Editorial

With the seasonal festivities just behind the corner it’s time to get started on New Year’s resolutions. Forget about the gym, correcting all the mistakes on Wikipedia or re-reading 1984, and make “Contribute to The Reasoner” top of your list!

Why should you consider doing this? Well, because not everything worth reading can go through the lengthy and costly process of academic writing. Sometimes good ideas need to be jotted down quickly, otherwise they will be lost, possibly forever! The Reasoner Speculates is the place for ideas that are too good to be snowed under the next hundred of posts on facebook or twitter, but which aren’t quite fully baked for a paper. I discussed this (partly baked!) idea in my May 2017 editorial, but bear with me if I repeat once more the key message by I.J. Good “It is often better to be stimulating and wrong than boring and right”.

News are of course always welcome. You can report on workshops, seminars, summer/winter schools and all sorts of reasoning activities that you find exciting. Not only the reasoning community will be updated on your field – your funding body will be delighted to read about how you used their money!

If you are running an important project, then you may also consider reporting regularly about it on the Dissemination Corner. We are delighted to host updates about the ERC Consolidator Grant the Logic of Conceivability and we hope to host many more.

Two sections evolved into being the most recognisable features of The Reasoner for the past decade. The first is A Interview with . . . in which guest editors introduce the background and work of a reasoner, who is then asked to share their insights with the readers. Topics of interest span the history and foundations of reasoning as well as its applications, from artificial intelligence to medicine to economic theory – reasoners can be found in all playgrounds. The second very recognisable feature of our gazette is What’s Hot in . . . A number of columnists have recently joined The Reasoner. In addition to the columns on Evidence-Based medicine and Uncertain Reasoning which have been running for years, recent regular additions include (Formal) Argumentation Theory, Medieval Reasoning and Philosophy & Economics. The Reasoner constantly welcomes proposals for new interviews, reviews and columns – see the submit page on the website for more details.

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Alice is not impressed by the Sorites Paradox

Bob, in order to impress Alice, decides to amuse her with the Sorites Paradox. The conversation goes like this:

**Bob**: See that tree over there. It’s far away right?
**Alice**: Sure.
**Bob**: But if I was standing right in front of it it would not be far away, it would be near.
**Alice**: For sure.
**Bob**: And from points in between the tree may be far or near.
**Alice**: Sounds reasonable.
**Bob**: And if you’re at some point in between which is far from the tree and you move 1mm forward towards the tree then clearly you’ll still be far from the tree.

**Alice**: Hmm, I guess.

At this point Bob plays his trump card pointing out that starting where they are and moving 1mm at a time towards the tree and the tree will remain ‘far’ throughout, so will still be ‘far’ even when they arrive right next to the tree. Unfortunately Alice doesn’t seem quite as impressed as Bob hoped. The resulting conversation goes like this.

**Alice**: Well obviously then you can’t be right, it must change from far to near at some point. Unfortunately we don’t have time to actually do your experiment to find out where it is but we can if we try it another way. Let’s walk half way. If I still think it’s far then this point must be between that point and the tree. On the other hand if I think it is then near we know the point must be between our start and this mid-point. So now we’ve trapped the point in an interval half what we started with. Repeating it we can go down to a quarter of the original distance, and so on. Since the tree is at most 100m away we will determine this point in about \( \log_2(10,000) \leq 14 \) steps, which we do have time for.

**Bob**: Oh.

When they do attempt this experiment there are now two possibilities. The first is that they capture the point.

**Alice**: OK, so I was wrong not to object to your assertion And if you’re at some point in between which is far from the tree and you move 1mm forward towards the tree then clearly you’ll still be far from the tree at the time we now see it is false.

The other possibility is that at some point Alice simply isn’t able to say if the tree is far away or not.

**Alice**: OK, so I was wrong not to object to your assertion And if you’re at some point in between which is far from the tree and you move 1mm forward towards the tree then clearly you’ll still be far from the tree at the time. For how could I agree to it if in general I cannot even tell if a point is far or near to the tree? I was clearly wrong to go along with this assumption of yours.

**Bob**: So you don’t think there’s a paradox here?
**Alice**: No.

**Bob to himself**: Don’t know why I ever wanted to impress her in the first place.

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**News**

Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences - 5th Workshop on Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality, May 18–19

The workshop on Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences (May 18–19, 2017, Ghent) is the 5th in the series on Logic, Reasoning and Rationality, organized by the scientific research network Logical and Methodological Analysis of Scientific Reasoning Processes. The network is funded by the Flemish Research Foundation (FWO). It consists of nine research centers within Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and the UK. The workshop series includes two workshops per year (see here for more info on the workshop series, the network, and upcoming events).

The workshop was organized by two partner centers of the network: the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science at Ghent University and the Research Group for Non-Monotonic Logic and Formal Argumentation at Ruhr-University Bochum. The aim of the workshop was to bring together scholars investigating ampliative reasoning in the sciences, working in different philosophical sub-domains. In particular, the focus was on three central perspectives on this topic: the formal perspective (philosophical logic, probability theory), the methodological perspective (philosophy of science, epistemology) and the historical perspective (integrated history & philosophy of science). Three keynote speakers each addressed the topic of ampliative reasoning from one of these three angles. In addition, there were 17 contributed talks ranging over a variety of topics from these three perspectives, leading to fruitful cross-disciplinary discussions.

The first keynote speaker, Chiara Ambrosio (University College London), gave a talk covering the historical perspective. The topic of her talk was “Ampliative reasoning from an integrated HPS perspective: Some insights from Peirce and Whewell”. The talk focused on the status of ampliative reasoning in 19th century scholarship and, in particular, in the works of Peirce and Whewell. Ambrosio suggested that the notion of ampliative reasoning in this time period should be understood against the backdrop of the reformation of science, characterized by its divergence from natural philosophy and by the process of specialization. She suggested that ampliative reasoning played a central role in the understanding of the notion of scientist, by offering a remedy against the fragmentation of science into particular domains. This was argued for with reference to Whewell’s influence on Peirce.

The second keynote speaker, Jon Williamson (University of Kent), gave a talk on the topic “Establishing causal claims in medicine”, covering the second, methodological, perspective on ampliative reasoning. Williamson started from an epistemological thesis, previously developed by Russo and Williamson, that establishing a causal claim in medicine requires establishing (i) that the putative cause and putative effect are appropriately correlated, and (ii) that there is some underlying mechanism that can account for this correlation. Williamson argued that even though this thesis conflicts with some approaches rooted in contemporary evidence-based medicine, it offers a better explanation of (a) the role of clinical studies in establishing causal claims, and (b) the extrapolation from causal claims about the source population to causal claims about the target population. In particular, the thesis accounts for the cases in...
which causal claims can be established even in the absence of clinical studies, as well as the cases in which evidence from clinical studies is trumped by the evidence of mechanisms underlying the phenomenon in question.

The third keynote speaker, Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck—University of London and LMU Munich), covered the first, formal perspective on ampliative reasoning. In her talk entitled “Bayesian reasoning for non-statistical contexts” she discussed normative standards of argument quality in contexts that are not statistical in nature. Hahn presented a Bayesian framework for ampliative reasoning, focusing on argument forms that are in some contexts (though not in others) considered fallacious, such as the circular argument or petitio principii. She argued that this probabilistic framework can provide a normative standard by which to assess the strength of a range of everyday arguments. The framework can also be used to complement the argumentation scheme approach in informal argumentation theory. In the latter approach arguments are evaluated with reference to critical questions. Answers to such questions are often a matter of degree, so a Bayesian framework provides for their natural representation.

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**Summer School in Social Epistemology, 28 August–1 September**

The *Summer School in Social Epistemology*, August 28th-September 1st 2017, a five-day summer school at La Cristalera, in the Autonomous University of Madrid, brought together researchers from all over the world to explore some views and debates on recent topics in social epistemology. The Summer School was organized by the Epistemology and Society Network (EpiSoc), based in the Autonomous University of Madrid, in collaboration with the Social Epistemology Research Group, based in the University of Copenhagen. Each day was devoted to a central topic and included a plenary talk by a keynote speaker, a pre-read session with prepared comments and presentations by selected speakers.

The first day was dedicated to *What is Social Epistemology and Epistemic Injustice*. The first talk of the session was Sanford C. Goldberg’s *Against Epistemic Partiality in Friendship: Value-Reflecting reasons*. He presented an account on how the appearance of unwarranted epistemic partiality in friendship dissipates once we acknowledge a new category of reasons. On the pre-read session, Chris Kelp commented Goldberg’s *Proposed Research Program for Social Epistemology*, which was a thorough and programmatic presentation of the challenges that Social Epistemology faces. One of the central parts of the discussion revolved around the question whether there is something entirely new and unique about this project or whether traditional epistemology can cover the new challenges, despite its alleged individualism. The day included presentations about identity prejudices, epistemic silencing, testimonial injustice and epistemic inclusion and fruitful reflections on the different harms that can be done to someone in her capacity as a knower.

Tuesday, 29th was devoted to *Trust* and Katherine Hawley was the leading voice. She presented her work on *Trust and Gettier*. She carefully pointed out that there is some asymmetry in our reactions to Gettiered trust and Gettiered distrust. She suggested that it seems worse to distrust on a fragile basis than to trust on a fragile basis. The cases she presented supported the idea that when it comes to trust, as long as it is accurate and justified, Gettiered scenarios do not cause us as much. Jesús Navarro introduced the discussion on Hawley’s work *Trustworthiness*. Long story short, according to her view, in order to be trustworthy, we must ensure that our commitments are matched by action. The presentations covered a wide variety of topics, including trust and its relation to epistemic paternalism and authority, instruments, sincerity and blame.

Wednesday the 30th was dedicated to *The epistemology of groups* and Berit Brogaard opened the day with a talk on *Social Media and Knowledge degradation*. She presented research on crowd manipulation and group polarization, an interesting (and potentially worrisome) phenomenon where a group ends up having a view that is more radical than the one held by the most radical of its individual members. Her pre-read session on the topic included some experiments from social psychology and was commented by Fernando Broncano-Berrocal who introduced the discussion session. The day included interesting presentations and debates concerning group epistemology (from intergroup biases to group polarisation), epistemic practices and rationality.

The fourth day was *Testimony* day and Paul Faulkner presented his account of the phenomenon of *Giving the Benefit of Doubt*, where he offered an interesting argument for the view that it can be rational to give the benefit of the doubt and believe in the innocence of your friend, even in the face of discriminatory evidence. On the pre-read session Jesús Vega presented and opened the discussion concerning Faulkner’s work in progress *On Conversion*. The debate was specially hot concerning the limit and scope of the practical engagement of conversion. Lies, testimonial dogmatism and luck were some of the topics discussed during the day.

Friday 1st of September was devoted to *Disagreement*. Jonathan Matheson gave a stimulating talk on *Disagreement and the Rationality of Religious Belief*. He first took up the question of whether disagreement on religious matters is of a special or unique kind. His conclusion was that it is not and that the conciliationist stance that he advocates could also apply to this type disagreement. His work on *Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution* was commented by Klemens Kappel and the debate revolved around the question whether a conciliationist position is compatible with the existence of disagreement on basic epistemic principles and thereby scrutinized the very nature of those principles. Conciliationism, epistemic injustice and assertion were some of the topics presented and discussed during the rest of the sessions.

Overall, the event was insightful and called attention to significant challenges to social epistemology. It also offered the opportunity to bring together people, open new spaces for discussion and engage in high-quality debates concerning the current state of Social Epistemology. As a nice corollary, I would like to point out that all of the topics that Goldberg presented in his proposed research program on the first day were addressed throughout the days of the summer school. This might be read as a sign that social epistemology is a cohesive, flourishing project.

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