic structure. In terms of the division of power and labor, the pinnacle is usually centered on the Summit of Heads of State and Government (designated, for instance, as ‘Assembly’ in the case of the AU, the OAS and IGAD, ‘Conference’ in ECCAS, or ‘Meeting’ in COMSEC), which lays out the general guidelines and provides strategic orientation. Under its strict dependency, a ministerial organ composed of Defense Ministers and/or Foreign Ministers of all member-states is generally tasked with implementing the decisions emanating from the Summit, and to elaborate work programs in their respective areas of intervention (e.g. the ‘Council of Ministers’ of the ECCAS or IGAD, the ‘Executive Council’ of the AU, or the ‘Ministerial Committee’ of the SADC). In conjunction with this ministerial organ, some organizations have established a committee composed of only Defense officials that examine all technical and administrative issues and evaluate the prerequisites for intervening in conflicts (e.g. the ‘Defense and Security Commission’ of the ECOWAS and ECCAS, or the LAS’ Permanent Military Commission). Larger organizations, such as the AU, ECOWAS, or LAS, have set up a more executive organ – which does not include all member states – responsible for the formulation and implementation of key political decisions associated with conflict prevention, peacekeeping, or enforcement. In the case of ECOWAS, it is the ‘Mediation and Security Council’ that fulfills this role, in the AU this function is attributed to the ‘Peace and Security Council’, whereas in LAS it is the ‘Arab Peace and Security Council’. In the case of the AU, ECOWAS, and the EU, which have ventured into the realm of supra-nationality, a Commission which manages day-to-day tasks and implements the organizations’ policies was also created.

Apart from the general organic structure of the organizations, it is important to assess their organizational capacities in the specific areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding:

Conflict Prevention

1. Almost all organizations undertake conflict prevention measures. The AU, IGAD and ECOWAS in Africa, and the EU in Europe, maintain conflict prevention centers with early warning systems in place, including in the field in some cases. The EU, specifically, has developed a sophisticated conflict prevention mechanism for early warning on potential conflict areas on a global basis. However, it lacks a mechanism for its own member states. This is based on the political assumption, borne of experience, that its unique integration
movement has successfully rendered the prospect of conflict among its own member states unthinkable. Other organizations, such as the SADC, ECCAS, OAS, IOF, PIF, or the LAS, have a legal mandate to establish early warning measures, but they are either still non-existent or dysfunctional. Indeed, the LAS has been mandated by its 2006 Statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council to set up an early warning mechanism, which has not yet materialized. The OAS does not have a specialized EW unit, but is working to enhance its capacity in this area under its new preventive strategy through political analysis, data banks, and the development of indicators. The EW mechanisms of the ECCAS and SADC, on the other hand, suffer from grave financial and human limitations, which have led to virtual paralysis;

2. Other regional and sub-regional agencies have informal methods of monitoring potential crisis spots within their jurisdictional zones. Specifically, the OSCE – despite various declarations stressing the importance of EW – does not have, or plan to have, a specialized full-time EW unit, nor does it use specific EW indicators or parameters to assess potential crisis areas. It does, however, have desk officers mandated to monitor countries and regions for EW indications, and it has used external consultants and public databases to this end. It does acknowledge the need for improvement in its EW – through greater focus and resources. The CoE lacks a specific mandate for EW, but its various standard-setting and monitoring bodies (in human rights, minorities and democracy) contribute to an overall regional knowledge base in this respect. The CPLP, although not exclusively geared to early warning, has used in one instance a temporary mission in a crisis situation operating as an early warning mechanism. The IOF has established both a Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace Consolidation Division, and an Observatory which monitors democracy, rights and freedoms;

3. It is widely recognized that early warning is an essential part of an effective conflict prevention strategy. Progress in institutionalizing an effective early warning function in the organizations, however, has been hampered for some time by various sensitivities, namely: (i) the use of official intelligence in an otherwise transparent forum; (ii) the sanctity of the principle of sovereign equality; and (iii) concern that an explicit and shared identification of a potential crisis situation may be a negative instrumental factor in worsening the situation;  

4. Among all organizations, the EU has perhaps the most advanced EW system in the world, involving the EU Check-List of countries and regions that relies on mission reporting, and open-source information for Brussels-based desk analyses using the EW indicators;

5. Only a few organizations are involved in structural conflict prevention (i.e. addressing the root causes of conflicts). So far, only the EU, OAS, and the CoE have developed programs that target baseline issues such as democratization, human right protection, environmental security, and economic welfare;

6. There is no system yet in place for liaising between the United Nations and its partners in conflict prevention. This militates against efficient coordination in the early detection of emerging crises and policy formulation in preventive measures.

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123 The 2000 Brahimi Report recommended an early warning information and analysis unit for the United Nations: “The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).” Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, Recomm. 5.
Peacemaking

7. Most organizations have adopted legal provisions and have attained substantial institutional strength in peacemaking. The legal provisions to engage in peacemaking can either be found in the founding document of an organization (e.g. chapter V of the OAS Charter), or in specific protocols that supervise and commit member states in this area (e.g. the CoE’s European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes);

8. The organizational capacity in peacemaking varies widely from organization to organization. We may find organizations that have developed an adequate organic structure, which could be illustrated by the establishment of panels of eminent people (the AU, ECOWAS, LAS, ASEAN/ARF), the deployment of representatives of the Secretary General with adequate headquarters’ support (the AU, IOF); COMSEC Secretariat’s Good Offices Section; the OAS Permanent Council; the Specialized Committees of the OIC; or the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. In these cases, peacemaking is interpreted as a formal endeavor. Some other organizations have a more informal and consensus-oriented approach to peacemaking, such as the IGAD, CIS, and ASEAN. Finally, others, such as the ECCAS, CPLP, LAS, CARICOM, carry out peacemaking activities more by chance than by design – such as whenever international pressure or local dynamics compel them to intervene;

9. Over the same crisis, the United Nations often coordinates its peacemaking initiatives with those of its partners. In some cases, however, effective coordination has been acknowledged to be lacking. No organized system is in place to ensure effective and continuous coordination, although the capacity appears to exist in terms of secretariat resources for liaison purposes.

Peacekeeping

10. Only a limited number of UN partners engage in peacekeeping activities. Some lack the juridical competence, others possess the competence but make the political judgment against undertaking such responsibilities. Some, however, have acquired the juridical competence and exercised the political will to engage in peacekeeping measures within their jurisdictional zones, notably the AU, CIS, ECOWAS, LAS, OSCE, PIF, and the SADC. The CSTO is currently developing its peacekeeping capacities. The nature of the existing forces (Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment) is related more to collective defense than peacekeeping. Currently, only the EU, NATO, CIS and the CSTO have the mandate to undertake peacekeeping missions outside their jurisdictional zones, on a potentially global basis, on behalf of the United Nations. For the EU and NATO, the extra-jurisdictional mandate is exclusive, whereas the CIS and CSTO may operate both intra-territorially and extra-territorially;

11. Some organizations which do not have a peacekeeping nor an enforcement capacity have been encouraged to establish such a mechanism. In the case of ASEAN, numerous proposals have been put forward to provide the organization with a military role. However, ASEAN leaders have rejected the proposals and contended that bilateral arrangements are the most viable strategy instead. Nevertheless, ASEAN is currently undertaking a study on the feasibility of a regional peacekeeping force. The IOF, on the other hand, although not holding an autonomous military capacity, sponsors the military training of peacekeepers through the RECAMP and PAIM programs;

12. The United Nations remains the natural leader in peacekeeping measures. However, because it has not been granted an adequate resource capacity by UN member states, however, it is unable to undertake all mission requirements on a global basis. A trend is underway, therefore, for hybrid, bridging or support arrangements to be developed, in which the UN and a regional partner will ‘twin’ in a peace mission or a partner will undertake a preliminary mission pending a UN take-over; or will provide the ‘hard’ security function for a ‘soft’ UN peacebuilding mission.
Peace Enforcement

13. The same two intergovernmental partners (the EU, NATO) that are prepared to undertake peacekeeping missions beyond their jurisdictional zones are also prepared to undertake peace enforcement missions (on behalf of the United Nations with a Security Council-derived mandate) beyond their jurisdictional zones and on a potentially global basis. Beyond these, only the CIS and the CSTO have an enforcement capacity. CIS has exercised this capacity, for example, in Tajikistan. CSTO remains inexperienced in this area.

14. However, the UN Secretary-General’s new vision of global security, comprises a ‘network of effective and mutually-reinforcing multilateral mechanisms’ – ‘regional and global’ not yet being developed in terms of a uniform juridical and resource capacity across all regions. Of all regions, an interlocking system of peacekeeping and enforcement capacity is under development only in Africa, although the Pacific has shown a capacity to deploy on an ad hoc basis. No such internally-focused regional capacity exists elsewhere – either in Europe, the Arab world, Asia or the Americas.

Peacebuilding

15. All UN partners play a role, of some type and magnitude, in peacebuilding. This augurs well for the involvement of regional partners in the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission;

16. However, even if they have some operational experience in peacebuilding (see below), their organizational capacity is low, and this is reflected in their legal mandate and the organizational structure. Beyond the OSCE, CoE and the EU, only one organization, the African Union, has developed a clear program in peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction. In this way, it has produced a compelling Handbook on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. And although the organization has only one staff person working on this area (within the Conflict Management Division), the AU is breaking new ground. However, the peacebuilding capacity of most organizations (COMSEC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IOF, the SADC) is confined to election observation. Some of them have adopted specific protocols to regulate their observation missions (AU). The AU has adopted a Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, the IOF the Defining Principles Guiding Election Observation, and the SADC has approved its Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections;

17. The two organizations with the strongest peacebuilding capacity are the EU and the OSCE. Both have deployed missions as a way to pacify, democratize, humanize and improve life in societies emerging from crisis or violence. The OSCE’s work in peacebuilding is coordinated by the Permanent Council and implemented, primarily, by the field missions. In the EU, the DG RELEX (Commission) is tasked to supervise and guide the work of the organization in peacebuilding, even if there is a strong inclination to transfer responsibility to the EC Delegations. Interestingly, the EU has recently created a Peacebuilding Partnership portal, intended to allow interested organizations and entities working in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding to provide to the Commission, on a voluntary basis, information regarding their areas of activity.

In the case of Africa, a note of alert should be given to the organizational framework between the AU and the sub-regional Organizations (i.e. ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS). Despite the recent adoption of a MoU, the relationship still needs to be strengthened by clarifying the precise role of each organ. The AU has established its African Standby Force on the basis of the existing Regional Economic Communities, nevertheless, some of these sub-regional organizations still have the possibility to develop their own and independent peace and security agenda. For example, it will be
possible for the ECOWAS military component to deploy even without an AU mandate, while in the Horn, IGAD’s CEWARN is independent from the EASBRIG framework. Problems may also arise because of the overlapping memberships of some African countries. Angola, for example, is a member of both ECCAS and the SADC. It is taking part in the process of slowly establishing a standby force in Central Africa, while also taking part in the Southern Africa Standby Force.
b) RESOURCE CAPACITY

The discrepancy between organizations is wider when looking at resource capacity – measured in terms of financial and human resources. If we only compare same type of organizations, the noteworthy difference is evident. The study has surveyed eight regional organizations and arrangements: the ASEAN, AU, CIS, COE, LAS, PIF, OAS, and OSCE. Even if we take into consideration the idiosyncratic nature of the political context, the local level of welfare, and the historical background of these organizations, the differences in terms of financial power and human resources are palpable. It is clear that the comparisons are also difficult to make because some of the organizations may have a large budget but, in fact, the source of capital comes from donors. Others have a small budget to run their Secretariat, but if their work is carried out by field missions, it might not reflect the size and capacity of these organizations. Nevertheless, the comparisons are warranted. Of the regional organizations, the European ones have the largest financial and human capacity. Among regional organizations in the world, the Council of Europe has the largest budget: USD $395 million, followed by the OSCE with USD $246 million, the AU with USD $133 million, the OAS with USD $88, the LAS with USD $36 million, the PIF with USD $23 million, and, at the bottom, CIS and ASEAN with USD $9 million. As far as human resources are concerned, the OSCE ranks highest, with a number of staff that reaches 3450 people. It is followed by the Council of Europe with 2140, the AU with approximately 700, OAS and LAS with roughly 500, ASEAN and CIS with about 250, and PIF with 100.

In terms of the sub-regional organizations, i.e. CARICOM, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and the SCO, the discrepancies are more salient. Of all these organizations, ECOWAS is the one with highest financial capacity with a regular budget of USD $121 million. Indeed, ECOWAS is one of the organizations that has been attracting more donor funds although we judge that they have not been allocated in a systematic manner. All other sub-regional organizations in the world have a lower capacity: SADC with USD $45 million, ECCAS with USD $18 million, CARICOM with USD $10 million; and finally SCO and IGAD around $3 million. With regard to human resources, most of the sub-regional organizations surveyed have been able to supply rigorous quantitative data on the number of staff. Nevertheless, if the analysis is based on the estimates, ECOWAS has a staff of approximately 300; the SADC, 200; CARICOM, 180; and ECCAS, SCO and IGAD employ roughly only 30-50 people.

The other intergovernmental organizations surveyed – coined in this way because they are either ‘alliance organizations’ (collective defense) operating outside their area of jurisdiction, or because their criteria for membership does not abide by any geographical criteria, such as the COMSEC, CPLP, CSTO, EU, IOF, NATO, or OIC – have very heterogeneous resources. Out of the 3 transnational organizations, the COMSEC, CPLP and IOF; it is the French speaking community that has the largest financial capacity, with a budget reaching USD $101 million, followed by the Commonwealth with USD $27 million, and the Portuguese-speaking Community with a meager USD $1.7 million. Of all organizations surveyed, the CPLP is the one with the lowest financial capacity. In terms of human resources, CPLP employs only 20 people, whereas COMSEC and IOF have a staff of approximately 250-350 people. Of the alliance organizations, NATO is by far the most capable organization, with a staff of 4200 working at headquarters and a civilian budget of USD $364 million. Finally, the European Union is the largest and wealthiest of all organizations surveyed. With only 27 member states (about half the size of the IOF, OIC, COMSEC or the OSCE), the EU has grown into a powerful civilian (but progressively also military) organization that employs 25000 people and has a budget of USD $188.5 billion.

A statistical analysis of the organization’s resources is warranted but it should not be exclusive. Often, even if the organization has an adequate budget, its physical resources (headquarters’ working conditions) are very poor. This is the case, for example, at ECOWAS, IGAD, and the AU. A qualitative assessment on human resources is equally justifiable. And as it is the case with the AU, CARICOM, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, LAS, OIC, and SADC, the staff lacks the appropriate training and motivation to work in difficult conditions. And even if it is not always the case,
appointments are recurrently based on political and national affiliations, rather than on professional experience and merit.

Furthermore, one must be careful when comparing the financial and human resources of organizations with such different mandates and natures as the ones here studied. An organization that is devoted solely to cooperation in peace and security can have a much lower budget and number of staff and still be more efficient in this field than an organization that devoted itself largely to economic integration. One example is the case of CARICOM, whose budget and number of staff is relatively high, but is in fact very limited if one takes into consideration that these resources are being used for economic integration (in the creation of a single market, for example).
c) OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Most of the organizations have only recently incorporated a security mandate. However, they already have considerable operational experience in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding:

Conflict Prevention

1. At least three organizations have considerable experience in structural conflict prevention: the EU, the CoE and the OAS. For instance, the EU (and its member states) is the largest aid donor in the world. Through partnerships signed with ACP countries and also with its neighbors in Northern Africa and Central Europe, the EU has established development programs that aim to prevent the outbreak of conflict. The CoE, through its Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project (started in 2002), intends to help policy-makers, civil society and all who play a part in culture to devise a policy of dialogue that respects every aspect of cultural diversity. With this in mind, the CoE undertook an analysis of the sources of conflict between cultural and religious communities, and the mechanisms that stir such conflict, in order to define cultural activities with a preventive aim and to identify actions to promote reconciliation. On the other hand, the OAS has, for instance, established a Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution;

2. In terms of early warning and operational conflict prevention, ECOWAS and IGAD are at the forefront. The first has experience in working with civil society organizations and has set up four Zonal Bureaux in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou. IGAD also has plenty of experience in the field, namely in collecting primary data through its field monitors. Although both mechanisms have been set up only recently, they have integrated an extensive network of field actors who assist the organizations in becoming strong conflict prevention entities with robust empirical experience.

Peacemaking

1. Either operating under Chapter VI or Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, regional and other intergovernmental organizations have attained considerable peacemaking experience. The major difference between organizations does not lie in the extension of the experience (usually ample), but in the quality. In fact, only some organizations have a clear mandate and a strong organizational capacity in peacemaking. The OIC, for example, has set up Specialized Committees to engage in Israel-Palestine, the southern Philippines or in Jammu and Kashmir; whereas the representatives of COMSEC's Secretary General have been involved in numerous conflicts, such as in Tonga, the Maldives, Kenya or Guyana. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has also mediated conflicts in the FYROM and in the Baltic states;

2. However, the involvement of other organizations in peacemaking has been on a periodic and ad hoc basis. They lack a clear strategy for peacemaking, and their interventions are primarily driven by reputation, pressure, or impulse. ASEAN's mediation of the South China Sea dispute, and in Cambodia, and Myanmar; CARICOM's interventions in Venezuela, Haiti, or Guyana; the CPLP's role in Sao Tomé and Guinea Bissau; or ECCAS' involvement in Sao Tomé are illustrative of peacemaking activities carried out with minimum organizational and legal support. And, they are often confined to the dispatch of special envoys or the issuing of political statements (notably in the case of ASEAN).
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

3. Regional and other intergovernmental organizations are able to deploy missions under Chapters VI, VII or VIII of the UN Charter. Since the first military intervention (LAS in Palestine, 1948), intergovernmental organizations have deployed approximately 20 missions. These include the LAS (Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen), ECOWAS (Liberia (twice), Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone), the AU (Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Comoros), PIF (Solomon Islands), CIS (Tajikistan; Georgia, South Ossetia; Georgia, Abkhazia; and Moldova), the SADC (Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo), NATO (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the FYROM), the EU’s peacekeeping missions (Bosnia and FYROM), and the OSCE (Kosovo);

4. These deployments vary widely in terms of type and ambition. Often, the trigger of the intervention has more to do with the interests of the intervener than with the need on the ground to intervene. As an example, one can remember the intervention of the SADC in Lesotho and Democratic Republic of Congo, which were fueled by the economic and geostrategic interests of South Africa (in the case of Lesotho), Angola and Zimbabwe (in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo). Also, ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia were propelled by Nigeria’s national agenda, just as Russia’s interests led to the interventions of the CIS in Tajikistan, Georgia and Moldova.

Peacebuilding

5. The peacebuilding capacity of the majority of the organizations is centered on election observation. For example, COMSEC, IOF and ECOWAS have significant experience in election observation. However, election observation is generally not integrated into a comprehensive peacebuilding policy, but simply regarded as a temporary and self-contained political exercise;

6. Other organizations, however, have a more comprehensive experience. For instance, the CoE, itself a post-conflict organization, has helped build up fledgling post-conflict and post-totalitarian countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950; Spain and Portugal, 1970s; Central and Eastern European states, 1990s). The CoE is involved in standard-setting, monitoring, and supervision of compliance on human rights and good governance issues. It also provides expertise on draft legislation, training, and awareness-raising activities. Also, the OSCE plays a significant role in all peacebuilding activities, most notably in the rule of law, human rights, good governance, anti-crime and counter-terrorism operations, and weapons management. It also has been involved in humanitarian and refugee work in Albania and in the DDR, and in truth and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Arab world, the LAS has experience in several areas: viz. (i) humanitarian assistance is generally carried out through NGOs (e.g. humanitarian assistance to Palestine and Darfur); (ii) a program for the disarmament of weapons is being carried in Somalia; and (iii) disaster relief efforts are carried out in cooperation with the Red Crescent. There have also been efforts in collaboration with the UN and the AU in the areas of disarmament and weapons management. The OAS has been heavily involved in peacebuilding activities such as: (i) DDR (past experiences in Suriname, Nicaragua and Guatemala); (ii) truth, justice and reconciliation, through the work of the former Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD); (iii) rule of law through the work of the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs; (iv) human rights, through the work of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR); (v) good governance and electoral assistance through the work of the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs; (vi) criminal law (trafficking, laundering) through the work of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD); (vii) counter-terrorism through the work of Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), and
(viii) disaster relief through the work of the Office for Sustainable Development and Environment. Both the EU and NATO are heavily engaged in all peacebuilding activities. The OIC has had a fairly satisfactory experience in humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance and disaster relief;

7. Both the OSCE and the EU have substantial experience in deploying peacebuilding missions. The EU has been involved in 14 missions so far (e.g. Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo or FYROM), whereas the OSCE has deployed 17 missions (e.g. Albania, Croatia, Moldova, and Georgia).
d) RECOMMENDATIONS

General Recommendations

1. A ‘UN-Regional and Other Intergovernmental Partnership’ could be formalized through an agreement between regional and other intergovernmental organizations and the UN Secretary-General, with a list of partners invited to attend the High Level Meetings being developed, in a manner similar to the process of gaining observer status at the UN General Assembly;

2. The role of each organization – whether it has the mandate and capacity in the various aspects of international peace and security (early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement and peacebuilding) – could be declared at the 8th High Level Meeting. This would be a precursor to proceeding towards the introduction of more formalized agreements between the United Nations and partners, as called for in the report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change;

3. A Capacity Working Group could be established by the 8th High Level Meeting with the task of developing, by 2015, a ten-year capacity-building program for ensuring uniform strength of the partnership, across both thematic and geographical lines;

4. There is an immense potential in the different early warning systems already in place at the regional level. At a time when UNDPA is implementing a plan to reorganize and strengthen its capacities for conflict prevention, the development of a regional-global early warning database could have substantial results for the renewed efficiency of both global and regional organizations in this field. In October 2006, UNDPA launched the ‘Peacemaker’ database. This database could be followed by similar work with the regional organizations on early warning.

Specific Recommendations

Africa

1. In the African context, there are important discrepancies between the level of readiness and the progress towards the establishment of peace support capabilities among the various African sub-regions. Northern Africa stands out as the only sub-region that does not have any regional standby force or even any plans to implement one in the near future. Among the other regions, central Africa, through ECCAS, is still lagging behind. Western Africa, through ECOWAS; eastern Africa through EASBRICOM (previously led by IGAD); and southern Africa through the SADC; appear as the only regions that will have a solid peace and security component including the capacity to intervene at hand. The AU should, thereby, increase the level of supervision of its PSOD (Peace Support Operation Division) on the establishment of the sub-regional brigades. The sentiment in the sub-regional organizations is that the brigades are being created with no effective accountability from the African Union;

2. Therefore, effective liaison and coordination with the sub-regional brigades is required through the appointment of liaison officers each per brigade and the setting up of an effective communication link between the AU and the standby brigades;

3. When the ASF Policy Framework was created, it was assumed that the UN would continue to be the premier organization providing security on the continent. The ASF would fill the
initial gap until the UN is ready to assume responsibility. Consequently, the ASF's readiness time varies between 14 to 90 days. Yet, experiences from AMIS suggest that a smooth transition within a limited time frame shall not be taken for granted, thus illustrating the importance of looking at sustaining capabilities. This leads to new ambitions in terms of training requirements, staff manning, equipment and strategic lift capabilities;

4. After a long and arduous process, the MoU between the AU and the African regional economic communities was signed in December 2007. All signatories should take advantage of the momentum and work to give a pragmatic orientation to the document. This includes: (i) the identification of major gaps in capacity among the REC’s with the intention of ensuring, as far as possible, equal progress, (ii) the formulation of specific capacity building projects with detailed budget description and cost estimate resulting in comprehensive coordinated contribution agreements, (iii) the possible rotation of personnel between the AU and the African sub-regions, and (iv) maximizing the leverage created by the recent establishment of liaison offices by the sub-regions at AU headquarters.

Americas

1. The OAS must continue reinforcing the links between democracy, peace and development in its region, namely the political and developmental sides of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Because OAS interventions are sensitive for the member states if seen as a response to a conflict, one important avenue could be to de-stigmatize the idea of conflict prevention, so that it is not seen as an intrusion;

2. In this sense, the OAS could strengthen its efforts on structural prevention measures, in cooperation with the UNDPA and UNDP country offices, focusing on in-country staff coordination. Further coordination could help also identify the so-called “yellow countries” (countries showing signs of developing instability or crisis) at an early stage, so that broad and light conflict prevention programs are put in place which further encompass the needs of the citizens, and are seen to be more development-related;

3. CARICOM has been attending the UN High Level Meetings regularly since 1996 (at SG level), and wants to become an important partner of the UN for peace and security. Nevertheless, it is presently primarily focused on economic integration, which is reflected in its organizational structure and mandate. In order to better match its goals in this field, CARICOM could focus on an organizational reconfiguration, developing specific peace and security structures, namely by creating a conflict prevention/good governance department with a broad mandate to respond to political instability.

Asia-Pacific

1. ASEAN has not attended the last two High Level Meetings between the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organizations. In order to strengthen its role in peace and security and its cooperation with the UN, ASEAN could focus on this cooperation at the formal level, by assuring its presence in the HLMs, and choosing to discuss peace and security issues more openly – not only with the UN, but also with other regional organizations;

2. As the issues of peace and security have been more successfully discussed at the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), a further recommendation could be to have an ASEAN-ARF joint representation at the High Level Meetings. This would require further cooperation between ASEAN and northeast Asian countries, and hopefully contribute to a better representation of these two regions (north and southeast Asia);
3. In the Pacific, as the question of non-interference is a fundamental political principle, the PIF could focus its efforts on the long-term responses to instability, linking security and development closely, and focusing on the de-stigmatization of the idea of conflict prevention, as was recommended above for OAS;

4. In this region, the major threat to stability seems to be related to environmental hazards. This encourages a multidimensional approach to security, which illustrates in a clearer way the need for the reinforcement of cooperation with the UN.

Central Asia

1. Notwithstanding the fact that the CIS is accepted by the UN as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, conflicts affecting its member states are still enduring, which penalizes its reputation and legitimacy. Therefore it is important to clearly define the aims and the future tasks of the organization and its position in the region. Nowadays, it seems that the CIS is primarily a consultation forum for its member states rather than a fully-fledged working body. The CIS should move towards the effective materialization of its political resolutions;

2. The CSTO is a young organization which has not clearly declared its status yet. Even if it has gained observer status in UN’s General Assembly, its aims are not clearly spelled out. The CSTO should, in the near future, decide if it will concentrate on soft security issues, or hard security issues, and whether it will become a collective defense alliance, or if it will focus on internally-generated security problems;

3. It is important to better define the border between the CIS and the CSTO. Sometimes, the CSTO is reported as the Collective Security Treaty Organization of CIS, and therefore as a sub-organ of the CIS, when the organizations have indeed different membership. At the same time, even if the UN accepts both organizations as independent bodies, the overlap between them is significant. Recently, for example, the CSTO canceled its plan of broadening the Forces of Rapid Response (supposed to operate in emergency situations of a technological or environmental nature) because a similar structure is functioning within the CIS framework;

4. At the last Summit, the CSTO’s Heads of State adopted two important documents which will pave the way for the creation of its collective peacekeeping forces. The latest information from the CSTO shows that the actual aim is to establish these forces on a permanent basis, which would turn the CSTO into the first international organization with permanent peacekeeping forces. Although the creation of this mechanism is still at a preparatory phase – as the adopted documents need to be ratified by member states – the Organization should intensify its consultations with the UN in this field;

5. The CSTO should also work on its public relations, especially in order to become more known in non-Russian speaking parts of the world. Although the basic documents and information covering the creation of the Organization are available in other languages (e.g. English), they are out of date, are not comprehensive, and are poorly translated from Russian.

Europe

1. The Council of Europe has a long tradition and expertise in the field of standard-setting,
monitoring and supervision of compliance on human rights and good governance within post-conflict and post-totalitarian countries. A continuous and increased exchange of expertise between the organization and the UN is desirable;

2. The CoE has been considered to be a dormant organization in this field, even if it has the largest and more complete European membership. If the CoE chooses to further develop its functions in the field of the peaceful settlement of disputes (especially in the areas encompassed by its membership that are still unstable, such as eastern Europe, southeastern Europe, the Caucasus and central Asia), the organization may be able to strengthen its image in order to be considered as the main European regional organization in the field of peacemaking;

3. The OSCE is one of the regional organizations with the world’s strongest field experience, especially in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For the latter, the OSCE can be a valuable partner for the UN Peacebuilding Commission. While the EU has shown its interest, together with the OIC to become a preferred partner of the Peacebuilding Commission (and is considered as such at the moment), the OSCE has not yet made the same step;

4. The EU has been considered as the *sui generis* actor in the regional-global partnership for peace and security, as it sits 3 times at the table in the High Level Meetings. The EU could envisage the possibility of strengthening its unity at the High Level process by choosing a single representation that coordinates the voices of Council, Presidency and Commission. This might be possible with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, when the EU will have a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and should be followed by the final coordinated and unique EU representation at the High Level Meetings, but also in its cooperation with the UN at the highest level.
e) Selected UN Documents

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1769 (31 July, 2007) was the resolution that established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1706 (31 August, 2006) was the resolution on the situation in Sudan mandating UN assistance to AMIS.
- S/RES/1631 (17 October, 2005) was the first resolution adopted by the Security Council on regional organizations. S/PV.5282 and Resumption 1 (17 October, 2005) were the records of the open debate and the adoption of resolution 1631.
- S/RES/1625 (14 September, 2005) was a declaration on the effectiveness of the Security Council's role in conflict prevention, calling for the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1674 (28 April, 2006) was a Resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts.
- S/RES/1497 (1 August, 2003) recognized the role ECOWAS played in implementing the June 2003 ceasefire and cited Chapter VII.
- S/RES/1467 (18 March, 2003) and 1209 (19 November, 1998) addressed the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa and in the whole continent respectively and recognized the role of regional organizations in this endeavor.
- S/RES/1464 (4 February, 2003) welcomed the actions of ECOWAS in response to the violence in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 with reference to Chapter VII and Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1366 (30 August, 2001) addressed the issue of DDR in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates and stated that preventing armed conflict was a major part of the Council's work that could benefit from existing regional preventive mechanism.
- S/RES/1265 (17 September, 1999) and S/RES/1296 (19 April, 2000) expressed the Council's willingness to take measures to protect civilians in armed conflict and to consider how peacekeeping mandates, including through regional organizations, might better address the negative impact of conflict on civilians.
- S/RES/1197 (18 September, 1998) was on the need for the UN to provide support to regional and sub-regional organizations and to strengthen coordination between the UN and those organizations.

**Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2007/42 (6 November, 2007) addressed the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/PRST/2007/7 (28 March, 2007) and S/PV.5649 and resumption 1 (28 March, 2007) was a Council debate on relations between the UN and regional organizations, particularly the African Union discussed the relationship between the UN and regional organizations.
• S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September, 2006) welcomed the progress made in realizing the goals of resolution 1631 and urged contributions to the capacity building of regional organizations and sub-regional organizations, particularly of the AU and African sub-regional organizations. S/PV.5529 (20 September, 2006) was the open debate on cooperation between the UN and international and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security.

• S/PRST/2005/20 (26 May, 2005) was a Statement by the President of the Security Council on Post-conflict peacebuilding that stressed the importance of extending the partnership between the UN and African regional organization.

• S/PRST/2004/44 (19 November, 2004) recognized the importance of strengthening cooperation with the African Union in order to help build its capacity to deal with collective security challenges.

• S/PRST/2004/27 (20 July, 2004) was the statement after the Council's debate on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in stabilization processes.

• S/PRST/1998/35 (30 November, 1998) reaffirmed the increasingly important role of regional arrangements in maintaining peace and security.

• S/PRST/1998/28 (16 September, 1998) set general standards for peacekeeping and stressed the need to be fully informed of peacekeeping activities carried out by regional or sub-regional organizations.

• S/PRST/1994/22 (3 May, 1994) said that regional and sub-regional organizations should be taken into account when setting up new peacekeeping operations.

Letters

• S/2007/640 (29 October, 2007) was the letter from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia forwarding the concept paper on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.


• S/2007/179 (30 March, 2007) was the letter dated 29 March, 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council which presented the Joint statement of the Fourth General Meeting of representatives of the Caribbean Community and the United Nations system.

• S/2007/148 (14 March, 2007) was the letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa forwarding the concept paper on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

• S/2005/828 (22 December, 2005) was the letter containing a report on a seminar held by the Working Group on cooperation between the United Nations and African regional organizations in the field of peace and security.

• S/2005/567 (8 September, 2005) was the conclusions of the sixth high-level meeting between the Secretary-General and regional organizations.
Secretary-General’s Reports


• A/60/891 (18 July, 2006) was a progress report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the prevention of armed conflict.

• S/2005/740 (28 November, 2005) recommended the Council adopt a new resolution to reflect the new challenges to the protection of civilians and called for more support to regional organizations so that they can facilitate the necessary security environment for humanitarian and protection activities.

• A/59/2005 (21 March, 2005) In larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all

• A/60/182 (1 August, 2005) and A/59/285 (20 August, 2004) are progress reports on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa and called for the UN to enhance the analytical capacity of regional organizations.

• S/2005/86 (11 February, 2005) and S/2004/200 (12 March, 2004) are reports on ways to combat sub-regional and cross-border issues in West Africa and recognize the role of ECOWAS and other regional arrangements in this endeavor.

• A/59/591 (30 November, 2004) and A/50/711 - S/1995/911 (1 November, 1995) are reports on improving African peacekeeping capacity including through the reinforcement of the role of regional organizations.

• A/59/565 (2 December, 2004) and Corr. 1 (6 December, 2004) was the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

• S/2001/574 (7 June, 2001) was the Secretary-General’s first comprehensive report on conflict prevention and that stressed the importance of regional arrangement in the maintenance of peace and security.

• A/54/63 - S/1999/171 (12 February, 1999) is the Secretary-General’s report on enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity

• S/1998/318 (13 April, 1998) was the Secretary-General’s report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

General Assembly Resolutions

• A/RES/60/1 (24 October, 2005) was the World Summit Outcome Document.

• A/RES/49/57 (9 December, 1994) was the Declaration on Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements and Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Other

• S/PV.5735 and resumption 1 (28 August, 2007) was the discussion on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa.

• S/PV.5529 (20 September, 2006) were the records of the latest open debate on cooperation between the UN and international organizations in maintaining international peace and security.

• S/2006/610 (3 August, 2006) was the concept paper circulated by Ghana for the debate on peace consolidation in West Africa and that called for the development of a more complementary relationship between ECOWAS/AU/UN and other regional organizations.


• S/PV.5282 and S/PV.5281 (Resumption 1) (17 October, 2005) were the records of the open debate and the adoption of resolution 1631.

• S/PV.5261 (14 September, 2005) were the records of the Council summit meeting and the adoption of resolution 1625.

• S/PV.5007 and S/PV.5007 (Resumption 1) (20 July, 2004) were the records of the open debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations.

• S/PV.4739 and S/PV.4739/Corr.1 (11 April, 2003) were the records of the Council open debate with the AU, ECOWAS, EU, League of Arab States, OSCE and OAS.

• S/2002/979 (29 August, 2002) were recommendations from the Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa regarding Groups of Friends, coordination between the Security Council and the AU, and peacebuilding in Guinea Bissau.

Useful Additional Sources


• Gilliers, Jakkie (2005), Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa. Institute of Security Studies Occasional Paper 102;


• Holt, Victoria and Shanahan, Moira (2005), African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS. The Henry L. Stimson Center;


• UN Dept. Peacekeeping Operations (1999), *Cooperation Between the UN and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms*. Lessons Learned Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations;