Adaptive compiler strategies for mitigating timing side channel attacks
- Author
- Jeroen Van Cleemput (UGent) , Bjorn De Sutter (UGent) and Koen De Bosschere (UGent)
- Organization
- Abstract
- Existing compiler techniques can transform code to make its timing behavior independent of sensitive values to prevent information leakage through time side channels. Those techniques are hampered, however, by their static nature and dependence on details of the processor targeted during the compilation. This paper presents a dynamic compiler approach based on offline profiles and JIT compiler strategies. This approach reduces overhead significantly and enables a trade-off between provided protection and overhead. Furthermore, it supports adaptive policies in which the protection adapts to run-time changes in the requirements. A prototype implementation in the Jikes Research VM is evaluated on RSA encryption, HMAC key verification, and IDEA encryption.
- Keywords
- JIT compiler, adaptive protection, time side channels, code transformations, efficiency, effectiveness, trade-off, profiling, DRIVEN CACHE ATTACKS, SECURITY
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Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8533203
- MLA
- Van Cleemput, Jeroen, et al. “Adaptive Compiler Strategies for Mitigating Timing Side Channel Attacks.” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, vol. 17, no. 1, 2020, pp. 35–49, doi:10.1109/tdsc.2017.2729549.
- APA
- Van Cleemput, J., De Sutter, B., & De Bosschere, K. (2020). Adaptive compiler strategies for mitigating timing side channel attacks. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, 17(1), 35–49. https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2017.2729549
- Chicago author-date
- Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Bjorn De Sutter, and Koen De Bosschere. 2020. “Adaptive Compiler Strategies for Mitigating Timing Side Channel Attacks.” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 17 (1): 35–49. https://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2017.2729549.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Bjorn De Sutter, and Koen De Bosschere. 2020. “Adaptive Compiler Strategies for Mitigating Timing Side Channel Attacks.” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 17 (1): 35–49. doi:10.1109/tdsc.2017.2729549.
- Vancouver
- 1.Van Cleemput J, De Sutter B, De Bosschere K. Adaptive compiler strategies for mitigating timing side channel attacks. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING. 2020;17(1):35–49.
- IEEE
- [1]J. Van Cleemput, B. De Sutter, and K. De Bosschere, “Adaptive compiler strategies for mitigating timing side channel attacks,” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 35–49, 2020.
@article{8533203,
abstract = {{Existing compiler techniques can transform code to make its timing behavior independent of sensitive values to prevent information leakage through time side channels. Those techniques are hampered, however, by their static nature and dependence on details of the processor targeted during the compilation. This paper presents a dynamic compiler approach based on offline profiles and JIT compiler strategies. This approach reduces overhead significantly and enables a trade-off between provided protection and overhead. Furthermore, it supports adaptive policies in which the protection adapts to run-time changes in the requirements. A prototype implementation in the Jikes Research VM is evaluated on RSA encryption, HMAC key verification, and IDEA encryption.}},
author = {{Van Cleemput, Jeroen and De Sutter, Bjorn and De Bosschere, Koen}},
issn = {{1545-5971}},
journal = {{IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING}},
keywords = {{JIT compiler,adaptive protection,time side channels,code transformations,efficiency,effectiveness,trade-off,profiling,DRIVEN CACHE ATTACKS,SECURITY}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{35--49}},
title = {{Adaptive compiler strategies for mitigating timing side channel attacks}},
url = {{http://doi.org/10.1109/tdsc.2017.2729549}},
volume = {{17}},
year = {{2020}},
}
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