@phdthesis{8723536,
  abstract     = {{Years before the 2008 financial crisis, Wall Street magnate Warren Buffett described derivative contracts as "financial weapons of mass destruction". In a bid to discharge the destructive forces that derivatives may entail, post-2008 international policy initiatives have converted central counterparties (CCPs) for derivatives into the nuclear powerhouses of modern financial markets. Trillions of euros now change hands through these institutions every year. This risk centralization has turned CCPs into powder kegs with the potency to ignite financial and economie crises. Viewed through this lens, regimes for CCP market access constitute a pivotal safety valve for financial  stability. The question of how this safety valve ought to be designed has taken center political stage in the post-Brexit era but has remained vastly undertheorized. By examining how the body of literature on the different emanations of systemic risk may be applied to the market for centrally cleared derivatives, this dissertation develops a conceptual framework for thinking about the structure of CCP market access regimes. In a second stage, the dissertation employs this conceptual framework to normatively assess the EU rules for CCP market access. The outcome of this exercise suggests that the increasingly inward-looking EU approach towards CCP market access does not promote financial stability.}},
  author       = {{Callens, Evariest}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{XX, 552}},
  publisher    = {{Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology}},
  school       = {{Ghent University}},
  title        = {{EU regulation of CCPs for OTC derivatives : CCP market access regimes in light of systemic risk}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}