Ethnicity, Voting and the Promises of the Independence Movement in Tanzania: The Case of the 2010 General Elections in Mwanza

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Dissertation presented in the fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Comparative Science of Culture

Promoter: Prof. Dr. Koenraad Stroeken
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I wish to conclude by exonerating the individuals and institutions acknowledged in this section from all inaccuracies and shortcomings that may be found in this dissertation. All deficiencies are my responsibility and mine alone.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved parents Mbegu Said Malipula and Rehema Mrisho Kapara, who did not live long enough to see their son grow to accomplish this significant academic milestone. My parents’ love, encouragement, dedication to education and industrious sacrifice inspired me to undertake an intellectual journey to the highest academic diploma that a University can offer – PhD.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. The issue of explaining ethnicity and voting in Tanzania is puzzling. The puzzle stems from the fact that Tanzania is less ethnically politicised compared to most African states, despite being ethnically diverse with over 120 ethnic groups, sharing the colonial history and an ongoing anxiety about competitive politics and liberal economics breeding ethnic salience in voting.

The overriding literature on influences of ethnicity on voting in Africa revolves around the paradigms of ethnic structure and neo-patrimonial or hybrid systems. Whereas the concept of ethnic structure contends that salience of ethnicity in voting is determined by the ability of ethnic groups to form a minimum winning coalition (MWC) in elections, the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools explain the same from Africa’s presumed traditional primordialism – as opposed to legal-rational institutions of governance (LRIs) or historically grown values preventing ethnic voting. The assumption of ethnic motivations and the reference to traditional structures has long concealed the role of shared history, political thoughts and innovative practices in Tanzania’s management of ethnicity, particularly in voters’ choices in elections. Such backdrop warranted exploration of an alternative analytical framework.

This study developed an analytic narrative method that mainly relied on interviews with privileged witnesses as well as ordinary voters (65). The fundamental factor, we established, in explaining ethnicity’s low salience in voters’ choices in Tanzania has been the Promises of the Independence Movement (PsIM), namely a political imaginary about realising and enhancing promises of national unity (PNU), equitable distribution of national resources (EDNR) and peace. The PsIM in sum created a nationalist political culture against ethnic polarisation and salience in politics capable of sustaining low salience of ethnicity in voting for 50 years after independence. Based on the interviews, we reject the neo-patrimonial theory and hybrid schools and brand them as inadequate tools for understanding the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. The rejection is predicated on the fact that the Tanzanian case does not support the primary tenets of the theory in divulging the influences of ethnicity on voting as explained above. Ideals deduced from a nationalist political culture as embedded in the PsIM, informed legal rational rules and institutions, values as well as experiences that militate against the salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices. On this basis, we can give credit to, but also critically examine, the indigenous political thoughts informed by African political thought and practices that determine voting practices.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the influence of ethnicity on the choices of voters in Tanzania. The explanation of ethnicity in voting behavior is complex and surprising in Tanzania. The surprising effect comes about because Tanzania is less ethnically polarized than most other African countries, despite the fact that Tanzania is a very ethnically diverse country, with more than 120 ethnic groups. Furthermore, it shares with its neighboring countries a colonial history and a continuous concern about competitive politics and liberal economy, factors that may give rise to ethnic preference in voting behavior.

The most relevant literature on the influence of ethnicity on voting behavior in Africa refers to paradigms of ethnic structure and neo-patrimonial or hybrid systems. The concept of ethnic structure posits that the importance of ethnicity in voting behavior is determined by the hardness of ethnic groups to form “minimum winning coalitions” (MWC) during elections. The neo-patrimonial and hybrid model, on the other hand, explains everything from Africa’s assumed traditional rootedness. This view is in direct contrast to the existence of legal-rational administrative institutions (LRIs) or historically grown values and norms that stymie voting behavior on the basis of ethnicity against. This suspicion of ethnocentric voting behavior and the reference to traditional structures has been largely ignored in understanding the role of a common history, a shared political thought and an innovative way of dealing with ethnicity in Tanzania. This background justifies the exploration of an alternative analytical framework.

This study developed an analytical-narrative method that relied heavily on interviews with privileged witnesses, and also on ordinary voters (65). The key factor, we found, in explaining the very weak role of ethnicity in voting behavior in Tanzania is the promises of the Independence Movement (PsIM). This refers to a political ideology with respect to realizing and promoting the promises of national unity (PNU), a fair distribution of resources (EDNR) and peace. The PsIM created a nationalist political culture that resisted ethnic polarization and the importance of ethnicity in politics. In this way, they were able to subordinate ethnicity in voting behavior in Tanzania. Based on the interviews that I have conducted, I reject the neo-patrimonial theory and the hybrid school. I devalue them as insufficient in attempting to understand the importance of ethnicity in voting behavior. This rejection is based on the fact that the impact of ethnicity on voting behavior in Tanzania cannot be explained based on that theory. Ideals, derived from a nationalist political culture, as embedded in the PsIM, have given rise to legal-rational rules and institutions, values and experiences that resist the importance of ethnicity in the voting behavior of voters. Based on this, we should place much weight (without forgetting the critical eye) on the local political ideology that is inspired by African political ideologies and practices in determining voting behavior.
MUHTASARI

Tasnifu hii imejikita kuchunguza ushawishi wa ukabila katika kuongoza kura nchini Tanzania. Suala la kueleza ukabila na upigaji kura nchini Tanzania ni gumu na linakanganya. Mkanganyiko huu unatokana na ukweli kwambwa nafasi ya ukabila katika masuala ya siasa nchini Tanzania ni ndogo kikilinganishwa na nchi nyingi za Kifrika, licha ya kuwa na makabila zaidi ya 120, kupitia historia ya utawala wa kikoloni kama mataifa mengine ya Afrika na wasiwasi unaonendelea kuhusu siasa za ushindani na uchumi huria kukochea matumizi makubwa ya ukabila katika kushawishi wa upigaji kura.

Maandiko mengi yahusuyo nafasi ya ukabila katika kushawishi maamuzi ya wapigaji kura barani Afrika yanahusisha suaal hilo na dhana ya muundo wa makabila na mifumo mamboleo ya utawala wa kuleana na chotara (mchanganyiko wa mfumo wa utawala mamboleo wa kuleana na mfumo wa utawala wa kale unaosherehesha ukabila katika uendeshaji wa siasa na mgawanyo wa rasilimali za taifa). Wakati dhana ya muundo wa makabila inadai kwamba makabila hayo kuwa muungano muendelee na masuala ya kulela na masuala ya kulema nchini Tanzania. Sabaabu yake tuliyogundua katika kufikia na kuboresha tumaini la umuhimu wa ukabila katika kushawishi wapiga kura nchini Tanzania, wakati dhana ya muundo wa makabila inadai kwamba nafasi ya ukabila katika siasa na upigaji kura unaweza kutoa muungano wenye idadi inayotosheleza kushinda uchaguzi (MWC), mielekeo ya mifumo wa utawala na wapigaji kura wa kulema na chotara vinaphanya nafasi ya ukabila katika kushawishi kwa kuongoza maamuzi ya wapiga kura wakati wa uchaguzi mbalimbali.

Utafiti huu utemudia njia ya uchambuzi simulizi uliojikiza katika na watu mashuhuri walongishuwula historia ya kisiasa nchini Tanzania, na wapigaji kura wakati wa kwa kulema na kuchunguza kwa kuongoza maamuzi ya wapiga kura. Wazo la motisha za kikabila katika uendeshaji wa siasa na nafasi za muundo wa makabila hayo kuwa kuchunguza historia za kisiasa na mifumo mamboleo za utawala wa kulema na chotara vinaelezea nafasi ya ukabila katika siasa na upigaji kura. Utamaduni wa siasa na utakatiza maitumaini la umuhimu wa ukabila katika kushawishi wa upigaji kura kwa muundo wa Tanzania unaweza kutoa muungano wa kuboresha tumaini la umuhimu wa ukabila katika siasa na upigaji kura. Msondo yake yaweza kutoa muungano wa kuboresha tumaini la umuhimu wa ukabila katika siasa na upigaji kura. Utafiti huu umetumia njia zaidi dhana ya utawala na utawala kwa muundo na wapigaji kura wa kwa kulema na chotara kwa muundo wa Tanzania unaweza kutoa muungano wa kuboresha tumaini la umuhimu wa ukabila katika siasa na upigaji kura.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUHTASARI</td>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND MAPS</td>
<td>XV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. INTRODUCTION AND ARGUMENT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. FOCUS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. RESEARCH EPISTEMOLOGY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA AND RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING IT</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. SETTING THE RESEARCH SCENE</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND SAMPLE SIZE</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. RESEARCH INFORMATION SOURCES AND TOOLS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.1. SEMI-STRUCTURED LOCAL VOTERS INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.2. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.2.1 Background of KIs and their Selection</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.3. DOCUMENTARY REVIEWS</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8. DATA ANALYSIS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9. DATA VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10. ETHICAL ISSUES</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.1. ACQUIRING RESEARCH PERMISSION</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10.2. OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.1.1. Incorporation of Societal Organisations into the Nation

4.3.2. Ethnicity and Voting during the Nationalist Movement

CHAPTER IV

3.3. UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY AND ITS GERMINATION INTO A POLITICAL SALIENT PHENOMENON

3.2. UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY AND ITS GERMINATION INTO A POLITICAL SALIENT PHENOMENON

2.12. CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER III

2.11. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

3.4.6. A HYPOTHETICAL PATH-DEPENDENT MODEL EXPLAINING INFLUENCES OF ETHNICITY ON DETERMINING VOTERS’ CHOICES IN TANZANIA

3.4. ETHNICITY AND VOTING: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

2.10.4. ESTABLISHING RAPPORT

2.10.3. ENSURING CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY

2.11. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

2.12. CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER III

3.3. UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY AND ITS GERMINATION INTO A POLITICAL SALIENT PHENOMENON

3.2. UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY AND ITS GERMINATION INTO A POLITICAL SALIENT PHENOMENON

2.11. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

2.12. CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER IV

THE TANZANIAN POLITY: AN ETHNO-POLITICAL AND VOTING NARRATIVE

4.1. INTRODUCTION

4.2. TANZANIA AND ITS ELECTORAL SYSTEM: A PRELUDE TO THE ETHNO-POLITICAL AND VOTING NARRATIVE

4.2.1. THE 2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TANZANIA: A PICK OF KEY ISSUES

4.3. ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN TANZANIA IN THE NATIONALIST ERA AND BEYOND

4.3.1. A LEAD UP TO ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN THE NATIONALIST ERA

4.3.2. Ethnicity and Voting during the Nationalist Movement

4.4. ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN THE POST-COLONIAL TANZANIA

4.4.1. MWALIMU’S NATIONALISATION MISSION-1961-1985

4.4.1.1. Incorporation of Societal Organisations into the National Political Realm
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Arusha Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>African Progressive Party of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>African Farmers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKWATA</td>
<td>National Muslim Council of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Controller and Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Democratic and Progressive Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAUSTA</td>
<td>Chama cha Haki na Ustawi Tanzania (Justice and Welfare Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURT</td>
<td>The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasia Makini</td>
<td>Meticulous Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDNR</td>
<td>Equitable Distribution of National Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEs</td>
<td>General Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIs</td>
<td>Key Informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIIIs</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRIs</td>
<td>Legal-Rational Institutions of Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAEs</td>
<td>Local Authorities Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISA</td>
<td>Media Institute of Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWCs</td>
<td>Minimum Winning Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-M</td>
<td>National Convention for Construction and Reforms-Mageuzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National league for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Reconstruction Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNVR</td>
<td>Permanent National Voter Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCB</td>
<td>Prevention and Combation of Corruption Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PsIM</td>
<td>The Promises of the Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>Promise of National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDET</td>
<td>Research and Education on Democracy in Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPOA</td>
<td>Research on Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAU</td>
<td>Sauti ya Umma (People’s Voice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Tanganyika African Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACCEO</td>
<td>Tanzania Consortium of Civil Society Election Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADEA</td>
<td>Tanzania Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMCO</td>
<td>Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPD</td>
<td>United Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMD</td>
<td>Union for Multiparty Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>The United Republic of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND MAPS

MAP 1: THE MAP OF EAST AFRICA ................................................................. 24
MAP 2: THE MAP OF TANZANIA AND MWANZA .................................................. 25
TABLE I: SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVIEWEES ......................... 30
FIGURE 1: THE RESEARCHER CONDUCTING AN INTERVIEW AT ONE OF THE INTERVIEWEES’ HOME ........................................................................................................................................... 34
FIGURE 2: A SCHEME EXPLAINING POLITICISATION OF ETHNICITY (TRIBALISM).......................... 69
FIGURE 3: A HYPOTHETICAL PATH DEPENDENCE EXPLANATION LOW SALIENCE OF ETHNICITY IN VOTING IN TANZANIA ........................................................................................................................................... 107
TABLE III: PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY VOTER TURNOUT IN TANZANIA (1965 - 2010) .... 121
TABLE IV: TANZANIANS IDENTIFICATION ETHNIC VS. NATIONAL ........................................ 169
TABLE V: 2015 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS IN TANZANIA .......... 254
TABLE VI: USE OF PLACES OF WORSHIP FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGNING ................................. 274
CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction and Argument

The overriding literature on ethnicity and voting in Africa regards ethnicity\(^1\) as a central cleavage in informing voters’ choices in competitive multi-party elections (Eifert, 2010; Bratton and Bhavnani, 2009; Erdmann, 2007, 2004; Burgess, 2004; Berman et al 2004; Posner, 2004, 2005). The literature suggests that ethnicity in African elections is salient and is a significant determinant of voters choices. In the main, it contends that Africans use ethnic divisions for political mobilisation whereby contestants are said to lure their co-ethnics through promises of accessing public goods and favours once they are elected (Weber, 2010; Young, 2009). Such line of thinking suggests that Africans *politicise ethnicity*\(^2\) and are *ethnic voters*\(^3\). This implies that tribal or ethnic demography is a key determinant of vote allotment and thus election results reflect the distribution of ethnic groups in a country. Such distribution is said to occur because the contesting parties are organised along ethnic divisions and voters support co-ethnics either for the promises of public goods or as an expression of identity (McLaughlin, 2008; Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 1985). In this way, ethnically based voting counteracts nation-building policies by dividing people on the basis of ethnic groups and disproportionately providing resources along those ethnic lines. As a result of disproportionate distribution of resources, conflicts which have dilapidating effects between the favoured and disfavoured ethnic groups ensue or are encouraged to (Miguel, 2004).

The literature on ethnicity and voting provides numerous examples of states that have experienced dilapidating effects due to salience of ethnicity in Africa. I will just mention a few. For instance, in Nigeria ethnically based electoral competition has been a distinctive feature of the country’s political history. Such competition has frequently resulted into violent conflicts and voting divisions among the competing ethnicities (Salawu and Hassan, 2011). Likewise, in Kenya ethnically anchored voting and violence has been evident in all pluralist elections (Weber, 2009; 

\(^1\) Ethnicity is thoroughly conceptualised in section 3.2.1 to 3.2.5. At this juncture it is worth to describe albeit in nutshell the term. Ethnicity stands for one’s belonging to a social group with ethnic traits known to it and others.

\(^2\) Politicised ethnicity is detailed in section 3.2.6. However, at this stage it is worth to note that politicised of ethnicity refers to a politically oriented consciousness of ethnic belonging which informs active ethnic identities engagement in political affairs.

\(^3\) Ethnic voting in this study entails expression of solidarity among ethnic group members to elevate leaders from their own ethnic group into positions of power.
Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008). The same can be said of Uganda which has a long history of ethnic polarisation and misunderstanding among ethnic groups which reflect voters’ choices (Rohner et al. 2013).

The significance of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices highlighted above and the effects thereof is not immune to at least mild criticism. Recent research has suggested that the impact of ethnic identities is extremely complex and varied. For instance, empirical studies in Ghana (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008), South Africa (Piombo, 2005) and Kenya (Gibson and Long, 2009) challenge the centrality of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in African elections. The three studies recognise the role of ethnicity as important on determining voters’ choices but argue that economic evaluations supersede ethnicity in informing such choices. From such argument it can be said that Africans are more rational economic voters than ethnic ones. Concurring with Lindberg and colleagues’ stance on the limited role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, Scarrit and Mozaffar (1999) contend that ethno-political fragmentation and the geographical concentration of ethnic groups in Africa are important factors in explaining the number of political parties but not voting patterns. This line of thought is perplexing from the partisanship voting perspective which contends that voters vote for the party they belong to. The attachment to the parties in voting is either because they perform well or benefit them personally which is referred to as patronage or strategic voting; or because of their unconditional affiliation to them regardless of performance and personal benefits which is referred to as sincere partisan voting (Young, 2009; Brody and Rothenberg, 1988). If Scarrit and Mozaffar’s (1999) view is right then the partisanship explanation of voting is rendered incompetent of explaining voting behaviour. Arguing in the same vein, Bannon et al. (2004) demonstrate that there is no simple relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and the likelihood that individuals will identify themselves first and foremost in ethnic terms when it comes to voting.

The debate on the role of ethnicity in informing electoral choices presented above indicates that in general terms, ethnicity is an important determinant of voters’ choice in African elections. However, one major weakness of the literature is the lack of differentiation of levels of ethnic salience on the continent. Tanzania\textsuperscript{4} for instance, a multi-party African state with over 22 political

\textsuperscript{4}Tanzania is a United Republic formed as the result of a merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar states in 1964. The scope of this article is the then Tanganyika.
parties, exhibits a striking ethnic plurality with over 120 groups socially and culturally recognised, but, has a lower salience of ethnicity in voting compared to most African states (Malipula, 2014; Bratton et al 2011; Young, 2009; Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2006; Miguel, 2004; Kiondo, 2001; Mpongala, 2000; Jerman, 1997). A wider description of the political and electoral system of Tanzania is provided in the next section and in section 4.2.

The fact that Tanzania is not being structured on this cleavage despite having around 120 ethnic groups is, so to speak, ‘abnormal’ for an African state as indicated in the overriding literature presented above. Tanzania’s less politicisation of ethnicity spares it from the effects of ethnic politicisation befalling other states in Africa particularly under the current multi-party era as indicated in the dominant scholarship on ethnicity and voting in Africa (Weber, 2010; Nyang’oro, 2006). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that concerns that ethnic sentiments would gain salience after the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 have been documented (Erdmann, 2002; Gasarasi, 1997; Omari 1997). These claims are understandable as such patterns are typical in other African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria as indicated above. The presumed fear as thoroughly discussed in section 4.5.2 was anchored on the general notion that multi-party democracy due to its competitive nature might lead to the emergence of ethnic-based political canvassing and eventually ethnic voting (Chaligha et al. 2002; Gasarasi 1997). These concerns have never been vindicated in Tanzania. Whether measured in terms of inter-ethnic trust or inter-ethnic discrimination, Tanzanians’ shared pride of nationhood has always been remarkably higher than among citizens of most other African countries (e.g. Afrobarometer 5 2001; 2005; 2008; 2012). This raises the question why.

Knowledge of the causes of influences of ethnicity particularly on determining voters’ choices is mainly limited to ethnic structure, neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations. The ethnic structure school contends that a country’s ethnic structure - the number and size of ethnic groups can explain the influence of ethnicity in voting (Barkan, 1994; Posner, 2005). According to this line of thought, countries with few and large ethnic groups are expected to be prone to ethnic

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5 The Afrobarometer is an independent, non partisan research project that conducts regular surveys measuring social, political and economic atmosphere in around 20 African countries. The main partners are the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), The Institute of Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Institute of Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) University of Nairobi. These partners are provided technical support by the Michigan State University and The Democracy for Africa Research Unit (DARU), Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. Likewise in all nations there are national partners who oversee data collection exercise. For Tanzania REPOA (Research for Poverty Alleviation) is responsible.
politicisation because they are endowed with ethnic groups large enough to form a MWC\(^6\) in elections. This MWC is said to influence voting because the voters expect rewards for being part of the winning coalition. The opposite is expected from countries with a collection of minor ethnic groups which force politicians to reach out to and win votes from numerous ethnic groups through nationalistic pleas (Weber, 2009). Under such circumstances, politicians strive to sustain an ethnically inclusive posture by equitably distributing the spoils of the state. As convincing as the ethnic structure view may be in terms of strategic rationality, the political-ethnographic school questions its validity on grounds of the dynamic and contextual reality of ethnic identities, which a static conceptualisation of ethnic groups and their politicising effect fails to grasp (Malipula, 2014; Schultz, 1984). Moreover, against both the ethnic structure argument and its critique, Miguel (2004) suggests that nation-building policies and practices can moderate ethnic politicisation. To Miguel, nation-building can mitigate politicisation of ethnicity while the lack of the same can exacerbate it.

Tanzania augurs well in both the ethnic-structure and the nation-building debate. This is chiefly because it is recognised as a state where ethnicity is not politically salient in voting despite being ethnically diverse as indicated above. Specifically in electoral terms, the numbers of pronounced ethnic groups can hardly add up to make a MWC when it comes to presidential elections. In Tanzania the largest ethnic group, the Sukuma, constitutes 17% of the population and there is none other that has more than 5%; all are geographically scattered. As such, any MWC must involve many ethnic groups and adopt a national outlook (Malipula, 2014). However, the antagonism may play in the elections of parliamentarians, because constituencies in most cases harbour a dominant ethnic group; therefore, ethnic political canvassing can be envisaged. The competition might be mainly intra-ethnic rather than inter-ethnic as parties essentially sponsor members of the same ethnic group to compete for such seats (Nyaluke, 2013). Likewise, Tanzania has embarked on a sustained nation-building policy from colonialism to-date regardless of the political system operating in the country - mono-party or multi-party - as thoroughly expounded throughout the fourth chapter and in the third in sections 3.4.4. and 3.4.5. It is imperative to note

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\(^6\) The concept of a MWC, minimal winning coalition, refers to a coalition of ethnic groups with enough voters to meet the electorally set threshold for securing political office.
that almost all African countries also had similar nation-building policies and philosophies\textsuperscript{7} (Rioba, 2012). However, most of these countries have not recorded the success that Tanzania has. A comparison of Tanzania and Kenya made by Weber (2010; 2009) suffice to shed light on the matter.

In a current analysis of the causes of politicisation of ethnicity comparing Tanzania and ethnically salient Kenya, Weber (2010; 2009) buys into the nation-building argument, even to the point of dropping the structural argument altogether. Weber holds the view that Tanzania through the Sukuma\textsuperscript{8} has the potential to mobilise a “super-ethnic group” and forge the MWC to render the structural explanation irrelevant. Hence, lower ethnic salience in Tanzanian politics should not be attributed to the number (structure) of its ethnic groups but to nation-building policies, with the addition of two related factors: colonial history and lack of land alienation. Weber argues that the degree of ethnic polarisation was lower in Tanzania compared to Kenya due to less economic investment made by the British colonialists in the former compared to the latter. The difference of investment is attributed to the colonial status the British had in the two states. Kenya was a colony, thus the British were assured of longer stay. As a result, the British were more assured of long-term investment and motivation of ethnic polarisation to contain strong national anti-colonial struggles. Tanzania attracted less investment and ethnic polarisation because the British established a mere trusteeship and later a protectorate charged with the role of overseeing its independence by the League of Nations and the United Nations respectively (Weber, 2010, 2009; Mwakikagile, 2010). Weber also argues that land in Kenya is disproportionately distributed among the economically powerful who use it to win support from their co-ethnics. In this regard, the economically influential inform conflicts that develop voting patterns among those accessing land and those who do not. The dissimilarity between Tanzania and Kenya’s colonial history makes

\textsuperscript{7} Kwame Nkrumah’s \textit{African Personality} ideological slogan which steered Ghanaians for national unity and development through a \textit{Pan-African} system of values, Leopold Senghor \textit{Ngritude} which meant to promote African thinking in national unity and development in Senegal, Jomo Kenyatta’s \textit{Harambee} (let’s pull together) aiming at promoting a spirit of national unity and working together to bring about development in Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda’s \textit{Humanism} in Zambia and Mobutu Seseseko \textit{Authenticite} in Zaire which sought to enhance psychological rebirth of a people freed from years of foreign domination, provide examples of the political ideologies that meant to enhance national integration.

\textsuperscript{8} The Sukuma is the biggest ethnic group in Tanzania with around 17% of the country’s total population (Glickman, 1995). This amount is similar to the Kikuyu in Kenya. Moreover, Sukuma could be joined by their culturally and linguistically near neighbours in the south, the Nyamwezi to add their numerical and political visibility.
Weber argue that colonially engineered ethnic polarisation cannot be a basis of ethnic voting in Tanzania, while it applies to Kenya.

Weber’s explanations are central to explaining ethnic salience from the points of view of colonial history and land alienation, but they ignore African political thoughts that informed nationalist struggles as well as post-independence endeavours in making ethnicity insignificant in politics. From such deficiency, it is logical to appreciate Weber’s contribution that blends a structural and colonial historical thesis, but to add to the mix Tanzania’s ethno-political dynamics to thus capture the agencies of change that impact on structures is essential. The shortcomings of this school compel us to first explore the positions of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theses, the dominant explanations of African politics about the influences of ethnicity on voting behaviour.

The neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations associate salience of ethnicity in voting in African states with: Lack of LRIs or their preference for traditional primordial tendencies over LRIs. They also attribute ethnic salience in voting in Africa to lack of shared history and values militating against the same (Malipula, 2014). In the view of neo-patrimonialists, primordialism exacerbates ethnic salience in voting due to personal rule and ethnic-based patronage while LRIs militate against the same through established rules and value systems (Clapham, 1985, Bayart, 1993, Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997, Chabal and Diloz, 1999). Since African states including Tanzania have decided to go multi-party and instituted LRIs, it could be unwise to say they are purely patrimonial. Instead, the fact is that they have the LRIs but are not well functioning (Makulilo, 2012). This fact informs the base of the hybrid school and makes states with such dysfunctional LRIs viewed as hybrid regimes pseudo-democratic regimes. To hybrid theorists, rulers of pseudo-democratic regimes use neo-patrimonial practices like politicising ethnicity to manipulate electorates and win their votes (Bratton and Posner, 1999, Schedler, 2006, Diamond, 2002 and Levitsky and Way, 2002). In light of the hybrid school, ethnicity can be manipulated at will by the ruling elites to influence peoples’ electoral choices without the ruled having a say. From the two schools, one would expect Tanzania as an African state to be ethnic salient in voting. Such expectation is predicated on the fact that it is an African state and possesses hybrid and some neo-patrimonial characteristics, like malfunctioning LRIs and strong social and cultural ethnic identities like other African states, but it is not ethnically salient politically. In this regard, the

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9 Primordialism is understood as the belief in a primeval culture shared by all members of an ethnic group.
presence or lack of LRIs and preference to ethnic identities alone cannot satisfactorily explain the influences of ethnicity in voting in a state like Tanzania. Such gap casts serious academic shortage on the over-generalised nature of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanation of the influences of ethnicity on voting in Africa as it will be thoroughly unravelled in section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.

Furthermore, although neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations have dominated the academic discourse on issues related to the failures of the African state associated with the use of extra legal-rational authority like ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices, they suffer from their biased treatment of African history and traditions. This critique stems from the theories’ essentialist and overly negative interpretation of African politics including the use of ethnicity in elections. This essentialist view is reluctant to appreciate alternative political ideas and structures relevant to Africa (Mustapha, 2002, Erdman and Engel, 2006, de Grassi, 2008, Pitcher et al. 2009). For instance, while the theories basically see nothing positive in the African traditions as they are supposed to promote traditional as opposed to modern legal rational issues including the use of ethnicity in elections, there is sound evidence proving limited use of ethnicity in elections in Tanzania (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2009; Ole Therkildsen, 2008; Nyang’oro, 2004) as well as ideals and values in African traditions and history to counter the neo-patrimonialists claims (Malipula, 2014; Pitcher et al. 2009). The insistence on the primitive and inferior status of the African traditions to the “modern” western traditions embedded in the legal-rational institutions cornering the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools informs a research strand focusing on reassessing the role of African history in explaining varied social, political and economic phenomena (Mustapha, 2002, Erdman and Engel, 2006, de Grassi, 2008, Pitcher et al. 2009) which is applicable to exploring influences of ethnicity on African politics including determining voters’ choices as substantiated in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5.

The current dissertation has been motivated by the reassessment of the African history school that criticises neo-patrimonialism and hybrid approaches analysis of the influence of ethnicity on voting. On its part, it employs African history informed by colonialism and the resultant PsIM to explain influences of ethnicity on voting in Tanzania. The dissertation endeavours to present a critique to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools and set up an alternative explanation for the continued limited influence of ethnicity in anchoring voting in multiparty elections in Tanzania despite political and economic changes that have occurred over time. The alternative approach employed to
understand the role of ethnicity in influencing voting in multi-party elections that this dissertation suggests rests on the idea of a path-dependent nationalisation frame informed by the privileged witnesses interviewed in this study. The nationalisation frame in question results from the political ideas and aspirations of the independence movement, and the capacity of that movement to build a political organisation encompassing the political leaders, ideals of the independence movement and the people. The dissertation uses the 2010 General Elections (GEs) in Mwanza region as a case study to attest this framework.

At its core, the dissertation explores the ramifications of the implementation of the PsIM in Tanzania. More specifically, it analyses how and why the implementation of the PsIM (PNU, EDNR and peace\textsuperscript{10}) impacts the way Tanzanians interact and apply ethnicity in the electoral processes and subsequently vote. In this regard, the study gives a comprehensive account of the current state of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania as it has been informed by the PsIM. Cognisant of the fact that the degree of ethnic salience on determining voting in Tanzania is low compared to most African states as argued above, the dissertation provides explanations as to why it is and continues to be low. It is the assumption of this study that Tanzania’s extensive post-independence nation-building policy has created a national identity that emphasises peacefulness and national unity as central national values that serve as a frame through which Tanzanians reject any calls for violence and ethnic polarisation. This being said, however, ethnicity is dominant in Tanzania on social and cultural grounds and its flashes in electoral politics cannot be avoided. Therefore, the dissertation explores in which shapes or forms such flashes of ethnicity influence voting in Tanzania.

1.2. Focus and Scope of the Study
The analysis of the influences of ethnicity in voting in African states has been largely informed by neo-patrimonial and hybrid theoretical underpinnings as highlighted above. The structural analysis as described above sheds light on the matters but it is not the dominant explanation and lacks the

\textsuperscript{10} We recognise that there are two versions of peace. One regards peace as the absence of war and another goes beyond absence of war by including presence of social justice, democracy and reconciliation. However, literature and interviewees’ views on ethnicity and voting mostly revolved around the violent aspects of peace and effects thereof. As such peacefulness in this dissertation is informed by the version of peace as absence of warfare and massive violence within a given society (Ramsbotham, 2006). The peacefulness of Tanzania in this context rests on the fact that the country has never experienced civil war or civil disobedience that has had alarming consequences as evidenced in countries like Burundi and Rwanda were genocide occurred, and Kenya were the ethnic-based post 2007 elections that merited an ICC case etc.
agency aspect when explaining influences of ethnicity and voting. Such backdrop gives little explanatory power to explain a complex phenomenon like ethnicity and voting which is associated with an interface of many actors, institutions, structures and processes. In this regard, the analysis of the dissertation will be largely informed by the discourse of the dominant theoretical positions - neo-patrimonial and hybrid, and the legacy of the PsIM as stated by my privileged informants. The dominant theories as explained above essentially argue that ethnicity is salient in African states’ voting due to primordial ways of organising politics in Africa, Tanzania inclusive. The current study does not reject the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations outright but deems them insufficient in explaining influences of ethnicity. Tanzania has in place LRIs but also a layered history of constructing ideals that seem to have a role to play in explaining influences of ethnicity. To substantiate the study’s deviation from the established theoretical suppositions one key focus of the study is to make a well-founded critique of neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime literature relevant to ethnicity and voting and to suggest an alternative explanation. The alternative explanatory framework advanced to analyse the influence of ethnicity on anchoring voting is predicated on the PNU, EDNR and peace embedded in the PsIM in Tanzania.

By using this framework, the current dissertation can explain how accountability to the deliverance of shared goals of a nation (PsIM) can inform influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. It analyses the role of Africa’s major historical fact (colonialism) and its subsequent effect on the establishment and implementation of shared promises of the Tanzanian people embedded in the PSIM to explain the role of ethnicity in informing voting. In this way, the current dissertation deviates from the modernity vs. traditional, personal vs. institutional debates that are at the core of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theories as presented in sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.

Cognisant of the fact that Tanzania has undergone numerous changes since attaining its independence in 1961, and the level of ethnic salience has been argued to be comparatively low, the dissertation proposes the PsIM as explanatory framework. Being aware of the fact that low ethnic salience does not mean absence of ethnicity, the dissertation also focuses on exploring the various shapes and forms in which ethnicity has manifested itself in Tanzanian politics. We also analyse the ramifications of those flashes of ethnicity in future voting trends. At this stage I should share the disclaimer that a part of Tanzania will be omitted in the discussion, as clarified next.
As indicated in 1.1 under the fourth footnote, Tanzania is a United Republic resulting from a merger of the previously sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26th April, 1964. However, the current research as indicated in the first footnote leaves out Zanzibar and deals with Tanganyika/Tanzania Mainland for reasons provided hereafter. The choice of one part of the URT in this research stems from the fact that Tanganyika and Zanzibar have dissimilar political histories and dynamics. Such fact renders it complicated to treat them as a single case study. The Tanzania that forms the base of this research achieved its independence from the British colonialists in 1961. At the time in question, it was under a pluralist political system with one dominant and the nationally inclusive political party that marshalled the fight against colonial rule - Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Other parties that existed at the material time were weak and lacked nation-wide coverage. As a result, TANU won almost all seats in the multi-party elections. In 1965, Tanzania was constitutionally declared a one-party state and TANU that championed the country’s independence movement was made the sole political party in the country (Makulilo, 2009). TANU’s status was given to CCM in 1977 when it was formed after the merger of TANU and ASP following the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. It is imperative to note that although Tanzania was constitutionally declared a single party state in 1965, it was a de facto mono party state since independence (Babeiya, 2012). This argument is predicated on the fact that TANU enjoyed uncontestable control of the country’s political realm. In the main, this was due to its mass character and the role it played in the country’s struggles against the colonial rule (Mwakikagile, 2010). In 1992, pluralist politics were reintroduced in Tanzania as a result of internal and external pressures of economic and political liberalisation (Babeiya, 2012). Currently, Tanzania as indicated in section 1.1 has 22 registered political parties and has conducted five multiparty GEs11. In all elections, the ruling party CCM has won convincingly in both the presidential and parliamentary races as indicated in appendix I12. In these elections, fears of ethnicity abounding were prevailing as some argued that political pluralism would inform the use of ethnicity in

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11 Tanzania has conducted multiparty general elections in 1995; 2000;2005; 2010 and 2015. The sixth is expected to be held in 2020.
12 The results exclude five members elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar to the national Assembly who are divided among members of Zanzibar House of Representatives which happen to be divided among CCM and CUF, 10 presidential nominees and the Attorney General. Generally speaking since CCM has been winning 50% of the House and the presidency most of the nominated parliamentarians are from CCM. In rare occasions opposition leaders like Chief Abdallah Fundikira, Hon. Augustine Mrema and Hon. James Mbatia from the opposition were appointed.
political canvassing and voting (Gasarasi, 1997). These fears have never been vindicated and the state of ethnicity and other regional or social divides have never taken political salience in elections (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2010). While this has been the case in Tanganyika, the same cannot be said of Zanzibar (Killian, 2010). This is chiefly due to dissimilar political histories and dynamics evidenced in following paragraphs.

Elements of ethnic fragmentation in Tanganyika never had dilapidating effects. This is mainly because efforts of nation-building have watered down divisive politics. The same cannot be said of Zanzibar. This argument rests on the fact that while the independence movement in Tanganyika had dexterously mobilised the major social forces in Tanganyikan society to forge a high degree of unity upon independence and beyond (as it will be explained in detail throughout the third and fourth chapters), the movement in Zanzibar was divided and took structures set by the colonialists and their agents. It is imperative to note that Zanzibar was a satellite colony under the Sultanate of Oman with clear domination of trade and political affairs. The Sultanates’ hold of business and politics established an extremely centralised state in Zanzibar. The political system and its associated economic mode had implications on the ethnic structures of pre-colonial Zanzibar manifesting into class and racial structures. The Oman Arabs constituted the ruling class and the land-owning aristocracy, the Indians were the traders and financiers of the slave trade while Africans mainly from Tanganyika forming the class of slaves. The indigenous Zanzibar Africans and the Shirazi people were mere peasants (Mukangara, 2000). At this juncture, I can agree with Bakari (2001) who is of the view that even before colonialism the elements of racial and classical ethnicity in Zanzibar were developed. According to Bakari, such divisive elements coupled with the inability to reverse them and with undemocratic tendencies, have significant bearings on the racial and ethnic related conflicts during the struggle for independence and the post-independence politics.

The nationally integrated nature of the Tanganyika movement informed the less competitive opposition and comparatively peaceful elections when multiparty politics were reintroduced in 1992 (Mwaipopo, 2011). This was not the case in Zanzibar where political opposition is very strong and electoral violence serious enough to cause violence and casualties (Malipula, 2001; Bakari, 2001; Mukangara, 2000). The difference can be proven by the fact that in all GEs in Tanganyika the ruling party CCM has scooped a clear winning majority ranging between 60% and
80%. At the same time, in all Zanzibar elections contests are very close with the ruling party CCM candidate winning by 0.5 % of the vote in the 1995 presidential elections. This trend of meagre success in other elections against CUF opponents characterised the forthcoming elections in the Isles. The sustained trend of close ties in electoral results is attributed to regional differences (between the individual Islands forming Zanzibar: Pemba and Unguja), something absent in Tanganyika’s politics.

In general, the political culture of Tanganyika differs from that of Zanzibar. Tanganyika provides an interesting and unique case for investigating the basis of the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in a stable, peaceful and ethnically depoliticised country since its independence to-date. The opportunity provided by Tanzania stands despite the country’s move from socialist to liberal political and economic policies. As such, Tanganyika allows an analysis of ethnicity and voting in the changing nature of politics and economics in this stable context. A detailed overview of Tanzania’s political and electoral system is provided in section 4.2. Issues of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania as they unfolded over time are presented in the rest of the sections constituting Chapter IV.

1.3. Justification for the Study

The influences of determinants of electoral choice including the role of ethnicity in anchoring voting remain to be a gaping lacuna in Tanzania’s voting behaviour literature. This is the case despite four competitive GEs being conducted since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 (Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Phillips, 2010). Surveys by REDET and Afrobarometer remain the main sources of empirical data on voting behaviour in Tanzania. However, they lack comprehensive analysis of the influences of ethnicity on explaining voters’ choices. REDET’s opinion polls and voters’ preferences provide insights into voting behaviour with a bias on the party preferences, electoral systems, candidate choices and performance of the incumbent. The Afrobarometer studies on democracy and governance provide a limited analysis of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania because they discuss it as an undifferentiated trend among African countries. The studies view Tanzania as an unrepresentative case for ethnicity in Africa (Miguel, 2004; Young, 2009; Bratton et al. 2011). Other studies concurring with the Afrobarometer-guided studies

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13 REDET is an acronym for the Research and Education on Democracy in Tanzania. REDET is housed in the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam
14 Varied voters preference and opinion poll results can be accessed on REDET’s website
on ethnicity and voting include but not limited to Ole Therkildsen (2009), Nyang’oro (2006), Kiondo (2001) and Mpangala (2000). The studies fail to provide a thorough path-dependent analysis that explains in detail why the level of ethnicity is comparatively low on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. Equally, we should shed light on how the factors that caused the limited use of ethnicity in anchoring votes have consistently managed to have their effect during different political and economic circumstances that Tanzania has undergone.

This dissertation is the first comprehensive empirical study of voting behaviour in Tanzania to deviate from the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools of African politics. It does so by suggesting an empirically rigorous and theoretically grounded path-dependent historical explanation relevant for explaining the role of ethnicity on voters’ choices in Tanzania.

At a broader level, the study is a step towards reducing the shortage of electoral behaviour studies in new democracies of which Tanzania is part, as purported by varied scholars (O’Gorman, 2012; Bratton et al. 2011; Phillips, 2010; Kimenyi and Romero 2008; Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Young 2009; Erdmann, 2007; Posner 2004 and Ozcan, 2000). The limited studies of voting behaviour in new democracies make them rely on theories developed from experiences of established democracies’ to explain their voting behaviour. The negative aspect of such reliance revolves around the fact that architects of these theories assume that their postulations could cater for all democracies (advanced and new) irrespective of distinguishable socio-economic and political milieu within which voters live and elections are conducted (Kang, 2009). Taking this assumption for granted without any scientific test of their applicability is not only an empirical flaw, but indeed an underdevelopment of the contribution of the experience of new democracies like Tanzania in the field of electoral behaviour (Kang, 2009; Ozcan, 2000).

Equally vital, because Tanzania has strived to build nationhood and national identity since independence, this study provides pointers to reflect about the interplay between ethnicity and the state’s accountability to the society’s overall nation-building enterprise in different political orientations. The analysis offers an indication of how national political culture envisioned under the monolithic political dispensation and socialist economic system has been sustained, rejected or accepted, and adapted by different generations. One generation of respondents had the privilege to witness the monolithic political and socialist economic order. The next grew up after the demise of
such order. Views from the two generations offer a compelling glimpse of the future of the influences of ethnicity on anchoring voting in Tanzanian multi-party elections.

1.4. Research Questions

Research questions according to Punch (2005) are essential to any research undertaking. They direct a research project by drawing its boundaries. Research questions enable researchers to remain focused during the entire research project. These questions guide the researcher to collect relevant data and provide an agenda for report writing (Kothari, 2009). Given the above, the fundamental problem that the present research endeavours to answer is: *What ramifications do the PsIM and their implementation have on the way Tanzanians apply ethnicity in voting in competitive elections in Tanzania?* The central research question breaks down into three sub-questions as enumerated below:

The first aspect of the dissertation deals with how the PsIM influence voting in multi-party elections in Tanzania. The relevant question is: *How have the PsIM and their implementation influenced the use of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in competitive elections in Tanzania?* The primary focus of this question is to obtain information about the role of the legacy of the PsIM on determining the use of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. The legacy of the PsIM is measured by the PNU, EDNR and peace. The study borrows the Afrobarometer variables to measure the role of PNU on determining voters’ choices. The Afrobarometer measures the role of national unity through interviewees’ perceptions of ethnic ethnic salience, inter-ethnic discrimination and inter-ethnic trust. According to the barometer low level of ethnic salience is measured by the following variable: preference for and identifying more with national identity compared to ethnic group identity. Ethnic salience is said to be high when interviewees identify first and foremost with the ethnic group rather than with the nation. Inter-ethnic trust according to the barometer is measured through interviewees’ trust in members of other ethnic groups, as no less trustworthy than co-ethnics. If interviewees trust the members of other ethnic groups as much as their own, they are viewed to harbour feelings of inter-ethnic trust. Feelings of inter-ethnic indiscrimination (feelings that your ethnic group or ‘tribe’\(^\text{15}\) – *kabila* in Swahili - is not

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\(^{15}\) ‘Tribe’ is a translation of the Swahil word ‘kabila’ and stands for cultural groups, namely population groups whose members identify with a certain common cultural tradition. These groups in Africa were fluid and manipulated by colonialists to serve their divide and rule policy as we will see in Chapter III and IV.
discriminated in various domains including distribution of the spoils of the state) are measured by interviewees’ denial of ethnic-based segregation and distribution of resources. Studies by Bratton et al. (2011) and Young (2009) provide examples of how the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices can be measured through the variables picked in this study.

As for EDNR and peace, the views of my key informants (KIs) set the base. To them, EDNR should be measured by (1) the criteria and legacy of the *Ujamaa*<sup>16</sup> villagisation processes (which removed people from scattered areas to live together in newly created villages to ensure collective production and the sharing of public goods including social amenities); (2) nationalisation of the major means of the economy (putting the previously private owned properties owned by foreigners in the hands of the Tanzanians through their government and sharing its produce) as well as (3) free social service distribution to Tanzanians. Where villagisation and nationalisation are considered to enhance unity and EDNR, the likelihood of low salience of ethnicity is deemed to be great. Finally, the role of the promise of peace is measured in terms of interviewees’ opposing views on the use of violence as a means of organising politics and acquiring public demands.

The major assumption embedded in the variables is that the more positive the interviewees are to the PsIM in the form of the elements of national unity, EDNR as well as love of peace by denouncing violent means of acquiring public resources, the more the likelihood of low level of ethnic salience in voting. In this way, the PsIM can be said to have influenced voting in the non-ethnic way it intended.

Secondly, this study explores dynamics behind the influence of the PsIM on voters’ choices in Tanzania. Therefore, the relevant research question in this connection is: *Why the PsIM and efforts to implement them have influenced the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania the way it has?* The underlying idea of this question is to obtain information on how the PsIM could motivate Tanzanians’ use of ethnicity on determining their voting choices. Once again the

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<sup>16</sup> The concept of *Ujamma* literally means familyhood. It was Tanzania’s major socio-economic philosophy that guided the country’s political, social and economic affairs. At its core, it aimed at bringing people together and cooperate in reaping the advantages of the nation in an egalitarian manner (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). Further explanations of *Ujamaa* as enshrined in the AD which explain the philosophy are provided in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 and further elaborated in section 4.4. For thorough understanding of *Ujamaa* and *Ujamaa* villages (see Nyerere, J. (1967). “Socialism and Rural Development”, in Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa*-Essays on Socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
base for addressing the question is informed by the KIs views. The major assumption is that the PsIM depict the felt needs of the people (national unity, EDNR and peace) and have formed an identity among Tanzanians as well as pride which people do not want to see wither away.

Thirdly, the dissertation endeavours to explore flashes or bursts of ethnicity that manifest in Tanzania and their role in influencing voting. For this objective the relevant research question is: In what forms and shapes/bursts of ethnicity have manifested in Tanzanian elections, and how do they inform voters’ choices? The main intent of this question is to gather information about historical events heightening ethnicity during elections in Tanzania. This is useful as in Tanzania there are cultural and social grounds for ethnicity which might have corresponding effects on voters’ choices in elections. The analysis is anchored on politics of origin and belonging as defined in section 3.2.6. Key elements include candidates’ knowledge of the local language of the area he/she vies for political office (in our case Kisukuma), candidates’ ancestral origin and ownership of land in the area he/she seeks to be elected, as well as residence in the area of electoral contest and perceptions of kinship networks as defined in section 3.2.6.

1.5. Organisation of the Dissertation
The present dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides the general introduction of the study, in which theoretical perspectives and discussions on the politicisation of ethnicity and its ramification are presented. At its core, the arguments suggest Africa is an ethnically polarised continent whereby ethnicity is supposed to be salient in anchoring votes. However, it exempts Tanzania from such categorisation. The chapter presents the focus of the study that marks a departure from the patrimonial and hybrid schools of African politics which are central to explaining the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes. It does so by developing an alternative theoretical underpinning discussing ethnicity and voting through the legacy of the PsIM in Tanzania. Similarly, in the same chapter the research problem and questions as well as the significance of the study are presented. The chapter concludes by giving the organisation of the dissertation.

The second chapter discusses the study’s methodology whereby information on research design and strategy as well as the study area and the rationale for choosing it is provided. In addition, the
chapter includes information on the research process, methods used to obtain, analyse and present data as well as limitations and delimitations of the study.

The third chapter presents a conceptual and theoretical discussion on the literature about ethnicity and voting. It provides an understanding of ethnicity resulting from a critical account of the primordial, instrumental and social constructivist conceptions of ethnicity and the germination of ethnicity into a politically salient phenomenon. Theoretical and empirical literature on the influence of ethnicity in influencing voting in African elections and puzzles thereof are also treated. In this chapter, a point of departure from the ethnic structure school and the Neopatrimonial and hybrid regime theory in explaining ethnicity and voting is drawn. An explanation based on the legacy of the independent movement is made and its relevance in explaining depoliticised ethnicity in Tanzania is justified. Subsequently, a conceptual framework for the study derived from the theoretical discussions and interviews with privileged informants or KII's as referred to in this dissertation is presented.

The fourth chapter presents a concise narrative of the Tanzanian ethno-polity. It essentially canvasses a conceptual and contextual analysis of the ethnic, political, and economic developments in Tanzania from the nationalist era to the present and serves as an introduction as well as a theoretical and empirical foundation for the analysis of the role of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in Mwanza in the 2010 multiparty GE’s. The chapter presents the essence of the insignificant role of ethnicity in Tanzania’s politics compared to other African countries. It goes on to unravel the nation-building policy in Tanzania to show how it meticulously developed a national identity and political culture that helped Tanzanians to enjoy peace and avoid the horrors of divisive politics and ethnic polarisation. The chapter indicates that the Ujamaa political culture that was in line with the PsIM has sustainably managed to inform the way Tanzanians behave politically even amid the collapse of the Arusha Declaration (AD) and challenges of liberal politics and economics that are against the letter and spirit of Ujamaa.

The fifth chapter presents the empirical data and analyses made on the influence of the legacy of the PsIM in informing the role of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices in competitive elections in Mwanza region as guided by the study’s specific research questions. The results are examined to determine interviewees’ attitudes toward the role of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices in multiparty elections in Tanzania. The interviewees’ examined in this survey offer an
indication of how national political culture, which was conceived and propagated under one-party politics and a socialist economic system, has been sustained or rejected by those who lived in the AD era and those who did not. This comparison is essential for drawing the path dependency by establishing acceptance and adoption of practices by a generation that has lived and that grown up after the demise of the AD dictates. The political imaginary[17] is thoroughly path-dependent. Attitudes derived from such analysis offers a valuable glimpse of the future of national identity, divisive politics and conflicts in Tanzania.

The sixth chapter presents my interviewees views on the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. In the main, the chapter presents and discusses Tanzanians predictions on the role of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices.

The seventh and last chapter gives an overall summary of the dissertation, its conclusions and implications as well as recommending further research in the area of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania.

[17] An ‘imaginary’ is not an illusion. Images imagined may be true. Imaginary is another term for ideology but it includes also unconscious ideas such as metaphors.
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

2.1. Introduction
Conducting research encompasses a chain of interconnected activities which are done in a logical manner. These activities involve conceptualisation of the problem which is being investigated, reviewing literature relevant to the study in question, collection of data as well as analysis and presentation of the collected data. Consequently, research entails discussion of the research findings and drawing conclusions on the basis of the research questions and findings. Throughout the process of conducting research a number of methods and strategies are required depending on the nature of the research or problem that is to be investigated.

In this chapter, I present the methodology involved in the study. It includes the research approach, research epistemology, sources of data, data analysis, data validity and reliability, ethical issues, limitations and delimitations, and finally the chapters’ conclusion.

2.2. Research Design
A research design is a plan unfolding how, when and where data for a particular research has been collected and analysed. In other words, a research design entails the orientation of the study as a whole (Creswell, 2009, 2003; Walliman, 2006). This study employs qualitative research design. The choice has been influenced by the fact that a qualitative design is useful for descriptive studies as it is flexible and allows the incorporation of various methods of data collection and is suitable for answering “how” and “why” questions (Creswell, 2009). Since we are interested in unveiling how ethnicity influences voters’ choices the way it has, and give reasons for such influences, a choice of quantitative methods which according to Berger (2010); Hesse-Biber, (2010); Lindlof and Taylor (2010) are relevant to questions like how many and/or to what extent would not provide relevant results. Similarly, the design was preferred due to its strength in understanding a social or human problem and obtaining detailed views from informants in a natural setting. Since ethnicity is a social phenomenon with sensitive attachments, interactions with interviewees and

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18 Is a general approach to studying a research topic which includes how the research is carried out and procedures involved in exploring or describing phenomena (Silverman, 2000)
application of methods that can ensure their involvement in a natural setting was essential for acquiring relevant data.

Furthermore, qualitative designs are very useful in studies where limited information exists about a phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). The exploration of the PsIM is an example of such understudied phenomenon. The researcher’s close involvement in qualitative studies also influenced our choice. This is because it guaranteed the researcher an insider's view of the researched field, such as we seek to gain in our interviews of privileged witnesses in the political arena. This allowed the researcher to find issues like subtleties and complexities that according to Punch (2005); Burns (2000) are often missed by quantitative studies due to their emphasis on statistical analysis.

The qualitative research strategy employed in the current dissertation is called analytic narrative. An analytic narrative is a theoretically informed research strategy that builds models mainly derived from rational choice (Bates et al. 1998). Analytical narratives do so through analysis of key actors in a particular matter studied; their goals and preferences as well as the effective rules that influence actors’ behaviours. Analytical narratives analyse and elaborate the strategic interactions that produce an equilibrium that constrains some actions and facilitates others. The drawback of rational choice is the assumption that actors, in this case, voters act rationally, and moreover that rationality (choosing on rational grounds) means the same thing in every culture. It is imperative to note therefore that although Bates et al. (1998) confesses a preference for rational choice theory in analytical narratives, Bates (2000) two years later changed his position and argued that it is not a necessary condition for an analytic narrative. Alternatively, researchers can use any theory or theories of choice, provided that it is sufficiently developed to provide a consistent technique for deducing behaviour. It is against this background that I decided to go beyond the rational choice theory to inform my analysis of the influences of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. The requirement of explicit theory (or, at least, a theory that could be formalised even if it is not) compels scholars to make causal statements and to identify a small number of variables (Levi, 2002). This approach provides the researcher with some discipline as explicit theory affords the researcher to distill the narrative and ensure that the explanations are not informed by factors outside the theoretical base.

Analytical narratives are capable of generating not only the favoured explanation of a phenomenon but also an alternative explanation. This is done through making assumptions clearly and
explicitly. As such, it provides the possibility of challenging assumptions to produce new insights and competitive interpretations of data. Likewise, analytical narratives entail comparative static results crucial for comparative research. This is because they are the basis for hypotheses of what could have taken place under different conditions (Bates et al. 1998). When the models are game theoretic, they offer yet another source of hypothesis building. While rational choice emphasizes an actor’s motives and personal interests, the kindred approach of game theory looks at outcomes at the collective level, which allows for zero-sum and non-zero sum (including win-win as well as non-optimal) outcomes. The consideration of off-the-equilibrium path-behaviour should reveal reasons and reasoning for why actors took one path and not another. Indeed, what actors believe will happen should they make a different choice might determine what choices they do make (Levi, 1990).

The analytic narrative strategy employed in this dissertation is fundamentally a basic analytic explanation method as put forward by George and Bennett (2005). This approach is by no means a rational choice analytic narrative as spearheaded by Bates et al. (1998), which he criticised later as pointed out above (Bates, 2000). According to George and Bennett (2005) an analytic explanation research strategy is conceived as a variant of process tracing methods. Its defining characteristic is that it converts historical narratives into analytical based explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms. The analytical explanation is, in essence, a narrative that ‘pays attention to stories, accounts, and context’ and is, at the same time, a tool of analysis that ‘extracts explicit and formal lines, which facilitate both exposition and explanation’ (Bates, et al, 1998).

The basic analytic narrative does indeed make use of history and share the elements of historical narratives. However, it has a vital advantage which makes it deviate from pure historical narratives (Levi, 2002; Mahoney, 1990). The merit is the fact that an analytic narrative does not necessarily need to be a strictly sequential narrative because it accords a researcher room of choosing key points of focus. As George and Bennett (2005) points out: “the explanation may be deliberately selective, focusing on what are thought to be particularly important parts of an adequate or parsimonious explanation.” In line with George and Bennett (2005) advice that analytic explanations could select accounts deemed relevant, I put forward the research questions to guide this study and constructed in Chapter IV of this dissertation a general narrative of Tanzania’s ethno-political experience. This narrative depicted the environment within which the questions
came about. It also provided the base for analysing the influences of the PsIM in informing the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs. The base created in Chapter IV smoothened the analysis of qualitative data garnered from a survey conducted in Mwanza, KIs and documentary sources meant to explain the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections in Tanzania and the implications thereof.

2.3. Research Epistemology

Social research concedes that social inquiry is based upon the dual fundamental principles of epistemology and ontology (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). In a nutshell, epistemology deals with the issue of knowledge, and specifically, who is, or can be a “knower” (May and Williams, 1998). Epistemology addresses itself to issues related to knowledge like: how reality can be known; the interplay between the knower and what is known; the assumptions that guide the process of knowing and the achievement of findings, as well as the possibility of such process replicated by others for purposes of assessing the quality of a study and the reliability of its findings (May and Williams, 1998). Ontology is concerned with questions pertaining to the kinds of things that exist within society. It is about ways of constructing reality, how reality really is and how things really work (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).

Ontologically, this study does not differ very much from two theories which this dissertation critiques - neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime research. The matter and object of the study are political thoughts and political elites and how they use ethnicity to seek and gain political mandate from voters in elections. However, the study leaves aside how such influence impact upon legitimacy and dominance of the power gained through ethnicity in a given polity. These two aspects are at the core of neo-patrimonial and hybrid studies. The major dissimilarity between this dissertation and the approach informing neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime research projects is essentially in epistemology. While neo-patrimonial theory emphasises individual actions of leaders as the base of determination of voters choices, which made Mustapha (2002) to brand the research strand as one led by methodological individualism, this dissertation is guided by an epistemology which conceives elections in general and voting in particular as a complex process with sometimes unpredictable outcomes at the collective level. To this dissertation elections and voting are processes in which both leaders and the led in a given polity participate in shaping the processes’ expectations and the do and don’ts, including the salience or otherwise of ethnicity.
With regard to how an idea becomes shared by a collective group, the episteme employed in this dissertation is analogous to that used for the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of social realities such as a nation and nationalism conceptualised as cultural artefacts (Gellner, 1983) or imagined communities (Anderson, 1991). Fundamental attributes that this study shares with Gellner’s and Anderson’s approach to nationalism is the tracing of historical visions, ideas, socio-economic processes and activities that came to produce these communal social realities shared by a collectivity of people - in our case, how they have informed the salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters choices. Following this methodological approach, this study traces not only the origins of the visions and ideas of ethnicity on determining voting that came to be shared by Tanzanians as a political community, but also how such ideas were used to inform ethnicity’s role on determining voters’ choices over time. Moreover, it is interested in unveiling why those ideas sustained the major political and economic reforms that took place in the Tanzanian state since independence.

The last point of departure in the epistemology used by this research from neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theory is that it gives credit to, but also critically examines, African ideas and viewpoints informed by African political thought. As such, it uses African political thought embedded in the PsIM as an independent variable in itself, and in this way a possible standard for assessing the relation between ethnicity and voting. In our case the example is the PsIM claimed to ensure national unity, EDNR and peace to render ethnicity insignificant in elections. Thus, the effectiveness of that outlook has been judged according to the standards they put forth and the innovations they developed to that effect. It also takes into account the particular historical milieu in which some individuals had, through reading, acquired academic knowledge about the neo-patrimonial and hybrid ideas of ethnicity and voting, and thus had impacted on their concern with the dangers of ethnicity. However, for them and for the masses, it was the lived experience of politics emanating from the independence movements that primarily informed their thinking, we will argue. And later, in the post-independence era, leaders and individuals had the opportunity to combine lived experience with borrowed and learned ideas from other parts of the world to inform their choice of significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This position contrasts with the way Africans are perceived (by the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theses) to apply ethnicity in anchoring votes. That view has been largely Western-European centric in its epistemology, ignoring the influence of knowledge and experience sharing on the views of African leaders.
2.4. Description of the Study Area and Rationale for Choosing It

Tanzania is a country that is constituted by 30 regions. The data-collection for this study was conducted in Mwanza Region specifically in Nyamagana and Misungwi districts. The region lies in the northern part of Tanzania, located between latitude 10 30' and 30 south of the Equator. Longitudinally, the region is located between 310 45' and 340 10' east of Greenwich. Mwanza is bordered by Kagera region to the west, Shinyanga to the south and south east; to the north east Mwanza is bordered by Mara region, while to the northern part Mwanza is bordered by Lake Victoria which separates the region from neighbouring countries of Uganda and Kenya (see East African and Tanzania and Mwanza maps below).

MAP 1: The Map of East Africa
Mwanza is a relatively small region occupying 2.3% of the total land area of Tanzania mainland. The region occupies a total of 35,187 sq km, out of this area 20,095 sq km is dry land and 15,092 sq km is covered by Lake Victoria. Thus 43% of the region’s surface area is water. Land wise, Mwanza is the fourth smallest region in Dar es Salaam after Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro and Mtwara. The region has a total of 8 districts, seven Local Government Authorities, 33 divisions, 174 wards, 683 villages and 481 streets (the lowest administrative areas resulting from subdividing wards within townships, municipalities and cities). Although Mwanza is among the smallest region in terms of dry land area, it has a population of 2,772,509 with a population density of 292 people per sq.km according to 2012 National Population and Housing Census. Mwanza is the second densely populated region to the country’s commercial capital Dar es Salaam. Mwanza is the third most urbanised region of Tanzania with (18.6%) of its population urbanised. The first two mostly
urbanised regions in Tanzania are Dar es Salaam and Morogoro with urban populations of 89.6% and 21.1% respectively.

Ethnic-wise Mwanza Region is predominantly populated by the Sukuma ethnic group which constitutes over 90% of the region’s population. Other ethnic groups found in the region are the Zinza, Haya, Sumbwa, Nyamwezi, Luo, Kurya, Jita and Kerewe. These groups constitute small proportions and are mainly found in Mwanza Municipal area where the district of Nyamagana is located. The presence of the non-Sukuma ethnic groups is felt in Geita and Sengerema where the Sumbwa and Zinza are mostly found (Mwanza Social Economic Profile, 2008).

Case selection in qualitative research requires a researcher to determine study cases which are unique in some way or cases which are considered typical and may also select cases to represent a variety of geographic regions, a variety of size parameters to mention a few (Cresswell, 2009). Mwanza was picked to provide the dissertation’s case study for a number of reasons. The first and foremost is that Mwanza is the centre of the largest ethnic group in Tanzania, the Sukuma, who constitute around 13% of the country’s population (Malipula, 2014). Other regions with predominant Sukuma are Geita, Shinyanga, Simiyu; and Tabora that is predominantly the home of the Nyamwezi but with a substantial number of the Sukuma. It is imperative to note that the Nyamwezi and the Sukuma are culturally and lingually identical. This is because history suggests that the Sukuma is a breakaway of the Nyamwezi. In light of this fact in some cases, the two are analysed in oneness making the percentage of Sukumas rise up to 17. An interesting element of the Sukuma ethnic group is that despite being the largest ethnic group numerically it has never been known for their political activism and is only quite modestly represented in the halls of political power despite their size (Weber, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2006). Another important element related to Mwanza is the impetus that political parties and their candidates place in the region as the centre of the Sukuma to tap votes and influence support from other Sukuma dominant regions mentioned above, which through varied interactions and media sources can be reached. Harnessing the Sukuma peasant’s vote is reaching the mainland’s rural heart.

The second factor that makes Mwanza interesting is the fact that the levels of political support of the ruling party CCM in the 2010 elections as well as those of other comparatively good performers in the region, CUF and UDP, decreased. While the support of CCM, CUF and UDP fell, CHADEMA’s support rose drastically compared to the previous three multi-party elections. In
2010 CHADEMA scooped the urban constituencies in Mwanza town and one in Ukerewe, and fared well in most constituencies across the region; something that has never happened before. In this regard, Mwanza provided an interesting political environment for analysing ethnicity in a context that electoral results reflect a changing environment where the dominance of the ruling party was put to test.

Finally, Mwanza region is the home of the second largest city in Tanzania, but also harbours large sparsely populated rural areas within it and more predominantly rural areas in its districts, therefore the region permits a mapping of both urban and rural attitudes in analysing the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. Since case selection requires a researcher to determine study cases which are unique in some way or cases which are considered typical and may also select cases to represent a variety of geographic regions, a variety of size parameters to mention a few. This study has opted to be moved partially by the urban-rural geographical reality of Mwanza to select Nyamagana and Misungwi. The districts of Nyamagana and Misungwi found in Mwanza Region came into picture to represent the urban and rural areas of the region respectively. Likewise, as indicated earlier the district of Nyamagana at the time of research was led by an MP from the opposition while the one in Misungwi is led by CCM. this provides information from people within constituencies that have support from the major political parties in the region based on the 2010 election results. In this sense the two districts usefully provide scenarios reflective of the region and therefore contribute positively in potraying the base for exploring the influences of ethnicity in determining electoral choices. It is against these backgrounds that Overall, the region and the two districts selected (Nyamagana and Misungwi) does provide a very fitting context for analysing the core research issues of this dissertation.

2.5. Setting the Research Scene

Before embarking on actual fieldwork, I toured the Mwanza region so as to have a general picture socioculturally mapping the study area and to introduce myself to the relevant authorities. The mapping started on 15th October 2014 and lasted for five days covering 2 districts: Nyamagana and Misungwi. In these days, I have had discussions with leaders of political parties and government on issues relevant to the study. Most of the discussions, interlarded with informal background information, gave a general picture of the politics of the study area and proved significant in
sharpening my tools. However, they do not form part of the dissertation as they merely meant to give me a better understanding of the area studied.

2.6. Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

In this study, because of the envisaged limited number of respondents, I employed a multi-stage sampling procedure, to raise representativeness. The procedure is a complex type of cluster sampling that includes two or more stages of arbitrary sample selection. In simple terms, multi-stage sampling allows large clusters of population to be divided into small clusters in numerous stages for purposes of making primary data collection manageable (Kothari, 2009). Multi-stage sampling addresses certain disadvantages associated with true random sampling such as being overly expensive and time-consuming (Patton, 2002). The procedure simplifies random sampling method by dividing a population into small clusters like region, districts, wards, etc. thus reducing costs and time that may result from random sampling which may force a researcher to get interviewees from scattered locations. The procedure was picked because the study in question was about Tanzania that has 25 regions and over 100 districts, much more wards and a lot of households which could not be reached by the researcher due to time and resources. Mwanza region was purposively selected due to factors explained in the rationale for the choice of the study described in section 2.4 above. Therefore, the multi-stage sampling started from Mwanza.

The multi-stage sampling procedure with five stages was applied in this study as follows. The first stage was the regional level. At this point, two districts were selected from lists of urban and rural districts constituting Mwanza region respectively. I made a list of all districts constituting the region and then divided these among the dominantly urban and dominantly rural districts. From each list, I wrote pieces of paper with one district on each and put them in two separate bowls distinguishing the urban and rural districts. From the bowls, I randomly picked one piece from each bowl to select the districts to be included in the study. Nyamagana and Misungwi were randomly selected through this process.

The second stage was the district level whereby two wards from each district were randomly selected from a list of wards constituting the districts. As it was the case for the choice of the districts, I made a list of all wards located in Nyamagana and Misungwi. The pieces of paper with names of the wards found in each district were put into two separate bowls. I picked two pieces
from each bowl to be included in the study. The wards selected in Nyamagana district were Igoma and Mirongo while Misungwi and Igokelo wards were selected to represent Misungwi district.

The third stage was the ward stage where two streets or villages were randomly selected from a list of streets and villages depending on the nature of the status of the wards. For the urban wards, streets were the sampling points while villages were the appropriate sampling points for the rural wards. The same procedure of writing pieces of paper with names of the villages and streets found in each ward and putting them in separate bowls for selection was applied. The streets randomly selected in Igoma ward were Shamalala and Kishiri A; while Rufiji and Utemini represented Mirongo ward. Misungwi and Mbela villages were selected from Misungwi ward; and Mapilinga and Nange villages represented Igokelo ward.

The fourth stage was selecting households in each village or street based on the village or street household registers. From the register, 6 households were randomly picked through a table of random numbers. The fifth and last stage was picking interviewees of voting age alternating from women to men from those households. Lists of males and females of voting age were made after consultation with the household head; I randomly selected the interviewee from the lists by picking one name from the relevant list in each household. That means in each village or street 3 males and 3 females constituted the sample. With this strategy, the total number of individuals interviewed from the wards was 48. The sampling procedure has accorded the study an interesting and representative sample of the people in the studied area. It has an equal distribution of the sex, residential area, varied age groups including the youth, middle aged and elderly. The sample also included interviewees of varied educational backgrounds, religions and occupations. Social demographic distribution of the interviewees based on sex, age, residence, tribal distribution, marital status, educational level, religion and occupation is presented in Table I below.
Table I: Social Demographic Characteristics of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVIEWEES</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 – 39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 and above</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESIDENCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIBAL DISTRIBUTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukuma</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION LEVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Primary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Workers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self employed Entrepreneur</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above indicates the social demographic characteristics which are reflective of the Tanzanian society. For instance, regarding sex, the distribution is equal as the percentage of interviewees in the study area was 50% male and 50% females. These figures are very close to the reality of the Tanzanian sex structure that is 49% to 51% among males and females respectively (URT, 2014). One may ask why I have not tried to go for the actual census percentages. I was of the opinion that the difference of one percentage was so minor to have any significance in effecting the findings towards the male sex.

As it was the case for sex, the age distribution of the interviewees also indicated a reality of the age structure of the country whereby there are younger people than older ones. In this regard, although
I picked the interviewees randomly and ended up interviewing 48%, 33% and 19% of young, middle age and elderly interviewees. The Tanzanians between the age of 22 and 39 according to this study were conceived to be young. The choice is anchored on the fact that in Tanzania the age for youth ranges between 18 and 40. After 40 particularly in the political arena, a party member seizes to belong to the youth wing and can vie for the presidency. The constitution warrants among other things, presidential aspirants to be of the age of 40 or above. One could question why I do not have interviewees of the age of 18. The reason is that I wanted to have views of people who were eligible to participate in the 2010 elections. Therefore, since at the time of interviews those who were eligible to participate were 22 years old and above, I decided to start at 22 instead of 18. The second category was of the middle age that ranged from interviewees with the 40 to 54 years of age. This group had more interviewees compared to the group conceived to be elderly that was constituted by interviewees with the age of 55 and above. As indicated in the preceding sentence the age of 40 was the starting point for the middle aged because it is when the youth age ends. The choice of 54 as the end of this category was banked on the fact that in Tanzania people are allowed to retire on the basis of old age at 55. Therefore, that is the reason why 54 was deemed to be the end of the middle age and all interviewees from the age of 55 and above, were considered to be elderly in this study. From such categorisation, I managed to get views of all age categories that were eligible to participate in the elections of 2010 in Mwanza which constitutes the study’s case.

The social demographic characteristics also indicates that the residential distribution of respondents in terms rural and urban residency was equal as the study purposively picked one urban district and another rural one to depict the Mwanza’s urban and rural characteristics as indicated in section 2.4 above. The ethno-cultural (‘tribal’) distribution also deviated from the actual percentages of the region’s tribal distribution which is 90% Sukuma and the rest non-Sukuma as indicated in section 2.4. The interviewees in the study were 72% Sukuma and 28% non-Sukuma. This is, as said, not reflective of the magnitude of the tribal distribution as indicated in the 2008 socio-economic profile of the region, probably because less rural villages could be included. Still, members of the dominant ethnic group make up the majority, thus having the highest probability of their views determining the study. More important, the data of 2008 might also be less realistic given the increase of urban migration in the region, particularly with the expansion of St Augustine University in the region, which accommodates many students and
workers from other regions. All in all, since the interviewees were randomly picked biases were minimised.

The table also indicates that most of the interviewees belong to the two major religions in the country- Christianity and Islam. The number of Christians was far higher than the Muslims in the study area - 63% to 33% which seems to deviate from the general distribution of the religion in the country. Statistics indicate that the two religions have almost equal followers in Tanzania. However, the disparity is because the distribution of the religion in the country is not uniform in all areas. There are places like in the coastal areas were the number of Muslims is far higher than Christians, and others that have the opposite. Mwanza region is one of the areas were the number of Muslims is much lower than that of Christians and, therefore, it is no wonder that the distribution of interviewees took such look. However, the limited number cannot by any means entail biases in the views of the minority as they were all randomly selected and religion was not part of the issues researched. It is also relevant to recognise that the non-Muslims and non-Christians were also included. Their number was nominal among the study’s interviewees (4%); however, this is a reality of their minority in the country’s overall religious distribution.

As for education, a reality of the education distribution of the Tanzanian society is reflected in the sample as more interviewees have primary education (52%) and secondary and tertiary education (35%) compared to the non-formally educated and university graduates. It is the case because primary education in Tanzania is compulsory and almost free. More important, it is in the recent past that every ward has managed to build a secondary school thus providing opportunities for secondary education. As a result of few secondary schools, few elderly people, particularly in the villages, accessed secondary education. That tells the story of the shortage in the higher levels of education. The distribution presented, however, suggests that the study has benefitted from views from the non-educated to the highly educated thus providing views of a cross section of the people in the area studied.

As for the main economic activities of the interviewees, the table indicates that most of them as it is widely known, are peasants. Indeed, the national figures suggest that agriculture is the country’s economic mainstay and provides livelihood to around 80% of the working population. In the study area the major occupation was determined by the interviewees’ responses. However, in reality, most of the entrepreneurs and employed workers also engage in agriculture in one way or another.
The major observation that can be made here is that very few interviewees are wage-earning employees in the formal labour market. This is a true picture of Tanzania where the levels of unemployment are high among people of working age. The job creation initiatives rely mostly on self-employment through entrepreneurial ventures. That explains why the self-employment categories make a cumulative 70% (derived from adding the non-formally employed and sparing students) compared to 23% of the wage-earning workers who in this case was influenced by the choice of the urban district of Mwanza and civil servants in the social sector in the rural districts.

It is imperative to note that I also purposively selected privileged informants referred to as Key Informants (KIs) and political leaders in Mwanza and Dar es Salaam to complement the interviews with the voters in Mwanza. I included 7 KIs from three categories relevant to the study. These were seasoned politicians, journalists and an expert on the social structure of Tanzanian society. A detailed explanation of the KIs is provided in section 2.7.2.1. I also interviewed CHADEMA, CCM leaders in Mwanza. CCM and CHADEMA leaders were selected because of being the leading parties in the race in the Region. I also interviewed four street and four village leaders in Mwanza. This made a total sample size of 6519. The sampling procedure and sample size selection were done in consultation with relevant public institutions in various administrative levels National, Regional, District, Ward and Village; and aided by district maps.

### 2.7. Research Information Sources and Tools

The data used in the present study was garnered from interviews and documentary reviews. The interviews employed in this study were semi-structured and involved two main categories: the local people in the study area and KIIs most of which were not residents of the area studied but knowledgeable people on the subjects under study. A description of the interviews and reviews is made below.

#### 2.7.1. Semi-Structured Local Voters Interviews

A semi-structured interview is a qualitative research technique used to collect data through setting up a context that provides interviewees time and room to talk about their opinion regarding a particular subject (De Fina and Perrino, 2011; Gill et al. 2008). Semi-structured interviews collect data from guided questions and ensure collection of extra information. This is because it enables

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19 The selection sample and determining of sample size is based on literature which suggest that there is no hard and fast rule in qualitative research on sample size (Travers, 2001)
questions/issues to be added on important aspects as they surface in the course of an interview. Since semi-structured interviews are conducted face to face, they provide option for more personal communication with the interviewees. As such, allowing a greater rapport to be established with a mutual relationship of trust and reciprocity. Furthermore, the face to face nature of the interviews allows reassurance to minimise any distress interviewees might feel relating to their experiences and participation on the issues studied. This is mainly the case when assurance of the complete confidentiality of the research was given at the opening of the interview (as we did) to encourage the participants to open up more as research ethics require (Patton, 2002).

The technique was employed in this study because it allowed the researcher to ask and gain wide information of sensitive issues- ethnicity and voting. These issues are wide and responses of questions related to them normally require follow up questions to get the underlying meanings of the issues brought up by interviewees. Equally important, the semi-structured interviews provided the space for the interviewees to provide in-depth responses and be able to reveal meanings behind their views on ethnicity and voting. Through this tool the researcher was able to collect appropriate individual experience, attitude or inner feelings of reality about ethnicity and voting in Tanzania from man and women of voting age in selected households in Nyamagana and Misungwi.

**Figure 1: The Researcher Conducting an Interview at one of the Interviewee’s Home**

The interviews were conducted during the day depending on the interviewee’s availability and time. Most interviews were taped. Therefore, I was keen in following interviewee’s narrations to
generate questions in response to the interviewees’ narrations. Tape recorders were used upon getting consent from the interviewees. Some interviews were not taped as the interviewees did not want to be taped therefore I had to record the responses in a notebook and ask supplementary questions in response to their narrations. The conversations were coupled with informal talks sometimes unrelated to the research topic so as to bring intimacy and to relieve interviewee’s tension whenever necessary. The interviews were conducted in Swahili, Tanzania’s national language, which is widely spoken by Tanzanians. Therefore, the content of the interviews used in the study have been translated by the researcher. We are aware of the limitation in interpreting data including cultural biases and lingual/terminological differentiations. However, the massive discourse against ethnicity and divisive elements in the conduct of Tanzania’s politics provided smooth discussions during the Swahili conducted interviews and translations of the concepts that are central to the study.

2.7.2. Key Informant Interviews
The interviews made with local people in Nyamagana and Misungwi were complemented with KIIIs and documentary reviews. KIIIs refer to getting information from an individual who is considered to be particularly knowledgeable about the topic of interest. The individual through which the information is obtained is called a Key Informant (KI). A KI is knowledgeable of the enquiry setting and their insights are typically valuable for understanding and explaining broad and specific events, thus providing additional information of a topic under study. KIs are privileged witnesses, or people who, due to their position, activities or responsibilities, have informed understanding of a problem that is explored (Creswell, 2003). Thus, a KI in this study is referred to anyone who could provide detailed information and opinion based on his/her knowledge on ethnicity and electoral choices in Tanzania as informed by the variables and measurements guiding the study.

KIIIs are normally conducted in a face to face setting which permits the researcher to seek new insight, ask questions, and assess a phenomenon in different perspectives (Jimenez, 1985). KIIIs are used when there are limited records or published material on the topic studied, different information to the one that exists is needed and when there are KIs who are accessible and have in-depth knowledge about the matter studied (McKillip, 1987). As for the current study KIIIs were used because of limited published material on the voting behaviour in Tanzania in general and
particularly those providing a thorough ethno-political narrative of the role of the PsIM in influencing voters’ choices in Tanzania. This way, the dissertation benefitted from individuals with the first knowledge of the key issues studied.

A KII is a qualitative research technique used to collect data through setting up a context that provides interviewees time and room to talk about their opinion regarding a particular subject. KIIs in this study were employed because they permit several questions to be asked to an interviewee with a broad range of coverage of an area to be explored. Likewise, KIIs provide space for an interviewee to provide in-depth responses and be able to reveal meanings behind an action. Equally important, KIIs are known to be an appropriate and widely used research instrument to express an individual’s experience, attitude or inner feelings of reality (De Fina and Perrino, 2011; Gill et al. 2008).

KIIs interviews are useful when they employ semi-structured interviews as opposed to strict interview guides (De Fina and Perrino, 2011). As it has been argued above, semi-structured interviews are not fixed and limited to predetermined questions as structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews affords the researcher space to determine the information to be collected beyond the originally thought questions intended for the interview but deemed relevant for meeting the study’s objectives. In this study, the semi-structured interviews afforded the researcher the opportunity of garnering data relevant to the study’s main objectives and other social cleavages than ethnicity that were relevant in the nation-building endeavour, state formation and economic transformation.

During the study, interviews were conducted starting at any time and place convenient to the KIs. Luckily, no KI picked a place that was not conducive for conducting an academic interview. Most of the interviews were held at the KIs homes or offices. For most of the KIIs there were no problems for them to participate in the interviews after contacting them in person and describing the objectives of my study and their involvement. The letters introducing me to them and permitting me to undertake the study were very useful (See Appendices II and III). Only in one incident, a wife of one of the KIs wished to go through my authorisation letter before I interviewed her husband. This is very uncommon for African women who are culturally required to be subservient and humble to men. I had to avail the documents and explain the purpose of my visit to create a better rapport for the interview. After doing so, she consented and told his husband that the
interview is worthwhile as a way of documenting experiences and contributions of key political figures in the country especially on things that have not been widely written.

While some of the interviewees in the local people category refused to be taped, I taped all KIIIs. The taping of the KIIIs granted me an opportunity to keenly follow my interviewee’s narrations while generating supplementary questions in response to their answers. Tape recorders were used upon getting consent from the KIs. The interviews were conducted in Swahili, Tanzania’s national language, which is widely spoken by Tanzanians and, therefore, the contents of used in the dissertation were translated by the researcher. As indicated in the previous subsection, substantial discourse on politicisation of ethnicity and other divisive elements in Tanzania’s polity ensured proper discussions of the concepts that were vital to the study.

2.7.2.1 Background of KIs and their Selection

The KIs in this study were mainly people who have lived Tanzania’s history and actively participated in the political realm in various key political and bureaucratic positions. The KIs in this study were selected after thorough discussions with relevant people. For instance, the politicians involved are a result of numerous discussions with senior political scientists and colleagues from the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam involved in electoral analysis. In our discussions three key categories of choice identified. The first involved politicians who were in the nationalist struggle and served in the first multi-racial cabinet in 1960 illustrated in a photo and described in section 4.4.1.1. The second involved 3 politicians who participated in the struggle without holding position in the cabinet but played a vital role in the independent government and put their experiences in writing. The third involved privileged respondents who lived the history participated actively in the political and economic development as well as the electioneering processes over time. The first category has two surviving people Mzee George Kahama and Mzee Job Lusinde. I attempted to consult both to no avail due to health related issues. The second category had several people but I decided to use their literature. In the third category I decided to pick among individuals mentioned in my discussions the most. The reason behind their choice was a deep ideological, political and economic understanding of the topic understudy.

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20 Mzee is a Swahili term that literally means an elderly man/woman.
The research consulted and interviewed Mzee Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru, Dr. Juma Halifa Ngasongwa and Mzee Hemed Bakari Mkali. Mr. Mwiru is one of the oldest politicians who has lived and practised the history of politics in Tanzania. He has worked with TANU\(^{21}\) during the nationalistic struggles in his early age, went on to work with all governments from the first to current phase in strategic portfolios including the cabinet. In one way or another, he has been closely related to, or at the centre of, all major political, social and policy transformation due to his role as the head of the ruling party’s ideological and publicity section for decades. Recently, in the constituent Assembly that proposed a new constitution for Tanzania to be passed or refuted by a referendum, he singlehandedly proposed a complete chapter about the country’s economic direction. Importantly, Mzee Kingunge has crossed from the ruling party CCM to the opposition. In this regard, he provided views of a non-sincere partisan\(^{22}\) that one would expect of him after playing a central role in CCM and its government for decades. This experience is the basis for his inclusion in the study as a KI. Dr. Juma Ngasongwa is an academic cum politician who has been involved in the study. He has worked as a development studies lecturer, economic advisor to the second phase President of URT and a cabinet minister responsible for industries and trade, natural resources and tourism as well as economic affairs in the third and fourth phase governments. He is among the Tanzanians who have been critical in the execution of the liberal economic reforms in the country. He has also been instrumental in the writing of the party’s ideological blueprints including election manifestos. Mzee Mkali as opposed to the former is more of a career politician who mostly worked at the district and regional levels. He worked as a primary school teacher, an MP for two terms, a District Commissioner and a CCM Chairman for Kinondoni district-Dar es Salaam and lastly as CCM Regional Chairman of Dar es Salaam for two terms. Currently, Mzee Mkali is the Chair of the elders of Dar es Salaam. The elders of Dar es Salaam provide a strategic platform for politicians particularly—the President of the URT whenever he wants to talk to the nation on serious national concerns. His inclusion is based on the fact that his role as a party Chair in Dar es Salaam, the de-facto\(^{23}\) capital city of Tanzania provides experience from a cosmopolitan

\(^{21}\) TANU as indicated in the list of abbreviation stands for Tanzania African National Unity. It was a mass socialist political party led by Julius Nyerere that spearheaded Tanzania’s fight against colonial rule. The party ruled Tanzania from independence to 1977 when it merged with Afro-Shirazi Party to form CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) which since then has been the country’s ruling party. Chama cha Mapinduzi as indicated in the list of abbreviations can be literally translated to mean Revolutionary Party.

\(^{22}\) Sincere partisans are those who people who support a party unconditionally, even when it is not performing.

\(^{23}\) Dodoma is the dejure capital city of Tanzania since 1973. However, the state house is still in Dar es Salaam, as are all government ministries and foreign diplomatic missions. Actually, some ministries have built or building offices in
setting with complex political, social and economic characteristics which are indeed critical in explaining issues of ethnicity and party identities as well as economic evaluations.

The study also interviewed several seasoned media practitioners cum academicians. The aim was to garner information on the role of the media in informing the electoral choices. These interviewees were picked after discussions with experts from the Media Council of Tanzania. The interviewees in this category were Mr. Lawrence Kilimwiko, Mzee Suleiman Hegga and Mr. Doto Bulendu. Several categories were identified in my discussion with the Media Council. These include authors on media and democratisation, seasoned journalist who witnessed electoral reporting over time and reporters who actively participated in covering the 2010 elections in Mwanza. Mr. Lawrence Kilimwiko was picked due to his exemplary contributions in the documenting academic writings about the media and democratisation in the country. Others mentioned were Dr. Ayoub Rioba and Dr. Mfumbusa whose works are referred in this dissertation. However, Kilimwiko according to the advice of the Media Council of Tanzania is next to none when it comes to publishing in the area. He has over 5 publications. Mzee Suleiman Hegga is the only surviving seasoned journalist who worked with the state-owned national broadcaster - Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation during colonialism and went on to hold the top most but one position in its successor Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam after independence. Such experience was considered too important not to be involved in the study. Doto Bulendu works with the biggest media house in Mwanza-STAR TV as a broadcaster specialising in current affairs and political matters. His experience in covering the 2010 elections was deemed relevant for the study.

Mangi Ezekiel was purposely picked after having discussions with him in Shamala and found that his expertise on the social structure of the Tanzanian state was very relevant to the research. At first, I did not plan to interview a person with this background. However, it came to be realised that literature on ethnicity and voting was lacking social structural elements that augur well in analysing ramifications of ethnicity in voting.

Generally, the KIIIs made it possible for the dissertation to obtain data on varied political, economic, ethnic and media developments over time. The data was very relevant in drawing the

Dar es Salaam while they have offices in Dodoma. All of these developments question the commitment to make Dodoma the defacto capital city of Tanzania. The only significant development to this effect apart from forming a Capital Development Authority to plan the city and oversee its building is the Parliament conducting its sessions in Dodoma.
path that explains the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In other words, the data garnered from the KIIIs complemented the documentary reviews and primary data collected in the field on the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In light of the key role played by the KIIIs I have had close academic relations and discussed with them the preliminary findings of my research. I intend to share with them the final results of this study once completed.

2.7.3. Documentary Reviews

Documentary reviews relevant to the topic under study were done to complement the data gathered from interviews. The reviews included library materials, information from the internet, books, journals and other sources of documentary material. To establish the ethno-political narrative this study made use of historical records by renown Tanzanian historians such as Kimambo and Temu (1969), and upcoming historians like Mwakikagile (2010) as well as international historians of Tanzanian history for example Maguire (1969) and Illife (1979). The developments during the colonial regime have also been explained using historical records of British Colonial information Office and research information commissioned by the office. Knowing several people have lived the history and actively participated in the political realm, the dissertation made use of their writings: works of Mwalimu24 Julius Nyerere, Pius Msekwa and Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru were used. For the conduct of elections this study has exploited reports from Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), an independent consortium of the University of Dar es Salaam researchers, REDET, TACCEO, MISA and Non-governmental Organisations both local and International, which have monitored the elections since the onset of the multiparty political system in 1992.


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24 Mwalimu is a Swahili word that literally means Teacher. Julius Nyerere was widely referred to as Mwalimu by his fellow countrymen. He was a teacher by learning and practice who chanced to teach among others, the third President of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa.
2.8. Data Analysis

Data analysis entails the whole process of inspecting, categorising, tabulating and testing data which varies depending on the type of data to be analysed (Kohlbacher, 2005; Kleiman, 2004). In quantitative data, the focus is on figures, whereas the overall goal of any qualitative data analysis is to deal with meanings so as to uncover underlying themes, patterns, insights and understanding (Kothari, 2009; Patton, 2002). Data garnered in this study was chiefly qualitative in nature, thus necessitated qualitative methods of data analysis to illuminate, understand, and extrapolate the situation under study rather than to generalise (Creswell, 2003). Analyses of qualitative data are mainly undertaken in an inductive thematic manner. That is identifying and categorising themes and key issues that ‘emerge’ from the data (Patton, 2005). As for this study, it began in the preliminary visit that assisted in generating tentative theoretical explanations for the empirical work. From this base, responses gathered from interviewees in the field were analysed progressively at each stage of data collection. The purpose was to generate a pattern that related the research arguments and data collected.

In this study, the data collected through interviews and documentary reviews were analysed using structural content analysis and by triangulation. Content analysis is a technique for data analysis which involves codifying data into pre-defined categories so as to develop patterns in the presentation and reporting of information which can be in a form of transcripts of interviews/discourses, protocols of observation or video tapes. In content analysis, emphasis is placed on according categories to come out from the data and on recognising the importance of understanding the meaning of the context in which an item is analysed (Ricceri, 2004). The analysis was conducted focusing on variables indicated in the conceptual framework as shown in the third chapter of this dissertation. I have analysed all of my interviews using standard content analysis mainly presented in a form of quotations and descriptions. Subsequently, results from qualitative sources were matched against each other so as to identify concurrences or disagreements in data. The work was made possible by the process of triangulation of primary data with secondary data.

Triangulation is a qualitative research method that involves using multiple lines of evidences in an investigation to produce a thorough understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena. This method is used by qualitative researchers to check and establish validity in their studies by analysing a
research question from multiple perspectives to arrive at consistency across data sources or approaches. The collaboration of findings and test for validity component of triangulation raises some questions about the method (Punch, 2005). The questions are predicated on the assumption that a weakness in one method will be compensated for by another method, and that, it is always possible to make sense between different accounts (Creswell, 2008). It is not the case as triangulation is not geared at squarely seeking validation or verification of data instead it is a technique striving to ensure research outputs are rich, robust, comprehensive and well-developed. As such, collaboration of methods and results which could in some instances prove inconsistencies should not be seen as weakening study evidences, but should be viewed as an opportunity to uncover deeper meaning in the data (Patton, 2002).

There are several types of triangulation in literature which revolve around four major issues: research methods, theories, investigators and sources of data (Hussein, 2009). The first is termed methods triangulation which involves checking out the consistency of findings generated by different data collection methods. In this type, it is common to have qualitative and quantitative data employed in one study. When this is done a research elucidates complementary aspects of the same phenomenon. Often the points were these data diverge are of great interest to the qualitative researcher and provide the most insights. The second type is triangulation of sources whereby a researcher examines the consistency of different data sources from within the same method. For instance, one can triangulate sources at different points in time, sources that are public against those that are private and but not limited to, comparing people with different viewpoints. The third type of triangulation is analyst triangulation. In this type, a researcher uses multiple analysts or observers to review findings. This can provide a check on selective perception and illuminate blind spots in an interpretive analysis. It is worth noting that the intent is not to seek consensus, but to understand multiple ways of seeing the data. The fourth and last is theory/perspective triangulation. Theory triangulation involves multiple theoretical perspectives to examine and interpret the data.

In this study, I was eclectic in the usage of triangulation. I have employed quantitative data to validate and provide further information on ethnic salience, inter-ethnic mistrust and ethnic discrimination. I also used triangulation of sources as most of the field data analysed was triangulated with varied sources and the sources themselves were in various occasions compared.
Similarly, various views of analysts discussing ethnicity and voting were employed in the study and their opinions used to provide more insights into achieving the study’s objective. The study also was informed by four major theoretical strands– the ethnic-structure, neo-patrimonial theory, the hybrid regime and the legacy of the independence movement, thus the field data was in various occasions analysed from these viewpoints.

Generally, in this study words, phrases, sentences and paragraphs were considered as meaning units which were condensed according to their context and content to answer the study’s questions as indicated in section 1.4 to derive at the study’s conclusions.

2.9. Data Validity and Reliability
Quantitative researchers regularly criticise validity and reliability of qualitative research. Their critique is partly predicated on the fact that its findings cannot be generalised or used to predict similar situations in other cases (Kothari, 2009). Far from watering down, the critical proponents of qualitative research maintain that qualitative based research results should be evaluated on the basis of precision, transferability, credibility, dependability and reliability in its application and interpretation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Inferably, data validity shall not be construed to be about objective truth against which the credibility of results and conclusions are measured. This position is predicated on the fact that, it is not necessary for a qualitative research or any other to identify the ultimate truth for it to be believable; instead it is adequate for a study to identify a basis for drawing conclusions. In this regard, relevant questions to put into consideration when evaluating the validity of research findings should according to Massoi (2015) include: did the research tools measure what they were intended to? Was there consistency in their applications? Are the conclusions drawn consistent with the research arguments or questions?

While conducting this research, I was mindful of the validity and reliability challenge. For instance, I was conscious of the fact that what people say about their behaviours during interviews may contrast with their actual actions particularly when what is discussed is a sensitive issue like ethnicity. Cognisant of this drawback known as the danger of social desirable answers, and in order to enhance the quality of my findings as well as avoiding possibilities of bias or misinformation - as indicated in the data collection section, I employed a variety of data sources and triangulated them as suggested by Denzin (2009) to get more valid and reliable data. It was important particularly for the politicians and partisan interviewees I met who in varied occasions
expressed their biased political orientations. Through triangulation of interviewees views with literature as indicated in section 2.8 above the research findings are made more valid and reliable.

Likewise, for the purposes of ensuring construct validity, internal validity and external validity I used designated data gathering tools systematically and properly in collecting the evidence. As Walliman (2006) put it, well constructed and systematically employed data gathering tools ensures construct validity, internal validity, external validity. According to Walliman, construct validity requires a researcher to use the correct measures for the concepts being studied. In this study, the measures of influences of ethnicity were informed by the primary and secondary sources on ethnicity and voting as highlighted in the research questions. The role of the KIs in providing the basis for measuring the PsIM role was critical. Importantly, the literature reviewed also was significant and the visit to Mwanza during the setting of the research was also useful in sharpening of the study’s measurements. My interactions with varied political and government leaders in Mwanza complemented the KIs and literature based measurements by informing the shape of the measurements to closely replicate the issues of ethnicity and voting experienced in the region. As such, the concepts and measurements applied in the study benefited from varied sources and applied systematically to collect and further analyse the data in this study.

Internal validity (especially important with explanatory or causal studies) demonstrates that certain conditions lead to other conditions and requires the use of multiple pieces of evidence to uncover convergent lines of inquiry (Cresswell, 2009). In the current study, internal validity is ensured by the use of multiple sources of data that establish a chain of evidence warranting forward and backward linkages. The use of interview guides to varied categories of interviewees employed in the study and literature review attest to this fact. The wide social demographic composition of the interviewees which represents Mwanza region as indicated in table I add weight to the internal validity of the research.

External validity which entails whether or not findings are generalisable beyond the immediate case or cases was also considered in this study. External validity is said to be ensured when despite variations in places, people, and procedures a case study can withstand and still yield the same findings (Walliman, 2006). Techniques such as cross-case examination and within-case examination along with literature review help to ensure external validity (Patton, 2000). The triangulation of data explained above which indicates cross-examination of sources, theories and
views of interviewees all contributed to improve external validity and reliability. However, by nature a case study is relevant to the case studied and cases with similar circumstances and therefore its generalisability is limited compared to quantitative studies.

All said above indicate the validity and reliability of the data gathered and analysed is banked on systematic data collection and analysis as well as the multiple sources the data collected which warranted triangulation possible.

2.10. Ethical Issues

Research undertakings require researchers to conduct their research projects in an ethical manner or behaviour (Miller et al. 2012). An ethical behaviour in general terms represents a set of moral principles, rules, or standards governing a person or profession (Baagini and Fosl, 2007). In the moral domains to be ethical is equated with “do good things and avoid evil ones.” Deducing from this conceptualisation, research ethics entail the major principles of ethical behaviour associated with research. In other words, research ethics are the do and don’t-s of a research activity in its entirety. As such exhausting the do and don’t-s of everything related to a research is indeed a mammoth task. In this regard, the section highlights the key ethical issues relevant to the current study.

There are no clear and uniform standards for governing all research activities (Miller et al. 2012). They can differ regarding the nature of the studies, time, environment and other factors. However, there is no disagreement on the fact that researchers are supposed to be responsible and accountable to their research participants, colleagues and the people to whom they will present their findings (Miller et al. 2012; Creswell, 2009; Duncombe and Jessop, 2005). According to Miller et al. (2012) researchers are supposed to be able to explain how he or she ensured quality and integrity of their research; seek informed consent; respected the confidentiality and anonymity of their interviewees; ensured that their participants voluntarily participated in the study; for sensitive studies mainly related to human bodies how they avoided harm to their participants; and show their researches are independent and impartial. Relevant ethical issues to this study and how they were dealt are reported below.
2.10.1. Acquiring Research Permission
Research ethics require a research should not commence his/her study without requesting for and being awarded authorisation from a competent research body (Vogts et al. 2012). It could be a government body, a university or research institution (Miller et al. 2012). It was essential for the researcher to obtain permission to carry out the study because it is a policy requisite for anyone wishing to conduct research in Tanzania to obtain permission from competent authorities before embarking on their research work.

Mzumbe University granted the permission to carry out this study through formal letters (See Appendices II and III). Apart from granting permission to carry out the research, the letter also served as an introduction to the government authorities and interviewees in the study area. I took the letter with me as I was moving around throughout the entire period of fieldwork.

2.10.2. Obtaining Informed Consent
Research ethics require interviewees to a research to freely consent to participate in a research project without being coerced or unfairly pressurised (List, 2008). In this regard, interviewees should be well-informed about what participation entailed and reassured that declining will not maliciously affect them in any way. During the data collection exercise, I informed my participants about the nature of the study and its intended objectives. He also informed the interviewees that they may decide to withdraw from the study whenever they feel like. They were also told that if they decide to drop, they should not fear of any penalty for so doing. In this study, I never encountered any case were interviewees wished to withdraw. In one instance, a KI rescheduled a family meeting to accord me time to accomplish our interview. Generally speaking, all interviewees were cooperative.

2.10.3. Ensuring Confidentiality and Anonymity
Research ethics require that information provided by individuals participating in a research shall be treated in a confidential manner. Consequently, the participant is entitled to expect that such information will not be given to anyone else and not used for any purpose other than the research in question (Miller et al. 2012; Vogts et al. 2012). It is, therefore, essential to protect the identity of the person from whom you gather information from and their views. In this regard, the identity of the participants must be protected at all times and not be left lying around in notebooks, tape recorders or un-protected computer files. In the present study, I guaranteed my interviewees’
privacy and confidentiality. In the interview guide, the researcher made a statement that was read to his interviewees that assured them that all information garnered by him will be kept confidential by him and the institution he is studying at through his Supervisor (See Appendices IV, V and VI). The statement equally assured the interviewees that the information given will be used for the purpose of this study and this study alone. To execute privacy, the researchers secured his tape recorder and computer files including the voices of the interviewees. All views of the ordinary interviewees are reported without mentioning their names in the dissertation. The names of the KIs, who often are or have been public figures, are indicated in the report after receiving their consent that I used their names while reporting their views in the dissertation.

2.10.4. Establishing Rapport
Once participants agree to be part of a study, a researcher develops rapport in order to get them to disclose information. This is important because interviewees’ information provided to a researcher is essentially a favour. Therefore, in order to break the ‘psychological barrier’ of trust, a researcher is supposed to develop a sense of ‘closeness’ to his interviewee (Duncombe and Jessop, 2005). Meanwhile, a researcher is required to reassure his/her interviewee that the information garnered is genuinely of interested to him/her (Miller et al. 2012). In a way, researchers should be consistently receptive, pleasant, and patient to their interviewees when they are talking (Duncombe and Jessop, 2005). In sum, researchers should make sure that they provide an environment that is trustworthy. In the present study, I created the rapport through explanations of the research topic while seeking informed consent. At the time in question, I presented myself in a humble manner and allowed them to raise questions about the research, and responded to the questions diligently whenever raised. In the course of the presentation and the questions as well as unveiling research permits, I managed to avail interviewees’ worries. Subsequently, interviews were smoothly conducted. The major interruptions faced especially during the KIIIs were telephone calls in the mid of interviews. However, to my surprise, despite their busy schedules and important engagements, when it happened, most of the KIs decided to switch off their phones to avoid further interruptions.

2.11. Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
Any research is bound to have its limitations in terms nature of the problem and the conditions under which the research work is carried out. The present research had several limitations that were adequately tackled to ensure that that the objectives of the research are met.
The first limitation of this study is related to power rationing that was common while collecting data and writing in Tanzania. The rationing of power time and again disturbed my day-to-day plan of activities particularly in relation to computer usage. The rationing forced me to hand write several notes which was time consuming and actually doubled my work, since I had to key into my computer the hand written notes later. The challenge was however minimised after purchasing an extra laptop battery and a small generator to ensure constant supply of power while writing the dissertation in Tanzania.

The second limitation is related to interviewees’ suspicion of the researcher. Some interviewees, at first, were not cooperative and free to talk mostly due to the sensitiveness of the topic of ethnicity and voting. Some initially believed that I was a spy under the guise of a researcher who is trying to seek information on who they will vote for in the next elections. As a way of allaying their suspicions and reducing the impact of this limitation, I had to assure them that the objective of my study was not to know who they voted or wish to vote for, instead to explore the influences of ethnicity in voting as informed by the PsIM in Tanzania. Equally, I had to show my student identification as well as research clearance to justify that what I was doing was purely academic and not commissioned by any person or institution. Most importantly, I ensured them that their information will be treated in utmost confidentiality and their views will be presented anonymously.

The third limitation was related to research funds as the fund provided by my employer - Mzumbe University for the Study was far less than the actual cost of collecting data. Needless to mention other costs related to successful accomplishment of the study. The limitation was addressed by funds added up from my BOF UGent PhD scholarship that made me and my Research Assistants manage to conduct the interviews in Mwanza and address the power shortage and transportation costs highlighted above.

The fourth limitation is associated with language barrier. I experienced to a limited degree language barrier in the field, especially in the rural area of Misungwi where I met a Sukuma pastoralist who was not fluent in either Swahili or English- the two languages that I can follow and speak fluently. This complicated the interview exercise as it required involving indigenous research assistants who translated interview questions/discussions from Swahili to Kisukuma and vice versa. Such exercise was not only expensive in terms of paying a research assistant for his
labour, but it was also time consuming. Likewise, the research assistants from the way they struggled to find Swahili words to explain the issues, I was tempted to believe that sometimes the translated questions and answers were subjective instead of accurate.

The fifth limitation is also related to the translations of the Swahili interviews. As indicated earlier, lingual/terminological differentiations do present a challenge in explaining any phenomenon. Indeed, this was the case as in some cases several Swahili words were captured by one English terminology that in some way did not carry the verbatim nature of the interviewees’ statements. However, these structural and lingual differences never stood in the way of expressing the central views of my interviewees. As said in section 2.7.1 above, the massive Swahili discourse against ethnicity and divisive elements in the conduct of Tanzania’s politics provided room for our interviewees to address their views in detail during the interviews and the translations of the concepts well captured in English.

The sixth and last limitation was related to poor infrastructure. Roads from Misungwi to Igokelo ward, and Mapilinga and Nange villages found in the ward were rough. To make matters worse, there is no reliable public transport heading to the areas. It should be noted that the houses in the rural areas are scattered as most Sukuma have kept cattle within their compounds and own at least three hectares of farmland around their environs. Such situation makes an average distance from one house to another to be about a fifteen minutes walk. Therefore, a lot of physical walking had to be done in order to reach the scattered interviewees. Moreover, there are no street names, which mean reliance on local oral directions. Similarly, there was limited telephone communication network in some parts of Mapilinga and Nange villages particularly with the mobile operator I was using – Airtel. Also, no internet service was available in the two villages studied. With regard to the poor roads and transport infrastructure, I and my team, had to hire private transport to reach the villages in Igokelo. I had to purchase a Vodacom line that has a better coverage in the ward to ensure telephone communications. As for the internet constraint we had to use the services in the evening when we get back to Misungwi Town.

2.12. Concluding Remarks
Exploring the role of the PsIM in informing the influence of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices is intricate given the complex nature of ethnicity and limited information that exists. In light of such complexity, I argue that qualitative research design in the form an analytic narrative is
appropriate for the study and may yield more information. This is mainly due to its flexibility in incorporating various research tools and allowing detailed analysis of the subject matter from a path dependent viewpoint. As such, allowing a discourse of the interface between the past, current and projection of the future. Equally, I argue that based on the nature of the study, one data collection tool cannot adequately provide detailed information about the subject. Therefore, a wide range of data collection tools were required for the study. It is against this background that indepth interviews with KIIIs to solicit their experience on the PsIM, and the interplay between the PsIM with ethnicity and voting; as well as interviews with ordinary voters in Mwanza that provided a case, plus documentary reviews were employed. The selection of Mwanza as case study proved a good strategy for obtaining detailed information about the influences of the PsIM on informing the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. This is chiefly because case studies provide room for detailed analysis of a phenomenon under study.

In this chapter, I indicated that some preliminary activities such as obtaining research clearance and setting the scene for collection of data in the area of study are essential before commencing actual data collection. At the end of this chapter, I indicate the major limitations encountered during the fieldwork and their delimitations. I regarded the limitations as challenges to be solved rather than permanent barriers to the execution of the research project. It is against this background that I present how I dealt with the limitations to ensure that the objectives of the study in question are achieved. In the subsequent chapter, I present theoretical and conceptual issues related to the study. After presentation of the introduction of the study and the methodology it employed, it is logical to present conceptual and theoretical issues relevant to the study.
CHAPTER III

ETHNICITY AND VOTING: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES

3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores extant conceptual, contextual and theoretical discourses relevant to ethnicity and voting. The chapter shows what is already known in the literature, identifies knowledge gaps and possible applications to the analysis of the influences ethnicity has on determining voters’ choices and thus enhancing theoretical aspects.

In view of the above, this chapter has a total of five main sections organised as follows: The first section 3.1 provides the chapters’ introduction. Section 3.2 which follows is made of six subsections presents an understanding the concept of ethnicity and its germination into a politically salient phenomenon. Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 discussed the major theoretical underpinnings that define ethnicity: the primordialist conceptions of ethnicity, the instrumentalist view of ethnicity, the social constructivist school of ethnicity and the study’s take on ethnicity respectively. The last two parts of the section deal with the politics of origin, being and belonging and lastly ethnicity and its manifestation in politics under subsections 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 respectively. The third part of the chapter in section 3.3 provides an understanding of the concept of voting and the fourth in section 3.4 presents a theoretical overview of the relation between ethnicity and voting. The fourth section consists of five subsections from section 3.4.1 to 3.4.6. The titles of the subsections presented sequentially are ethnic structures and voting, neo-patrimonialism, ethnicity and voting; hybrid regimes theory, ethnicity and voting; Independence movement legacy, ethnicity and voting; frames analysis and its application to ethnicity and voting in Tanzania, and a Proposed Path-dependent model for understanding influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. In the final section (3.5) I present the chapter’s concluding remarks which provides a concise summary of what has been discussed in the entire chapter.

3.2. Understanding Ethnicity and its Germination into a Political Salient Phenomenon
Ethnicity has never enjoyed a common conceptualisation despite being on the academic agenda of social scientists for a long time (Cocodia, 2008; Balcha, 2008; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lonsdale,
1994). Equally important, the debate on the nature and importance of ethnic identity is indeed far from common understanding (Jerman, 1997; Emberling, 1997). In the African context, ethnicity has been equated with tribalism and regarded as a problem (Chabal and Daloz 1999). That is why studies of ethnicity in Africa like the one informed by Afrobarometer surveys, Young (2009) and Weber (2009) just to mention a few, did not refrain from using the concept of tribe in their analysis of ethnicity and voting in Africa. According to Berman (1998) ethnicity for quite some time has been widely condemned by both Eurocentric and African observers as an expression of a traditional culture that is divisive and encroaching on the process of modernisation. In contrast to this view, other scholars consider ethnicity as a form of societal organisation anchored on shared identity and allege that it has a positive integrative potential as nationalism (Lonsdale, 1994; Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996). In this dissertation, our interest is not to engage in a normative debate on the probable effects of ethnicity, but to delineate our conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic groups, and how they come to gain social and political impetus in political processes mainly influencing voting in multiparty elections.

From the onset, we wish to make it clear that in this dissertation our understanding of the concept of ethnicity is anchored on the contention made by scholars like Chabal and Daloz (1999), Eriksen (1993) and Lonsdale (1994) that ethnicity is a collective human attribute that is part of every individual’s identity. And, that although ethnicity has been widely researched and documented, it is still difficult to apply objective markers to define ethnicity and an ethnic group. It is against this backdrop that Posner (2007:1303) and Muigai (1995: 161) argue that ethnic groups are typically defined by external markers such as culture, language, tradition, region of origin and heritage. The centrality of the cultural components notwithstanding, Barth (1969) argues that in some instances ethnic groups survive radical changes of ethnic group membership and the customs and traditions of their ethnic group. In other cases the vice versa becomes the case as an ethnic group may dwindle while its customs, traditions and membership remains intact. From Barth’s argument therefore, it is not the cultural elements of ethnicity that matters the most, but rather the maintenance of ethnic boundaries vis-à-vis other groups. That is to say, the fundamental aspect of ethnicity is the self-recognition of an identity by members of a group, as well as the use of that recognition by others. It is important at this juncture to stress that the recognised identities are commonly predicated on cultural factors but are not by any means an unfiltered expression of cultural heritage. Instead, they are based on mere bits of selected primary cultural signals and
values. In this regard, Barth (1969) emphatically maintains that ethnic boundaries are basically social and are upheld by regular expressions of identity, founded on parameters that have gained social significance in a particular milieu.

Barth’s contention that a group’s ascription is ethnic when it corresponds to an individual’s prime identity that is universally associated with his/her origin and background, suggests that ethnicity is both an individual and social recognition (Barth, 1969). The social aspect of ethnicity triggers a question of the role of ethnicity in the social and associated political and economic domains. An extensive debate about the social and political role of ethnicity, and how its usage is to be judged is at the core of the scholarly discourse of ethnicity. The academic debate in this field revolves around the primordial, instrumentalist and social constructivist approaches to ethnicity. At this juncture we provide a general view of the approaches and later engage in a broader discussion of the development and role of ethnicity in voting.

3.2.1. Primordialist Conceptions of Ethnicity

The primordialist approach to ethnicity is the oldest in sociological and anthropological writings which enjoyed dominance before the 1970s. It conceives ethnicity to be something ordained, certified at birth, deriving from the kin-and-clan-structures of human society, and thus something necessarily rigid and undying (Isajiw, 1993). Primordialists’ view human society as an assortment of diverse social groups and once a person is born assumes membership of a particular group. In this context ethnic identification is predicated on unfathomable, ‘primordial’ affection to a particular group, established by kinship and descent. One’s ethnicity is therefore “set” and is an inflexible part of his/her identity.

The roots of classical primordialist thinking can be traced back to the German Romantic philosophers, who argued for the “atavistic power” of the blood and soil that bound one closely with one’s people (Kreitzer, 2004). However, insignificant strand of scholarship buys into the classical primordialist view. Instead, contemporary primordialists conceive primordial ties from a biological phenomenon (socio-biological primordialism) or what Brown (1998) branded ‘quasi-kinship’ groups; and as a result of cultural, historical, and/or foundational myths, symbols and memories (ethno symbolism). While the contemporary waters down the centrality of birth they retain the view that primordial ties to one’s group are fixed and hardly change over one’s lifetime.
An interesting conception of contemporary primordialism in the field of ethnicity and nationalism which has been developed by Smith is called ethno symbolism. Ethno symbolism views the essential elements of ethnic identification as psychological and emotional, emerging from a person’s historical and cultural background. According to Smith, the ‘epitome’ of ethnicity is located in the myths, values, symbols, memories and the traits of a given historic configuration (myth-symbol complex). Smith associates the sustained fixed nature of ethnic identities to the body of beliefs and sentiments, which the defenders of a particular ethnic group wish to preserve and impart to the generations to come. In this context, the resilience of an ethnic group rests in the diffusion and transmission of the myth-symbol complex to its unit of population and its future generations (Smith, 1991).

The arguments made above suggest that primordialist interpretations of ethnicity conceive ethnicity to be a relic from a far away past. The relic conceptualises ethnicity dichotomously, either as an evidence of atavistic barbarianism, or, alternatively, as a romanticised notion of un tarnished or natural communities (Gentili, 2005). According to this approach ethnicity is regarded as a perception of common origins, historical memories, ties and aspirations that are viewed by a group of people as the epitome of their people-hood (Cocidia, 2008; Balcha, 2008).

The relevance of the primordialist approach to ethnicity tested massive criticism in the late 1960s and 1970s. At the said time, anthropologists led by Barth (1969) questioned the view’s supposition that distinctive named groups constituted the social world. That is to say, the identity of a group, in essence, is a fixed objective reality belonging to a cultural or ethnic group. The anthropologists instead argued that group identity is what emerges when a given social group intermingles with other social groups. To Barth and company, the ethnic groups interface points out variations among them and the identified cultural dissimilarities subsequently inform the creation of confines distinguishing one group from the other. This means as opposed to Smith, Barth contends that an ethnic group preserves its identity when its members interact with others.

From Barth’s viewpoint ethnicity rests on one’s perception of “us” and “them” and not on objective reality that exits in the real world. This is chiefly because markers, such as language, religion, or rituals that serve to identify subjective ethnic boundaries can change and therefore, ethnicity is not fixed but situational and subjective (Nagel, 1994). A critical look at Barth’s position suggests that he was of the view that conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic group
identities should target the “confines” of groups, not on the groups themselves. In his line of thinking it was in those “confines” that ethnicity was constructed. This way, Barth detached ethnicity from culture; and made ethnicity a flexible, socially constructed, subjective construct. From Barth’s critic, it can be deduced that an ethnic group is any substantial aggregation of persons who are perceived by themselves and/or others to share a unique set of cultural and historical commonalities at a particular time and space (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996; Horowitz, 1985).

The significant contribution of Barth’s influence on the conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic group identities is an anthropological shift from emphasising static evocations of tribal identity as a feature of social structure to an acknowledgment of ethnic identity as a dynamic aspect of social organisation (Hummel, 2014). The shift eventually became the basic anthropological model of ethnicity and informed the emergence of instrumental and social constructionist theories of ethnicity (Jenkins, 1994).

3.2.2. The Instrumentalist View of Ethnicity

The instrumentalist view opposes the primordial on grounds that complex patterns of fusion and fission among groups warrant genealogical or cultural based definitions irrelevant (Fukui and Markakis 1994). Supporters of this view consider ethnicity to be a product of political, social, and historical situations and interests which are not necessarily genealogical or cultural (Turton, 1994). Arguing in the same vein, Eriksen (1993) contends that ethnicity is the relationship between groups whose members’ consider themselves and claim to be recognised by others sharing distinctive political, organisational as well as symbolic traits.

Supporters of the instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity regard ethnicity to be flexible, constructed or even manipulated to gain specific political and/or economic gains (Eriksen, 1993). The logic of the instrumentalist propositions augurs well with the elite theory, which hold the view that leaders in modern states use and manipulate their powers for their sake. Locating ethnicity in the mid of the theory suggests that perceptions of ethnic identity can be manipulated to further leaders self-centred interests and to maintain power (Brass, 1991). From this approach ethnicity and ethnic groups are perceived to be a product of the dynamics of elite competition within the boundaries determined by political myths and economic realities, created and manipulated by cultural and political elites in their quest for power and authority. According to this
approach, ethnicity in Africa is a modern phenomenon (Gentili, 2005). Gentili’s position is predicated on the view that ethnic groups that existed before the emergence of colonialism in Africa were highly manipulated during colonial rule to suit colonial economic and political interests. Independent African governments either maintained or re-organised the groups for their interests. The ethnic manipulations ranging from the creation of new ethnic groups, combining and diffusing of ethnic groups is widely documented in African history (Illife, 1969; Mpangala, 1992; Weber, 2009). However, in the fourth chapter the matter is described as it relates to Tanzania. Arguing from an electoral point of view in post colonial era Posner applies the instrumental explanation of ethnicity to consider politicisation of ethnicity as a tool for attaining political and economic resources within African polities (Posner, 2005).

3.2.3. The Social Constructivist School of Ethnicity

The social constructivist conceptualisation of ethnicity combines elements of the aforementioned approaches to provide a thorough historical account of ethnicity. It recognises the core tenet of the primordial and instrumentalist approaches but criticises both for failing to take into account the historical factors shaping and reshaping ethnicity and, therefore, disregarding a crucial constitutional part of ethnic identity particularly in Africa. According to constructivists, ethnicity is not a given or solid identity. It is the outcome of historical processes in which political, economic and cultural factors all play their role. In this regard, ethnic identities in Africa are rooted in the socio-economic processes informing and identifying peoples ethnic belonging. However, its present day shape is the result of similar continuous colonial to post-colonial socio-economic processes. Therefore, present day ethnicities are both old and new, or rather both modern constructions and age-old cultural expressions (Chabal, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Berman, 1998).

According to Isajiw (1993) social constructivist approach to ethnicity is theoretically sandwiched between Michel Foucault’s stress on the construction of a metaphor and Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of practice and habitus as the fundamental factors determining the structure of all social phenomena. At its core, this approach emphasises that ethnicity is being negotiated and constructed daily. That means ethnicity is a process which continues to unfold. The continuous nature of ethnicity formation coupled with the rise of the postmodern paradigms more relevant to nationalism has tilted the attention placed on group boundaries and identity. This is chiefly because
scholars subscribing to the constructivist paradigm felt those terms like “group,” “category” and “boundary” portend an unchanging identity, which they strived to shun away from. This elastic nature of the term ethnicity informed confusion as even various interest groups could claim to fit into the term ethnic groups.

According to the social constructivist school, it is hard to say when a group deserves the status of becoming an ethnic group. There are no rigid rules or standards by which to judge. In other words, social collectivises of any nature and antiquity, can don the mantle of ethnicity and stake a claim to identity and rights as a group. From this line of thinking, attention is diverted from determination of a particular group’s “reality” as an ethnic group in strict sense, and what a “real” ethnic group is; instead, it foretells that ethnicity is so central to social discourse and competition to the extent that its salience and effectiveness have become attractive to all sorts of collectivities (Eller, 1997).

3.2.4. The Essentialist School of Ethnicity

Another theoretical perspective relevant to conceptualising ethnicity is essentialism. Essentialists hold that there exist several noticeable and objective core qualities of particular groups of people that are inherent, eternal, and unalterable. Therefore, such groupings can be categorised in line with those qualities of essence, which are predicated on problematic criteria as gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, and class (Hirschfeld, 1996; Mason, 1994; Solomos & Back, 1994). Generally these external traits are marked by visual cues to make them distinct and/or easier to detect. Importantly, according to the essentialist school these qualities carry with them social and — more importantly from an antiauthoritarian perspective — hierarchical significance to those marking the cues and those marked by the cues; for instance sexism in the case of gender; and racism in the case of skin tone. Racism, sexism, classism, and most other forms of historical oppression and corresponding divisions and interactions are ideologies and policies maintained and justified by essentialism (Van Dijk, 1987).

Essentialist beliefs about social groups including ethnicity is rather recent, although the concept of essentialism was used by Allport (1954) and Sherif (1948) to portray prejudicial thinking based on beliefs that distinguish one group from another. According to Campbell (1958) the differences between ethnic groups are based on the prejudicial beliefs identifying ethnic groups by perceptions of a coherent and unified entity linked to a belief in an underlying essence glueing the groups
(Yzerbyt et al. 2001; McGarty et al. 1995). These essentialist arguments in some instances could even emphasise stereotypes set to rationalise existing social arrangements. In this regard, essentialist view of ethnicity would provide an acceptable and justified account for the status quo maintenance of ethnic groups (Yzerbyt et al. 1997). From such point of view the essentialist conceptualisation of ethnicity consider ethnic groups as natural, inevitable and, therefore, unchangeable categories bound by particular shared belief. In this regard, ethnic groups represent human types, specifying that an individual is fundamentally a particular sort of person. Therefore, ethnic groups and ethnic related tendencies are an attempt to fix social groups on the basis of essential, quasi-natural properties of belonging within specific political and social contexts. Generally, to essentialists, ethnicity is viewed to be a static phenomenon which people cannot change. This is against the dynamic view of ethnicity well put forward by Barth in section 3.2.1 above. They also suggest that ethnicity should also be seen in a divisive and conflictual manner as racism, classism and other forms of oppressive ideological phenomena are viewed. Moreover, therefore, the analysis of ethnicity has to be made along the line of oppressed and oppressors. This is not by any means the objective of this study as we are interested in the role ethnicity plays without confining it to dichotomous relations among and within ethnicities. Tending towards a more constructivist and instrumentalist view, we rather look at the way in which ethnicity can be used in the context of political tribalism and the politics of affection as further described in subheadings 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 below.

3.2.5. The Study’s take on Ethnicity

The discussions on the theoretical approaches to ethnicity made above suggest that there is a theoretical divergence in explaining ethnicity. However, irrespective of the divergences, the discussion entails that ethnicity is a clear fact in human experience built upon cultural, political and social factors that are meaningful to people in their self-identification. Since cultural, social and political factors are complex, shared identities like ethnicity are bound to be dynamic as they are subjected to constant expressions, creations and inventions. Cognisant of this complexity, ethnicity in the current dissertation is viewed as an imagined identity blend from real and

\[25\] The concept refers to organisation and mobilisation of politics around tribal lines. This entail that voting is informed by tribal belonging and therefore members of a particular ethnic group will go for their fellow and the same applies for others.

\[26\] Politics of affection refers to political preferences informed by the ability of those who wield power to lure support through ensuring the people disproportionate access to state resources as opposed to rationally based factors. As such people are not moved by overt rational theories or performance.
constructed realities of time which delineate groups within societies. These groups are supposed to be well identified by varied people as a collective and identified by others as such. For instance in Africa, the shape of ethnicity transformed with colonialism, moving from a rather fluid and malleable identity to a noticeably defined and distinguished group identity mostly in the forms of what Swahili speakers call *kabila*.

On the basis of the discussion above, the current study conceives ethnic identity as the inclination of individuals to define themselves and others by their ethnic origins (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; Bratton et al. 2011). Elements of the distinctive approaches to ethnicity are appreciated in the present study. This is because we concur with the contention that far from being primordial or atavistic, an ethnic identity is constructed, fluid, and one among multiple identities that actors can adopt depending on political mobilisation or any other pull or push factor(s) they are confronted with. In Africa, ethnic identity is widely perceived to be the predominant organising principle of society and politics and a concrete base for forming individuals’ political opinion during elections and stimulating political action (Eifert, 2010; Erdmann, 2007, 2004; Posner, 2005, 2004; Burgess, 2004; Berman et al. 2004; Norris and Mattes 2003; Holm 1996 and Molutsi and Holm, 1992). Emphasising the same Romero (2013) adds that ethnic identity influences who one trusts, does business with, gets married to, and whom to vote for.

The centrality placed on ethnic identities in the organisation of African politics (political tribalism) inferably suggests that ethnicity is important in anchoring votes. It is against this backdrop that the concept of ethnic voting which refers to the act of members of a particular ethnic group to vote as a bloc for a specific political party or candidate is associated with Africa (Bratton et al. 2011; Young, 2009; McLaughlin, 2008 Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 1985 and Wolfinger, 1965). Elucidating the logic of ethnic voting, Posner (2005) argues that ethnic voters elect their fellow ethnic members to positions of power, particularly the top executive spot, so as to gain collective representation. When ethnic voting is of the highest order it can translate itself into election results that resemble head counts of ethnic groups or ethnic census (McLaughlin 2008; Ferree 2006; Horowitz, 1985; Lever, 1979). Under these circumstances, ethnic demography is the principal determinant of the distribution of votes. On that the claim that ethnic groups with numerical advantage make leaders is based.
While the definition of ethnicity as the inclination of individuals defining themselves and others by their ethnic origins will form the basis of analysing ethnicity and voting but there are other social identities within ethnicities. These identities are central to influencing politics and are related to and sometimes viewed to be ethnic. In this dissertation we look at the politics of origin, being and belonging as informed by Chabal. The choice of aspects of origin, being and belonging is based on the fact that origin, being and belonging are constitutive parts of the ethnic identities. However, they do not constitute ethnic identities as discussed above and particularly in the tribal sense. However, a less deep analysis may consider these factors as ethnic simply because of the constitutive nature that they have. In this dissertation we recognise origin in terms of being born or having ancestral roots in an area of political contest, and being and belonging as informed by knowledge and use of the local language of the area of contest, as well as owning land and having a residence in the constituency one vies for political office. These elements are taken on board in our analysis of the role of ethnicity in informing electoral choices because although they do not fit in the definition of ethnicity in terms of tribalism, I consider them as flashes of ethnicity. This is because they mildly reflect integral parts of ethnicity which in low salient ethnic countries like Tanzania might have an impact in anchoring voters’ choices. Such conceptualisation gives me room to deal with ethnic group based ethnicity and voting as well as the partly tribal and extra tribal based elements of ethnicity and voting informed by issues of origin, being and belonging as further described below.

3.2.6. The Politics of Origin, Being and Belonging

The importance of origin in the analysis of politics in Africa is extensively documented but Patrick Chabal’s book *The Politics of Suffering and Smiling* (2009) cannot be ignored in any academic discourse on the same due the significance it has assigned to the topic. It is against this background that Chabal is widely referred in this section. According to Chabal, origin is an integral part of what he calls the politics of being and belonging which are central at his approach to analysing the role of ethnicity in voting. As a starting point, Chabal argues that there are identities that are negotiable and others which are not. Contextualising his stance to identity categorisation in Africa, Chabal contends that identities are often equated with ethnicity which is fluid, flexible and adjustable and thus negotiable; while factors of origin like birth, on the other hand, are not flexible and as such represent an integral part of anyone’s community identity (Chabal, 2009). In this regard, Chabal essentially argues that being born in a particular community or ethnic group is not
something that is negotiable and thus distinguishes the basis of origin from the flexible concept of ethnicity presented above. In other words, ethnicity expressed by ethnic groups cannot be wholly flexible as one’s ethnic group is associated with one’s birth.

However, Chabal’s thesis of origin adds other components that go along with the inflexible birth requisite which could question the centrality of the line he draws between ethnicity and origin. These are land, ancestors and beliefs. According to Chabal apart from being born as a member of a group, groups have land ownership, ancestral and the beliefs systems that are expected to shape members’ do and don’ts. In this connection, land impacts upon self-perception of communities and marks its physical boundaries and determines relevant occupation of those inhabiting it. These impacts suggest that land is essential at shaping the self-definition, socio-political and economic organisation of a given community or group. Ancestors in this equation are typically related to land as they inhabit the lands of origin (Chabal, 2009; Ellis and ter Haar, 2007). From such viewpoint one can belong to an ethnic group only because he is born of a parent(s) from that group and can or cannot behave in line with the expectations of the group. In this regard, a tribal member by birth may or may not be viewed as being a member of, or belonging to the group, despite his/her birth right ticket. Conversely, it suggests that other people can own land and behave in a manner that is expected of a member of that ethnic group. Thus, one can be qualified as being and belonging to such ethnic group without being born by a member(s) of that group or in the geographical confines of the ethnic group in question.

In Chabal’s view land and ancestors form the basis of a belief system that guides both ethical and socio-political values which impact voting choices within a particular locality. The belief system in Africa according to Chabal presupposes that authority is gained by adhering to primordial beliefs and reciprocity. Moreover, while primordialists reduce the adherence and reciprocity to “primordial, traditional or ascriptive” ethnic identities, Chabal associates them to kin which to him shall be understood as a large association of people, their norms and structures binding local societies. According to Chabal, kin-related associations form networks with other associations on the local and national levels. In this regard, belonging to a kinship network is essential for the social identity of individuals and accords value, legitimacy and worth to political action. That is to say, kinship networks are responsible for making an individual exist, and exist socially within a locality. This communal sense of identity according to Chabal has to be reflected in politics. This
argument is predicated on the fact that politics is about collective virtue as well as power. As such, politicians should exhibit the identity and qualities of their kin association on the local and national political levels to anchor votes. In this way, the link between kin association and the politicians consists of a system of obligations which extends to the political sphere to form a network of obligations (Chabal, 2009). These obligations in the words of Chabal are referred to as structures of reciprocity. These structures of reciprocity are found on definite rules of exchange of symbolic and material resources between leaders and the led. The exchange is often exemplified by the expectations of the community of origin of their rulers once they acquire political office.

Aside from representing the interests of their constituents, politicians are also expected to assure certain material rewards, as well as representing numerous identity markers like ethnicity and the virtues that the community of origin holds of itself. All this put in one basket makes a political representative a proper constituent member of the kinship association as it defines itself. To all intents and purposes, then, politicians’ legitimacy is anchored on their ability to meet their kinship obligations. These local obligations are supposed to be delivered even if politicians take on national attributes and identities (Chabal, 2009). The network of obligations presented put the notion of accountability of rulers to the ruled into practice. This is because the network of obligations on one hand provides informal channels of influence for ordinary citizens to check their representatives and have a stake in the flows of power and resources; on the other hand politicians get a chance to maintain legitimacy.

As much as Chabal views the means of accountability discussed above as more relevant in the informal field, he acknowledges that democratic institutions may also serve as a reciprocal mechanism for electing representatives, distributing resources, producing legitimacy and providing channels of influence for local community members (Chabal, 2009). In this context, the informal and formal, democratic and non-democratic domains should not necessarily be viewed in disagreement. In this way, factors of origin could also be used for a democratic electorate to ensure inclusion in a polity and observance with their standards. Interesting questions to the accountability discussed is whether it is rational to resort to identity issues to gain leverage over politicians, or if personal issues associated with a person and political agenda should function as political accountability.
Chabal’s thesis on origin is quite useful in explaining the role of local interests on determining voters’ choices and politicians and individuals’ existence in communities. However, Chabal’s model apart from presenting the inflexible element of birth and the possibility of birth forming or not forming the base of ethnic belonging in the discussion of ethnicity, hardly distinguishes origin from ethnicity in broader terms. For instance, when he states that origin cannot be squarely attached to identity but rather to community, however, the factors that influence origin – land, ancestors and beliefs highlighted above – are vital in shaping a person’s identity. In addition, what is expected of political representatives of a community are quite in line with Lonsdale’s concept of moral ethnicity (defined in the following subheading) on what membership in an ethnicity involves and who is to represent a particular ethnic entity (Lonsdale 1994). However, Chabal’s idea of origin, being and belonging gives us room to unpack ethnicity proper and take into consideration specific ethnic related elements in politics. In this sense, Chabal’s view of origin is helpful for understanding how local forms of identity which could be employed in politics. This is the case regardless of Lonsdale’s position that these identities are considered a form of ethnicity as a common origin, heritage and culture form the basis of what ethnic identity is all about. However, according to our definition having constituent parts of ethnicity is not enough as such ingredients in their totally have to be recognised by the group members and others thus Lonsdale critic should be viewed on that limit. Chabal’s thesis provides grounds for analysing specific ingredients of ethnic identities as regarded important in a specific political community which on its specific context cannot qualify to be ethnicity in the broad sense.

By employing Chabal’s thesis we can analyse ethnic-related political attributes relevant in explaining voters’ choices in elections. In the Tanzanian context, this is relevant as there is a common view of being and belonging: mwenzetu, translatable as ‘our own’. This concept qualifies people who do not belong to the ethnic group in question on pure tribal terms, but harbour and further some tribal or ethnic qualities. Inferably, the concept (mwenzetu) allow for previous outsiders to be allied and part of ‘the family’/ the group/ community and ethnic group they associate themselves with. The allied individuals can assume political responsibility when they are considered to possess the ideal leadership qualities deemed significant by the members of the ethnic group they are allied to. A relevant example in Tanzania can be derived from my previous election monitoring endeavours in Igunga and Kilombero. The election of Rostam Aziz and the late Abbas Gulamali to the parliament in Igunga and Kilombero respectively, provide a case. Both
of the politicians in question are Tanzanians of Asian origins who were considered to be ‘being and belonging to’ the constituencies that they contested for. For instance, Rostam’s father was a local businessman and a prominent traditional musician in Igunga who sang in Kinyamwezi. Rostam himself speaks the language and has nowhere better to call home than Igunga. However, he is not a Nyamwezi in strict tribal terms as he lacks ancestral lineage. Similarly, Gulamali spoke Kipogoro fluently, had land and residence in Ifakara, and did business in the area. In particular, his buses operated from Dar es Salaam to Ifakara and rented tractors for cultivating rice which is the economic mainstay in the area he contested for. Gulamali wrote on his buses “Mwana wa Pakaya” literally meaning “a son of the land” in Kipogoro to associate himself with the Pogoros to win their hearts politically. In political tribalist campaigns, Gulamali’s competitors asked him and his supporters to justify his claim of being a son of the Pogoro land by asking about her mother: “yu wi mwana wa binti yani?” Who is your mother? The question was relevant to Gulamali because the Pogoros are matrilineal and, therefore, tribal belonging and major rituals of passage are attuned to one’s mother. Knowing that Gulamali’s mother is not a Pogoro, they meant to disqualify Gulamali’s claim of being the son of the land in strict tribal terms. The question notwithstanding, Gulamali won the elections and was always viewed as “mwana wa pakaya”. The current thesis wants to see how the mwenzetu label plays out in informing voters’ choices particularly knowing that the level of ethnicity in the form of tribalism is relatively low in Tanzania. However, I believe that considering origin, being and belonging strictly as defined by Chabal in terms of kin networks, land, ancestors and beliefs alone narrows the sense of origin, being and belonging. That is why in this study we add the aspect of knowledge of the language of the area of contest.

Constructivists also allow for the subjective factor: the capacity to convince people of one’s autochthony (Hilgers, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006; Kopytoff, 1987). Autochthony refers to an original belonging to a group or territory. At its core, the concept suggests that within social entities there are categories of people who are ‘bonafide’ members of the entity and those who are not, but can be ‘naturalised’ (Geschiere and Jackson, 2006). This categorisation entails that members of a social entity are autochthonous compared to strangers, but within the entity certain lineages have a greater degree of autochthony than others. In Africa, the distinction between ‘firstcomers’- bonafide members or autochthons and ‘newcomers’- ‘immigrants’ is common and formed a means of categorisation at the base of a hierarchy determining the distribution of rights, especially land rights, and access to resources during the
colonial and immediate post-colonial eras (Kopytoff, 1987). The firstcomers (autochthons) in the said eras enjoyed the valued and prestigious spaces in their community, and designate spaces that newcomers could occupy; and assure a harmonious co-existence among people, natural forces and invisible forces. This distinction defined the scope of integration while maintaining respect for a social organisation headed by the autochtons (Hilgers, 2011). Inferably, the social order, allows autochthony to play the role of an actual form of capital that can be invested, valued and profited from by the autochthons in elections.

It is imperative to note that autochthony is rather malleable as latecomers can be integrated into the autochthomous status once they are given cultural resources or responsibilities such as managing the autochthons’ main earth-shrine (Hilgers, 2011). This mobility of identity indicates that ‘firstcomers’ and ‘latecomers’ labels could shift and be used to anchor votes to both groups within a community provided that who benefits from the principle of autochthony at a particular time and context. Currently, urbanisation and decentralisation, as well as land and political conflicts inform resource-based autochthonous arguments aiming at barring a section of a population from accessing resources and/or basic rights. The autochthonous arguments include accessing property, settlement history or burial places, enjoying the right to vote, who to stand in elections and who to vote for (Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006). This is because urbanisation and decentralisation and land and political questions revolve around distribution and re-distribution of resources which could influence autochthonous shifts of identities.

From the analysis of Chabal’s politics of origin and Tanzania’s contextualisation it can be argued that the overarching ethnic identity of an individual in Africa may be tribal (Sukuma or Nyamwezi etc), but such identity can coexist with other local identities connected to a place of origin; or those locally set identities can happen to be a fraction of the broader ethnic identity. In some instances, origin might transcend beyond an area occupied by one’s ethnic group. Most zone27-related origins are beyond districts and regions thus binding members of different ethnic groups for political interests. Therefore, reference to common origin could be used as a political referent whereby

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27 Tanzania is divided in seven zones formed by regions that are geographically proximate. The regions on their own and collectively are ethnically diverse. The division is depicted in allocation of public offices to serve in the regions found in the zones and have bearing in national politics.Six zones are well known among Tanzanians.The Eastern Zone (Dar es Salaam, Coast and Morogoro); Central (Dodoma and Singida); Lake (Mwanza, Geita, Simiyu, Shinyanga, Mara and Kagera); Northern (Arusha, Manyara, Tanga and Kilimanjaro); Western (Tabora, Kigoma); Southern Highlands (Iringa, Njombe Mbeya, Ruvuma, Songwe, Rukwa and Katavi) and Southern (Lindi and Mtwara).
local, district, regional, zonal or national politicians may be understood. A detailed account of how ethnicity can manifest and germinate into a political salient phenomenon is presented below.

3.2.7. Ethnicity and its Manifestation in Politics

Ethnic identities as we saw in the discussions above can be a result of varied cultural, political, social and economic realities that inform the basis of people’s identification. For instance, although the ethnic identities in Africa took shape since humans started interactions in varied social settings but since the common historical reality in Africa happens to be colonialism, most studies on ethnicity could hardly shun away from analysing its ramifications on present ethnic identities when examining ethnicity in the continent (Posner, 2003; Turton, 1997). Most of the literature in their analysis argue that ethnicity in Africa has received its present shape, structure and even geographical distribution as a consequence of political, economic and cultural processes of colonialism (Weber, 2009; Posner, 2003; Turton, 1997; Lonsdale, 1994; Illife, 1979). Generally the colonialists either merged previously separate groups to create new ones, divided one into several or influenced formation of news completely depending on the suitability of the identities to the colonial project. Weber (2009) for instance, shows how ethnic groups were divided in Kenya by forcing association formation to be based on ethnic groups to ensure maximum yields are accrued from its investment compared to Tanzania were associations were supposed to be national in character. Illife (1979) and Mpangala (1992) provide evidence of how the German and British colonialists merged ethnic groups to form new grand tribal identities. In the next chapter the role of colonialism in shaping ethnic identities as they relate to Tanzania are discussed.

Solid ethnic identities according to Jerman (1997) can be distinguished by cultural and social factors whereby the former factors inform what she conceives to be objective ethnicity and the later subjective ethnicity. Objective ethnicity according to Jerman refers to the existence of ethnicity as a cultural category of traditions, customs, languages, etc without developing into a self-ascribed group identity. Since this kind of ethnicity does not represent a self-reference of individuals and groups, its significance in social interaction is rendered irrelevant and can hardly be a base of social identity. On the other hand, subjective ethnicity is used to connote the form of rigidly defined ethnic groups. As opposed to the objective type of ethnicity, subjective ethnicity entails that ethnicity becomes an integral part of the self-definition of individuals and groups. In this regard, ethnicity gains social significance. In essence, both objective and subjective ethnicity
express the cultural feeling of “we-ness” and “otherness”. However, the subjective one articulates it in a manner useful for mobilising social and political interests (Jerman, 1997)

The possibility of ethnicity to mobilise social and political interests intrigues a discourse between the link between social and political ethnicity. This is because if the categorical distinction of ethnicity is left at the cultural and social level, then the political process that forms the link between the social significance of ethnicity and the political relevance of ethnicity would be missed. This is relevant because ethnicity does not automatically assume political significance in a situation where its social significance has increased (Malipula, 2014).

The distinction between social and political ethnicity is made on the basis of Lonsdale’s (1994) categorisation of ethnicity into *moral ethnicity* and *political tribalism*. In the eyes of Lonsdale, both moral ethnicity and political tribalism emerged as a result of the process of colonialism. Moral ethnicity according to Lonsdale is conceived as the moral and ethical norms and meanings founded on social interactions and forms of labour that exist within a community that is ‘imagined’ or craved to be reached (Anderson, 1991). This definition is of an abstract nature but its interpretation is rather uncomplicated. It entails that ethnicity is an identity predicated on the ethical norms and rules that guide and shape people sharing a similar identity within a certain community. The commonality aspect of the ethical norms among members of a group stretches the definition to questions of negotiations concerning social rights and obligations of members of the group, as well as the distribution of authority and property within an ethnic group. The process of negotiation and definition of the boundaries of the ethnic groups in the holistic fashion explained in this definition occurred during colonialism and led to the formation of more rigidly defined ethnic groups (Lonsdale, 1994).

The clarity of the definition of political tribalism according to Lonsdale is undoubted and does not require clarifications to resolve seemingly imaginary concepts like moral ethnicity. Political tribalism is the use of ethnic identity in political competition with other groups (Lonsdale, 1994). The emergence of political tribalism in Africa can be traced back to the colonial times as collective political action “across communities of moral ethnicity” (Berman, 1998). To begin with, it was employed in the struggles against the colonial domination and was later used in competition for power and resources between ethnic groups in the independent African nation states (Mamdani, 1996: 23-25; Lonsdale, 1994: 139-140). Ngugi (2008: 18) presents a succinct conceptualisation of
political tribalism in the post-colonial context, when he refers to it as the pursuit of public resources on the basis and to the advantage of one’s ethnic group, at the expense of other ethnic groups in a country (Ngugi, 2008:18). Since the resources pursued mainly belong to the state, and the demands are from divergent ethnic groups, political tribalism easily becomes a “zero-sum game” which alienates others participating in the game (Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996:31). The process of political tribalism in Africa revolves around the nation state and its resources because the state is commonly a main provider of both employment and appropriable resources (Bates, 2008; Azam, 2001).

The game nature of political tribalism presupposes mobilisation of ethnic groups for competition. The mobilisation of ethnicity for competition with other groups calls for some measure of “myth-making” vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups and the boundaries of the ethnic groups to be defined in relation to other groups (Barth, 1969; Laakso and Olukoshi 1996). Also political tribalism call for lines to be drawn between the self and the “other” on the basis of conceptions of good and evil, virtue and morality, oppressor and oppressed (Lemarchand, 1999: 4; Berman 1998: 324-25; 327-330). In the process of this competition, ethnic myth making and rivalry are spread across the ethnic groups as privilege and discrimination. In this context, political tribalism and its associated competition for resources lay bear the fundamental questions in politics-“who gets what, when and how?”

Contextualising ethnicity in post-colonial Africa, Wimmer (1997) suggests a three-staged explanation of the politicisation of ethnicity as summarised below. The first stage includes the act of one of the competing ethnic groups dominating the state bureaucracy. This stage is followed by systematic discrimination of elites from other groups preventing them from having an influence on public policy and strategic positions within the bureaucracy. Lastly, as a result of domination and discrimination the “ethnic grassroots” getting activated in this setting of ethnic competition as they find themselves excluded from the national cake (Wimmer, 1997: 632-651). The three staged process of politicising ethnicity proposed by Wimmer might be considered rigid, but it is useful for the present study as it highlights the role of the elite in the domination of authority and the effects of their acts of inclusion and exclusion. Above all the study finds its way to the lower level communities who are excluded from the material and symbolic resources of the state.
Figure 2: A Scheme Explaining Politicisation of Ethnicity (Tribalism)


It is imperative to note that while Wimmer contends that politicisation of tribalism ensues from political competition between ethnic groups it is fuelled by what Barth (1969:33) regards as some mobilising efforts by political elites, or innovators. Posner (2005:2-8) agrees with the role of mobilisation in enhancing politicisation of tribalism but assigns the essence of the mobilisational role of politicisation of ethnic groups to social institutions. To him, formal rules, regulations and policies that structure social and political interactions determine which ethnic identities are to choose from and which ones will be deemed most valuable to use by individuals and groups in garnering resources of the state (Posner, 2005). However, Posner’s model fails to explain why in some instances people choose not to voice ethnic identities politically at all, or only to a limited extent.

3.3. Understanding the Concept of Voting

Voting is a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a decision or express an opinion—often following discussions, debates, or election campaigns. Voting is considered an important form of political participation\(^\text{28}\) in a democracy (Oswald, 2010: xi). It is a democratic routine used by individuals to make a choice between two or more candidates or policy options in an election (Misafi, 2014:43). In this regard, voting is a formal expression of opinion or choice,

\(^{28}\) Other forms include direct democracy, participating in campaigns, joining political parties and interest groups and contesting for an office
either positive or negative, made by an individual or body of individuals. More often than not, the choices are made by individuals out of free will and thus the choice to or not to vote rests with the individual. That is to say one may decide to or not to vote. However, in some countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Turkey, and Venezuela to mention but a few, voting is compulsory (Oswald, 2010:6). The rationale for making voting compulsory is to improve voters’ turnout in elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2009; O’Gorman, 2012). In the majority of countries including Tanzania, citizens are free to participate or not to participate in voting. In this study, I conceptualise voting as an act of casting a ballot carried out by an individual citizen of a voting age and with personal characteristics required by the jurisdiction of the place an individual wishes to exercise his voting right. Voting in this study involves individual’s liberty to vote or not and whom to vote for. Since this is a study of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, it was assumed that individuals are free to decide whether or not to vote in ethnic lines. Since voting is done after campaign activities during which candidates and political parties present their policies to the electorates, I assume there is a correlation between individuals’ view of ethnic salience and the candidate’s or a political party they vote for. This is because the electorate has the chance of scrutinising candidates and or political party policies before making the decision to vote for or not to vote for a particular candidate or policy.

3.4. Ethnicity and Voting: A Theoretical Overview

The theoretical debate on the ethnicity and voting in new democracies has for ages revolved around the nature of a state and its connection to society. The debate is relevant to the study in question because indeed Tanzania is a new democracy and state-society relationships and social structures have a profound impact on the relations between ethnicity and voting in any polity (Bayart 1989; Chabal and Daloz 1999). It is against this background that neo-patrimonial and ethnic structural theses are considered relevant to this dissertation. However, because of the weaknesses of the ethnic structure in terms of pointing out the agents of ethnic salience indicated in section 1.1 less attention is provided to this school in our analysis. In this regard, a more relevant angle to this dissertation is the discourse on the state and its leaders’ use of non-legal rational elements like ethnicity to sustain power, legitimacy and control political competition (Van De Walle, 2003, Van Cranenburg 2003, Salih, 2003, and Bogaards, 2004; Rothchild and Olorunsola, 1983, Bates, 1983, and 2000, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1993, Wamba dia Wamba, 1996). A critical look at the dominant literature on power sustenance in Africa points to the fact that the
state in Africa has patrimonial characteristics. Such characteristics tend to support traditional particularistic and personalised authority that gives centrality to aspects like ethnicity in manipulating voting choices. This explains why, recent explanations (which are viewed relevant to the current study) are by and large informed by neo-patrimonial theories (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).

The argument of the neo-patrimonial rule is anchored on a blend the use of the institution of the presidency, the political centrality of ethnic groups support in elections and the use of state resources to influence voters to vote for those in power (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 61-68). The neo-patrimonialist suggestion that ethnicity is central in voting in Africa because leaders have given credence to personal rule instead of LRIs is criticised and slightly modified by hybrid regime researchers. Hybrid researchers are of the view that states do have in place legal-rational institutions but use them in a manner that ensures their survival. For instance, hybrid theorists point out that regimes in Africa adhere to conducting multiparty elections but such elections are far away from being fair and free and employ patrimonial tendencies including the use of ethnicity to influence electoral choices in a manner that ensure they maintain political power.

A critique of both theoretical positions that questions the efficacy of LRIs and the preconceived traditional and paternalistic nature of African states to explain influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices suggest an alternative explanation. This explanation stems from African political thought as informed by its shared historical realities particularly colonialism and the effects thereof.

Below we present a theoretical discourse of the ethnic structure school, and the neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime approaches to ethnicity and voting and suggest an alternative model to the two for explaining the role of ethnicity in voting in Tanzania. The discussion is organised in four main parts. The five discusses the ethnic structure school, neo-patrimonial theory; the second section deals with hybrid regime analysis; the third presents an African centred explanation of the state, ethnicity and voting that is critical of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theoretical underpinnings and lastly a contextualised framework for explaining the influence of ethnicity in Tanzania is presented.
3.4.1. The Ethnic Structure School and Voting

As indicated in the general introduction, this school contends that a country’s ethnic structure - the number and size of ethnic groups - can explain the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices (Posner, 2005; Barkan, 1994). As such, countries with few and large ethnic groups are expected to be ethnically politicised as they are endowed with ethnic groups large enough to form MWCs. These MWCs are said to influence voting because voters expect rewards for being part of an MWC. The contrary is viewed to be true for countries with an array of small ethnic groups which force contestants to reach out to, and win votes from, a myriad of ethnic groups through a national appeal (Weber, 2010: 58). Tanzania would seem an instance of this kind of electoral process, and it helps to explain the lower levels of ethnic politicisation in the country. As convincing as the ethnic structure view may be in terms of strategic rationality, the political-ethnographic school questions its validity on grounds of the dynamic and contextual reality of ethnic identities, which a static conceptualisation of ethnic groups and their politicising effect fails to grasp (Malipula, 2014:51). To this school of thought, the structural argument’s neglect of the dynamic and contextual nature of ethnic identities is a serious flaw as ethnic groups might be regrouped into smaller sub-ethnic groups or larger super-ethnic groups (Weber, 2009:8). In this respect, then, the structural explanation is only relevant to static ethnic structures and well defined ethnic groupings. Where does the Tanzanian case fit in this broad structural debate? This question will be addressed below through a comparison of Tanzania and Kenya. However, against both the ethnic structure argument and its critique, Miguel (2004) suggests that nation-building policies and practices can moderate ethnic politicisation. To Miguel, nation-building can mitigate politicisation of ethnicity, while lack of the same can exacerbate it regardless of the ethnic structure. My focus is rather on the perception of nation-building, namely people’s social imaginaries, which can be obtained ethnographically.

Tanzania as a polity augurs well in both the ethnic-structure and nation-building debate. Weber (2010) argues that Tanzania has a potential of forming MWCs in presidential elections. I disagree because the largest ethnic group, the Sukuma speakers, constitutes 17% of the population while there is none amounting to more than 5% (Malipula, 2014:54). Any MWC for the presidential seat would require many ethno cultural groups and a national outlook. It imperative to recall that Tanzania exhibits a striking plurality of ethnic groups as already indicated in section 1.1. Estimates differ, but 120 is the most quoted figure of ethnic groups in the country (Jerman, 1997:34). Some
estimates put the figure as high as 150 (Omari, 1997:51) while others (Nyang’oro, 2004) indicate 130 and yet others 140 (Heilman and John, 2012:2). The task of providing an official number of ethnic groups and of their population size is substantially hindered by the 1967 legal prohibition on registering the population by ethnic groups and religious affiliation (Jerman, 1994:34). Nevertheless, estimates can be found in the literature. Glickman (1995, 308), presents estimates of the seven largest ethnic groups in the country by 1992. Likewise, the Afrobarometer surveys of 2005, 2008 and 2012, which list the ethnic origin of its respondents also sheds light on the size of ethnic groups in Tanzania. Although the sample size of the surveys (N= 1208, N=1304 and N=2004 for the 2005, 2008 and 2012 surveys) might be viewed as too small to give reliable estimates for the whole Tanzanian population, there is at present no better alternative to establishing ethnic group size. Based on these sources, the seven largest ethnic groups in Tanzania can be listed as follows.

### Table II: Relative Size (%) of Ethnic Groups in Tanzania

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sukuma</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyamwezi</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chagga</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makonde</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haya</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hehe</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyakyusa</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26.5+</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data presented in Table II above prove that Tanzania is an ethnically diverse state without an ethnic group close to commanding a simple majority in presidential elections. More importantly, such status could not even be achieved by a merger of the large ethnic groups as they constitute only around 37% of the general population. Under such circumstances, grand coalitions based on ethnic group sizes could be beneficial to the smaller groups as their mergers can produce an MWC. However, the MWC requires massive canvassing in Tanzania. This structural fact provides an

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29 The 1992 estimates deviate from the rest, which raises doubts on the survey. As stated earlier, it should be noted however that ethnic categories are not fixed at the geographical margins. Sukuma and their southern neighbours, Nyamwezi, are culturally and linguistically related, with regional linguistic variants where the groups neighbour each other, so much so that a shift in ethnic identification is possible over only a few generations. Intermarriage is another element. Note that such dynamic identification is less likely in politicised ethnicity.
incentive to nationalistic political canvassing as any ethnic move must be ethnically broad and inclusive to have a positive effect. It is against this background that Barkan (1994:10), Hyden (1994:79) and Glickman (1995: 289) partly attribute the lack of ethnic salience in politics in Tanzania to its ethnic composition. However, Weber (2009:7) refutes the contention by making the contrast with its neighbouring country Kenya. Although Kenya lacks an ethnic group with a clear majority, ethnicity has long played a significant role there to the extent that presidential elections resemble an ethnic census (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Barkan 1994). The argument advanced by Weber against the structural explanation of ethnic salience is predicated on the assumption that Kenya and Tanzania have the potential to forge MWCs.

Weber, for instance, argues that in Kenya ethnic groups competing for power and resources are blocs made up of smaller groups appearing as one on the national political scene (Kiondo, 2001:260-61). The Kalenjin, which was crafted by President Moi by combining his own small Tugen and other cousin ethnic groups (Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, and Pokot) to support his presidential bid, provide an example of how the politicisation of ethnicity can originate from a small ethnic group (Weber, 2009:8). The Kikuyu’s inclusion of the cousin ethnic groups of Embu and Meru to increase their number from 21% to 27% provides an example of a large ethnic group extending itself for political reasons (Ibid.). There are also politically motivated ethnic mergers like the Luhya and Mijikenda (Makoloo, 2005:11) as well as the Masai and Samburu (Ogot, 2005:291). Taking into consideration the Kenyan examples where ethnic groups have come together irrespective of their sizes, Weber wonders why the Sukuma have not made use of their numerical advantage to maximise their political influence. To Weber the explanation cannot be found in their size. While this idea might well attract support, we believe that it is open to criticism. The critique, salvaging aspects of the hypothesis of a structural politicisation of ethnicity, is anchored in the fact that the major ethnic groups in Kenya (Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjin) do provide an incentive for ethnic politics as their numbers combined is above the MWC. More precisely, if the leading ethnic groups in Kenyan politics – the Kikuyu and Luo – manage to court two big and a few smaller groups they can compose a MWC\textsuperscript{30}. This is not the case in Tanzania where the Sukuma and Nyamwezi together constitute less than 25% of the general population and where none of the other 118 ethnic groups has more than 4% of the general population as indicated above. Under such circumstances, the Sukuma-

\textsuperscript{30} Assuming all are eligible to vote the MWC requires 19.3 million which could be met if the Kikuyu, Luhya and Kalenjin plus Kikuyu’s cousins Embu and Meru joined.
Nyamwezi conglomerate would need to embark upon pan-territorial courting of ethnic groups to achieve success. We also question the relevance of Weber’s choice of the Kalenjin to argue his case. We agree that President Moi has engineered the formation of the Kalenjin and used it for political visibility, but by no means has it guaranteed him the MWC. He came into power without elections as he succeeded President Jomo Kenyatta, who died in the middle of his term. Moi clung to power through the political infrastructure built by Kenyatta and utilised the advantages of his incumbency (Mutua, 2008:66). The advantage included the misuse of coercive organs to intimidate his opponents to the extent that his re-election under multi-party politics was regarded as fraudulent (Brown, 2001; Klopp, 2001). President Moi only managed to elevate the Kalenjin into an important bloc by supporting the two major political bases in Kenya, the Kikuyu and Luo, thus coaxing the ruling or opposition circles depending on the electoral outcomes. This potential, activated by Moi, may be structurally informed by the fluidity of the Kenyan ethnic groups and the real potential of making the MWC.

The structural explanation for depoliticisation of the ethnicity in Tanzania is not limited to the presidential race. The situation is also vividly apparent in parliamentary and civic elections as the demarcation of most of the parliamentary and civic electoral constituencies particularly found in rural areas are predominantly occupied by one ethnic group (Nyaluke, 2013). The lack of divided ethnic groups in these constituencies principally restrains the potential for inter-ethnic conflicts as contestants are from the same ethnic group. Potentially intra ethnic conflicts could occur as ethnic groups are composed of different clans, but, there is no evidence to claim its salience in Tanzanian politics (ibid.). Only Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania is ethnically cosmopolitan to present an exception to constituencies’ ethnic group homogeneity. Other urban constituencies share Dar es Salaam’s cosmopolitan nature yet the ethnic groups inhabiting the cities or towns are often more populous than the immigrants, thus dampening the efficacy of politics centred around the original inhabitants against immigrants (ibid.). Generally speaking, the potential for politicisation of ethnicity suggested by Weber is, in the case of Tanzania, imaginary. The obstructions are not only structural but also exist at the level of political ethnic consciousness. Ethnic groups in Tanzania have socially active and identifiable traits that resist political manipulation. Also, the scale of ethnic diversity and the distribution of tribal populations make political manipulation difficult to execute; and attainment of the MWC by default ensures, as argued above, a national rather than ethnic outlook. Because of both the numerical argument for acquisition of state power and the crystallised
nature of the ethnic groups, the structural element still has a part to play in the explanation of depoliticised ethnicity in Tanzania, the exceptions to the Dar es Salaam case notwithstanding. Rather than asking whether or not it has a role in mitigating such politicisation, the question should be to what extent does it do so? Therefore, we complement the structural argument by turning to history, the path(s) of the past, and consider the ethnic structure in place since the colonial administration until the current administration. Also in order to clarify why the structure has been retained and taken advantage of to unite Tanzanians against ethnic salience in politics, a thorough-going historical perspective particularly from the nationalist era to date is required.

From a historical perspective, Weber (2010:59) argues that the degree of ethnic polarisation is lower in Tanzania than in Kenya due to their different colonial status and the colonizer’s greater involvement in Kenya, which meant more colonial economic investment. The heavy investment in Kenya and its colonial status motivated colonialists to spearhead ethnic polarisation to avoid strong national anti-colonial struggles. The contrary was the case for Tanzania, which as a protectorate was less invested and was supposed to be led to independence. Likewise, Tanzania has embarked on a sustained nation-building policy from colonialism to date. It is worth to recall that most African states had similar nation-building policies and philosophies as indicated in section 1.1 above. However, most of them have failed to emulate Tanzania’s success due to lack of commitment to the nation-building enterprise and colonial history (Weber, 2010). From this angle, influences of ethnicity can be understood from Tanzania’s endogenous evolution, namely the line of African political thought that informed nationalist struggles. This is a particular social imaginary (Castoriadis 1997), converging into a political imaginary, that has contributed to making ethnicity insignificant in voting in Tanzania regardless of the ethnic structure. As such to bridge Weber’s ethnic structure explanation of the role of ethnicity in influencing voting, a deeper understanding of Tanzania’s political imaginaries and agencies that inform salience of ethnicity could be achieved through the PsIM approach described below. Before discussing the PsIM let us turn to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theses.

3.4.2. Neo-patrimonialism, Ethnicity and Voting

Neo-patrimonialism is a complex phenomenon that incorporates varied sub-concepts like clientelism, ethnicity, tradition, tribalism, nepotism, etc. (Mkandawire, 2013:6). The literature dealing with the concept of neo-patrimonialism commonly describes it as a vague catch-all concept for the political problems befalling the African continent (Van de Walle, 2001:71; Theobald, 1982:
Arguing along the same line, De Grassi considers neo-patrimonialism to be a “conceptual muddle” (De Grassi, 2008: 112). The basis of De Grassi’s conceptualisation is hinged upon the fact that the concept is difficult to pin down. To him, it embeds “thick description” and often imaginative descriptions of the local African scene, sated with anthropological knowingness, presented in colourful metaphors. These metaphors are usually characterised by unrestrained recourse to anecdotes, derogatory vocabulary or shameless name calling and vivid vignettes of the all-too-frequent cases of egregious abuse of state resources and power in Africa (Mkandawire, 2013:6).

The conceptual complexity notwithstanding, the concept of neo-patrimonialism from which the explanation of the ethnicity and voting is rooted, has been derived from the term patrimonial. The term according to Chabal and Daloz (1999) is an amalgam of all the cultural affairs (including ethnicity) that characterised the traditional pre-colonial past and informed the elite and other people’s organisation and livelihood. According to Ole Therkildsen (2005:41), patrimonial relations connote a patron-client relationship. In this relationship, a patron (a person of influence culturally anchored in the social and political order) bestows gifts from his resources to followers or ‘clients’ to obtain and strengthen their loyalty and support. Contextualising it to ethnicity and voting, the theory infers that electorates vote for the ethnic group of their patron and/or the ethnic group of his choices.

The client-patron relationship and its links to patrimonialism are of seminal significance in explaining the link between ethnicity and voting particularly in African states (Bayart, 1993; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This is because the patron-client relationship in the context of African regimes is between the ‘strongmen’ or ‘big men’—the African term for rulers (in most states the President)—and their subjects. The strongmen are said to use public resources and or their positions to buy off clients to enlist their support and loyalty or to simply meet extended family and ethnic expectations (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 98-99). Through this practice Hyden (2006: 72-93) coined the term “economy of affection” literally meaning electoral choice and forms of supporting patrons are informed by economic rewards gained or expected to be gained upon supporting the patrons.

The patrimonial character of the state in Africa described above implies that African statesmen are not properly institutionalised as independent actors differentiated from personal and local contexts.
as propounded by the Weberian\textsuperscript{31} school of modern state. According to the Weberian school, a modern state has to be characterised by a set of independent political institutions and an autonomous bureaucracy, unbound from particularistic and personalised interest in the society (Hyden, 2004; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). As such, the buying of ethnically based clientelistic support during election can be made evitable. This is because the Weberian dictates condemns personal and particularistic tendencies. Basing on the demerits of politicisation of ethnicity explained in the general introduction one might be eager to ask why the Weberian dictates are not implemented in African states.

According to Clapham (1982; 1985) neo-patrimonialistic tendencies that support the use of ethnicity in voting in Africa are high due to lack of common ideals and values militating against such practices. Clapham (1985) argues that divisive colonial orientations informed by the policy of divide and rule barred expression of a set of shared values among the African people which could instil effective LRIs, unite people and discourage ethnic polarisation in politics inferably on determining electorates’ choices in particular.

Clapham’s view on ethnicity in Africa is an essential component of patrimonial mobilisation of votes and maintenance of political power is supported by several authors. Explicating the component Salih (2003) regard ethnic groups in African politics as a channel through which resources are distributed, support is accrued and political power is maintained. Similar views are held by Lindberg and Jones (2010), Arriola, (2009), Bogaards (2008), Diamond (2008), Van de Walle (2003) and Van Cranenburg (2003). However, this bunch of scholars maintain that ruling parties benefit more from the practice as they have access to resources required to practice the politics of affection. It can be inferred from this position that ethnic polarisation in politics and ethnic saliency in voting can be potentially put into effect by ruling parties. In the same vein, ruling parties can play a leading role in navigating away from ethnic polarisation in politics and ethnic saliency in voting by using the resources at its disposal in a non-particularistic and personal manner.

The basis of the argument that the politics of affection can be invigorated or diffused by the ruling parties in Africa is well explained by Makulilo (2012) who point out that power in most African

\textsuperscript{31} The Weberian School mentioned above is associated with Max Weber and not the less known Weber whom we cited earlier.
governments is excessively concentrated in the presidency who is the head of the respective ruling party in his/her state. These presidents possess such power without proper checks and balance as well as accountability mechanisms (Van de Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Such state of affairs grants the holder of the office-the President, enormous power and authority to exercise personal rule and distribute favours to ethnic groups’ leaders and followers whose interests and those of politicians coincide. This provides the basis for continued loyalty when it comes to elections. The resources also provide room for swaying disloyal ethnicities and voters also to support the incumbent.

The link of ethnicity to the patrimonial relations highlighted presents some interesting implications for the relation between ethnicity and voting. On one hand the patrimonial network creates ‘disincentives’ for opposition politicians to form grand coalitions involving multi-ethnicities when seeking to defeat the ruling party. The reason is the likelihood of conflicts abounding among the united ethnicities over the control of the state (Van de Walle, 2003). Alternatively, the patrimonial network influences opposition politicians to strive for personal glory by mobilising small and highly personalised political parties to either join the ruling party or have leverage in negotiating with it to access state resources. On the other hand, ethnic communities seek representatives in organs responsible for dividing the national cake so that they can indirectly benefit (Van de Walle, 2003). Such interest in the spoils of the state is arguably what made Salih (2003) describe ethnic communities of this nature ‘interest groups’.

The interests of the opposition parties to make small parties to access resources and ethnic groups’ intent to enjoy the same tend to coincide. However, since political parties are the formal organs of political competition in most polities, politicians are afforded an opportunity to seek ethnic support for political competition and ethnic elites also could find way of accessing resources through party tickets in elections. This way, it can be argued that the likelihood of formation of ethnic parties and voting patterns which cannot oust patrons but ensure possibilities of a share of the national cake from the patron is greater than otherwise (Arriola, 2009; Brooks 2004; Bogaards, 2004). According to this perspective then, voters would support the most rewarding patron and connections between rulers and ruled are structured according to a “vertical accountability modelled on the basis of economies of affection” (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Therefore, to neo-patrimonialists ethnic voting in Africa is supposed to be common and informed by the
clientelism. That is to say, partisanship and economic evaluations which are other determinants of voting have no room only if they coincide with the client–patron scripture. This assertion has indeed been criticised by some who argue that political programmes and past policies indeed do affect voters’ choices in Africa much as anywhere else (Ole Therkildsen, 2009).

As much as the neo-patrimonial school has gained traction in explaining ethnicity and voting particularly in Africa, it is not free of criticism. The major critics stem on grounds that the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices is not so simple to be squarely and fairly explained by a mere combination of the legal-rational and patrimonial elements (Erdeman and Engel, 2009). The critique gains credence when the neo-patrimonial school overemphasise accusations that African cultures are supportive of divisive ethnic tendencies in politics and other corruptive, unaccountable and irresponsible tendencies which can exacerbate the politics of affection and inform ethnic voting. This is the case because in the actual sense there is cultural practices in Africa that point opposite to such evil deeds (Pitcher et al. 2009). For instance, Pitcher et al. (2009) argues that there are numerous traditions (rituals and other cultural elements) in Africa that grace accountability, unity and denounce corruption. The works of anthropologists like Vincent (1986) and Scharzberg (2001) are but few that thoroughly document that African leadership is required to be accountable by reciprocities between the ruler and the ruled and not informed by kin or ethnic loyalty were societal do’s do not provide. For example, Botswana is one African state capable of refuting arguments that African cultural heritage is incompatible with Weberian dictates of governance and non-ethnic polarisation in elections. This position is anchored on the fact that a succession of Botswana elites is deeply rooted in the traditional way of life, they employ its power and a set of reciprocities that mended tribal divisions in elections (Pitcher, et al. 2009).

Another important critique of neo-patrimonialism although general is quite relevant to the ethnicity and voting debate; it concerns a methodological issue (De Grassi, 2008; Mustapha, 2002). De Grassi (2008: 112-113) criticises the neo-patrimonial perspective research methodology for focusing on relatively few countries and paying attention to few journals and mostly presenting anecdotal evidence. Mustapha on his part concurs with De Grassi but adds more forcefully his disapproval to the neo-patrimonialists analysis of the influence of ethnicity and voting in Africa through the strongman’s whims. He is of the view that considering the strongman to be an
individual with only self-interests capable of manipulating everyone to evoke patrimonial tendencies including ethnic sentiments in voting is uncalled for (Mustapha, 2002:1-6-9). Mustapha’s disapproval is anchored on the fact that the strongman credence in informing choices tends to neglect that ethnic groups are a complex collective social reality and its evocation in elections requires to be viewed as such. Reducing the influences of ethnicity on elections to the deeds and wishes of the strongman deprives members of ethnic groups of political agency on determining electorates’ choices.

In a more particular way, Mustapha’s critique points out that the methodological individualism characterising the neo-patrimonial school orients the discussion on ethnicity and voting away from the political context of elections. An election from a political context is a group process in which both the rulers and the ruled participate, and exercise a measure of autonomy and political expectation. In this context, the agency of influencing can be initiated from either of the two- the rulers or the ruled. The failure of the neo-patrimonial’s approach to recognise that influences can emanate from the ruled reduces them to a passive mass of victims of ethnic voting. During elections this erroneous view suggests that patrimonial societies are full of hungry individuals ready to be swayed in any direction by rulers. Considering the influences of ethnicity on voting from an individual perspective reduces elections to the struggles for spoils within the elite, while the shared values and ideals, visions and passions that have fuelled broadly based political life like nationalism and others which condemn the use of ethnicity in elections are rendered ineffective in influencing voting. In this way the neo-patrimonial school reduces the political community to narrow elite with greed and predation who can politicise ethnicity to access public resources.

Basing on the critiques of the neo-patrimonial school in explaining influence of ethnicity made above it is only logical that we look into other theories that attempt to fill the gaps identified. In this regard, I turn to the Hybrid regime approach.

3.4.3. Hybrid Regimes Theory, Ethnicity and Voting

The concept of hybrid regimes is derived from the characteristic features of most regimes in Africa and other third world countries after undergoing transition towards liberal democracy in general and multiparty politics in particular (Diamond, 2006). At its core, the transition is considered incomplete as features of despotic monolithic dispensations like unlevel political playing fields for political parties and controlled watchdog institutions just to mention few are retained within
pluralistic reforms. As a result states that have these characteristics are branded hybrid, semi-democracies, or electoral authoritarians (Schedler, 2006, 2002; Diamond, 2008 and 2002; Levistisky and Way, 2002). The hybrid approach poses an opposition to the neo-patrimonial school in the analysis of the influence of ethnicity in elections. Whereas the neo-patrimonial view is preoccupied with the failure of the state to institutionalise LRIs in Africa and assign that failure to the use of ethnicity to inform voting, the hybrid underpins how African states have redesigned Eurocentric LRIs to conform to local political practices including the use of ethnicity in voting, hence creating a genuinely indigenous state (Diamond, 2006). The hybrid regime view is concomitant to arguments supporting the rationality of African states resorting to ethnic loyalties in mobilising electoral support as a reaction to the abortive efforts towards institutionalisation of modern LRIs (Bayart, 1989). To this school, patronage systems and the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes are regarded as a response to neo-patrimonial modernisation that has brought increased insecurity and few benefits to the bulk of the population as it favours few who are in good pages of the strongmen (Bayart 2009; Bogaards, 2009; Lonsdale, 1994).

The rise of modern statehood in societies traditionally governed by patronage envisioned by the hybrid school suggests a “hybrid” political culture in which the public legal-rational institutions of ‘modern’ governance exist alongside cultural practices of indigenous “traditional” governance (Vida, 2010; Bogaards, 2009). As such the use of ethnicity in mobilising electoral support survives amid the legal ration institutions and therefore these institutions do not necessarily ensure lower salience of ethnicity. According to the hybrid theorists the use of either modern or traditional elements rests with the rulers interests’ and calculated benefits (Whitehead, 2002). That is to say, when ethnicity works in mobilising electoral support, it could be used to influence voters. In circumstances where it cannot other clientelistic and corruptive means are preferred. However, it is worth noting that even the clientelistic and corruptive acts could influence the use of ethnicity in elections as politicians benefiting and not benefitting from the corrupt transaction could resort to ethnic support to maintain the benefits or access them for those who have not (Bratton and Mattes, 2009).

The patronage nature of the hybrid regimes operating in an environment where formal and informal institutions coexist in ways that are not complementary, belittle the role of formal institutions that denounce the use of ethnicity in voting (Uslaner, 2008). This is because they are
often perceived as biased/unfair (Hyden, 2006). As a result, informal personalised traditional primordial like the use of ethnicity become essential in providing guidance on voting (Bratton and Mattes, 2009).

The explanations of the hybrid regime provided above differs from the neo-patrimonial in terms of explaining why ethnicity has or can be resorted to determine voters’ choices. However, it retains the essentialist and biased nature widely discussed in the neo-patrimonial literature. It regards African traditions as the base of malpractices and primordial developments occurring in African states. While it provides room for the politicians not to use ethnicity in politics because the notables can use state power to manipulate LRIs and exercise corruption to wield power, it does not completely disentangle the role of ethnicity in elections as a way of effecting the use and/or monopoly of power and influencing voters’ choices. A question that is relevant with regard to the hybrid thesis on ethnicity and voting is the fact that there are countries like Tanzania where ethnicity has not been salient despite the presence of many ethnic groups and having all features of the hybrid system. Also, the exercise of politics in the broader spectrum has not been overtly organised in a manner that suggests a significant role of the notables in putting into power candidates through bending legal-rational rules (Nyaluke, 2013). These facts tempt me to think that explaining the role of ethnicity through this approach, as it is the case for the neo-patrimonial school, to be insufficient as it leaves a lot to be desired.

In light of the doubts casted on the above theoretical underpinnings- neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theories- in explaining the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, this dissertation provides a counterexplanation. The proposed framework informed by privileged informants interviewed in this study argues that a regime with high level of legitimacy gained through a frame informed by the PsIM has the potential of informing the significance of ethnicity on determining voting. This is chiefly because the frame creates a political culture away from divisive politics. From this viewpoint, the frame is viewed to be strong enough to sustain varied political and economic reforms which might occur overtime as well as the menu of manipulation that the hybrid regime theory suggests African states’ incumbents employ like mobilising ethnic support to amass electoral support and holding on to power. The proposed framework as opposed to the previous ones, explains the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices from a sociocultural and historical viewpoint. As a starting point it divulges the historical genesis of the
relationship between the independence movement’s ideology during the independence struggles as informed by the colonial deeds and misdeeds to determine the role of ethnicity on informing voters’ choices. It goes on to analyse the aspirations of Africans as a political community at independence in relation to ethnicity and voting over time.

3.4.4. PsIM’s Legacy, Ethnicity and Voting

The independence movements in Africa that were born to fight undemocratic, divisive and exploitative colonial regimes have in essence promised the African people all that colonialism had denied them. It is imperative to highlight albeit in a nutshell that colonialism is a policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically and ruling it undemocratically (Illife, 1979). Broadly speaking, the independence fighters promised Africans that independent African states will be politically democratic and just, economically developmental in nature and as welfarist as possible, and socially united and peaceful. These PsIM form the epitome of the ideology of the independence movement which meant to emancipate the colonised from the ills of colonialism and restore the dignity, freedom and economic welfare of the colonised (Young, 1982). It is worth noting that colonialists divided and manipulated ethnic groups through divide and rule policies and never held elections until few years before granting independence to African states including Tanzania. The colonialists also exploited the economies of the colonised countries through colonial economic policies which meant to export the riches of the colonised to their homeland and benefit the white and Asian traders operating within the colonies. Internally, the colonialists’ thirst of raw materials called for disproportionate distribution of infrastructure in favour of strategic raw material producing areas.

For instance in colonial Tanzania uneven regional development was evident in the infrastructure. This is essentially because the infrastructure was developed to support export crop production from the areas of production to the main exporting point, Dar es Salaam (Harnevik et al. 1988). Such distribution of resources evokes distant feelings of favouritism levelled against highly developed commercial agricultural regions like Kilimanjaro, Kagera, Mwanza and Mbeya and the pronounced ethnic groups of the Chagga, Haya, Sukuma and Nyakyusa found within the regions respectively (Jerman, 1997). Such feelings present a potential for regional and/or ethnic conflicts among the “developed” and “less developed” regions which could manifest on voting during
elections. However, this has not been experienced in Tanzania (Nyang’oro, 2004). According to Nyang’oro this is mainly because the advantaged regions were simply a victim of the colonial state’s infrastructural support meant to exploit their raw materials, therefore making the colonialists the centre of the blame. This suggests that the disproportionate economic statuses of regions could not gain political impetus to forge competing ethnic camps for mobilising votes when competitive elections started. Instead, it created a base for the organisation of a broadly based multi-ethnic group of the less privileged to demand for reversal of the exploitative colonial rule which went on to guide the organisation of politics.

All said above indicate that the challenge for post-colonial Africa was to gain legitimacy to reverse divisive distribution of resources. As Cliffe (1969:243) put it, the development question that they had to answer was whether the development efforts would be for all inclusive or something confined to a small section of the nation. The question was critical because notable concerns of nepotism and lack of tangible economic development delegitimised African regimes and led to the intensification of ethnic political competition and, in some cases, to demands of secession of whole sections of communities from African nation states (Nyaluke, 2013). With the challenges enlisted above African leaders had to ask themselves how and by what means they would address the development concerns. Most African states though in different names and styles argued for and adopted socialism (Tanzania’s version was called Ujamaa) and monist political dispensations to record democracy and justice, EDNR and national unity - ingredients of the PsIM (Idahosa, 2004).

Informed by the colonialists’ divisive and exploitative acts, most African states in the early days of independence as indicated in section 1.1 and specifically elaborated on in footnote 7, interpreted the broad PsIM into concrete socialist ideological and policy blueprints (Burgess, 2004). This was indeed significant because the legitimacy of the newly independent states and their leaders was predicated on delivering the PsIM as informed by the ideology of the independence movements (Young, 1982). Tanzania took six years after independence to produce a statement of socialist economic and political policy that set out a vision defining the focus, means and goal of development. This statement was contained in the AD of 1967 that is the blueprint of Tanzania’s Ujamaa. The six years before the AD gave the public concrete experience of economic self-governance that would influence the choice of policy direction.
According to TANU (1967:1-2) the AD reiterated the economic and political promises of TANU dating back to its foundation in 1954, which were:

- Ensuring that Tanzania’s resources are mobilised to eliminate poverty, ignorance and diseases;
- To see that the government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of cooperative organisations;
- Making government participate directly in the economic development if and when need be;
- Ensuring individual’s right to receive just returns for their labour;
- That the government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption; and
- To see that the government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country.

The content and tone of these objectives that formed the preamble of the AD arguably linked the aims of PsIM to the socialist policy of 1967. The AD included two important elements for building and maintaining a united political and equitable economic community. Firstly it asserted a commitment to national building by denouncing all divisive elements and avowing equality through a policy against economic exploitation. It also promulgated a leadership code that unequivocally prohibited leaders from engaging in business and using their positions to enrich themselves. At its core, the AD aimed at establishing a classless society. Arguably, the goals to achieve equality and the classless society without exploitation put forward in the AD and the commitment of the Tanzania leadership to implementing this gave the regime a coherent common purpose (Nyerere, 1968; Msekwa, 1979). Needless to say that the ethical contrast with the colonial ideology of reputedly civilised European empires could be a source of pride for Tanzanians, hence a motivational basis for their voting behaviour. Our qualitative research in chapter 5 will explore further.

Tanzania’s commitment to a policy of equality limited conflicts bound to go sky-high when economic benefits were seen to reach only, or mostly, certain sections or areas (Miguel, 2004).
Through this policy then, the regime in Tanzania recreated unity cultivated in the struggle for independence. The leadership code that was part of the AD according to Msekwa (1979) contributed to enhance legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania and ensured a greater degree of equality. From the economic viewpoint, the leadership code formally demarcated and separated the public sphere and the private sphere. It made clear that as servants of the public sphere, political leaders could not continue to serve nor have economic interests in the private sphere. The problem of merging political and economic interests among politicians in current politics of Tanzania is well described by Kilimwiko (2012) as merchant politics, branding the development as a mockery of multi-party politics.

The Leadership code[^32] in the AD specifically stipulated that:

- Party or government leaders must be either a peasant or a worker, and should be in no way associated with the practices of capitalism and/or feudalism;
- No leader should hold shares in any company;
- No leader should hold directorship in any privately owned enterprises;
- No leader should receive two or more salaries; and
- No leader should own houses that he/she rents to others.

This clear stipulation by the Tanzanian leadership of a code of conduct for leaders is important to this dissertation. This is because engagement of the leadership in the private economic sphere has often been the cause of conflict of interests, corruption and neo-patrimonial practices. How these practices happen and how they feature in African politics has been elaborated thoroughly in neo-patrimonial literature (Lemarchand, 1972, Clapham, 1985, Bayart, 1993, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In Tanzania, implementation of the leadership code was complemented by the state-controlled economy (Lipumba, 1989). The controlled nature of the economy meant that not only that leaders were prohibited by the code from engaging in business but also that—given the smallness of the private sector—the leadership could not abuse their powers in its favour nor engage in it themselves (Nyaluke, 2013). In other words, the economic structure after the AD, presented few incentives for leaders to serve competing entrepreneurs from the private sector. In the same vein, the government’s commitment to expansion of the public sector and its promotion

[^32]: For thorough understanding of the leadership code see part five of the AD in TANU (1967: pp 19-20)
of public, collective and cooperative practices, there were very few private entrepreneurs. This overt separation of the private sphere and the public sphere curtailed businessmen from engaging in politics and seeking political office or political leadership positions (Ngowi, 2009: 263). This way, the statist economic system and the leadership code served to minimise abuse of leadership positions to implement neo-patrimonial practices that benefit leaders and influence politics. Inferably, the possibility of leaders having muscles for practicing the ethnic-based politics of affection was minimised by the leadership code.

It is worth noting that the leadership code was seriously regarded as a deterrent to merchant politics. Leaders were given a year to choose to continue in their positions—in which case they had to adhere to a new code or resign (Bennett, 1969:84). In the same spirit, in the nationalisation of the economy that will be discussed below, several real estate properties of leaders were nationalised by the government through the 1971 Acquisition of Building Act geared at barring such endeavours seen as exploitative and a cause of land speculation and scramble (Fimbo, 1974). As such, nationalisation and leadership dealt a ‘devastating blow’ to commercial and petty bourgeoisie interests that could widen economic gaps in the Tanzanian society (1974:252). The leadership code and the egalitarian policies of Arusha continued to monitor and deter leaders from engaging in private economic activities until it was officially modified by the Zanzibar resolution of 1992. This resolution allowed leaders to engage in economic activities for income generation (Mwiru, 2013). The resolution is associated with the widening economic gaps between leaders and the people, as well as growth of political corruption in Tanzania (Kilimwiko, 2012).

The choice of socialist policies can be well understood from a broad ideological as well as a contextual position. Given the bi-polar international system in which post-independence states operated, African leaders faced a situation in which they could choose a variety of policies for their countries (Cartright, 1989: 1-2; Moshi, 1992: 60). With regard to the socio-economic domain, choices revolved between capitalist or socialism-oriented strategies. Socialist strategies were seen reasonable for regimes seeking to maintain popular support and the engagement of the entire

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33 Bi-polar international system refers to an international order organised around two superpowers with distinct competitive ideological orientations. The leaders of the opposing superpowers rally support from other states worldwide to enhance its power in domestic and international affairs in order to outpower its competitor in the global economic and political realm. At the time of reference the superpowers were United States of America which led a capitalist camp and USSR which led the socialist camp.
population in the economic system in a way that reflected the struggle for independence. While African leaders regarded the choice of socialism as an official ideology and policy rational, opposors contended that socialism was damaging for economic growth and development (Meredith, 2005). This debate has dominated the literature on development under socialism. Most criticism of socialist economic policies have failed to factor in—or simply ignored—the political logic that motivated Tanzania and perhaps other African states in adopting socialist, rather than liberal economic policies (Nyaluke, 2013). This overlooked feature cannot be dissociated from capitalism’s inability to nationally mobilise development to the majority of the population. An objective of this thesis, as reflected in its theory and methodology, is precisely to prevent this capitalist assumption of self-interest forming the final explanation of choices.

As noted by Moshi (1992), the capitalism-oriented policies that Tanzania practised for the first six years of independence after independence could not guarantee broadly based development. This is because of capitalism’s dependency on capital and capitalists among the population, which means economic incentives, were given to those who had capital. Richer regions were spoiled with services in the hope that the economic benefits of their activities would trickle down to all citizens. In the agricultural sector, this meant focusing on areas which were endowed with favourable climatic conditions that ensure higher yields (Moshi 1992:62). In the period during which capitalist economic policy was implemented, scholars have reported that a majority of the people in rural and urban areas became disillusioned with the prospect of economic improvement while sections of the elite and those with capital in the private sector became richer, the position of the majority of the population did not improve (Cliffe 1969: 242; Coulson, 1982: 180-182). Although the government had followed capitalist economic policies and set a favourable environment for investment, the economy did not grow as expected. As such, the capitalist policy informed the post-independence regime to mobilise the population within an “inegalitarian” economic system, which was against the PsIM.

For the majority of the Tanzanians such situation meant diminishing hope and enthusiasm after the successful struggle for independence. It is in light of this background that the AD was announced as a panacea to the ideological and practical problems that the Tanzanian economy and development endeavour faced at the time.
Another interesting point in the debate about the choice of socialist policy in Tanzania is international. This is because foreign direct investment which was seen as central to economic development was not forthcoming (Mtatifikolo, 2002:226). As if that was not enough, Tanzania’s development aid expectations in the 1960s were not met, and two of its main aid supporters, West Germany and United Kingdom, broke diplomatic relations with Tanzania (Coulson, 1982). Such shortage gave impetus to looking for alternative development financing from the socialist states like China and Russia which were leading the socialist bloc. In light of the ideologically competitive bi-polar international system, China and Russia alternatively contributed towards Tanzania’s socialist orientation (Nyaluke, 2013). In light of the shortfall of capitalism presented above Tanzania’s rejection of capitalism was because of its inconsistence with the ideology of PsIM. As such, the socialist choice in Tanzania was informed by its compatibility with the PsIM and as an alternative to the capitalist economic policy it pursued for the first six years after independence (Yeager, 1989; Moshi, 1992).

Another strand of literature associates the rationale for adoption of socialism and monopartism to African political thought. To this school, the rationale for adoption of the single-party political systems immediately after independence was that the institutional set-up and the form of democracy that the one-party state provides resemble the African tradition of democracy (Fisher, 2003). The African democracy used to bring all people in a particular community together to discuss matters until they reach an agreement broadly binding on the members of the community in question (Ake, 2000). As such, African leaders wanted to give impetus to nation-building processes. The processes meant to cement unity among people amalgamated within states characterised by arbitrary boundaries that lack historical roots (Chachage, 1998; Makulilo, 2009). Arguing along the same line but beyond Ake, Nyerere (1967) contended that African societies such as Tanganyika at independence were not class-based societies and, therefore, never needed many parties to represent people’s interests, which are the concerns of a classless society. To him, multi-party democracy was relevant to the class-prone societies of Europe where varied parties represent various classes. However, apart from the class analogy, it is imperative to note that the one-party state was deemed appropriate for Africa as it would also avoid political opposition and

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34 Tanzania differed with United Kingdom over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Zimbabwean settlers. With Germany the difference arose over the establishment of an East German consulate in Zanzibar.
ethnic polarisation architectured by the colonialists which did not serve the key aims of PsIM as highlighted above (Ake, 2000). In Tanzania, as it is thoroughly discussed in section 4.4.1.1, the monolithic order apart from legally allowing one party also incorporated all social and political organs into the party including government organs, the mass media, CSOs and even the militia. Such incorporation limited space for competing viewpoints and the room for airing dissents (Makulilo, 2012; Chaligha et al. 2001). In sum, the adoption of single-party political systems in Africa was premised on cementing inclusion, unity and solidarity of the people in political affairs. The unity envisaged to be furthered by the monist political order, inferably, suggests that ethnic-based political canvassing and voting was discouraged as they go against the nationalist character of the PsIM.

The choice of socialism equally stems from the same logic. While mono-partism was equated to African democracy, socialism was regarded as a socio-economic system that is similar to communalism which was practised in most African traditional societies. In communalism, the major means of production, land, was communally owned and people jointly tilled it to meet family and community needs. The objective of Ujamaa in Tanzania vividly exemplifies the communal nature of African socialism as it aimed at building a society in which every member is accorded equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all members live in peace with their neighbours without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all members have a basic level of material welfare before anyone lives in luxury (Nyerere 1968: 340). Since the Tanzanian society is predominantly rural, Ujamaa’s focus could not escape a rural development component. In this regard, Tanzania embarked on a massive villagisation programme popularly known as villagisation operation (Operesheni vijiji). The operation created thousands of villages in which 60% of the population was relocated to form the Ujamaa villages (Wangwe, 2005). The reallocation exercise was mainly through encouraging people to settle in the Ujamaa villages. However, in some instances people were forced to live and work on a co-operative basis in the organised villages (Hyden, 1980). The Ujamaa villagisation and its associated agriculture communalisation project in Tanzania are discussed in the next chapter in sections 4.4.1.4. From the economic viewpoint socialism was deemed desirable for fulfilling the independence promise because it was meant to restrict differential acquisition of wealth and shun attendant divisions and conflicts, which could follow growing inequality. This was an important factor as socio-economic
conflicts were not only considered undesirable but also incompatible with the unity and development PsIM.

The argument for socialism went beyond its resemblance to communalism. Nyerere (1974) considered socialism a rational choice due to the smallness of the capitalist class in African countries at independence. To him, state intervention in the economic sphere which socialism permits was central for hastening development. Such intervention was deemed significant because socialism promised Africans to reverse the exploitative and unequal distribution of opportunities and prosperity which characterised the colonial regime (Burgess 2004). It can be argued that the choice of socialism meant to form egalitarian nations in Africa that could discourage economic differences. The choice aimed at avoiding economic disparities that once politicised can fuel competitive political rivalry within and among societies. Inferably, because ethnic groups are within the society and are as indicated above capable of forming the formidable base for the practice of the politics of affection and forging MWCs, it is not irrelevant to argue that the fear of disunity and endangering PsIM can be linked to them. That is to say, the haves in a non-socialist economy could make use of ethnicity to gain political power and further their economic wellbeing. The opposite can also be said for the have-nots who can mobilise to reverse their economic backwardness by mobilising political support for acquiring state power ethnically.

The Leadership elites in Africa adopted single-party political systems and socialism to meet the challenge of bringing about democracy, development and national unity as the PsIM required, arguably, with little or no opposition (Burgess. 2004). Only few cases like Angola and Mozambique can be picked to point to the fact that adoption of socialism in a bipolar international system, whereby each pole is identified with supporting the warring factions (the Western bloc supporting the rebels, and the Eastern the socialist ruling elites), came to be a source of protracted conflict between the ruling elite and the opposition (Hawkins, 2013; Leão, 2007). However, broadly speaking, adoption of one-party political systems by the African leadership was an attempt to establish ideological and institutional means by which they could achieve the PsIM and legitimise their rule to the people. Subsequently, divisive means of organising the society and soliciting political support like ethnicity can be minimised.

A critical look at the PsIM suggests that African politics is informed by African culture, values and ideals just as the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theories suggested. However, the current school
differs from the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools on the cultures picked to be followed. While the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools unreasonably assume that African states and their people after independence settled for the guidance by the most negative aspects of their culture (permitting personal and particularistic tendencies including the use of ethnicity to garner electoral support), the PsIM subscribes to the best, as highlighted by Pitcher et al. (2009) above which among others denounce the use of ethnicity in elections. Based on the African culture supported by the independence movement and experience of colonialism, Tanzanians forged and articulated visions, ideals, and hopes for the new independent nation-state that anchored people’s expectations. These shared visions, ideals and values embedded in the PsIM as highlighted above have to be evaluated by the ideals and the performance of the state and its leaders at post-independence. Thus the accountability aspect of the PsIM based on the expectations from the people for their leaders to implement the PsIM is expected to shape the political imaginary and thus the frame of practising politics. This frame among other things discourages the influence of ethnicity in political canvassing and voting. Below let us have a look at frames and their application in ethnicity and voting in Tanzania.

3.4.5. Frames Analysis and its Application to Ethnicity and Voting in Tanzania

Frames are a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives on how individuals, groups, and societies organise, perceive, and communicate about a particular social reality (Benford, 1997). Frames are socially constructed, structured and institutionalised. These constructs are often amplified by the mass media and mass movements in the political or social arenas, politicians, or societal actors and organisations (Chong and Druckman, 2007). In social theory, frames are geared as schemes of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes, that individual rely on to understand and respond to events (Butler, 2009). In other words, people build a series of mental filters through which they make sense of the world (Chong and Druckman, 2007). The sense made, and the subsequent choices individuals make are influenced by their creation of a frame. Since individual filters are influenced by mass media, politicians or other societal agencies, it follows that social interaction among humans and groups are a function of varied agencies’ ability to orient individuals. Cognisant of the fact that there are numerous agencies in societies different influences and issues compete within a social world. Therefore, meticulous framing techniques are central to ensuring the dominance of a particular frame (Santamaria, 2004). Smart framing reduces the ambiguity of intangible topics by contextualising the information in a way the recipient can
connect to what they already know and enhance their commitment and believe in a particular frame (Tudor, 2007).

Conflict management in Sukuma-speaking communities, for instance, is dominated by a play on frames of crisis (such as bulogi, witchcraft) and remedy (such as kupoja, cooling), according to Stroeken (2012), in which peasant intellectuals and local healers (bafumu) are well versed, regularly innovating their terminology and discourse, or their diagnostic tools and recipes, in function of current social processes such as modernisation, liberalisation and globalisation. These frames are produced and draw on the cultural imaginary, which has a long history with colonial continuities, but is much informed by global media, as in the youthful ‘imagined futures’ studied by Brad Weiss (2002) in Arusha’s barber shops and among hip hop fans. In this thesis, however, we will limit our delving into the (political) imaginary and stick to the concept of frames, which is most instrumental in understanding the ideas communicated and reproduced at a national level.

In conflict framing theory which is relevant to among others questions of peace, ethnicity and voting that are at centre of this dissertation, parties to a particular conflict use frames to understand why a conflict exists, what important actions are to be made by the parties to the conflict, why the parties act as they do, and how each party should respond to the acts of the other party (Tudor, 2007). Contextualising this to ethnicity and voting, competing ethnic groups use frames to understand why there is a contestation between the ethnicities for political positions, what voting choices should be made by members of the groups in contestation, why they vote the way do, and how members of each ethnic group should respond to the voting decision made by their counterpart. The dictates of the conflict framing theory suggest that frames can exacerbate and discourage ethnic voting, divisiveness and misunderstandings. Frames aggravate ethnic voting, divisiveness and disputes by allowing parties to a particular conflict to limit information intake, filtering and categorising it according to their pre-existing conflictual identities and values (Kaufman et al. 2003). Frames perform the opposite and provide a pacifying effect when interpretations are informed by an inclusive, peace-oriented national frame. Such frame serves to limit violent behaviour and filter out divisive ethnic influences in voting within a particular polity (Kaufman et al. 2003). The KIs forcefully argued that the ideology of independence movement embedded in its values and ideals a frame informing African people’s resistance to dictatorial, exploitative, divisive and uncaring post-independence regimes and all elements which according to
the partimonialists depict personal and particularistic tendencies including the use of ethnicity in garnering political support in elections. This transcended the post-independence era and was also supported by most of the interviewees in this study. Tanzania provides an excellent example of how frames can explain ethnicity and politics.

Tanzania, as argued in the introductory section of the dissertation, is an African state which is ethnically diverse with 120 ethnic groups. The state shares colonial history with other African states and the exploitative and divisive manipulations of the colonial masters responsible for making most African states susceptible to ethnic salience in politics and its dilapidating effects (Rohner et al. 2013; Salawu and Hassan, 2011; Weber, 2009; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Posner 2007, 2005) However, Tanzania is indeed free from ethnic salience voting (O’Gorman, 2012; Phillips, 2010; Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Weber, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2004). This makes it an outlier when it comes to analysing the role of ethnicity in elections in Africa which is viewed to be highly informed by ethnic polarisation. The same can be said to issues of peace as Tanzania is relatively peaceful compared to other African countries in terms of violent civil or international conflicts. Other African states are war-torn despite the fact that they promised their people peacefulness (Eiffert et al.2010). Tanzania is relatively peaceful despite the fact that most of the conventional theories of conflict suggest that Tanzania “should” be beset by violent conflict (Eiffert et al. 2010; Cocodia, 2007). These theories as indicated in a nutshell in the general introduction, suggest that conflicts are more likely in heterogeneous countries coupled with socio-economic problems like high rate of unemployment and poverty, compared to homogeneous ones with the same characteristics (Marshall and Gurr, 2005:52-54).

Also, Tanzania has diverse religious followers and is one among the poorest countries of the globe, with all of the income indicators of poverty (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). It is imperative to stress that Tanzania has 23 different ethnic groups that constitute more than 1% of the population, which ranks highest in the world in numbers of significantly sized ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The structure of Tanzania’s ethnic heterogeneity in the light of the conflict theories presupposes that ethnic salience in voting should be high in Tanzania (Bratton et al, 2011). However, it is comparatively peaceful in relation to other more developed states in Africa and has not been proven to be ethnically salient on determining voters’ choices as highlighted in the general introduction and the detailed ethno-political narrative of Tanzania in the next chapter.
The comparative low salience of ethnicity and peace that Tanzania enjoys has never made its leaders complacent. The Tanzanian state and its leadership in all the four phases have never got tired of accentuating the significance of national unity, peace, just and moral policies. This emphasis sometimes was made to the detriment of the state’s ailing economy and other selfish cardinal measures of national interest (Lupogo, 2001; Mamdani, 2013b). Mzee Mwiru well summarised this opinion in one of my KIIIs. He argued that for all standards:

“Dhamira ya Tanzania kwa Ujamaa na utekelezaji wa sera zake zinazohusiana na haki na utu na maadili zilikiwa zeitupwa nafasi kubwa Tanzania ukilinganisha na mataifa mengine mengi ya kijamaa ya Afrika na zimetupa mafanikio makubwa yaliyojionesha dhahiri. Faida kubwa ambayo hakuna mtu wa ndani wala wa jike anayeweza kukanusha ni umoja wa kitaifa; na amani na utulivu.” (Mwiru, 14.05.2014).

“Tanzania’s commitment to Ujamaa and implementation of its associated just and moral policies was far beyond most other African socialist states and has provided lots of dividends to our country and its people which speak by themselves. The major dividends which no one can refute, internally and externally, are national unity; and peace and tranquillity.”

The commitment highlighted by Mzee Mwiru and widely shared among scholars has won Tanzania a benevolent public image domestically and internationally (Pratt, 1999). The implementation of Ujamaa villages’ policy and mandatory national service trainings, making Swahili the national language and overt denunciation of ethnicity are but just a few examples of nation-building policies that enhanced this image. Internationally, Tanzanians’ role in the frontline states and the liberation of all southern African countries all point to the benevolent image (Mamdani, 2013a). However, for the study at hand emphasis is on the domestic nation-building policy. Pertinent questions are how was it passed to Tanzanian citizens and to what extent did Tanzanians reject or embrace it? How has the message effected Tanzanian national identity formation, and, in turn, how does the built national identity effect ethnic saliency in voting?

A shared view of my KIIIs who have lived the Tanzanian history hold the view that Tanzania’s zealous and well-articulated nation-building policy coined around the PsIM was so convincing not to attract massive fellowship among its people. Such position is informed by the fact that nation-building was so imperative after colonialism and its associated demerits as highlighted in the previous subheading. It is against such background that the PsIM informed a shared identity to guide their individual relations and political activities particularly the use of ethnicity in mobilising

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35 Tanzania has had four Presidents since its independence. These are Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Alhaj, Ally Hassan Mwinyi, Benjamin William Mkapa and the sitting President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete
votes during elections. According to Mzee Mkali, another KI, the PsIM were well taught in schools, at workplaces, and in the Ujamaa villages to the local people, widely covered on the mass media and in the political circles (Mkali, 10.3.2014). To Mzee Mkali the nation-building policy’s outright denunciation of divisive tendencies and perpetuation of inclusive nation-building rhetoric is responsible for the creation of a strong national identity that helps to explain the low level of ethnic saliency in politics and subsequently limited ethnic voting. In other words, the strong national identity inculcated among Tanzanians forms a frame through which Tanzanians view politics and society (Mkali, 10.3.2014).

Before expounding on Mzee Mkali’s views on the nationalistic frame it is imperative to say a word or two on the role of the media in the propagation of the frame in question. This is because the centrality of the media in popularising is essential as argued above. It is worth noting that the media policy in post-independent Tanzania was preoccupied with issues of nation integration and promotion of the socialism and self-reliance development agenda (Kilimwiko, 2009; Rioba, 2008, Mfumbusa, 2006, 2002; Hyden and Okigbo, 2002, Sturmer and Rioba, 2000; Kasoma, 2000). The presidential charter of 1970, which in the view of Mfumbusa 2002 was the de facto information policy in place until the early 1990s assigned the mass media the role of supporting the state’s socialist policy-Ujamaa. To advance the political-ideological role in development, the mass media was ideologically indoctrinated, nationalised and co-opted by the state. It is against this backdrop that Nordenstreng and Ng’wanakilala (1987) argue that the ruling parties in the country TANU from 1961 to 1977 and later CCM from 1977 to date attempted to turn pressmen into devoted advocates of the socialist ideology and its associated unification effects. Since the rulers of the day were against the use of divisive elements in politics and ethnicity in amassing votes the media projected such view. An interesting view of the working of the media in the early days of independence and throughout the monolithic political order given by an extended quote from Kilimwiko is useful to summarise how the media helped in propagating the nationalist frame in Tanzania.

"Unajua vyombo vya habari vya umma wakati wa chama kimoja vilikuwa na sera ya kupanga habari kwa kuzingatia au tunachoita kwa katika tasnia ya habari line-up. The line-up dictates that the leading news regardless of the value of the event should be of the President, ikifuatiwa na habari ya Makamu wa Rais, Katibu Mkuu wa CCM, Mabalozi kama anakutana na Mkuu wa nchi and lastly rounding up with police news from Regional Police Commanders. Kwa njia hii hadithi kutoka maeneo ya vijijini inaweza tu kufanya habari ikiwa seismic! Yaani pawe

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na tetemeko la ardhi au mafuriko ndio habari hiyo itapewa nafasi. Hali hii inafanya vyombo vya habari kuwa mnyororo wa kutoa taarifa zitokazo juu (Kwa viongozi wa juu) kuelekea chini (kwa wananchi) na si vinginevyo. Kwa muktadha huu, vyombo vya habari vikawa sehemu ya vyombo vya utawala vinavyoeneza maslahi ya serikali na kutia hofu pale inapobidi ili kuhakikisha wananchi wanatii sera ya serikali badala ya kuwa chombo cha mawasiliano. Kwa maneno mengine, vyombo vya habari vinakuwa kinywa cha serikali au kipaza sauti cha watawala, na walini wa maslahi yao ambayo yalilenga kwa dhati kutimiza ahadi za wapigania uhuru” (Kilimwiko, 2014/11/03).

“You know the public media outlets during single party rule had a policy of ranking news by personality or what in journalism is called line-up. The line-up dictates that the leading news regardless of the value of the event should be of the President, followed by his Vice President, the Secretary General of CCM, an Ambassador if he/she meets a top leader and lastly rounding up with police news from Regional Police Commanders. In this way a story from the rural areas can only make news if it is seismic. That is if an earthquake or floods take place. Such scenarios made the media conveyer belt providing information from the top (the top leaders) to the bottom (citizens) and not the other way round. As such, the media outlets became mostly administrative machineries furthering state interests and instilling fear were necessary to ensure loyalty to state policy instead of being a medium of communication. In other words, the media becomes nothing but a mouth piece or loudspeaker of the ruling elites and their interests which forcefully championed the promises of independence.”

Kilimwiko’s views succinctly establish the role played by the media for the leadership in Tanzania. In essence, the media has been projecting and disseminating what the political leadership wished to hear and achieve. No alternative view was given room and, therefore, the PsIM won massive space on media products. If this could as well have led to opposition in the rural areas against the PsIM, it is imperative to note that during the single party regime all major media outlets were either owned by the state or the ruling party led by the head of state (Rioba, 2008). Furthermore, heads of these media outlets were appointed by the President and the party formed a special committee to supervise the functions of the media. The committee was led by a chair who was a member of the party's National Executive Committee (Kilimwiko, 2009). Thus Kilimwiko in an interview told me that: "the heads received direct orders from the president and his party, to reprint what they have been directed without questioning the authenticity of what they were required to write.” Indeed, what is projected could hardly be against the interests of and policies spearheaded by the ruling class, which happened to be achieving the PsIM that among other things meant denouncing the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes.
Expounding on Mzee Mkali’s view on the frame that navigated Tanzania away from ethnic voting, Mzee Mwiru argues that all states in one way or the other are characterised by divisions and conflicts which might be ethnic, racial, religious, class etc; and they are addressed differently in different states according to a political culture developed in the particular state. According to him in some states, disputes are treated on their individual merits, while in others, they are politicised and turn out to be the ground or pretext for major societal divisions and sometimes violent conflict. Tanzania in the view of Mzee Mwiru has been able to create a pacifying frame that is linked with limiting ethnic salience in politics including downplaying the role of ethnicity on anchoring voters’ choices and interethnic conflicts because of its nationally inclusive character. However, Mzee Mwiru warns that the frame does not preclude the complete use of ethnicity in elections or flashes of violence, but it moderates its likelihood by influencing how people view the possibility and outcome of organising politics around ethnic grounds (Mwiru, 14.05.2014). In this context, the frame determines political ethics, creates a menu of acceptable or unacceptable responses to the running of political activities including campaigning for office. Therefore, it can be argued that Tanzanians’ resistance to mobilising political support in elections along ethnic lines – one of the driving forces of ethnic polarisation and interethnic conflicts in most of its neighbours – is, by and large, a result of ethnicity’s lack of legitimacy as a political organising mechanism within the Tanzanian national frame. The mutually reinforcing nature of peace and national identity is an important factor in the strength and persistence of Tanzania’s culture of subdued ethnicity in electoral politics.

Since “political culture” does not crop up overnight. Instead, it is built and toughened over decades, involving contingent factors, this dissertation subscribes to the view that national values, institutions and practices that set a country away from ethnic salience in voting are consciously drawn from a nation’s do and don’t-s. It is against this backdrop that we employ the model of path dependence that argues that antecedent historical conditions make certain policy decisions more likely than others. From this background, the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices could be attributed to the path set by pre-existing political, social and economic situations (Schwartz, 2003; Greener, 2002; Pierson, 2000). In the Tanzanian context the pre-existing

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36 Political culture is like the ‘political imaginary’ mentioned earlier, a particular pattern of orientations to political action. It is a set of values, beliefs, emotions and viewpoints of people about the political system of their state. Normally the term is applied to explain distinctions in the way citizens of different states react to similar political stimuli. This is the case although political culture is not entirely uniform in any country.
conditions are embedded in the country’s historical realities that chiefly revolve around reversing the evils of colonialism through the implementation of PsIM - PNU, EDNR and peace; as originated by socialist socio-economic and political order mainly articulated in the AD of 1967 and sustained impacts. It is in the logic of such (national) frame, reproduced across generations, that some paths (political ideas and choices) become more likely than others at a national level.

The AD set out Tanzania’s comprehensive development road map in which the country committed itself to following a socialist and self-reliant path as will be further expounded in the fourth chapter in sections 4.4.1.4 and 4.4.1.5. The AD was personally written by Mwalimu at first to be published in a newspaper but later presented in TANU meetings and got the party’s blessing to be a formal party and state policy (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). The AD is arguably the very first expansively documented vision that informed the way Tanzania’s entire socio-economic and political domains had to be viewed, planned and achieved (Mwiru, 2013; Shivji, 2013; Ng’wanza et al. 2009; Wangwe, 2005). The AD was informed by African political thoughts and realities that shaped Tanzania’s nationalist struggles and post-independence expectations of the people (Nyaluke, 2013). Basing myself on its significance in informing the country’s socio-economic and political fabric as well as its ideological orientation I concur with Kessler (2006) who considers the AD to be the country’s main historical antecedent.

At its core, the AD strived to make Tanzania a self-reliant state with equitable economic development among the people through nationalisation of previously privately owned economic ventures, enhancing national unity through a monolithic political dispensation as well as ensuring peaceful coexistence through respect of human dignity and indiscrimination of all kinds. Taken in wholesale the AD meant to provide a truly participatory form of socio-economic and political development (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; Mesaki and Malipula, 2011; Nyang’oro, 2004). Two key famous products of the AD that will be discussed in the context of this study were the Ujamaa villages and the nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution, in sections 4.4.1.4 and 4.4.1.5.

The AD arguably proved to be the dominant and uncontested vision until the 1980s when Tanzania’s ailing economic conditions required some soul searching (Mwiru, 2013). At the time in question internal and external initiatives to address the economic hardship were sought. Internally CCM reviewed its economic policies and the international donors and the IFIs pressurised for
implementation of economic and political liberalisation (Mwiru, 2013; Wangwe, 2005). Mwalimu being the architect of the AD as he wrote it and channeled it through the party organs for endorsement it is only logical for him to be hesitant to agree to foreign-oriented capitalist liberal reforms. This position can be supported by the fact that before his death, Mwalimu was asked about the continued validity of the AD to which he retorted, “I still travel with it. I read it over and over to see what I would change. Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the AD is still valid, I would not change a thing” (New Internationalist Magazine issue 309, 1999).

Earlier, when he stepped down in 1985, Nyerere had declared, "although socialism has failed in Tanzania, I will remain a socialist because I believe socialism is the best policy for poor countries like Tanzania" (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). It is against this background that Wangwe suggests he preferred locally made structural adjustments that did not temper with the core of the socialist ideology as opposed to the donors’ reforms which were capitalist oriented (Wangwe, 2005). However, the homegrown adjustments could not work mainly because they lacked donor funding. Therefore Mwalimu’s successor who came into power in 1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a conceived liberal thinker, in his reign swiftly negotiated liberal reform packages with donors (Costello 1996). The liberal reforms have failed to reverse the national integration intentions of the AD and its effects. This position is argued in the Tanzania’s ethno-political narrative as well as the primary data as indicated in Chapter IV and V.

The path-dependence thesis, which we buy into, holds the view that structures and processes inform and reinforce each other in shaping outcomes or choices. Path dependence does not necessarily need to be structural or informed by a myriad of forces because when a state reaches a “critical juncture,” even a choice of one policy option can set the country on a specific trajectory (Mahoney, 2001:9). The adoption of the socialist AD in Tanzania in 1967 was according to my KIIIs and other interviewees, the state’s critical juncture and its promulgation set the path for the conduct of politics including the influence of ethnicity in voting for years to come. This AD informed an extensive nation-building policy; invoked numerous socialist economic policies chiefly of which were villagisation and nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution which were mainly owned by foreigners; EDNR and consolidation of single party rule. An amalgamation of these socio-economic and political policies that are in line with the PsIM are said to have created a national political culture that set the country on a long-term path of low level
of ethnic salience in voting; and domestic peace and stability compared to most of its neighbours and fellow African states, some of which have been mentioned in the general introduction.

According to the path dependence model once these choices are made, states tend to remain on the chosen path because values and institutions associated with them become self-perpetuating and political elites sustain values and institutions that benefit them (Mahoney, 2000, 2001; Pierson, 2000). More so, political elites and the organs of governance commit themselves to values and institutions they staked their reputation on. Therefore they cannot afford to establish new ones. As for citizens, accepted values and institutions are viewed legitimate, and thus they voluntarily opt for their reproduction out of the conviction that it is the right thing to do (Mahoney, 2001: 9). A classic comparison, in economics, is with production units sticking together out of cost-efficiency (also known as the power law) and thus naturally growing into a hub (which may acquire a particular outlook or ‘culture’). An illustration directly relevant to our argument is that, in analogy with the country Tanzania, the Sukuma who are the dominant ethnic group in study area are historically the conglomerate of several ethnic groups that (for whatever cost-benefit advantages such as protection and subsistence) gradually blended into a common cultural path, without the whole or the parts ever being politicised as such.

Zeroing in on the path-dependent framework I trace how lack of ethnic salience in voting is informed by the divisive and exploitative colonial structures that necessitated a united fight among the oppressed during the nationalistic struggles, and later the socialist nation-building policy which equitably distributed economic gains and fought discrimination of all kinds. I further look into how the past informs the choice of national as opposed to ethnic identities in voting in the present liberalisation era. I explicitly speak of depoliticised rather than unpolarised ethnicity, since the latter would imply a lack of process, while I argue the absence of politicised ethnicity to result from a process, one that is historical and ongoing. In essence, I am tracing the long-term path of national identity responsible for the continued pacifying frame against divisive agendas within the contemporary era of liberalised economics and politics in Tanzania, which are characteristically different from the pre-liberal political orders. This objective tests the authenticity of Mahoney’s contention that “path-dependent structures and institutions endure in the absence of the processes that initially led to their establishment” (Mahoney, 2001). In the current study, we analyse the
influences of the PsIM in the conduct of Tanzania’s politics in the absence of the TANU thinktank and Nyerere’s genius during the last 16 years.

3.4.6. A Hypothetical Path-Dependent Model Explaining Influences of Ethnicity on Determining Voters’ Choices in Tanzania

As indicated above political culture denotes a particular pattern of orientations to political actions that can explain differences in the way citizens of different states react to similar political stimuli. On the basis of the discussion above this dissertation assumes that the political culture that demonstrates the influence of ethnicity in voting in Tanzania is made in the name of a path-dependent national pacifying frame. This frame stems from Tanzania’s efforts in building an equitable, inclusive, and peaceful nation. The efforts that have been informed by the PsIM were well-entrenched in the AD, served as a buffer from ethnic divisions and violence to take root. The AD has been the most significant factor contributing to barring the rise of ethnicity into a political salient phenomenon on determining voters’ choices due to its insistence on PNU, EDNR and peace.

The genesis of nation-building policies in Tanzania particularly its commitment to peace and unity, economic equality, and the pursuit of single party politics can be traced back to the PsIM. However, the dissertation picks the AD as the critical juncture (antecedent) in the nation-building policy in Tanzania. The choice of the AD as the critical juncture in the nation-building policy is predicated on the fact that the AD is a blueprint that committed Tanzania to the implementation of a coherent, long-term all-inclusive socialist policy direction for the nation (Shivji, 2013). The AD is known as Tanzania’s most prominent political statement of African Socialism, Ujamaa, or ‘familyhood’ (Mesaki and Malipula, 2001). At its core it meant to ensure human dignity, unity, EDNR and development as well as ensuring peace and tranquillity (Mwiru, 2013). It was clearly against segregation and oppression which according to Wimmer are motivators of politicisation of ethnicity if the divisions are ethnic-based. The commitment was not just on paper but in deeds as Mzee Mwiru explained above. Indeed, this is very significant particularly in Africa where policy promulgation does not necessarily guarantee implementation or translate into concrete policy outcomes. Tanzania could follow suit if the early nation-building efforts were not comprehensively streamlined into a vision that guided the entire political, social and economic fabric of the Tanzanian state and its people as the AD did. The content of the AD as indicated above was
informed by the early nation-building policies that were put into place immediately after independence. The AD, therefore, could have firmly committed Tanzania to that path. If this is the case after its promulgation and implementation, turning back from the nationalist path to divisive ethnic trends in the organisation of politics in general and voting, in particular, should never provide an option. And this option should not be assumed to be deemed desirable even after the collapse of the AD and institution of liberal democratic market-oriented ethos that contradict the very fabric of the AD as will be well discussed in the following chapter.

In this dissertation, I have differentiated the Ujamaa political culture that is viewed significant to explaining the limited influence ethnicity in voting into three broad components. These are national identity pride, unity/non-polarisation, and subject political orientation. The social component of the AD informed an extensive nation-building policy has shaped/reinforced a strong Tanzanian national identity. The identity meant to redress the divisive colonial manipulations of divide and rule which have had dilapidating violent effects in African states that failed to address them. Economically, the policies enshrined in the AD – villagisation and nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution that perpetuated classes in the colonial era – contributed to unity and non-polarisation because no ethnic group or any other group identity was overtly favoured. Instead, every individual or group worked together collectively for development purposes and the nationalised assets formed the base for equitably distributing resources. Politically, the AD advocated for a monolithic political dispensation that cocooned all political and social forces, comprising political parties, civil society organisation, the media and even the militia into one mass national party. That social fact should at the same time be responsible for the creation of a passive-subject political orientation among most Tanzanians. Such political orientation in any case limited the airing of dissents and possibilities of competing ideological viewpoints from those of the state that were pro PsIM.

The elements of AD-based Ujamaa political culture were not acting in isolation. These elements were complementary and mutually reinforcing. The subject political orientation resulted from legal and extra-legal means leaving little public space for ethnic groups and other social forces to organise parochially and channel their agenda, therefore helping to suppress ethnic and other

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37 Subject political orientation refers to a passive and /or uncritical political orientation (Kilimwiko, 2012). Citizens with such orientation hardly question their political leaders, and beg for their rights instead of claiming them.
divisive dissent to determine voters’ choices. Such suppression, in turn, contributed to a more unified population. The strong national identity has been responsible for making it possible for otherwise distinct ethnic and other groups to share common goals, thus reinforcing national unity. In the same vein, the unified Tanzanian population that worked collectively on common national objectives enshrined in the AD such as self-reliance particularly in agriculture in the villages advanced a sense of national pride and collective identity (Nyaluke, 2013). This view is argued in more detail in the ethno-political narrative and the PNU related qualitative data constituting Chapter IV and Chapter V respectively.

The sense of national pride informed by the AD-based Ujamaa political culture contributed to the love of peace that Tanzania widely boasts compared to its neighbours, and the reinforcing effect of peace on this political culture helped to perpetuate this pattern. The subject political orientation caused Tanzanians to disapprove of civil conflict. Such disapproval left little support for any form of violent or non-violent disruptions including ethnic clashes to abound and disturb the peace. Since the Tanzanian state has remained relatively peaceful, social misunderstandings have not been able to create competing ethnic or other social groups to upset the subject political orientation of most citizens and thus give room for ethnic voting to gain salience. Likewise, unity and non-polarised population contributed to peace because there were no significant ethnic group divisions that could escalate into violence that could perpetuate ethnic voting. This peace contributed to national unity because there were less violent conflicts among ethnic groups to divide people and inform ethnic voting. National identity contributed to peace because being a peaceful nation was central to Tanzanian national identity, so citizens engaging in political acts like politicising ethnicity and ethnic polarisation which are prone to escalating violence would have been betraying their own identity. From this framework, the PsIM are the primary source of national pride and identity for Tanzanians. This pride make Tanzanians define themselves nationally and contrast themselves with their brothers and sisters in comparatively violent and ethnic polarised neighbouring states. Thus, the mutual reinforcement between the three elements of Tanzanian political culture informed by the AD helped to keep Tanzania on a non-ethnically politicised path in the exercise of politics in general and elections in particular for over four decades.

In the past ten years, the PsIM and the political culture of peace, national pride and equitable sharing of resources that it has created is under threat. Most of the policies that created that
political culture are gone: the nation-building policy lacks the immediate post-independence impetus, and single party politics and Ujamaa economic policies have been abandoned. The subject political orientation is incompatible with competitive politics that Tanzania has chosen to pursue in 1992, but it has not yet been replaced by a participant political orientation (Makulilo, 2012). Emerging differences in wealth concentration and political party membership are creating more divisions in the population. Numerous demonstrations organised by or supported by opposition political parties which compelled the police to apply force, like the recent CUF demonstrations to register their discomfort with the conduct of the civic elections of 2014 that saw its national chair beaten and apprehended, were seen as instances of peace threatened rather than as signals for a need of change, let alone revolution (Ramadhani, 2015a). Given the importance of the political culture embedded in PsIM in preventing ethnic conflicts and ethnic salience on determining voters’ choice in Tanzania, the kind of political culture that develops in the coming years may well determine whether Tanzania remains on its peaceful path or whether emerging political divisions bring violent ethnic divisions and ethnic salience in voting that Tanzania has so far minimised. Figure 3 below shows the path by which the AD led to the development of the Ujamaa political culture and how that political culture depoliticised ethnicity in voting even after the collapse of the AD.
Figure 3: A Hypothetical Path Dependence Explanation Low Salience of Ethnicity in Voting in Tanzania
The figure above indicates that low salience of ethnicity on voting has its genesis in the nation-building policies of the PsIM meant to enhance national unity, economic equity and peace as enshrined in the AD. It is imperative to note that the three variables picked to explain the roles of PsIM in our framework (PNU, EDNR and peace) are not treated in isolation because they are mutually reinforcing. Three policies of the AD - villagisation, nationalisation and equity, and impacts of implementation of such policies are viewed key in explaining salience of ethnicity in politics in Tanzania. It is contended that strong EDNR components of the nationalisation and villagisation policies cemented unity by avoiding ethnic polarisation informed by disproportionate ethnic distribution of resources. Also, aspects like political monism, controlled media and muzzled civil society that were central to ensuring national unity through creation of a passive subject political orientation are considered central in explaining the role of ethnicity. A passive, subject political orientation informed by subsuming political and social forces in the state, left little public space for ethnic groups and other social forces to organise parochially thus contributing in suppress ethnic dissents and reinforcing national identity and pride. Also because the political leadership and the PsIM they stood for was against the use of divisive elements in politics. In turn the passive orientation enhanced national unity /trust and discouraged ethnic polarisation. The enhanced national unity and trust informed by the the PsIM are responsible for enhanced national identity pride that diffused ethnic and other groups to share common goals thus reinforcing national unity. Also, the subject political culture and national unity perpetuate love of peace that informs Tanzanians to disapprove violent conflicts hence diffusing support for ethnic competition to abound to disturb peace. Importantly, because Tanzania is relatively peaceful, limited social ethnic divisions failed to undo the subject political orientation of most citizens and breed ethnic salience. Similarly, unity and non-polarised population contributed to peace because there were no significant ethnic group divisions that could escalate into violence and inform ethnic voting. Peace contributed to national unity because there were less ethnic violent conflicts to divide people. National identity contributed to peace because being a peaceful nation was central to Tanzanian national identity. Therefore, citizens engaging in political acts like politicising ethnicity and ethnic polarisation which are prone to escalating violence and salience of ethnicity in elections were always at the verge of betraying their own identity. This trend could not change with the reforms of the current liberal reforms that are not in line with some of the key elements of the AD. It is assumed in this study that the pluralist and liberal economic reforms enhance private ownership,
competition and liberal democratic ethos informed dissent views and flashes of ethnicity but the
dissents were not ethnicised as the foundation for the mutually reinforcing components national
identity pride, unity/non-polarisation, and subject political orientation still militate against ethnic
salience. A detailed analysis of Tanzania’s polity based on the framework is made in the following
chapter and a specific analysis of the 2010 elections in Mwanza further tests the frame.

3.5. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have provided a thorough conceptual overview of ethnicity and voting and its
germination into a political salient phenomenon. Cognisant of the complexity of the concept of
ethnicity the chapter engaged in a detailed conceptualisation of what ethnicity is and is not in the
view of the current study. I undertook a critical review of the primordialist, instrumentalist and
social constructivist conceptualisation of ethnicity to draw the study’s take on ethnicity which at its
core picks elements of all four deemed relevant in explaining ethnicity as argued in section 3.2.5.
Informed by the fact that Tanzania has low salience of Ethnicity compared to other African states
as highlighted in the very first section of the general introduction and widely argued throughout
this dissertation the study put forward elements of ethnicity that could prove to constitute flashes
of ethnicity in electoral politics and have an impact on determining voters’ choices termed as the
politics of origin, being and belonging which in collaboration with political tribalism derived from
the conceptualisation of ethnicity will be used to explain the influences ethnicity has on
determining voters’ choices in elections. As such a scheme borrowed from Wimmer (1997)
exemplifying the germination and manifestation of ethnicity into a political salient feature capable
of informing ethnic voting is presented. The scheme in question indicated that germination of
ethnicity has to be politicised through disproportionate distribution of public resources among
ethnic groups. This position entails social ethnicity cannot graduate into a political salient
phenomenon capable of influencing ethnic voting without being politicised.

As it was the case for ethnicity voting was conceptualised to provide a general understanding of
what it means in this thesis. As opposed to ethnicity the concept of voting was rather
straightforward. It is regarded as a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a
decision or express an opinion—often following discussions, debates, or election campaigns. The
conceptualisation of the major concepts of the study provided the basis for turning to the
theoretical discourses on the influences of ethnicity on the determination of voters’ choices.
In this chapter we provided a thorough account of the two dominant theoretical underpinning that are used to explain African politics including the role of ethnicity and voting-neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime theories. It is indicated that the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations associate the salience of ethnicity in voting in African states to preference of traditional primordial tendencies which give impetus to ethnicity, personal rule and patronage; over effective legal-rational institutions whose authority is based on codified laws which set restrictions against the use of ethnicity in electoral politics. Although the two theories tend to converge in associating ethnicity and voting with preference to traditional primordial tendencies, the two theories have a key difference. While the neo-patrimonialist tend to deny the existence of LRIs in Africa, the hybrid theorists are aware of the fact that almost all modern states have gone multi-party and instituted LRIs although not well functioning. Therefore, to them it is imprudent to regard them to be purely patrimonial. Instead they are pseudo-democratic regimes with limited elements of liberal democracy and legal-rational institutions but with rulers revolting to the use of neo-patrimonial practices like politicising ethnicity to manipulate electorates and win their votes. In this regard, Tanzania that possesses the hybrid regime characteristics is expected to have high ethnic salience in voting, but it is not. Such gap casts serious academic doubt on the over-generalised nature of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanation of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices which demands an alternative or complementary explanation.

In this chapter, it is indicated that the major shortcoming of the two theories is that they suffer from their biased treat of African history and traditions including the use of ethnicity in elections. This biased view is reluctant to appreciate alternative political ideas and structures relevant to Africa despite sound evidence proving limited use of ethnicity in elections in countries like Tanzania. It is against this backdrop in this chapter that I present an alternative theoretical stand redefining the role of African history in explaining the influence of ethnicity on the determination of voters’ choices. This alternative theoretical explanation poses a critique to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid views. It is informed by a nationalisation frame embedded in the political ideas and aspirations of the independence movement (building national unity, EDNR and peace), and the capacity of that movement to construct a political organisation encompassing the political leaders, ideals of the independence movement and the people.
From the theoretical perspectives and discussions, I formulated a conceptual framework for this study. The framework indicates that low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices has its genesis the PsIM (national unity, economic equity and peace) as enshrined in the AD. In this chapter, I dissect the AD into three mutually reinforcing components to understand the influence ethnicity in voting. These are national identity pride, unity/non-polarisation, and subject political orientation. In a nutshell, strong national identity and EDNR cemented unity by avoiding ethnic polarisation informed by disproportionate ethnic distribution of resources. A passive, subject political orientation informed by subsuming political and social forces in the state, left little public space for ethnic groups and other social forces to organise parochially thus contributing in suppress ethnic dissents and reinforcing national identity and pride. National identity pride diffused ethnic and other groups to share common goals thus reinforcing national unity. Also, the subject political culture and unity perpetuate love of peace that informs Tanzanians to disapprove violent conflicts hence diffusing support for ethnic competition to abound to disturb peace. More importantly, because Tanzania is relatively peaceful, limited social ethnic divisions failed to reverse the subject political orientation of most citizens and breed ethnic salience. Likewise, unity and non-polarised population contributed to peace because there were no significant ethnic group divisions that could escalate into violence and inform ethnic voting. Peace contributed to national unity because there were less ethnic violent conflicts to divide people. National identity contributed to peace because being a peaceful nation was central to Tanzanian national identity. Therefore, citizens engaging in political acts like politicising ethnicity and ethnic polarisation which are prone to escalating violence and salience of ethnicity in elections were always at the verge of betraying their own identity.
CHAPTER IV

THE TANZANIAN POLITY: AN ETHNO-POLITICAL AND VOTING NARRATIVE

4.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the major political and ethnic developments that the Tanzanian state has undergone over time. It starts by providing in a nutshell an introduction of Tanzania and its electoral system and goes on to present an overview of the key issues related to ethnicity and voting from the nationalist to the post-colonial era. The exclusion of a thorough overview of the pre-colonial and early colonial time in this section is predicated on the fact that at the time in question no competitive elections were conducted. However, there were some essential elements for understanding ethnicity and voting in the Tanzania’s nationalist era and beyond which will be highlighted in a nutshell as a prelude to the intended nationalist era.

This chapter places emphasis on providing readers with a concise analytical narrative of effects of changing political and economic systems on manifestations of ethnic identities on the country’s electoral politics particularly on influencing voters’ choices. At its core, the chapter accords readers a background for understanding the Tanzanian state and the political milieu within which the current study explores and analyses the influence of ethnicity on Tanzanians’ electoral choices in competitive elections. This chapter then serves as an introduction to both the theoretical and the empirical discussions in the subsequent chapter dealing with the influences of ethnicity on anchoring electoral choices in Mwanza region addressed in Chapter V. Since the Tanzanian state and particularly its electoral background has not been introduced earlier in the dissertation, before embarking on the state’s ethno-political narrative, I provide such description.

4.2. Tanzania and its Electoral System: A Prelude to the Ethno-Political and Voting Narrative

As indicated in the focus the study, Tanzania is a United Republic resulting from a merger of the previously sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26th April, 1964. However, only one part of the union -Tanzania Mainland, is researched and, therefore, this prelude is relevant to that part of the union. Tanzania is located in East Africa and has a total area of 881,000 square kilometers. The total population of Tanzania is 43,625,354 million (URT, 2014). The borders of
Tanzania as it is the case for almost all African states are an outcome of the struggle for power and influence exhibited in the Berlin conference that partitioned the continent; as well as continued intricacies of power politics of colonialism thereafter (Mwakikagile, 2010). The partition of the African continent within which Tanzania belongs, paid little regard to ensure that the people that became confined to the new borders are of the same ethnic background (Illife, 1979). Because of such partitioning it is not rear to find members of same ethnic groups belonging to two different states. For instance, the pastoralist Masai and the Luo who are found in both Tanzania and Kenya. In the said conference, the present day Tanzania was demarcated and accorded to the German colonialists in 1890. The Germans colonial domination lasted for two and a half decades up to 1920 when it lost in the First World War. Following the Germans defeat in First World War, the League of Nations and later the United Nations gave Britain a mandate to preside over Tanzania until it gained its independence in 1961 (Mwakikagile, 2010).

Tanzania through a unified nationalist movement managed to navigate its way to independence without a drop of blood as most of its neighbours like Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola had, just to mention few. The peaceful independence movement in Tanzania was spearheaded by TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and its leader Mwalimu Julius Nyerere rose to the helm of political power in the newly established independent Tanzania (Heilman and William, 2012). Due to the unified and all inclusive independence movement TANU enjoyed almost uncontested support (Mamdani, 2013b; Mwakikagile, 2010; Illife, 1979). Tanzania achieved its independence under a multiparty political system and continued with such set-up up to 1965 when it officially became a one party state. TANU and later CCM (after the merger of TANU and ASP) were the only parties allowed to operate in Tanzania. The two parties were granted supreme political status over all government organs (Makulilo, 2012, 2008; Baregu, 1997). The rationale for the introduction of the monolithic political order was to enhance nation-building and equitable economic development (Coulson, 1982; Illife, 1979). In other words, a pluralistic political dispensation was, at the time in question, conceived as a stumbling block towards attainment of nation-building. This trend changed in the late 1990s when Tanzania liberalised its economic and political orders.

It is imperative albeit in a nutshell to recall that liberalism was against the AD that committed Tanzania to following a socialist and self-reliant path as indicated in 3.4.4 and further expounded
in sections 4.4.1.4 and 4.4.1.5. This is mainly because liberalisation was seen as a threat to national unity, EDNR and peaceful coexistence as indicated in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. Economically, the liberal reforms were embarked amid criticism from the pro AD dictum and those affected by the consequences of deregulation\(^{38}\) like privatisation related unemployment and inflation (Stein, 1999). The liberal economic reforms went on to influence changes on the monolithic political stature within which it operates. Calls for a liberal democratic pluralist political order came from both internal and external dynamics. Internal pressure albeit minimal, came from civil society (mainly organised professional groups) but greater impetus came from within CCM itself and its national Chairman then- Mwalimu (Liviga, 2009: 6-7; Nyang’oro 2004; Chaligha et al. 2002). The external pressures for political pluralism in Tanzania were exerted at the time when Eastern European countries went multi-party and international aid agencies made going multiparty a prerequisite for developing countries across Africa to access aid (Liviga, 2009; Villalón and VonDoepp, 2005; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

In the early 1990s elite figures opposing single party rule formed a Steering Committee agitating for and mobilising people in favour of a multiparty system. The committee was headed by Chief Said Abdallah Fundikira. Fundikira’s committee included Mwalimu’s staunch socialist opponents back in the early days of independence like Lifa Chipaka, Oscar Kambona and James Mapalala. It also incorporated academic and civil society elites who questioned Mwalimu’s socialist and monolithic philosophies. According to Chege (1994: 53–4) this committee through several alliances led to the formation of a range of opposition parties, including NCCR-Maguezi, UMD and CUF. However, although the committee and the civil society had pushed for the pluralist reforms, most scholars argue that the major drive for the multiparty system came from within CCM (Barkan 1994; Chaligha et al. 2002; Erdmann 2002; Nyang’oro 2006). Mwalimu Nyerere has been recognised for being instrumental in leading the sentiments for the pluralist political change within CCM. After stepping down as CCM’s National Chairman in 1990, he argued for a gradual change towards multi-party democracy to avoid a conflictual transition (Nyang’oro, 2006). Consequently, in 1991, Mwalimu’s successor President Mwinyi appointed a presidential commission to solicit views on Tanzanians’ preferred political system. The Commission was

\(^{38}\) See Chaligha et al. 2002; Wangwe, 2005 for thorough explanations of the consequences of liberal reforms
commonly known as the “Nyalali Commission” bearing its name from its head- the then Chief Justice of the URT, the late Hon. Justice Francis Nyalali.

The Commission was assigned the task of collecting views of Tanzanian citizens and making appropriate recommendations on whether the country should adopt a multiparty or retain a single party system (URT, 1992). In its report that came out in early 1992, Nyalali’s Commission recommended that Tanzania’s political system should be changed from the existing one party system to a new multi-party system (Mwaipopo, 2011). The recommendation was made despite the fact that only 20% of the Tanzanians interviewed by the commission were in favour of political pluralism (Chaligha et al. 2002). The option of the majority against their greater freedom of choice illustrates the power of the PsIM, as Tanzanians appear to associate unity with peace, and the lack of unity with its opposite. Two days after the commission presented its report CCM convened an extraordinary General Assembly to bless the commission’s recommendations. The blessing was followed by amendment of CURT to allow political pluralism by a CCM-only constituted national assembly (NA) in 1992 (Nyang’oro, 2006: 42). The NA in the same year enacted the Political Parties Act that permitted the formation of political parties and governed their operations (Makulilo, 2012). From 1992 to-date Tanzania by Article 3 (1) of CURT is a democratic country with a Multi-party political system.

Several political parties were formed in the first years of multiparty politics, out of which 13 managed to secure registration by the first multiparty GEs of 1995 (Erdmann, 2002). During the last elections (2010) the number raised to eighteen. These include AFP, APPT- Maendeleo, CCM, CHADEMA, CHAUSTA, CUF, DP, JAHAZI ASILIA, Demokrasia Makini, NCCR-Mageuzi, NLD, NRA, SAU, TADEA, UDP, UMD, UPDP and TLP (Mwaipopo, 2011). Currently, Tanzania has a sum of 22 registered political parties as indicated in section 1.1. All political parties are registered under the Political Parties Act, 1992.

As a result of the political reform, Tanzania had to amend its monolithic electoral laws to be consonant with multi-party democratic tendencies. However, its electoral system has never changed much. An electoral system is the process which establishes the manner in which electoral votes are translated into seats in the legislature (Mwaipopo, 2011). In this regard, an electoral system is an electoral arrangement that places priority on the level to which the elected leader mirrors the beliefs and preferences of the voters. Tanzania has always been using a “First Past the
Post” electoral system. According to this system, the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councilor candidate who wins the majority share of valid votes is declared to be the winner. Therefore, even if contending parties are beaten by one vote they get no seat to show for its hard fought campaign (Kawishe, 2011). In this regard, the voice of those who voted for the losing parties are not reflected in the NA and in the Local Government Authorities’ Councils.

For purposes of the GEs, Tanzania is demarcated into constituencies and wards. Each constituency elects an MP, while every ward elects a Councilor. There are also Women Special Seats MPs and Councilors who are proportionally elected to mend the gender gap in these two organs. According to Article 78(1) of CURT, these Women Special Seats MPs and Councilors are obtained by way of Proportional Representation calculated on the basis of the total votes each Party got country-wide in the Parliamentary Elections and the proportion of Councilor Seats each Party won in each local Council respectively.

The electoral system of Tanzania consists of three types of elections, namely: The GEs, the Local Authority Elections (LAEs) and By-elections. The GEs are for electing the President of URT, MPs, and Councilors. These elections are organised by the National Electoral Commission. The LAEs are for electing village, hamlet, street leaders, as well as members of village and street councils. These elections are organised by the ministry responsible for local government. In this study, I am confined to the GEs because they provide a wider avenue of intra-tribal and inter-tribal evocations of ethnicity. GEs also afford wider latitude for inclusion of national debates compared to LAEs that are more localised in terms of jurisdiction and leadership mandate.

There are By-elections- for re-electing leaders who were elected in the previously mentioned elections, once such leader dies, resigns or his/her office becomes vacant for any legal reason. Since By–elections are meant to re-elect leadership positions that fall vacant, the competent organising authority falls on the jurisdiction of the institution that oversaw the original election of the position to be filled. Although the ministry responsible for local government and NEC are the principal organisers of the elections, they work in collaboration with several authorities which manage electoral processes in Tanzania, which include the Registrar of Political Parties, law enforcers like the police force, the Prevention and Combation of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). These authorities perform duties that fall under their parent jurisdictions during the electoral processes.
The GEs and LAEs are conducted every fifth year after the previous one. Regularly, the LAEs are held a year prior to the GEs. All candidates aspiring to become President of URT or MPs must be sponsored by a political party. No independent candidates are permitted to stand for elections in Tanzania (Makulilo, 2012). CCM has won an uncontested majority in all multiparty elections held in Tanzania from 1995 to 2010 as indicated in sections 1.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. Since this dissertation deals with experiences of the 2010 elections it is worthwhile portraying the background of the elections before addressing issues of ethnicity and voting overtime.

4.2.1. The 2010 General Elections in Tanzania: A pick of Key Issues

The GEs of 2010 in Tanzania were for electing the President of the URT and parliamentarians. The largest political issue in the run-up to and in the actual elections revolved around graft-related issues popularly referred to in Swahili as ufisadi. CHADEMA during the elections repeatedly accused top CCM and government leaders of being involved in grand corruption. Through its presidential candidate Willibrod Slaa, CHADEMA and its cadres in and out of parliament, named and shamed notable CCM and government leaders including the president for their supposed engagement in ufisadi. This way, CHADEMA identified itself as a party with zero tolerance to graft and poor management of public resources during the elections. Accusation of ufisadi against the ruling party and government officials was an essential element of its campaigns (TACCEO, 2010; Interview with Kurya street vendor in Nyamagana, held on 13.11.2014; interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward held on 5.11.2014). According to the TACCEO (2010) accusations of ufisadi levelled against CCM and government leaders were used as a political propaganda geared towards character assassinating and discrediting them. Since CHADEMA accused CCM widely, CCM had to respond to the accusations in the same magnitude. This makes the view that CHADEMA was instrumental in setting the agenda hold some water. This being said, I am not trying to argue that other issues like water, agriculture services, infrastructural development, housing, education, health care, peace and tranquillity were not important. Indeed, they were as such issues were identified by my interviewees as central election issues. However, they thought that ufisadi was on top of the agenda.

Upon concluding the elections, Tanzania was showered with praise on its conduct of the elections from most of the foreign observers, heads of state and governments as well as leaders of
international organisations. These elections were declared by election monitors, both local and international as broadly free and fair. The elections were mostly peaceful although there were many minor irregularities. It is against this backdrop each election monitoring report pointed out varied irregularities that need to be improved. Most of the irregularities are associated with the enormous power and resources that the ruling CCM enjoyed compared to the opposition parties. It is worth recalling that the President of the URT who normally is the Chair of CCM, appoints varied public office bearers including the chief of the security services, regional and district commissioners as well as the National Electoral Commission just to mention a few. He and his cabinet also retain their position while contesting for their seats, thus they enjoyed incumbency advantage, as we will see later in this chapter in section 4.5.2 (Makulilo, 2012).

As it has been already highlighted in section 1.1 and indicated in Appendix I, CCM’s victory in the 2010 elections was tsunamic with over 70% parliamentary seats. Excluding this fact, the elections are exceptional on many counts, chief of which was CHADEMA’s ability to challenge the incumbent during and after the elections to a magnitude that Tanzanians hardly experienced before (TACCEO 2010; TEMCO 2011). Reduction of the presidential vote share won by CCM in the 2005 elections (80%) by 20% in 2010 attests to this fact. Similarly, CHADEMA for the first time won enough votes to be the formal opposition in the National Assembly. Whitehead (2010) argues that CHADEMA’s impact on the political agenda in 2010 exceeded that of previous opposition parties particularly Augustine Mrema’s NCCR-Mageuzi which in the 1995 elections was the biggest opposition party as it is projected on section 4.5.2.

Mwanza was one of the regions where CHADEMA enjoyed increased support compared to the 2005 elections. In 2005, CHADEMA only scored a mere 6.5 percent in the presidential and parliamentary contest. Indicating partisan voting as the voters for its presidential and parliamentary candidates were essentially the same. In 2010, CHADEMA’s support unprecedentedly rose up to 35.2% in the presidential and 30.9% in the parliamentary elections. The substantial increase was not only in terms of numbers. It was translated into winning two parliamentary constituencies in Mwanza Urban - Ilemela and Nyamagana, and another one in the island of Ukerewe. This was an

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39 For further understanding of the conduct of the 2010 election see the TEMCO, TACCEO, MISA and AU and the Commonwealth mission election monitoring reports.
interesting development as Mwanza has always been a CCM stronghold in multiparty elections. Moreover, the Sukuma are considered to be politically “docile”, or at least that they would not change their political preferences easily (Interview with Mzee Mkali, 10.3.2013). As such, reasons for CHADEMA’s sudden ascent in popularity in Mwanza were deemed significant. My interviews in Nyamagana suggested that the main election issues that gave CHADEMA skyrocketing success in the election revolve around its anti-corruption crusade, people’s drive for change. Likewise, political machinations 40 played against CHADEMA’s candidate (Ezekia Wenje) while contesting for CCM’s flagbearership and later when he crossed over to CHADEMA as indicated in section 5.4.1. In my interviews in Nyamagana there was a definite irritation about the perceived arrogance and misuse of public office portrayed by Lawrence Masha- the then Minister for Interior affairs, to try denying Wenje’s candidature on grounds of citizenship. Also, interviewees expressed the view that large-scale corruption scandals within the ruling party and the unpopular local CCM candidates paved the way for CHADEMA’s success in the elections. CHADEMA’s support is well comprehended when elements of corruption and unpopular leaders are attributed to the perceptions of declining standards of living among the voters. Such understanding informed the zeal for change. Interviewees who expressed their support to CHADEMA were tired of CCM. A view from a Kurya street vendor that I interviewed in Rufiji Street represents this position “we are tired of people (CCM) who are making us poor”. The views of the street vendor contended that it was not necessarily that voters were particularly fond of CHADEMA, but that they were simply tired of the ruling party due to their economic backwardness. Most interviewees who supported CHADEMA in Mwanza argued that people of Mwanza had not benefited from the natural resources in the region. They mostly referred to minerals and Lake Victoria located in Mwanza as resources that they are supposed to benefit from. It is imperative to recognise the fact that CHADEMA in its election manifesto advocated a policy of provincialism whereby regions are supposed to be joined administratively to form provinces and benefit from their own resources to a larger extent, rather than revenues being pooled nationally.

Unlike the previous elections TACCEO (2011) spelt out that Tanzania experienced considerable

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40 It is worth noting Ezekia Wenje seeked CCM’s consent to contest for the the Nyamagana parliamentary seat against the incumbent then Hon.Lawrence Masha who was the Minister responsible for Home Affairs. While in CCM primaries he was accused of not being a Tanzanian and later formal complaint was made by Hon. Marsha to that effect when he was nominated to vie for the same seat through CHADEM. See The Citizen, 5.9.2010. Chadema: Masha used office to block our man. Accessed on 21.11.2013 via http://www.shwari.com/habari_za_nje/print.php?newsid=57
unrest as the announcement of results in various parts of the country were delayed in constituencies that CHADEMA were hopeful of winning. The state of unrest associated with CHADEMA’s rise in the political landscape went beyond the announcement of the results. Tanzanians after the declaration of the results experienced protests directly or indirectly claimed to be arranged by CHADEMA. The famous doctors’ strike demanding better pay and working conditions in 2012; businessmen strikes mainly in Dar es Salaam over the use of electronic fiscal devices (EFD) meant to enhance tax collection and the nagging bus and truck drivers’ strikes over proper working conditions. In all of these unrests CHADEMA as an opposition party evidently spoke in favour of the striking groups to pressurise the state to meet their demands. In the drivers’ strike the Chairman of CHADEMA went and participated in halting the strike. He was widely cheered when he urged them to continue with their services for the benefit of Tanzanians. CHADEMA’s support and the role of its Chair in halting the strike does not overtly entail that it organised it or any other. However, it signifies a fact that the interests of the striking groups and theirs as a government in waiting and a watchdog coincide. Thus their visibility in right-based strikes is warranted.

A Mwanza-specific strike that was associated to CHADEMA that signified unrest and enhanced its political visibility was the strike organised by Marching guys, or Wamachinga, as they are branded in Swahili. Wamachinga are small-scale hawkers or vendors with ad hoc stalls in urban areas. In Mwanza they are found hawking around the city and others have their stalls in central Mwanza, mainly along the central Makoroboi Street. According to the CHADEMA leader and the parliamentary aspirant interviewed, this strike resulted from the CCM-dominated city council decision to move the Wamachinga out of the city centre for purposes of cleanliness. CHADEMA campaigned actively for the rights of the Wamachinga to remain in the city. Interviewees in

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42 For details of the doctors strike see Tanzanian Affairs, September 2012 accessed on 30.11.2014 via http://www.tzaffairs.org/category/politics
43 More information about the traders boycott can be viewed on www.tanzaniatoday.co.tz/news/wafanyakazi-kariakoo-wagomea-machineza-EFD. Accessed on 20.11.2015
45 See the following clip on youtube to see how Mbowe was cheered by the striking drivers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1fY9jYkLWQ
Nyamagana verified that CHADEMA’s regional leadership and its parliamentary contestants overtly supported the marching guys.

Apart from CHADEMA’s rise as a formidable political force in the 2010 elections another outstanding issue about the elections is the steep decline in voter turnout compared to all other elections in the country as the following table entails:

**Table III: Presidential and Parliamentary Voter turnout in Tanzania (1965 - 2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,373,089</td>
<td>2,600,040</td>
<td>77.08</td>
<td>3,373,012</td>
<td>2,579,040</td>
<td>76.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,051,938</td>
<td>3,649,789</td>
<td>72.25</td>
<td>5,051,908</td>
<td>3,647,101</td>
<td>72.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,577,566</td>
<td>4,557,595</td>
<td>81.71</td>
<td>5,577,566</td>
<td>4,555,992</td>
<td>81.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6,969,803</td>
<td>5,986,942</td>
<td>85.90</td>
<td>6,969,793</td>
<td>5,960,121</td>
<td>85.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6,910,555</td>
<td>5,181,999</td>
<td>74.99</td>
<td>6,910,535</td>
<td>5,181,576</td>
<td>74.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,296,553</td>
<td>5,425,282</td>
<td>74.35</td>
<td>7,296,544</td>
<td>5,425,282</td>
<td>74.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8,929,969</td>
<td>6,846,681</td>
<td>76.67</td>
<td>8,928,816</td>
<td>6,831,578</td>
<td>76.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10,088,484</td>
<td>8,517,648</td>
<td>84.33</td>
<td>10,088,484</td>
<td>7,341,067</td>
<td>72.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16,401,694</td>
<td>11,875,927</td>
<td>72.41</td>
<td>15,705,223</td>
<td>11,389,530</td>
<td>72.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20,146,119</td>
<td>8,626,283</td>
<td>42.83</td>
<td>20,398,394</td>
<td>8,626,283</td>
<td>42.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** African Elections Database

The data in Table III above indicate that voter turnout in all GEs in Tanzania has been higher than in the 2010 GEs. Tanzania has maintained high voter turnout even under one-party election as the results of turnout of the elections of 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 presented above substantiate. This is the case despite criticism from some scholars that single-partism narrows chances for voter participation (Cliffe 1967).

According to a study on low voter turnout in the 2010 elections in Tanzania by Shumbusho (2012), twelve factors explain the phenomenon. The twelve reasons in order of importance are: First, the voters’ belief that their votes cannot make a change (low political efficacy). Second, due to eligible electors’ poverty, they have lost interest in political processes compared to income generating activities. Third, most Tanzanians lack knowledge on the importance of voting. Fourth, the voters believe that elections do not create any significant change in political system. Fifth, eligible voters consider not voting as a way of penalising the elected leaders and the institutions established through elections for their poor performance. Sixth, multiparty elections have failed to influence
noteworthy changes in policies since its inception. Seventh, voting is seen as a useless cost in terms of time and resources, which has to be avoided. Eighth, not voting was viewed to be a punishment to the government for inadequate performance. Ninth, eligible voters foresaw that CCM will win the elections due to lack of significant competition. Tenth, the new and elaborate CCM intra-party nomination model adopted to get flagbearers made some voters believe that elections were over. Eleventh, the long-term effect of the First-Past-the-Post which encourages wastage of votes and voter’s preference discouraged eligible voters. Twelfth and last, there were cases of mismanagement of Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR), which led to some eligible voters not to appear on the voter lists at polling stations.

In an interview with the CHADEMA leader in Mwanza, it was suggested that the low turnout was also associated with vote rigging of the polling stations. According to this leader CHADEMA had in fact won more votes than it officially had and in some cases was robbed of the victory through the spoiling of votes. This position was even made public by Dr Wilbrod Slaa who contested for the presidential seat immediately after elections and recently in a press conference held at Serena Hotel, Dar es Salaam on 1st September 2015. Another possible explanation for low voter turnout is buying of voting cards. Accusations to this effect go both ways. The opposition claims that CCM buy cards to lower the number of people able to vote in opposition strongholds and CCM casts similar claims on the opposition. My interviewees revealed that in the campaign rallies both parties urged eligible voters not to sell their voting cards. This buying of voting cards in Mwanza was not vividly voiced out by my interviewees but the use of money in elections was. Most interviewees in the rural areas confessed that they were ‘bribed’ in the form of given T-shirts, salt, caps and clothes and even money to support a particular candidate. Most of the voices in this regard were directed to CCM candidates and their agents. This position shall not be taken lightly as the CCM leader interviewed in Mwanza confessed that accusations of vote buying in CCM primaries are rampant. He told me that at various occasions, the party organs do not sponsor candidates who are proven to win the primaries through corruptive means. Another factor that is associated with low voter turnout is fear of violent acts. It was argued by interviewees in Mwanza that women and elderly people particularly in Nyamagana did not turn up to vote because of unusual police and military presence in the days preceding the 2010 elections. This account of the 2010 elections serves as a background for the empirical chapter in particular on the political situation in Mwanza.
After this general overview of the 2010 elections, now let us zero into issues of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania from the nationalist era to post-independence era.

4.3. Ethnicity and Voting in Tanzania in the Nationalist Era and Beyond

4.3.1. A lead up to Ethnicity and Voting in the Nationalist Era

Tanzania as indicated in section 4.2 above was ruled by German colonialists and later fell under the British trusteeship. The German colonialists never conducted elections and the British did so in the late 1950s after pressures from the nationalist movement that claimed for Tanzania’s independence (Mwakikagile, 2010). Both administrations have as indicated in section 3.4.4 engaged in acts that informed nationalist struggles against colonisation and the PsIM. However, manipulation of ethnic groups stands out to have important bearing on ethnicity and politics that are relevant to this dissertation as we will see below. Before digging into the ethnic manipulations it is useful to point out that despite the manipulations the colonialists contributed intendedly or not in enhancing national unity as well. For instance, they included local people from different ethnic groups in their civil service and used Swahili as their formal administrative language (Iliffe, 1979; Coulson, 1982). The use of Swahili as an administrative language led to the introduction of a national language that facilitated inter-ethnic dialogue and significantly contributed to the formation of a Tanzanian national identity (Lofchie, 2013). It is equally imperative to note that Swahili does not belong to any particular ethnic group- Kabila in Tanzania. Therefore, no specific ethnic group can use it to wield power or influence for political dominance (Omari, 1995). The inclusion of people of different ethnic backgrounds portrayed to some extent an inclusive civil service though most on the jobs held by the indigenous were mostly blue-collar. The inclusive character became an important element of the nationalisation movement and post-independent Tanzania’s administrative and political set-up (Malipula, 2014). Inferably, the elites of the day who become critical in the nationalist struggles were prepared to organise the broadly based multi-ethnic national force to fight colonialism and forge strong national ties that inform the politics and voting in post-independence as it will be shown below. Let us turn to the ethnic manipulations that are important to be known before engaging in a thorough discussion of ethnicity and voting in the nationalist era.

The administrations of both foreign powers manipulated ethnic groups and their leadership to perpetuate their rule. In some instances converged ethnic groups to make grand ethnic groups that
exist today. For instance, the British introduced a system where smaller chiefdoms were placed under “paramount chiefs” (Mpangala 1999). Putting the smaller chiefdoms of the Chagga ethnic groups located around the Kilimanjaro Mountain under one Chief (Chief Mareale) provides an example of the efforts made to centralise ethnic group leadership and subsequently broaden and solidify ethnic identities (Mamdani, 1996). The solidification of ethnic groups could have bred ethnic salience on voting as it broadened ethnic group sizes and visibility and provided more potential grounds for forging MWCs compared to fluid and less concentrated ethnic groups. However, it has not been the case in Tanzania because of similar structural, legal and economic reasons that fuelled nationalism and nation-building to be discussed in the following subheadings in this section.

Ethnic chiefs who were symbols of ethnic orientation in various Tanzanian ethnic groups were used by the colonialists to enhance colonial rule. However, most of their traditional powers were stripped off and in some instances changed their traditional names (Mpangala, 1999). For instance, the Ntemi of Wanyamwezi, the Mtwa of Uhehe, the Nkonsi of the Wangoni, the Mangi of the Wachagga, all became Sultans altering the foundation of the ethnic groups’ political leadership orientation and the interest of their people. As such, the Chiefs lost their influence and respect among their followers (Sheriff, 1980). Although there were no elections, they lost trust and legitimacy required to marshall ethnic crusades for political office even when elections were instituted in the late 1950s (Illife, 1979). This partly explains why ethnically oriented parties never emerged and the traditional leaders did not champion the nationalist struggles.

The process of creating artificial chiefdoms that is regarded by Deutsch (1996) as “tribal makeshift solutions” made Chiefs mere clients of their colonial masters, while retaining the patron role in their communities. In this setup, the colonial state was the primary source of resources meant to further the patron-client networks between the chiefs and the colonial state on one hand, and the chiefs and their subjects on the other (Berman, 1998; Lemarchand, 1972). However, the fact that the colonialists’ intent was to exploit the colonised, and that the ethnic manipulations and corresponding economic benefits had alienated the majority of Tanzanians, militated against the wide distribution of patronage, as the chiefs had limited access to colonial resources (Illife, 1979). In this regard, the traditional role and authority of the chiefs over their people was questionable. Therefore, they could hardly mobilise societies to feel that they should stand with their patron and
support. Instead, the people as a collective felt the urgency of uprooting their corrupt chiefs and their master (the British colonialists). From this line of thought, the neo-patrimonial explanation of patronage as a means of fuelling ethnic voting is rendered insufficient in explaining influences of ethnicity in the colonial Tanzanian politics. Such view stems from the fact that the means and circumstances for practising it were quite limited.

The limited resources for exercising patronage were not the only inhibiting factor in curbing ethnicity from growing into a politically salient phenomenon in Tanzanian electoral politics when national elections took place in the late 1950s. The British colonialists’ deliberate move to disallow formation of parochially based political organisations in Tanzania inadvertently stimulated a nationally unified Independence struggle. The nationalist requirement was purposely set hoping that the hugeness of Tanzania and multiplicity of ethnic groups would disqualify independence movements’ existence (Said, 2006). However, the restriction happened to be a blessing in disguise as the national political organisations like Tanzania African Association (TAA) and later TANU (Tanzania African National Union) were formed to lead a nationally unified independence movement in Tanzania that in all elections championed national unity and denounced the use of ethnicity in soliciting political support. Mzee Mwiru in his words revealed:

"Mimi nilijiunga na TANU baada ya kumaliza Shule ya Sekondari na nilipangiwa kazi Rufiji kuhamasisha watu kujiunga na harakati ya uhuru. Nilinufaika sana na TAA na juhudi za nyuma yake zilizoweza TANU kufanya kazi zake maana tulitakiwa tuwe tumetapakaa katika taifa lote ili tuweze kusajiliwa, kushindana katika uchaguzi na hatimaye kupata uchukaji. Ilikuwa jukumu kubwa mno kupata ufuasi wa kitaifa na nchi yote katika utwaaji na matumizi ya nguvu za kisiasa." (Mwiru, 2014/05/14).

“I joined TANU after accomplishing Secondary School and was sent to Rufiji to mobilise people to join the independence movement. I benefitted a lot from the TAA and earlier efforts made to make TANU operate as we were required to have a national presence so that we can be registered, compete in elections and eventually gain independence. It was a mammoth task to get support at the time considering the hugeness of the country and limited resources for reaching people. In actual fact the British thought we wouldn’t be able to, and thus, they..."
could delay our independence. This was not the case as we managed to reach out to people all over the country irrespective of their ethnic belonging. This made TANU stronger! We managed to organise our party above ethnic, racial and religious divides. What was supposed to be a liability (getting members from all over the country) turned out to be an asset to TANU in the independence movement and beyond as it enhanced national unity over any divisive element in the acquisition and use of political power.”

The worthiness of Mzee Mwiru’s words is provided in the discussion made in the subsequent subheading. A critical look at the prelude to ethnicity and voting in Tanzania before the height of the nationalists’ movement discussed below suggests identical ethno-political trends. The ethnic identities, their organisation and relationships never changed much with the change of colonial masters. The political authority of the Tanzanians through their chiefs was highly undermined as their working as agents of the colonialists especially discredited them in the eyes of their subjects and unmasked their real role as stooges of the colonialists. However, their role became a blessing in setting the path towards denunciation of the use of ethnicity in politics and voting in particular as their agent role affected their mobilisation power when it came to fighting the colonialists. This negative view on the traditional aristocrats and their divided structure necessitated alternative forces to lead the fight against colonialism. That is why in the 1950s African elites had resort to using a broadly based political organisation under TAA and later TANU to marshal all of the social forces against the British colonialists. Such movement as discussed below marks the beginning of the unification and consolidation of the Tanzanian state existing today and the move towards denunciation of ethnicity and other irreconcilable conflictual identities on determining political support in elections.

4.3.2. Ethnicity and Voting during the Nationalist Movement

Before the nationalisation efforts gained currency in Tanzania elements of ethnic fragmentation could never exert their dilapidating effects on the organisation of politics. Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the role of the nationalist movement under TAA and TANU in sustaining such virtue in Tanzania as widely argued below. This is because it has dexterously mobilised the major social forces in Tanzania to forge a high degree of unity upon independence and created the base for nation-building policies that denounced the use of ethnicity for marshalling electoral support after independence (Malipula, 2014; Mamdani, 2013b; Weber, 2009; Illife, 1979).

It is worth noting that from its formation throughout the 1930s and 1940s, TAA was quite weak and lacked a national character but was revitalised in the 1950s by the entry of young intellectuals,
most notably Julius Kambarage Nyerere who was elected president in 1953 (Maguire, 1969; Temu, 1969). On the election of Mwalimu to the helm of TAA Mzee Mwiru said:


“Mwalimu was elected by TAA members to be their President on the basis of merit as he belongs to a small tribe (the Zanaki), and the meeting that put him to power did not have another Zanaki nor did it have many members from Musoma. This indeed has replicated in all elections that followed as we have never had a President who is from a large tribe or supported exclusively by his tribe.”

TAA’s recruitment of intellectuals and the able leadership of Mwalimu marked the start of a massive societal integration role in the nationalist struggle. TAA achieved this by reorganising and merging tribal based nationalist movements spearheaded by ethnic groups, trade unions and cooperatives. The tribal movements reorganised by TAA for nationalist purposes during the 1940s and 1950s were essentially ethnic groups’ struggles against the cash-crop oriented colonial policies (Iliffe, 1979; Mpangala, 1999). The Sukuma Union formed in 1945, the Pare Union in 1946, the Chagga Kilimanjaro Union in the late 1940s, and the Meru Union in 1951 which were subsumed into TAA structures provide examples of tribal cooperative movements re-organised by TAA to forge a nationally based struggle against colonial rule that contributed towards lowering the salience of ethnicity on voting.

An important point to note at this juncture is that while these “proto-nationalist organisations” could have developed into ethnic political parties to stand for both their economic and political interests, the TAA did not let that happen. This mainly because it managed to draft them into the mainstream nationalist movement by making them branches of TAA. The failure of the proto-nationalist organisations to transform into fully-fledged political parties reduced the chances of ethnicity gaining salience in anchoring political support in elections. This is attributed to the fact that when the organisation of political parties was allowed, there were no ethnic parties to further parochial interests. Better still, TAA as the major political force in its words and deeds spearheaded a national agenda (Maguire, 1969). Aside from co-opting ethnic-based cooperative movements, TAA also skilfully managed to win over young tribal activists whose traditional authorities were discredited and/or manipulated by the colonial powers as exemplified in the colonial section above. According to my KI’s TAA’s unification of the ethnic-based forces during
the nationalist struggles provides a sharp difference with nationalist movements in other African states that were deeply polarised like Kenya and Nigeria.

The KIs in unison presented the view that the rebranding of the TAA in the 1950s extended the legitimacy of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika. It made it a formidable movement for a cross section of the population that was against colonialism. It is worth noting that TAA is credited from an organisational point of view with the "organisation-is-bigger-than-individual" mantra, which is usually played out to undermine the indispensability of individual agency in modern organisations. However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the structural and institutional coherence and sustainability or otherwise of organisations frequently benefit from the sanctity, individual brilliance and charisma of some individuals. In the Tanzanian case, Mwalimu has been the individual brilliant and charismatic figure that made use of every opportunity to incorporate factions into the nationalist movement. It is doubtful whether, without his zeal, skill and creativity, TAA would have enjoyed internal unity (Mamdani, 2013a). Also Nyerere’s origin as a son of a Chief from a small ethnic group, the Zanaki, played a crucial role in this context. This is because when he advocated unity, other ethnic leaders did not see him as an immediate threat to their own positions (Omari, 1995). The KIs told me that TAA’s elections were free to all of its members and no elements of ethnic discrimination were promoted. TAA’s role in nationalising the independence movement in Tanzania and its crusade against divisive tendencies like the use in ethnicity in voting was further sustained by TANU.

As mentioned earlier the role of the TAA was further reinforced when it was transformed into a fully-fledged political party called TANU in 1954. TANU had three key attributes which are critical to furthering the PsIM and in informing the influences of ethnicity on voting in Tanzania (Iliffe, 1979). Firstly, TANU was unequivocally committed to the PsIM and overtly proclaimed its opposition to tribalism and other divisive tendencies like racism, racialism and religiosity in the conduct of politics including elections. Secondly, TANU allowed unions and associations (whether based on ethnic group or occupation) to join it and pay a “political levy”, to complement TANUs youth and women’s wings, which Nyerere viewed key to TANUs work. The incorporation of the unions and associations from varied areas and ethnic foundations bestowed the feeling of nationhood ahead of parochial feelings that countries like Kenya never enjoyed as their unions and associations were ethnically divided (Weber, 2009). Thirdly, the modus operandi of the party was
based on forging an inclusive elitist representation. To effect such inclusiveness the party’s National Executive Committee was elected by the national congress, giving considerable representation to the party’s base, but daily activities were carried out by elected officers and a Central Committee appointed by the TANU president. These presidential appointments provided space for Mwalimu (the then president) to appoint prominent figures from varied backgrounds including ethnicities. As such, it contributed in building wider national unity which militates against the use of ethnicity to garner political support in elections.

The nature of the organisation of TANU and its modus operandi afforded it space to forge an inclusive coalition of elites that surpassed ethnic and other peace threatening divides like racial, religious, and occupational divides. TANU managed to implement its multi-ethnic approach and skilfully incorporated key figures from various ethnic groups into the movement (Omari, 1995). According to Omari, key leaders of ethnic groups who joined TANU included Chief Fundikira of the Wanyamwezi, Chief Anna Gwassa of Kasulu, Chief Therea Ntare of Heru Kasulu, and Chief Kasusura of Rusubi-Biharamulo. My KIs widely narrated the broadly based ethnic outlook of TANU ranks. In our discussions, all KIs indicated that the nationalist movement leadership not only incorporated tribal leaders in the movement, but also other academic elites from different corners of the country. As patrons or elders (wazee), these key figures and opinion leaders all had their networks whose support they – and indirectly the national movement - could count on and harness. More so, these elites were sent to mobilise support pan-territorially and not just from their areas of origin. The incorporation of varied ethnicities into the independence movement made TANU able to develop a powerful mass-based political party that mobilised thousands of peasants, workers and traders to the course of national independence irrespective of their ethnic orientation (Coulson, 1982; Iliffe, 1979). Such state of affairs made TANU appeal to all ethnic groups and win massively in all elections in which it participated in Tanzania before independence and beyond. According to Mzee Mkali, ethnicity was never considered to be the essential aspect of getting elected as there were people who won elections in constituencies where they do not come from.

Election-related literature in Africa suggests that independence and the expansion of the franchise in many former colonies in Africa paved the way for factionalism and salience of ethnicity on elections (Illife, 1979). However, Iliffe excludes Tanzania from the broader African conclusion on grounds that the composition of the ethnic groups in Tanzania created structural impediment to the
use of ethnicity in influencing voters in elections. Illife’s position is predicated on the fact that there is no dominant ethnic group to solely wield political power and authority. Under such circumstances, thinking of using an ethnic ticket in Tanzania’s elections is tantamount to conceding defeat before a contest. Equally, and probably more important, the unified political posture epitomised in TANUs strong party machinery throughout Tanganyika championing for the wellbeing of the entire Tanzania surpassed any divisive motives, including the ethnicity that troubled many African states (Iliffe, 1979). This situation continued in the post-colonial era.

4.4. Ethnicity and Voting in the Post-Colonial Tanzania
This part endeavours to provide a concise account of the state of politics, ethnicity and voting in the post-colonial Tanzanian history. It discusses relevant information throughout the tenure of Julius Nyerere (1961-1985) which was characterised by Mwalimu’s efforts towards institutionalising an ideal socialist state that was predicated on the PsIM. The essence of prescribing the first section of the discussion on Mwalimu Nyerere’s architecture of an ideal socialist state is hinged on his personal and systemic leadership role in making Tanzania popularly described as an African state that has transcended divisions inherent in colonial set boundaries and state formation (Cameron and Dorman, 2009; Kaiser, 1996). Hartmann attributes the development to Mwalimu when he argued that Nyerere’s nation-building strategies created the Tanzanian state, consolidated it, and institutionalised it, so that it would give him the tools to develop an egalitarian political community with a common political culture that among other things denounces the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes (Hartmann, 1991). This section will see how the nation-building initiatives impacted upon the use of ethnicity in informing voting in Tanzania. Mwalimu’s era will be followed by an institutionalisation account of the capitalist liberal democratic market-oriented paradigm that mainly covers the tenures of the presidents who succeeded him. Again, the primary interest is to see how liberal politics and economic institutionalisation have informed the use of ethnicity in informing voting in Tanzania.

4.4.1.1. Incorporation of Societal Organisations into the National Political Realm
Tanzania had embarked on a broader political engineering geared towards incorporating societal organisations such as trade unions, parents’ associations, student groups, women’s associations, agricultural cooperatives into the political sphere under TANU and later CCM for purposes of
enhancing national unity including fighting the use of ethnicity in politics and equitably distributing national resources (Kelsall, 2000). Not only the societal organisations were subsumed in the party but TANU and later CCM were supreme to the state and the parliament (Makulilo, 2009).

As a starting point, it is worth pointing out that Tanzania achieved its independence under a multiparty political system (Makulilo, 2008). In 1965, the interim constitution of the URT declared Tanzania a one party state and provided the sole party powers over the parliament and cabinet (Harnevik et al. 1988). The AD stood up to 1992 when the Parliament of the URT enacted the Political Parties Act, which reinstated multiparty politics in Tanzania’s politics in 1992. The adoption of one party state, though seen as the main authoritarian policy in the liberal democratic context, did not produce an outcry among many Tanzanians due to the unifying agenda it meant to serve. One of the principal arguments to support the view is that multi-party democracy provides room for ethnicity to determine voting as the parties themselves could be organised along ethnic lines (McLaughlin 2008; Ferree 2006). There were only distant voices of few elites denouncing the measure. Records indicate that only two prominent political elites, Kasanga Tumbo and Abdallah Fundikira, protested the move to political monism (Maguire, 1969). Others who protested included Zuberi Mtemvu who formerly ran the only prominent opposition party in the early days of independence and spearheaded a divisive Africanisation agenda (Illife, 1979).

The party supremacy era was characterised by the suffocation of civil society organisations, the media banning of political parties and politicisation of the civil service as well as the militia (Lupogo, 2001; Swai, 1991). The act created a passive society as people lacked avenues to be critical of the system and address an alternative view (Makulilo, 2009). The process of disallowing political pluralism and the stifling of autonomous civic organisations were predicated on the pursuit for national unity, peace and promoting development—the PsIM. Rationalising this trend, Mwalimu Nyerere time and again argued that realisation of the twin goals of nation-building and economic development in the early days of independence required a united front— one that provides no room for ethnic polarisation in politics as it was the case during the struggle against colonialism (Nyerere, 1967). In other words, the democratic practices of separation of powers and checks and balances that open up room for different views and the use of ethnicity to mobilise
political support, were tantamount to retarding the unifying and developmentalist efforts of an infant state that had tasted overt exploitation of colonialism for decades.

The incorporation of the societal organisations into the party never ended with the formal institutions. The practice also had a hand in traditional systems that had implications for ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. In this regard, traditional leaders who were highly weakened during the pre-independence period and hoped to regain some authority at independence were stripped of all official powers and their powers went to politically appointed commissioners at the Regional and district levels which did not honour the traditional areas of the defunct chiefs’ jurisdictions. This act according to Miguel (2002) reduced the political mobilising role of ethnicity in elections. Miguel’s position can be understood from a neo-patrimonialist view as the Chiefs (Patrons) could be at the centre of mobilising the use of ethnicity on anchoring votes as the patrons had powers and access to resources for practising clientelism. It is imperative to note that while tribal authorities were disbanded, customary law was maintained though adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law. This partially symbolised respect of customs albeit the recognition that keeping the traditional authority intact was also detrimental to nation-building as it could among others ruin the idea of a nation, or indeed fuel the use of ethnicity in voting. An interesting question related to the maintenance of customary law that should concern the hybrid theorists would be why the customary issues did not come up and influence traditional practices to use ethnicity in voting? The answer could be that the customary practices never integrated electoral experience as no elections were held before colonialism. Also, the nationalist movement and post-independent governments have proven to be strictly against the use of ethnicity on voting by words and deeds, as argued above and further pinpointed below.

The abolition of chieftain authority, followed by the prohibition of the establishment of ethnic associations and by the promulgation of one party rule, barred the formal chance of creating ethnic-based political following (Deutsch, 1996). In all of my KII's it was maintained that TANU and CCM governments under Mwalimu severely restrained ethnic sentiments and interests by all means. They shared the view that he was ready even to use force when it was necessary. Mzee Mkali in an interview unveiled:

"Wakati wowote wanasiasa bila kujali nafasi zao walitamka maneno yanayoashiria mvuto wakikabila katika umma kushinda uchaguzi na vyombo vya chama vikasikia, hatua kubwa zilizochukuliwa dhidi ya mwanasiasa husika, hivyo ilikuwa vigumu sana kutumia kuwabili kuwashawishi wapiga kura." (Mkali, 2013/10/03).
“Whenever politicians regardless of their portfolio uttered ethnic sentiments in public to win electoral support and the party machinery heard, serious measures were taken against the politician in question, so ethnicity was barely used to influence voters.”

Despite the fact that political monism and the ruling party’s anti-ethnic crusade guaranteed suppression of formal interparty tribal politics, there is a school of thought suggesting that ethnicity still existed in Tanzania’s political life. Supporters of this school argue that ethnicity has always played a part in local level politics. In the main, the school contends that while ethnic sentiments have been zero-tolerated at the national level, the same cannot be said at the local level as efforts were made to ensure ethnic representation in the party organs of that level. Scholars in this school include Glickman (1995), Jerman (1997), and Omari (1997). The argument made by this school requires contemplation, because it could hardly apply to situations where most constituencies’ contestants are of the same tribal orientation. The kind of ethnicity relevant in such context would be intra-ethnic. It could only be inter-ethnic in cosmopolitan constituencies with several ethno-cultural groups, such as when indigenous ethnic groups compete with other groups residing in the constituency. However, given the fact that the party had a definite structure and committed to discouraging political mobilisation on the basis of ethnic loyalties, one would hardly expect this exception to be rampant. The words of Mzee Mwiru suffice to clear this doubt:


“TANU although never having a lot of resources in the early days of independence always had a way of communicating to ensure that the basic principles of unity were always respected from the national to the local level. Indeed, some information reached late the national level. However, we had functional district and regional structures and leaders who had mandate to address politicians using ethnic sentiments to mobilise for electoral support. The party used all organs it had and government instruments to get necessary information to address divisive elements in the country and people played a key role in making them successful.”

133
The words of Mzee Mwiru suggest deliberate efforts were made to fight ethnic salience in influencing voting. To corroborate Mzee Mwiru’s views it is worth pointing out that TANU adopted a series of further measures to rule out the exploitation of ethnic ties to determine electoral choices. The efforts include, but were not limited to, ensuring that civil servants and, at least, half of students attending secondary school serve and study in districts other than the one they hail or grew up in respectively (Heilman and John, 2012; Kaya, 2004; Maguire, 1969). In the same vein, the government reinforced policies begun under the German and British colonial administrations to promote Swahili as the language of instruction in primary schools and the language of government (Sigala, 2009). At the time, substantial resources were devoted to spreading literacy in Swahili, the national language, which as in the nationalistic liberation era was key in furthering national unity among Tanzania’s ethnic groups. The continuous use of Swahili as a national language reinforced nationhood as the language has no overarching connection to any particular ethnic group(s). In this regard, Swahili was consciously employed to facilitate national integration and communication across ethnic groups. The language developed “political idioms, which has fostered the development of national political culture” (Barkan, 1994). Concepts like Ujamaa (family hood), amani na utulivu (peace and tranquillity), umoja ni nguvu (unity is strength), Kidole kimoja hakivunji chawa (One finger cannot pinch lice) or Fimbo ya mnyonge ni umoja (the stick of the weak is unity) are but a few Swahili idioms that are so central to explaining Tanzania’s political culture that denounces divisive and violent tendencies.

According to my KIs Swahili facilitated inter-elite communication that significantly contributed to the saliency of national identity and to cross-ethnic accommodation. It is worth stressing that Swahili is the primary language to most Tanzanians. This is mainly because English and other foreign languages are only spoken by elites in their circles. Also, to many urban youth who do not necessarily speak the vernaculars of their parents due to the cosmopolitan nature of urban settings and inter-tribal marriages, the sole language of communication is Swahili. Tanzanians in all of the 25 regions constituting the Tanzanian state and in all social strata speak fluent Swahili with pleasure and pride as a genuinely national language that helps knit their country together across ethnic boundaries. The role of Swahili in enhancing national unity at the material time was complemented by national cultural festivals and competitions in the creation of an overarching sense of identity (Maguire, 1969). All these efforts in a way militated against the rise of ethnic salience that could impact voters’ choices as such influence would have been against the
integrating efforts that were much entrenched because of the commitment of the political leadership. My interviews with the journalists involved in the study suggest that all of the nation-building policies discussed in this section were further cemented by the maintenance of a monolithic political order highly publicised by a dominant state media and institution of an inclusive democratic order for two decades.

4.4.1.2. Maintenance of the Monolithic Order: Situational Democracy and Inclusiveness

The discussion related to the centralisation of political authority in Tanzania made above does indeed suggest clear patterns of despotism if one zero in elements of political pluralism (Makulilo, 2012). However, Dashwood and Pratt (1999) argue that TANU’s consolidation into a powerful ruling party intertwined with the Tanzanian state was one of the major achievements in fighting divisive elements like politicisation of ethnicity that affected other African states. This position is anchored on grounds that the entanglement of TANU and the state hinged upon a meticulous combination of centralisation of political authority in the hands of TANU and inclusive cooperation and co-optation of notables in the exercise of political power and authority. In the words of Dashwood and Pratt (1999), the supremacy of TANU established an:

“original set of political institutions that were sufficiently participatory and democratic as to limit the risk of the regime’s becoming severely authoritarian and corrupt, but not too open as to threaten Tanzania’s still fragile unity or weaken prematurely the integrating and energising capabilities of the nationalist movement”.

Inferably, Dashwood and Pratt are of the view that the monolithic political order guaranteed achievement of the PsIM and its positive impact on denouncing the use of ethnicity on anchoring electoral votes. Dashwood and Pratt argued that the monolithic political dispensation in Tanzania provided democratic space and ensured that tribalism is disallowed as a means of mobilising electoral support (Pratt, 1976). Although out of the scope of the study, it is worth noting that in the name of the PsIM candidates were not allowed to use religious, racial and regional appeals to win votes. Also, as a means of avoiding class differences that can make poor people loose elections, candidates were barred from using their private money and other means for campaigning purposes (Dashwood and Pratt, 1999). All of these initiatives meant to ensure national integration which provides a stumbling block for the significance of ethnicity on the determination of voters’ choices.
With regard to inclusiveness, TANU in the early days of independence maintained the inclusive elite coalition that was largely representative of ethnic and regional divisions (Mc Gowan and Wacirah, 1974). Informed by findings based on sample of 705 elites covering the period from 1963 to 1968, McGowan and Wacirah, reveal that the composition of Tanzania’s government included 37% of all of the total ethnic groups present in the country (120), and none of the pronounced ethnic groups enjoyed serious overrepresentation. As for regional representativeness McGowan and Wacirah further contend that all regions were represented in the national leadership, even though the northern regions (Kilimanjaro, Tanga, and West Lake) benefited from slightly overrepresentation. Mwalimu’s first Cabinet presented in the photo below, included members from varied backgrounds and social settings; and was multi-racial. It included local Chiefs as represented by Chief Fundikira-the then Minister for Cooperative and Trade Union, movement activists as represented by Mr. Paul Bomani, the then Minister for Agriculture, and Mr. Rashid Mfaume Kawawa, the then Minister without Portfolio respectively. The Cabinet also was accommodative for non-Africans as it provided space for Europeans and Tanganyikans of Asian origins. The inclusion of two Europeans Sir Ernest Vasey, the then Minister for Finance, and Mr. Derrick Bryceson, the then Minister for Health and Labour, as well as Mr. Amir Jamal, the then Minister for Communications, Power and Works, attests to this fact.
The First Cabinet\textsuperscript{46} of Independent Tanganyika

An important point to make about the multi-racial first cabinet of the newly independent Tanganyika is that the Europeans worked for a short time. They were partly serving the interests of the departing colonialists who by and large were still financing the country and were in charge of the army. At the same time, they were preparing for the indigenous to takeover. The inclusion of Tanzanians with Asian origin has been normal in Tanzanian politics. For instance, Hon. Jamal (far right, seated in the photo above), is the first of many\textsuperscript{47} Tanzanians of Asian origin to serve in Nyerere’s cabinet and varied political portfolios. Jamal has been a long-serving cabinet member, who has served in the powerful portfolio of the Minister for Finance for several times (1965-1972, 1975-77, 1979-80 and 1980-83). He also served as a Minister for Industries and Trade and Communications and Works and the Commissioner of Planning - often being named to posts or ministries needing difficult management and self-less commitment (Centre for Global Negotiations, 22nd March 1995, Retrieved on 23rd May 2013; sunsonline.org. 23 March 1995, Retrieved on 23rd May 2013). He continued to hold high office beyond Nyerere’s retirement in 1985, including a five year stint as Tanzania’s Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva from 1988 to 1993 upon President Ally Hassan Mwinyi’s appointment. Amir Jamal’s close working relationship with retired President Nyerere continued as he became his personal representative when Mwalimu Nyerere was Chairman of the South Commission and then on the South Centre, and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation of Uppsala, Sweden. Amir Jamal was continually re-elected to Parliament by his Morogoro constituents with ever greater margins from 1965-1980

\textsuperscript{46} Standing from left to right are Mr. Job Lusinde-Minister for Local Government, Rashid Kawawa-Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Nsilo Swai- Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. Oscar Kambona- Minister for Education, Tewa S. Tewa- Minister for Lands and Surveys, and Mr. Iain Macleod- Britain's Colonial Secretary. Sitting from left to right are Mr. Paul. Bomani, Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Chief Abdallah Fundikira-Minister for Legal Affairs, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere – the Right Prime Minister, Sir. Ernest Vasey-Minister for Finance and Mr. Amir Jamal- Minister for Communications, Power and Works. Two Ministers, Mr George Kahama – Minister for Home Affairs - and Mr. Dereck Bryceson, Minister for Health and Labour are not in the Picture.

\textsuperscript{47} Other cabinet members of Asian origin include but not limited to: Al Noor Kassum – the then Minister for Energy, current Chancellor Sokoine University of Agriculture; Shamim Khan-the then Deputy Minister responsible for Community Development, Gender and Children Affairs. Other key political and bureaucratic figures at the time include; late Mahmood Nasser Rattansy, the former Tabora MP, and the country’s Ambassador to The Hague and France; Akber Salehe, the only South Asian elected Member of Parliament of the Mafia constituency and Wolfgang Dourado, former Attorney General of Zanzibar (The African, Tanzania on 2 October 2003).
despite not being a Luguru, the original ethnic group of the constituency that he represented for a decade and a half. This was the case while members of his racial group comprised less than 1% of the population (Tanzania soko; Retrieved on 23rd May 2013). Jamal’s successive political career provides a testament to Tanzania’s success in making its polity a truly non-ethnic and/or racial based electoral community. We should add that Morogoro has a tradition of being led by non-Lugurus as Jamal was succeeded by Shamim Parker Khan, another Tanzanian of Asian origin grown up, working and chiefly residing in Morogoro. It is equally worth noting that even Mwalimu, a Black Tanzanian hailing from Mara, a region found in the northern part of the country also represented the eastern constituency of Morogoro after defeating the Luguru Chief Kunambi. Currently, the constituency is represented by a Tanzanian of Asian origin - Abdulaziz Abood after a spell of 10 years without Asians in that office from 1995-2005.

The inclusiveness depicted above and the citizen debate that took place few days before independence in 1961 raises an important question on aspects of the politics of origin and belonging that are at the core of this dissertation. The inclusion of non-Tanzanians in the cabinet and the citizen debate in the National Assembly (NA) raised the question whether citizenship should be based on race or residence (Larson and Aminzade, 2007). TANU upholding the inclusive national character of the PsIM stood for the latter; while its opponent African National Congress (ANC) for the former (Taylor, 1963). According to Larson and Aminzade (2007) during the debate, the ANC called for priority for “indigenous inhabitants” over “other races that have made their homes in Tanganyika” depicting a position that pure origin is more important than perceived feelings of belonging gained by residence, ownership of land and other aspects put forward by Chabal. Nyerere is said to have lost his temper, most uncharacteristically, and denounced his opponents sharply in a manner that depicts the centrality of aspects of belonging. Nyerere called his racialist opponents, “little Hitlers” (cited in Iliffe, 1979: 572). Mamdani further revealed that Nyerere argued in the debate that:

“If we are going to base citizenship on colour, we will commit a crime. Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against … We glorify human beings, not colour” (Mamdani, 2013b).

Due to TANU’s majority in the NA Nyerere defended a notion of “political citizenship” that accorded political rights to people regardless of their racial origin (Iliffe, 1979). As a result, a law was passed in 1965 allowing non-citizens to vote if they have five years residence. This epitomises
TANU’s seriousness in its fight against racialism and unifying Tanzanians. Under such circumstance, it can be inferred that TANU’s emphasis on national unity went beyond unifying ethnicities in a way defined in the conceptual chapter, to add aspects of origin and belonging that constitute flashes of ethnicity in this dissertation. Such development explains the inclusion of several Tanzanians of Asian origin in political positions. This warrants them an opportunity to actively participating in a polity while they constitute a minority population-wise. In this regard, the role of ethnicity on voting was limited: the numbers of the minority ethnic groups in constituencies could not have won in ethnic-based voting.

4.4.1.3. Economic Inclusiveness: The Bone of Contention
The discussions above indicate that social and political domains were inclusive and created an environment for denouncing the use of ethnicity in voting through the inculcation of a strong sense of national unity. However, the greatest challenge of the post-independent era was to make the economy national, equitable and inclusive as the PsIM pledged. The challenge is attributed to the colonial economic architect that put the economy in foreign hands as highlighted earlier (Harnevik, 1993). An important step taken was to nationalise the major means of production and distribution including land (Hyden 1980). The nationalisation and subsequent EDNR was quite vital to dilute broad societal divisions among the indigenous and foreigners and inequalities between ethnic groups and/ or regions in the country then (Harnevik, 1993). In other words nationalisation was critical to minimise “horizontal inequalities”, that is, inter-group inequalities that are arguably more conducive to large-scale violent conflict and misunderstanding than interpersonal (or “vertical”) inequalities (Stewart, 2000). In electoral terms, nationalisation meant reducing inter-ethnic competition for political office resulting from horizontal inequalities informed by the divisive economic structures set by the colonialists. Cognisant of this fact a socialist-oriented philosophy in the name of the AD was promulgated to reverse the inequalities. Below we look at the AD from an ethnicity and voting point of view as informed by the PsIM.

4.4.1.4. The AD Era
The AD of 1967 in this study is understood as a response to the political and economic contradictions within the post-colonial state impacted by the exploitative colonial legacy and Tanzanians mounting ambitions of enjoying the political and economic fruits of independence (Shivji, 2013). This broad view is preferred to the narrow views that look at the AD from the
perspective of interest-based conflicts within TANU elites some subscribing to the position that economic and political gains of independence shall go to Tanzanians of African origin alone and those who do not subscribe to the same (Hyden, 1980). At its core, the AD laid bare Nyerere’s vision of a socialist society, emphasising national unity, respect human equality and dignity, public ownership, self-reliance as well as the importance of agriculture and rural development (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). It informed radical transformative policies – most notably large-scale nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution (previously owned by foreigners) and villagisation in the 1970s. The nationalisation and villagisation process in its broader sense entailed empowerment of the indigenous Tanzanians (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; Lofchie, 2013). For instance, nationalisation and villagisation informed enhanced education opportunities to the indigenous in the villages through a universal primary education programme that wanted all kids of schooling age to be enrolled. The same can be said for health services. Nationalisation also informed Africanisation of the civil service by substituting the dominantly Asian and/or Tanzanians with Asian origin staffed civil service with Black Africans. Likewise, nationalisation meant to create patriotic nationalistic feelings among the Tanzanian youth through compulsory National Service military training programmes (Lofchie, 2013). All these initiatives as argued above militated against ethnic salience in politics as none was ethnic biased. Inferably, these initiatives had significant impact on furthering the PsIMs and the way ethnicity influences voting in Tanzania as discussed below.

The AD through the nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution enhanced national integration and avoided class related conflicts and divisions which according to Wimmer (1997) potentially fuel ethnic polarisation and voting. The AD has enhanced national integration through nationalisation of the previously foreign own companies which broadened its capacity to distribute national resources equitably among regions (Khan and Gray, 2006). In the main, the establishment of parastatals meant to reduce fleeing of profits from the country; expanding investment in productive sectors, and strengthening infrastructure in the country enhanced the redistribution capacity (Coulson, 1982). The implementation of nationalisation within the monolithic dispensation highlighted above brought significant change in the direction of societal development and unity in Tanzania. It essentially made the TANU and later CCM leadership, the bureaucrats and the social base of the nationalist movement to work and grow together closely
(Harnevik, 1993). In this way, the colonial set exploitative capitalist development divisions that would have been a blessing to the Asian and European businessmen, and slightly to the minute class of indigenous African were reversed (Khan and Gray, 2006). Thus enhancing social integration among ethnicities and avoiding class related conflicts and divisions in the competition for state power. Mzee Mwiru was of the view that:

"Bila juhudi mahususi za kukabiliana na matabaka ya kiuchumi, Tanzania ingeweza kufungua Pandora box kuruhusu mambo yote yanayoleta mgawanyiko katika jamii ikiwemo matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi ambalo lingeathiri vibaya misingi mikuu ya dola la Watanzania - amani na utulivu, umoja wa kitaifa na mgawanyo sawa wa rasilimali za umma." (Mwiru, 2014/05/14).

"Without deliberate efforts put to curb the rise of economic classes through the AD, Tanzania would have opened a Pandora box freeing all divisive elements including ethnicity in elections which would have negatively impacted on peremptory norms of the Tanzanian state - peace and tranquillity, national unity and equitable distribution of the spoils of the state."

The high degree of state intervention in the economy through the parastatals created vacancies for African elites as well as accommodated ethnic and regional cleavages that the few political openings could not accommodate. In this context, the AD equitably distributed the fruits of independence to the countries elites. This concretised elite unity and thereby contributed to political stability and national integration as opposed to ethnic salience in voting. According to Ngasongwa, one of my KIs, the AD is responsible for making Tanzanians feel economic control and made it possible for the state to distribute equitably the national cake as the PsIM wished. He further was of the view that:

"... Azimio la Arusha limefifisha nafasi ya ukabila katika upigaji wa kura kwa sababu moja ya sifa kuu ya kugombea au kuteuliwa kushika nafasi mhuimu ya kisiasa au kitaalamu ni kupinga matumizi ya ukabila na mambo mengine yanayogawanya watu katika siasa na jamii. Hali hii ilibidi ithibitishwa kwa mtu na matendo yake, kwa hivyo, watu walipata viongozi ambao hawawezi kueneza ukabila na wachache ambao walishughulikiwa na vyombo vya dola vilivyopewa majukumu na chama na serikali ya kuhakikisha umoja wa kitaifa." (Ngasongwa, 2014/05/23).

"...the AD has diffused the role of ethnicity in voting because one central qualification for contesting for or being appointed to hold a strategic political or technical position was being against the use of ethnicity and other divisive elements in politics and society. This had to be proven by one’s words and deeds and, therefore, the people get leaders who cannot propagate ethnicity and few who would, were dealt with by state apparatuses which were assigned the role of ensuring national unity by the party and government”

Apart from nationalisation of the foreign owned economic ventures, Tanzania created communal village production units to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth accrued from agricultural produce between commercial farmers and peasants. It is against this that Tanzania created communal village production units, sometimes forcefully, to explicitly reverse the
dominance of large farmers in the agriculture sector. The disparity of agricultural gains was a lingering problem from the colonial economic set-up and the failure of the early post-independence period to reverse the colonial sin in the agriculture sector (Hyden, 1980: 96). The income accrued from villagisation enabled redistribution of economic gains to meet TANU’s intent of recording equitable development among people and regions to enhance national unity and avoid ethnic salience in politics.

The villagisation policy in Tanzania so far is the largest resettlement effort known to have been implemented in the history of Africa with about 5 million Tanzanian rural inhabitants being resettled in Ujamaa villages (Hyden, 1980: 129). By 1977, there were 7684 villages involving a total of 13 million people Coulson (1982: 242), compared to 1956 with around 2 million people in 1970 (Hyden, 1980:129). TANU as the political force in the country assumed a vigorous role in village creation by mounting explicit campaigns against capitalist farming. As a consequence of villagisation and nationalisation of settlers’ farms, European capitalist farmers especially those settled in Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions had to leave the country marking the end of capitalist farming in Tanzania. Villagisation and nationalisation contained even the emerging African large scale farmers. As such, the two enhanced the state’s hold of the economy and its ability to divide or unite Tanzanians. This is because it was the custodian of the nationalised assets on behalf of the Tanzanian people as well as the villagisation programme that meant to improve social service delivery (Harnevik, 1993). A lot is documented of the positive role of villagisation in improving social services.

It is worth noting that universal primary education and adult education programmes were established and health facilities in almost all villages built. This complemented the large hospitals that are accessed by few urban people. The government at the time channelled around 16 per cent of its budget to education. As a result, literacy increased from 10 per cent in 1960 to 30 per cent in 1970 and 70 per cent by the end of the 1970s (Klugman et al. 1999: 85). By 1985 literacy rate went up to 90 percent (Ndulu, 1994). The health developments raised the life expectancy and reduced child mortality substantially (Klugman et al. 1999: 85) According to Wangwe, life expectancy at birth improved from 41 years in 1960 to 52 years in 1980. Also, infant mortality declined from 146 per thousand live births in 1960 to 120 per thousand live births in 1980 (Wangwe, 2005:11).
The income accrued from agriculture during the period was redistributed according to the overall TANU intent of equitable development among regions. The villages being the focal points and since ethnic groups are found within the villages they also had access to state resources. However, there is evidence that local elites typically benefited disproportionately from villagisation policies as they were the managers of development in the villages and regional imbalances were maintained among peasants (Coulson, 1982: 246.). For instance the cash income of smallholders in Tanga, Kilimanjaro and Arusha were consistently high between 1969 and 1975, the cash income of regions like Kigoma, Mtwara, Lindi, Mwanza, Ruvuma, Coast, and Dodoma, which are considered of lesser development than these (yet still middle class regions in relation to the rest), were consistently reduced by nearly 20 per cent; an even more dwindling trend of cash income loss of 50 percent was reported for the poor regions (Coulson, 1982: 197). The government managed to heal the wounds by equitably distributing social infrastructure to the economically disadvantaged regions in the country (Hyden, 1980: 122). However, although villagisation enhanced EDNR, comparatively advanced farmers in Mwanza region never supported the exercise and returned to their original lands (mahame) due to land erosion and spaces to limited space to keep their cattle among others. This said, they still benefitted from the services made possible by villagisation and interacted with villagers in social and cultural affairs that bound them. In this regard, a divide between the economic and societal benefits of the villagisation among the comparatively poor and rich can be drawn. However, the social reality of villagisation cannot. The poor and the rich took their kids to the same schools and health centres in the villages. The rich also sold their produce in the villages and participated in all cultural endeavours.

Since our study is interested in ethnicity and voting, it is worthwhile to look into the debate as far as villagisation and ethnicity are concerned. The overriding literature on the matter suggests that relocations through villagisation have enhanced national unity in Tanzania as people from different ethnic groups were put together in one village (Klugman et al. 1999). To Klugman et al. such arrangement diffuses the original ethnic identities of the members forming the new village. This is because to their view the broader but fluid ethnic groups formed are incapable of mobilising votes and politicising their previous ethnic identities in favour of the new one. As much as Klugman et al.’s position might be logically appealing, a critical empirical consideration regarding the ethnic belonging of the people put together in the Ujamaa villages renders the argument questionable.
This position is anchored on the fact that while millions of Tanzanians were relocated into villages, the villages’ creation collected families within an average of around 5 square kilometres from their original households. Therefore, it would be an over-exaggeration to believe that within such space in rural areas there is a cosmopolitan ethnic base for ethnic blending (Martin, 1988). Martin’s stance points to the fact that villagisation has, more often than not, assembled together wider number of isolated households belonging to members of the same ethnic groups. In this regard, the view of Klugman et al. on ethnic attenuation is more applicable to urban settings which were not an integral part of the massive villagisation project. Seemingly in partial support of the two opposing stances on the role of villagisation on ethnicity, Hyden reports that there are some villages that took on board more than one ethnic group but the result of them teaming up was violent conflict over land. The fight between members of the Nyaturu and the Barabaig ethnic groups over land rights resulting from the enforced movement of people into villages substantiates the conflictual nature of villagisation that blended ethnic groups (Hyden, 1980). Such conflictual relations could create a basis for competing ethnicities in elections.

A critical look at the arguments made on the role of villagisation on ethnicity suggests that the various views are complementary to each other. While Klugman et al. attribute villagisation to detribalisation, Martins is of the view that blending cannot satisfactorily explain minimisation of ethnic divisions and Hyden further looks into material conditions in place to ensure smooth blending of ethnic groups. In other words, the role of villagisation on ethnicity requires an eclectic analysis to be well understood. However, based on Martin’s critique and Hyden’s limited case of interethnic mingling, villagisation might have worked more significantly in solidifying intra-ethnic differences than interethnic divides. This is because the villagers were mainly from a single ethnic group. However, as indicated earlier for tribalism to gain currency in effecting voting, it has to be politicised, an act that was against the very intent of villagisation -enhancing unity and equitable distribution of public services and the overall objects of the AD as explained above. In this regard, villagisation through its communal nature and EDNR component militated against the politicisation of ethnicity. This is said cognisant of the comparatively advanced farmers in the Mwanza negative view of villagisation informed by their economic interests that forced them back to their original lands (mahame). This is partly because they were from a similar ethnic group and benefitted from the services made possible by villagisation. Also, they interacted with villagers in
social and cultural affairs that bound them. As such, competitive division necessary for politicisation of ethnicity hardly existed.

4.4.1.5. Synthesis of the Nationalisation Era

The AD was the key economic signpost of Tanzania’s postcolonial political and economic development based on Nyerere’s Ujamaa that stressed social welfare rights and equitable development. It marked the intricacies of an independent state responding to expectations of independent citizenry amid divisive colonial economic legacy. The nationalisation of the major economic assets made Tanzania relatively sovereign economically by ceasing the Asian and European hold on the economy. It granted the state the economic muscles to equitably distribute economic gains and exercise nationalised patron-client relations as resources were nationally distributed. It was believed that EDNR could ensure political stability, peace and limit divisive element like the use of ethnicity in voting. Tanzania’s socialist development endeavours under Ujamaa as experimented through the AD failed and liberalism came into force in late 1980s. This is when Tanzania felt a myriad of economic problems and pressure from the Breton wood institutions to undergo ideological reorientation from the Ujamaa to liberal democratic market-oriented economic and political reforms (Wangwe, 2005). Nonetheless considerable progress was made in nation-building. At that point in time, the post-independent government exemplified its dedication to the idea of building an inclusive national identity and averting the politicisation of ethnic identities in voting in their words and deeds. Indeed, the efforts put into nation-building were noble to the extent that they were widely embraced by Tanzanians throughout the country. The use of Swahili in governance and as a medium of instruction in primary schools, coupled by national cultural festivals and competitions, the policy of stationing public servants of other geographical and ethnic origins in other villages/districts/regions of Tanzania ensured ethnic diversification of the polity. As such, the initiatives contributed in cementing Tanzania’s distinct national identity over ethnic ones. The inclusive appointment approach exercised by Nyerere stroke a workable balance of social forces, ethnic groups and regions indicating efforts towards unifying Tanzanians and denouncing ethnicity as a means of mobilising political support. Actually, in general terms, the less fortunate have been equitably reaping the advantages through AD policies. For instance, disadvantaged regions through EDNR mostly gained through resources mobilised from other parts of the country. Similarly, smaller ethnic group disproportionately
outweighed the bigger ones in the allocation of public offices (Nyang’oro, 2004). This is a clear attest to equitable distribution of public responsibilities for national integrity. All of the efforts made under the dictates of the AD barred ethnicity from becoming salient in voting. This is attributed to the fact that the declaration virtually curtailed ethnic-based divisive and exploitative tendencies that according to Wimmer can trigger ethnic political canvassing and voting. As indicated earlier AD survived until the late 1980s when Tanzania economic problems warranted liberal democratic market-oriented economic and political reforms. These reforms brought in fears of nation-building and the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes (Mmuya, 1998; 2000; Gasarasi, 1997; Campbell, 1992).

4.5. Ethnicity and Voting in the Economic and Political Liberation Era

4.5.1. Economic Liberalisation, Ethnicity and Voting

In the 1980s Tanzania like many African countries was forced to embark on IMF and World Bank liberal democratic market-oriented economic reforms. The reforms meant to reverse the ailing economic hurdles associated with the failure of the Ujamaa driven centralised economic system, the war with Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1979, coupled with drought, productivity problems, and a mounting national debt (Mwiru, 2013; Heilman and John, 2012). Mzee Ngasongwa in an interview likened the economic hurdles of the day to a bombshell that hit hard the country’s economy. He further alluded that its impact is responsible for the fall of the AD and the rise of the current liberal economic and political policies Tanzania implements today.

The rise of liberalism presented a blow to the economic and political fundamentals of AD that intended to mobilise material resources for actualising the PsIM- national unity, EDNR and peace (Baregu, 1994). In the views of Mzee Mkali and Mzee Mwiru, liberalisation meant to bring back the foreign and domestic forces that benefitted from the colonial exploitative economic structure through privatisation and cost sharing in service delivery. Such practices sow the seeds of class division as depicted by the differences of social services accessed by different people in the society, whereby the rich due to their ability to pay got better services compared to the poor. Similar views are put forward by Klugman et al. (1999) who argues that liberalism defeated Mwalimu and TANU’s efforts towards the creation of an ethnic free socialist society. They argue that TANU’s principles of equality and respect for human dignity as well as EDNR were defeated by liberalisation dictates of privatisation and cost sharing. To Klugman et al. liberalism
emphasised individualism and competition in elections. As a result, classes based on the haves and
the have not’s emerged in electoral politics. Nevertheless, these classes did not have ethnic
features. They were mainly economic-based.

The views of Mzee Mkali, Mzee Mwiru and Klugman et al. suggest that liberal economic reforms
presented chances for reinstitution of *capitalistic* ethos in Tanzania’s polity. And such ethos has
had several negative impacts that took away even what had been achieved by the AD as discussed
above. The issues that were affected in relation to nation-building and ethnicity and voting from an
economic viewpoint are summarised in an extensive quote from Mzee Ngasongwa:


“Liberal reforms gave power to the Tanzanian businessmen of Asian origin an upper hold on the economy, and power to actively participate in politics because the use of private money is allowed in campaigning. Also, in the name of liberalism ethnic-based associations in universities and other places mushroomed and politicians graced several occasions organised by them. Personally I have been invited time and again but turned down. I know several people who were vying for political vacancies who used such associations to win votes. If you ask me whether their bids were successful because of appealing to these associations for support? My answer will be No! This is because the foundation of the forefathers was too strong to break particularly among the rural people who lived the AD and benefitted from its implementation in a more egalitarian way than the urbanities. However this does not mean there were no incidences that tempted to dent the foundations.”

The views of Ngasongwa notwithstanding, literature suggests that despite the liberal reforms, President Mwinyi’s leadership maintained the inclusive character of the previous government. The core elements of Mwalimu’s unifying efforts like the fight against ethnic and regional discrimination were maintained (Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2004; Kelsall, 2002). That is
to say, the fall of the AD never meant the end of key aspects of national unity and identity which as indicated above limited the influence of ethnicity on voting. Whether political reforms notably in the form of multi-party democracy 1992 have had any impact on the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices is of interest to this study. This is dealt with in the following section.

4.5.2. Ethnicity and Voting under Political Liberalisation

While economic liberalisation was comparatively easier to perfect as the IMF and World Bank spearheaded them with sticks and carrots to African states, political liberalisation was hard to perfect. This is mainly because single-partism was quite entrenched and the elite involved in it indeed were not in a position of losing their political hold (Baregu, 1997). In this regard, multiparty democracy was reinstated de jure, but a lot leaves to be desired for the system to operate in a manner commensurate to the dictates of liberal democracy (Makulilo, 2012). The failure to have a fully fledged political pluralist state presents relevant issues to the discussion on ethnicity and voting. One important aspect revolves around the fact that multipartism in Tanzania could hardly reverse the interests of the ruling elite and its nationalist foundation. This is because the political liberalisation in Tanzania was not the product of a popular movement initiated by the people (Tripp, 2000). Instead, as indicated in section 3.1 and further insisted by Hyden (1999), Tanzania’s democratisation initiative was informed by international democratisation developments and carefully imposed and managed by the CCM to Tanzanians. There were no sound calls for political pluralism from the civil society. Therefore, CCM elites managed to control the reform process in a manner that ensured maintenance of their own political power and its nationalistic posture (Makulilo, 2009). It is against this background that various legislations requiring political parties to be national in character were legislated. For instance, Tanzania’s political party Act demands that parties have 200 members from at least ten regions- two of which shall be from Zanzibar. Also, the electoral laws deny parties and their candidates’ room to campaign in vernaculars and uttering statements inciting ethnic divisions (Kilimwiko, 2012; Msekwa, 2006).

CCM’s dominance in informing the pluralist reform has been vividly reflected in the political practices that followed the institution of multipartism. Since multipartism has been re-introduced in 1992, CCM has proved to be too strong for the opposition to oust, as Appendix I below indicates. For instance, in the 1995 GEs (the first since the re-introduction of political pluralism in 1992) CCMs presidential candidate Benjamin Mkapa triumphed by winning 61.8 % of the valid
votes (URT, 1995). Augustine Lyatonga Mrema (an ex-CCM Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Interior) of NCCR-Mageuzi took the second position with 27.7% of the votes followed by Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba of the CUF, who won 6.4% and John Memose Cheyo of UDP 3.9%. CCM in that year also overwhelmingly dominated the parliament by scooping 80% of the parliamentary seats. Only four of the 16 opposition political parties that took part in the elections managed to win parliamentary seats. The strongest opposition party in parliament was CUF that won 24 seats, mainly from Pemba where it won close to 50% of the votes and seats, followed by Mrema’s NCCR-Mageuzi, which won 16 seats while CHADEMA and UDP each won three seats.

CCM’s dominance was even clearer in the 2000 GEs as the incumbent Mkapa raised his winning tally to 71.7%. Similarly, CCM won a total of 206 seats which amounts to around 90% of the seats in the house. This meant their share was 10% more than the previous election. In the 2000 elections, the opposition only managed to get 25 parliamentary seats. As it was the case in the last elections, CUF won the lions’ share of 16 seats, most from Pemba, as it was the case in 1995, CHADEMA managed 4 seats, and the TLP this time with Mrema heading it, won 3 seats and the UDP got 2 seats. An interesting development in the 2000 elections apart from the enhanced win of CCM is the failure of NCCR-Mageuzi to defend even one out of the 16 seats it won in the 1995 elections. This development took place after Mrema’s defection from NCCR-Mageuzi to TLP. Among other reasons the politics of fame and personality as opposed to institutions and ideology can explain the downfall. This is because NCCR managed to get its political strength after Mrema, a well known hard worker while working as the country’s Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, joined the party from CCM and dwindled once he left it (O’Gorman, 2012).

The results above justify Kelsall’s view that pluralistic politics in Tanzania has never weakened CCM’s vice-like grip on the political system (Kelsall, 2003). However, the votes won by Mkapa cannot be ethnic-based. This is because the Southern part of the country where he hails has less than a quarter of the Tanzanian population. As such, he could not manage to win in such margins had he campaigned in an ethnically biased manner. An interesting observation to be made here is that Mkapa managed to get more votes on his re-election. This observation also confirms that voters’ choices were not based on ethnicity, as the ethnic groups are not as fluid as they used to be earlier. Inferably, the observation entails that determinants other than ethnicity are critical in making voting decisions. Conventional views of my KIs asserted that President Mkapa’s increased
votes in 2000 were not ethnic related. They attributed the rise to his satisfactory performance in office and to the fall of popularity of Mrema who crossed to TLP from NCCR Mageuzi. It is imperative to note that despite President Mkapa’s previous serving in Cabinet as the Foreign Minister, Minister of Science Technology and Higher Education as well as Minister of Information and Culture he was not as popular and known as Mrema. Mrema who crossed from CCM to NCCR-Mageuzi to show his discontent about corruptive actions, climbed to eminence in his short stint as a Minister for Home Affairs and Deputy Premier. He was quite popular for his no-nonsense administrative style; possibly prefiguring the popularity of the current head of state, John Pombe Magufuli.

In the 2005 elections, CCM built on the 2000 results as its new candidate Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete won the presidential race with an unprecedented 80.3 % vote share. Kikwete was followed by Prof. Lipumba of CUF who won 11 % of the votes and Freeman Mbowe of CHADEMA scooping 5 %, with other candidates for the post failing to attract even 1 % of the votes. The parliamentary elections for the third time around were one-sided as CCM secured 206 out of the 232 parliamentary seats. The trend in the opposition was more or less similar with CUF winning 19 seats, most from its Pemba stronghold, CHADEMA winning 5 seats, while TLP and UDP managed 1 seat each. In the 2010 elections, CCM maintained its incumbency but with a comparatively lesser lead. In the Presidential race President Kikwete’s vote share decreased from 80 % in the 2005 elections to 62 % in 2010. This time Kikwete was trailed by Dr. Wilbrod Slaa who won 27 % of the votes, followed by Prof. Lipumba who won 8 % of the votes with other contestants winning 1 or less than one %. The parliamentary elections for the fourth time around were one-sided as CCM secured 186 out of the 239 contested seats. The trends in the opposition were once again more or less similar with CUF winning 24 seats most from its Pemba stronghold, CHADEMA winning 23 seats. NCCR winning 4 seats while TLP and UDP once again managed 1 seat each.

Once again the results of 2005 and 2010 presented above generally, although more convincing in the pre-2010 elections, vindicates Kelsall’s view that pluralistic politics in Tanzania has never weakened CCM’s vice-like grip on the political system. As it has been argued above President Kikwete could not have won to the magnitude of 80% by relying on his ethnic group –Kwere due to its numerical disadvantage. This position is laid bare by one of my KIs, Dr Mangi Ezekiel who
is the Head of the Department of Behavioural Sciences of Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences when he highlighted that: 

"...kabila la Wakwere lilikuwa halijulikani na Watanzania wengi na yeye (Rais Kikwete) amelifanyakuwa maarufu baada ya kushinda nafasi ya Urais mwaka 2005. Nina uhakika kwamba Wakwere hawawezi kuwa hata asilimia moja ya idadi ya Watanzania"^{48} literary meaning “the Kwere ethnic group was not known to many Tanzanians and President Kikwete popularised it by winning the Presidency in 2005. I am pretty sure the ethnic group hardly makes 1% of the country’s population”

The reasons for CCM’s triumph divide scholars. Some point to its incumbent advantage and lack of will to truly democratise (Makulilo, 2007) while others, more positively, attribute CCM’s persistent electoral victories to path dependency following nation-building policies and the love of peace and tranquillity (Kelsall, 2003; O’Gorman, 2012). In support of the incumbency school, Makulilo has recently argued with conviction that Tanzania is only a de jure multiparty state as CCM still dictates the major political endeavours despite the presence of multiparty (Makulilo, 2010; 2012). Arguing in a more forceful fashion, Baregu is of the view that CCM in the multiparty era has been a state-party^{49} rather than a political party. To him, it is a ruling machine designed to maintain a grip on power through the resources of the state and manipulations of the coercive organs of authority as well as command over patronage (Baregu, 1994). In simple terms, the incumbency view of CCM maintenance of power rests with the party’s greater access to state resources compared to the opposition parties it is competing with (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Such state of affairs undermines opposition parties’ electoral chances. The views of Baregu and Makulilo subscribe to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations that votes are won by using primordial tendencies like bending legal-rational rules. Omari (1997) specifically points out that ruling parties exhibit primordial ethnic-based patron-client relations in soliciting votes. Such acts could make ethnicity salient in garnering political support as votes are seen as a product of access to power and authority as well as the ability to practise the politics of affection. In this regard,

^{48} Personal interview with Dr Ezekiel held in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 11.12.2014

^{49} The concept of state-party refers to a political party that survives and operates solely by relying on coercive instruments and resources of a state. In this context people could hardly distinguish between the state and the party as the fusion is almost watertight. Under such circumstances a state-party suffocates political space for other actors to play their roles effectively. State-party can either be de jure or de facto, and in some cases take both forms. In de jure, a party is made state-party by law as was the case for TANU and ASP, and later CCM in Tanzania. In contrast, a de facto state-party is not a product of legal enactment but vivid practices depicting a political marriage between the party and the state.
ideologies and policies may not be as important in garnering support. This line of thought suggests
the neo-patrimonial and hybrid tendencies have a significant role in anchoring votes compared to
the PsIM.

As convincing as the incumbency school suggests being, there is a rival school that unveils several
factors explaining CCM’s enduring supremacy which are relevant to the debate on ethnicity and
voting. As a starting point, the crippled associational life in the name of unity, peace, tranquillity
and creation of a socialist society during Mwalimu’s tenure is linked to the overwhelming majority
CCM enjoyed in elections (Kelsall, 2003). While the creation of the socialist society might not be
relevant today as the country is embracing liberal policies, Kelsall held that CCM has consistently
advocated the national integration content of the socialist era. Such nationalistic base enjoyed by
CCM makes the opposition parties suffer from the absence of ready-made social bases on which
they could have built (O’Gorman, 2012). Kelsall argues that CCM has conservatively preserved
with passion its inclusive character and mass posture that manifests varied cleavages. Its leadership
has continuously been heterogeneously divided in its religious, regional, generational and ethnic
identifications, and in its ideological persuasions (Kelsall, 2003). In sum, the party culturally
reflects the nation. The general public attributes the country’s relative state of peace to the party’s
conscious quest for national unity and equitable distribution of the national cake. These are values
that both the Tanzanian state and its people feel proud of (O’Gorman, 2012). Nyerere’s ideal of
Umoja50, long permeated the postcolonial lyrics of popular Swahili hip hop music known as Bongo
Flava (Stroeken, 2005). All elements are there to speak of a depoliticisation of ethnicity by the
rulers and the ruled. The inclusive nature maintained the racial and citizenship stance of
Mwalimu’s era as Tanzanian’s of Asian origin continued to hold political posts51 as well as
Zanzibaris being appointed to non-union52 portfolios.

50 Umoja is a Swahili word that means unity.
51 Asian Tanzanians who served as members of Parliament include but not limited to: Rostam Aziz-Igunga, Mohamed Gulam
Mohamed Bhiku, Ahmed Shabiby, Abbas Gulamali-Ukanga, Sumry, Yasmin Aloo-Special Seat, Aden Rage-Tabora, Zakia Megji-
Special Seats,Jitu Soni-Babati, Mohamed Ibrahim Sanya-, Mussa Zungu Azan-Ilala, Omar Badwell-Bahi, etc.
52 Ministries that are charged with union matters include essentially are four: Foreign Affairs, Finance, Home affairs and Defence.
There are other Ministries that partially deal with union matters. These include: Office of the President of URT, Prime Minister’s
Office, Vice Presidents’ Office, Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Education and Vocational Training, East African Cooperation,
Energy and Minerals, Industries and Trade, and Communications. Zanzibaris who served in non-union ministerial posts include :
Zakia Hamduni Meghji once served as a Minister for Health, Ahmed Hassan Diria and Muhamed Seif Khatib both served as
Ministers responsible for Information Juma Hammad Omar once served as a Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism, Hussein
Mwinyi had two stincts in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Prof.Makame Mbarawa is currently the Minister responsible
An interesting observation derived from my KIs is that while parties slightly differ on how they will approach varied political and economic problems, they agree on issues of national unity, the importance of peace and tranquillity and the adverse effects of using ethnicity in garnering political support. Mzee Mkali argued at length that:


Katika mikutano ya kampeni sisi tunawaambia watu kwa dhati kuwa CCM imefanya kazi ya kulilia amani, na Nyerere ndiye mwanadamu tangoza chama cha kufanya chini cha utulivu kama hivyo kwa kutokana na kumbi la ya kutoka kwa mapatifu ya kufanya chini cha utulivu kama hivyo, kwa hili sio viko vya kutokana na kumbi la ya kutoka kwa mapatifu ya kufanya chini cha utulivu kama hivyo. Kwa hali hii kwa nini wawapigie wapinzani ambayo wanachoweza nikuwakilisha nakala (photocopy) ya Mwalimu katika masuala haya?"(Mkali, 2013/10/03).

"...because of the importance of peace and tranquillity that has been with us for ages we politicians both from CCM and our rivals(opposition parties) denounce the use of ethnicity and anyone who wouldn’t do won’t win any election because the foundation for national unity laid by Mwalimu were and still are so strong to break! And my son Tanzanians hear, read and now see on Television what has transpired in Rwanda and Burundi; our neighbours Kenya, Bosnia and other places where thousands of lives were claimed because of politicised ethnicity, why shall they embrace such negative practices? They (people) certainly will not (support politicisation of ethnicity) and continue to support CCM. We tell the people with passion that CCM has worked for the peace that we have, and Nyerere was the founder of the party and our nation, so if his party is contesting and his ideals stands why should people vote against it? In campaign rallies we tell voters CCM represents the true copy of Mwalimu when it comes to national integration, denouncing the use of ethnicity and religion in politics, peace and tranquillity as well as equitable distribution of resources; why should people vote for the opposition which could at most represent a photocopy of Mwalimu on these issues?"

The long extract of Mzee Mkali presents an antithesis to the incumbency view regarding the use of authority to maintain power in elections. He subscribes to a track record path-dependency school
which associates attraction of votes with ideological practices that address the felt needs and interests of society. In his view, national integration, peace and EDNR are Tanzanians’ felt needs which make them vote for it sustainably. In this regard, CCM’s history of denouncing the use of ethnicity in mobilising political support in elections explains the less importance of ethnicity in garnering political support in Tanzania.

An interesting point put forward by Mzee Mkali is the role he accorded to Mwalimu in enhancing peace, tranquillity and national unity. This view is in line with what Becker (2013) calls the official view of Mwalimu. Becker uses a commemorative song by TOT plus a CCM-owned and sponsored band announcing: *Lulu ya amani*, “The pearl of peace”. The song is full of words depicting the heritage of peaceful societal relations that Mwalimu is said to have bestowed on Tanzania – and of which the CCM avows to be the sustaining guarantor. This line of thinking is the nucleus of Mzee Mkali’s views and the focus of a sustained electoral campaign depicting such discourse in varied media. This notion of Nyerere as the founder of a peaceful, consciously non-violent polity in the eyes of Becker (2013) augurs well with another portrayal of him as *mbabe wa wanyonge*53- the “champion of the downtrodden”or as *mkombozi wa wanyonge* “the liberator of the downtrodden”. Nonetheless, the two images of Mwalimu have potentially conflicting implications. For CCM the invocation of Nyerere as the pioneer of peace serves as a budding legitimisation for crackdowns on peace threatening incidences including ethnic politicisation. Its message is clear: Nyerere’s peaceful legacy shall not be squandered. On the contrary, the portrayal of Mwalimu as *mbabe wa wanyonge* or *mkombozi wa wanyonge* could precipitate and/or legitimise dissent against alleged social injustice, and thus permit the downtrodden to invoke Nyerere against CCM grandees (Becker, 2013). In this context, therefore, it can be said that Mwalimu’s descriptions can serve both the ruling party and the opposition camps in Tanzania’s electoral politics. While the ruling party leans more towards the official version to denounce disunity, it also boasts of Mwalimu standing for the disadvantaged, and associates itself to both. The opposition mainly uses the second version to discredit the party through standards set by its founder. Who has benefitted out the images requires thorough analysis but with electoral results indicating CCM’s overwhelming majority, one can hardly deny that its use of Mwalimu’s images have contributed to its success.

53 *Mbabe* is a Swahili word that refers to ‘lord, strong patron, strongman’, while *Wanyonge* refers to the downtrodden. It denotes both monetary poverty and a lack of social status and connections.
Since the study is about ethnicity and voting, therefore it is wise to amplify that CCM’s mass (national) posture and the projections of Mwalimu within Tanzanian’s diverse ethnic structure has played well to its advantage (Malipula, 2014; O’Gorman, 2012; Nyang’oro, 2004). Actually, CCM managed to water down fears of scholars like Mmuya (1998, 2000), Gasarasi (1997), Campbell (1992) who expressed concern that the introduction of multiparty politics would revive ethnic and regional loyalties as well as heighten tensions around class, religion and other factional differences. Indeed, some instances or claims point into this direction (Aminzade, 2008, 2003, 2001; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). In the context of ethnicity, CCM has stigmatised the infant opposition parties with seemingly strong local bases as tribalist, thereby impeding their expansion into other areas (Kelsall, 2003).

According to Kelsall, NCCR-Mageuzi, once a major contender for the presidency whose leader came from Kilimanjaro, has been a victim of this stigma as CCM identified it as a 'Chagga' party. UDP was accused of being a vehicle for Sukuma interests. Similar views are made of CHADEMA as a Chagga party. While CCM is bedevilling its competitors for being ethnic the current trend in the elections is to field local candidates in elections. This pattern is in striking contrast with the TANU era when Mwalimu Nyerere, Amir Jamal, Omar Muhaji and Oscar Kambona, for instance, stood, and won, in constituencies outside their home areas. Likewise, Derek Bryceson a white, Cambridge-educated prominent farmer who stood in a working class area in the current Kinondoni district, the numerically largest constituency in the whole country then (1960s), won massively (Kaya, 2004). Whether these ethnic claims are concrete enough to make an obvious trend in elections require a bit of analysis.

4.5.3. Multi-Party Elections and Claims of Ethnic Political Canvassing

As it has been highlighted above, Tanzania adopted multi-party politics in 1992 despite distant voices asking for it from domestic activists and most Tanzanians rejecting the idea. The reason cited by most Tanzanians in opposition of multi-party democracy was the fear that it will dent the nation-building efforts and breed ethnic related conflicting groups (Fisher, 2003). It is against this backdrop that the country’s Political Parties Act lays out strict requirements for political parties to be pan-territorial and inclusive as hinted above. Likewise, and probably more important to this dissertation, political parties in Tanzania are legally prohibited from objecting to exclusively further interests of any ethnic, racial, religious groups or region (URT, 2002).
Additionally, Tanzania’s Electoral Code of Conduct overtly stipulates that campaign meetings are to be held in Swahili. Where Swahili is not well understood an interpreter shall be used. The code further stipulates that campaign meetings shall not discriminate against any ethnic group or religion (URT, 2010). The nationalistic torn of the Political Parties Act and subsequent code of conduct on one hand avail the fear raised by pro-monolithic political order proponents who refused political pluralism and avows continuation of concerted efforts to further the nationalist endeavours of Julius Nyerere (Nyang’oro 2004); on the other hand, at least in part, they can be viewed as attempts to set hurdles on the registration procedure (Makulilo, 2009). No matter which school is right, a point that can be made without the fear of thoughtful criticism is that the possibilities of political parties to legally secure a following on ethnic or any other divisive basis have been truncated from the very beginning of multiparty politics (Moroff, 2010). What is the situation on the ground? Few examples can usefully shed some light on the matter.

While the strict registration rules meant to bar divisive parties, some opposition political parties are accused of exhibiting some ethnic or regional bias (Chaligha and Mmuya, 1994; Gasarasi, 1997). Parties that are considered to be big in terms of winning parliamentary seats like CHADEMA, NCCR-Maguezi and CUF are all accused of having regional strongholds, so are some of the smaller parties, like UMD and UDP (Whitehead, 2009). For instance, in the 1995 presidential elections, NCCR-M and its candidate Augustine Mrema, an ethnic Chagga, had a sizeable following in his region of origin - Kilimajaro. Mrema enjoyed a support level above the national average by winning in all Chagga-dominated constituencies in the region (Whitehead, 2009). As if that is not enough, Mrema is believed to have enjoyed much support from Chaggas in all urban settings of the country (Gasarasi, 1997). Such following is viewed ethnic in nature and some voters in Shinyanga rejected Mrema and his party on grounds that they never wanted to be led by a Chagga party (Omari, 1997; Erdmann, 2002).

In the same way, the electoral triumph of UDP’s John Memose Cheyo in his district of origin-West Bariadi and Shinyanga region was also understood as stemming from Sukuma ethnicity. Cheyo like Mrema in the 1995 presidential elections won a considerable support in several constituencies in Shinyanga, which contributed to around 67 % of his nationwide votes. Cheyo’s support was the most regionally concentrated compared to all candidates in the presidential contest (Whitehead 2009). An interesting observation related to Cheyo’s support is his concerted efforts to win votes
from his fellow Sukuma by using Kisukuma in his campaigns (Gasarasi, 1997). Cheyo went beyond using Kisukuma to lure voters in Usukumani, ‘the Sukumaland’\(^{54}\). He conducted ethnic-based political canvassing that is in violation of the election code cite above and Tanzania’s political culture against ethnic salience in voting as the following quote substantiates:

“Several weeks ago, during his campaign as an opposition presidential candidate, John Cheyo committed Tanzania’s cardinal sin. Cheyo, who belongs to one of this East African country’s largest ethnic groups, urged his Sukuma tribe to become more politically active and hinted that its activism should manifest itself in votes for him. His suggestion brought a blaze of criticism, with opponents accusing him of embracing tribalism for political gain. The candidate abandoned the tactic…In many countries across Africa where ethnic strife has ripped through nations such as Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Ethiopia, Cheyo would have been viewed as an ordinary politician playing every angle for votes…… [I]n Tanzania, where political leaders and the citizenry have made ethnic peace a top priority, the candidate’s words riled the normally placid population as perhaps no other issue could. “In our country, just asking someone which tribe he is from will make him suspicious of you”, said Evarist Maembe, a political activist here in the capital (Washington Post\(^{55}\), November 7, 1995).

Mrema and Cheyo’s vote figures above notwithstanding, it is far from clear, however, that their electoral victory can be viewed strictly in terms of ethnicity, understood as Sukuma or Chagga ethnic group identity. This argument is based on the fact that in an actual sense such canvassing is not effective. For instance, although Cheyo’s support was mainly based in Sukuma dominated areas, he was not the most accepted candidate in Sukumaland as CCM’s presidential candidate Benjamin William Mkapa personally and his parliamentary aspirants then won most constituencies at ease, a trend that was even stronger in Mwanza, the other Sukuma-region. The unpopularity of Cheyo in the broader Sukumaland can be further proven by the Shinyanga urban constituency results, which indicate that Cheyo lost not only to the CCM candidate Mkapa, but also to NCCR’s Mrema and CUF’s Lipumba (URT, 1995).

A similar trend was evident in 2010 elections, as UDP won the Bariadi-West parliamentary seat but its support never stretched outside Meatu and Bariadi in Shinyanga and Magu in Mwanza, which constitute only a small part of the Sukumaland. From these data, UDP’s support is from the Sukuma, but the bulk of the Sukuma do not support UDP. However, John Cheyo serves as a rather

\(^{54}\)‘Sukumaland’ is a translation of people’s use of the word Usukumani and not pretend an existing entity.

good example of how origin plays out through representation in the way Chabal outlined earlier. This position is banked on the fact that Cheyo, who has won the Bariadi-West constituency for three consecutive terms from 2000, is a member of a family that has extended roots in the area. He is a prominent community member who has been the principal funder of his party and a sponsor of various social activities in Bariadi (Erdmann, 2002). In this regard, we buy into Whitehead’s (2009) thesis that Cheyo’s case augurs well into the idea of a “patron” of his place of origin. A fact that can further second this line of thinking is Cheyo’s victory in the 1997 Magu parliamentary by-election. Magu is a Sukuma-dominated constituency in Mwanza, which is outside of Cheyo’s home constituency. However, according to the interviews in Mwanza he was considered as someone coming from the “exterior” to assume office in Magu despite being a Sukuma. In this vein, being a Sukuma alone does not necessarily guarantee a Sukuma the status of being perceived locally by the constituency members outside his area of origin. Thus, this reinforces the position that Cheyo’s considerable parochial appeal in Bariadi based on local-level ethnicity does not encompass the entire Sukuma ethnic group. More important, the mobilisation potential and effect of Cheyo’s ethnic appeal on politics is quite limited in scope.

Whereas Cheyo’s support was not near to exhibiting anything close to suggesting it encompassed the whole Sukuma ethnic group, Mrema’s hold, in turn, was not confined to the Chagga ethnic group. Of course, Mrema’s support among the Chagga in Kilimanjaro was outstandingly high with about 77.5 % in the region but in 1995 he was also the second most popular presidential candidate in all regions on the Tanzania mainland except for Shinyanga (Cheyo’s stronghold) and the Zanzibar regions (where CUF and its presidential candidate Prof Ibrahim Lipumba was the most popular). Mrema’s support in regions was above national average in regions like Mbeya and Rukwa where the Chagga influence can be assumed to be low (URT, 1995). Particularly, Mrema’s support was exceedingly high in the north even in those districts were the Chagga were not predominant like in most of Arusha region.

Mrema’s popularity outside his home region of Kilimanjaro in the 1995 presidential elections became evident in the parliamentary by-election of 1996 in Temeke, Dar es Salaam. In this election, Mrema won the seat against a CCM’s local candidate Abdul Cisco Mtiro. Mrema won despite his competitor and his campaign team attempting to discredit him on the basis of being both Chagga and Christian, and therefore not fit to represent the predominantly Muslim
constituency, where the Zaramo and Ndengereko ethnic groups are apparently predominant (Whitehead, 2009). This example suggests that voters in Temeke were not appealed by the use of ethnicity and religion to undermine Mrema’s position as a political representative. At the same time, if Mrema would have resorted to outright political tribalism, specifically mobilising the Chagga as a Mchagga, probably the results of the by-elections could have read very differently.

The scenario in the North of Tanzania mainland resembles CHADEMA’s Dr. Wilbrod Slaa’s support in the 2010 presidential race. Dr. Slaa, an ethnic Iraqw, won above the national average in the districts of Mbulu, Karatu and Hanang found in Arusha and Manyara regions where his ethnic group is dominant. He also secured outstanding support across the whole Northern Zone - Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Manyara regions (URT, 2010). It is worth noting that while Slaa won convincingly in Iraqw dominated areas, both Babati constituencies which are predominantly constituted by Iraqw inhabitants went to CCM that fielded a Tanzanian with Asian origin and a Tanzanian coming from Mara region. This suggests that the support that CHADEMA got in the region was not primarily ethnic. The triumph experienced by Slaa in 2010 as with Mrema in 1995, is attributed to the fact that they were the powerful opposition candidates of the day. Moreover, their appeal to the Northern Zone might have been more in terms of the symbolic representation of origin in its wider geographical sense than ethnicity.

While most accusations of ethnicity are leveled against the opposition, the performance of President Benjamin Mkapa in the 1995 presidential elections also raised eyebrows that warrant discussion. According to Gasarasi, Mkapa’s high performance in the said elections in the southern part of Tanzania (his homeland in Mtwara and regions close to it) is attributable to the “homeboy” effect (Gasarasi, 1997). According to Gasarasi the homeboy effect is a “milder form” of ethnic parochialism, associated with the local standing of a politician within a particular geographical area than to “ethnicity proper”. It is normally linked with expectations people have of benefitting in one way or the other from someone they consider to belong to their area (Gasarasi 1997). In connection to Mkapa, southerners expected that President Mkapa once in office would steer resources to the South and allocate a considerable share of cabinet positions to them (Kelsall, 2002; Omari, 1997). Limited evidence points to any special favours being put in place conforming to the southerners’ expectations. However, the example indicates two implications of the politics of origin. On one hand, it suggests that origin-based representation may be expected to convey
certain advantages to the ethnic groups sharing the representative’s origin, while on the other hand it suggests that origin might have a cross-ethnic appeal in elections.

On the basis of the discussion made on the claims of ethnicity under this section, a case can be advanced that while ethnic groups in Tanzania can be alleged to have mobilisation potential, identities based on ethnic, local or regional origin cannot be assumed to exhibit this inherent politicisation potential to the same extent. Explanations of this view lie in the failure of politicians and parties accused of being parochial to effectively mobilise the broader ethnic or regional bases that they are accused of. More important, competitions between ethnic groups as well as regional blocks are relatively modest (Kelsall, 2002). Likewise, while some claims suggest that some parties appeal to regions other than the most populous Lake region, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that all serious presidential candidates in Tanzania focus more intensively on the Lake region due to its numerical advantage. This does not mean they do not target others but since elections are about the number of votes, only a party that does not want to win will ignore this region. Although the claim has not been empirically tested, the local level ethnic appeal well exemplified by Cheyo has seemed less dangerous for national politics despite being identity-based, parochial and factionalist due to its geographical confines.

4.6. Concluding Remarks
The comprehensive ethno-political narrative of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania presented above indicates that ethnicity has never been salient in influencing voters’ choices in Tanzania. As it has been highlighted above, most of colonial Tanzania never had the experience of conducting competitive elections and, therefore, no concrete knowledge of how ethnicity influenced electoral votes could be established. However, what was and/or was not done in those days have a bearing on the way ethnicity came to influence voting in elections few years before independence and beyond. In a nutshell, the political systems and corresponding ethnic identities in the colonial era were fluid and their boundaries were porous and constantly redefined that suggests that politicisation of such groups would have been as fluid as the ethnic group identities were had they been politicised for purposes of anchoring votes. Similar views can be held about the German rule as it inherited the fluid ethnic group identities but further undermined the potential of ethnic groups to enhance ethnic salience in politics as through the direct rule attempts for such groups to organise against ethnic lines were curtailed by the restriction put on the formation of ethnic-based political
organisations. The British colonial government acted in a similar manner by demanding political organisations to be national in character which strengthened national unity among the Tanzanians, and positively impacted upon the formation of a nationalist movement against colonialism. The movement was united and strong enough and inclusive to inform low salience of ethnicity in the colonially organised elections in Tanzania before independence. The low political salience of ethnicity in Tanzania was further crystallised by the extensive socialist nation-building policy predicated on the PsIM that shaped a strong national identity among citizens of the independent Tanzanian state regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. The identity formed that militated against the salience of ethnicity in voting is predicated on the socialist political and economic principles enshrined in the AD, which meant fighting divisive elements, equitably distributing the national cake and ensuring peace and tranquillity. The identity has proven to be too strong even for political and economic liberalisation to defeat it, as such orientation has left limited public space for pan-territorial ethnic politicisation in the mobilisation of political support in Tanzania. Such situation equally suppresses real, perceived and/or manipulated forces of ethnic canvassing that multiparty elections was expected to bring. The national identity made Tanzanians of distinct groups share common goals, thus leading to greater unity and peace that bars salience of ethnic tendencies in influencing voters’ choices.
CHAPTER V

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: PSIM, ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN THE 2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TANZANIA

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the data related to the objectives of the study as indicated in part 1.4 of this dissertation. The main objective as indicated in the cited section is to determine the influences of ethnicity on voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs. The analysis of the data in question is informed by the study’s research questions and related variables that measure the influence of ethnicity as described in the methodological section and summarised in the study’s analytical frame. Informed by the two types of ethnicity relevant to our discussion on ethnicity and voting – the politics of origin, being and belonging, and political tribalism as outlined in section 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 respectively, I set out to explore how the PsIM have influenced the role of ethnicity in the 2010 GEs in Mwanza region.

The data employed in the analysis is a product of fieldwork conducted in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, particularly in Nyamagana and Misungwi. The interviews were designed to extract how the PsIM as explained in the introductory and methodological chapters had influenced the salience or otherwise of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs. They also meant to unveil why they have influenced them the way they have. Knowing that the degree of ethnic salience in voting is low in Tanzania, the interviews meant to essentially unveil why that is the case. However, the low degree of ethnic salience in politics does not cancel out completely ethnicity or outbursts of ethnicity to be practiced in the electoral process. Therefore, the interviews intended to elicit outbursts of ethnicity that had a role in the 2010 GEs in Mwanza and the implications of such flashes of ethnicity on Tanzania’s electoral scene. The analysis strived to establish how and why the PsIM inform the study’s interviewees’ perceptions of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices during elections. The focus of the interviews was placed on ethnic identities – ethnic groups, and wider origin, being- and belonging-based identities proposed by Chabal (2009) – that came to the fore in various circumstances, and how they influence voters’ electoral choices. The analysis is done in subsequent sections (5.2, 5.3. and 5.4).
5.2. PsIM, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices in the 2010 Elections in Tanzania

The first objective of the dissertation as indicated in section 1.4 was to explore how the PsIM informed the way Tanzanians apply ethnicity to influence voters’ choices in elections. The main focus was to obtain information about the role of the legacy of the PsIM on determining the significance of ethnicity in electoral process in general and on influencing voters’ choices in particular. The analysis is informed by the following variables/promises: PNU, EDNR and peace. Specific analysis on the variable is made below.

5.2.1. PNU, Ethnicity and Voters Choices

As I have indicated in the previous chapter, the Tanzanian state informed by the PsIM has made concerted efforts to ensure that there is low salience of ethnicity in the conduct of politics. This was done by instilling in its people the sense of national unity during the nationalist movement and crystallised it during the socialist AD era. However, in the 1990s the socialist principles were overtaken by liberal democratic market-oriented economic and political reforms. Such reforms brought fear of national disunity including ethnic competition in mobilising electoral votes as indicated in section 4.5.2. In light of these political and economic changes, I attempt to explore how strong the promise of PNU embedded in the PsIM and efforts meant to realise it impact upon ethnicity’s influence on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania through the 2010 elections in Mwanza.

Based on the views of my KIs it is assumed that the PNU and varied efforts meant to put the PsIM into practice have created a strong sense of national unity. Such sense of unity, in turn, militates against the use of divisive elements like ethnicity in mobilising political support during elections. This is said to be the case despite liberal reforms and the associated fears that it will breed salient ethnic canvassing as discussed in section 3.4.4. In this regard, scholars like Nyang’oro (2004) and Lofchie (2013) expect Tanzanians to prefer nationhood over ethnic identities, harbour fewer feelings of inter-ethnic mistrust and ethnic discrimination. All of these expectations point to the fact that the role of ethnicity in anchoring votes in competitive elections will be nominal.

The interviews conducted in Mwanza managed to establish how the PNU was embedded in the PsIM and which efforts were made to realise it; how it had influenced my interviewees’ first and foremost (primary) identity; and in turn, how such identity influenced their voting. I managed to get such data by asking my interviewees: Whether they preferred to be identified first and foremost...
with their national or ethnic identity? Whether they harbour feelings of ethnic discrimination? Whether they feel inter-ethnic mistrust? And how has the nation-building socialist initiatives as presented in Chapter III impacted upon their choice of identity, the feelings of inter-ethnic discrimination and mistrust as well as electoral choices?

5. 2.1.1. Identities and Voters’ Choices
5.2.1.1.1. National vs. Ethnic Identity

The data gathered through the interviews conducted in Mwanza and the KIIIs in Dar es Salaam indicated that most of my interviewees (82%) identify first and foremost with their nation, rather than with an ethnic, religious, occupational or any other identity. Such response suggests that most of my interviewees are proud of their national identity, which overshadows association with their ethnic groups or regional identities. The following view of an elderly woman in Nange Village is one among those that well summarises the view expressed in this paragraph:

"Mimi ni mwanawake wa kisukuma lakini napenda kutambuliwa kama Mtanzania kwa sababu Watanzania bila ya kujali makabila yao wanashirikiana katika hali ya amani kama "Ndugu". Nyerere na wenzake walifanya vizuri kutuunganishaa..." 56

“I am a Sukuma women but I like to be referred to as a Tanzanian because Tanzanians irrespective of their ethnic belonging cooperate peacefully as relatives “ndugu”. Nyerere and his colleagues did well to unite us...”

A retired civil servant supported the view in an interview held in Rufiji Street when asked if he feels proud of being a Tanzanian:

"Unataka mimi niwe nani? Mimi ni Mtanzania halisi ... Makabila ni msingi wa taifa lolote lakini yananaweza tu kuunganishwa na kuishi pamoja kama hisia ya utaifa ni utaifa yao. Sisi (Watanzania) tunajisikia fahari kubwa wa taifa wetu na tunauthamini kubwa makabila yote binafsi. Kwa hakika tunamuomba Mwenyezi Mungu ambariki mwenzilishi wa taifa hili kwa kutuunganishia. Bila juhudi zake, ukabila ungeweza kutugawa na kusababisha migogoro isiyokwisha. Sera za za utaifa za Azimio la Arusha hazina budi kusifiwa kwa hisia za Utaifa wa watanzania." 57

“Who do you want me to be? I am a bonafide Tanzanian ... Ethnic groups are the cornerstone of any nation but they can only be integrated and coexist if the feeling of nationhood surpasses parochial identifications. We (Tanzanians) are proud of our nationhood as we put it ahead of our tribal belonging. We actually ask Almighty God to bless the founder of this nation for unifying us. Without his efforts, tribalism could have torn us apart and cause irreconcilable conflicts. The national integrative policies of the AD should be credited for Tanzanians’ national salience”.

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56 Personal interview with an elderly women in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015
57 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 5.11.2014
The views of these two interviewees represent interviewees who feel proud of being Tanzanians. However, it is imperative to note that they are from elderly interviewees. This could beg the question, is such feeling shared by the younger ones involved in the study? The answer according to my interviewees is yes. Interviews with a young man and young woman from Utemini Street and Misungwi Village presented below attests to this position. The young man from Utemini expressed the following view:


"I am proud to be known as a Tanzanian than by my tribe. Anyone who is not proud of his own nation above any other identity is a slave! As we speak, we are poor but enjoy peace and national unity that other countries wish to have....For this, I proudly identify with my national identity. Who knows the Kerewe tribe anyway? Tanzania is known globally as the Island of peace”

Arguing along the same line the young woman in Misungwi had this to say:

"Najisikia fahari kuwa Mtanzania zaidi ya kabila langu. Kwa nini nisijisikie hivyo wakati Tanzania ni nchi ya amani ikilinganishwa na majirani zetu?"

“I feel proud to be a Tanzanian above my ethnic group. Why shouldn’t I be while Tanzania is peaceful compared to our neighbours? ”

Similar views were aired by a hawker from Kishiri A when he asserted that:


“I was born here. I love my country and feel proud to be a Tanzanian. I have nowhere to go and don’t want to go anywhere anyway. We Tanzanians are unified and peaceful; do you think it is easy to find such comfort in other countries? You don’t need to answer. It is not! My life depends on activities done throughout the country and I can go to any region and settle peacefully without being asked about my tribe.”

A critical look at the views above indicates that the interviewees are proud of their national identity and prefer it to be their first and foremost identity. However, the views present a difference in depth of explanations regarding interviewees’ choice of national identity. The difference is that all point of views except one, indicates the pride one feels for belonging to a state

58 Personal interview with a young man in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 7.11.2014
59 Personal interview with a young woman in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 17.01.2015
60 Personal interview with a male hawker at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 09.11.2014
where people co-exist and interact peacefully compared to other countries. Violent incidences in ethnically polarised countries like Kenya Nigeria, Rwanda and Burundi as indicated in the general introduction partly informed this choice. The view from the retired civil servant went beyond mentioning peace and unity as the source of national pride. It associated the cause of pride to the socialist policies of the AD as indicated at length in Chapter III and IV. This line of thought is further contextualised to our case in the analysis and discussion of the second objective in section 5.3 below.

The choice of national identity above ethnic identities provides a case for questioning the neopatrimonial theory. This is because the theory suggests that Africans prefer traditional issues compared to modern ones. In this regard, neo-patrimonialists would expect my interviewees to prefer ethnic group identifications to their modern national one. This is because ethnic identities ensure the traditional paternalistic ties for traditional patron-client relations as opposed to the broader nationalistic ones. As such, the preference to national identity and pride questions the validity of the parochialistic and paternalistic nature of Africans which is said to inform ethnic salience in voting. More important, it enhances national patronage practices that militate against ethnic salience in politics including determining voters’ choices. This is because politicians tend to associate with issues that can move voters. In this case, national salience is of interest over parochial ethnic identities. In this sense, the ethnic-based patronage thesis advanced by neo-patrimonial theorists as a source of their position on ethnic salience is baseless. More important, as indicated in other elements of the PNU presented in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, the choice of national identity waters down the ethnic patron-client relations. Also, the association of the AD with unity and peace indicate another area of disagreement with the neo-patrimonial view that Africa lacks ideas and history against ethnic salience in politics.

Although most interviewees indicated that they are proud of being Tanzanians and hold high national identity over their ethnic identities, I met a few (18%) who did not buy into this general choice. This group was either pro-ethnic identities or discouraged to be national salient identity due to embezzlement of public resources by public servants. The following view of a middle aged female teacher in Nange Village represents the pro-ethnic identity stance:

"Napendelea utambulisho wa kabila langu zaidi ya wa taifa langu. Taifa ni muunganiko wamakabila na hivyo hatuna budi kujivunia makabila yanayotengeneza taifa. Kutoa sadaka utambulisho wa kikabila kwasababu ya utambulisho wa kitaifa utaua historia na utamaduni wa watu wetu. Tupende taifa letu lakini tusichukie makabila
yetu. Sidhani kama waasiri wa taifa letu walitaka tuye telekeze makabila yetu wakati walipositiza umoja wa kitaifa.”

“I prefer my ethnic identity over the national identity. A nation is an amalgamation of ethnic groups and thus we shall be proud of what make a nation. Sacrificing ethnic identities for a national one will bury the history and culture of our people. Let us love our nation but not hate our tribes. I don’t think the founders wanted us to abandon our tribes when they championed national unity.”

The views of the teacher presented above looked at carefully suggest that ethnic and national identities shall be balanced. To the teacher, this is critical because the foundation of national identity has its root from the combination of varied ethnic identities. Such ethnic groups for reasons of unity or any other interest make nations. In this regard, the ethnic groups’ identities should not wither away in favour of a collective identity willingly made by them. The inevitability of ethnic identities thesis advanced by the teacher suggests that ethnic salience in politics could be viewed as a means of perpetuating Tanzanians primordial and essentialist identities. This is against the national unifying spirit of the PNU. This apparent resistance to the PNU spirit of unity may be perceived as harmful to the PsIM intent. The words of my privileged interviewees which echoed their idol Julius Nyerere while addressing the CCM congress in Dodoma when CCM was voting for its flag bearer for the 1995 GE’s pose a relevant question to the teacher. In his speech, Mwalimu identified that there is a small section of the Tanzanian society that worships tribalism over nationality, which if left to grow can disturb Tanzania’s unity. He pleaded with the members of the CCM Congress to elect a flag bearer who is anti-tribalist and can help the nation to avoid ethnic polarisation. He asked the Congress if in the 21st century it was ideal to board a bus that heads Tanzanians to ethnic polarisation. A situation that has proven dilapidating effects in Tanzania’s neighbours as indicated in section 1.1. The question is relevant to the views of the teacher from Nange but she would have answered Mwalimu that there is no harm. This is because the passengers in the bus should have bifocal identities and balance them in a manner that would not disturb national unity. In other words, the teacher recognises the significance of bifocal identity as Mwalimu himself does, but she goes for her ethnic identity first. This is contrary to the nationalists who also recognise bifocal identity but choose national identity over tribal identities. Mwalimu seems to belong to the nationalists as many of the interviewees.

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61 Personal interview with a mid aged female teacher in Nange Village, I goloko Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015
62 Hotuba ya Mwalimu Nyerere, Mkutano Mkuu wa CCM Dodoma-1995- Mwalimu’s Speech at the CCM Congress, Dodoma-1995 can be traced on http://youtube.com/watch?v=GAEpisZ3CuK
Views garnered from a mid aged female food vendor from Shamalala further presents the view that ethnic identity is preferred to national identity:

"Mimi sijivunii kuwa Mtanzania kwa sababu ya ufisadi unaoendelea bila ya woga wa kuchukuliwa hatua za kisheria. Viongozi wetu wanakwenda kinyume na mafundisho ya Mwalimu. Kutambuliwa kwa kabila langu kunaniokoa katika aibu ambazo Watanzania wanapata kutokana na matendo maovu ya viongozi wao. Mimi ninapendaumoja lakini viongozi wanaotumia ofisi za umma kwa manufaa yao binafsi yanatufanya baadhi yetu kupendelea utambulisho wa kikabila."

“I am not proud of being a Tanzanian because of graft-ufisadi that goes on with impunity. Leaders are against Mwalimu’s teaching. Identifying with my tribe saves me from the embarrassment Tanzanians get because of evil acts of their leaders. I love unity but leaders who use of public office for their selfish ends evoke ethnic preferences in some of us.”

While the teacher’s salient ethnic view is predicated on primordial and essentialist approaches to ethnicity, the street vendor’s is informed by an ad hoc instrumentalist viewpoint that accords her leverage of disassociating with the public resource embezzling label. The vendor’s view is informed by a calculated analysis of how one is viewed through his/her leaders. Since leaders who carry with them national stature are associated with graft she disassociates with that identity. Analysed critically, her choice of the ethnic identity over the national one is to avoid being associated with elements that are against the dictates of the AD. The AD as indicated in 4.4 among other things barred leaders to aggrandise public resources and distribute public goods disproportionately. In this regard, she is not ethnic salient by conviction. In addition, better performance in stamping graft can sway her back to national salience. Interestingly, when I asked the vendor of cases of ethnic-based distribution of the embezzled resources, she could not provide any. One of my KIs, Dr. Ezekiel well expressed this observation in an interview held in Shamalala on 11.12.2014. In this interview among other things, he claimed that selfish parochial and divisive ethnic favours that leaders are believed to have practised, propel ethnic identification among some people. However, he contended that for it to gain salience, it needs to be widely perceived and the ethnic identifications proven to be presenting an alternative better than the national one. To his position, the feelings of favouritism might be held by a section of the Tanzanian people but ethnic identifications are not providing an alternative worth turning to. This is because national unity has facilitated peaceful co-existence and solidarity among members of varied ethnic groups. To him this widely explains the greater pride interviewees have on their national identity.

63 Personal interview with a mid aged female food vendor in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 14.11.2014
The fact that ethnic identities are in the minds of some interviewees providing an alternative to national identity (while based on the evidence they should not) confirms the significance of the political imaginary, namely its success in establishing a dualism of national unity versus ethnic division. This dualism is at the same time its weakness, since a weakly performing State apparently conjures up reliance on the ethnic group. In some instances when such boomerang effects were mitigated, either by individualising corruption (as in cases of the ruling party naming and prosecuting individual members) or by over-generalising it, as in media and music performances extrapolating cases of embezzlement to a complicity and mindset shared by all members of society (cf. Mbembe 1999, Stroeken 2005). In both cases the nation Tanzania dating from Nyerere’s days appears as today’s victim rather than culprit.

The results found in Mwanza on the way Tanzanians first and foremost identify themselves are in line with the pan-territorial Afrobarometer surveys held in Tanzania in 2005, 2008 and 2012. Table IV below presents a concise summary of how Tanzanians identified themselves in the three Afrobarometer surveys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV: Tanzanians Identification Ethnic vs. National</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and ethnic identities equal</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Source: Afrobarometer data 2005, 2008 and 2012

The results presented above indicate that there has been a substantially strong sense of national identity in Tanzania. As noted in the table above around 84% identify themselves with the nation. A remarkable 76% responded that they felt only Tanzanian, and 8% felt more Tanzanian than their ethnic affiliations. Similar trends were experienced three years later albeit the figure dropping to 78%, with 69% feeling only Tanzanian and 9% feeling more Tanzanian than their ethnic groups. Four years later 97% responded that they identify with the nation, with 68% exclusively identified with the national identity only, and 29% felt more Tanzanian than their ethnic affiliations. Interestingly, the share of interviewees who declared that they feel equally ethnic and Tanzanian increased over three times from 9 to 29% between 2008 and 2012 surveys. The results
indicate that national identification is quite strong in Tanzania. However, the degree of strength tends to decrease as time passes mildly justifying the fears raised by Gasarasi and colleagues in 4.5.2. After establishing the way Tanzanians identify themselves along the ethnic salient and non-salient continuum, now let us explore how such identification influence the role of ethnicity in anchoring voting choices.

5.2.1.1.2 Identity and Voting

The results from interviews point out that the strong national identification discussed above has informed low ethnic salience in motivating votes. This position is predicated on the fact that most voters (86%) prefer candidates who uphold nation-building policies and parties which do not incite people into divisive ethnic tendencies. This is confirmed by a young man in Shamalala Street who disclosed that:

“.... Waasisi wa nchi hii hawakuwa watu wasioona mbali walipotuonya dhidi ya matumizi ya ukabila na mambo mengine yanayogawa watu kama dini na ubaguzi wa rangi kwa kufikia mtego wa kuchagua viongozi kwa misingi ya makabila yao.”

“...the founding fathers of this country were not short-sighted to warn us against the salience of ethnicity and other divisive elements like religion and racialism in deciding who to vote for. The words of these great leaders avoid Tanzanians from falling into the trap of electing leaders on the basis of their tribes.”

This line of thought was further insisted by a staunch CCM supporter in Utemini who expressed the following view:

“Watanzania wanajivunia sana kwa msingi ya umoja wa kitaifa iliyoewekwa na CCM wakati wa utawala wa chama kimoja. Msingi huu umeunganisha zaidi ya makabila 120 na kuipa Tanzania utulivu wa kisiasa mkubwa zaidi ikilinganishwa na majirani zake. Demokrasia ya vyama vingi ilipokuja katika kufikia msingi huu. Vyombo vya habari, asasi za kiraia, vyama vya siasa na wagombea wao hukemia matumizi ya ukabila katika kuhamishia msingi wa wapiga kura kama waasisi wetu walivyohubiri kabla yao.”

“Tanzanians are very proud of the foundation of national unity set by CCM during the single party rule. This foundation unified over 120 ethnic groups and given Tanzania political stability compared to its neighbours. Multiparty democracy that came in the 1900s has failed to break this foundation. The media, the civil society, political parties and their candidates denounce the use of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices as our founders preached before.”

Similar views were advanced by a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street:

“Umoja wa kitaifa unaosisitiza na Azimio la Arusha ni suala la msingi na ambalo linakwenda zaidi ya mfumo wowote ya siasa. ... Umoja huleta nguvu, wakati mfarakano husababisha kutokaelewana na kuzuia kufikiwa kwa malengo ya maendeleo. Nani anataka machafuko na kukosekana kwa maendeleo? Matumizi ya ukabila katika

64 Personal interview with a young man in Shamalala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 16.11.2014
65 Personal interview with a CCM supporter in Utemini, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 09.11.2014
kuvutia kura kutatuongoza k matumizi ya ukabila katika kutafuta wafuasi wa kisiasa wakati wa uchaguzi?“ 66

“The unifying character of the AD is a matter of principle that goes beyond any form of politics. ... Unity brings strength, while disunity causes misunderstanding and bars attainment of developmental goals. Who wants chaos and underdevelopment? The use of ethnicity in soliciting votes will lead us to disunity which has been denounced since independence. Why shall we give disunity weight now by championing the use of ethnicity in seeking political support during elections?”

Likewise, views of a nurse in Mbela corroborate the above views as she authoritatively asserted:

"Umoja ni kitu ambacho dunia nzima inajua kuwa ni tabia ya Watanzania. Hakuna mfumo wa kisiasa uliofanikiwa kutufanya kurudisha nyuma juhudi za waasisi wa taifa letu kudhibiti ukabila katika kuomba kura wakati uchaguzi. Sisi si kama Kenya ambako mgawanyiko wa kikabila ya upigaji kura." 67

“Unity is something that the entire world knows is a character of Tanzanians. No political system has made us turn our back on the efforts put in by the founders of this country to control ethnicity in soliciting electoral votes. We are not like Kenya were ethnic divisions characterise voting.”

Analysis of the interviews above suggests that the foundations of national unity meant to unify Tanzanians beyond ethnic groups’ parochial boundaries are intact. The foundation is strong enough even in circumstances were the very ideological antecedents that informed it– the socialist AD is no longer in existence. That is to say, the liberal democratic pluralist political reforms could not reverse the national integration efforts spearheaded in the socialist monolithic political dispensation discussed throughout Chapter IV. This can be proved by the fact that most of my interviewees (84%) did not support the view that ethnicity was the most important means of gathering political support during the 2010 elections. Furthermore, they did not want ethnic-based political campaigning to be allowed. Views derived from an interview with a female farmer in Misungwi Village and an elderly man in Nange Village below attests respectively:

“Ukabila haukuwa muhimu katika kampeni za uchaguzi na nisingependa uwe. Kuna watu kutoka makabila mbalimbali ambao wanaishi kwa amani hapa Misungwi. Umoja huo ni muhimu na nisingependa kuona unapotea kwa sababu ya ushindani wa nafasi za kisiasa.” 68

“Tribalism was not important in election campaigns and I would not want it to be. There are people from different tribes who peacefully co-exist in Misungwi. Such unity is important and I would not like to see it go simply because of competition for political office.”

“Makabila ni muhimu kwa ushirikiano wa kijamii na si kwa kampeni za kisiasa wakati wa uchaguzi. Ukabila hajiwahisi kutumika waziwazi kuhamasisha upigaji wa kura kufuata makabila ya wapiga kura na wagombea .... Nisingependa kuishi muda wa kutosha kushuhudia hali kama hiyo ikijitokeza.” 69

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66 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 05.11.2014
67 Personal interview with a nurse in Mbela, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
68 Personal interview with a female farmer in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
69 Personal interview with an elderly man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 14.01.2015

171
Tribes are for social engagements and not for political canvassing during elections. The ethnic ticket has never been overtly used to propel ethnic voting.... I would not want to live long enough to witness such development”

The above views notwithstanding, there were some few interviewees (16%) who claimed that ethnicity was used in elections and felt it was not a threat to unity as the following words of a housewife in Mbela suggested:

“Mambo ya ukabila ni ya kawaida katika uchaguzi wa serikali za mitaa na Udiwani. Katika uchaguzi huo watu wanaulizia asili ya wagombea na kumchagua mmoja anayetoka Misungwi. Kama mgombea si Msukuma, ni vigumu kushinda. ... Tunahitaji mtu tunayemjua na hii haihatarishi umoja na amani kwa sababu makabila yenye watu wachache watatuelewa. Kwa nafasi ya ubunge watu hawana mpango na kabila  la mgombea kwa sababu wapiga kura wanavutiwa na uwezo wa wagombea kuleta maendeleo bila kujali makabila yao.”

“Issues of ethnicity are normally experienced in lower local government and Councillorship elections. In those elections people ask for the origin of candidates and elect one that is from Misungwi. If a candidate is not from the Sukuma tribe, it is hard to win. ...we need someone we know and this does not endanger unity and peace because the minority tribes will understand us. For the parliamentary post people do not bother about a candidate’s tribe because they are motivated by candidates’ ability to bring development irrespective of their ethnic group.”

The views of the woman in Mbela concur with those of Omari (1997) who argues that the level of ethnic salience in Tanzania is higher in the lower levels of political positions (hamlet, village, streets and ward councillor positions) compared to the higher ones (parliamentary and presidential seats). It is imperative to note that the lower level elections were not part of the 2010 GEs as indicated in section 4.2. Interestingly, the woman from Mbela despite pledging her preference to elect a fellow ethnic group mate to address the problems in the lower levels of governance, she still loves national unity. This seems to present a contradiction as national unity and ethnic polarisation tend to pull apart. In her view, this is not the case. This is because she feels that the ethnic voting based on a competent Sukuma will be understood by members of the minority ethnic groups in the villages. More important, the limited number of the non-Sukuma cannot cause conflicts and ethnic voting because their numbers would not motivate them to invoke either of the two. The ethnic voting rationale suggested by the lady of Mbela which is in line with bi-focal identity, is against the conflict theories as highlighted by Eiffert et al. (2010) and Cocodia, (2007). Eiffert et al. (2010) and Cocodia, (2007) suggest ethnic voting and competitions propel conflictual relations regardless of the composition of the conflicting ethnic groups.

In an interview with a farmer in Mapilinga Village, I noted the following:

“Matumizi ya ukabila katika kushawishi wapiga kura kuchagua wagombea hayakuwa wazi hapa kwasababu

70 Personal interview with a housewife in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 11.01.2015
The use of ethnicity in soliciting votes was not overt here because the state prohibits the use of ethnicity in political campaigning. However, candidates and their agents go to people at their homes and convince people to vote in their favour using the ethnic card.”

Interestingly, when they were asked whether multiparty democracy vindicated fears of ethnic salience on determining electoral votes abounding, most interviewees (82%) replied negatively. In the main, they were of the view that no party would be unintelligent enough to pursue the ethnic ticket to mobilise electoral support. This is because ethnicity has never been proven significant in the politics of Tanzania. A long comment made by a lady in Kishiri A below well describes the issue:

“...Watanzania wanajulikana kwa makabila yao lakini utambulisho huo kamwe hauwezi kuzidi utambulisho wao wa kitaifa uliojengwa na wapigania uhuru wetu ... Kutambuana kwa makabila ni muhimu katika utani wakati wa mazishi. Si katika Siasa! Unaweza kuona jinsi gani CHADEMA kinavyopinga shutuma zinazotolewa dhidi yake kuwa ni chama cha Wachagga. Hii ni kwa sababu muonekano huona msaada kwake kisia. Walikuja hapa (Mwanza) mara kadhaa na helikopta zao wakati wa kampeni kutuambia wao sio chama cha Wachagga bali ni kwa ajili ya ustawizi wa taifa zima. Walisikilizwa (CHADEMA) na matunda yake ni ushindi wa viti viwili vya ubunge Mwanza Mjini- Ilemela na Nyamagana. Hakuna chama kinachoweza kushinda mioyo ya Watanzania na kupigiwa kura za kushinda madaraka kwa kuchochewa migawanyiko ya kikabila. Upigaji wa kura kwa kufuata ukabila haujewahi kuwa tabia ya kupiga kura ya Watanzania wakati wa mapambano ya kudai uhuru wala baada ya kupata uhuru.”

“...Tanzanians have ethnic identities but such identities will never supersede the national identity built by our freedom fighters... Tribal identities are important in joking relationship during funerals. Not in Politics! You can see how hard CHADEMA denounces the accusations levelled against it that it is a Chagga party. This is because such label does not help it politically. They came here (Mwanza) time and again with their helicopters during the campaigns to tell us that they are not a Chagga Party, and are for the entire nation’s wellbeing. They were heard and rewarded by two parliamentary seats in Mwanza Urban- Ilemela and Nyamagana. No party can win Tanzanians’ heart and be voted into power by championing ethnic divisions. Ethnic voting has neither been a characteristic of Tanzania’s voting during the struggles for independence nor after gaining independence.”

The views of the lady in Kishiri A are in line with the views of Malipula (2014), Weber (2009), and Nyang’oro (2004), who argue that the mobilisational effect of ethnicity has never been deemed significant in politics in Tanzania from the struggles of independence to-date. However, she presents an important dimension in the role of ethnicity in mobilising electoral support. In the main, she concurs with the view that salience of cultural and social ethnicity does not translate into political tribalism as defined in section 3.2.7 unless it is triggered by systemic ethnic–based disproportionate distribution of political and economic resources. The political and economic

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71 Personal interview with a male farmer in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015
72 Personal interview with a lady at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 08.11.2014
factors potential of breeding ethnic salience in voting revolves around disproportionate division of political offices as well as public goods among ethnic groups. On the other hand, the example presented of CHADEMA’s efforts to clear accusations levelled against it, suggest that ethnic and zonal labels drawn along the zone defined in section 3.2.6 are against the letter and spirit of national unity embedded in the PsIM. As such, the labels have an adverse effect in its bid to acquire state power in a multi-ethnic state like Tanzania with over 120 ethnic groups without any big enough to form a MWC in the presidential race (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2009). At most, the label can ensure its visibility and some parliamentary seats in the area they are accused of being dominant if they appeal to it. However, it is relevant to analyse CHADEMA’s accusations from a historical perspective to put them in the context of the study.

As a starting point, it is imperative to hereby detail our earlier analysis of CHADEMA’s electoral performance in the multi-party era, and more rigorously in the 2010 elections, to be able to understand and analyse the claim and link it to the PNU. The general verdict is that as much as CHADEMA is accused of being a Chagga Party or party for the Northern Zone (Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Manyara regions), it has hardly managed to win commandingly presidential votes or parliamentary seats in the Kilimanjaro region (the homeland of the Chagga ethnic group) in particular and the Northern Zone in general. For instance, in the 1995 elections of which CHADEMA did not field a presidential candidate but all of the parliamentary seats in the Chagga-dominated constituencies in Kilimanjaro went to NCCR-Mageuzi under the chairmanship of Augustine Mrema, a prominent Chagga and nationally known politician as argued in section 4.5.2. In the 1995 and 2000 GEs CHADEMA only managed 18% and 23% of the parliamentary votes in Kilimanjaro respectively (URT, 1995; 2000). As if this is not enough, Kigoma (which is not a Chagga dominated region) in both elections happened to be CHADEMA’s stronghold in terms of winning electoral votes with a total of 21% and 26.8% in the 1995 and 2000 elections respectively. The results in Kigoma were also above the other Northern region of Arusha, in which CHADEMA scooped 10.5 and 17.5% in 1995 and 2000 elections respectively. In 2005, CHADEMA’s outstanding performance in the presidential race came from Kilimanjaro, which was 20.6% of the region’s votes. It is imperative to note that CHADEMA’s presidential candidate in that year’s election, Freeman Mbowe, is a Chagga from Kilimanjaro and some associate the performance

73 The Chagga dominated constituencies are Moshi Urban, Hai, Rombo, Vunjo, Moshi Rural and Siha
mainly to his candidacy (Whitehead, 2009). However, it is fascinating to note that his votes were below half of the Kilimanjaro voters and even in his home constituency of Hai, his non-Chagga competitor Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the then President of the URT, won more votes than him. In sum, then, there is no compelling case for an extraordinarily disproportionate support among the Chagga of Kilimanjaro or the Northern Zone to substantiate the claim that CHADEMA is a Chagga party based on the 1995-2005 election results. The fact that Kigoma outsmarted Kilimanjaro and Arusha in a decade suggests that the party had something more than ethnicity to offer in exchange of political support in non-Chagga regions. The 2010 results are more interesting to this dissertation because CHADEMA’s support happened to increase tremendously in the Lake zone particularly in Mwanza and in the entire Sukumaland which by all standards is not a Chagga dominated area as depicted in the description of the study area.

In 2010, CHADEMA managed to win an average of around 42.6% and 39.3% in the Presidential and parliamentary elections in the Northern Zone respectively. However, in both contests, CHADEMA won more votes in Manyara and Arusha compared to Kilimanjaro (URT, 2010). A close look at the presidential race suggests CHADEMA was not that superior in Kilimanjaro as its candidate only managed to win the presidential votes in one of the Chagga dominated constituencies-Moshi Urban, while the remaining five went to CCM’s Kikwete (URT, 2010). In the parliamentary race, however, CHADEMA managed to win 3 out of the 5 Chagga dominated constituencies, 2 went to CCM and 1 won by Mrema who represented TLP this time around. Such division does indicate that CHADEMA has won most seats in the Chagga dominant constituencies of Kilimanjaro but does not entail clear dominance in those constituencies. In Hai where CHADEMA’s national chair Freeman Mbowe, an ethnic Mchagga and the incumbent MP won the parliamentary seat by a narrow margin and President Kikwete of CCM once again defeated CHADEMA’s candidate in the constituency (URT, 2010). More important, CHADEMA won 23 parliamentary seats in Tanzania out of which only 6 approximately a quarter of them came from the Northern Zone 3 less than the ones they won in the Lake Zone- Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mara, Kagera, Geita and Simiyu after massive campaigning in the area. In some cases as it will be discussed in section 5.4. CHADEMA won without even having candidates with blood ties in the constituency of contest. Other seats came from Mbeya, Iringa and Dar es Salaam. With this data, again there is little evidence to support any claims of the party’s alleged Chagga dominance. Of course, the party received considerable support from Chagga dominated areas and the Northern
Zone but also won more seats out of the Northern Zone and particularly enjoyed the support of the urbanites in Dar es Salaam, Geita, Mwanza, Iringa and Mbeya (where they won parliamentary seats) and in other urban settings as well. All of the facts concerning CHADEMA’s electoral performance question the ethnic claims highlighted in section 4.5.2 and suggest a more nationalist approach to winning voters’ support.

The all round performance of CHADEMA point to the fact that ethnicity in the form of political tribalism was not given salience in its political canvassing in the 2010 election in the country and particularly in Mwanza where the Chagga are not dominant. In this regard, the constant accusations levelled against it are mere mud-sliding by CCM meant to discredit it in the general public for endangering a sacrosanct value among Tanzanians - national unity, by practising ethnicity in mobilising support as argued by (Whitehead, 2009; Shaba, 2010) and highlighted in part 4.5.2. The discussion on the accusations of CHADEMA suggests that national unity as envisioned by the PsIM is critical for mobilising votes. This can be evidenced by CHADEMA’s denial of being a Chagga Party and CCM’s sustained accusations that it is one as Whitehead (2009) managed to associate the accusations with current chair of CCM and his predecessor in their campaigns. Concurrently, CCM projecting itself as a national integrator that wins it votes as widely discussed in chapter four. Such national integration projection concurs with the official view of Nyerere as argued by Becker (2013) that CCM claims its ownership and association. The strong discourse on the importance of national unity by CCM, its accusation on CHADEMA as well as CHADEMA’s strong denial of ethnic and regional bias signify the limited role and efficacy that ethnic mobilisation can have in luring electoral support in Tanzania. In other words, nationalistic views preside over ethnic salient ones on determining voting in Tanzania. Such state of affairs is against the paternalistic explanations of the neo-patrimonial schools that suggest that divisive ethnic-based patron–client relations would take credence in informing ethnic salience in voting as discussed in section 3.4.2.

The nationalistic views downplaying the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices presented above are in line with the vote intentions of the three Afrobarometer surveys that took place in Tanzania in 2005, 2008 and 2012. The Afrobarometer results of the said years established that most voters in Tanzania are nationalistic regardless of the electorates’ party affiliation. This is proven by the fact that the ruling party in Tanzania - CCM and the opposition parties in their totality
have been supported by over three-quarters of voters harbouring national identification first and foremost. This fact diffuses the commonly viewed notion that opposition political parties use the ethnic card to mobilise followers for electoral support. This concurs with the opinion expressed by Mzee Mwiru in section 4.5, that all contending parties in Tanzania do not primarily run their campaigns on an ethnic line. According to Mzee Mwiru political parties in Tanzania are aware that the foundation of unity informed by the PsIM will act against them if they decide to evoke ethnic political canvassing during elections. Therefore, Mzee Mwiru insisted all of the parties strive to uphold nationalist tendencies and avoid issues that discriminate against ethnic groups. Mzee Mwiru’s views are in line with Mushi and Baregu (1994) who argue that candidates in elections compete on how they will keep alive national integration ethos by condemning divisive elements like race, religion, and ethnicity.

5.2.1.1.2. Inter-ethnic Discrimination and Voters’ Choices
Avoidance of ethnic discrimination is one among the key issues that the PsIM have strived to achieve as the detailed narrative presented in the fourth chapter suggests. In our interviews in Mwanza, we managed to establish that people harbour low feelings of inter-ethnic discrimination (13%) and inter-ethnic mistrust (11%) which entail limited ground for ethnic political mobilisation. This observation is logical in the eye of Fearon and Laitin (2003) who contend that feelings of the ethnic discrimination tend to take the lead where the sense of nationhood is nominal due to disproportionate distribution of public goods and ethnic polarisation. With the deliberate policies of the AD, and the elite inclusive character of the Tanzanian state traced way back to the nationalist struggles as depicted throughout the fourth chapter, it is only logical to find that the feelings of ethnic discrimination are nominal. Therefore, it took no trouble for most of my interviewees (87% and 89%) to suggest that the national unity initiative diffused inter-ethnic discrimination and mistrust respectively. Additionally, such diffusion, in turn, informed low salience of ethnicity in the mobilisation for voters’ support and actual voting in the 2010 elections. The words of a young woman from Shamalala succinctly summarises this position:

“Ubaguzi wa kikabila siyo sera ya Tanzania. Hatuna makabila ya daraja la kwanzan ya ya la pili. Sisi sote ni Wata Tanzania na tunajua makabila yote kushirikiana bila ya tatizo. Matatizo binafsi kati ya watu wa makabila tofauti katika mahusiano yao yanaweza kuwepo, lakini si makubwa ya kutosha kuwafanya watu wapige kura kikabila.”

74 Personal interview with a young woman in Shamalala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 14.11.2014
“Discrimination against ethnic groups is not our policy in Tanzania. We do not have first and second rate ethnic groups. We are all Tanzanians and proudly co-exist. Personal problems between people of different ethnic groups in their interaction may exist but not big enough to inform ethnic voting.”

It is imperative to note that the low feelings of ethnic discrimination are prevalent despite the fact that 76% of my interviwees acknowledged that there are some ethnic groups in Tanzania like the Chagga, Haya, Nyakyusa and Sukuma that are comparatively developed than others. However, they do not associate the development to disproportionate distribution of the national cake done by the independent government. In this context, they have no reason to feel discriminated. This explains why 74% of my interviwees claimed that the distribution of resources by the state is fair and not the source of the differences. These views inferably augur well with the historical explanations of developmental differences among regions as highlighted in the ethno-political narrative that constituted the fourth chapter. The historical explanation shed the blame to the colonialists who disproportionately distributed infrastructure in the areas where the ethnic groups are located because of their richness in raw materials badly needed by European industries. A detailed account of these issues will be presented in section 5.3 where the reasons as to why ethnicity influences voting the way it does are provided. At this juncture it is worth having the views of a learned interviewee below that gives a summary of the point made in this paragraph.


“The development of the Nyakyusa, Haya, and other tribes with abundant raw materials was perpetuated by the colonialists as they ensured railway roads are built so that they can transport cotton, sisal and other raw materials to Europe via Dar es Salaam port. Because of these resources they were given more schools and hospitals. Because of the infrastructure and wealth they are developed! What is the problem with that? Better still, the AD tried to reverse this historical imbalances for purposes of national unity and avoiding inter-ethnic resource based conflicts. Actually the riches of the developed tribes are enjoyed by other less developed tribes through tax. Under such circumstances how can inter-ethnic discrimination inform ethnic voting?”

To show that developmental imbalances have never entailed sour relations among ethnic groups, 88% of my interviewees did not recommended for deliberate measures to reverse perceived or real inter-ethnic development imbalances. This is the case despite the potential of the imbalances to

75 Personal interview with a male university student in Utemini Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 13.11.2014
breed salience of ethnicity in voting. They were of the view that there is no need for doing anything against the richer ethnic groups as their riches have no political impact. Their position was anchored on the supposition that the proper foundation of national unity and indiscrimination was set by the implementation of the PsIM in the distribution of political positions and economic resources that reflect nationhood. Such argument is indicative of the views widely argued my KIs and the overriding literature throughout Chapter IV on the matter. An interesting observation derived from an elderly man in Mapilinga following a question that meant to gauge interviewees’ views on discrimination among ethnic groups in Tanzania augurs well with the low feelings of ethnic discrimination. The elderly man disclosed that:


"Anyone can be a President in Tanzania, even if he does not come from the big tribes like all of our presidents have, to ensure unity. I am sure one day the President will hail from this giant Sukuma tribe! Why not? By the way, no serious Sukuma candidate has ever contested for the position in the elections. Once a serious one contests for the post especially through CCM’s ticket, will be elected. You know that we (Sukuma People) are not stubborn and arrogant. We are peace loving and by no means can our big population and wealth disturb the unity of this country well built for ages."

The views of the elderly man presented above suggest that inter-ethnic discrimination was not an important factor in informing electoral choices. This situation leans toward the view expressed above that economic differences among ethnic groups in Tanzania are not a source of political division as they are not attributable to the independent state. This is chiefly because independent governments have strived to avoid the colonially set ethnic discrimination described in section 3.4.4. An interesting point here is that positive discrimination of having members of less pronounced ethnic groups on grounds of avoiding the possibility of enhancement of ethnic salience once the pronounced and numerically bigger one’s like the Sukuma hold state power.

One would wonder why the more populous ethnic groups like the Sukuma would agree to be ruled by members of the less populous ethnic groups. The question gains impetus when one buys into the views of Weber (2009) who claims that the Sukuma can mobilise their numbers to form a super-ethnic group capable of forming a MWC and enhancing its visibility in electoral politics.

76 Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015.
The view of Weber is somewhat realistic in the question of enhancing political visibility and at most informing ethnic voting among the less nationalist voters in Mwanza. As for the possibility of forging a MWC for winning the presidency, it is far-fetching as the number of the Sukuma is around 17% of the entire population of Tanzania. Even if you add the entire Lake Zone, the numbers would not add up to a MWC. More important, in light of the discussion on the hypothesised Northern amalgam, the Sukuma will be accused of national disintegration. Better still, if other ethnic groups team up against the Sukuma conglomerate, they will triumph over it numerically (Malipula, 2014). Equally important, the elderly man suggested that for one to be viewed as worth for being elected to a political post, a candidate has to be competent, peace loving and have a national outlook. Therefore, the Sukuma have not and should not team up discriminately against other ethnic groups to solicit political support nationally, neither, should they do the same in local level politics. This is because it will be against the political culture of national unity as enshrined in the PsIM and supported by Tanzanians. From the discussion held above the Sukuma to engage in an ethnic move for power will be prove futile as elements of national unity are entrenched in the minds of the people as highlighted throughout this section as well as in the fourth chapter.

5.2.1.1.3. Inter-ethnic Trust and Voters’ Choices

In the above subsections we unveiled that Tanzanians harbour feelings of national identity over ethnic identity, and have low feelings of ethnic discrimination. Such revelations point towards low significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In this subsection we unveil Tanzanians perceptions on inter-ethnic trust and their implication on voting. Views derived from the interviews I conducted in Mwanza suggest that the level of inter-ethnic trust is high (89%) among the interviewees. Therefore, matching of ethnic groups between voters and contestants is not significant in informing voting. A comment from a young man in Nange succinctly expresses this feeling:

“Watanzania kwa ujumla wanaaminiana na kupendana. Hatuna hisia kubwa za kutoaminiana kiasi kwamba hatuwezi kumpigia Kura mtu ambuye siyo wa kabila lako. Tuna zaidi ya makabila 120 na hakuna uwezekano katika kinyang'anyiro cha urais au katika nafasi nyingine yeyote makabila yote yawe na mgombea wa kabila lao wakumchagua”

“Tanzanians generally trust and love one another. We don’t have big feelings of mistrust to the extent that we cannot vote for someone who does not belong to your tribe. We have over 120 tribes and there will never be a day

77 Personal interview with a young man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 14.01.2015
that in a presidential race or in any other election people from all tribes will have a candidate from their ethnic group to elect"

A Young man in Mapilinga Village had echoed the same view when he disclosed that:

“Katika uchaguzi sisi tunangalia sifa ya mtu ya uaminifu wake wake bila kujali kabila lake. Uaminifu miongoni mwa watu wa makabila tofauti ni binafsi kwanjani mtu anaweza kuhukumu kabila kwa kutazama vitendo vya watu wachache anaohusiana nao. Hii si sawa na hawapaswi kuwa njia ya kufanya maamuzi ya kupiga kura.” 78

“In elections we look at one’s qualities of trustworthiness regardless of his/ her ethnic group. Personal trust among people of different tribes is mostly subjective as one can base his/her trust on the acts of few people they interact with which is not the right way of making electoral choices”

Arguing along the same line an NGO worker in Misungwi had this to say:


“Inter-ethnic trust in Tanzania is still intact as we work together pray and engage in numerous issues. If we have a problem with someone it is personal and should not in any way guide my judgment when it comes to elections. I cannot punish a competent candidate just because of his tribe! When we go to vote we do not vote tribes but people on the basis of their competence. People say the Chagga like money and the Sukuma aredocile despite their large number. Shall I vote for any Sukuma hoping that he will not embezzle public funds and leave a competent Chagga simply because his tribe is accused of being harbouring feelings of money mongering?”

The key point in the views of the three interviewees presented above is that the level of inter-ethnic mistrust in Tanzania is low. Such situation makes ethnicity less significant on determining electoral votes as there was no inter-ethnic mistrust to be politicised. However, flashes of mistrust raised by the minority of my interviewees (11%) are merely personal and subjective. In this regard, they lack the salience needed for broadly based inter-ethnic mistrust that could inform the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. As such, the limited feelings of inter-ethnic mistrust and the role it plays in influencing an insignificant role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, depict a positive contribution to the realisation of the PsIM.

The views presented above on inter-ethnic discrimination and inter-ethnic trust concurs with the findings of the Afrobarometer surveys of 2005, 2008 and 2012. The feeling of ethnic discrimination in the 2008 and 2012 Afrobarometer surveys in Tanzania were well above average. This is proved by the fact that 57% and 66% of the 2008 and 2012 respondents held the

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78 Personal interview with a Young man in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
79 Personal interview with an NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015

181
position that their ethnic groups were never discriminated respectively; while 23% and 18% felt less discrimination (sometimes) respectively. The 2005 survey results suggest a divided opinion as far as the question of ethnic discrimination is concerned. However, though the majority still belong to the group who feel no or less ethnic discrimination. This is supported by the fact that only 44 % of the interviewees were clear enough to say they are not discriminated. 37% are holding the view that they are discriminated in different degrees, either sometimes, often or always. A clear verdict of the degree of the ethnic discrimination in the 2005 survey is blurred by the 17 % of interviewees who claimed they do not know whether their ethnic groups are discriminated or not. This could be a function of the migratory processes and or detaching themselves from their roots or fear of responding to the question that carries with it some elements of sensitivity. However, working with the distinctive choices-those who feel discriminated and those who do not, the results indicate that all parties garnered higher support from interviewees who feel no or less discrimination (sometimes). Therefore, ethnic unfairness which could fuel ethnic voting among the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of discrimination cannot constitute an incentive for canvassing meaningful electoral support as the feeling is not entrenched in the voters regardless of the position of the competing parties.

The verdict given on inter-ethnic discrimination by the Afrobarometer resembles the barometer’s findings on inter-ethnic trust. The Afrobarometer discloses that Tanzanians do not conceive inter-ethnic mistrust in the country as unproblematic. This is evidenced by the total of 66 % of interviewees indicating that they trusted members from other ethnic groups somewhat or a lot, compared to 33 % who do not trust completely or have a little trust on members of other ethnic groups. These results are in line with the first round of Afrobarometer surveys held in 2001 which documents that 68 % of interviewees in that survey were of the opinion that they trust Tanzanians from other “ethnic groups” (Chaligha et. al. 2002). However, it is worth noting that a comparative look of interethnic and intra-ethnic trust among the 2005 interviewees suggests that intra-ethnic trust is higher than interethnic trust. This is evidenced by a total of 80 % who trusted members of their ethnic group compared to the 67 % trust placed on members of other ethnic groups. Although the comparison indicates a stronger intra-ethnic trust against interethnic trust, both figures are substantially high to indicate trust among ethnic groups, which again suggests low salience of ethnicity. The percentages went up in 2008 as a total of 76% affirmed their trust in members of other groups while and 23% declared that they do not trust members of other groups.
With regard to the way interviewees harbouring feelings of interethnic mistrust and those who do not vote, Afrobarometer surveys of 2005 and 2008 indicate that the ruling party which claims association to the PsIM enjoys a greater support of inter-ethnic trusting voters as the 67% and 76% compared to an average of around 50% and 62% for opposition parties in the 2005 and 2008 surveys respectively. This distribution entails that the voting patterns are nationalist although CCM that claims to be more nationalist wins more nationalist voters compared to opposition parties. However, in general terms, all parties enjoy support from Nationalist voters’ thus ethnic mistrust cannot be an all round trunk card in luring voters in Tanzania.

5.2.1.2. Synthesis of the PNU, Ethnicity and Voting

A critical analysis of the element of national unity, ethnicity and voting based on the issues discussed above suggests that the PNU enshrined in the PsIM have informed low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in the studied area. The degree of national identification over ethnic and any other identities was evident and their national pride was very high. The national pride has been attributed to the implementation of national integration policies that militated against salience of ethnicity on determining electoral support. Thus, questioning the parochial and paternalistic claims that neo-patrimonialsts strongly subscribe to while describing the salience of ethnicity in the conduct of African politics.

The few ethnic salient voters encountered could hardly make a difference to this direction in terms of number and logic. This is chiefly because the material conditions for ethnic salience revolving around ethnic discrimination and mistrust barely exist, and/or carry with them no salience to inform significant feelings of ethnic salience in voting. In this regard, the wise decision among contestants and parties was to canvass along nationalist policies for political success in the 2010 elections. It is imperative to note that deep feelings of national unity and its mitigating effects on ethnicity argued is surviving years after the collapse of the socialist AD that provided its foundation. Therefore, I argue that the PNU transcends ideological orientations because its effect on informing low salience of ethnicity in voting still stands. This conclusion logically begs the question why? Responses to the question will be provided in section 5.3 below. Meanwhile, let us see how another PsIM- EDNR informed the influence of ethnicity on voting.
5.2.2. EDNR, Ethnicity and Voting

The second PsIM was EDNR. As we briefly highlighted in the study’s analytical frame and further expounded in the fourth chapter, the AD was instrumental in making this promise a reality through the implementation of socialist and self-reliant policies. The espousal of the AD, and its consequent implementation was a vital stage in Tanzanian history. It set Tanzania on a unique historical path in terms of nation-building, EDNR and moving it towards domestic tranquillity while its neighbours moved toward factionalism and internal warfare (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; KAS, 2010). Two aspects elaborately described in sections 4.5.1.4 and 4.5.1.5 will be used to measure the role of EDNR on informing the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. These are the establishment of Ujamaa villages and nationalisation. The intent is to see how the promise of EDNR enshrined in the PsIM and efforts put to implement it has informed low or high salience of ethnicity in the determination of electoral votes in the 2010 elections. The assumption behind this section is that the promise of EDNR and implementation of the policies geared towards implementing them has improved inter-ethnic cooperation and diffused the role of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. The basis of this assumption is informed by conflict and neo-patrimonial theses that suggest that discriminative ethnic-based clientelistic resource distribution hamper inter-ethnic co-operation by causing conflicts between beneficiaries of the clientelistic networks and those who do not benefit (Rohner et al. 2013; Salawu and Hassan, 2011; Weber, 2009; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Posner 2007, 2005). Contextualised towards the current study, the salience of ethnicity on determining voting will inform voting patterns around the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the clientelistic distribution of resources (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005). According to Posner (2005) where ethnic-based clientelistic resources-distribution stands, politicians are encouraged to emphasise ethnic affiliations to attract voters and once a party is elected, it distributes national resources to its ethnic supporters to ensure continued support. Was this the situation in Mwanza?

5.2.2.1. Villagisation, Ethnicity and Voting

As for the first aspect, establishment of Ujamaa villages and the influence of ethnicity in soliciting voters’ support, my interest was to see how the villages and their associated intent of EDNR to villagers have had an influence on the way ethnicity motivate voting. The views of my interviewees (77%) pointed to the position that Ujamaa villages put people closer and the communal nature of production and distribution of public gains, had enhanced social cohesion and
unity promised by the PsIM. More important, they were of the view that the villages improved the
wellbeing of the many in the society. This is mainly because before Ujamaa villages most people
lived in scattered huts next to their small agricultural plots, making it almost impracticable for the
state to provide basic social amenities and/or mobilise them politically. The following words
express this view:

“Vijiji vya Ujamaa vimetuunganisha na kutufanya wakisasa sana. Unajua kabla ya vijiji sisi tulikuwa tukiishi
mbalimbali na ilikuwa vigumu sana kupata huduma za kisasa za afya. Shule ziliikuwa mbalani kiasi kwamba
ilibidi twende shule tukiwa na umri mkubwa. Vijiji vimetuleta pamoja na kutuletea huduma za jamii karibu na bila
ubaguzi. Ukaribu huu uliboresha mwingiliano na ulipunguza ukabilta kati siasa siwa kwakwata wanakijiji wote ni
ndugu” 80

“Ujamaa villages have unified and modernised us a lot. You know before villagisation we were living very far
from one another and it was very hard to get modern health care. Schools were very far to the extent that we had to
go to school at an advanced age. The villages brought us together but also brought social services close to all of us
indiscriminately. This closeness improved interactions and stands against tribalism in politics as all villagers are
relatives in the villages.”

Arguing along the same line a male retail shop owner in Mbela Village asserted:

“Vijiji vya Ujamaa vimeleta huduma za jamii za bure karibu na watu. Nyerere alituhamasisha kuja shule na
dispensaries in collaboration with the government and the government run them to ensure that everyone can enjoy
the resources. All of us in the village regardless of our tribes are served by these facilities for services. Such
policy bared tribal discrimination in daily life and much more when it comes to choosing leaders.”

Another young man in Mapilinga echoed the view that Ujamaa villages have lowered the influence
of ethnicity in voting when he divulged that:

“The Ujamaa villages and the social service that they brought made people of different backgrounds who were
scattered come together and live as one family. The schools and health facilities built were for the use of all. No
ethnic group was given favour and up to now that is not the case. People of all tribes get the services and therefore
I don’t think the villages can be the base of ethnic competition in elections. Instead the familyhood that it created
makes us all one and think that way while choosing our leaders.”

80 Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
81 Personal Interview with a male retail shop owner in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on
16.01.2015
82 Personal interview with a Young man in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
Arguing from a different angle one interviewee in Mbela suggested that villagisation strengthened the visibility and reach of the ruling party. In the context of ethnicity, villagisation enhanced CCM’s ability to mobilise voters to reject the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes as the following views evidence:

“Vijiji vya Ujamaa vimefanya Watanzania kuwa wamoja na kutoa jukwaa kwa TANU na CCM kwa ajili ya kulaani matumizi ya ukabila katika kuomba kuungwa mkono kwenye uchaguzi katika nchi nzima. Maoni haya yalirejewa katika kampeni na wanakijiji wote huheshimu wito huu.”

“The Ujamaa villages unified Tanzanians and gave TANU and CCM a platform for denouncing the use of ethnicity in soliciting electoral support across the entire country. These views were echoed in the campaigns and all villagers respect this call.”

The views presented above suggest that the villagisation exercise was positive to most people by bringing them together and according to them access to social amenities. These services could hardly be provided to them by the state because the scattered nature of their houses before villagisation. More important, the views suggest that public resources related to the villagisation were for the use of all and not ethnically divided to wield political support from the beneficiaries. In this regard, the resource distribution did not create room for inter-ethnic conflict among ethnicities which could influence voting. If the distribution was for enlisting support, then it was from the multi-ethnic members of the Ujamaa villages. In this way, villagisation diffused ethnically resource based clientelism and ethnic competition for votes that neo-patrimonialism consider being a feature of African voting. Also the view that the villages strengthened CCMs political organisation and mobilisation ability in villages suggest that they furthered the objectives of the PsIM. This position is predicated on the fact that CCM as the ruling party is the custodian of the PsIM and, therefore, furthering them is logical. The integrative character of villagisation coincides with Wangwe (2005) who argues that the Ujamaa villages managed to improve social cohesion and integration among villagers through communal farming; construction and running of public schools and health centres shared by all villagers. He also went on to tell that the villages also strengthened CCMs branches for political organisation and mobilisation.

The views expressed above are relevant to our dissertation in varied counts. They suggest that the elements of the promise of EDNR and efforts to implement them through the Ujamaa villages diffused the role of ethnicity. This is predicated on the fact that there were no conflictual elements of disproportionate distribution to inform voting. Also, the views suggest that the Ujamaa villages

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83 Personal Interview with a male Primary School Teacher in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015
had more weight in the rural areas than in the urban settings. This is understandable as the urbanites have not experienced directly the intricacies of the villagisation process. Equally, their socio-economic demands are different as explained in the subsequent paragraph. The equitable sharing of the national resources practiced in the villages is against the neo-patrimonial view that there is rampant divisive ethnic distribution of public resources in Africa that breeds ethnic voting. According to the neo-patrimonialists such state of affairs inevitably leads to ethnic voting and continued distribution of resources to supporters of the establishment. The people of Mwanza have in the 2010 elections proven the neo-patrimonial view irrelevant, as the basis for exercising this type of logic did not vividly exist.

As much as the most interviewees were pro the limited role of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices in the rural areas, it is important to note that some interviewees (23%) were against the view. They hold the view that villagisation has caused competition between the ethnic groups that mingled as a result of villagisation. According to this group of interviewees these divisions manifest in elections whereby the Sukuma originating from the core or close to the villages feel they have more rights to lead than others who came from far. While the dominant view considers villagisation to be a blessing due to communal production and distribution of social amenities, there is a minority view that harbours a rival view. Their position is banked on the idea that the Ujamaa villages undermined people’s initiative to succeed individually and perpetuate social and economic individualism. To this group, the scattered nature of their livelihood was better than the collective view of Ujamaa and its associated distribution of social services. This position is relevant to the comparatively richer villagers who had to leave their ancestral land and belonging to join the villages.

A critical look of the anti-villagisation proponents suggests that they were against the PsIM meant to spearhead national integration and diffuse salience of ethnicity in voting through fair and equitable distribution of national gains. The individualistic arguments based on the economic prowess of the comparatively richer people and their selfish ancestral origin, navigates away from the promise of EDNR. To this group, social differentiations should have been allowed as well as native based identities which according to Posner (2005) can fuel ethnic salience in voting. The views of this group, particularly in the rural areas, are not sound enough to reflect a general picture. This position is anchored on the fact that no evidence could be proven of such intra-ethnic
competition in the elections of Councillors that is the lowest in the GEs in Tanzania. Needless to mention the higher ones that are exonerated by Omari (2007) from sound claims of ethnic salience. The claims could be relevant to the village government elections where the demarcations of origin can be easily drawn and competing ethnic identities put into play as argued by (Glickman 1995; Jerman 1997; Omari, 1997) in section 4.4.1.1. Unfortunately, the village elections were not part of the 2010 elections. Although data did not widely support ethnic salient political canvassing and voting as well as the fact that the village level elections were not part of the 2010 elections, it is relevant to be known that such feelings exist. This necessity stands on the fact that further research can be done to unveil such observations.

It is equally imperative to note that despite the limited cry of the economic disadvantages of villagisation and disruption of ethnic originality, very few interviewees (2%) managed to confess to the researcher that villagisation has significantly affected their primordial ethnic ties. This view is based on the fact that most of them are from the same ethnic group, spare newcomers from other places who joined the villages. In the same token, their relationship with their ancestors is intact as the places are reachable. And the social as well as cultural traditions like rituals of passage, initiations burials etc were shared. This is in line with the debate on villagisation and ethnicities in section 4.4.1.4 that indicate that the villages served intra-ethnic as opposed to inter-ethnic integration. As such, the ethnic canvassing that could have been effected would be intra-ethnic. However, the EDNR that accompanied villagisation as argued above did not give room for both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic political canvassing to grow and gain salience. This is because it disallowed ethnic divisive clientelistic distribution. The words of a parliamentary aspirant I interviewed in Nyamagana are quite relevant in summing up the debate on villagisation, ethnicity and voting:

“Vijiji vya Ujamaa vinakosolewa kwa mtazamo wa kiuchumi wa kibepari ambao unaamini katika umiliki binafsi wa rasilimali. Vijiji vilipingana na ubinafsi na kuunganisha watu wa Makabila mbalimbali na kuboresha juhudi zao kupitia mgawanyo sawa wa huduma za jamii, hivyo kupunguza tofauti za upatikanaji wa huduma za umma kati yao. Kwa sababu hii, matumizi ya Ukabila katika kupiga kura ni madogo.”

“Ujamaa villages are criticised from a capitalist economic viewpoint that believes in private ownership and individualism. The villages fought individualism by unifying people beyond ethnic groups and complementing their efforts through equitable distribution of social services, thus mending disproportionate distribution of public services among them. Because of this, ethnic salience in voting is nominal.”

84 Personal interview with an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana held on 12.11.2014
On the basis of the discussion presented above, I argue that villagisation has contributed towards low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This is due to its role in enhancing inter and intra-ethnic integration as well as EDNR. This argument is based on the fact that ethnic integration and disproportionate distribution of public goods stand in the way against ethnic gaining salience. Such position is predicated on the fact that they form the opposite of the constitutive ingredients of politicised ethnicity as advanced by Wimmer 1997 in section 3.2.7. After establishing the influence of villagisation on informing the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, let us turn to the other variable picked to analyse the influence of the second variable under EDNR: nationalisation.

5.2.2.2. Nationalisation, Ethnicity and Voting

Nationalisation in Tanzania as widely discussed in section 4.4.1.4 was responsible for confiscating privately owned properties and putting them in the hands of the state to benefit Tanzanians indiscriminately (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). The intent was to ensure that the resources of the country are equitably divided among Tanzanians and benefit all of them equitably. The intent of nationalisation justifies the broader definition of nationalisation that goes beyond confiscation of the major means of production and distribution. This broader definition includes Africanisation of the bureaucracy civil service, expansion of educational opportunities through universal primary education and creation of a National Service programme meant to instil the sense of nationhood into youths (Lofchie, 2013). Below we present and discuss data related to the implications of nationalisation on informing the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.

The general view of my interviewees (78%) is that nationalisation has contributed towards enhancing the sense of nationhood and improving nation integration. This in turn contributed to low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices as argued in section 5.2.1. Interviewees holding this view argued that nationalisation has managed to create the base for EDNR and made them see the importance of sharing resources among them. This position is predicated on the assumption that no ethnic group is self-reliant. Moreover, if the levels of development are left to grow disproportionately, conflicts between ethnic groups that are developed and those that are not, are likely to abound. This to their views will lead to ethnic voting revolving around the richer and poorer ethnic groups, something that they would not like to see. This is mainly because it will
endanger peace. The following observations from an interview with a teacher at Mapilinga express such views:


“Nationalisation put the economy in the hands of Tanzanians and gave them employment without asking their tribal belonging. The money accrued from nationalised properties financed development pan territorially. This situation works today as tax from privatised ventures goes back to all Tanzanians through development projects. This act enhances national unity and peace which we vote for.”

Views from an extension officer in Misungwi concur with the opinion of the teacher of Mapilinga as he was of the opinion that:

“Kutaifishwa mali kumepunguza nafasi ya ukabila katika kuhamasisha wapiga kura kwa sababu maendeleo yote ya kiuchumi yaliwekwa chini ya serikali kwa makundi makabila yote. Kwa hiyo, ikapunguza ushindani baina ya makundi ambayo yangeweza kuwa msingi wa ukabila katika kupiga kura.”

“Nationalisation has lowered the role of ethnicity in soliciting voters support because it economic development was put under the hands of the government for the good of all ethnic groups. Therefore, it reduced competition among groups that could have provided the base for ethnic salience in voting.”

The notion of ethnic cooperation and indiscrimination expressed in the two subsequent ideas presented above is further revealed by the words of the then MP aspirant from Rufiji Street:


“The Sukuma are rich of resources and if all were used for the development of Mwanza alone, we would have been more developed. However, we do not have everything; we need salt and other things from others. Therefore, it is important that we do not discriminate other people. Instead we should complement each other to fill our gaps. Nationalisation taught this lesson and we complement each other across tribes. With such cooperation why shall we discriminate against tribes for the sake of gaining state power?”

While views of the above may reflect an elitist bias, the general support of the ordinary people on nationalisation’s role in lowering ethnic voting presented below, blow away such suspension. This is evidenced by views of a young man from Shamalala who in a mockery fashion suggested:

85 Personal interview with a female Primary School Teacher in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
86 Personal interview with an Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
87 Personal interview with a an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 12.11.2014

“Nationalisation gave the government and the ruling party chance to lower the influence of ethnicity in begging for votes. This happened by making every Tanzanian in one way or the other access public resources and think nationally. Nationalisation made everything national-the National Bank of Commerce, National Housing Corporation and other national corporations. Even the football national team was called Taifa (National) Stars. “National” became the catchword, how would one think ethnically?”

Similarly, views from a hawker from Misungwi village justify the non-elitist view of nationalisation’s role in lowering ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices:

“Makampuni yanayomilikiwa na serikali yanaajiri watu kutoka makabila mbalimbali nchini kote, na faida zilizumika kutoa huduma za umma kwa ajili yetu sote. Usawa kama huu huwa hauchocheni ukabila katika upigaji wa kura kwakuwa hakuna kabila lenye kinyongo cha kubaguliwa.”

“Government owned companies employ people from different tribes all over the country, and the gains are used to offer public services for all of us. Such equity does not advocate ethnicity from growing in voting as no ethnic group holds grudges for being discriminated.”

Views of an elderly woman from Nange further cement the role of nationalisation in undermining the influence of ethnicity in soliciting votes:

“No tribe has been given more of the nationalised resources, why shall people fight and vote ethnically?”

As much as the interviewees’ general view is that nationalisation has informed a negative base for ethnicity to inform voting, there were few interviewees (22%) who did not buy into this idea. The views of a male farmer from Nange attest to this position:

“Utaifishaji haupo. Makampuni yote yaliyotaifishwa yamebinafsishwa na mapya binafsi yameanzishwa. Kwa hiyo, havina nafasi yeyote katika masuala ya ukabila na maamuzi ya wapiga kura.”

“Nationalisation does not exist. All of the nationalised companies have been privatised and new private ones have been formed. Therefore, they have no impact on the role of ethnicity on determining voting.”

Likewise, a young man in Mapilinga expressed an identical argument when he remarked:


88 Personal interview with a young man in Shamalala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 16.11.2014
89 Personal interview with a male hawker in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 17.01.2015
90 Personal interview with an elderly woman in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015
91 Personal interview with a male farmer in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 20.01.2015
sababu ya utaifishaji. Bali, tuna ukabila mdogo katika uchaguzi kwa sababu ya amani na umoja; si kuchukuliwa kwa mali za wageni wa nje.” 92

“Where is nationalisation nowadays? We have sold everything except prison cells. The National Milling, regional trading companies and all other national ventures are no more. How can nationalisation influence anything? Nationalisation brought unity in the past and unity still exists. However, this is not because of nationalisation. Instead, we have limited ethnicity in elections because of peace and unity; not confiscation of foreign properties.”

An interesting view of a female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street buys into this narrow view of nationalisation. In her own words she argued that:

“Utaifishaji hauna uhusiano wowote na nia ya kupiga kura kwakuwa katika hali halisi utaifishaji haupo. Wala Ujamaa haupo ingawa katiba yetu inadai upo. Nia ya waasisi kutaifisha kwa manufaa ya watu pia imekufa maana viongozi wanaiba fedha za umma kwa faida zao binafsi. Tuna bahati kwamba fedha zilizoibiwa hazikwenda kundeleza ukabila wala hazikugaiwa kwa watu wa makabila yao tu. Lakini zinakwenda kwenye mifuko ya viongozi hao wasio na maadili. Wangezisambaza bikiliba ingekuwa sababu ya kusababisha kura kwa misingi ya kikabila.”

“Nationalisation has nothing to do with voting intentions as in strict sense it does not exist. Neither does Ujamaa although our constitution claims that it does. The founders’ intention to nationalise for the good of the people also died as leaders embezzle public funds for their selfish interest. We are lucky that the money they embezzle is not going to perpetuate ethnicity as is not shared among tribe mates. It goes to the pockets of those unethical leaders. Had they distributed it along tribal lines tribalism would have been a common factor in informing votes.”

The views above in the main indicate that privatisation of the economy took back to private hands what was nationalised. Therefore, since confiscation of privately owned economic venture is no longer the state policy, nationalisation cannot have any impact on informing the influence of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices. In other words, anything that was associated with nationalisation died when liberal policies came into existence. This position is against the majority view of my interviewees that suggests that the legacy of nationalisation as defined in its broad sense has a significant role in influencing low salience of ethnicity in voting. This stance is based on the fact that the state still entails using taxes from the privatised ventures for financing equitable development. Moreover, while it is true that a lot of nationalised companies have been privatised, some still exist and new ones have been formed. Likewise, the broader view of empowering Tanzanians still exists in varied contexts. For instance, the EDNR meant to lay flat developmental differences among regions and people are still implemented. This is done through budgetary initiatives financed by tax as widely argued by most interviewees and scholars like Wangwe

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92 Personal interview with an young man in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
93 Personal interview with a female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 18.11.2014
(2005). Similarly, the Africanisation initiative though not spelt out in that term is relevant as the civil service is predominantly black African. Additionally, initiatives of inculcating patriotism as well as educating Tanzanians as provided in Lofchie’s definition of nationalisation, still exist.

The view of the teacher that questions some leaders’ sense of nationality from the embezzlement point suggests no or limited chances of ethnicity gaining salience in influencing voters’ choices. This observation is anchored on the fact that although the acts depart from the PsIM, no evidence points to the fact that the embezzled monies have been disproportionately distributed among co-ethnics to lure electoral support. Such division according to Wimmer (1997) is necessary for salience of ethnicity in voting to gain currency. In this regard, the argument made by the minority of our interviewees on the matter is based on the narrow definition of nationalisation. This definition considers nationalisation within the confines of confiscation of foreign-owned companies for equitable distribution. From this angle their position makes some sense. However, from the broader aspect of enhancing nationhood and giving people access to public resources irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, it is rendered questionable.

5.2.2.3. Synthesis of EDNR, Ethnicity and Voting

The discussion of the elements of EDNR, ethnicity and voting above suggests that the component of EDNR enshrined in the PsIM have informed low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. The degree of insistence on the role of nationalisation in enhancing national unity over divisive ethnic polarisation is a clear testament to the pride invested in the nation, as indicated in the previous subheading. Nationalisation according to the interviewees enhanced national pride and unity by equitably distributing resources across regional and ethnic demarcations. The EDNR curtailed the room for ethnic polarisation that breeds ethnic voting once resources are disproportionately distributed among ethnic groups. In the study area feelings of favoured distribution of resources could not be evidenced to inform ethnic competition of resources. The interviewees who thought nationalisation had nothing to do in lowering ethnicity base their argument on the fact that the current economic system does not support public ownership in the business world and, therefore, the impacts of nationalisation ended with the liberal reforms. However, the broader definition of nationalisation encompassing the national unity elements and the continued EDNR viewed within the framework of the PsIM still suggests a

From the discussions above I deduce that the EDNR in the area of study has built on the already existing deep feelings of national unity in Tanzania and its mitigating effects on the use of ethnicity in soliciting votes. The nationalist feelings prevail over claims of embezzlement of public funds and favouritism that are levelled against some public officials. This is because although the embezzlement could have an effect on the ability to distribute public resources but it was not done to serve ethnic ends. In this regard, nationalistic feelings could be affected but without fuelling ethnicity as the unethical acts never meant to further ethnic interests which could inform salience of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices. Under such circumstances, I argue that the nationalist feelings and the legacy of EDNR promised by the PsIM has survived decades after the demise of the AD that provided its base. Thus the implementation of the promise of EDNR embedded in the PsIM transcended the ideological changes from socialism to capitalism. More important, its effect on informing low salience of ethnicity in voting is intact irrespective of the ideological shift. Such situation informs the widely agreed view among interviewees that contestants and parties in the 2010 elections canvassed along nationalist rather than ethnic policies for electoral success. Once again the sustenance of the socialist based nationalist discourse informed by the AD amid a liberal democratic capitalistic era raises the question why. Before providing answers to such a question, let us turn to the influences of the last PsIM on informing the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.

5.2.3. Peace, Ethnicity and Voting

The third PsIM was to ensure that Tanzania is an Island of peace, and Tanzanians enjoy that peace to the fullest. The promise was given to all independent African states but Tanzania is among few countries that put the promise into practise. This is evidenced by the fact that it is more peaceful compared to other African countries if measured by violent conflicts as indicated in section 1.1 and 3.4.5. This is the case despite the fact that most of the conventional theories of conflict suggest that Tanzania “should” be beset by violent conflict because of its ethnic and religious heterogeneity as well as the acute economic hurdles facing its citizens as argued in section 3.4.5. The structure of Tanzania’s ethnic heterogeneity in the light of the conflict theories does not only presuppose that violent ethnic conflicts should be high in Tanzania but also ethnic salience in voting (Bratton et al,
2011). Both suppositions have never been proven, as highlighted in the general introduction and the detailed ethno-political narrative of Tanzania. Below we discuss how the promise of peace as embedded in the PsIM, and manifested in varied efforts to ensure its existence has informed the influence of ethnicity on voters’ choices in the 2010 elections.

86% of my interviewees were of the view that the promise of peace and the initiatives meant to implement it have thwarted the use of ethnicity in seeking electoral support. The data gathered from the interviewees generally suggest that initiatives like denouncing politicisation of ethnicity, application of violent means to demanding rights, national integration and EDNR have enhanced peace and made my interviewees fond of the concept of peace. They expressed opinions against ethnic salience in the conduct of politics and elections which have proven to be harmful in other countries of Africa. The main reason advanced revolves around the belief that ethnic salience in voting could trigger violent ethnic conflicts and subsequent adverse effects among the competing ethnic groups. This was detested because it would affect development and dent the peace that our founding fathers worked hard to build since independence. It is against this background that most interviewees were of the view that the use of ethnicity in political canvassing shall be avoided by all possible means. The following words well summarises this general position:

"Kama kuna jambo moja ambalo Watanzania wanaweza kujivunia lichwa ya kuwa maskini, ni hali ya amani wanayoifurahia. Kwa kutumia ukabila kuungwa mkono kisiasa tutajikuta tunakuwa Rwanda au Burundi nyingine ambapo mauaji ya kimbari yamesababisha vifo vya maisha ya watu wasio na hatia kwa kwa faida ya wanasiasa ambao kwa maslahi yao walitumia ukabila katika siasa. Mungu atuepushe hali yake ambapo kama hiyo wakati tunaendelea kukataa migawanyiko ya kikabila katika siasa kama tulivyofanya katika uchaguzi uliopita."

“If there is one thing that Tanzanians can boast of despite being poor, is the state of peace that they enjoy. Using ethnicity in garnering political support will make us another Rwanda or Burundi where ethnic cleansing claimed innocent lives for the advantage of politicians who politicised ethnicity for their political interests. God should spare us from such situation while we continue to reject tribal political divides in electioneering as we have in the previous elections.”

More interviewees in the study area could not express the above sophistication but outrightly said ethnic voting is bad for peace which is necessary for socio-economic wellbeing. One interesting view was provided by a fisherman in Igoma who told me that ethnicity in elections should be avoided because Tanzania’s neighbours cannot harbour influx of refugees from Tanzania the way Tanzania did for Burundi, Rwanda and Congo. Therefore, a lot of us will die and those remaining will be indigent.

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94Personal interview with a female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street, Miroango Ward, Nyamagana District held on 18.11.2014
The views above are representative of many interviewees who lamented about Tanzania’s state of poverty particularly by stating that there is high level of joblessness, expensive social services and utilities. The hardships notwithstanding they are proud to be Tanzanians as discussed in section 5.2.1, for the peace they enjoy compared to other countries. A feeling that is even envied by Tanzania’s neighbours as the following quote from a Kenyan known by the name of Chris while contributing to a discussion on the Global Voices blog about the 2010 GEs in Tanzania. Chris was of the view that:

“For most Kenyans (as other non-Tanzanians who are not tired of inciting ethnic hatred on this blog) it will be hard to understand Tanzanian politics. Ethnicity has no political value in Tanzania despite being as big as Kenya and Uganda combined and having about 140 ethnic groups; History tells there is no tribe that has ruled the country than others. A person who should be singled out for ensuring unity is Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. While Tom Mboya and Jomo Kenyatta were pride of national symbols with mighty connotation like Lion, Nyerere preferred the coolest animal in the jungle, Giraffe, depicting his commitment to peace. There is sufficient evidence that in his Life Mwalimu was very visionary to the extent that his legacy is so strong that it influences the decisions on varied matters. Nyerere unified Tanzanians through Swahili and managed to knit together the entire Tanzanian society” (Global Voices, 2010).

The view of the Kenyan reaffirms the significance of peace and the concerted efforts made by the country’s founding father to build and nurture peace. The role of the founding fathers highlighted by Chris, inferably suggests that the implementation of the PsIM have had an impact on the way ethnicity determines voting. This is due to the fact that they are the ones who envisioned them and strived hard to implement them as well elaborated throughout Chapter IV. Chris associates peace to the communicative and interactive role of Swahili that has been widely discussed in Chapter IV and in section 5.2, as well as section 5.4.1 that deals with the use of Kisukuma in soliciting electoral support. An interesting innovation brought forward by Chris that has not been well documented is the use of pro-peace national symbols in promoting and nurturing peace. The comparison of the Giraffe used in peaceful Tanzania and Lion by the ethnic violent Kenya is quite interesting. It usefully explains tools of civic peace building in the two neighbouring states and their implications on peacefulness and national integrity. The symbol, chosen and instrumentally enacted by Nyerere in view of a national identity, partakes of the political imaginary shared by Tanzanians and made explicit in the PsIM.

The denunciation of the use of ethnicity in soliciting votes based on the negative experiences it has had in countries like Rwanda, Kenya and Burundi highlighted in the first quotation under this section and other interviewees informed the significance of competing parties and candidates in
Mwanza to make peace an important element in their campaign. One interviewee summarises this aspect very well when he remarked:

"Wakati wa mikutano ya CCM kama kuna jambo moja ambalo unaweza kuotea kwamba litasemwa zaidi ya neno lingine lolote ni amani. Wanatunia muda wao mwingi kuhusisha amani ya Tanzania na kazi ya waasisi wa taifa hili. Wanatuambia jinsi wa kifaa dhidi ya migawanyiko ya kikabila kupitia kwa kusambaza kwa usawa rasilimali na kupunguza tofauti za kipato ambazo zinaweza kuchochea migogoro ya kikabila. Wanafanya hivi wakijua kwamba Wataanza wanapenda sana amani, hata kama baadhi ya haki zao za msingi zinaporwa. Wapinzani wanajua ukweli huu, kwa hivyo nao wanahubiri amani na kukataa matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa pia. Hata hivyo, wao hawasisitizi uhusiano na amani kwa sababu inafanya CCM. Kwa ujumla, pande zote mbili (CCM na wapinzani) wanaahadi amani na kukataa ukabila katika siasa pia. Hata hivyo, wao hawasisitizi uhusiano wa waasisi na amani kwa sababu inafanya CCM. Kwa ujumla, pande zote mbili (CCM na wapinzani) wanaahadi amani na kukataa ukabila katika siasa pia.

"During CCMs meeting if there is one thing that you can bet that will be said more than any other word is peace. They use most of their time to associate it with the work of the founders of the nation. They tell us how they unified people against ethnic divisions through equitably distributing resources and reducing income inequalities that could fuel ethnic conflicts. They are doing this knowing that Tanzanians love peace so much, even if some of their basic rights are infringed. The opposition know this fact so it preaches peace and reject political tribalism as well. However, they downplay the association of the founders and peace because it favours CCM. All in all both parties (CCM and the opposition) promise peace and reject ethnic salience in voting".

The views of the civil servant tell us the importance placed on peace (amani in Swahili) by the ruling and opposition parties in luring votes. As for the ruling party, it is very common for their candidates and campaigners while campaigning to reflect the role of the founding fathers in building and nurturing peace by using a common Swahili saying “usione vinaelea vimeundwa” literally meaning “you should not just see things flowing, they have been made”. This common saying intends to convey to voters’ the message that the peace that Tanzania enjoys is a product of the nation-building policies implemented by TANU and its successor CCM as widely discussed throughout Chapter IV. The expression illustrates the instrumentalist and constructivist view on identity that is common among Tanzanians, to support a political imaginary in service of the nation, as Nyerere did. Peace does not come by itself. It is the product of concerted efforts - peacework so to say. An Extension Officer in an interview in Misungwi underlined this and seconded the idea of centrality of peace in the 2010 campaigns as well as its advantage to CCM presented in the view above when he asserted that:

"CCM wanatuambia kwamba amani tunayoifurahia hajaletwa na Mungu bali ni matokeo ya juhudi za makusudi za TANU na CCM kupuka ukabila katika uendeshaji wa siasa. Wanatukumbusha kupitia vyombo vya habari ujumbe wa Mwalimu juu ya amani zinazokemaa matumizi ya ukabila kuvuta wapiga kura kutoke na nafasi yake katika kusababisha migogoro ya kikabila na vita. Wataanza wanavutia na maneno haya kwa sababu wanapenda amani na kuunga mkono vyama vinavyosimamia amani."

95 Personal interview with a civil servant in Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 19.11.2014
96 Personal interview with a Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
“CCM tell us that the peace that we enjoy is not God given but a result of TANU’s and CCM’s concerted efforts to avoid tribalism in the organisation of politics. They remind us through the media Mwalimu's peace advocating messages that denounce the use of ethnicity in winning voters due to its chances of invoking violent ethnic conflicts. Tanzanians are moved by these words because they love peace and support peace loving parties.”

The views above are well comprehended if read together with the opinion of a secondary school student in Kishiri A street who disclosed that:

"Unajua maandamano yanayoandaliwa na CHADEMA ni msaada kwa CCM kushinda kwa sababu Watanzania wanachukia vitendo vya vurugu na maneno ambayo huchoea matumizi ya nguvu katika kudai haki yanayotamkwa na viongozi wa CHADEMA. Ni maoni yangu ya dhani kwamba jambo muhimu zaidi kwa ajili ya chama chochote kushinda uchaguzi nchini Tanzania ni amani! Sababu zengine zinazohusiana na utendaji zinafuata. Hatutaki kuwa kama Kenya ambako wowatike uchaguzi unapofanyika hofu ya kutokea kwa ghasia za kikabila kuhusiana na uchaguzi ipo juu." 97

“You know demonstrations organised by CHADEMA help CCM to win because Tanzanians hate violent acts and words that incite the use of force in claiming rights uttered by CHADEMA leaders. It is my frank opinion that the most important thing for a party to win elections in Tanzania is peace! Others related to performance follow. We do not want to be like Kenya where whenever elections are held the fears of ethnic related electoral violence to abound are great.”

The view that Tanzanians do love peace is attested by the fact that most of my interviewees (91%) condemned the use of violence in demanding their economic and political rights even if the government commits grave breaches of democracy that could easily invoke chaos in other countries. For instance, when I asked them if they will resort to violence if the government suspends elections indefinitely, ends the ongoing constitutional making process or the President dissolves the NA. Many of them never wanted such things to happen but if they do they said they will not contest violently instead they would like political parties to engage in a dialogue to resolve the matters. More important, most of my interviewees (92%) told me that they never signed any petition and/or participated in demonstrations or boycott in their lifetime, and have not even written letters to newspapers or commented on social networks. The failure of the interviewees to take part in the matters pointed out above not only suggests that most of the people are politically inactive but also that political parties shall strive to address their differences amicably to win electoral support. Such love of peace and the adverse impacts of politicised ethnicity indicated above are enough to deduce that peace lovers would not be moved by ethnic political canvassing and much more vote ethnic-wise.

Few interviewees (9%) who participated in the demonstrations were of the view that they had to apply violent means to stamp undemocratic tendencies. This is because most people are docile and

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97 Secondary school Girl Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 06.11.2014

198
refrain from the use of violence in the organisation of politics. An opinion of a Kurya Street vendor who has completed advanced secondary education in Nyamagana and identified himself with CHADEMA portray this line of thought:

"Watanzania ni wapole sana, hasa Wasukuma. Wao hawataki kushiriki katika maandamano kudai haki zao hata kama kwa kufanya hivyo watafaidika. Hawa ni watu ambao wanaampiga kura wale ambao watanaahidi amani na mambo ambayo hayataihatarisha ni kama matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa. Ndio maana chama tawala kinazungumzia amani na amani na amani badala ya ustawi wa kiuchumi na jamii. Amini ninakuambia, CCM wanaweza kuzungumzia ubaya wa matumizi ya ukabila kuhamasisha kura, kuonyesha vipande vya video vya mawuaji ya kikabila na kuomba watu wawapigie kura na kushinda hasa katika maeneo ya vijijini. Katika maeneo ya mijiini tunataka zaidi ya hayo. Ndio maana sisi tunachagua CHADEMA. Hatuchukii amani au tunataka utumii kikabila utumii kikabila kura lakini wakati mwingine tunahitaji kuzungumzia ubaya wa kushinda watafaidika. Katika maeneo ya mijiini tunatamiza utumii kikabila kura lakini wakati mwingine tunahitaji kuzungumzia ubaya wa kushinda watafaidika katika maeneo ya vijijini. Ndio maana sisi tunachagua CHADEMA. We don’t hate peace or want ethnicity to be used to solicit votes but sometimes we need to demonstrate to express our dissatisfaction and make the state address our needs.”

The view of the street vendor adds an important dimension to the debate on peace, ethnicity and voting in Mwanza. First it does indicate a difference of opinions and perception on the role of peace and ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This is because to him, peace informed low ethnic salience is more common and applicable in the rural settings compared to the urban areas. Also the street vendor suggests that the Sukuma who are the main voters in Mwanza as indicated in the description of the study area in section 2.3 are docile and more peace loving than other ethnic groups in the Lake Zone. The submissive and peace-loving quality of the Sukuma is widely shared among Tanzanians as they have never used their numerical advantage to ensure political visibility (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2004). Such characteristic contributes towards making most of them influenced by non-violent initiatives to limit the occurrence of violence. This inferably suggests that the use of ethnicity for garnering political support is discouraged among them and because of their numerical advantage contesting parties that wish to win the Sukuma should ensure them peace in exchange for their votes.

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98 Personal interview with a a Kurya Street vendor in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 13.11.2014
The vendor’s take on the Sukuma is understandable as most Tanzanians view the Sukuma to be polite and non-aggressive compared to his ethnic group (Kurya) and neighbours Jita both from Mara region. Although we do not have means to substantiate the stereotypes dominating the public imaginary, it can be said that the two ethnic groups are known for being rude and aggressive in fighting for their conceived rights leading to the occurrence of violent conflicts among ethnicities, locals and investors and sometimes with state apparatuses. A possible substantiation is the special police in Tarime district within Mara region due to the frequency of deadly conflicts related to cattle raiding and mining related conflicts between the indigenous people and foreign miners. Actually in Tanzania there is a common understanding among people that the Kurya are militant in nature and a job well suited for them is serving in the Army. Two of the Chiefs of the Tanzania People Defence Force came from that ethnic group something unheard of in other security forces. In this context, it is understandable that the interviewee was of the view that the Sukuma are viewed cowardice and thus they compromise there basic rights. To the interviewee the peace threatening impacts associated with the salience of ethnicity on anchoring voters’ choices are are meant to deny people’s rights. He is of the view that the fear of the impacts of ethnic salience shall not take precedence over rational economic factors. More important, as indicated above stressing the country’s peace advantages the ruling party and, therefore, its political rivals would hardly wish to compete with it in this end. They prefer to debate on the economy and aspects like protection and use of public resources for which they could convincingly criticise the ruling party and its government.

A point that is worth mentioning regarding the root of the difference of opinion between the rural and urban people on the role of peace, ethnicity and voting revolves around the urban complex socio-economic set-up and of the superior socio-economic characteristics of the urban people. The demonstrations mentioned by the militant Kurya are a product of the economic and political rights deemed relevant for the urban people involved in entrepreneurial and paid sectors to survive. This is justified by the re-occurrence of multi-ethnic small businessmen demonstrations in Mwanza geared towards demanding better conditions for doing business that got lots of followers in Mwanza town. These demands took centre stage in the campaigns in Nyamagana according to the interviewees from Nyamagana.
The street vendors and ordinary people who needed better conditions for doing business and entrepreneurial support irrespective of their ethnic background, saw demonstrations as a way of getting their rights despite its peace threatening perspective. Another point equally important here is that despite the opinion that the Sukuma are docile, the demonstrations were multi-ethnic and included Sukuma. More important, it was never informed by a clientelistic distribution of favours to a business community of one or few ethnic groups. In this way, the event suggested elements of non-ethnic issue-based interest aggregation and peaceful co-existence among ethnic groups. Such situation stands in the way of ethnic polarisation and salience of ethnicity in elections as people join cross-cutting interests instead of ethnic belonging. This is indeed a contributing factor to Wenje’s electoral success in 2010 although he is not a Sukuma by ethnic group. All in all, as much as different arguments on the relation between peace and ethnic salience apply to the rural and urban people in Mwanza (as in the Nyamagana and Misungwi situations), both categories of residents have proven to be admirers of peace. Such deduction can be derived from the views directly in favour of peace in the last sentence of the Kurya street vendor which indicates that he does not love violence but resorts to it as the last resort. In this regard, the significance of peace and its relevance in dissuading the salience of ethnicity in soliciting electoral support is indeed significant.

To further show the interviewees’ love of peace and its influence on the use of ethnicity in soliciting votes in elections, most interviewees (88%) did not want national radio and television stations to broadcast in vernacular languages. They thought such act will increase the use of ethnicity in political canvassing which will turn to be detrimental to the peaceful situation that Tanzanians value far above a lot of other things as indicated in this and the previous sub-heading. This position is substantiated by the words of a Bar-maid in Shamalala Street, and collaborated by other interviewees:

"Mwanza inakaliwa na Wasukuma wengi lakini kwa kutumia Kisukuma kutangaza televisheni na redio wakati wa kampeni haitukiwa maana ni ubaguzi dhidi ya wasio Wasukuma. Ubaguzi huu ni mbaya kwa amani kwakuwa itakuwa ni mwanzo wa migogoro ya kikabila." 99

“Mwanza is dominantly resided by the Sukuma but using Kisukuma to broadcast television and radio programmes during campaigns is uncalled for as it is discriminating against non-Sukuma. The discrimination is bad for peace as will be the beginning of tribal conflicts.”

Correspondingly, an Extension Officer in Misungwi village was of the view that:

99 Personal interview with a Bar-maid in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward , Nyamagana District held on 15,11.2014

“I don’t want us to be like South Africa where several news bulletins are aired in vernacular languages. This is not necessary here as it will provide an avenue for spreading ethnic hatred and conflicts among contestants of different ethnic backgrounds. Tanzanians want peace and unity which is well served by using Swahili that is understood by all Tanzanians. Vernaculars will enhance tribalism and incite tribal divisions and conflicts that are uncommon in Tanzania.”

A Primary School Teacher in Mapilinga Village also seconded the view that vernaculars should be avoided for the sake of peace and national integration by saying:

“....haven’t you heard of the negative role played by the ethnic radio stations in the Rwandan genocide? I have, and therefore I don’t want such a thing to happen here in Tanzania. Let us hear the vernaculars in traditional dance songs played on Swahili transmitted radio stations. Election campaigns should not be aired in languages other than Swahili to avoid the Rwanda incidences.”

Vernaculars are suitable within folklore activities and leisure but not in politics, where culture becomes ethnicity. An MP aspirant interviewed in Rufiji Street also followed suit by arguing that:

“Why shall we make a step backward? Swahili is known by everyone and going back to using vernaculars in cosmopolitan societies will divide people and enhance ethnic salience in elections, which has been widely denounced in Tanzania. Vernaculars are not used in broadcasting now and this shall not be allowed by all means to sustain peace and national integration much needed for development.”

The views against the use of vernaculars widely presented above indicate that the love of peace predicated on the national integrative nature of Tanzania’s politics is valued so high. Examples of incidences of political mobilisation employed in other countries like Rwanda provided a basis for the interviewees to denounce the use of vernacular languages. This is against the neo-

100 Personal interview with an Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
101 Personal interview with a female Primary School Teacher in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
102 Personal interview with a an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 12.11.2014
patrimonialist thesis that suggests Africans prefer traditionalism so as to enhance local patron-client relationship. The rejection of the use of vernaculars concords with earlier observations that local patron-client relationships and ethnic canvassing were not significant in informing voters’ choices.

5.2.3.1. Synthesis of the Peace, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices

A critical look at the relation between peace, ethnicity and voting suggests that the promise of peace enshrined in the PsIM has informed low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. The interviewees have proven to be proud of their national identity, unity and comparative peace to its neighbours despite their high rate of poverty. While there are claims that the Sukuma do not love peace but are cowards and docile therefore taken advantage of by the ruling party’s promises of peace and calls for denouncing ethnic salience in politics, the frequency of the imperative of peace given by the interviewees rejects the claim. Indeed, the rationale provided for the need to avoid the adverse impacts of violence that have been triggered by politicisation of ethnicity in Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi as depicted in the general introduction further questions the significance of the docile characteristic claimed to inform lower salience of ethnicity on determining electoral choices in the study area. The interviewees’ opinions demonstrate that the discourse against violence is well-entrenched in the Tanzanian’s minds and a proactive choice against the effects of violent-prone ethnicity as in other countries providing practical experience. Moreover, the impetus for the PsIM started before the pointed violence gained currency in those countries. Therefore, I argue that the rationale for enhancing peacefulness as informed by the PsIM serves as a frame through which Tanzanians reject ethnicity in mobilising voters support.

5.2.4. Concluding Discussion: PsIM, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices in Competitive Elections in Tanzania

A general conclusion to be made concerning this objective is the fact that the PsIM has informed low salience of ethnicity in the determination of electoral votes in Mwanza. This is in line with the general picture of Tanzania presented in the ethno-political narrative that constituted Chapter IV and is against the neo-patrimonial position that African states are traditional and paternalistic thus giving ethnicity a centre stage in informing voters’ choices. A critical analysis of the PsIM as enshrined in section 3.4.4 and various initiatives done to put them to effect in the area of national unity, EDNR and peace broadly enshrined in the AD and beyond has created an environment
militating against the salience of ethnicity in voting. This is quite logical for any independent state that has tasted colonialism as such states wished to see that they benefit from the fruits of independence resource-wise and also have peace and security to enjoy their social and economic lives. It is against this background I argue that the voters in Mwanza substantiated that they are by far proud of and uphold their national identity, are appreciative of the EDNR and value peace when they are encountered with electoral decisions. All of this is clearly evidenced by the frequency with which the interviewees cited the significance of national unity, EDNR and peace in sections 5.2.1 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 as the primary sources of national pride and stumbling blocks to the salience of ethnicity on determining electoral votes. In this way, the use of ethnicity in luring votes in the 2010 election would have been heading against the direction that the interviewees believe in.

Cognisant of the fact that the 2010 elections took place after the collapse of the AD which is responsible for providing the foundation for actualising the PsIM through an extensive post-independence socialist nation-building policy, entails that the PsIM have proven to be applicable even beyond the socialist era. This position I argue is predicated on the fact that Tanzania is implementing capitalist liberal democratic market-oriented policies which are against the letter and spirit of the famous AD and the monolithic political dispensation as extensively argued in Chapter IV. Such state of affairs intrigues the question why that is the case. This question is addressed in the next sub-section of this dissertation that endeavours to explain the dynamics behind influences of ethnicity on determining voting choices in the 2010 elections in Mwanza.

5.3. Explaining the Influences of Ethnicity on determining Voters’ Choices in the 2010 General Elections

Section 5.2 above has managed to elicit how the PsIM and implementation of some policies meant to realise them have influenced low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices in the 2010 elections in Mwanza. The section confirms that the intent of the PsIM that meant to reverse the divisive, exploitative and insecurity elements that colonialism instilled have influenced ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices in the studied area. In the section referred and in the fourth chapter of the dissertation, it was argued that the attainment of the PsIM was hinged upon the implementation of the socialist AD. However, Tanzania has witnessed varied political and
economic changes that are against the letter and spirit of Ujamaa, yet the level of ethnic salience in voting have remained low. Of interest to this dissertation was to explore why the PsIM have continued to inform the influences of ethnicity even after the collapse of the AD and commencement of liberal democratic market-oriented policies.

Since socialism and liberalism are opposing ideological viewpoints, it was of interest to this dissertation to unveil the explanations as to why the socialist crafted PsIM still produced low salience of ethnicity on voters’ choices. To be able to capture this, a question on how the PsIM and initiatives meant to realise them have influenced the role of ethnicity in voters’ choices in 2010 was succeeded by a follow-up question on why the PsIM have had such effect. Also, interviewees were asked a general question on what influences their voting choices, and why ethnicity has consistently remained low in Tanzanian electoral politics compared to other countries. The interviewees’ explanations revolve around the nation-building frame, the unifying efficiency of Swahili, civic education, the legacy of Mwalimu’s leadership and legal restrictions, as presented and discussed in the subheadings below.

5.3.1. The Nation-building Frame

The views of (84%) of my interviewees pointed out that the PsIM and efforts meant to realise them have sustainably lowered salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections. This is due to a meticulous framing of an over-arching vision to unite Tanzanians nationally and avoiding divisive tendencies in the conduct of politics in general and voting in particular. The over-arching nationalist vision won the hearts of Tanzanians because the fight against ethnicity was framed as a war - a do or die phenomenon. The words of a teacher from Mapilinga village attest to this position:

"Uongozi wa kisiasa umetangaza vita dhidi ya magonjwa, ujinga na umaskini ambavyo zinahitaji umoja wa kitaifa, mshikamano, amani na utulivu ili kufanikiwa. Matakwa haya yanakinzana na matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi kwa sababu ukabila utazua mfarakano na migogoro ambayo itatufanya kushindwa vita na kuimarisha maendeleo duni." 103

"The political leadership waged war against diseases, ignorance and poverty; that needed national unity, solidarity, peace and tranquillity to succeed. These prerequisites stand in the way of ethnic salience in elections because it could breed disunity and conflicts which will make us lose the war and enhance underdevelopment”

103 Personal interview with a female Primary School Teacher in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
The words of the teacher from Mapilinga were seconded by the then MP aspirant interviewed in Rufiji street who was of the view that:

“Waanzilishi wa taifa hili wameweka msingi imara sana wa kujenga umoja wa kitaifa na kupinga matumizi ya ukabila katika kupiga kura. Hii ilifanyika kwa kutangaza vita dhidi ya masuala ambayo yanaweza kugawanya Watanzenia kama ukabila, kidini, ukanda, matabaka, n.k. Msingi huu unaendelea kuunda masuala ya ukabila katika siasa kwasababu Watanzenia bila kujali mwelekeo wa maoni yao ya kiuchumi wanatambua umuhimu wa amani na mshikamano katika kulala maendeleo kwa wote.”

“A retired civil servant in Rufiji Street further supported the idea put forward by the Mapilinga teacher and the then parliamentarian hopeful when she asserted that:


“Arguing along the same lines a secondary school girl in an interview held at Kishiri A Street had this to say:

“Katika nchi maskini kama zetu kuleta maendeleo ni suala la dharura linalohitaji umoja, amani na maelewano miongoni mwa makabila. Kuruhusu ukabila kupata nafasi kubwa katika uchaguzi itakuwa kusaliti maendeleo kwake kugawa vikosi vinavyopaswa kupambana kwa pamoja kuupiga umashiriki.”

“In poor countries like ours attainment of development is a matter of emergency that need unity, peace and understanding among ethnic groups. Allowing ethnicity to gain salience in elections would be sabotaging development by dividing the forces required to jointly fight poverty.”

The views presented above suggest Tanzanians’ concern about ethnic salience in election that will disturb peace and unity. The variable is seen as central to bringing development. An interesting point drawn out of the data presented above is the war imagery attuned to Tanzania’s development.
enemies and the requisites for fighting them – national unity, peace and tranquillity. The requisites were considered so central to explain low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in a country that has prided itself on peacefulness for decades. The enemies of the nation of which Tanzanians had to fight could easily have been called challenges. As such, the aspects of national unity and peace deemed central for winning the challenges would not have been given war-like attention. According to Mzee Mwiru, the choice of war imagery was not unintentional. This choice was predicated on the fact that war is a powerful and commonly understood concept. It is a metaphor understood even by those who have not tasted its direct impacts. (The giraffe is another metaphor partaking of the political imaginary). More important, war is an immediate threat. War requires sacrifice and perseverance on the part of the fighters and the general citizenry. Moreover, those who do not participate in a war are traitors to the war’s course. From such line of thought, supporting ethnic salience in voting is tantamount to betraying the war against development by endangering unity which is a requisite for winning the war. The words of a STAR TV presenter in Mwanza that I interviewed, Doto Bulendu, well disclosed the centrality of the war imagery in ensuring low salience in voting when he explicitly argued that:

“Wapigania uhuru wetu wamefanikiwa kufanya raia wa nchi yetu kwa hiari kujiunga katika mapambano dhidi ya matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi. Wamewezesha mtu yeyote ambaye anaingilia mapambano dhidi ya matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa kujisikia kama msaliti na adui wa juhudi za kuleta amani na maendeleo ya nchi yetu. Hisia hizi za kina zinaelezea kwa nini Watanzania hawapigi kura kikabila.”

“The fighters of our independence managed to make citizens of our country to willingly join in the fight against the use of ethnicity in elections. They made anyone who interferes with the fight against the use of ethnicity in politics to feel as a traitor and an enemy of our country’s peace and development endeavours. These deep feelings explain why Tanzanians do not vote ethnically.”

According to Bulendu the war imagery usefully guaranteed involvement and support from citizens in diffusing the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In this regard, the war imagery acted as a unifying factor. This is based on the fact that during war enemies put aside their differences and unite against the immediate threat. The threat of ethnic salience in voting in Tanzania has been well framed in the PsIM and well articulated by the political leadership from a hypothetical and real standpoint. The framing of the enemies of development in war terms and the requisites for winning the war-national unity and peace provided Tanzanians with an opportunity to channel their aggressiveness against the enemies and ensure that the requisites for success are respected. The respect of national unity and peace all point to informing low salience of ethnicity

\[107\] Personal interview with Doto Bulendu held on 19.11.2014 at Star TV offices in Mwanza
in voting. This is due to the fact that political canvassing along ethnic lines was considered to be a cause of disunity and violent conflicts, which will lead to losing the war whose triumph is vital for people’s wellbeing. Although the aggression necessary in a conventional war is different, and guns and blood may bring a more satisfying adrenaline rush, the efforts to win the war required sweat and sacrifice as intense as a conventional war. By aggressively fighting the enemies through nation-building and peaceful initiatives, Tanzanians could unite against a common foe; unleash their aggressiveness to ensure that the developmental problems are tackled in a non-ethnic polarised and peaceful manner. In this way, Tanzania’s framing of its development efforts as a war helped to unify its people toward denouncing ethnic salience in voting. This is mainly because national unity is a prerequisite for winning the war against poverty and bringing development. The values instilled by this frame – that everyone’s effort is necessary for bringing development and that violent conflicts which in Africa are mostly ethnic-based, continue to inform Tanzanians perceptions of low ethnic salience in voting. Such position is anchored on the fact that ethnic violence like the ones experienced in Burundi and Rwanda deterred development from being registered. It is against this background that I argue that the framing of the major challenges of development as a war has informed low salience of ethnicity in Mwanza. This is mainly because requisites for winning the framed war (nation-building, peace and tranquillity) have proven to be significant in minimising the role of ethnicity in voting as seen in section 5.2.1 and 5.2.3.

5.3.2. The Role of Swahili in Ethnic Integration and Peaceful Co-existence

The importance of Swahili in influencing low salience of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs was profoundly stated by 86% of my interviewees. This was mainly due to Swahili’s role in enhancing national unity and peaceful co-existence among members of varied ethnic groups. This position was well argued by an NGO worker in Misungwi Village who was of the view that:


108 Personal interview with an NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015
“The use of Swahili as a national language and particularly in political campaigns spared us of ethnic divisions in voting. This is because it facilitates inter-ethnic communication and cooperation. Swahili has made all Tanzanians relatives who interact at ease and cooperate in development endeavours. The role of Swahili in enhancing national identity and unity contributed a lot in making ethnicity insignificant in mobilising voters’ support. By using Swahili nationally, ethnic languages have limited room of anchoring votes.”

Similar views on the role of Swahili in informing limited role of ethnicity on determining electoral support in the 2010 elections in Mwanza were advanced by a Secondary School Girl Kishiri-A:


“Tanzanians are unified by Swahili and it is the official language of campaigns. It is the only one that a politician can reach out to all and gain political support in elections. Nobody can deny that national unity and interactions, peace and development could not have been realised without Swahili. Ethnic languages and ethnicity is insignificant in elections because of the role of Swahili in unifying Tanzanians.”

 Arguing alone the same line an elderly man from Misungwi had this to say:

“Sisi (Watanzania) ni wamoja, na matumizi ya Kiswahili yamefanya watu wa makabila yote kusikilizana. Imefanya watu mijini kushindwa hata kuongea vilugha vyao. Sisi hatukupiga kura kikabila kwa sababu tumekuwa Kiswahili kimetufanya taifa moja.”

“Tanzanians are united, and Swahili has made members of different tribes communicate. It has made urban people fail to even speak their vernaculars. We did not vote ethnic-wise because Swahili has made us one nation.”

An expert of Tanzania’s social structure, Dr Ezekiel also concurred with the national integrating role of Swahili in Tanzania, and its role in informing low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. In on his own words he argued:

“The use of vernaculars and English in seeking political mandate in Mwanza is not supported because our national language is Swahili. Tanzanians like unity and Swahili provides a vehicle for enhancing unity among ethnicities. We had candidates who know English and Kisukuma but did not use the two languages because they will not be able to reach out to all through those languages; and using those languages is against the unifying language of our founders-Swahili. Swahili is the language of unity and its continued use as a lingua franca in Tanzanians communications reduces the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.”

The arguments presented above indicate that Swahili has consistently contributed to Tanzania’s nation-building and ethnic co-existence. The use of Swahili as a national language differentiates Tanzania from other states where members of different ethnic groups do not share a common

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109 Secondary School Girl Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 06.11.2014
110 Personal interview with an elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2015
111 Personal interview with Dr Ezekiel held in in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 11.12.2014
language, thus creating a challenge of inter-ethnic communication and ethnic political canvassing. Swahili in Tanzania was pertinent in enhancing national unity over ethnic identities as clearly indicated in section 5.2.1. This position is predicated on the fact that Swahili has spared Tanzania from the adverse effects of designating one or a few national languages or adopting the languages of a few large ethnic groups which reinforce ethnic solidarity and sub-national divisions in voting once politicised (Lofchie, 2013). The almost universal knowledge of Swahili among Tanzanians made Swahili become a source of shared identity for Tanzanians of all ethnic groups. This influenced low salience of ethnicity as inter-ethnic. Broadly based communication in the highly integrated state was made possible. The benefits of the language in accessing economic, social and political benefits explained in section 5.2.1 stood in the way of ethnicity gaining salience on determining voters’ choices. This was the case regardless of the pluralist liberal democratic dispensation that was fear of being able to breed ethnic salience in voting (Gasarasi, 1997; Mmuya, 2000). This is because Swahili has crippled the chances of a significant mobilisational element of ethnicity – ethnic languages, from informing parochial identities which could easily be used in political canvassing and thus creating an opportunity for fuelling ethnic salience in voting once politicised.

In my interviews with KIs on the role of Swahili in informing low salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices was discussed beyond the communicative and integrative role it has among members of different ethnic groups. The KIs second the views presented above but went ahead to argue that Swahili’s careful linkage to the concept of familyhood made it possible to explain the overall rationale of the nation-building policy. Without this common language, the national integrative intents of the PsIM which denounced ethnic salience and violence in politics could hardly be understood. These views are in line with Martin (1987) who argued that creation of a Swahili political discourse based on traditional notions of family interactions framed the country’s political arena as one in which all citizens live in harmony. In such life, violent conflicts and factors likely to contribute to them like ethnic salience in voting are deemed unacceptable. In other words, the use of Swahili to project notions of familyhood made each member of society easily recognise his or her proper role in supporting the overall good of the nation-family, which is to denounce the salience of ethnicity in voting among others.
The views presented above suggest that most of the variables employed to explore the role of the PsIM in informing the part that ethnicity plays in influencing electoral choices were made possible by the use of Swahili. For instance, without everyone speaking Swahili, nation-building policies like mixed-ethnicity Ujamaa villages, multi-ethnic recruiting schools, friendships, business partnerships, and marriages across ethnic groups would be impossible. Cities like Mwanza without Swahili could have simply developed rival ethnic enclaves as opposed to vastly integrated environs with lots of intermarriages that make many children lose their ethnic languages entirely. As such, they lose even an ethnic identity to use for political visibility. Political parties would not be able to reach out to penetrate the rural areas and would rely on narrow ethnic bases. Conflicts between groups would flare up more frequently as a result of miscommunication. In short, if the policy of spreading Swahili had not been so successful, Tanzanian society would have been significantly more parochial and prone to conflict. Moreover, other nation-building policies that diffused the significance of ethnicity in anchoring votes would have been almost impossible to implement. It is against this background that I argue that the voters in the study area were motivated to identify more with their national identity and give ethnicity less significance on determining voters’ choices.

It is worth noting that although Swahili has been widely recognised for suppressing ethnic languages from strengthening feelings of ethnic salience, there still exist few interviewees (13%) who argued that Swahili has not buried ethnic sentiments. Representatives of this minority group base their argument on the fact that Kisukuma was used in the 2010 elections, and that it was instrumental in mobilising political support during elections. As much as this line of thought is relevant in providing an opposite view to the one widely presented in this subsection, it casts many doubts. This position is based on the fact that the debate on the use of Kisukuma in elections in section 5.4.2 indicates otherwise. In the referred section most voters argued with conviction that Swahili was the official and mostly used language of campaign due to legal and extra-legal factors as widely discussed in sections 5.3.5 and 5.4.1 below. In this regard, I argue that the national integrative role of Swahili was accorded room to flourish in the 2010 elections. Thus, it crippled the potential of vernaculars breeding ethnic salience and divisions to inform voters’ choices in the 2010 elections.
5.3.3. Generational Denunciation of the use of Ethnicity in Soliciting Political Support

The significance placed on Swahili in explaining the low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices was not the last factor identified by my interviewees. 78% of them were of the view that intergenerational reproduction of the ideas against ethnicity anchoring political support contributed towards explaining the continuous low salience of ethnicity in anchoring voter’s choices. Views of an Extension Officer in Misungwi village succinctly expressed this idea:

“TANU na CCM wameelimisha watu ni vibaya kutumia ukabila na dini katika kushinda uchaguzi. Ujumbe huu hutolewa kwa njia ya vituo vya redio, shule na mikutano ya hadhara na watu wamekubali kutokutumia ukabila na udini katika uchaguzi. Kwa bahati nzuri vyama vipya pia vinalaani ukabila kuhamasisha kuungwa mkono kisiasa na hivyo kuminya fursa ya hisia za kikabila kuhamasisha kuungwa mkono kisiasa na hivyo unavunza na unavyo kupewa nafasi kubwa katika maumuzi ya waipiga kura.”

“TANU and CCM have educated the masses that it is bad to use ethnicity and religiosity to win elections. This message is delivered through radio stations, schools and public rallies and people have agreed not to use tribalism and religiosity in elections. Luckily the new parties follow suite to condemn the use of ethnicity in mobilising political support thus providing limited room for ethnic sentiments to gain salience in determining voters’ choices.”

Arguing along the same lines an elderly man in Mapilinga remarked that:

“Watanzania wamefunzwa vizuri kuhusu ubaya wa kutumia ukabila kushinda uchaguzi. Sisi, watu wa zamani tulifundishwa haya na waasisi wa nchi yetu, tumefuata mafunzo hayo katika maisha yetu kwa sababu ni jambo tukufu kufanya. Sisi tumewafundishwa njia yetu na kusema jambo hili kwaliwa wadogo kwao pia. Muendelezo wa mawazo haya (ubaya wa ukabila kushinda uchaguzi) kumemnefanya Watanzania kuwa wamoja, wenye amani na kinyume na matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi.”

“Tanzanians have been well taught about the demerits of using ethnicity to win elections. We, the old people were taught this by the founders of our country, and carried those lessons with us throughout our life because it was a noble thing to do. We went on to teach our young ones and they spread it to their juniors as well. Continuation of these ideas (the demerits of using ethnicity in elections) made Tanzanians united, peaceful and against the use of ethnicity in elections.”

Concurring with the views expressed above, an elderly woman in Utemini disclosed that:

“Elimu ya Siasa inayotolewa shuleni na wanasisa katika runinga, redio na mikutano vinapinga matumizi ya ukabila kupata kura. Elimu hii imesambazwa kutoka kizazi kimoja hadi kingine na mtu yeyote ambaye anapingana na elimu hii ni msaliti wa uataifa wetu.”

“Political education provided in schools and by politicians in television, radio and meetings denounces the use of ethnicity to win votes. This education has been transferred from one generation to another and anyone who is against these teachings is a traitor of our nationhood.”

The views expressed above suggests that the nation-building policy in Tanzania and its role in ensuring low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices revolves around continued

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112 Personal interview with a an Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
113 Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015.
114 Personal interview with a young woman in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 8.11.2014

212
denunciation, transmitted across generations, of the use of ethnicity to win electoral support. This was done through varied mass media. From the interviews, one thing that comes out clear is the involvement of the youth in the struggle against the use of divisive elements like ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices. The involvement of the younger people was critical as cultural maintenance and/or changes tend to be informed by generational reproduction of ideas (Malipula and Ngalawa, 2004). In the context of low salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections, the elderly people and the young voters were influenced by the anti-ethnic salience teachings. However, the future of low salience of ethnicity in voting in Tanzania laid not so much in persuading the adults to buy into or sustain the idea since they already proved to have, but rather in appealing to the would-be voters to commit to such idea as they grow up. This is significant because the young people are among the most unstable sections of any population. If they support an idea, they represent a source of energy, enthusiasm, and physical vigour to the implementation of an idea. In the same vein, if they oppose one, they do so with the same zeal. For these reasons, a teacher at Mapilinga argued that gaining young people support against the salience of ethnicity on determining voting is essential. He went on to argue that civic education in schools and beyond was an essential step taken by the government of the URT to make Tanzanians detest ethnic salience. As such, it contributed towards sustaining low salience of ethnicity on determining electoral votes.

An interesting component related to the civic education that came out of the discussions with the comparatively learned interviewees like teachers and civil servants. This group was of the view that civic education not only swayed people away from ethnic salience, but also created a passive /subject citizenry that helped in suppressing the significance of ethnicity in politics. According to a teacher I interviewed in Mapilinga, civic education meant to:

“...kuwafanya watu kuwa raia wema wanaopenda nchi yao, umoja wake wa kitaifa, amani, na ambao wako tayari kufanya kazi wendawi na kwa ajili ya taifa lao huku wakijua maarifa madogo tu ya msingi kuhusu majukumu mapana ya uraia na jinsi serikali inavyofanyakazi.”

“...mould the masses into good citizens who loved their country, its national unity, peace and who are willing to work hard for their nation with only a basic knowledge of broader civic duties and how the government functions.”

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115 Personal interview with a female Primary School Teacher in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
To the teacher, civic education meant to create uncritical/subject citizenry which deters the masses from violent conflicts resulting from questioning the establishment. Such relationship made citizens obey and succumb to what is forwarded to it by the political elites. Since national unity preoccupied political elites, then the chances of ethnic salience gaining significance on determining voters’ choices were limited in the 2010 elections. The following view from an elderly woman in Nange attests:

"Watanzania wengi hawaulizi maswali mengi wanasisa hasa kutoka chama tawala wanapowaambia vitu. Tuliani kiwamba kwa kutumia ukabila katika kutafuta kuungwa mkono kisiasa sio vizuri na witu walikubali. Siku hizi vijana kuhoji wazee wao juu ya masuala nyalimbali lakini hawaulizi wito wa kukataa matumizi ya ukabila katikasiaa."

"Most Tanzanians do not question a lot once politicians particularly from the ruling party tell them things. We were told that using ethnicity in seeking political support is not good and people agreed. Nowadays young people question their elders on a lot of issues but do not question calls for rejecting the use of ethnicity in politics."

The views of the elderly woman suggest that civic education had a role to play in lowering the salience of ethnicity in voting in the 2010 elections to the younger and older generations. To the elderly woman, the elderly choose to reject salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices because they wished to maintain the status quo without questioning it. As for the younger ones who were trained to be critical, they did so because they bought into the merits of low salience of ethnicity in politics. In other words, the uncritical and critical minds converged to reject ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices. As much as the knowledge distinction that the elderly women impliedly draws on the basis of civic know-how, the discussions in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3 on the PsIM and voting suggests otherwise. This is because in the referred sections even the uncritical voters exemplified an awareness of the demerits of the application of ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices. In this context, their decision to reject the application of ethnicity in luring political support is well informed.

5.3.3.1 New media and Ethnicity

The use of ICT and social media although not widely discussed by rural interviewees is quite interesting in the dissemination of information pro and against ethnicity. It is also relevant to the media ownership and coverage debate that constitutes part of the subsequent subheading. This is mainly because ICT and social media have been on the rise in recent years in Tanzania and for the first time in the 2010 elections particularly mobile phones were used to court voters.

116 Personal interview with an elderly woman at Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015
with mobile phone penetration of over 18 million Tanzanians judging by registration statistics, meant the gadget afforded around 50% of the population access to campaign messages (Mataba, 2011). The phones were particularly useful in reaching the masses in the remotest parts of Tanzania. The phones’ impact is not limited to the young generation it seems. An elderly man in Mapilinga confessed to me that he was getting a lot of campaign messages from his mobile phone. As such, the use of mobile phones helped to break communication barriers that hitherto existed between aspirants for political office, their parties and the voters. Also, editorial barriers related to media owners interests that inform bias reporting as it will be discussed in the next subheading. In this context, the achievements ICT and social media are a boost to the coverage of elections particularly in overcoming principal aspects facing the conventional media like owners' editorials, power games as well as legal barriers mitigating free press that are common in Africa. Conversely, the key hitch, as far as the use of mobile phones is concerned, was the spreading with impunity of hate text messages (Tagalile, 2011). According to Tagalile, if such messages will be tolerated by the authorities in elections to come, Tanzania is likely to slither into another Kenya or Rwanda. Tagalile's fear could partly be associated with the fact that ICT in the name of electronic communication as an industry in stricto sensu, is unregulated in Tanzania. In this sense, the country is running the risk of being a cyber criminals' sanctuary (Ubena, 2009). The fear notwithstanding, interviewees widely referred to texts that required them not to vote for candidates who incite violence or have not been proven track record. Ethnic-based texts meant to lure voters were not mentioned to have been texted during the elections.

Like mobile phones, social media (websites, blogs and networking sites like Facebook and Twitter) were remarkably used for the first time in the 2010 general election campaigns. Some of the renowned blogs and social forums in Tanzania include the Issa Michuzi (http://issamichuzi.blogspot.com) and Jamii Forums (http://jamiiforums.com). The main motive behind the use of websites was to capture the youth among the electorate (Tagalile, 2011). The youth constitute about 33% of the total population and 68% of the labour force in Tanzania. The two leading candidates in the elections, CCM Chairman, Dr Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete and the CHADEMA Secretary General, Dr Wilbrod Slaa opened their own blogs and made full use of them to garner support through Facebook and Twitter. This was quite easy as social media operators in Tanzania are not required to register or obtain permission from state authority like print or broadcasting media. Only Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which are critical for people to
access information placed on the social media are required to register. However, the ease to open a blog does not entail that the social media is free of challenges. Indeed, it has several challenges and internet usage presents a major one.

The hindrance to effective use of the internet and associated social media around the time of 2010 elections was that only 1% of the Tanzanian population accesses the internet (Mataba, 2011). This is the case despite the inauguration of the Seacom Fibre Optic Cable and the National ICT Optical Fibre Backbone Network project meant to cheaply link South and East Africa countries to Europe and Asia. Internally a 10,000-kilometre inland optic fibre cable network to facilitate ICT connectivity to district level is underway to address ICT needs at grassroots level. Hopefully, this will promote citizens' participation in information collection and dissemination on various issues. Mobile phones could be an ideal answer to limited internet coverage but another hurdle is the fact that few people in rural areas can afford smart phones and those who could, might not be able to use them.

Another important challenge of social media identified in my interview with Kilimwiko, is that it is mainly one-way information, with the potential of being a conveyer belt of the operators or mouthpieces of the political inclinations of the runners and contributors. In this way, the reliability of information provided can be more biased than professionally written conventional print or electronic news. In this regard, mechanisms need to be in place to ensure the the social media upholds journalistic ethos and avoid becoming a one way means of communication that can enhance ethnic divisions and hatred among citizens. In short, the newest media should not replace the conventional media, rather it should complement it and in a manner that furthers mass media ethics and national unity. Luckily, despite the possibility of ethnic canvassing that ICT and social media had, however, no evidence have been garnered to argue that it has impacted ethnic salience or denounced it to a satisfactory level due to the barriers discussed.

A critical look at the views provided above indicates that low salience of ethnicity is not something that can be taken for granted. It is a product of concerted sustainable efforts done by varied political actors to ensure that the significance of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices is discouraged. The essence of the denunciation of ethnicity in elections can be traced back to the PsIM as they were against the use of ethnicity in politics. However, the PsIM needed extensive civic education to ensure that generations subscribed to them and spread them to generations to
come. Continuous transfers of ideas that reject the use of ethnicity in soliciting electoral support were widely disseminated before and during the campaigns of 2010. As such, the intentions of the PsLM of fighting ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices were reinvigorated. The continuous transfer of anti-ethnic feelings transmitted from both the formal and informal civic education teachings have sunk into Tanzanian’s minds. According to the interviewees’ views, the anti-ethnic feelings have sunk into Tanzanian’s minds to the level that even mammoth discourse against it can hardly reverse this position in the near future. The teachings are well supported by the effective practices of EDNR, which militates against the politicisation of ethnicity and its subsequent use in soliciting electoral votes as widely argued in the 5.2.2. This generational denunciation of the use of ethnicity is further collaborated by Mwalimu’s Charismatic and Symbolic Leadership in the nation-building policy. This is discussed in the subsection below.

5.3.4. Mwalimu’s Charismatic and Symbolic Leadership in the Nation-building policy

A name that was widely mentioned in connection to the low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices by my interviewees was Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the first President of the URT. Such views entail the sustained projection of Mwalimu’s critical role in denouncing the use of ethnicity in politics while fighting for independence and creating a highly integrated socialist state. This is the case despite Tanzanian’s plurality of ethnic groups and regional orientations. A view of a young man in Shamalala Street provides evidence to this position:

"Masuala muhimu ya kitaifa kama dhambi ya kutumia ukabila katika siasa yanazama ndani ya mioyo ya watu pale yanapotokana na watu wanaoheshimiwa katika jamii. Wakati wa uchaguzi hapa Tanzania vipande vya video na sauti za hotuba ya Baba wa kitaifa letu, mwanasiasa anayeheshimiwa zaidi Tanzania akilaani matumizi ya ukabila katika kuhamasisha kura vinarushwa hewani. Maoni yake kwamba kupiga kura kwa misingi ya ukabila kutawagawanya Watanzania inafanya tusipige kura kikabila."117

“Serious national issues like sins of political tribalism sink into the people’s hearts when they are based on the views of respected public figures. In Tanzania during elections video and audio clips of speeches of the Father of our nation, the most respected politician in Tanzania denouncing the use of tribalism in mobilising votes are widely transmitted. His view that tribal based voting will divide Tanzanians informs Tanzanians rejection to vote ethnically.”

The core of the views of the young man from Shamalala was echoed by an elderly man in Mapilinga Village who had this to say:

“Wanasiasa wote tangu kurudishwa kwa vyama vingi wanajihusisha na mambo ya Nyerere ya umoja wa kitaifa na mapambano dhidi ya ukabila katika siasa. Waandishi wa habari wakati wa uchaguzi wanataoa mawazo ya Nyerere

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117 Personal interview with a Young man in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 16.11.2014
yanayopinga kutumia ukabila kushinda uchaguzi. Mawazo ya Nyerere yamefanya ukabila usiongoze wakati wa kupiga kura.”

“All politicians since re-introduction of multi-partism are associating themselves with Nyerere’s visions of national unity and anti-tribalist politics. Journalists during elections present a lot of Nyerere’s views against using tribalism to win elections. Nyerere’s views tribalism insignificant when I vote.”

The positions expressed above are seconded by another elderly man in Rufiji Street when he revealed the role of Mwalimu Nyerere’s speeches on lowering ethnic salience in politics. However, he added to that a dimension of Nyerere’s personal traits to explain how he managed to have an impact in the 2010 elections and years to come.

“Mwalimu ni kiongozi mkubwa, na msimamo wake juu ya umoja wa kitaifa na kukana matumizi ya ukabila katika kuvutia wapiga kura vimegusa watu wengi. ... yeye aliishi imani yake kwa vitendo. Nyerere akitoka kabila dogo (Zanaki) aliwaongoza Wata nzania wenzake bila kubagua na kwa amani na utulivu. Kwa, muungano wa kitaifa ulikuwa muhimu kuliko ukabila. Maneno ya Mwalimu na matendo yake ya kusimamia umoja wa kitaifa umewaachia Wata nzania urithi ambao wape wa uboza wakiwa uzito mdogo kuwavutia wapiga kura.”

“Mwalimu is a great leader, and his conviction on national unity and outright denunciation of the use of tribalism in attracting voters support touches many people. ....he practically lived his convictions. Nyerere as a member a small tribe (the Zanaki) led his fellow Tanzanians indiscriminately and in peace and harmony. To him, national integration was above tribal orientations. Mwalimu’s words and deeds in championing national unity has left Tanzanians a legacy that makes them accord tribalism low weight in winning voters’ support.”

Similarly, an NGO worker in Misungwi concurred with the views that recognised Mwalimu’s efforts in informing low salience of ethnicity in voting, when he disclosed that:

“CCM, CHADEMA, CUF and other smaller parties echo Nyerere’s words about the disadvantages of tribalism in politics; like civil war and its associated effects. They also echo the speeches of Mwalimu telling Tanzanians that leaders should serve all of the people and uphold national instead of tribal interests like the freedom fighters did. With such words voting on tribal basis was considered a direct insult to Mwalimu and what he stood for.”

The views expressed above indicate that as much as most political scientists avoid explanations of political processes based on the force of individual personality, Mwalimu has turned out to be an exception. This is because many associate his leadership to the country’s low salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices. These views are in line with Mamdani (2013a) as widely

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118 Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
119 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 5.11.2014
120 Personal interview with an NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015

218
discussed in section 4.3.2. In a nutshell, Mamdani suggests that an inventory of governmental measures to promote low salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices benefit from the sanctity, individual brilliance and charisma of Mwalimu. This argument is predicated on the fact that he used every opportunity to preach national unity and denounce ethnic salience in politics. To my interviewees, it was doubtful whether without Mwalimu’s zeal, skill and creativity Tanzanians in 2010, almost 16 years after his demise, could still hold high the anti-ethnic crusade. My interviewees were of the view that Julius Nyerere’s unique role as the leader of the independence movement, head of the Tanzania’s ruling party and state for almost an accumulated three decades, gave him an opportunity of influencing the limited role of ethnicity on determining electoral choice. Such stance is informed by the fact that during his tenure and beyond, he denounced in words and deeds, divisive elements in politics in general and in elections in particular. My KI’s argued that Nyerere presented himself to the Tanzanians as a compassionate, socially humanistic and determined anti-ethnic salient politician. Such presentation represents an indisputable personal contribution to the Tanzanian culture of low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices entrenched in the minds of the Tanzanian people and political actors. This distinguishes Mwalimu from African leaders who politicise ethnicity for their selfish political ends. It also distinguishes Tanzania from states like Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda where feelings of ethnic salience take the fore-front in elections. More importantly, Mwalimu presents an exception from the neopatrimonial view that African leaders politicise ethnicity to acquire political office.

Mwalimu’s role in the fighting against the use of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices would have been less successful if Tanzania’s thought they could get to the corridors of power by appealing to ethnic identities (Lofchie, 2013). In a KII with Mzee Mkali it was revealed that Nyerere’s credit in lowering the significance of ethnicity in the 2010 elections rests on his vision of minimising the role of ethnically based political and social organisations. The organisations referred to by Mzee Mkali were ethnically organised credit and burial associations as well as ethnically constituted recreational clubs and chiefdoms. To Mzee Mkali such ethnically based associations elsewhere in Africa have been the epitome of ethnic polarisation and ethnic voting. Subsequently, they bred violent effects among ethnic salient rival political competitors. Such rivalry according to Mzee Mkali adds impetus to Tanzanians denial to evoke ethnic salience on determining electorates’ choices. Such view is anchored on the fact that the violent consequences of politicised ethnicity in
countries like Rwanda and Kenya are used by politicians in Tanzania to complement Mwalimu’s speeches against the use of ethnicity in luring votes. As such, it can be said that the anti-ethnic salient views of Mwalimu benefit from the practical effects of ethnic salient political canvassing and voting in Tanzania’s neighbours.

In my discussion with an announcer of the largest Television station in Mwanza- Star Television, Mr. Dotto Bulendu the role of Mwalimu came out. He shared with me the view that the national integrative symbolic posture of Mwalimu Nyerere was visible during the media coverage of the 2010 elections. He was of the opinion that the media coverage extensively projected Mwalimu’s dream of Tanzania being a community that gives no attention to the use of ethnicity in luring votes. The media projected his image as an important model for Tanzanian unity, identity and civic values. For instance, Bulendu disclosed that although Nyerere was a devoted Catholic several photographs of him wearing a Baraghashia\textsuperscript{121} to blur the lines of division between Christians and Muslims, who also belong to varied ethnic groups. Mwalimu also has been shown carrying a chief’s staff of office -Kifimbo as a symbol of leadership and recognition of chiefly authority although he abolished chieftaincy in the early days of independence.

Also, Mwalimu was projected in the media wearing a simple dress code, a simple Mao or safari suit, which became de facto the official attire for Tanzanian leaders. This projection promoted an ideal of sameness and equality across the nationals of varied ethnic groups and backgrounds. Indeed continuous projection of all of these points to national integration which is against ethnic salience in general terms. Most relevant to the dissertation, the media according to Bulendu presented Mwalimu as a leader who never favoured his ethnic group and/or his home region. Such projection based on his deeds is against the dictates of neo-patrimonialism which would expect him to distribute a share of patronage to them. Such image contributed in convincing Tanzanians to emulate the values of their national hero in rejecting ethnic salience in the 2010 elections.

As indicated earlier in this section, most political scientists avoid explanations of political processes based on the force of individual personality. However, it is worth noting that pictures of Mwalimu still hang in all public offices and almost all shops and sidewalk stalls in Tanzania. For

\textsuperscript{121} The traditional Muslim hat
the rural settings where few offices and shops exist, memorial *Kanga*\(^{122}\) with his picture are owned by ruralites or seen by many of them. These photographs served as a reminder of the values that he promoted. Most Tanzanians including politicians publicly refer to him as *Mwalimu* or as *Baba wa Taifa* (Father of the Nation) which project Nyerere as an honoured, well read and knowledgeable, benign, affectionate figure whose citizens should obey. In this regard, the use of Nyerere as a symbol promotes national unity and influences low salience of ethnicity in voting. This position lays on the fact that Mwalimu condemned the practice with great anxiety. However, the continued use of Mwalimu’s symbol offers little for contemporary political reformers as Mwalimu is no longer alive to speak for himself, even if he wished to change some of his viewpoints. The danger of such practice is that contemporary leaders could at some point appropriate his popularity for their own purposes, and reframing his past speeches in the context of current debates.

An interesting question that needs analysis is the massive space Mwalimu gets in the Tanzanian media during elections and its implications on ethnicity and voting in the 2010 elections. The views of the voters in Mwanza indicated that Mwalimu’s opinion influenced lower ethnic salience but said a little about why such space has been accorded to him. The answer was simple he is the father of our nation and talks sense. Here is where the KIIIs from the media came in. The views of the media practitioners interviewed argued that the rationale for Mwalimu’s extensive coverage is two-fold. On one hand the value of his views and on the other revolves around CCM’s dominance in the ownership of the media houses in Tanzania.

According to the media practitioners interviewed, the nationalist frame informed by the PsIM spearheaded by Mwalimu forms a great part of the election agenda and news. This is because it depicts the Tanzanian political culture-national unity, peace and tranquillity. As for the ownership pattern view, it was argued that most of the major media houses are owned by the state, CCM or CCM followers, therefore, covering Mwalimu widely and projecting him in the manner he has been, is part of the campaigns of their party. These thoughts are in line with Mataba (2011) who argued that almost all of the privately-owned media outlets in Tanzania are owned by politicians cum-businessmen who have overt links to CCM. As such, they colour CCM good just as the state and CCM owned media houses do (Mataba, 2011). Kilimwiko (2012) concurs with Mataba but

\(^{122}\) Tanzanians traditional cloth for women
goes a step further by mentioning them. These politicians cum-businessmen with overt links to CCM include Rostam Aziz (the former MP for Igunga constituency and CCM's National Treasurer), Anthony Diallo (CCM's Regional Chair for Mwanza, former MP for Ilemela constituency and Minister for Industries and Trade), Nazir Karamagi (the former MP for Bukoba Rural constituency and the Minister responsible for Energy and Minerals), Aden Rage (the then MP for Tabora Urban constituency), Richard Nyaulawa (former parliamentarian), Khamis Kagasheki (the former MP for Bukoba and the ex-Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism) Reginald Mengi (a businessman known to be supporting CCM) among others. Kilimwiko in an earlier article indicates that even a Minister responsible for information while in office owned a media house (Kilimwiko, 2006). According to Mataba, (2011) there were only two media firms owned by politicians who have recognised links to CHADEMA, namely Freeman Mbowe (CHADEMA's national chair and MP for Hai constituency) and Phillemon Ndesamburo (one of CHADEMA's key financiers and the MP for Moshi Urban Constituency).

The ownership pattern revealed above suggests that the media is unprecedentedly monopolised by the state, the ruling party and its merchant political cadres. Such state of affairs provides room for politically biased coverage and/or subjectivity in favour of the owners and their political inclinations which are pro the ruling CCM. Such situation was identified as a factor that contributed to, if not ensured, generational denunciation of the discourse against salience of ethnicity in voting and projecting Mwalimu as a symbol of national unity. This is because by so doing, they were advancing their policies and soliciting electoral support. This situation is imperative in the Mwanza elections as the biggest media house in the region - Sahara Media is owned by CCM’s regional chair who contested for a parliamentary seat in the 2010 elections. Both capacities partly explain the projections revealed by Bulendu, and the influences associated to those projections on informing ethnicity’s role in voting in the 2010 elections. This view is banked on the fact that no evidence was explored that suggests that the media has given credence to critical aspects of Mwalimu’s philosophy and policies. As such, no news that could question Mwalimu’s charisma and symbolic portrayal and their subsequent effect on the influencing voters’ choices were aired. However, although this was not aired, the discussions on Mwalimu criticise his socialist political and economic stances but have not downplayed his unifying effect (Lofchie, 2013; Wangwe, 2005).
An opinion that can be deduced from this sub-heading is that Mwalimu Nyerere’s anti-ethnic views and deeds while in office and beyond has informed a legacy of rejecting ethnic voting. His words and deeds have contributed towards making appeals to ethnicity in political canvassing to be considered unpatriotic and un-Tanzanian to critical political actors. The mass media has most importantly contributed to this effect by massively projecting this anti-ethnic portrait. Informed by such portrait, political parties found it inevitable to recognise that their best prospects for winning elections depended on mobilising support in an inclusive multi-ethnic manner. Furthermore, project ethnically peaceful national ethos for electoral success. In this regard, the efficacy of Mwalimu’s charisma and symbol can be said to be epitomised on its merit in providing space for acquiring political office. Importantly, it furthers the PsIM which as argued above, barred ethnic salience in voting.

5.3.5. Legal Restrictions on the Use of Ethnicity in Political Canvassing

Legal restrictions on the use of ethnicity in mobilising political support during elections and beyond were also associated with low salience of ethnicity in voting. Words of a Secondary School girl in Kishiri A Street express the role of legal restrictions on lowering salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections:

“Huwezi kutumia ukabila kuvutia kura Tanzania kwa sababu ni marufuku kisheria. Sheria inazuia vyama vya siasa kuwa vya kikabila kwa eneo la kufanyakazi na wakati wa uchaguzi wagombea na mawakala wao hawaruhusiwi hata kutumia lugha za makabila kuombea kura. Sheria hizi zinazuia matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi? “

“You cannot use ethnicity to lure votes in Tanzania because it is prohibited by law. Laws restrict political parties to be ethnic in their coverage and during elections candidates and their agents are not allowed even to use vernaculars to beg for votes. These laws stand in the way of exercising tribalism in elections?”

An NGO worker in Misungwi supported this view when he argued that:

"Mapambano ya serikali ya kupunguza ukabila ukabilia katika siasa ni dhahiri hapa Tanzania. Vyama vya siasa na taasisi zote za umma zinatakiwa kuwa vya kitaifa na si vya kutumikia kabila fulani. Uchaguzi wa mgombea wowote unaweza kufutwa ikithibitika kwamba ukabila ulitumika kushinda. Hii imesaidia Tanzania kupunguza matumizi ya ukabila katika kupiga kura.”

“You cannot use ethnicity to lure votes in Tanzania because it is prohibited by law. Laws restrict political parties to be ethnic in their coverage and during elections candidates and their agents are not allowed even to use vernaculars to beg for votes. These laws stand in the way of exercising tribalism in elections.”

123 Secondary School Girl Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 06.11.2014
124 Personal interview with an NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015
Arguing along the same line but from a historical perspective an Extension Officer in Misungwi had this to say:

"Matumizi ya ukabila Tanzania halichukuliwi kuwa jambo jema. Hii inaeleza kwa nini sheria mbalimbali zilitungwa ili kudhoofisha matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa. Mwalimu alipitisha sheria kukomesha uchifu na viongozi wengine wa kitamaduni waliokuwa na madaraka ya kisiasa ili kuimarisha umoja wa kitaifa. Waliachiwa majukumu ya kufanya matambiko. ... vyama vyote vya siasa vinatakiwa kuwa vya kitaifa na mtu yeyote atakayechochea hisia za mgawanyiko wa kikabila katika jamii hasa wakati wa uchaguzi anaweza kushtakiwa kihalali na kufungwa jela. Hivi ndivyo dola la Tanzania daima imekuwa katika vita yake dhidi ya ukabila katika siasa. Vikwazo hivi na sera nyingine za ujenzi wa taifa, haishangazi kwamba ukabila una nafasi ndogo katika maamuzi ya kupiga kura."125

"The use of ethnicity in Tanzania is not viewed to be a good thing. This explains why numerous laws were enacted to undermine its salience in politics. Mwalimu enacted laws to disband chieftaincy and other traditional leaders from holding political powers to enhance national unity. They were left with the role of conducting matambiko. … all parties are supposed to be national and anyone inciting divisive ethnic sentiments in the society especially during elections can be lawfully charged and jailed. This is how serious the Tanzanian state has always been on its war against tribalism in politics. These restrictions and other nation-building policies, it is not surprising that ethnic salience on determining voting is low in elections.”

The views expressed in the interviews above indicate that legal restrictions deterred candidates and their parties from using ethnic tendencies to lure voters. As such, voters were not enticed to vote on ethnic line. These views augur well with the views of Lofchie (2013), Malipula (2014) and Weber (2009) who argued that the Tanzanian government has taken an active stance against the use of ethnicity and other decisive elements in politics. This included enacting laws and policies that consider divisive elements like racism, religiosity and ethnic polarisation as taboos in political canvassing. It is against this background that the mass media have been legally made to control divisive statements that could propagate ethnic salience in voting (Kilimwiko, 2012; Rioba, 2008). In the same vein, numerous electoral requirements intended among other things, to enhance national integration and lower salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices (Makulilo, 2012). For instance, as it was indicated in section 4.5.2, candidates are required to use Swahili while campaigning and an interpreter only if need be. Also, they are strictly forbidden from making appeals for support on an ethnic basis, and in case one does, the benefits accrued like electoral triumphs can be nullified. Likewise, the Political Parties Act of 1992 and its amendments stipulate that to be eligible for registration, a political party must be voluntary and that its membership must be open to all the citizens of the URT without discrimination on any divisive element like ethnic origin. Additionally, the same legislation further lays down that to qualify for registration, parties shall not aim to advocate or further the interests of any religious belief or

125 Personal interview with an Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
group; tribal, ethnic or racial group; or only a specific area within any part of the URT. To enforce compliance with these provisions, the Political Party Act requires political parties to demonstrate that it enjoys multi-ethnic pan-territorial support. This is measured by obtaining not less than 200 registered members who are qualified to be registered as voters for purpose of Parliamentary elections from at least 10 regions of Tanzania. Out of the 10 regions, at least two regions should be from Zanzibar, one from Unguja and another from Pemba –the two Islands that form Zanzibar. Failure to meet these requirements means one thing, no registration. All these point to the direction that legal restrictions stand in the way of political actors from mobilising support ethnically and providing space for ethnicity gaining salience on determining voters’ choices.

The restrictions made on the legislations highlighted above find legitimacy in the parent law of the land- the CURT. The CURT provides freedom of expression but does not specify that this freedom should be extended to individuals or political organisations that use the privilege to create ethnic animosity. Section 20 of CURT makes this limitation explicit.

20. - (1) Every person is entitled to freedom, subject to the laws of the land, to freely and peaceably assemble, associate and cooperate with other persons, express views publicly, and more specially to form or join associations or organisations formed for the purposes of preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests or any other interests.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (1) it shall not be lawful for any political entity to be registered which according to its constitution or policy -

(a) aims at promoting or furthering the interests of:

(i) any religious faith or group; (ii) any tribal group, place of origin, race or gender,

(iii) only a particular area within any part of the United Republic...

Another very paramount legal restriction raised by one interviewee is the restriction of private candidates in fear of the possibility that individuals could use ethnicity to garner political support. In his words the interviewee disclosed that:

“Mwalimu na warithi wake hawakuwa wajinga kukataza wagombea binafsi. Walitumia Bunge kufanya marekebisho ya katiba wakati Mtikila alipokwenda mahakamani kudai haki ya mgombea binafsi na akashinda. Walifanya hivyo ili kuepuka uwezekano wa wagombea binafsi kutumia ukabila kushinda viti vya kisiasa na kupanda mbegu za ukabila katika kuvutia upigaji kura katika nchi yote.127"

“Mwalimu and his successors were not stupid to disallow private candidature. They used the parliament to amend the constitution when Mtikila went to court to demand such right and was granted. They did that to avoid possibilities of private candidates using tribalism to win political seats and sow seeds of tribal salience in attracting voters nationally.”

126 The late Reverend Christopher Mtikila was the then Chair of Democratic

127 Personal interview with a an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 12.11.2014
According to this interviewee the drafters of CURT and the political leadership were concerned that independent candidates seeking political seats operating outside the party system use the ethnic ticket to acquire power. The basis of the fear of private candidates was that they lack systemic barriers to diffuse ethnic tendencies that political parties have. Such position is based on the fact that decisions are collectively made and informed by rules and regulations that are against ethnic salience in politics. As such, candidates and leaders who perpetuate ethnic salience can be dealt with by party organs. This is hardly the case for independent candidates who can only be controlled by his own conscious. As a way of preventing this from happening, all candidates in contest for political offices in Tanzania have to be sponsored by a political party. In this way, fears that and the potential of, private candidature breeding ethnic salience were curtailed.

However, it is less convincing to suggest that legislations or even meticulously drafted constitutions can create and preserve a political culture. This is particularly so when the political culture shuns away an ethnically diverse society from ethnic salience in anchoring voters’ choices. This position is banked on the fact that laws do not ensure automatic implementation. It is worth recalling that even the most oppressive dictators that the world has experienced, had constitutional documents that had formally included a menu of political and economic freedoms. Tanzania can be exempted from such situation as it has managed to escape the gap between having and implementing laws meant to diffuse ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices. The views of an Extension Officer in Misungwi village suffice to express this position:

"Sheria zinazolenga kuimashina umoja wa kitaifa nchini Tanzania ni rahisi kutekelezwa, kwasababu zipo sambamba na mfumo jumuishi wa kisiasa ambayo waasisi wetu walitujengea, na ambao tunaupenda." 128

“Laws meant to enhance national unity in Tanzania are easily implement because they are in line with the integrativepolitical order that our founders built for us, and that we enjoy having”

Arguing along the same direction but with a biased experience from his party, a staunch CCM supporter had this to say:

“CCM inachuja wagombea wake vizuri ili kuhakikisha wanawasimamisha wagombea ambao hawaamini katika matumizi ya ukabila kuvutia wapiga kura. Hii inafanywa na vyombo vya chama kuanza ngazi ya wilaya hadi

128 Personal interview with a an Extension Officer  in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
“CCM always filters its candidates well to make sure it sponsors candidates who do not buy into the use of ethnicity in attracting voters. This is elaborately done by the party’s organs from the district to the national levels. The laws simply ensure our national unity and peace enhancement policies that Tanzanians buy into. That is why many people vote for us in abundance.”

The views presented above suggest that laws geared towards barring ethnic salient practices contributed in informing low salience of ethnicity in 2010 elections. This is partly because the laws and the CURT, in which they are embedded, provide disincentives to politicise ethnicity. More important, the legislations are a consequence of the path-dependent nationalist political culture. This culture is informed by the PsIM and believed to be worth followed by the people as highlighted in section 3.4.4. Such culture sets the politicisation of ethnicity outside the perimeter of the permissible use in soliciting voters’ support. In this regard, Tanzanians wrote these restrictions into their laws to insure a value system they firmly believe in. This value system affords them a degree of political freedom without allowing politicisation of ethnic identities. As such, the values make ethnicity insignificant in informing voters’ choices.

The views presented above suggest that laws geared towards barring ethnic salient practices in elections benefit from a path-dependent nationalist political culture informed by the PsIM. Without such culture, the fallacy between blueprint and reality that is common in most African states indicated by Mwiru (2013) and Mamdani (2013a) could have been obvious. Such culture sets the politicisation of ethnicity outside the perimeter of the permissible use in soliciting voters’ support. This is because the country’s political culture has projected the use of ethnicity in seeking political office as a taboo that would destroy national integration, peace, tranquillity and development as widely argued throughout this sub-heading. Interestingly, the fact LRIs oversee application of anti-ethnic salient tendencies in elections questions the neo-patrimonial thesis that Africa lacks LRIs. Also, the content of the laws questions the premise that Africans prefer traditional issues like politicisation of ethnicity in the conduct of its politics. The fact that the laws are in line with the national integrative intent of the PsIM, and their role in mitigating ethnic salience in politics, convinces me that they add impetus to the PsIM role in explaining low influences of ethnicity in voting.

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129 Personal interview with a CCM supporter in Utemini, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 09.11.2014
5.3.6. Synthesis of the Explanations of the Influences of Ethnicity on Voters’ Choices
Tanzania is widely acknowledged as having implemented one of the most extensive nation-building policies that dealt successfully with diffusing the salience of ethnicity in politics compared to most independent African states (Malipula, 2014; Lofchie, 2013; Weber, 2009). According to the discussions presented above Tanzania’s success in lowering the salience of ethnicity in elections is attributable to the creation of a common narrative and a shared anti-ethnic salient culture in the conduct of politics. This culture among other things rejects luring voters through ethnic-based voters’ mobilisation. This common narrative and culture was made possible through a series of sustained nation-building strategies. As indicate by interviewees and I concur, the political leadership of Mwalimu and his successors never felt tired of explicitly emphasising nation-building as a goal that was necessary for Tanzania’s development. The leadership successfully stressed that the participation of all Tanzanians in ensuring that all divisive elements that can hinder nation-building was inevitable. Such conviction made the state and its people merge forces in quashing issues like the use of ethnicity in influencing voters to ensure the country’s development, peace and tranquillity.

It is imperative to note that none of the nation-building policies used to ensure low salience of ethnicity were unique to Tanzania. However, the zeal, commitment and ability of the leadership to forge an alliance with the people, political actors and systems and processes made it successful than other African countries (Malipula, 2014; Lofchie, 2013; Rioba, 2008). Such argument is informed by the fact that calls for national unity in other African countries were hardly accompanied by the true will of implementing policies for diffusing ethnic salience (Weber, 2009). More important, the monolithic government of Mwalimu and his immediate successor Mzee Ali Hassan Mwinyi had almost free reign to pursue nation-building policies due to the lack of strong political opposition. Equally, the widespread popularity of the ruling party made a significant, long-term ideological and financial investment in the nation-building policy possible. Similar views are applicable to the governments of President Mkapa and President Kikwete. However, to a comparatively lesser degree as the opposition under both regimes were relatively stronger in parliament and their reach in the community. Nevertheless, CCM’s share of political power and authority by the time of the 2010 elections was still dominant. CCM and its government through the incorporation of the societal forces into the political realm including the control of the media,
civic organisations, school syllabuses, and major industries, as indicated in section 4.4.1.1 made it able to control the nation-building policy to a degree that was impossible for anyone to sabotage.

In actual sense, the dominance of the political, social and media space curtailed the potential for an alternative view even when political and economic liberalisation came into being. In this way, the nationalistic movement denunciation of the use of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices widely reached out to the people. Importantly, it was seconded by the newly formed parties. However, this is not to say that there were no voices of dissent or alternate nationalising narratives. Nonetheless, in fact these voices rarely reached much of the populace. This is because of the government’s monopoly on political expression and organisation was stronger than the dissents. This partly explains why Tanzania has successfully managed to create a cross-cutting national identity incomparable to most African countries as the Afrobarometer data highlighted above suggest. By successfully establishing a cross-cutting national identity, Tanzania managed to reduce the legitimacy of ethnic polarisation and lowered the barriers to ethnic cooperation among members of ethnic groups. In this way, Tanzania’s relative lower rate of ethnic salience in voting can be said to be a legacy of the nation-building policy.

With 24 years of multiparty politics and the rise of liberal democratic political and economic institutions, one would have expected that the media and other forms of non-government sanctioned political expressions to be free. As such, political pluralism was expected to have reduced the ability of the monistic dispensation to control national discourses and from this window they could even perpetuate ethnic salience as suggested by Gasarasi (1997). This has not been the case as only distant voices from ethnic salient individuals are heard. In this context, the foundation placed by the nation-building policies still proved to stand in informing low salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections. As indicated above the civic discourses in the county’s school and media still denounce ethnicity. Importantly, the newly formed parties are striving hard to propagate the nation-building discourse as initially set by the PsIM. Indeed today, there are many more avenues for spreading ethnic salient elements in the country’s political debate due to competitive politics and economics. However, they have not been given a go. Whether this will be translated into awakening dangerous ethnic-based extremists’ views to gain followers remains to be seen.
An important point to be made with regard to the dynamics of the PsIM on informing the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections is the limited role of legal restrictions. A critical review of the data presented above suggests that the efficacy of the legislations enacted to avoid divisive political canvassing relies on the implementation of the nation-building policy. In the main, this is because the PsIM and varied efforts made by the country’s founders and sustained the current political actors and institutions, have created a national identity that warrants reasonable adherence to the laws. The national culture emphasises national unity and EDNR and peacefulness as central national values which promote low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This identity according to the data gathered in Mwanza, serves as a frame through which Tanzanians reject calls ethnic polarisation. This is due to the fact that it ethnic polarisation presupposes the potential of violent ethnic-based conflicts which will stand in the way of national development and peaceful co-existence of ethnicities.

It can be deduced from the discussions above that the PsIM and efforts to actualise them have created a political culture responsible for Tanzania’s low salience of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. In the main, this culture is a result of a set of norms, values, and institutions which have fostered extensive acceptance of national identity over ethnic identities; and rejection of politically violent and divisive trends as being “un-Tanzanian”. This path-dependent low salience of ethnicity continued even in the absence of the socialist AD and the commencement of liberal democratic market-oriented policies which casted doubt on its sustenance. Such argument is anchored on the fact that well-entrenched cultures do not wither away rapidly. They take time to wither away especially if their relevance transcends the political and social orientations within which they take place. It can be argued that the merits of low salience of ethnicity meticulously framed within the nation-building policy informed by the PsIM are still relevant today. Moreover, they formed the base of influencing low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. In a clearer statement, the political culture informed by the PsIM and well crafted in the AD, established the basis for ethnicity’s insignificance in luring voters’ choices. This means that the legacy of the PsIM is at work even after the collapse of the AD. It has been established that the AD promoted equality and discouraged divisiveness, enhanced peace, nation-building policies as well as the monolithic political institutions that created subject citizens; generated Tanzanian identity and national pride. This identity and pride contributed to establishment of a peaceful and self-reinforcing political
culture against ethnic polarisation and ethnic voting. Therefore, I argue that this political imagery culture is the primary cause of low salience of ethnicity in Tanzania. As such, the neo-patrimonial and hybrid accusation that Africa lacks a frame to guide it away from ethnic salience in voting is questioned.

5.4. The Peripheral Politics of Origin, Being and Belonging in the 2010 Elections in Mwanza

Knowing that the level of ethnic salience in Tanzania is low as argued widely in this thesis, I endeavoured to explore momentary outbursts, peaks or ‘flashes’ of ethnicity that manifest in Tanzania and which role they play in determining voters’ choices, even if they are peripheral to mainstream politics. For this objective, the relevant research question as put forward in section 1.4 was: *In what forms and shapes have flashes of ethnicity manifested themselves in Tanzanian elections and how do they inform voters’ choices?* The main intent of this question was to gather information about the flashes of ethnicity involved in the 2010 elections. This is useful as cultural and social ethnicity is a salient reality in Tanzania. Such forms of ethnicity might sometimes be reflected in political ethnicity which could have political relevance in informing voters’ choices.

The analysis in this connection is made by analysing politics of origin, being and belonging as defined in the conceptual and theoretical segment in section 3.2.6. The thesis identifies and analyses the role of candidates’ knowledge of Kisukuma and the politics of origin, being and belonging in informing electoral choices.

5.4.1. The Use of Kisukuma and Voting

In this thesis, the use of the most spoken ethnic language in the study area (Kisukuma) was used as an indicator of the significance of the flashes of ethnicity in anchoring votes. Cognisant of the fact that language and ethnicity are not synonymous as the detailed conceptualisation of ethnicity in chapter section 3.1 entails, yet language boundaries nonetheless frequently coincide with ethnic groups. For instance, in Tanzania, most ethnic groups have their own languages. These languages can be differentiated from others and be used to create identities for political visibility. In the context of this thesis, the dominance of Kisukuma over the other languages in the study area made me regard it as an indication of belonging to the region. Therefore, I included questions, asking whether Kisukuma was used in campaigning and if someone can be elected in Mwanza if he/she does not know Kisukuma. The responses to these questions were quite straightforward. 88% of my interviewees held the view that Kisukuma was not the most frequently used language in electoral
campaigns and rallies. It was Swahili that was mostly used in both urban and rural settings in Mwanza. Most of my interviewees (87%) also were of the view that knowledge of Kisukuma was not a prerequisite for, or guarantee of, getting elected in Mwanza.

As explained earlier, Swahili is a lingua franca through which Tanzanians of all ethnic groups can readily communicate with one another and which contributed decisively to enhancing national integration (cf. sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.1.5). An elderly man in Misungwi had this to say on Swahili when I asked him about the use of Kisukuma in election campaigns:

"Tuna lugha yetu ya taifa (Kiswahili) ambacho kimetuanganisha wakati wa kupambana na mkoloni. Lugha hii inatumiwa na Watanzania wote na vijana wengi wa Kitanzania hawana lugha nyingine wanayojua zaidi ya Kiswahili. Tukiwa na lugha hii kwanini tumia Kisukuma kuhukumu watu ambao wanataka kuongoza Wasukuma na wasisi Wasukuma? Kisukuma kwanza hakitumiki katika mikutano ambayo viongozi wetu wanatumbuka!'"

"We have a national language (Swahili) that unified us to fight colonialism. This language is used by all Tanzanians and a lot of young Tanzanians know no other language than Swahili. With this language why shall we use Kisukuma to judge people who want to lead the Sukuma and non-Sukuma? By the way Kisukuma is not used in the meetings that our leaders represent us!"

The words of the elderly man urge Tanzanians to be proud of the national integration initiatives done by the state. He also wanted people to honour tools like Swahili that played a decisive role in the integration process. Inferably, using Kisukuma to solicit political support is tantamount to betraying the noble efforts of nation-building. The views of the elderly man in Misungwi were further corroborated by a bar-maid in Shamalala who remarked:

"Kisukuma hakizungumzwi na kila mtu Mwanza, kwa hiyo kutumia Kisukuma katika kampeni ni kuwabagua wale ambao hawaelewi Kisukuma. Hii siyo sawa wala haki kwakuwa na madiwani si Machifu wa Wasukuma. Kiswahili hujulikana kwa kila Mtanzania, hivyo basi wacha kitumike katika kampeni kama tulivyozoa."

. "Kisukuma is not spoken by everyone in Mwanza therefore using it in campaigns is discriminating against those who do not understand Kisukuma. This is not fair and good for unity as MPs and Councillors are not Sukuma chiefs. Swahili is known by every Tanzanian, so let it be used in campaigns as we are used to."

The words of the bar-maid and those of the elderly man above, indicate that the use of Kisukuma in soliciting political support in elections is not a rational decision. Such position is predicated on the belief that the use of Kisukuma will breed ethnic tendencies that could act against the country’s nation-building efforts. Furthermore, it was feared that it could discriminate those who do not speak the language while the political offices contested for are for all people living in the area of

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130 Personal interview with an elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2015
131 Personal interview with a Bar-maid in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 15.11.2014
contest. The view of this elderly man and the Bar-maid questions the neo-patrimonial thinking that African people are traditional and tend to stick to their traditional ways. In the context of language in Mwanza, the neo-patrimonial thinking would suggest that the parochial language – Kisukuma would have been preferred ahead of the national language. Such position is based on the fact that the Sukuma could exercise the local level patron-client relationship in electoral mobilisation.

A primary school teacher in Mapilinga seconded the above views. Apart from supporting the negative use of Kisukuma in soliciting votes, the teacher rationalised the legal restriction on the use of vernaculars in election campaigns. In his words the teacher had this to say:


"Tanzanians of all walks of life speak Swahili with pleasure and pride, therefore Swahili does not carry a taint of ethnic superiority based on a tribe’s command of, or not commanding Swahili. Using Kisukuma in election campaigns will divide Tanzanians, endanger their unity and contribute to tribal voting. This will not do well even to the Sukuma regardless of their big number because the personal and socio-economic value of Swahili to Tanzanians is so big to be foregone. This is why laws of the land do not allow the use of vernaculars in campaigning"

The views of the teacher recapitulated the unifying role of Swahili and condemned the use of Kisukuma. This is because in his opinion, it will inform ethnic competition and voting around the Sukuma and non-Sukuma speakers. The teacher’s answer might be seen by opposers of this line of thought as a socially desirable response leaning towards abiding with the establishment which denounces political tribalism. However, except for ethnic salient Tanzanians and those who do master Swahili the answer is practical and rational. The teacher rationalises Tanzania’s electoral law prohibiting political canvassing and mobilising votes discussed in section 5.3.5. The law in question restricts candidates and their agents to use vernaculars in campaigning as well as uttering of statements inciting ethnic divisions and chaos as highlighted in sections 4.5.2 and 5.3.5. The law in its content and objective presupposes that Tanzanians know Swahili. Inferably, it demands those who do not, to learn it. Such view is predicated on the fact that the legislation demands that the campaigns should be done in Swahili. And if there are people who cannot follow, an interpreter shall be used to make them understand what was said. When I took trouble to ask if the services of

132 Personal interview with a female Primary School in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015
an interpreter were used during the 2010 elections, no interviewee was able to give an example where such services were needed or used. In fact, asking for such service would not be socially desirable for anyone to come forward and request this service in Tanzania where ethnicity is widely denounced. This further attests to the fact that Swahili is well used, and serves the purpose of conveying the campaign message to multi-ethnic populations. Whether it served the rural audiences mastering Swahili less well, we cannot know for sure, since the chances of demanding an interpreter are slim for those groups.

As much as it was widely argued above that the use of Kisukuma in campaigning was not supported by most interviewees it does not mean there were none who thought differently. Indeed, there were some interviewees (13%) who felt that it was used and would be a good idea for Kisukuma to be used in the future. Importantly, although the percentage is low it might be practically higher. This is especially because we are not basing our conclusions on a representative sample of the Tanzanian population with proportional inclusion of rural communities. As such, we cannot determine the percentage of rural farmers who barely speak Swahili and may share this position. Interviewees are generally in support of the view that Sukuma identity as manifested in the use of Kisukuma was significant in luring votes in elections as the following observation suggests:

"Kisukuma ni muhimu ili kupata ufuasi wa kisiasa Mwanza na imekuwa lugha kuu ya kampeni muda wote. Ni kama lazima kwa mgombea kuonesha Usukuma wake kwa kuzungumza Kisukuma. Bila kujua Kisukuma mgombea anaweza kwa urahisi kupoteza uchaguzi katika majimbo yenye Wasukuma wengi."

"Kisukuma is imperative in commanding political support in Mwanza and has always been the main language of campaigning. It is almost a must for a candidate to exemplify Sukuma identity by speaking Kisukuma. Without knowing Kisukuma a candidate can easily lose elections in Sukuma dominated constituencies."

The views of the elderly woman in Nange are quite important in terms of presenting an antithesis to the view that Kisukuma was insignificant in luring votes in the 2010 elections. However, they raise some pertinent questions. The first could be how and why Kisukuma has been used in elections campaigns while electoral laws exist barring the use of vernaculars in such campaigns. The answer could simply be having a law restricting the use of vernaculars does not ensure automatic enforcement. As such, the possibility of using it exists. However, this explanation is hypothetical and does not help much. The critical question to ask to verify the use of Kisukuma in the campaigns was whether it was actually used. Although we do not have data on actual

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133 Personal interview with an elderly woman at Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015
campaigning practices across Mwanza Region, the general conviction of the interviewees was that limited Kisukuma words were used in the campaign rallies that took place in rural areas. This view is well summarised by one young man in Mbeli who asserted that:

"Baadhi ya wagombea walitumia maneno machache yanayofahamika ya Kisukuma kama salamu wakati wakuhutubia wapiga kura kwenywe kampeni za uchaguzi. Kwangu mimi hii si kuzungumza Kisukuma, ni kama mlevi katika kilabu cha pombe za kienyeji akizungumza maneno machache ya Kiingereza baada ya kunywa pombe nyingi zaidi ya wastani. Kwa kutamka maneno hayo machache mtu hawezi kusema mlevi huyo aliongea Kiingereza.\textsuperscript{134}\n
"Some candidates used few common Kisukuma words like greetings when addressing voters during election campaigns. To me this is not speaking Kisukuma, it is just like a drunkard at a local brew club speaking few English words after taking above average alcohol. By uttering these few words one cannot say the drunkard was speaking English."

Arguing in the same vein, a university student interviewed in Utemini Street stated:

"Mikutano ya Kampeni inafanyika maeneo ya wazi na inahudhuriwa na watu wa makabila mbalimbali, kwa hiyo njia pekee ya kuwavutia wote ni kwa kuongea katika lugha inayojulikana na watu wote. Ndio maana Kisukuma hakikutumika kama lugha kuu katika mikutano ya kampeni. Wagombea walitumia maneno machache ya Kisukuma kwamba ambayo ambayo anaweza kujifunza na kuzungumza mbele ya umati wa watu.\textsuperscript{135}\n
. “Campaign meetings are done in the open and people of different ethnic backgrounds attend, therefore the only way of winning all of them is by speaking in a language known to them. That is why Kisukuma was not used as the main language of campaigns. Candidates picked few Kisukuma words that even a foreigner can learn and speak in front of a crowd.”

The views of the young men from Mbeli and Utemini indicate the use of few Kisukuma words in the 2010 campaign rallies. However, in essence they second the opinion that Kisukuma has not been very influential in mobilising electoral support, particularly in formal campaign rallies. It does not seem that they were mainly voicing socially desirable opinions to the interviewer. Of course, there may be rural areas where the use of Kisukuma was significant in campaigning, as asserted by the elderly woman from Nange. However, on the basis of the limited magnitude of usage in the study area that salience of Kisukuma we have no reason to assume that the use of Kisukuma was significant luring votes across Mwanza. If as she suggested, the politician’s purpose was to make himself understandable among all present in a Sukuma-speaking community, then it is in this way that we must interpret her second argument that Kisukuma is essential in winning elections in Mwanza, as also discussed below.

\textsuperscript{134} Personal interview with a young man at Mbeli Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 11.01.2015
\textsuperscript{135} Personal interview with a male university student in Utemini Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 13.11.2014
An interesting exploration was made after asking if my interviewees knew any candidate in Mwanza who has been elected without knowing Kisukuma. The answers were divided among interviewees in the two districts under study. As for the parliamentary level in Nyamagana the interviewees were certain as the MP for Nyamagana Hon. Ezekia Wenje was widely referred to. The reference is due to the fact that Wenje is an ethnic Luo from Musoma, whose mother is said to be from Kenya. His mother, however, resides in Rorya, Mara - a district found close to the Tanzania and Kenya border. It is imperative to recall that Wenje’s citizenship was questioned during the 2010 electoral processes (Raia Mwema, 25th June 2010). In this election, Wenje defeated the incumbent MP Lawrence Masha the then Minister for Home Affairs. Due to such portfolio, Masha was in charge of among other things, citizenship issues. In this regard, he was the boss of the officials who dealt with Wenje’s citizenship claim. Masha is an ethnic Zinza and a non-Sukuma speaker whose ethnic group is closer to the Sukuma and found within Mwanza as described in the description of the study area.

A similar verdict was given to Councillors in Nyamagana as several non-Sukuma candidates won Councillor Seats. It is imperative to note that in the 2010 elections Nyamagana was not the only Sukuma dominated constituency in Mwanza region that went to a non-Sukuma speakers. For instance, in Nyamagana’s neighbouring constituency Ilemela, Highness Kiwia an ethnic Chagga by origin defeated Anthony Diallo. Diallo is a Sukuma by ethnic group and happens to be Mwanza regional CCM chair. He is also a well established financial magnet owning the biggest media house in the regional and an Ex-Minister. Kwimba constituency also went to a non-Sukuma. In the constituency in question, a Tanzanian of Asian origin Hiran Mansoor unprecedentedly beat a Sukuma of Kwimba, Leticia Nyerere in the race for MP. Similarly, the then MP for the Geita urban constituency, Donald Max who was neither a native Sukuma nor a Sukuma speaker won against a Sukuma. Max’s citizenship like it was the case for Wenje was questioned during the electoral process (Raia Mwema, 25th August, 2010). Questions emanated from the premise that Max’s father was from the southern part of Tanzania close to Mozambique (creating suspicion of his citizenship). His mother is a Sukuma. However, according to the Sukuma culture, Max is not a native Sukuma as ethnic group membership is patrilineally attuned, that is to the male parent. However, cases of non-Sukuma speakers were not found in Misungwi where interviewees were not able to mention an MP or Councillor who cannot speak Kisukuma. This was regardless of the fact whether they were Sukuma by origin or not.
The views presented above suggest that it is easier to be elected into political office without knowing Kisukuma if you vie for an urban constituency compared to a rural one. The cases of Wenje, Kiwia and Max suggest such fact. Only the Mansoor’s case deviates, since Kwimba is predominantly rural like Misungwi, yet elected a non-Sukuma and a non-Kisukuma speaker. In Misungwi which is predominantly rural, no interviewee could identify a candidate who does not know Kisukuma. A similar trend is applicable to other Sukuma dominated rural constituencies.

We collected some data exceptionally indicating that the local language may be used not merely for communicative purposes but also to signal ethnic belonging or respect for the voters’ unique ethnicity. In an interview with a resident in Nyamagana who stood for a parliamentary seat in Mwanza, I managed to get an attention-grabbing observation of the significance of Kisukuma in elections in Mwanza. He told me that it is important to know Kisukuma if you are to win a parliamentary seat in the rural areas. This is particularly so if one aspires for a Sukuma dominated rural parliamentary or councillor constituency under CCM’s ticket. In his words he disclosed that:

"Kama unataka kuwania wadhifa wa kisiasa katika majimbo ya vijijini ya Mwanza kupitia CCM, inabidi uzungumze Kisukuma kuonyesha kwamba wewe ni sehemu ya wapiga kura. Kisukuma inakuwa muhimu kuwasiliana na watu kwakuwa mambo ya kijamii yanayofanyika kwa kutumia Kisukuma. Hii inaweza isiwe muhimu kushinda uchaguzi kwa sababu uwezo wa kuleta maendeleo na utendaji ni vigezo muhimu pia."\(^{136}\)

“If you want to vie for a political post in rural constituencies of Mwanza through CCM, you have to speak Kisukuma to show that you are part of the voters. Kisukuma becomes imperative to interact with people, as the social issues are done in Kisukuma. This might not be the key to winning elections because ability to bring development and other performance related criteria are also important.”

The views of the then MP hopeful indicate the importance of Kisukuma in campaigning for electoral votes in informal campaign avenues in the study area. Interestingly, the informal avenues are said to be useful for candidates who seek the CCM ticket to vie for a parliamentary seat. This observation is based on the fact that CCM has an elaborate system of primaries whereby aspirants seek votes from ordinary members from CCM branches within the constituency. In these primaries, candidates are not well monitored by the electoral bodies compared to the formal elections. Therefore, when candidates reach out to people to declare their interests to stand for political seats, they do things to identify themselves with them. This may include speaking their language, claimed the ex-parliamentary hopeful. Since opposition parties in Tanzania are not found in the remote areas and lack elaborate primaries for their parliamentary nominees, it is

\(^{136}\) Personal interview with a an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 12.11.2014
understandable that the prospective parliamentary exonerated them in his observation. The view on the significance of Kisukuma in CCM primaries expressed above does indicate some use of Kisukuma in elections. However, it does not entail significance in influencing electoral choices in actual elections. This argument is based on the fact that the then parliamentary hopeful failed to claim that without knowing Kisukuma an aspirant for political office cannot win the primaries and the actual elections in Mwanza. Also, doubts can be cast on the role of Kisukuma in the setting of primaries and formal campaigns among sponsored candidates from different parties. While the enforcement of electoral laws regarding the use of vernaculars is overtly at play on the formal campaigning stage, it is not as effective in party primaries, particularly during non-formal interactions between candidates and the local people. As the interviewee disclosed, Kisukuma is used in the social settings and not in official primary campaigns.

Another important dimension raised by the then parliamentary aspirant that waters down the significance of Kisukuma on determining voters’ choices is related to elements of being and belonging. His mention of candidate’s being viewed to belong to the constituencies and having the ability to deliver public goods, suggests that Kisukuma is not the sole factor that lures voters support. This questions the neo-patrimonial school that Africans are moved by traditional tendencies that exacerbate ethnic voting due to disproportionate ethnic-based client–patron relations. In the subsequent heading, we analyse the importance placed on candidates being known in the constituency, attached to it through lineage and clan, residence and owning property particularly land and housing. In other words, one may summarise that the section strives to explore if parties need to send locals to contest for political seats in the study area.

5.4.2. Influences of Candidates’ Origin, Being and Belonging on Voting in Mwanza

In section 3.2.6 of this thesis, I presented different ways in which identities related to origin, being and belonging may effect voting other than political tribalism as defined in this dissertation. The identities in this thesis are termed the politics of origin, being and belonging. The politics are referred to as flashes of ethnicity, mere peripheral moments, although they carry some of the constituting elements of ethnicity as thoroughly discussed in section 3.2.5. In the section referred, I argued that the politics of origin, being and belonging may manifest in the form of either locally or broadly defined ethnic group identities. More specific to our discussion, it was contended that when a community throws its weight in support of local aspirants in elections, it could be viewed
as a way of securing inclusion in the local political space and accessing public resources (Chabal, 2009). As such, candidates’ attachment to the area of contest is viewed as a way of ensuring that communities get competent, accountable and trustworthy leaders (ibid). This is because the leaders are part of the community they serve and, therefore, will be basically serving their own community and themselves (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). In this section, my interest is to discuss the interplay between common origin, being and belonging and its implications on voting. Based on the conceptualisation of politics of origin, being and belonging outlined in section 3.2.6, I set out to investigate the flashes of ethnicity termed the politics of origin and belonging deemed important in the study area and how they came to play in the 2010 elections. To elicit the significance of different aspects of the politics of origin, being and belonging in influencing voting in the 2010 elections, I set the following four questions:

The First question: is it important that a candidate is from the constituency of contest to win a Councillor or MP seat? The essence of this question was to unveil whether if belonging to a particular constituency in the autochthonous and the politics of being and belonging as described in section 3.2.6 is important or not in anchoring voters’ choices. At its core, the question will delineate the chances of extended versions of ethnic belonging in Tanzania’s political scene. This broad question is followed by a question that attempts to unveil the role of selected elements of belonging (land and residence) highlighted by Ghabal (2009) in anchoring voters’ choices. Since the question is addressed to two levels in the 2010 elections- MP and Councillor Elections, we will be able to discuss implications of belonging in the lowest office contested in the 2010 and the one that follows it on top of the hierarchy. As such we are able to compare ramifications of belonging on elections of Councillors whose jurisdiction (in a ward) and functioning is relatively closer to the people than MP whose jurisdiction is an entire constituency constituted by several wards and most of his functions are in the national parliament. The relevance of this distinction lies on the assumption that the closer the leader is to the people in terms of jurisdiction, the higher the demand of having a native to hold the position. This logic of the Councillor- MP distinction is relevant to all questions.

The Second question is whether it is important that a candidate owns land and residence in the constituency of contest for him or her to win a Councillor or MP seat? This question as mentioned above intends to unveil the role of land that according to Chabal is a key element of belonging
since it entails that one is part of the community in question and in the rural setting ownership of land connotes the possession of a key factor of production. As such, owning land and working on it indicates that one is part of the community’s development agenda and therefore can be entrusted leadership. Land and in particular ancestral land is expected to ensure one’s adherence to the kin network reciprocity and representativeness explained in section 3.2.6. Residence is also viewed in the same way as one’s belonging to a particular community is associated to his ownership of, and more importantly, residing in the community connotes that he is part of the community one wishes to serve politically. In this context, land and residence are taken to measure how elements of belonging play in anchoring votes. The logic of the Councillor- MP distinction presented in the first question is applied to this question. This question is followed by one that attempts to unveil the role of exclusive ethnic membership (origin) in informing voters’ choices.

The third question was: can someone get elected to the Councillor or MP position if he or she is not born within the areas of contest? This question intends to unveil the role of exclusive ethnic membership in informing electorates’ choices. At its core it crosschecks the first one that meant to unveil the role of the politics of being and belonging. The question as indicated above follows the logic of the Councillor- MP distinction presented in the first question.

Lastly, we intended to capture another basis of belonging significant in anchoring votes. The question set was: what issues and characteristics reflective of the politics of origin being and belonging are important when electing a political candidate at the local Councillor and MP levels? This question is open so as to capture anything beyond the elements of origin, being and belonging addressed in section 3.2.6.

The first three questions provided specific knowledge of the interviewees on the issues of origin, being and belonging. The responses on the individual variables tell a little as asked separately each variable received high responses. However, when the variables are crossed to provide a holistic picture we obtain an analysis of pro-origin and pro-being and belonging and their role in influencing voting in Mwanza. For this reason, our analysis essentially deals with the debate among the proponents of origin over being and belonging. That is whether origin is significant than belonging in anchoring voting.
Generally, the results gathered in Mwanza, in both Nyamagana and Misungwi suggest that political representatives should either originate from the area of contest by birth and/or own land and residence within the area where they contest for a political seat. The explanations in favour of this line of thought revolve around the conviction that attachment to the area of contest will ensure trustworthiness and accountability, as well elaborated by Lindberg and Morrison (2008). According to Lindberg and Morrison (2008) native leaders ensure trustworthiness and accountability to the community because they are part of it and, therefore enjoy the fruits of the development registered in their constituencies. Most of the interviewees (85%) had a conviction that politicians are more morally inclined to diligently serve their place of origin than an outsider as confirmed in the following interviews.

"...viongozi bora wanapaswa kuwa sehemu yetu, tunaowajua na hivyo, kuwachagua kwa misingi ya uaminifu wao. Tunatarajia kwamba watalinda maslahi yetu na kuleta maendeleo, kama hawatafanya hivyo, wao hawatakuwa wanasaliti maendeleo ya jimbo lao la uchaguzi tu lakini pia wa watoto wao wenyewe na jamaa zao. Kama tukichagua watu wasio miongoni mwetu tunauhakika gani kwu hawatotuma rasilimali zetu maeneo watokako."

"... best leaders should be part of us, one’s we know t and, therefore, elect them on basis of their trustworthiness. We expect that they will defend our interests and bring development. If they will not do so, they will not only be denying their constituency’s development but their own children and relatives. If we choose people from outside how far are we sure that they will not send our resources to their own places of domicile”

"Tunahitaji binti au bin mwenye uwezo na anayeaminika aliyezaliwa au aliy na makazi Misungwi tumchague. Tunahitaji watu wa aina hii kwa sababu wanajua matatizo yetu kama wafugaji na wakulima kwahiyo wanaweza kutetea maslahi yetu kikamifu katika vyombo vya uoaji wa maamuzi.”

"We need a competent and trustworthy son or daughter of this land by birth and /or residence to elect. We need such kind of people because they know our problems as pastoralist and farmers so they can competently defend our interests in the decision making organs.”

The views of the elderly man in Nange and the young woman in Mbela represent the notion that the origin and belonging of a candidate was an important factor in motivating voters in elections. Their view suggests that if a political contender hails from or is believed to belonging to a constituency wherein he /she participates for elections, that will give voters a better chance of picking a right (trustworthy) candidate. This is a view anchored on the fact that voters would know the aspirants’ character and be able to judge it in an informed manner. This line of thought suggests that representatives needed to have an attachment to the area of contest in the form of

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137 Personal interview with an elderly man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 14.01.2015
138 Personal interview with a Young woman in Mbela Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015
family, relatives and property particularly land and shelter for people to be moved to elect them to hold political office. A retired civil servant well presents this view:

"Viongozi wanapaswa kujulikana na kujichanganya na watu katika shughuli mbalimbali za kijamii, kisiasa na kiuchumi. Unaweza vipi kufanya hivyo kama humiliki ardhi na wala nyumba katika eneo la unalotaka kugombea? Unahitaji kuwa na nyumba utakaoitumia kukaribisha watu wakati wa mazishi na sherehe za jadi. Lazima uwe na ardhi ya kulima na ng’ombe ili uonekane kuwa wewe ni sehemu ya jamii ya Kisukuma. Ukizungumza lugha ya kisukuma unaonegeza muonekano wa Usukuma wako. Hata hivyo, yote haya yatakuwa na maana ukioomba ofisi ya kisiasa kama watu wanauhakika kwamba unaweza kutatua matatizo yao..." 139

“Leaders have to be known and interact with the people in various activities - social, political and economic. How can you do that if you do not own land and house in the area of context? You need to have a house where you will invite people during funerals and traditional ceremonies. You must have land to till and cows to show you belong to Sukuma society. Speaking the language adds a lot to being viewed a Sukuma. However, this can be useful in a bid for political office if people are sure that you can solve their problems....”

The retired civil servant has brought up an important element of the politics of origin, being and belonging. He has managed to point out how leaders are expected to be identified if they are to influence voters. He seconds the view that candidates have to be close to the people so that their trustworthiness and ability to deliver public goods that are in line with the needs of the people can be judged. To him, leaders shall be voted in, on the basis of proving to know the problems of the people by being among those who face them in one way or another. Since agriculture is the core economic activity in Mwanza, a leader has to be known to have participated in agricultural activities which take place on land. Therefore, he/she has to own land. Equally, land is important for housing. This is significant because housing suggests that someone is a bonafide member of the area of contest. Housing ensures that a candidate can take part in and share his social and/or traditional activities with the community he/she expects to lead. While the highlighted issues are important in projecting the sense of being and belonging, they do not ensure votes if one originating or belonging to the area of contest is considered incompetent of delivering public goods.

In Nyamagana where the parliamentary contestant was a Minister in the previous government, common references were made to him that he had less connection to his home constituency. This is because it was claimed that he spent most of his time in Dar es Salaam and abroad fulfilling his ministerial duties. The references made to Masha in Nyamagana, were not put to the MP for Misungwi Hon. Charles Kitwanga, who was a Deputy Minister. This raises questions as Kitwanga

139 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 5.11.2014
then had similar ministerial duties in Dar es Salaam like Masha. I was moved to seek for answers to this difference of opinion upon two candidates with similar activities that limit the time they can spend in their constituencies. It was established that Hon. Kitwanga is an ethnic Sukuma with established ancestral links, land and residence in Misungwi. More so, interviewees indicated that the basic elements of origin, being and belonging were a trunk card for him as the following view indicates:

"Mbunge wangu anatoka Misungwi, tunamjua yeye, wazazi wake na makazi yake. Yeye hatusaliti kwa kula fedha zetu au kujihusisha na masuala ya rushwa. Hii ndio aina ya kiongozi tunayetaka kumchagua na kushirikiana nae kuleta maendeleo. Hatuna tatizo na watu wageni na tunachanganyika lakini ili mtu aweze kuwa kiongozi mzuri tunahitaji kumjua vizuri! Tunapaswa kuwajua wazazi wa mgombea, familia yake, historia yake na kuthibitisha uwezo wake wakufanyakazi."\(^{140}\)

“My MP originates from Misungwi, we know him, his parents and his residence. He is not betraying us by eating our money or engaging in corrupt tendencies. This is the kind of leader we wish to elect and cooperate with to bring development. We have no problem with outsiders as we mingle with them but for one to be able to make a good leader we need to know him/her well! We have to know the candidate’s parents, family, history and proven ability perform.”

The MP for Misungwi Hon. Kitwanga according to the view recorded above has all of the elements of the politics of origin, being and belonging measured in this study. He is from Misungwi by ancestral birth, owns land and residence and is well known to the people. More important, the views above suggest that people wish to elect MPs who stay in their area of political jurisdiction. However, if they cannot get one, they will settle for someone who does not, but has established links in terms of residence and land ownership by which they can measure their trustworthiness and ability to serve. From the views expressed in the three preceding interviews, for one to be considered as being of and belonging to the area of contest needs to reside or own a house in the area. Equally, s/he has to be known so that people can judge his/her trustworthiness and ability to deliver public goods. From a neo-patrimonial line of thought that considers ethnicity to be salient in Africa one would expect Sukuma origin to be salient in identifying the politics of origin, being and belonging. The reasoning is that the ethnic-based patron-client relationship prevails: since Misungwi is Sukuma-dominated, the people will vote for a Sukuma patron. However, the views depicted above do not exclusively refer to Sukuma as the only representatives of Misungwi people. Instead, they only wanted someone to come from among the Misungwi people, who understands well the problems of the people and whose roots can be traced to the district through ownership of land, family or residence. In this regard, even people whose origin is

\(^{140}\) Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015.
not from Misungwi qualify for election and stand a chance of winning votes. In the perspective of the voters, not the candidate’s ethnicity but knowledge of the problems constitutes belonging. In the same vein even a Sukuma who is not well vested with the problems of the people and whose history cannot be traced stands a little chance of winning elections. This is because they are viewed as not belonging to Misungwi. Therefore, in Misungwi origin is not equated with being a Sukuma. The same can be said of Nyamagana. This position lays on the fact that the cosmopolitan nature of the constituency and its urban context, the catchment for candidates to qualify for election was the entire Lake Zone Area. The word of the then MP hopeful well summarises the Nyamagana position:


Nyamagana people consider candidates hailing from the whole Lake Zone who know the problems of our city and its people as belonging to the city. That is why it is common to have MPs and Councillors who are Wajita, Wakerewe, Wasukuma, Wazinza and other tribes from Mara, Tabora, Bukoba and Shinyanga. You can recall that Paschal Kurwa Mabiti hailing from Mara ousted Paul Bomani a wealthy Sukuma with abundant political experience of representing the Sukuma, which can be traced back to the country’s cooperative and independence movement. The 2010 elections have made advancement the people of Mwanza elected a Luo MP who was brought up in Mwanza, well known and resides in Nyamagana.”

A critical look at the views presented above suggests that in Nyamagana a broad definition of being and belonging puts less weight on origin. This is because residence, ownership of land, and knowledge of peoples’ problems are enough for one to be viewed as belonging to the area of contest. Even those who placed emphasis on origin basically looked at origin as an assurance of getting candidates who are familiar with the problems of the voters. As such, it can provide people with a chance of measuring a candidate’s trustworthiness and getting competent bearers of political vacancies during elections. From this line of argument, the interviewees’ suggestions point to the position that knowledge of the character of an aspirant of political office was vital for determining voters’ choices in Mwanza. In this regard, the chances of an outsider and a native of being elected in Mwanza is equal if he/she is well-known in the area of contest, resides or owns land in it, has proven to be trustworthy and able to deliver the development promises. This line of thought can

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141 Personal interview with a MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 12.11.2014
explain why some non-Sukuma were elected to hold parliamentary seats in Nyamagana, and other constituencies like Geita and Ilemela as highlighted in the previous section.

However, it is worth noting that there were few interviewees (15%) who proved to be ethnically salient. This group thought that only candidates born in the area of contest and living in it are true representative of the people. Therefore, they deserve to be the only persons to be elected to office in the study area. To them, it is not enough to own land, live and know people’s problem for one to attract political support in elections. The views derived from an interview with an elderly woman in Mapilinga well represent this view:

"Napendelea kumchagua Msukuma aliyezaliwa Misungwi kushika madaraka ya kisiasa kwa sababu atakuwa anajua mahitaji yetu na hawezi kuchaguliwa kushika nafasi ya kisiasa katika mahali ambapo yeye hajazaliwa." 142

“I prefer to choose fellow Sukuma born in Misungwi to hold political office because he would know our needs and cannot be elected to hold political office at a place where he was not born.”143

Likewise, an elderly man in Misungwi Village echoed the elderly woman’s views as he disclosed that:

"Kila jimbo la uchaguzi katika nchi yetu inabidi liongozwe na kiongozi ambaye amezaliwa na kukulia kwa sababu wao wanajua nini wenyeji wenzake wanataka'. Wageni lazima wakubaliane na hili kwa sababu wao wanajua nini wenyewe ya asili.

“Every constituency in our country shall be led by a leader who was born and grew up because they know what their fellow bonafide inhabitants’ want. Outsiders should agree with this because they have their own places of origin.”

Personal interview with a shop-keeper in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, also shares the view that being a native shall be a ticket to political office:

"Nadhani ni vyema kama viongozi watachaguliwa miongoni mwa wale waliozaliwa hapa – ‘wazawa’ 145 kwa sababu wanajua maslahi yetu katika mioyo yao, hatimaye, mwisho wa siku makabila yote yatawakilishwa katika vyombo vya maamuzi kama bunge."146

“I think it is good if leaders are elected among those who were born here-wazawa because they have our interest at heart, at the end of the day, all tribes will be represented in decision-making organs like the parliament.”

142 Personal interview with an elderly woman in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 17.01.2015.
143 Personal interview with an elderly woman in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 17.01.2015.
144 Personal interview with an elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 14.01.2015
145 Wazawa is a racial nationalist vocabulary for indigenous people singlehandedly coined by Mtikila to express his exclusive sense of authentic Tanzanian identity
146 Personal interview with a male shop-keeper in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 16.11.2014
The comments above represent ethnically salient views in the determination of voters’ choices. The ethnic salience presented casts doubts on the possibility of non-Sukuma being elected in areas where they are not dominant. This is because the Sukuma are dominant in the study area as highlighted in the description of the study area in section 2.4. Their view is understandable as they mainly prefer ethnic voting. However, this view has not been preferred by most of the interviewees as highlighted above. Interestingly, it is contradicted by the practice in Nyamagana, where a non-Sukuma won the parliamentary seat. In this regard, it is relevant to acknowledge the salience elements but we should also recognise that a strong basis of subjective ethnicity is lacking, as in our discussion of the position of the elderly woman from Mapilinga. In addition, the questions go beyond the parliamentary results in Nyamagana and the views of my most interviewees on the matter as presented throughout the current chapter. A critical dissection of the basis for preferring the native candidates provides a critique from supporters of the minority position on the importance of origin. This is because their argument for ethnic salience in voting revolves around the fact that they know better the environment and are able to be true representatives of the people. The ability to solve voters’ problems overshadows the centrality of origin, as it excludes incompetent originals from luring voters. In sum, we learn from our respondents that a marriage of origin and ability to deliver public goods to the masses has to be forged to influence voters’ choices. As such, one could question if a more competent non-Sukuma belonging to the area of context by residence will not be able to win such ethnic salient voters. Based on this criticism, I am convinced to argue that although the tone of the minority views leans more towards ethnic salience, they too bent in the opposite direction when issues of knowledge of problems and ability to solve them are factored in.

In my interview with Mzee Mwiru in Dar es Salaam (Mwiru, 14.05.2014) he expressed the dilemma when he first stood for a parliamentary seat in his home area-Kilwa. He told me that friends he grew up and worked with in Dar es Salaam discouraged him when he sake their advise on the matter. They advised him to vie for one of the constituencies in Dar es Salaam where he is well known compared to his ancestral land Kilwa, where he never lived. He went against the advice by contesting for the Kilwa seat and winning it. He associated his triumph with his ancestral origin that is well known, his academic credentials, experience and proven capability of holding
political office exceeding his competitors. He confessed that indeed he lacked first-hand knowledge of the problems of Kilwa compared to other contestants because he was not residing in the area. However, he thought people are more moved by candidates’ ability to solve problems than origin. At the time, he was a highly ranked Party and government leader which could have made people feel he has access to resources, so the ability to solve the known problems is part of the equation as well. The doubt expressed by Mzee Mwiru’s friends contradicts the ethnic-salience views. This is mainly because they wanted him to contest at a place where he belongs but does not originate, Dar es Salaam. Mzee Mwiru went for his place of origin and was elected. Mzee Mwiru felt he was elected on the basis of merit, because electorates apart from knowing his roots were moved more by his academic qualifications, leadership experience and presumed ability to deliver public goods. In light of the arguments of the interviewees, belonging to the majority camp on this issues, my critique on the minority group and Mzee Mwiru’s experience, the motivating appeals broader senses of being and belonging as well as presumed ability of solve electorates’ problems; reduces the weight of origin in terms of birth and even ethnic group in influencing voters’choices.

5.4.3. Synthesis of the Politics of Origin, Being and Belonging in the 2010 Elections
On the basis of the discussion of the politics of origin, being and belonging above, the importance of origin in terms of being native and the use of Kisukuma in mobilising political support have been proven to be nominal in Mwanza. The weight given to origin is diluded by the broadly based lake zone catchment for viewing candidates as ‘being from Mwanza’ (see expressed in Nyamagana). Equally, the vitality of belonging expressed by residing in Misungwi owning land and knowing the problems of the people in the area of contest diluded weight of origin. More significantly, candidate’s origin was only deemed relevant when it is accompanied by trustworthiness and ability to deliver socioeconomic development to the community that they aspire to have. The interviews proved that native candidates who reside in the area of contest or owned a house, know the problems of the people in question, have proved to be trustworthy and viewed to have the ability to deliver public goods, stand an equal chance of winning elections in Mwanza as the “outsiders”, Sukuma and non-Sukuma with similar characteristics. A point that at this juncture is worth mentioning is that the insistence placed on elements of trustworthiness and ability which are at the core of our discussion of the politics of origin, being and belonging have been put forward by interviewees who are dominantly Sukuma as the study’s sample indicates. People whom one would expect to prefer their ethnic identity to prevail expressed a view that they
meritocratically voted for candidates who had the ability to deliver development to the community; hence they voted in function of rational concerns of wellbeing.

Interestingly, the distant voices that saw the significance of the use of Sukuma identity and Kisukuma in garnering political support during elections could not convincingly establish patterns that suggest significance in the 2010 elections. This position is anchored on the fact that no trend was evidenced among the political parties that they co-opted notable Sukuma politicians to contest in the 2010 elections due to their significance in winning elections. Political parties in some instances endorsed non-Sukuma to vie for political seats in Mwanza and won against prominent Sukuma contenders as highlighted above. Also, some parties in the region like TLP are led by a non-Sukuma. This would not be expected to happen if Sukuma identity and language were key determinants of votes. As it turns out, one’s image as a regional leader is not necessary for winning the support of the dominantly Sukuma-populated Mwanza region. In brief, we conclude that although Mwanza belongs to the Sukuma ethnic group by origin and numerical dominance, the Sukuma identity is not a determining factor when it comes to winning elections. Both the quantitative data (the afrobarometer statistics and the actual elections) and the qualitative data (the interviews) indicate that voters were moved by the broader elements of origin, being and belonging and not ethnicity. In this regard, if a sukuma meets these qualifications he can be elected. In case there is none, the people of Mwanza go for any other who fits the bill, regardless of where he/she come from as proven in Nyamagana, Geita and Ilemela.

5.5. Concluding Remarks: PsIM, Ethnicity and Voting

This chapter has as indicated in its introduction presented results, analysed and discussed the data related to the objectives of the study as indicated in part 1.4 of this dissertation. The objectives as put forward in the referred section revolved around determining how and why the PsIM informed the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs in Mwanza region.

The discussion in this chapter has shown that the role of political tribalism as defined in section 3.2.6 was rare in influencing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections in Mwanza. Field data indicate that the PsIM and efforts made to put them into practice in their generality have informed low salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections in Mwanza. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to argue that political tribalism is unthinkable in Tanzania, despite its historical and current low salience. This is because distant ethnic salient voices still exist and the ethnic composition of electoral
constituencies in the rural areas can attract ethnic canvassing. The possibility is anchored on the fact that almost all rural constituencies are dominated by one major ethnic group as argued by Nyaluke (2013). In light of this composition, we can expect that in all rural communities the local candidates will address their voters in the local language in informal meetings and possibly too at the start and finish of public speeches in those villages. Importantly, the one major ethnic group constituency composition presents the potential of the dominant ethnic group forging MWCs required to effectively evoke ethnic salience in voting as suggested by Weber (2009). Furthermore, accusations of ethnic mobilisation of votes in the Sukumaland that resemble Cheyo’s attempt in the 1995 elections as indicated in section 4.5.3 as well as fears of Gasarasi (1997) and Erdmann (2002) still exist. These accusations based on elements of political tribalism mostly occur in the lower level civic elections (although not part of the 2010 elections), attesting to signs or flashes of ethnicity which if not addressed could gain salience in future. However, currently the legacy of the PsIM in the areas of PNU, EDNR and love of peace as well as varied initiatives informed by the socialist AD have proven to be strong enough to curtail ethnic sentiments from gaining salience in the determination of voters’ choices. This has been proven to be the case despite liberal economic and political transformations that are against the letter and spirit of the AD which meant to guide the realisation of the PsIM. This is mainly because the reforms have failed to reverse the legacy of PNU, EDNR and love of peace.

The data and discussions presented in this chapter indicate that there is a very strong normative foundation of Tanzania’s national unity that militated against ethnic salience in mobilising and motivating voters’ choices in Tanzania. The frequency to which my interviewees made reference to Mwalimu and policies and philosophies he stood for and their implications for crippling ethnicity from gaining salience in informing voters’ choices was high. Interviewees irrespective of the political orientation, age, residence and educational and/or economic background concurred that the founding fathers and especially Mwalimu had “taught” the people that ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices was to be avoided, and the people had understood. These views suggest that Mwalimu was a meticulous teacher to Tanzanians when it comes to Ujamaa and its associated elements of national unity, equity, human dignity and the like which have proven to contribute in mitigating ethnicity from gaining salience on determining voters’ choices in elections. Mwalimu’s teachings against the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes were widely
amplified and presented by the mass media thus contributing towards the creation of a political culture that denounces ethnic salience in voting.

The firm normative foundation of national unity as presented above was further reinforced by the elements of EDNR and peace as enshrined in the PsIM. Nationalisation, according to the interviewees, enhanced national pride and unity by mobilising resources necessary for EDNR across regional and ethnic demarcations. In this way, the door was shut for ethnic voting based on disproportionate distribution of public goods among ethnic groups. The lack of evidence suggesting favoured distribution of resources to inform ethnic competition of resources not only informed national pride and unity, but also minimised ethnic violence. No base for serious ethnic resource competition to inform ethnic conflict and subsequently ethnic voting was in place. The arguments made with regard to the role of the PsIM-PNU, EDNR and peace on determining voters’ choices indicate that the neo-patrimonial ethnic-based patronage have little purchase to explain the influences of ethnicity on voting. However, this does not mean there are no elements to point against this general view among my interviewees. For instance, a relevant exception to the role of nationalisation as argued in this paragraph could be as indicated by some interviewees who felt nationalisation and villagisation had nothing to do with lowering ethnicity. Their position is based on the fact that Tanzania’s current economic system does not support public ownership of the major means of production, and villagisation is not an official policy now. As such, the impacts of nationalisation and villagisation are supposed to end with the liberal reforms. This deviation from the majority view on EDNR and salience of ethnicity in voting is based on a narrow definition of nationalisation and the limited role of historical effects in explaining the same. While the opposing camp claims that nationalisation (in terms of confiscation of private property) and villagisation (in terms of compulsory putting together of possessions) are over and thus could not influence current phenomena, proponents reject this view on the basis of a broader definition of nationalisation and its implications as well as those of villagisation. The broader definition of nationalisation encompassing national unity elements and the continued EDNR viewed within the framework of the PsIM still exist, and are widely furthered. The spirit of nationalisation according to Lofchie and most of our interviewees is alive through non-ethnic resource distribution. Likewise, the integrative role of villagisation and the distribution of social amenities that came with it still exist, and thus bar the potential of ethnic competitions that could ensue had the distribution taken ethnic root. Such situation plays down the biased neo-patrimonial view of
African politics that suggest Africans prefer ethnic-based clientelistic distribution of resources which leads to ethnic competition for votes.

As mentioned in the above paragraph that national pride and unity was reinforced by peace and EDNR- two of the three major PsIM. We saw how EDNR had contributed to Tanzania’s peace. The interviewees in Mwanza have proven to be proud of their nationality due to among other things, the comparative peace Tanzania enjoys compared to its neighbours who have tasted the adverse consequences of ethnic-based civil violence. This way, the need to avoid the negative impacts of violence that have been triggered by politicisation of ethnicity in Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Nigeria informed low salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices in Mwanza. Furthermore, while the violence influenced denunciation of ethnicity in elections it enhanced national unity; national unity that was made possible by among other things EDNR and peace informed continued peace by militating against the salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. While the reinforcing role of peace in lowering salience of ethnicity on informing voters’ choices is associated with effects of war in other countries, few interviewees associated it with the docile nature of the Sukuma people.

A much as the significance of the docile characteristic claimed to inform lower salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices in Mwanza holds water to its believers, it raises a lot of doubts. First of all, the effects of war in the neighbouring country compared to the peaceful Tanzania provide practical experience and impetus for the peace lovers to shun away from peacelessness. Likewise, to avoid them, the causes of violent conflicts include ethnic polarisation as evidenced in other African states. In this regard, the rationale for enhancing peacefulness is not based on cowardice but informed by the need to maintain and enhance peace. In this way, the promise of peace enshrined in the PsIM serves as a frame through which Tanzanians use to reject the significance of ethnicity in mobilising voters’ support. This frame existed even before the outbreak of the politicised ethnic violence in African states, widely referred to by my interviewees as sources of lowering ethnic voting in Mwanza. Therefore, the violence in these states added practical experience that augured well in furthering the anti-ethnic salient political order that forms an integral part of the PsIM.

By the discussion of the politics of origin, being and belonging above, the importance of origin in terms of being native and the use of Kisukuma in mobilising political support, have been proven to
be nominal in Mwanza. The weight given to origin is diffused by the broadly based lake zone catchment for viewing candidates as being from Mwanza expressed in Nyamagana and the vitality of belonging expressed by residing in Misungwi, owning land and knowing the problems of the people in the area of contest. More significantly, candidate’s origin was only deemed relevant when it is accompanied by trustworthiness and ability to deliver public goods to the community. The interviews proved that native candidates who reside in the area of contest or owned a house, knew the problems of the people in question, have been proved to be trustworthy and viewed to have the ability to deliver development promises stand an equal chance of winning elections in Mwanza as the “outsiders”, Sukuma and non-Sukuma with similar characteristics. Given this attention paid locally to the candidate’s knowledge of the community’s problems and to the capacity to solve them, I argue that the politics of origin, being and belonging were employed in the 2010 elections in Mwanza while those flashes of ethnicity functioned as a means of getting competent representatives to win resources necessary for bringing about development.

Importantly, distant voices that saw the significance of the use of native Sukuma and Kisukuma in garnering political support during elections could not convincingly establish patterns that are strong enough to suggest the significance of language and Sukuma identity in the 2010 elections. This position stems from the fact that no tendency was substantiated among the political parties that they took the trouble to persuade and co-opt Sukuma politicians to vie for political office in the 2010 elections in Mwanza because of the vitality of the Sukuma identity and language in luring political support for winning elections in the region. As it has been argued in the section that covered the politics of origin, voting and ethnicity, political parties sponsored several non-Sukuma and non-Sukuma speakers to contend for parliamentary and councillor positions in the elections in the region. Some of them won against prominent Sukuma contenders as highlighted in section 5.4.2. As if this is not enough, even some political parties in the region like TLP and APPT Maendeleo are led by non-Sukuma in positions that require voting, like that of Regional Chairman. Had Sukuma identity and language been the main determinants of votes in the 2010 elections this would not have been the case. Since there were non-Sukuma who stood in the 2010 elections and won, as well as regional leaders who are not native Sukuma, the Sukuma identity was not a determining factor in voters’ choices in the 2010 elections, despite Mwanza’s belonging to the Sukuma ethnic group by origin and numerical dominance. As indicated above, most of the interviewees disclosed that voters were motivated more by broader elements of origin, being and
belonging than ethnicity in the form of political tribalism. It is against this background that I argue that the Sukuma who contested for the political seats in the 2010 elections were not elected by virtue of being Sukuma. Their ability to deliver public goods, and thus realise the PsIM, was a major factor. The chances of a Sukuma and non-Sukuma are more or less equal as people of Mwanza elect people who are trustworthy and can deliver public goods regardless of where they come from and/or the languages they speak as evidenced in the 2010 elections in Nyamagana, Geita and Ilemela.

To conclude, our data-analysis and discussion in this chapter does indicate that the PsIM and initiatives meant to realise them under the broad guidance of the AD have managed to shape a sustained political culture that shuns Tanzanians away from the salience of ethnicity in motivating electorates. The PsIM in their broad sense indicates that Tanzanians do have the history and the political concepts as well as experiences together forming a political culture and frame that grounds low ethnic salience, as opposed to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theories that regard Africans as traditionalists who vote ethnically to serve ethnic-based client-patron relations.
CHAPTER VI
ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN YEARS TO COME

6.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter we established how the PsIM as explained in the introductory and methodological chapters had influenced the salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 election. Equally, we established why the PsIM have influenced the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices the way they have. The current chapter presents and discusses data related to the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. The main objective is to give out a picture of how the PsIM are expected to influence the role of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices in the years to come. The chapter is informed by interviewees’ views on a question that wished to gather their perceptions on the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. It comprises also experiences of political canvassing in the country derived from secondary information sources. Several incidences from the 2015 elections form part of the discussions. These are the most recent elections that availed an opportunity for Tanzanians to decide on their country’s destiny. These elections are the fifth after re-introduction of political pluralism in 1992. Unlike the 1995, 2000 and 2005 and 2010 elections, the 2015 election in comparative terms was closely contested particularly in the presidential race as table V below indicates.

Table V: 2015 Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Presidential Elections</th>
<th>Parliamentary Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>8,882,935</td>
<td>58.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>6,072,848</td>
<td>39.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>98,763</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>66,049</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAUMA</td>
<td>49,256</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>8,198</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>8,028</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDP</td>
<td>7,785</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,596,110</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NEC 2015

*The results exclude the ex-officials and presidential appointees as well as 5 members from the Zanzibar House of Representative and kijitiupole constituency.
Several explanations can be offered for this turn of events. First, CHADEMA was gradually rising into a formidable opposition political party. Second, in 2014 a Constitutional Review Commission roamed the country soliciting for peoples’ opinions for inclusion in a new constitution. Demands for a new constitution had been a long time agenda of the opposition political parties and not CCM’s. Third, CHADEMA led a loose coalition of four political parties known as Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi (UKAWA) to boycott the Constituent Assembly, protesting against the removal of the three-tier-government clause proposed by the commission that solicited peoples’ views and reinstated the current two-government Union structure. Fourth UKAWA’s decision of joining forces to unseat the ruling party-CCM. Our interest in the elections is related to issues of ethnicity and voting in the years to come and not each and every bit of the elections.

6.2. The Future of Ethnicity and Voting in Tanzania
The views on the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania were derived from the question about whether our interviewees think Tanzania will ever be ethnically salient in political terms and why. The results indicated a trend consistent with the discussions in the preceding chapters. Around 80% of my interviewees were optimistic that ethnicity will not gain salience in anchoring voters’ choices in Tanzania, compared to 20% who argued otherwise. In the main, interviewees who were of the view that ethnicity will not gain salience on determining voters’ choices banked their opinions on Tanzanian’s sense of national unity, the legacy of EDNR, and the centrality of peacefulness. To them, these values provide a solid frame against salience of political tribalism and the politics of origin in voting. As for those pessimistic of continued low salience of ethnicity, they base their arguments on the assumption that the strength of the above mentioned ethnic salience mitigating factor is diminishing over time. Their arguments are based on the demise of the socialist principles and principled leaders to address growing inequalities in the society. An interesting convergence among the two opposing camps in this connection is the fact that both seem to agree that there are flashes of ethnicity that should not be left to grow into fully fledged ethnic voting. In this regard, they urged the political establishment and political actors to suppress such outbursts of ethnicity in elections. Likewise, they highlighted divisive elements that provide larger chances of threats to national unity and peaceful co-existence in the Country. Below let us discuss the findings.
6.2.1. The Sustained Sense of National Unity

Most of my interviewees (83%) were of the view that Tanzanians’ lasting sense of national unity will bar ethnicity from gaining salience in determining voters’ choices. They basically argued that nationalist feelings are, and will continue to be strong among Tanzanians because they have made the country politically stable and peaceful, thusly diffusing ethnic identities’ role in politics. The views of a retired civil servant when asked if he sees the possibility of ethnicity gaining salience in voting in Tanzania well summarises this position:

“Ukabila hautakuwa muhimu katika kupiga kura kwa sababu misingi ya umoja wa kitaifa ni imara sana. Pia, watu hawataki kuonja uzoefu wa madhara ya vurugu za ubaguzi wa kikabila.”

“Ethnicity will not be important in voting because the foundations of national unity are very strong. Also, people do not want to experience violent effects of ethnic polarisation”.

The views of the retired civil servant were seconded by a lady in Kishiri A when she said:

“Sisi tumeunganishwa vizuri na watu wote wenye mapenzi mema na nchi yetu hawataki kutuona tumegawanyika kikabila au kidini. Kwa kutumia mambo ya ukabila na dini kuomba kura kutatutenganisha na kuharibu nchi yetu. Kuna wachache ambao wanataka kuona sisi tukiingia katika matatizo ya mgawanyiko kama nchi nyingine za Afrika tunazopakana nazo..... Lakini, hatutatoka fursa kwa hilo kutokea. Waasisi wa Taifa letu hawakutaka tugawanyike! Wao wametuunganishwa na kutuonesha umuhimu wa umoja kwa maendeleo yetu.”

“We are united and all well wishers of this country do not want to see us divided ethnic or religiously. Using ethnicity and religion in anchoring votes will disintegrate us and destroy our country. There are few who wish to see us get into divisive problems like other African countries bordering us. However, we are not going to let that happen. Our founding fathers did not want us to be divided! They unified us and made us see the importance of unity for our wellbeing.”

The views expressed above seem to be reflective of the argument made throughout the dissertation that Tanzania has managed to keep itself away from falling into ethnic polarisation. This has been the case despite being bordered by countries like Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and others that have proven to be ethnically polarised and tasted violent ethnic conflicts. The interviewees quoted suggest that sustained denunciation of the use of ethnic identities in political canvassing and voting as widely argued throughout section 5.2.1 can ensure continued low salience of ethnicity in politics. The views of my interviewees indicated clearly that a key tenet in Tanzania’s post-independence government was, and still is, to fight ethno-cultural divides and any other divisive factors which would hinder unity among its citizens. The interviewees held the view that the measures used to unify Tanzanians from Independence like using Swahili as national language to

147 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 5.11.2014
148 Personal interview with a lady at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 08.11.2014

256
unite 120 ethnic groups, intermarriages, legal restrictions to the use of ethnicity in public life well explained in section 5.3 all set a national cohesion that is so strong for ethnicity to gain salience in voting.

These views are indeed in line with varied stances for national unity evidenced in the 2015 elections. In the said elections, contestants and their parties never went for the ethnic ticket to lure votes. All of them promised to enhance national unity. The CCM candidate (now President) Dr. John Pombe Magufuli as it has been usually the case, led the league of promising national unity, peace and tranquility which he associated to his party. The opposition did promise the same. However, the accusations of CHADEMA being a ‘Chagga party’ or party of the Northern Zone were not put to rest. This time, the feelings were invigorated by the crossover of two ex-Prime Ministers – Edward Lowassa, who stood as its presidential candidate, and Fredrick Sumaye - his chief campaigner, who are both from the Northern Zone. From the election results, one can be convinced that there is some truth as for the first time CHADEMA won in all Chagga dominated constituencies and increased seats in the Northern Zone. In the same vein, CCM whose candidate was from the Lake zone won in all Sukuma dominated parliamentary seats and almost all Councilor seats in the Sukuma dominated constituencies. The results notwithstanding CHADEMA in some constituencies like Arusha Town fielded a non-Arusha and won against CCM’s native candidate. Importantly, CHADEMA through its presidential candidate accused CCM of playing an ethnic campaign for its native contender for the Arusha parliamentary seat. He urged the people of Arusha to vote for Godbless Lema basing on the elements of politics of being and belonging beyond the purely ethnic genealogical factors. He appealed to them that he has spent most of his life in Arusha, knows the problems of the constituency and can solve them. Lema won by a landslide majority. In this sense, political tribalism and its impact on voting were diluted by the politics of being and belonging.

In my interviews with the KII's an overriding theme that came out to support low salience of ethnicity in the future is CCM’s overall hold of the country’s polity. In the main, they were of the view that CCM’s sustained control of political offices has formed an inclusive elitist political tradition that enhances unity and assures politicians access to, and maintenance of power. Since politicians are likely to use ethnicity instrumentally to gain power, their inclusion in the political establishment without using it decreases their likelihood of appealing to it. In other words, the
insignificance of ethnicity in political mobilisation demotivates political elites from invoking it to lure votes. Correspondingly, they uphold nationalist (as in nation-oriented) pleas. Interestingly, while the political elites are anti-ethnic, there seem to be no rural or commercial elites or lobbists to counter their position. The views of Bana and McCourt (2006) that rural and commercial economic elites have not (yet) developed points in this direction. The basis of Bana and McCourt’s position is that while the number of marginalised rural people are poorly organised and without much political influence, an indigenous urban capitalist class to champion ethnic polarisation is yet to emerge. Some critical reflections need to be made in this regard though, which concern the Tanzanian situation. First of all, the political history of Tanzania and TANU we described earlier has always had a rural scope, with AD integrating the views of ‘peasant intellectuals’ (Feierman 1990), which means that through the latter the poor rural communities indirectly did have political influence. Cultivating this link with the rural grass-roots has been part of CCM’s success. Secondly, however successful an urban capitalist class may become, it will still have to reckon with the nation-building efforts discouraging ethnic canvassing. Thirdly, such as class does exist in a limited, ethnic version in the form of the economically dominant Asian business community. While negatively refererd to as neo-liberal by some and even as ‘parasitical’ (Magabacholi)149 by the late Rev. Mtikila, they keep a low political profile, also when being well-known members of CCM and part of its leadership. Their inclusion in the anti-ethnic move by CCM ensures limited use of their economic might, which could otherwise have incited the politics of affection among ethnically divided communities. CCM’s nationwide support in elections that cuts across regional, religious, ethnic, social, and class divides has never been shaken in all elections and this indicates a positive trend in the enhancement of national unity (Malipula, 2014; Ole Therkildsen, 2009). This being said, it does not mean there are no divisive elements or internal conflicts within the party and Tanzanian society. Indeed, there are economic disparities, ideological divergences among its members and so forth that come into the open during election campaigns. It is worth recalling that the party is not held together by a common ideology after the 1990’s effectively distanced the party from its socialist past. CCM now supports a market-driven, privatised economy and liberal politics which breed fears of ethnic salience in politics. This has caused some tensions between conservatives and reformers, but has not split the party up to now. Even with the defection of

149 Magabacholi is a term coined by the late Rev. Mtikila referring to thieves or looters of Tanzania’s wealth. The terminology has its origin in the Indian word Choli which literary means thief. The vocabulary was meant to connote
Edward Lowassa who commanded massive support in the party, the base of CCM remains unshakable. It still controls around 80% of the parliament and the local government authorities in the country. However, the party’s inclusiveness suggests that it is a coalition of competing factions that mainly share a nationalistic outlook and pragmatic interest in staying in power.

The strength of the coalition and its role in the anti-ethnic salience crusade according to my KII is attributed to two major factors. The first is the considerable degree of continuity in the party’s fight against divisive politics. This is mainly associated with the composition of the party’s central organs. This view is predicated on the fact that CCM has never relegated its “elders” in the Central Committee (CC), which is the party’s most powerful organ for decades. Some former ex-presidents and ex-prime ministers sat in the CC and old party stalwarts like the KII Mzee Mwiru were rewarded ministerial posts. It is only in the past three years that the former presidents requested to be relieved of such membership. However, they constitute a council of elders to advise the party that played a crucial role in the nomination of CCM’s presidential candidate. As such, the core national integrative ethics are assured in the party that has had the exclusive opportunity to hold power in Tanzania. This position, however, is crystallised by the party’s grooming and replacement process that is carefully managed to ensure consistency, particularly in the nation-building policy. As Mzee Mkali told me that CCM elites are brought up through the party’s parent organs or its affiliated organisations like the CCM Youths League, the CCM Women’s Organisation, and the CCM Parents Association. Therefore, most of the leaders have been groomed to detest the use of ethnicity in politics. Today, we are seeing intellectuals and technocrats holding political offices through appointments without contesting for legislative seats. However, it is important to highlight the fact that social links between members of the political, intellectual and bureaucratic elites have been built through their education in a few high quality public secondary schools, a single national university (until relatively recently), and army conscription of university graduates (Therkildsen & Tidemand, 2007). Therefore, they are not isolated. More significantly, the monolithic political dispensation as discussed in sections 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.1.2 established an institutionalised party apparatus, which helped to provide the do and don’ts among the political and bureaucratic domains. This ensured a predictable set of political incentives and signals to public figures. Tanzania is a pluralist state de jure. However, literature still recognises CCM as a state party with the legal and extra-legal muscles to execute the core intents of a monolithic political dispensation. This is particularly through appointment and
dismissal of public officials (Makulilo, 2012). In this regard, the party can weed out ethnic-salient officials groomed from the party’s ranks and beyond.

Apart from the role that the ruling party plays in making my interviewees optimistic of continued low salience of ethnicity in politics, the opposition parties also have a role to play. This is because they have not decided to use the ethnic ticket as Gasarasi (1997) and Omari (1997) expected. The parties never agreed to use such ticket in lower elections where as highlighted in the past chapter the possibility of forming MWCs was provided, nor in the presidential elections that hardly provide such opportunity. This, as argued above, stems from the firm discourse against the use of ethnicity and the adverse impacts of ethnic polarisation in other African states. The parties as indicated above have been preaching national unity overtly despite claims of ethnic and/or regional biases levelled against them. For instance, the ethnic and/or regional biases levelled against the opposition party CHADEMA as argued in section 5.2.1 are politically meant to label the party as divisive. As such, it aimed to be viewed as an organisation that intends to dent Tanzania’s national unity, peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence and the country’s broad peaceful and tranquil nature. While this is said, we saw in the 2010 elections and in the current one that CHADEMA had several candidates like in Arusha constituency, Nyamagana and Ilemela who were not native. In Arusha they won with such candidates and in the other two they lost by a minuscule margin. Such incidences point to the fact that their support is trans-ethnic. At most they relied on the politics of origin, being and belonging couched in the idea of having someone competent to deliver public goods. These trends point to the limited role of ethnicity in luring votes now and in the future.

The majority view was not without opposition as 17% claimed that weaknesses in spearheading national unity will make ethnicity gain salience in politics. In the main, this group of interviewees was of the view that the current political leadership has failed to crackdown on parochial tendencies in the manner that the past regimes have. The views of a young man from Mapilingo Village suffice to unveil this ethnic salient line of thinking:

“Ukabila utakuwa muhimu Tanzania kwa sababu baadhi ya viongozi si wazalendo kabisa! Wao kusafiri nje ya nchi kilima kikuwa yao wenye we. Hawana maslahi ya nchi katika moyo yao, jinsi Mwalimu na wenzake walivyokuja. Hali hii ya Utaifa unaotiliwa shaka unaweza kutufanya kuchagulize kuwa wakabila.”

“Ethnicity will be important in Tanzania because some leaders are not patriotic at all! They travel out of the country daily for their own good. They do not have the interest of this country at heart; the way Mwalimu and his colleagues had. This doubtful nationalism can make us choose to be tribalist”

150 Personal interview with a young man in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
The young man’s ethnic salient view was echoed by a female teacher who argued that:


“There are elements of political tribalism that can grow if left to continue. For instance, many people contest for political seats in their places of domicile. In the parliament these MPs talk more of their constituencies compared to national issues. This means they greedily solicit resources for their co-ethnics. This trend will add tribalism in politics.”

Another view pointing to the likelihood of ethnic salience in Tanzania’s future was provided by Kurya Street vendor. In his own words the vendor retorted:

"Hisia za ukabila zipo hai katika masuala mbalimbali ya kiuchumi na kijamii! Hii itakuwa sana kwa sababu viongozi hawafanyi juhudi za kutosha kuondoa hisia hizi. Wameshindwa hata kutupa vitambulisho vya Uraia! Hawa viongozi ni wataifa hili kweli? Kwanini wameshindwa kutufanya tutambulike rasminje na ndani ya nchi kama Watanzania?"

“Feelings of ethnicity exist in various social and economic fronts! This will be salient because leaders are not doing enough to stop these feelings. Are these leaders really nationalistic? Why have they failed even to give us national identity cards so that we can be formally identified domestically and internationally?”

The views above suggest that shortcomings in upholding nationalist ethos by some political leaders in Tanzania will fuel ethnic salience in politics: unlike the elites losing their nationalist zeal and moving their assets abroad, the ethnically oriented candidates in the future may at least have the interest of their own community at heart. The interviewees compare the efforts of the past regimes especially Mwalimu’s zeal in nation-building to argue their case. As we saw throughout the fourth and fifth chapters, it is a fact that Mwalimu’s contribution in furthering national cohesion and unity was above the average. However, it does not mean that his successors have completely abandoned his crusade as indicated in section 5.2.2. It is a fact that the timing of Mwalimu as highlighted in section 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 was critical in the nation-building architecture. This is mainly because he led the country to its independence and the independent state building was wanted national integration and peace. It is against this backdrop that the AD which provided Tanzania’s critical juncture in the political, social and economic domains came into existence. Interestingly, it is imperative to recall that Mwalimu is the primary author of the AD. None of his successors enjoyed

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151 Personal interview with a female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 18.11.2014
152 Personal interview with a Kurya Street vendor in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 13.11.2014
such historical moment, yet in their own way and circumstances as argued throughout chapter V, they did honour the ideals embedded in the PsIM and used Mwalimu as an icon to further the nationalist crusade. In section 5.2.2 it is indicated how a strong frame militating against ethnic salience exists and informs national identities over ethnic identities. Similar views are presented with the majority who feel that ethnicity will not gain salience in Tanzania in this chapter. The views presented indeed explain comparative shortcomings which partly can be associated with the leadership era and political and economic history. Importantly, the observations do not suggest that flashes of limited nationalist practices will automatically fuel ethnic salience. This is against the constituting elements of politicisation of ethnicity advanced by Wimmer (1997). According to Wimmer ethnicity has to be politicised by vivid divisive distribution of resources which ensue conflictual relationship between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of national resources.

Overall, we can see the interviewees still hope that the fostering of a national identity predicated in the PsIM has dismantled the strength of ethnic groups as a form of political identity and political canvassing. In this regard, political elites are curtailed from manipulating ethnic interests and fears in mobilising electoral support. The limited ethnic salient identities unveiled suggest the likelihood of limited ethnic-based voting in response to social and political differences. As of now limited evidence point to this direction, the differences are not ethnically battled out. This is mainly because they lack the constitutive elements of politicisation of ethnicity. At most the differences are battled out on issues in a broad national response which furthers nationhood as opposed to ethnic orientations.

6.2.2. The Sense of EDNR

As it was the case for the element of national unity, EDNR also was viewed to be significant for crippling ethnic salience for anchoring voters’ choices in Tanzania. This position was held by 79% of my interviewees. A view of an NGO worker presented below asserts this viewpoint:

“... Bunge kupita bajeti ya Taifa linasambaza rasilimali kwa kila mkoa kwa usawa. Hakuna kanda au kabila linalokuwa na upendeleo maalum usiokuwa na msingi. Mgawanyo huu wa haki utaonga kuhusu na ukaunti kufanya ukaunti wa nafasi ndogo kuathiri upigaji wa kura.”

“... the parliament through the national budget distributes resources to every region equitably. No region or tribe is unrationally special. Such fair distribution enhances nationhood and will make ethnicity have less significance in anchoring voting”

153 Personal interview with an NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 16.01.2015
This view above was seconded by an extension officer in Misungwi through a practical example of the equitable distribution of gas resources found in Mtwara.

"Ukabila ha uwezi kupata nafasi kubwa za nchi kwa sababu rasimali zinagaiwa kwa usawa. Kwa mfano, gesi ya Mtwara imeelekezwa kwenye gridi ya taifa ili Watanzania wote wanufaie na umeme. Wakati wananchi wa Mtwara walipoonesha tabia ya kikabuzi ya kudai kwamba wawamehe na wawekezaji la umeme zaidi. Serikali liikuwa makini kukandamiza madai hayo ya kikabuzi. Hii inaelezea jinsi gani viongozi weweze wa rasimali wengine wa watanzania wanufaike na umeme kwa kufanya ubali uwezo wako."154

“A tribalism cannot gain salience in politics because resources are always equitably distributed. For instance, the gas of Mtwara is directed to the national grid for all Tanzanians to enjoy electricity. When the people of Mtwara expressed parochial tendencies demanding that they must benefit more than others, the government was keen to suppress such discriminatory demands. This tells how serious our leaders are when a section of the country wants to disproportionately enjoy national resources”155

A retired civil servant further echoes the views:

“Tanzania itaendelea kuwa na umoja za nchi kwa sababu rasimali za nchi zinaliwa kwa pamoja na watu wote. Hakuna ubaguzi wa kikabila katika mgawanyo wa rasimali za nchi. Sasa tumebinafishisha uchumi wa taifa na kukaribisha wawekezaji la umeme zaidi na kodi hivyo. Kwa uchumi wa taifa, hakuna kabila linaloweza kupata nafasi za umeme kwa kuna kabila za kikabila. Hii inaelezea jinsi gani viongozi wetu wanaonekha wawekezaji la umeme. Hivyo wawekezaji la umeme waliomuikeza na wameheza kufanya ubali wa wasihi wa nchi wa sababu rasimali wengine."156

“A Tanzania will continue to be united because national resources are shared by all people. There is no ethnic discrimination in the distribution of national goods. Now we have privatised national economic ventures and invited investors but the loyalty received from minerals and other taxes from investors are equitably distributed. With such practices no tribe can feel discriminated and therefore ethnic conflicts and salience in politics cannot grow”157

The views presented above indicate that the component of EDNR enshrined in the PsIM is expected to inform low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in the years to come. The degree of insistence of the role of EDNR in enhancing national unity over divisive ethnic polarisation explains the optimism expressed by the majority of my interviewees. According to this group of interviewees, distribution of resources across regional and ethnic demarcations enhanced national pride and unity which militates against ethnic salience in voting. This is because national unity tends to curtail ethnic polarisation that breeds ethnic voting once resources are disproportionately distributed among ethnic groups. Interestingly, the interviewees indicated that the elements of EDNR raised are cognisant of the liberal reforms that took place in the country. It

154 Personal interview with a Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
155 Personal interview with an Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
156 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 5.11.2014
157 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 5.11.2014
is against this backdrop that the views discussed EDNR on the base of resources mobilised through the private and public sectors. An important element raised related to the EDNR, is the government’s response to parochial calls of favouritism put forward by people located where resources are found. The resolute position against parochial distribution of resources depicted in the Mtwara case suggests that ethnic-based resources distribution has no chance. As such, ethnic polarisation is diffused and in turn ethnic voting shall not be expected to gain salience. As argued above in section 5.2.2 the optimistic view of low salience of ethnicity in politics related to EDNR is banked on the broader definition of nationalisation as put forward by Lofchie (2013). This definition goes beyond the narrow view of nationalisation that confines it to confiscation of private property for EDNR. Such conceptualisation provides a broader view of nationalisation encompassing confiscation and other public efforts set to empower national capacity to enjoy the available resources in the country in all fronts. In this regard, EDNR complements the elements of national unity as discussed in section 5.2.1. Therefore, EDNR and PNU collectively militate against ethnic salience in politics.

The optimistic views presented above suggest a paradox as in conflict theory: nations with ethnically diverse populations are deemed to be more susceptible to higher levels of ethnic-based inequality and conflicts. Such inequalities inform ethnic voting in African countries like Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda and Nigeria as indicated in the introduction section in section 1.1. My interviewees’ position that such situation is unheard of despite the country’s ethnic diversity indicates that state policy has not been influenced by any ethnic group(s) to overtly invoke divisive distribution of national resources. It could be that in this case, grievances held by the Mtwara people, though not strictly ethnic, could spur conflict, but that they are drawn outside of ethnic lines as Tanzania has no history of ethnic groups in another part of the country enjoying favours for resources found in their region. As such, no ethnic group is significantly subjugated by the state or another ethnic group to effect ethnic salient feelings and political practices.

The majority view that expressed optimism that ethnicity will not gain salience in Tanzania’s future was not unchallenged. There was a minority (19%) who were of an opposite view. The following view put forward by a farmer in rural Nange substantiates this:
"Ethnicity will gain salience in Tanzania because of the economic disparity among regions and tribes. The government cannot erase this fact and therefore conflicts are likely to abound. These differences will inform political competition among members of rich and small tribes in elections."

This view was supported by a young man in Mapilinga who had this to say:

"Ethnicity will take toll in Mwanza because it is poor although it has minerals. We are tired of this situation! Minerals are taken and we are left with empty holes. We will stand up as the Sukuma to demand for development. Cheyo tried to marshail us to this effect, but has lost elections in Bariadi."

The views presented above suggest that equitable distribution of resources found in regions may be a source of ethnic salience in politics. In the main, they indicate that resources found in the regions of Tanzania shall be enjoyed more by the people living in those regions instead of being equitably shared pan-territorially. Indeed, John Memose Cheyo as indicated in section 4.5.3 attempted to incite this kind of ethnicity to no avail. Today Cheyo is not an MP anymore. While this view sounds favourable to those regions endowed with resources, the opinions expressed in section 5.2.2 indicate that no region is self-sufficient. In this regard, regions need to be and are complementing each other through the national government. In this context, furthering parochial enjoyment of resources has social and economic costs. It fuels disproportionate development which diminishes national cohesion and breeds inter-ethnic competition. Interestingly, although the interviewees attempted to sound as if Mwanza is an all Sukuma region, but it is not, as we saw in the description of the study area and the discussion of the PNU in section 5.2.1. In this regard, although using the resources in Mwanza will mean that the Sukuma will gain more resources, but they will also be consumed by non-Sukuma living there. More interesting, although now the resources are nationally distributed, it is not distributed along ethnic lines that can suggest inter-ethnic tension. That is to say, no ethnic group was pointed out to have benefitted more from Mwanza resources for conflicts to ensue. Most of the accusations of failing to develop Mwanza

158 Personal interview with an young man in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015
159 John Memose Cheyo is a Sukuma politician who is accused of urging his fellow Sukuma ethnicmates to become politically active by supporting his presidential bid in 1995 as indicated in the opening quote of the fifth chapter.
through gold are directed to the state and investors. In the main, they claim that the big mining companies have not given much in the form of loyalty and corporate social responsibility to develop Mwanza. From such line of thinking, the battle is essentially on the economic reforms rather than economic based inter-ethnic resource distribution.

From the discussions above it can be deduced that EDNR is viewed to be central in mitigating ethnic salience in politics in the future. EDNR’s contribution as argued widely in section 5.2.2 is complementing the existing deep feelings of national unity and its mitigating effects on the use of ethnicity in soliciting votes. The ethnic-salient feelings expressed by few interviewees seem to be less realistic as they lack the constituting elements of ethnic competition. This is due to the fact that the developmental disparity claimed to fuel ethnic salience does not indicate covert or overt ethnic competition. Instead, the dissatisfaction of few Tanzanians who wish to resort to ethnic tendencies in retaliation of limited benefits of privatisation. Importantly, sound feelings of national unity and resource complementarity defuse ethnic polarisation. Let us see how elements of peace are expected to influence the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the future.

6.2.3. The Longing for Peace

The love of peace and the adverse impacts of ethnic-based conflicts attracted 81% of my interviewees to believe that ethnic salience in Tanzania will not gain significance in voting shortly. This position seems to augur well with the discussions made in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3. The position is attributable to the fact that Tanzania is known as a heaven of peace in the civil-war prone continent of Africa. This line of thought is supported by the following opinion:

“Tanzania is the paradise of Africa when you talk about peace. We have never seen violent ethnic conflicts like other countries that are always broadcasted in the media. We have no reason to be ethnic salient in voting and expose ourselves to the problems that Kenya, Burundi or Rwanda had due such divisive politics. No Tanzanian wants to taste the impacts of ethnic war.”

The views of the Extension Officer are predicated on the fact that Tanzania, as opposed to its neighbours Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and other African countries has neither experienced ethnic-

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161 Personal interview with an Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on 13.01.2014
based civil wars. Neither has it experienced large scale violent religious conflicts nor ethnic-based income disparity conflicts or coups since independence (Hirschler, 2004). This is an interesting puzzle as according to John (2011) what happens at one end of the world has corresponding impact in the other parts of the world. From John’s line of thinking, ethnic-based violent conflicts like those that happened in Burundi, Rwanda and Kenya were expected to spill over into Tanzania. Instead, they stopped right there, and this despite the porous borders demarcating our countries which provide the potential of perpetrators of violence to penetrate their interests into Tanzania. The penetration into Tanzania could have been through its loose boundaries, also in other parts than the West, especially from the Indian Ocean, which are poorly patrolled thus offering room for penetration of weapons. Such weapons have entered the country. Coupled with the poverty of most Africans, they occasion indigenous involvement in terrorist acts like the bombing of the United States embassies in Tanzania by Al-Qaeda in 1998 prove (Rosand et al. 2008).

In the views of John, human behaviour including violence does not occur in the vacuum. According to him, poverty is a crucial factor in influencing violence because it threatens people’s basic human needs and creates a sense of relative deprivation. As such, the poor people are prone to involvement in violent acts to reverse deprivation. In the context of ethnicity, the poor ethnic groups are expected to be likely to engage in violent acts against the richer to reverse poverty. In essence, this can manifest and later inform political identities and agendas worth of anchoring voting along the conflicting ethnic lines. This has not been the case as the degree of national cohesion as well as ethnic indiscrimination and trust are high despite different levels of wealth among ethnic groups as indicated in section 5.2.1. This is indeed attributable to deliberate initiatives against the significance of ethnicity in anchoring votes and Tanzanians love of peace among themselves and their neighbours.

It is perhaps worth noting that Tanzania has not only been comparatively peaceful but also has facilitated peace in fellow African countries. Tanzania does so by stimulating mediation, negotiation and reconciliation among warring or conflicting parties. For example, through Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Tanzania mediated the Burundi conflict (M pangala, 2000). President Kikwete and President Benjamin Mkapa also played a role in addressing the ethnic-based electoral violence that claimed Kenyans lives in 2007 (Odallo, 2010). Just recently, Tanzania as the chair of the East African Cooperation, has championed peace talks in Burundi. In such capacity, it has
appointed President Yoweri Museveni to negotiate the violent political conflict in Burundi related to President’ Nkurunziza’s accused illegal third term in office. In this regard, Tanzania’s peace was used to make peace in war-torn areas. This seems to be internationalisation of the domestic philosophy embedded in the PsIM which among other things promised peacefulness and national integration. Although Tanzania could not directly cripple the factors that attract ethnic conflicts in those countries, it had and still is, addressing them within its borders. These include enhancing national unity and social cohesion, avoiding ethnic-based disproportionate distribution of resources and sustainable preaching of the importance of peace for development as widely argued throughout chapter V.

My interviewees argued that the intensity of the discourse against peace threatening aspects has never been reduced in Tanzania. This had been the case even when liberal political and economic reforms came into existence. We still see the media preaching peace and national unity amid competitive political and economic practices. Political parties in elections indeed denounced peace threatening acts like politicising ethnicity and urged state organs to refrain from excessive force. The love of peace and peaceful co-existence among ethnicities still hold considerable currency in Tanzania (TACCEO, 2010). However, this does not mean there are no incidents of peace threatening or violent incidents in elections or beyond. For instance, incidents were reported that the state apparatuses have used excessive force particularly in the opposition campaigns in Mwanza and other urban centres. The following quote attests to the application of force in the management of the elections:

“Hakuna amani wakati wa uchaguzi kama polisi wanawatupia mabomu ya machozi wapinzani wanaoanika uovu wa serikali katika kampeni.”

“There is no peace during elections if the police throw tear gas at the opposition unveiling the ills of the state in campaigns.”

As argued above those incidents of excessive uses of force were not ethnically selective. This is mainly because members and supporters of the opposition are not ethnically based. So are citizens and foreign observers, who attend such campaign meetings. Therefore, as much as flashes of violence take place, they do not in any way entail divisive ethnic conflict which can inform ethnic

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162 Personal interview with a a Kurya Street vendor in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 13.11.2014
voting. The same can be deduced from the views of the 19% of my interviewees who felt that peace may not limit ethnic salience in voting in the near future.

The position of the minority of my interviewees on this matter was predicated on the occurrence of violent conflicts which challenge the peaceful atmosphere enjoyed by Tanzania since independence. To them, such violence can be politicised and hence cause ethnic voting. At its core, the argument rests on the idea that human identities can create ethnic conflicts and ethnic voting once politicised and used for acquiring state power (Wimmer, 1997). There are many violent conflicts in the country that made the headlines in the newspapers and were actually sung about in political hip hop known as Bongo Flava by artists such as Professa Jay. One example is the fight involving peasants and farmers of Mabwegere village, Kilosa District, Morogoro Region in the 2000s that led to the deaths of around 23 people and more than 832 villagers took refuge in neighbouring villages (LEAT, 2008). Resource-based violent conflicts among local communities of North Mara and goldmine investors leading to deaths abounded in the 2000s (John, 2010). Also, religious based conflicts like the one that took place on 12th February, 1998 Moslems of the Mwembechai Mosque in Dar es Salaam orchestrated a violent demonstration, which vandalised properties like cars and crates of beer, and beating up people. Police officers’ forceful intervention to stop the riot claimed the life of 2 people and severely injured 20 others (John, 2011). Although these conflicts are not predominantly ethnic, if politicised they could turn out to be, and divide Tanzania.

Of these threats, I am tempted to deal with the religious and racial and citizen identities and divides. Specifically, to see how they are linked to the neo-patrimonial and ethnic structure theses. I am dropping the resources-based component because it has been discussed earlier in subheading 6.2.2. The views of the minority of my interviewees are basically anchored on the assumption that the form of identity, which in recent years appears to threaten social cohesion in Tanzania is religion (Ramadhani, 2015a, 2015b; Mallya, 2006; Chachage, 2006; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). There are several socio-economic problems that have been given religious expression in Tanzania. The expressions in question mainly revolve around improving Muslims' access to formal secular education and lucrative political and professional positions. These positions so far are meritocratically dominated by Christians due to their comparative academic superiority resulting from Christian missionaries’ investment in education in the country since colonialism. Zanzibar’s
failed bid to join the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and arrests of Muslim preachers are all cited to indicate religious-related tensions. We can add the most recent upsurge in religious tension occurring between 2013-2015 including assassinations of people, assault, attacks on religious leaders, destruction of property and Christian-Muslim disputes over who has the right to slaughter animals such as cows in Geita (Ramadhani, 2015a).

Likewise, Muslims blame the government for refusing to incorporate the “Kadhi Courts” (Muslim courts) into the government machinery. Generally, the Muslims want the government to have affirmative actions to improve their academic standard. At one time in what can be viewed as helping them, the state sold to the Muslim Development Foundation a college previously owned by the country’s Electrical Company at a very low price (10 million Tanzania Shillings). This act and the preferential treatments requested by the Muslims are not well taken by the Christian community (Ramadhani, 2015b; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). In the main, they argue that the cry must be addressed by the Muslims investing in education and that having a Kadhi Court in a secular state would be discriminating against other religions (Seymour, 2015). The two accusations point to a base for misunderstanding between Christian and Muslims and sometimes public dissent as well as violent acts. But this has never proven to crystallise into a politically salient trajectory in Tanzania (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). This seems to be a blessing because the neo-patrimonial client-patron relation thesis and the ethnic structure logic of MWC would all predict religious salience. This argument rests on the fact that the religious leadership have resources and statuses that provide room for practising patronage and the division between Muslims and Christians in the country is almost at par (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002: 703). Therefore, religious-based MWC can be easily forged. Likewise, the resource based religious client-patron relations could work. However, the national integration policies carried out in Tanzania mainly decreased such possibility legally and extra-legally. Actually, in Tanzania the discourse against ethnicity is more often than not accompanied by denunciation of religiosity—*Ukabila* (Tribalism) and *Udini* (Religiosity). These negatively connoted words are simultaneously used when one preaches national unity. Moreover, they are still widely preached in various media during and after electoral processes. In the 2015 elections Tanzanians views against religious canvassing were put to test. This is when

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163 Ten Million is approximately 4800 Euros
164 There were incidences of vandalising pork burthery in Kimara, Dar es Salaam, the Mwembechai riots explained earlier and varied incidences of putting churches on fore in Arusha and Zanzibar that are associated to the religious demands highlighted above.
CHADEMA’s candidate Edward Lowassa on 6th September 2015, while attending Sunday prayers in Tabora, was quoted by several media outlets canvassing the Lutheran votes, claiming that no Lutheran has ever been elected as President of Tanzania since independence. Tanzanians from different quarters criticised him. CCM, Imam Bukhary Islamic Institute and the National Electoral Commission issued statements to criticise Lowassa. NEC pointed out that what Lowassa did was unacceptable, calling upon other political parties to adhere to the 2015 Code of Ethics for Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillorship candidates, which prohibits the conduct of campaigns in places of worship. The ruling party CCM took advantage of Lowassa’s incident by publicising a clip found on YouTube showing him pleading for Lutherans’ support to brand him as politically religious and a divider of Tanzanians.

Lowassa’s party was also accused of religious canvassing. On several occasions, CHADEMA invited religious leaders in its campaigns whereby they performed ceremonial deeds. The participation of Bishop Josephat Gwajima and the Sheikh Rico in CHADEMA’s campaign launch in Jangwani grounds on 29th August 2015 provides a notable base of these accusations. The two clergymen in the occasion offered venomous prayers, which went against the customary assuaging religious tones. Sheikh Rico for instance prayed: “Tunamuomba Mwenyezi Mungu, msimamizi wa haki, kwamba mtu yeyote atakayeiba kura zetu au kufanya ulaghai wowote apate kansa ya damu, mirija ya mkojo izibe” [We pray to God, the dispenser of justice, that anybody who will steal our votes or indulge in any cheating, be inflicted with blood cancer and urethral stricture]. In the same vein, Bishop Gwajima implored: “Majira hayawafuati watu, watu huifuata majira; muda huu ni muda wa mabadiliko. Tunakuomba Bwana utufanye Lowassa kuwa ndio Josho letu, uwaangamize wanaopinga haki kama ulivyowaangamiza waliopinga watu wake”165 [Times do not follow people, people follow times; this is a time for change. We pray to you our Lord that Lowassa be our cleanser. Destroy the opponents of justice the same way you destroyed his opponents].

Providing room for religious leaders to participate in election campaigns might be construed spiritually accurate, but it was alienating. Indeed, CHADEMA might have wished to be projected to be religious and perhaps virtuous. Also having the services of a Christian and a Muslim leader in the campaigns meant to portray an image of having the support of the major religions groups in

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Tanzania. However, many Tanzanians would hardly argue that the two clerics represented the mainstream religious sects in Tanzania. This is because Gwajima is not from the major Christian denominations- the Roman Catholic and Lutheran to mention few, and the Muslims in Tanzania are organised under the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA) and yet have several sects that do not operate under BAKWATA. In this regard, the clerics were not having any formal religious backing of the major religions structures and institutions. That being said, yet on many occasions CHADEMA meetings carried substantial religious traces, its leaders trenchantly reminding the audience that “Tulianza na Mungu na tutamaliza na Mungu” [We started with God and we shall finish with God] (Ramadhani, 2015a). Political parties seeking refuge in religion stimulate voter empathy and cultivate in-group solidarity. However, this is done at the risk of alienating a larger population that might wish to distance itself from the vagaries of political division.

While the 2015 elections seem to revolve around CHADEMA’s incidences of religiosity, the religious leaders and the state politicians in Tanzania in the 2000s have developed a kind of complex interdependence (Mallya, 2006). The interdependence is two-fold. On one hand, religious leaders offer an authoritative voice against the degrading quality of life of the marginalised poor in Tanzania. In the main, they condemn the deterioration of social services resulting from the failure of the political leadership to control vices such as graft, corruption, embezzlement of public fund and accountability. Since the political system has proven to be unable to address these critical issues, and civil society organisations and political parties have not played their role effectively in holding it accountable, religious leaders filled the vacuum. They come out in the open to express the discontent that was pervasive amongst the general public (Mallya, 2006). As such, religious leaders have become a mouth-piece of the weak about sensitive current political issues, including grand corruption, nepotism and other social vices.

On the other hand, there are elements of uncritical attitude of religious leaders towards the government. Such character stems from the clerics’ desire for the respectability bestowed by government recognition, and for the rewards a well-disposed government can dispense (Gifford, 1994). In Tanzania, religious leaders give a strategic platform to politicians to press forward their political aspirations and in turn, the politicians guarantee the religious leaders a smooth environment for discharging their Godly activities. According to Ramadhani (2015a) when some
religious leaders are criticised of embracing politicians implicated in corruption scandals, their
defence has been that they are out to save the wrongdoers and not the upright flocks. In such
context, some politicians use religious platforms instrumentally to buttress their public image.

A typical manoeuvre has been for politicians to fish around for invitations as guests of honour at
fundraising events organised by religious institutions, mostly churches and mosques. At these
fundraisings they contribute several millions of shillings, with staged media broadcast. As such,
they project images of Godfearing and obedient servants, and inferably, politically clean.
Interestingly, the civil society and the media hardly question the sources and cleanliness of the
massive funds contributed in the name of religion. It pays very high dividends when a politician is
bequeathed “the choice of God” accolade, as one bishop so bequeathed ex-President Jakaya
Kikwete and many more who are doing the same to the sitting President John Magufuli
(Ramadhani, 2015a). Again this might be viewed as a noble gesture, however when public figures
promote their images using supposedly private space, secular dictates preserving religion as a
private affair are consciously aborted. More importantly, the private sphere, the lifeblood of the
civil society, is severely crippled.

It is worth noting that prior to the 2015 elections, Tanzanians saw live on TV several would-be
presidential aspirants then flocking to Nigeria to see the well-regarded Reverend, T.B. Joshua166.
The aspirants for CCM’s flagbearership to run for the presidency, who had been to Nigeria167
include but are not limited to, the current President John Pombe Magufuli, the Minister of
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Hon. Mwigulu Nchemba and Hon. Lowassa who defected
later, to seek spiritual acumen to find their way to the State House. Perhaps in what can be
regarded as being intrigued by the “spiritual awakening” of Tanzanian political figures, Reverend
T.B. Joshua paid a brief political visit to Tanzania after the elections168. He was received at the

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166 Temitope Balogun Joshua, commonly referred to as T. B. Joshua, is a Nigerian prophet. He is the leader and
founder of The Synagogue, Church of All Nations (SCOAN), a religious organisation that runs the Emmanuel TV
television station from Lagos, Nigeria. SCOAN claims regular occurrences of divine miracles and hundreds of
Nigerians and international visitors go to the SCOAN each week to register for the prayer lines where the visitors are
prayed over by Joshua and the “Wise Men”. SCOAN has published numerous videos claiming to document the healing
of incurable disabilities and illnesses.

167 The above mentioned presidential aspirants can be seen on http://www.vitukovyamtaani.com/2015/06/picha-za-
wagombea-urais-3-wa-ccm-wakiwa.html

168 Details of T.B. Joshua’s visit and photos of him with the then and current Presidents of Tanzania and of
CHADEMA’s presidential candidate in the 2015 elections can be seen on http://spynewsagency.com/t-b-joshua-in-
tanzania-to-inaugurate-president-magufuli/
airport by the president-elect John Magufuli and, later on, held talks with President Kikwete at Tanzania’s State House and the CHADEMA/UKAWA presidential candidate Hon. Edward Lowassa and the top UKAWA clique. He never performed his usual spiritual deeds although many Tanzanians wished and asked for such services. The contrasts were visibly evident: a visit by a religious leader on a purely political mission without any stint of spirituality.

The role of religion in politics presented above, particularly the interdependence between religious and political leaders, is watered down by research data on the use of places of worship for election campaigning. In a study conducted by CEMOT\textsuperscript{169} the following results presented in Table VI below were garnered:

Table VI: Use of Places of Worship for Election Campaigning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, witnessed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, heard of</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3689</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3781</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEMOT dataset, 2015

The Table indicates that incidents of using of places of worship for election campaigning were almost absent as 98% of the respondents said such acts never happened. A meagre 2% of CEMOT respondents indicated that they either heard or witnessed election campaigns in places of worship. The data does offer some consolation. However, the mention of few incidents of campaigning in places of worship by the respondents and the Lowassa’s Tabora incident dented the 2015 elections and sparked widespread criticism as indicated above. That being said, and as much as religion is capable of forging strong identities for political visibility and informing voting, the national integrative elements and peaceful co-existence still act against it. This is clearly illustrated by the criticism against political canvassing in the church. More practically, the discourse against divisive politics widely argued in this dissertation and the social integrative facts among Tanzanians of the major religious groups militate against religious salience in politics. It is worth noting that the degree of inter-marriages in Tanzania is so high that members of the two religions groups are even

\textsuperscript{169} CEMOT is an acronym for Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania that included observars from varied CSOs in Tanzania
bonded by blood. Likewise, the effects of violence as discussed in section 5.2.3 discourage Tanzanians from evoking religious salience in politics.

Another divisive incident in Tanzania politics is racial and citizenship-based. This divide was laid bare by activities of the opposition parties led by Rev. Mtikila. Mtikila mobilised Tanzanian’s support by denouncing Asian-Tanzanians - magabacholi and demanding preferential legislation for wazawa (Aminzade, 2003). In his racial nationalistic plea for political support Mtikila targeted magabacholi as disloyal outsiders who are exploiting the nation for their own benefit at the expense of walala hoi (Campbell, 1999). Mtikila’s claims questioned an essential element of liberal democracy, the protection of minority rights. In response, CCM denounced advocates of indigenisation supporting Mtikila’s perspective as racist and shifted the focus of the indigenisation debate away from racial issues and magabacholi’s control of the economy toward citizenship and issues of free trade, foreign investment, and foreign economic domination (Aminzade, 2003). In this spirit, CCM’s government neutralised Mtikila’s claims by implementing indigenisation measures targeting non-citizens and featuring anti-liberal economic policies, including tariff barriers, local content laws, and restrictions on property ownership (ibid). Two decisions were invoked to neutralise Mtikila’s plea. These were the appointment of Iddi Simba, an advocate of indigenisation (though not as radical as Mtikila), to the Ministry of Trade, and enactment of an economic empowerment Act to support Tanzanians irrespective of their racial origin (Larson and Aminzade, 2008). However, wazawa due to their number and economic backwardness benefitted most from the micro-level empowerment measures. The indigenisation measures were implemented amid the danger of losing international support from foreign donors and international financial institutions that advocate liberalism (Aminzade, 2003).

Apart from the measures that neutralised Mtikila’s indigenisation plea, the over-generalised nature of his claim that labelled all Tanzanians of Asian origin as magabacholi rose eyebrows. This is mainly because it included even those who are not in the business world. More important, it camouflaged wazawa known to be involved in the looting of public property either through their positions in public or private sectors. This critique partly explains the public outcry against mafisadi, a terminology meant to include all Looters of public goods regardless of their colour or

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170 Walala hoi is another terminology coined by Reverend Mtikila meaning downtrodden Black Tanzanians
origin. Such development waters down the racial and citizenship role in politics in general and in voting in particular, because the emphasis is put on graft practices instead of the colour of one’s skin. That is to say, one is not voted into power because of his/her colour but his/her ethical standing. More important, the racial divide has limited effect on Tanzania’s polity because the population of the Tanzanians of Asian origin is scattered and is only around 3% in the country, although visibly dominant in the large cities’ business neighbourhoods. They could hardly weigh in numerically in the formation of MWCs or ethnic-based patronage to compete against the black Tanzanians. However, their economic prowess could be useful in buying out support or sponsoring candidates in an ethnic manner. As much as this could be possible, no evidence was put to that effect. In essence, they are associated with the ruling party because of what Kilimwiko (2012) calls merchant politics. That is, the rich Tanzanians of Asian origin forge close political and economic relations with politicians so as to enjoy patronage once the politicians get to the corridors of power. In the same vein, politicians further the relationship so that they can get resources for financing their campaigns. Since the main polity is against ethnic salience in voting as argued throughout this dissertation, it is hard to expect ethnic-based sponsorship. In other words, the determinant of the political marriage between the rich Tanzanians of Asian origin and the native political elites is centred on patron-client relations meant to benefit businessmen and politicians cardinal interests - profit and political power respectively. In certain occasions the two groups permeate the imaginary boundaries as the business people join politics and the vice versa. As for the businessmen who join politics their incursion among other things is guaranteed by their capability to use their economic muscles to solve voters’ problems.

6.3. Concluding Remarks

The views discussed in this chapter suggest that the importance given to ethnicity in explaining voting behaviour in Africa is often overrated by neo-patrimonial observers of African politics. In other words, salience of ethnicity in African politics should be empirically established within each African country - not assumed a priori. Ethnic salience in countries like Tanzania is a product of political elites’ decisions on policies and implementation arrangements. The significance of ethnicity in Tanzania today and optimism of its continuity is a result of meticulous decisions to defuse the vitality of ethnicity in politics. The decisions in question that enhanced nationalist political feelings as argued above were made by the political elite decades ago, and sustained since then despite varied political and economic reforms. It has been argued in Chapter IV that the
bureaucratic elites recruited from a wide variety of ethnic groups are made to denounce ethnic sentiments by the political establishment, especially the nationally salient ruling party that controls them. In the same vein, in the absence of explicit nationalist ethos propagated by the PsIM and implemented before political pluralism, opposition parties could be enticed to mobilise religious, ethnic or other forms of identity to amass political support. This did not happen to an alarming degree as widely argued in Chapter V. The ruling party, opposition parties and bureaucratic merger in enhancing nationalist feelings through the nation-building policy widely discussed in Chapter IV and empirically confirmed Chapter V are highly responsible for the future of ethnicity in Tanzania presented in this chapter. However, the 2015 elections exemplified that augmented use of religion and religious platforms by some contestants and political parties intrude the civil society’s space, thusly threatening national cohesion. Likewise, increased interdependence between religious and political poses the danger of curtailing the much needed private space essential for civil society growth.

The nationalist endeavours discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters inform political parties’ inclusive vote-winning initiatives that defuse ethnic salience. In the main, Tanzanians seem to believe that national salience and EDNR have enabled political stability, contained factional competitions, and build the peaceful nation they boast of. As such, any divisive tendencies like ethnicity are not welcomed to tarnish such development. This being said, it is imperative to plug the divisive holes centred on socio-economic disparities to enhance national cohesion and peacefulness which will contribute towards diffusing ethnic salience in elections. Of the divisive elements discussed above religiosity which does have a potential of making MWCs and economic disparity, although not necessarily ethnic, can be ethnicised as the beneficiaries and affected groups do have ethnic allegiances to a varying degree. This is very crucial as Crawford Young (1999) once argued, behind the success of political stability in ethnically diverse countries: there remains a vector of uncertainty, a prowling vulnerability to interethnic relationships. In this context, the fact that Tanzania has managed to stay clear of instability for decades and people are optimistic that such situation will continue is an achievement but not a guarantee.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

7.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I present a summary of the entire study about the PsIM, ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. As an aid to the reader, I give a brief overview of the study problem and methods; and summarise the study findings. I also provide the conclusions reached, the theoretical and policy implications of the study as well as suggestions for future research projects.

7.2. The Study Problem, Methods’ Overview and Conclusion Summary
This thesis has come a long way to elicit the influences of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices in elections in Tanzania. I believe that my results have some relevance to the state of ethnicity in Tanzania in general, although my conclusions should be seen as valid mainly for my region of research. At the beginning of this study, I introduced the theoretical arguments for ethnic salience in motivating voters’ choices in elections. These arguments cover a wide range of perspectives that are neo-patrimonial, hybrid, ethnic-structure and PsIM viewpoints. I recognise the existence of information about ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. However, I substantiate that there is limited updated documentation regarding ethnicity and voting that transcends the neo-patrimonial school. This dominant scholarship on ethnicity and voting ignores the African history and its political thought in analysing influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections. Informed by this gap, the current study engages African history and political thought through an alternative framework termed the PsIM. The proposed framework mends the gap identified in the analysis of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections in Tanzania.

This study employed a qualitative research approach called analytic narrative. The qualitative tools were applied in the present study to obtain, analyse and discuss the information as well as for drawing conclusions. The main qualitative means to garner data were interviews, KIIs and documentary reviews. The data collected was presented and analysed qualitatively throughout this dissertation and eventually conclusions drawn.
This thesis rejects the neo-patrimonial theory (the main theory used to explain influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in African polities) as an inadequate tool for understanding the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. This study proposed an alternative framework which draws among others on Mustapha’s (2002) idea of political community. According to Mustapha do and don’ts of a political community are chiefly informed by ideals deduced from common history and political thoughts entrenched within the political community in question. For the Tanzanian case, its political community is informed by a nationalist political culture embedded in the PsIM. These promises meant to enhance national unity, EDNR and peace which militate against salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This conclusion contradicts the neo-patrimonial theoretical perspectives that claim that the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in African states is explained in light of Africans’ preference to traditional primordial and paternalistic tendencies. Such tendencies are said to give impetus to ethnic salience in politics, personal rule and ethnically based patronage in the distribution of public resources. As a result, such tendencies breed ethnic voting. Since the current study could hardly find salience of the neo-patrimonial suppositions, I consider the theory to be over-generalist in explaining the influences of ethnicity in informing voting in Africa. Such over-generalisation makes the neo-patrimonialism unappreciative of alternative political ideas relevant in explaining the role of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in Tanzania. This is because it shuns away from analysing the ideals entrenched in its ethno-political history and electoral practices which deviate from the primordial and paternalistic explanations.

This study argues that the alternative framework of ideas in the name of the PsIM that usefully explain the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices emanate from the nationalist anti-colonial movement. At its core, this movement promised Tanzanians that their polity will be nationally unified, equitably developed and peaceful - issues that are against salience of ethnicity in political competition (Wimmer, 1997). These ideas formed the political community amongst Tanzanians during the struggle for independence and created a political contract between Tanzanian leaders and peoples. The PsIM informed the do and don’ts both during the struggle for independence and in independent Tanzania. Given the relatively recent date of the independence in historical terms and the relevance of the PsIM in the ethnically diverse Tanzania, this political framework still forms the basis of Tanzania’s political community. If it is accepted, as this thesis argues, that this framework of ideas has the potential to delineate the influences of ethnicity on
determining voters’ choices, then this is a significant contradiction of the neo-patrimonial theorists’ argument that neo-patrimonialism which is dominant in explaining African politics. This position is predicated on the fact that it rejects the idea that African states’ lack of unity and shared values between the state and the society as argued by Clapham (1982). This study has established that the values and ideas embedded in the PsIM and struggles for independence have the capacity to provide an association between state and society in informing low salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices. More important, the PsIM have proven significant in sustaining such marriage for over 50 years. A concise abstract of the findings of each core issue studied is presented in the subsequent sections. I return to the three research questions presented in Chapter II to guide my presentation.

7.3. Overview of Main Conclusions

7.3.1. PsIM, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices in Tanzania

The first objective of the dissertation was to explore how the PsIM influenced voting in the 2010 elections in Tanzania. I found that the PsIM informed low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices in the elections. This position concurs with the general picture of Tanzania presented in the ethno-political narrative that constituted Chapter IV of this dissertation.

The analysis and discussion of the PsIM and various initiatives done to put them to effect in the area of national unity, EDNR and peace have lowered the significance of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices. The analysis indicates that the PsIM are responsible for creating a nationalistic political culture that militated against the salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices in elections. This political culture is manifested in Tanzanians’ unprecedented pride of their national identity over their ethnic groups’ identity, their appreciation to EDNR as well as the value they place on peace when they are encountered with electoral decisions. The culture is clearly evidenced by the frequency with which the interviewees cited the significance of national unity, EDNR and peace in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. In the referred sections interviewees considered the culture to be the primary source of national pride and the stumbling blocks to salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections. From such background, salience of ethnicity in luring and informing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections would have been navigating against the direction that the nationalistic political culture they believe in.
The PsIM proved to be relevant in explaining the influences of ethnicity on voters’ choices even after the collapse of the backbone of the PsIM- The AD, and implementation of liberal economic and political policies. This position is made cognisant of the fact that the 2010 elections were held after the collapse of the AD which strived to actualise the PsIM through an extensive socialist nation-building policy in the late 1980s. The 2010 elections were held while the country is implementing liberal reforms. In this regard, I argue that the PsIM and the efforts to realise them have created a frame that informs Tanzanians rejection to letting ethnicity gain salience on determining voters’ choices in elections. This is regardless of the political and /or ideological changes it has underwent over-time. Such situation questions the claim advanced by the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools that African states including Tanzanians lack common political history and convictions that can lower the salience of ethnicity in elections. And therefore, are doomed to embrace traditional tendencies (tribalist client-patron relations) which among other things, breed salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices as argued in section 3.4.1. The view held by this dissertation on the relevance of the content of the PsIM in lowering ethnic salience confirm that Africans have a shared history and ideals that can explain varied developments. As such, we criticise the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools of being reluctant to appreciate alternative political ideas, agencies and structures to their own, to explain African politics, including the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.

7.3.2. Explaining the Influences of Ethnicity on Determining Voters’ Choices

The second objective of the dissertation was to explore why the PsIM and efforts meant to realise them had influenced the way ethnicity had informed voters’ choices in the 2010 elections in Tanzania. The major finding under this objective is that the lower salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections in Tanzania is a product a shared anti-ethnic salient culture in the conduct of politics. This common anti-ethnic salient culture was informed by the Ujamaa based PsIM and embraced by the Tanzanian state, the majority of its political elites and individuals. The rejection of the use of ethnicity in politics benefited from a well-framed vision of national unity informed by the PsIM and well articulated by the political leadership from a hypothetical and real standpoint. This nationalist culture is predicated on a set of norms, values, and institutions which have instilled overwhelming acceptance of national identity over ethnic identities and rejection of politically violent and divisive trends in elections. As such, national unity is almost regarded as a peremptory norm that should be upheld by all Tanzanians. In this
context, ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices is considered to be “un-Tanzanian” and, therefore, should be avoided by all means.

Since the elections of 2010 studied were conducted over four decades after Tanzania’s independence, we argue that explanations of low salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices embedded in the PsIM are reliant on a meticulous path-dependent nationalist frame. This frame managed to survive amid major political and economic reforms that occurred overtime because of it is well-entrenched and relevant. This stance is anchored on the fact that well-entrenched and relevant cultures do not wither away easily. This position explains why ideas like the negative impacts of ethnic polarisation transcended the political and social changes that took place in Tanzania as indicated in the fourth chapter. It also explains why the fears of liberal policies breeding ethnic salience on determining electorates’ choices were not vindicated. According to the study findings and discussions, the culture against ethnic salience in motivating voters’ choices benefitted from a series of sustained nation-building tools especially through a war framed nation-building crusade, the use of Swahili as a national language, national integration based civic education, the legacy of Mwalimu Nyerere’s leadership and legal restrictions against the use of ethnicity in election processes.

In this study, it was revealed that low salience of ethnicity in voting has been influenced by the negative projection of ethnicity in the country’s development endeavours. As a starting point, the framing of the enemies of development in war terms, thus making the requisites for winning the war-national unity and peace do and die issues, helped to make ethnicity insignificant in politics. The war imagery provided Tanzanians with the motivation and conviction necessary for channelling their ferociousness against the enemies of development and guarantee that the requisite for success – national unity and peace are highly respected. The respect for national unity and peace diffused the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This argument is informed by the fact that political canvassing and voting along ethnic lines would breed disunity and violent conflicts among competing ethnic groups which would affect the victory in the war against the enemies of development whose success is essential for Tanzanians’ progress. In this way, Tanzania’s framing of its development efforts as a war helped to unify its people toward denouncing ethnic salience in voting and beyond. Likewise, the negative impacts of ethnic polarisation on development endeavours in countries like Burundi and Rwanda added impetus in
influencing Tanzanians low ethnic salient voting. This conclusion corroborates Mpangala (2000) who contends that experiences of civil wars in other African countries prove a lesson to Tanzanians not to engage in ethnic polarisation. In the main, this position questions the neo-patrimonial thesis as advanced by Diamond (2008) and Van de Walle (2003) that Africans are short of political ideas and convictions that can make them lower the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.

The study also reveals that the PsIM, particularly its national integration endeavour has benefitted a lot from the use of Swahili as a national language. It has been established in the dissertation that almost all of the multi-ethnic integrative initiatives would have been seriously crippled, if not impossible, without Tanzanians sharing a common lingua franca. All of the multi-ethnic communications and nationalist messages were made possible by Swahili. Therefore, I argue that Swahili has made Tanzanians ethnic groups loose a valuable tool for furthering ethnic identity that could be used for political visibility once politicised. Inferably, Swahili has facilitated the national unity and peace components of the PsIM by reducing lingual informed parochial identities and ethnic miscommunication. Correspondingly, Swahili enhanced multi-ethnic communication for the attainment of the nation-building policies that contributed in informing voters to harbour feelings of national identity over ethnic ones. The feelings as well put in the analysis of the PNU, diffused the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. The choice of Swahili as a national language, its role in enhancing national unity and peace promised by the PsIM and subsequently informing low salience of ethnicity in voting questions the neo-patrimonial explanations of ethnicity and voting. This position is predicated on the misleading component of the neo-patrimonial thesis that Africans are ethnic salient in voting because they are primordial, paternalistic and thus prefer divisive patronage ties over rationally integrative modern ones. I argue that the preference for national language and identity over vernacular and ethnic ones respectively, renders the neo-patrimonial thinking redundant. More important, the nationalist initiative of using Swahili from the independence movement to-date to facilitate a nationally integrated polity indicates that the neo-patrimonial claim that Africans lack political thoughts, history, and cultures to disentangle from the web of ethnic salience is far from relevant in Tanzania.
The importance of Swahili in informing low salience of ethnicity in elections is further laid bare by the role it has played in another basic explanation of low salience of ethnicity - sustained denunciation of the use of ethnicity in political canvassing and voting. This thesis has established that a series of concerted efforts by the political establishment and other stakeholders to sustainably denounced the significance of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices from independence to-date. The denunciation was made possible by extensive civic education. The civic education endeavoured to make sure that the post-independent movement generation subscribed to the idea of denouncing ethnicity in motivating voters and spreads the same to generations to come. This was made possible by among other things, the use of Swahili and implementation of the comprehensive nation-building policies. The sustained anti-ethnic civic education and the nation-building efforts widely discussed in the dissertation points to an opposite direction to the neo-patrimonial argument that Africans lack the ideals and zeal to lower the salience of ethnicity in voting. In the main, the thesis quashes the conception that Africans are fond of traditional ethnic-based patronage tendencies which exacerbate ethnic polarisation and voting. The dissertation established that the PsIM have inspired extensive denunciation of ethnicity and the implementation of the PsIM further reinforced them. In this vein, I argue that the marriage between the nation-building policies argued in the first objective above, and continuous transfer of anti-ethnic education have sunk into people’s minds to the level that an opposite discourse is hard to be bought. From such position then, we further argue that the marriage militates against salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices as it curtails discourses for the use of ethnicity in political canvassing and voting. Generational denunciation of the use of ethnicity is further corroborated by Mwalimu’s charismatic and symbolic leadership in the nation-building policy and the legal restrictions to use ethnicity in electioneering.

As established in the dissertation, political scientists tend to undermine the indispensability of individual agency in the realisation of outcomes of modern organisations. However, the frequency of mention Mwalimu in the fight against ethnic salience in voting indicates that organisations can benefit from charismatic individuals. Mwalimu Nyerere’s anti-ethnic views and deeds about rejecting ethnic voting have contributed towards making Tanzanians consider ethnic salience in motivating voters’ choices unpatriotic and un-Tanzanian. The fact that Mwalimu personally wrote the AD; his anti-ethnic views have been massively projected in the media because he was at the
epitome of the nation-building efforts; his successors sustained his nation-building crusade and Tanzanians supported the ideas over-time, renders the institutional mantra questionable. I argue that political actors informed by Mwalimu’s anti-ethnic salient opinions and deeds, and the adverse impacts of ethnic conflicts in other African countries contributed in making Tanzanians choose to amplify ethnically inclusive peaceful national ethos. In this regard, I argue that the influence of Mwalimu’s charisma and symbol in the furtherance of the PsIM particularly in unifying Tanzanians and ensuring peace and tranquillity inform continued lower influence of ethnicity in voting.

The study also established that legal restrictions on the application of ethnicity in political canvassing particularly the restriction on the use of vernaculars in campaigning for office have had a contribution in lowering the salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. However, the legislation benefitted from the anti-ethnic culture informed by the PsIM. I argue that such culture mended the problem of having laws without being enforced. This view rests on the fact that the political culture prohibits the use of ethnicity in seeking political office. In fact, ethnic salience in voting is considered as a taboo that would destroy national integration, peace, tranquillity and development that most Tanzanians do not want to miss. The fact that there are laws prohibiting the use of ethnicity and LRI supervising them, questions the relevance of the neo-patrimonial view that African state lacks legislations and LRI to stamp ethnic salience in politics. The efficacy of the laws in terms of actual use could not be established. However, I argue that the hypothetical restrictions coupled with the other conclusions made, point towards explaining the low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.

Broadly speaking, the conclusions made under this objective express the complexity and interrelated explanations of sustained low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. In other words, the demarcation between the conclusions made are not water tight, They overlap and, therefore, can well explain the low salience of ethnicity if eclectically and/or complementarily treated. In this sense, all of the factors should be considered as they relate to the PsIM in the context of the electoral politics, actors and structures to explain the way ethnicity motivates voting in Tanzania.
7.3.3. Influences of Candidates’ Origin, Being and Belonging on Voting

As opposed to the neo-patrimonial theorists as well as the overriding literature of ethnicity and voting presented in the general introduction and sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 that suggest ethnic salience in Africa, this dissertation asserts that the importance of origin in terms of being native and the use of Kisukuma in mobilising political support have been proven to be nominal in the 2010 elections. The low significance of being a native in luring voters is highly associated with the strong nationalist feeling as argued in the above conclusion, and the quest for candidates who are trustworthy and able to solve people’s problems. Interestingly, candidate’s origin was only viewed imperative in judging the trustworthiness and ability of candidates to deliver public goods. In this context, origin is important only if, and when, the candidate is considered to be trustworthy and able to deliver public goods to the community he or she vies to lead. In this regard, the voters have been proven to be moved more by rational and meritocratic calculations of benefitting from able candidates than aspirants originating from the area of contest. This being said, it follows that candidates who reside or own a house in the area of contest being a Sukuma or not; who are aware of the problems of the people where he or she wishes to lead; proven to be trustworthy and be able to bring development, are of equal standing when it comes to luring voters in elections.

Furthermore, the broader zonal feeling of belonging to the study area adds impetus to the lower significance of having natives to stand in elections to win political support. This argument is based on the fact that voters in the studied area consider the Lake Zone, including non-Sukuma dominated regions like Mara, Kagera and Tabora, as a catchment area for accepting those candidates as being from Mwanza. As such, the extended catchment widens the number of ethnic groups that can claim being and belonging to Mwanza. Such categorisation also widens the base of gaining competent candidates to stand and lure voters. Equally, the importance placed on owning land and knowing the problems of the people in the area of contest, further widens the belonging catchment and its associated advantage of gaining competent and trustworthy people to stand in elections. The extension suggests the possibility of inter-ethnic competition. However, this has not been proven to be the case. Instead, the extension of being and belonging in the study area defuses the role of political tribalism on determining voters’ choices as the tribal ticket does not guarantee election unless it is accompanied by trustworthiness and competence to discharge leadership functions. Also, laws of the land and the culture of national unity entrenched in the PsIM which have proven to be well-entrenched in the mind of the people in the area of study, requires from the
ideal candidates to refrain from ethnic political canvassing. Under such circumstance it can hardly be said salience of ethnicity can emanate from the elements of the politics of origin, being and belonging as they are not informed by the constituting ingredients of politicisation of ethnicity. Better still, the basis of politicising ethnicity is discouraged by the nation-building ethos informed by the PsIM in the areas of national unity, EDNR and peace.

With regard to the ethnic use of Kisukuma there were there no convincing facts to establish patterns that are strong enough to suggest its significance in the 2010 elections. This position is anchored on the fact that no evidence pointed to the fact that the language was dominantly used in the formal campaigns, neither did political parties rush to co-opt Sukuma speakers to lead their parties or to have only Sukuma speakers contest in the 2010 elections. In the study area and beyond, there are numerous cases where non-Sukuma speakers won in the elections against prominent Sukuma speakers or contenders as the Illemela, Kwimba and Geita parliamentary results indicate. The limited use of Kisukuma as a tool of ethnic identity in the election questions the claim made by the neo-patrimonial theorists that Africans are traditionalists and prefer traditional over modern things. This is because the language widely used in the elections was Swahili which has no traditional dominance of any ethnic group in Tanzania. Moreover, all ethnic groups respect Swahili as their national language and prefer it and its nationalising effect to their traditional ones in politics (Lofchie, 2013). In this regard, I argue that lingual identities are not static. They change according to relevance and contexts even if what comes out is against traditions. In the case of Kisukuma, its relevance was recognised in the social settings and traditions, but not in public issues of national interest like elections. This is due to the strong conviction towards national unity and peace that can be endangered by lingual propelled ethnic divisions.

In light of the findings on the politics of origin, being and belonging, I am convinced to argue that the Sukuma’s numerical dominance and identity provides no significant guarantee to win political office in the region. The key to political office revolves around broader elements of origin, being and belonging and the ability to discharge the demands of public office. In this context, a trustworthy and competent native Sukuma and a non-Sukuma residing in the region with similar traits have equal chances of winning electoral support. In this regard, the people elect any candidate who meets the requisite qualifications for the vacancy contested for regardless of where
they come from, as Nyamagana, Geita and Ilemela parliamentary elections indicate. Such rational voting practices questions the ethnic salient and ethnic-based patronage central to neo-patrimonial explanations of voting in Africa.

7.4. Implications of the Study
7.4.1. Theoretical Implications of the Study

The contribution of this study to the understanding of the interplay between the PsIM, ethnicity and voters’ choices in Tanzania is twofold. On one hand the current dissertation has synthesised various strands of emerging critiques of the neo-patrimonial theory regarding voters’ choices. On the other hand, from the synthesis the study has managed to come up with an alternative framework of ideas termed the PsIM. This framework is deemed useful in capturing the reality and understands the basis of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. The framework does so through Tanzanians’ shared ideas embedded in the struggles for its independence and the legacy and dynamics thereof.

Whereas the neo-patrimonial theorists turned a blind eye to the merits entrenched in indigenous African ideas and values as possible basis for low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices, and went as far as pointing out that African primordial culture informs ethnic-based patronage as the source of politicisation of ethnicity, the PsIM tells the opposite. This dissertation has established that indigenous political thoughts and processes informed by African culture and historical experiences informed by the PsIM and concretised by the AD, could provide a basis for informing low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices in Tanzania.

The dissertation has indicated that the PsIM were constructed by the Tanzanian people as it was the case for other African people through real historical experiences of living the colonial rule and its characteristics. These include brutal, racist, racial, religious, exploitative, undemocratic and more important ethnic divisive tendencies. As a reaction to these ills Tanzanians formulated ideas and visions of national unity, EDNR and peace and democratic monolithic political dispensations to further the three ideals and distinguish the independent Tanzania from the divisive and exploitative colonial regimes. The main inspiration for the formulation of this vision was the idealised culture of communalism that most Africans had had before colonialism to develop their independent state. In this regard, I reject the idea central to neo-partimomialist theorists that
African states lack common ideals and values for explaining varied political developments and curtailing salience of ethnicity as argued by Clapham (1982).

Two important benefits are attributable to the alternative framework proposed by this dissertation over the neo-patrimonial theories that dominate analyses to African politics. The first is that one may be able to appreciate in full the underlying causes and internal contradictory dynamics of African history within the PsIM. While neo-patrimonial theorists combine causes and outcomes of salience of ethnicity in elections as an internal logic informed by the dynamics of paternalistic and parochial political culture that fuels competition among ethnic groups, the alternative framework proposes that the manifestation of ethnicity and influence on determining voters’ choices is not a product of a culture of ethnicity dictated by neo-patrimonialists but an outcome of contradictory forces functioning within a political community. In the case of Tanzania, contradictions were between the Tanzanian pro unity, equity, peace and harmony cultures and the divisive and exploitative colonial ones as pointed out by Pitcher et al (2009). This should be a significant contribution as the neo-patrimonial theories have erred to select the externally manifested features of ethnic belonging as if such external observable features are more important than the political culture and imaginary in explaining the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.

Secondly, the PsIM puts emphasis on Tanzanians’ (Africans) political thought. To comprehend the influence of ethnicity on voting, one will have to engage with the Tanzanians’ history of ideas, even if a scholar’s description of these is always an ideal-type rather than actual thoughts all Tanzanian share. Discussing the way the PsIM are actually thought by our respondents provided insight in the Tanzanian people’s viewpoint on how they think ethnicity may or may not shape electoral choices within their polity. In this dissertation, it is argued that based on the divisive and exploitative nature of colonialism, Tanzanians in the struggle for independence espoused an ideal comprehensive vision of how they wanted their nation to be ordered. In particular, how ethnicity should influence the general conduct of politics including voters’ choices. Neo-patrimonial research in its efforts to explain influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Africa without factoring in Africa’s political thought and ideals, thus treated what transpires in Tanzania as lacking indigenous political orientation. Indeed, Tanzania lacks philosophers who have written down their thoughts about ethnicity and voting, and few who did have been informed by the neo-patrimonial views. As such, their analysis cannot escape the theory’s critique. Tanzania and other
African countries had well-established traditions and culture before colonialism. They also had experiences of colonialism and beyond which have a role to play in explaining the influences of ethnicity on determining electorate’s choices. These experiences should not be left out in any analysis of African politics. Underplaying ideas and experiences of the African people and their political communities renders the analysis of this polity incomplete and biased.

Using the case of Mwanza to explain influences of ethnicity in Tanzania, this study has engaged with the political thought of Africans. Specifically, how an African political thought in the name of PsIM developed and informed the influences of ethnicity in Tanzania and dynamics thereof. Arguably, the study has been able to point out how the PsIM and policies meant to realise them produced a political culture in Tanzania militating against the significance of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. It pointed out that the Tanzanian leadership past and present, stood for attainment of the PNU, EDNR and peace. As such, they contributed to defusing the chances of ethnic polarisation and politicisation, and acted in line with the aspirations that Tanzanians through the PSIM were made to believe in and do believe in. This way, Tanzania produced a united, peace-loving, equitably distributive functional nation-state, whose low political ethnicity negates the view held by neo-patrimonial theory and other western-centric evaluations of ethnicity in African politics which claim that Africa lacks common values and ideals to avoid divisive ethnic patronage and politicisation of ethnicity. This thesis establishes that Tanzania is an exception as it has shared values and ideals of a national community embedded in the PsIM, which are moreover opposite to the paternalistic and parochial values that the neo-patrimonial theorists envisage to be dominant in all African states.

7.4.2. Policy Implications of the Study

From the experience of the voters in Mwanza and other individuals involved in the study we can learn several policy-related issues.

Firstly, the overall discussion indicates that exploitative and divisive colonial socio-economic and political policies can inform a strong nationalist culture capable of comprehensively analysing factors behind the low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices. In this study, I argue that the PsIM which are resultant of the socio-economic and political ills of colonialism have informed the enactment of socialist nation-building policies embedded in the AD which provides a frame that navigates Tanzanians away from politicisation of ethnicity. This is the case even after
the collapse of the AD due to its strong discourse against ethnic polarisation, inequitable
distribution of resources and violence. In this regard, continuation of low salience of ethnicity in
political canvassing and determination of voters’ choices is dependent on the sustenance of these
virtues regardless of the ideological or political orientation that Tanzania follows.

Secondly, as much as the nationalist political culture entrenched in Tanzania through AD has been
critical in navigating Tanzania away from politicisation of ethnicity and lowering its role in
influencing voters’ choices, flashes of ethnicity still exist, but with nominal effect. This is mainly
due to the benefits that national integration is believed to have and the reinforcing nature of the
factors responsible for national integration. From the observations it was made apparent that the
path-dependent anti-ethnic salient experiences in Tanzania has been influenced by the reinforcing
effect of peace, and EDNR on the nationalist culture as well as the culture did on reinforcing peace
and EDNR. Understanding the dynamics of low salience of ethnicity is complex because the
dynamics are interlinked and reinforcing, and one factor cannot guarantee explanation of the
phenomena in isolation. Therefore, in my view, I argue that to guarantee comprehensive
understanding and to formulate policies sustaining lower salience of ethnicity in voting, one
requires a holistic approach appreciating the underlying forces determining the factors behind
voters’ choices.

Thirdly, whereas most of my interviewees were keen to divulge that ethnicity in the form of
Sukuma identity, common origin, language and heritage were not significant factors affecting
voting decisions, it was commonly mentioned that candidates’ origin, being and belonging was
necessary for the voters in a constituency to be able to judge candidate’s character, particularly
their trustworthiness and ability to deliver development promises. In this regard, I am inclined to
argue that the politics of origin, being and belonging was not considered to be a factor affecting
ethnic voting in Mwanza except as a measure of determining the suitability of candidates to hold
political office for the good of the community that they are part of. More important, it is a way of
ensuring political inclusion by informing voters to choose suitable political representatives among
proven trustworthy and able members in their constituencies.

Fourthly, the data and its discussion provided an exception to political scientists who tend to use
the “organisation-is-bigger-than-individual” mantra to undermine the indispensability of individual
agency in the realisation of outcomes of modern organisations. The frequency of mentioning
Mwalimu in the efforts set out to lower salience of ethnicity indicate that structural and institutional coherence and sustainability of organisations can benefit from the sanctity, individual brilliance and charisma of charismatic individuals. Mwalimu has been the charismatic figure that made use of every opportunity to integrate Tanzanians nationally and to denounce any divisive elements including the use of ethnicity to lure voters. The fact that he wrote the AD and stood by it as well as being at the centre of nation-building efforts sustained by his successors renders this view relevant. In this regard, I argue that political will, zeal, awe of a charismatic figure for nation-building coupled with national integration policies and formal and informal structures and processes can stand in the way of ethnicity influencing voters’ choices during elections.

Lastly, the dissertation has clearly pointed out that a national language that is spoken by almost everyone in an ethnically diverse country like Tanzania can play a decisive role in diffusing the significance of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices. We have indicated Swahili as a tool of common national identity reduced the significance of the dominant vernacular in Mwanza-Kisukuma in campaigning and motivating voters’ choices. This way an important ingredient of propelling ethnic differentiation and identity was curtailed hence reducing the possibilities of ethnicity gaining salience in motivating voters. I am arguing that common language alone could not bring about low salience of ethnicity. However, its role in ensuring inter-ethnic communication and nation-building policies like national service, sending students from their areas of origin, is critical and it could have been difficult to believe that Tanzania’s culture of low salience of ethnicity predicated on the nationalist political frame would have been possible without the use of Swahili as a national language. Therefore, maintenance of national integration and low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices would benefit from the continuation of such language policy.

**7.5. Suggestions for Further Research**

This dissertation cannot claim to have exhausted all information concerning influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. Therefore, more research has to be done to broaden understanding of the issues related to ethnicity and voting. The following suggestions are proposed.

First, further research needs to be done to understand better the experiences of the influences of ethnicity and voting among ethnic groups so as to be able to compare and contrast varied
experiences among the diverse ethnic groups that Tanzania has. I find this interesting because there are cultural variations among ethnic groups which could provide a better understanding of elements of ethnic practices in elections in Tanzania. By comparing ethnic groups, detailed experiences in the influences of ethnicity and voting as informed by the cultures of the compared ethnic groups can be gathered and analysed.

Secondly, I find that there is a need for further research to study how ethnicity influences voting in civic elections which involve elections of the bearer of the lowest ranks of governance in Tanzania. The significance of this suggestion stems from the fact that most elements of ethnicity as argued by Gasarasi (1997) are relevant to the lower level elections which were not part of the 2010 GEs that this study dealt with. Such study will, therefore, contribute to filling the information gap between the intricacies of ethnicity and voting in higher and lower levels of elections. This will provide insight in how ethnicity takes shape and motivates voters’ choices in elections of leaders who are closer to the people geographically and thus interact with daily. The study will, therefore, unveil how ethnicity plays out in a jurisdiction that voters have comparative easier access to interact with compared to Councillors, MPs and President, who have broader geographical mandate and national issues to address.

Thirdly, I suggest a comparative study of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar to be able to understand the applicability of the PsIM on the previously sovereign states that form the URT. This would be interesting because it will shed light on the influences of ethnicity on voters’ choices among two parts of a political union with distinct history and levels of ethnic salience in voting. Whereas Tanzanian Mainland, which was studied here, harbours low feelings of ethnic salience and polarisation, the case is different in Zanzibar. In this regard, a comparative analysis of the role of the PsIM and the neo-patrimonial and hybrid as well as the ethnic structure on determining electorates’ choices can be put to the test to explain the divergence and/or convergence of elements of the ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the two parts of the union.

Fourthly, I propose a study on the role of globalisation on the influencing the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. The study is relevant because political and economic developments
within states in the current world do hardly avoid interactions and experiences of what takes place in other states. The present dissertation highlighted some elements external to Tanzania particularly in the area of peace and tranquillity but a full fledged analysis of globalisation will provide a broader picture.

Fifthly, I suggest a nation-wide quantititative study on the influences of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. To be able to generalise the findings and provide more contribution in the field of voting behaviour that is seriously lacking in developing societies including Tanzania.

Lastly, I also find it timely to have a further study of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the most complex and cosmopolitan city of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. This suggestion is rooted in the fact that although Nyamagana that was studied is part of Mwanza city and thus cosmopolitan, and fitted well to provide the urban nature of Mwanza, the dominance of the original ethnic group, the Sukuma, and the ethnic groups found within the Lake Zone as shown in the description of the study area, is vivid. The cosmopolitan nature presented by Nyamagana is somewhat limited in describing and analysing the influences of ethnicity and voting from a purely cosmopolitan viewpoint. Dar es Salaam provides a real cosmopolitan environment as the original ethnic group of Dar es Salaam, the Zaramo, is not the dominant ethnic group numerically, and its culture is by no means the dominant one in the city. Members of ethnic groups from the entire country are found in Dar es Salaam in thousands and none of the seating MPs elected in the city are Zaramo by ethnic group. Such situation to my opinion presents an avenue for shedding more light on the motivations of ethnicity on voting in cosmopolitan settings. Such avenue will provide an opportunity for exploring how ethnicity is defined, takes shape and pulls strings on voters’ choices in a context invoking Weber’s (2009) argument about the impossibility of forging a MWC to influence voters’ choices through promises of resource benefits after their choices win elections. This type of research will help us to establish the influences of ethnicity in a situation where tribal origin has a limited role in effecting political tribalism.
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Raia Mwema, 25 June 2010


Vida, I. (2010). Hybrid Political Regimes: Qualified Democratic and Authoritarian Systems. How they have been Conceived, Categorised and Made Operational within the different types of Political Regimes, Revista De Estudios Politicos, pp.103-135.


APPENDIX I
Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>4,026,422</td>
<td>61.82</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>79.55</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>1,808,616</td>
<td>27.77</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>418,973</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>258,734</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
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<td>CHADEMA</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>269</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>CCM</td>
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<td>CUF</td>
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<td>16.26</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>637,115</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>UDP</td>
<td>342,891</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>1.79</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCCR- Mageuzi</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>279</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>9,123,952</td>
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<td>264</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>1,327,125</td>
<td>11.68%</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>668,756</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
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<td>84,901</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>55,819</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>31,083</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NLD</td>
<td>21,574</td>
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<td>PPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>18,783</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>MAKINI</td>
<td>17,070</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SAU</td>
<td>16,414</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>307</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>CCM</td>
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<td>62.83%</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>74.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>2,271,941</td>
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<td>CUF</td>
<td>695,667</td>
<td>8.28%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>96,933</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NCCR- Mageuzi)</td>
<td>26,388</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>UPDP</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>349</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX II
Research Clearance Letter

MZUMBE UNIVERSITY
(CHUO KIRIU MZUMBE)
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

26 March 2014

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

The above captioned subject is concerned.

Mrisho Malipula, is a lecturer at Mzumbe University pursuing PhD studies at Ghent University Belgium. Currently, he is doing a research on the influences of ethnicity on voting as part of the requirement for his studies. The research will include conducting interviews with key informants and leaders of political parties for a period of four months from April to July, 2014. This letter intends to introduce him and seek your cooperation in achieving the objectives of his study.

I hope you will accord him cooperation.

Yours Sincerely

Moses Ndunguru
Acting Head, Department of Development Policy, Mzumbe University
APPENDIX III
Research Clearance Letter II

MZUMBE UNIVERSITY
(CHUO KIKUU MZUMBE)
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Email: idm@raha.com
Tel: +255 (0) 23 2604380/1/3/4
Fax: +255 (0) 23 2604382

P.O. BOX 83
MZUMBE, MOROGORO
TANZANIA

23 October 2015

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE

Refer to the caption above.

Mr. Mlalo Malipula, is a lecturer at Mzumbe University pursuing PhD studies at Ghent University Belgium. Currently, he is doing a research on the influences of ethnicity on voting as part of the requirement for his studies. The research will include conducting interviews with leaders of political parties and ordinary voters in Mwanza Region for a period of four months from November to February, 2015. This letter intends to introduce him and seek your cooperation in achieving the objects of his study.

I optimistically expect that you will accord him cooperation.

Yours Sincerely

[Signature]

Dr. Ashatu Kijaji
Head, Department of Development Policy, Mzumbe University
APPENDIX IV
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PRIVILEGED INTERVIEWEES (SEASONED POLITICIANS)

Introduction
Good day. My name is Mrisho Malipula, a doctoral student at Ghent University. I am conducting a study on the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral choices in Tanzania. An essential element of this study is to see how the political, economic and social history of Tanzania has played and is playing a part in informing the role of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices. Knowing that you have lived the history and actively participated in the political realm, I would like to discuss with you some political and economic issues that have a bearing in Tanzanians voting behaviour over time. All information provided will be kept confidential by me and the institution, I am studying at. Equally, the information given will be used for the purpose of this study and this study alone.

Utangulizi
Habari za leo. Mimi naitwa Mrisho Malipula ambaye ni mwanafunzi wa shahada ya Udaktari wa Falsafa katika Chuo Kikuu Ghent nchini Ubeligiji. Ninafanya utafiti wa nafasi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi wa vyama vingi nchini Tanzania ikiwa ni sehemu ya mafunzo ya shahada ya udaktari wa Falsafa. Sehemu mojawapo muhimu ya utafiti huu ni kuibua nafasi ya historia yetu ya kisiasa, kiuchumi na kijamii katika kuelezea ushawishi wa ukabila kwa maamuzi ya wapiga kjura nchini Tanzania. Kwa kutambua kwamba unaijua vizuri historia ya nchi yetu kutokana na kuwa sehemu yake na kushika nadhifa mbalimbali za kisiasa, ningefurahi iwapo tutajadili masuala mbalimbali ya kisiasa na kiuchumi yenye uhusiano na tabia ya upigaji kura wa watanzania kwa wakati mbalimbali. Maelezo yote yatokanayo na majadiliano yetu yatakupa siri na kuhifadhiwa name an Taasisi ninayosoma. Vilevile, taarifa zote zitatumika kwa ajili ya utafiti huu pekee yake.

Questions

1. Could you share with me your personal biography?
2. What motivated you to be a politician?
3. How did your parents, peers and community view you when you embarked upon your political journey?
4. Have you at any point in time felt pressure from your community resulted from the political career that you had nationally?
5. If you are to write the history of Tanzania how many historical epochs would you suggest?
   What is the significance of each epoch in the political history of our country?
6. Were the changes from one epoch to the other smooth and logical? Or were there resistances resulted from ideological or power related interests?

7. Were there any key turning points in the national building initiatives? Were there any surprises? What were the key sources of support and/or resistance?

8. Why is ethnicity insignificant Tanzanian politics?

9. Is there any link between the national unity, equitable distribution of resources and peace; and low salience of ethnicity in motivating votes?

10. Political pluralism has raised worries of ethnicity gaining salience in elections. Do you think worries are real? Why?/why not?

11. Have you personally encountered ethnic-based difficulties in sustaining a political position during your political life?

12. Do think Tanzania will ever be ever ethnically politicised? Why
APPENDIX V
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LOCAL INTERVIEWEES IN MISUNGWI AND NYAMAGANA

Introduction
Good day. My name is Mrisho Malipula a PhD student at Ghent University. I am conducting a study on the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral choices in Tanzania. The study mainly intends to explore influences of ethnicity on multi-party elections in Tanzania. An essential element of this study is to see how the political, economic and social history of Tanzania has played and the current trends are playing a part in informing voters’ choices in Tanzania. We would like to discuss this issue with a member of your household of the age above 22. All information provided will be kept confidential by the researcher. Equally, the information given will be used for the purpose of this study and this study alone. Every person in the ward has an equal chance of being selected in this study. Your household has been picked by chance. We would like to choose an adult from your household. Would you help us to pick one? Thank you for your help

Utangulizi

Demographic Data:

Questions:
1. How did you participate in the 2010 elections?
2. What informed your choice of candidates in the 2010 elections?
3. Do you normally vote for the same party in presidential, parliamentary and council elections? Why?

4. How do you participate in politics? Probe if they have participated in writing views in media, signing petitions, participate in demonstrations/boycotts, join political party, party rallies, etc.

5. How would you react if the government engages in undemocratic practices like suspending elections indefinitely, dissolving the parliament, suspending the constitution making process or force the electoral commission to declare election victory to a party that lost in the voting process?

6. Which groups of people took the centre stage in presidential campaigns when they came to Misungwi/Mwanza during the 2010 election elections?

7. To what extent did the presidential campaigns make use of and reflect the cultural values of the Sukuma in the 2010 elections?

8. What issues was key to winning presidential elections in the 2010 elections?

9. If you are given the role of managing a presidential campaign what critical issues will you insist to ensure that your candidate is elected to office?

10. Did traditional leaders participate in the 2010 elections in Misungwi/Mwanza? How did they? If they did why? If not why?

11. It is important for an aspirant to
   - originate here (himself/herself or parents, born in the ward the ward, district or region?
   - Know Kisukuma
   - Own land, house

12. What languages were commonly used in the 2010 election campaigns?

13. Are you proud to be a Tanzanian? Why?

14. What are your views on dual citizenship? Why?

15. If you were to choose one identity between your ethnic group and being a Tanzanian which one will you prefer? Why?

16. Some people believe that certain ethnic groups in Tanzania have an unfair amount of wealth and power compared to others. Do you agree with this view? Why?

17. Do you think the government fairly treats your ethnic group/tribe compared to other ethnic groups/tribes? How? Why?

18. Do you think a member of your ethnic group can become a president of our country one day?
19. Do you think Tanzanians today trust each other more, less, or the same amount as Tanzanians did during Ujamaa?

20. What role has Ujamaa villages played on informing ethnicity in voting in the 2010 elections?

21. Did equitable distribution of resources have anything to do in explaining the role of the ethnicity of voting in the 2010 general elections?

22. Do you think multiparty politics provide room for different groups to organise themselves along ethnic lines and parochially further their interests? Why and how?

23. How did peace influence voting in the 2010 elections?

24. What would you advise a party that contests unfair management of elections?

25. Do you believe in witchcraft? Have you ever been bewitched?

26. Do you think Tanzania will ever be ethnic salient politically? Why?

27. Do you own— a house, car, cattle, tv, radio, bicycle
APPENDIX VI
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS

Introduction

Good day. My name is Mrisho Malipula, a doctoral student at Ghent University. I am conducting a study on the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral choices in Tanzania. The study mainly intends to explore the role of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices in Tanzanian. An essential element of this study is to see how the media has played and is playing a part in the current voting patterns. Knowing that you have for some time actively participated in the media, I would like to discuss with you some media related issues that have a bearing in Tanzanians voting behaviour over time. All information provided will be kept confidential by me and the institution I am studying at. Equally, the information given will be used for the purpose of this study and this study alone.

Questions

1. Could you share with me your personal biography?
2. What would you say has motivated you to be a journalist? Do you enjoy being one?
3. How important is the media in Tanzania?
4. What role has the media played Tanzania’s in the countries national building initiatives over time?
5. Do you believe the media can affect the way ethnicity influence voters?
6. How has the state influenced the role of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices?
7. Is there any difference between media reporting during single and multi-party rule?
8. Ethnicity in Tanzania’s elections is insignificant! What role has the media played in sustaining such situation?

9. Currently, we have community radios and newspapers do think they can exacerbate ethnicity?

10. Do you think the media can popularise the use of ethnicity in political canvassing?
APPENDIX VII
INTERVIEWEES

A. Key Informants
1. Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru
2. Dr. Juma Halifa Ngasongwa
3. Hemed Bakari Mkali
4. Dr. Mangi Ezekiel
5. Lawrence Kilimwiko
6. Doto Bulendu
7. Suleiman Hegga

B. Politicians/Government Representatives
8. CCM Assistant Regional Secretary
9. CHADEMA Regional Secretary
10. Misungwi Village Executive Officer
11. Mbela Village Executive Officer
12. Mapilingo Village Executive Officer
13. Nange Village Executive Officer
14. Shamala Street Executive Officer
15. Kishiri A Street Executive Officer
16. Rufiji Street Executive Officer
17. Utemini Street Executive Officer

C. Ordinary Voters
18. An elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
19. A male hawkers in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
20. An elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
21. An Extension Officer in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
22. A woman in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
23. An NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
24. A mid-aged female food vendor in Shamala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
25. A young man in Shamala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
26. A Young man in Shamala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
27. A male shopkeeper in Shamala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
28. A Bar-maid in Shamala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
29. A young woman in Shamala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
30. A mid-aged female teacher in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
31. An elderly woman in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
32. A young man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
33. An elderly man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
34. A female farmer in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
35. A male farmer in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
36. A male farmer in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi
37. An elderly man in Mapilingo, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
38. A Young man in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District
39. A female Primary School Teacher in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi
40. A female farmer in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi
41. A female farmer in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi
42. A male Primary School Teacher in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
43. A male retail shop owner in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
44. A nurse in Mbela, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
45. A housewife in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward Misungwi District
46. A male farmer in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
47. A female farmer in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District
48. A male hawker at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
49. A lady at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
50. A Secondary School Girl Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
51. A civil servant in Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
52. A private sector employee at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
53. A male casual labourer at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District
54. A woman in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District
55. A woman trader in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District
56. A young woman in Utemini Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District
57. A male university student in Utemini Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District
58. A CCM supporter in Utemini, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District
59. A young man in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District
60. A female fish seller in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana
61. An MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana
62. A female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District
63. A Kurya Street vendor in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District
64. A young female entrepreneur in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District
65. A retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District