Advanced search
1 file | 294.26 KB Add to list

"The" interpretation(s) of conditionals

(2008) EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 55(3). p.173-181
Author
Organization
Abstract
Recent studies indicate that a vast majority of people judge the probability of a conditional < if A then C > as equivalent to the conditional probability of < A, given C >. This means that in evaluating the applicability of a conditional people do not seem to take into account situations in which the antecedent < A > is false. This has been taken as evidence against the model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002). This theory, however, claims that the conditional interpretation in which false-antecedent cases are relevant is only one of many possible interpretations of "if." We present new evidence that confirms this flexibility of the interpretive system. When people are primed by thinking (1) about truth and the difference between the < if A then C > and < if A then possibly C > or (2) are invited to judge which situations are consistent with the conditional, they are more likely to select a probability estimate that takes into account the false-antecedent cases.
Keywords
mental models, meaning, interpretation, logic, conditionals, MENTAL MODELS, reasoning

Downloads

  • (...).pdf
    • full text
    • |
    • UGent only
    • |
    • PDF
    • |
    • 294.26 KB

Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Schroyens, Walter, Walter Schaeken, and Kristien Dieussaert. “‘The’ Interpretation(s) of Conditionals.” EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 55.3 (2008): 173–181. Print.
APA
Schroyens, W., Schaeken, W., & Dieussaert, K. (2008). “The” interpretation(s) of conditionals. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 55(3), 173–181.
Chicago author-date
Schroyens, Walter, Walter Schaeken, and Kristien Dieussaert. 2008. “‘The’ Interpretation(s) of Conditionals.” Experimental Psychology 55 (3): 173–181.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Schroyens, Walter, Walter Schaeken, and Kristien Dieussaert. 2008. “‘The’ Interpretation(s) of Conditionals.” Experimental Psychology 55 (3): 173–181.
Vancouver
1.
Schroyens W, Schaeken W, Dieussaert K. “The” interpretation(s) of conditionals. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 2008;55(3):173–81.
IEEE
[1]
W. Schroyens, W. Schaeken, and K. Dieussaert, “‘The’ interpretation(s) of conditionals,” EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 173–181, 2008.
@article{747528,
  abstract     = {Recent studies indicate that a vast majority of people judge the probability of a conditional < if A then C > as equivalent to the conditional probability of < A, given C >. This means that in evaluating the applicability of a conditional people do not seem to take into account situations in which the antecedent < A > is false. This has been taken as evidence against the model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002). This theory, however, claims that the conditional interpretation in which false-antecedent cases are relevant is only one of many possible interpretations of "if." We present new evidence that confirms this flexibility of the interpretive system. When people are primed by thinking (1) about truth and the difference between the < if A then C > and < if A then possibly C > or (2) are invited to judge which situations are consistent with the conditional, they are more likely to select a probability estimate that takes into account the false-antecedent cases.},
  author       = {Schroyens, Walter and Schaeken, Walter and Dieussaert, Kristien},
  issn         = {1618-3169},
  journal      = {EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
  keywords     = {mental models,meaning,interpretation,logic,conditionals,MENTAL MODELS,reasoning},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {173--181},
  title        = {"The" interpretation(s) of conditionals},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.55.3.173},
  volume       = {55},
  year         = {2008},
}

Altmetric
View in Altmetric
Web of Science
Times cited: