“What does it mean to be Hindu today?” This question stands at the heart of Vamsee Juluri’s *Rearming Hinduism*. It is a peculiar question. On the one hand, it appears to be of tremendous importance in the twenty-first century. The expanding middle classes in India are playing a major role in the economic growth and political rise of the country and most of these middle-class families are Hindu (or, at least, identified as such). The way they understand what it means to be Hindu in our times – how they relate to life, society, and the world as Hindus – could have a massive impact on the future of humanity.

On the other hand, it is unclear what would count as an answer. The Indian traditions never raised such questions about Hindu identity or the meaning of being Hindu. There are no precepts that people should follow in order to be Hindus. No one possesses the authority to tell another individual whether he or she is being a good Hindu, let alone a genuine one. Is it then a borrowed question, alien to the traditions about which it is being raised? This seems to be the case: the concern to find out what it means to be Hindu emerged mainly among Indians living in the United States – a country obsessed with identity politics.
The roots of this type of question reach far back into history. Sixteen centuries ago, in the age of Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine, early Christians raised it with some urgency: “Quid sit Christianum esse – what is it to be a Christian?” (Markus 1990: 19) Over the centuries, many views crystallized as to what it means to be Christian, from martyrdom through monastic asceticism to the missionary life. The dominant modes of being Christian gave shape not only to individual lives in the Western-Christian world but also to its cultural projects. To a significant extent, the contemporary world is the product of this process: the crystallization of views about the true nature of being Christian went hand-in-hand with the emergence of many of the institutions we consider ‘modern’ today.

Given how different the Hindu traditions are from Christianity, they are unlikely to establish similar orthodoxies as to what it means to be Hindu. In this sense, “What does it mean to be Hindu?” is indeed a borrowed question. Yet, it seems to resonate with more and more people. It expresses a sense of disorientation, a sense that something is not quite right with the state of the Hindu traditions today. As Juluri puts it:

We are living right now in a moment of vast civilizational hunger. It is not fundamentalism, nor fascism. It is an exceptional historical moment in which an entire generation of young, modern Hindus in India and the diaspora is growing up and asking only one pressing question: who are we, really? (117)

This question is not the subject of dry academic scholarship. Even though Juluri is a professor of Media Studies at the University of San Francisco, his book is neither a
scientific treatise nor a slice of science journalism. It is neither the exposé of a spiritual teacher nor a commentary on ancient Hindu texts, neither political propaganda nor religious pontificating. So what kind of book is it then? This is hard to say. In fact, one of the appealing aspects of Juluri’s book is that it leaves the well-trodden path to explore a new genre of writing.

_Rearming Hinduism_ presents itself as “a handbook for intellectual resistance” – a work that teaches today’s Hindus how to defend their traditions against what Juluri calls the reigning ‘Hinduphobia’. But its title is misleading: it should not be mistaken for a militant apologia for Hinduism. It intends to be much more. The ‘rearming’ is more a rediscovering – a making aware once again: “You must remember. We came from a world of wisdom we can barely fathom in today’s terms. And we are here, still” (3). It is also a search to recover a lost voice: “We belong to a moment in history when Hinduism is beginning to wake up, if not from a long slumber, then at least a long silence” (2). “We want a culture that is the best of what we know lies at the heart of our Hinduism. We want our civilization back” (119). This voice must speak not just to Hindus but to all of humanity: “When Hindu thought truly informs the social sciences and humanities, it will revolutionize knowledge, humanity, and indeed the future of the world itself” (31).

In several ways, then, Juluri’s work is a call to cultural renaissance: a plea to reinstate the knowledge and wisdom embodied by the Hindu traditions and make it available to the world. At times, he succeeds in conveying the awe-inspiring scale of what is at stake. But is Juluri also able to explain how we can begin to recover these knowledge traditions from centuries of misrepresentation? Does he find the terms to fathom “the world of wisdom” that Hindus have come from? Can he reformulate the
insights of these traditions in ways intelligible to the generation that he is addressing? In other words, is the potent rhetoric of his writing matched by an equally robust conceptual language?

**Hinduphobia**

Something is rotten in the study of Hinduism, Juluri rightly points out. While the field has seen controversy after controversy during the last decade or so, the turmoil has produced hardly any cognitive progress. Initially, there seemed to be some promise. Shocked by the way in which their traditions are portrayed in school textbooks and the academic world, highly-educated Indians living in the U.S. began to raise their voices. They uncovered genuine problems in the dominant accounts of ‘Hinduism’ and exposed harmful power structures in American academia. They expressed concerns and grievances shared by thousands of people. The language was sometimes aggressive but some of the criticism was equally incisive.

It is painful to behold what is left of these original concerns: we are witness to campaigns to ban books and fire professors, to tweets and blogs consisting of vicious *ad hominem* attacks, and to racism directed at ‘white’ scholars. The other side – that of the mainstream academics in Hinduism studies – practices a form of intellectual terrorism that seeks to silence alternative voices by dismissing them as ideological, marginal, or unprofessional. Understandably, many scholars of India wish to stay away from what they call the ‘politics’ of the field. But they do so to no avail: *the issues refuse to go away*. Hence, it is high time for intellectuals to address them in reasonable ways.

From the time of his earlier essay *Hinduism and Its Culture Wars*, Juluri added a
much-needed rational voice to these controversies (Juluri 2012). Like other voices, he is in search of a language to address the persistent misrepresentation of Hinduism. In his new work, he relies heavily on the term ‘Hinduphobia’ to do so. Hinduphobia, Juluri says, “is not a quirk or an individual stereotype that afflicts some individuals. It is a systematic distortion in human thought that serves to distract the world from the cruelty and the needlessness of suffering, not just Hindu, but all human and non-human suffering too” (18). Borrowed from the recent craze about ‘Islamophobia’, this term may appear to be an astute strategic choice to expose the rampant prejudice against Hinduism. However, how helpful is it to understand the current predicament in the study of India? How does it allow us to unearth and understand the systematic distortion in the current thinking about Indian culture?

The answer, I submit, is that it does not get us very far at all. Much like ‘Islamophobia’, ‘Hinduphobia’ is more of an empty label than a well-developed concept. Both scholarly work and popular opinion in the West often show explicit or implicit hostility towards Hinduism. Why is that the case? “Well, these people suffer from Hinduphobia.” It must be clear how poor an answer this is. Imagine a similar explanation of the fact that I feel uncomfortable in cramped spaces. “Oh, that’s because you suffer from claustrophobia.” What is claustrophobia? It is the fear of being in small or enclosed spaces. In other words, I fear being in cramped spaces because I suffer from the condition of fearing such spaces. Inevitably, ‘Hinduphobia’ will lead to similarly circular accounts that lack epistemic value.

Still, could we not use the term as a handy moniker to draw attention to the prejudices we regularly see in the Western representation of Hinduism? As Juluri
suggests, these often remain invisible today. Vices like racism or sexism are now recognizable and recognized. When there are flagrant public instances, people across the world get outraged. “But a massacre against Hindus does not seem to get the slightest reaction in the world press; except to perhaps say: ‘Let’s hope the Hindu fundamentalists now don’t go on a backlash!’” (18) We need some forceful term to expose such unfair attitudes, one could say. Why not use ‘Hinduphobia’ to point out this systematic distortion?

Let me explain why I think it is unwise to do so. Critical work on Orientalism has indeed shown there is remarkable constancy in the reproduction of commonsense ideas and moral judgments in Western writings about India (37). Juluri points out this phenomenon in the recent work of Wendy Doniger, *The Hindus: An Alternative History* (2009). As he suggests, this work is anything but an alternative; it is “the last dominance-display of a dying hegemony” (53), a particularly shallow American version of an age-old story about Indian culture. While the mainstream media have made a lot of brouhaha about this book as a courageous attempt to challenge ‘Hindu nationalism’, it is really a bad case of Cold War social science, the ideological enterprise launched by U.S. universities in the postwar period. This type of writing hides propaganda for the American ideology of freedom under the cloak of ‘progressive’ scholarship. It systematically depicts non-Western societies as dens of tyranny and patriarchy and then purports the aim of saving the ‘oppressed’ groups and ‘liberal’ strands in a society from its dominant culture.

Thus, Doniger’s story reproduces the systematic distortion of the Indian traditions that has occurred in mainstream scholarship from the early colonial era to this day. Now,
if the ‘Hinduphobia’ discourse is meant to characterize this distortion, it should also address some crucial questions: *What is the systematicity in the distortion? How did this systematic distortion of Indian culture emerge and how can it survive? Why were centuries of scholarship, European and Indian alike, unable to escape from the distortion?*

Here, the notion does not work at all. Like other phobias, Hindu-phobia must revolve around fear or anxiety (otherwise, the term loses its meaning). But many scholars of Hinduism do not show any such anxiety towards their object of study. The nineteenth-century Orientalists genuinely wanted to understand the cultures they wrote about; some even dedicated or sacrificed their lives to doing so (see Irwin 2007). Hinduism repelled some and appealed to others. From the German Romantics to the American Academy of Religion, a variety of Western authors expressed their love and admiration for Indian culture. Yet, as Juluri points out, even these scholars ended up reproducing Orientalist accounts about India in different guises. In spite of the variation in their preferred theories and value judgments, they agree about the same set of ‘facts’ as though these are self-evident: Indian culture consists of several religions; Hinduism is one such religion; it has priests and particular views about the divine; Hindus believe the cow is sacred and hence worship it; the caste system is the inegalitarian social structure of Indian society; this system transforms certain people into ‘untouchables’ and others into ‘upper castes’; etcetera.

Why do scholars reproduce the same Orientalist consensus irrespective of their sympathy or antipathy towards Indian culture? One option is to say that these are indeed obvious facts. However, the philosophy of science has taught us that such facts are
always facts of a theory. In this case also, the relevant descriptions of the facts are structured by a particular set of concepts (‘religion’, ‘worship’, ‘sacred’, ‘the caste system’). Scholars of India may have worked with different ‘theories’ to make sense of what they believed to be the facts, but they did draw on the same conceptual apparatus to structure the facts themselves. Hence, to understand the process whereby scholars have reproduced the same basic descriptions for centuries, we need to focus on the cognitive framework that guided them all this time. Charging Western and Westernized intellectuals with ‘phobia’ towards Hinduism does not take us forward in any way here.

To understand the systematic distortion in the dominant understanding of Indian culture that Juluri is so concerned about, we need to grasp the conceptual limitations that have compelled these people to see a particular set of ideas as facts about Indian culture and society.

**Eurocentrism**

Eurocentrism is another problematic concept that plays an important part in Juluri’s book. Consider his reflections on the Aryan Invasion theory. He rightly points out its dubious character and intends to trace the causes behind the distortion that led to the current ‘Hinduphobic’ discourse. “The most obvious source of distortion in the writing of Hindu history may be described as Eurocentrism,” he suggests, a tendency which came along with the colonial project of domination (61). When the Europeans encountered other cultures, Juluri explains, they wished to convince themselves of their civilizational superiority. But in India they met with a civilized people. Therefore, “they came up with the theory that the Hindus were probably once of their own kind, now grown dark and
dull in the sun, the notorious Aryan Invasion theory” (61-2). In other words, Eurocentrism caused Hinduphobia.

Let us take a closer look at this explanation. Over the years, Europe encountered several flourishing civilizations that showed substantial achievements, such as the Chinese, Japanese, or, say, the Aztecs. This gave rise to various reactions. Some attributed the civilized elements to a past where these nations still had inklings of the true God and His Will. In their own times, they saw rampant idolatry and immorality among the same nations, which they attributed to the corruption of religion. Since true religion was superior to false religion, Europeans faced no difficulty in dismissing these alien cultures as inferior, no matter how civilized they might look. Consequently, the fact that they found a civilized people in India (or in China or in Japan) cannot have compelled them to invent an invasion by a foreign nation sharing its ancestry with the Europeans. There is no causal connection between the ‘Eurocentric’ need to feel superior and the belief that the Hindu nation had originally invaded India.

By giving this facile explanation, Juluri misses out on some basic questions: in the absence of empirical or theoretical evidence, what made the Orientalists postulate with such certainty that India had been invaded by an alien nation? What made it so obvious to them that the ancient religious history of India was to be characterized in terms of the links between a nation (the Aryans), a language (Sanskrit), a religion (Vedism, Brahmanism, and later on Hinduism), a priesthood (the Brahmins), and a hierarchical social structure (the caste system)? The formula ‘Eurocentrism causes Hinduphobia’ cannot even begin to address questions like these.

It can only be applied algorithmically to any and all European descriptions of
other cultures: as colonizers, the Europeans wanted to feel superior; therefore, they came up with stories about other cultures to show how inferior those cultures were. From the 1800s until the 1940s, Juluri says, “Orientalism about Hinduism was fuelled by the political interests of colonization, proselytization and the ideology of the ‘civilizing mission’,” which inspired the false fantasy about “Hinduism as a violent, superstitious, and barbaric religion, and its people as evolutionary inferiors” (37). Though popular, this type of account begs the question. Why did European colonial officials and missionaries give one particular account of India and not some other account? Among all the options they had to judge this culture inferior, why did they find it cogent to see the Hindus as a nation, their traditions as a religion, the Brahmins as a priesthood, Sanskrit as a sacred language, the dharmashastras as codes of law, the devas and devis as gods, puja as worship, and caste as a religiously sanctioned social hierarchy? Surely, these are questions we must look into. To do so requires fundamental research into Western culture and the development of its intellectual traditions.

Here, Juluri’s book has little to offer, in spite of some intriguing suggestions. For instance, when he discusses the way in which modern scholars like Doniger read violence into Hinduism and its deities, he writes that this reading does not stem from a mere lack of understanding of India, but from “a deeper lack of self-reflexivity about the mythology of violence in Western thought itself.” “There are some ground assumptions about nature and violence in Western social thought and even more so in today’s popular culture,” he suggests, “that make some beliefs, theories and stories seem only ‘natural’ to everyone today (including non-Westerners as well, thanks to media and globalization)” (75). This is a thought-provoking suggestion: the Western search for violence and oppression in
other cultures is rooted in its own cultural stances concerning the naturalness of violence (83).

At the same time, however, Juluri trivializes his own insights. Take his critique of Western modernity: it transforms the world into a machine and thus de-animates reality (67). He writes: “Today’s science and technology is not nature’s intelligence. It is artificial intelligence, unnatural intelligence” (7). This discourse derives from shifts within Western culture. Over time, counter-streams in the European intellectual traditions – Romanticism, the ‘noble savage’ tradition, the New Age movement, postmodern continental philosophy – produced a discourse which claimed that science transforms nature into a lifeless machine and subjects the natural world to the violence of human sovereignty. Here, the West becomes an intrinsically violent culture that instrumentalizes the natural world and alienates humanity from itself.

While this story may contain a modicum of truth, it is also profoundly wrong: Christianity views the natural world as an embodiment of God’s Will, as the Book of Nature that needs to be deciphered along with the Book of Revelation. Many of the naturalists who first engaged in systematic scientific study of the natural world exemplified a profound love for nature, which characterizes Western culture as much as its other strands. So repeating the rhetoric of Western civilization’s self-critical moments cannot substitute for an Indian cultural critique of this civilization. It can only lead to loose rhetoric about science as ‘artificial’ or ‘unnatural’ intelligence (scientific knowledge is a product of human intelligence after all, not of artificial intelligence).

The problem is that Juluri lacks any alternative conceptual framework for the study of Western culture and its discourse about other cultures. His understanding of
Europe – and the Western world more generally – corresponds more or less to the standard textbook account, with some negative valuations added to it. Now, this textbook account reflects the West’s self-image, an image whose structures and origins again cannot be understood without a deeper study of Western culture and its Christian religious foundations.

Importantly, the above problems are not unique to *Rearming Hinduism*. They point to fundamental difficulties that face any attempt like Juluri’s – difficulties he is also aware of, to some extent. The conceptual language currently available to discuss Western and Indian culture is a product of centuries of Western theorizing about the human world. Theory formation in the social sciences and humanities has so far been the territory of Western thinkers and the same theorizing also provided the frameworks for describing other cultures like that of India. This we cannot remedy by introducing terms like ‘Eurocentrism’ or ‘Hinduphobia’, since these give no insight into the dynamics and cognitive limitations of a culture. As the work of Balagangadhara (2005 and 2012) has shown so cogently, only when we have done a very serious and scientific study of *Western culture* will we be able to go beyond the distortions inherent to the Orientalist representations of *Indian culture*.

**Rediscovery**

How then can we rediscover the knowledge offered by the Hindu traditions in the face of centuries of misunderstanding? While addressing this question, Juluri is very much aware that twenty-first-century Hindus “have not yet found a voice for what it means to speak of a Hindu world today, or of the world as Hindus today” (182). To do justice to his
work, we need to appreciate how it provides an impetus for this quest to find a new voice, while it also stumbles upon the obstacles that stand in the way.

As many thinkers have pointed out, the hold of colonialism on Indian society has gone much further than material exploitation or political domination. It did not end on 15 August 1947 “at the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps.” In a crucial sense, India is yet to “awake to life and freedom.” In Juluri’s words:

For several hundred years, Hindus were forced to just about survive culturally in the face of colonialism. We kept our customs, temples, and beliefs, but we could not assert the philosophies underlying them intellectually. After independence, we neglected our own history, and more or less accepted what we were given by our former masters. In more recent times, with the rise of a global Hindu middle class, we have started to become more self-aware, and assertive too. But the problem is that we still do not know what is the right answer. (60)

This predicament afflicts all the traditions of India. While Indian culture was transmitted from mother to child and from generation to generation in the form of all kinds of practices and stories, colonialism caused a rupture in the transmission of this culture’s modes of thinking and theorizing. It tried to replace them with the discourse about India that is still dominant, namely the stories that conceptualize its culture in terms of ‘religion’, ‘worship’, ‘the caste system’, ‘superstition’, and similar notions. To recover the Indian modes of reflection from this colonial rupture and to assess what remains valuable in them are two of the great challenges facing contemporary India.
This is the quest for an Indian cultural renaissance. As Juluri knows, he is not traveling alone on these roads and he is not the only one confronting the obstacles he finds on his way. These obstacles have to be unearthed and understood, before they can be overcome. Just consider one example: Juluri’s remarks on the traditional stories of the Hindu traditions. How should we understand the many narratives about Rama, Shiva, Krishna, Kali, and the other devas and devis? What is the role of epics like the Mahabharata and the Ramayana in Indian culture? The current framework inherited from Western colonialism gives only two options: these are either myth or history. Either you know that all these stories are myths and did not really happen; or you must believe that they did happen and then you give them the status of historiography.

Juluri remarks that “in our hearts, we cannot ever think of the deeds of our gods as mere fairy-tales. We do not know yet what to call them, so for now we call them, respectfully, stories about our gods. We somehow feel they happened, if not literally, at least loosely” (58). Modern academics, he points out, want to show that these stories are fiction. In response, Hindus argue that they are history. But, between these two positions, they forget the obvious: “These are neither myth, in the sense of fantasy-tales for entertainment, nor are they histories, in the sense of what social groups do with each other” (102). What then are they? “They are god-stories; a truly significant, enduring, and inspiring form of culture. God-stories are stories about God.” We may disagree about God but we can still recognize the undeniable value of these stories (102).

What is this value that the stories of the Hindu traditions have? Calling them god-stories or stories about God can give some kind of temporary emotional relief in face of the claim that they are mere myths. However, it leads one into to the same traps set by the
Western-Orientalist accounts of Indian culture. Since medieval times, ‘God’ is first and foremost a term from the Bible and the proper name of the Divinity of Christianity – the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent creator of the world. This religious framework determined the way in which the word ‘God’ is used in English, often in ways that we are not aware of. Under its terms, one can give two types of accounts about God: true doctrine or false fabrications.

Looking at the Hindu traditions, Christian missionaries and European Orientalists saw in them false accounts of God and His creation. They characterized ‘Hinduism’ as a form of pantheism mingled with polytheism (or later as ‘kathenotheism’, in Friedrich Max Müller’s term). They said that Hindus wrongly believe that the natural world is suffused by God and think that He is present in all of us and in all of nature. Within the framework of Christian orthodoxy, this pantheism is but a heresy. Accepting that the Hindu traditions revolve around ‘God’ and that they find God in all life – or understanding the Hindu stories as stories about God, as Juluri does – implies an implicit acceptance of these accounts of Hinduism as some form of theism, as an erring variant of Christianity. One could suggest that ‘God’ has another meaning for Hindus, but this is precisely what missionaries were saying all along: Hindus do not know God’s revelation of Himself; therefore, they inevitably view the divine and its relation to the world and humanity in a different way (that is a false way). One cannot escape this framework by removing the predicate of falsity and keeping the rest of the claims about Hinduism and its stories about ‘God’. When one reproduces the terms of this religious framework, one ends up with a veiled reproduction of its conclusions, no matter how positive or sympathetic one may be towards the Hindu traditions.
How could Juluri avoid such traps in elaborating his important insight that the stories that are so important to Indian culture can count neither as fictional myths nor as disguised historiographies? Currently, he cannot, simply because there is no framework available that enables him to do so. From fragmentary insights, he seems almost compelled to fall back into the very conceptual language that trivializes these insights.

For instance, Juluri repeatedly suggests that experience, rather than theory, is central to Hinduism and that its traditions revolve around “a socially endowed practice of cultivated intelligence to sustain that experience” (150). When discussing the Bhagavad Gita, he goes to the core of that experience: “One supersoul in which all we individuals feel the illusion of separation, go through life and its story thinking I, we, mine; thinking, my soul, when all there is just One, daring you to live up to it in and through and past your mind” (180). But together with such intriguing formulations of the central concerns of the Hindu traditions, he also says that “the language of Hinduism” is ultimately the language of the heart (142), that “God is not a mere theory for us, but experience” (150) and that “Hinduism is sensibility, not doctrine. It is what we feel, and not what the experts say it’s about. It is what we feel” (141). For whom is God ‘a mere theory’? He is certainly not that for Christians, Jews, and Muslims. They seek faith in God, total surrender to Him, which does not revolve around doctrine. Thus, for them also, religion is what they experience and what they feel, rather than mere dogma. To act as though such claims characterize Hinduism is to profoundly trivialize it.

Perhaps it is inappropriate to put heavy cognitive demands on a book like *Rearming Hinduism*, which has no theoretical pretentions. However, it does aim to be “a handbook for intellectual resistance” addressed to a new generation of Hindus trying to
make sense of their traditions in the face of centuries of distortion. To succeed here, a genuine understanding is required of what caused the distortion: the currently dominant conceptual framework and its limitations and implications. Today’s Hindus are facing the same old questions raised by and within this framework: “Why do you worship the cow and the phallus? How can you give up your individual autonomy to gurus and god-men? Do you believe in reincarnation? Do you support the caste system?”

To gain an understanding of the framework that raises and answers such questions, one needs to study the culture that has produced it. One will have to re-examine the structures and dynamics of Western culture and its relation to the Christian religion. The challenge is to develop an alternative research program about Western culture, which is cognitively superior to the currently dominant accounts and which uncovers the limitations of this culture and its understanding of the human world in general and other cultures in particular. Before coming to a rediscovery of their own culture, then, the new generation of Indians will have to understand the cultural framework that has come in between and that prevents them from finding their own voice in the world of the twenty-first century.

Conclusion
We live in an era when Asian giants like India are rising to a more prominent place on the global stage. Much as the dominance of the West went far beyond the realm of politics or the economy, this global shift will give rise to new attempts to establish a cultural and intellectual hegemony – this time from the side of Asian cultures. In India, it is already giving rise to “the stormy rumblings of a cultural and intellectual hunger that those who
do not understand reduce to its one political face as Hindu nationalism,” as Juluri writes (120). This will go hand-in-hand with the building of new research groups and institutions that challenge the hegemonic frameworks and institutions in the academic world and the media. When successful, such attempts would have consequences that we cannot even begin to assess today: cultural traditions that are not of Abrahamic religious stock shall begin to reconfigure the world we live in.

What would this new world look like? What would happen if Indian cultural and intellectual traditions were to reshape our political thinking and institutions or, say, our educational theories and universities? All we can say today is: “We don’t know.” Still, as intellectuals, we need to understand and guide this process, so that the new hegemony can take as humane and reasonable a form as possible. Our current ignorance prevents us from taking up this task.

Rearming Hinduism is a resounding call for an alternative to the currently dominant approaches to the Hindu traditions. It not only conveys a sense of urgency to go beyond the framework inherited from centuries of colonialism, but also looks for a new approach that can recover the world of wisdom out of which these traditions emerged. Juluri realizes that it will not be easy to find a voice and a language to make this world accessible once again. It takes the work of generations to pave the road to the renaissance of a culture. If he is right, a new generation inspired by a “vast civilizational hunger” will soon be ready to take up this task. While Juluri has not yet found the kind of nourishment that could satisfy this hunger, we can only hope that this new generation of Indians will share his humane stance towards the beings living in this world, human and otherwise.
References


