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The signal of applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme

Eva Van Belle (UGent) , Ralf Caers, Marijke De Couck, Valentina Di Stasio and Stijn Baert (UGent)
(2019) INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. 58(2). p.251-274
Author
Organization
Abstract
We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor-market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.
Keywords
signalling, activation policies, job referral, policy evaluation, unemployment, FACTORIAL SURVEYS, VOLUNTEER WORK, PAY, EDUCATION, SEARCH, UNEMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYERS, DURATION, VIGNETTE, WOMEN

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Citation

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MLA
Van Belle, Eva, et al. “The Signal of Applying for a Job under a Vacancy Referral Scheme.” INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, vol. 58, no. 2, 2019, pp. 251–74, doi:10.1111/irel.12230.
APA
Van Belle, E., Caers, R., De Couck, M., Di Stasio, V., & Baert, S. (2019). The signal of applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 58(2), 251–274. https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12230
Chicago author-date
Van Belle, Eva, Ralf Caers, Marijke De Couck, Valentina Di Stasio, and Stijn Baert. 2019. “The Signal of Applying for a Job under a Vacancy Referral Scheme.” INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 58 (2): 251–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12230.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Van Belle, Eva, Ralf Caers, Marijke De Couck, Valentina Di Stasio, and Stijn Baert. 2019. “The Signal of Applying for a Job under a Vacancy Referral Scheme.” INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 58 (2): 251–274. doi:10.1111/irel.12230.
Vancouver
1.
Van Belle E, Caers R, De Couck M, Di Stasio V, Baert S. The signal of applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. 2019;58(2):251–74.
IEEE
[1]
E. Van Belle, R. Caers, M. De Couck, V. Di Stasio, and S. Baert, “The signal of applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme,” INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 251–274, 2019.
@article{8607434,
  abstract     = {{We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labor-market programs. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which human resources professionals make hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.}},
  author       = {{Van Belle, Eva and Caers, Ralf and De Couck, Marijke and Di Stasio, Valentina and Baert, Stijn}},
  issn         = {{0019-8676}},
  journal      = {{INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS}},
  keywords     = {{signalling,activation policies,job referral,policy evaluation,unemployment,FACTORIAL SURVEYS,VOLUNTEER WORK,PAY,EDUCATION,SEARCH,UNEMPLOYMENT,EMPLOYERS,DURATION,VIGNETTE,WOMEN}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{251--274}},
  title        = {{The signal of applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12230}},
  volume       = {{58}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}
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