Interpersonal grammatical metaphor as double scoping and double grounding

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ABSTRACT

This article focusses on the notion of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as understood in Halliday’s model of systemic functional linguistics (SFL). First, the concept of grammatical metaphor as developed in SFL is reviewed and its relation to comparable concepts developed in other linguistic schools is specified. On the basis of a general semiotic-functional characterization of the interpersonal sign in terms of scoping and grounding, I will then define interpersonal grammatical metaphor as involving a doubling of semiosis, viz. a doubling of scoping in its structural-realizational dimension, and a doubling of grounding in its semantic-functional dimension.

KEYWORDS: metaphor; grammatical metaphor; systemic functional linguistics; cognitive grammar; semiotics; interpersonal meaning; grounding, instantiation; parentheticals.

1. Introduction: ‘Grammatical metaphor’?

Of the various expressions that have recently received a lot of attention in approaches to interpersonal grammar, including the studies presented in this volume, a large group would be considered as instances of what Halliday has called interpersonal ‘grammatical metaphor’. This group includes expressions
such as those underlined in the non-italicized sentences in the following examples:

(1) a. However, if you imagine you can now buy them back I would advise you to forget all about it. [BNC: HGD, 4186]
b. It is advised that the choice of issue should reflect the choice of the two key questions as indicated above i.e. relate either to the problem of evil/suffering in the world and/or the topic of the value of human life. [BNC: J27, 443]
c. The exercises are detailed below; it is advisable to practise each exercise individually before attempting the whole routine. [BNC: A0W, 189]
d. In order to achieve satisfactory returns from such investments, it is necessary to move ‘downstream’. [BNC: HB1, 128]
e. Kyle, can you open your mouth so we can shove this in? [BNC: KDV, 4236]
f. Open your mouth, please, so that we can shove this in.

(2) a. Yes, I, yes I think Andrea’s put her finger on it. [BNC: HIJ, 220]
b. It might perhaps be assumed that families sending girls to be compositors would be those where there was some interest in books, but the evidence is quite fragmentary. [BNC: EVJ, 1149]
c. Indeed, it is arguable that the different speeds of financial liberalisation are a prime cause of world trade and savings imbalances. [BNC: AAA, 125]
d. Since the report is expected to form the basis for an investigation and possible action by the Serious Fraud Office, it is highly unlikely that it will be published in full. [BNC: A1S, 465]
e. It will certainly be held next year. [BNC: HD1, 364]

As can be gathered from these examples, it is such types of expressions, amongst others, that have been taken up in appraisal theory (see the second part of this issue), especially under the heading of ‘engagement’ (Martin 1997). This approach offers a detailed lexical-semantic categorization of such expressions as evaluations (‘appraisals’) of propositions and proposals (see especially Martin’s approach to appraisal theory), or it focusses on the role such expressions have in negotiating inter-subjective positions in a speech exchange (see especially White’s elaboration of appraisal theory). Expressions such as the examples given above also play a central role in McGregor’s semiotic approach to interpersonal grammar, which is centred around the notions of scoping and framing, and which explores such types of expressions in terms of the interclausal interpersonal relationship of ‘conjugation’ they construe.
However, although it is especially such expressions – expressions that Halliday has brought to attention under the heading of ‘interpersonal grammatical metaphor’ (or ‘interpersonal metaphor’) in the early 1980s – that form the focus of the study of appraisal and the study of scoping in language, the notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’ is only rarely mentioned, and does not play any significant role in these more recent studies of interpersonal meanings and constructions. The very concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ itself is even looked upon with scepticism by the proponent of the semiotic theory of scoping and framing (see McGregor 1990: 41).

A possible explanation for this relative neglect of grammatical metaphor in the two frameworks mentioned above, is that, even though grammatical metaphor has been interpreted as one of the most significant innovations in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) in the past two decades (Butler 1989: 5, Martin 1992: 490), the specific nature of its internal organisation as a construction type – i.e. a linguistic sign seen as a coupling of form and meaning – has never been characterized in precise terms. This paper is intended as first step towards such a semiotic-functional characterization of interpersonal grammatical metaphor.

I will propose to define interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis: a doubling of scoping in structural terms, and a doubling of grounding in semantic terms. This characterization builds on a refined definition of the interpersonal sign as such, in which the concepts of ‘scoping’ and ‘grounding’ play a fundamental role as structural and semantic notions, respectively.

The argument will be built up in three steps. In a first move, the initial motivation for introducing the concept of ‘interpersonal grammatical metaphor’ into SFL will be reconsidered (Section 2), and on the basis of this, I will justify the need for a semiotic characterization and specify the approach to such a characterization that will be taken in this paper (Section 3). As a second step, the nature of the interpersonal sign in general – whether metaphorical or not – will be looked into (Section 4). The final move will then focus on defining ‘interpersonal grammatical metaphor’ and its various sub-types (Section 5).
2. Whence interpersonal grammatical metaphor?

The aim of this section is twofold. [1] First, it serves to explain the introduction of a concept such as interpersonal grammatical metaphor into SFL against the background of the design of SFL as a functional model of language. As such, this section also forms an appraisal of the notion of grammatical metaphor – a linguistic concept which is unique to the SFL framework. [2] Although the concept of grammatical metaphor itself hardly has any equivalents in other theories, distinct linguistic phenomena covered by this concept have received extensive treatment in other frameworks, albeit never in the integrative sense offered by the notion of grammatical metaphor. A second aim of this section is thus to contextualize the systemic functional concept into a wider theoretical and descriptive background.

2.1. The interpersonal component in SFL

Before turning to the introduction of interpersonal grammatical metaphor into SFL, I will consider the theoretical context, i.e. the systemic functional conception of the interpersonal component of language, into which Halliday incorporated the notion of interpersonal metaphor.

In Halliday’s (1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) version of SFL, the interpersonal organisation of an utterance is structured in terms of a Mood + Residue pattern. The Mood comprises the Subject of the clause, the Finite (which encodes grammatical number, primary tense and modality), polarity markers, and modal adverbs (if present). In this conception, it is the Mood element which is seen as carrying the burden of the utterance as an interactive event, and hence, it is through different options available for the Mood element that the interpersonal component is manifested in language.
The different systems pertaining to options that are realized in the Mood element are specified on two different levels: the level of SPEECH FUNCTION on the one hand, and the level of MOOD and MODALITY on the other hand (see Figure 1). The system of SPEECH FUNCTION deals with the negotiation of meaning in discourse, it focusses on an utterance as a linguistic exchange, i.e. on the way in which an utterance is (to be) taken in a speech interaction. It is organized around two primary dimensions, as shown in Figure 1. First, what is being negotiated in a speech interaction is either information or ‘goods-&-
services’, i.e. the accomplishment of an extra-linguistic task (see Halliday 1994). For example:

(3) a. Where is John?
   b. Come here immediately!

(3a) illustrates an exchange of [information]: I ask information, whereas (3b) is an exchange of [goods- & -services]: I ask for a service to be done. Thibault (1995: 81ff.) speaks of a contrast between a “semiotic-discursive” versus a “physical-material” negotiation (However, we will return to the interaction between a semiotic-discursive and a physical-material encoding in discussing grammatical metaphor below; see Section 5.). Davidse (1998: 152) views language as being exchanged either on an “informational axis” or on a “volitional axis”. I will refer to this dimension as the TYPE OF EXCHANGE.

The second dimension of the system of SPEECH FUNCTION focuses on dialogue as a ‘give-and-take’ interaction. This is formalized in the system of DIRECTION and its options [give] and [demand]: Where is John? illustrates a demand for information, in John is in London, information is given. The combination of the options in the systems of TYPE OF EXCHANGE and DIRECTION leads to four primary categories of speech function: ‘statement’, ‘question’, ‘offer’ and ‘command’, as shown in Figure 1.

The systems of MOOD and MODALITY deal with the lexicogrammatical setup of an utterance. MOOD is based on the traditional distinction between clause-types in terms of, for example, declarative, indicative, interrogative, imperative moods. The system of MODALITY (see Figure 1) comprises further options which are available for expressions with [indicative] ([interrogative] or [declarative]) mood. It comprises three major sub-systems. The TYPE OF MODALITY can be [modalization] or [modulation], which more or less correspond to the traditional notions of epistemic modality and deontic modality. The modal VALUE is [high], [low], or [median]. For example, She might come by train realizes a low probability, You must come! realizes a high obligation. The third system, viz. ORIENTATION, refers to the realization of modal meanings through modal operators, which are categorized as [subjective], or through modal adverbs, which are considered as [objective] expressions of modality.
It is into this model of interpersonal grammar that Halliday introduced the notion of interpersonal grammatical metaphor. Two types of interpersonal metaphor are distinguished, viz. metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality, whose respective locations in the overall interpersonal system are highlighted in Figure 1. The remainder of this section will focus on how the introduction of grammatical metaphor into the model of interpersonal grammar was initially motivated in SFL.

2.2. Metaphors of mood

The term ‘grammatical metaphor’ is based on an earlier distinction made by Halliday between congruent and incongruent grammar, and it is incongruent expressions which later came to be reconceived as grammatical metaphors. The notion of incongruence is first highlighted in Halliday’s (1984) paper called “Language as code and language as behaviour”, in which he focusses on the relationship between system (language as code, as a potential) and process (language as actual behaviour) in the interpersonal component of language. The general aim of this paper is to show how systems are actualized in dialogue, and how an analysis of dialogue leads to a refinement of the system. The starting point is the interpersonal model as described above and set out in Figure 1, and the concentration on the relationship between system and process turns out to be a focus on the relationship between the options that are systemically possible, in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, and the realization of these options in the lexicogrammar of MOOD. A congruent realization is defined as an unmarked, typical realization, or a realization which “will be selected in the absence of any good reason for selecting another one” (Halliday 1984: 14).

Thus Halliday claims that a ‘statement’ is most congruently realized by means of the [indicative:declarative] type of MOOD, and the most congruent expression of a ‘question’ is a sentence of the [indicative:interrogative] type. Incongruent types of expressions are especially important in the area of [goods-&-services]. In general, Halliday notes, there is a greater tendency to incongruence in the exchange of [goods-&-services]. According to him, this is hardly surprising: since information is inherently linguistic, it is only natural that language has clear categories, [declarative] and [interrogative], to express different types of exchange
of [information]. The exchange of [goods-&-services], by contrast, takes place outside the system of language, and as such, it is not dependent on an expression in language. As a result, language does not have a clearly defined type of pattern which is specialized for the expression of an exchange of [goods-&-services].

This can be seen most clearly in the area of ‘offers’: there is no single type of expression in English which can be regarded as a congruent realization of an ‘offer’. Various possible verbalizations can be used, such as the following:

(4) a. Well, here you are, it’s twenty-five pounds!’; said Joe delightedly, handing the bag to my sister. [BNC: FPU, 702]
b. Would you like a drop of tea while you’re waitin’? [BNC: CFY, 269]
c. Shall I go and put the kettle on? [BNC: KBB, 9480]

For ‘commands’, the [imperative] can be regarded as the unmarked, congruent expression, but, Halliday argues, non-congruent forms are more often used to express the ‘command’ function. This variety is illustrated in examples (1a)–(1f) above.

In his 1985 overview of SFL, Halliday re-defines incongruent types of expressions as grammatical metaphors. In contrast with another type of metaphor which we will focus on below, examples such as sentences (1a)–(1e) and those in (4) above are termed metaphors of mood. From the above discussion, it is clear that metaphors of mood, as defined by Halliday, have at least two central characteristics, which are interdependent: (1) they are based on the relationship between the speech functional categories of ‘statement’, ‘question’, ‘command’ and ‘offer’ on the one hand, and the expression of these categories through different MOOD types on the other hand; and (2) the distinction between an exchange of [information] and an exchange of [goods-&-services] plays an important role in the recognition and definition of metaphors of mood.

2.3. Metaphors of modality

A second general type of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as defined by Halliday pertains to the area of modality. Halliday claims that modal meanings are most congruently expressed by modal elements in the clause, i.e. modal operators and adjuncts (certainly, probably and the like). Metaphors of modality diverge from the congruent pattern in that, here, a modal meaning is construed
outside the proposition that is being modally assessed. This is made possible in two types of constructions: projecting mental processes, as illustrated in examples (1a) and (1b) above, and relational processes, as in examples (1c) and (1d). In order to accommodate metaphorical expressions in the system of MODALITY, Halliday introduces an additional sub-system with the options [implicit] and [explicit] (later called MANIFESTATION by Matthiessen 1993). Thus, metaphors of modality, in which a modal meaning is construed by means of an ‘additional’ construction outside the proposition assessed, are defined as [explicit] realizations of modality, as shown in Figure 1. The distinction between metaphors based on mental processes and those based on relational processes is captured by the contrast in the simultaneous system of ORIENTATION, viz. between [objective] and [subjective] expressions of modality: *I think she knows* is defined as [subjective], whereas *It’s very likely that she knows* is [objective] (see Figure 1).

It is clear that Halliday’s notion of interpersonal metaphor of modality provides yet another perspective on a topic that has received much attention in various research traditions. It comes under different headings, whose names are inspired by the meaning or function of the expressions at hand (e.g. propositional attitudes, epistemic qualification, evidentiality), or motivated by the structural position of these expressions (e.g. parentheticals).

Criteria which Halliday adduces to define interpersonal metaphors of modality are similar to features that have been brought up in connection with these expressions in other frameworks. The two most important of these are the following. First, the proposition that is being modally assessed is the major [information] that is being negotiated in the dialogue, and not the evaluating expression, even though it constitutes the matrix clause. This is shown by the fact that it is the evaluated proposition which is being taken up by a question tag (Halliday 1985: 333; see also Aijmer 1972: 47, 52; Nuyts 1990: 583).\(^5\) Compare (5a) which illustrates a metaphorical reading to (5b), which shows a literal interpretation.

(5) a. *I think Jane knows, doesn’t she?*
b. *I think Jane knows, don’t I?*
A second feature is the possibility of transferred negation (Quirk et al. 1985: 1033; referred to as negative-raising in formal approaches). In other words, when the proposition assessed is negative, the negation can either be expressed in the proposition itself (6a), or in the evaluating expression. In the latter case it is regarded as being ‘transferred’ (from the subordinate clause to the evaluating expression, i.e. the main clause, see example (6b)) (Halliday 1985: 333; see also Bublitz 1992):

(6) a. I think Jane doesn’t know.
    b. I don’t think Jane knows.

2.4. A general feature of interpersonal metaphor: Semantic tension

The metaphorical nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor has been specified in terms of a tension between a ‘literal’ and a ‘figurative’ interpretation, i.e. a tension which is equally present in the traditional notion of (lexical) metaphor. This feature, which has especially been pointed out by Martin (e.g. Martin 1995: 37; 1997: 26–27), has not gone unnoticed in other frameworks (see Aijmer 1980: 13ff). An interpersonal grammatical metaphor can have at least two uptakes in dialogue, i.e. it can be interpreted metaphorically or literally. This can be illustrated by means of the following examples given by Martin (1995: 39) and quoted from well-known detective stories:

(7) Commander Dalgliesh: “You were watching her closely all the time, Inspector? Are you absolutely sure that Miss Foley couldn’t have replaced the keys in the box without your seeing her?”
    Inspector Blakelock: “No, sir. That would have been quite impossible.”

(8) Sherlock Holmes with Dr. Watson.
    “I’m inclined to think ---” said I.
    “I should do so,” Sherlock Holmes remarked impatiently.
    I believe that I am one of the most long-suffering of mortals; but I’ll admit that I was annoyed by the sardonic interruption. “Really, Holmes,” said I severely, “you are a little trying at times.”

In the first extract, Blakelock takes a metaphorical reading of Are you absolutely sure …, and his answer thus takes up the subordinate proposition (Miss Foley couldn’t have placed the keys in the box …) as the major move of the exchange – the information that is being negotiated – and responds to this proposition: ‘no, that
would have been impossible’. In the dialogue in (8), by contrast, Sherlock Holmes responds to a literal reading of *I’m inclined to think* ….

This tension between literal and metaphorical meaning in interpersonal metaphor is also clear in instances of verbal play based on metaphors of mood. The possibility of a literal interpretation in examples such as (9) is well-known:

(9) – Could you pass the salt, please.
– Yes, I could do that. [without any action undertaken]

3. Interim conclusion and outlook

In the previous section, we have considered the introduction of two types of interpersonal grammatical metaphor into the systemic-functional model of interpersonal grammar. We have focussed on the major features of metaphors of modality and metaphors of mood, and the general characteristic of semantic tension which they share. From this review, it is clear that a wide range of phenomena which are well-known in other approaches to language are united under the systemic functional concept of grammatical metaphor. The concept of a certain ‘metaphoricity’ involved in these phenomena, although not completely absent in other frameworks, provides a unique perspective on these phenomena. However, from the above review, it is equally clear that, although interpersonal metaphor is incorporated into the system network of interpersonal grammar, its ‘metaphorical’ nature is only motivated in general terms which link grammatical metaphor to the more well-known traditional (lexical) metaphor: i.e. in terms of two different interpretations, a literal one and a metaphorical one, underlying the expressions at hand. More precisely, no specification is offered of the internal semiotic organisation of grammatical metaphor as a type of construction – as a linguistic sign.

Metaphor is inherently a second-order phenomenon in language: an expression can only be recognized as metaphorical by virtue of there being a comparable, non-metaphorical (type of) expression. What is more, as a second-order expression, metaphor builds upon non-metaphorical resources in language (see also Taverniers 2003a). Any definition of interpersonal grammatical metaphor must therefore be rooted in a specification of the interpersonal sign as
such. Conversely, if interpersonal grammatical metaphor is to be defined as an interpersonal construction type, the general definition of the interpersonal sign must be broad (or abstract) enough to account for grammatical metaphor as well.

If we reconsider the diversity of expressions discussed above – metaphors of modality, metaphors of mood, and the non-metaphorical counterparts for both types – in light of their treatment in other frameworks, there appear to be at least two contexts that offer a unifying perspective on non-metaphorical and metaphorical expressions. A first context is well-known and is provided by broadly based approaches to epistemic modality in which expressions such as *I think, it’s conceivable that* and the like are treated as instances of epistemic qualification or epistemic modification, and are thus placed alongside the more traditionally delineated category of epistemic modals. A second context, which appeared more recently, is formed by McGregor’s concept of scoping. Most of the expressions given above as illustrations of the systemic functional notion of interpersonal grammatical metaphor, and all the modalized non-metaphorical counterparts would be conceived of as instances of scoping in terms of McGregor’s semiotic grammar. More exactly, they would be characterized as illustrating scoping relationships which realize a rhetorical modification.

The semiotic-functional definition of the interpersonal sign which will be given below will be based on two dimensions, representing the two sides of the interpersonal construction type as a linguistic side, viz. content (*signifié*, the semantic-functional side of the sign) and expression (*signifiant*, the form-realizational side of the sign). The first of these is **scoping** as a structural (realizational) concept. The second dimension is intuitively clearer, and is also better known from the literature: it is the semantic dimension of rhetorical modification, of which the epistemic modification/qualification of other frameworks forms a part. This second dimension will be defined in terms of the concept of **grounding** from the framework of cognitive grammar. This concept, as it is theorized by Langacker and further re-interpreted by Davidse, forms a very precise semantic-functional framework for characterizing interpersonal ‘meaning’.
4. The nature of the interpersonal sign

4.1. The expression side of the linguistic sign: Scoping, prosody, operator-status

In this section I will bring together a number of concepts that have been introduced in the literature to specify the way in which interpersonal meanings are realized in language. These concepts, which will be important in the characterization of interpersonal metaphor, are summarized in Table 1.

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Table 1: Structural-realizational aspects of the interpersonal sign

McGregor’s notions of scoping and framing (see McGregor 1997; this volume) are based on intuitive metaphors, and the names have been used with related (but different) senses in other frameworks (e.g. the notion of quantifier scope in formal grammar; the scope of adverbials (e.g. McCawley 1988); Bolinger’s (1972: 42) notion of ‘framing’ a proposition).

Halliday’s classification of linguistic signs (of which McGregor’s semiotic grammar is a more full-fledged and fundamentally semiotic reworking) is based on Pike’s (1959) metaphorical description of three complementary aspects of language in terms of three different appearances of light: as wave, particle and field. In Halliday’s view, interpersonal meanings are regarded as being realized in a field-like manner, as opposed to representational (ideational) meanings which are regarded particulate, constituency-based, and textual meanings which are said to be realized by wave-like or culminative patterns. The concept of a field-like “mode of expression” (Halliday 1979) is based on another conception of interpersonal meanings, viz. their prosodic pattern of realization. Halliday views interpersonal meanings as being “strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif of colouring”, or as being “distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous
stretch of discourse” (1979: 66; emphases MT). Matthiessen (1990) distinguishes between two types of interpersonal prosodies: continuously realized prosodies and boundary prosodies. The former, of which Matthiessen gives examples such as (10) and (11), pertains to the possibility of interpersonal elements/meaning being “scattered prosodically through the unit” (Halliday 1994/1985: 190, emphasis MT), while the latter refers to the tendency for interpersonal meanings to be realized at the boundaries (the beginning or the end) of a clause.

(10) I don’t want never to see him again, I don’t. (G.B. Shaw, Pygmalion).

(11) I think I might perhaps have walked out too from all the accounts.

Nuyts (1993) specifies two other dimensions which he sees as typical of the structuring of interpersonal meanings.9 On the one hand, Nuyts (2000: 122–123) argues, interpersonal elements tend to have an operator(-like) status, and stand apart from the rest of the clause representing a state of affairs. Nuyts explains this feature in terms of iconicity: this status reflects the conceptual semantic status of those elements as ‘meta-level’ comments relative to the state of affairs expressed in the clause. On the other hand, interpersonal expressions tend to be “freewheeling”, i.e. they can often take different positions in the clause they qualify. It is clear that the two aspects specified by Nuyts are in harmony with and further enhance the observations referred to above, as shown in Table 1.

A final typical aspect of the mode of expression of interpersonal meanings is their left-to-right orientation, and especially their left anchoring in the syntagm: the more interpersonal elements tend to occur first in a syntagm. This feature has been pointed out by Halliday in relation to the nominal group and the verbal group: both of these types of groups “begin with the element that ‘fixes’ the group in relation to the speech exchange [the Determiner and the Finite element, respectively; MT]; and both end with the element that specifies the representational content [i.e. the Head noun and the lexical verb or Predicator; MT]” (Halliday 1994: 197).
4.2. The content side of the linguistic sign: Grounding

The concept of grounding, as it will be used here in defining the semantic side of the interpersonal sign, is to be understood in its technical sense derived from cognitive grammar. In this framework, grounding is related to three other notions, viz. quantification, instantiation and type specification, which Langacker specifies in explaining the conceptual structure of clauses (and of nominal groups).

The grounding aspects in an utterance are those elements that tie the utterance to the speaker-now context, i.e. the ground. According to Davidse’s reinterpretation of the grounding function, which will be adopted here, the clausal grounding elements are primary tense, modality and person-deixis of the Subject (Davidse 1997, 1998). What exactly is grounded vis-à-vis the speaker-now context in a clause, is a quantified and instantiated type specification. A verbal type specification is what corresponds to the Residue in Halliday’s view of interpersonal grammar, i.e. the Predicator (non-finite part of the VP), Objects and Complements (see Section 2.1 above). A verbal type specification occurs, as such, in nominalizations, as in (12). The Subject serves to turn a verbal type specification into an instantiated event. Highlighting its instantiating function, Davidse therefore terms the Subject ‘Instantiator’. In nominalizations the Instantiator may appear as a genitive (13):

(12) Writing letters can be fun.

(13) John’s writing of a letter annoyed me.

Quantification, realized by means of polarity, pertains to Davies’ (1979: 105) notion of “occurrence value”: negative polarity means ‘occurrence value = nil’; positive polarity means ‘occurrence value = at least one’.

In view of Halliday’s model of the interpersonal structure of the clause in terms of a Mood/Residue patterning, the basic distinction is between type specification on the one hand (encoded in the Residue), and instantiation, quantification, and grounding on the other hand (encoded in the Mood). The instantiating, quantifying and grounding elements in the clause together constitute an interpersonal domain into which the utterance is anchored, and it is
precisely this anchoring which turns the clause into an utterance that can be negotiated (i.e. argued about) in the speech interaction.

The four functions by which Langacker models the conceptual structure of the clause are interdependent: grounding presupposes an instantiated and quantified type specification, instantiation presupposes quantification, and quantification presupposes type specification. In this sense, the different semantic functions distinguished by Langacker are said to indicate a kind of layering: within a structure as a whole, the type specification is regarded as “a kind of nucleus”, or the “innermost functional layer”, while a grounding predication is added as “the outmost layer” (Langacker 1991: 54, 143). This description ties in with the formal-realizational features of interpersonal elements noted in the previous sub-section.

4.3. Conclusion: Primary scoping and primary grounding

In this section, the Mood element of the clause has been characterized in terms of the structural-realizational concept of scoping and the semantic-functional concept of grounding. Because the Mood element provides the basic and essential interpersonal domain into which an expression is anchored in order to function as a negotiable utterance, its interpersonal nature can further be defined as providing a primary grounding, realized by primary scoping elements (especially Subject and Finite). The design of the primary interpersonal dimension of utterances as thus defined is visualized in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: Primary scoping elements and primary grounding](image-url)
Miriam Taverniers: Interpersonal grammatical metaphor double scoping and double grounding (2004)

To appear in Word

Mood element:
- declarative mood
- interrogative mood

Negotiation of information

Negotiation of goods & services

instantiator + number

modal operator:
- modalization

modal operator:
- modalization

exchange of information

exchange of goods & services

negotiation of information

negotiation of goods & services

mood Adjuncts:
- certainty
- possibility
- probability

validity, evidentility

desirability

exchange of goods & services

physical-material negotiation

non-metaphorical foundation

metaphors of modality

mental verbal

mental verbal

I think that
- I believe that
- I claim that
- I hear that
- I've seen that

I hold that

I assume that

I'd say that

I claim that

I hear that

I've seen that

She persuades me that

She convinces me that

She assures me that

She informed me that

She told me that

She demonstrated to me that

She convinced me that

I'm certain that

I'm sure that

I'm sure that
Figure 3: Interpersonal grammatical metaphors in relation to non-metaphorical realizations, and attitudinal modification
5. Interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis

The aim of this section is to specify the nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a linguistic sign. This specification will be guided by two principles: (1) in the definition, both the interpersonal nature and the metaphorical nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a sign must be specified, and (2) a definition of interpersonal grammatical metaphor must define what exactly metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality share, as construction types. Figure 3 presents a framework for exploring general types of interpersonal grammatical metaphor and can be used as a background for the further discussion in this section.

5.1. Metaphors in the exchange of information

Let us start with the area of the exchange of information, indicated at the left side in Figure 3. In this area, there is a simple opposition between a non-metaphorical construal of modal meanings and a metaphorical one, embodied in metaphors of modality. We have seen in the previous section that the non-metaphorical construal of modality (see area 2 in Figure 3) refers to an encoding of modal meanings within the Mood element (i.e. especially through modal operators and modal adjuncts). As described in Section 2.3, metaphors of modality (see area 4 in Figure 3) differ from this type of construction in that a modal meaning is construed outside the Mood element of the proposition which is assessed, and hence, outside the structure of this proposition as a whole. Taking as a basis the definition of the interpersonal sign proposed in the previous section, interpersonal grammatical metaphor can now be further defined as a construction in which an extra-propositional element (especially a projecting process or a relational construction) has (rhetorical) scope over a proposition and grounds that proposition. Importantly, because the proposition which is assessed does have its own scoping elements (encoded in its Subject and finiteness), and, as such, its own grounding, the separate element in metaphors of modality provides a secondary scoping and a secondary grounding for an already grounded proposition. This can be shown as in Figure 4. In this perspective, the metaphorical nature of
interpersonal metaphors of modality lies in the fact that they are based on a **doubling of scoping** (structurally) and a **doubling of grounding** (semantically).

![Interpersonal grammatical metaphor](image)

**Figure 4:** Interpersonal grammatical metaphor

The type of grounding – the type of interpersonal domain – which is encoded in secondary scoping elements is a further specification of the occurrence value of the proposition in terms of the speaker's (and/or hearer's, in interrogatives) evaluation of the validity of the proposition, or the evidence the speaker has for asserting or denying something. Therefore, secondary scoping elements in metaphors of modality can be argued to encode a grounding into a **domain of validity** or a **domain of evidentiality**.

### 5.2. Metaphors in the exchange of goods and services

In the area of the exchange of [goods-&-services], the situation is somewhat more complex, in that here, there is a basic variation between a non-metaphorical construal (the imperative, as we have seen above) (14), and two types of metaphorical construals: metaphors of mood (15) and metaphors of modality (16).

(14) If you require any more details regarding exemptions please **contact** this office. [BNC: G2N, 32]

(15) If you are worried about your name appearing on the public register you **should** contact your local council’s Community Charge Registration Officer. [BNC: A0Y, 1026]

(16) If you have any problems with enrolment you **are invited** to contact your Faculty Administrative Office. [BNC: B3A, 30]
The higher degree of complexity involved in encoding an exchange of [goods-&-services], which lies at the basis of the greater variability found in this area as compared to the area of exchanging [information], lies in the inherent multi-modal nature of command and offers – a feature which has been emphasized by Thibault (1995: 78ff; see also Thibault and Van Leeuwen 1996). Evidently, just any type of linguistic meaning is shaped by and in itself shapes reality, but with regard to the exchange of [goods-&-services], reality itself becomes a medium for the very expression of an offer or a command. Thibault (1995: 78ff) refers to the negotiation carried by the language medium as “semiotic-discursive negotiation”, and he calls negotiation carried by reality itself as a medium “physical-material negotiation”. In the case of an exchange of [goods-&-services], the interaction between the language medium and the medium of reality itself is an intrinsic aspect of the interpersonal meaning which is under negotiation, namely, an offer or a command. What is crucial in the expression of a command or an offer is that the semiotic-discursive negotiation is intrinsically linked with, and for its success depends upon a physical-material negotiation: a command and an offer are effective when something is ‘done’, in the physical-material sense. The role of the physical-material medium in the construal of offers and commands is in fact implied in Halliday’s general characterization of an exchange of [goods-&-services].

Let us now consider the various ways in which offers and commands can be construed in order to specify which role multi-modality plays in non-metaphorical and metaphorical types of constructions. The area of commands construed by the imperative – i.e. a typical construal, in Halliday’s framework – can be taken as a starting point. What is typical of imperatives, as opposed to indicatives, is the absence of a Mood element. However, this absence only pertains to the purely linguistic level, or the semiotic-discursive level in Thibault’s terminology: an Instantiator, and also a certain type of finiteness (to be further specified below) of the process which is designated are presupposed to be ‘realized’ non-linguistically, at the level of the physical-material negotiation. In other words, an Instantiator and a type of finiteness are presupposed to be carried by reality itself as a medium. Furthermore, these two aspects, which surface in the tag of an imperative (e.g. Be quiet, will you), are recoverable from the speech situation: the presupposed Instantiator in a typical imperative is ‘you’, and the
finiteness which is implied is modal/volitional (the imperative appeals to the volition of the hearer). In this vein the physical-material manifestation of an Instantiator and a type of finiteness is a type of grounding. This feature of imperatives has been emphasized by Davidse (1991/1999) as well as Thibault (1995).

As we have seen above, Halliday (1994: 363) defines the imperative as a non-metaphorical or ‘basic’ type of realization of commands. This means that the non-metaphorical basis of expressing a command is characterized by the absence of a Mood element, or by the ‘realization’ of a grounding element in extra-linguistic reality. The non-metaphorical encoding of an offer, in this perspective, is even more radically dependent on the medium of physical-material negotiation: the most basic realization of an offer is the accomplishment of the offer itself in the physical-material world, for example the action itself of opening a door for someone. Therefore, at the most general structural level, carrying out an offer is interpersonally parallel to construing a command by means of an imperative: both constructions are characterized by the absence of a linguistic Mood element.

Having defined the non-metaphorical basis of the construal of offers and commands, we can now turn to metaphorical types of realizations, which, as indicated above, are of two types: metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality. Both of these types of metaphorical expressions are based on the general characteristic of interpersonal metaphor: they are based on a doubling of grounding (semantically) and a doubling of scoping (structurally). As can be seen in Figure 3, metaphors of modality in the area of the exchange of [goods-&-services] are completely parallel to the same type of metaphor in the area of the exchange of [information], and they display the same inherent variation between constructions. However, while modality metaphors construing an exchange of [information] provide a secondary grounding in terms of evidentially or validity assessed by the speaker, the domain in which offers and commands are metaphorically grounded has to do with desirability on the part of the speakers: metaphors of modality construing an exchange of [goods-&-services] indicate various degrees to which the speaker desires (or does not desire) that a particular event be accomplished in the near future. This definition of a metaphorically-
realized ‘domain of desirability’ ties in with Davidse’s general characterization of the exchange of goods-&-services as an exchange which takes place on a “volitional axis”, as referred to above (See Section 2.1).

Metaphors of mood represent a type of interpersonal metaphor which is only available for the encoding of commands and offers, although, importantly, the construction types on which these metaphors are based (i.e. indicative Mood) are not unique to the expression of an exchange of [goods-&-services]. Indeed, as shown in Figure 3, the parallel types of constructions used to encode an exchange of [information] constitute precisely the basic, non-metaphorical type of construction in that area. The constructions which are involved here are the [indicative] type of Mood (comprising [declarative] and [interrogative] sub-types), with its further interpersonal aspects encoded by modal operators of modulation, and modal Adjuncts. These types of constructions are metaphorical vis-à-vis a non-metaphorical construal of offers and commands in that they are based on an explicit, linguistic Mood element: the [indicative] type of MOOD is characterized by the presence of a Subject and a Finite (while the sub-types [declarative] and [interrogative] are defined by the order of Subject and Finite in the syntagm). Hence, the metaphorical nature of [indicative] (especially modulated; interrogative (17) or declarative (18)) expressions construing commands (examples a) or offers (examples b) lies precisely in the presence of a Mood element, which is the characteristic feature that sets off [indicative] from [imperative] in the system of MOOD.

(17) a. Can you take that up then and your school uniform, and go and put that away somewhere. [BNC: KBJ, 387]
   b. Shall I buy you a skirt for the beginning of term? [BNC: H8N, 2555]

(18) a. You should give yourselves a chance, you really should. [BNC: G0Y, 2708]
   b. I’ll stay with you, if you like, and by the morning it’ll probably all be over. [BNC: FEE 1268]

In metaphors of mood, this Mood element indicates a secondary type of grounding, since the command as such, for instance, (take that up in (17a), give yourselves a change in (18a)) is already grounded in terms of a physical-material
negotiation: because these expressions construe an exchange of [goods-&-services], a grounding in physical-material reality is inherently presupposed.

Parallel types of constructions which construe an exchange of [information] (the left-hand side of area 4 in Figure 3) are not metaphorical. This has to do with the general nature of an exchange of [information]: it is a discursive-semiotic type of exchange and thus is carried by the linguistic medium as such (i.e. this exchange does not intrinsically depend on a concomitant physical-material negotiation in order to be ‘effective’). It is in this sense that the Mood element, as a discursive-semiotic (or inherently linguistic) grounding element, indicates the basic type of grounding of propositions and is therefore by definition a non-metaphorical type of construal in the area of the exchange of [information].

5.3. Interpersonal metaphors: Their semantics and their modes of expression

The aim of this final sub-section is to reconnect the definition of interpersonal metaphor as involving a doubling of scoping and a doubling of grounding to the general features of the interpersonal sign as characterized above (see Section 4).

Interpersonal grammatical metaphors provide a further illustration of the interpersonal mode of expression defined in terms of scoping and the related realization concepts of prosody and orientation as I have discussed above. The scoping elements in interpersonal metaphors typically occur at the beginning of the syntagm. As such, they corroborate the concept of a boundary prosody, and are further illustrations of the left-right orientation and the typical left-anchoring of interpersonal meanings in the syntagm. In their most grammaticalized realizations secondary scoping elements such as the expressions I think and I suppose receive a more independent status, and thus acquire the typical ‘free-wheeling’ behaviour which Nuyts refers to (see Section 4.1):

(19) a. Well P C I think is an older policeman. [BNC: KE6, 10210]
    b. The hardest thing I suppose will be to see him play against us during the season. [BNC: J1G, 3627]

The primary grounding of the clause (in its Mood element) and the secondary grounding provided by secondary scoping elements together construe
an interpersonal domain on which the utterance is based. With regard to the semantic dimension – i.e. the nature of interpersonal domain into which utterances are grounded – interpersonal grammatical metaphor, and especially its various sub-types of constructions, proves to be an intriguing basis for further exploring the interaction between grounding, quantification and instantiation. I will only briefly mention one linguistic phenomenon onto which the notion of grammatical metaphor, as defined here, offers a new perspective: factivity.

It is the creation of one interpersonal domain – through secondary scoping elements – which sets off grammatical metaphor from other expressions based on an attitudinal evaluation of propositions (indicated as area 5 in Figure 3). The difference between expressions referred to here as interpersonal metaphors and other, attitudinal expressions such as *It's amazing that, I'm surprised that* and the like has been recognized in various traditions: for example, it is this difference which is incorporated in the Kiparskys’ notion of ‘factivity’, in McGregor’s (1997) distinction between rhetorical and attitudinal modification, or in the distinction between ATTITUDE and ENGAGEMENT systems in the appraisal model (see White, this volume). The definition of grammatical metaphor proposed here offers a new perspective onto this phenomenon. Grounding, as defined by Langacker (see Section 4.2 above) interacts with and presupposes instantiation. Thus, the secondary grounding encoded in metaphorical expressions interacts with the instantiation of the evaluated proposition as a proposition. In other words, the evaluated proposition exists by virtue of the secondary grounding element:\(^{11}\) in (20), *I’m more at risk than she is* is created, as a proposition, by the modal metaphor *I think*. It is in this sense that the evaluated proposition which is in the scope of interpersonal metaphors is grounded with respect to the speaker-now context, and not just with respect to a ‘matrix clause’. This feature has especially been noted with respect to constructions encoding indirect speech (e.g. Langacker (2000:118ff); see also Vandelanotte, this volume), as illustrated in (21):

(20) *I think I’m more at risk than she is.* [BNC: KSV, 5448]

(21) *He said that this is my* reparation, and I need fear no other. [BNC: BP0, 2253]
The difference between interpersonal metaphors and attitudinal modifications or factive constructions lies in the fact that the latter are based on an attitudinal evaluation of an existing proposition, or in Halliday’s (1994: 264ff) terms, a “pre-projected fact” (see also Davidse 1995 on fact projection): the instantiation of the evaluated proposition is not dependent on the evaluative expression.

6. Conclusion

In this article I have concentrated on a range of expressions which in Halliday’s model of SFL are regarded as interpersonal grammatical metaphors. We have considered the nature of grammatical metaphor as understood by Halliday and its relation to similar phenomena studied from different perspectives in other frameworks. The gist derived from this exploration is that, although related phenomena have received extensive treatment in different traditions, the notion of ‘interpersonal grammatical metaphor’ offers an interesting alternative perspective, provided that it can be defined more precisely in constructional terms. I have defined interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a construction type based on a doubling of semiosis: a doubling of scoping (in its structural dimension) and a doubling of grounding (in its semantic dimension). By relating the unique systemic functional notion of grammatical metaphor to insightful concepts central to other traditions, especially cognitive grammar, I hope to have shed a new integrative light on the myriad of interpersonal expressions, and ultimately, to inspire dialogue between different functional schools in linguistics.

References


**Notes**

1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented as a Friday afternoon linguistics seminar in Sydney, 24 March 2000, and at the First Workshop of the Systemic Functional Research Community on Interpersonal and Ideational Grammar in Leuven, 18 November 2000. I wish to thank the participants of this seminar and this workshop for their interest and constructive comments. For further discussion, I am particularly grateful to Kristin Davidse and Jim Martin. I am also grateful to Kristin Davidse for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2. All examples marked in this way have been taken from the British National Corpus. The notation indicates the BNC file and the s-unit.
3. Apart from the systems of mood and modality, at the level of the clause interpersonal grammar also comprises modal assessment (a system dealing with the realization of modal meanings in for example comment adjuncts – i.e. adverbial disjuncts in terms of Quirk et al. (1985) – such as frankly speaking, rather unexpectedly). In systemic functional studies, especially by Matthiessen (1993), also polarity and temporal deicticity (primary tense) are regarded as belonging to the interpersonal component of language. However, this interpretation of polarity and tense as ‘interpersonal’ has not been explicitly argued for, except in Kristin Davidse’s more cognitive re-interpretation of the interpersonal grammar of the clause, which will be dealt with below.

4. The term ‘incongruence’ itself is used much earlier, see Halliday (1956), and it also occurs in Halliday (1978). On the relationship between these early conceptions of ‘incongruence’ and the later introduction of grammatical metaphor, see Taverniers (2003b).

5. The possibility of adding a question tag which takes up the subordinated proposition was used by R. Lakoff (1969) as a feature to explain negative-raising (see the following paragraph) in the context of formal grammar. See also Aijmer (1972: 47, 52); Nuyts (1990: 583).

6. It is only with predicates expressing a median modal value (e.g. probability rather than possibility or certainty) that the transferred negative form is realized by polarity markers only, as in It’s likely that John won’t come | It’s not likely/unlikely that John will come. For expressions with an outer modal value, the transferred negative takes the opposite negative expression, i.e. positive high value (+certainty) corresponds to negative low value (–possibility) in the main clause: It is certain that John won’t come | It’s impossible that John will come (see Halliday 1985: 358; also Horn 1978: 187ff).

7. In terms of McGregor’s semiotic grammar, the semantic characterization of the interpersonal sign offered here is relevant for what McGregor calls rhetorical modification (hence it does not apply to the other two semantic types of modification that McGregor distinguishes, attitudinal and illocutionary). I believe that McGregor’s threefold distinction is based on two
dimensions which should be disentangled, viz. attitudinal vs. rhetorical modification on the one hand, and a modal vs. illocutionary level on the other. The division into two levels is inspired by layered models of language in general (Functional Grammar, Role and Reference Grammar), and by detailed studies of a range of phenomena in relation to which this distinction has proved to be insightful (e.g. adverbials (Davies 1967) or conjunction (Davies 1979, Verstraete 1998)). With respect to this division into two levels, the semantic definition of the interpersonal sign given in this section focusses on the modal level only. See also the following note on the realizational characterization of the interpersonal sign.

8. Regarding the realizational characterization of the interpersonal sign, I take scoping to be the general type of structure underlying interpersonal signs. I believe that framing is a special, limiting case of scoping, i.e. framing incorporates the features of scoping, but not vice versa.

9. Nuyts focusses on epistemic modal expressions.

10. The differences between Langacker’s and Davidse’s views can be summarized as follows. Langacker (1991: 33) defines the type specification as the verb and its arguments, and secondary auxiliaries. Taking into account a radical distinction between argument roles (ideational components) and interpersonal functions such as Subject, Object, Complement (a distinction which is crucial to SFL), Davidse regards the Subject as the primary Instantiator of the clause, and also assigns it a grounding function, in terms of its person-deixis (see Davidse 1997: 421; 1998: 156). To specify the role of the Subject, which is by definition mapped onto one of the arguments that the verb takes, is a tricky issue. An alternative solution, which disentangles both interpersonal vs. ideational layers, and syntagmatic vs. functional structuring, is proposed in Taverniers (2002: 515–533).

11. The dimension of interpersonal grammatical metaphors focussed on here suggests an inherent performativity as a further characteristic of grammatical metaphors. ‘Performativity’, which is intrinsically linked to the notion of grounding as speaker-now anchoring, proves to be a keynote concept in defining fully grammaticalized modality (see Nuyts 1993: 951ff., Verstraete
2001 – the notion is also implied, although not explicitly referred to, in Langacker's concept of subjectification, see Langacker 2000: Chapter 10.)