Advanced search
1 file | 941.30 KB Add to list

Adding feasibility constraints to a ranking rule under a monotonicity constraint

Author
Organization
Abstract
We propose a new point of view in the long-standing problem where several voters have expressed a linear order relation (or ranking) over a set of candidates. For a ranking a > b > c to represent a group's opinion, it would be logical that the strength with which a > c is supported should not be less than the strength with which either a > b or b > c is supported. This intuitive property can be considered a monotonicity constraint, and has been addressed before. We extend previous approaches in the following way: as the voters are expressing linear orders, we can take the number of candidates between two candidates to be a measure of the degree to which one candidate is preferred to the other. In this way, intensity of support is both counted as the number of voters who indicate a > c is true, as well as the distance between a and c in these voters' rankings. The resulting distributions serve as input for a natural ranking rule that is based on stochastic monotonicity and stochastic dominance. Adapting the previous methodology turns out to be non-trivial once we add some natural feasibility constraints.
Keywords
Linear Order, Group Decision Making, Weak Order, Monotonicity, Stochastic Dominance, Integer Linear Programming

Downloads

  • KERMIT-P1-054.pdf
    • full text
    • |
    • open access
    • |
    • PDF
    • |
    • 941.30 KB

Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Perez Fernandez, Raul, et al. “Adding Feasibility Constraints to a Ranking Rule under a Monotonicity Constraint.” Advances in Intelligent Systems Research, edited by JM Alonso et al., vol. 89, Atlantis Press, 2015, pp. 1302–09.
APA
Perez Fernandez, R., Rademaker, M., Alonso, P., Díaz, I., & De Baets, B. (2015). Adding feasibility constraints to a ranking rule under a monotonicity constraint. In J. Alonso, H. Bustince, & M. Reformat (Eds.), Advances in Intelligent Systems Research (Vol. 89, pp. 1302–1309). Paris, France: Atlantis Press.
Chicago author-date
Perez Fernandez, Raul, Michaël Rademaker, Pedro Alonso, Irene Díaz, and Bernard De Baets. 2015. “Adding Feasibility Constraints to a Ranking Rule under a Monotonicity Constraint.” In Advances in Intelligent Systems Research, edited by JM Alonso, H Bustince, and M Reformat, 89:1302–9. Paris, France: Atlantis Press.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Perez Fernandez, Raul, Michaël Rademaker, Pedro Alonso, Irene Díaz, and Bernard De Baets. 2015. “Adding Feasibility Constraints to a Ranking Rule under a Monotonicity Constraint.” In Advances in Intelligent Systems Research, ed by. JM Alonso, H Bustince, and M Reformat, 89:1302–1309. Paris, France: Atlantis Press.
Vancouver
1.
Perez Fernandez R, Rademaker M, Alonso P, Díaz I, De Baets B. Adding feasibility constraints to a ranking rule under a monotonicity constraint. In: Alonso J, Bustince H, Reformat M, editors. Advances in Intelligent Systems Research. Paris, France: Atlantis Press; 2015. p. 1302–9.
IEEE
[1]
R. Perez Fernandez, M. Rademaker, P. Alonso, I. Díaz, and B. De Baets, “Adding feasibility constraints to a ranking rule under a monotonicity constraint,” in Advances in Intelligent Systems Research, Gijon, Spain, 2015, vol. 89, pp. 1302–1309.
@inproceedings{7258308,
  abstract     = {{We propose a new point of view in the long-standing problem where several voters have expressed a linear order relation (or ranking) over a set of candidates. For a ranking a > b > c to represent a group's opinion, it would be logical that the strength with which a > c is supported should not be less than the strength with which either a > b or b > c is supported. This intuitive property can be considered a monotonicity constraint, and has been addressed before. We extend previous approaches in the following way: as the voters are expressing linear orders, we can take the number of candidates between two candidates to be a measure of the degree to which one candidate is preferred to the other. In this way, intensity of support is both counted as the number of voters who indicate a > c is true, as well as the distance between a and c in these voters' rankings. The resulting distributions serve as input for a natural ranking rule that is based on stochastic monotonicity and stochastic dominance. Adapting the previous methodology turns out to be non-trivial once we add some natural feasibility constraints.}},
  author       = {{Perez Fernandez, Raul and Rademaker, Michaël and Alonso, Pedro and Díaz, Irene and De Baets, Bernard}},
  booktitle    = {{Advances in Intelligent Systems Research}},
  editor       = {{Alonso, JM and Bustince, H and Reformat, M}},
  isbn         = {{9789462520776}},
  issn         = {{1951-6851}},
  keywords     = {{Linear Order,Group Decision Making,Weak Order,Monotonicity,Stochastic Dominance,Integer Linear Programming}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  location     = {{Gijon, Spain}},
  pages        = {{1302--1309}},
  publisher    = {{Atlantis Press}},
  title        = {{Adding feasibility constraints to a ranking rule under a monotonicity constraint}},
  volume       = {{89}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

Web of Science
Times cited: