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Formalizing commitment-based deals in Boolean games

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Abstract
Boolean games (BGs) are a strategic framework in which agents' goals are described using propositional logic. Despite the popularity of BGs, the problem of how agents can coordinate with others to (at least partially) achieve their goals has hardly received any attention. However, negotiation protocols that have been developed outside the setting of BGs can be adopted for this purpose, provided that we can formalize (i) how agents can make commitments and (ii) how deals between coalitions of agents can be identified given a set of active commitments. In this paper, we focus on these two aims. First, we show how agents can formulate commitments that are in accordance with their goals, and what it means for the commitments of an agent to be consistent. Second, we formalize deals in terms of coalitions who can achieve their goals without help from others. We show that verifying the consistency of a set of commitments of one agent is Pi(P)(2)-complete while checking the existence of a deal in a set of mutual commitments is Sigma(P)(2)-complete. Finally, we illustrate how the introduced concepts of commitments and deals can be used to achieve game-theoretical properties of the deals and to configure negotiation protocols.
Keywords
NEGOTIATION, PROTOCOLS

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MLA
De Clercq, Sofie, et al. “Formalizing Commitment-Based Deals in Boolean Games.” Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, edited by GA Kaminka et al., vol. 285, IOS Press, 2016, pp. 329–37, doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-329.
APA
De Clercq, S., Schockaert, S., Nowé, A., & De Cock, M. (2016). Formalizing commitment-based deals in Boolean games. In G. Kaminka, P. Bouquet, E. Hullermeier, F. Dignum, & F. Van Harmelen (Eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications (Vol. 285, pp. 329–337). https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-329
Chicago author-date
De Clercq, Sofie, Steven Schockaert, Ann Nowé, and Martine De Cock. 2016. “Formalizing Commitment-Based Deals in Boolean Games.” In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, edited by GA Kaminka, P Bouquet, E Hullermeier, F Dignum, and F Van Harmelen, 285:329–37. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-329.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
De Clercq, Sofie, Steven Schockaert, Ann Nowé, and Martine De Cock. 2016. “Formalizing Commitment-Based Deals in Boolean Games.” In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, ed by. GA Kaminka, P Bouquet, E Hullermeier, F Dignum, and F Van Harmelen, 285:329–337. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-329.
Vancouver
1.
De Clercq S, Schockaert S, Nowé A, De Cock M. Formalizing commitment-based deals in Boolean games. In: Kaminka G, Bouquet P, Hullermeier E, Dignum F, Van Harmelen F, editors. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press; 2016. p. 329–37.
IEEE
[1]
S. De Clercq, S. Schockaert, A. Nowé, and M. De Cock, “Formalizing commitment-based deals in Boolean games,” in Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2016, vol. 285, pp. 329–337.
@inproceedings{8513736,
  abstract     = {{Boolean games (BGs) are a strategic framework in which agents' goals are described using propositional logic. Despite the popularity of BGs, the problem of how agents can coordinate with others to (at least partially) achieve their goals has hardly received any attention. However, negotiation protocols that have been developed outside the setting of BGs can be adopted for this purpose, provided that we can formalize (i) how agents can make commitments and (ii) how deals between coalitions of agents can be identified given a set of active commitments. In this paper, we focus on these two aims. First, we show how agents can formulate commitments that are in accordance with their goals, and what it means for the commitments of an agent to be consistent. Second, we formalize deals in terms of coalitions who can achieve their goals without help from others. We show that verifying the consistency of a set of commitments of one agent is Pi(P)(2)-complete while checking the existence of a deal in a set of mutual commitments is Sigma(P)(2)-complete. Finally, we illustrate how the introduced concepts of commitments and deals can be used to achieve game-theoretical properties of the deals and to configure negotiation protocols.}},
  author       = {{De Clercq, Sofie and Schockaert, Steven and Nowé, Ann and De Cock, Martine}},
  booktitle    = {{Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications}},
  editor       = {{Kaminka, GA and Bouquet, P and Hullermeier, E and Dignum, F and Van Harmelen, F}},
  isbn         = {{9781614996712}},
  issn         = {{0922-6389}},
  keywords     = {{NEGOTIATION,PROTOCOLS}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  location     = {{The Hague, The Netherlands}},
  pages        = {{329--337}},
  publisher    = {{IOS Press}},
  title        = {{Formalizing commitment-based deals in Boolean games}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-329}},
  volume       = {{285}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

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