Prime-time Nationalism
The rational and economic underpinnings of the June 30 nationalist “hysteria”

Osama Diab
Dissertation presented in fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences 2018
Faculty of Political and Social Science
Ghent University
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sami Zemni
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To Iman Khattab, who lived long enough to see the start of this project, but left me too early to witness its end.
The Fatherland was the home wherein God has placed us, among brothers and sisters linked to us by the family ties of a common religion, history, and language.

– Giuseppe Mazzini

We have […] a single, universal language. And we possess a religion which most of us share, ways of performing our activities, and a blood which is virtually one flowing in our veins.

– Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid
Acknowledgements

I have a large number of “invisible hands” that have unknowingly contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I would therefore like to start by thanking those who might not have contributed directly to this project, but whose support was still indispensable to its completion. I would like to first express my gratitude to my colleagues at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) who have been very patient and understanding of my frequent PhD disappearances, and have shown nothing but support throughout the long months of writing this dissertation. I would also like to thank my friends and family who have also been understanding of my need to disappear and migrate to a different continent for an extended period of time to get the needed focus for finishing this project. I would like to extend special appreciation to my partner Severine Chavanne who had to endure the often-dizzying PhD emotional roller-coaster, and all the uncertainty and precarity it had coloured our life with.

For the more direct contributions, I would like to thank Maher Hamoud, Andrea Teti and Mohamed Gad for the invaluable feedback they provided on different parts of the text. Their suggestions in their respective areas of expertise helped me considerably in working to improve the text. Needless to say, I claim full responsibility for any faults or defects in it. I would also like to thank Kateleen Maes and Khaled Diab for providing their English-Dutch translation service free-of-charge. A special thanks goes to Omar Jabary Salamanca who suggested the title of this work over a casual conversation after I had presented the research to my colleagues at the Department of Conflict and Development Studies at the University of Ghent.

I would also like to thank members of my defence committee Zeinab Abul-Magd, Koen Bogaert, Ifdal Elsaket, Vivienne Matthies-Boon, Christopher Parker, and Brecht de Smet whose engagement with this work and feedback was of immense value. Last, but most certainly not least, I would like to express my uttermost gratitude to the supervisor of this work Sami Zemni who guided the whole process from its moment of inception until completion, and who have battled with my endless drafts despite his overly busy schedule. For someone who does not consider himself a “natural academic”, I can only owe the completion of this dissertation to Sami’s support, patience and trust, but also to his constructive and detailed critique.
Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to address the ultra-nationalism of the June 30, 2013 period from a new and still largely unexplored angle, that is, the function it served the businessmen who have supported the dissemination of this discourse through their media outlets. In order to do this, this research utilizes theories and tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in order to examine the forces and interests—including economic—behind the diffusion of such discourse.

The study uses as its sample three of the most popular talk shows which were at the forefront of spreading this ultra-nationalist discourse. The talk shows were screened on private media channels owned by businessmen that have started their process of wealth accumulation as a result of the 1970s open-door policy, mostly during the Mubarak era and in close alliance with state institutions.

Although analyzing discourse critically takes into consideration the broader context in which the text has emerged, CDA is sometimes criticized for having contexts that are ahistorical and synchronic (looks only at a given moment in time). Therefore, the study broadens its context to also include the historical dimension. Accordingly, the second half of this study explores the historical links of how nationalism served economic functions in Egypt since the second half of the 19th century. The focus is on shifts and ruptures in official nationalist discourse, and how the past is in a continuous process of change and restructuring based on present considerations.

This rational adoption of nationalist discourse based on economic considerations attempts to offer an alternative narrative to the dominant discourse that described the June 30 ultra-nationalist discourse as hysterical, irrational and emotionally charged. Given that key players in disseminating such “hysteria” were rational economic men, these descriptions are therefore unsatisfactory. The study also argues that these views are linked to the dominant notion that the rational development of modern capitalism only influenced nationalisms in European contexts, whereas in non-European settings nationalism is often presented as a way to mimic Europe’s development and copy its example.
Abstract (NL)

Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift is een poging om het ultranationalisme van de periode rond 30 juni 2013 te bespreken vanuit een nieuw en grotendeels niet onderzocht standpunt. Dit wil zeggen: als een hulpmiddel voor zakenmensen die de verspreiding van dit ultranationalistische discours ondersteunden via hun mediakanalen. Hiervoor gebruikt dit onderzoek de theorie en de middelen van de ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) om de machtsverhoudingen en belangen, inclusief economische, die een rol spelen in de verspreiding van zulks een discours te bestuderen.

De studie gebruikt drie van de meest populaire praatprogramma’s die de voorhoede vormden van dit ultranationalistische discours als voorbeeld. De drie shows werden uitgezonden op particuliere mediakanalen die het eigendom zijn van zakenlieden die hun rijkdom begonnen te vergaren als gevolg van het open-deur beleid van de jaren 70, voornamelijk tijdens het Mubarak tijdperk en in nauwe alliantie met de staatsinstellingen.

Hoewel een kritische analyse van het discours rekening houdt met de bredere context, is de context meestal synchroon en wordt deze op een bepaald moment bekeken. Maar deze studie neemt ook de ruimere historische context in acht. Bijgevolg gaat de tweede helft van de studie na hoe het nationalisme, historisch gezien, de economische doelstelling van Egypte diende sinds de tweede helft van de negentiende eeuw. Daarom ligt de focus op verschuivingen en breuken in het officiële nationalistische discours, en op hoe het verleden een voortdurend proces van verandering en herstructurering is, gebaseerd op de huidige overwegingen.

Deze rationele manier om het nationalistische discours voor te stellen, gebaseerd op economische overwegingen, poogt een tegenwicht te bieden aan de overheersende beschrijving van het ultranationalistische discours van de periode rond 30 juni als hysterisch, irrationeel en emotioneel geladen. Aangezien de hoofdrolspelers in het verspreiden van die “hysterie” rationele zakenmensen zijn, waren deze beschrijvingen onvoldoende. Deze studie betoogt ook dat deze denkbeelden verbonden zijn aan het overheersende idee dat de rationele ontwikkeling van het moderne kapitalisme alleen het nationalisme in een Europese context beïnvloedde, terwijl het nationalistisme buiten Europa gezien werd als een manier om het meer geavanceerde Europese model te imiteren.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Conversation Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Central Auditing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Capital Broadcasting Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCS</td>
<td>Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>DME</td>
<td>Developed Market Economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGP</td>
<td>Egyptian Pound</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMPC</td>
<td>Egyptian Media Production City</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERTU</td>
<td>Egyptian Radio and Television Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOM</td>
<td>Free Officers Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFI</td>
<td>General Authority for Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDS</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>Middle East Broadcasting Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front</td>
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<td>NUCA</td>
<td>New Urban Communities Authority</td>
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<td>TDA</td>
<td>Tourism Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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Introduction

As far as historical events could be defined and contoured, June 30 was a historical event par excellence. William Sewell (1996) defines a historical event as “a ramified sequence of occurrences that is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that results in a durable transformation of structures”. For Sewell, moments of accelerated change, are usually initiated and carried forward by historical events, and are more than just the outcome of processes that have been long underway. Historical events tend to transform social relations in ways that could not be predicted and goes beyond the impact of the gradual changes that may have made the events possible.

Just like the revolution of January 2011, the June 30 moment was a historical event that sent shockwaves so powerful that their impact helped “reshape history” in the words of Sewell, who also emphasizes the sense of rupture created by historical events. History tends to deal with events of such magnitude as a clear line that divides history itself into what happened before and after them. One of the gradual changes that made June 30 possible, but at the same time led to an accelerated transformation that goes beyond the outcome of these gradual changes had it not created a historical event, was the slow and perhaps peculiar shift of political alliances that were built in the lead up to and during the January 2011 revolution.

The alliances and the counter-alliances that were established in the build-up to the January 2011 revolution and its aftermath were turned on their heads in the prelude to the June 30, 2013 events. The enemies of yesterday were the friends of today, and some of those who were calling for the “fall of the military regime” were now calling for its restoration. The revolutionary alliances which were built in the lead up and during the 18-day protests in January 2011 were composed of many forces including leftist and left-leaning groups such as The Revolutionary Socialists and April 6 Youth Movement, liberal groups such as al-Wafd party and The Democratic Front party, Nasserist groups and political parties, broad-based alliances such as Kifaya and the National Association for Change, and Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and some of their allies—not to mention the numerous labour unions and associations, and student movements (Shehata, 2011; Masoud, 2011).

On the other hand, the counter-revolutionary forces consisted mainly of business interests closely associated with the Mubarak regime and its institutions, in addition to many in the culture industry and a petty bourgeoisie that worked in or close to the hospitality industry. Members of this petty bourgeoisie thought that the political instability caused by revolutionary politics has much more of a negative impact on their livelihoods than the political stagnation that would have ensued had the revolution not taken place (Ahlberg, 2017, p. 214).
The June 30 moment shuffled this configuration quite radically. Already after the overthrow of Mubarak, and during the Muslim Brotherhood gradual ascent to power—first through the winning 40% of the late 2011 parliamentary elections and then winning the presidency with immense difficulty in extremely tight elections—alliances were already starting to shift. 2011 and most of 2012 were seen as a period of relative agreement and harmony between the Brotherhood and the military, which caused a great unbridgeable gulf between the Brotherhood and its allies on the one hand, and anti-military revolutionary groups on the other.

This rift resulted in a new configuration composed of three major forces this time instead of the simple pro- and counter-revolution. Now it was Brotherhood and its Islamist allies, revolutionary groups mainly composed of secular (both leftist and liberal) groups, and the pro-Mubarak elements popularly known as filool (lit. remnants). Moreover, Hizb al-Kanaba (lit. couch party)\(^1\) had “left its couch” for the first time and mobilized significantly against the Muslim Brotherhood in the months leading up to June 30 both in the streets and on social media (Lynch, Freelon, & Aday, 2017). Under this new configuration, the military occupied a peculiar space at the nexus of all three forces trying to appear neutral in the process.

This configuration lasted until the June 30 moment, and it was characterized by a gradual and cautious coalescence between revolutionary and Mubarakist forces during Mohamed Morsy’s year in power united by their opposition to his rule. The one moment where this union was best manifested was during the constitutional crisis at the end of 2012 when Morsy issued a constitutional declaration granting himself immense powers, sparking great protests and prompting the establishment of the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF was a broad-based alliance composed of so-called secular parties comprising both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary parties and politicians with very little in common except for their opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood (Beinin, 2013).

This tripartite classification—although schematic—could be key to understanding the fluid politics leading to the June 30 events and the crisis of governance that coloured the post-2011 era. First, the antagonism between the three groups meant that any of them reaching power would have the two other forces in opposition making their ability to govern very difficult even with unconditional support from their core group. It also meant that in order to overthrow the Brotherhood regime, the two other factions had to unite even if there was animosity between them.

\(^1\)A term used to describe the collective of politically apathetic individuals during the height of revolutionary politics and during the aftermath of the 18-day protests against Hosni Mubarak in January/February 2011.
The Brotherhood also failed despite some few and dispersed attempts to make an alliance with one of the other two forces (revolutionary and pro-Mubarak) to alienate the third. They had no clear conception of which force to ally and share power with to be able to defeat the third force; sometimes it would seem as if they were trying to warm up to the revolutionaries to alienate the Mubarakist forces and at other times would do the exact opposite. Eventually, this strategy turned everyone against them except their core group of supporters.

The military successfully positioned itself as a neutral force above these divisions. It was trying to situate itself as an arbitrator between the warring factions rather than part of the conflict; it was no one’s closest friend but also no one’s fiercest enemy, so even if it was very few people’s most favourite option, it was no one’s least favourable, except obviously the Brotherhood since it was the faction that held official power. Given this tripartite classification in which antagonism between all three forces was too strong to make an alliance or power sharing possible once in power, each of the forces sought to prevent the other two forces from ruling on their own, while realizing that they will not be able to rule on their own for the same reason of lacking enough popular support.

The way was therefore paved for a fourth and “neutral” force to emerge and claim power. The military was the obvious option in this case; in a way the military was neither revolutionary, nor Mubarakist, nor proponents of the Brotherhood, but in some way, it was paradoxically all of this. The military was able to present itself as supportive of the revolution because it withdrew its support for Mubarak in the face of growing protests in January/February 2011, but it was still perceived as counter-revolutionary because its policies and decision in the interim period under the rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) represented a very reactionary position towards revolutionary change. This reactionary position was appreciated by the Mubarakists for putting the brakes on revolutionary momentum, but at the same time a regime that has stepped in to overthrow Mubarak and yielded to pressure for prosecuting him and his entourage cannot be perceived as fully Mubarakist either. As for Islamism, the military in Egypt--unlike in Turkey for example--does not have a strong secular tradition and is quite religiously conservative, but at the same time had a long history of tense relations with different Islamist factions including the Brotherhood; however, this conservative nature helped with not alienating conservative Egyptians whose conservatism does not necessarily translate to support for political Islam.

In this atmosphere, a nationalist discourse was rampant because it offered to act as a unifying force between competing groups that had little in common ideologically except for a rejection of Islamist rule, and a vague normative conception of Egyptian identity, culture and lifestyle. Surely,
this identity discourse was supplemented with other issues such as economic mismanagement, but nationalism remained the main basis from which the Brotherhood was most vigorously attacked. This nationalist discourse was disseminated through means of mass media. As will be discussed throughout the study, many of these media outlets have mobilized vast resources to persuade people to join the June 30 protests.

This kind of June 30 nationalist fervour and identity politics were reminiscent to some commentators of the rise of fascism in Europe. David Kirkpatrick, the *New York Times* Cairo Bureau Chief at the time, said in an online podcast interview that this is how he imagines how Europe might have felt during the rise of fascism. “It may be just a momentary national hysteria, but at the moment there is a surreal-seeming enthusiasm for the military ... even by people who just a few months ago were calling for the end of military rule,” said Kirkpatrick (Fresh Air, 2013).

Political scientist Ashraf El-Sharif also likened the anti-Brotherhood propaganda to hysteria. “The government and the elite stoked a sort of hysteria towards the Brotherhood, and this took hold among the urban middle and lower middle classes in a way I had never witnessed,” said El-Sharif (El-Sharif, 2017). Human Rights Watch’s deputy Middle East director Joe Stork thought that this hysteria extended to the country’s institution after three al-Jazeera journalists were sentenced to prison for covering the post-June 30 protest events. Stork said that these sentences show how Egypt’s judges have been caught up in the anti-Brotherhood hysteria fostered by President al-Sisi (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Political pundits were also using the term casually in describing the events. Here is the Guardian’s Patrick Kingsley who reported the June 30 events from Cairo in a 2015 article recalling the events:

Sensing their moment, the business elite, which controlled the media, launched a full-on decapitation strategy. As June wore on, their newspapers and TV cast Morsi and the Brotherhood as terrorists, and holding them solely responsible for Egypt’s deep-rooted economic problems and fuel shortages. Aboul Fotouh, Morsi’s former ally, supported calls for early elections, and for anti-Morsi protests. But he also argues that these protests were egged on by a campaign to “smear the president, to smear the revolution, and to make people feel that revolution didn’t bring any stability or any security.” Which came first may never be established, but amid an increasingly hysterical national conversation, the military also began to move behind the scenes (Kingsley, 2015).
Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institute also makes an analogy between the political activity of the time and hysteria:

The level of repression under President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi [sic] surpasses that of President Hosni Mubarak and even his predecessors, in terms of the number of Egyptians killed, wounded, detained, and “disappeared” since the military coup of July 3, 2013. Meanwhile, the nature of repression is more dangerous – and therefore of greater concern for U.S. policymakers – because it enjoys a significant degree of popular support, drawing on media and mass hysteria, cult of personality, and the dehumanization of political opponents (Hamid, 2015).

Critics of the June 30 developments seem to have widely adopted the view that “national hysteria” had dominated the scene; however, as someone who had closely followed the events—including through the media—and who has some knowledge about the background of the main supporters of the June 30 movement through my work as an economics journalist and researcher for over a decade, I found the reduction of events of such magnitude to “national hysteria” and emotionally-charged political activity very unsatisfactory.

The source of this dissatisfaction was the fact that newspapers and television networks which took the lead in propagating this “hysteria” were owned by veteran businessmen who had very close ties with the Mubarak state and benefited immensely from such ties as will be explained in detail throughout the study. These media-owning businessmen are risk averse, and would not let irrational political action harm their interests. Even if such irrationality could be a possible explanation for the action of an individual businessman, when treated as a collective and when the actions are clearly coordinated, the “hysteria” discourse becomes even more unsatisfactory.

From there, I grew interested in exploring the rational and economic underpinnings of this frontage of irrational ideological mess that appears on the screens and the pages of the media outlets they own, and with moving beyond a view of nationalism that is only associated with the cultural and the political domains. Since so-called economic men—whose focus is on maximizing profit for themselves—were heavily engaged in the propagation of this “hysterical” discourse, the point of departure of this study is trying to examine this nationalist discourse from an economic point of view. The objective is to uncover the rational underpinnings of such irrational national fervour by
examining the economic functions that the dissemination of this type of discourse might have served this media-owning business elite.

In other words, the hypothesis of this dissertation is the existence of sober and economic interests that lie beneath this hysterical media discourse. Accordingly, these hysterical nationalist utterances will be examined in relation to and from the lens of the economic interests of the media owners who host and invest in their dissemination. This will happen while not treating nationalist hysteria and sober rationalism as binary oppositions, separate processes or expressions, but as possessing elements of one other. This is reminiscent of the Rational-Choice Theory of Neurosis (RCTN) which accounts for the development and treatment of neurosis in conscious-rational terms. It suggests that the choice of neurotic symptom is determined by certain rational functions including functions like cost-benefit analysis (Rofé, 2010).

The best place to start this task is the media outlets that were heavily engaged in the propagation of this hysterical discourse, and at the same time are owned and financed by those economic men. I aimed in this study to analyze the discourse of these media outlets and try to liken it to the economic interests of those who fund the whole process. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seemed like the most suitable tool to proceed with such task because—unlike other forms of textual analysis only focusing on the text—it takes the analysis beyond the micro level of text analysis (the uttered nationalist “hysteria” in this case) to the power behind its production, and the interests—including economic—of its producers.

The CDA will focus on three prime-time shows aired on three different television channels owned by what I describe as “infitah (open-door policy) businessmen”, who started their process of capital accumulation as a direct result of the open-door policy of Anwar Sadat in the 1970s, and were also Mubarak loyalists, as Mubarak’s economic policies and ruling alliance are widely perceived to be a continuation of Sadat’s. The reason behind selecting this group of businessmen is that the conditions which allowed them to accumulate their colossal wealth led to a landmark transformation in the political orientation of Egypt. This transformation included the official nationalist discourse of Egypt from a focus on pan-Arabism under the Nasserist order to an Egyptocentric focus under the Sadat regime.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I comprises the Critical Discourse Analysis where each of the CDA levels (micro, meso and macro) are assigned a chapter. Part II of the study is an attempt to historicize the discourse presented and analyzed in Part I of the study. Chapter 1 will present the history of the field of nationalism studies and its gaps when dealing with contemporary
and non-European nationalism, the research problematic and question. From there it discusses the conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches of the study and how tools such as CDA were employed to answer the research question. The rationale behind using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods is also discussed.

Part I of the dissertation, which starts with Chapter 2, comprises the Critical Discourse Analysis itself. It analyzes the nationalist discourse of the prime-time shows of three channels owned by three of the biggest infitah businessmen who started investing in the broadcasting media after the revolution. The purpose of this investment is to propagate a political message and promote their political standpoint at a time when their privileged position was under threat due to sweeping revolutionary change.

Chapter 2 comprises the first stage of the CDA, and focuses entirely on the micro-level dimension of analysing the text. It mainly consists of data and transcribed material that result from watching about 40 hours of the three prime-time shows in the three channels owned by three conspicuous infitah businessmen from one week before the June, 30 2013 protest until the day of the tafweed (popular mandate) to fight terrorism at the end of July of the same year. The micro level also incorporates some basic quantitative analysis to identify the focus of the producers, and to examine through relational analysis the links between concepts in a text.

Chapter 3 focuses on the meso-level analysis of the nationalist discourse of the three private channels. This chapter relies mostly on official company records and available media interviews with the owners of the broadcasting business. This chapter is the first step of what distinguishes CDA from a normal discourse or conversation analysis because it goes beyond just analyzing the text that is the subject of study, into analyzing other texts that belong to the wider immediate context, and the story of power relations and struggles behind producing the text. In the case at hand, it was extremely useful to look at issues such as the ownership of the media, and the political and economic affiliations of the owners of the media (party membership, business partnerships, etc.). This meso-level analysis was effective for understanding events through media discourse, especially that analyzing the nationalist discourse of the media rather than directly analyzing the nationalist discourse of the owners was due to the scarcity of relevant statements uttered directly by the owners. The few and disparate statements by the owners is used when available to cross-examine them with the micro-level discourse presented and studied in Chapter 2, and examine whether the micro-level discourse is representative of the producers and the owners’ positions.

Chapter 4 is the last chapter of Part I and it comprises the macro-level analysis of the nationalist
discourse of the three private channels. The macro level builds on the findings of the micro and meso levels, to bring the research one step closer to answering the first part of the research question about the function of the nationalist discourse articulated by Egypt's business elite in their opposition against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in the period around the June 30 events.

Furthermore, Chapter 4 discusses how the macro-economic phenomenon of capital (over)accumulation both on the national, regional and international levels have played a prominent role in influencing the nationalist discourse of the period. Special attention will be given to capital flows from different Gulf countries before, during and after the Muslim Brotherhood time in office. This also highlights how competition over foreign markets between different Gulf countries as a result of excess capital in those countries might have had its impact on the unfolding of events in Egypt.

Part II starts with Chapter 5, which historicizes the links between economic interests and nationalist discourse by exploring the economic shapers and origins of Egyptian nationalism from the late 19th century until the 1970s. It starts with the 1870s debt crisis that led to extreme austerity measures mainly affecting small Egyptian landowners. This, many scholars agree, shaped a certain national consciousness and ultimately led to the Urabi revolt which is widely marked as the "birth moment of Egyptian nationalism" (Cole 1993; Farah 2009; Reid & Mayer 1988). The chapter then goes on to discuss the inter-war period where a class of Egyptian capitalists, led by Talaat Harb, Abud Pasha, and Ismail Sedky, tried to establish a class of Egyptian national industrial and financial elite. Although they were not really in confrontation with foreign capital, and in many cases they cooperated and partnered with it, they however benefited from and fueled a nationalist discourse that ultimately resulted in an increasing share for Egyptian-owned capital and the emergence of a national industrial and financial bourgeoisie.

The chapter also analyzes the discourse of the early champions of Egyptian nationalism Mustafa Kamil and Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid, highlighting differences and similarities between their nationalist stances, and their focus primarily on more abstract notions of religion, kinship, etc. with almost complete disregard to the political economy of the nationalist struggle. The purpose of this section is to give a sense of the competing principles and foundations Egyptian nationalism was built upon.

Finally, the chapter also discusses how the subsequent post-colonial Nasserist experiment in the 1950s and the 1960s characterized by the rise of Arab nationalism, “socialism” and third-worldism also had its economic logic, and was necessary for the dismantling of the power of the mostly feudal
ancient regime. The chapter then discusses how this project was facilitated by the widespread penetration of radio, which unlike the press, allowed the Nasserist regime to reach the most remote of areas to address both the literate and the illiterate masses in Egypt, but also in the entirety of the Arab world.

Chapter 6 presents how the monumental socio-political and economic transformations of the 1970s created a class of pro-state businessmen, which is referred to in the rest of the study as the *infitah* (open-door policy) businessmen or business elite. The infitah policies caused this business elite to accumulate colossal amounts of wealth with the assistance of the state, and therefore become the mouthpieces for the new policies whether it is economic liberalization or the peace treaty with Israel. In many cases this business elite was at the forefront off forging a new national identity that is now based on an alliance with the West (or imperialism in Nasser’s discourse), peace with Israel, and the consequent tension with most of the Arab world.

This chapter examines the business landscape and trends of the post-infitah era until the January 2011 revolution including the return of some business families to Egypt, such as Egypt’s wealthiest Sawiris family, after their businesses had been nationalized during the Nasser era. This period also witnessed the establishment of a private advertising industry in Egypt by the US-educated businessman Tarek Nour to serve the emerging “private” sector.

The analysis also includes the increased Islamization of culture and society as the new regimes method to preemptively counter any expected opposition to open-door policies, and how the state’s growing Islamic character culminated during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) by encouraging the sending of the *Mujahideen* to fight the war against the Soviet Union. The chapter finally discusses how the economic interests and changes of the Mubarak era, with a more aggressive neoliberalization project associated with the rise of Gamal Mubarak, helped in shaping and modifying the official nationalist discourse up until the 2011 revolution. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses some closing remarks synthesising the different findings of the different stages, and linking them all to the research question.
Chapter 1
The research design

1.1 The field of nationalism studies, its history, and gaps
Perhaps one of the most contentious and contested concepts in modern social sciences is that of nationalism and what constitutes nations. Whether nations and nationalism have pre-modern roots or are a purely novel phenomenon, and whether the bases of nationalism are organic, illusory or a form of voluntarist civil and political organization has been the subject of intense debate since interest grew in this field over a century ago.

A good way to taxonomize the different approaches for studying nationalism and the competing views in the field is to use Anthony Smith’s classification (1999). Smith divided the dissonance over nationalism into four broad categories or paradigms; the first paradigm is the modernist approach, which is the dominant Western scholarly paradigm to studying nationalism, according to Smith. This approach sees nationalism as a relatively novel form of political organization and a product of a process of modernization. According to Smith, the modernist approach is named as such because it regards the era of the French Revolution as marking the moment when nationalism was introduced into the movement of world history. Hence, this view identifies nations as well as nationalism as a purely modern phenomenon without—or with very little—roots in the past.

Ernest Gellner (1996), whom Smith identifies as adopting a modernist model, argues that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena and a product of a modernization process that eroded traditional societies and cultures, uprooting masses of people and proletarianizing them in the anonymous city. A shared linguistic education, provided by a state-run, standardized, and public education system was the sole means of communication. Gellner argues that a state-supported high culture was built into the requirements of modernity.

There are many other scholars belonging to what Smith identifies as the modernist paradigm who link the emergence of nationalism to modernization, industrialization and capitalism, perhaps most notably Benedict Anderson and his key text Imagined Communities (1991) which introduces his theory about how linguistic and cultural standardization necessary for national identification was first brought about by the emergence of print capitalism, and Eric Hobsbawm (1977) who also sees nationalism as a product of "the Age of Capital".

Even 19th century scholar Ernest Renan (1990) in his famous lecture titled What is a Nation?
given in 1882 argues that nations are something fairly new in history, and that antiquity was
unfamiliar with them. He asserts that old entities like Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were in no
way nations. Instead, “they were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven.” According
to his views, neither in Egypt nor China were there citizens as such.

Classical antiquity had republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and
empires, yet it can hardly be said to have had nations in our understanding of the term. Athens, Sparta, Tyre and Sidon were small centres imbued with the most admirable
patriotism, but they were [simply] cities with a relatively restricted territory. Gaul, Spain and
Italy, prior to their absorption by the Roman Empire, were collections of clans, which were
often allied among themselves but had no central institutions and no dynasties. The Assyrian
Empire, the Persian Empire and the empire of Alexander the Great were not patries either.
There never were any Assyrian patriots, and the Persian Empire was nothing but a vast
feudal structure. No nation traces its origins back to Alexander the Great’s momentous
adventure, fertile though it was in consequences for the general history of civilization
(Renan, 1990, p. 9).

Renan would go as far as claiming that the creation of a nation is a historical error that requires
collective amnesia. He argues that historical enquiry could shed light on deeds of violence that took
place at the origin of all political formations including the creation of a nation. He explains that unity
is always effected by means of brutality. He gives the union of northern France with the Midi
(Southern France) as an example of a union that was the result of massacres and terror lasting for a
century (Renan, 1990, p. 9).

The historical materialistic view of the Marxists of the late 19th and early 20th century quite
naturally places a lot of importance and emphasis on economic shapers of nationalism. Vladimir
Lenin (1960), for example, writes in his correspondence with Russkoye Bogatstvo magazine, that
while one might speak of tribal life in ancient Rus, there can be no doubt that by the Middle Ages,
the era of Moscovite tsars, these tribal ties no longer existed. He argues that by this time the state was
based on associations that were not tribal at all, but local. He writes that despite this, one cannot
speak of national ties in the true sense of the term.

Lenin argues that only the modern period of Russian history is characterized by the
amalgamation of all Russian regions, land and principalities into one whole (a nation), an
amalgamation that he thinks was not brought about by tribal ties nor their continuation and
generalization, but instead was brought about by the increasing trade exchanges among the different regions and the growing circulation of commodities—as well as the concentration of small local markets in a single all-Russian market. In his view, since this process was led by the merchant capitalists, the creation of these national ties were nothing but the creation of bourgeois ties (Lenin, 1960, p. 154-155). This closely echoes Benedict Anderson’s later theory on how capitalist interest created by the invention of print was the foundation for the creation of the homogeneous modern nation state.

But the Marxist view of nationalism was far from homogeneous. The Austro-Marxist thinker Otto Bauer preoccupied himself with the issue of nationalism and dedicated one of his key monographs to the issue (Bauer, 2000). Bauer attributes the emergence of modern capitalism to the bringing down of tribal ties, and how even in the villages, it dissolved differences in terms of work, custom, dress integrating popular masses into a community of culture. Bauer also associates this cultural integration with linguistic integration, and how the common written language is disseminated via the school and public authority to merge with the tribal dialects breaking the barriers between them even more.

Bauer also makes a distinction between national communities of culture in the feudal and early capitalist era on the one hand and the modern capitalist era on the other. For him, the feudal and early capitalist era was characterized by the integration of the ruling classes in a national community of culture. It was only the further development of capitalism that facilitated the integration of the popular masses (Bauer, 2000, p17). Bauer deviated from the orthodox Marxist position that perceives the nation as illusionary, but did not adopt the view of nationalists who see the nation as natural, essentialized and primordial. Instead, Bauer saw the nation as a historical and social construct (Bauer, 2000, p. xxxv).

The nation, according to Bauer, is historical in the sense that the national character that link members of a national community is historically modifiable. Accordingly, what links one generation to the next is not the passing down of an immutable national spirit, but the fact that every generation enters a social arena shaped and defined by the actions and circumstances of preceding generations. The so-called national character in that sense is shaped by both historical and contemporary experience. The intersection of the historical and the contemporary is therefore the key determinant factor in the making of the national character and in forming national identities (Bauer, 2000, p. xxxvi).

Joseph Stalin, a Georgian who was a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social
Democratic Labour Party, responded to Bauer in 1913 six years after he wrote his *Social Democracy and the Nationalities Question*. He criticized Bauer’s view that identifies a nation with its national character, and accuses him of divorcing the nation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force. The result, for Stalin, is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural (Stalin, 1913). Stalin describes nationalism as a historical category belonging to the epoch of rising capitalism. Just like later and contemporary modernist scholars of nationalism, Stalin attributes the constitution of people into nations to the elimination of feudalism and the development of capitalism. “Trade and means of communication were developing. Large towns were springing up. The nations were becoming economically consolidated. [...] The development of the press and the theatre [...] were helping to strengthen ‘national sentiments’” (Stalin, 2013).

Isam Khafaji (2004) also pays allegiance to communication and transport technology in the shaping of capital interests, and subsequently the emergence of the “nationalist moment”. Khafaji describes the “nationalist moment” as not a once-and-for-all stage whose beginning and specific contours can be clearly defined. Khafaji defines the nationalist moment as a historical moment characterized by the drive of more than one social group to put the resources of the community in the hands of indigenous elements.

This moment, according to al-Khafaji, arrives when nationalism as a mood captures the feelings of wide sections of a given society. He then contrasts this moment with the attempts by thirteenth century patricians to impose their monopoly on their respective cities and their hinterlands. He finally argues that such interests or ambitions cannot be achieved without a powerful preconditions, that is communication and transport technology. He gives the modernist argument that without the ability to link disparate regions through technological advancement, no awareness of common identity can rise (Khafaji, 2004, p. 224).

The role of modern capitalism and associated technologies are often brought to the forefront by the modernist approach at the expense of the role of language, ethnicity, and religion. Hobsbawm, for example, debunks the idea that language or linguistic unity, genetic ethnicity, religion, etc. could form the basis for nationalism.

On language he writes that in the era before standardized general primary education—itself a product of modernity—there was no *spoken* national language except possibly for oralizing some literary and administrative idioms to function as a *lingua franca* between speakers of different dialects or to address different audiences across dialectical boundaries (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 52).
Hobsbawm also argues that standard national languages—both spoken and written—could have not emerged before printing, mass literacy and schooling. He then argues for what I believe is the crux of the modernist approach to nationalism, stating that “nations and their associated phenomena must therefore be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10).

This clearly echoes Anderson’s (2006) assertion that linguistic standardization, and henceforth the possibility for national communities, would not have been possible without the emergence of technical and economic advancements that brought about the mass print industry and its associated capitalist interests. By the same token, Hobsbawm goes on to doubt the possibility of genetic ethnicity being the basis for national sentiments. He believes that the populations of any large territorial nation-states is always too heterogeneous to make any claims about common ethnicity—let alone the impact of modern immigration on any claims regarding common descent (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 63). Hobsbawm even argues that the more powerful the claims are about tribal ethnicity, the more likely it would resist the imposition of a modern nation state (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 64).

Otto Bauer in 1907 had already made a similar argument that language or linguistic unity, genetic ethnicity, or consciousness could not form the basis for nationalism.

Is the nation a community of persons of common descent? Surely the Italians are descended from Etruscans, Romans, Celts, Germanic tribes, Greeks, and Saracens, the present-day French from Gauls, Romans, Britons, and Germanic tribes, the present-day Germans from Germanic tribes, Celts, and Slavs. Or is it the community of language that unites human beings as a nation? Surely the English and Irish, the Danes and Norwegians, the Serbs and Croats, although in each case both speak the same language, do not therefore constitute one people; the Jews do not have a common language and yet they are a nation. Is it, then, the consciousness of a common bond that unites the nation? Should the Tyrolean peasant not be regarded as a German because he has never become conscious of his common bond with East Prussians, Pomeranians, Thuringians, and Alsatians? And furthermore, what is the German conscious of when he thinks of his “Germanness”? What makes him a member of the German nation, what connects him with other Germans? (Bauer, 2005, p. 19).”

A major limitation of the modernist approach both when applied to the universal phenomenon of nationalism, and when applied to the more specific context, such as in the case of Egypt, is its Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism should not be confused with focus on European history and nationalism.
There is obviously nothing wrong with having a scholarly focus on the history of European nationalisms. However, the modernist approach due to its focus on capitalist development often looks at the development of non-European nationalisms through the narrow lens of its encounters with European colonialism whether in its colonial or post-colonial forms. This is based on the presupposition that capitalism in the so-called non-European “periphery” is always less advanced than in the European “core”, and perhaps is therefore less of a powerful force. Some of those identified with the modernist approach go as far as arguing that nationalism is a pure European phenomenon, whereby it is implied that Europe is a closed self-contained system that influences others but is not influenced by anything outside of it.

Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) argues that because from a European perspective the rest of the world seemed to be lacking in modern technology and was therefore not considered modern, it was deemed difficult to apply modern social sciences—such as economics, sociology and political science—outside of Europe. Therefore, new disciplines, namely anthropology and orientalism, were created to study non-Europeans under actual or virtual colonial rule. For Wallerstein, so-called primitive people had no history independent of colonial rule which, according to this view, resulted in cultural contact and therefore cultural change (Wallerstein, 2004, p.7).

However, colonies that were perceived as less “primitive” required something other than anthropology to study it. China, India, Persia, and parts of the Arab World were described as “high civilizations” for having common languages and “world” religions. For Wallerstein, such large languages and religions were the product of past empires. Despite having a history, those vast regions were however seen as lagging behind militarily and technologically in the modern era compared to Europe.

The field of orientalism therefore appeared as an attempt to decipher these great languages and religions; orientalism preoccupied itself with studying why such “high civilizations” failed to modernize in the same way as Europe. For Wallerstein, the persistent answer to this persistent question was the existence of “something” in the composite culture of these civilizations which have frozen their history and has made it impossible for them to move forward without the assistance of the European world (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 8).

Consequently, non-European nationalism could have only existed to simply mimic the model of development set by Europe. Even if Europe modernization inspired many outside of Europe, the modernist approach tend to largely ignore other factors and experiences of non-European historical developments. As will be discussed later, some forms of early nationalism developed outside of
Europe had taken place before any significant contact with European colonialism and before world trade had become European led. In that sense, Eurocentrism for the purpose of this study means overstating the European factor—which I am in no way interested in understating either—while largely overlooking other factors, and simplistically dividing the world into European and non-European experiences.

Put differently, this Eurocentrism manifests itself in two manners: first, its view that nationalism as a social and political phenomenon, that is a product of the modern capitalist era, is par excellence a pure European phenomenon. Second, even non-European nationalisms are either modeled after European nationalism in a one-way direction of influence, or was born as a national liberation movement in reaction to European colonialism and hegemonic influence in the second half of the 19th century and throughout the 20th century.

John Chalcraft identifies in the writings of European historians—including grassroots ones—a double standard that takes place when constructing the history of Europe compared to the history of non-European societies and gives Hobsbawm as an example. He sheds light on Hobsbawm’s assertion that the makers of “Third World” transformations are elite minorities, which is highly contrasted with his “history from below” or grassroots take on historical change in the West (Chalcraft, 2005, p. 3). Hobsbawm, for example, argues that for the “dependent” world, the nearest they come to producing thought about nationalism was their skepticism about its universal applicability, and that it was perceived mostly as an ideology of “minorities of evolues out of touch with the mass of their countrymen, whose ideas of community and political loyalty were quite different” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 158). He thinks that Europe is “the original home of nationalism” and “ the traditional home of national causes” (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 138).

Even when nationalism occurred outside of Europe as a public sentiment, and not necessarily a sentiment of an elite of evolues, it was usually a reaction to European colonialism not to be compared with the rational process of European nation-building.

While, as we have seen, these national liberation movements in the Third World were in theory modelled on the nationalism of the west, in practice the states they attempted to construct were, as we have also seen, generally the opposite of the ethnically and linguistically homogeneous entities which came to be seen as the standard form of 'nation-state' in the west. Nevertheless, even in this respect they were de facto more like than unlike the western nationalism of the liberal era (Hobsbawm, p. 158).
Benedict Anderson (2001) himself attributes the idea that there is a distinctively Asian form of nationalism to what he describes as “the notorious insistence of a racist European imperialism that ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’”. Anderson then proceeds to ask whether this radical dichotomy is really justifiable, either theoretically or empirically? His answer is no, and he states two main reasons for this: 1) oldest nationalisms in Asia are older than many of those in Europe; 2) what people have considered to be East and West has varied substantially over time.

I myself do not believe that the most important distinctions among nationalisms—in the past, today, or in the near future—run along East–West lines. The oldest nationalisms in Asia—here I am thinking of India, the Philippines and Japan—are older than many of those in Europe and Europe Overseas—Corsica, Scotland, New Zealand, Estonia, Australia, Euskadi, and so forth. Philippine nationalism, in its origins, looks—for obvious reasons—very similar to those in Cuba and continental Latin America; Meiji nationalism has obvious similarities to the late nineteenth-century official nationalisms we find in Ottoman Turkey, Tsarist Russia and Imperial Great Britain; Indian nationalism is morphologically analogous to what one finds in Ireland and in Egypt. One should also add that what people have considered to be East and West has varied substantially over time (Anderson, 2011).

Reducing the rise of nationalism in non-European settings to a reaction against European colonialism fails to explain many phenomenon related to the development of Egyptian nationalism. As will be discussed throughout the study, Egyptian nationalism in its period of formulation during the Urabi revolution was more about anti-Ottomanism challenging the privileges granted to the Turko-Circassian elite than it was about European hegemony. The writings of Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid, a few decades later, were still characterized with significant anti-Ottoman sentiments.

It could be argued that this anti-Ottomanism does not contradict, and in fact goes in line with, the desire to replace a pre-modern Ottoman order with the building of a European-modelled modern nation state. This was certainly true for some thinkers including Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid and Taha Hussein, but presenting the modern nation-state as a “purely” European discovery cannot be dealt with separately from the hegemony of European colonialism itself and its ideas that would quite naturally present its model of political organization as a universal model to aspire to. It is also natural for some national intellectuals from the so-called “dependent” countries to adopt this
hegemonic discourse.

On the other hand, leading nationalist thinkers such as Mustafa Kamil created a movement that still envisioned Egypt as being part of some sort of an “Islamic” unity led by the Ottoman Empire. For Kamil, national independence only meant independence of the British empire, and most certainly did not fit the criteria of how a modern European-modelled nation state should look like.

In a more recent period, a Eurocentric modernist approach would fail to explain the nationalist discourse uttered during and around the June 30 period which was targeted against a national political Islamist group—not European colonialism—without necessarily adopting a European model to replace it. Even external influences were mostly the cause of capital over-accumulation in the neighbouring Gulf state and not from the European countries as was the case in the 19th century and most of the 20th century. This flow of excess capital from the Gulf promoted values very different from what would be perceived as “European values”. Finally, the Eurocentrism of the modernist approach also fails to explain forms of rational nation-building in Egypt that might have even preceded many European processes; in many cases, it took quicker and earlier steps than in some European process.

One of the earliest republican experiments of the Modern era was located in upper Egypt in the mid 18th century, which did not have much links to Europe at the time because most of its trade partners were located in Arabia, the Ottoman Empire and East Africa within an Indian Ocean World System. Furthermore, the first seeds of a modern nation state in Egypt were sown very shortly after the French revolution and arguably before many European nations such as Italy and Germany who only became nation-states in the modern sense of the meaning in the 1870s.

Zeinab Abul-Magd, in her book *Imagined Empire: A History of Revolt in Egypt* (2013), explains how an independent republic based on the Indian Ocean World Economy emerged in Upper Egypt before the French revolution, and before the world economy system had transformed to become European-led. The Qina province in Upper Egypt was a major port in this economic world system and traded mostly in sugar, cotton, textile, grains, spices and coffee with East Africa and Arabia. As the owners of sugarcane plantations and sugar refineries, the Hawwara clan of Upper Egypt rose to prominence as the rulers of this independent republic (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 22).

The Hawwara, under the leadership of Sheikh al-Arab Hammam, have established in the mid-18th century a “republic” independent from the Ottoman ruler governing lower Egypt, and subsequently from the Ottoman ruler in Istanbul or any other empire. Abul-Magd explains that the registers of the courts of the Qina province had no first-page preamble even mentioning an official affiliation with
the Ottoman empire, and no records or decrees of the Ottoman order were published as they were seen as irrelevant to the politics and affairs of the province (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 25).

This republic in the south of Egypt was based on a sophisticated administrative system and a social contract based on power sharing completely divorced from the Ottoman imperialist order. According to Abul-Magd, the social contract between the dominant Hawwara class and the subaltern groups was designed to appease the latter. The power sharing structure was designed to sustain agricultural production, secure the movement of trade and ensure political stability.

Hammam's [social] contract incorporated peasants producing the commercial crops, educated Copts managing the finances of the state, and Bedouins protecting southern trade routes and carrying goods on their camels. Each of these groups played a vital role in maintaining the stability of Hammam's regime (Abul-Magd, 2013, p. 32).

A degree of private property relations in this mid-eighteenth century regime was also established. The peasants had the right to sell, buy, rent and mortgage agricultural land. A justice system was created to mitigate the exploitation of the peasantry. Moreover, Copts and Muslims enjoyed the same rights of transacting landholdings without discrimination (Abul-Magd, 2013, pp. 24-25). This form of non-European independent and economically rational civic form of early nationalism is rarely discussed in European literature on Egyptian nationalism.

Some early European nationalists were even inspired by some of these models of non-European forms of political organization. Friedrich Meinecke, the German nationalist historian, discusses in his book *Machiavellism* how Traiano Boccalini regarded Turkey to be the only country during his time with a clear *raison d’etat*. He thought of it as a state that was organized entirely differently from those of Christian Europe and that “it claimed the attention of political minds, not only because it stood on the edge of the European horizon like a thundercloud of power politics, but even more so on account of its wonderful inner structure.” Boccalini thought, according to Meinecke, that Turkey brought to life what European Renaissance has always been striving for, that is: “an artificial construction which had been consciously and purposively built up, a State mechanism which was arranged like a cloak, and which made use of the various species and strengths and qualities of men as its springs and wheels.” (Meinecke, 1957, p. 86).

This Eurocentric approach is not confined to the modernist approach. Earlier typologies of nationalism also subscribe to similar—if not more blunt—Eurocentrism. Hans Kohn, who is often
dubbed as the pioneer and one of the most influential theoreticians of nationalism, in his book *Nationalism, its meaning and history* (originally published in 1955), attributes Egypt’s independence from the British empire to England’s liberal civilization, and the reforms introduced in its colonies which improved the level of education and economic development. He argues that England set the example of “complete emancipation” of “dependent peoples” by giving independence to Egypt. This view not just completely strips the colonized people of their agency and disregards their tireless struggle against the colonialist power, but also completely ignores and overlooks important historical junctures when colonized Egypt revolted against and resisted British occupation, most notably in the 1919 revolution, as a reaction to Britain’s decision to exile nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul.

In this historical process England was the leading power. Her liberal civilization, which in preceding centuries had influenced the growth of constitutional liberty in Europe, infused a new spirit into Asia and later into Africa. England introduced constitutional reforms in her colonies and increased the facilities for education and economic development. She set the example of complete emancipation of dependent peoples by giving independence to Egypt (1922, completed 1936) (Kohn, 1985: 84).

As for the primordialist approach, it has—quite naturally—been the approach of choice for many nationalists arguing that the nation is a stable and natural community; however, it has also been a scholarly stance for some. Smith divides the primordialist paradigm into socio-biological and familiar cultural. The socio-biological approach championed by Pierre L. Van Den Berghe (1979 quoted in Smith, 1999, p. 98) argues that nations are little more than an extension of kinship units and are built up from the same nepotistic drives of inclusive fitness you find in smaller clans and families. The familiar cultural primordialism, on the other hand, dismisses the significance of biological descent for the formation of nations, but gives weight to the primordial ties attributed to congruities of blood, speech, custom, religion, and territory. This primordialist approach was pioneered by Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz (Smith, 1999, p. 4).

If primordialists believe that nations and nationalism have their foundation in the natural order, perennialists believe nations and nationalism have existed throughout at least recorded history. One approach to perennialism stresses the continuous existence of nations, and it claims that at least particular nations have existed for millennia, such as Greece, Egypt and France. Perennialists, however, are ready to accept that other nations are more modern and recent. A recurrent
perennialism, on the other hand, is the argument that nations emerge and dissolve, and continually re-emerge at different periods of time (Smith, 1999, p. 5).

The last paradigm, which is also the paradigm advocated by Smith himself, is the ethno-symbolic paradigm. For the ethno-symbolist scholars, what gives nationalism its power is the symbols of ethnic heritage and how the past can be reinterpreted and rediscovered by the modern nationalist intelligentsia. In Smith’s view, this paradigm seeks to overcome the limitations of the modernist approach which Smith summarizes as:

1- a failure to distinguish genuine constructs from long-term processes and structures in which successive generations have been socialized;

2- a concentration on elite actions at the expense of popular beliefs and actions; and

3- a neglect of the powerful affective dimension of nations and nationalism (Smith, 1999, p.9).

As for approaches to Egyptian nationalism in particular, they span across the four paradigms discussed above. Recent scholarship on early Egyptian nationalism has given a significant deal of attention to signs of modernism in the creation of a nationalist discourse such as in the process of building a modern army, a massive state bureaucracy, mainstream media, etc. (See Fahmy, 2002; Isaac & Gershoni 1995; Cole 1993; Mitchell 2002; Farah, 2009). Juan Cole, a historian of Egypt in the 19th century, devoted a whole monograph for the discussion of the “social and cultural origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement” (1993), but although he does not include it in the title of his book, Cole gives considerable attention to the economic origins of Egypt's Urabi movement, and the birth of modern Egyptian nationalism.

Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, who conducted extensive research on Egyptian nationalism, also pay allegiance to what they call “the social context of thought”—which also includes the socioeconomic context—in the introduction of their book on Egyptian nationalism *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood* (1987). Gershoni and Jankowski stress the importance of “institutional-political, but also socioeconomic” context as a prerequisite to comprehending the origins and meaning of *intellectual constructs* such as nationalism and their spread. Timothy Mitchell, a historian and a specialist on Egypt in the 19th century, is known for his critique of modernity, capitalism and technocracy. His most prominent monograph *The Rule of Experts* (2002) explores in-depth questions regarding the interrelatedness of technological modernization, capitalism and nationalism. He makes many references to the modernist theories of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Renan (Mitchell, 2002, p. 180) when discussing the wider socioeconomic context of Egyptian nation-building in 19th and early 20th century Egypt.
Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman also attribute the workers antagonism against British rule over Egypt and the movement's resulting rise of nationalist sentiments to economic factors in their book *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class* (1998). For example, Beinin and Lockman, like Juan Cole, argue that heavy borrowing abroad had led to a downward spiral of indebtedness that in turn led to Egypt's bankruptcy in 1876. As a result, foreign financial controls were imposed on Egypt which stimulated nationalist reaction (Beinin & Lockman, 2008, p. 8). Although the link between economic context and the rise of nationalism is a thread that weaves throughout their book, many passages make the link in a very straightforward manner.

Given Egypt semi-colonial status and the form of capitalist development it had experienced, the national question could not be easily separated from the social and economic grievances felt and expressed by working people. For this reason the 1919 revolution also marked the first full articulation of the special labor-nationalist relationship which had already been foreshadowed by the Nationalist party's prewar role in labor affairs and would significantly shape the Egyptian union movement in the following decades (Beinin & Lockman, 2008, p. 84).

Khaled Fahmy, in his book *All the Pasha's Men* (2002), argues that the increased profits from an expanded cultivation of long-staple cotton in the 1820s played an instrumental role in helping Muhammed Ali Pasha build a modern army, navy, factories, schools, hospitals, etc, placing Egypt on a path for modernization that rarely existed outside of Europe at the time; the existence of these institutions would prove instrumental in the building of a nationalist imaginary in the succeeding decades.

On the other hand, the scholarship and writings of the Egyptian nationalist intelligentsia throughout the different eras quite expectedly fall outside the modernist paradigm, and largely into the ethno-symbolic, perennial and primordialist paradigms. This will be discussed in detail throughout the study especially in Chapter 5 where the foundational texts of the intellectual founding fathers of Egyptian nationalism, namely Mustafa Kamil and Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid will be discussed in detail. Throughout the study, texts by other nationalist thinkers including Taha Hussein, Jamal Hamdan, Mohamed Hassanein Haikal, Moussa Sabry and Ne’mat Fouad will also be discussed.

As discussed above, a large body of non-nationalist historical study of Egyptian nationalism was modernist in its orientation and tended to factor in economic issues, but recent analyses of
nationalist discourses in the post-revolutionary period have mostly focused on issues of politics, religion, culture and identity. However, limiting the contentious politics of the post-2011 era to identity politics falls short of explaining the national fervour that captured a business elite that are expected to act rationally and based on economic considerations.

Surely, due to the relative recency of such events, academic research on the nationalist discourse of the June 30 and post-June 30 Egypt is still limited. However, none of the few studies that were published have discussed nationalism in relation to the economic interests of the business elites who have played a key role in shaping and disseminating such nationalist discourse. For example, David H. Warren in his paper (2017) focuses on "Ali Juma's nationalist legal reasoning in support of the 2013 Egyptian coup and its bloody aftermath" emphasizing the nexuses between the religious and nationalist spheres, and the nationalist stance of religious leaders and scholars.

Patrycja Sasnal (2014) Hania Sobhy (2015) have focused on the sphere of education and its relation to nationalism, by examining the nationalist content of school textbooks. Sasnal argues, through examining school textbooks, that very few and insignificant changes have been made in the writing of the nationalist history since the 2011 revolution, which in her opinion, signals that the revolution has not happened yet, since for her, changes in educational textbooks is "the most accurate barometer of systemic change". Sobhy, on the other hand, examines how central Islam is to the nationalist discourse uttered in high school textbooks, from the late Mubarak era until the time the article was written in 2014.

There has also been several analysis of official nationalist discourse, but mostly focusing on the micro level of discourse analysis. Joyce van de Bildt (2015), examines the themes of nationalist propaganda expressed by the post-Morsy military governments. However, this discourse analysis mostly focus on the micro-level of the text itself, and even when attempts are made to examine the shapers of discourse, it is usually limited to the political sphere, and is rarely extended to the economic sphere. Similar to the examples above, the focus is mostly on the action and the discourse of state actors, but barely any mentions are given to non-state actors including that of civilian businessmen, the private sector and private media. Mohammed El-Nawawy and Mohamad Hamas Elmasry (2016), employ semiotic and discourse analysis to examine the sign system of al-Sisi's presidential campaign posters and video. However, their focus was also on the micro "text" level without adding the critical dimension of higher levels of discourse.

Zeinab Abul-Magd, however, succeeds in making links between nationalism and the military's business interest, in her book Militarizing the Nation (2018), and her book chapter Egypt's
Adaptable Officers (2016), but she also focuses on the action of military and state actors.

Finally, searching for the rational underpinnings is not an attempt to justify resulting violent actions or ultra-nationalist politics, and in no way the expression “rationalism” is used in the enlightenment sense with a positive connotation. When speaking of rationality, I will adopt Michel Foucault’s description of rationality as not being of an absolute value. The task, according to Foucault is not measuring “regimes of rationality” against an absolute value-of-reason, but to analyze them according to how they form an ensemble of rules and procedures, and means to an end (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991, p. 79). The subjects of this study were clearly involved in forming procedures and means to some end, and the aim of this study is to analyze the workings of their “regime of rationality” and the procedures they formed to achieve it. The goal is therefore not to judge whether their actions were rational or not as though there is an objective, agreed-upon and absolute definition of what constitutes a rational act.

1.2 The research problem and questions

Based on the arguments set out in the previous section, the research problem concerns the inability of theories of passion-driven (or irrational and child-like in Edward Said's terms) national sentiments to explain the nationalist discourse around the June 30 period. This discourse was highly backed by billionaire businessmen and their media outlets, as well as by large regional interests. This view, therefore, fails to explain why such “economic men” will get involved and invest in such emotionally-charged national craze. This study looks at whether there was a potential profit-maximization incentive behind the dissemination of such national discourse.

The main research question of the study is therefore as follows: what was the function ultra-nationalist and nationalist rhetoric served in promoting the economic interests of this group of capitalists, and what is the historical pedigree behind the articulation of a nationalist discourse by the media owned by Egypt's infitah business elite in their opposition against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in the period leading up to the ouster of Mohamed Morsy in 2013?

In order to be able to answer this main question, a list of sub-questions will need to also be answered:

1. What were the key messages of their anti-Brotherhood nationalist discourse, and what discursive techniques were used?
2. Can the action of a business elite and their national, regional and international backers be reduced to involvement in a mass irrational national frenzy as has been described by the
1.3 Conceptual and theoretical framework

As explained previously, this research hypothesizes that there is more to the nationalism of the June 30 media discourse than just pure ideology. Many scholars have discussed the business interest of the media owners and rivalry between the Brotherhood and the Mubarak businessmen; however, a close examination and detailed scrutiny about the relationship between these power and economic struggles on the one hand and this hysterical nationalism on the other remains largely unexplored. Most of the analysis was either about nationalist discourse treated in relative isolation from the political and economic fields, and where links were made, they were usually linking the political interests to the economic without bringing in the discursive element. What this study aims to achieve in order to answer the research question is to bring down these barriers between the economic, the political and the discursive.

In order to achieve this objective, a few tasks need to be carried out including the conceptualization of links between “structural” (economic interests) and “superstructural” (nationalist discourse) and the dynamics of their interaction. To this end, the study adopts a conceptual framework for linking economic power and discourse, that is, the conceptual framework of overdetermination as developed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (2001). The concept of overdetermination can be traced back to Freud who thought in the Interpretation of Dreams of overdetermination as a process in which one dream image comes to represent a plurality of unconscious concerns, and that affects which appear in dreams appear to be formed by the confluence of several tributaries (Lewis, 2005). Louis Althusser in turn borrowed the concept from Freud; however, Mouffe and Laclau criticize Althusser’s adoption of overdetermination accusing him of reproducing the same essentialism and dualism in the field of Marxist discursiveness by integrating the concept of “determination in the last instance” to his theory of overdetermination.

If society has a last instance which determines its laws of motion, then the relations between the
overdetermined instances and the last instance must be conceived in terms of simple, one-directional determination by the latter. We can deduce from this that the field of overdetermination is extremely limited: it is the field of contingent variation as opposed to essential determination. And, if society does have a last and essential determination, the difference is not constitutive and the social is unified in the sutured space of a rationalist paradigm. Thus, we are confronted with exactly the same dualism that we found reproduced since the end of the nineteenth century in the field of Marxist discursiveness (Mouffe and Laclau, 2001, p. 99).

However, Mouffe and Laclau’s rejection of an ultimate determinant of a last instance does not mean a rejection of the centrality of economic factors. Laclau writes in his 2005 book *On Populist Reason* that the economy, like anything else in society, is the locus of an overdetermination of social logics. However, “its centrality is the result of the obvious fact that the material reproduction of society has more repercussions for social processes than do other instances. This does not mean that capitalist reproduction can be reduced to a single, self-defining mechanism.”

Mouffe and Laclau reject the simple determinism of a base/superstructure configuration because they argue that if labour was merely a commodity like others, its use-value—just like a machine—could be made immediately and automatically effective once they are purchased. Since labour-power is purchased, according to them, the maximum possible labour has to be extracted from it; therefore, the labour process cannot exist without a preexisting series of relations of domination (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 78-79). Such pre-existing relations of domination—which are also prerequisites for production—are political, legal, and cultural, which are all superstructural elements in classical Marxist thought which makes relations of production themselves overdetermined.

Other than Mouffe and Laclau, John T. Chalcraft in his study on craftsmen and guilds in Egypt prior to World War I (2005) gives an overview of critiques of economism including from within the Marxist tradition reaching back to Trotsky. According to Chalcraft, Trotsky has taken history, power and culture seriously in understanding economic change (Chalcraft, 2005, p. 8). Chalcraft highlights a few ideas that he regards as suggestive in showing how society and politics could be integral to the changing shape of relations of production and exchange. He agrees with Raymond Williams that the base is not a fixed economic abstraction but involves the specific activities of people with their fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore is always in a state of flux. Chalcraft writes: “with this concept of economy, it is easier to perceive how social, political, and cultural factors
might invade, intersect with, and help produce economic outcomes” (Chalcraft, 2005, p. 8).

Even Friedrich Engels rejected the adoption of a simplistic approach to economic determinism, and claimed that he and Marx are partly to blame for this misunderstanding common among the young generation of his time.

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize the main principle vis-à-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to give their due to the other elements involved in the interaction. But when it came to presenting a section of history, that is, to making a practical application, it was a different matter and there no error was permissible. Unfortunately, however, it happens only too often that people think they have fully understood a new theory and can apply it without more ado from the moment they have assimilated its main principles, and even those not always correctly. And I cannot exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from this reproach, for the most amazing rubbish has been produced in this quarter, too (Engels, 1999).

The way overdetermination provides the conceptual framework for this study is by identifying the nationalist discourse of June 30 as an overdetermined phenomenon where the economic factors act as a central—even if not the only or ultimate—determinant, and even if those underlying economic factors are themselves overdetermined.

Overdetermination is a useful conceptual framework for the purpose of this research because it shows inter alia that the economic, political, discursive, cultural, religious determinants of social phenomenon are too intertwined in a web of determinants too complex to be dealt with separately in different academic disciplines. Applying this to the study of nationalism, overdetermination is useful to demonstrate that while it is important to study the political, cultural, social and even religious determinants of nationalism as a discursive phenomenon, there would always be room to examine other factors that are overlooked especially when the determinant is as central as the economic. Moreover, overdetermination helps with moving freely between different fields and relations of determination to not only show how economic interests contribute to shaping nationalist discourse but also include other forces, and at the same time look at how nationalist discourse itself shapes and maintain other structural and superstructural fields. Finally, it allows me to focus on one aspect without denying the role of other aspects that may not get enough attention for being beyond the scope of the study.
The focus on rational and economic determinants within a framework of overdetermination also helps counter an age-old approach to the study of the Middle East that is tainted by simple determination that over-emphasizes cultural, mythical and religious aspects—or that “something” in the words of Wallerstein—with relative disregard to regimes of rationality that govern or at least influence them. Gilbert Achcar writes that a lot of people attributed the failure of democracy in the Middle East to the fact that there was something about the nature of Arab culture that made it different in a way that made it resistant to democracy (Achcar, 2016). Overdetermination could therefore be considered a non-reductionist approach to study the role of underlying regimes of rationality and their relations to irrational expressions in producing a social phenomenon such as nationalism as well as being produced by it.

In terms of theories of nationalism that would honour this conceptual framework of non-essentialism yet acknowledges the centrality of economic factors, the most well-suited would be the modernist approach, which according to Smith’s four paradigms of studying nationalism, is the one that accords more weight to economic factors in the shaping of nationalist imaginings as opposed to the other approaches of ethnosymbolism, primordialism and perennialism. The focus on the role of capital and technological advancement in the formation and development of European nationalisms will be extended and applied to study the development of Egyptian nationalism, including in its most contemporary version. Even in so-called “backward” societies where capitalism is not as “advanced”, economic considerations, the organization of economic life, the struggle over resources and profits, and technological progress, are equally powerful factors in influencing “superstructural” elements of culture including nationalism. Also, the modernist approach and its focus on capitalism and technology in constructing national imaginings seem to primarily focus on nationalism’s formative years. This applies to the works of Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Gellner on European nationalism but also to the works of Cole, Gershoni and Jankowski, Mitchel, etc. on Egyptian nationalism. This dissertation will expand the focus on the role of capital and technology in the creation of nationalist discourse and imaginings in relation to contemporary developments. In other words, the study will adopt as its theoretical framework a modernist approach to critiquing nationalism, but expand the scope of this approach beyond its European and historical focus to address issues of contemporary significance.
The conceptual and theoretical frameworks will be operationalized through the adoption of CDA, which will provide the general methodological terrain for the procedures and instruments needed to examine the links between these “structural” and “superstructural” levels because it starts its analysis at the micro-level with discourse (superstructural) and ends with its macro contexts including economic (structural), linking the text analysis to non-linguistic fields which belong to the meso and macro levels.

The study will roughly follow Michael Meyer’s model (see Figure 1) in which the theoretical level is first conceptualized through the selection of theoretical concepts, relations and assumptions, which then takes the process to operationalization providing the instruments of which the discourse/text is selected and then interpreted (Meyer, 2001). Finally this interpretation is used to examine assumptions and link them back to the theoretical level. This is more or less the path that this study follows after a problematic was identified. The conceptual and theoretical framework were selected before being operationalized into CDA. Texts were then selected and interpreted, and then this interpretation was used to examine my assumption before being linked back to the theoretical level. So far, I have discussed the conceptual and theoretical frameworks; how they will be operationalized will be discussed in more detail in the methodology sections.

Before we get into the methodology section, I would like to make a last remark about my
theoretical approach. Because the study focuses on the nationalism of business elites, it is prone to be interpreted as a top-down view of history. The research examines the nationalist discourse articulated by businessmen as a social group with immense economic power, rather than as a hegemonic group with cultural influence. The objective of this dissertation is not to assess their hegemonic role vis-à-vis the “masses”. This is of particular importance since the June 30 moment was not a clear moment of the “masses” against an “elite” as both the proponents and opponents of the Brotherhood had their elites and “masses”.

Consequently, being a study of an economic elite does not make the approach of this study a top-down one. I believe it is perfectly tenable to study a social group that is considered a political and economic elite without being interpreted as adopting a top-down view of history. This would have been indeed a top-down view of history if I had treated the business elite behind the media discourse as a hegemonic group and then had neglected the reciprocal relation with the “common sense” of everyday life of the “masses”. The focus on a business elite does not mean that the study denies that systemic or elite ideologies are directly interwoven with everyday common sense, which shapes it but is also being shaped by it. I explain further in the dissertation that the focus of the media discourse on issues of identity was not invented by a handful of businessmen and media personnel and then imposed unidirectionally in a top-down fashion upon the “masses”; far from it. The heavy use of identity issues was a capitalization of a sentiment that was already very widespread. What they did was nurturing a widespread and already-existing fear of the impact of Islamist rule on people’s lifestyles and livelihoods, and was far from being an exclusively elitist sentiment.

In other words, I do not study business elite in their relation to a certain conception of the “masses”, but as a social group that is not necessarily a stable hegemonic group. I do not accord more weight to the discourse of this supposed elite as an influential discourse. In many ways I believe this discourse is rejected by wide sections of the population including by people who participated in the June 30 protests.

It is questionable whether economic power automatically translates to hegemonic power especially in settings where the economy is rent-based and processes of accumulation happen independently of labour surplus extraction, and perhaps by means of dispossession. The modus operandi of processes of accumulation and its impact on nationalist discourse will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. In the Gramscian distinction between hegemonic and coercive power where the former is the domain of institutions of civil society and the latter is the domain of State institutions, there are significant evidence that the Mubarakist business elite has failed in its
role as a hegemonic group and therefore became more reliant on coercive power.

Gramsci makes this distinction in his concepts of “war of maneuver” as a direct clash against the state and “war of position” as a counter-hegemonic project, where the former is more suitable to an “Eastern” (Russian) setting where capitalism is not as advanced and the regimes rely more on coercive power. The latter is more suitable for Western European regimes where civil society and therefore hegemony is more developed, and where no revolutionary gains could be made without countering this hegemony. Here Gramsci himself writes:

In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying—but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country (Gramsci, 1971, pp.237-8).

1.4 The study’s multimethodical approach – a *set of tools to answer the research question*

As explained above, the main reason why CDA was my method of choice is because it goes beyond analyzing the text itself into analyzing the power dynamics behind it and the immediate and broad contexts within which the text was produced.

The origins of CDA is usually attributed to Foucault but this attribution was challenged by some scholars. Keith Sawyer (2002) argues that the use of the term “discourse” within its current meaning precedes Foucault and that it was already developed at the time he wrote the Archeology of Knowledge, which is the Foucaultian work where the concept of discourse is usually traced back. Sawyer argues that the British cultural theorists in the 1970s and the early 1980s all attribute the term to Pêcheux, Althusser or Lacan. It was only at a later stage that the term started to be attributed to Foucault, but according to Sawyer, the cultural studies theorists that further developed the concept in relation to Foucault did so with very specific theoretical needs, and interpreted the work of Foucault in the 1960s and 1970s within an already-established concept of discourse. Sawyer argues that while the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies (CCCS) were developing their theory of discourse, they drew more on Foucault’s non-discursive works than they did on the Archeology of Knowledge, especially *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*. The
argument is that the theory of discourse had already been developed but these non-discursive works of Foucault were not used to develop the concept, but was only seen as an analysis of the emergence and constitution of forms of discursive subjectivity (Sawyer, 2002).

Sawyer, demonstrates how Foucault used the term “discourse” to clarify his point. Foucault acknowledges that he has “used and abused” the term discourse in many different senses. Foucault lists three different senses in which he used the term “discourse”. The first is the most “general” and “vague” and denotes a group of verbal performances produced by a group of signs (Foucault, 2002, p. 120). In the second sense, Foucault meant discourse as a group of acts of formulations, that is, a series of sentences or propositions (Foucault, 2002, p. 120-1). The third sense, which is the one that Foucault says he finally used at the time of writing the Archeology of Knowledge, is “constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence”. A discourse in this last sense is therefore “a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (Foucault, 2002, p. 121).

Despite—or rather because—its fluid meaning, the concept of discourse rose to prominence out of necessity as the terms “culture”, “ideology” and “language” were facing some serious conceptual challenges. First, the concept of “culture” was developed in opposition to the economic determinism of orthodox Marxism (Hall, 1980, p.23-5 quoted in Sawyer, 2002). Just like economism, the centrality of culture was later criticized as overly synchronic, ahistorical and totalizing. The term “culture” was gradually abandoned even within cultural studies, and was replaced by discourse and took up many of the connotations culture used to previously refer to (Sawyer, 2002).

As for ideology, the concept was too tied to the base/superstructure concept of Marxism which, according to Sawyer, implied a separation between ideas on the one hand and social reality on the other. This critique however lacks accuracy, because the base/superstructure argument is that ideology stems and is rooted in economic conditions not separate from them. Maybe a more convincing argument about what the framework of “discourse” could offer that “ideology” cannot is how it could take into account race and gender conflicts, whereas ideology was too embedded within a Marxist model of class conflict, and therefore became a prominent framework within feminist and post-colonial studies (Sawyer, 2002). This makes discourse a more suitable concept in the framework of overdetermination because its dissociation from the base/superstructure configuration means that it can better represent complex relations of determination.

In addition to culture and ideology, Sawyer argues that discourse replaced language as well after it had suffered from several conceptual weaknesses. With the rise of post-structuralism, language
represented an inescapable association with structuralism and was limited to semiotic symbol system implying synchronic and mentally represented structures. On the other hand, discourse was focused on the active practice of language and included the connotations of power and conflict while language did not. This, once again, suited the theoretical needs of feminist, post-colonial, and race theory scholars.

‘Discourse’ thus retains many connotations of 1970s Marxist and Lacanian theory, but in a way that allows the incorporation of history, culture and both structuralist and post-structuralist insights. It is not surprising that such an all-encompassing term is now associated with a wide range of conflicting and confusing meanings (Sawyer, 2002).

Regardless of the theoretical concept’s origin, Fairclough is seen as the person who provided methodological procedures and instruments to—or operationalized—what had only been a theory up until this point (Blommaert, 2005, p. 44). According to Blommaert, Fairclough sketched a three-dimensional framework for analyzing discourse. The first dimension, which Blommaert calls discourse-as-text concerns the text itself or the ‘linguistic features organization of concrete instances of discourse. The second dimension is called by Blommaert “discourse-as-discursive-practice”, which means that after the analysis of vocabulary, grammar, text structure, the task is now to link the text to its wider social context. The third dimension is “discourse-as-social-practice”, that is, the ideological and hegemonic processes in which discourse is seen to operate (Blommaert, 2005, p. 44). These three dimensions will be used to operationalize the study’s conceptual and theoretical frameworks by linking the micro level of nationalist discourse to the meso and macro levels of their determinants.

Explaining why the study of discourse should not be restricted to linguists, Blommaert argues that linguists should have no monopoly over theories of language because the linguistic bias restricts the analysis to textually organized and linguistically encoded discourse, not to where it comes from and goes to (Blommaert, 2005, p. 35). Instead we should be looking at how the linguistic generates the economic social, political as well as how the economic, social and political generate the linguistic (Blommaert, 2005, p. 66).

The problems I have identified with treatments of context in CDA and CA all had to do with the centrality of text in both traditions. Despite claims voiced in both traditions about the
mutually constitutive relationship of discourse and society, the ultimate ambition remains explaining discourse, not explaining society through the privileged window of discourse (Blommaert, 2005, p. 66).

Other than the centrality of text in discourse analysis, Blommaert also criticizes the focus of CDA on single societies as self-contained systems, and how it is almost always restricted to societies he describes as “Late Modern, and post-industrial, densely semiotised First-World societies”. He says that he had never encountered a reference in any CDA work to world-systems theory or the works on transnational and global processes of interconnectedness, inequality and value-differentiation of scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank (Blommaert, 2005, p. 36).

Therefore, if discourse is perceived as contextualized language where the dimension of contextualization is taken seriously beyond the national and temporal contours, CDA then ceases to belong exclusively to the linguistics fields and becomes a social science of language in society. Blommaert’s elaborate this idea and argues that discourse analysis should be a social science that utilizes language to answer social scientific questions. This study therefore tries to challenge the dominant threshold of contextualization which limits the context to single societies and single events. This, above all, is also a response to a criticism of discourse analysis which usually used a misattribution of Derrida as saying “there is nothing outside the text” to assure that the real focus of this dissertation is on what lies beyond—or outside—the text.

The contexts of discourse are both temporal and spatial. As discussed above in the theory section, and as argued by Blommaert (2005), no CDA can be complete without studying the historical context of discourse, but Blommaert also argues that in the era of globalization context can no longer be limited to a single society and “needs to include the relationships between different societies and the effect of these relationships on repertoires of language users and their potential to construct voice” (Blommaert, 2005, p.15). By emphasizing this intertextuality and pretextuality, the study aims to honour this interplay of historical and global forces in the shaping of discourse.

However, global and historical contexts can naturally go without limit and therefore need to be delimited. First, the global context would be delimited by the most key movements of capital flows and its likely impact on the discourse at hand. For this reason, special attention will be given to the impact of “Khaleeji capital” (capital flows from oil-rich Arab Gulf countries) in the post-2011 period since it constituted the bulk of capital flows at the time, which was also a period characterized by the
receding role of US capital. As for the historical scope, the focus will be on important ruptures starting with the Urabi revolution that broke out in 1879 because it is seen by many scholars as the birth moment of modern Egyptian nationalism as will be discussed further in the study. The study will be covering other landmark rupture moments in both the flows and workings of capital and their impact on the discourse of the nationalist bourgeoisie, such as the project to establish a national bank in Egypt after World War I, the 1952 land reform programme, the 1961 nationalization programme and the 1974 open-door policy.

Although I think of this study as primarily qualitative, I will be complementing it with some quantitative data. The quantitative approach—with all its shortcomings—was only employed minimally to help me select texts—upon which some meso- and macro- analysis will be built. It was utilized to demonstrate that the selected texts are not one-off isolated utterances or a deviation from the discourse of the programme and the channel, and to demonstrate that the texts were not selected at the whim of the researcher to confirm a predetermined outcome. This is always a risk when doing a qualitative study of a relatively small sample; in this manner, I believe that counting the recurrences of some themes can be useful in selecting more specific passages for deeper examination and ensure a degree of representability. For example, it was very revealing to see that the United States received a great deal of antagonism across the three shows and channels. In this light, it was useful for me when running an analysis of anti-American text passages to know how recurrent of a theme it was across the three shows and the three channels.

1.4.1. Prestage 1: Data collection and sampling
Since qualitative research determines the size and the non-random nature of the sample, I will limit the research to three businessmen whose profiles match the definition of infitah businessmen as outlined in the introduction of this study. Other than having accumulated their wealth as a result of the open-door policy, these three businessmen were selected because they own some of the most viewed media outlets, and are highly involved in media production with a high political content that was established in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. The samples will be the prime time shows of the three most-viewed TV stations in June 2013 owned by members of the infitah businessmen around the period of the June 30 anti-Brotherhood protests.

The three channels will be Sada al-Balad (the echo of the country) which is owned by the Mubarak-era business tycoon, and a member of the deposed National Democratic Party Mohamed Abo Elenien; al-qahira wal nas (Cairo and the people) which is owned by Tarek Nour, an
advertisement tycoon known for his closeness to the state, and animosity towards the Muslim Brotherhood, and was the campaign manager of Mubarak’s 2005 electoral campaign; Capital Broadcasting Center (CBC) which is owned by Mohamed al-Amin, another business tycoon from the era who has highly invested in media outlets (both TV and print) with a clear anti-Brotherhood nationalist message. Al-Amin was relatively obscure before the establishment of CBC compared to other Egyptian businessmen with comparable levels of wealth. This is because he spent most of his business career in Kuwait. However, CBC was very instrumental in propagating the June 30 message that it would have been very difficult to ignore. Al-Amin is also a major partner and shareholder in Amer Group, which is owned by Mansour Amer, a senior National Democratic Party member of parliament during the Mubarak era. This connection, the opinions he holds and the kind of business circles he belongs to qualify him to be one of the study’s infitah businessmen.

1.4.2 Stage 1: Micro level

As previously discussed, the study is carried out using CDA techniques to analyze the content of selected TV channels. The purpose is to deconstruct and detect ideas related to the change in the socio-political power structure of the time, and the quick revival of another. The research was conducted using an inductive method starting with the micro level of discourse used in the subject media, and leading to middle and macro level analysis. I will employ Fairclough's (Fairclough & Holes, 1995) three dimensions for studying discourse: the micro level which focuses on analysing the text (the language and the message presented) itself, the meso-level which focuses on the production of the text (who funds it, for which audience and for what reason?), and finally, and most importantly, the macro level, which involves studying the broad economic, social and political factors that affect the researched text (what domestic, regional and international economic, political and social factors led to the employment of such discourse).

The first stage for studying discourse entirely focuses on the micro-level dimension of analyzing the text. It mainly involved watching about 40 hours of three prime-time shows, and taking preliminary notes and counting the frequency of certain occurrences (e.g. how many pro and anti Brotherhood guests and phone-ins, the language used, etc.).

The CDA also incorporates qualitative analysis in the micro level (counting the frequency of thematic concepts within the selected text) to identify the focus of the producers, and to examine through relational analysis the links between concepts in a text. The tool used for this stage is a list of questions designed to identify relevant patterns in the text and is loosely based on Norman
Fairclough’s ten questions for CDA (1989).

Fairclough distinguishes between three types of values that formal features of discourse may have. These types of value are experiential, relational and expressive. For Fairclough, experiential values give a cue to how the text producer’s experience of the social and natural world is represented; it is the value that concerns knowledge and beliefs. As for relational values, they are the formal features of discourse that have to do with social relationships; for the purpose of this study, detecting relational values in the discourse will be mostly employed to analyze how the text producers include or exclude social and political groups using grammatical features, such as the use of the pronouns “we” and “you”. Finally, expressive values concern subjects and social identities, and Fairclough stresses that any formal feature might simultaneously have two or three of these values (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112).

Based on these concepts I have chosen from Fairclough's ten questions for analyzing discourse a set of questions that are most relevant to the discourse analysis at hand:

1) What experiential values do words have?
   1.1 Are there words which are ideologically contested?
   1.2 Is there rewording or overwording?
   1.3 What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy) are there between words?

2) What metaphors are used?

3) What experiential values do grammatical features have?
   3.1 What types of process and participant predominate?
   3.2 Is agency unclear?
   3.3 Are processes what they seem?
   3.4 Are sentences active or passive?
   3.5 Are sentences positive or negative?

4) What relational values do grammatical features have?
   4.1 Are the pronouns “we” and “you” used, and if so, how?

5) What expressive values do grammatical features have?

6) How are (simple) sentences linked together?
   6.1 What logical connectors are used?

6.2 Are complex sentences characterized by coordination or subordination?

7) What larger-scale structure does the text have?

After a first screening of the shows and getting a sense of what kind of anti-Brotherhood discourse was disseminated, I have generated a number of questions for the quantitative analysis to count the frequency of different themes and detect bias in media coverage. The questions are as follows:

1) What is the topic of the discussion?
   a) The Muslim Brotherhood is the only topic of discussion.
   b) The Muslim Brotherhood is the main topic of discussion.
   c) The Muslim Brotherhood is a main topic of discussion.
   d) The Muslim Brotherhood is an important topic of discussion.
   e) The Muslim Brotherhood is a topic of discussion.
   f) The Muslim Brotherhood is a passing topic of discussion.
   g) There is no mention of the Muslim Brotherhood.

2) What is the general sentiment of the episode?
   a) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a very positive light.
   b) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a fairly positive light.
   c) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented fairly neutral.
   d) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a fairly negative light.
   e) The Muslim Brotherhood was presented in a very negative light.

3) What was the Brotherhood accused of (if at all)?
   a) Inefficiency at running the country but with no mention of collaborative activities or deliberately working against the interest of Egypt (they are mere failures).
   b) Does not prioritize the interests of the nation because they belief in a different kind of nation that transcends Egypt.
   c) Actively work against the interests of the nation because they work for a foreign enemy.

4) Which foreign power (if any) was the Brotherhood accused of working for?
   a) Turkey
b) Qatar

c) Hamas

d) the European Union

e) The United States

f) Israel

5) On which nationalist basis was the Brotherhood dismissed?
   a) UnEgyptian
   b) UnArab
   c) UnMuslim

6) What kind of nationalist/identity references (if any) are used to deligitimize the Brotherhood rule?
   a) References made to ancient Egyptian civilization.
   b) References made to modern Egyptian culture.
   c) References made to Islamic belief and moral conduct.
   d) Reference made to principles of pan-Arabism.

7) What kind of other non-nationalistic/identity-related references are used (if any) to delegitimize the Brotherhood rule?
   a) reference made to human rights.
   b) reference made to law and constitution.
   c) reference made to the economy
   d) reference made about violence

8) Phone-ins were made by?
   a) Proponents of the Brotherhood
   b) Neutral
   c) Opponents of the Brotherhood
   d) Irrelevant
9) What was the guests’ position on the Brotherhood?
   a) Proponents
   b) Neutral
   c) Opponents
   d) Irrelevant

1.4.3 Stage 2: The Meso Level

From Stage 1 analysis, I was able to formulate questions that took me to stage 2 of my research (the meso-level dimension) to explain the funding mechanisms, the ownership structure, and the profit/loss model of the media outlets, but also of the other non-media business activities of the owners. Stage 2 would rely mostly on official records and media sources. This is the stage when a CDA starts diverting from a normal discourse analysis because it goes beyond just analyzing the text, into analyzing other factors and discourse that belong to the wider context, that is, the immediate forces and determinants behind the production of the text. In the case at hand, it was extremely useful to look at issues like the ownership of the media, and the political and economic affiliations of its owners (party membership, business partnerships, etc.), as an effective tool for understanding events through media discourse.

The findings of the micro level were cross-examined in the meso level against the discourse of the owners themselves; in some cases like that of Tarek Nour and Ibrahim Eissa, there was a conflict of some views. Such conflict of views are just as worthy of analysis and examination as the predominant agreement and harmony between the views of the presenters and their employers.

1.4.4 Stage 3: The Macro Level

If the meso-level dimension studies immediate forces behind producing a text, the macro level would look into the wider and more broad forces behind the production of the text up to the regional and the global levels, which, as highlighted by Blommaert, are very key to understanding the economic motives behind the uttering of the researched discourse. In a global condition where media and communications becomes increasingly transnational, and more importantly, in an economic system where the flow of capital is facing less barriers and economic activities are becoming increasingly transnational, it is no longer sufficient—perhaps it never was—to limit the broader context to the national level. Therefore, my focus in the macro level was on the regional and international interplay of forces.
1.4.5 Historical background

CDA as a methodological tool has been criticized for its ahistoricism as it tends to ignore the historical conditions that influence the production of discourse and tends to examine single events of discourse and disconnect it from previous events, but fortunately some scholars have noticed this shortcoming and tried to overcome it.

Jan Blommaert criticizes Critical Discourse Analysis for ignoring the historical dimension of discourse, or what he describes as pretextuality. Blommaert’s concept of pretextuality is defined as “contexts that influence language long before it is produced in the form of utterances and that define the conditions under which utterances can be produced, or fail to be produced” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 77). Blommaert argues that a synchronic reading of discourse will not suffice if the aim is to “launch a critique of systemic features of contemporary societies and focuses on issues of power” (p. 37). Critical analysis of discourse for Blommaert should not, therefore, start as soon as people open their mouths, but should start long before that.

An ahistorical reading of discourse therefore risks failing to spot the crucial phenomenon of inequality or mistakenly locate them in the analysis of single instance of communication (Blommaert, 2005, p. 96). Accordingly, the study will be concerned with explaining this present or recent discursive phenomenon by conducting a historical investigation of the nationalist discourse of different business elites since the late 19th century, which scholars mark as the birth of the Egyptian nationalist movement, and into how business and economic interests throughout this history have at least partially contributed to shaping the nationalist discourse.

To overcome this shortcoming and to incorporate such historical analysis, the second half of the dissertation will be a historical study of Egyptian nationalism and its intertwinement with economic interests from the time of the Urabi revolution until the June 30 events. I will aim at highlighting major ruptures and shifts in the nationalist discourse and the positions of the political and national elites, and how they were intimately linked to economic considerations from the very “birth moment” of modern Egyptian nationalism during the second half of the 19th century at the hands of the Urabi movement and until I arrive at the June 30 moment. This should help with highlighting the unstable nature of nationalist discourse and expose its susceptibility to economic and technological changes.
Before we move onto the next chapter, I would like to make a few final methodological remarks about my presence as a researcher in the study. This dissertation is a result of an almost five-year long process that started with the unfolding of the June 30, 2013 events, which led to both the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime after only one year in power and the establishment of a military authoritarian order. I was a firsthand witness of the June 30 mass protests, the resulting coup d’etat of July 3, and the Rab’a massacre a month and a half later. I witnessed these developments not only by following their live coverage in the media, but also by taking part in some of the protest events, first as a participant who was hoping for better governance than that provided by the Muslim Brotherhood, and then as an observer anxious about the direction into which the events were heading, since it quickly became clear that extreme violence, the emergence of a more authoritarian regime, and the final “death blow” of the January 2011 revolution were imminent.

Being trained as a journalist and in policy research where it is generally unacceptable to include the author’s subjective experience, I was trying to avoid the use of first person singular when I first started drafting this dissertation. This normally gives the illusion of removing the researcher from the research as if there is an objective truth that is capable of speaking for itself. Halfway through writing up this dissertation, I abandoned this positivist approach because I came to the realization that not just it is inconceivable to remove any researcher from any research, but this topic
particularly is one where I am (by definition and by virtue of being an Egyptian researcher) involved emotionally, professionally, socially and politically.

This subjective view is clear when I use the term “revolution” to describe the events that led to the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011, but I use the term “events” or “protests” to describe the June 30 events which led to the removal of Mohamed Morsy from power. Many have argued that the two processes were similar where mass protests led to the military’s intervention to remove the head of state followed by a period of military rule. I have plenty of what I think are objective reasons to make this distinction, but cannot also deny the role of subjective inclination and personal preference.

Needless to say, this does not make the dissertation a long opinion piece; I put significant effort into data collection, verification, ensuring samples are representative, using cross-examination techniques, and developing multimethodical tools to tame this subjectivity but stopping short of making any sweeping positivist claims.

I would also like to make a remark about linguistic matters. This being a study of discourse, it is quite naturally heavy on exact quotations and passages. Most—if not all—of these quotations were written or uttered in Arabic with no official translations; therefore, I had no choice but to translate them myself. Besides being a researcher, I have worked for more than a decade as a translator and therefore I hope that my translation will convey the meaning and the spirit of the text as much as possible. Whenever I was faced with untranslatable expressions or words, I left them in transliterated form with an explanation of their meaning as a footnote.
Part I

A three level analysis of private TV’s nationalist discourse at the time of June 30, 2013
Chapter 2

Prime-time nationalism

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will try to assess the nationalist discourse that was propagated in the media owned by the infitah business elite in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood around the June 30 protest and the subsequent military coup. As a first step towards answering the first half of the research question about the functions this discourse might have served for its propagators, the main characteristics of such discourse need to first be identified, and that is the objective of this chapter.

I will discuss in this chapter the micro-level of text analysis of the three prime-time shows. The chapter will start with an overview of the TV shows and their presenters. The text will be analyzed and divided thematically in separate sections based on the most recurrent themes that came up while watching the shows. The selection of the themes was based on counting the frequency of similar utterances throughout the three shows. This resulted in three broad nationalistic and identitarian themes: Egyptocentrism, anti-Americanism and Islam. The micro-level text analysis is the first step in the CDA, and will set the stage for the rest of the analysis in the sense that the subsequent chapters—including the historical section—will follow the same thematic structure.

Quantitative analysis used in this chapter admittedly have their shortcomings and might offer an over-simplistic categorization of different statement. I hope, however, that the quantitative and qualitative analysis will compensate for each other’s shortcomings while acknowledging the impossibility of reaching a full impartial and objective position while analyzing the discourse of a highly intertwined political, social and economic phenomenon.

Before delving into the discourse of the media in 2013, I will go over some of the main thematic concepts covered in the chapter. I will first start with a working definition for “Egyptocentrism”, which is a term that heavily features in this study. Egyptocentrism is a nationalist ideology that rejects all forms of pan-nationalisms, and believes that Egypt has a unique—if not superior—identity different even from its closest neighbours. The first elaborate expression of Egyptocentrism was the writings of Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayed in the first two decades of the 20th century. It was further refined and applied during the liberal era between 1923 and 1952 by thinkers like Taha Hussein, whose writings will be described in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. After the failure of its competitor, the pan-Arab project in 1967 and its death in 1970 with the death of its main promoter Nasser, Sadat revived this Egyptocentric nationalism but with some modification given the specific circumstances
and the local, regional and global struggles and conflicts of the time. This version was combined with economic re-liberalization in the 1970s, or the so-called infitah or open-door policy. As a result, a new national business elite had emerged (or rather re-emerged) as a result of this policy and ideology. The three businessmen covered in this study were the product of the switch in the state’s general political and economic orientation in the 1970s including quite a radical switch in the state’s official nationalist discourse.

On the other hand, the pan-Arab project championed by Nasser believed in an Arab political union where Egypt plays a central and a leading role. Instead of a focus on Egypt-specific histories, it focused instead on trying to manufacture a collective history of the region. It crystallized a self-described progressive and vanguardist regime: anti-imperialist, republican and post-colonial. It was antagonistic towards the West, namely Britain, the US and their “illegitimate child” in the region, Israel. It was a developmental state that believed in central planning, import substitution, self-sufficiency and protectionism. Although Egypt officially adopted an official non-aligned position during the Cold War under the Nasser’s pan-Arab regime, it was quite clear that in reality Egypt was more on the side of the Eastern Bloc at the time.

2.2 The TV Shows

I have watched 16 episodes of three TV shows from three different channels in the period around the June 30 protest. My time frame was the episodes of the week before June 30, the day that Morsy was officially overthrown by a military decree on July 3, and the day of the mass protests on July 26 when Abdelfattah al-Sisi, the leader of the military at the time, called for Egyptians to take on the streets to “grant him a mandate to fight terrorism” (Armbrust, 2015: 105). I was restricted to those episodes that were available online on the official Youtube channels of the three TV stations. Despite being daily shows, they also have two or three days off every week. Taking all these factors into consideration, I was able to access, watch and analyze 16 full episodes from this period, with each episode typically lasting for over two hours.

The first show is Huna al-Aassema (This is the Capital), a prime time show presented by the star TV host Lamis al-Hadidi. It is a political show that has a mix of live coverage of events, video reports, while hosting guests usually towards the end of the episode. The show is broadcast on the Capital Broadcasting Center (CBC) channel, which was established in July 2011 after the revolution and quickly became one of the most viewed TV networks covering a wide range of topics such as politics, entertainment, lifestyle, etc. (Dubai Press Club, 2012). The network is
owned by Mohamed al-Amin, a business tycoon who owns a large media empire which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Al-Hadidi is a prominent TV host and journalist who joined CBC from its very inception, and whose programme was one of the most important shows of the then newly-established TV network. Al-Hadidy had worked for national TV under Mubarak, and for Mubarak’s 2005 election campaign and was the managing editor of *al-Alam al-Youm* (the world today) financial newspaper (Sakr, 2007, p. 30). She had—for a brief time—a programme during the month of Ramadan in 2009 in *al-Qahira wal Nas* channel, which is one of the other TV channels this chapter would be looking into. She also worked in the late 1980s as a correspondent for the New York Times in Cairo and the American TV network NBC, and is a graduate of the American University in Cairo (Guaaybess, 2015: 169-170).

Al-Hadidi, as would be demonstrated in this chapter, held a clear oppositional stance against the Muslim Brotherhood. I watched and analyzed six episodes with a duration of about 13 hours of her show dated June 24, 25, 29, and 30, and July 3 and 25. In four out of the six episodes, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only topic of discussion, and in two it was the main topic of discussion. As for the general sentiment and how the Brotherhood was portrayed, in four episodes they were portrayed very negatively, and in two they were portrayed fairly negatively. She made over the six episodes 11 explicit accusations against the Muslim Brotherhood or showed agreement with a guest’s accusation. The accusations against the Brotherhood are categorized as follows: a) they were five times accused of inefficiency and failing at running the country with no mention of collaborative activities or deliberately working against the interest of Egypt. b) in three incidents they were accused of collaboration and working for a foreign enemy. c) three times they were accused of not prioritizing the interest of Egypt because they believe in another kind of nation or international organization that transcends Egypt.

As for with explicit nationalist references, and on what identity bases were the Muslim Brotherhood attacked, they were dismissed five times as un-Egyptian, and four times as un-Muslim. They were not dismissed at all as un-Arab. The significance of this will be demonstrated later in the chapter. As for the foreign powers they were implicitly or explicitly accused of collaborating with and their frequency, over the six episodes they were accused 11 times of collaborating with the US, 10 times of collaborating with Hamas, two times with Qatar, one time for Israel and one time for Hezbollah.

When it comes to the frequency of references to nationalist identity to explicitly or implicitly delegitimize the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, 30 references were made of which eight
references were made to ancient Egyptian civilization, five to modern Egyptian culture, and nine to Islamic belief and moral conduct and eight to sectarianism, while no references were made to pan-Arabism. 32 non-identity references were counted to delegitimize the Brotherhood rule. Two references were about disrespect to human rights, 14 were about disrespect to law and constitution, six to economic failure and 10 to violence.

63 phone-ins were received during the six episodes, of which 57 were by opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, three were neutral and three were irrelevant. There was not a single phone-in by a proponent of the Muslim Brotherhood or President Morsy. The shows hosted 10 guests over the six episodes and they were all opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood. Reports were also overwhelmingly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsy’s presidency.

The second show I have analyzed is Huna al-Qahira (This is Cairo), a political prime time show presented by the celebrity journalist Ibrahim Eissa. Unlike Huna al-Aassema, the show has very little live coverage of events, filmed reports, and mostly depends on Eissa’s political analysis and hosting and interviewing guests. The show is broadcast on the al-Qahira wal Nas channel, which was established before the revolution as an entertainment channel broadcasting only during the month of Ramadan.

However, after the revolution it expanded to become an around-the-clock network of two channels. While still providing entertainment, the channel has increasingly started to include political shows. Also, the advertising company behind the channel, Tarek Nour Communications (TNC), worked on many political campaigns including the 2005 election campaign for president Mubarak, and the election campaign of presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik (Bohn, 2014) in 2012 in addition to many other governmental campaigns during the Mubarak year. Established in 1978 a few years after the open-door policy, TNC was the first private advertising agency to be established in Egypt under the name Americana, and has grown to become one of the largest advertising houses in Egypt and the Middle East (TNA Website). The company and its owners will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3 on the meso-level of Critical Discourse Analysis.

As for Eissa, he is a veteran journalist who established one of the first private newspapers in the mid-1990s called al-Dostour. Al-Dostour was highly critical of the regime and was sometimes critical of Mubarak himself which was not entirely usual at the time. He was sentenced to prison in 2006 for having doubted Mubarak’s health condition, but was shortly released after he received a pardon from Mubarak himself. He was initially supportive of the January 2011 revolution, but grew very critical of the Muslim Brotherhood regime and was a staunch supporter of the June 30 protests,
and started distancing himself from January 25 revolution. However, after June 30 he changed the name of his programme to 25/30 paying allegiance to both the January 25 and June 30 events. Throughout his career, he had a multitude of media projects including several newspapers and political shows in different networks. The Facebook page for the Huna al-Qahira programme dates back to September 2012, just a few months before the June 30 events (Official Facebook Page for Huna al-Qahira Programme, 2012).

The same as Al-Hadidi, Eissa held a clear oppositional stance against the Muslim Brotherhood. I watched and analyzed five episodes with a total duration of about eight hours of his show that were aired on June 24, 25, 26, and July 3 and 26. In all of the five episodes, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only topic of discussion. As for the general sentiment and how the Brotherhood was portrayed, in four episodes they were portrayed very negatively, and in one episode they were portrayed fairly negatively. In the five episodes, he made 11 explicit accusations or expressed agreement with a guest’s accusation. The accusations are categorized as follows: a) they were accused once of inefficiency without a mention of collaborative activities or deliberately working against the interest of Egypt; b) five times they were accused of not prioritizing the interest of Egypt because they believe in another kind of nation or international organization that transcends Egypt; c) five times they were accused of actively working against the interest of the nation for a foreign enemy.

As for explicit nationalist references, and on what identity bases the Muslim Brotherhood were attacked, they were dismissed seven times as un-Egyptian, and four times as un-Muslim. Just like with al-Hadidi, there was no mention at all of Arabism. Over the five episodes they were accused 11 times of collaborating with the United States, one time of collaborating with Hamas, two times with Qatar, and seven times for Israel.

When it comes to the frequency of references to nationalist identity employed to explicitly or implicitly delegitimize the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, 21 references were made of which two were made in relation to ancient Egyptian civilization, two to modern Egyptian culture, eight to Islamic belief and conduct, only one for pan-Arabism and eight to sectarianism. 38 non-identity references were counted to delegitimize the Brotherhood rule. No references were made for disrespect of human rights, six references were made about the disrespect to law and constitution, six reference were linked to economic failure and 14 to violence. 10 phone-ins were received during the six episodes, and all of them were by opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood. The same applies to the three guests who were all opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood as well.

The third and final show is *al-Balad al-Youm* (The Country Today) on Sada al-Balad’s channel.
presented by Rola Kharsa. The channel started broadcasting on November 28, 2011 just before the first round of the first parliamentary elections after the January 25 revolution (Sada al-Balad official Website, n.d.). The channel is owned by business tycoon Mohamed Abou El Enein, the owner of Cleopatra Group, which is the biggest producer of ceramic in Egypt, and exports its products to over a 100 countries, and has 17 plants and employs over 25000 workers (Ceramica Cleopatra Official Website, n.d.). He was also member of parliament from 1995 until until the 2011 revolution, and a member of Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (Atef, 2015).

Rola Kharsa has started her career in the media as a presenter in the European programme on the Egyptian radio in 1989. She then moved to London to work for the BBC in 1992. In 1994, she became the London correspondent for the Egyptian state-owned TV. In 1999, she returned to Cairo and started a programme on state-owned TV called Akhbar al-Nas (news of the people), and then one year later started another programme called fil ’omq (in-depth) (Moheb, n.d.). Although Kharsa is not as much of a celebrity TV personality as Eissa or al-Hadidi, Sada al-Balad’s beginnings were quite modest in comparison to CBC and al-Qahira wal Nas, and did not attract as many TV celebrities as the two other networks. Taken that into consideration, Kharsa was Sada al-Balad’s star who took up prime time slots and covered key events at key moments.

Kharsa was also the wife of Abdel Latif El Menawy, the head of the news sector in the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) at the time of the revolution. El Menawy was known for his pro-Mubarak coverage during the 18 days of the revolution to the extent that workers within the ERTU protested for his removal until he was sacked by the interim military government shortly after the overthrow of Mubarak (Reuters, 2011). El Menawy was personally close to the Mubarak family. He wrote in his book Tahrir: the last 18 days of Mubarak about how he accompanied the Mubarak family on their last day in power as they were about to board a helicopter that would transfer them from the presidential palace to their private residency in the Sharm al-Sheikh resort (Abdel Latif El Menawy, 2012).

I watched about 11 hours of her show split over five episodes dated 24, 25, 26 and 30 June and 3 July. Like the previous two shows, Kharsa’s show was overwhelmingly anti-Brotherhood, where all five episodes presented the Brotherhood in a fairly negative light. The Brotherhood was the only topic of discussion in four out of five episodes, and a main topic of discussion in the remaining one. They were twice accused of not prioritizing the interests of Egypt because they were loyal to another kind of nation or international organization. They were dismissed as un-Egyptian three times and un-Muslim only once. They were not dismissed as un-Arab at any point during those 11 hours.
In terms of countries the Brotherhood was accused of collaborating with, once again the US tops the list with four mentions, Qatar and Hamas with three mentions each, Israel with two mentions and Hezbollah with one mention. In the five episodes there were no references made to ancient Egyptian civilization or modern Egyptian culture as a method of delegitimizing the Brotherhood rule. Only one reference was made to Islamic belief and moral conduct, and one reference made to pan-Arabism. Three references were made to sectarianism.

As for non-identity references to delegitimize the Brotherhood, no references were made to human rights, two references were made to the law and constitution, three to economic failure, one to general administrative failure and seven to violence. In terms of guest and phone-ins, Kharsa’s show was more balanced relative to Eissa’s and Lamis’s but was still clearly imbalanced against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Out of 47 phone calls, 32 were from opponents of the Brotherhood, 11 were neutral, two were from Brotherhood proponents, and two were on irrelevant topics. As for studio guests, 13 out of 16 were opponents of the Brotherhood, two were neutral and only one was a proponent. Out of 9 reports, 4 were neutral, three had an anti-Brotherhood tone, and two were irrelevant.

### 2.3 Egyptocentrism without anti-Arabism

What is remarkable from the quantitative analysis as portrayed in the previous section, that even if Egyptocentrism was quite dominant as a nationalist sentiment, it is clearly distinguishable from the Egyptocentrism of the late Sadat era in that it was not anti-Arabist. This approach might have started with Mubarak’s conciliatory approach with the other Arab states, but also unlike the 1970s transformation whose main supporter was the US, the sponsors of the June 30 transformation—as I will discuss in Chapter 4—were the oil-rich Gulf states namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Sadat used to employ a double offensive on Arabism, the first was on the Nasserist version of pan-Arabism, which was in line with and sponsored by the Gulf’s policy towards Nasserism and pan-Arabism as an ideology that imposed an existential threat to their rule. However, the second element of Sadat’s anti-Arabism was against Arabs in general with the aim of humiliating them and asserting Egypt’s cultural and historical superiority after it has been isolated and expelled from the Arab League. These two forms of anti-Arabism constituted in the late 1970s a key component of the official Egyptocentric national discourse of the time. This second form of anti-Arabism was almost completely absent from the discourse of the studied media around the June 30 events, which could safely be attributed to the increased financial and political dependence on support from Arab
oil-rich countries.

As clear from the quantitative analysis, there was an excessive nationalistic and identity-related discourse used to dismiss the Muslim Brotherhood as un-Egyptian across the three shows. Ahmed Said, one of al-Hadidi’s guests who was at the time the leader of the liberal Free Egyptians party, established and funded by business tycoon Naguib Sawiris, described the protests against the Muslim Brotherhood as a move to defend the “true identity of Egypt”.

Said: The Egyptian people are taking to the streets today to defend the Egyptian culture and not to attack the minister of culture, whom we don’t care about.1

Al-Hadidi (interruptedly): the true identity of Egypt.

Said: The true identity of Egypt. The Egyptian people are taking to the streets so that Egypt is not divided into two. The Egyptian people are going down to defend the literature of Naguib Mahfouz, the heritage of Taha Hussein, the heritage of Om Kolthoum, the theatre of Naguib al-Rihani, and the cinema of Youssef Chahine. The Egyptian people are not taking to the street because of the hatred, sectarianism, killing or violence that they talk about. The Egyptian people are taking to the street for freedom of opinion and freedom of belief, not to lynch the shia’a folks, or to threaten the Christians, or deem the opposition kafirs. The Egyptian people are taking to the streets for Egypt, and not against Morsy (Ahmed Said on Huna al-Aassema 24/6/2013).

By using the totality of the “Egyptian people” several times to describe opponents of Morsy and the Muslim Brotherhood, Said is de-Egyptianizing anyone who will not be joining the protest because they support the presidency of Morsy. What is at stake here, according to Said, is not issues of politics or the economy, but issues of identity and culture; what is under aggression and threat here is nothing but Egypt itself, a clear affirmation that the opponents are un-Egyptian. The overwording of “Egypt” and “Egyptian people”, and the rewording of the different elements of culture that are under attack stresses further the attempts of de-Egyptianizing the Muslim Brotherhood.

1A group of Egyptian artists had occupied the Ministry of Culture headquarters in June 2013 to protest the removal of cultural leaders by the then newly-appointed minister Alaa Abdel Aziz. Abdel Aziz was seen by the protesters as being planted to destroy the cultural life of Egypt to serve a Muslim Brotherhood agenda.
The antonymy between expressions like “freedom of opinion”, “freedom of belief”, “theatre”, “heritage”, “literature” as values associated with the “Egyptian people” on the one hand and “lynch”, “kafir”, “sectarianism”, “hatred”, “killing”, “violence” and “division” as characteristics of the non-Egyptian Other is designed to show the incompatibility of the first set of terms with the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. This strategy was used to dichotomize the unfolding political crisis, and divide the nation into “us” and “them”.

Al-Hadidi also makes primordialist and perennialist references reminiscent to the writings of early nationalist thinkers that will be described in Chapter 5 to Egypt as an ancient entity that was united by King Menes, which is, according to her, a unity that stood the test of time and is protected by God and cannot be divided by Morsy.

We will not accept division, because the country that was united by Menes, is not going to be divided by Morsy; it will not be divided by Khairat⁴ and will not be divided by Badie⁵. This country will stay unified because God protects it. Because this is the country of prophets. It is the country of Moses, Jesus, and Mohamed (Huna al-Aasema, 30/6/2013).

Here al-Hadidi is using the antonymy “united” and “divided” to create contrast and polarization between the Muslim Brotherhood rule and the primordial unity that is divinely protected by God. Three days after the first mention of Menes as a uniter of Egypt, which has remained united since, al-Hadidi made another remark about the indivisible nature of Egypt.

We are not Syria, we are not factions. We are a country that was united by Menes. When Menes united it, Morsy cannot break us. Morsy cannot divide us (Huna al-Aasema, 30/6/2013).

Al-Hadidi in this passage uses an inclusive “we”, which Fairclough (1989) described as a relational value of grammatical features, in saying “we will not accept division”, which includes both herself and the audience and any truly Egyptian citizen, which again de-Egyptianizes any supporter of Morsy’s presidency.

The dichotomization of the political crises was more bluntly and explicitly laid bare by al-

⁴Khairat al-Shater is a Muslim Brotherhood leader and businessman who was widely believed to be the most powerful member of the Islamist organization.
⁵Mohamed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time of June 30.
Hadidi’s guest Mahmoud Badr, the coordinator of Tamarud, the campaign that worked on collecting signatures for the overthrow of Morsy, and which decided the June 30 date for the anti-Morsy mass protests.

Tamarud has succeeded where Mohamed Morsy has failed, in that it divided the Egyptian people into two groups only: Egyptians and Muslim Brotherhood. You are either with the Egyptian people, and with the great Egyptian state with a 7000-year history, which will not die or end and no one including Morsy and Badie will be able to alter its identity, or you are with those who frankly will take the country a million years back. But in the end, I have great confidence in the Egyptian people, and I am optimistic and we know that Egypt will not become Afghanistan, Somalia or Omar al-Bashir or any of that kind of stuff (Huna al-Aassema, 24/6/2013).

Other than very clear dichotomization, this passage also stresses the perennial nature and continuity of the Egyptian state not just in relation to the past but also the future, when he says “the great Egyptian state with a 7000-year history, which will not die or end”. Furthermore, Egypt is portrayed here not just as having a stable identity, but also an identity that is immutable and eternal. This immutability of the Egyptian identity was expressed by al-Hadidi herself on several occasions such as in the following passage from the day Morsy was overthrown:

This is a civilian state. This is a civilian state. This is a civilian state. It won’t ever remove its skin. It won’t wear an Iranian costume. It won’t wear a Pakistani costume. It won’t wear anything but the Egyptian costume. We will walk wearing our own headscarves. If we want to wear gilbabs, we will wear our own—the fellahi jellabiya; the sa’eedi (upper Egyptian) jellabiya. [...] No one will alter our soil. No one will change us and tell us you are a different people, and you have a different anthem. We will keep singing the national anthem only (Huna al-Aassema 3/7/2013).

This passage is a continuation of the de-Egyptianization process by associating the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood with the preservation of the Egyptian identity. It also continues to demonstrate an identity of Egypt that is stable, primordial, pure, immutable and uncontaminatable. The usage of the words “soil” and “skin” which denote stability, rootedness and insusceptibility to change, and associating the concepts of “altering the soil” and “removing the skin” to issues that are

6“Civilian” or madaniya is often used in Egypt to mean “non-religious” rather than “non-military” because it is more generally acceptable than the Arabic term for “secular” which many Egyptians associate with being anti-religion.
more susceptible to change like dress and costumes, gives the message that replacing the Egyptian traditional costume with something else is as difficult a process as removing the skin that lies underneath this costume.

However, on the same episode and only a few minutes later, al-Hadidi admits that she lost faith in the immutability of the Egyptian identity after Morsy’s election and spoke about how she felt that Egypt was losing her identity after being captured by those whose Egyptianism is questionable.

Exactly a year ago, we were in this studio. I didn’t vote for Morsy but I accepted the result. It was a difficult day for me. It was a difficult day. Maybe this is the first time I tell this story. It really was a difficult day, not because Shafik lost. It was a difficult day because I felt my country was stolen. I felt like my life was stolen. I felt that my son would not live here [...] I felt that I too might not be able to live here. I felt that we will be forced to leave. I felt that I will not be able to help in building this country. I felt that the country was going to be a different place, and its identity will change, and will be stolen for the sake of other people. People I read a lot about. They are Egyptian, but they were brainwashed; a lot of their ideas were disfigured. They are Egyptian, but they think of Egypt as part of a caliphate. Not a home. A part of a big organization that is not ours. We learnt to say biladi biladi, we didn’t learn to say nashid al-jihad, or any other nashid° (Huna al-Aassema 3/7/2013).

Eissa also engages quite bluntly in a process of de-Egyptianization by distinguishing between being Egyptian and belonging to the Ikhwan⁹ (Brotherhood). After Morsy’s last speech to the nation four days before the June 30 protests and a week before his overthrow, Eissa wondered whether this speech could “touch the hearts of Egyptians”. “Is it possible that this speech can touch something in the heart of Egyptians? Of course the hearts of the Ikhwan is a different matter” (Huna al-Qahira, 26/6/2013).

Eissa does not just stop there. He goes on to proclaim that the Brotherhood are not Egyptian and therefore it does not count if they were touched by the speech. Eissa while predicting the content of Morsy’s last speech, compared the Muslim Brotherhood to the Kharijites, an early Muslim group who are believed to have assassinated the fourth caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib for agreeing to arbitration in his power struggle with Muwaiyah I. The word “kharijites” is derived from the Arabic word kharaja meaning “to leave” or “to exit” denoting that they have left their community and have

° The title of Egypt’s national anthem meaning “my homeland, my homeland”.
° Islamic hymn but could also mean a national anthem.
⁹ Arabic for “brothers”, referring to the Muslim Brotherhood.
become alien to it. The group is highly vilified by most Muslim scholars and the contemporary use of term denotes a group that has left and betrayed its community and declared war against it.

Eissa also ruled out the possibility of a civil war breaking out also by means of de-Egyptianizing the Muslim Brotherhood. He argues that a civil war only happens between equals, and when a nation is evenly divided. He described the mass June 30 protests as “the entire Egyptian people against you (the Brotherhood)”.

Didn’t Mubarak say “it’s either me or chaos?”. Tomorrow, Mohamed Morsy will tell us: “it’s either me or the civil war. Me or the civil war!” You ask yourself, what civil war? [...] You’re a bunch of terrorists. Are terrorists capable of making a civil war? Civil war happens when a nation is divided, when factions are divided, when there is a defected army. When you have things like that […] When you have different races and ethnicities. But this is the entire Egyptian people, against you (Huna al-Qahira, 25/6/2013).

In the previous passage, Eissa uses the word “entire” instead of “most” to denote that any and every Egyptian can only be opposing the Brotherhood, and therefore the Brotherhood cannot be part of the “Egyptian people”. He refuses to think of the political conflict as a nation divided, because that would be implying that the Brotherhood are a significant part of the Egyptian nation, and that conflict with its opposition would be considered division of the nation. Eissa goes on in the same episode to make his point even more clear:

We are the Egyptians and you are the proponents of the international caliphate. We are the proponents of Wataniya10. The conflict by the way is a conflict of thought more than it is a conflict about anything else. For some people it is “Egypt, first, second, third and fourth”, and for some people “the caliphate and the world” comes first (Huna al-Qahira 25/6/2013).

Kharsa also emphasized this difference in size stressing the fact that the Brotherhood and their supporters are a minority, and therefore deviant and do not represent the true spirit of the nation.

The people of Raba’a al-Adawiya, with of course all respect to their opinions and their support of Dr. Morsy, went on the stages to say that they are four times the number of those in Tahrir. It

10A term used to denote Egyptian nationalism as opposed to Arab-nationalism or other forms of pan-nationalisms which uses the term “qawmiya”.
seems that they did not see all the governorates of Egypt, that they did not go to Itihadiya. The did not see in the other governorates and all of Egypt’s squares the numbers there (Studio al-Balad, 30/6/2013).

In the following passage, Kharsa gives her instruction to protesters urging them to put their differences aside and just express their love for Egypt.

“When you are in the protest, don’t say what your affiliation is, don’t say which movement you belong to, just say that you love Egypt, and that you will make a sacrifice for Egypt. You will stand by anyone, and walk next to anyone who loves Egypt. Don’t ask the person next to you: “who are you?”; don’t look to what they’re wearing; don’t try to know whether they are kanaba, or filool, or revolutionaries, or Tahrir. Don’t try to know their affiliations. Ask him simply: “do you love Egypt?”, and God willing, Egypt will return to the Egyptians (al-Balad al-Youm, 24/6/2013).

A recurrent theme that serves the same goal of de-Egyptianizing the Muslim Brotherhood as a political group is to portray them using different discourse techniques in a manner akin to colonizers or occupiers.

No one can assault you, Egypt. Not the French, nor the English, nor the Hyksos; not any invasion; not the Israelis; not anyone; and not the Brotherhood. But the Brotherhood are our brothers, and will remain our brothers. No one can assault you Egypt, no one can rape you, ya bahiya (Huna al-Aassema, 3/7/2013).

Here it is clear that al-Hadidi is trying to liken the rule of the Brotherhood to colonization before she retracts by calling the Brotherhood “our brothers”.

We will not be enslaved after today. We will not be ruled by a group and an international organization. This is the Egyptian people saying their word (Huna al-

11 The presidential palace area where large anti-Morsy protests took place

12Hizb al-kanaba (couch party): a derogatory term popularized after the January 2011 revolution referring to those who have not participated in any revolutionary events, and preferred instead watching them from the comfort of their couch.

13Meaning someone who is supportive of the revolution

14A nickname for Egypt, which is also a woman’s name meaning “glorious” or “illuminated”
The expression, “we will not be enslaved after today” is a famous quote purportedly said by Urabi to Khedive Tawfiq during his revolt against European and Ottoman privileges in Egypt. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is an international organization was often stressed to prove that their loyalty cannot be to Egypt because the way they function as an international group is inherently transnational.

On the day of the overthrow of Morsy on July 3, 2013, Kharsa also makes the colonizer’s analogy. Known for her animosity towards the January 25 revolution, she explains that June 30 is a continuation of the 1919 revolution against British occupation. She also uses the theme of national unity in defiance against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The June revolution is a continuation of 1919 revolution. The revolution of the crescent and the cross. The revolution of the youth and the elderly. A revolution that was against a colonizer, even if they spoke in the name of religion. A revolution where the army accepted the challenge and have outdone themselves. It challenged Mr Obama and the White House’s plan to destroy Egypt. Who did this were the heroes of the Egyptian army (Studio al-Balad, 3/7/2013).

Back then, there was still a strong debate whether the overthrow of Morsy should be described as a military coup or a revolution. Proponents of the overthrow tended to defend the idea that this was a revolution, whereas the opponents were keen on describing it as a *coup d’etat* (Fisher, 2013). The overwording of “revolution” where it is uttered five times in this short passage shows the need to stress and emphasize the fact that it was not a coup d’etat, despite in the end paying homage to the role of the armed forces.

2.4 Anti-Americanism

The same way the June 30 Egyptocentric discourse differed from the 1970s Egyptocentric discourse in the fact that it was void of anti-Arab references, the June 30 discourse was notably anti-American, unlike the 1970s discourse which was pro-American and very anti-Soviet in the spirit of the bipolar world order of the time; this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, where the anti-Soviet Sadatist discourse will be discussed and analyzed. The US received the lion’s share of attacks by the media presenters as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. This antagonism towards the US might
be likened to the receding role of the US in favour of the Gulf Arab states as more important key political and economic players, whose interventions can prove more decisive. It is worth noting that this antagonism was also particular to the Obama administration which was seen as sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, and during the term of US ambassador to Cairo Anne Paterson, who was also seen as an ardent supporter of the Brotherhood.

The following passage for example was voiced on the episode of 24/6/2013 on the day a group of Shi’a Muslim were publicly killed in a village in the outskirts of Giza in a mob attack by the Sunni Muslim resident of the Zawiyat Abu Musallam village. Lamis al-Hadidi blamed the incident on the sectarian rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood, and blamed President Morsy himself for sponsoring such hate speech. She accused the Brotherhood of only denouncing the violent attack after receiving orders from Paterson, whom she calls “the American High Commissioner”, making an analogy to the British High Commissioner who was the effective ruler of Egypt when it was under British occupation.

Today Anne Paterson released a statement denouncing the killing of the Shi’as. You know the ambassador, is the British high commissioner, or the American high commissioner, whom this regime bows to, and uses it to protect itself. The high commissioner said—the lady said, “that this is foul play you children”, “it is inappropriate” and “shameful” (Huna al-Aassema, 24/6/2013).

Al-Hadidi used a tone as if Paterson was addressing children who had misbehaved. The message she was trying to relay by using this metaphor is the level of intimacy the US ambassador has with the Muslim Brotherhood regime, but the language of this motherly rebuking of a child, and the use of Arabic terms of the words “shameful” and “inappropriate” while changing her tone to imitate a mother rebuking her children, is used to show that there is a very high degree of intimacy but not an equal one, and that there is a clear authority mixed with love like that between a mother and her children.

In a separate incident on her show six days later on June 30, al-Hadidi made another mother metaphor, but this time the mother was not Anne Paterson but was Egypt itself, as Egypt has traditionally been portrayed as a woman and a mother (Baron, 2007). In Al-Hadidi’s metaphor Egypt was a mother under attack and therefore afraid, but Al-Hadidi was reassuring her because her children in the demonstration are out to defend her. In the previous passage the mother of the Muslim Brotherhood was American and the Brotherhood were portrayed as misbehaving children.
who were rebuked by their American mother, whereas the mother of the opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood is Egypt itself and the opposition are portrayed as loyal courageous children.

Don’t be afraid, Egypt, as long as your children are there in the streets. Don’t be afraid, Egypt, as long as there are men and women covering your back, and women, and women who are worth a million man. The louder voice today in Tahrir was the voice of women, singing all the nationalistic songs that we all know by heart and were brought up listening to. Do you know why? Because “the women of these country are men”\textsuperscript{15}; they don’t hide at homes; no one can hide them behind curtains, or a \textit{khimar}, a \textit{hijab}, or behind anything. Veiled women take to the streets; face-veiled women take to the streets; non-veiled women take to the streets. Your women, are like men, Egypt. Those are the ones who stood in the lines, and those are the ones who took to the streets. Why are you afraid? Don’t you be afraid as long as those are in the streets; as long as they have faith in you; as long as they still memorize your poems, the poems of al-Abnudi\textsuperscript{16}, as long as they are still singing the songs of Mounir\textsuperscript{17}, and as long as they recite all the art and culture that we grow up with. Why are you afraid? Don’t you be afraid? (Huna al-Aassem, 30/6/2013).

In Kharsa’s show, the term “American High Commissioner” was also used to make the analogy between American influence and British colonization when interviewing Hossam Khairallah, a former military and intelligence officer, on the same evening al-Hadidi made the analogy less than a week before the planned protests.

\textit{Khairallah:} It is not acceptable that the United States, the American High Commissioner here, imposes a condition on us. We are the decision makers. We will make our decision and after that they will have to agree with us; we are rational […] our politics is moderate. We take into consideration the interests of the great powers (Studio al-Balad, 24/6/2013).

Role Kharsa then went on to ask Hossam Khairallah why does Anne Patterson support the Muslim Brotherhood like she did in Pakistan and Afghanistan\textsuperscript{18} and everywhere she goes. To this question, Khairallah responded:

This shows that she does not understand the Egyptian people. We are very different from

\textsuperscript{15}A misogynistic Egyptian expression describing courageous women by equating them to men.
\textsuperscript{16}A popular nationalist Egyptian poet from the south of Egypt.
\textsuperscript{17}A popular Egyptian singer from Nubia.
\textsuperscript{18}She was the US ambassador to Pakistan before Egypt.
Pakistan […] Even within the Pakistani intelligence there is an extremist current and they were
the ones supporting Taliban, and there is a part of Taliban inside Pakistan. As for us, neither
the nature of the people, nor its culture or civilization is similar to that. We are very different.
So unfortunately, she brought a very wrong measuring tool which shows that she doesn’t
understand the Egyptian people (Studio al-Balad, 24/6/2013).

Abdel-Halim Kandil, the prominent Nasserist journalist, also mentioned Paterson, while he was
hosted by Eissa on June 26 right after Morsy’s last public speech as president, accusing the
Brotherhood of making the same policy choices as Mubarak’s regime including warming up to the
United States.

The choices of the Mubarak clan is the same as the Brotherhood’s, which are: loyalty to the
Americans; protecting the security of Israel; crony capitalism […] Here, notice that the speech
lacks any mention of the United States or Israel; they are not conspiring against the revolution
as if this is the White House and Anne Paterson’s revolution (Huna al-Qahira 26/6/2017).

Eissa also oscillates from accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of prioritizing pan-Islamism over
Egyptianism, to accusing them of being American agents. Eissa enthusiastically argued that the June
30 events and their repercussions were not just a victory over the Muslim Brotherhood, but he
described them as an “independence day” and a victory over America itself, making use again of the
colonizer’s analogy.

Today is the day of independence. We didn’t just triumph over extremism and bigotry. We
didn’t just triumph over snobbery, exclusion, arrogance, stubbornness, blindness, dullness
and tediousness. No, we triumphed over America. Today is a victory over America (Huna al-
Qahira 27/7/2013).

2.5 Heavy use of Islam
Over a quarter of all identity references across the three shows used to deligitimize the Brotherhood
were references to Islamic belief and moral conduct. Other than questioning the Egyptianism of the
Islamist group as discussed earlier in the chapter, their understanding of “true Islam” was also
questioned. It was clear at times that the hosts and their guests wanted to demonstrate that their
rejection of the Brotherhood rule does not equal a wholesale rejection of Islam. For example, Al-
Hadidi was keen to say that even if the media she works for is against the Brotherhood, that does not mean it is against Islam.

This is the time of construction, and not destruction. Please understand us. This media is not against religion. This media is not against Islam. On the contrary, the banner of Islam rises with an advanced country, a modern country, a civilized country. This is how to raise the banner of Islam (Huna al-Assema, 1/7/2013).

Eissa heavily used Islam as an entry point to Egyptian nationalism, making a rough distinction between an Egyptian civilized version of Islam and between a Bedouin backward Islam supported by Islamist groups including the Muslim Brotherhood. This version of Islam, in Eissa’s opinion is imported, outlandish and foreign to Egyptian culture, and he argues instead that the Egyptian—but also the correct—version of Islam is more civilized and tolerant.

Today also Islam has triumphed. Islam has triumphed, and Christianity has triumphed against extremism and bigotry. Today was a victory for the real understanding of Islam: the enlightened, the open-minded, and the tolerant over coarseness, boorishness, and grimness and excess. Today, the believers won against the tedious. Today, the Egyptian Islam won against the foreign imported image from the desert and the *fiqh* (jurisprudence) of nomadism (Huna al-Qahira, 3/7/2013).

This expression is also a clear process of uneven dichotomization, dividing Egyptians into true Egyptians who are pious yet tolerant, open-minded and enlightened, and who according to Eissa set the norm. The other group is deviant because it is “foreign”, “imported”, “deviant”, “extreme” and “bigoted”. Excessively using the war metaphor of “triumph” and “victory” is designed to imply that the other is not only different or foreign, but is also an enemy. Moreover, the concept of dullness that was expressed using several near-synonyms such as “coarseness”, “boorishness”, “grimness”, and “tedious” could be an indicator of what qualities he wants to attribute to the other side of the equation. This set of words also corresponds with an opposite set of words such as “enlightened”, “open-minded” and “tolerant” in an act of antonymy to entrench this dichotomy and express a certain irreconcilability of these “opposites”.

We need our understanding of religion to be corrected. We need our Egyptian Islam to
prevail, that is, the Egyptian understanding of Islam. The understanding of the great Egyptian Imam, al-layth ibn saad. The understanding of al-Imam al-Shafei, who when arrived to Egypt, changed his fiqh completely. The understanding of al-imam Muhammed Abduh of Islam. Even the Qur’an and its recitation, the Egyptian recitation (Huna al-Qahira 3/7/2013).

Here Eissa stresses the primacy of Egyptianism over Islam. However, he does not reject Islam, but emphasizes the importance of having it Egyptianized. He also thinks the Egyptianization of Islam is an old phenomenon going back to al-Imam al-Shafei, the founder of one of the four main schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and one of four great imams who lived in the 8th century AD. According to Eissa, al-Shafei changed his fiqh when he arrived to Egypt and made it more enlightened. He also refers to the 19th century Egyptian reformist Muhammed Abduh who believed that the values of enlightenment and modernity are compatible with Islam.

Eissa contrasts this primacy of Egyptianism over Islam, or a unique Egyptian Islam being a key component of Egyptianism, with the Brotherhood’s pan-Islamic project in which Egypt is merely a component of a large entity, that is the wider Islamic world.

Do you know that when Hassan al-Banna thought of establishing this group [the Muslim Brotherhood], he was thinking of one of two countries: Egypt or Yemen. The topic of nationalism and Egyptianism is not at all of their concern (Huna al-Qahira 27/7/2013).

It is important to note here that Al-Qahira wal Nas took it upon itself to advocate for a liberal reading of Islam through several shows including that of Ibrahim Eissa. Ibrahim Eissa was a huge critic of Wahhabism and what he coins “the fiqh of nomadism” even if he would not mention Saudi Arabia by name in most cases. He likened the Muslim Brotherhood interpretation of Islam to Wahhabism and what he described as the fiqh of desert and nomadism. Moreover, in 2016, during the process of the transfer of the two strategic red sea islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, which many regarded as the Sisi regime selling the islands to Saudi Arabia in exchange for economic and political favours, Eissa was a fierce critic of such transfer. This has put Eissa and his channel under immense pressure and many believe that it led to the suspension of his show in December 2016 on the day he was supposed to host prominent opposition lawyer Khaled Ali, who led a legal battle against the transfer of the islands and won it to the vexation of both the Egyptian and the Saudi governments (Mada Masr, 2017).
In an interview with the daily *al-Masry al-Youm* in January 2017, Eissa was asked by the interviewer about his view on what has been said about his continuous attack on Saudi Arabia and its positions in the Arab region and his criticism of the transfer of the two Red Sea islands as the reason behind the suspension of his show. Eissa responded by saying that many parties are requesting the “blood of his thinking”. As for Saudi Arabia, he said he was committed to being against Wahhabism, and that the politics of Riyadh is a catastrophe for the Arabs and for Islam in general and that “[Saudi Arabia] is fully responsible for the blood of millions killed in civil wars across the Arab world now” (Ramzi, 2017).

In a separate interview in May 2017 in al-Masry al-Youm, Tarek Nour admitted that Eissa had gone overboard and that he was subject to pressure.

I felt that they were “upset”, but not from me but from Ibrahim Eissa, although Ibrahim Eissa is certain that President Abdelfattah al-Sisi is one of the most pure, honourable and noble men of Egypt, and that no rational Egyptian who has not been polluted with the ideologies of backwardness, terrorist alliances, objecting everything and ignorance will ever doubt these characteristics. I think he agrees with the goal, but he objects to the method. Ibrahim Eissa saw that it is better to leave because he harmed [al-Qahira wal Nas], and harmed me personally because an overdose of criticism might kill the patient, and Egypt after what happened to it and after what we’ve done to it is in the ICU now (Badawi, 2017).

Another fierce critic of Wahhabism appearing on the screen of al-Qahira wal Nas was Islam al-Behery who also advocates for a liberal reading of Islam away from the strict teachings of Ibn Taimiyyah and Muahmmad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Word was also circulating that Saudi Arabia was disquieted by al-Behery's show. The programme was first suspended in April 2015, and al-Behery then cited “disagreements with the channel” without giving details about the nature of such disagreements (Al-Masry al-Youm, 2015). Al-Behery was later sentenced to one year in prison on charges of contempt of religion before being pardoned by a presidential decree short before his sentence was over (El-Sheikh, 2016). In a press interview after the suspension of his programme and before he was jailed in June 2015, al-Behery said that the disagreement with Nour began when his show started being censored without his knowledge. When he spoke with Nour about this, Nour had told him to just deliver the episodes, and then Nour “will then see what do with them”. Al-Behery then said that these omissions were due to pressure from security agencies (Ramzi, 2015).
2.6 Non-identity assaults: Economic failings and business rivalry

The Muslim Brotherhood was also dismissed in the studio of Huna al-Aassema on grounds that are not only and always identitarian. When this was the case, most non-identity references were linked to economic failings or business rivalry. This is of particular significance given the dominance of nonmarket and state-sponsored models of accumulation as will be detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Al-Hadidi thinks the rivalry between different classes of businessmen is behind this economic crisis.

There is about a 1 percent increase in unemployed people during his [Morsy’s] year [as president]. This 1 percent is millions of Egyptians who became unemployed. And why is that? Because a lot of factories have closed down for the lack of fuel, land; and because of shaken hands, and threatening the industries because there is a new class of businessmen replacing another class of businessmen (Huna al-Aassema, 25/6/2013).

Al-Hadidi in this passage refers to the businessmen of the Muslim Brotherhood as a “new class of businessmen” that is trying to push aside a more established class of businessmen and take its place. She speaks about factories closing down in the passive without stating a clear agent, but it clearly implies—given the context—that this was more of a Brotherhood strategy to weaken the established business elite in order to be able to take its place.

Al-Hadidi was also not shying away from mentioning the owner of the channel Mohamed al-Amin on a few occasions and even receiving phone calls from him. Mohamed al-Amin was mentioned by name in Morsy’s last speech addressing the nation four days before the June 30 planned protests. Morsy then implied that al-Amin is waging a media war against him because of tax issues, a case which will be covered in Chapter 3. Al-Hadidi responded to this allegation a few days later by accusing Morsy of delusion to think that the masses who took on the streets are the workings of a Mubarakist businessmen conspiracy.

Those are not 37 thousand. Those are not a conspiracy. CBC is not a conspiracy. Mohamed al-Amin is not a conspirator. I am not a conspirator (Huna al-Aassema, 30/6/2013).

This is not the only incident where Al-Hadidi directly mention the owner of the network and

19Referring to the June 30 protesters.
20An estimation of the number of anti-MB protesters allegedly made by someone associated with the Muslim Brotherhood
her employer:

Thank you Nasser Amin who called on the residents of Helwan\(^{21}\) to take on the streets to defend Helwan after what he described as a barbaric attack from the pro-Morsy forces and he said that these are crimes against humanity. But you must stand your ground. This is not going to intimidate us, folks. This is what they want. This is their way. This is the path they choose. You are not going to intimidate us. Put my home address, what can I do? What can I do now? What will Mohamed al-Amin do? We are not doing anything. We are just doing our work and duty (Huna al-Aassema, 2/7/2013).

It is worth noting the use of the pronoun “we” in “We are not doing anything. We are just doing our work and duty” for grouping herself with al-Amin. This passage is what Fairclough (1989) calls an exclusive “we” as it includes the speaker/writer and another person but excludes the audience, as opposed to an inclusive “we” which includes the speaker/writer and the audience. Here she is excluding everyone except herself and al-Amin in what she perceives as an act of defiance. This comes in great contrast to the earlier use of “us” and “folks” in the inclusive “they are not going to intimidate us”. This use of the pronouns aims at creating a dichotomy of us against them, and presenting the “us” as a large group and “they” as a deviant minority group. The use of “you” in “you must stand your ground” serves the same purpose of this uneven dichotomization, assuming that anyone who is listening or watching is more likely to be in opposition to the Brotherhood, rather than supporting them or even being neutral or indifferent. Here, al-Amin himself speaks to al-Hadidi:

Mrs. Lamis\(^{22}\), I would like to tell you something. No matter what they do, they will not intimidate us. They want to burn our houses, let them do it. They want to kill us, let them do it. Our blood will never be more valuable than the blood of any young man around. Mohamed Morsy’s gang, Mrs. Lamis […] I tell him, if the blood that runs in your veins is Egyptian blood, have mercy on the Egyptian people for the love of God (x3) All what they do, Mrs. Lamis is not going to intimidate anyone. Whatever they do, the gang around him will end up, and I will remind you, in prison for the crimes they are committing now. I want in this occasion to send some very important messages. An important message to the great people of

\(^{21}\)A neighbourhood in South Cairo.

\(^{22}\)“Mrs.” here is a translation of the Egyptian title “ustaza” which is similar to the use of “Mrs.” or “Madam” in English; it is commonplace in Egypt to use a title such as Mr. or Mrs. with a first name

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Egypt, to the youth of Egypt, to the heroes of Egypt, to the girls of Egypt, and when I say youth and girls of Egypt, I mean every Egyptian citizen regardless of their religion, regardless of their political affiliation, stand your ground. You are right, and God almighty will make what is right prevail. We need you for a few more days. The issue is not over ya shabab. Continue with your defiance. Be on the ground. I am talking to you, Mrs. Lamis while being among the young people on the ground. I am not afraid of Mohamed Morsy or his gang. […]

The second message is to the brave Armed Forces soldiers, who are loyal to their homeland. Those are the soldiers of Ahmed Urabi; those are the soldiers of Abdel Nasser; those are the soldiers who liberated Sinai; those are the soldiers of Anwar al-Sadat (Mohamed al-Amin on Huna al-Aassema, 2/7/2013).

This passage spoken by Mohamed al-Amin uses a techniques of inclusion. Al-Amin directs his speech to “the young men and girls regardless of their religion, political affiliation”, and he talks about “every Egyptian citizen” needing to stand their ground against “Mohamed Morsy’s gang” who he clearly does not consider as part of the Egyptian citizenry. It is also crucial to notice his mentioning of both Nasser and al-Sadat as a method of inclusion and consensus-building, and to keep with his emphasis on not wanting to alienate any Egyptian citizen. Most importantly, this phone call demonstrates that al-Amin endorses the views and opinions of the show and its host, especially that he spent a long time praising al-Hadidi and describing here as a heroine.

2.7 Findings and conclusion

As we have seen throughout the chapter, there was a very heavy use of identity discourse across the three programmes in the build up to and straight after the June 30 protests and the overthrow of Morsy on July 3 to delegitimize the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Out of the times the Brotherhood was dismissed on a nationalist basis across the three shows, in 72.2 percent of them they were dismissed as un-Egyptian, in 27.8 percent they were dismissed as un-Muslim, and not a single time they were dismissed as un-Arab. In terms of countries or organizations the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of collaborating with or being supported by, the US was named 43.1 percent of the times, and Hamas comes as a distant second with 21.57 percent of all mentions. Israel came close after Hamas with 19.61 percent, Qatar with 13.7 percent and Hezbollah with nearly 2 percent.

23An expression literally meaning “youths”, but is mostly used informally to mean something similar to “folks” especially to a young group of people.
Topping identity related references that were used to delegitimize the Brotherhood was sectarianism at about 34.2 percent. Part of the reason this topped the list was also the coverage of the Shia massacre that took place just a week before the June 30 protests. However, perhaps less expected was the use of Islamic belief and moral conduct to delegitimize the Brotherhood rule at 26.3 percent. Following Islam in the third place with about 18 percent of all mentions, was mentions of ancient Egyptian civilization, and in the fourth place was mentions of modern Egyptian culture at 15.8 percent. If we combine the two as Egyptocentric indicators, then they would top the list as the most employed identity discourse aiming at attacking the Brotherhood. References of pan-Arabism bottoms the list with only 5.26 percent. This trend is somehow similar to the indicator on which nationalist basis was the Brotherhood dismissed, where in about three quarters of the cases they were dismissed for being un-Egyptian.

This chapter showed how the US was the foreign power that was most consistently attacked throughout the three shows. This anti-Americanism and portraying the US as colonizers with the Muslim Brotherhood as their local agents contradicts the Sadatist open-policy discourse, which worked on aligning Egypt with the Western world and directed all its antagonism in the 1970s towards communism, socialism and the Eastern Bloc as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Eissa’s employer Tarek Nour named his first advertising agency—which was established as a first private advertising agency in the late 1970s as a result of the open-door policy—Americana, and Nour himself had studied and started his career in the US, as I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4.

As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the adoption of an aggressive Egyptocentric discourse was the result of the collective Arab boycott against Egypt as a result of a US-brokered peace with Israel. After liberalizing its economy and expelling the Soviet experts, the regime also wanted to distance itself as much as possible from Nasserist Arab nationalism. This happened by allowing a greater role of religion in politics to fight socialist ideas, and allying with the West and the US. When all the Arab states turned its back on Egypt, the US emerged as the regime’s major and indispensable ally.

Furthermore, the complete absence of anti-Arabist Sadatist sentiments is also a major diversion that could at least be partially explained by the increased dependence of the infitah businessmen on support from the Arab Gulf countries. Despite these diversions from a Sadatist discourse, some similarities remain, including the heavy use of Islam which goes in line with the Islamization of society initiated by Sadat. Moreover, the Egyptocentrism—even if less anti-Arab compared to the Sadatist version—was still very present and perhaps the dominant sentiment. This inward-looking
approach to nationalism was very much in line with the policy of oil-rich Gulf monarchies who were anxious about a pan-Arabism that was driving Egypt to take a more outward-looking approach to its nationalism by trying to influence change in its surrounding countries. The Gulf monarchies finally had the double convenience of having this inward-looking Egypt but without positioning itself against Arabic culture, but on the contrary, a position that is full of praise of the Gulf Arab states with a hint of conservative and reactionary Arabism.

Positioning themselves against a religious organization and political groups, two of our three critics heavily used Islam in perhaps attempt of beating the Brotherhood at their own game. Most of these incidents revolved around the Brotherhood adopting a wrong version/understanding of Islam, and using Islam only for their own political benefits. Even when Egyptianism was employed, Islam was still heavily used to make a distinction between an Egyptian form of Islam and other forms.

The specifications of this Egyptian form of Islam was mostly vague except from some ideas about dress and a vague conception of moderation and tolerance. Even when Islam was used, it was used to dismiss the Brotherhood as un-Egyptian more than to dismiss them as un-Muslim.

The fault of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political religious group that support them, according to Eissa, is that they were trying to Islamize Egypt rather than Egyptianize Islam. This is particularly a defining characteristic of Egyptian nationalism that has mostly been friendly to Islam but still rejects the transnational political Islam project and defines it as akin to colonialism.

When it comes to Arabism, across the three programmes there was almost no mention at all of pan-Arabist values, of ideals of Arab nationalism. In both al-Hadidi and Kharsa’s programmes, there was no mention of ideals of Arab nationalism, but there was also no criticism of Arabism and often there was a positive acknowledgment of the role of other Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in supporting the anti-Brotherhood movement. Only Eissa has shown some antagonism towards an Arabian version of Islam that he describes as backward, desertic, anti-modern and extreme.

The Egyptianism of the Brotherhood was aggressively and consistently contested and denied throughout the three shows. They were mostly portrayed as colonizers, cultural aliens, and deviant. What is interesting is that this exclusion and production of the Other was not based on a pure and rigid idea of the self, but rather on a degree of appreciation of diversity: a diversity that stops short of including the Brotherhood. Al-Hadidi and Kharsa were especially emphasizing—and to a certain degree celebrating—the diverse nature of the opposition, who were united in their rejection of the Brotherhood rule.
It was always emphasized that Egyptians are eager to join the protest movement regardless of their age, political affiliation, geographical areas, region, gender, religion, social class, etc. This is also clear with giving platforms to guests from different backgrounds, including Nasserists and socialists. This was particularly true in Ibrahim Eissa’s show where he hosted the leader of the leftist Socialist Alliance party Aboulezz al-Hariri, the general secretary of the centre-left Egyptian Social Democratic Party Ahmed Fawzy, and the Arab nationalist journalist and writer Abdel Halim Qandil. Aboulezz al-Hariri even spoke critically of the open-door policies adopted by Sadat.

The general nationalistic sentiments expressed across the three shows generally go in line with a territorial Egyptianism that was championed by Sadat. However, due to the dwindling role of Egypt as a regional leader and the immense support that the Brotherhood opposition received from the increasingly powerful oil-rich Gulf states, this strong Egyptocentric and ultra-nationalist wave did not position itself vis-a-vis the Arab states as was the case in the late 1970s or against European/Ottoman influence in the last part of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Instead, it adopted a very delicate position stressing Egyptianism against an Islamist group but without upsetting its Arab supporters that also embrace Islamic rule, especially Saudi Arabia.

Other than Egyptocentrism, the use of Islamic moral codes across the three programmes was reminiscent of the widespread use of Islamic morality that was prevalent during the 1970s transition from Arab nationalism to Egyptocentrism to discredit the political left as disbelievers and enemies of Islam, when Sadat coined himself alra’ees almo’men (the believer president) as will be explained in chapter 6.

Hamas also got its fair share of accusations of collaborating with the Brotherhood to destabilize Egypt by carrying out works of vandalism and helping the Brotherhood leaders, including Morsy, escape jail during the January 25 by breaking into the prison complex in which they were detained. A general anti-Palestinian, and a particular anti-Hamas sentiment, is typical of an Egyptianist discourse since the Palestinian cause has always acted as the single most important rallying cause of Arab nationalism, and also due to Sadat’s description as a traitor by pro-Palestinians for single-handedly signing a peace treaty with Israel. A vast majority of the Hamas criticism came from al-Hadidy’s show. However, the other two programmes did also mention Hamas negatively and associated them with the Brotherhood’s project. Israel, the usual suspect, was not far behind Hamas as an entity that was attacked as associated with the Muslim Brotherhood project. However, most of the mentions of Israel were uttered by Eissa and the least by al-Hadidi, the fiercest critic of Hamas.
Chapter 3

The meso-level analysis of the nationalist discourse of three private channels owned by infitah businessmen

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 comprises level two of the CDA and focuses on the level of discourse production. The chapter looks at the general landscape of broadcast media ownership, and the political and economic affiliations of those who dominate the media scene (party membership, business partnerships, etc.), their business interests. This focus distinguishes CDA from a normal discourse or conversation analysis because it goes beyond just analyzing the text that is the subject of study, into analyzing other texts that belong to the immediate wider context concerned with producing the text. The findings of this chapter will act as a prerequisite for understanding the general events and processes through which the nationalist media discourse that is the subject of the study came into being.

The chapter then focuses on the ownership of each of the three channels that were presented in Chapter 2, and describes the business interests and political affiliations of their owners. Whenever possible, an analysis of the owners’ own discourse will be conducted in a similar fashion to the micro-level analysis of Chapter 2. This is however conditioned to the availability of such discourse, and whether the owners of the channels have given public interviews or written articles on topics relevant to that of the study.

This chapter brings the research one step closer to answering the first part of the research question about the function ultra-nationalist and nationalist rhetoric served in promoting the economic interests of the propagators of such discourse; it does so by explaining how their model of accumulation was rent-based and state-dependent which made it easy to keep most of the economic privileges to this small group of select businessmen, and how this model of accumulation might have contributed to the adoption of the discourse discussed in the previous chapter.

3.2 The private broadcasting landscape in Egypt before and after the 2011 revolution

In Egypt, broadcasting was for very long almost exclusively state-owned. Until the year 2000, broadcasting was under the control of the state monopoly Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) (Sakr, 2007, p. 22). The ERTU, according to the Media Broadcasting law of 1997, is the agency in charge of managing all the broadcasting affairs of Egypt (Mohammed & Gunter, 2013, p.
99). After opening up for privately-owned broadcasters to operate in the television industry alongside state-owned broadcasters, business leaders, especially those close to the political regime were the main beneficiaries of this opening. This was mostly due to the excessive—but also complex and unclear—regulations, difficult licensing procedure and the high cost of establishing a TV channel or network.

This opening has “coincided” with the rise of businessmen influence which culminated when six businessmen held ministerial positions corresponding with the fields of their business activity in the 2004 cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif which was also popularly known as the “businessmen cabinet” (Sakr, 2017, p. 28). For example, Ahmed Maghrabi, the Minister of Housing in this cabinet was a major shareholder in one of the largest real estate development companies in Egypt. The Minister of Trade and Industry Rashid Mohamed Rashid, was also one of the main industrialists in Egypt owning one the biggest food manufacturing companies in the Middle East (Diab, 2015).

The first businessmen to take advantage of this limited opening of the broadcasting market was Ahmed Bahgat when he established Dream TV in 2001. Bahgat is a businessman with investments that span a large number of sectors including real estate, electronics, household appliances, and now media. Hassan Rateb, a business tycoon and one of the funders of Mubarak’s 2005 election campaign, shortly followed to established al-Mehwar TV in 2001 (El-Issawi, 2014, p. 55). Despite this limited opening, the government still maintained a tight control over news broadcasting, did not provide licenses for news channels and retained an effective monopoly over news broadcasting (El-Issawi, 2014, p. 76). Some talk shows circumvented this monopoly by providing a round up of news that they give names like “the pulse of the street” or “the headlines of the country” as is the case in Rola Kharsa’s al-Balad al-Youm (The Country Today) programme presented in Chapter 2. In addition to the fact that private broadcasters are not allowed to broadcast news and to the excessive levels of governmental control, they can only distribute their signals via the Nile Sat satellite, which is largely controlled by the government (El-Issawi, 2014, p. 23).

The early days of private TV also saw licenses mainly extended to providers of non-political content such as music channels modeled after MTV but for Arabic music. One of the early players of private TV in Egypt was the grandson of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Gamal Marwan, who established a music channel called Melody, which led to a subsequent proliferation of music video channels which exceeded 50 channels in the Arab world by 2006. Melody’s main rival, Mazzika, was also indirectly owned in part by EFG-Hermes (Sakr, 2007, p. 122), which was found after the 2011 revolution to have strong links to the Mubarak sons Gamal and Alaa (Diab, 2016).
“Having nothing to do with politics, religion or news” was a precondition for getting a license for Good News Group to establish the first two private radio stations, as described by Amr Adib, a prominent TV personnel and the brother of the founder and president of Good News Group (Sakr, 2007, p. 30). Back to television, the governmental ERTU had a stake in the early private channels Dream and Mehwar. The ERTU also had a stake in the companies running the Media Production City. Furthermore, the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) also has the power of suspending TV licenses, which is a power it exercised many times including for political reasons. This emerging private broadcasting industry was also subject to the general restrictive laws on freedom of expression and even the more general restrictions of political freedoms which were employed to add another measure—in addition to restrictive licensing—to keep the new private TV in check (Sakr, 2007, p. 30).

The government sustained centralized control by employing the above-mentioned methods, but also through legally obliging satellite broadcasters to operate from Egypt’s only Media Production City (EMPC) in the outskirts of Egypt’s capital Cairo. The EMPC, according to Egypt’s investment law, is placed under the supervision of the GAFI. The governmental ERTU’s dominance was maintained to a significant degree by owning a 50 percent stake in the overall EMPC project; parts of the remaining stake were owned by state-owned banks and investment companies (Sakr, 2007, p. 195-196). Even when some political talk shows seemed to be mildly critical of the government, this excessive amount of regulations makes it difficult to believe that this was not within a margin of “freedom” allowed for by the government.

Another milestone in the development of the private broadcasting industry was when business tycoon Naguib Sawiris, then Egypt’s richest man, entered the private TV industry in early 2007. He founded OTV, a channel which he describes as a service "for young people, without religious or loud content" (Tryhorn, 2010). Sawiris was keen to present himself as an independent businessman by not accepting membership in the ruling National Democratic Party or any governmental position. A large portion of his business empire by this time was already outside of Egypt in a dozen countries including Iraq, Algeria, and the US, making him relatively immune to government pressure. In the press, Sawiris funded newspapers with a relatively independent and even at times oppositional tone such as the daily al-Masry al-Youm, but his TV investment in OTV remained largely non-political and focused almost exclusively on entertainment.

Al-Sayed al-Badawy, the president of al-Wafd party, also established al-Hayat TV network in 2003 (El-Issawi 2014, p. 56). Despite being the president of an “opposition” party, al-Wafd after its
re-establishment in the late 1970s has not posed any meaningful political challenge to the successive regimes, and was a symbol of the co-opted opposition under Mubarak, or what used to be referred to as ‘ahzab kartoniya (cardboard parties) by their critics to describe their impotency and staged nature.

3.2.1 After the Revolution
The broadcasting landscape changed both in quality and quantity after the 2011 revolution in a myriad of ways; first, the already-existing channels have become more politically oriented with an explosion of political talk shows covering—as well as trying to shape—the rapidly unfolding political developments of the post-revolutionary era (El-Issawi, 2012). Secondly, many new channels were established after the revolution including the three channels that are the subject of this research—CBC, al-Qahira wal Nas and Sada al-Balad—and which will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Other channels that were established after the revolution include al-Nahar, which is owned by advertising businessman Alaa al-Kahki, and the pro-revolution low-budget al-Tahrir channel which was partially owned by some of the journalists working in it including Ibrahim Eissa (Daily News Egypt, 2011).

A similar mechanism happened to the Islamic channels, which existed before the revolution in the form of televangelism by Salafist celebrity preachers, but most of them stayed away from politics up until the revolutionary period. In the aftermath of the revolution, the existing ones have become increasingly occupied with the unfolding political developments, and new ones were established as a result of the revolution (Dorpmueller, 2012). Examples of such Salafist channels that were established before 2011 but only got involved with politics after are al-Rahma (the mercy) (est. 2007), al-Nas (the people) and al-Hekma (the wisdom) (both established in 2006) (Shehata, 2012). This goes in harmony with the establishment of the first Salafist political party, al-Nour party, after the revolution by Salafist groups, namely al-Da’waa al-Salafiya (the Salafist Call), who were keen on remaining apolitical during the Mubarak years. Besides being able to establish their own political party, the Muslim Brotherhood was also able after the revolution to have its own media outlets including the TV channel Misr 25.

3.3 Capital Broadcasting Center and Mohamed al-Amin
Established in 2011, Cairo Broadcasting Center (CBC) has grown rapidly to become one of the most important private TV channels in Egypt hosting a range of celebrity TV personalities and popular
political talk shows, including the ultra-popular satirical show of the “Jon Stewart of Egypt” Bassem Youssef, which broke TV viewership records in Egypt at the time. CBC has decidedly taken a very oppositional anti-Brotherhood stance during most of the year Mohamed Morsy was in power between late June 2012 and early July 2013, but this oppositional tone has intensified during the later days of Morsy’s rule in the buildup to the June 30, 2013 protests (Douai & Moussa, 2016, p. 149).

The owner of CBC, Mohamed al-Amin, is also the president of the Media Industry Chamber, which part of the Egyptian Federation of Industries—a body that acts as a union for businessmen in various industries. Al-Amin in a 2014 interview with Ibrahim Eissa said that his strength derived from the fact that he had all his career as a businessman outside of Egypt, so no one could find—despite the many attempts—any wrongdoing committed by him like the other businessmen who were involved in corruption cases. Compared to other businessmen and media owners, Mohamed al-Amin was relatively unknown compared to other business tycoons like Naguib Sawiris, Ahmed Bahgat and Tarek Nour.

According to Al-Amin himself, he has built his wealth and business in Kuwait—where he lived for over three decades—in the infrastructure business before moving back to Egypt. Al-Amin said that profit seeking was never the goal of establishing CBC, and that it operates like a non-profit organization. He says that no TV channel makes profits in its early years and that it would be considered an achievement if a TV channel just breaks even after five years. He added that even if CBC starts making profits, it will be donated to charities, according to his agreement with the channel’s other minority shareholders (OnTV, 2014). Al-Amin said:

> From our own experience, anyone who claims that private channels could make a quick profit after a year or two, or even three, is delusional. If it breaks even after five years, it will be a wonderful thing […] It was never the goal to be profitable because from the start, this group had a charity subsidiary, and the agreement was that even if profits are generated by the group (which owns the channel), it will be redirected to the charity.\(^4\)

The goal of establishing CBC was political; al-Amin asserts that he wanted to establish a channel that will counter the discourse propagated by the Qatari pro-Brotherhood al-Jazeera channel, a discourse that he described as serving the “American plan to completely redraw the map of the

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4 Mohamed al-Amin on 25/30 show dated 20/8/2014 presented by Ibrahim Eissa.
Middle East”. The objective of this plan, according to al-Amin, is to serve American interests and consequently “remove the extremist and terrorist groups from the US and Europe, and place them in conflicts in the Middle East region.” (OnTV, 2014). This explains the heavy anti-American and anti-Qatari views that was presented in Chapter 2, especially that al-Amin asserted in the interview that there is no such thing as an objective channel, and that the presenters must be chosen according to the channel’s orientation.

Al-Amin asserted that this is not to suggest that the presenter has no agency in the process of media production, and that they simply follow the instructions of the media owners. He said that the media owner would not put themselves in a position where they need to regularly intervene by picking and selecting TV hosts with a shared view and political orientation. Al-Amin’s strategy is for owners to decide the framework of the channel and then have a hands-off approach with no direct editorial intervention (OnTV, 2014).

Al-Amin is also the main owner of al-Watan daily newspaper, but he believes that TV is a much more effective medium for influence and awareness raising because it is watched by millions whereas even the most widely circulated newspaper is only read by tens of thousands.

3.3.1 Economic clash with the Muslim Brotherhood

It is difficult to determine whether the economic war that emerged between the Brotherhood regime and al-Amin was the result or the cause of the political and ideological battle. In either case, it is clear that both were interlinked and used to serve each other. The Morsy regime seemed to try and harm the business interests of their critics in several ways including starting tax investigations of their business interests. This happened with one of the Sawiris family members, when he was asked in 2013 by the tax authorities to pay EGP 7 billion (about $1 billion at the time’s exchange rate) for making a profit on selling a cement factory in 2007 (Saleh, 2013).

There are many businessmen in Egypt who are very good, but some are determined to make a comeback. What is Mohamed al-Amin doing? [Applause] He has taxes to pay; he is a tax evader. Pay them (the taxes). You’re afraid? Pay. But instead he unleashes on us his channel. Ahmed Bahgat [Dream TV owner] owes money to the banks, more than EGP 3 billion. Pay or settle them. But instead he unleashes his channel on us. (Morsy’s speech on 26/06/2013 – misr25channel)
These tax investigations were triggered by Talaat Abdallah, the public prosecutor appointed by Morsy to replace the Mubarak era public prosecutor Abdelmeguid Mahmoud. The appointment of Abdallah by Morsy, which allowed for this kind of tax cases to gather steam, was seen as an encroachment from the executive authority over the judicial authority and granting the president dictatorial powers (Kirkpatrick & El-Sheikh, 2012). It triggered mass protests against Morsy, and ushered the country into a political crisis that led to the formation of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a broad-based political coalition that played a key role in overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood regime.

Only a few days before the June 30 protests amidst the heightened tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood regime and the opposition, al-Amin and his business partner Mansour Amer were accused of evading the payment of $60 million in taxes and banned from travel (Daily News Egypt, 2013). On July 9, less than two weeks after the tax charge and the travel ban, the newly restored Mubarak-era General Prosecutor Abdel-meguid Mahmoud dropped the charges and bans against both Amer and al-Amin.

In his 2014 interview with Eissa, al-Amin said that some of the harm that happened to Amer Group was because of CBC’s position during the rule of Mohamed Morsi (OnTV, 2014). Al-Amin did not specify in what manner exactly was Amer Group harmed by the CBC activity other than the travel ban and the tax evasion accusation that was brought against him and Amer. However, looking at the financial statements of Amer Group, it shows clearly that the company’s revenues in 2012 and 2013, the calendar years corresponding with Morsy’s year in power (June 2012-June 2013), were much less than the following years from 2014 until 2016 (see Table 1).
Table 1 Amer Group’s net profits, revenues and total assets between 2012 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net profits (EGP million)</th>
<th>Revenues (EGP million)</th>
<th>Total assets (EGP million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>155.6</td>
<td>1152.5</td>
<td>4955.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>877.7</td>
<td>6241.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2168.2</td>
<td>7510.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amer Group Financial Statements

3.4 Tarek Nour and al-Qahira wal Nas

In Ramadan 2009, advertising mogul Tarek Nour made his first entry into the broadcasting business by starting al-Qahira wal Nas channel to broadcast entertainment shows and soap operas only in the month of Ramadan, which is the high season for TV drama and entertainment in Egypt. In the summer of 2012, the same summer Morsy took office, the channel started broadcasting year-round, and in the spirit of the time, it started introducing political talk shows including Ibrahim Eissa’s show. Being established by an advertising agency, the channel was able to cover its costs. In an interview with Egypt Independent, the Chief Executive Officer of the channel Yasmin Abdullah said that all the channel’s income comes from commercials and that they have never failed to cover the costs of any of the channel’s shows (Halawa, 2012). Media experts in the field say that the advertising packages Tarek Nour Communications offers to their client include airtime in al-Qahira wal Nas channel guaranteeing a flow of advertisement that is possibly not available for other channels.

Nour does not make regular public appearances despite having behind him four decades of working closely with the media first as a radio host in the public radio in the 1970s, then as the founder and head of Egypt’s major advertising company in the 1980s and the 1990s, and finally as the founder and owner of one of the biggest private TV stations in Egypt. He only gave a handful of interviews in the past years, and these interviews will be used to cross-examine the findings of Chapter 2.

Despite claiming in all his interviews that he is a “professional” advertiser, and that his approach
to designing governmental and electoral campaigns during the Mubarak era is a professional approach, Nour does not refrain from giving his strong political opinions about both current and historical events and people. In 2005, Tarek Nour was the media designer of Mubarak’s presidential elections campaign, and he also ran the media operations for the presidential campaign of the Mubarak-era minister Ahmed Shafik in the 2012 presidential election (Fadel, 2012).

When asked in a 2009 television interview about whether he would accept to make a campaign for the Muslim Brotherhood to help them revamp their image, he said that he cannot do it because he disagrees ideologically with them (shbarakat, 2010a). This implies that he must agree ideologically with the political campaigns he accepts, or at least not fundamentally disagree with them. In the same interview he expressed contempt towards Nasserist policies of land reform and nationalization, and called Sadat a “great man” for his economic reform and said that things would have been very different had he lived for only five more years (shbarakat, 2010b).

Nour would, however, criticize the government for having excessive regulation and red tape and failing to market itself properly. He saw the 2004 “businessmen cabinet” as a positive change and was full of praise to them. He dismissed the question by the presenter that it presents a conflict of interest for businessmen to hold ministerial positions. His argument was that they had enough money and were already wealthy and therefore less prone to be corrupt, and that their track record as successful businessmen means that they have superior management and administrative skills that is lacking in traditional bureaucratic governance in Egypt. He also praised the cabinet for understanding the importance of marketing (shbarakat, 2010c).

It is obvious then why Nour would not be a supporter of the January 2011 revolution, which not only overthrew Mubarak, but also stripped the businessmen cabinet out of their power, put many of them in prison and pushed others to flee Egypt. To celebrate the second anniversary of one of the al-Qahira wal Nas shows titled Cairo 360, the host of the show Ossama Kamal reversed his role as a presenter and took the seat of the guest and Nour took on the role of the presenter. Nour, in his temporary role as a host, asked Kamal about his position regarding both the “revolutions” of January 25 and June 30. After giving a diplomatic answer saying that he considers both legitimate revolutions even if they differ in their motives, Kamal returned the question to Nour, to which he responded by saying: “I can tell you that the result of the [January] 25 revolution was the Muslim Brotherhood. What was the outcome of June 30? It was Abdelfattah al-Sisi. I think the question does not need a response as to which one I support. Of course I am with the second [June 30] revolution” (Cairo 360, 2015).
Al-Qahira wal Nas’s move from a Ramadan-only entertainment channel to a year-round political channel was a conscious move made by Nour. He said in a short interview that at the time of the revolution, they needed to have nationalist Egyptian channels, and that he believes that it made a difference during the build up to the June 30 “revolution” (Itfarrag Live, 2015). Just like al-Amin, Nour is concerned with countering the narrative of al-Jazeera; he also implied during the interview with Kamal that al-Jazeera acts like a fifth column in Egypt (Cairo 360, 2015).

In our three case studies, it seems that the largest gap between the micro- and the meso-level is the case of Ibrahim Eissa and Tarek Nour. When the position of Nour is compared with that of Ibrahim Eissa, whom he hosted in his channel, it is clear that they agree when it comes to the general opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Islamism. However, Nour is clearly more antagonistic to the January 25 revolution compared to Eissa, who thinks that January 25 had pure motives but was hijacked by the Islamists, and that June 30 came to “correct its path”. Eissa was also opposing the Mubarak regime and the the tawreeth25 plan, whereas Nour was closely linked to the so-called reformists close to Gamal Mubarak. Nour was also heavily involved in the image revamp of the National Democratic Party and the political campaigning of the Nazif neoliberal businessmen cabinet.

Other than Mubarak, another important difference is over Sadat, the political hero of Tarek Nour. Eissa is more of a mild Nasserist and a fierce critic of Sadat. Among the three presenters who are the subject of this research, Eissa was the one who was more open to hosting guests from Nasserist and socialist backgrounds, which clearly contradicts the views of Eissa’s employer, Tarek Nour.

The reason behind this might be to manufacture an image of unity among opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, and not to alienate Nasserists, socialists, anti-Mubarakists who are also anti-Brotherhood. This unity was proven to be short-lived; when Eissa started becoming mildly critical of the government and of Saudi Arabia, he was dismissed from al-Qahira wal Nas. The shelf-life of this unity was linked to how strong the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood is. The more the threat fades, it seemed that the unity was becoming weaker, and the fundamental differences and disagreements were re-emerged to the surface.

For example, when Eissa started being more vocal in his criticism of the new regime after June 30, his relationship with al-Qahira wal Nas became extremely erratic. Despite being a fierce critic of

25Arabic for hereditary succession referring to the the plan of grooming Gamal Mubarak to be his father’s successor
the Muslim Brotherhood and one of only two journalists to interview Abdelfattah al-Sisi during his presidential campaign in 2014, Eissa—as discussed in the previous chapter—was a very vocal critic of the handing over by the Egyptian regime of two strategic Red Sea islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia in early 2015 (Dawoud, 2017). The government adopted a zero-tolerance policy over criticisms regarding the transfer of the two islands and have rounded up and arrested scores of protesters who rejected the transfer (Walsh, 2016).

A probable explanation of this zero-tolerance approach is the increasing influence Saudi Arabia is having in Egypt as will be discussed in Chapter 4, especially as Eissa is well-known for his criticism of Saudi Arabia and its “backward” version of Islam. Saudi Arabia’s anger was manifested when the Saudi Arabian TV network the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) suspended the airing of a show hosted by Eissa. The official reason reported by the MBC administration was that the show does not meet the production standards of the of MBC and that the content is not suitable for its audience (al-Masry al-Youm, 2015). However, it is widely thought that the MBC took this step due to Eissa’s criticism of Saudi Arabia’s policy in Yemen and Syria, and its promotion of extremism and Wahhabism.

The tension between Eissa and al-Qahira wal Nas on the one hand and the government (including the overwhelmingly pro-government parliament) on the other hand has intensified to an extent that the continuation of Eissa’s appearance on the screen of al-Qahira wal Nas has become an impossibility. A large furniture convention organized by Tarek Nour was suspended by a decision of the Ministry of Interior in 2016 citing security concerns without further explanations (Mada Masr, 2017). The cost Tarek Nour had to bear for the suspension of the fair was EGP 60 million (about $3.4 million by that time’s exchange rate).

However, for a furniture convention that has been taking place annually for about 35 years, the indirect cost due to the harm to its reputation would be much higher than this immediate cost, especially that it was estimated that the exhibitors who work all year round to showcase their products at the convention lost around EGP 300 million ($17 million) due to the suspension (Mecky, 2016). It is widely believed that the suspension was due to the government’s anger at Eissa, although both the channel and the government have never officially stated so. Only a few days after the suspension of the convention, al-Qahira wal Nas announced officially that Ibrahim Eissa resigned from the channel (Mada Masr, 2017).

This uneasy relationship between Eissa, al-Qahira wal Nas and the political regime in the post-2013 should not give the false impression regarding the existence of a free media where TV hosts
are free to express views against the wish of both the owners of the media outlet and the political regime. Eissa stated clearly that his resignation was due to pressures after the parliament had filed a report against him and demanded that the General Authority of Investment (GAFI) close the channel. This is a clear indication that if one show in a channel crosses some red line, the whole channel could risk suspension even if it is otherwise overwhelmingly supportive of the regime and had helped in bringing it to power. This also testifies to the fact that despite the officially private status of some media outlets, they are still subject to heavy government regulation and control through the various means discussed earlier in this chapter.

Eissa, is therefore a case where the micro-level of discourse might not perfectly match the views and the beliefs of the producers, but what is important here is the nexus where their ideologies link, which is antagonism towards the Muslim Brotherhood and advocating a more liberal reading of Islam. Moreover, building an anti-Brotherhood consensus needs by definition people from different ideological backgrounds, otherwise it cannot be argued to be a “consensus”. Eissa, therefore, served this appearance of “consensus” very well. As was discussed in chapter 2, this appearance of consensus was a recurring theme across the three shows including that of Eissa.

3.5 Sada al-Balad and Abou El Enein

Sada al-Balad was established on November 28, 2011, and is owned by Cleopatra Group (Sada al-Balad, 2014). It operates, like all the other private TV stations, out of the Media Production City and is broadcast on the Nilesat. Out of the three infitah businessmen, its owner Mohamed Abou El Enein is perhaps the most political figure and the one with the strongest direct links to the Mubarak regime. Abou El Enein was appointed by Mubarak in the 1995 People’s Assembly (the lower chamber of the Egyptian parliament). He was then elected for three consecutive terms in 2000, 2005 and 2010. In the parliament he was the head of the Housing Committee from 2000 to 2005, and then head of the Industry and Energy committee from 2005 and until the parliament was dissolved in the aftermath of 2011 revolution (Mohammed M. Abou El Enein Official Website, n.d.).

In 2010, Abou El Enein also chaired the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, an inter-parliamentarian organization consisting of parliamentarians from 37 Mediterranean and near-Mediterranean countries. He also chaired a few committees in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean for two terms. He played many roles in many business associations and councils in Egypt such as being the President of the so-called Egyptian-European Council since 2007, and a member of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (Mohammed M. Abou El
As for his economic activity, Abou El Enein started a trading business in the 1970s before establishing his ceramics factory in 1983 in the then newly established 10th of Ramadan industrial city, which was founded in 1977 by Sadat to promote private investment in industry. The company now, according to its own website, owns 17 factories in two locations in the North West Gulf of Suez and the 10th of Ramadan City and employs 25,000 workers and exports its products to 108 countries (Mohammed M. Abou El Enein Official Website, n.d.).

Since then, Cleopatra has widely expanded not just in terms of ceramic production but also penetrated different sectors including real estate, tourism and media. Abou El Enein has been allocated vast areas of lands by direct order. It is not possible to have an exhaustive list of the lands he was granted by direct order due to the unavailability of such data, but some official documents and media reports can give a glimpse of the scale and how the process would take place. An over 300-page report by the Central Auditing Agency (CAA) was leaked in 2015 listing the different financial violations and embezzlement of public assets in the different sectors including in that of land and real estate. The report sheds light on a piece of land in October city in the outskirts of Cairo given to Abou El Enein between 1999 and 2004 in violation of the laws regulating the selling of public land.

According to the report, the constitution in article 95 prohibits members of parliament from buying any state-owned assets. The constitutional article stipulates that: “no member of the People’s Assembly shall, during his term, purchase or rent any state property or sell or lease to the state or barter with it regarding any part of his property, or conclude a contract with the State in his capacity as entrepreneur, importer or contractor.” Disputes over the legality of the land continued from right after the revolution until in 2014 when it was settled by a ministerial decree allowing Cleopatra Group to build an upscale residential compound selling luxury units on the land.

Additionally, Abou El Enein, along with Naguib Sawiris and senior NDP member and businessman Ahmed Ezz, were granted in 1998 vast areas of land in the North West of the Gulf of Suez, according to another leaked official correspondence between the director of the CAA and the minister of investment Mahmoud Mohey Eldin in 2007. Abou El Enein was given about 22 million square metres in this area for the meagre price of EGP 5/square meter, where he established his second Ceramica Cleopatra industrial complex. He is believed to have sold the rest of the land for up to EGP 200/square meter (Abdelmeguid, 2009). These lands, divided among four companies, are, in the words of David Sims, “truly enormous”. They are larger than all industrial land of all of Egypt's...
new industrial towns (Sims, 2015, p. 223).

In 2007, Abou El Enein was also allocated a 15 million square metres of land in the pristine and touristic red sea resort of Marsa Alam. Abou El Enein had to only pay $1/square meter for half the area, and the other half was rented for $1/100 square metres per year (Soliman, 2011). According to the Cleopatra Group website, a luxury resort is to be open soon in Marsa Alam to be added to the Cleopatra portfolio of resorts in Sharm al-Sheikh, Marsa Matruh and Hurghada (Cleopatra Luxury Hotels & Resorts Website). In a similar vein, Abou El Enein has grabbed vast areas of other desert, coastal and agricultural public lands in a variety of areas around Egypt throughout the years.

It was not just his lands that were threatened and its legality questioned as a result of the 2011 revolution. Since the breakout of the revolution in 2011, Abou El Enein had also been perpetually struggling to manage his industrial empire. In the revolutionary spirit of the time, one strike used to break out after the other in his factories both in Suez and 10th of Ramadan industrial zones. Some of these strikes would continue for a few months.

The workers’ action has come to a peak in July 2012, only a few days after Morsy took over office, when the workers were close to taking full control of the factory operations. The workers called on the newly-elected Morsy to intervene in their favour, possibly also encouraged in their action by his election. Morsy probably had vested interest in breaking the power of former members of the Mubarak regime like Abou El Enein. However, mass strikes and mass protests were something that started to alarm the Brotherhood regime now that they were in power because they wanted the kind of calm that would enable them to stabilize the economy. Therefore, Morsy chose to “mediate” between the workers and the owner of the factory (Adly, 2017).

However, Abou El Enein had another story to tell; in an interview on his own channel Sada al-Balad in 2014 on the day Sisi was officially elected president, Abou El Enein claimed that he was facing pressure from the Brotherhood to sell the factory, and that he had received advice to sell it from people associated with the Brotherhood that he chose not to name. Abou El Enein claimed that this pressure made him more stubborn and keen to keep the factory; he added that his factories are like his children, and that he will never sell his children. Abou El Enein also implied that the striking workers belonged to and were pushed to action by the Muslim Brotherhood (Sada al-Balad Official Youtube Channel, 2014).

However, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the former NDP businessmen was not always tense. It seemed for a brief moment that the newly-elected Muslim Brotherhood and former Mubarakist businessmen are on their way to finding a coalition or a method of working together. It is
worth mentioning that many of the former NDP businessmen such as Mohamed Farid Khamis, a
billionaire industrialist and the founder of Oriental Weavers, were part of Morsy’s business
delegation during his trip to China. On this trip, Morsy was accompanied by a large business
delegation comprised of 80 businessmen of which many were associated with the former Mubarak
regime (Hussein, 2012).

The delegation was, nevertheless, led by Hassan Malek, a Muslim Brotherhood businessman
who saw that the investments of business heavyweights is vital for the restoration of economic
performance. Malek was the architect of the new regime’s business landscape trying to bring
together the businessmen of both the former regime and the Brotherhood’s regime under the banner
of a business association that he founded and called the Egyptian Business Development Association
(EBDA).

Despite this “conciliatory” approach, it was clear that the businessmen who had direct links with
the Mubarak regime can only be accepted as a second tier and in a subordinate position to the
businessmen of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was clear in the leadership of the EBDA, which was
chaired by Malek and its other leaders were mostly comprised of businessmen with strong links to
the Brotherhood such as Samir al-Najjar, Abdel Moneim Seoudi and Safwan Thabet (Adly, 2016).
This strategy did not go unnoticed by Mubarak-era businessmen and their associate media personnel,
as was demonstrated in Chapter 2 when al-Hadidi spoke of the Brotherhood’s plan to replace one
group of businessmen with another.

However, Abou El Enein even before Morsy became a president seemed to have been a fierce
opponent and not on the Muslim Brotherhood’s map of former Mubarak businessmen to reconcile
with. Morsy, during a presidential campaign tour in May 2012 in Suez, said that Abou El Enein “has
a black history”. He stressed that the Ceramica Cleopatra crisis must be resolved, and he encouraged
the workers to “demand their right, but without disrupting production”. According to al-Masry al-
Youm newspaper, more than 3,000 workers from the Ceramica Cleopatra factory have attended
Morsy’s presidential election rally to demand his support against Abou El Enein’s refusal to address
their demands (Abadi, 2012). It is unclear why Morsy was so fierce in his attack against Abou El
Enein during his presidential campaign, and not other Mubarak-era businessmen. One explanation
could be that he simply wanted to win the votes of thousand of striking workers in Suez by
promising to support them if he was elected. Another probable explanation was the support that
Abou El Enein’s channel Sada al-Balad gave to presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik, Morsy’s rival
in the second round of the presidential elections.
3.6 Findings and conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to focus on the forces and struggles behind the production of the media discourse that was presented in chapter 2, that is, the immediate broader context of producing such discourse. This broader context does not include the historical context which will be presented in Part II of this study, and instead focused on trying to maintain a temporal unity with the micro-level of the CDA while slightly oscillating to cover events that took place right before and after the June 30 events.

In a country that is not very rich in extractable natural resources, and with a growing population and a growing tourism industry, land becomes a crucially important natural resource with values that are constantly on the rise. The rapid expansion in the last decades of urban centres like Cairo and Alexandria, and the expansion of tourist areas around the northern Mediterranean and eastern Red Sea coasts created a very high demand for lands and property in these areas.

The vast majority of these lands were privatized by direct order and handed for meagre prices to businessmen close to the regime and government officials. Given this model of accumulation, it is not just vital to be close or be part of the political regime that distributes such land, it is inconceivable to be able to reach such levels of accumulation without such relationship. The January 25 has shaken the property rights over these new lands, and the new successive regimes along with the courts have started looking into tens, if not hundreds, of these land privatization contracts. Within weeks of the overthrow of Mubarak, 27 businessmen were reported by state-owned al-Ahram newspaper to have been prosecuted for involvement in illegal land deals (Sims, 2015, p. 276).

Many businessmen have settled the disputes by paying an amount of money that would close the gap between the original nominal price they paid to the governmental authorities and the market price for such lands. Some had their land re-nationalized, and some managed to maintain its ownership. The companies of both Abou El Enein and Amer and his partner al-Amin were among the tens of companies and individuals who were involved in such land privatization schemes.

This explains the contempt toward the January 25 revolution that has put the property rights that resulted from such dealings into question, and challenged them both in the streets, courtrooms and in the media. Moreover, given that land is by definition in limited supply, the rise of a new business class associated with the Islamist movement would bring an unwelcome competition and threaten the accumulated wealth of the established business class.
For long, Islamist businessmen were barred from such processes of accumulation and many have either made their wealth outside of Egypt or through underground trade in foreign currency, or investing people’s money in ponzi and pyramid schemes. Some were allowed to run retail businesses in food, clothing and electronics keeping them confined to modes of accumulation that is more subject to market forces away from state-granted privileges (Joya, 2016). This was surely prone to change after the Muslim Brotherhood had reached power. This is why it was a matter of survival for some of these businessmen to wage a double media war against both the January 25 revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood. Given the cultural fear of many in Egypt and globally from the Islamists, it was the easy and convenient choice to base the media war on issues of identity, sectarianism and violence, while trying to represent a brand of nationalism that stands in contrast to such characteristics associated with the country’s new Islamist rulers.

However, this process of accumulation does not apply *prima facie* to Tarek Nour, whose investments are mostly limited to media and entertainment. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood probably posed as much of an existential threat to his business given that the type of entertainment he produces is usually sensational and its humor is often sexually explicit in a way that might not be accepted by an Islamist government. Programmes that discuss religion on al-Qahira wal Nas are known to be controversially unorthodox as well. However, even under the military government and in the post-June 30 era, al-Qahira wal Nas host Islam al-Behiery was accused of blasphemy and served a year in prison for opinions he expressed on the screen of al-Qahira wal Nas.

Therefore, a prolonged Islamist rule would have had a potentially destructive impact on the show business, which drove many of the players in the industry to take some of the most staunch oppositional positions against the Brotherhood. Lastly, since Nour is in the advertising industry, his own process of accumulation depends largely on the accumulation of others, especially that excessive spending on advertising is usually the product of excess capital and possibly a crisis of overaccumulation (Odih, 2007, p. 207). Finally, this close-knit small community of state-dependent political/business elite, positioned Nour to be the agency of choice for many of the infitah businessmen. The emergence of Nour’s political rivals to power would in this case be nothing less than an existential threat to his business empire.
Chapter 4

The macro level analysis of the nationalist discourse of three private channels owned by infitah businessmen

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the broader context for Chapter 3—which discussed the business interests and position of the owner of the subject media outlets in order to situate the text in its immediate context (the meso level).

The first section of the chapter will discuss the national trends of “accumulation by dispossession” that characterized post-infitah Egypt in which the three businessmen found themselves but also helped create, especially at later stages, and how this contributed to the positions they had around the June 30 events. The following section explains the regional forces that contributed to shaping the events in Egypt with a focus on the role of Qatar and Turkey in supporting the Morsy regime, and then the role of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (the UAE) in supporting the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood new order. Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave almost unconditional support to the ruling alliance that took over power after July 3, 2013 formed by the so-called jihat siyadiya (lit. sovereign entities) that constitute the military, the police, the diplomacy, and the judiciary, along with some veteran Mubarak-era businessmen and journalists, as well as some new fresh faces.

The final section of this chapter will cover the global context which contributed to the emergence of the June 30 nationalist discourse, although it argues that unlike many previous eras, the international context had minimal impact at least compared to developments on the national and regional levels. As a working definition for this chapter, “national” will generally be used to denote developments that happen between Egyptian parties, whereas “regional” is used to describe developments where Egypt engages with other parties from the region, that is, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) including Turkey. Lastly, “international” will be used to mean any developments where Egypt engages with the world outside of the MENA region.

The chapter also discusses how the anti-Americanism, lack of anti-Arabism and the use of Islam that were presented in Chapter 2 are linked to economic interests, workings and movements of capital going a step further in answering the first part of the research question about the function this nationalist discourse served in promoting the economic interests of its dissemenators.
4.2 A national economy characterized by “accumulation by dispossession”

Despite the professed support of market forces as a result of the infitah policies and subsequent waves of neoliberalization, methods of accumulation in post-infitah Egypt remained largely dominated by nonmarket mechanisms, and was characterized by a process of “accumulation by dispossession”. The process of commodification and privatization of land and its enclosure in the Marxist tradition contrasts with market-based accumulation, which motivates the pursuit of profit through market forces rather than the direct and violent expropriation of natural resources including land enclosure. This mode of accumulation, according to the Marxist tradition, characterized the pre-Capitalist feudal stage and imperialism, and was set as a precondition for a capitalist mode of production and accumulation. Being a precondition for a capitalist mode of production does not deny its continuity as necessary for market-based accumulation, yet external to it (Roberts, 2017). Harvey thought it is peculiar to keep using the Marxist terms of “original” or “primitive” accumulation to describe an ongoing process and a process that was intensified under an emerging neoliberal order. Since it is inapt to use the term “primitive” for something that still continues to occur at our present time, Harvey therefore adopted the term “accumulation by dispossession”.

In Egypt, since the infitah, accumulation could at best be described as a mix of both primitive and market-based accumulation, given the amount of public land that was enclosed and privatized by ‘amr mubasher (direct order) significantly below its market price and in many cases even for free. Other methods of accumulation by dispossession took place in Egypt since the infitah, such aggressive privatization of public companies, stock manipulation, pervasiveness of investment in public debt, national debt monetization, etc. However, the focus of this chapter will be exclusively on land as a more direct and forthright mechanism of accumulation by dispossession.

Angela Joya (2016) argues that although the neoliberal reforms introduced some restructuring to the bureaucratic state, privatization remained controlled by the state and official policy. Joya describes the free market as a “guise” to privatize public resources. Koen Bogaert argues that privatization “served a new source of patronage to reinforce and extend links between the political and economic elites”. Bogaert argues that privatization remained a state-led and state-controlled affair (Bogaert, 2013, p. 223).

Since the start of the open-door policy, many forms of accumulation by dispossession have been taking place in Egypt through privatization of public sector assets, the market liberalization of the agricultural sector and arable land that took place in the 1980s and culminated with law 96 for 1992
(Bush, 2007), and also the privatization and allocation of desert and coastal areas. Many scholars (see Bush, 2007 and Bogaert, 2013) have studied the revocation of land reform policies passed in the 1950s and the 1960s by Nasser’s developmental state. This academic focus on arable land was not matched by a similar focus on accumulation by dispossession that took place as a result of the privatization of desert and coastal land despite its magnitude.

This under-researched topic might be due to the fact that it is more of a recent phenomenon, or that such lands were for the most part unpopulated and therefore no physical, violent and direct process of “dispossession” took place. However, this section will primarily focus on desert and coastal lands for a few reasons: first, in an economy whose growth is becoming less reliant on agriculture because the capacity of growing crops is limited by Egypt’s water share, and due to its low profit rates, and as the population is growing at a very fast rate, most of the growth potential existed in the real estate and construction sectors. The share of agriculture as a percentage of GDP has gone down from about 30 percent in the mid-1970s to less than 12 percent at the moment. This is evident by the huge urban encroachment on agricultural land where it has become much more profitable to build residential housing than to grow crops. Therefore, desert and coastal land has become the public natural resource of choice in the last three decades.

Second, agricultural land has been in private hands for long, and even if land reform heavily regulated it and put a limit on ownership, it was still relatively subject to some degree of market mechanisms. On the other hand, market forces were completely absent in the vast majority of the cases of privatizing desert and coastal lands, and there was no bidding process or any form of competition to bring the price close to its “fair market price” which demonstrate how nothing less than full control over the state is a prerequisite for enabling such nonmarket and non-capitalist mode of accumulation. Third, at least two of our three infitah businessmen have accumulated colossal wealth by means of dispossession the public of desert and coastal lands. Finally, the regional players covered in this study have also been heavily investing in desert and coastal land-related economic activities namely real estate and construction.

In 1974, when Egypt embarked on its open-door policy, the population was 38 million, and at 2016 it stood at 95.6 million (World Bank Data). This increase of nearly 60 million people in 32 years has led to a massive and accelerated process of urban expansion. This increase simply meant that 15 million households needing 15 million homes were introduced to the market in only three decades, not to mention the need for commercial property, holiday homes, second and third vacant properties, etc. This means that 500,000—as a very conservative estimate—new properties on
The tourism arrivals to Egypt have also increased exponentially in the two decades preceding the revolution driving the industry of real estate and construction to expand. The number of tourists arriving in Egypt has increased from 2.8 million in 1995 to a record 14 million in 2010 (World Bank Data, n.d.).

There are a few government agencies who own the entire desert and coastal land on behalf of the state, and they are mandated in a lot of cases to sell the land in the same manner as a private owner would in a form of a contract signed between the authority and the purchaser at a price that is negotiated between the two parties alone with almost no oversight. The first authority, the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) is the government authority in charge of owning land in new cities in the desert usually in the outskirt of big urban centres like Cairo and Alexandria. Established by Sadat in 1979, the NUCA’s establishment law states that its capital is formed, among other things, by the lands chosen for the establishment of new urban communities. Most critically, article 31 of law number 59 for 1979 states that the assets (including land) are considered the private property of the state, rather than public assets. The legal implications of this seemingly subtle difference is significant because it means that the state can deal with these assets as it pleases or at least with less rules than if it was considered public assets.

According the NUCA’s website, the total built areas of all new urban communities is 500,000 feddans, with a total area of 1.14 million feddans. Since the NUCA is the authority in charge of owning and selling all land in new urban communities, this means that since its establishment in the late 1970s, it has “sold” more than half a million feddan to private investors.

How the land is allocated is under the state’s full control. Before a land can be available for allocation, it has to be “let” by several state entities. First, the Minister of Defense has the right to declare an area as a military zone or of “strategic importance”. Second, the Supreme Council of Antiquities is allowed to declare lands to have a special archaeological importance. Lastly, the Ministry of Petroleum can claim lands for extractive activities (Sims, 2015, p. 263). All land that is not claimed by these entities become subject for allocation. Before being allocated to the investor, they are normally allocated to the relevant land authority first, which would in turn allocate it to a selected investor.

Sims, based on his research, has classified land in Egypt into four broad categories; public lands are divided into two categories, which are public-domain land which cannot be disposed of due to infrastructure or security reasons, or state private-domain land which can be sold, transferred or allocated under several executive laws. The third category is private land which can be traded
through market mechanisms and transferred freely. Finally, there are the Awqaf lands which are lands held in religious trusts as endowments. According to Sims, it is the state private-domain land—such as the land controlled by the NUCA—that account for the majority of public land and almost all desert land (Sims, 2015, p. 263).

The relevant authorities are as follows: the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation which manages desert land planned for reclamation into arable land; the NUCA which manages land that will be used to construct new urban communities (desert towns); the Tourist Development Authority (TDA) which manages land including coastal land for tourist projects; the General Authority for Industrial Development which manages land for industrial use; the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency which is in charge of conservation and protected areas.

As many of the cases revealed by media reports and court documents, the profitability that results from such land allocation policy happens at rates that cannot be achieved by any other form of economic activity, and the disparity between the “buying” and the selling price sometimes reaches a factor of one hundred. Sims writes: “such pricing means that getting a foot in the door and inside the relevant authority, either through influence or personal connections or by interference from above, is extremely important to secure such cheap lands before they are offered in anything approaching a public arena” (Sims, 2015, p. 267).

Even the World Bank took notice and expressed concern over this nonmarket mechanism when it comes to land management, or rather mismanagement, in Egypt. In a report published in 2006, titled “Egypt Public Land Management Strategy” the World Bank sheds light on what it calls “the limited reliance on market-based allocation mechanisms”.

Most public land outside of the Zimam\textsuperscript{26} is allocated using administrative, non-market-based channels at State-determined prices that are often unrelated to the opportunity cost of land or even to recovery of service delivery costs. The typical method is direct allocation administered by the competent land controlling authority to individual or corporate investors in response to advertisements or submitting unsolicited requests for land (World Bank, 2006).

Two of the three businessmen that are the subject of this research are involved in tourism development (i.e. building resorts and hotels on under-priced coastal land) and housing construction

\textsuperscript{26}Zimam: Boundaries of cultivated and uncultivated agricultural lands that have been historically surveyed by the Egyptian Survey Authority and is included in the Real Estate Tax Department and property tax registry. Based on World Bank definition. 
in new urban communities. The two have benefited immensely from this mismanagement of land distribution as described by Sims above. The lands have been clearly given to investors and businessmen associated with the regime. This seems to have been the one and most important criteria, as the relevant state authorities had almost complete discretion as to who they “sell” the land to.

Not only have billions upon billions of dollars been wasted, but even more colossal amounts of potential revenues have been lost. And those who have benefited from the wholesale disposal over the last fifty years of what should be considered held in trust for the Egyptian people are mainly a few individuals who are either in key positions or who wield particular influence, and some of these, both inside and outside government, have benefited spectacularly” (Sims, 2015, p. 261).

An example of this conspicuous profiteering is when real-estate tycoon Ahmed al-Maghraby was appointed Minister of Housing in the Nazif cabinet (2004-2011), and more crucially the head of the NUCA. In his capacity as the director of the NUCA, he granted vast areas of strategic land to his own real estate development company at a fraction of its price. In 2006, Al-Maghraby was able to allocate to his own company, Palm Hills Development, by direct order a million square meter piece of land in a strategic location in New Cairo for EGP 241 million, or EGP 241 per square meter (Diab, 2015). According to a judicial report by the Egyptian State Council, the market price of the square meter in this area at the time of the allocation reached EGP 4000. The difference of the market price and allocation price was therefore about EGP 3.6 billion ($620 million at that time exchange rates) (El-Badrawy, 2013). It is worth mentioning that Alaa Mubarak, the former president’s older son, owned over three percent of Maghraby’s company (Diab, 2015).

This capture of key state agencies, and establishing a legal framework that would enable that sort of land grab meant two things; first, methods of aggressive and rapid accumulation away from market-based accumulation was a common method of enrichment that made reliance on state capture indispensable; second, this meant that losing state power would not just mean losing new opportunities, but having previous gains expropriated by the new order which was already starting to be the case after the revolution. Furthermore, many of those cronies faced prison and jail sentences as a result of revolutionary change. The dominance of a state-sponsored “accumulation by dispossession” model has made control over the state indispensable for economic success (Zemni et
Those who worked in the culture and entertainment industry, including our third businessman Tarek Nour, might have followed a different model, and the theory of “accumulation by dispossession” might be inadequate to explain the motives of an owner of an entertainment and advertising company to fight the June 30 battle. It is important to note that the process of accumulation by dispossession does not happen in a vacuum and in many cases feeds other forms of economic activities including those dependent on market-based accumulation.

Therefore, the two domains should not be treated separately, as they have several points of intersection and interdependence, most clearly manifested in the reliance of the culture industry on advertisement and funding from businesspeople who made there money elsewhere. This is also manifested in how Nour—as presented in Chapter 3—seems to be the only one out of the three businessmen who treats his channel as a for-profit enterprise, because he regards the show business as his domain of profit unlike the other two businessmen who regard it as a domain of influence. Rosa Luxemburg (2003) argues that the two modes of accumulation are organically linked and that ‘the historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together’.

Thus capitalist accumulation as a whole, as an actual historical process, has two different aspects. One concerns the commodity market and the place where surplus value is produced – the factory, the mine, the agricultural estate. Regarded in this light, accumulation is a purely economic process, with its most important phase a transaction between the capitalist and wage labourer. In both its phases, however, it is confined to the exchange of equivalents and remains within the limits of commodity exchange. Here, in form at any rate, peace, property and equality prevail, and the keen dialectics of scientific analysis were required to reveal how the right of ownership changes in the course of accumulation into appropriation of other people’s property, how commodity exchange turns into exploitation and equality becomes class-rule.

The other aspect of the accumulation of capital concerns the relations between capitalism and the non-capitalist modes of production which start making their appearance on the international stage. Its predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system – a policy of spheres of interest – and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process.
Bourgeois liberal theory takes into account only the former aspect: the realm of ‘peaceful competition’, the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it strictly from the other aspect: the realm of capital’s blustering violence which is regarded as more or less incidental to foreign policy and quite independent of the economic sphere of capital. (Luxemburg, 2003, p 432).

4.3 The growing regional “new imperialism”

In December 2013, five months after the overthrow of Morsy, the then-new Egyptian government organized a conference titled the Egypt GCC Investment forum to promote GCC investments in Egypt in areas of energy, housing and real estate, agriculture and food, infrastructure, tourism, etc. (Joya, 2017).

Also, a year after the overthrow of Morsy in June 2014 at a time when the economy of Egypt was struggling from the lack of investments, then-Saudi King Abdullah called for Egypt’s friends and brothers “to attend a donors’ conference to help Egypt overcome its economic difficulties”. This call materialized in March 2015 as the Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) in Sharm al-Sheikh which aimed at marketing Egypt as an attractive FDI destination where Gulf states pledged $12 billion to Egypt in the form of FDI, loans and assistance (Georgy & Kalin, 2015 & Başkan, 2016, p. 125). This pledge, according to Angela Joya, is “both a reflection of the GCC ruling elites’ economic interests, as well as a desire for political stability facilitated through investments in the Egyptian market” (Joya, 2016).

Joya continues to argue that in order to improve the investment opportunities for Gulf capitalists in Egypt, the GCC pressured Egypt to implement investment reforms, and that Saudi Arabia, using the leverage it gained in the revolutionary period, has used this influence to shape the investment and economic policy framework of Egypt ensuring new investment opportunities for Egypt (Joya, 2016).

It was reported that during the Egypt-GCC conference, Saudi Arabia had “suggested” to the interim president Adly Mansour some amendments to the Egyptian investment law that would ensure that no criminal procedure against an investor would take place without the approval of the Minister of Investment, alongside other measure that would protect investors from any legal proceedings (Alarabiya.net, 2014). This move was aimed at protecting Saudi investment interest

27Stands for Gulf Cooperation Council: a regional political and economic union consisting of all the Arab states of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf except Iraq.
against legal action that proliferated in the aftermath of the revolution, including against Saudi Arabian investors. It is worth noting that all these suggestions have been put into effect through multiple changes to the investment law.

According to Joya, other forms of pressure were also exerted on Egypt to “reform” its investment policy. In early 2011, the Saudi Arabian government warned Egypt that it would cancel work visas for a million Egyptian workers residing in Saudi Arabia that are considered a major source of remittances and foreign currency for Egypt, if the privatization deals in which Saudi companies are involved were revisited. The Egyptian government at the time responded by forming an extrajudicial committee to resolve 20 investment disputes. Among the disputes were prominent cases involving Saudi Arabia and UAE multinationals, such as Saudi’s Kingdom Agricultural Development Company, the UAE-owned construction company DAMAC and Saudi Arabia’s Anwal group (Joya, 2016).

For the Gulf countries, between the period of 2002 and 2006, $510 billion of extra liquidity were generated (Hanieh, 2011, p. 106). In 2011, the Gulf region recorded the highest account surplus in the world which was estimated at $300 billion, meaning that the region’s exports and earnings on investment abroad were $300 billion more than its imports and the earnings of foreign investors in the GCC countries. Total combined value of foreign assets owned by the GCC countries by 2011 were $1.7 trillion, of which half were owned by sovereign wealth funds (Augustine, 2011).

Moreover, Gross Domestic Savings (GDS), which measures the combined savings of the government, the household sector and the corporate sector was 33.6% and 52.8% of GDP in Saudi Arabia and the UAE respectively. The highest the percentage of GDS means the more the funds that are available for investment and these two rates are among the highest in the world. The GDS rate in Egypt, on the other hand, was 3.1% of GDP (World Bank Data, n.d.).

This massive increase in surplus wealth which resulted from the rise of oil prices in the first half of the 2000s, had a remarkable impact on capital flows to other Middle Eastern countries. In 2008, 36 percent of total foreign investments in the region came from the GCC countries, which exceeds the amount of investments arriving from North America which stood at 31 percent, Europe at 25 percent and Asia at 4 percent (Hanieh, 2011, p. 150). In Iraq, for example, the GCC countries benefited tremendously from the removal of the restrictions previously imposed on foreign capital entering Iraq as a result of the US invasion. The ruling Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Paul Bremer in the immediate aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq, had passed 100 laws to
allow unlimited foreign ownership of companies, while ushering in the privatization of 200 state-owned companies and setting a low flat tax rate of 15 percent (Hanieh, 2015, p. 149).

Contrary to what was expected, investments coming from the GCC quickly surpassed that coming from the US itself, especially after the dissolution of the CPA in June 2004. By 2009, more than half of all foreign investment in Iraq came from GCC countries (Hanieh, 2015, p. 150). This overaccumulation and the resulting export of capital from the Gulf countries has intensified the competition among them over external markets especially given the very small populations, and hence markets, in most of the GCC countries with the sole exception of Saudi Arabia. Sending this excess capital abroad in the form of FDI, portfolio investments, loans and aid has also served a double purpose of winning political allies regionally and internationally to help save their absolutist models of government against external threats, namely that of Iran and of the post-2011 revolutionary wave.

During the year of Morsy in power, two new countries, Qatar and Turkey, remarkably increased their investments in Egypt. Before Morsy’s ascendancy to power, the contributions of the two countries were minimal. Qatar’s FDI contribution to Egypt increased more than tenfold from about $35 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011/2012 to about $375 million in FY 2012/2013 which corresponds exactly to Morsy’s year in power. As for Turkey, its FDI increased from $12.5 million in FY 2011/2012 to $169 million during the year of Morsy’s presidency. For both countries, their investments of this year in Egypt were the highest ever including until the end of 2017 (see Table 2).
Table 2 Foreign Direct Investment to Egypt from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Qatar (2001-2017) (in USD million).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>3049</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>365.4</td>
<td>726.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>184.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>514.1</td>
<td>1037.4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>323.4</td>
<td>303.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>206.3</td>
<td>410.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>191.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2011 Revolution
2011-2012  | 240.4        | 559.8                 | 12.5   | 34.9  |

Mohamed Morsy’s year in power
2012-2013  | 191.7        | 480.6                 | 169.2  | 375.6 |

June 30, 2013 events
2013-2014  | 284.4        | 401.2                 | 31     | 109.1 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>649.1</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>343.7</td>
<td>1590.2</td>
<td>397.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1382.5</td>
<td>1328.7</td>
<td>836.9</td>
<td>3949.3</td>
<td>987.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>188.3</td>
<td>47.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>194.8</td>
<td>169.4</td>
<td>567.7</td>
<td>141.925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data collected from different Monthly Statistical Bulletins published by the Central Bank of Egypt, and tabulated by the author

Qatar and Turkey were two of the most important allies for the Muslim Brotherhood regime. Before the election of Morsy to office, Qatar announced that it would invest $10 billion in Egypt over a period of five years. In September 2012, three months after Morsy’s election, Qatar’s prime minister announced a new higher number of $18 billion to be invested by Qatar in tourism and industry projects in Egypt (Başkan, 2016, p. 99). The same month of September 2012, the Egyptian government signed a deal with Turkey in which the latter would provide $2 billion in financial assistance to Egypt constituting of a $1 billion loan, and the other $1 billion would be used as credit to finance imports from Turkey (Başkan, 2016, p. 100).

Qatar and Turkey continued to back Morsy even as opposition increased against him. A new $2.5 billion of financial assistance package to Egypt was announced by Qatar, of which $2 billion were in the form of a central bank deposit, and $500 in the form of a grant. Soon after, Qatar offered another $3 billion making total Qatar financial assistance to Egypt reach $8 billion, making it the largest donor and lender, and hence supporter, to Egypt during Morsy’s presidency (Başkan, 2016, p. 103). Even after the overthrow of Morsy, Doha and Istanbul were major safe destinations for members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were forced to flee Egypt (Trager, 2017; Başkan, 2016, p. 126).

As for the regional opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, and at the same time the supporters of the military regime that took over power from Morsy, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have slightly cut
down their FDI flows into Egypt during the year of Morsy’s presidency. Saudi Arabia’s FDI decreased to $191 million in FY 2012/2013 from $240 million in 2011/2012. As for the UAE, its FDI inflows went down to $480 million in FY 2012/2013 from $560 in FY 2011/2012 (Central Bank of Egypt).

The four years after the coup saw a remarkable slump in FDI flows from Qatar and Turkey, which averaged about $142 million a year for Qatar compared to $375 million during Morsy’s tenure, and $47 million for Turkey compared to $169 during the year of Morsy presidency (Central Bank of Egypt).

Conversely, the FDI of regional supporters of the regime of Abdelfattah al-Sisi invested annually on average double what they did during the year of Morsy. Saudi Arabia’s average annual FDI flows during the four years after the military coup stood at about $397 million compared to only $191 million during Morsy’s year in presidency, and the UAE for the four years sent $987 million as an annual average compared to $480 million during Morsy’s presidency (Central Bank of Egypt).

As for indirect portfolio investments, or investments in debt bonds and equity (stocks), the pattern is less clear than that of FDI (see Table 3). For example, Saudi Arabia’s portfolio investments throughout all the successive governments and regimes since late 2011 and until the spring of 2017 were quite stable. The UAE’s portfolio investments seem to have had a slump compared to the time of Morsy. For the supporters of the brotherhood Turkey and Qatar, the trend was very clear and similar to that of the FDI.

Turkey, for example, in December 2012 halfway through Morsy’s one-year tenure, had a total of portfolio investments in Egypt at $105.4 million and it kept going down gradually until it hit an extreme low at the end of March 2017 reaching $1 million. As for Qatar, at the end of December 2012, portfolio investments amounted for $110.8 million and ended up reducing until it hit a low of $29 million at the end of March 2017, with an exception of a post-revolutionary peak at June 2014 when its portfolio investments reached $126 million (Central Bank of Egypt).

The reason behind the less clear pattern in indirect portfolio investments compared to FDI may be that the assets in the case of portfolio investment are traded in an open market, and it is technically up for anyone who has the money to trade in securities, whereas FDI normally depend on getting through a lot of red tape, licenses, and complicated laws, and having access to factors of production like land; companies are in many cases state-owned and are privatized by direct order allowing for a great deal of favouritism, especially that a significant portion of both the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s FDI were in the real estate and construction sectors, a sector where favouritism is
crucial as discussed above and in the previous section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of December 2011</strong></td>
<td>337.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of December 2012</strong></td>
<td>339.2</td>
<td>123.6</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>110.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of December 2013</strong></td>
<td>326.9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of June 2014</strong></td>
<td>348.5</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>126.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of June 2015</strong></td>
<td>392.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>102.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of June 2016</strong></td>
<td>316.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of March 2017</strong></td>
<td>364.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: figures collected from different External Position Quarterly Reports published by the Central Bank of Egypt, and tabulated by the author*
The choice of investment and the allocation of capital is therefore clearly more than just a choice driven by private sector profit motives that are detached from the political considerations of the involved states. Any non-political and purely economic explanation of the post-June 30 upsurge of Saudi Arabian and UAE investments, such as improvements in the business climate, better investment incentives, better returns, etc. would fail to explain the concurrent slump in Qatar and Turkey’s investments at the time when Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s were increasing. If these movements were just a matter of neutral non-selective economic opportunity, it should apply more or less equally to investments of all relevant states, or at least with a less clear pattern than the one at hand. The profit-driven argument holds stronger for portfolio investments in the open securities market, but for FDI—given the nature of both the sending and receiving ends of the investment—it is very clearly linked to the political considerations of the involved states.

Accumulated capital in the Gulf is either directly state-owned or closely linked to the state through a “private” sector that is overwhelmingly controlled and owned by member of the ruling family in the different Gulf monarchies; it is, therefore, not akin to market economies where corporations would get involved in these accumulation structures in a private capacity (Hanieh, 2015, p. 147). However, as an additional way to cross-examine the claims that is made based on the FDI statistics, I will also look into other forms of financial flows into Egypt from our four countries.

Table 4 Outstanding stock by creditor country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>40.64</td>
<td>25.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1000+68.74</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>500+95.71</td>
<td>21.80</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>500+102.12</td>
<td>19.09</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>500+106.03</td>
<td>40.83</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>500+121.55</td>
<td>590.78</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>48.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>500+439.54</td>
<td>632.71</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>34.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures collected from different External Position Quarterly Reports published by the Central Bank of Egypt, and tabulated by the author
Other than FDI, billion of dollars of financial assistance from Gulf countries have also been closely linked to the quick political developments witnessed in Egypt in the post-revolutionary era. Since the January 2011 revolution, Egypt received about $31 billion in financial assistance in the form of aid and deposits from all countries, of which $13 billion came from Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the overthrow of Morsy in July 2013 and until August 2016. Turkey and Qatar gave no financial assistance to Egypt at that period despite having previously given $8.5 billion during Morsy’s tenure, of which $7.5 billion came from Qatar and $1 billion came from Turkey (see Table 4).

This form of financial assistance is completely government-to-government and therefore does not have the reservations of the FDI mentioned above. Looking at our three indicators: financial assistance, FDI and portfolio investments, it becomes clear that the more governments are involved on both the sending and the receiving end, the more the sensitivity to the political developments is clear. We see this trend the clearest when it comes to the fully-state managed financial assistance, and it is clear but to a lesser degree when it concerns FDI which is highly influenced by the receiving and sending states but just stopping short of having full control. As for portfolio investment where governments have the least control over both receiving and sending, the clear pattern becomes a lot more blurred.

These kinds of financial flows have a double purpose; first, they provide for more channels to invest all the excess capital that was described in the introduction to this section. Egypt, a very large consumer market but still suffering a shortage of capital seems like a suitable avenue for this kind of activity. Second, these financial flows also extend the influence of the concerned countries and win them political allies especially at a time when protests and demands for change and democratization are sweeping the region. However, the two points might not be as separate because placing political allies in power in a country like Egypt where investment opportunities and access to markets are tightly controlled by the government, is key to having access to such markets, and it is therefore crucial to have a “friendly” government in power.

In other words, winning political allies acts as a guarantor of access to markets and lucrative business opportunities, but the ability to access such markets and send FDI and financial assistance help these regimes in installing friendly governments in power. The same way, the Mubarak-era businessmen might have been anxious about being replaced by another class of businessmen as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, the GCC heavyweights Saudi Arabia and the UAE who have been investors of privilege in Egypt, might have been slowly faced with increasing
competition from both Qatar and Turkey with the help of their Brotherhood allies in power.

The very generous support to the anti-Brotherhood ruling alliance by the two biggest Gulf economic powers, of which at least one is a conservative religious monarchy who has been investing for decades to spread its own ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam in Egypt, might have contributed to limiting the adoption of too much of a secular nationalist discourse against the Brotherhood, and could give a probable explanation of the heavy use of Islamic arguments against the Brotherhood in the June 30 period as was demonstrated in Chapter 2. This support could also provide a partial explanation about how the anti-Brotherhood discourse of the media owned by the infitah businessmen differed from a purely late Sadatist discourse in its eschewal from disseminating an anti-Arab discourse.

Given that the United States was a major supporter of the regime that saw the enrichment of the infitah business elite, and a promoter of a transition that gave them increasing economic power, the growing anti-Americanism discourse that was one of the key characteristics of the micro-level discourse (see Chapter 2) is a phenomenon worthy of careful studying. Egypt is the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel with an average of military and economic aid of $1.3 billion a year that has been steadily flowing from 1978 until the present time. However, although the aid has been more or less stable in absolute amounts or even declining at times, its weight relative to the size of the Egyptian economy is significantly decreasing with time.

In 1979, the year where the US aid started flowing to Egypt, the GDP of the country was 18 billion dollars (World Bank Data). According to this year’s GDP the US aid constituted about 6.6 percent of Egypt’s GDP. In 1991, the US aid constituted about 5 percent of the GDP, and it kept descending to only 0.6 percent in 2013. The Decode company for economic and financial consulting argued that economically, cutting or canceling the aid is not expected to increase or pose serious fiscal pressure due to the bilateral aid coming from Gulf Arab countries (DECODED, 2017).

Decode has put the US aid in context by comparing it to key foreign currency inflows of Egypt in 2012-2013. By this measure, exports in the same year brought about $26 billion, in addition to about $18.4 billion from remittances which mostly comes from Gulf countries namely Saudi Arabia, $9.7 billion from tourism, $5 billion from Suez Canal and $3 billion from FDI totaling about $62.1 billion against $1.3 billion of US aid (DECODED, 2017). This measure does not include loans, grants and portfolio investments.

This sense of the increasing insignificance of the US aid to Egypt has been expressed by many people including Abou El Enein himself. Abou El Enein said in a press conference in September
2017 that Egypt must refrain from seeking aid or assistance and that it should shift from the culture of aid to building strong partnerships and achieving common interests (al-Houti, 2017). Moreover, Egyptian diplomat Gamal Bayoumi said in August 2017 that the US aid does not mean anything to Egypt if compared to the figures of Egyptian imports from the US, adding that the US and Europe benefit much more from what Egypt imports from them compared to the aid they give Egypt (Moawad et al, 2017).

This increasing sense of dispensability of US aid, coupled with a general sense of distrust in the US foreign policy after the 2011 revolutions, has fueled anti-American discourse from some of the US most traditional allies in the region. From the perspective of the status-quo proponents in the region (whether the military regime in Egypt and its civilian business allies, or the regional actors especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE) there has been a general lack of trust in the Obama administration, and a sense of disappointment that the US has not supported and backed its longtime allies in the regime—especially Mubarak—until the end,. For example, Dhahi Khalfan, the head of the Dubai police known for his anti-Brotherhood sentiments, in January 2012, accused the USA of working to export the revolutions and claimed that after Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the Gulf would be next in line. Khalfan also accused the US of allying with the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve this goal, and as the Brotherhood was getting more powerful with the US support, it became more of a security threat to the Gulf countries. The UAE authorities in 2012 waged a wave of arrests against tens Muslim Brotherhood member in the UAE. They were charged with “seeking to oppose the basic principles of the UAE system of governance and to seize power” (Başkan, 2016, p. 111).

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter described two forms of dependence in the economic field in which the infitah business elite is situated. The first form is the dependence of the business elite itself on the state as an entity in control of distributing the country’s natural resources, namely land, independent from market mechanisms in a process more akin to that of “accumulation by dispossession” than market-based accumulation. This sort of dependence on the state as a primary method of extreme enrichment and accumulation, while the market mechanism only comes as secondary mechanism typically predicated by accumulation by dispossession, makes the continuation of direct control and capture of the state more decisive than in an often hypothetical setting where the market dominates as a method of accumulation.

Therefore, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its increasing control over the state
apparatuses and the increasing role its regional allies namely Turkey and Qatar played in the Egyptian market, posed a threat not only to the infitah business elite who formerly held privileged position on the receiving end of the distributive policy of the state, but also to the more traditional and established regional investors, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, the interests of the infitah business elite on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other hand coalesced around the time of the June 30 protests. The mission was clear, to dispose of the Brotherhood regime, and stop the increasing economic role of the Brotherhood’s regional allies, namely Qatar and Turkey.

This competition over opening up markets for excess capital was also coupled and intertwined with a more imminent existential political threat during a time of revolutionary fervour sweeping the region. Qatar and Turkey were more embracive of these changes especially when they resulted in bringing groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood to power. King Abdullah of Jordan described this rise of groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey and then Tunisia and Egypt as the Muslim Brotherhood crescent (Başkan, 2016, p. 3). The embracing of these changes, especially by Qatar, was best manifested through the coverage of al-Jazeera. During the revolution, al-Jazeera was the network with the most extensive around-the-clock coverage of the Egyptian revolution. However, unlike other networks, al-Jazeera did not concern itself much with hiding its vehement support to the political developments taking place in Egypt (Başkan, 2016, p. 86). Al-Jazeera also endorsed the subsequent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, supported them during their time in power, and was unapologetically and bluntly critical of the military regime for overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood regime and ruthlessly cracking down on the entire movement.

This position was a major motivation behind Nour and al-Amin establishing TV networks to counter this narrative of al-Jazeera, as I discussed in Chapter 3. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also invested significantly in establishing TV networks to counter the narrative of al-Jazeera. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut all diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed a siege by restricting trade and closing air space in front of Qatari airplanes, among other measures (Nasser, 2017). Among the key demands of the “siege countries” was to shut down al-Jazeera television completely (Maclean et al., 2017).

This chapter argued that the economic and political competition and rivalry should not be treated separately, especially under a model of accumulation characterized by “accumulation by dispossession”. In order to adequately separate the economic from the political, accumulation should therefore happen completely independent of state power. This is far from being the case in most settings, but especially in post-infitah Egypt, which witnessed the rise of “accumulation by
dispossession” and also witnessed the rise of oil-rich Gulf countries leading to a process of immense overaccumulation in the early 2000s, which made Egypt a theater for both political and economic competition between the GCC countries. The post-revolutionary period has intensified this process due to the political anxiety that characterized all regional players.

Tying back together the political and the economic is of crucial importance because orientalist and neo-orientalist approaches and theories of Middle Eastern exceptionalism often perceive the authoritarian state in the Middle East as the major obstacle against democratization, as if the state was functioning independently of society, and as if politics was functioning independently of economics (including the workings of global capitalism) (Zemni, 2017).

This introduces us to the second form of dependence, which is that of the Egyptian economy as a whole. The Egyptian economy has since the infitah been mostly dependent on external assistance and support in the form of aid, loans, remittances, etc. due to its economic structural and chronic crisis, characterized by long-term budget and trade deficits, and shortage of capital and foreign currency inflows. This has made the post-infitah Egypt increasingly reliant on aid, loans, and foreign investments. As discussed throughout the chapter, the early providers of aid, loans, tourism inflows and foreign investments in the post-infitah era were the US and European countries. With time and with an accelerated process of accumulation in the Gulf, the relative weight of the GCC countries has increased.

This has perhaps contributed to the emergence of a new Egyptocentric discourse whose characteristics were identified in Chapter 2, where Egyptocentrism was no longer positioned in opposition to the Arabo-Islamic heritage as it did in the 1930s, or in opposition to Arabism as it did in the 1970s. Instead, the Egyptocentric discourse of June 30 was characterized by an unequivocal anti-Americanism, and a lack of a superior attitude towards Arabs. These two characteristics of discourse, the chapter argued, cannot be separated from the changing roles of the GCC countries and the US as economic players in Egypt.
Part II

A century of nationalism, media and capitalism in Egypt
Chapter 5

The economic determinants of nationalist discourse and the role of mass media

(1919-1970)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of the two chapters which historicizes the nationalist discourse presented in Part I of this study. I explore the economic origins of the Egyptian national identity, and the changes it has undergone since the beginning of the 20th century and up until the death of Nasser and the Arab nationalist project, while highlighting how mass media was indispensable to the subsequent nationalist undertakings. Chapter 5 and 6 provide the pretextual dimension for the discourse discussed in Part I of this dissertation in order to avoid the treatment of discourse as single incidents isolated in time. It also aims to test the stability of nationalist discourse as a way to examine the extent to which it is sensitive to changes in the economic and technological contexts.

In a sense, the overarching objective of this study is to assess the extent to which economic agents are capable of modifying nationalist discourse to serve their interests. This could not be done without examining the history of nationalist thought and its links to the workings and movement of capital and technological development. The objective of this chapter is, therefore, twofold: first, it aims to demonstrate the foundational principles of Egyptian nationalism by analyzing the writings of foundational nationalist thinkers and historians. Second, it aims to show whether these foundational principles were determined—even if not simply determined—by the interests of the business elite in different historical periods.

I did so by exploring the early Egyptian nationalist project and its intimate links with a modernist capitalist (including state capitalist) project. I examined its role as a method for trying to have better control and a bigger share of the means of production by a nationalist bourgeoisie that were alienated by a foreign feudal and bankers’ class in the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century. The chapter will also look at how major shifts in the nationalist discourse in Egypt since the 1919 revolution have had major economic aspects to them, and how technological advancements in mass media were mobilised to achieve such nationalist objectives. It will also explore how for the first time such nationalist discourse switched from being an anti-establishment discourse of resistance prior to the 1919 revolution, to being institutionalized in the inter-war period after the emergence of al-Wafd party as a representative of a nationalist bourgeoisie, and Egypt’s partial independence from
the British empire.

This chapter will also analyse the writings of the two main nationalist thinkers representing the two major camps from the period leading up to the "constitutional era" in Egypt which spans from the Urabi revolution until the revolution of 1919, which scholars mostly agree were the years a modern nationalist discourse was founded by leading nationalist intellectuals. This era leading up to the 1919 revolution is the era in which calls for independence and a constitution became more vocal, especially with the outbreak of World War I.

After the 1952 coup, the Free Officers Movement (FOM) took the independence project to the next level when they embarked on a land reform programme in order to dismantle the power of the overthrown regime and its allies. The land reform set a ceiling of 200 feddans of land ownership to dismantle the power of the feudal elite. Other than social justice, redistribution of wealth had two benefits for the new regime; gaining popular support as a new regime and breaking the power of a former elite. With an expected backlash from other regional and international powers, Nasser and the FOM felt the need for “exporting the revolution” and creating allies both in the Arab region, in Africa and around the world.

Therefore, a discourse of social justice, Arab-nationalism, third-worldism and non-alliance was well-suited for the new regime’s ambitions. This was further exacerbated by the refusal of the US and the UK to fund the building of a new dam south of the Aswan Dam to provide the needed energy for Nasser’s industrialization and modernization dreams, which was also a way of distinguishing himself from the old feudal regime. This has driven Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal, turn to the Eastern Bloc for political and militaristic support, which added a new characteristic to the Nasserist regime, that is, anti-imperialism. This was also heavily used by his propaganda tools to discredit his opponents in the region who were constantly described as “lackeys of colonialism”.

The chapter will discuss another important and relevant event where economic aid played a major role in changing/shaping a nationalist discourse. Saudi Arabia's aid to Egypt after the 1967 defeat in the six-day war to help with the economic challenges caused by the humiliating defeat was implicitly conditioned to the toning down of the Arab nationalist discourse (Dawisha, 2003, p. 255-6). This was followed in the 1970s by a Saudi Arabian campaign and a continuation of politically-motivated aid to Egypt, and Saudi efforts in brokering the expulsion of Soviet experts in 1972 by the Sadat administration. The toning down of Arab nationalism due to this Saudi Arabian influence, followed by the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League due to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,
made it urgent for Egypt to develop a new nationalist discourse that would distance it from the pan-
Arabist discourse of the foregone era.

5.2 “The birth of Egyptian nationalism”

Many scholars regard the Urabi revolution as signaling the birth of Egyptian nationalism (Cole 1993; Farah 2009; Reid & Mayer 1988). Juan Cole argues that the first signs of modern Egyptian nationalism were a direct result of the mismanagement of the economy by Khedive Ismail, and the debt crisis that was caused by an over-borrowing spree that banked on a boom in cotton production, which did not last for as long as was hoped for in the middle of the 19th century. The debt crisis led to large budget cuts, and an increase in taxation imposed by the European cabinet which almost exclusively affected small Egyptian landowners and low-rank Egyptian military officers and soldiers, leaving the Turko-Circassian military elite and feudal aristocracy almost unharmed. The introduction of mixed courts meant that European creditors managed to seize land from small Egyptian landowners who were slightly in arrears due to the cotton bust and high taxation. The interest of both the peasantry and the military in abolishing foreign influence has led to the initial success of the Urabi movement due to the broad-based support it received with its assertive nationalist discourse, which emphasized that Egypt should only be for the Egyptians. The success of the Urabi movement ended with further and more aggressive foreign intervention in the form of a British military conquest of Egypt.

Cole goes back 31 years before the start of the Urabi movement, and starts with explaining in detail the privileges, namely estates, granted to the Ottoman-Egyptian service class forming it into a new nobility, and how they paid no taxes on the land granted to them before Khedive Said imposed a ‘ushr (one-tenth land tax) on this newly-formed nobility. However, even after a further increase under Ismail’s rule, the tax remained remarkably lower than what the peasants paid as kharaj (tax on agricultural land) (Cole, 1993, p. 56).

Cole explains how the Egyptian cotton industry was the region's first large-scale experience with boom-and-bust cycles which are typical to primary commodity trading in “the periphery of the industrial market”. The boom in Egypt's cotton production and export was a result of the North's blockade of the South during the American Civil War, for the American South was the main supplier of cotton to Britain; the South’s overall cotton exports fell by 95 percent as a result of the siege (Cole, 2013, p. 58).

Cole continues to explain in many pages the effect of the cotton boom and bust on the peasants,
and how the boom benefited the Ottoman-Egyptian elite much more than it did the local peasants, and how it significantly increased the value of agricultural land, especially land that belongs to the nobility because the light taxation it received. Due to the boom and expected increased prosperity, the state raised land taxes in the late 1860s, and once again during the debt crisis in the early 1870s which led most small peasant to default and give up their land to large landowners. Cole explains how during Khedive Ismail’s era, this process led to the transfer of 300,000 feddans from medium- and smallholders to largeholders. Starting 1876, mixed tribunals, which became widely despised by local peasants, were introduced to apply European laws that would allow European creditors to capture land belonging to peasants in arrears, replacing Islamic laws that did not allow the seizure of land for debt default. It is estimated that between 1878 and 1883, mixed court transferred ownership of about 50,000 feddans from defaulted peasants to money-lenders in the province of Minuffiyah alone (Cole, 2013, p. 59).

In his book, Cole also attributes the participation of the propertied peasants in the Urabi movement to more economic issues such as the recognition of small peasant land as private property in 1858. The legal claims of peasants to their land, and a stronger sense of private property gave the peasants a greater political interest in its disposition, and left peasant seeking ways of regaining their lost lands (p. 64). Cole also argues that Ismail's abolishment of forced labour, a step that led to the end of their statuses as near-serfs and instead into a rural proletariat, led to the abrogation of noble privileges and an increased income for peasants, which in turn, led to a greater ability for peasants to mobilize resources.

In short, peasants started to have a greater stake in the system due to economic changes in the second half of the 19th century, namely the increased per capita earnings due to the cotton boom, greater profitability, and the recognition of their land as private property. Around the same time, propertied peasants saw their land taken by the Khedive and his Ottoman-Egyptian nobility. As part of the mixed tribunals system, peasants also started seeing their land being foreclosed by European and Levantine creditors. Due to all this, there started to be a real and burning interest in abolishing privileges of the Turco-Circassian nobles and foreign creditors, “an interest sharpened by high rates of population growth that increased competition for land”. Cole then continues to demonstrate how such economic factors would build up over a number of decades until it culminates with the Urabi revolt.

Although the nationalist movement led by Urabi was suppressed and Urabi himself was sent to exile, the direct military occupation would only firmly establish his movement’s nationalist ideals.
which culminated decades later with the 1919 revolution. Nadia Ramsis Farah (2009, p. 64) argues that the Urabi revolt signaled the birth of Egyptian nationalism because the Egyptian landed elite, who was subordinate to the ruling Turkish-Circassian elite, sought an ideology that would deprive the foreign elite of political legitimacy, and they found this ideology in Egyptian nationalism.

The nationalism of the Urabi revolution was mostly an ideology of resistance; it was grassroots, and although Urabi at some point was the effective ruler of the army—and even the country as a whole after Khedive Tawfik’s authority dwindled—this was very short-lived, and the movement was not able in the end to fully institutionalize after being crushed by a British invasion which managed to forcefully restore Khedive Tawfik to the palace. However, a few decades later, the nationalist movement did have some success in institutionalizing Egyptian nationalism, and the nationalist discourse ceased to be one of grassroots and organic resistance, and became a discourse with a degree of institutional backing as will be discussed later in the chapter.

5.3 A false dichotomy between Kamil and al-Sayyid? Determinism in the writings of the two pioneer national thinkers

Mustafa Kamil and Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid are considered by scholars of Egyptian nationalism the architects of early modern Egyptian nationalism (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 6). They dedicated most of their writings to theorizing and structuring an identity for Egyptians amidst a myriad of influences including the Ottoman Islamic influence on the one hand and European modernist influence on the other. They were also prominent political figures leading the two main political parties of the time established to fight for Egypt's independence: Kamil being the historical leader of al-Hizb al-Watany (the nationalist party) and al-Sayyid being the historical leader of Hizb al-Umma (the nation’s party). They both were also the chief editors of two of the most important nationalist publications of the time.

By 1900, the nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil, published al-Liwa newspaper, probably the nationalist platform that was the most aggressive in its attack against the British occupation. Its uncompromising tone won it great popularity among student and young intellectuals making it the most widely circulated newspaper in Egypt by 1908, reaching a circulation of 15,000 (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003, p. 242). Being the official newspaper of the al-Hizb al-Watany (Kamil's nationalist party), it propagated the party’s anti-British and pro-Ottoman stances.

Al-Liwa's main nationalist rival newspaper was therefore quite naturally the newspaper of the Umma party led by Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid. Al-Jarida newspaper, established in 1907, focused on
issues of literary criticism, feminism and social reform and saw itself as independent of British, Ottoman and Khedival influences, and was home for the writings of liberal nationalist thinkers of the time such as Taha Hussein and feminist pioneer Malak Hifny Nasif (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003, p. 214). *Al-Jarida* was also co-founded by nationalist leader, economist and the founder of Banque Misr, Talaat Harb, in which he wrote articles calling for the creation of an economic bases of political independence, through the establishment of national economic institutions. This burning nationalist desire has been a common theme in all the post-1919 newspapers namely the nationalist Wafdist ones such as *al-Akhbar* (Tignor, 1976).

During the period of British occupation, a formulation of an Egyptian identity was advanced by the leaders of the two political parties established in the decade preceding World War I (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987). According to Israel and Gershoni, the views of these two parties articulated by its two thinkers "were the culmination, the most elaborate and cogent expression, of Egyptian nationalist attitudes as they had evolved over the preceding decades." (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 6).

The slogan of the Urabi movement "Egypt for the Egyptians" is thought to be interpreted by Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid as a secular statement that contradicts what he defines as Ottomanism based on religious loyalty, and that this loyalty is incompatible with the slogan. As I will discuss later in this chapter, Kamil had a different interpretation of the Urabi motto. Israel and Gershoni argued that al-Sayyid, with his liberal tendencies, believed that such religion-oriented nationalism has a destructive potential of dividing the nation’s Muslims and Copts and instigating a hostile reaction in Europe against Egypt (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 8).

One important and exemplary event that perfectly captures the ideological division in the foundation years of modern Egyptian nationalism was the tension caused by the Turco-Italian war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire which represents a more traditional and older form of political association. This was an important war on many levels. It is popularly known for the use of the first aerial reconnaissance mission in the history of wars—as well as the first aerial bomb ever; two technological advances which have become key characteristics of all subsequent modern wars. This war was also one of the last nails in the coffin of the Ottoman Empire, or rather the Sick Man of Europe.

Other than being a defeat in its own right, it had presented a pretext for a Balkan states to think they might be able to defeat the Sick Man of Europe, leading to further suffering for the Ottoman
empire. As one of the world’s last surviving pre-modern empire, its fall had ushered in the formation of many new nation-states across its former territory.

The Turco-Italian war forced the Egyptian nationalist thinkers to start making difficult choices about which side to support as Egypt was still then officially a nominal vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In his book *Story of my Life* (2012a, p. 79), al-Sayyid explains how the disparity between Europe's supportive reaction towards the independence of the Balkan state on the one hand, and its reaction towards the independence of Egypt on the other hand makes Egyptians conclude that Egypt's only fault is that it is an Islamic nation. This, in his view, led to the unfavorable outcome of Egyptians siding with the Ottomans as defenders of the majority's faith against the Italians who represented in the minds of many Egyptians the attackers on the faith. Al-Sayyid wrote:

What they [Egyptians] conclude is that Egypt's only fault is being an Islamic nation, and that Europe does not help in the East except Christian nations. Therefore, some of them wish if Muslims had a unity like that they imagine exists in Europe, which was the reason for Europe to interfere in the affairs of the Balkan States and Armenia. We say this while we do not know of a collective word for Christianity (Pan-Christianism) the same way a collective word for Islam was created (Pan-Islamism) (Al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 40).

Al-Sayyid continues to describe this war as a chance to revisit what he had been advocating, which is that “Egypt should be for Egyptians”. Al-Sayyid writes that he kept reminding Egyptians that Egypt's duty in this war is to be neutral, that Turkey's dominion does not bring good to Egypt, does not prevent it from harm, and that it could not save her from the British Occupation— an occupation that Egypt cannot get rid of except with its unity and relying on itself (Al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 79).

Al-Sayyid's neutral position on the Turco-Italian war in 1911-12, developed with time to become more anti-Ottomanist. During World War I, he privately advocated for entering the war on the side of Britain, and get in return recognition of independence from the British Empire. However, the plan did not proceed because the British were not very receptive to such offer (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 26).

Evident of such anti-Ottomanism, in December 1914, al-Sayyid's newspaper *al-Jarida* went as far as hailing the declaration of Egypt as British Protectorate as a “great revolution”, and that it would portend a glowing future for the country. It also took the chance to state that the resulting
termination of Ottoman sovereignty as advantageous to Egypt's true interest in attaining self-rule (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 27).

Kamil, on the other hand, had already died at the time of the breakout of the Turco-Italian war, but his views and legacy which became the official position of his party were extremely pro-Ottoman. In 1898, Kamil dedicated an entire book titled The Eastern Question for the defense of the Ottoman Empire, which he refers to as al-dawla al-'olya (Sublime State). In the introduction of the book, Kamil congratulates the Sublime State for its great victory over Greece in the Greco-Turkish war of 1887.

Kamil wrote in the introduction of his book: “People—both friends and foes of the [Ottoman] state, have seen substantiation of its well being, and evidence of its youthfulness, and therefore the souls of its sons and friends have been refreshed, and the hearts of its enemies and adversaries were blurred by God.” (Kamil, 2014, p. 7). He ended the introduction of the book with a prayer in which he writes:

God, the creator of heavens and earth, with a faithful and sincere heart to bestow eternal strength and everlasting victory upon the sublime state, and for the Ottomans and Muslims to live for eternity in mastership and sublimity; to save for the Ottoman empire its protector, and for Islam its imam and champion: his majesty the Greatest Sultan and Caliph Abdel Hamid II the Conqueror (Kamil, 2014, p. 7-8).

This obvious political allegiance to the Ottoman empire as the guardian and protector of Islam against the non-Muslim world namely “Christian Europe” continues throughout the book. In his criticism of how the Greeks were seeking independence from the Ottoman empire, he harshly attacked them based on the pretext that the “Islamic treatment” was unique in dealing with them, and that even Catholics treated the Greeks with contempt and disdain. Kamil also writes that it is impossible for historians to deny the high qualities and moral rectitude of Mehmed the Conqueror and Muslims, which appeared in Constantinople after the conquest like a “rising sun dissipating darkness, and as a sign of how outstanding the Islamic faith is.” (Kamil, 2014, p. 39).

Kamil also saw Egypt as a mere component of a wider Islamic world united under the rule of the Ottoman empire, and represented in the person of its Sultan. In his book, Kamil claims that the wellbeing of Egypt and the sublime state cannot be achieved without harmony and unity, and that Egyptians have unanimously realised such fact following the example of their beloved prince
Abbas [II Hilmi Bey].

Egyptians, according to Kamil, have come closer to the Sublime State, and voiced their love to it through thick and thin, and the whole world admitted that the people of Egypt are the most faithful loyalists to the Sublime State and the shahist throne. According to Kamil, this was proven during the Greco-Turkish war, and he expressed that he has no doubt that the proud Egyptian nation is solid in its position and will never give up its loyalty to the Sublime State.

He goes on to call on every honest Egyptian and Ottoman to thwart the workings of those who try to sow division between Egypt and the Sublime State. He described those who “sow the seeds of discord between His Majesty the Great Caliph and His Highness the Great Khedive [of Egypt], and those who work on creating hatred and resentment between the leader and the follower” as the most serious opponents of the state, and its biggest enemies (Kamil, 2014, p. 72).

But was al-Sayyid really the ideological arch rival of Kamil? Despite al-Sayyid's apparent adoption of secular and liberal ideas and his outright anti-Ottomanism, al-Sayyid's views were not void of primordialist and perennialist sentiments, which according to Smith, the key to its nature and power lies in the rootedness of the nation in kinship, ethnicity, and the genetic bases of human existence (Smith, 1999).

No one has any doubt that we are a nation distinct from any other by virtue of qualities peculiar to us, and which possibly no other nation shares with us. We have our own peculiar color, our own peculiar tastes, and a single, universal language. And we possess a religion which most of us share, ways of performing our activities, and a blood which is virtually one flowing in our veins, while our fatherland has clearly defined natural boundaries which separate us from everyone else (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 14).

Al-Sayyid in this passage echoes a sentiment that is extremely primordialist and puts a lot of focus on nature, whether it is geographical nature such as “defined natural boundaries” or physiological nature such as “our own peculiar color” and “blood which is virtually one flowing in our veins”. According to al-Sayyid, such forces of nature led to developing a “single universal language”, “a religion that most of us share”, “peculiar taste” and even “ways of performing our activities”.

This statement defines how nature gave Egyptians immutable characteristics such as a universal religion and language, and that even cultural phenomena, or social constructs in the language of
social sciences, is still a product of the natural order. Al-Sayyid proceeds to more explicitly refer to “civic association” as a “product of nature and one of its creations”. "The umma is that civic association [al-ijtima' al-madani] which is a product of nature and one of its creations”. Al-Sayyid also personifies what he describes as the “civic association”—which according to typologists of nationalism stands in great contrast with nationalism based on organic elements such as ethnicity, language, etc.—as having the right to life and freedom in the same manner individuals possess those natural rights (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1987, p. 13).

Al-Sayyid believed in the rootedness of the Egyptian nation in a past that is intimately linked to the present as a continuous whole that defies time.

Our nation in this present does not have an independent presence from our previous nation. But a nation is a whole undivided and indivisible one. It is a nation where its social body was created from the day it became independent in this bounded homeland. It had a known social system, so it started moving in its life from health to disease, and from disease to health, until it became what it is today (al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 55).

In this passage, al-Sayyid once again puts a very clear emphasis on “nature” and comparing a nation to a living creature in expressions such as “moving in its life from health to disease, and from disease to health.” For someone who was celebrated as a liberal nationalist thinker, Al-Sayyid was intolerant towards citizens hosting various national identities, and was asking for those who hail from other nations to pay allegiance to Egypt only, or else their Egyptianism should be doubted.

If many of us reflected on themselves, looked into the depths of their consciences, reviewed what they say in their gatherings, and examine their actions, they will see that some of us still like belonging to the countries of the Arabs, or to Syria or Turkey and not Egypt. This tendency is shown in speech and embodied in action. Who can describe this tendency and its results as loyalty to Egypt? Who can […] call those who love [countries] other than Egypt, Egyptian? (al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 55).

Here also Al-Sayyid expressed antagonism towards Egyptians who identified in anyway with other nations like the Turkish, Arab, Syrian, Circassian or European. For al-Sayyid, an Egyptian identity was exclusive and could not be shared in anyway with any other national identity.
If the Greeks when occupied by Turkey abandoned their nationalism, renounced their national traits and despised belonging to their country and forgot that they are Greek, their personality would have perished, the ambition for independence would have died for them, and it would have been impossible for them to restore its honours. However, despite their weakness, they retained their nationalism and solidarity. They did not shame their homelands by belonging to another, and so they ultimately achieved what they demanded (al-Sayyid 2012b, p. 61).

Despite al-Sayyid's effort to gain independence from the British empire, he was very influenced by European models of political organization. A recurrent theme in al-Sayyid's writings is “the Egyptianization of European modernity”. In an article written on the March 4, 1913 titled *Imitation*, al-Sayyid encourages the copying of other peoples' experiences, and argues that this does not necessarily lead to the distortion of the national identity of the receiving end. He gives ancient Greece’s influence by ancient Egypt as an example of imitating another civilization, but still being able to brand it as yours. Furthermore, when the Arabs took a lot from the Persian and Greek civilizations, they Arabized it and made it their own.

Al-Sayyid believes that Egyptians' “linguistic, religious and moral standards” will shape and overtake any modern cultural or scientific imports from Europe. For al-Sayyid, full imitation does not exist; the imports from Europe once reaches Egypt will acquire our character and adjust to our linguistic, religious and moral standards until it becomes completely our own (al-Sayyid, 2012a, p. 55).

Al-Sayyid's nationalist reference points and examples were all European, and the same way he mentions “old” nations such as Greece, he also makes a reference to a new 19th century nation state: Italy. He explains in a column written in January 1913—just half a century after Italian unification and the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy—that Italians became weak and divided and fell under the rule of Austria and France, and have only regained their independence and restored their glory by means of their attachment to their nation, and love to their country. He wonders why we have not heard anyone in Italy claiming that they were French even if they were from French origins, or Austrian even if they were from Austrian origins.

This solidarity, in al-Sayyid's view, led them to have the honour of independence, and subsequently upgrade to the “ranks of great colonial powers”. It is also worth noting that this was written only three months after the end of the Italo-Turkish war, in which Italy defeated the Ottoman
empire in its first major successful colonial expedition. Al-Sayyid's admiration for the Italian struggle from unification to its rise as a colonial power could also partly explain his position against the popular support in Egypt for the Ottomans against Italy.

His admiration of colonialism as the end result for successful struggles of independence and attachment to the homeland, is also reminiscent of Kamil's writings where he uses terms like “conqueror” in a favourable sense. In a way, the two nationalist leaders also have in common a view of Egypt as an imperialist power waiting to be realised. Their anti-colonialist activism was, therefore, perhaps not a principled position against imperialism in general, but based on a belief that Egypt is too great to be colonized by European nations, and that Egypt could be as “great” as European powers if it could achieve independence and was left to realize its imperialist potential.

Another example of al-Sayyid drawing inspiration from Europe's modernism is apparent in his column published in April 1913 titled *The secret of the development of nations* in which he praises his friend Ahmed Fathy Zaghloul for Arabizing a book by his contemporary French philosopher Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. In the same article he also refers to what Zaghloul told him about how *al-Tarbiya* (upbringing) was the reason behind the development of the Anglo-Saxons, and that he asked Egyptians to imitate them. He praised Zaghloul's translations of Western thinkers and philosophers as a way of disseminating to the public the “scientific rules for advancement”, in order for his people to apply them and make use of the experiences of other nations (al-Sayyid 2012b, p. 94).

He argued that it is very useful for Egypt as an emerging nation to know the findings of social scientists on the rules regarding the rise and fall of nations and the reasons behind their strength and weaknesses. He thought it was indispensable for Egypt to be guided by this social research in her efforts for progress and development. He simply believed that these findings or social rules will be applicable to Egypt, and its favourable results will be what Egyptians wish for their nation (al-Sayyid 2012b, p. 76).

Even Kamil–despite his outright Ottomanism and pan-Islamism–would still look northward for inspiration. Defending his argument that religion is not in conflict with nationalism, he wrote that he believes nationalism and religion are inseparable, and that the man whom his heart is captured by religion, will love his nation sincerely and sacrifice his soul for it. Kamil explains that he does not rely on the sayings of his Muslim forefathers in order not to be accused of intolerance and ignorance by the children of the modern age; instead he cites the words of Bismarck, whom he describes as the most important politician of his era, and as a great man who had served his country and raised its
status. In defending his argument, he attributes to Bismarck the saying: “if you take away religion from my heart, you would take with it my love for the homeland” (Hussein 1984, p. 83).

Despite being presented in Western and Egyptian historiography as an advocate of a secular, territorial and inclusive brand of nationalism compared to Mustafa Kamil, al-Sayyid still paid allegiance to the role of religion, language and nature in the process of nation building in Egypt. He also fiercely rejected liberal cosmopolitanism and the possibility of having multiple identities for the Egyptian citizenry, and argued that any other sort of national identification would disqualify any individual from being Egyptian.

This laid the foundation for strict conditioning of who could qualify as an Egyptian in terms of religiosity, language, etc. The writings discussed throughout the chapter set these conditions quite bluntly. Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid's writings also praise colonialism as the ultimate objective of the struggle of independence. His overall fascination with the colonialist powers of Europe mixed with his nationalist tendencies demonstrates that his views are not against anti-imperialism in principle but rather that colonialism is something the could be learned and acquired given the right “nationalist upbringing”.

Al-Sayyid is highly influenced by Europe's 19th century nationalism and technological advancement, which in his view culminates with European-style imperialism as being the highest form of nationalism. Kamil, on the other hand, was more oriented towards a traditional form of state, where the monarch and Islam play a key role in defining the nation. He was, nevertheless, still fond of Europe’s 19th century experiment with modern nationalism making the ideological gap between both thinkers and their followers narrower than what is generally believed, and mainly centres around their position towards the Ottoman empire and Egypt’s relation to it.

This section aimed to give an overview of some of the principles of Egyptian nationalism through analyzing the writings of Mustafa Kamil and Ahmed Lotfy al-Sayyid and situating them in their wider political, social and economic contexts of the time. It was a glimpse into the debates that were taking place among Egyptian nationalists in the build up to World War I and then the 1919 revolution. The conclusion of this section is that despite political differences between Kamil and al-Sayyid over the Ottoman Empire, they were both organicist in their nationalist approach putting a significant deal of emphasis on issue of ethnicity, blood, geography and nature as a basis of what constitutes the Egyptian nation.

It might be argued that nationalism is by definition an ideology of perennialist and primordialist beliefs, especially in relation to nations that are perceived as ancient compared to nations that are
perceived as more recent (e.g. settler nations). Hobsbawm argues for the existence of two distinct forms of political entities containing nations: the nationalist and the revolutionary-democratic. The nationalist assumes the existence of some prior community distinguishing itself from foreigners, while the revolutionary democratic regarded the sovereign citizen-people as what constitutes a nation-state, and distinguishes its people from the remainder of the human race (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 22).

Hobsbawm argues that French nationality, despite being an “old” nation, was of the revolutionary-democratic type; issue of ethnicity, history, the language or patois spoken at home, were irrelevant to the definition of 'the nation'. Kamil and al-Sayyid, despite their difference, both advocate for a nationalist political entity to contain the Egyptian nation in this Hobsbawmian sense. This might have been necessary, since Egyptian nationalism, arguably born with the Urabi revolution, was set in motion to challenge the privileges of both the Turkish-speaking ruling and land-owning elite and the European financial elites. This will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of the chapter on the economic origins of Egyptian nationalism.

5.4 A bourgeois revolution, and the creation of an institutional and constitutional national order

The 1919 revolution paved the way for the creation of a sovereign, modern, constitutional nation-state in Egypt that does not orbit in a sphere of a larger empire. By then, the Ottoman Empire was already in its death throes, and Britain granted Egypt formal recognition as an independent state. Surely, this was not the end of the British presence in Egypt, but the formal independence was not entirely cosmetic and did have some impact in creating some constitutional order, and more importantly in creating a national economy and media led by national businessmen to work in parallel with foreign-controlled media and capital. This nationalist bourgeoisie managed to produce itself as an integral part of the nationalist struggle against British occupation in particular and European influence in general (Abdel-malek, 2013).

In order for the Egyptian business class to increase its stake in the economy, a strong nationalist discourse was needed to gain them legitimacy over their foreign rivals. Al-Sayyid’s discourse for “Egyptianizing European modernity” and his strict criteria for what constitutes an Egyptian suit well a national bourgeoisie that was committed to sharing in the fruits of a modern European-dominated processes of capital accumulation in finance and industry by calling for its Egyptianization. The revolution of 1919 and its aftermath led, unlike the previous nationalist movements and struggles, to
the institutionalization of these nationalist ideas. The nationalist struggle no longer became only an informal struggle against formal institutions that work in favour of Ottoman and European centres of power, but it had some success in creating institutions to rival those of the colonial administration.

Albert Hourani (2013, p. 180-1) argues that when industry began to appear in the 1920s and the 1930s, it was the circle of Lutfi al-Sayyid that was responsible for it. Talaat Harb, who established Banque Misr and the lot of companies that was associated with it, was a school fellow and a collaborator of al-Sayyid. The role of Talaat Harb and Banque Misr in building the economic foundation for the national independence movement was one of the clearest manifestations of the role of economic men in the shaping of nationalist discourse as will be discussed later in the chapter.

Robert Vitalis (1995) argues that minor investors coalitions such as that of the Greek and the Jewish minorities may have imagined a continued expansion of their holdings under the protection of a colonial administration, but after 1919, argues Vitalis, an Egyptian political elite gradually took control of the administration of the state, which led Egyptian nationals to rapidly monopolize access to resources.

Vitalis, who studies business nationalism in inter-war Egypt, points out that World War I brought immense benefits to Egyptian capitalists, and that the war started to gradually bring down the entry barriers, namely the capitulations or mixed courts system, erected in the mid-1800s. For such business elite, industry and manufacturing—as well as finance, cotton export, transport, construction—were all areas where they could now pursue both profit and power (Vitalis, 1995, p. 30).

Other than establishing political institutions such as a modern parliament and the constitution, the Egyptian business class had some success in increasing its share in the economy of Egypt. From the time of Urabi’s defeat in 1882 until Egypt was declared a British protectorate at the start of World War I in 1914, the share of foreign capital, especially British and French, had increased significantly. Foreign capital invested in Egypt had increased from EGP 21 million in 1902 to over EGP 100 million in 1914 without taking into account the Suez Canal (Abdel-malek, 2013, p. 43). Between 1900 and 1907, 160 new companies were incorporated with a capital of EGP 43 million. Abdel-malek argues that the principal allies of this new influx of foreign capital were the big landowners because the occupying force has become a perpetual customer for their products, as Egypt was turning into a gigantic cotton farm for the textile mills of Lancashire (Abdel-malek 2013, p. 42). Furthermore, some merchants were main allies of the British colonizers because they could profit from supplying the British army with the merchandise they needed.

This trend, however, started to slowly reverse after the end of World War I. In 1917, two years
before the 1919 revolution, a commission for industry and commerce was established and included in its membership nationalist leader and businessman Talaat Harb and others with a mission to establish a national industry. Abdel-malek (2013) argues that the national bourgeoisie was supportive of the violent revolution of 1919 with the hope that they become the sole owners of the country’s wealth and resources, and this strategy was successful to a certain extent. Although its success was limited and the majority of capital was still controlled by foreign powers, the share of Egyptian capital did increase quite significantly in the aftermath of the 1919 revolution.

On the eve of the declaration of Egypt as a British protectorate on December 18, 1914, foreign capital in Egypt amounted for EGP 92 million, of which EGP 67 million were invested in land as opposed to only EGP 8 million of Egyptian capital invested in land, in addition to EGP 94 million of Egyptian debt owed to foreign creditors which makes the percentage of foreign capital in Egypt at that time about 92 percent of all invested capital in the country (Abdel-malek, 2013, p. 46). By 1948, the amount of capital invested by the total amount of companies operating in Egypt was around EGP 118 million of which 61 percent was foreign and 39 percent was Egyptian (Abdel-malek, p. 47).

However, Vitalis argues that there was no direct antagonistic confrontation between foreign and national capital. On the contrary, in many cases the two “forms” of capital served each others interests and worked together harmoniously. This, in Vitalis’s view, was probably the national capitalists’ biggest chance to slowly but increasingly infiltrate the European-dominated business world, and join ranks with the country’s top capitalists. New rising figures such as Talaat Harb and his new national bank project Banque Misr, and the construction and sugar empire run by Ahmed Abbud, who had reportedly become one of the world’s richest persons, marked a new shift in the weight and the power of national economic forces (Vitalis, 1995, p. 30).

The role of the printing press in supporting the efforts of the nationalist bourgeoisie was immense. It was quite natural for an event as significant as the 1919 revolution, and the emergence of political heavyweights such as al-Wafd party to alter the media landscape of the time. Talaat Harb already started a decade before the outbreak of World War I to focus on the nationalist economic problems using nationalist media platforms to promote his ideas. However, it was not until after the partial independence gains resulting from the 1919 revolution that his plan had been realised, and the mass print media had played a crucial role in the realization of his plans.

Banque Misr, which was founded in 1920 to mobilize Egyptian capital to compete with European capital, started as a relatively small operation, but its symbolic value attracted the attention
of both the nationalist and the European press. One of the most devoted supporters of the project was *al-Akhbar* newspaper with its nationalist Wafdist tendencies calling on Egyptians to support the new enterprise by buying shares in it. *Al-Ahram* and *al-Muqattam* also participated in the new bank’s publicity campaign (Tignor, 1976).

The European press was more skeptical though about Egypt’s readiness for such step. The *Bulletin Commercial*, despite its professed support, did not think the project was feasible. The journal wrote in reaction to the project: “A long education is necessary in order to adapt to the principles and prescriptions of modern finance—in a word European assimilation. In everything there must be an apprenticeship. One does not become a master at a stroke. Without wishing to diminish whatsoever the merit of this new activity, we can say that limited strictly to the indigenous element in capital, administration, and direction its hour has not yet come.” (Tignor, 1976).

Despite its modest start with a capital of less than EGP 80,000, the campaigns of the nationalist newspapers started to pay off after a slow take-off and the capital of the bank rose from EGP 474,924 in 1924 to EGP 720,000 in 1925 to EGP 1,000,000 in 1927, or more than 12 times the initial capital of the bank that was raised seven years earlier (Tignor, 1976). It is very unlikely that without the control of mass media platforms in the form of newspapers and the kind of mass mobilization it allows, that these efforts would have ever seen the light, let alone succeed in establishing a national bank that will prove instrumental, and will play a key economic and symbolic role in the struggle for independence.

In order to increase the share of the national bourgeoisie in the country’s capital, some degree of protectionism and import substitution policies were adopted in the early 1930s when the tariff system was amended to increase the taxes to as high as 50 percent on luxury products that have an equivalent produced nationally. This has resulted in an 11-fold increase in the size of local textile market in the 1930s, taking from the market share of the British textiles (Tarouty, 2015). British factories were affected by the decline of their exports to Egypt and considered establishing plants in Egypt to exempt its products from the high tariff, but any presence in Egypt had to happen through a joint venture with an Egyptian company.

The result of this was that Calico Printers entered the Egyptian market in 1933 as a joint venture with the national firm *Filature National D’Egypte*, and five years later in 1938, Bradford Dyers entered into a joint venture with the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company established by Talaat Harb. Harb found pride in the fact that the Misr firms blocked Bradford’s original intention to enter the country as an independent producer and that it had managed to capture its technical and
managerial skills for itself (Tarouty, 2015).

It is therefore clear that a certain form of economic nationalism during this period had strengthened the position of national capital vis-à-vis foreign capital, and guaranteed national capital more political support from an increasingly nationalized set of institutions; the domination of foreign elements in the political and economic sphere made more viable the argument that all Egyptians shared the same interests regardless of their class position. This allowed the national bourgeois elite, represented by al-Wafād party, to avoid class-based confrontation and mobilize the support of disenfranchised groups and secure the hegemony of bourgeois influence within the national movement (Hussein, 1973, p. 69).

This highly shifting and volatile tides of capitalism and business required a nationalist discourse that is relatively flexible, broad, abstract and could be adjusted depending on private investment interests and strategies (Hussein 1973, p. 45).

Local businessmen understood this, and the versions of nationalism that different Egyptian investors championed proved flexible enough to accommodate shifting and pragmatic assessments of interest. The public expressions of economic nationalism associated so prominently with the Misr group’s chairman, Harb, proved equally useful to Harb’s local Egyptian rivals, especially in trying to obtain political support for their various enterprises. There were no obvious penalties involved in doing so as long as economic nationalism was the discursive monopoly of capitalists or intellectuals who did not challenge the legitimacy of the prevailing private enterprise–oriented economic order. Harb, along with Yahya, ‘Abbud and others, remained free to pursue strategies of selective cooperation with foreign capital. Business nationalism strengthened the competitive positions of local capital—Egyptian and non-Egyptian both—vis-à-vis potential foreign partners, even while Egyptian nationals could use it to advantage in neutralizing some of the well-known competitive advantages that had accrued to local foreigners. In sum, Harb’s public-relations campaigns benefited, if unequally, a diverse range of local investors (Vitalis, 1995, p. 45).

As explained above, an expanding mass print media after almost a century of maturation was an important tool in the hands of the nationalist movement, and just like with capital, the nationalist movement was keen on having their own share of an otherwise dominated European media scene. The history of a vibrant and old press scene in Egypt cannot be separated from the national struggle
for independence. Modern press in Egypt had started with the French Campaign which introduced mass printing in 1798 by publishing two journals *Le Courrier de l'Egypte* and *La Decade Egyptienne* to act as propaganda tools for the Napoleon-led French campaign in Egypt (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003, p. 320).

Two decades later, Bulaq Press was established by Muhammed Ali in 1822 as the first Arabic printing press owned by the government as part of his modernization plan, and seven years later the first Arabic-language newspaper, *al-Waqai' al-Misriya* was founded as the government's official journal, and still acts as such until this day (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003, p. 90).

Established as a mouthpiece for the pro-French Levantines in Egypt, al-Ahram was established in 1876 in Alexandria by the Christian Levantine Tiqla brothers. One year after the establishment of *al-Ahram*, the humorist and nationalist writer, playwright and journalist Yaqub Sanu' established, with the encouragement of Islamic reformists Muhammad Abduh and Gamal al-Din al-Afghani, the satirical comic magazine *Abu Naddara Zarqa*, which was critical of both the Khedive in Egypt and the Sultan in Istanbul. This first experiment to print cartoons in Egypt was short-lived because the Khedive, growing impatient with the satire of Sanu', expelled him from Egypt in 1878. However, Sanu’ continued to mock the Khedive from his new home in Paris (Goldschmidt & Johnston, 2003, p. 352).

The growing nationalist movement culminating with the Urabi revolution and the subsequent British occupation filled the scene with more publications representing different—and often competing—interests. *Al-Muqattam*, established in 1988, was representing the point of view of the British occupation. *Al-Muayyad*, founded in 1889 by Mustafa Riyad, was the mouthpiece of Khedive Abbas, and was published to counter the pro-French *al-Ahram* and pro-British *al-Muqattam*. *Al-Hilal* monthly magazine was established in 1892 by Jurji Zaydan, an early theoretician of Arab nationalism, with the aim of popularizing science in the Arabic language.

### 5.5 Paving the way for Arab nationalism by means of redistributing land

The important transformation towards a bigger role for national capital in the interwar period vis-à-vis foreign capital would continue as a trend even after World War II and the collapse of the monarchical order in 1952 during the years of the Nasserist republic. Three major milestone, which signaled further nationalization of capital during the Nasser eras, were the land reform project put in place right after the Free Officers Movement took power in 1952, the nationalization of Suez Canal
and the resulting tamseer\textsuperscript{28} programme in 1956 and the nationalization programme of 1961.

Many regard the 1952 Free Officers Movement (FOM) as a rupture with the country’s monarchical history. However, the 1952 overthrow of the monarch, and the subsequent establishment of a republic along the Nile, was probably somehow a culmination of movements and sentiments that have existed long before 1952, such as the type of economic nationalism discussed in the previous section. The land reform measures, and many of the subsequent economic policies implemented by the Free Officers Movement cannot be separated from the national demands that preceded 1952 of more equal access to capital to end foreign privileges and usher into a new era of true national independence.

Almost immediately after the 1952 coup d’etat, the FOM embarked on a land reform project as a way to gain popular support and derive legitimacy for a new regime who reached power through extra-constitutional channels and wanted to present itself as a vanguardist force addressing the grievances of the nation. However, land reform most importantly aimed at breaking the political power of the landed aristocrats (Abdel-Malek 2013; Al-qazzaz 1971; Hussein 1973; Margold 1957 Parsons 1959; Tingay 2005; Warriner 1953; Younis 2012). At this point, out of the 550,000 feddans of agricultural land that was confiscated as a result, 175,000 or about a third, were confiscated from members of the royal family. The biggest landowners (the top 0.5 percent) owned 36 percent of all land under cultivation in Egypt then (Margold, 1957).

Table 5 shows that the number of landowners who owned more than 20 feddan increased meagerly between 1916 to 1956 from 32,000 (2 percent of total landowners at the time) to 35,000 (1.19 percent of total landowners at the time) while owners of less than 1 feddan increased quite dramatically from 100,600 (47.4 percent of total landowners at the time) to 212,3000 (72 percent of total land owners at the time). This indicates that even if the number of larger landowners were stable, their relative weight had gone down dramatically.

\textsuperscript{28}literally “Egyptianization”, and it refers to the process of managing assets that belonged to the European and Jewish communities after their outmigration as a result of the Suez Crisis.
Prior to 1952, control over arable land had undoubtedly been translated to political power and influence. Out of the 319 members of parliament elected in the early 1950s, more than half were big landlords (Al-qazzaz, 1971). Kenneth H. Parsons (1959) also argues that the land reform programme in Egypt is relatively conservative in terms of ownership and that it was based on the preservation of private property, as the very high 200 feddan cap on ownership has only led to the redistribution of land owned by the biggest of landlords.

Parsons believes that the land reform law, therefore, was designed mainly to limit the economic and political power of individual landholders, especially at a period when the new regime was trying to consolidate its power. Some scholars also argue that Nasser’s reforms, in addition to reducing the political influence of the landed elite, was simultaneously designed to promote a politically passive peasantry. In other words, the state would provide basic services and privileges to the peasants in exchange for their political acquiescence during a time of serious transition (Hussein, 1973; Tingay, 2005).

It was only natural also for the Free Officers to position themselves against what the monarchy stood for. They tried to promote a discourse of modernization, industrialization and progressive ideals as opposed to the monarchy’s “rural, backward and reactionary” character that was also supported by foreign powers. The new regime was therefore hoping that by putting into effect a cap on land ownership, excess capital will divert to industrial activity (Beinin & Lockman 1998; Hussein 1973). Historically, capital accumulated before the time of the Free Officers was used almost exclusively to purchase more land. After land reform was implemented figures show that capital was most used for the construction and purchase of property in urban centres (Abdel-Malek, 2013).

Between 1954-1956, capital invested in industrial activities was a modest 12 million Egyptian
pounds. In contrast, around 100 million Egyptian pounds were invested in urban property. The regime then responded to this failure by limiting rents on new buildings, but the landowners once again did not invest in industrial production and have either hoarded their money in gold or smuggled it abroad. This is what prompted the regime to start taking a more active role in the process of industrialization and modernization, which eventually led to the emergence of the Nasserist model of state capitalism in 1961 (Al-qazzaz, 1971).

There might be no one better to describe the political intentions behind land reform than Nasser himself. In a 1957 speech before the parliament, Nasser said:

The overthrow of the king was a precursor for declaring the republic, a precursor for the abolition of titles, and a precursor for the abolition of feudalism. Land reform was the precursor for the abolition of political parties […] The land reform law aimed at comprehensive change in the prevailing political and social systems in the country; it abolishes feudalism; it abolishes the vast estates that gave their owners social and economic powers and privileges, which turned them into an upper class that managed the country’s affairs as they wish through control of the legislature represented by the parliament, and control of the executive represented by the ministries (Younis 2012: 113).

This attack on feudal monarchical regimes meant that in a region mostly ruled by absolute monarchies, there was a need to spread a republican anti-imperialist nationalist ideology to support the new movement against the expected backlash from foreign superpowers, Israel that was widely seen as the West’s planted ally in the region, and from the West’s monarchical allies in the region. In addition to promoting an anti-colonialist and nationalist discourse, this new ideology had to also promote unity among regimes who held these views to be able to counter this expected backlash. This is why the Arab nationalism and Third-Worldism championed by Nasser would make the perfect ideology that encompasses all the requirements and characteristics needed by the free officers’ regime, and act as a safeguard against a return to a previous model of ruling and governance in a region ruled mostly by conservative pro-Western regimes.

After Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact with Turkey, Iran and the United Kingdom with the blessing of the United States in 1955, Nasser was quick to react in less than two weeks and formed an alliance with Syria that was presented as a first step in a wider integration of the Arab world. Nasser even dispatched forces to be situated at Iraq’s border with Syria and Turkey. He signed a mutual
defense pact later the same year with Syria which was later joined by Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Nasser’s mutual defense pact was an attempt to isolate Iraq politically as a punishment for signing the Baghdad Pact—which helped with establishing Western influence while trying to limit Soviet influence in the region—without consulting Egypt’s leadership beforehand (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164). Nasser’s idea was that the Arab world should take a neutral stance in the cold war between Western powers and the Soviet Union.

Nasser’s mouthpiece and one of his principal propaganda tools, the Voice of the Arabs radio station waged a media war against the Iraqi Prime Minister of the time Nuri al-Said, and repeatedly accused him of being anti-Arab because of his “Turkish descent”. The radio station accused al-Said of dispersing Arab officers in the Iraqi army and replacing them with Turkish officers to ensure the subjugation of the Iraqi army and its loyalty to its “imperialist obligations” (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).

Nasser’s nationalism was not only about Arab nationalism, but also Third-Worldism. He did not want to waste an opportunity of finding allies anywhere to help with his struggle against the expected backlash from the region’s monarchies and the international powers. Nasser, along with Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India and Sukarno of Indonesia, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement established in Bandung, Indonesia in the spring of 1955. The Bandung Conference confirmed Nasser’s position of resistance in the minds of people, and that Egypt is seeking real sovereignty from the West, and will seek to establish a new “progressive” order of republics both in the region but also around the “developing” world to counter the power of the West and its regional allies. Another milestone of this rebellion was in the autumn of the same year, when Nasser signed the arms deal with Czechoslovakia. This arms deal was particularly important because it was one of the first, and probably the biggest, arms deal that did not come from the West (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).

Before the conclusion of the Czech arms deal, the Americans turned down an arms deal with Nasser worth $27 million, and the excuse was that he will not be able to pay for it in hard currency. As a reaction, Nasser asked the Chinese prime minister in the Bandung Conference to sell Egypt arms. Since China was mostly relying on Soviet arms, the Chinese prime minister could not promise more than passing Nasser’s request on to the Soviets. The Czech arms deal was the result of this process, and it is widely believed that the Czechs only performed the role of the middle man between the Soviets and Egypt. This deal was hailed in the Arab world as a sign of the region’s “independence” from the Western imperialist powers and one of the important signs that the region is taking strides in its post-colonial experiment, and Nasser was no doubt the hero of this moment.
Also, Nasser’s propaganda hailed the deal as a “momentous juncture in the historical march of Arab nationalism.” (Dawisha, 2013, p. 168).

This arms deal and rising popularity of Nasser both among his people and in the Eastern bloc was quite naturally very central to the question of Israel’s security. The rising tide of Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser had already been worrying the then newly-founded Israeli state. According to Dawisha, Ben Gurion was especially worried and was looking at the possibility of toppling him and believed that it was a sacred obligation to do so. One of the goals of the offense on the Egyptian-controlled Gaza strip in 1955 led by Israel’s Ariel Sharon was to demonstrate the incapability of Nasser’s military and to undermine his rising popularity in the Arab world. The Egyptian military headquarters was destroyed and 38 soldiers were killed and 31 wounded (Dawisha, 2003, p. 164).

It is important to note that Nasser did not start his political career ruling out the possibility of cooperating with the West, and it is believed that the US was even sympathetic with the FOM ouster of the king in 1952 (Hussein, 1973, p. 95). This will be described in the following section on his clash with the US over its withdrawal from funding a new dam south of Aswan which led him to nationalize the Suez Canal, and how this specific move irreversibly contaminated his relations with the West. The souring of the relationship with the West was also due to the hesitant attitude of the British and the American in supplying him with adequate weapons.

5.6 Suez Canal crisis and funding for the dam as a pretext for a wide nationalization movement

The last section explained the several reasons why it was logical for Arab nationalism to adopt a model of state-led development and centralized power: the first was to break the power of the feudal lords by means of excessive government intervention to manage, regulate and redistribute wealth. The second reason is adopting a model that would contrast with the market economies of the West, and the feudal and rentier economies of the region’s monarchies. The third reason is adopting a model closer to the model developed by the country’s new allies in the Eastern bloc, and lastly is the belief that a central strong government would be more capable of consolidating its power against the potential backlash of Israel, the regions’ monarchies, and the Western superpowers.

As a result, the Nasserist nationalist ideals of state-led development (or state capitalism), redistribution of wealth, anti-Westernism, and Third-Worldism, can all be at least partially attributed to many economic conditions around issues of funding for mega projects, redistribution of wealth, and arms deals.
What further aggravated Nasser’s relations with the Western superpowers, was his dream to build a high dam south of Aswan and south of the existing Aswan dam that would supply the needed energy for his modernization and industrialization plan. Nasser approached the World Bank, the US and the UK to raise the large funds needed to erect the dam, and they all expressed initial willingness to provide financial and even technical assistance to support the project; the World Bank in late 1955 announced that it agreed to lend Egypt $200 million for the project, in addition to another $200 million mostly funded by the US government. However, Nasser’s actions against the Baghdad Pact and the arms deal signed with Czechoslovakia naturally alarmed the West; the US and the UK have grown increasingly impatient with him due to his warming relations with the Eastern powers (Joesten, 1960).

After a draft agreement was signed in February 1956, the US State Department announced in July of the same year that the US was no longer financing the dam project, and Britain and the World Bank followed suit. These developments were the prelude to the Suez Crisis. A week after such announcement, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal to fund the high dam project, which prompted the first direct wide-scale military confrontation between the Nasser regime and Western powers (Britain and France) and their ally in the region, Israel (Joesten, 1960).

The Suez Canal was nationalized in 1956, but it was not until 1961’s “socialist” transformation that the regime started its large-scale nationalization project. Nasser moved forward with this project as he was encouraged by his rising popularity after his regime survived the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent Suez War (Hussein, 1973: 100).

Additionally, the outmigration of some European and Jewish communities as a result of the Suez Crisis had transferred a lot of private economic enterprise into government hands alluring it to play a larger and more direct role in the economic sphere; this made the regime realize that it could speed economic development and industrial transformation if it takes matters into its own hands rather than relying on the whims and unreliability of private capital (Hussein 1973; Shechter 2008).

It was also what Nasser perceived as an economic necessity and prerequisite to modernization that drove him to embark on a massive nationalization programme. Nasser’s dream was to industrialize the economy, and his aim at start was to incentivize private capital to invest more in industry (Warriner, 1953). As discussed above, one of the main goals of land reform was to divert capital that became available by placing a ceiling on land ownership to industrial activity. This, however, did not yield the expected results, and the private sector had failed the regime’s hopes for industrialization, and pushed it to pass the nationalization law in 1961 and control major industries.

Nasser realised the importance of mass media to support all these fundamental transformations, and once he began to establish his power as the undoubted ruler of the country, he started to propagate his new doctrines of social transformation through the radio to get across the government’s new plans and policies to the masses (Shalabieh, 1985, p. 2). The use of latest technology by the Nasser regime to inform and influence larger communities was marked by the establishment of the Voice of the Arabs radio station, Nasser’s most significant media project that could summarize his media policy (Shalabieh, 1985, p. 3).

The dramatic conversion to the cause of Arab nationalism, in which Nasir [sic] was to use Egypt's extensive capabilities, particularly its unquestionable cultural dominance, was to be transmitted to the rest of the Arab world through the medium of radio. Like no other Egyptian or Arab leader before him, or among his contemporaries, Nasir recognized the immense power of radio, a power which, as a dazzling orator, he had used vigorously and effectively (Dawisha, 2003, p. 147).

Although television was introduced in the 1960, its growth was relatively slow in the early years. It was confined to the rich urban population and was hence an ineffective tool of persuasion compared to radio, which had already reached Egypt’s remote areas and was heard across the Arab world (Dawisha, 2003, p. 6-7). Wilton Wynn (1959) writes in the Nasser of Egypt:

Nasser's most famous propaganda weapon was his powerful —Voice of the Arabs radio. As Nasser's fame grew, this radio became daily more popular in the Arab world. A Saudi Arabian merchant buying a radio stipulated that he wanted a set —that picks up the 'Voice of the Arabs'. The Palestinian refugees in camps in Gaza and Jericho gathered in vast throngs at public places daily to hear the fiery broadcasts of the —Voice (Wynn, 1955, p. 133-144).

The Voice of the Arabs motto was that “the voice of the Arabs speaks for the Arabs, struggles for them and expresses their unity”, and it defined Egypt as being in the service of the Arab nation and its struggle against Western imperialism and its lackeys in the Arab world (Dawisha, 2003, p. 147). Nasser's radio broadcasting expanded rapidly in a media scene which he made almost void of any competing views (Khamis, 2011, p. 1160). Unlike most of his predecessors, Nasser was a charismatic leader with massive popular support due to being perceived as a culmination of Egypt's nationalist struggle for independence and a symbol of a country falling back into the hands of its rightful
owners. He realised the importance of the media and banked well on anti-imperialist sentiments and a strong desire for national sovereignty that has been brewing over the preceding seven decades (Wynn, 1959).

The 1967 humiliating defeat marked the beginning of the end of Nasser’s pan-Arabist project and with it the Arab nationalist discourse. It was not just a defeat against Israel, but also the entire Western powers and their allies in the region that he for a period of time managed to defy. After the defeat, Egypt was in dire need to compensate the loss of land and revenue. Nasser's defeat and need for money after 1967 made him give up his ideals on pan-Arabism. Adeed Dawisha argues that it was Arab statism and not nationalism that defined the post-1967 era, and that despite the fact that people in Arabic-speaking countries still defined themselves as Arabs, hardly any of them believed that there could be any political unity between them, and that this change began with Nasser himself (Dawisha, 2003, p. 254).

Dawisha continues to argue that Egypt’s acceptance of this principle was facilitated by grants given to Egypt by its former oil-rich and conservative adversaries. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and monarchical Libya paid Egypt a much-needed annual grant of $280 million to compensate for the loss of its land and revenues making Nasser dependent on assistance from these oil-rich pro-Western kingdoms, whose goals from the start was to fight Nasser’s pan-Arabist project, which they perceived as an imminent existential threat to their monarchical regimes (Dawisha, 2003, p. 255). Haikal, Nasser’s confidant and the most influential journalist of the era, wrote in his book *The Sphinx and the Commissar*, that the revolutionary struggle of the pre-1967 era was now a thing of the past due to the political power of money, in reference to the rising power of the reactionary oil-rich countries. The Khartoum Summit, in which the terms of the grant were finalized, marked the institutionalization of the petro-dollars power in fighting pan-Arabism (qawmiya) and promoting instead territorial nationalism (wataniya), according to Haikal (Haikal, 1979).

I have read all of Haikal’s articles in al-Ahram from the time of the Khartoum Summit until the death of Nasser, and none of them included criticism (not even in a mild form) of Saudi Arabia and its ruling elite. We will see in the following chapters, how a change in the discourse about the Palestinian question has been very central to the switch from Arab to Egypt-centered nationalism. The Palestinians ceased to perceive the post-1967 Nasser as an Arab nationalist leader, but the president of a defeated state, articulating and warning against concerns on a par with concerns given by the reactionary King of Jordan (Dawisha, 2003, p. 256).

This trend continued and was further entrenched during the Sadat era. Sadat inherited a country
that was already too dependent on grants from the oil-rich monarchies after the losses resulting from the war, the closure of the Suez Canal (one of Egypt’s most important sources of foreign currency), and the decline in tourism. In 1964 tourism had brought in $86 million in foreign exchange; in 1966 it brought in $100 million; and the projections were $138 for 1967 had an armed conflict not taken place. The minister of planning estimated that there would be a decline of $84 million in tourism revenues for the 1967/1968 financial year. Other than tourism, it was estimated that Egypt was losing $56 million annually in oil production due to the loss of the Sinai oil fields as a result of its occupation (Kanovsky, 1968).

This has clearly made Egypt all the more reliant on aid especially from the rising regional powers in the Gulf, whose agenda was clearly antagonistic to the ideals of pan-Arabism. The simple idea was for each Arab state, especially Egypt, to stay away from meddling into their affairs, especially if this meddling posed an existential threat to their fragile monarchical orders in the region. Therefore, from now on, Egypt will refrain from adopting any form of pan-nationalism and instead develop a territorial imagination and a brand of nationalism that confines itself to Egypt’s borders. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

5.7 Conclusion

It is impossible to determine whether national capital—whether private capital before 1956 or state capital after 1956—in its struggle for economic gain employed nationalistic sentiments, or whether the nationalist movement in its struggle for independence sought economic gains. A traditional Marxist view would arguably support the former and regard the nationalistic sentiments as a superstructural phenomenon based on the substructural mode of production of the era. It is sufficient for the purpose of this study to assume an intertwined and mutually reinforcing relationship between the nationalist struggle for independence and the quest for economic gain without having to determine the primacy of one over the other.

As we have seen throughout the chapter, in the pre-1952 era, the national business elite associated itself with the national struggle for independence; it shaped a nationalist discourse that had at its heart the issue of economic independence and mobilizing national capital so that Egyptians can start sharing in the wealth and resources of their country. This, for a period of time, succeeded in delaying class-based questions about the distribution of wealth and resources among Egyptians. The nationalist struggle was seen mostly through the lens of “Egyptian against foreign” which allowed a class of national business elite to accumulate capital and control parts of industry
and finance in the name of the country’s quest for independence.

In the post 1952 era, issues such as breaking up the political power of the feudal elite by the new military elite required some serious economic measures by atomizing land ownership through the so-called land reform. These measures were shortly followed by a clash with the US, Britain and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) over the funding of the new dam, which was seen by the emergent Nasser regime in the mid-1950s as a prerequisite to the industrial development of the country and its hopes for modernization. The failure to secure such funding was the first incident in a series of events—including the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the 1956 crisis—that led to an irreversible harm to the Egyptian-Western relationships that was only mended two decades later. This drove Egypt to search for new allies in the non-Western world which contributed to the refinement of a nationalist discourse that is based on—besides pan-Arabism—Third-Worldism, socialism, and anti-imperialism.

This project had ended with the 1967 defeat of the Nasser regime against Israel and its subsequent reliance on aid from its previous foes in the Gulf region, which was implicitly conditioned to giving up on the pan-Arabist project and abandon attempts to “export the revolution” to Egypt’s neighbours. As we will discuss in the following chapter, from then on, Egypt will give up on the promotion of any pan-nationalist ideology, and will (re)institute an Egyptocentric brand of nationalism with very little interest in influencing any developments beyond its territorial borders.
Chapter 6
Bringing Egypt back to the Western orbit (1970-2011)

6.1 Introduction

As discussed in chapter 5, the 1967 defeat was a major disruption in the post-colonial nation-building project, and started placing Egypt and its national identity on a radically new track with the forging of new regional and global alliances. The massive socio-political and economic changes of the 1970s created a class of pro-state group of businessmen which are referred to in this study as the infitah (open-door policy) businessmen or business elite.

The infitah policies caused this class of businessmen to accumulate colossal amounts of wealth with the assistance of the state, and, therefore, became the mouthpieces for the new policies whether it is economic liberalization or the peace treaty. In many cases, they became responsible for forging a new national identity that is now based on alliance with the West (or imperialism in Nasser’s discourse), peace with Israel and the consequent tension with most of the Arab world, with an outbreak of a soft-Islamic revolution that was crafted by Sadat to counter both Nasserism and the “threat of world communism”. In the spirits of the 1970s and the Cold War politics, socialism was still seen by Sadat and his Western allies as more disruptive than Islamism. This view was short-lived and Sadat had quickly started clashing with the Islamist groups, of which one ended up assassinating him on the 8th anniversary of the 1973 war.

This chapter will present the business landscape and economic trends of this era including the return of some business families to Egypt after their businesses had been nationalized during the Nasser era, the beginning of the private advertising industry in Egypt to serve the emerging “private” sector, and the rise of the state-sponsored private sector’s role in influencing nationalist discourse. This economic liberalization and change in political orientation based on peace with Israel and joining the US camp in a Cold War context needed a carefully crafted official nationalist discourse to face the inevitable opposition to such policies. This official discourse was more often than not laden with contradictions and ended up giving Sadat more foes than friends.

These transformations quite naturally required the adoption of a new official nationalist discourse; first, the discourse undermined Egypt’s Arab character after a unanimous decision was made by the Arab league to expel Egypt and move its headquarter to the Tunisian capital. Additionally, the undermining of Egypt’s Arab character would free it from its previously claimed
responsibility of supporting different groups in the region with their battle against colonialism and conservative monarchies, such as in Algeria, Palestine and Yemen; this would, therefore, facilitate such a transition to a liberal economy and a close alliance with the US; secondly, the new official nationalism needed then to define itself less as a champion of Third-Worldism, anti-imperialism and less as an opponent of Western imperialism, Israel and conservative Arab monarchical rule. Lastly, this new discourse was antagonistic to all forms and shades of socialism especially Nasserism and communism in order to swiftly implement the liberalization process and peace with Israel and curb any potential opposition to them.

Sadat himself over a period of two decades switched from a defender and promoter of Arab nationalism into its most fierce critic. In an article titled “What do the Arabs want?” written in 1957, Sadat wrote:

There was nothing behind our coup [1952] other than Arab nationalism . . . which awakened a new historical development. . . . We must nurture this link between the people of the Arab nation . . . for when the revolution occurred in Egypt, it rendered the Arab nation one nation, sharing one history and claiming one destiny (Dawisha, 2003, p. 184).

A couple of decades later after signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat—in a speech before the parliament in the late days before his assassination—sent a clear message to the Arabs who made the decision to boycott Egypt.

[The Arabs] push us with their escalation and attitude to estrangement . . . We are the origin of the Arabs. Hagar, the wife of Abram, is the mother of Ishmael, the ancestor of Arabs. Hager is Egyptian. So if there is someone out there who wants to belong, they should belong to Egypt, not Egypt to them. There is no point in these debates about whether we belong to the Pharaohs or not. Our blood is Arab and we are the origin of the Arabs and they belong to us (Sadat: We are the origin of Arabs, 2009).

This chapter will discuss in detail this shift in official nationalist discourse by analyzing Sadat’s speeches and media interviews especially after the signing the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979. This will be supplemented with analyzing other texts—literary and otherwise—from the era.

As for the Mubarak years, the focus was still largely on Egyptian nationalism despite a relative ease in tension with Egypt's Arab neighbours. With the emergence of a neoliberal state in Egypt in
the decade preceding the 2011 revolution, the official national discourse had become mild and mundane and less populist while the few expressions of mass nationalism in this period were limited to sports events and rivalries.

6.2 Anti-Arabism

The Nasser leadership was undoubtedly pan-Arabist, but it also saw Egypt as having a central and leading role in an aspired Arab unity rather than merely being an equal part of it. Under Nasser, the Egyptian and Arab brands of nationalism have conflated rather than conflicted until at least 1967 (Smith, 1997, p. 512). The relative harmony of official nationalist discourse between Egyptian territorial sentiments and Arab regional sentiments started fading gradually after 1967 and culminated when the Arab world decided in 1979 to isolate Egypt following Sadat’s visit to Israel and the signing of the peace treaty. Sadat’s mood shifted inward and decided to prioritize the interests of Egypt as opposed to Nasser’s assertion that Egypt’s responsibility and focus is the Arab world (Shalabieh, 1985, p.193).

Sadat was very vocal in his criticism of the Arab states especially during his last years. Unlike the following sections on Pharaonism and Islam which mostly focus on other literary texts condoned by the state, but not directly uttered by it, this section will mostly focus on Sadat’s own discourse. Just one year before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, he was still paying lip service to some form of Arabism. Sadat in a speech in 1976 said:

> It is crucial that the people feel through their representatives that they are an actual partner in drawing policy and not just an audience. At the Arab level, you might remember what I have always repeated in my talks about principles that guide our Arab policy; my belief that Arab solidarity is a strong foundation capable of overcoming any disagreements was not just mere optimism but a belief with its deep reasoning supported by our approach that rejects the policy of axes in the Arab world, and cancels theoretical categorization of Arab states […] We are not a small nation that could be ravaged or shaken by any storm that blows. Our Arab nation is a great nation. Great in all sense; great for its past; great for its vast area and potential; great for the justice of its causes. Such a nation deserves to achieve justice for itself and security for others, and deserves the opening of a new world based on justice and equality (Sadat, 1976).

Three years later after the peace treaty, Sadat’s discourse had changed drastically, and the Arabs have become “midgets who only appear like giants when they stand on their money”. In an
interview with October magazine he said:

I am sorry to say that the Arabs did not change, but they have lagged behind and it is Egypt that has changed. We were and still are more civilized and developed, and they have all been belittled in our eyes because we are the ones who grew, and therefore we look at them from above. I remember a joke I heard from a great political leader about a rich ugly dwarf who married a beauty queen and she was asked: “how do you marry such man? Did you not find a more youthful and handsome man?” to which she responded: “but you did not see how he seemed like a giant when he stood on his money?”

They seem like giants when they stand on their money but in reality they are dwarfs. This is a problem to which Egypt did not contribute. It is not our fault that Egypt was and will remain a giant with all its long history, bitter struggles and international achievements, while others seem like short people who buy golden artificial limbs to seem more youthful, taller and greater; they are nations without causes, and if they had a cause, it is about where, how and when to spend their billions, but Egypt has urgent and severe causes and what the people here suffer is not today’s product or something that started during my period but before that (Sadat, 1979).

Unlike Nasser who adopted an interventionist policy and actively supported regime change in several Arab countries, Sadat advocated a more non-interventionist and isolationist approach.

Arabs used to fear that Egypt will export troubles and coups to them, and this horrendous image Arabs have of Egypt did not change until the Khartoum summit when King Faisal has shown generosity and provided financial support and pushed Kuwait to provide even more. Only then Gamal Abdel Nasser felt ashamed of King Faisal and ordered an immediate halt of hostile action inside Saudi Arabia. If there were any reckless actions after that in Saudi Arabia, I am certain that Gamal Abdel Nasser was not aware of them. What’s funny now is that Saudi Arabia has increased the level of readiness of its armed forces to combat secret attempts by the Egyptians against the Saudi rulers, and what is bizarre is that Saudi received this information from Syria. This happened despite my assertion from the first moment I took office that what happens in any Arab country is none of my business, the same way that what happens in Egypt is not the business of any other Arab country, and this is driven by respect of the sovereignty of each state over its people and resources (Sadat, 1979).
In this paragraph, Sadat is clear in his condemnation of Nasser’s interventionism under the pan-Arabism banner, and is implying as discussed in chapter 5, that the Khartoum Summit in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War and the aid given by the Gulf states to Egypt has changed Nasser’s approach dramatically, and made him give up on his pan-Arabist progressive project and switch his focus to affairs that take place within Egypt’s borders. Sadat goes on in this interview to attack the Nasserist categorization of Arab states into reactionary monarchies and progressive republics, and the belief that there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except on the rubbles of the royal palaces. “If we return back in time a little, we find that the reactionary states are the ones who supported the progressive states. Saudi Arabia, which is the most reactionary according to that classification, is the one who assisted Egypt, Syria and Jordan. King [Idris] Senussi is the one who paid for the Egyptian tanks,” said Sadat in the same interview in 1979.

Sadat’s early days before the peace treaty were less antagonistic towards the region especially the conservative monarchies in which the seeds of a reconciliation were sown in the aftermath of 1967, and it also marked the beginning of an era in which Egypt was more in a subordinate position as an aid recipient in relation to the rich oil-producing conservative Arab states. This new reality required a toning down of Arab socialist discourse which Sadat has been very effective in implementing, but the fully-fledged all-encompassing anti-Arabist discourse, only emerged in his last days as a reaction to the immense pressure he faced as a result of his solo quest for peace with Israel.

The same way Nasser had Haikal as his confidant and ideologue, Sadat’s advocator was Moussa Sabry. Sabry was a journalist who was appointed the Chief Editor of Akhbar al-Youm in 1975. Sabry was in Sadat’s immediate circle of friends and advisers and accompanied him in most of his crucial visits, especially those related to the peace talks with Israel. Most notably, Sabry wrote Sadat’s historical speech that he gave before the Knesset in 1977, according to a testimony by Sadat’s wife (Dream TV Egypt, 2014). Sabry in his weekly columns in Akhbar al-Youm propagated Sadat’s anti-Arab, anti-Nasserist and anti-communist discourse, and promoted fiercely the peace decision with Israel. Sabry was also a major promoter of the May 15 “corrective revolution” and he is the one who reportedly coined it a “revolution”. In his column titled “This is the Arab solidarity!” published on June 9, 1979, Sabry wrote:

The alliances of evil and greed cannot continue for long, because its nature is temporary and it is set to achieve narrow and personal goals. Therefore, it must vanish. We have examples
of that from our reality. The expressions of praise exchanged between the Baathist rule in Iraq and the communist rule in South Yemen went beyond the permissible limits of praise, when the two agreed on attacking Egypt. Back then, statements were issued to express Arab solidarity, and discontent over Egypt’s abandonment of this solidarity because it sold itself to imperialism, and all these clichés which have become tacky. Nevertheless, let’s see what these combatants against imperialism have done? (Sabry, 1979a).

Sabry then spends the rest of his column providing incidents of disagreements and battles among those regimes while continuing to sarcastically calling them “combatants against imperialism”. In the same week, he wrote a column titled The myth of Arab chivalry criticizing the position of the so-called “progressive” camp in trying to overthrow the regimes of the “regressive” camp.

Gaddafi—while we were trying to tame his excesses—wanted to impose on us dropping Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf from our calculations, because from his point of view they are regressive, and that we have to work together to overthrow their rulers! We told Gaddafi very clearly that we gave up on intervening in the internal affairs of any other Arab country, and that we no longer adopt this progressive-regressive division (Sabry, 1979b).

This echoes Sadat’s previous assertion about Egypt’s non-interventionist policy which clearly refers to the era and policies of Nasser and his allies in the region. After attacking most of the Arab regimes and highlighting their ungratefulness and hypocrisy, Sabry concludes the column by stating that he everyday finds new evidence that Arab chivalry and morality is nothing but a myth. Sabry's sharp pen was also used to attack Moscow and communism. In an article written by Sabry in May 21, 1978 he was mocking the Soviet Union for criticizing Egypt after a wave of arrests against communist Egyptians. “Moscow does not like Egypt's democracy because it is a democracy that wants to protect itself from Moscow's mouthpieces and from those who kneel in its sanctuary.” (Sabry, 1978).

In a series of articles commenting on the January 1977 bread riots, Sabry described the riots as a Moscow-instigated conspiracy. In an article titled “Egypt is above the conspiracy”, Sabry explains how the youth of the leftist party of the time came to his office with their resignations from the party after they had discovered the conspiracy behind the bread riots to destroy Egypt. He quotes one of the leftist youth as saying:
I do not accept that the Soviet Union attacks the people of Egypt. I do not accept that Radio Moscow assaults the dignity of Egypt. I used to believe the leaders of this party when they used to say that the termination of the treaty with the Soviet Union is against the interests of Egypt, and that we must maintain the friendship with the Soviet Union. But today I see the Soviet Union as instigating the destruction and the burning of Egypt, and I have not heard a single voice from the leftist party leaders. I have not read a single statement [of condemnation], like the tens of statements that are sent to us from the part at each occasion—not a single statement that defends the sovereignty of Egypt, that attacks Moscow for instigating sabotage and destruction. Yes, I discovered that I was deceived (Sabry, 1977).

6.3 Pharaonism and Westernism

It is not completely coincidental that whenever liberalism is on the rise in Egypt, Pharaonism is as well. The pharaonization of Egypt was a quasi-colonial European project started by Napoleon Bonaparte’s French campaign on Egypt, and the subsequent discovery and deciphering of the Rosetta stone in 1822. This preoccupation with ancient Egypt reached its peak a century later by the discovery of the Tutankhamun tomb in 1922 (Wood, 1998). The interest in Egyptology was more prevalent outside than inside of Egypt.

Egyptology started as an academic discipline in Europe in the late 19th century, and later proliferated into hundreds of Egyptology degrees offered by universities around Europe and the world. It is therefore unsurprising that whenever a political elite wanted to forge a unique personality from its surrounding or as part of their soft-independence project, which would not put Egypt at an ideological conflict with any so-called European values of civilization, Pharaonism came as a very strong candidate. It was also often utilized by its liberal protagonists to criticize both Arab and Islamic pan-nationalist projects at different periods of time (Wood, 1998).

For example, Taha Hussein, the great Egyptian thinker and a symbol of the Egyptian Renaissance, supported in 1937 in his influential book The Future of Culture in Egypt (Hussein, 1996) the idea that Egypt should adopt the European ways of organizing their military and their economy if it was serious about modernizing and developing. This was Hussein's recipe for independence: if we want to be independent like the Europeans, we must copy them in their ways.

If we want this mental and psychological independence which cannot happen without scientific, literary, and artistic independence, then we would want the means for that.
Those means are to learn the same way the European learns, to feel the same way the European feels, judge the same way the European judges, act the same way the European acts, and go about our lives the same way he does (Hussein, 1996, p. 45).

Taha Hussein is considered a symbol of Egyptian enlightenment and one of the most important intellectual architects of the so-called “liberal age”. He is normally credited with establishing free basic education in Egypt, first as a fierce advocate of establishing education as a universal right, and then as a minister of education who made education more available and accessible to a wider population. Hussein became the second person to earn a PhD from the then newly-established Egyptian University (now Cairo University), and went on to study European history and philosophy at the University of Montpellier and the Sorbonne to complete his master’s and doctoral degrees respectively.

Hussein was not only fond of European civilizational achievements, but also a staunch supporter of Pharaonism and sees the Mediterranean as Egypt’s natural cultural and historical habitat (Hussein, 1996). He fiercely rejected Arab nationalism and unity which was starting to gain some ground in the 1930s at the hand of one of its first promoters Sati’ al-Husri (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1995). Hussein wrote an article published in the 1930s that Pharaonism is deeply rooted in the hearts of Egyptians, and that it will remain so. He asserts that the Egyptian is more Pharaonic than he is an Arab, and that Egypt should not be asked to give up her Pharaonic character, otherwise, this would be at par with asking Egypt to destroy the Sphinx and the pyramids, according to Hussein. “Do not ask from Egypt more than it can give. Egypt will not join an Arab union whether the capital is in Cairo, Damascus, or Baghdad.” (Hamed, 2017, p. 76).

Hussein in his book also stresses the link between the ancient Egyptian and Hellenistic civilizations, and argues that the only link Egypt has to the East is to the near Mediterranean East in the Levant and Turkey. He finds it absurd that people in Egypt might feel a stronger connection with people from China, Japan and India than with people from Greece, Italy and France.

One of the earliest and foundational thinkers of pan-Arabism Sati’ al-Husri wrote a long response to Taha Hussein's article criticizing his take on the nationalist question and defending his pan-Arabist view. Al-Husri reassured Hussein that Arab political unity does not mean bringing down the Sphinx or the pyramids as he had claimed. He accused Hussein of unnecessarily imposing mutual exclusiveness between Arab and Pharaonic culture by arguing that over millennia Egypt has spoke many languages and practiced many religions which has weakened its links to the Pharaonic past but
without destroying its heritage. According to al-Husri, all the Pharaonic heritage that is filling up Egypt’s museums did not produce a movement to embrace the ancient Egyptian religions or revive its ancient language, so why then would an Arab unity require the demolition of Pharaonic monuments. “Egypt has distanced itself from the Pharaonic religions without demolishing the Sphinx, and it gave up its ancient language without bringing down the pyramids,” writes al-Husri (1938).

The 1970s saw the revival of pharaonism and rejection of all sorts of pan-nationalisms when it comes to official nationalist discourse (Selim, 2000; Dawisha, 2003; Shalabieh 1985). Samah Selim shows the difference between the two editions of Ne’mat Foud’s *Shaksiyat Masr* (The Character of Egypt)—the first published just right after the 1967 defeat and the second edition in the second half of the 1970s— and detects a stress on pharaonism and territorialism in the second edition compared to the first. Selim noticed how passages extolling Egypt’s Arabism was deleted in the later edition. Furthermore, Fouad’s 1974 polemic *A’idu Kitabat al-Tarikh* (Rewrite History) was an attack on Nasser’s Arab nationalist legacy and called for the rewriting of Egyptian history along Pharaonist lines (Selim, 2000). In her call to rewrite history, Fouad suggested that Egyptians should start from the Egyptian Museum as a starting point for creating a new national consciousness. “In the Museum, the Egyptian can see the history of Egypt being weaved one thread at a time,” writes Fouad (1974, p. 52).

Fouad then goes to explain that in the Museum where Egyptian civilization starts at the stone age chamber and ends in one of its peaks where the statue of Amenhotep III, the father of Akhenaten, stands with his wife Tiye and their children in the age of the empire (Fouad, 1974, p. 52). According to Selim, this was not the only literary attack on Arab nationalism in defense of adopting a more particularistic brand of nationalism; Husayn Mu’nis’s *Misr wa Risalatuha* (Egypt and its mission) also deleted earlier sections extolling Egypt’s Arabism (Selim, 2000).

Selim argues that when Pharaonism started in the early 20th century as part of the broader independence movement, it was politically more anti-Ottoman than anti-British, and culturally its was a modernist movement that implicitly eschewed what it saw as a decadent Arabo-Islamic heritage. Michael Wood (1998) also asserts that Pharaonism “identified Egypt as a distinctive territorial entity with its own history and character separate from that of the rest of the Arab and Islamic world”.

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6.4 Islam as a cultural and legal, but not political, project

The Pharaonism of the liberal age championed by figures like Taha Hussein was not identical to that of the 1970s. While Pharaonism in the 1930 was mostly used to escape Egypt’s Arubo-Islamic heritage as argued by Selim and Wood, in the 1970s it was mostly employed to undermine pan-Arabism and was not intended to challenge the nation’s Islamic heritage in any fundamental manner. It was in fact designed to co-exist with it. Even in the 1930s, the far-right ultra-nationalist group Young Egypt managed to pay allegiance to both Pharaonist and Islamic heritage through the argument that Egyptians have always been respectful to their religions, and that modern Egyptians can learn from their ancient ancestor the respect of the dominant religion which in this day and time is Islam (Gershoni & Jankowski 2010, p. 235). Ni’mat Fouad herself is an example of the conflation of Muslim and Pharaonist sentiments. “The Egyptian civilization, which is said to be pagan, preached Christianity and Islam because the revealed details of its art and thought, acknowledges the unity of creation in life and a comprehensive sense of the universe. This is the basis of Islam, which continues to promote reflection and thinking” (Fouad, 1989, p. 88).

Islam was heavily employed by Sadat and his administration to justify reversing some of the social and economic reforms that was made under Nasser to fit the new liberalization of the economy; the Sadat regime bet that an increased religious awareness would push down the popularity of secular socialist and Nasserist ideals, and would facilitate both the political and economic transformation from a secular, state socialist, Eastern- and Southern-oriented regime, to a more capitalist Western-oriented regime (De Smet & Bogaert, 2017, p. 216).

In the words of Nadia Ramsis Farah: “the last thirty-five years have been marked by a strident religious ideology designed to justify the abolition of the Nasserist system and the reintegration of Egypt into the international economic system.” (Farah, 2009).

Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid (2015) discusses how shari’a was used to reverse land reform and inheritance tax, and “all that had been accomplished since the Free Officers Revolution for the benefit of the poor”. The land reform law passed in 1954 was decided by Sadat’s government to be against Islamic law. Accordingly, the government captured the land from families who have worked it for more than two decades to return it to its former owners (Abu Zaid, 2015, p. 121-122).

According to Abu Zaid, the 1967 and 1973 wars ended the era of pan-Arabism and socialism in Egypt, and people have decided to move gradually towards a fundamental view of Islamic thinking (Abu Zaid, 2015, p. 121-122). In addition to introducing shari’a as the main source of legislation, Sadat envisioned Egypt as “the country of science and religion” (Guindi, 1981). He wore a gilbab
every Friday on his way to the mosque escorted by cameras to film him as he prays; a prayer sign has started to appear on his forehead and he insisted on appearing publicly with his prayer beads, and describing himself as “the believing president” (Guindi, 1981). Sadat was also the first president to start broadcasting the call for prayers five times a day on national television (Abu Zaid, 2015, p. 123), while claiming to be a “Muslim president of an Islamic state” (Connect TV, 2015).

Islam at the time was promoted as a religious and cultural project but less as a political project. Fadwa al-Guindi (1981) describes this as allowing “alternative Islam a relatively high degree of laissez-faire for nonmilitant activities. These nonmilitant Islamic groups enjoyed a relative freedom of expression and consequently embarked on establishing numerous publications with wide circulations including the monthly al-Da’wa, the weekly al-’Itisam and the bi-monthly digest al-Mukhtar al-Islami. These periodicals acted as the ideological organs of “alternative Islam”.

It is true that many of the Islamic groups were critical of the infitah policy, but it was mostly mild criticism and focused on the moral implications of consuming cultural Western products, and the impact this might have on society. However, most Islamic groups were never critical of the fundamental Laissez-Faire philosophy of liberalism as long as it did not bring with it a threat to the perceived cultural foundation of society. This is probably inspired in part by the career of the prophet as a merchant, and his hadith that “Nine-tenths of the sustenance (rizq) is derived from trade (business ventures)” (Kayed & Hassan, 2013: 76). The antagonism of the loyal Nasserists and leftists towards the infitah policy, on the other hand, was significantly more fundamental and was calling for its full abolishment as a state policy and not only a slight modification to suit the cultural needs of a Muslim population.

6.5 The infitah and the rise of a new elite

The open-door policy did not just coincide with the rise of Pharaonism, an Islamic revival and anti-Arabism, but they were mobilised to facilitate such radical transformation and set the stage for it. As discussed above, a religious (re)awakening would serve as a tool to delegitimize and dismiss any policy that would contradict with the new liberal order as socialist/communist/soviet and consequently atheistic and therefore undesirable.

Egyptocentric territorial nationalism combined with Western orientation was an ideology of choice of the secular liberal business elite. They thought that pan-nationalist commitments would hurdle the transition to a liberal economy, especially that for them pan-nationalism was always associated with a highly despised socialist doctrine and with central planning. This sentiment linking
socialism and Arab nationalism to obstacles in the way of private enterprise was best expressed by David Rockefeller, the head of the Chase Manhattan Bank which is one of the first foreign banks to operate in Egypt after the open-door policy in the 1970s, after his visit to the Middle East in 1974.

I think that Egypt has come to realize that socialism and extreme Arab nationalism ... have not helped the lot of the 37 million people they have in Egypt, and if President Sadat wants to help them, he has got to look to private enterprise and to assistance (Mullaney, 1974).

In this view, a narrow territorial national imagination would therefore create a desired fast-track towards a re-liberalization of the economy by freeing Egypt from its costly commitments towards its neighbours especially with regards to the Palestinian cause. Moreover, with a Western orientation and massive reliance on the tourism industry, a stress on that Pharaonist brand of Egypt would certainly appeal to Egypt’s new allies in its new political orbit.

A quick comparison between the names of the companies from the pre-infitah era and the post-infitah era is quite indicative of that shift. Companies established under the Nasser regime would typically include the words “Arab” or Nasr (victory) such as the Arab Contractors (est. 1955), Arab Company for Foreign Trade, Nasr Export and Import Company (est. 1958), and the state-owned automobile company Nasr (est. 1960). In the post-infitah era, many of the large companies’ names reflected the spirit of the time, such as Ceramica Cleopatra (est. 1983), Americana (est. 1979) and Orascom Construction (est. 1976) whose logo is a pharaoh holding a hammer. In the late 1970s and the 1980s there was also a proliferation of Islamic businesses carrying Islamic names.

Gouda Abdel-Khalek (1981), argues that the infitah (opening up) is an inaccurate description of the shift in the 1970s because it implies that what preceded it was inhqilaq (closing down). Instead, Egypt did not leave a state of autarky in favor of more exchange with the outside world because Egypt was already open to the outside world. What happened, according to Abdel-Khalek, was having less exchange with the Eastern Bloc countries and more with the so-called Developed Market Economies (DMEs). He argues that the infitah did not simply mean looking outside, but it specifically meant “turning northwest” and was a process of realigning and restructuring Egypt’s economic alliances.

Under the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), bilateral trade agreements were scrapped by the government. This step favoured trade with developed economies at the expense of trading with the Eastern Bloc and so-called Third-World countries. It also meant that the state has
less say in planning priorities for foreign trade. Infitah then, according to Abdel-Khalek, was more a process of opening the Egyptian economy wide open for Western goods at the expense of national industry, and that the policy of “open-door” merely means opening the door to consumer goods from capitalist industrialized countries. According to this view, consumer goods are easier to handle than intermediate and capital goods. Therefore, deregulating the import industry encourages the import of consumer goods giving it an immediate boost, but also a future boost for the negative impact this policy would have on national production and products. It is true that the 1970s was also notorious for directing available capital for investments in importing and then trading the imported products rather than in manufacturing for the quick and easy profit it provides.

Abdel-Khalek proves this argument using foreign trade statistics. He noticed that DME’s share in imports to Egypt fell until 1967, stabilizes through 1971 and rises afterwards whereas the Eastern Bloc’s share behaves in the exact opposition fashion. A noteworthy remark is that the combined total of both blocs remained stable, which means that for the two blocs, trade with Egypt is more akin to a zero-sum game, where the gains of one bloc has to be at the expense of the other. From Table 6, it is obvious that when the imports of one bloc increases, the other almost always decreases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Developed Market Economies</th>
<th>Eastern Bloc Countries</th>
<th>Both Blocs Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956-1958</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1965</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1978</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Marvin G. Weinbaum (1985) shares Abdel-Khalek’s assertion that Egypt did not go from a state of isolation during the Nasser years to a state of opening up during Sadat. He mentions that between 1957 and 1964 trade as a share of national income ranged between 36 and 43 per cent with an external debt bill reaching more than $2 billion. He argues that the major changes during the Nasser
period is not the volume of trade but the decrease in Egypt’s trade with its traditional partners in the West in favour of Eastern planned economies.

Weinbaum also goes on to explain Sadat’s economic and political dependence on direct financial assistance from the increasingly affluent conservative Arab states, at least until the boycott of the late 1970s when Egypt mostly relied on US aid for that matter. To prepare the stage for this new shift, the government had jailed Egyptian communists in 1971 and expelled 25,000 Soviet military advisers in July 1972. Egypt tried to make up for its lack of exportable oil by sharing in the region’s oil-driven growth by exporting skilled labour to its oil-rich neighbours (Weinbaum, 1985).

The new ideological change was therefore intimately intertwined with the socioeconomic changes of the era. This chapter does not argue that one lead to the other and one was the cause and the other the effect, but rather that the economic forces and the ideological forces of the time were mutually reinforcing. It is important to note that when the rise of Egyptocentric nationalism at the expense of Arab nationalism is discussed, it is not meant that no residues of Arab nationalism remained in official discourse or that under Nasser there was no elements of Egyptocentrism or even Islamism. Since the Urabi revolution, Egyptianism, Arabism and Islamism have been all present at all times but with different intensity, and this study is only trying to measure the relative rise or fall of the different Egyptian nationalisms. In many cases also these brands were more harmonious than at other times, as was a dominant Arab nationalism harmonious with Egyptocentrism in the 1960s, but then both became in conflict and almost mutually exclusive in the 1970s which was also the case in the 1930s. Similarly, Islam and Pharaonism seems to have coexisted to a certain degree in the 1970s, but might have been more conflictual in the 1930s.

This consequential reordering of Egypt’s political and economic orientation resulted in the restoration of Egypt’s business elite which was active before the 1961 nationalization programme. In the 1960s, the regime used to appoint the previous owner of the nationalized companies as their chairmen in their public sector form. Some of these companies returned to their owners in the mid-1970s, or at least the previous owners were allowed to establish similar companies in the same industry. Some of the business leaders of the time agreed to continue leading their enterprises as chairmen even if they lost ownership of the company such as Osman Ahmed Osman; others such as Onsi Sawiris and Ahmed Abbud chose to leave the country. However, in many cases ownerships were restored as a result of the infitah policy, and even when it was not, many of such businesspersons and families chose to return and start a new enterprise. The different ways in which private business activity was restored in the 1970s could be summed up as follows: the
businessperson had never left and remained at the top of the company even after it was nationalized, and then ownership was restored under Sadat and they returned to their previous status as both chairmen and owners (e.g. Osman Ahmed Osman).

the businessperson had left the country after their company was nationalized and therefore had no control over the nationalized business. The person/their family would return to Egypt after the infitah policy gaining control and ownership of their previous company or establishing a new one (e.g. Onsi Sawiris and Lotfi Mansour).

Most of the current giant business conglomerates and billionaire tycoons have founded (or refounded) their business in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 open-door policy. Although, the state did denationalize the previously nationalized businesses, it allowed the former owners to establish new private companies (Sherbiny & Hatem, 2015, p. 111). Most of these new private businesses worked as local agents for international and especially American multinationals, which was the area with the most potential for growth after decades of attempts at Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and heavy restrictions on importing consumer products. While the bitter taste of nationalization was still fresh in the memory of these businessmen, this model of acting as local agents was suitable for a business community that wanted to take limited risk. Acting as agents meant that there was no investment in heavy machinery or a large labour force that could be expropriated by the government (Sherbiny & Hatem, 2015, p. 111).

One of the most important names in that regard is Onsi Sawiris, the patriarch of Egypt’s richest family which consists of himself and his three sons, of which each is a dollar billionaire in their own right (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015, p. 141). Onsi Sawiris established a construction company in 1950, which was nationalized by the Nasser government in 1961 (Orascom official website, n.d.). Five years after the nationalization of the company in 1966, Sawiris left to Libya to pursue construction business elsewhere. He only returned 12 years later after Qaddafi and Sadat had a tense relationship leading many Egyptian including Onsi to return to Egypt now that the atmosphere was becoming more favourable for business in Egypt. Onsi returned to Egypt and established (or rather re-established) a construction company calling it Orascom which would grow to become a giant multinational business group that has international investments in different industries including construction, telecommunication, and tourism. In the spirit of the time, Orascom’s first logo was that of a Pharaoh’s face (Tarouty, 2015: 94). The Sawiris family in the early days after their return to Egypt acted as an agent for a number of multinational companies including German Siemens, American AT&T, Swedish Volvo and French Alcatel (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015: 112).
The Mansour family has a very similar story. Also consisting of a patriarch Lotfy Mansour and three sons Mohamed, Yasin and Youssef. Just like the Sawiris family, the three sons of the Mansour family are each responsible for a business line constituting different parts of a giant conglomerate. Lotfy Mansour started a cotton business in 1952 which was later nationalized by Nasser. Mansour then left to Sudan to work in the cotton industry there, until the company he was working for was also nationalized. He then worked as a cotton broker in Switzerland before returning to Egypt following the infitah to start a new business (Hazlehurst, 2016). The company established in 1975 became the agents for General Motors, Ford, Chevrolet and Caterpillar, and then later American brands such as Marlboro, Merit, L&M and McDonald’s (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015, p. 141; Zayed & Hussein 2011). According to Forbes rich list, the Mansour family, along with the Sawiris family, are the two richest business families in Egypt and among the richest in Africa (Forbes, 2017).

Not all businessmen of the pre-nationalization era were sidelined and some were co-opted and became important figures of the Nasserist order. Unlike the Sawiris and the Mansour families, many businessmen have chosen to stay and work with the new regime as corporate bureaucrats or a state bourgeoisie. One of the most prominent of these examples was Osman Ahmed Osman. Osman established a small engineering company in the late 1940s, which grew to become the Arab Contractors company which won a $48 million contract to construct part of Nasser’s own dream project, the Aswan High Dam. Like most major companies, Osman’s Arab Contractors was also nationalized.

However, Osman did not leave the country and still led the company as its chairman even if he ceased being its owner. However, Osman was allowed by the Nasser regime to run branches of his business abroad as a private enterprise. Despite his close relationship with Nasser, Osman had an even closer relationship with Sadat and brokered deals between the new Sadat regime and the Muslim Brotherhood for them to counter the power of Nasserist and leftist groups. He then served as the Minister of Housing under Sadat, and his son wedded Sadat’s daughter (Tarouty, 2015: 42). Although, Arab Contractors was never denationalized, Osman was allowed to establish a new construction company in 1974—one year after taking over the Ministry of Housing—taking advantage of the new investment law which signaled the start of Sadat’s open-door policy (Osman Group Website).

Hassan Allam, a construction tycoon, shares a story similar to that of Osman Ahmed Osman. Allam established his construction company in 1936 to become one of the biggest construction companies in Egypt owned by an Egyptian. The company continued to be a giant until it was
partially nationalized in 1961 and then it was fully nationalized by 1964. A year after the enactment of the open-door policy in 1975, Hassan Allam was allowed to establish a private construction firm called Hassan Allam Holding, which is still operational until today and is among the largest construction companies in Egypt.

6.6 The Afghan War and the Mubarak years

The Soviet-Afghan war was an important milestone that further established Islamism as a forceful power in the political, culture and economic spheres. The Mujahideen fighting the Soviets in the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 received large support from the US but also from regimes allied with the US such as Sadat’s Egypt and Israel. Sadat already allowing Islamists to operate to counter Nasserist and Leftist influence, went a bit further by agreeing with the American administration to train and equip the Mujahideen for the war (Cooley, 2000, p. 32).

Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s national adviser at the time, who is also widely considered to be the architect of Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan, visited Sadat in early 1980 to discuss delivering arms and training the Mujahideen in Pakistan to fight the Soviets. Egypt under Sadat, and as part of the US cold war efforts, engaged for the first time in a war by the side of the US and against the Soviet Union. According to John K. Cooley, Sadat had completely focused his attention on the Soviet Union and described it as more dangerous to the world than Adolf Hitler had ever been (Cooley, 2000, p. 32).

The Soviets undoubtedly thought of Sadat as ungrateful and considered his actions a slap on the face, especially when he allegedly handed Soviet SAM missiles to military researchers at the Pentagon and of course after the prominent expelling of the Soviet advisers in 1972. “Neither were Soviet observers astonished to see President Sadat, in 1980, building popular backing for his still unpublicized, if not truly secret, military support to the Soviet Union’s adversaries in Afghanistan. He began trying to create committees to raise money and volunteers for Afghanistan, and against the “threat of world communism.” (Cooley, 2000, p. 32).

Rather than to only appease the US and Israel, Sadat might have thought that supporting jihad in Afghanistan will also appease Islamist groups angry at the peace treaty with Israel and at Sadat’s reception of the deposed Shah of Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Cooley, 2000, p. 32). However, Sadat’s assassination at the hands of Islamist groups demonstrate that this might have been a gross miscalculation.

Conventional wisdom seems to suggest that Hosni Mubarak’s rule was a mere continuation of
Sadat’s policies. Although the transition from Sadat to Mubarak can hardly be considered a substantial rupture as in the case of the transition from Nasser to Sadat, Mubarak was generally more prudent than Sadat and this had its own policy implications.

First, Mubarak worked on mending relations with his Arab neighbours, especially the Gulf states but also Gaddafi’s Libya, and have succeeded considerably. After ten years of being expelled from the Arab League, Egypt managed to re-enter and restore the Arab League to its original headquarters in Cairo after being hosted by Tunis for 10 years. One year after, Egypt joined a US-led coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion in the Gulf War of 1990. This intervention established Mubarak as a hero in the Gulf countries especially in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Just before the Gulf war, Egypt’s economy was seriously struggling. In 1990-91 Egypt's budget deficit was 20 percent of GDP, inflation was soaring, foreign-debt service was consuming half of Egypt’s inflows of foreign currency, and foreign reserves covered barely two months' worth of imports, which imposed a serious food security issue given that Egypt then imported half of its wheat needs. Mubarak was quick to join the US-led alliance to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein's invasion, and he was rewarded by the forgiving of $20 billion-worth of debt owned by America, the Gulf states and Europe, and about another $20 billion were rescheduled (The Economist, 1999). One year after the forgiving of the debt, Egypt embarked on an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programme aimed at liberalizing the economy and privatizing the public sector of the country.

These developments signaled the start of the second neoliberal wave that culminated with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his clique challenging the power of the old guard bureaucrats and military generals. Due to the absence of wars and military conflicts, and the neoliberal promise of global borderless prosperity, the nationalist discourse of the Gamal Mubarak clique, which was effectively ruling the country the decade before the 2011 revolution erupted, was mild and mundane, especially in contrast with the populist developmental struggle-based nationalist discourse of earlier periods.

David Harvey (2005) explains the tension in which the neoliberal state deals with the question of nationalism. Harvey argues that the neoliberal state is expected to set the stage for market functions and only intervening enough to ensure that. On the other hand, the neoliberal state needs to behave as a competitive entity in global politics under a neoliberal world order that discourages protectionist policies. “In its latter role it has to work as a collective corporations, and this poses the problem of how to ensure citizen loyalty. Nationalism is an obvious answer, but this is profoundly antagonistic
to the neoliberal agenda” (Harvey, 2005, p. 79). Neil Davidson also argues that neoliberalism needs nationalism to recreate a cohesion at the political level which was lost at the social level by the implementation of neoliberal policies (Davidson, 2008).

Blommaert (2005, p. 234) argues that what we may identify as ‘nationalism’ in recent decades (the decades of neoliberalism) is a new form of ‘statism’, where the state is searching for reinforced authority in symbolic fields such as culture and language because of the gradual erosion of its role and authority in ‘hard’ domains such as the economy, monetary affairs, social policies, international relations or defence. Nationalism under Gamal Mubarak’s neoliberal condition has therefore belonged more to the symbolic than to any of the “hard” domain.

Since the neoliberal state needs to mobilize nationalism in order for a nation-state to succeed at the level of a world market and to ensure citizens’ loyalty amidst an austerity state that does not provide as much in terms of social services, this nationalism cannot go too far as to threaten global market forces which it is supposed to advocate. Developmental nationalism is therefore excluded as a model, especially in developing countries, because it encourages protectionist policies and the closing down of borders through erecting tariff barriers for Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). In the case of Gamal Mubarak, the political elite was mostly formed of a Western-educated civilian business class of which many are dual-citizens trying by means of a neoliberal passive revolution (De Smet & Bogaert, 2017, p. 222) to take over power from an old military/bureaucratic elite that has no deep connection to the outside world, and who would often adopt a populist nationalist discourse.

Therefore, one of the main avenue left for expressions of mass nationalism was during football tournaments, especially between 2006 and 2010 when Egypt won three African cup of nations in a row and came close to qualifying to the World Cup for the first time in 20 years in an event that provoked a violent face-off with regional rivals Algeria. Gamal Mubarak used to attend the key games in person, and would spend time with the national team players in the dressing room and made sure the media would capture these moments.

His brother Alaa Mubarak made a phone-in in one of the sports shows after Egypt’s defeat against Algeria and some allegedly violent episodes around the game in Sudan where Alaa and Gamal Mubarak were attending themselves. In the phone call he said: “Egypt is worthy of respect. No one can humiliate us. Those who humiliate us will have to pay the price for it […] They envy us. I can understand [their aggression] because they have a complex about Egypt.” (GigaManMedia, 2009). Hosni Mubarak himself addressed the parliament a few days after the disqualification from
the World Cup using a highly nationalistic speech assuring listeners that the protection of Egyptians abroad is the responsibility of the state (BBC, 2009). This happened after news reports that Egyptian interests in Algeria have been attacked by angry football fans.

Media under Sadat and Mubarak was still tightly controlled by the state despite the introduction of some cosmetic changes. Radio was utilized by Sadat the same way it was by Nasser to publicize and persuade the nation with his peace plan, but Sadat in his era had a new media weapon: television. Shalabieh (1985: 210) argues that television influenced the way Sadat and Begin behaved during the peace talks. By knowing that the whole world was watching, they seem to have been self-conscious about the long-lasting effect they were creating by engaging in these peace talks.

However, television, even more so than the press, was under Sadat's total control. Although Sadat permitted the formation of political parties and a few independent media outlets especially in press, his rule and control of media production was almost absolutist and did not differ much from Nasser except only cosmetically. Therefore, he utilized different forms of media to propagate the country's new political line and towards the end of his rule have had many writers, politicians and journalists who opposed him put in jail and then introduced even more restrictive measures on the press (Khamis, 2011).

Mubarak, at least in the early years of his rule was an extension of Sadat's policy when it came to media control. Same restrictions were applied during the era of Mubarak on journalists and the media until the introduction of satellite television which offered an uncensored alternative to state-owned media. This was also accompanied with the introduction of independent and private press and the emergence of the Internet (Khamis, 2011, p. 1161). The Mubarak regime still carried out its occasional crack down on media and journalists when they took a clear opposing stance against any official narrative (Kenner, 2010). Despite the continuous attempts to control new media technologies, these new and diverse media outlets meant that for the first time since the 1952 revolution Egypt managed to shift from a highly monolithic media scene to a somewhat more dynamic one which played a significant role in the build up to the 2011 revolution (Khamis, 2011).

6.7 Conclusion
In 1974, Sadat embarked on an economic liberalization programme aimed at reversing most of the economic measures taken during the 1950 and 1960s, namely land reform and nationalization. In order to do so, Sadat needed to craft a new national identity that would suit the requirements of the
new era. A religious awakening, a rejection of pan-Arabism and Third-Worldism seemed to have been the new regime’s strategy to face resistance to the new unpopular policies.

In the Cold War politics of the time, the US embraced these changes and brokered a peace treaty with Israel in Washington, D.C.. This led to denunciation from almost all Arab countries. They accused Sadat of betraying the Palestinian cause by not linking an Israeli evacuation of the West Bank, Gaza and Arab East Jerusalem to the Israeli commitment to evacuate Sinai. Sadat reacted by drawing closer to the US. In public speeches, he termed the Arab leaders “dwarves and ignoramuses” with “putrid and corrupt” minds (Cooley, 2000). This led Sadat’s regime to not just reject political pan-Arabism, but also any form of Arabism including cultural, and resort to a nationalist discourse that positions itself against and claims superiority over Arabs. In order to do so, an identity that stresses the uniqueness of Egypt even compared to their closest neighbours was crafted. This identity drew heavily on Egypt’s Pharaonic history. The re-emergent business elite of Egypt embraced this Pharaonism and Americanism as was clear from the symbols, names and economic activities of their companies. However, as we have discussed earlier in the study, this Americanism did not survive well. Recent political and economic developments has led those who rose to power and accumulated wealth as the result of an alliance with the US in the 1970s to sponsor some of the most anti-American sentiments in 2013.

Mubarak’s policies is usually perceived as an extension of Sadat’s, but there was still significant differences characterized by Mubarak’s non-confrontational character who managed, for example, to mend relations with the Arab states—especially the oil-rich Gulf states—and restore the headquarters of the Arab League to its former city, Cairo. During the first two decades of the Mubarak rule—before the neoliberal turn took full effect with the rise of Gamal Mubarak—pressures on territorial Egyptian nationalism and Egypt’s Pharaonic identity, and the increased Islamization of the cultural sphere continued.

However, these brands of nationalism were more reconciled with a better relationship with Arab countries due to the structural economic crises that culminated in Egypt in the late 1980s, and that led to reliance of all sorts of economic support and lifelines from the oil-rich Gulf states. Although, there was plenty of emphasis on “Arab Brotherhood” in the official discourse, this was in no way the kind of Arabism propagated by Nasser, but was more of a conservative, US-led alliance as was demonstrated in both the Soviet-Afghan war and the first Gulf (Kuwait liberation) war.

The project of a young mostly Western-educated neoliberal elite in the first decade of the millennium was to finish whatever little remained of the developmental postcolonial militaristic state
that was established in the 1950s and the 1960s in Egypt, and inspired much of the nationalist discourse adopted since at least the establishment of the republic in the 1950s. Giving up on nationalism altogether in favour of cosmopolitanism and globalization was not an option due to the nature of the neoliberal state as being in competition with other states in a globalized world with no trade or capital barriers. This kind of tension characterized the attempts of a shock transformation from a developmental militaristic state to a neoliberal civilian one, and gave way to an incoherent and confused discourse of nationalism mainly centred around football nationalism.
Chapter 7
Closing remarks
Throughout this study, I tried to explore how did the ultra-nationalist and nationalist discourse of the June 30 period serve a group of businessmen who helped with the dissemination of such discourse. I analyzed the propagated discourse critically by going beyond the text to examine why and how it was produced. In order to do so, this exploration needed to be historicized especially in a field like nationalism which heavily draws on imaginings of the past, but also to demonstrate how the past is continuously reconstructed and re-imagined based on present conditions. Therefore, I also explored the historical pedigree of the June 30 discourse to serve two functions: first it worked to show the history of how economic interests played a prominent role in shaping the nationalist discourse of economic elites; second, it worked to demonstrate the nationalist resources that the June 30 business elite and media drew from, and where it corresponds to previous forms of nationalism and how it differs.

In order to achieve this goal, I have tried to answer a research question through answering a list of sub-questions. The first sub-question was about identifying the key messages of such discourse, and the discursive techniques to be used as a starting point for exploring the functions of such messages and techniques. The second sub-question was on whether nationalist hysteria is a one-dimensional phenomenon or does it have a rational dimension to it. One of the studies starting points was challenging the idea that the discourse of rational agents could be reduced to “hysteria” even if this is how it appeared at face value.

The third sub-questions was about the possible economic interests that led the producers of such discourse to take this position. It was demonstrated throughout the text that the discourse at hand was heavily influenced by the movement of capital. For example, the economic role of the US was becoming more and more irrelevant due to the rise of oil-rich Gulf countries, and this was reflected in an Egyptocentric discourse that was highly anti-American but at the same time toned down on the anti-Arab component of previous Egyptocentric discourses.

The fourth sub-question was trying to examine whether these media outlets were a profitable enterprise in and of themselves. Of course these media outlets could have been established and this discourse employed to generate traffic and therefore profits. Although it is extremely difficult to find financial data for media outlets, the study made it clear that direct profits was not the goal of establishing these media outlets and that most of them were non-profitable. Having proved that these
media outlets were not self-contained and self-sufficient systems, it was left to be explored the "real" functions and purpose of these outlets.

This study has made and covered some general and specific pronouncements about the field of nationalism. The general ones regard the study of non-European nationalisms, or nationalisms in countries that are perceived as not having reached a stage of advanced capitalism, or the so-called “periphery”. It argued, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, that since at least the emergence of the modern nation-state, Egypt has been part of the global and historical developments and its brands of nationalism have echoed that of German romantic nationalism at times, populist nationalism when it was the global trend, and non-populist neoliberal nationalism also when it was the historical mode and global trend. The findings of the study show that the link nationalism has with the organization of economic life, whether capitalist or not, was just as strong as in “advanced” European capitalisms.

For example, this research was initiated before Brexit took place, and before the rise of Donald Trump in the US, Victor Orbán in Hungary, Matteo Salvini in Italy and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. However, by the time of its finishing it became clear that this nationalist rise was not peculiar to Egypt and is a global trend as a reaction to a global economy in deep crisis; it becomes clearer by the day that the globalization order is under serious threat, and that faith in issues like free trade, multiculturalism, and liberal democracy constituted around a centrist consensus is dwindling as a result of an economic crises that was brought about by the forces of globalization and neoliberal consensus. As discussed in the introduction, for the New York Times’ former Cairo bureau chief David Kirkpatrick, the June 30 was reminiscent of the rise of ultra-nationalism in Europe in the 1930s, but it is also perhaps reminiscent of the rise of ultra-nationalism in Europe in this day and age; it could even be argued that the rise of nationalism in Europe is reminiscent of its equivalent in Egypt.

The study argued that the national ideology of Egypt as an “Eastern” nation has seldom, if at all, been motivated and driven by pure mysticism, irrational dogmatic faith and passion (characteristics that have typically been attributed to the East), and has mostly been driven by rational considerations. Even when it is related to seemingly faith-based systems such as religion, it remained largely fluid and always ready to metamorphose depending on rational considerations.

The use of “rationalism” throughout the study was not meant to act a positive attribute, and was far from being a word of praise. In this study, it was used to denote that careful strategies and planning have always been employed by promulgators of official and bourgeois nationalism to serve
their economic interests and maximize their economic gains. In many cases, this strategizing and planning was carried out by the so-called economic man, the heroic figure of modern capitalism whom John Stuart Mill defines as “a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (Sedlacek, 2013: 22). The study demonstrated how this was the case temporally across all eras and thematically across all brands of nationalism in Egypt, including in its anti-imperialist forms.

This should not be misinterpreted as an echoing of classical economic theory that all men *always* seek to maximize utility as consumers and profits as producers. Instead, economic men should be understood as some men (the economic elites) who seem to prioritize the maximization of their wealth and power without denying the existence of other drives and motives and without an attempt to universalize the claim and extend it to all mankind as is the case with classical economic theory. The study was focused on the nationalism of economic elites, who are by definition primarily preoccupied and driven by economic interest.

There is good reason to believe that the ideological standpoints of such economic men are largely influenced by their economic interests. This conclusion would help us answer at least the first part of our research question regarding “the function of the articulation of a nationalist discourse by the media owned by Egypt's infitah businessmen in their opposition against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in the period leading up to the ouster of Mohamed Morsy in 2013?”.

A major function served, as argued throughout the study, is of economic nature. When I made the decision to study the media, it was not to argue that this was a dominant nationalist discourse, or if the watching “masses” adopted such discourse; it was stressed that this is not a reception study, and media was only a tool to study the discourse of a business elite that chooses to “speak” and influence discourse through investing in media outlets. Whether the receivers are influenced or not was not within the scope of this study. However, I would be more inclined to give a negative answer because if this was the case, than the structure/superstructure configuration could then be universalized to include the whole society whose ideology, culture and beliefs would be a mere consequence of the economic interests of its business elites.

For this reason, I consider this to be a study of power rather than hegemony in the Gramscian sense because it distinguishes power from mere force or violence in that power addresses individuals without annulling their capacity as agents. On the contrary, it presupposes their capacity as agents, and power in that sense only exists in relation to individuals who are free to act in one way or another (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991, p. 5). The June 30 persuasive discourse of the
anti-Brotherhood media is evident that the agency of the addressees and consumers of this discourse was presupposed by the infitah businessmen media. The study also argued that since the economic terrain which the business elite operated in was characterized by “primitive” accumulation, the business elite is unlikely to have been functioning as a hegemonic class in the Gramscian sense of the term.

Gramsci himself divided the superstructure into two levels: one is civil society that is the totality of the organisms that are called private and the other level is the State (or the political society). For Gramsci, the levels of the civil society corresponds to the function of hegemony which the dominant group exercise throughout society, whereas the level of political society (or the State) corresponds to “direct domination”. For Gramsci, the two functions are connected where the hegemonic function is driven by the prestige and confidence enjoyed by the dominant groups because of their function in the world of production. On the other hand, the complementary role of coercive power exercised by the state targets those who do not consent in order to enforce discipline on them (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). The issue of “consent” is therefore very central to Gramsci’s hegemony. As discussed in Chapter 1, for Gramsci, the ability or the motivation of the “dominant” groups to drive consent from the masses using cultural hegemony at the level of civil society is questioned in settings that are rent-based and where capitalism is not advanced.

The other general thread that weaved throughout the study was the fluid nature of nationalism that perhaps answers the second part of the research questions about the historical pedigree behind the discourse uttered around the events of June 30. We have seen that nationalism could be a progressive or regressive force; an inclusive or an exclusive mechanism or a blend of both; anti-imperialist, or a proponent of imperialism. It could be secular or religious. It could comprise democracy or authoritarianism. It could be nationalism from below, or nationalism from above.

This fluid nature was manifested throughout the study, but in this closing chapter, I would like to remind of the changing position of the infitah businessmen from the official nationalism under which they started their process of wealth accumulation. Tarek Nour went from being a businessman who had close links with America to the extent that he would name his first advertising agency Americana, to a businessman who would hire a TV host who is a fierce critic of the US, and would give a powerful platform for anti-American sentiments. As a quick reminder, I will bring out this quote by Ibrahim Eissa uttered on Tarek Nour’s channel once again for further reflection.

"Today is the day of independence. We didn’t just triumph over extremism and bigotry. We
didn’t just triumph over snobbery, exclusion, arrogance, stubbornness, blindness, dullness and tediousness. No, we triumphed over America. Today is a victory over America (Huna al-Qahira 27-7-2013).

It is true that later Ibrahim Eissa’s show was suspended, but it is almost certain that this was because of his anti-Saudi pronouncements and not the anti-American. Eissa’s suspension due to his anti-Saudi sentiments is a further proof of the second most important diversion from the baseline infitah discourse, that is, the strong views regarding the inferiority of Arabs to Egyptians. It is also worth noting that Eissa ended up—despite his highly anti-American discourse presented in Chapter 2—hosting a show in al-Hurra television, which is an American channel funded by the US government to promote the image of the United States in the Arab world (McCarthy, 2004).

The historical pedigree of such nationalist discourse is therefore minimal without so much in common with past discourses. It is more characterized by violent ruptures with the past than with continuity; therefore, instead of Anthony Smith’s argument that “perhaps the central question in our understanding of nationalism is the role of the past in the creation of the present” (Smith, 1999: 180; my italics), the study would conclude by asserting that “perhaps the central question in our understanding of nationalism is the role of the present in the creation of the past”.

The study adopted a modernist view to study a recent nationalist phenomenon in Egypt by examining the role of capital in influencing nationalist discourse. Despite its name, the modernist view was not adopted in this study to argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon; this theoretical debate was beyond the scope of this study; it was employed because it is the paradigm that gives the most attention to the role of capitalism, economic factors and mass media technology in the forging of nationalism as a discursive formation. The sensitivity of Egyptian nationalism to the movement of capital and modes of accumulation—as it has been demonstrated throughout the study—challenges the dominant modernist view that mostly limits the impact of capital to European nationalism. Even in the post-colonial tradition, nationalism in the so-called periphery is often regarded as merely a reaction to European colonialism (Tom Nairn, 2015: 331; Michael Hechter, 2017; Hobsbawm, 1990).

The regional influence and developments stemming from over-accumulation occurring in the oil-rich Gulf states described throughout the study challenges this view, even if it was true to a certain extent in the 19th century colonial and in the 20th century post-colonial era. Moreover, the emergence of early experiences of pre-modern forms of nationalism outside of Europe before the age of
European colonialism and before a European-led world economic system also poses questions about the validity of this post-colonial assumption. With excessive capital accumulation occurring in non-European settings and regions, the study of nationalism needs more than ever to break away from this Eurocentric tradition.

The last point to be made shall be about the potential of this research to be extended beyond the pages of this dissertation. The reason why I did not give this last chapter the typical “conclusion” title is my belief that this research still does not—and might never—have a conclusive end. I believe that what is needed is the revival of further examinations of links between more “structural” and “superstructural” elements, that is between the fields of ideology, religion, culture and language on the one hand, and the economy and relations of production on the other hand in studying the contemporary and recent history of Egypt, but also the Middle East.

This bringing down of disciplinary barriers is a way to confront Middle Eastern exceptionalism especially after it has seen a revival due to the “failure” of the Arab revolutions to transition into democracies. One year before the breakout of the Arab revolutions in 2010, Larry Diamond, a scholar of democratic transitions, described the Middle East as “a striking anomaly – the principal exception to the globalization of democracy” (my italics) (quoted in Heydemann, 2015). This view of the Middle East as an anomaly was seriously challenged after the Arab revolutions of 2010/11 when the respective authoritarian orders started crumbling one after the other and analogies were drawn with the “Spring of Nations” of 1848 (hence the coinage of the “Arab Spring” as the most common description of the revolutionary events) and the 1989 revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe. However, it is arguable that the persistence of authoritarianism—with the possible exception of Tunisia—gives a new life to arguments about Arab—or Middle Eastern—exceptionalism (Heydemann, 2016).

An appreciation of how symbolic and discursive fields are overdetermined could prevent the analysis from stopping at the cultural level. It is a way to challenge the view that this “something” in the composite culture of the Middle East—“which has frozen its history and has made it impossible to ‘move forward’”—is not intrinsic and does not develop in a vacuum.
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