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Getting what you want: the case of genetic relatedness in the context of assisted reproduction

Seppe Segers (UGent)
(2018)
Author
Organization
Abstract
The goal of having genetically related offspring is often described as a ‘fundamental human need’ or as a ‘natural drive’. This is not a merely descriptive assertion. It is much rather performative, in the sense that it is invoked to justify moral obligations to accommodate this goal of genetic parenthood in the field of assisted reproduction. Such assumptions, however, require normative interrogation. That there may be ‘evolutionary reasons’ for this presumed drive does neither justify that it should be met, nor does it mean that it cannot be overcome. More: the contextual reality is that in the field of assisted reproduction, attempts to reach this goal are not free of other interests that have to be taken into account (e.g. the future child’s wellbeing but also broader community interests). This leads to a complex balancing of interests, to which the normative importance of the goal of genetic parenthood is central. For one thing, even if many people highly value having a genetically related child and are willing to accept certain risks and costs to others to obtain this, such an observation does not in itself entail the normative conclusion that one should accommodate this desire. In this presentation, I will provide a novel framework to analyze the normative significance of this desire for genetically related offspring, in order to assess how far one should go to accommodate this desire. This is especially relevant for the ethics of assisted reproduction. The presented argument will provide a ground to show that there may be a pro tanto moral obligation to accommodate the desire for a genetically related child, which means that its normative significance might be trumped by other considerations or moral norms in actual contexts. In doing so I will build on and bring together insights from theory of need, philosophy of desire and feminist ethics.
Keywords
Genetic parenthood, need, desire

Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Segers, Seppe. Getting What You Want: The Case of Genetic Relatedness in the Context of Assisted Reproduction. 2018.
APA
Segers, S. (2018). Getting what you want: the case of genetic relatedness in the context of assisted reproduction. Presented at the 32nd European conference on philosophy of medicine and health care, Lisbon.
Chicago author-date
Segers, Seppe. 2018. “Getting What You Want: The Case of Genetic Relatedness in the Context of Assisted Reproduction.” In .
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Segers, Seppe. 2018. “Getting What You Want: The Case of Genetic Relatedness in the Context of Assisted Reproduction.” In .
Vancouver
1.
Segers S. Getting what you want: the case of genetic relatedness in the context of assisted reproduction. In 2018.
IEEE
[1]
S. Segers, “Getting what you want: the case of genetic relatedness in the context of assisted reproduction,” presented at the 32nd European conference on philosophy of medicine and health care, Lisbon, 2018.
@inproceedings{8571702,
  abstract     = {{The goal of having genetically related offspring is often described as a ‘fundamental human need’ or as a ‘natural drive’. This is not a merely descriptive assertion. It is much rather performative, in the sense that it is invoked to justify moral obligations to accommodate this goal of genetic parenthood in the field of assisted reproduction. Such assumptions, however, require normative interrogation. That there may be ‘evolutionary reasons’ for this presumed drive does neither justify that it should be met, nor does it mean that it cannot be overcome. More: the contextual reality is that in the field of assisted reproduction, attempts to reach this goal are not free of other interests that have to be taken into account (e.g. the future child’s wellbeing but also broader community interests). This leads to a complex balancing of interests, to which the normative importance of the goal of genetic parenthood is central. For one thing, even if many people highly value having a genetically related child and are willing to accept certain risks and costs to others to obtain this, such an observation does not in itself entail the normative conclusion that one should accommodate this desire. In this presentation, I will provide a novel framework to analyze the normative significance of this desire for genetically related offspring, in order to assess how far one should go to accommodate this desire. This is especially relevant for the ethics of assisted reproduction. The presented argument will provide a ground to show that there may be a pro tanto moral obligation to accommodate the desire for a genetically related child, which means that its normative significance might be trumped by other considerations or moral norms in actual contexts. In doing so I will build on and bring together insights from theory of need, philosophy of desire and feminist ethics.}},
  author       = {{Segers, Seppe}},
  keywords     = {{Genetic parenthood,need,desire}},
  language     = {{und}},
  location     = {{Lisbon}},
  title        = {{Getting what you want: the case of genetic relatedness in the context of assisted reproduction}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}