Advanced search
1 file | 328.36 KB Add to list

Moral enhancement: do means matter morally?

(2015) NEUROETHICS. 8(2). p.139-151
Author
Organization
Abstract
One of the reasons why moral enhancement may be controversial, is because the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than on those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal benefits by lowering immoral behavior and increasing public safety, but it is not directly clear if this also benefits the individual in question. In this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be moral enhancement, how different means may be used to achieve it and whether the means we employ to reach moral enhancement matter morally. Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement wrong in themselves? Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement better than others, and if so, why? More specifically, we will investigate whether the difference between direct and indirect moral enhancement matters morally. Is it the case that indirect means are morally preferable to direct means of moral enhancement and can we indeed pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences between both? We argue that the distinction between direct and indirect means is indeed morally relevant, but only insofar as it tracks an underlying distinction between active and passive interventions. Although passive interventions can be ethical provided specific safeguards are put in place, these interventions exhibit a greater potential to compromise autonomy and disrupt identity.
Keywords
MORAL ENHANCEMENT, AUTONOMY, DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION, AUTHENTICITY, IDENTITY, Moral enhancement, Enhancement, Bioenhancement, Biomedical enhancement, Identity, Autonomy

Downloads

  • Focquaert Schermer 2015.pdf
    • full text
    • |
    • open access
    • |
    • PDF
    • |
    • 328.36 KB

Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Focquaert, Farah, and M. Schermer. “Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?” NEUROETHICS, vol. 8, no. 2, SPRINGER, 2015, pp. 139–51, doi:10.1007/s12152-015-9230-y.
APA
Focquaert, F., & Schermer, M. (2015). Moral enhancement: do means matter morally? NEUROETHICS, 8(2), 139–151. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9230-y
Chicago author-date
Focquaert, Farah, and M Schermer. 2015. “Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?” NEUROETHICS 8 (2): 139–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9230-y.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Focquaert, Farah, and M Schermer. 2015. “Moral Enhancement: Do Means Matter Morally?” NEUROETHICS 8 (2): 139–151. doi:10.1007/s12152-015-9230-y.
Vancouver
1.
Focquaert F, Schermer M. Moral enhancement: do means matter morally? NEUROETHICS. 2015;8(2):139–51.
IEEE
[1]
F. Focquaert and M. Schermer, “Moral enhancement: do means matter morally?,” NEUROETHICS, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 139–151, 2015.
@article{7054372,
  abstract     = {{One of the reasons why moral enhancement may be controversial, is because the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than on those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal benefits by lowering immoral behavior and increasing public safety, but it is not directly clear if this also benefits the individual in question. In this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be moral enhancement, how different means may be used to achieve it and whether the means we employ to reach moral enhancement matter morally. Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement wrong in themselves? Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement better than others, and if so, why? More specifically, we will investigate whether the difference between direct and indirect moral enhancement matters morally. Is it the case that indirect means are morally preferable to direct means of moral enhancement and can we indeed pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences between both? We argue that the distinction between direct and indirect means is indeed morally relevant, but only insofar as it tracks an underlying distinction between active and passive interventions. Although passive interventions can be ethical provided specific safeguards are put in place, these interventions exhibit a greater potential to compromise autonomy and disrupt identity.}},
  author       = {{Focquaert, Farah and Schermer, M}},
  issn         = {{1874-5490}},
  journal      = {{NEUROETHICS}},
  keywords     = {{MORAL ENHANCEMENT,AUTONOMY,DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION,AUTHENTICITY,IDENTITY,Moral enhancement,Enhancement,Bioenhancement,Biomedical enhancement,Identity,Autonomy}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{139--151}},
  publisher    = {{SPRINGER}},
  title        = {{Moral enhancement: do means matter morally?}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9230-y}},
  volume       = {{8}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

Altmetric
View in Altmetric
Web of Science
Times cited: