Editorial

Last year, we started our editorial by referring to the Women’s March, denouncing structural (gender) inequality around the world. This year, we open our issue by alluding to the #MeToo movement, uniting millions of women in speaking out against sexual abuse, discrimination against women, and unequal power relations. Although both initiatives have their proponents and opponents, they indicate a growing debate about questions of gender and diversity. What both movements have in common is that they denounce sexism, sexual harassment, and the suppression of women’s rights. They work towards a more “open” and “just” society in which there is radical equality for all. The Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies applauds these goals and hopes to contribute to them by publishing new work on gender and diversity from a wide range of disciplines, including the social sciences, humanities, and psy-disciplines. The journal wants to be a platform for ongoing research that examines the visible and invisible hurdles in our (European) societies that hamper equality and, therefore, social progress. As we wrote in our mission statement five years ago, societal openness is negatively defined as “the condition in which individual life chances or the formation of social boundaries are not determined by social categories such as sex, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, ‘race’, social origin, class, age, disability, (chronic) illness ...”. This issue of DiGeSt aims to reflect on societal openness by offering new theoretical concepts (the “dis/ability complex”), empirical studies (new figures on attitudes towards gender quotas in academia), and avenues of thought (on gender representation on social media, and constructions of race and identity in the Netherlands and beyond).

The current issue opens with an article by Dan Goodley on what he terms the “dis/ability complex”, a critical tool and vantage point from which to think through the tension between ability and disability, ableism and disablism. As Goodley shows, one does not exist without the other: as we further define disability and disablism as critical categories and social practices, so we further establish ability and ableism as the social norm. By thinking the two concepts together in the “dis/ability complex”, we are able to understand the complex co-dependent workings of ableism and disablism in various fields going from labour to emotion, education, politics, technology, and the anthropocene. In the area of labour, for instance, queer and crip theory subvert the dominant narrative of equating individual success with employment, i.e. the logic that we are “good” citizens if and when we work. Looking at the domain of labour through the lens of the “dis/ability complex”, however, we recognize not only the exclusionary logic behind the above reasoning (the implication being that those who do not or cannot work are somehow also “lesser” citizens) but also the privilege to work (i.e. the right to work from which disabled people are often excluded). It is possible, Goodley argues, to be simultaneously drawn to and repulsed by work, to desire normative citizenship and yet, at the same time, to want to reshape it. What the “dis/ability complex” adds to the state of the art is that it
allows us to acknowledge both ends of the dichotomy (what falls under “ability” and under “disability”) and to expose both privilege and subordination. Goodley regards the concept as related to intersectional analysis and critical disability studies, which both recognize the intersections of multiple categories. Rather than seeing ability and disability as two mutually exclusive categories, he considers them as co-constitutive.

In “Exploring the Politics of Gender Representation on Instagram: Self-presentation of Femininity”, Sofia P. Caldeira, Sander De Ridder, and Sofie Van Bauwel examine how the social media platform Instagram reflects and shapes current gender norms. On the one hand, Instagram provides a platform for challenging gender norms by emphasizing agency and extending practices of gender representation beyond current conventions. On the other hand, it also reproduces extant social norms not only by removing content that is deemed too explicit or divergent but also by offering users the possibility of “flagging” or “reporting” deviant behaviour. As the authors recognize, both processes of challenging and reproducing gender norms can be combined. Their case study of Belgian Instagram near-nude model Marisa Papen shows how a discourse of empowerment (to claim and express one’s own body by curating a series of photographs taken by oneself and others) co-exists with what seems at first sight relatively stereotypical representations of femininity (narrow notions of “sexiness”, similar to the images we see in mainstream media outlets). By focusing on the everyday politics of self-representation on Instagram, the authors show how various filters – technological, institutional, and cultural – are at work on social media platforms. They demonstrate how power on social media is diffuse, rather than coming from one source. If social media like Instagram offer more opportunities for empowerment than traditional media (e.g. by bypassing the power of traditional media companies), they also have strong limitations due to their Terms of Use and users’ feedback. Often the political potential for change attributed to social media is strongly curbed or remains unrealized, as illustrated by the ban of Papen’s Instagram account.

The discussion of gender is continued in a different context in Jolien Voorspoels’ article “‘In our department there is absolutely no discrimination of women or others.’ Staff Attitudes on Gender Quotas in a Belgian University”. Voorspoels offers new data on attitudes towards gender quotas for decision-making bodies among all staff at the University of Antwerp. She adds to the knowledge of how attitudes towards gender quotas affect the success of their implementation. The findings of the research show that resistance towards gender quotas as a policy measure can be understood through respondents’ gender stereotypes (their score on the so-called “sexism scale”) and the denial of gender inequality in contemporary society (the idea that gender equality already exists or that gender inequality is mainly caused by individual, gendered choices and behaviour). In addition, women and those who support diversity policies are shown to be more likely to evaluate gender quotas positively than men. The same goes for female assistants, humanities and social sciences staff, and other/external staff. The findings, however, also demonstrate that
(full) professors are less likely to support gender quotas as a policy measure. This is attributed to the idea that at this level quotas are potentially perceived as conflicting with ideas of meritocracy, excellence, and neutrality. The study further suggests that explicit communication about gender inequality in academia and beyond is crucial for the success of the implementation of gender quotas. In order for gender quotas to be accepted among staff, it is necessary for staff to recognize structural gender inequality first.

Structural inequality is also at the heart of Nella van den Brandt, Lieke Schrijvers, Amal Miri, and Nawal Mustafa’s interview with social and cultural anthropologist Professor Emeritus Gloria Wekker regarding her book White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race (2016), translated in Dutch as Witte onschuld: Paradoxen van kolonialisme en ras (2017). White Innocence caused a stir in the Netherlands with some praising and others despising Wekker for her argument that Dutch people seem to deny racism and praise themselves for their cultural open-mindedness. In the interview, Wekker elucidates to what extent the cultural archive regarding race and ethnicity has been forgotten in the Netherlands, and how a cultural language to discuss race still seems to be missing from the culture. She refers to “aphasia”, as if the Dutch collectively suffer from a brain lesion that affects their ability to speak about these issues. Wekker calls not only for an increased awareness of racism in the Netherlands but also for comparative perspectives: “what does white innocence look like in Belgium, Scandinavia, and southern European countries?” she asks. Moreover, as the interviewers note, Wekker challenges our methods for doing inter-sectional analysis by mixing academic writing with personal anecdotes. Identity, she argues, always consists of multiplicity, requiring us to define and stake out our positions and to do so again and again, drawing attention to complexity. In this, her position is comparable to that of Dan Goodley: both call attention to the workings of suppression and privilege across various categories of identity.

The “What are you reading?” section presents a number of short notes on relatively recent critical studies that are of particular significance to a researcher’s ongoing project. The first four authors in this category discuss works that deal with the nineteenth century. Laura Nys discusses Stephanie Shields’ “Passionate Men, Emotional Women: Psychology Constructs Gender Difference in the Late 19th Century” (2007) in relation to her ongoing project on emotion, gender, and discipline in Belgian state reformatories for juvenile delinquents. Charlotte D’Eer reviews Harriet Anderson’s Utopian Feminism. Women’s Movements in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna (1996) in light of her research on emotional constructs in the nineteenth-century periodical press and their relation to women editors. Mahdiyeh T. Khiabani researches the literary works of Oscar Wilde and comments on how research cultures differ in Belgium and Iran, where Wilde is often considered off-limits because of his “gay” authorial persona. Leah Budke similarly stresses the importance of gender characterization in her discussion of Talia Schaffer’s and Kathy Psomiades’s works on female aestheticism as a particular kind of aestheticism that influenced modernist women writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two other contributions to
the “What are you reading?” section address our contemporary situation. **Lisen Maebe** gives an account of Leigh Gilmore’s *The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony* (2001) and relates this work to her own research on how discourses of truth are constructed in contemporary autobiographical writing by women authors. Finally, **Ladan Rahbari and Gily Coene** review Ann Furedi’s *The Moral Case for Abortion* (2016), critically discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a moral take on (as opposed to a judicial approach to) abortion. They consider the implications of the book for research on women’s rights, autonomy, harm, and well-being.

We want to conclude by thanking our readers and subscribers for their support, the anonymous peer reviewers for their advice, the members of the editorial and advisory boards for their invaluable work and feedback, our intern Bregje Biebuyck for her commitment, and our publisher Leuven University Press for their assistance. On 25 April 2018, the *Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies* is celebrating its fifth anniversary in Filmzaal Plateau at Ghent University with lectures by Sarah Bracke and David Paternotte. We hope to see many of our readers and supporters there. At the same time, we are looking forward to the next issue, which will be a special issue, edited by Sophie Wennerscheid, Sara Van den Bossche, and Rozemarijn Vervoort, titled: “Whose Side Are You On? Border Crossings, Rites of Passage, and Liminal Experiences in Contemporary Literature and Culture”.

Birgit Van Puymbroeck, editor-in-chief
1

The Dis/ability Complex

Dan Goodley

Abstract
Diversity studies have much to gain from the interdisciplinary field of critical disability studies. The dis/ability complex acknowledges the mutually inclusive socio-political practices associated with the conceptual co-constitution of disability and ability. Simultaneously, the dis/ability complex recognizes that in order for disablism to be reproduced it requires its hidden referent to be present; namely, ableism. Disability all to often appears in our cultural psyche as a problem of body or mind, as an object of rehabilitative or curative intervention. Ability, meanwhile, is posited as an idealized marker of successful citizenship. In this paper I foreground the dis/ability complex as a guiding subject through which to think about a number of important individual and collective processes including labour, emotion, learning, technology, and the anthroposcene. I conclude that all of these intersectional sites of engagement significantly benefit from an engagement with the dis/ability complex.

Keywords
Disability, ability, ableism, disablism, theory, politics

Introducing dis/ability studies

We might frame the contemporary climate, in which we study diversity, as one of working in an age of intersectionality. This term, popularized through the now classic work of Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), demanded white feminists to engage more seriously and readily with the politics of blackness, race, and ethnicity. Intersectionality has been incredibly important, especially in the North American context, in plugging diversity studies into racialised politics that continue to dominate even today. In the same year as Crenshaw was admonishing white feminists for excluding women of colour, Jenny Morris (1991) was doing exactly the same to feminist and
disability studies scholars for failing to represent the desires of disabled women. From the early 1990s a whole body of feminist disability studies literature has blossomed (e.g. Morris, 1992, 1996; Thomas, 1999; Garland-Thomson, 1997, 2002, 2005; Titchkosky, 2003), some of it connecting with the politics of race (e.g. Vernon, 1999; Erevelles, 2012; Dunhamn, et al., 2015; Mollow, 2017). This work has been important not only in decentring the implicit masculine and white values of disability studies but also in bringing to the fore the perspectives of disabled women of colour. These intersectional interventions have moved the field from plain old disability studies to critical disability studies (Meekosha & Shuttleworth, 2009). A critical disability studies scholar asks difficult questions about the possibilities of representation and accountability of scholarship and activism to all disabled people. And this newly found criticality seeks to challenge some of the starting assumptions of disability scholarship, founded at a time when some groups of disabled people were not present in deliberations as to its potential meaning. This paper is a small contribution to the growing criticality within disability studies, a criticality that has a lot to offer to studies of diversity (see Goodley, 2016 for an overview).

In my 2014 book *Dis/ability Studies: Theorising Disablism and Ableism* I sought to blend studies of disability and ability. It had occurred to me, in the early days of writing that book, that critical disability studies had given rise to a number of theoretical communities that were, at times, forking off in different investigative directions and failing to commune with one another. In 2016 I wrote the second edition of *Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction* for Sage, in which I spent some time unpacking theoretical studies of ableism/ability and disablism/disability. I argued that traditionally disability theory had connected with the lives of disabled people, contested disablism, and challenged the socio-political genealogies of disability and impairment. Disability was, unsurprisingly, the main object of study for scholars of disability. We have since learnt much about the conditions of oppression that disabled people are subjected to and, just as significantly, disabled people are now often the subjects, authors, and researchers of disability. This work has paralleled and fed into the wider disabled people’s movement, resulting in a stage of theoretical sophistication framed in terms of critical disability studies.

A hallmark of this growing theoretical maturity is the emergence of critical studies of ableism. The work of Fiona Kumari Campbell (2008a, 2008b, 2009) has been especially influential. Ableism denotes a broad cultural logic of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and independence. We would want to consider ability (and the craving of ability tied up within ableism) in similar ways. Neoliberal ableism is the elision of national economic independence with an individual and cultural celebration of autonomy (Goodley, 2014). This particular affect economy ties individual and national progress to self-determination and, by virtue of this, associates happiness with self-reliance. Ableism is felt psychologically, as the broader social processes of ableism shape our psyches. And, as we believe in the offerings of ableism, we contribute to, reproduce, and uphold the logics of ableism. Hence, while people with physical, sensory, and cognitive impairments risk experiencing disablism,
all individuals of contemporary society are imperilled by the practices of ableism. Ableism and disablism feed off each other; they are co-terminous. This is because disability cannot exist without ability. We would not be able to comprehend dis-ability without its mirror image. Moreover, the ableist premise that we can (and should) ontologically and economically self-finance our everyday lives helps breed the disabling circumstances on which disabled people are seen as not embodying the autonomous assets necessary for everyday life. I find it helpful to think of us all living with the “dis/ability complex”. This is a bifurcated reality where just as disability is diagnosed so ability is further expanded. And just as society holds more sway in the promises of self-sufficient, autonomous, and able citizens so those that fail to meet up to the ableist zeitgeist are rendered disabled. And there are winners and losers here as different values, social groupings, and individual human qualities are placed on either side of the dis/ability complex. In figure 1, I seek to briefly tease out some of the key elements of the dis/ability complex:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 1: The dis/ability complex unpacked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermeshed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective packs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entangled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a number of potential reactions to this representation. Let me elucidate two. First, one might feel uncomfortable with the reliance on a binarisation of life when in many ways we might feel we live in the liminal space that exists between binary categories. Whilst recognizing that we will occupy different places on a continuum between, say, dependent and autonomous, it is important to acknowledge the deeply dividing practices of ableism and disablism. We need to spend more time revealing these contradictory though co-terminous repetitions. Therefore, I feel that the binary of dis/ability does some useful work in holding in tension the two phenomena. I am happy to keep the split term because of the analytical work it does in capturing the realities of contemporary life emboldened by the scholarship and activ-
ism of critical disability studies. Second, one might view either side of the dis/ability complex as extreme binaries of opposition. And while some might argue that we live in a time of post-binaries, the dis/ability complex attends to the very definite ways in which humanity works through and against preferred and othered, claimed and abandoned, majoritarian and minoritarian positions. Disabled people are conceptualized in those terms described on the left of figure 1, and reacted to as monstrous others by a non-disabled society (Shildrick, 2002). Able-bodied and -minded people tend to succeed in a world governed by and constructed for citizens with whom they share many similarities (the right column in figure 1). The dis/ability complex captures the global politics of diagnosis (in which more and more of us are likely to encounter a disability category) that is happening at exactly the same time when human survival and success is being ramped up in terms of individual autonomy and self-sufficiency, as the interventions of the state recede, austerity rolls across and through nations, and American and UK isolationism begins. And the dis/ability binarism also invites the grouping of people in terms of “the same” and (on the other side) “many others”. So, while I am prepared to concede that the dis/ability complex is a representational figure of extremes, one could assert (with some justification) that we are living in extreme socio-political times, a point I develop later when I consider our Trump-Brexit condition.

The dis/ability complex provides a framing from which to connect with other human beings and non-humans. This frame has an intersectional quality. From this vantage point, I want to explore a number of levels of analysis that I think could benefit from a dis/ability studies analysis. A dis/ability studies centralizes the dis/ability complex and in so doing is sensitized to unpacking the often-complementary practices of disablism and ableism. This is not to water down disability politics or the activism of disabled people. Rather, while disability remains of primary interest, the simultaneous attention to ability asks us to grapple with a broad political landscape in which people – disabled and otherwise – are found lacking in the ableist imaginary. By adopting the dis/ability complex as a critical approach, I seek to connect with other political agendas, as I broaden the discussion to include a number of intersectional engagements that move beyond a concern with dis/ability. My intentions are not to replace race, feminist, class, trans, or queer studies with critical disability studies as the master narrative. Rather, I am interested in the potential of the dis/ability complex to add to what is already a well-populated transdisciplinary arena of intersectional theorising. Originating in the work of Crenshaw (1991) and other allies, intersectional theorizing seeks to make sense of the ways in which mutual processes of exclusion take place and the frictional impact this has on multiple identities. I concur with Moodley and Graham (2015) that disability might be one starting point for a consideration of intersectionality that, of course, will not end with disability but will pull in other identity categories and material conditions. I thus introduce dis/ability as an important category of consideration in order to help us account for “multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1245).
Labour

The dis/ability complex has the potential to allow us to think critically about the way we labour in life. Labour remains a key topic of analysis for a whole host of disciplines ranging from economic policy to social policy and sociology. Labour in the form of paid labour is a defining feature of identity in many global north countries across the globe. Employment status is an absolute marker of human success in these neoliberal-able times. Work is so embedded into the psyche of all of us that the prospect of unemployment conjures up not simply matters of financial survival but also questions of ontological stability. But what would it mean to contest this naturalised phenomenon of the valued labouring citizen? How might we offer an intersectional critique of labour? One productive elision is that of critical disability and queer studies.

Queer scholars have led a resistance against the neoliberalisation of the soul where human value equates with labour value. The work of Halberstam has been foundational to the queer celebration of “a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline” and “a form of critique” (2011, p. 88). Carr beautifully described Halberstam’s *The Queer Art of Failure* as an energetic and loving tribute to those of us who fail, lose, get lost, forget, get angry, become unruly, disrupt the normative order of things, and exist and behave in the world in ways that are considered antinormative, anticapitalist, and antidisciplinary. In this manifesto on failure, the author claims the possibility of failing well. She also looks at what it means to not win, to not buy into consumer culture, to not aspire to accumulate goods, or to challenge disciplinary boundaries (Carr, 2012, n.p.).

Halberstam comments that “under certain circumstances, failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 2). This celebration of failure resonates wonderfully with the life worlds of those disabled persons who do not work. Occupying one side of the dis/ability complex, disabled people too often find themselves positioned as dependent idlers. Welfare claimants. Wards of the state. State dependents. Halberstam’s work offers a reversal: rather than being cast as unproductive citizens, the unproductivity of (some) disabled (and queer) people might be reconceptualised as a moment of possibility. Not working “jams the smooth operations of the normal and the ordinary” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 70). It demands that we recreate alternative futures that are not so centred on labour. Disability as disruption is at heart of recent articulations of crip theory (McRuer, 2006, 2012; McRuer & Wilkerson, 2003). The term crip is reappropriated as a term of deference and disruption. When disabled people fail to work, then they crip the normative ideals attached to employment and encourage new ways of thinking that might, for example, promote alternative forms of community participation and
contribution. Immaterial and unpaid relationships of support and care provide necessary building blocks of everyday community life. And these relational moments are a necessary antidote to the ableist emphasis on human value being tied to labour value. As Akemi Nishida (2017) demonstrates, it is through our emotional connections and assemblages that we can promote mutual relationships and, by virtue of this, our shared humanness.

At the same time, however, disabled activists and researchers desire employment. We know of the myriad ways in which disabled people are excluded from the world of work (e.g. Barnes & Roulstone, 2005). Failure in the labour market reveals the oppressive nature of employment regimes: conditions that many people (disabled and non-disabled) struggle to celebrate. This does not automatically denigrate queer/crip politics though it does raise questions about the place of normative desires for such things as the chance to work. Dis/ability studies provides a means of holding in tension crip and normative desires in relation to labour. I have built on this tension by developing a DisHuman perspective with my colleagues Rebecca Lawthom, Katherine Runswick Cole, and Kirsty Liddiard. A DisHuman theory “simultaneously acknowledges the possibilities offered by disability to trouble, reshape and re-fashion the human (crip ambitions) while at the same time asserting disabled people’s humanity (normative desires)” (Goodley & Runswick-Cole, 2016, p. 1). As we argue, DisHuman analysis allows us to “claim (normative) citizenship (associated with choice, a sense of autonomy, being part of a loving family, the chance to labour, love and consume) while simultaneously drawing on disability to trouble, reshape and re-fashion liberal citizenship” to invoke what we call Dis-Citizenship (to rethink how we choose, act, love, work, and shop). DisCitizenship keeps in sharp relief the deeply complex, contradictory, and tension-filled ways in which disabled people crip the relationships around them while simultaneously engaging in very normative modes of life. The dis/ability complex recognizes the push and pull of labour. Labour is an intersectional phenomenon that we might both be drawn to and repulsed by.

**Emotion**

The renowned feminist social psychologist Margie Wetherell has recently argued that the humanities, psychological and social sciences are witnessing the emergence of various theories of affect and emotion that attend to the ways in “which bodies are pushed and pulled in contemporary social formations, in the ‘engineering’ of affective responses, and in how workers and citizens become emotionally engaged and affectively interpellated” (2015, p. 139). The study of emotion is a key area of studies of diversity. And my sense is that there is much potential in probing the intersections of critical disability studies, critical race, feminist, and queer theories.

---

1 Please visit https://dishuman.com/
In terms of critical disability studies, there has been a plethora of work associated with psycho-emotional disablism. This phenomenon permits insights into the micro-aggressions felt by disabled people when they undergo direct and indirect forms of discrimination. Much can be learnt from the feminist disability scholars who have developed this work to consider the ontological damage that risks being done as a consequence of disablism. I am thinking here of the work of British writers Carol Thomas (1999) and Donna Reeve (2005). When non-disabled people stare at disabled people, ask inappropriate questions about impairment, or respond with hostility, then there is a risk that disabled people are emotionally marginalised by these very political, micro-sociological encounters. And the psycho-emotional register not only reflects processes of disablism but is also informed by ableism. As Ben Whitburn and Lucinda McKnight (2017) acknowledge, it is paramount that we attend to the psychological impact of living in an ableist culture where the very language we use speaks of a wider symbolic order that is phallocentric and ableist.

To speak of disability is to use the language of deficiency:

- Retarded development.
- Blind to the facts.
- The truth falling on deaf ears.
- We stand up for ourselves.
- Blind panic.

These are just some common examples that reveal an inherently ableist and disablist lexicon. This focus on psycho-emotional ableism is being developed in the work of Julia Daniels (2016). Her current groundbreaking doctoral research seeks to investigate the experiences of disabled people as they reflect back on their educational experiences. Schools are designed with a non-disabled learner in mind. And narrowing forms of assessment assume a particular kind of learner. Her unique angle on these experiences relates to the ways in which she asks informants to reflect on the presence of ableist thought in their educational memories. Early findings indicate the profound ontological impact of competitive individualized modes of achievement upon disabled people. Daniels’ work assembles a new way of thinking about the ableism inherent within society that risks denigrating the psycho-emotional worlds of individuals who fail to match up to ableist imperatives. Failure might, as we have considered above, be a resource for intersectional politics. But, equally, failure hurts. Emotion is worked at the dis/ability complex.

This focus on the psycho-emotional register resonates with recent work about micro-aggression relating to race, gender, and sexuality (e.g. Sue, et al., 2007; Sue, 2010). This phenomenon correlates with the mundane everyday exchanges that communicate denigrating messages to some individuals because of their group membership. An intersectional moment of connection is found here in relation to the dis/ability complex where we consider the psychical impact of discrimination (such as disablism, homophobia, racism, sexism) and the cultural manufacturing of preferred
kinds of personhood associated with dominant groups (able-bodied and -minded, straight, white, male). This play of denigration and predilection risks constituting a split cultural psyche. It is therefore crucial to work the split self in order to tease out the hegemonic forces at play. Such an activity fits well with a psycho-political analysis in which we consider the ways in which the psyche risks being injured through discrimination and oppression (Fanon, 1993; Hook, 2004). Without lapsing back into the usual individualized therapeutic discourses that colonise the affective register, a psycho-political intervention would uncover the social, cultural, and political circumstances that risk spoiling human subjectivity. A dis/ability complex provides a complementary framework for psycho-political work that builds on the critical race and black studies of Fanon. Indeed, in a recent book (Goodley, 2016) I argue that a pressing concern is to address the psychical injuries caused by racism and disablism that flourish in our cultural imaginaries biased towards ableism and whiteness. Disabled people often complain at “becoming the repositories of other’s ontological anxieties” (Marks, 1999, p. 188). Just as black people are expected to be, in the words of Frantz Fanon “good niggers” [sic], disabled people are supposed to be “good cripples;” “eternal victims of an essence, of an appearance, for which they are not responsible” (1993, p. 34). Black studies and disability studies each respond to these subtle relational moments of racism and disablism and feed, most importantly, into the work of activist organisations that respond to the psychological impact of living in a disabling and racist society through politicisation and the arts as powerful forms of catharsis. Similarly, the self-advocacy movement of people with the label of intellectual disabilities has established supportive community spaces for the sharing of aspirations (Roets, et al., 2008), mad pride has subverted normative understandings of sanity (Chamberlin, 1990), and queer crips have celebrated their transgression (McRuer, 2006). And these transformative spaces necessarily challenge the subjective outcomes of disablism, racism, sanism, and heterosexism, performing a cultural act of what Frantz Fanon called socio-diagnosis: “waging war against discrimination on both levels of the socio-economic and the subjective” (Fanon, 1993, pp. 12-13).

Finally, unpacking the cultural production of dis/ability would feed into feminist and queer readings of affect economies, especially the constitution of happiness. Here I am thinking of the work of Sara Ahmed (2004, 2007/2008, 2010) whose influential analysis has problematized what might appear to be a benign desire for happiness. In contrast, she pulls away at the foundations of happiness to demonstrate that it is deeply intersectional phenomena servicing dominant groups and powerful discourses in society. Happiness is an ideological smoke screen: it obscures the deeply racist, sexist, and heteronormative conditions of contemporary society as we look away to consume joy, contentment, and affective fulfilment through a host of practices including consumption, therapy, and self-care. To be happy is to be fulfilled. In this sense the dis/ability complex invites us to consider who is allowed to be happy on either side of the complex. When we constitute happy subjects we also create unhappy others: what methods of individualization and tropes of psychopathology are drawn on to conceptualise the unhappy? When we make un/happy
categories we pull emotion out of its cultural moorings and, instead, comprehend un/happiness as an individual attribute. The dis/ability complex can weigh in on these discussions about the cultural reproduction of emotion.

**Learning**

Drawing in the dis/ability complex encourages us to question the ideological apparatus of our places of learning. Clearly education is an intersectional concern. Ability and normativity tend to hunt together. Schools are striated in ways that lead groups of students down different ability pathways. Norming ability and finding disability are key dividing practices of our educational systems. Educational success, signified through individual achievement, threatens to break alliances between young people and sets them up as individualized entities competing with one another. Such individualization is apparent, too, in the university sector. In Britain the rather clumsily titled Early Career Researcher (ECR) is expected to adhere to a number of trajectories related to publication power, research bidding success, and administrative leadership. Little space is afforded for collegiality and collectivity when one is chasing the next grant or publication. This culture is not conducive to those researchers who are mutually interdependent on or with others. Disabled researchers and academics, those with caring responsibilities – many of whom are women – are already disadvantaged even before the success indicators are brought out for public consumption and institutional audit. Educational spaces, across the board, work upon the dis/ability complex. Education needs ability as an outcome and also as an object of educational practice. And, just as importantly, let us not forget education’s reliance on disability: the naming, diagnosis, and treatment of those whose abilities fail or fall at educational hurdles that are designed to sift and sort learners.

Slee (2017) argues that exclusionary educational practices are an ontological given: where we find learning we will find some learners who are included and others who hover on the peripheries of the classroom. Slee (2017) is inspired by the American musician, composer, activist, and filmmaker Frank Zappa when he argues that inclusive education is not dead, it just smells funny (a point Zappa had made about the state of Jazz music in the 1960s). His point is that the educational systems we bear witness to are the products of complex debates, politics, and policies in relation to education and inclusion. We have inherited a failed project of inclusive education in which we are (i) obsessed with individual achievement and attainment and (ii) infatuated with disability diagnoses. Whether or not inclusion ever occurred (though I find that unlikely) the point of significance is that we are currently witnessing a mismatch of competing discourses that are right at the heart of the dis/ability complex. This leaves spaces of learning in a questionable state. And we know schools struggle to respond to diversity in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and disability, with those at the normative centre responding the best.

---

2 For a useful discussion of the additional labours of disabled researchers, see Hannam-Swain, 2017.
Applying the dis/ability complex to education reminds us that children of colour and disabled learners continue to exist on the peripheral borders of our educational cultures. And as the ableism of education becomes ever more pronounced, we can only expect to find these learners shifting further and further away from the normative centre.

**Politics**

In a concurrent piece I am writing with Tanya Titchkosky, we argue that these Trump–Brexit times pose significant challenges for marginalised sections of society (Titchkosky & Goodley, 2018). Both the Trump and Brexit campaigns referenced migrants, refugees, Mexicans, disabled people, and people of colour as threats to the normative homelands of the USA and the UK. These colonizing practices merely reiterate white colonial and supremacist views that deem the US or the UK as the centre of the world. This is a particular kind of centrism where the white British or American voter is re-sited as the citizen worthy of interest. Centralising white Brits/Americans feeds into an ableist ideology that positions the WENA (Western European and North American) individuals as the business of our wider politics. Disabled activists have been quick to point out the irony of this politicking that claims to address the ignored generation. The Trump and Brexit campaigns postured around a politics of inclusion, developing policies that addressed the hidden (white) urban and rural working classes, historically ignored by the political elites (Harnish, 2017). Trump’s campaign emphasized the plight of the able-bodied, self-sufficient working class that needed only work rather than the state to release their potential. In making this argument we are left, yet again, with an ableist common sense: an unconscious, ideological position that emphasizes this well-worn trope. According to this view, individual citizens are ready and able to work if only we would let them. Such a tacit model of the citizen ignores those that require the support of others (such as many people with impairments or illnesses) and, importantly, dismisses those communities that have at their heart a more collectivist and interdependent approach to everyday life (such as many of the diasporic and First Nation communities found across the states of America).

A politics of intersectionality would organize around the principle that a life worth living is a life lived with others. This would involve working the edges of the dis/ability complex: to highlight the ways in which the seeming recognition of the working class actually recreates a politics of disablism. And the isolationist and misplaced autonomy appropriated by Trump and Brexit discourses must be opposed at every opportunity. Here an intersectional politics is not merely something we might desire but an essential kind of politics that responds to these challenging times. The dis/ability complex shines light on the able-bodied and able-minded character of a new austerity politics of self-sufficiency that can only be redressed through a collectivist, interdependent, and intersectional activism.
The blending of the wet ware of bodies with the hard ware of technology demands a cross-examination of the promises and ethics of technology. What is it about the limits of humanity that some of us find so unappealingly incomplete? When is technology brought in to refashion the human whose imaginations are being framed? The ethics of human enhancement and bio-psycho improvement encompass a huge range of ideas and possible interventions including genome editing, the use of prosthetics, the merging of organic and inorganic matter, artificial intelligence, and revised uses of drugs previously assigned for childhood labels such as ADHD. Enhancement also encompasses fraught bioethical debates such as the quality of life, the right to die and live, and the value of technological implants.

One way in which dis/ability studies can intercede is to provide an indispensable moment to pause and think. Let us take, as an example, the treatment of ADHD with Ritalin. Disability’s detection invites a pharmacological response to make the user as able as possible and contain or eliminate difference. Disability is diagnosed at the same time as a trajectory of ability is produced. Many scholars and activists of disability studies are understandably suspicious about technological or medical intervention, especially when these treatments imply normative ambitions. The prescription of ADHD responds to a dis/ability diagnosis with the hope of emboldening the dis/ability element of newly diagnosed children (to get them back in line with other non-disabled people in the classroom). Dis/ability studies would want to unpack the normative desires at the heart of such psycho-pharmacological intervention.

At the same time, however, dis/ability studies must be attentive to the more non-normative approaches to biomedical and technological intervention (see, for example, Sparrow, 2013). One example relates to trans and gender nonconforming individuals who draw on technologies of the psyche and body. For those people who are engaged with gender transition we might understand the appropriations of technology as potentially more non-normative by design. Biomedical intervention, in this case, feeds into gender fluidity. The debates do not end there, of course, because others might view gender reassignment as the medical paradigm offering only strictly embodied, gendered binarised options. I would suggest, however, that there is queer potential in technologies of trans. This draws in trans activists (and I would also add disabled people) as key contributors to bioethical deliberations (Powell & Foglia, 2014). Too often people from LGBTQ communities – like disabled people – are considered to be merely the objects rather than the subjects of medical intervention and bioethical debate. Trans perspectives on technologies of the body share much with the politics of disabled people who are working the dis/ability complex for more crip ways of living life. We want to explore how biomedical technologies – often the subject of crip critique – might be utilized in order to enhance

3 I would like to thank Kirsty Liddiard for some essential feedback on this section of the paper.
Dan Goodley

a body’s trans potential. As Argüello (2016) makes clear, too often we hold normative ideas about the biomedical that already view medicalization as (often unnecessarily) intervening in life to eradicate ill health and pathology. This might explain why some disability studies scholars have recently contributed to Twitter debates arguing against gender reassignment surgery undertaken by young trans people. Such surgery is viewed as a form of medicalization being unnecessarily adopted by unwitting, not-yet-adult and, therefore, naïve individuals. Yet, such a viewpoint fails to engage with more queer understandings of biomedical intervention. Here, again, the dis/ability complex invites a deep interrogation of technology, including trans/crip connections.

**Anthropocene**

Our discussion of technology inevitably takes us into a discussion of the anthropocene, i.e. our current times when the world has been deeply marked by the practices of human beings. Environmental politics and disability politics might be conceived of together as a critical response in these times of posthuman activism. The reason for this is that a wider exclusionary politics is at the heart of the dehumanization of disabled people, a politics that justifies the privileging of certain sections of the human population over other humans and non-humans. Indeed, in their introduction to the 2018 *Posthuman Glossary*, Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova are clear that these posthuman times need to bring together animal, human, cosmological, technological, and ecological politics in order to address the damage being done to the globe and those who live on it.

Mindy Blaise’s work with other colleagues draws attention to the importance of attending to the relationships between humans and non–humans. In order to develop a truly inclusive human politics, Blaise (2017) argues that we need to attend to our relationships with non–humans and the wider environment. She puts forward a non–hierarchical model of difference in which we consider the complexities of human–animal relationships and resist the temptation of anthropocentrism. Instead, thinking through how we live with animals may develop a more complex, non–hierarchical, and contingent politics of everyday life. This approach picks up on the influential work of Rosi Braidotti and her analysis of the posthuman (2006, 2013). She calls for a posthuman politics that extends life beyond the species. As we argue in Goodley, Lawthom and Runswick-Cole (2014, p. 345),

> Braidotti takes to task the human species centering of our own perceived superiority: an anthropocentrism that puts humanist man (anthropos) before other species and the environment. Humanism situates anthropos as elite species, occupying a sovereign position. A posthuman turn contests such elitism, reminding itself that the superior human ideal is of course

4 See http://commonworlds.net/
only that; a utopian ideal. Moreover, this is an organic entity that has been “technologically mediated to an unprecedented degree” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 57) subjected to “the four horsemen of the posthuman apocalypse: nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science” (59). The human species has been expanded upon through these experiments; thus challenging the centrality of anthropos and ensuring that “the boundaries between ‘Man’ and his others go tumbling down, in a cascade effect that opens up unexpected perspectives … relinquish[ing] the demonic forces of the naturalised others” (66–67). These others include animals, insects, plants, environment and the cosmos as a whole.

For Braidotti, the posthuman urge to move beyond the species opens up solidarities with non–humans including animals and the wider natural environment. Post–anthropocentricism results from this posthuman response, a reaction that fits well with dis/ability studies. With this in mind, we can revisit the dis/ability complex:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dis Ability</th>
<th>Dis Ability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad</td>
<td>Sane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>Happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermeshed</td>
<td>Atomistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitting</td>
<td>Standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective packs</td>
<td>Lone wolves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crippling</td>
<td>Norming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entangled</td>
<td>Alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many others</td>
<td>The same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Civilised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non–human</td>
<td>Human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal</td>
<td>Anthropos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmology</td>
<td>Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodies</td>
<td>Minds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The additional elements reflect the dis/ability complex’s invitation to merge and engage with environmental, animal, and dis/ability studies. Sunaura Taylor’s synthesis of animal and disability studies has been absolutely essential in probing “an
Dan Goodley

oppressive value system that declares some bodies normal, some bodies broken, and some bodies food” (2011, p. 191). She declares, “as a freak, as a patient, I do not deny that I’m like an animal. Instead, I want to be aware of the mistreatment that those labelled ‘animal’ (human and nonhuman) experience. I am an animal” (Taylor, 2011, p. 194). In contemplating the ways in which animals are portrayed as burdensome, dependent, and natural, we connect with some key tropes associated with the historical maltreatment of disabled people. Taylor envisages a cross-pollination of ideas across animal and disability studies precisely because both animals and disabled people occupy similar devalued positions. This dialogue between animal studies and disability studies invites the engendering of a posthuman politics that contemplates human/non-human connections (see Taylor, 2017).5

Such connections seem to me to be at the forefront of contemporary engagements with intersectionality especially when we think more broadly about environmental politics. Deborah Fenney-Salkeld offers the following observation about the relationship between disability and environmental politics:

Disability studies’ concern with the environment has often only extended as far as its potential for accessibility is concerned – implying an anthropocentric viewpoint. Although it may be appropriate for disability studies to remain broadly anthropocentric, an explicit acknowledgement of the value of the environment beyond accessibility would enable engagement with sustainability debates. This might mean explicit recognition of the natural environment as sustaining life, and an understanding of the interdependence of humans and nature (2016, p. 460).

This argument fits well with a posthuman political project that seeks to respond to the anthropocene through a trans-amalgamation of animal, disability, and environmental studies.

Conclusions

To say that a category such as race or gender is socially constructed is not to say that the category has no significance in our world. On the contrary, a large and continuing project for subordinated people – and indeed, one of the projects for which postmodern theories have been very helpful – is thinking about the way power has clustered around certain categories and is exercised against others. This project attempts to unveil the processes of subordination and the various ways these processes are experienced

5 See also the current research project at the University of Oslo being led by Jan Grue and Mike Lundblad: Biopolitics of Disability, Illness, and Animality (BIOITAL). This project explores how certain human and nonhuman lives are constructed as less valuable than others in cultural, literary, and social representations of disability, illness, animals, and animality. For more details, see: https://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/biopolitics-of-disability-illness-and-animality/
by people who are subordinated and people who are privileged by them. (Crenshaw, 1991, pp. 1296–1297)

I end this paper with this extended quotation from Crenshaw to remind us of the tension at the heart of intersectional theory: the simultaneous exposure of privilege and subordination. This fits in with the project of dis/ability studies to keep in play the oppositional work that takes place everyday between “dis” and “ability”. The dis/ability complex functions as an intersectional cultural archetype: an event, process, model, moment, and instance. For intersectional theory, dis/ability offers what Garland-Thomson (2005) terms the chance to “rethink”: to reflect on what we already have learnt from intersectional theory and to draw in new insights from dis/ability. Rather than replacing theoretical ideas, concepts or preferences, the dis/ability complex is an additional heuristic device that we might draw into our work.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank and acknowledge the Economic and Social Research Council for the funding of the research project ES/P001041/1, “Life, Death, Disability and the Human: Living Life to the Fullest”. This project, while in its early stages, has challenged me further to understand the complex co-dependent workings of ableism and disablism.

References

Dan Goodley


**About the author**

Dan Goodley is Professor of Disability Studies and Education at the University of Sheffield and co-director of iHuman: the institute for the study of the human (www.shef.ac.uk/ihuman). His work analyses the dual processes of ableism and disablism. Recent publications include *Disability Studies* (Sage, 2016: Second edition) and *Dis/ability Studies* (Routledge, 2014).
Exploring the Politics of Gender Representation on Instagram: Self-representations of Femininity

Sofia P. Caldeira, Sander De Ridder, and Sofie Van Bauwel

Abstract
This article presents an analysis of the politics of gender representation on Instagram. It adopts a broad understanding of the political in terms of “everyday politics” and “everyday activism”. This allows for exploring the political potential of self-representation on Instagram and Instagram’s ability to enable more diverse forms of gender representation. It starts from the assumption that Instagram can play a role in reproducing and reinforcing traditional gender norms, and then explores the technological affordances and limitations that shape representations, such as Instagram’s Terms of Use and the diffuse power exerted by Instagram users’ feedback. These theoretical arguments are illustrated by discussing the recent ban of Marisa Papen, a popular Instagram model.

Keywords
self-representation, Instagram, social media, gender, Marisa Papen

What Is Political About Gender Representation on Instagram?

In early August 2016, a controversial case involving the social networking site Instagram emerged (e.g. Elise, 2016b; Falabregue, 2016) when twenty-four-year-old Belgian female nude model Marisa Papen’s popular Instagram account was banned from the online platform. Papen’s unapologetically sexy photographs were deemed too provocative, despite her creative efforts to avoid breaking Instagram’s Terms of Use (2016), by covering her nipples and other body parts judged to be “too explicit” (Elise, 2016b). Although this is a unique and highly context-dependent illustration,
Marisa Papen’s Instagram ban magnifies and highlights some of the complex and nuanced gender-related politics that underlie self-representation on Instagram.

The aim of this article is to provide a theoretical contribution to gender studies, as well as to feminist media studies. The politics of gender representation on Instagram are discussed in relation to Marisa Papen’s Instagram account ban. As Instagram continues to grow in popularity, reaching over 500 million active monthly users (Instagram Press News, 2016), there is an increasing need to critically examine these emerging representations and their underlying gender politics. This article views social media platforms, and more specifically Instagram, as spaces in which gendered representations are shaped in specific mediated contexts. To explore the mediated contexts of Instagram, we discuss the technological affordances (Livingstone, 2008) and the platform’s Terms of Use. Thereby, we are showing that each form of media is shaping representations of gender in particular and unique ways.

This study on the politics of gender representation on Instagram will focus specifically on representations of women and femininities. This focus stems not only from the specificities of the illustrative case of nude model Marisa Papen but also from the predominance of active female Instagram users (Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016). The article draws on the expertise of previous research on women’s uses of such social networking sites (e.g. Burns, 2015; Murray, 2015; Rettalack, Ringrose, & Lawrence, 2016; Rettberg, 2014a, 2014b). Further, it acknowledges the complementary studies on how masculinities are constructed on social networking sites (e.g. Dinsmore, 2014; Iovannone, 2016; Siibak, 2010).

Women have historically been associated with the consumption of media rather than with its production (Kanai & Dobson, 2016, p. 1). Social media platforms like Instagram, with user-friendly interfaces that are integrated into smartphones and are already widely used in everyday life, have simplified and democratised the means for visual creation, editing, and distribution. This has allowed women easier access to the tools of media production and distribution (Vivienne & Burgess, 2012, p. 373). As such, there is a certain “political” character in self-representation on Instagram.

This understanding of the political goes beyond the overt online activism of the still–contented notion of “fourth-wave feminism”, which calls for active participatory engagement and uses social networking sites to call out injustices and inequalities (Munro, n.d.; Rettalack et al., 2016, pp. 86–87). It differs from the deliberate use of Instagram and social media for digital feminist activism, as a tool to facilitate connections and encounters between feminist and queer activist groups, both online and offline (Fotopoulou, 2016; Korn & Kneese, 2015), or as a means of protest or social commentary, used to spread openly political messages through online self-representation (Kuntsman, 2017, p. 14).

Our understanding of the political relates more closely to the notions of “everyday politics” (Highfield, 2016) and “everyday activism” (Vivienne & Burgess, 2012). This understanding grounds the discussion on how political themes are framed around our personal experiences and interests (Highfield, 2016, p. 3). It allows for
seemingly banal subjects, such as self-representation on Instagram, to be understood as political, even if they are not specifically constructed as such. This idea of “everyday activism” views the simple act of sharing the personal representations and stories of previously marginalised groups of people – like women or queer people – in a public (online) space as a catalyst for social change with potential to challenge popular stereotypes (Vivienne & Burgess, 2012, p. 363). Self-representation on Instagram might not be a deliberate political act, but it becomes political by shifting the decision of who gets to occupy the public’s visual field into the hands of individuals (Syme, 2015). Self-representation has the potential to create greater visibility for demographics that are usually underrepresented or misrepresented in traditional mainstream media.

While feminist techno-utopias of earlier studies on gender and the Internet are now believed to be overly optimistic – such studies overestimated the potential for a free and unrestricted experimentation with identity and gender afforded by the Internet (Sveningsson Elm, 2009, p. 243–244) – there is still a sense of optimism surrounding the political potential of self-representation on apps such as Instagram. Such apps are perceived as opening up space for more democratic and diverse representations that do not fit the narrow parameters of beauty valorised by the popular mainstream media (Gill, 2007, p. 12). These popular media often display a version of normative femininity and ideal beauty that is limited to the strict standards of the young, white, able-bodied, seemingly heterosexual, well-groomed, thin and conventionally attractive woman (Gill, 2007). Conversely, self-representation on Instagram can normalise diversity and challenge restrictive views of the representation of women (Burns, 2015, p. 90), acknowledging differences of age, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and culture.

However, this view of the potential of Instagram must necessarily be counterposed by a more sceptical understanding of these social networking sites. Overly optimistic claims that the Internet is a tool of pure resistance are receiving increasing scrutiny (e.g. Döring, Reif, & Poeschl, 2016; Kanai & Dobson, 2016). Critics point out that the online practices of individuals draw heavily on their “real” offline experiences, and thus can serve to reproduce existing gender norms (Kanai & Dobson, 2016, pp. 1–3). Furthermore, it must be noted that access to digital technologies is not equally distributed, often being concentrated among the young and privileged. There is still a “digital divide” that prevents some women access to the tools of representation (Schuster, 2013, p. 11).

Self-representation on Instagram does not exist in a cultural void. It is intertextual, embedded in popular culture, and thus re-appropriates, often unconsciously, the texts and conventions of the film and television industries, of women’s magazines, and of the fashion and beauty industries to enable one to construct one’s own image through a process of “bricolage” (De Ridder & Van Bauwel, 2015, p. 334). This often creates a struggle between the dominant discourses that popular culture seems to carry and the varied subjective meanings that people create by re-appropriating these texts (De Ridder, 2014, pp. 87–8).
By the same token, intertextuality also functions in the reverse direction, incorporating the “edginess” and potentially resistant character of self-representation on social networking sites into the production of mainstream media representations (Krijnen & Van Bauwel, 2015, p. 119). Popular mainstream media often assimilate the self-representations that have a resistant nature, simplifying them and depoliticising them (Duguay, 2016, p. 3).

Therefore, Instagram can continue to reinforce and reproduce existing hegemonic notions of gender. Incredibly narrow conceptions of attractiveness, sexiness, and idealised femininity can re-emerge on social networking sites and can often become integrated into a seemingly postfeminist discourse of “sexiness as empowerment” (Burns, 2015, p. 199). McRobbie (2009) understands this postfeminist discourse as taking elements of feminism, such as the emphasis on empowerment and choice, and incorporating them into media and popular culture, presenting a simplified version of feminism which focuses on the body and the pursuit of beauty as a personal choice, thereby losing the political edge of feminism. This simplified version of feminism makes it possible for women to inadvertently perform the same formulaic gender stereotypes while claiming empowerment (Murray, 2015, p. 495).

Studying Instagram and its gender representation politics should be a tentative endeavour: on the one hand, it can be seen as a tool for reinforcing women’s agency and extending the practices of gendered representation beyond their current norms; on the other hand, it can also be a tool for reinforcing and reproducing existing social norms. Empowerment and disempowerment can co-exist, as the illustration of Marisa Papen’s Instagram helps to exemplify. The symbolic empowerment gained by the visibility of a greater diversity of representations on Instagram may not always be accompanied by the social empowerment that ensures greater equality and fairer treatment (Senft & Baym, 2015, pp. 1957–8).

Understanding Instagram as a Technology of Gender

Teresa de Lauretis’s work Technologies of Gender (1987) is especially relevant for the study of gender representation on Instagram. Reading Instagram through the lens of the technologies of gender – those media forms, narratives, and discourses through which gender is constructed – allows for refocusing on questions of gender representation (De Lauretis, 1987, p. ix).

It draws on the idea that gender is constructed rather than a “natural” given. The construction of gender is enacted through a series of performances, repeated stylizations of the body, operating within a specific regulatory cultural frame (Butler, 1990/2007). Following the same line of thought, De Lauretis (1987) understands gender as both the product and the process of representation and self-representation (p. 9). In this sense, gender is seen as the outcome of various social technologies, amongst them cinema and now also social networking sites like Instagram, and of the discourses surrounding them (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 2). These representations
not only depict gender but also actively create it, producing gender differences and norms that did not exist previously (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 7).

Understanding gender as representation does not mean, however, that it does not have real and concrete implications, both subjective and social, for the lives of individuals. Through a process of interpellation, these social representations become absorbed and accepted by individuals as their own, real representations (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 12).

According to De Lauretis (1987), the construction of gender is an ongoing effort (p. 3). Instagram inserts itself in a long line of visual technologies, from painting to cinema, that throughout history have served to actively produce and disseminate conceptions of gender. De Lauretis (1987) briefly explores how cinema in particular can be understood as a technology of gender, enquiring how its visual techniques and conventions of spectatorship contribute to the construction of gender (p. 13). These kinds of interrogations can easily be translated into the context of Instagram by questioning how gender is constructed through this particular technology and how it is absorbed by the individuals who use it.

The representations on Instagram produce and reproduce specific gender conceptions that are linked to broader sociocultural discourses (De Lauretis, 1987, pp. 18–9). Self-representations on Instagram can thus be seen as gendered performances (Butler, 1990/2007) that not only exhibit the pre-existing gender expressions of the photographed individual – through their clothing, styling and mannerisms – but also create gender expressions in the process of taking the photographs, conveyed by the choice of what to photograph, how to pose, what facial expressions to present, etc. (Döring et al., 2016, p. 955). Furthermore, gendered associations and stereotypes are created and reproduced through the use of Instagram, such as the idea that women share photos of themselves while men post photos of what they like, such as what they are drinking (Dinsmore, 2014).

Instagram is populated by representations that can only offer limited access to “the real”, showing only certain desirable aspects of ourselves. Instagram users make very careful and deliberate choices about what to share and what strategies of representation to use (Thumim, 2012, p. 8). Further, they attempt to portray themselves in a positive and idealised manner. Users sharing information that will portray them in a positive light can be understood as engaging in “promotional practice”, in the words of Enli and Thumim (2012, pp. 96–7).

Moreover, representations on Instagram, as well as their gendered meanings, are shaped through a series of filters. According to Jill Rettberg (2014) the term “filter” is usually understood as a process through which something is removed. Although the filters on Instagram often seem to be adding new things to the image, such as brighter colours or retro-effects, they nonetheless can serve as a means to remove or hide imperfections, for example, by hiding skin imperfections by over-exposing the image.

In addition to these more direct kinds of technological filters, there are other types of filters that shape and constrinct the image-based representation on Insta-
gram. These cultural and institutional filters are often so naturalised and taken for granted that they go unnoticed (Rettberg, 2014). “Cultural filters”, according to Rettberg (2014, pp. 22–4), are the social norms and expectations, rules and conventions that shape our photographic creations. They teach us, often unintentionally, to mimic societally approved images in our own photographic practices. Some of these cultural filters arise from our understanding of Instagram as a direct descendent of analogue photography, thus carrying some of its visual conventions. In this way, our understanding of Instagram is constructed through a process of remediation (Bolter & Grusin, 1999/2000) that establishes a dialogue between new media and preceding technologies.

Also, these cultural filters are reproducing socially accepted gendered conventions, such as the idea of women as essentially constructed as to-be-looked-at. According to John Berger (1972, p. 46), this sense of existing as image becomes internalised, creating in women a double understanding of themselves, both as subject and object. Women must continuously watch and be aware of such images of themselves, in order to maintain their aesthetic appeal. This idea frames the construction of online self-representation, and particularly selfie-taking, as a gendered activity, essentially associated with young women (Burns, 2015, p. 16–17).

Institutional filters refer to the way in which social networking sites shape how we represent ourselves (Thumim, 2012, p. 139). Although we appear free to share whatever we please on these sites, there are nonetheless plenty of constraints. The social networking sites themselves are carefully designed to elicit certain kinds of responses and representations (Thumim, 2012, p. 153). The interface’s affordances determine what can be represented through the platform (Livingstone, 2008, p. 400). Thus, Instagram, as a technological platform, is not neutral. The “politics of platforms” are shaped by companies’ ideologies and particular commercial interests (Duguay, 2016; Gillespie, 2010). These politics organize users’ interactions and may shape self-representations. However, the platform itself does not wholly determine how users will make use of it, because unlike traditional media industries, social media platforms do not act as gatekeepers of content (Gillespie, 2010, pp. 352–353).

Some of these technological affordances are presented in a more explicit manner, through app store ratings and descriptions of the app’s intended use (Duguay, 2016, p. 4), or through regulations and terms of use. Instagram’s Terms of Use, for instance, directly regulate what can be shared on the platform and what is liable to be deleted. They impose direct constraints over the self-representations shared on Instagram, prohibiting the sharing of images with full or partial nudity, of sexually explicit or pornographic photographs, as well as of violent, discriminatory or illegal content (“Terms of Use”, 2016). Yet other users can also exercise a sort of “editorial power” that constrains representations. They can approve certain kinds of representations by giving “likes” and making comments or they can show their disapproval by “reporting” the images they consider inappropriate (Enli & Thumim, 2012, p. 93).
Exploring the Politics of Gender Representation on Instagram

The process of constructing gender is thus related to the notion of power (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 18), as is the case with the politics of gender representation in social media. However, the power underlying these representations is not a “top–down” power imposed by a sovereign or ruling class. Rather, it is, in Foucault’s conception, something that is neither centralised nor uniform, but that runs through the whole society (Gill, 2007, p. 61). Institutionally unbounded, especially in the context of Instagram, the power that regulates the technologies of gender comes from a multitude of “ordinary” sources, which are everywhere and nowhere in particular. This helps to convey a sense that these representations of gender emerge in a voluntary and natural way (Bartky, 1998, pp. 36–8).

These technologies of gender, amongst them Instagram, serve to define the culturally accepted gender norms by conveying the gender roles that are most approved of in contemporary society. Understanding Instagram as a technology of gender helps to highlight its ideological role in culture and society, as a producer of hegemonic representations of femininity and masculinity. When narrowly defined into traditional gender stereotypes, these hegemonic representations can become not only reductive of the potential of the representation of gender but can also divide the normal and acceptable from the unacceptable, drawing symbolic boundaries and excluding what does not fit in these simplified notions (Krijnen & Van Bauwel, 2014, p. 44).

Regarding the technologies of gender, De Lauretis (1987) emphasises the role of the individual in the construction of these representations. She sees the social representation of gender as affecting its subjective construction, and conversely, the subjective self-representation of gender as also affecting the social construction. This opens up the possibility of agency in the creation of gender at the individual level (p. 9). On Instagram, this agency is especially noticeable in the context of self-representations, which carry the potential for different constructions of gender. They allow for a “local” level of resistance, emerging from the users’ subjectivities and self-representations (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 18).

A more cautious view, however, may consider Instagram as playing into a restrictive gender system that still accords different values and hierarchies to different gender representations (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 5). Representations of femininity or masculinity carry different meanings and are thus treated differently by Instagram, as the case of Marisa Papen’s ban evinces. Representations of women are treated restrictively by Instagram’s Terms of Use (2016). The tendentious nudity policy allows, for example, images of men’s nipples to be shared while banning all images of women’s nipples for being overly sexual (Wahl, 2015). Furthermore, the aforementioned “editorial power” given to Instagram’s users through “likes,” “comments,” and “reports” (Enli & Thumim, 2012, p. 93) is influenced by gender, as women’s self-representations are more likely to be met with hostility and even vilification (Burns, 2015; Warfield, 2014a).
Despite the constraints exerted by the aforementioned cultural filters (Rettberg, 2014), technological affordances (Livingstone, 2008), and “politics of platforms” (Duguay, 2016; Gillespie, 2010), there is still a tendency to think of Instagram in terms of “pure” self-representation.

Self-representation on Instagram is often equated with a wide-spread public discourse on the selfie phenomenon, simply defined as a photograph one takes of oneself, usually with a smartphone or digital camera, and that is later shared on social media (Thumim, 2016, p. 1564). The creation of selfies is one of the digital practices expected and encouraged on Instagram as expressed through the descriptions and photographs featured in the app store. These featured images suggest the type of content that is expected to be produced on Instagram and reinforce certain discourses as acceptable (Duguay, 2016, p. 4). Yet, despite this expectation and the widespread popularity of the selfie, popular media outlets have shown noticeable disdain for it. It has been dismissed as common or trivial, and has been excluded from the realm of “proper portrait photography” (Burns, 2015, pp. 63–64). The selfie is also considered, perhaps paradoxically, as narcissistic, in a simplistic understanding of the word that disdains such self-representations as a tool for shameless self-promotion and a cry for attention (Tifentale & Manovich, 2014, p. 6). This overwhelmingly negative view of the selfie phenomenon also leads to an overall attack on and vilification of the selfie-takers, a gendered category that mainly consists of young women (Burns, 2015, pp. 16–17).

However, despite the immense media attention, selfies do not constitute most of the images that are shared on Instagram. In their massive multi-city research on selfies, Selfiecity, Alise Tifentale and Lev Manovich (2014, pp. 2–6) concluded that single-person selfies were only 3–5% of all photographs posted on Instagram during the period of one week.

As such, self-representation on Instagram should not be merely understood in the strict sense of “a picture one takes of oneself”. Self-representation can also include photographs of the users that were taken by other people (e.g. their friends), and that the users decided to publish on their own Instagram accounts. These particular photographs become a visual form of self-representation because of the choice to share them (Rettberg, 2014, p. 40), with users exercising their curatorial agency. Moreover, self-representation on Instagram can be created through images of things we love, like photographs of our family, pets, meals, or vacations. This creates an indirect self-representation of our personality (Enli & Thumim, 2012, p. 15). Either directly or indirectly, the images shared through Instagram provide a form of carefully chosen “myth-making-via-imagery” (Syme, 2015, n.p.).

When created by women, these self-representations can carry the potential to displace the culturally established male-oriented gender narratives by offering “a view from elsewhere” (De Lauretis, 1987, p. 25). Self-representation implies per-
sonal agency, emphasizing the experience of the individual self. It has a humanising power, drawing the viewer into a closer relationship with the represented (Ehlin, 2015, p. 77). It shows the self-represented person as an embodied subject, sharing their experiences from their own point of view, rather than a disembodied object (Warfield, 2014b).

As a form of “everyday activism” (Vivienne & Burgess, 2012), the simple visibility of women’s self-representations goes against the deeply rooted dominant ideologies that describe women’s main role as “to-be-looked-at”, a source of visual pleasure (Berger, 1972; Mulvey, 1975). These ideologies have, for a long time, conditioned women not to expose themselves (Rettberg, 2014, pp. 17–8), not to seek control of their representations, and not to take overt pleasure in their own image. Despite self-representations being judged on looks and attractiveness, women are nonetheless trapped in a double standard; when women are considered “too” attractive and publicly show concern for their own image and self-representation, they are judged and accused of narcissism and vanity (Berger, 1972, p. 51).

Self-representation on Instagram can be an opportunity to experiment and play with gender representations, allowing users to represent themselves both in accordance with stereotypical gender ideals and through representations that transgress traditional notions of femininity and masculinity. Both conventional representations of women, such as those that show women embracing an unashamed normative sexiness that is equated with postfeminist liberation and power (Gill, 2007), and non-conformist representations of women, which do not fit the normative beauty standards, such as images showing women unshaven or with period stains (Bernard, 2013; Murray, 2015), can co-exist on Instagram.

Recent studies, however, point to the fact that this political potential tends not to be realised. The self-representations on Instagram are often conceived in more normative ways, reproducing traditional gender stereotypes, rather than actually creating non-hegemonic, stereotype-breaking gender representations (Döring et al., 2016, p. 957).

These representations are also continuously evaluated by the other Instagram users (Burns, 2015). They can receive positive reinforcements, through “likes” or other positive feedback, but they can also receive heavy critiques, signified not only by a lack of “likes” but also by negative comments, “unfollowings”, by having a photo “flagged” as inappropriate, or even by being “reported” by other users (Dinsmore, 2014, p. 40). Such feedback demonstrates the kinds of representations that are most valued on Instagram, establishing what is and what is not considered acceptable (Dinsmore, 2014, pp. 40–1), but also what is liable to be banned, as in the case of Marisa Papen. Self-representations that stray too far from the desired norm are often met with mockery and derision, which act as a form of “institutionally unbounded discipline” and regulation of these practices (Burns, 2015, p. 132). These forms of discipline regulate users’ behaviour, by leading them to exert tighter self-surveillance over their representations and to shape them to the socially approved ideals (Burns, 2015, p. 77).
This user feedback is largely responsible for enforcing Instagram’s gender representation politics and ensuring the observance of its Terms of Use. Most of Instagram’s shared content that is deemed inappropriate is marked as such by other users, who “flag” photographs as improper or “report” other users. Often, it is only after this negative critique that Instagram takes action, deleting the “offending” photographs or accounts (Olszanowski, 2014, pp. 88–9). It is the user’s engagement with Instagram that helps to reify its “platform politics” (Duguay, 2016; Gillespie, 2010).

The construction of gender on Instagram is thus a constant interplay between Instagram’s institutional gender representation politics shaping the users’ self-representations and those subjective self-representations moulding Instagram’s gender politics.

Gendered Instagram Struggles: The Banning of Marisa Papen’s Instagram Account

Marisa Papen is a twenty-four-year-old Belgian Instagram model, who gained national and international fame by sharing carefully aesthetically crafted photographs of her (nearly) nude body on Instagram, in an unapologetically sexy manner. Before being banned, Papen’s Instagram account had amassed over six hundred thousand followers (Elise, 2016b). She was even voted the “most beautiful woman on Instagram” by the readers of the Dutch online magazine Manners.nl (Van Der Cooling, 2016). For Papen, Instagram played a significant role in launching her modelling career by serving as a tool for sharing her stories and for making connections with a wider audience (Van Der Cooling, 2016) and modelling agencies (Elise, 2016b).

Marisa Papen is from, and currently based in, Belgium, a liberal western European country. However, her Instagram and modelling activities transcend this local context. She was featured in magazines and websites worldwide, including in shoots for both Playboy.com and Playboy.nl (Papen, 2016). She posed for photo-shoots worldwide (Elise, 2016a), and her Instagram had a large transnational group of followers.

Despite her wide popularity, Papen’s photographs were deemed “too provocative” by Instagram, and her account was thus banned from the online platform in August 2016 (Falabregue, 2016). This decision made by Instagram – a private company based in the US – creates a transnational context, transcending the local Belgian context. More importantly, it brings the “platform politics” (Duguay, 2016; Gillespie, 2010) that shape Instagram use to the fore.

For Papen, this was the fourth time her account was banned from Instagram. But unlike the previous times, when her account was quickly re-instated after making an appeal to Instagram (Falabregue, 2016), this was a lasting ban, which was still in effect at the time of writing this article, over three months later.

Papen’s example thus provides an illustration of the theoretical discussion previously introduced and exemplifies how gender politics work in relation to her Instagram account ban.
Exploring the Politics of Gender Representation on Instagram

Papen’s Instagram use is quite distinct from the informal engagement of most common social media users, as it is not confined to the expected practices of self–taking. Papen’s Instagram use is better understood in line with Leah Schragger’s (2016) conceptualisation of the uses of this social media platform by Instagram models, which entails a highly skilled labour of self-branding; a shaping of one’s own image and Instagram practices, in order to gain fame, to spread one’s perspective, and to monetise one’s Instagram activity. Nonetheless, Papen’s illustrative case helps to emphasise the complex and nuanced gender representation politics that underlie and shape all self–representation on Instagram.

The banning of Marisa Papen’s Instagram account makes particularly clear that there are institutional constraints at play on Instagram. These reflect the specific “platform politics” of Instagram, which are shaped by the ideologies and commercial interests of Instagram (Duguay, 2016; Gillespie, 2010). These institutional filters (Thumim, 2012) are made explicit, for example, in Instagram’s Terms of Use (2016), which prohibit the sharing of images depicting full or partial nudity, of photographs with sexually explicit or pornographic content, as well as content of a violent, discriminatory or illegal nature.

Papen had carefully avoided violating the terms imposed by Instagram by finding creative ways to evade the limitations. She used strategies of creative censorship (Olszanowski, 2014), sharing photographs in which she carefully covered her breasts and pubic area by posing in a certain way or by using props, or by playfully using emojis and other drawings to cover her nipples and other body parts deemed “too explicit” (Elise, 2016b). These strategies of creative censorship can still be seen on Marisa Papen’s Facebook account (Papen, 2017), in photos such as her current profile picture – a nude portrait of Papen, in which one of her nipples is covered with her own hand and the other with a drawing of a white heart.

Despite such creative efforts, her Instagram account was still banned. Marisa Papen has never publicly shared any official reply she received from Instagram about previous bans. Yet the response of the platform seems to echo other similar cases when Instagram banned certain images due to what they deemed inappropriate, only to publicly concede later on that they “don’t always get it right when it comes to nudity”, acknowledging their mistakes and restoring the banned photographs and accounts (Vagianos, 2015).

Papen tried once more to appeal Instagram’s decision and to have her account re–instated (Falabregue, 2016), but at the time of the writing of this article (May 2017), her account was still not re–activated and she had not shared any response from Instagram on her other online platforms, such as her website or Facebook account.

Marisa Papen’s gendered self–representations are actively created through a negotiation with Instagram’s possibilities and limitations. On Papen’s blog and in interviews, she has explained the aesthetic of her nude photography as a discourse of agency and resistance – one that is very different from the justification given by Instagram for her ban. Instagram argued that her pictures were too provocative and
too sexually explicit. Papen, however, sees herself as a “free, wild hearted expres-
sionist” (Papen, 2016a), using her photographs as a means to express her way of
viewing the world. Her choice to “go naked” is presented as a form of resistance,
and, simultaneously, as the way in which she simply feels comfortable expressing
herself (Elise, 2016a). She equates it with an effort to distance herself from the “cor-
ruption of society”, that is, as a mode of being that is authentic, pure, and in touch
with nature (Papen, 2016a). It is a nakedness that she claims has no specific bodily
requirements, that supports embracing the body just as it is, and that encourages
feeling good in one’s own skin (Elise, 2016a).

Papen’s discourse echoes the political discourses of liberation and empower-
ment of “fourth-wave feminism” (Rettalack et al., 2016, pp. 86–7), although she
does not actively engage in overt digital feminist activism (Fotopoulou, 2016; Korn
& Kneese, 2015) or make use of politicized self-representation (Kuntsman, 2017).
She takes advantage of the online platforms of Instagram and her own blog to create
representations that seek to disrupt the hegemonic limitations of “proper” femi-
ninity. Furthermore, Papen’s use of Instagram embodies the notions of “everyday
politics” (Highfield, 2016) and “everyday activism” (Vivienne & Burgess, 2012) that
view the sharing of women’s personal representations as political in itself, even
when not deliberately constructed as such. It is a “micropolitical practice of daily
life” that allows for the dissemination of different perspectives and discourses (De
Lauretis, 1987, p. 25). By using Instagram, Papen claims visibility, making her voice
heard and using the humanising potentialities of self-representation (Ehlin, 2015,
p. 77) to present herself as a “speaking subject” in her own right. The photographic
practices of Papen on Instagram seem, in this way, to be following the postfeminist
idea of bodily display as being a sign of strength, independence, and empowerment
(Burns, 2015, p. 197).

In addition, by using Instagram, Papen seems to be claiming agency not only
over her photographic practice but also over her modelling career, adopting an ethos
of self-enterprise, self-employment, and self-branding (Duffy & Pruchniewska,
2017). She subverts the traditional power structure of the professional modelling
agency and media industry, taking matters into her own hands, doing the work of
production, distribution, and networking herself, and monetising her Instagram
activity (Schrager, 2016).

Despite the aforementioned institutional constraints of Instagram’s Terms of
Use, which ultimately led to Papen’s account ban, there is still a sense of agency
and freedom of self-representation present in Papen’s discourses and photographs.
Papen’s discourses and photographic practices seem to echo the cautious optimism
surrounding the political potential of Instagram’s self-representation by opening up
a space for a more diverse representation of gender (Burns, 2015, p. 90).

However, the same sceptical and tentative approach that is required in the
study of Instagram must also be extended to the present case of Marisa Papen. The
discourse surrounding her photographic practices seems to frame Instagram as a
platform where everybody can become a successful model, even those who do not
Exploring the Politics of Gender Representation on Instagram

fit the typical high-fashion standards (Schrager, 2016). Yet this narrative overlooks the emphasis put on the representation of Papen’s own body in a highly conventional and idealised manner. Her body and photographic representations still visually comply, point by point, with the “young, white, able-bodied, middle-class, apparently heterosexual and conventionally attractive” standards that Rosalind Gill (2007, p. 12) exposed as comprising the exclusionary view of women in traditional mainstream media. Her self-representations occupy a privileged position, benefiting from the visibility generally afforded to representations of women of her race and cultural context (Brager, 2017). One must keep in mind that intersections with race, religion, sexualities, cultural context, etc. shape the readings that are generally made of such self-representations (Brager, 2017; Dean, 2016; Kuntsman, 2017), and that representations of women who, unlike Papen, do not comply as neatly to the beauty standards, either by virtue of their race or body size, for example, tend to face more online harassment, “flagging” and “reporting” by other users (Olszanowski, 2015), rather than being hailed by the media as the “most beautiful woman on Instagram” (Van Der Cooling, 2016).

In line with other recent studies on self-representation on Instagram (e.g. Döring et al., 2016), Marisa Papen’s photographs can also serve to reproduce normative gender representations through her poses, styling, mannerisms, and a portrayal of sexiness that is traditionally constructed as enticing to the male gaze. Perhaps inadvertently, she continues to represent the same formulaic gender stereotypes, while claiming empowerment (Murray, 2015, p. 495).

Equating this very narrow definition of “sexiness” with empowerment leads to the internalisation of oppressive norms of femininity that perceive the female body as both powerful and in need of constant improvement (Burns, 2015, p. 199). Despite her stated views that there are no specific bodily requirements to be an Instagram nude model, Papen nonetheless adheres to and professes a specific fitness and dietary regime in order to maintain her slim figure (Elise, 2016a). Even under the banner of something done just to please oneself, the representations are still strikingly similar to the conventions that the larger society identifies as “sexy” femininity (Gill, 2007, p. 93). As De Lauretis (1987) states, through a process of interpellation, these social representations have become accepted by Papen as her own authentic representations (p. 12).

Despite Papen’s claims of resistance, her self-representation can be read as one that has already been “absorbed by the mainstream” and has become tailored to normative tastes. Her images draw their influence from other societally approved images, intertextually linking them to the texts and conventions of popular culture (Krijnen & Van Bauwel, 2015, pp. 57–8). They represent a highly perfected and idealized image of femininity, filtered both visually and through cultural conventions (Rettberg, 2014).

Conversely, the edginess and the resistant potential of Marisa Papen’s self-representation on Instagram has also been absorbed and incorporated into the popular mainstream media. Her images are still constructed in a way that is especially
attractive to the male gaze (Mulvey, 1975), appealing to a traditional heterosexual male audience, as an erotic object for male visual pleasure.

This erotic appeal to a heterosexual male gaze is reflected in the comments that often accompany Papen’s photographs. Although the original comments on her Instagram account were removed when her account was banned, on her other online platforms, such as her website (Papen, 2016) and Facebook account (Papen, 2017), most comments are made by male commenters. These comments are mostly positive and supportive, expressing appreciation for the aesthetics of both her photography and her body, often echoing her own discourses of freedom and naturalness. Yet, at other times, the comments have an explicitly sexual nature, expressing overt desire for Papen herself.

As such, Papen’s images could be seen not only as highly gendered representations but also as sexualized. She represents herself as fitting the seemingly heterosexual ideal (Gill, 2007, p. 12). These images are produced for male sexual pleasure (Mulvey, 1975).

Indeed, Papen’s images, with their appeal to a conventionalized notion of sexiness expressed in the poses and styling, can evoke concerns of sexual objectification of women (Nussbaum, 1995). Viewed in isolation, they seem to encompass some of the characteristics that Martha Nussbaum (1995, p. 257) associates with objectification. Namely, the notions of instrumentality – of treating a woman as a tool for the purposes of others, in this case as a tool for achieving visual and erotic pleasure – and the denial of subjectivity – treating women as if their subjective experiences and feelings do not need to be taken into account. As a result, Papen is often featured in media outlets typically associated with sexism and objectification, such as Playboy magazine or the Belgian online “lads magazine” Clint.be. Some of the people commenting on Papen’s (2016b) blog were quick to point out these inconsistencies, stating that “if you look at her actual images, the way they’re photographed, and the initial sneer at Playboy etc. for objectifying women: you really have to ask what the difference is. 99.9% of people looking at her images just see another beautiful model in semi-erotic nude poses...”.

The self-representations of Marisa Papen can thus be seen in disparate ways, both as artistic and personal self-expression and as erotic or near-pornographic imagery displayed in objectifying media outlets. Such porous borders were similarly questioned and contested by Sarah Smith (2017) in light of the case of Natacha Merritt, an American photographer whose online photographs of her own sexual encounters were temporarily categorised as works of art. The case of Natacha Merritt relies on discourses similar to the ones used by Marisa Papen in defending her photography as a vehicle for self-exploration and emphasizing her agency in creating images. However, unlike Merritt’s often-explicit images of sexual acts that can be closely linked to pornography, Papen’s images occupy a more tentative position. They also rely on a voyeuristic and objectifying gaze, but they remain closer to an erotic aesthetic and are framed by her personal discourse of resistance and freedom of representation (Papen, 2016a).
There is also a clear gender bias underlying Marisa Papen’s ban from Instagram. The platform’s Terms of Use (2016) are quite vague with regard to the nudity policy, relying on somewhat ambiguous divisions between appropriate and inappropriate body representations (Olszanowski, 2014). Representations of women and men carry different meanings, and thus they receive different treatment from Instagram (Wahl, 2015). While Instagram accounts filled with topless and nude men abound, with some in quite provocative poses (e.g. male models like River Viiperi, Drew Hudson, and Terry Miller), male nudity tends not to be perceived as heavily sexualised; rather, it is viewed as neutral or functional, and is thus not seen as a cause for “reporting” and bans. Conversely, female nudity is quickly equated not only with sexuality but also with depreciative notions of vulgarity (Syme, 2015). In terms of overtly sexy representations of women, there seems to be an excess of “social puritanism” that rules over Instagram, leading to accounts being banned even when they do not directly break Instagram’s rules (Schrager, 2016), thus limiting the potential for radical visibility.

As the 2013 polemic surrounding photographer Petra Collins demonstrates, this online puritanism is not confined to the cases of representations that are too explicitly “sexy”. On her Instagram, Petra Collins shared a photograph of herself from the waist down, wearing a bikini, against a sparkly background. The photograph might have gone unscathed if not for the fact that her bikini line was ungroomed and, as such, there was some visible pubic hair. Consequently, she was banned from Instagram (Bernard, 2013). As Collins (2013) herself noted, her image in no way broke the Terms of Use policy, as it contained no nudity or pornography. This example emphasises the inconsistency of Instagram’s policy, for while plenty of more revealing images of women in bikinis are allowed on the platform, Collins’ photograph was censored for showing an image of a female body refusing to adhere to the dominant, narrow feminine ideal (Collins, 2013).

These controversies illustrate the ways in which the practices of self-representation on Instagram are embedded in broader discursive practices that serve as a means of regulating and limiting the photographic practice. These discourses are used to impose discipline by defining what is and is not appropriate to show (e.g. explicitly sexy photographs of women) (Burns, 2015).

The power underlying Instagram’s “platform politics” (Duguay, 2016; Gillespie, 2010) and gender representation politics is not, then, a “top-down” power. Its power is not enforced by some sort of iron hand that selects and bans all the photographs and accounts considered inappropriate according to its Terms of Use. Rather, it is a more diffuse and unbounded form of power (Burns, 2015) that is spread across its whole user base, with the banning of some accounts being triggered by the users who “flag” and “report” the images for being inappropriate (Olszanowski, 2014, pp. 88–9). Users’ scrutiny and judgements, in the form of “likes”, “comments”, “flags”, or “reports” serve to regulate Instagram’s gender representation, punishing those representations that stray too far from the desired norms (Burns, 2015).
The case of Marisa Papen becomes more complicated when considering that many, perhaps even most, of the photographs she shared were not self-representations in a literal sense but, rather, photographs of herself taken by others, often in the context of professional modelling shoots. The fact that the photographers in such sessions tend to be male contributes even more to the sense of empowerment and resistance claimed by Marisa Papen (Elise, 2016a) to be viewed as a sort of disillusion. These images – created by male photographers for outlets like Playboy, and representing Papen in ways that can be read as traditional female objectification for male visual pleasure (Nussbaum, 1995) – can appear to fall back into the commonly established mainstream media practice of portraying women through the male gaze (Bernard, 2013), although this is not Papen’s own view.

Indeed, Papen (2016b) herself has been quite critical of this, embracing the ethos of self-representation that seems to define Instagram, and challenging the views of her photographs as male-imposed objectification. Even when confronted with the problematic choice of posing for Playboy, she defended this choice by framing it as an artistic expression of nudity and as a representation of her own, true, natural self. She has been vocal about her dislike of the objectification of women by the media, and has even acknowledged the role Playboy itself plays in this objectification. Nonetheless she countered that Playboy had offered her “total freedom of content”. As Nussbaum (1995, p. 271) states, “in the matter of objectification context is everything”, and Marisa Papen views her work with photographers, in this and other sessions, as a collaborative effort, through which she gets the chance to express to a larger public her alternative and resistant views on nudity (Papen, 2016b). Her agency is framed as a means to subvert the idea of objectification and to emphasize the experience of the individual, subjective self (Ehlin, 2015, p. 77).

Although Marisa Papen’s use of Instagram is not confined to the expected practices of selfie-taking, she nonetheless embraces its self-representation ethos. The fact that these specific images have been actively chosen by Marisa Papen herself to be shared on her Instagram makes them, at some level, self-representations. They fit into a broader understanding of self-representation in terms of curatorial agency and choice about what to share (Rettberg, 2014, p. 40). As Rachel Syme (2013) states, allowing someone else to take your picture and then posting it to Instagram is still a form of carefully chosen “myth-making-via-imagery”. As already stated, we can choose to represent ourselves in various different ways on social media, either by using self-portraits or photographs of us taken by others, or even by sharing photographs of things we love, like our pets or family (Enli & Thumim, 2012, p. 101). In this manner, the photographs of Marisa Papen taken by others are used to convey a more comprehensive sense of self-representation on Instagram, as she is an active participant making choices about what to show or to conceal.

Overall, the study of Marisa Papen’s photographic practices on Instagram serves to complexify and question our understanding of the politics of gender representation on Instagram and to put into question the role of social media in shaping self-representations. Papen’s practices and discourses reveal a deeply nuanced stance on
an ever-shifting middle ground between empowerment and compliance with the objectification of the male gaze. The possibilities of freedom are always accompanied by constraints in a precarious balance between resistance and conformity.

Conclusion

Although the case of Marisa Papen is a unique and non-generalisable illustration, it nonetheless provides an interesting real-life context that facilitates questioning the gender representation politics of Instagram and contemplating how this can affect the freedom of self-representation.

The banning of Marisa Papen’s Instagram account was motivated by her (near-) nude photographs, which were deemed “too provocative” by Instagram. This decision makes explicit the institutional limitations and constraints (Thumim, 2012) that condition the potential uses of Instagram. The example shows how the platform’s specificities and its technological affordances – particularly Instagram’s Terms of Use and the way users can use the features of “flagging” and “reporting” as a form of diffuse power (Burns, 2015) – can help to enforce these institutional policies (Olszanowski, 2014). These institutional constraints shape, frequently in less noticeable ways, all self-representation on Instagram, punishing those representations that stray too far from the desired norms. Thus, every representation is the result of a constant negotiation between Instagram’s possibilities and its limitations.

The example of Marisa Papen also illuminates the tensions between Instagram’s political possibilities of resistance against hegemonic gender norms and its potential to reproduce and even reinforce traditional gender stereotypes. Her personal discourse is one of resistance and freedom of representation that echoes the political claims of “fourth-wave feminism” (Rettalack et al., 2016, pp. 86–7) and of “everyday activism” (Vivienne & Burgess, 2012). It reflects the optimistic views on Instagram’s political potential of self-representation to potentially produce more diverse, individualised representations. Yet Papen’s actual representations very closely resemble the hegemonic gender norms, reflecting the intertextual influence of popular media. Her case exemplifies how such representations can be absorbed by the media and are re-shaped into depoliticised media products. As such, her representations can serve as a means to reproduce and reinforce hegemonic gender norms under the deceptive banner of empowerment.

The complexities and nuances of Papen’s illustrative case are reflective of the practices of Instagram on a larger scale. This presents an opportunity to question how Instagram and its gender politics shape people’s self-representations and how people come to understand complex questions of gender. As Instagram becomes increasingly prevalent and embedded in our quotidian existence, redoubled critical attention must be given to these self-representation practices, which are deeply intertwined with broader questions of gender representation politics, even if they are often dismissed as narcissistic and trivial.
References


Dinsmore, B. (2014). Chicks be like: Masculinity, femininity, and gendered double standards in youth peer cultures on social media (Bachelor of Arts thesis). Department of Sociology, Connecticut College.


Exploring the Politics of Gender Representation on Instagram


Sofi a P. Caldeira, Sander De Ridder, and Sofi e Van Bauwel


— (2014b). *Why I love selfies and you should too (damn it)*. Public lecture at Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 26 March 2014. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aOVIJwy3nVo

About the authors

**Sofía Caldeira** is a PhD student at Ghent University, conducting a project on representations of femininity on Instagram and women’s glossy fashion magazines, funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT).

**Sander De Ridder** is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) at Ghent University, conducting research on the mediatization of young people’s intimate sexualities.

**Sofía Van Bauwel** is Associate Professor at the Department of Communication studies at Ghent University with expertise in research on gender and media.
“In our department there is absolutely no discrimination of women or others.” Staff Attitudes on Gender Quotas in a Belgian University*

Jolien Voorspoels

Abstract

Though gender quotas are one of the policy measures used to address persistent gender inequality in academia, empirical studies on staff attitudes towards academic gender quotas are rare. In this case study of a Belgian university, I examine how the attitude towards gender quotas in decision-making bodies can be explained by attitudes towards gender equality and diversity policies. Using a 2014 survey of 469 academic and administrative staff members, I analyze their attitudes and sociodemographic variables through ordinal logistic regression models. The findings show that resistance towards gender quotas as a policy measure can be understood through respondents’ gender stereotypes and the denial of gender inequality in contemporary society. Furthermore, women and respondents who supported diversity policies were more likely to support gender quotas. Additionally, women assistants, humanities and social sciences staff and other/external staff were also more likely to be supporters. The results imply that enhanced explicit communication on gender inequality, in academia and beyond, could enhance the implementation success of gender quotas.

Keywords

gender quotas, staff attitudes, higher education, policy, decision-making

* The quote in the title was taken from one respondent’s comments in the survey.
In response to gender inequality, gender quotas are implemented at different levels of academia as one of multiple gender-equality policy measures, a set ranging from voluntary self-governance to legal initiatives (e.g. European Commission, 2013; Husu, 2005). Gender quotas and other affirmative/positive-action measures have been applied to students' admissions (Rotthoff, 2008; Suk, 2013), staff recruitment (Zehnter, 2012), and, more commonly, the appointment of decision-making bodies (Peterson, 2015; Schandevyl, Woodward, Valgaeren, & De Metsenaere, 2013; Zinovyeva & Bagues, 2010). This not only applies to universities but also includes (inter)national funding agencies, advisory boards, and public committees (Husu, 2005). In this article, I examine staff attitudes towards gender quotas for decision-making bodies at universities. I question how staff thinks about gender quotas as a policy measure and how these attitudes are embedded in attitudes towards gender equality and diversity policies.

Gender quotas in academia remain controversial. This is clear from the normative debates about gender relations in academia, the core values and practices of academia, and the way gender quotas would interact with these values either in a positive or a negative manner (e.g. Andersen, 2010; Peterson, 2015; Schandevyl et al., 2013; Zehnter, 2012). Opponents argue that gender quotas would undermine an academic tradition of self-governance based on principles such as meritocracy, excellence, and neutral allocation procedures. Proponents emphasize that such “universal” conceptualizations of merit, excellence, and neutrality are gendered to begin with and, therefore, that gender quotas could challenge gendered organizations and their processes to enhance justice and ethics therein (Andersen, 2010; Schandevyl et al., 2013; Zehnter, 2012). In addition, empirical research contributes limited and mixed findings on the effects of gender quotas. For instance, Bagues, Zinovyeva, and Sylos-Labini (2010; 2014) found that an increase of the number of women evaluators in academic committees did not necessarily affect the success rate of women candidates positively in Spain and Italy. Regarding another potential effect of gender quotas on its beneficiaries, Zehnter (2012) found that while arguments about quotas did not change over time, the stigma of incompetence towards quota beneficiaries did seem to fade.

As I will discuss in the next section, the empirical knowledge on attitudes to gender quotas is extremely limited. Therefore, I contribute to a greater understanding of staff attitudes by bridging and adding to the literatures on affirmative action and gender equality policies in academia. First, I do so by extending empirical research on the implementation phase as extant research predominantly focuses on diagnosis and adoption phases. Second, I include all staff members of the case university instead of focusing on women as beneficiaries or on students. Including all staff is important, since examining only a section of the population might result in an underestimation of how individuals could feel negatively affected by the measure and could engage in (in)formal resistance practices, which can obstruct the quotas’

---

1 Affirmative action is predominantly associated with the legal context in the US and, by extension, the Anglosphere, while positive action is the dominant terminology in the European context. They are both umbrella terms for measures targeting specific sociodemographic groups to establish greater equality. I will reference previous research accordingly; my own focus lies on gender quotas as a form of positive action.
formal implementation process. The third and perhaps most crucial contribution lies in testing insights from the mostly American affirmative action research in a Western European context, where gender quotas are in use.

As gender inequality and resistance seem to persist, the underlying aim of this research was to investigate how attitudes towards gender equality and diversity policies can predict support for, or resistance to, gender quotas. I hypothesized that opposition to gender quotas expresses a broader rejection of gender-equality promoting measures, based on an underlying denial of gender inequality. Inversely, I assumed support for gender quotas would go hand in hand with support for diversity policies. By testing these hypotheses, this research hopes to contribute to the understanding of the adoption and implementation of gender quotas within academia. If gender quotas prove to be controversial because the arguments underlying their adoption were not accepted, then it may be important to focus efforts towards gender equality on the underlying factors rather than on gender quotas themselves.

This article starts by theorizing attitudes towards gender quotas, gender equality, and diversity policies, and by formulating the hypotheses. The second section presents the methodology and data. In the third and fourth section, the empirical results are presented and discussed. The last section concludes the article by discussing the limitations of current research and suggestions for future research.

**Gender Quotas and Attitudes**

The limited research on experiences with gender quotas has predominantly focused on its beneficiaries, in casu women. It has shown that Dutch women professors preferred career-development measures to quotas. While the latter stand for an organizational approach to promoting women, the former focus on coaching and training individual women to develop their professional skills (Willemsen & Sanders, 2007, as cited in Castaño et al., 2010). In Sweden, women appointed to the Tham quota positions as research assistants reported a lack of institutional and financial support. Carl Tham, Minister of Education, had initiated 31 full professorship positions for women but this political intervention was met with institutional resistance (Mählck, 2006, as cited in Castaño et al., 2010). The broader literature on gender-equality policies targeting academia also covers views and experiences of “elite” stakeholders, such as academic managers. Carvalho et al.’s findings suggest that top managers are more aware of their agency in establishing gender equality when formal equal opportunities and/or affirmative action policies are in place (2013). In Sweden, women managers were aware of their role as active and symbolic change agents, although they also indicated they would resist equal-representation policies if these hindered individual women’s careers (Peterson, 2015). Bagilhole (2002), however, found that different responses to equal opportunities – characterised as confusion, collusion, cynicism, and contrariness – could potentially hamper the effective operation of equal-opportunities policies. In a rare study including all university employees, Deem and Morley (2006) examined the employees’ views on equality policies and
their opinion on UK universities’ shifting notions of equality and diversity from redistributional to recognitional forms. They found that the recognitional form highlighted a depoliticised take on diversity as management strategy, instead of addressing structural inequality in the organization.

However, we still need to understand the attitudes and factors that underlie and mediate the support for gender quotas in academia. Therefore, I turn to affirmative-action literature. Attitudes research has primarily focused on affirmative action in the United States. While gender quotas are an illegal category in the US variety of affirmative action plans (Kravitz, 2008), the affirmative action literature offers us specific insights and therefore the opportunity to test these in a Western European context where gender quotas are legal. Reviewing affirmative action literature, Kravitz (2008) summarized that, aside from the strength of the particular affirmative action plan, there were several attributes of respondents that could predict their attitudes towards affirmative action: sociodemographic (racioethnicity, sex/gender), opinion (racism and sexism, political ideology, belief that workplace discrimination exists, social dominance), and mediating variables (beliefs about fairness and the implications of affirmative action for self-interest). In this article I particularly follow up on two opinion variables as I study how attitudes towards the issue at hand (gender inequality) and the policy framework (diversity policies) predict staff attitudes towards gender quotas.

**Gender equality**

A resistant attitude towards gender quotas as a policy measure could originate from specific beliefs about gender and gender equality. As Lombardo and Mergaert report in their study of gender trainings, resistance is “a phenomenon that emerges during processes of change—such as when gender equality policies are implemented—and that is aimed at maintaining the status quo and opposing change” (2013, p. 299). Such resistance can be based on sexist attitudes. Previous research of faculty members’ attitudes in the US and Australia found negative effects for sexism on support for affirmative action (Konrad & Hartmann, 2001; Konrad & Spitz, 2003).

However, these studies were based upon traditional attitudes towards women, measuring the effect of respondents believing in classical gender roles. In contrast, I argue that, in a context of more subtle and covert sexism, the Modern/Neosexism scales (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995) are more fitting to measure sexism and to predict attitudes towards policies addressing gender inequality (Dierckx, Motmans, & Meier, 2017; Swim & Cohen, 1997). Both are based upon the concept of Modern Racism, but the Modern Sexism scale focuses on the denial of continuous discrimination against women, while the Neosexism scale aims to capture the opposition to feminist demands and to progressive policies supporting women (Becker & Swim, 2011). Resistance to affirmative action may actually reflect a lack of understanding of still prevailing gender inequality, rather than reflecting any conscious resistance to gender equality. When understanding is lacking, affirmative action or other gender-equality policies can be perceived as
exaggerated or even biased against the dominant social groups (Swim & Cohen, 1997). In European academia, Zehnter and Kirchler (2015) found that Austrian medical students more often thought quotas for women to be unnecessary, unfair, and discriminatory than hypothetical quotas for men. These findings uncovered implicit attitudes towards quotas for both women and men, and manifested a denial of discrimination against women in academia. With this in mind, I expect that respondents with modern sexist attitudes consider gender quotas less important, as they believe gender equality already exists or that gender inequality is mainly caused by individual, gendered choices and behaviour; neither belief requiring organizational policy intervention. Hence the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the staff score on modern sexism, the lower the attributed importance of gender quotas as a policy measure in academia.

Diversity policies

Gender quotas in academia tend to be implemented as part of a broader (gender) equality-policy framework (European Commission, 2013). Logically, we could then assume the attitude towards such frameworks to be an indicator of support for gender quotas as a policy measure. Positive action programs have been adopted in European academia since the 1980s, but recently diversity management has also entered policy discourses at European universities, mirroring an earlier shift in the Anglosphere (Ferree & Zippel, 2015; Klein, 2016). Diversity management presents differences in organizations as strategic, profitable assets, and takes into account a variety of differences beyond the most common identity references (gender and ethnicity), such as sexual orientation and skills (Bleijenbergh, Peters, & Poutsma, 2010; Pringle & Strachan, 2015; Zanoni, Janssens, Benschop, & Nkomo, 2010). In analogy to affirmative action studies, diversity attitudes have been studied as a dependent variable through examining the predicting and mediating role of sociodemographic, organizational-unit, and opinion variables (e.g. Kossek & Zonia, 1993; Park & Denson, 2009). Researchers have also studied how individuals’ diversity attitudes (van Dick, van Knippenberg, Hagele, Guillaume, & Brodbeck, 2008) and organizational policy support (Hicks–Clarke & Iles, 2000) affect individual and organizational outcomes, such as group identification, career satisfaction, and organizational commitment. The role of diversity attitudes in supporting gender quotas as a policy measure, however, has not yet been researched.

As the conceptual debate on the meaning of diversity and diversity management is ongoing (e.g. Pringle & Strachan, 2015; Zanoni et al., 2010), there is still a great deal of ambivalence. For instance, consider the possible shift away from “historically excluded groups, wherein minorities and women may be lost amidst the wealth of what constitutes diversity” (Flores & Rodriguez, 2006, p. 309). This uncertainty towards the meaning of diversity could also lead to different understandings and degrees of support for gender-equality policies. The embedding of gender quotas in a diversity policy context might thus appear either conflicting or logical depending
on one’s understanding of the principles of diversity policies. Empirically testing the relation between diversity policies and gender quotas attitudes for the first time, I hypothesize a positive effect. If respondents oppose diversity policies\(^2\) as a policy framework, I expect that they would resist more targeted measures such as gender quotas. Hence the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The higher the staff value diversity policies at the university, the higher the attributed importance of gender quotas as a policy measure in academia.

### Attitudes towards gender quotas

The two aforementioned hypotheses are not isolated from each other. When modern sexist attitudes and attitudes towards diversity policies combine in different ways, this could lead to different degrees of support for gender quotas. For instance, one might not support diversity policies at work, but might be very supportive of gender equality as a policy goal. In this case, gender quotas could still be important to the respondent as a policy measure. Following from the first two hypotheses, I expect that respondents are most supportive when they value diversity policies and exhibit no or low modern sexist attitudes. Hence the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: When university staff score low on modern sexism and value diversity policies (highly), gender quotas as a policy measure in academia is best supported (compared to other constellations of the two attitudes).

In sum, I hypothesize that attitudes towards gender quotas as a policy measure depend on how respondents think about the issue of gender inequality and the diversity policy framework.

### Methods and Data

Given its political context, the University of Antwerp as one of the public universities in Belgium provides an interesting case to investigate the research question and hypotheses. Belgium is a front-runner in terms of gender quotas, since it was the first European state to adopt electoral gender quotas for all political levels back in 1994. Furthermore, gender quotas apply to advisory committees as well as to the boards of listed and state-owned companies (Meier, 2014). The most recent gender quotas of 2012 were decreed by the Flemish Ministers for Education and Science Policy, which are sub-state competencies in Belgium, and targeted the decision-making boards of Flanders’ public universities (Ghent University, Hasselt University, and University of Antwerp).\(^3\) Since October 2013, academic decision-making bodies, on both centralised (e.g. Board of Governors and Research Board) and decentralised levels (such as faculty or department boards and selection committees) are required

---

2 I will use the concept of diversity “policies” instead of diversity “management”, since this aligns more with the institutional discourse of the case study.

to implement gender quotas of maximum two-thirds members of the same gender (Meier, 2014). Within this specific Flemish and Belgian context, I investigated the University of Antwerp, a mid-range, and internationally an average-sized, university in Flanders.

I conducted an online survey of all University of Antwerp staff. Through an email from the Human Resources department, 5,212 staff members were invited to participate in the bilingual survey (Dutch/English), of whom 808 responded (cf. sample discussion below). Data was collected between 18 November and 15 December 2014, with one reminder halfway through.

### Measures

**Importance of gender quotas as a policy measure**

This dependent variable was measured through the item “an obligation to have at least one third of the boards and commissions of the university made up of members of another gender”. Respondents were asked to indicate how important they considered gender quotas on a 5-point Likert scale (very unimportant – very important). The item was part of a series of initiatives regarding diversity and equal opportunities, including both implemented and suggested policy measures.

**Modern sexism (MS_GS, MS_D)**

This scale originates from Dierckx et al. (2014, 2017) and tests hypothesis 1. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale (totally disagree – totally agree). Following the outcome of a factor analysis, the subscales Gender stereotypes (MS_GS) (items 1 to 3, Cronbach’s α = .653) and Denial (MS_D) (items 4 to 6, Cronbach’s α = .811) were constructed as summated scales, scaled back to zero as the lowest value (see Appendix Table 1). The higher the scores, the more sexist attitudes the respective respondent held.

**Attitude towards diversity policies (DP)**

To test hypothesis 2, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree) regarding statements about working in a diverse environment and about the university’s policy-making role. The items in this question and in the broader survey clearly suggested that equal opportunities and diversity were not only about gender, but also about ethnicity,

---

4 The University of Antwerp employs almost 5,400 staff and teaches circa 20,400 students, while Ghent University and Hasselt University respectively employ circa 9,000 and 1,300 staff and teach circa 41,000 and 6,400 students (2016).

5 This was part of the European FP7 project EGERA. For more technical information about the survey design I refer to the EGERA report: http://www.egera.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Report_on_the_Pilot_study_on_gender_culture_in_academia.pdf
sexuality, ability, and so on. From a factor analysis of 12 items I extracted one scale, consisting of 7 items (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .875$, see Appendix Table 2), which I constructed by summating the items and rescaling to zero. The higher the score, the more the respective respondent valued diversity policies.

**Modern sexist denial and attitude towards diversity policies (MS_D & DP)**

I have constructed this nominal variable by recoding and combining the previous two scales to test hypothesis 3. To limit the percentage of empty cells while running an ordinal logistic regression, I first recoded both scales in a binary way: modern sexist denial (low: 0 to 6; high: 7 to 12) and attitude towards diversity policies (low: 0 to 14; high: 15 to 28). The new variable sorted respondents along four combinations, in which combination 4 was the base case of scoring high on attitude towards diversity policies and low on modern sexist denial. The other combinations then scored low on both (1), scored high on both (2), and scored low on attitude towards diversity policies and high on modern sexist denial (3). I consider the base case the most progressive and combination 3 the most conservative.

| Table 1: Visualization of the Nominal Variable Modern Sexism Denial (MS_D) & Attitude towards Diversity Policies (DP) |
|---|---|
| | DP low | DP high |
| MS_D low | Combination 1 | Combination 4 - base case |
| MS_D high | Combination 3 | Combination 2 |

Finally, the analysis included four sociodemographic variables (base case): gender, self-identified (*Dummy Woman*), age (18–30), staff category (*Administrative-technical personnel*), and work unit (*Sciences*).

**Analytical techniques**

To decide on the construction of the scales, the scores were factor analyzed using principal-axis factoring and varimax-rotation techniques with Kaiser normalization (Van Wesemael & De Metsenaere, 2009). No indication of multicollinearity between independent variables was flagged by the condition index and tolerance values (Janssens, Wijnen, De Pelsmacker, & Van Kenhove, 2008). I used ordinal logistic-regression analyses to predict the outcome of the ordinal dependent variable. I tested the hypotheses in separate models, as entering all independent variables into one model led to too many empty cells in the calculation, thereby limiting the ability to calculate a fitting model (Lammers, Pelzer, Hendrickx, & Eisinga, 2007; Strand,
Cadwallader, & Firth, 2011). To convert the log odds into odds ratios, I took the exponent of $-\beta$ based on the cumulative logit model (see Appendix Tables 3 & 4):

$$\log \frac{p(Y_i \leq j)}{p(Y_i > j)} = \alpha_j - \beta X_i$$

Sample

After data cleaning, I conducted the analyses based on 469 observations (response rate of 9%, before cleaning 15.5%). More than two thirds of the respondents identified as women (Table 2). As men are slightly in the majority at the university (51.19%), women were thus overrepresented in the sample. One third of the sample was between 18 and 40 years old (62.9%, table 3), which revealed an over-representation of younger staff – between 18 and 30 years old – of 35.2% to the 28.97% in the total university population. This was mostly accounted for by an underrepresentation of staff between 51 and 60 years old (13.6% to 18%). Age groups were recoded to 18–30, 31–40, 41–50, 51–60+ for analysis. Respondents encompassed both academic and administrative staff in all working units of the university. In comparison to the population, administrative-technical and assistant academic staff was overrepresented (41.4% to 24.3% and 13% to 5.7%, Table 4), while non-statutory academic staff – still one third of the sample – was underrepresented. Mirroring the sample of administrative-technical staff, respondents from administrative units were also overrepresented, together with respondents from the four humanities and social sciences faculties. Staff from the two health sciences faculties and from other university institutes or external affiliations was underrepresented (Table 5). The survey seemed to appeal more to women, younger, administrative-technical, assistant academic, and humanities and social sciences staff, which possibly indicates another level of involvement regarding the topics of equal opportunities and diversity. As ordinal logistic regression is based on probabilities and odds, it was not necessary to add weighing coefficients to the models. Since no significant effect was found for age, or subsequently for the intersection with gender, I will not discuss this further. Concerning staff category and work unit, the interaction models with the independent attitude scales did not result in reliable model fits or in significant interaction effects. For this reason, this will not be further discussed either.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Respondents and Population by Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel otherwise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Respondents and Population by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>N (469)</th>
<th>N %</th>
<th>P (5250)</th>
<th>P %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24 years</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30 years</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>23.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 years</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1492</td>
<td>28.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 years</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>19.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 years</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 60 years</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Respondents and Population by Staff Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Category</th>
<th>N (469)</th>
<th>N %</th>
<th>P (5224)</th>
<th>P %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATP – Administrative Technical Personnel</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>1271</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP – Assistant Academic Personnel</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAP – Non-statutory Academic Personnel</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2844</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAP 1 – Assistant/Associate Professors</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>812*</td>
<td>15.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAP 2 – (Full) Professors</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total ZAP population

Table 5: Respondents and Population by Work Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Unit</th>
<th>N (469)</th>
<th>N %</th>
<th>P (5250)</th>
<th>P %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/External</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Sciences</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities and Social Sciences</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1359</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

Gender quotas were thought (very) important by a small majority of the university respondents (54.7%). Table 6 shows that nearly a quarter (22.6%) considered them (very) unimportant, while just as many respondents (22.8%) remained undecided.6

6 These results resemble the attitudes of staff questioned through a similar survey in 2009 (Stuurgroep Gelijk Kansen, 2010).
Staff Attitudes on Gender Quotas in a Belgian University

The latter group might have been even larger, as respondents could have left this question open and therefore have not been included in the data analysis. I analyzed staff attitudes towards diversity policies and gender equality to help us comprehend this variation.

### Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable
**Importance of Gender Quotas as Policy Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>N (469)</th>
<th>N %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very unimportant</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither unimportant/nor important</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings in Table 7 indicate that the respondents were on average (20.76) supportive of diversity policies and held no strong sexist attitudes (3.85 and 2.98), although on average women were more supportive and less sexist than men (21.29 to 19.54 (DP), 3.36 to 4.98 (MS_D) and 2.73 to 3.56 (MS_GS)). However, even within this rather positive sample of respondents I could analyze the effects of the respective attitudes on the attributed importance of gender quotas.

### Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Women Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Men Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of gender quotas (1–5)</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>1.126</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>2.94**</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards diversity policies (0–28)</td>
<td>20.76</td>
<td>4.980</td>
<td>21.29 (4.332)</td>
<td>19.54 (6.067)**</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern sexism denial (0–6)</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>2.405</td>
<td>3.36 (2.141)</td>
<td>4.98 (2.602)***</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern sexism gender stereotypes (0–6)</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.037</td>
<td>2.73 (1.965)</td>
<td>3.56 (2.088)**</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.** Means compared by sex:
* , ** significant (2-tailed) at 0.005 and 0.001 level.
* Equal variances not assumed

The respective estimate parameters and model assumptions’ test results can be found in Appendix Table 3. I will now discuss the results per hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 – modern sexism

I hypothesized that the higher the staff’s score on modern sexism, the lower the attributed importance to gender quotas as a policy measure would be, which the data confirmed. First, respondents who thought more in terms of gender stereotypes (MS_GS), even if of a benevolent7 nature, were 1.19 more likely to consider gender quotas less important. However, this effect could only explain the variation for 3.8%. Second, the effect of modern sexist denial (MS_D) was on average moderated by the respondent being a man or a woman, the effect being stronger for men than women. The odds of considering gender quotas less important for respondents who increasingly did not recognize gender inequality as a prevalent problem in society were 1.60, if a man, and 1.19, if a woman. This interaction effect model could predict 19% of the variation in attributed importance to gender quotas. So while both gender stereotypes and a denial of gender inequality are confirmed as negative predictors, I find that the latter has a stronger power in explaining attributed importance to gender quotas.

Hypothesis 2 – attitude towards diversity policies

I hypothesized that the higher the staff values diversity policies, the higher the attributed importance to gender quotas as policy measure would be. As proportional odds could not be assumed in this model, I controlled for the odds ratios for each threshold of the dependent variable through separate binary logistic regressions (see Appendix Table 4) (Strand et al., 2011). The results show that the odds for considering gender quotas less important were 0.83 for respondents who valued diversity policies more. This indicated actual higher odds for considering gender quotas important. Recounting the highest threshold in the binary logistic regression (0.75), this effect was even stronger when predicting the difference between considering gender quotas very important and the lower categories. I hereby confirm the hypothesis that respondents who were more supportive of diversity policies were more likely to support gender quotas as a policy measure and this effect accounts for 20.4% of the variation.

Hypothesis 3 – modern sexist denial and attitude towards diversity policies

According to the third hypothesis, I expected that combining a low modern sexist denial attitude with a positive attitude towards diversity policies would imply the best chance for supporting gender quotas as a policy measure, which the data confirmed. Reflecting the previous results, the model also included an interaction effect with gender and could predict 15.1% of the variation. It is important to note that, following the construction of this nominal variable, 390 respondents (79%) were sorted in the base

7 Benevolent sexism entails (subjectively) positive gender stereotypes that reproduce gender order in society. For example, see appendix table 1, items on cherishing and protecting women.
case group as “most progressive” and only 19 in the third or “most conservative” group (4%). Overall, I note that the sample was supportive of diversity policies and showed low tendencies towards modern sexist denial. The gender variable had a main effect in the model. Men were 2.08 times more likely than women to consider gender quotas less important. Also a significant main effect was that respondents who scored low on both attitude scales were 4.65 times more likely to consider gender quotas less important than respondents from the base case group. Reflecting the significant interaction effect of gender with the modern sexist denial subscale, I found that men scoring low on attitude towards diversity policies and high on modern sexist denial were 13.79 times more likely to consider gender quotas less important compared to respondents in the base category. No similar interaction effect was found for women. There was no significant difference between respondents who combined a positive attitude towards diversity policies with either a low or a high score on the modern sexist denial subscale. The results suggest that diverse combinations of attitudes towards diversity policies and gender inequality have various effects on the attributed importance to gender quotas.

Lastly, being consistent with previous research and as reflected in the discussed models, it was more likely that women considered gender quotas an important policy measure than men. The odds of considering gender quotas less important were 2.65 times higher for men than women. The gender of respondents as independent variable can predict 5.9% of the variation in attributed importance to gender quotas. Furthermore, staff category can predict 2.6% and in an interaction with gender 8.5% of the variation in attributed importance to gender quotas. In the first model, the odds of considering gender quotas less important were 2.67 higher for (full) professors than for administrative-technical staff. The interaction model indicates that the effect of staff category is also dependent on gender. The predictive effect of being an academic assistant on the attributed importance to gender quotas is positive for women (0.47), yet negative for men (1.61). The effect of the work unit does not interact with gender. This variable can explain 4.4% of the variation. In comparison to respondents with a background in the sciences, it was more likely that respondents from the humanities and social sciences and from other/external units considered gender quotas more important as can be read in the respective odds (0.58 and 0.24).

Discussion

The likelihood of considering gender quotas an important policy measure is thus influenced by the respondents’ adherence to benevolent gender stereotypes, recognition of gender inequality, and attitude towards diversity policies, gender, staff category, and work unit. First, the negative effects of modern sexism complement the existing literature on affirmative action at American (Konrad & Spitz, 2003) and Australian universities (Konrad & Hartmann, 2001). Konrad, Hartman, and Spitz (2001; 2003) found that, among other predictors, traditional attitudes towards women and a belief in the existence of gender discrimination mediated the effect of gender on
affirmative-action attitudes. My case study shows that the subter benevolent gender stereotypes are also predictors of gender quotas support. Whereas men are on average more sexist than women, gender does not interact with this effect. The denial of gender inequality in society is a stronger predictor, however, playing out stronger for men than women. These results imply that support for gender quotas is lower when gender inequality is not (or no longer) perceived as a problem. Following Swim and Cohen (1997) and Zehnter and Kirchler (2015), we can explain such a denial or lack of insight in gender inequality as resulting in a perception of gender quotas as redundant.

Second, the finding that diversity policy attitudes were a positive outcome predictor contributes to the existing literature, as there is no comparable empirical material available yet. Third, the different attitudes of women and men are also consistent with previous research. Women in Belgian and international universities are more favorable towards gender quotas or affirmative action than men (Flores & Rodriguez, 2006; Meulders, O’Dorchai, & Simeu, 2012; Van Wesemael & De Metsenaere, 2009). Affirmative action researchers point out explanatory factors for this difference, such as self-interest and experiences of discrimination, as well as, as discussed above, traditional attitudes towards women and a belief in the existence of discrimination (e.g. Konrad & Hartmann, 2001; Konrad & Spitz, 2003). These factors could also explain the interaction effect of gender and staff category in the case of assistant academic staff. Women currently constitute the majority within this group, which could lead men assistants to consider gender quotas unnecessary, while women assistants might also take other aspects of gender inequality into account leading them to support gender quotas more. Fourth, I found that (full) professors were less likely to support gender quotas as a policy measure. They are professors of the two highest academic ranks and therefore often involved in academic decision-making and governance. I would suggest that the opposing gender quotas arguments concerning meritocracy, excellence, and neutrality resonate with their organizational experiences. As I will discuss in the next section, knowledge on structural gender inequality is still ambiguously met by academic managers. Fifth, staff from the humanities and social sciences and from other/external units attributed more importance to gender quotas. It would be interesting to further research how effects of staff category and work units can be explained. I expect that different experiences and perceptions of work (through individual work status and organizational culture) and of gender inequality (including vertical and horizontal segregation) in the university play a role in explaining support variations between and within certain sociodemographic groups. In this light, personal views on work and gender inequality probably influenced which respondents participated in the survey. As the sample is biased towards those respondent groups who were more likely to support gender quotas, I assume the overall university population to be less likely to support gender quotas.

What do these results tell us regarding gender equality and the implementation of gender equality policies? Given the finding that support for gender quotas is lower when respondents presume there is no inequality, I suggest that clear communication about existing structural inequalities could increase staff support for
Staff Attitudes on Gender Quotas in a Belgian University

gender quotas. As long as there is no (clear) problem in the minds of staff, policy measures such as gender quotas will appear unnecessary or even conflicting with organizational values such as meritocracy, excellence, and neutrality (Andersen, 2010; Schandevyl et al., 2013; Zehnter, 2012). Thus, communication on why gender quotas are implemented should be explicitly linked to insights into the structural gender inequality these quotas aim to counter.

However, increasing knowledge on gender inequality can be an ambivalent process in academia. Research on gender inequality is still met with resistance and bias, even in academia. For instance, Handley et al. (2015) found that men, especially STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) faculty, are more reluctant than women to accept the results of research on gender bias in STEM fields. van den Brink (2015) uncovered defensive patterns on the part of academic managers when she presented on gendered practices in academic recruitment and selection. They would laud gender equality in theory. Yet, by acknowledging gender inequality as a problem but locating it in the past or in other organizations, they avoided their own responsibility for, and commitment to, structural change. Academic managers also challenged the validity of van den Brink’s research. This attitude allowed academic stakeholders to hold on to the status quo instead of reflecting on gendered norms, practices, and power structures, on both individual and organizational levels (van den Brink, 2015). In a case study intervention at an American university, Bird (2011) also uncovered paradoxical stances towards knowledge on gendered structures in some men stakeholders. While almost all said they were committed to gender equality, they did not perceive the discussed issues as gendered. She concluded that if decision-making stakeholders “accept as valid only those strategies that assume that the problems to be resolved are all individual in form, strategies aimed at altering structures or systematic practices will never be implemented” (Bird, 2011, pp. 221–222). Kelan (2009) also recognised the construction of discrimination as an individual problem concerning singular instances of, mostly past, events. She characterised this navigation of the prevalence of gender discrimination and the image of one’s own organization as gender–neutral as “gender fatigue”. If academic managers are resistant to knowledge about gender inequality and to organizational approaches to change, the question remains how the remaining university staff can be expected to support such policy measures. It is here that the connection between gender equality and diversity policy attitudes of this study can make a contribution. First, it is important that the problem at hand is acknowledged, and second, just how this problem is perceived and framed will impact the choice for certain policy measures. Critical diversity scholars have already warned against an individual, economical approach to diversity – an umbrella term for sociodemographic characteristics, abilities, and skills to be seen as assets – which can lose sight of any structural power analysis or inequalities between sociodemographic groups (Klein, 2016; Zanoni et al., 2010).

In light of this discussion on (resistance to) knowledge about the issue and policy frameworks at stake, the way I presented and measured attitudes towards gender quotas was limited to the formal principle, namely the obligation to obtain at least a
Jolien Voorspoels

one-third two-third gender balance in decision-making compositions. Arguably, who holds what kind of knowledge about the gender quota decree and subsequent implementation at the university could play a (mediating) role in the variation of attributed importance. For instance, in her experimental studies, Zehnter (2012) found that good knowledge about quotas lessened negative stigmatization of women beneficiaries. Yet, the timeframe of my case study possibly interfered with knowledge accumulation. The decree of 2012 offered one year before commissions and boards had to comply in October 2013. Respondents were questioned about their attitudes in fall 2014 and were not reminded of the specific formal context. Lack of knowledge about the policy measure could explain why a quarter of them remained undecided. This means that academic and administrative managers, representatives, and (candidate) members involved in composing decision-making bodies had a knowledge advantage. Still, the difference of attributed importance between (full) professors and administrative-technical personnel and the above discussed resistance towards knowledge on structural gender inequality would suggest that the knowledge effect is ambivalent regarding support of or resistance to gender quotas. Thus, in addition to studying the effect of the different staff categories and work units, it would be interesting to include knowledge of gender quotas as variable in future research and to apply a longitudinal approach to untangle discussed ambivalences. Furthermore, as the overall survey focused on the organizational context of the university, respondents were not reminded of and not questioned about the central role of the government in decreeing gender quotas. In addition to the effect of attitudes towards certain policy frameworks, attitudes towards who adopts specific policy measures within such frameworks could further our understanding of support or resistance to these measures.

In the case of Tham quota, this top-down ministerial intervention was met with institutional resistance and was therefore limited in its implementation (Mählck, 2006, as cited in Castaño et al., 2010). In the Flemish case, all five Flemish rectors resisted the proposed gender quotas of the government – questioning the feasibility and effectiveness – but turned this into a broader effort to enhance gender equality by establishing gender action plans (VLIR High Level Task Force Gender, 2013). This brings us to organizational governance. As the gender action plan initiative of the Flemish universities show, gender quotas are but one policy measure to enhance gender equality. Although broader attitudes towards gender equality and diversity policies help us understand attitudes towards gender quotas in decision-making, we should be careful with the reverse relation. Resistance to a specific policy measure – gender quotas – does not necessarily entail individual or organizational resistance to other gender equality or diversity initiatives. Furthermore, I investigated attitudes towards one type of gender quotas. I expect that attitudes towards a governmental gender quota decree targeting recruitment would be met with higher resistance than the type I have studied. While the latter targets compositions of decision-making boards, the former would target the actual decision outcomes of these boards and commissions. Arguably, this could be perceived as even more invasive in a tradition
of self-governance and related values of meritocracy, excellence, and neutrality. For this reason, it would be interesting to include not only attitudes towards state intervention but also perceptions of organizational values as potential explanatory/mediating factors of support of or resistance to gender quotas.

To conclude, Benschop and van den Brink (2014) have emphasized that resistance is inevitable, as power is inherently at play when implementing gender quotas. Not only does the implementation of gender quotas often require the use of hierarchical power, e.g. top-down decisions or sanctions, gender quotas also challenge the status quo of certain positions, interests, and values, such as fairness and quality. However, Benschop and van den Brink (2014) argue that these resistances can actually be useful in organizational change processes. They could start an open debate on values and how these are constructed, possibly rendering practices of discrimination and inequalities visible again. Understanding the individual staff attitudes underlying resistance towards gender quotas can inform such a debate in greater detail. While the results cannot be generalized without a comparative or sector-specific valorization of the hypotheses, I believe that these findings, taking into account perceptions of the problem and policy framework, can supplement extant thinking about the support for, and resistance towards, gender quotas both at other universities and beyond academic organizations.

**Conclusion**

Gender quotas are controversial within academia, where they are seen as breaching the core values of meritocracy and objectivity. In this article, I used ordinal logistic regression models to research predictors of support for, or resistance towards, gender quotas in decision-making bodies. Although almost a quarter of the staff in the case study considered gender quotas to be a/n (very) unimportant policy measure, a small majority of respondents considered them (very) important, and close to another quarter was rather undecided. Based on the sample composition, I assumed that the overall population is less likely to favour gender quotas. Which attitudes can help us understand these varying levels of support? Denying persistent gender inequality in contemporary society and, to a lesser extent, holding on to benevolent gender stereotypes negatively affect the support levels. Additionally, supporters of diversity policies, women (assistants), and staff from respectively the humanities and social sciences and other/external units are more likely to support gender quotas as a policy measure. Based upon these results, it is important for managers who want to successfully target gender inequality to highlight the underlying reason for adopting and implementing the policy, namely structural gender inequality, so as to increase the legitimacy of the measures throughout the organization.

There are a few limitations to this first analysis of the staff attitudes towards gender quotas at a Belgian university. First of all, as discussed, self-selection bias hampers the external validity of the study. The overrepresentation of women, young, administrative-technical, assistant academic, and humanities and social
sciences staff could already indicate a different level of awareness to the topics of gender equality and diversity policies. However, I have controlled the analyses for these sociodemographic variables, and the study included all staff members, not only academics, nor only elite stakeholders or gender-quota beneficiaries. Still, results should not be generalized before this study is repeated at other universities, aiming for more representative and comparable samples. To supplement these findings on the individual level, further research could also look into the extent to which informal implementation practices of gender quotas are met with support or resistance at an institutional level.

The second limitation is the inclusion of only one survey moment. I studied staff attitudes to actual, implemented gender quotas, hereby moving beyond normative debates and common-sense arguments. It would be interesting to study possible attitude changes over time, before implementation and further along, especially within different policy contexts and to address the impact of increasing knowledge about, and experiences with, gender quotas. This might not be a progressive, linear process of experience and acceptance. Furthermore, the place of gender quotas within certain policy frameworks might also change over time and attitudes with them.

Appendixes

**Appendix Table 1: 6 Items and 2 Subscales for Modern Sexism (MS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Subscale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women should be cherished and protected by men.</td>
<td>Gender stereotypes (MS_GS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men are less likely to fall apart in emergencies than women are.</td>
<td>Gender stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men are more suited to leadership than women.</td>
<td>Gender stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination of women is no longer a problem in this country.</td>
<td>Denial (MS_D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society treats men and women the same way.</td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better measures should be taken to achieve equality (between the sexes) in the workplace.</td>
<td>Denial [reverse coding]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix Table 2: 7 Items for Attitude towards Diversity Policies (DP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In recruiting new staff, I think it’s good that there is a preference for certain minority groups if candidates are equally competent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The university should offer a tolerant and diverse work environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s the task of the university to teach its staff to appreciate diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that more diversity within the staff and student population will increase tolerance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that working in a diverse surrounding contributes to my personal development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the university, the advantages of diversity outweigh the disadvantages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think we should make extra efforts to promote equal opportunities at the university.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix Table 3: Ordinal Logistic Regressions of Importance of Gender Quotas as Policy Measure, by Sociodemographic Variables Gender, Age, Staff, Work Unit and Language; and by Attitude Variables Modern Sexism (MS_D and MS_GS), Diversity Policies (DP), and DP & MS_D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(base case)</th>
<th>Estimate $\beta$</th>
<th>Exp (-$\beta$)</th>
<th>Nagelkerke</th>
<th>Sig. (1)</th>
<th>Sig. (2)</th>
<th>Sig. (3)</th>
<th>Empty cells</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender (woman)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>-0.974***</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (18–30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff (ATP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAP</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAP1</td>
<td>-0.323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAP2</td>
<td>-0.983**</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work Unit (Sciences)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Ext.</td>
<td>1.443***</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Sc.</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hum.Soc.Sc.</td>
<td>0.547*</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender &amp; Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man 51 – 60+</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man 41 – 50</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man 31 – 40</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender &amp; Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>0.764*</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man AAP</td>
<td>-1.241*</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man BAP</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man ZAP1</td>
<td>-1.264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man ZAP2</td>
<td>-0.674</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender &amp; Work U.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Ext.</td>
<td>1.070**</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>-1.083***</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Admin</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Other/Ext.</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Health Sc.</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Hum.Soc.Sc.</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS_D</td>
<td>-0.311***</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>11 (16.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS_GS</td>
<td>-0.177***</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thresholds</td>
<td>Estimate $\beta$</td>
<td>Exp ($\beta$)</td>
<td>Exp ($-\beta$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; very unimportant</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; unimportant</td>
<td>0.170***</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; neither unimportant, neither important</td>
<td>0.151***</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; important</td>
<td>0.291***</td>
<td>1.338</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients: *, **, *** significant at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level.

Notes. Model test parameters:
(1) Model Fitting Information; null hypothesis: There is no difference between Intercept only model and Final model in the ability to predict the outcome.
(2) Goodness--of--Fit; null hypothesis: The observed data are consistent with the fitted model; Pearson’s chi-square significance test.
(3) Test of Parallel Lines; null hypothesis: assumption of proportional odds.
Cut points and base case parameters, always zero, of all models and parameters of non-significant models are not displayed, but available from the author upon request.
The occurrence of empty cells is not unusual when adding continuous variables to a model, as there are more possible category combinations that need to be accounted for than when used in combination with categorical variables (Strand et al., 2011).
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor and doctoral committee for their critical reading and constructive feedback: Petra Meier, Henk de Smaele, Inge Bleijenbergh, and Bernard Hubeau. Additionally, I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers, and for the answers to my methodological questions of Danny Rouckhout and Erik Fransen.

This research was funded through the European FP7-project EGERA (grant no 612413).

References


Jolien Voorspoels


Staff Attitudes on Gender Quotas in a Belgian University


About the author

Jolien Voorspoels is a PhD candidate in social sciences at the University of Antwerp. She obtained her master’s degrees in History (2012) and Public Management (2013) at Ghent University. Her PhD research is situated in the Research Group Citizenship, Equality & Diversity, where she also worked as a main researcher for the European FP7-project EGERA (2014–2017). Her work focuses on gender equality in higher education, with interests spanning across gender, organization, and science studies.
White Innocence: Reflections on Public Debates and Political-Analytical Challenges. An Interview with Gloria Wekker

Nella van den Brandt, Lieke Schrijvers, Amal Miri, and Nawal Mustafa

Abstract
This contribution is an interview with social and cultural anthropologist of Surinamese-Dutch background Professor Emeritus Gloria Wekker. It discusses the debate that ensued in the Netherlands after the publication of her book *White Innocence* (2016), now translated in Dutch as *Witte onschuld* (2017). The interview covers the reception of the book, Wekker’s future work, and her legacy for the academic and public debate about gender and race. It goes into methodological questions concerning intersectional analysis and the notion of race as a social construct.

Keywords
Gloria Wekker, White Innocence, race, intersectionality, colonialism, the Netherlands, Belgium, cultural archive
Witte Onschuld: Paradoxen van Kolonialisme en Ras was published by Amsterdam University Press. This Dutch version includes a new chapter, “The Great Discomfort: Reception of White Innocence”. Nella van den Brandt, Lieke Schrijvers, Amal Miri, and Nawal Mustafa met Gloria Wekker in Amsterdam a few days prior to the publication of this Dutch translation. They spoke about the public debate sparked by Wekker’s work and reflected on developments since the publication of White Innocence. The interview furthermore provided an opportunity to reflect upon various methodological questions across several academic fields of discussion.1

Politics and Society

The publication of White Innocence was met with controversy and sparked heated debates with harsh voices both in support of and criticising your argument. How do you reflect on these past months of what is now dubbed “the racism debate”, and the reception of White Innocence?

Wekker: In Witte Onschuld (Dutch translation of White Innocence), which comes out on Monday 6 November 2017, I wrote a new chapter about the reception of White Innocence in the Netherlands and the US. What strikes me is that in the US the discourse to talk about race and ethnicity is much more available and widespread. So, one of the characteristics of the reception in the Netherlands is that people seem to be very incapable of talking about difference, especially when it concerns difference of race and/or ethnicity. This was also one of the conclusions of the research we did as the diversity committee at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). The UvA can be understood as a microcosm of the Netherlands. On the one hand, the University has a remarkably positive self-image: look at us, we are great, everyone can enter, we’re so diverse! At the same time there is a complete and utter aphasia when it concerns talking about race and/or ethnicity. When you invite representatives of the UvA to talk about diversity, they can speak about gender, and they can speak about internationalisation, but there is an astonishing silence about race and ethnicity. And you can see all of that reflected in the reception of White Innocence.

However, a distinction should be made between traditional media, social media, and regular everyday encounters I have with people. People whom I just happen to meet in the supermarket or on public transport often thank me for the work that I’ve done. Those who approach me out of the blue, often but not exclusively people who...
of colour, both young and old, are very happy. I also noticed that young people often appreciate that I propose a discourse to talk about race and ethnicity. And then there’s social media. I don’t actually follow everything, mostly because of the bitterness that seems to dominate there. I noticed there’s a lot of youth who embrace my work. At the same time I received a lot of hate mail. There are those who want to sue me on account of hate speech against “Dutch people”. So I guess what happens on social media is very mixed.

Finally, traditional media are dominated primarily by older white men, but also by white women, and people of colour are present to a far lesser extent. The tone that is set by the traditional media is negative. I get the impression that many journalists have never even read my book. People don’t talk about my argumentation, and almost never about the actual content of the book. The conversation focuses mostly on the way I look, what my hairstyle is like, and which clothes I wear. The discussion is of a remarkably low standard. The fact that there is no engagement really troubled me. There’s the sense that everything I discuss is merely my own problem, and the problem of people of colour, but not the problem of white journalists. Many feel incredibly attacked by my use of the term “white”, as well as the term “innocence”. The title of my book, White Innocence, is thus met with a lot of resistance. Of course, we can say a lot about this resistance. Taking into account the longer history, from the moment that Philomena Essed (1984) began to publish about everyday racism and was met with an avalanche of criticism, the sole possible conclusion is that we didn’t get anywhere and that nothing has changed. We are still in the same state of denying race and racism as a fundamental signifier in Dutch society. So when it concerns a majority of white people, I see hardly any development since then. Yet, I should make one exception: my work does have an impact on young white people, but hardly or not at all on older white people.

More promising is the fact that a second anti-racist wave is taking place at the moment. A huge group of youth of colour, but also white youth, has started to unite in a second anti-racist wave. The former group of young people really wish to claim their citizenship in the Netherlands. They don’t want to follow what people of colour of my generation said: “we’re guests here, so let’s take it down a notch”.

So that’s my idea about the reception of White Innocence. It seems crucial to continue this type of work. For sure, I am positive about the anti-racist movement—I think that it’s incredible. And you know, also about the possibilities of social media. In the first anti-racist wave, in which I participated, we didn’t have social media. So we were heavily dependent on traditional media. With current social media, people can set their own agendas, make plans, and maintain contact with each other. That is exceptionally positive.
Do you notice any transformation in the construction of white innocence throughout the debate, or in different times and places? Is there some form of “essence” to white innocence, or are its characteristics changing? For example, did the content and direction of white innocence change in light of the rise of right-wing populism in European contexts? And is white innocence transforming, for example, in the debate about Black Pete?

Wekker: Well that’s the whole issue. I am a cultural anthropologist so I tend to focus on the outcome of a trajectory of developments in the Netherlands. And I elaborate on the ways in which the “cultural archive” (2016, pp. 19–20), which was formed during the colonial era, continues to be apparent. Yet I believe that it is rather pressing that historians investigate what the cultural archive looks like in different time periods. During my life, I have noticed how much the ways in which the cultural archive, specifically in relation to the way race is expressed, can change across different time periods. I wrote in White Innocence how I, as a little girl, belonged to a Surinamese family that had just arrived in the Netherlands during the 1950s. All of us made a trip to Artis, the zoo in Amsterdam. I was two years old at the time. The picture that was eventually included in White Innocence (2016, p. 9) was taken on that day. You can see these post-war white women staring at us in the margins of the picture. So we were focusing on the donkey, and they were preoccupied with us. We were one of the first families from Suriname who came to live in the Netherlands and curiosity was all around. Many people wanted to touch us, to see if we were “real”, and to feel our hair. This was linked to a feeling of being “the first” and created the sense that we were rather exceptional. It wasn’t connected to a feeling of threat; there were so few people of colour in the Netherlands at the time. It was the time of reconstruction [after World War II] and everyone was asked to work together and do their part, and there was quite some employment opportunity.

This differs a lot from the period in the Netherlands that follows right after, which I discuss with the incidents with politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Minister [of Integration] Rita Verdonk threatened to withdraw Hirsi Ali’s Dutch citizenship, which would mean that she would also lose her seat in parliament. Eventually, Hirsi Ali took the initiative to leave herself. So we see the difference in the rudeness with which Hirsi Ali was confronted. This is also the time that witnessed the arrival of the “new realist discourse” (Prins, 2002), which is indeed connected to right-wing populism in the Netherlands. This new realist discourse argues that we shouldn’t beat around the bush anymore, but instead speak our minds and say that “those foreigners” should assimilate and integrate. Nowadays, in this realist discourse, assimilation...
ilation has become the complete responsibility of so-called newcomers. Earlier, in the 1980s, when I had my first job and worked at the Ministry of Wealth, Healthcare, and Culture, this was more of a two-way process. Since then, the responsibility has shifted in a most preposterous way. This shift in who is responsible for “integration” means that everyone who enters the Netherlands for the first time is asked to seek for themselves where they will take their [obligatory] language course. The same ridiculousness is contained within the first interviews that, for example, gay asylum-seekers have to undergo with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). Migrants are expected to declare in these very first meetings “I am gay and that’s why I ran”. If you don’t, there’s no way, and you can forget about getting through the system. This narrow-mindedness has taken ground in an extremely disturbing fashion.

So, is there an essence to *White Innocence*? No, it depends on the context; how the cultural archive expresses itself. It is crucial that more research is done about different periods in history to see how this becomes apparent. There are several historians who have proposed to do this. You see, the issue is that we never critically examined the cultural archive in the Netherlands. We’ve conveniently imagined that this archive merely contains positive features. For example, that we are traditionally exceptionally welcoming toward newcomers, so-to-speak, and that everyone can come in and flourish here. This rose-coloured self-image emerges in many different areas. It is also applicable to gender and sexuality. We even feel that we have a lot to teach the rest of the world about gender and sexual regimes, that others should truly take us as an example. This self-image is imbricated in the ways in which [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs collaborates with all kinds of NGOs and human rights organisations. In this regard, it is surprising how little we have to say about how race functions on a global scale. On the contrary, we’re internationally chastised by others about the prevailing everyday racism in the Netherlands. I can already imagine Prime Minister Mark Rutte saying: “What do they know about this? They don’t know anything, they don’t know the Netherlands”. I’m very happy that I cannot be accused of such a claim—if this were the case we would hear it all around.

This tells us something: our activities and self-image mirror our engagement with gender and sexuality on the one hand, and race on the other. The fact that we never deemed it worthwhile to rigorously investigate the cultural archive: what is in there? Under what conditions does it express itself, in what way? A lack of material is definitely not the problem. I found that one of the hardest questions while I was writing the book was “what will be the limits of my material”? I aimed to show how the cultural archive works in different domains. With this approach, I wanted to show how race is heavily implanted in this cultural archive for it to come out so brightly and clearly to this day and age. It was very difficult to choose. In the end I put forward a kind of template that you can use and implement. But I also believe that different disciplines should do the work within their own field of study, and should examine how the cultural archive works in that particular area.
This question takes into consideration the tension between strategic essentialism and intersectionality. It may be necessary at times to essentialise an identity in order for marginalised groups to gain political and societal credibility, to be able to mobilise social movements, and to put repression of and discrimination against minorities on the agenda. At the same time, it is crucial to think and express inclusivity and to safeguard diversity within critical movements. Both academics and activists encounter this dilemma. What is your perspective in this regard?

**Mustafa** (interviewer): This is something that I often experience myself. It can be strategic to emphasise a certain element of my identity, but then there can also be a conflict between my various identities. I am a black Muslim woman, and both of these identities are the centre of attention in the racism debate. I’m always in a kind of split, a space in-between. This can be productive, as this grants me the space to reflect. Whenever I’m only with black activists, blackness is the only matter of concern, and islamophobia tends to be excluded from the agenda as a form of racism. And this goes the other way around as well. When I’m with groups who want to counter islamophobia, and which consist mainly of Moroccan Dutch or Turkish Dutch people, blackness is not a topic in the conversation. As a phenomenon, black Muslims seem to be non-existent. This situation motivates me to think more about this essentialism: what are the boundaries and when do they manifest themselves? How can we deal with them?

**Wekker**: Yes, I recognise this, and it’s something to be very aware of. I sometimes get the impression that men are very dominant and active in the black activist movements. This is different from the first antiracist wave, which was rooted in women’s activism, and in which women made the analyses. Therefore, I am working to encourage young black, migrant and refugee women to take on key positions and to speak out, and not to let the antiracist movement be dominated by men. [It is] a movement that is also often inflicted by internal homophobia. So how would I regard this? I don’t consider identity to be an established fact, but a kind of role that you play, or stories that we tell ourselves about ourselves. This means that identity is in constant movement and that certain elements may become important and singled out in different moments. Yet I always try to shed light on the complexity of these stories, and to resist being reduced to one axis of significance, because our stories are more complex than only being black. It has to do with intersectionality at all times. This is a very burdensome role to play: to emphasise that the often unspoken principle on which we base ourselves is too limited; that we should not only look at black people, but also at the workings of gender. And what does sexuality have to do with it? How about class? This is second nature to me, I do it automatically. I don’t really recognise myself as belonging one hundred percent to any group at all. I insist on keeping all of these elements of myself and on not being forced to flatness in my stories or in the way I experience myself. So I think that you will have a similar task in life as a black Muslima, to always bring this to the story, more axes of difference.
Then, is it sometimes necessary to be strategically essentialist? I am not convinced that we will do ourselves any favour that way. I would prefer to complicate strategic essentialism from the outset; that we make clear from the very first start that identity consists of multiplicity.

**Mustafa (interviewer):** This challenges me, so I will continue this line of questioning. What would this look like in practice? I agree with you that we need to problematise and complicate strategic essentialism head on, but at some point you do have to make choices in practice and in activism. I also have a refugee background, so all those identities are always there. But sometimes they tell you, literally, “no, you just have to choose from those identities. We’re faced with a bigger challenge: we need to dismantle whiteness. That’s our shared goal. So are you black, or are you a Muslim? You shouldn’t talk about all those other identities, nor about sexuality. You should focus on blackness or Muslimness”. So my question would be, is intersectionality only important on the outside, in the search of alliances with other movements, or is intersectionality also an internal issue?

**Wekker:** Yes. I wouldn’t even know how to imagine choosing between being a refugee, or being black, or being a Muslima. I sense that intersectionality is often misunderstood, especially by men, who think that they can just read one article about it and get the hang of it. Even more so, they then have become experts in the area! I can’t relate at all to the idea that we have to make a choice between these identities, because we need to collectively dismantle whiteness, for example. You see, it’s the same story that was told during the decolonial wars: women should just be quiet for now. Now that it supposedly concerns all of us, women’s rights can be put in the background for a bit. But this doesn’t come out of nowhere; you shouldn’t shoot yourself in the foot by imagining the movement flatter than it is. I believe activists owe it to themselves to make more complex analyses of reality than repeating this dominant thinking: something is either gender, or it has to do with race and/or ethnicity, or with sexuality, or with religion, but not with all at once. That just doesn’t work for me.

This question aims to analyse the usefulness of using political-analytical concepts transatlantically or transnationally. How does the American-British context connect to local terminology about racism, discrimination, and change? Which concepts are particular for the Dutch-speaking context and might help us? How, if at all, can we develop a specific discourse to address racism in a way that it is heard and read by a broader audience?

**Wekker:** Well, first of all we should take into account the longer history. James Baldwin says this all the time: he calls the US “the children of the Netherlands”. Race and racism were introduced by Europeans in America. And now we see that the discussion returns from the US. So, of course, we’re a part of this debate. I do think it’s crucial to develop specific terminology, and black, migrant, and refugee women have been doing this since the 1970s. This term “black, migrant, and refugee”
(zwart, migrant, en vluchteling (ZMV)) was coined by black women in the Netherlands and by women who had a migrant and refugee background (Botman, Jouwe & Wekker, 2001). This term is located in the Netherlands; it’s about the different groups here and about ways you could name those. The concepts are political, we didn’t take this from the US context. But I don’t want to be the one to say which terminology is good or not. However, I can often immediately feel whether a term makes sense or not, if it’s inclusive or offensive and exclusive. I still consider ZMV to be a very suitable term, but I’m open to having a debate if there are people who propose a different terminology.

We should not say that racism is mainly an American problem. That is such an easy presumption to hide behind, as if we can’t learn anything from the US. I find that too shortsighted. Of course there are major differences between the US, the Netherlands, and Belgium. I do believe that we have not done enough in the Netherlands to acknowledge the ZMV people who have played an important role in the past. I wouldn’t want to put Stokely Carmichael3 on the table as an example, if that means we’re forgetting about black thinkers who were important in the Netherlands. There are both men and women whom we should rescue from oblivion. I don’t believe that we’re copying the US, but we can be inspired by the US, as they can be inspired by us as well. We aren’t just the little brother or sister, and the contexts are indeed different. Yet the project of developing a language, an inclusive, non-offensive language, to talk about race and/or ethnicity matters to all of us. It’s truly embarrassing that we’re not able to talk about this, that we suffer from a kind of aphasia.

You see, I noticed that many people want me to write down a kind of to-do list. The idea is that once we’ll have completed all these points, we’ll be all right and a solution will be there. I don’t want to be forced into this role of “internal or national therapist”. Thinking about these issues should be the responsibility of all of us. We shouldn’t want to “resolve” certain issues too hastily by taking a pragmatic approach, as this would imply that we don’t take the time to truly understand the problem.

**Academic Perspectives: Methodology and Disciplines of Debate**

*White Innocence* is researched and written in an uncommon style that combines analyses with personal anecdotes. This writing style raises questions: what are the challenges in presenting a creative methodology for a broad and/or interdisciplinary audience? And to what extent can this combination of theory and the personal in itself be considered an intervention in academia?

---

3 Stokely Carmichael, originally from Trinidad, was a prominent figure in the Civil Rights Movement in the US. He was active in the Black Power movement, first as leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, then as the “Honorary Prime Minister” of the Black Panther Party, and finally as a leader of the All–African People’s Revolutionary Party.
Wekker: Yes, I do think that the mix of theory and personal matters is a critical intervention, but not everyone has the space and means to write this way. I would not advise young scholars at the beginning of their academic careers to challenge all sacred cows the way I have. If you want to make it in academia, you first have to prove you can write a thesis in the traditional way. Later on, you can figure out how to take space to experiment with the format. I have always found that very enjoyable and exciting. And it shouldn’t be forbidden for academic books to be so exciting that you just can’t wait to turn to the next page. The books that I find exciting don’t necessarily represent the positivistic way of working, where the “I” is completely banned, and where it supposedly doesn’t matter who the person or the researcher is. I have turned my back on these positivistic demands of neutrality and objectivity.

I have to say I quite underestimated the responses to my writing style. While I was writing, I assumed that everyone could follow me on this journey. I embrace an epistemological starting point that aligns with the perspective of Sandra Harding (1995). So this is not objectivity as in positivism, but a “strong objectivity”, in which we all make clear from which position we speak—a positionality that enables us to understand a certain part of reality. Knowledge is produced at the intersections of our positionalities, and allows us to see that part of reality. And someone else, with another position, sees a different part of that reality. You can put these types of knowledge next to each other and at a certain point you will, hopefully, have a more complete understanding of reality. I didn’t write a lot about this in White Innocence. I do in the additional chapter in the Dutch translation Witte Onschuld because I noticed that many people assume that I wrote a non-academic book, which is quite a pity and at the same time noteworthy, really, that there is such a limited understanding of what academic work entails.

Is this an intervention, a critical intervention? I think so, yes. See, the fact that I look at Dutch society as an anthropologist is already a critical intervention. We’re taught to think that as a sociologist, you analyse Dutch society, and as an anthropologist you analyse far-away countries, but I use methods from cultural anthropology to look at Dutch society. That in itself is an intervention that can be shocking for some people. And then the way of writing: people who are empirically trained and want to be able to count and read statistics won’t feel at home with me either. I do consider the cultural archive a kind of “grand theory”, and I try to find examples in different domains of how this plays out. And to that I add experiences of other people, and of myself, and analyse these. So, I analyse various things. I analyse practices, feelings, and organising principles, and what holds all of those together. These are methodological principles as used in anthropology and cultural studies. And post-coloniality or decoloniality, and intersectionality keep everything together. I think postcoloniality in the Netherlands has little colour on its cheeks, it’s just so weak. Apparently it is entirely possible to call yourself a postcolonial thinker without ever speaking of race or ethnicity. That is inconceivable to me. One moment you study Shakespeare, and the next Arundhati Roy and suddenly you become “postcolonial”. I’m not impressed by this.
So I see *White Innocence* as an intervention in established Dutch academic practices in many different ways. And it might be shocking indeed to read this book. My aim for this book was to participate in a debate, an international debate, about ways to study postcolonial societies such as the Netherlands. I embarked on this task with the help of decoloniality and intersectionality. I would like to see more research in other European countries about the question: what does white innocence look like in Belgium, in Scandinavia, or in southern European countries? I hope that there will be more comparative intra-European perspectives on white innocence. I consider that to be of great significance. What kept me going was influenced by what happened to Philomena Essed, how she was cut to bits when she published her research about everyday racism. She eventually moved to the United States. And I decided: that’s not going to happen to me! I don’t want to write in the Dutch language and leave the book to Dutch critics only. I wanted to be a part of an international debate.

Schrijvers (interviewer): Do you think it is important for academic work to be accessible for people without such academic training?

Wekker: Definitely. We should be more consistent in this matter and emphasise its importance. We’re paid by tax money, so we should write things that are accessible for those who pay for it, whether they have or haven’t enjoyed an academic education. Hence, I tried to, and I try to do so in all my writing. I don’t really recognise the boundaries between academic and non-academic genres, which is one of the characteristics of my work. By the way, I am planning to write two more books.

Anthropologist Ineke van Wetering did research in the Bijlmer⁴ from 1975 until the early 1980s. During this period, many Surinamese came to the Netherlands from Suriname. She lived in one of the high-rise buildings and became a member of all kinds of women’s groups. She wondered: what happens to all these people, especially the women? How do they maintain their culture? She also joined cultural associations. Van Wetering passed away before she was able to write a book. Her widower asked me whether I could write this book posthumously, so I am currently in the possession of stacks of handwritten fieldwork notes. This will be my next book. Yes, it’s an incredibly daunting task, and I am very eager to find out exactly how I will handle all of this. I don’t know yet. I have to jump into this, and I am very curious about which epistemology I will apply here. I can’t just pretend to be absent from this book, right? Will it be a book with two voices? Will Ineke and I get into a discussion? Because I will probably disagree with her every now and then. So it is a real challenge for me and I’m looking forward to start thinking about this next project.

The project following this one will be a novel. It will be about my grandmother—one of my grandmothers—but perhaps it will turn out to be about more grandmothers. That’s a whole different way of writing. And I’m not saying that academics should not read that [type of writing] anymore, that a novel is only for “ordinary” people. I don’t actually believe in such a distinction. My desire is to reach as big an

---

⁴ The “Bijlmer”, or Bijlmermeer, is a neighbourhood in South East Amsterdam that was designed as a single high-rise project in the late 1960s. It is known for being inhabited since the 1970s by many people of Surinamese-Dutch and African backgrounds.
audience as possible with everything that I write. I am aware that there are certain conventions, but I believe these conventions should be critically examined. I ask myself which conventions I wish to comply with or do without. But to emphasise once more, it’s important to realise that I am Emeritus, so I can basically do whatever I like.

With this question we would like to elaborate on the concept of race. Race is described as a social construct in *White Innocence* but seems to be used differently throughout the book. Is the concept mainly concerned with the relationship between black and white? How is race connected to other analytical concepts in the critical study of gender and sexuality, such as ethnicity and religion?

**Wekker:** Well, black and white are political terms. These are terms that were coined by ZMV-women at a particular time of struggle within Dutch society. This is very important and is often not acknowledged. The role of women in developing the thinking about gender and ethnicity and/or race has been a lot more influential than that of men. In the 1970s, women with different backgrounds came together to make a joint analysis of our situation. Men didn’t do this. So that was per definition a very meaningful development. The Dutch government subsidised different groups, which were not encouraged to get together. Yet Turkish, Moroccan, Indo, Moluccan, Surinamese, and Antillean women sat down and came up with the term ZMV.

I believe that Islamic women, or Muslims in general, are nowadays regarded as the “ultimate other”. I would like to have had more opportunities to talk about this in *White Innocence*, but at the same time I consider this to be a different issue. It is urgent that another study focuses on what our cultural archive tells us about Muslims. This may even have a longer history than what the cultural archive tells us about black people. I suspect that the archive concerning Muslims is older, that there are similarities with the archive concerning black people, but that there are differences as well. However, I’m not quite sure what these differences are exactly. At this moment in time I can conclude that we have rather fixed ideas about who is and isn’t emancipated when sexuality is the topic of debate. These ideas are structured in a kind of teleology: white women are at the summit of sexual emancipation, black women are too sexually free and Islamic women are not free enough. Those ideas are stuck in our heads nowadays. But I also know with respect to Muslim women that the framing was different at the end of the nineteenth century. Back then, they were considered the pinnacle of eroticism and desirability by white men. You see, there is still a lot of research to be done. I wish I had more insight in this area, but I don’t. Someone else will have to do this work.

Can you speak of people who are not literally black, as “black”? You can, if you use black as a political term, in which case black refers to otherness. The assumption is that outward, phenotypic difference is somehow connected to all kinds of internal characteristics. Culture is then framed as something unchangeable, as if people are stuck in it. In this way, culture becomes an almost biological explanation of differ-
ence. I have the sense that the static way Muslims are looked upon legitimises referring to Muslims as a race and/or an ethnicity on a conceptual level. I follow Stuart Hall (2000) here, who argues that race and ethnicity are two sides of the same coin. While race by and large emphasises the biological side, and ethnicity the so-called cultural side, both have become rather interchangeable and stringent nowadays in the sense that both are suffused with biological meaning.

Additionally, perceptions of adopted children of colour interest me. I did a research project on this with a few colleagues some years ago (Wekker et al., 2007). When the children of colour are still young and seen together with their white mothers, they are expected to be adopted. When the children grow up, this perception changes. A white man with his Thai-looking daughter is seen differently; the daughter is sexualised. We find it difficult to take into account that family members may have different phenotypes. Because of this, we often assume some form of sexual relationship. But what these different assumptions share, whether the children are young or already grown up, is that agency belongs to white people. A person of colour is always dependent on what meaning is ascribed to them by that white person. And it doesn’t even seem to matter whether it is a Colombian or Thai person, all are “other” and dependent.

I think that race refers to the moments when circulating hierarchised ideas are projected onto people who are not white. What I wanted to ask you is, how do you exactly see this different use of race throughout my book?

van den Brandt (interviewer): If race is a social construct, then you have a very broad definition that allows a lot, and can be employed in various ways. We can take the chapters “The House that Race Built” and “Of Homonostalgia and (Post-) Coloniality” as examples. The first chapter asks the question how and where black women are studied: where are they taken seriously as an interesting group to research and to learn from? I think that in this instance, race refers to a particular group of black women. The second chapter looks at “gay politics” and how that is connected to race. I think this is a methodological question. Race moves different ways conceptually. How do you see this? What are the boundaries? When can or can’t it move?

Wekker: Ah, yes, I understand. In the first chapter you mention, I don’t actually ask the question where black women are studied. What I ask is: what principles shape the governmental support or the academic study of women? And how does race play a role in that? And then I discuss that there are three different places in academia where women are studied. There seems to be one place where white women are studied, a second place is for ZMV-women, and the third place is for women from third world countries. This separation is not a coincidence, as we see the same thing happening in the ministries. And I analyse that race is an organising principle there. The point I wanted to raise here is that race is so embedded and cemented in our cultural archive, that it becomes an unconscious organising principle. Race is an unconscious ingredient that shapes our policies and knowledge production.

I can imagine that race is indeed employed in different ways in White Innocence, but it always comes back to the argument that race is a social construct. That social
construct can be an organising principle at times, and a feeling at other times. In the second chapter you mention, I ask the question: is there continuity in the ways sexuality was experienced in the colonies vis-à-vis black women, and the way Pim Fortuyn experienced his sexuality in relation to Muslims? Race becomes more of a factor that guides feelings and emotions in that exploration. So perhaps you are right that race is given different meanings. In any case, it is a very complicated concept that can be implemented in various ways in socio-political areas as well. But I like thinking about this issue. And maybe that is exactly my point: 400 years of colonialism have made race, in its various incarnations, a central but unconscious tool in our thinking, feeling, and acting. Race is ubiquitous, but mostly not recognized or acknowledged.

This question is related to the previous discussion about concepts and focuses on the (supposed) (dis)connections between fields of research. In the study of race, the study of religion often seems to disappear. At the same time one could argue that the study of Islam and Muslims in Europe, or religious studies more broadly, is rather hesitant when it comes to the concept of race. Feminist and queer theory are, moreover, not often considered together with postcolonial and critical race perspectives. How can we make these fields of research and debate more productive in their connection?

Schrijvers (interviewer): Being a researcher in the Netherlands can make me feel fragmented at times. It feels like there are separate academic fields, like anthropology, or gender studies, or religious studies, that don’t interact with one another. How can we work to overcome these distinctions?

Wekker: This again has to do with our previous discussion about strategic essentialism and the pressure to make a choice between different identities. We see the same demarcation in academic disciplines of course. These younger disciplines that we are talking about, like Gender Studies, Sexuality and Ethnicity Studies, are built around one key concept, and all the rest is preferably kept aside so as to understand this key concept more clearly. Still, you shoot yourself in the foot if you don’t approach gender as always and already entrenched by race, sexuality, and class. I feel like we repeat the traditional way of thinking in pillars—a thinking that might be connected to having been a pillarised country. We’re so infused by that way of thinking that it has become a very difficult habit to break. I couldn’t agree more with your statement that gender studies rarely touches upon religion, the study of

---

5 Both the Netherlands and Belgium used to be pillarised societies divided into tightly integrated communities formed on the basis of religion or ideology. Politics, administration, civil society, media, and social life were divided and organised in autonomous political–societal structures called pillars: the liberal, the socialist, the Protestant and the Catholic pillar (in Belgium, Protestant communities were a small religious minority and not an independent pillar). The government acted as intermediary between the different ideological and religious communities. These pillars emerged as a result of political mobilisation in the nineteenth century. While in the Netherlands, pillarisation collapsed at the end of the 1960s under the pressures of the sexual revolution, the student revolt and the rise to power of the post-World War II baby boomers, in Belgium pillarisation remained at least until the 1970s. In comparison with the Netherlands, social life in Flanders up to the present could be considered more structured by a “pillarised” civil society.
sexuality, or race and/or ethnicity. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to the other fields of study. So when you’re in the study of sexuality, you’ll often only study white gay men. You have to make a lot of effort to thematise women; it’s similar with religion or class. This brings us back to the same diagnosis: the dominant frameworks demand us to choose. You can be involved with gender and not take into account anything that happens in adjacent fields, even though that is a real shortcoming. I would prefer a similar approach as in the US or Canada, where intersectionality is the default setting in many Gender Studies programs from the start. That is very different compared to an approach in which a course on gender only includes other axes of significance in week nine, because by then, you have already installed an incorrect non-intersectional perspective and that is very persistent. I tried to show this in chapter two, “The House that Race Built”: what all these disciplines do and what they exclude, and what you’re missing because of this.

*Miri (interviewer):* Another location to consider is Belgium. There’s a course in the new Flemish interuniversity and interdisciplinary Master in Gender and Diversity in which we start with intersectionality and white privilege. We consider this to be essential. I think this is an interesting development; it seems like a different way of doing gender studies. Why does it sometimes work this way in some places while it doesn’t in others?

*Wekker:* Perhaps people can learn from each other too. This master programme in Flanders was founded much later than many study programmes elsewhere. It could be that this enabled them to see how this works, and what could be done differently from the very beginning.

To close, we would like to reflect on the legacy of Gloria Wekker for upcoming generations of young researchers and activists.

*Wekker:* This is a nice question, but it also makes me wonder. What is actually my legacy? I think that I, together with some colleagues, put intersectionality on the map in the Netherlands. Back then when I returned from the US and started to work in the Gender Studies Department, I was shocked to see how little race and other axes of signification were a matter of concern. Yes, I truly did my best to make a difference, to put intersectionality as a concept on the agenda, and I should acknowledge that gender studies did change in those years, but all of that can be destroyed in an instant. What I find interesting is that you can see in my books how, when you do intersectionality, you’re able to put gender and sexuality at the forefront one moment (as in my book *The Politics of Passion*) and put race and its intersections forward the next time, like I did in *White Innocence*. Intersectionality is such an enriching approach for precisely this reason. It enables you to work with this toolbox, depending on your interests, and emphasize something different each time. Meanwhile you should continue to ask questions about what else is going on there.

I think that part of my inheritance, part of my legacy, has to do with the history of black, migrant, and refugee women in the Netherlands. I always had the utmost
difficulty getting funding and having my research subsidised, so it hasn’t been all that easy. I was never able to get my research funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) because my research always in some way or another had to do with race. When the assumption is that “race is not an issue for us”, why would you then fund this type of research? Therefore, I have only been able to write *White Innocence* after I retired from my position as a professor. It seems that things really started to take off then. *Scienceweb* dubbed me one of the ten most influential academics in the Netherlands in 2017. All sorts of accolades are coming my way. The University of Warwick (UK) has proposed to name an award for young PhD scholars who are doing post- and decolonial work after me. On 11 December, I was awarded the prestigious governmental Joke Smit prize, for my endeavours to improve the position of ZMV women in society and for bringing the debate to more complicated levels. It is bittersweet, how all of this is happening only now that I have decided to take matters into my own hands. It says a lot about Dutch academia. That really saddens me, so I want this to be said as well.

Whether academia is then the right place to raise these concerns? Well, we need it there too. You cannot say, “let them do whatever they’d like”. The battle has to be fought there as well. Of course it is not easy, but it should be done.

**Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Professor Gloria Wekker for her time, effort, and generosity. Additionally, our thanks go to *DiGeSt* editors Birgit Van Puymbroeck and Leah Budke for their support and language editing of this article, and to Bregje Biebuyck who has been a great help in transcribing the interview.

**References**


About the authors

Nella van den Brandt holds a PhD from Ghent University (Belgium), and is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the Philosophy and Religious Studies Department at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. She has published in peer-reviewed journals such as *Social Compass*, *Women’s Studies International Forum*, and *Social Movement Studies*. Her current research focuses on religion/secularity, religious conversion, media and culture, and the production of difference. Additionally, she is the manager assistant of the online open access journal *Religion and Gender*: https://www.religionandgender.org/.

Lieke Schrijvers is a cultural anthropologist and PhD candidate for a joint doctorate in religious studies and gender studies at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Utrecht University, and the Centre for Research on Culture and Gender at Ghent University. Previously she graduated from the research master Gender and Ethnicity at Utrecht University. Her current research concerns the intersections of gender, race, and religion among female converts in Jewish, Evangelical Christian, and Muslim communities in the Netherlands from a comparative perspective.

Amal Miri holds an MA in Sociology from the University of Antwerp. From 2011 until 2015 she worked for ELLA, a non-profit organisation working on the intersection of gender and ethnicity to promote the empowerment and participation process of women from ethnic minority groups in Brussels and Flanders. Today Miri is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Research on Culture and Gender at Ghent University. Her research project concerns marriage migration, women’s agency, and integration in Belgium. This ethnographic research project aims to uncover the agency of Muslim female marriage migrants in Belgium.

Nawal Mustafa holds a BA in International & European Law and an LLM in International Law and Human Rights Law. Currently she is a PhD candidate for the EUROMIX project at the Migration Section at the Free University in Amsterdam. The focus of the project is the regulation of “mixed” intimacies and the construction of “race” through legal scholarship in the UK, Italy, and France. Previously, Mustafa has worked for NGOs such as Amnesty International Netherlands as a project officer on racial profiling and Humanity in Action as a program manager.
Abstract
The “What are you reading?” section invites (early-career) researchers to report on works that are deemed relevant to the field and that are of particular significance to the author’s ongoing research. This “What are you reading?” contains a discussion of a number of works that deal with the (late) nineteenth century, including Stephanie Shields’ “Passionate Men, Emotional Women: Psychology Constructs Gender Difference in the Late 19th Century”; Harriet Anderson’s *Utopian Feminism. Women’s Movements in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*; Ian Small’s *Oscar Wilde Revalued: An Essay on New Materials and Methods of Research* and *Oscar Wilde, Recent Research: A Supplement to “Oscar Wilde revalued”*, as well as, together with Josephine Guy, *Studying Oscar Wilde: History, Criticism, and Myth*; and Talia Schaffer’s *The Forgotten Female Aesthetes: Literary Culture in Late-Victorian England* and, together with Kathy Psomiades, *Women and British Aestheticism*. It also includes an account of Leigh Gilmore’s *The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony* and Ann Furedi’s *The Moral Case for Abortion*.

Keywords
gender, emotion, aestheticism, autobiography, abortion

In May 2007 the journal *History of Psychology* published a special issue on “Psychology’s History of Power”. The topics ranged from the role of psychology as a scientific field in colonial contexts to the power of technology. In her contribution “Passionate men, emotional women”, Stephanie Shields convincingly demonstrates how the “science of emotions” was important in the construction and legitimation of gender hierarchies during the nineteenth century. She argues that in the nineteenth century...
the idea of complementarity of the sexes – and the inequalities in social and economic power this entailed – was partly legitimised by referring to different capacities in emotion and reason for men and women, embedded in the then budding evolution theory. According to the nineteenth-century “science of emotion”, men had strong emotions, but because of their higher level of reason, they were better able to control their feelings and use them for the “right” cause. This in contrast to women, whose emotions were considered inherent to their female nature. As Shields aptly puts it, “he has emotions, but she is emotional” (2005, p. 10).

In addition, emotions were not just connected to gender, but also to class and race differences. It was widely agreed that emotion “ha[d] the potential to induce unreasoned and uncontrolled behavior” (p. 106). When expressed by people in power (i.e. those of higher status), strong emotions could be seen as serving a right cause. However, for the relatively powerless, “emotions out of control [could] be used to disempower people” (p. 106). The white middle-class male was considered the norm, as not only women but also the lower classes and people of colour were thought to be prone to this kind of uncontrolled behaviour.

In my PhD, I examine the role of emotion, gender, and discipline in Belgian state reformatories for juvenile delinquents between 1890 and 1965. Using minors’ ego-documents, I investigate how the detained minors navigated between the institution’s emotional norms and their own emotional expressions. Given the importance of gender for both reformatory practices and societal emotional norms, I explore how gender constructions impacted emotional norms and expressions. Shields’ research has been eye-opening to me in revealing the connections between scientific discourses on emotions, social hierarchies, and power.

Shields’ work has also inspired me in other regards. She has a habit of turning her research findings upside down, always raising new questions. For instance, after demonstrating how differences between the sexes were explained through so-called different emotional capacities, she asks “why was so much made of emotion in discussions of the sexes and so little made of the sexes in discussions of emotion?” (p. 103). Another valuable aspect is Shields’ continuous effort to connect (historical) research with contemporary society. Despite changing beliefs about gender, she argues, “a constant core remains . . . the identification of ‘emotionality’ . . . as distinctively ‘feminine’” (p. 104). Shields not only traces the historical origins of this stereotype but also demonstrates its present-day persistence.

To me, the great value of Shields’ work lays in her continuous negotiation between the macro and the micro level, the past and the present. She links scientific conceptions of emotions to gender, class, and ethnicity, and reveals the resulting hierarchies and role patterns. In addition, she points at the nineteenth-century origins of (some) present-day lay beliefs. This makes her work appealing not only to


historians of gender and emotion but to all scholars concerned with deconstructing discourses of gender, power, and emotion.

Laura Nys


The title of Harriet Anderson’s book, Utopian Feminism, is somewhat misleading as the author does not provide us with a vision of a distant or impossible future but with a historical overview of women’s movements in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century in Vienna, a period when coffeehouses flourished, theatre productions were staged, and the well-known Wiener Moderne paved the way for Arthur Schnitzler, Gustav Klimt, and Sigmund Freud to make their mark on society. The concept of utopia is a pretext for Anderson to compare different views of feminism in the fin-de-siècle and to examine their impact on education, social reform, personal conflicts, friendships, and fictional works. By focusing on the idealistic, utopian stances of leading figures of the Austrian women’s movements, Anderson explores the opinions, discussions, and disappointments that circulated at the time. Instead of focusing on legal and institutional documents, she pays attention to the general spirit, personal commitments, and emotions that underpinned women’s engagement in the public sphere.

My PhD project builds on Anderson’s work in that it focuses on women editors of German-language periodicals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More specifically, my study explores how emotion and emotional experience play a fundamental role in the way women editors approached their tasks and gave shape to their periodicals. Since the Enlightenment, stereotypical notions of gender were common. Women were seen as emotional and confined to the private sphere whereas men were more rational and therefore fit for positions in the public sphere. My study challenges these traditional gender norms by linking the emotional experience of women to their public position as women editors. It shows that women were not confined to the domestic sphere but took on a public role and considers their emotions not as fixed entities but as cultural constructs, whose specific constellations can be traced in the periodical press. To look at the periodical as a locus of shared emotions is to look at these women’s private and public engagements, as well as their emotional and political motives. Drawing on Anderson’s work, I will ask what these women felt, why they were passionate about their cause, how their personal and political motives were intertwined, and how this enabled them to shape and change public opinion.

In her book, Anderson does not regard women’s emotional experience as separate from their public output but considers individual experiences and shared emotions as part and parcel of a public identity. The significance of her work lies in its reorientation of historical feminist research as going beyond the mere institution-
alization of women’s rights. Resonating with the current affective turn in literary studies and recent scholarly attention to the history of emotions, her work is of use not only to scholars working on fin-de-siècle women movements but also to those interested in gender and emotion as cultural constructs.

Charlotte D’Eer


In *Oscar Wilde Revalued*, Ian Small provides a chronological survey of Wilde studies and expresses his general satisfaction with queer and gender approaches to Wilde in the 1980s. In contrast to the biographical approaches of the previous decade, Small indicates, these studies focused on Wilde’s works as well as his personality, and paved the way for viewing Wilde’s oeuvre as an “exemplary locus of late nineteenth-century politics”, both popularizing and politicizing his work (4). The result of such scholarly studies was that “Wilde the writer and Wilde the flamboyant homosexual iconoclast no longer exclude[d] each other” (4-5).

Published in 2000, Small’s *Oscar Wilde, Recent Research: A Supplement to Oscar Wilde Revalued* is less enumerative and more argumentative than his previous book. In one of the chapters Small gives an overview of the dominant trends in Wilde studies of the 1990s. Here, he refers to “the materialist Wilde”, “the Irish Wilde”, and “the gay Wilde”, indicating that the gay Wilde has been older and more enduring among scholars than the other two. In another chapter entitled “Wilde the Writer”, he discusses research in the 1990s that investigates Wilde’s writing style and “the seriousness with which he took his role” as poet, journalist, dramatist, and fiction writer (4). Once more, Small hopes that this perspective will lead to new and “valuable research” on Wilde.

In 2006, Small co-authored *Studying Oscar Wilde: History, Criticism, and Myth* with Josephine Guy. The two ambitions of the book are fundamental to Wildean studies: first, to persuade Wilde readers that Wilde’s oeuvre possesses layers of complexity that deserve careful scholarly analysis; second, “to establish a clearer distinction between the enduring ‘personality’ of Wilde [...] and the literary merits [...] of his works” (7). Referring to Wilde’s pre-defined and contextualized presence in his readers’ minds, the authors write, “[o]ften it is the notoriety of Wilde’s life that attracts readers to the works in the first place” (7).

3 The original paradigm was “Wilde and consumerism”, but Bashford (2002) renamed it “the materialist Wilde” to make it more compatible with the other two. See Bashford, B. (2002). When critics disagree: Recent approaches to Oscar Wilde. *Victorian Literature and Culture*, 30(2), 613–625.
As indicated in all three books, except for a number of remarkable literary readings of Wilde’s oeuvre, a majority of scholars still focus on the reflection of the writer in his works so that the works themselves, from a literary perspective, seem to vanish from view. The focus on Wilde’s (gay and queer) personality as the dominant research trend poses a problem that has often been overlooked by Western scholars; within those countries where discussion is not merely academically oriented but also, to some extent, ideologically oriented, it is often not possible to work on Wilde due to the priority of “gay Wilde” over “Wilde the writer”.

Within the Islamic Republic of Iran, for instance, where I studied and worked as a lecturer, there is a certain confinement to speak on particular theories and approaches, research fields, and writers that either are obviously in opposition to Islamic guidelines or might evoke controversies. Despite the fact that English literature and language has been a popular field of study in Iran with programs offered by the majority of state and private universities, there is an untransparent restriction on conducting research that includes LGBT approaches. As a consequence, Wilde, who has been characterized as a gay writer over and over again, is often considered off-limits by students and scholars, and hence remains marginalized in Iranian English departments.

Inspired by Guy and Small’s ambitions, I am conducting a research project at Ghent University on Wilde’s oeuvre that provides a careful analysis of a selected number of the fictional characters in his works and the way they are developed in each narrative. My hypothesis is that there is a complex pattern for character development repeated in each narrative that helps the writer to manipulate the audience’s ethical judgments of these fictional characters. Often resulting in controversial ethical judgments, this pattern of character development invalidates strict, Victorian moral codes and contradicts the middle-class virtues by which one was morally assessed and valued. Such an analysis can lead to a better understanding of the complex qualities in Wilde’s oeuvre that have been overlooked by academics because, as Guy and Small assert, his works are considered too simple or superficial to deserve thorough text-based analysis.

Although my PhD project will only contribute a small piece of the puzzle, it has two main implications: the first is to explore the complex techniques and codes that lie behind Wilde’s apparently simple narratives, thus contributing to the paradigm of “Wilde the Writer”. The second is to make a distinction between Wilde the writer and Wilde the person, to examine how Wilde’s writing is political insofar as it influences audiences’ ethical judgments. Through his writing and his person, Wilde makes us to think about morals and conventions, whether in nineteenth-century Britain or today’s global academia.

Mahdiyeh T. Khiabani
In their edited essay collection *Women and British Aestheticism*, Talia Schaffer and Kathy Alexis Psomiades make the case for a redefinition of aestheticism. They claim that while aestheticism has widely been considered a male-dominated movement, women writers were also numerous and significant participants. Talia Schaffer’s book *The Forgotten Female Aesthetes* builds on the groundwork laid in the essay collection and seeks to further define the characteristics of the female aesthete. Both works start from the premise that the female aesthete occupied a space between the traditional Victorian feminine ideal and the outspoken and often politically radical “New Woman” figure. As they explain, writing in the aesthetic tradition afforded women the opportunity to address taboo topics under the veil of a specific style of writing. Through the use of strategies such as archaisms (old-fashioned words), epigrammatic diction (witty forms of expression), and nonrealist settings, female aesthetes created imaginary spaces in which they could address their real and complex concerns about fluctuating gender roles, sexuality, and identity. These literary techniques allowed female writers to subtly subvert the negative tropes associated with dominant male aestheticism and decadence: negative representations of women such as the femme fatale, the prostitute, or the female vampire, which were often used to express male anxieties about the increasing commodification of literature and the debasement of literary standards, were reclaimed and repurposed to express female sexual power and desires.

The redefinition for which Schaffer and Psomiades argue requires a broadening of the concept of aestheticism, having implications for criticism of both late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century literature. In *Women and British Aestheticism*, Schaffer and Psomiades assert that while many thought aestheticism ended after the scandal surrounding the Oscar Wilde trials in the late 1890s, the influence of the artistic and cultural movement actually persisted in the early twentieth century. In particular, women modernist writers such as Virginia Woolf, Hilda Doolittle, and Edith Sitwell continued to find inspiration in aestheticism, which for them served as a strong female tradition with potential to counteract masculinist rhetoric in the modernist literary environment. It is this renegotiation of aestheticism and its implications for our understanding of early twentieth-century modernist writing that is of particular relevance for my doctoral research project.

My project studies the serially published modernist poetry anthology and its role in both establishing and representing a modernist tradition. On a more general level, my work considers collaborative periodical publications and the way in which these publication types facilitate meaningful encounters between authors of various cultural, racial, and sexual backgrounds. Such collaborative publications can play important social roles by creating or shaping a cohesive group identity or, conversely, by questioning or disrupting group identity. Moreover, the anthology
is a type of meeting ground where individuals with varying lifestyles and beliefs can come into contact or dialogue with one another and in which power dynamics can be contested. Edith Sitwell, for instance, was famous for putting herself on the foreground in the anthology *Wheels*.

Under influence of Schaffer and Psomiades’ works, I have been encouraged to look at modernism and modernist anthologies and periodicals from a perspective that includes the tradition of female aestheticism. Like their female aesthete forebears, modernist women writers were important figures and often played instrumental roles in relation to modernist publications. Many contributed poems to anthologies, were central figures in their literary circles (Hilda Doolittle, for example, was a key figure in the Imagist circle), and edited anthologies and periodicals. Restoring female aesthetes to the history of aestheticism affords us a different perspective on modernist women’s poetry. We see how modernist women poets perpetuate the tradition of female aestheticism by continuing to subvert misogynistic tropes associated with aestheticism, decadence, and modernism in their poetry. Their roles as editors of modernist publications, however, provided them the opportunity to select and arrange works in a way that could counter misogynistic undertones in works by male modernists. Through their roles as contributors and as editors of such publications, female modernists could negotiate their own gender roles and identities and situate themselves within specific creative communities.

By considering modernist anthologies and periodicals in light of female aestheticism, I have realized that collaborative creative publications provide unique spaces for the negotiation of identity including gender. This points to the potential that both historical and contemporary collaborative publications offer for research on social issues such as gender, race, and class relations. Schaffer and Psomiades’ works have helped me to understand that poetry functions in collaborative publications not in isolation from the social but in dialogue with it.

*Leah Budke*


“Art is a lie that tells the truth” but then why does there seem to be such a strict divide between “fact” on the one hand and “fiction” on the other? Building on her theory of “autobiographics” (see the eponymous work from 1994), which seeks to lay bare how women write their way into a space they have been traditionally denied, Leigh Gilmore’s *The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony* (2001) seeks to broaden the knowledge concerning the fields of autobiography and trauma, and studies how the discourses of “truth” work within them.

“Truth”, as a collection of discourses, is defined as a structure of power, which is consequently denied to those groups that are considered outside the norm: “whether an author is telling the truth ... is frequently elided with a judgment about how well
the author can be said to conform to (or reproduce) hegemonic notions of appro-
priate identity” (*Limits* 124). “Truth”, as a hegemonic (and legal) structure, appears
to be a “limit” to autobiography, or any form of life writing, as the question arises
as to who exactly is allowed to tell their story. Going beyond the simple opposi-
tion of “fact vs. fiction”, Gilmore aims to expose the power structures beneath this
seemingly stringent dichotomy, taking a step away from truth as a hegemonically
defined notion.

This approach to writing about the self (how personal narratives and self-rep-
resentation are constrained by too narrow, too normative a view of what is truthful,
correct, and right) is not only relevant to literary studies. Rather, the insight that
the intent of writing/telling the story of the self, in whatever form, annihilates those
“limits” of truthfulness is relevant to many areas of research, in that these limits
caused by a traumatic past (fallible human memory, the “unspeakability” of trauma
yet the need to work through it with stories) are *productive* barriers as subjects work
past them. In doing so, they question the discourses of “truth.” Where does fact end
and fiction begin, do they intersect and if so, how? When the discourses of “truth”
are inadequate to represent reality, subjects make up other ways to deal with it. It,
therefore, matters very little what exactly “truth” is. What matters is how subjects
position themselves toward the idea of truth and how they engage with it.

Truth, as a central issue for autobiography and trauma studies, is confronted
with invention, the invention of fallible, traumatised memory. It is this confronta-
tion that is useful for my research. For my master’s dissertation I am studying the
conscious self-representative writing of Jeanette Winterson in *Why Be Happy When
You Could Be Normal* (2011) and Jackie Kay in *Red Dust Road* (2010). I examine how
they choose to write their stories. Their narratives are to a certain degree trauma
narratives in that both authors were adopted. In these cases, “truth” becomes an
even more circumscribed notion, for their beginnings are hazy, invisible even. In
the face of incompleteness, the story of the traumatised self becomes “a struggle
between what is real and what is imagined in the representation of the self and
trauma” (*Limits* 46).

Gilmore’s *The Limits of Autobiography* dates from 2001, her older work *Auto-
biographics* was published in 1994, and yet they are still prevalent in 2017. We need
the publication of people’s stories who deviate from the “norm” (cisgendered, male,
white, heterosexual, able-bodied, etc.) for their stories have a great deal to say about
“truth” and whose “truth” is accepted. While the opening up of “truth” to other
groups can thus be conducive to an open and just society, it can also be abused.
Anno 2017, “truth” is considered relative by some and “alternative facts”, which,
ironically, are often distributed by groups that are very much the norm, are on the
rise. This goes to show that the questioning of the relation between truth and power
is as vital as ever, and that we should be wary of how such discourses are employed.

*Lisen Maebe*
What Are You Reading?


In *The Moral Case for Abortion*, Ann Furedi captures an important and relatively less scrutinized aspect of the debate on abortion rights. She defends abortion as a moral practice beyond the conventional justifications that are based on the victimhood narratives of women who seek abortion within or outside the legal possibilities. Furedi uses similar arguments as in human rights discourses that base their moral approach on the concept of human dignity. However, by reclaiming the case as a moral rather than a legal one, she implicitly questions the disconnection between the two modes of justification, a disconnection she does not explicitly aim to bridge. In her book, Furedi defends the right to abortion not by denying the foetus’ right to life but by prioritizing women’s right to decide. She regards women as persons (in addition to living beings) and draws on concepts of self, consciousness, autonomy, and choice to define personhood. Her book offers a strong liberal defence of women’s right to decide, based on widely shared values of personal autonomy and bodily integrity.

Furedi’s discussion of different abortion narratives is exceptionally inclusive, even if it is limited to Western countries. To some extent, it draws on agentic and empowering perspectives in analysing women’s life-stories. Nevertheless, Furedi’s approach is in danger of looking too closely to individuals’ lives, thus failing to see the bigger picture. She, for example, depicts the woman as the sole person who might suffer the consequences of a lack of rights to safe abortion, while in fact women’s lives and decisions are entangled with those of family members, friends, partners, and children. These relationships do not necessarily limit women’s ability to choose and can also provide support and enhance women’s autonomy.

Furthermore, Furedi relies on a Kantian ideal of autonomy yet ignores the fact that Kant implied that women could not strive toward this ideal, as they were perceived to be too confined by their bodies. A feminist standpoint view which considers women as part of a group who share a certain embodied experience and a certain subjectivity, giving them the upper hand in understanding their own condition, could have made for a more compelling discussion. Looking at women as mere individuals does not help to build solidarities but rather reinforces women seeking abortion to view their experience as a disparate one.

Another side-effect of the liberal autonomy approach Furedi emphasizes is that it implies that medical doctors can, on the same grounds, refuse to offer abortion care if abortion conflicts with their ethical views. Except for pluralist societies with sufficient provisions and enough liberal-minded medical doctors, this seriously limits women’s real ability to decide. The liberal autonomy argument may ground women’s right to decide but, as such, does not provide a strong case for why professionals should – instead of could – provide help. If Furedi would have been less sceptical of feminist ethics regarding care approaches, and had looked more towards ideas of relational autonomy and responsibility, she could have built a stronger argument for what she ultimately wants to do: to explain not only why women’s choices must be at the heart of abortion politics and abortion provision but also why those who strive to offer women a choice are doing something “good”.

The Moral Case for Abortion inspired us because our research also concerns issues of women’s rights, autonomy, harm, and well-being. Furedi’s work engages with the right to personal autonomy but also the harm that is bestowed upon women’s bodies by refusing safe and available abortions. This articulation is also relevant to our current research on harmful cultural practices, defined by the United Nations as practices that violate women’s right to health, life, dignity, and personal integrity.

Notwithstanding our earlier criticisms, Furedi’s volume is significant for its insight in many personal narratives. Her testimony to the countless problems women face in using and gaining their right to safe abortion based on real-life stories serves as a wake-up call for feminists and other actors devoted to democratic values and human rights. Moreover, with The Moral Case for Abortion, Furedi adds to the growing literature on questions of body, morality, and social justice, and goes beyond the classic view of research objectivity in social studies by bringing her own subjectivity as a pro-choice researcher and activist to the forefront. Overall, we found the book interesting and would like to suggest it to junior and senior researchers interested in questions of human rights, bodily integrity, gender, and morality.

Ladan Rahbari and Gily Coene*

About the Authors

Laura Nys is PhD candidate at Ghent University (history department) and Vrije Universiteit Brussel (criminology department). Her PhD research concerns the role of emotions in Belgian state reformatories for juvenile delinquents between 1890 and 1965. Her research interests include the social history of emotions, gender, youth, and the history of social movements. Her PhD project is funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

Charlotte D’Eer is a PhD student at the Department of Literary Studies, Ghent University, where she participates in the project “Agents of Change: Women Editors and Socio-Cultural Transformation in Europe, 1710–1920.” She specializes in German-language periodicals. Charlotte holds a master’s degree in English and German literature (2014) from Ghent University and also obtained a second master’s degree from the same university, in Comparative Modern Literature (2015), specializing in gender studies, women authors, and research on emotions.

* This book review is part of a research project funded by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO).
Mahdiyeh T. Khiabani studied English Language and Literature at Azarbaijan University in Tabriz, Iran where she also worked as a visiting lecturer. She is currently a PhD researcher at Ghent University working on character and ethical judgments in narrative worlds. Her research interests also include gender issues and post-revolutionary Iranian cinema.

Leah Budke is a doctoral research fellow for the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) carrying out her PhD project in the English section of the Literary Studies Department at Ghent University. Her research interests include fin-de-siècle and modernist poetry, editorial practices, periodicals, and print culture. Her current project studies the serially published modernist poetry anthology and the role this publication type played in creating a modernist tradition.

Lisen Maebé is an MA student in Gender and Diversity Studies at Ghent University, and an intern for DiGeSt. She has an MA in English Literature and Linguistics from Ghent University. Her MA dissertation focuses on self-representational writing in two autobiographies: Jeanette Winterson’s Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal and Jackie Kay’s Red Dust Road.

Ladan Rahbari holds a PhD in sociology, and is currently lecturer and doctoral researcher in Gender and Diversity at the Centre for Research on Culture and Gender, Ghent University.

Gily Coene is Associate Professor at the Philosophy and Ethics Department and at the Department of Political Sciences, and Director of RHEA, Research Centre on Gender, Diversity, and Intersectionality at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
DiGeSt
Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies

The *Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies* (DiGeSt) is a bi-annual, peer-reviewed international journal dedicated to the intersection of diversity and gender studies. It is included in the Flemish Academic Bibliography for the Social Sciences and the Humanities (VABB-SHW).

DiGeSt has the ambition to be a leading journal in the field and publishes original work from a wide array of disciplines including sociology, anthropology, communication sciences, political sciences, philosophy, history, arts, and literature. In addition, it is open to work from other disciplines such as psychology and educational sciences, especially when there is a strong link with frameworks that are also used in the social sciences and the humanities.

DiGeSt mainly publishes work related to Europe. Given that debates about gender and diversity often transcend national borders, the journal occasionally also publishes work related to other geographical contexts.

Online journal with a print edition
Bi-annually (April/October)
Print ISSN: 2593-0273
Online ISSN: 2593-0281
From 2018 online available

**Annual subscription fees for 2018:**
Institutional online only: € 150,00
Institutional online & print: € 170,00
Individual online only: € 40,00
Individual online & print: € 55,00

**Administration and subscription address:**
University Press Leuven
Minderbroedersstraat 4
3000 Leuven
Colophon

DiGeSt is the continuation of Verslagen van het Centrum voor Genderstudies (ISSN: 1781-1902).

Founding editor: Marysa Demoor (Ghent University)
Editor-in-chief: Birgit Van Puymbroeck (Ghent University)
Editorial assistant: Katrien De Graeve (Ghent University)
“What are you reading” editor: Leah Budke (Ghent University)

Editorial board: Maheen Ahmed (Ghent University), Tine Brouckaert (Ghent University), Tom Claes (Ghent University), Sander De Ridder (Ghent University), Petra Debusscher (University of Antwerp), Marysa Demoor (Ghent University), Frederik Dhaenens (Ghent University), Griet Roets (Ghent University), Sarah Van de Velde (University of Antwerp), Liselotte Vandenbussche (Artevelde University College Ghent), Pieter-Paul Verhaeghe (Free University of Brussels)

Advisory board: Carla Billitteri (University of Maine), Sarah Bracke (University of Amsterdam), Eva Brems (Ghent University), Gily Coene (Free University of Brussels), Nathalie De Bleeckere, Gita Deneckere (Ghent University), Bart Eeckhout (University of Antwerp), Anke Gilleir (University of Leuven), Margaret Homans (Yale University), Vivian Liska (University of Antwerp), Chia Longman (Ghent University), Petra Meier (University of Antwerp), Joz Motmans (Ghent University Hospital), Karen Nakamura (University of California Berkeley), Nouria Ouali (Université libre de Bruxelles), Ingrid Palmary (University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg), David Paternotte (Université libre de Bruxelles), Katharina Pewny (Ghent University), Marjan Sterckx (Ghent University), Aagje Swinnen (Maastricht University), Piet Van Avermaet (Ghent University), Sofie Van Bauwel (Ghent University), Mieke Van Houtte (Ghent University), Sami Zemni (Ghent University)

Editorial address:
Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies
Ghent University
Department of Literary Studies (English section)
Blandijnberg 2
9000 Gent
digest@ugent.be

For detailed submission guidelines please visit www.digestjournal.be