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Disbelief in belief: on the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs

(2016) PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 29(4). p.601-615
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Abstract
Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe” – in the ordinary sense of the word – what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously-motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embraces a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to (e.g., invulnerability to refutation, incoherence) are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general, and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief”.
Keywords
disbelief in belief, religious belief, cognitive attitudes, theological correctness, analytical thinking, illusion, doxastic commitment, FOUNDATIONS, RELIGION, MINDS

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Citation

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MLA
Boudry, Maarten, and Jerry Coyne. “Disbelief in Belief: On the Cognitive Status of Supernatural Beliefs.” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 29, no. 4, 2016, pp. 601–15, doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1110852.
APA
Boudry, M., & Coyne, J. (2016). Disbelief in belief: on the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 29(4), 601–615. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1110852
Chicago author-date
Boudry, Maarten, and Jerry Coyne. 2016. “Disbelief in Belief: On the Cognitive Status of Supernatural Beliefs.” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 29 (4): 601–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1110852.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Boudry, Maarten, and Jerry Coyne. 2016. “Disbelief in Belief: On the Cognitive Status of Supernatural Beliefs.” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 29 (4): 601–615. doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1110852.
Vancouver
1.
Boudry M, Coyne J. Disbelief in belief: on the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 2016;29(4):601–15.
IEEE
[1]
M. Boudry and J. Coyne, “Disbelief in belief: on the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs,” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 601–615, 2016.
@article{7185992,
  abstract     = {{Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe” – in the ordinary sense of the word – what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously-motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embraces a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to (e.g., invulnerability to refutation, incoherence) are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general, and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief”.}},
  author       = {{Boudry, Maarten and Coyne, Jerry}},
  issn         = {{0951-5089}},
  journal      = {{PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}},
  keywords     = {{disbelief in belief,religious belief,cognitive attitudes,theological correctness,analytical thinking,illusion,doxastic commitment,FOUNDATIONS,RELIGION,MINDS}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{601--615}},
  title        = {{Disbelief in belief: on the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1110852}},
  volume       = {{29}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}

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