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A case study in almost-perfect security for unconditionally secure communication

(2016) DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY. 83(1). p.145-168
Author
Organization
Abstract
In the Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from a publicly known deck. Alice and Bob must then communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning who holds a single card. Solutions in the literature provide weak security, where Alice and Bob's exchanges do not allow Cath to know with certainty who holds each card that is not hers, or perfect security, where Cath learns no probabilistic information about who holds any given card. We propose an intermediate notion, which we call -strong security, where the probabilities perceived by Cath may only change by a factor of . We then show that strategies based on affine or projective geometries yield -strong safety for arbitrarily small and appropriately chosen values of a, b, c.
Keywords
Information-based cryptography, Secure communication, Secret-exchange protocols, AGGREGATION, SECRET, CARDS, SHARE

Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Landerreche, Esteban, and David Fernández-Duque. “A Case Study in Almost-perfect Security for Unconditionally Secure Communication.” DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 83.1 (2016): 145–168. Print.
APA
Landerreche, E., & Fernández-Duque, D. (2016). A case study in almost-perfect security for unconditionally secure communication. DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY, 83(1), 145–168.
Chicago author-date
Landerreche, Esteban, and David Fernández-Duque. 2016. “A Case Study in Almost-perfect Security for Unconditionally Secure Communication.” Designs Codes and Cryptography 83 (1): 145–168.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Landerreche, Esteban, and David Fernández-Duque. 2016. “A Case Study in Almost-perfect Security for Unconditionally Secure Communication.” Designs Codes and Cryptography 83 (1): 145–168.
Vancouver
1.
Landerreche E, Fernández-Duque D. A case study in almost-perfect security for unconditionally secure communication. DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY. 2016;83(1):145–68.
IEEE
[1]
E. Landerreche and D. Fernández-Duque, “A case study in almost-perfect security for unconditionally secure communication,” DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 145–168, 2016.
@article{8566403,
  abstract     = {In the Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from a publicly known deck. Alice and Bob must then communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning who holds a single card. Solutions in the literature provide weak security, where Alice and Bob's exchanges do not allow Cath to know with certainty who holds each card that is not hers, or perfect security, where Cath learns no probabilistic information about who holds any given card. We propose an intermediate notion, which we call -strong security, where the probabilities perceived by Cath may only change by a factor of . We then show that strategies based on affine or projective geometries yield -strong safety for arbitrarily small and appropriately chosen values of a, b, c.},
  author       = {Landerreche, Esteban and Fernández-Duque, David},
  issn         = {0925-1022},
  journal      = {DESIGNS CODES AND CRYPTOGRAPHY},
  keywords     = {Information-based cryptography,Secure communication,Secret-exchange protocols,AGGREGATION,SECRET,CARDS,SHARE},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {145--168},
  title        = {A case study in almost-perfect security for unconditionally secure communication},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10623-016-0210-y},
  volume       = {83},
  year         = {2016},
}

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