ME, MYSELF AND THE COMMUNITY.

Empirical Research on the Effect of Deliberative Democracy on Social Learning

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1. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

Research Objective

The central causal question this research wants to explore is if – and if so, when – participation in deliberative democracy stimulates social learning among civic deliberators.

This research objective is based on the assumption that deliberation strengthens public-spiritedness and particularly stimulates social learning; deliberators would learn from each other’s insights and experiences which results in a greater understanding and appreciation of opposing views (Barraclough, 2013). However, we still lack accurate empirical data on the phenomenon of deliberative democracy for this claim to be empirically valid. Empirical research on deliberative democracy rarely explores social learning thoroughly, has generally broached deliberation as a grand treatment – which makes it unclear in what way deliberation is responsible for the measured outcomes –, and has not yet dealt with the question of the impact of the self-selection effect on the deliberative transformative effect.

Through the use of interrupted time series and classical experimental designs in which the investigation of social learning is directly approached and in which conditional factors are taking into account, this project will adequately be able to go beyond the rather broad existing causal questions in the field. Hence, the overall relevance of this work lies in the objective to significantly improve existing democratic theory with in-depth empirical data. Since ordinary citizens and local governments are extensively investing in the practical implementation of deliberative practices, it is as well of much practical relevance to contribute to insights on the efficiency of those investments, from a public-spirited perspective of citizenship – assumed in this research.

The Deliberative Effect

Democratic theorists argue that deliberation is good for democracy, as a process (e.g. rendering decision-making more legitimate) and/or an outcome (e.g. producing better decisions or citizens). Concerning the latter, democratic theorists generally make the claim of the transformative power of deliberation (Steiner, Bächtiger, Spördli, & Steenbergen, 2004). The reflective aspect of deliberation is claimed to be crucial:
Deliberative reflection would have the potential to transform preferences/interests/beliefs in a normative welcome way (Chappell, 2012; Dryzek, 2000; Stokes, 1999; Valadez, 2001). More specifically, the deliberative process, contrarily to the way citizen participation in representative democracies is organized, would have the potential to go beyond the mere aggregation of individual interest (Leyenaar, 2007). Some make the claim that there would be a reinforcement of the willingness to take the arguments of other people into account (Christiano, 1997; Fishkin, 1997), while others even assume that deliberation would strengthen the commitment to the common good (Chappell, 2012; Habermas, 1996; Mill, 1948; Pateman, 1975; Valadez, 2001; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995).

Some democratic theorists borrow the term ‘social learning’ from social psychological theories to formalize the public-spirited transformative effect of deliberation (Dryzek, 2006; Welton, 2001). Barraclough (2013) argues that participation in deliberative processes opens up the opportunity for learning from each other’s insights and experiences – as a part or a result of the process – which results in a greater understanding and appreciation of opposing views. What makes an opinion deliberative, is that it has grasped and taken into consideration the opposing view of others (Park, 2000). It is on this assumption of social learning that this research will further focus.

Empirical Fuzziness about the Deliberative Effect

Previous empirical research concluded that deliberation creates more single-peaked preferences1 (Farrar et al., 2010), that it acts as a buffer against more negative feelings towards the out-group (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2014) and that it makes people more thoughtful (Smets & Isernia, 2014). Other conclusions have been that deliberation stimulates mutual understanding of conflicting viewpoints (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Hansen, 2004; Luskin, O’Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 2014). It has also been derived from earlier research that deliberation leads to a greater cosmopolitan and collective orientation of preferences (Gastil, Bacci, & Dollinger, 2010), as well as to preferences that are more environmentally friendly (Fishkin, 1997).

All of these conclusions are in line with the transformative character argued for and assumed by deliberative theorists. However, there has been disproportionally less attention given to the concrete relationship between social learning and deliberative democracy in empirical research than this has been the case in democratic theory. Moreover, from the state of the art it is to be derived that empirical research in which social learning is approached as a key dependent variable, researchers have been largely dependent on participants’ self-assessment of the perception of specific potential effects on social learning (Hansen, 2004; Michels & De Graaf, 2010; Price & Cappella, 2002), or even on the self-assessment of deliberation as ‘the frequency of political conversations people think they have with those with whom they disagree (Park, 2000).

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1 A set of preferences in which there is a most preferred choice and in which options that are further away from this preferred choice are consistently less favored.
Besides the lack of direct focus on social learning, it is also remarkable that in empirical research on the deliberative effect, studies have generally approached deliberation as a broad deliberative experience.

There are many different empirical, institutional conditions by which a normative basis of deliberative democracy can be shaped. However, if one merely quantitatively explores the changes in preferences, thoughts or beliefs after respondents are invited to take part in a deliberative experiment, after they have been exposed to briefing materials and have informally deliberated the topic in their personal life setting, encountered other citizens, experts and politicians on scene, have been confronted with the presence of an active moderator and the need for particular decision-making (Farrar et al., 2010; Luskin et al., 2014; Smets & Isernia, 2014; Thompson, 2008), it is unclear in what way deliberation is responsible for each of the measured outcomes. It follows that, up until today, the most important conclusion drawn from the state of the art of empirical research on deliberative democracy is that we still know little about why and under which circumstances deliberative effects take place (Barabas, 2004; Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; De Vries et al., 2010). Indeed, at present day, researchers are therefore explicitly calling to pay sufficient attention to the characteristics of the deliberative process to learn more about the outcomes it produces (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2011; Setala & Herne, 2014).

Apart from the approach of deliberation as grand treatment, one should notice that empirical research on the deliberative effect generally overlooks which kind of citizen takes part in deliberative experiments or policy initiatives, which can be an important factor in the analysis of the deliberative effect.

The self-selection thesis, which opposes the socialization thesis, assumes that political participation is driven by the intrinsic presence of certain norms of citizenship. Some empirical evidence indeed suggests correlation between holding ‘social civic norms’ and the likelihood of political participation (institutional and non-institutional, indirect and direct participation); e.g. the less important one evaluates ‘civic duty’ as a norm of citizenship, the less likely one will cast their ballot (Blais, Young, & Lapp, 2000), the greater the emphasis citizens place on the norm that it is important to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions, the more likely they participate in non-institutional political participation (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013), the more important one finds it to address social needs, the more one is involved in political participation away from elections and parties towards more direct forms of action (‘engaged citizen’) (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe, Oser, & Marien, 2014). However, the specific relationship with deliberative democracy has not yet been directly explored and thus remains unclear (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2011). Moreover, other insights on civic norms and political participation precisely contradict this self-selection suggestion.

Besides the general remark that norms do not (necessarily) lead to corresponding behaviour (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2011; Van Deth, 2007; Zaff, Boyd, Lerner, & Lerner, 2010), empirical research challenges the notion of the ‘engaged citizen’ (Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013; Oser & Hooghe, 2013). Moreover, Agger (2012)

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2 Expressing that you think it is important to deliberate does not mean that you actually will participate in deliberative practices.
even explicitly advances the idea that when citizens are invited to participate, foremost those who see this participation as an opportunity to fulfil individual needs (e.g. improve the traffic situation around their children’s’ school) – ‘everyday makers’ – are likely to respond to this. A reasonable insight for which empirical evidence has been delivered by Michels & De Graaf (2010), but it does challenge the idea of the engaged citizen.

In this way, the literature reasonably suggests that there is a self-selection bias when it comes to political participation, but does not agree on its direction. The question becomes which kind of citizen is attracted by the deliberative form of political participation? Seen the centrality of (the lack of) public-spiritedness in the suggested self-selection biases, the occurrence and direction of it seems consequently of considerable importance in our quest to investigate the deliberative effect of social learning: how does this effect interacts with citizens who are already convinced of social norms? Is this an essential condition for the learning effect to come about, or does this precisely minimize the effect – which is greater in interaction with citizens who do not a priori value social norms?

As to be concluded from the above, the literature lend us some meaningful indications on the deliberative effect on social learning, but this relation has not yet been thoroughly explored. This research has the ambition to add significant value to the existing scientific knowledge by directly measuring this assumed effect (and thus not being dependent on participants’ self-assessment of the perception of this effect), to go beyond deliberation as a broad deliberative treatment by paying attention to the characteristics of the deliberative process, and to take into account the kind of citizens deliberators are, to be able to map the referred self-selection bias.

After all, empirical validity on the assumed deliberative effect on social learning seems pivotal. The relevance of social learning is argued by some of our greatest political theorists (Gosselies, 2010), and contemporary institutional and non-institutional participation is increasingly drawn to stimulate public-spirited conceptions of citizenship. Deliberative democracy is to be seen as a specific participatory democratic answer to bring an increasingly alienated citizen back in the limelight of policy-making. Hence, we notice that the more the idea is shared that the way in which Western representative democracies are being put into place alienates the citizen from the policy it produces, the more we see the actual implementation of renewed democratic ideas in which citizens are offered more than the mere possibility to choose, every once in a while, between alternatives offered by policy makers. Seen its promising normative assumptions, ordinary citizens and local governments are in this respect extensively investing in the practical support of deliberative practices. However, little is known on the efficiency of investments in local deliberative democracy. This research has the ambition to add to this knowledge, from a public-spirited perspective on citizenship – assumed in this research.
Deliberation and Local Politics

It should not be surprising that the current deliberative practices in Europe and the US are almost exclusively deployed on the local level (Hendriks, Loughlin, & Lidström, 2011). Local policy has – by its own very nature – the ability to affect – directly and tangibly – the day-to-day life of its citizens. Consequently, it is a reasonably and widely share argument that citizens will participate in the public sphere if they feel it directly affects themselves (Steyvers, Pilet, Reynaert, Delwit, & Devos, 2007) – an argument of which the notion of the everyday maker is to be seen as a specific and rather excessive elaboration (cf. supra). In that way the local level has the unique ability to attract citizens to deliberate in the public sphere who not necessarily would identify it as their civic duty to do so. This makes it particularly interesting in this explorative research on social learning. Following this reasoning, the local level can be seen as a kind of grand political school, exceeding the strict local level (Hendriks et al., 2011; Kersting, Caulfield, Nickson, Olowy, & Wollmann, 2009; Steyvers et al., 2007). It is John Stuart Mill (1948) who argues that on the local level citizens get acquainted with the political dynamics in general and the public debate in specie. In that way, local participation can give rise to analogous participation on broader levels. It follows from these arguments that the local level is indispensable in encouraging social learning in the political sphere among citizens.

Overall, this work wants to dwell on the importance of connecting political theory with empiricism by contributing to the knowledge on a subject on which many thoughts and ink have been flown, on which a lot of contemporary political practices are based, but on which there is – proportionally – insufficiently empirically known.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Deliberative Democracy

Many social and political theorists have embarked the Athenian idea of politics as a discussion before an audience (Elster, 1998). John Stuart Mill (1948), Joshua Cohen (1989), John Rawls (1971) and Jurgen Habermas (1996) are only some of the thinkers who were arguably of considerable importance for our social and political development and who also reflected on the notion of deliberation. Theorists do not agree on whether the debate needs to take place between groups of citizens, in the wider public sphere or in the legislature, or whether the normative emphasize lies on the input or the output of deliberation, but they all do centralize reasoned discussion in collective decision-making (Chappell, 2012; Cohen, 1989; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998; Valadez, 2001).

In specifying this rather broad conception of deliberative democracy, political theorists have different interpretations of what particularly counts as deliberation. Some authors define deliberation by the outcomes it produces. The most cited normative interpretation that define deliberation by its outcome concern the endogenous change of preferences that results from the deliberation (Stokes, 1999). Other authors on the
contrary, dwell on the deliberative process – irrespectively of the outcomes it produces. According to the latter, the process has to meet certain conditions to be counted as ‘deliberative democratic’ (Elster, 1998).

The essence of this research concerns a definite empirical investigation of the effect of deliberative practices. Practices which cannot be detached from the normative arguments on which they are based, but which can never fully reach the requirements political theorists aim for. One should note that there is no consensus in the literature on the normative – procedural nor outcome – requirements to which deliberative democracy has to answer. However, that is beside the point in this work. A research that aims at gathering empirical knowledge on the effect of local deliberative practices, does not require normative consensus, nor an ideal type of deliberation. It does need a core normative basis, but it has to leave open the different empirical, institutional conditions through which this normative basis of deliberative democracy can be fulfilled3.

The notion of ‘deliberative mini-publics’ is broadly used in the literature to outline a general framework for civic deliberation and will therefore be used as conceptualisation of deliberative democracy in this work. The notion defines the forums organized by policy-makers in which citizens who represent different viewpoints are gathered together to deliberate on a particular issue in small groups (Brown, 2006; Fung, 2003; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Setala & Herne, 2014). This conceptualisation of deliberative democracy implies a diverse public as well as a link with formal policy-making. Further, the reasoned discursive character of deliberation (which makes it different from other forms of communication in which the exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda or threats dominates), presupposes that participants are provided with information on the topic and that they engage in moderated small-group discussions. Information and briefing materials are crucial for participants to have access to necessary facts and competing opinions (Siu, 2008). Without information, participants are not only unable to weigh both sides of an argument, they are as well incapable to correct misinformation. Moderators are crucial to ensure that participants contribute equally to the deliberation. Moderators take on a neutral role to facilitate the group discussions; they ask participants to consider the opposing side and to think through the opposition’s arguments.

In that way, the conceptualization of mini-publics outlines a framework that is expected to encourage the central idea of deliberation as a reasoned discussion in which different arguments are being weighed between citizens (Setala & Herne, 2014), but leaves upon the different institutional possibilities through which this can be materialized (e.g. selection of participants, decision-making procedures, compulsory character of outcome).

As a result from the definition of the problem, the focus of deliberation in this research is further confined to deliberation on local policy matters.

3 Cf. Chappell (2012)
Social Learning

In this work we approve Barraclough’s (2013) definition as deliberators who learn from each other’s insights and experiences. More specifically, social learning refers hereby to the understanding and appreciation of opposing views.

For the concrete conceptualisation of this notion, we adapt Park’s (2000) classification of what he labels in his deliberative democratic research as ‘civility’: one’s understanding of why others think the way they do. Even though this definition consist of a pure cognitive approach (in contrast with our more broad interpretation of social learning that also refers to the appreciation of opposing views), he conceptualizes his notion of civility along a cognitive, attitudinal and behavioural axe. We reconcile this three-dimensional classification to outline the indicators of our dependent variable.

**Social learning** = learning from each other’s insights and experiences; understanding and appreciating opposing views

- **Cognitive**: the extent to which deliberators understand other’s views and to which they can make their views understandable for others
- **Attitudinal**: attribution of importance to other’s views and considerateness of those views
- **Behavioural**: making yourself understandable for others, listening to others, showing respect towards others and their views.

The understanding of other’s views as an indicator of social learning (cognitive) does not merely imply that people are conscious of what other people think. The ‘understanding’ factor indicates reference to learning why other people think the way they do (Siu, 2008). A necessary precondition for deliberators to be able to learn about the reasoned arguments of others, is that deliberators are able to make themselves understandable for others (cognitive), and do so (behavioural). This has also to be seen as an (implicit) indicator of social learning. Indeed, being able to explain why you hold a particular position implies an understanding that others do not necessarily share your background or world, or who are otherwise different. The appreciation of opposing views then (attitudinal, behavioural), is about taking the consciousness of these differences (in meaning, social position, needs) into account (Janssens & Steyaert, 2001).
3. RESEARCH DESIGN

The first causal question on which this research wants to formulate an answer is whether participation in mini-public stimulates social learning among civic deliberators.

**RQ1:** Does participation in mini-publics stimulate social learning among civic deliberators?

Empirical literature already suggested the empirical validity of the effect of deliberative democracy on public-spiritedness, from particular interpretations of the dependent and independent variables, from various research objectives and accordingly diverse operationalized designs. However, the effect on social learning has not yet been thoroughly, nor directly studied. Given its reasonable theoretical explanation and some meaningful empirical indications in previous research of which the designs adjoins the objective of this work (cf. supra), we could expect that deliberation actually stimulates social learning.

**H1:** Participation in local mini-publics stimulates social learning among deliberators.

The objective of this research is, however, not limited to the contribution of empirical knowledge on the mere outcome of deliberative practices. This work is also characterized by the ambition to discover some meaningful insights on the explanation of the measured deliberative outcome. “We consider it to be very much an open question just how well deliberation works, by what mechanism, under what circumstances” (Page & Shapiro, 1999). Indeed, at present day, researchers are therefore still explicitly stressing the need to come to a deeper understanding of the deliberative outcomes (Setala & Herne, 2014).

**RQ2:** Under which conditions does participation in mini-publics stimulate social learning among civic deliberators?

We will particularly involve the type of the deliberating citizen into our analysis. The literature suggests that particular kinds of citizens would be more likely to take part in participatory initiatives. The relevance of public-spiritedness in these – opposing – claims on the civic norms participatory citizens hold, turns these claims into assumptions of remarkable significance for this project. Research indicates on the one hand that citizens who already value a public-spirited approach to citizenship a priori are more likely to actually take part in deliberative practices, while on the other hand it explicitly denies this claim and even suggests that participative citizens are driven by a fulfilment of individual needs – which precisely indicates that deliberators would rather adhere a self-interested approach to citizenship. The local context of this research, which has – more than any other political level – the ability to affect – directly and tangibly – the day-to-day

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4 P.111
life of its citizens, provides us with the best opportunity to try to find out the difference in impact of civic norms on the deliberative outcome.

In our quest to explore the relationship between deliberation and social learning in specific more deeply, it is of considerable importance to analyse the occurrence and direction of this suggested self-selection bias. The question becomes how the assumed effect of deliberation on social learning interacts with citizens who already are convinced of general social norms. Is this an essential condition for the effect to come about, or does this precisely minimize the effect – which is greater in interaction with citizens who do not a priori value social norms?

H2.1.1: The effect of participation in local mini-publics on social learning is significantly greater among deliberators who a-priori value social civic norms as important.

H2.1.2: The effect of participation in local mini-publics on social learning is significantly greater among deliberators who a-priori value social civic norms as unimportant.

Another way by which this work wants to discover some meaningful insights on the understanding of the relation between deliberation and social learning, is by overtaking deliberation as grand treatment. As to be concluded from the above, there are many different empirical, institutional conditions by which a normative basis of deliberative democracy can be shaped. In this research, we want to pay attention to the characteristics of the concerned deliberative process to learn more about their effects. Since such a ‘middle ranged’ or ‘disaggregated’ approach is rare, little is known on the effect of specific components which shape deliberation (Setala & Herne, 2014). Yet, given the wide-ranging possibilities to construct the normative interpretation of deliberative democracy in this work, we expect them to respectively affect ‘the deliberative outcome’ differently.

H2.2: Distinct internal institutional characteristics of the mini-public significantly affect its effect of participation on social learning.

We will address the causal research questions by investigating distinct local mini-publics. Depending on the specificity and the granted access of the specific case at hand, we will employ either an interrupted time series design, or an experimental research design. We have been granted access, for instance, to the Citizen’s Cabinet (2017-2018) the city council of Ghent will organize. A diverse group of 150 citizens will deliberate at least four times (every three or four months) on the city’s renewed circulation plan in regard to the adjustment and/or evaluation of the plan (e.g. accessibility of the pedestrian zone, approachability of the inner city, comfort and security of cyclists in the inner city, experience with the congestion of public transport). The selection of participants will occur through an open call in which the city will ask interested citizens to answer some questions and to provide personal information. In that way they want to sample a diverse group of deliberators. This given selection method supplies us with data of a pool of participants

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5 Cf. Mutz (2008)
6 Cf. Thompson (2008)
who showed their interest in joining the mini-public (just as the actual group of deliberators, and in contrast with the rest of the population), but are eventually not selected. Via sampling matching we can then establish a control group with the same observable characteristics of the experimental group against whom the effect of the deliberation can be assessed. The case of the Antwerpian Citizen’s Budget (2017) for instance, requires us in turn to employ an interrupted time series design. In this case everyone who answers the open call is able to join the mini-public. In this case, it is not feasible to sample a control group (from the rest of the intrinsically not interested population) similar to the experimental group. That this trajectory for instance does consist of different deliberative phases in which new and already participated deliberators each time can join in, enables us to investigate the interaction effect of the amount of phases in one has participated.

4. METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN

Deliberative Effect

Based on the conceptualisation of the dependent variable, we will use two types of data collection methods to address the first research questions (cf. H1): surveys and verbatim transcriptions.

Regarding the behavioural dimension of social learning, we will collect qualitative data of (a small part of) actual deliberations in the mini-publics at hand through audio-recordings. These will be transcribed into textual files and will be qualitatively analysed (Adams, 2014; De Vries et al., 2010; Monnoyer-Smith & Wojcik, 2011; Steiner, 2012). The verbatim transcriptions will be codified and analysed through NVivo.
qualitative data analysis software. We will use this qualitative data to analyse if and how participants listen to each other, show respect to the other deliberators and their views, and justify their own position (cf. attachment I: pre-coding book). In regard to the latter, justification does not necessarily be ‘empirical statements about the world’, ‘facts’, or ‘rational argumentation’, but may involve a story that includes a sequence of events with a beginning, a middle and an end regarding an issue, or even personal experience (Adams, 2014; Black, 2008; Janssens & Steyaert, 2001; Polletta & Lee, 2006; Ryfe, 2006; Sanders, 1997; Steffensmeier & Schenck-Hamlin, 2008; Steiner, 2012). Indeed, research suggest that non-experts (citizens, instead of politicians) deliberate through personal narratives, which makes analysis of their stories and experiences (instead of argument evaluation) a more prudent and realistic aim for citizen-based deliberations.

Regarding the cognitive and attitudinal dimension of social learning, we will present the deliberators a short recurrent survey, pre- and post- certain deliberative meetings (cf. fig. infra). This enable us to investigate the effect of the deliberative trajectory, and its evolution. We will measure the extent to which deliberators are able to justify their own position, to which they are aware of the reasons other people with other opinions may have, and to which they think it is important to understand and consider the views of others (cf. attachment II – ‘circulation plan’). To be able to come to a better understanding if potential pre- vs post-differences are the result of the actual deliberative trajectory, we will on the one hand present a control group the same survey at the very beginning and the very end of the deliberative trajectory when we are in the possibility to do so (cf. supra) (cf. fig. infra), and will on the other hand include some additional questions at the very end of the deliberative trajectory that surveys the experiences of the deliberators of the deliberative trajectory (cf. attachment II – ‘experiences with the citizen’s cabinet’) (cf. fig. infra)

Self-Selection Effect

Regarding the exploration of the second research question on the level of the individual conditions (H2.1), we will add questions in the pre-deliberation survey (T1) that measure the norms of citizenship participants hold. Specifically, we will take on the widely duplicated operationalization of the citizenship dimension of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 2016) (cf. attachment II – ‘citizenship’). The civic norms of the citizenship dimension of the ISSP are labelled in different categories (cf. attachment III). The public-spirited civic category ‘solidarity’ of our interest consists of norm (e) (‘help people in the local community who are worse off than yourself’). Notice that norm (c) (‘try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions’) is hereby labelled as corresponding to the citizenship category of ‘autonomy’ (Dalton, 2006). We notice however, that in other categorizations of citizenship norms, this norm is often being replaced by the norm of ‘engagement in political discussion’ or ‘the formation of one’s own opinion, independently of others’ (Dalton, 2006; Hooghe et al., 2014; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2009; Zmerli, 2009). From the perspective of the specific nature of our dependent variable, the latter is not an
equivalent of the former, since the former has not just a deliberative democratic character, but already incorporate a clear, indispensable and concrete aspect of social learning (cf. supra). Consequently, we will additionally focus on norm (c) in our analysis. We will explore how the deliberative effect on social learning relates with participants who a priori attach either great or precisely little importance to these (correlated?) norms.

Seen norm (c) is a clear, indispensable and concrete aspect of social learning, we can also use it as an additional way to survey our dependent variable (cf. H1). Democratic theory does not expect that an evening in which citizens are being brought together to discuss policy will transform the values and attitudes on which their view on politics and citizenship is based. However, the way norm (c) is directly and tangibly linked to the very process of the deliberative trajectory and its deliberative effect on social learning, makes it arguably meaningful to explore these opinions on citizenship among the participants in light of the deliberative effect on social learning. Therefore we will not only add the citizenship question at the very beginning of the deliberative trajectory (to investigate the a-priori distinctive civic orientations of deliberators towards public-spiritedness), but also at the very end (to investigate the potential transformative effect of deliberation on norm (c)) (cf. fig. infra).

**Institutional Effect**

Regarding H2.2, by surveying the deliberators on different moments in their participatory trajectory (cf. fig. infra), we will be able to separate the effect of information and informal private deliberation (cf. H1), with the actual on-site public deliberation.

However, the deliberation as such does also consist of different features which can respectively have a different impact. Therefore, through an analysis of the institutional characteristics of the investigated distinct mini-publics through document analysis, fieldwork and additional survey questions (cf. attachment II – ‘experiences with the citizen’s cabinet’) (cf. fig. infra), combined with specific literature on the (effect of) deliberative conditions, we will – in a third stadium of this research – set-up own deliberative experiments, in which we specifically will focus on the manipulation of deliberative conditions and its effect on the deliberative outcome on social learning. In that way, we will be able to bypass the deliberation as grand treatment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major themes</th>
<th>Sub themes</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Sample quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPENNESS</td>
<td>Active Listening</td>
<td>Capturing what the sender is communicating, from the sender's point of view (Rogers &amp; Farson, 1957)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Paraphrasing</td>
<td>1. Restating the received information in one's own words (Bauer et al., 2010)</td>
<td>1. “So you think this is the better solution but maybe not the best solution?” (Bauer et al., 2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Verbalizing</td>
<td>2. Reflecting the speaker's emotions in words</td>
<td>2. “So you are happy that…”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asking</td>
<td>3. Asking questions</td>
<td>3. “Are you speaking about the situation in your street?”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Summarizing</td>
<td>4. Restating expressed ideas</td>
<td>4. “So your major concern is…”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clarifying</td>
<td>5. Asking questions for vague statements or restating wrong interpretations to force the speaker to explain further</td>
<td>5. “You said that you oppose this policy. Why is that?”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encouraging</td>
<td>6. Using varying voice intonations or offering ideas and suggestions</td>
<td>6. “That interests me…”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disregard</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. A speaker ignoring the arguments and questions addressed to him or her by other participants (Steiner, 2012)</td>
<td>2. “Will you please let me speak in peace now?”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. A speaker explicitly saying that he or she is disturbed by an interruption (Steiner et al., 2004)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPECT</td>
<td>Respect towards others</td>
<td>Making positive statements towards demands, arguments or counterarguments by others (Steiner et al., 2004)</td>
<td>“I think it is important to take these concerns into account”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No respect towards others</td>
<td>1. Using foul language to attack other participants (on a person level) and /or their arguments (Steiner, 2012)</td>
<td>1. “You seem a little confused” (Steiner, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Making negative statements towards demands, arguments, or counterarguments by others (Steiner et al., 2004)</td>
<td>2. “No one really minds you no longer being able to…”</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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| JUSTIFICATION | No justification | Saying that something should or should not be done, that it is a good or a bad idea, without providing rational arguments or narratives to justify it (Steiner et al., 2004) | “Because I think that it is good” |

| Justification | Saying why something should or should not be done, why that is a good or a bad idea; providing rational arguments or narratives for justification | 1. Justification in terms of the common good: reference to the costs and benefits for all groups represented (Steiner, 2012) |
| | | 2. Justification in terms of individual interest or with reference to the costs and benefits of the own group |
| | | 3. Justification with reference to benefits of costs for other groups represented in the experiment |
| | 1. “I like this idea, because it includes the accessibility of the city for all of the modes of transport” (argument) |
| | 2. “I like this idea, because it improves the accessibility of my street” |
| | “I run over potholes every day going to work” (narrative) (Adams, 2014) |

| Force of the better argument | The speaker indicating a change of position and gives reason for it (Steiner, 2012) | “Now I see it differently, because of…” |
ATTACHMENT II: BLUE PRINT SURVEY

Citizenship

1. There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally on a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 is not at all important, 3 is not important, not unimportant, and 5 is very important, how important is it according to you: (Please always encircle just one number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always to vote in elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Never to try to evade taxes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Always obey laws and regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>To keep watch on the actions of the mayor and aldermen</td>
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<tr>
<td>To be active in social or political associations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help people in the local community who are worse off than yourself</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Circulation plan

2. A/ Some Ghentians feel (very/somewhat) favorable towards the circulation plan. Yet others feel (very/somewhat) unfavorable towards the plan. What are the reasons you have for feeling (very/somewhat) favorable, yet unfavorable towards the plan? (Please enumerate all reasons that come up) [text box]

B/ What are the reasons you think others might have who have a different opinion towards the plan than you have?

If you feel (very/somewhat) favorable towards the plan, what are the reasons you think others might have for feeling (very/somewhat) unfavorable towards it. If you feel (very/somewhat) unfavorable towards the plan, what are the reasons you think others might have for feeling (very/somewhat) favorable towards it. (Please enumerate all reasons that come up) [text box]

3. Underneath you will find a scale from 0 to 10, whereby 0 stand for ‘there have to be strict measures to improve the liveability and accessibility of all modes of transport in the inner city, even if this implies that I have to adapt the way I travel to and in the inner city’ and whereby 10 stands for ‘there have to be as little restrictions as possible on the way I travel to and in the inner city, even if this implies that the liveability and accessibility of the inner city worsen”. Where would you place yourself on such a scale? (Please tick off only one box)

- “There have to be strict measures to improve the liveability and accessibility of all modes of transport in the inner city, even if this implies that I have to adapt the way I travel to and in the inner city”
- “There have to be as little restrictions as possible on the way I travel to and in the inner city, even if this implies that the liveability and accessibility of the inner city worsen”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Experiences with the citizen’s cabinet

4. To what extent have you talked with others about the circulation plan outside the meetings of the citizen’s cabinet? (Please tick off only one box)
   (Control Group: “To what extent have you talked with others about the circulation plan?”)
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Relatively often</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Can’t choose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. A/ To what extent do you think that you now (compared with the time before the citizen’s cabinet) **better understand the way other people look at the circulation plan**? (Please tick off only one box)
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Relatively often</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Can’t choose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

   Go to 6.

B/ To what extent do you **think that the meetings of the citizen’s cabinet were important to better understand other’s views**? (Please tick off only one box)
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very much</th>
<th>Quite a lot</th>
<th>A little bit</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Can’t choose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

   Go to D/

C/ In what way do you think that these **meetings were important to better understand other’s views**?
   (Please be as precise as possible) [text box]

D/ To what extent do you think that the **conversations you had with others outside of the citizen’s cabinet** were important to better understand other’s views? (Please tick off only one box)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very often</th>
<th>Relatively often</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Can’t choose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

E/ **In what way** do you think these conversations were important to better understand other’s views? (Please be as precise as possible) [text box]
6. To what extent do you think that the **participants of the citizen’s cabinet represented a diversity of views** on the circulation plan? (Please tick off only one box)

   Very much  |  Quite a lot  |  A little bit  |  Not at all  |  Can’t choose

7. To what extent do you think that **participants had equal opportunities to freely have their say**?
   (Please tick off only one box)

   Very much  |  Quite a lot  |  A little bit  |  Not at all  |  Can’t choose

8. To what extent do you think that the **organizers of the citizen’s cabinet have provided you with essential info** on the circulation before and during the citizen’s cabinet? (Please tick off only one box)

   Very much  |  Quite a lot  |  A little bit  |  Not at all  |  Can’t choose

9. To what extent do you think that the **moderators stimulate you to consider the other side or to think through other’s arguments**? (Please tick off only one box)

   Very much  |  Quite a lot  |  A little bit  |  Not at all  |  Can’t choose

10. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
ATTACHMENT III: CITIZENSHIP DIMENSION OF THE ISSP

Participants are asked to evaluate nine items separately from (1) not important at all, to (7) very important according to what they think is important for a person to be a good citizen (ISSP, 2013).

a. never try to evade taxes;
b. obey laws;
c. try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions;
d. buy or boycott goods for political/ethical/environmental reasons;
e. help people who are worse off than yourself;
f. always vote in elections;
g. be active in social and political associations;
h. keep a watch on the actions of the government*


