@phdthesis{8721569,
  abstract     = {{Political staffers are central actors in contemporary politics. The few top advisors that are known
to the general public are just the tip of the iceberg. Below the surface, a diverse unelected elite
operates behind the scenes of parties’ central offices, parliaments and ministerial offices. Their
many tasks include managing political offices, providing communication and policy advice,
assisting individual politicians and supporting party organizations. As they are closely involved in
daily politics, research shows that staffers have an impact on political representation and policymaking.
This seems to be odds with the core principles of representative democracy, as they have
not been elected by voters. Therefore, this study examines a fundamental question about political
staffers: does the political influence of this unelected elite create a democratic deficit? To address
this question, I develop an innovative perspective on staffers’ democratic legitimacy by considering
party loyalty as an important accountability mechanism. More specifically, I argue that a strong
relationship between staffers and political parties is beneficial to the democratic process because it
reduces the likelihood of staffers ‘going rogue’ by disregarding the preferences of voters and elected
elites.

The study takes a quantitative large-N approach by collecting original survey data among staffers
from fourteen Belgian and Dutch political parties (N=1009). This extensive dataset was compiled
through a challenging process of brokering access to political staffers by gaining the endorsement
of senior figures within the staff hierarchy. Based on these empirical data, I conduct an in-depth
analysis of staffers’ professional, voluntary, ideological and procedural relationship with political
parties. The findings show that most Belgian and Dutch staffers are loyalists who faithfully support
the policies of their party. Although most staffers are not directly employed by parties, they are
pivotal to creating political cohesion between central offices, parliaments and ministerial offices.
Moreover, they work in close tandem with the elected elites who are accountable to voters.

I conclude that staffers’ involvement in politics does not create a structural democratic deficit. If
voters, representatives and staffers are bound by the same set of policy preferences, even the most
expeditious staffers are unlikely to hinder democratic representation. By demonstrating the
relevance of staffers’ party loyalty, this PhD study adds a new perspective to the debate on staffers’
political legitimacy. However, party loyalty is only one piece of a larger puzzle and should not be
treated as a substitute for formal rules or responsiveness towards elected representatives. For this
reason, I advocate for a comprehensive approach to staffers’ accountability that considers legal
arrangements as well as party loyalty and loyalty towards individual politicians.}},
  author       = {{Moens, Pieter}},
  keywords     = {{Political Staff,Political Parties,Party Organization,Political Professionalization,Survey Research}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{355}},
  publisher    = {{Ghent University. Faculty of Political and Social Sciences}},
  school       = {{Ghent University}},
  title        = {{Serving or undermining democracy? How political parties hold staffers accountable in Belgium and the Netherlands}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}