Religion in the Yugoslav successor states at the beginning of the 21st century

With the turn of the century, a new stage began in the religious life in the Yugoslav successor states. In the previous decade, religious institutions and religious leaders had often played an active role in supporting or at least justifying the nationalist and irredentist policies of their respective government. In exchange, political leaders helped the church—and for that matter the mosque—to recover from the damages suffered under the communist regime and ultimately to acquire a privileged position in the state. As Mitja Velikonja noticed, commenting on the alliance between religions institutions and state power, “national, political, and, ultimately, military mobilization of these societies could not be achieved without religious legitimation, while, on the other hand, religious communities were unable to achieve their goals without the active support of nationalist parties and politics in general.”

Five years after Dayton, with the June 1999 Military Technical Agreement between Serbia and KFOR, concluding the war in the FR Yugoslavia, and the August 2000 Ohrid Agreement, the nationalist conflicts in the Western Balkans finally came to an end. About the same time, there occurred among both political and church leaders a number of “staff changeovers”: in 1997 Franjo Kuharić, the Croatian archbishop and true ally of President Franjo Tuđman deceased and was succeeded by Josip Bozanić; in 1999 Franjo Tuđman himself died; in Serbia in 2000, Slobodan Milošević was dethroned and replaced by Vojislav Koštunica. The consequences of these changes were not in all cases identical and not always unfavourable to the churches. However, there was nowhere a return to the close cooperation, not to say complicity of religious and party leaders. The religious institutions had now acquired a position of power that enabled them to focus on their evangelic mission—the dissemination of the traditional moral values proper to their creed, including love of one’s neighbour, while remaining, to be sure, the conscience of the nation. They did so with such a zeal that in some of the Yugoslav successor states the secular nature of the state was seriously endangered.

Consolidation of the legal status

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the religious institutions—Christian and Muslim alike—were facing the complex task of reacquiring the legal position, moral authority and political influence, the (immovable) properties and in some cases the jurisdiction they had lost under the communist regime. As the new independent states considered religious freedom as an aspect of the democratic societies they were eager to establish, religious freedom in the framework of a secular state was constitutionally granted to all citizens in each of them. Most of the legal provisions were initiated already in the 1990s, when the new constitutions were voted. Although these constitutions explicitly proclaim the separation of state and church and reject religious discrimination, in practice in most of the successor states one particular religious institution enjoys a privileged position as a “traditional creed”—which, by the way, is not uncommon in several Western countries either. This is most discernibly the case with the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia and Macedonia, to which a crucial role in the nation and state building process is attributed. This privileged position transpires most strikingly from the methodical and arresting presence of representatives of those “traditional churches” at various official occasions, which is a symbolic, but nevertheless significant infringement of the proclaimed secular character of the state.

The legal provisions regulating the position of the religious institutions were amended or expounded in the 2000s. In Serbia the Constitution reserves no privileged place to the Orthodox Church. However, Article 10 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities
Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, voted on 20 April 2006 by the Serbian Assembly after long public debates and after the text was endorsed by the Patriarchate ( ), makes a distinction between, on the one hand, “traditional churches and traditional religious communities that have in Serbia an age-old continuity and whose status as a legal subject is based on particular laws”, and, on the other hand, “confessional communities”. Traditional churches are the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church (Augsburg Confession), the Reformed Christian Church and the Evangelical Christian Church. (Eventually, after protests from Bucharest, the Romanian Orthodox Church was added to the list.) Traditional religious communities are the Jewish and the Muslim communities, which cannot be termed as “churches”. Article 11 of the Law, descriptively rather than prescriptively, points out “the extraordinary historical, state building and civilizational role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the formation, the safeguarding and the development of the identity of the Serbian nation” and actually singles out the Serbian Orthodox Church as a primus inter pares.

So-called “confessional communities” are all the others —mainly neo-Protestant or Evangelistic churches as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Methodists, Seventh-Day Adventists and suchlike—which, at variance with the “churches and religious institutions”, have to apply for official registration. Traditional churches and religious communities are not obligated to register—a discrimination that in fact legalizes a kind of hierarchical distinction between “traditional churches and communities” and “religious confessions”. Obviously the provision that “confessional communities” need to register aims at protecting more specifically the Serbian Orthodox Church against the neo-Protestant communities, which make converts mainly among the Orthodox flock. The “traditional churches and religious communities” as a rule do not proselytize among each other. Registration can be refused, as provided in Article 3 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities, which echoes Article 44 of the Constitution: “The Constitutional Court may ban a religious community only if its activities infringe the right to life, right to mental and physical health, the rights of child, right to personal and family integrity, public safety and order, or if it incites religious, national or racial intolerance.” In practice, neo-Protestant churches are frequently branded as “sects” and prevented from registration, or deprived of many of their rights. Similar restrictions on “sects”, however, exist in many European countries, although they are not applied in a similar discriminatory way; the US is as a rule more tolerant. Most protests against violations of the religious freedom of neo-Protestant communities seem to come from organizations in the US.

Article 41 of the Croatian Constitution states that “All religious communities shall be equal before the law and shall be separated from the State.” In the 2002 Law on the Legal Position of Religious Communities (Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica) no denominations are mentioned by name. Article 5, clause 1 of the Law specifies that religious communities can gain legal status when they become enlisted in the register, and they can get enlisted in the register (Evidencija) upon making an official application. Clause 2 also states that only communities that worked for five years as legal entities can apply for obtaining an official legal status. This means that a religious community is not obligated to apply for a legal status, but if it fails to do it does not have the same rights as those that did register.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations between the state and the religious communities are regulated by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which came as Annex 4 with the 1995 Dayton Agreement and was agreed upon by the signatories. Amendments were made in 2009 under the supervision of the international community. Both entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, created by Dayton Agreement, the (Bosniak-Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, have additional constitutions of their own. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants religious freedom, paralleling the rather unspecific phrasing of the Dayton Agreement. The 1992 Constitution of
the Republika Srpska proclaimed in Article 10 the freedom and equality of all religious
creeds, but specified in paragraph 3 of Article 28 that “The Serbian Orthodox Church shall be
the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” Paragraph 4 of Article
28, however, stating that “[t]he state financially supports the Orthodox Church, cooperates
with it in all domains, and particularly with the end of preserving, tending and developing the
cultural, traditional and other spiritual values” was removed by Amendment LXXII after the
conclusion of the Dayton Agreement.\(^6\)

The 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious
Communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina stipulates, among other things, that the state may not
accord the status of state religion nor that of state church or religious community to a church
or any religious community, that no church or religious community or their officials may
obtain any special privileges from the state as compared to any other church or religious
community or their officials, nor participate formally in political institutions, that no laws
and doctrines of churches and religious communities shall have any civil-legal effect or shall be
forcibly imposed by the public authorities. Newly formed churches and religious communities
acquire legal personality by the act of registration.\(^7\)

In Macedonia the Constitution was amended in a way that at least formally put an end to the
legal favourisation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a “primus inter pares”. Article 19
of the first 1992 Macedonian Constitution stipulated that

The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed. The right to express one's faith
freely and publicly, individually or with others is guaranteed. The Macedonian
Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are separate from the
state and equal before the law. The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious
communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable
institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.

Mentioning only the Macedonian Orthodox Church by name, the suggestion was made that it
occupies a more prominent position in the state vis-à-vis the other religious communities and
groups remained nameless. Implementing Article 19, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 2001 Ohrid
Agreement,\(^8\) and even enlarging them to additional religious communities not mentioned in
the Agreement, Article 19 of the Macedonian Constitution was by the end of 2001 amended
as follows:

1. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in
Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish
Community and other Religious communities and groups are separate from the state
and equal before the law.
2. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in
Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish
Community and other Religious communities and groups are free to establish schools
and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.\(^9\)

Relations between the state and the religious institutions and communities in Macedonia were
finally regulated in the same pluralist spirit by the 2007 Law on the legal status of church,
faith community and religious group (Zakon o pravnoto položba na crkva, verska zaednica i
religiozna grupa).\(^10\)

Both the 2006 Montenegrin and the 2008 Kosovo Constitutions, stating that the state is
secular and neutral in matters of religious beliefs.
Thus, the constitutions of all Yugoslav successor state emphasize the secular character of the republic that means the strict separation of church and state, in combination with an almost unlimited religious freedom. In practice, however, in most of them there is a “traditional church” that for historical reasons occupies a particular, privileged position. The extent to which this privileged position is explicitized in the constitution itself in some cases seems to depend on the scope of external pressure. As all Yugoslav successor states aspired or still aspire one day to become members of the European Union (EU), they have all tended to adapt their legislation to EU criteria. Those constitutions appear to be the most liberal that are designed in circumstances of considerable dependence on—or pressure from—the international community, as for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, in Macedonia after 2001 and in Kosovo in the years preceding independence in 2008. Conversely, the privileging of one particular religious institution is most noticeable in the constitutions designed or voted by parliaments that were reluctant or even hostile to foreign interventions as for instance the Serbian parliaments in Serbia and the Republika Srpska. The amendments to the constitutions of the Republika Srpska and of Macedonia are the result of direct intervention of the Office of the High Commissioner in Sarajevo and of the EU and the US mediators respectively in Ohrid. Whether these legal provisions are actually implemented or not also seems to depend to a large extent on international monitoring.

Recovery and more

The first concern of the religious institutions after independence was to restore the material and moral position they had had in society before the establishment of the communist regime. The concordats (agreements with the Vatican) concluded by Croatia in 1996 and 1998 and by Bosnia–Herzegovina in 2006 greatly restored the competences of the Catholic Church in the country and the entity not merely to an extent considered normal in Western secular states, but actually consolidated a process of increasing de-secularization of Croat society. In Croatia, a wide autonomy was granted to the Catholic Church; religious education in schools, was introduced in 1991, the church acquired access to the army, the police, hospitals, prisons, the media, and so on. Religious education in schools was on a voluntary basis, but pupils who did not attend the classes reportedly were discriminated against or ostracized. Catholic catechism teachers would be paid by the state; the state would also take care of the maintenance of church buildings. The archbishopric was entitled to open its own schools, high schools, seminaries and universities that were to be co-financed by the state; these church schools would grant valid diplomas. A marriage performed in the church was accepted as valid by the state authorities, as was an ecclesiastical annulment of a marriage. Church-issued certificates of baptism had the same validity as state-issued birth certificates. In 1998, an additional agreement was reached, stipulating that the state would pay a part of the salaries of priests and other people employed by the church. The favours offered to the Catholic Church in education, political and social life enabled the church to embark on activities that were then seen by many as a form of proselytism, the more so as an agreement with the other religious communities was reached only in 2002 with the Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities (Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica).

The 1998 Concordat provided for the restitution of all Catholic Church property (mainly land and buildings), confiscated by the communist regime after 1945, or compensation of the Church when restitution was impossible. In 2003 the church asked for a property restitution worth about hundred million euro. In 2004, it had received about 30 per cent of it. Although many properties have not yet been restituted—and probably never will as many local authorities are opposed to it—in 2005 the Catholic Church in Croatia was already among the
five wealthiest corporations in the country, exceeded only by oil and communications companies. The Church does not pay taxes on their income as all other citizens do. In 1997, when Archbishop Franjo Kuharić retired (1970-1997), the HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, Croatian Democratic Union), had lost its main supporter. His successor, Josip Bozanić, brought in a more moderate and ecumenical accent which was to overcome the perception of a church too blatantly involved in party politics and worldly affairs. When President Franjo Tuđman deceased in December 1999, the Croat Catholic Church lost its chief ally. In 2000, the HDZ for the first time since 1990 lost the parliamentary elections and had to cede power to a centrum-left coalition. From 2003 to 2011, the HDZ was in power again. Although the HDZ too had become more restrained, neither the social democrats, who ruled from 2000 to 2003, nor the current centrum-left Kukuriku coalition (2011-) have dared seriously challenge the position of power the Catholic Church has established in the 1990s.

In Slovenia the Catholic Church initially did not acquire the same prominent position in society as it did in Croatia. Slovenia had a sound secular tradition, rooted in the Reformation and in 19th-century anticlerical liberalism. At variance with the situation in Croatia, a large majority of Slovenians is opposed to church involvement in politics. This does not mean, however, that there is no conservative current in Slovenian society, which is in favour of a more potent Catholic church. With the enthronement of Msgr. Franc Rode as archbishop of Ljubljana in 1997, this current acquired momentum. In 2000, during the short-lived cabinet of the central-rightist Prime Minister Andrej Bajuk among other things the introduction of optional obligatory classes on religion or ethics in Slovenian schools was considered. These classes, the contents of which remained vague, were likely to be monopolized by the Catholic Church and therefore provoked huge resistance among uncompromising proponents of the separation of church and state. In addition, it was feared that optional religious instruction would open the door for non-Catholic students being ostracized, as often happened in Croatia. The eventual outcome was a compromise—an elective course called “Religions and Ethics”—that was, nevertheless, indicative of the influence the Catholic Church had acquired in Slovenia too.

The situation in Serbia is not different from that in Croatia. Although Patriarch Pavle (1990-2009) initially wholeheartedly supported the nationalist policy of Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian church failed to be rewarded immediately. Milošević and the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) leadership actually still were too much of old-school communists to cede much power to the church. The programme of the SPS explicitly rejected clericalism, considering Orthodox Christianity as useful only as a “counter-ideology” to Catholicism and Islam. The Serbian Patriarchate acquired a position of power only after the fall of Milošević in October 2000. His successor, Vojislav Koštunica, a more conventional Serbian nationalist and convinced Orthodox Christian, was prepared to agree upon a more prominent role of the Patriarchate in Serbian society. After fierce debates, religious instruction as a multi-denominational and optional subject for students of the first grade of elementary school and high school was introduced by a governmental regulation published on July 27, 2001. Pupils could choose between “Religious Education” or “Civic Education”, or select none of them. The options, as Miroslava Malešević noticed, not only reflected, but actually deepened the dichotomy in Serbian society concerning traditional, patriarchal Serbian values and modern, democratic, European ones. In the course of the following years, religious instruction was enlarged: by 2005 both “Religious Education” and “Civic Education” received the status of mandatory elective subjects for the entire duration of education. The traditional churches and religious communities were entrusted with the organization of religious instruction in public schools. The Orthodox Theological Faculty was incorporated in the State University of Belgrade. Rada Drezgić gives a long list of other encroachments of the Serbian church in public life: the appointment of priests to the governing boards of public companies, the
increased presence of religious content in the media, the performance of religious ceremonies for the inauguration of municipality leaders, the celebration of religious services in the army, the establishment of a chapel in the main dormitory of the University of Belgrade, and public celebrations of patron saints (Slava) by institutions ranging from political parties to trade unions and booking and gambling companies.  

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, by demand of all dominant religious communities—Croats, Muslims, and Serbs—religious education was introduced in 1994 already. In the (Bosniac-Croat) Federation of Bosnja-Herzegoyna, religious instruction is an elective subject in elementary and secondary schools; in the Republika Srpska it is taught in elementary schools. A Framework Law on Elementary and Secondary Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina was agreed upon in 2003. Article 9 stipulates that „pupils shall attend religious classes only if latter match their beliefs or beliefs of their parents” and wisely adds: “Students who do not wish to attend religious education classes shall not in any way be disadvantaged compared to other students“.  

Religious developments within the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina roughly follow the Croat and Serb models. The smooth cooperation of the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, Party for Democratic Action) with the Islamic Community reminds of the understanding and mutual support of the Catholic Church with the HDZ and the Serbian Patriarchate with the SPS. Since the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia in 1993 fell apart in national Communities, the Islamic Community (Izslamska Zajednica) of Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by Reis-ul-ulama Mustafa Cerić (1993-2012), has become the “own” religious institution of the Bosnian Muslims and has increasingly been committed to the defense of the national interests of the Bosnian Muslims. The same year, these “Muslims in the ethnic sense” as they were called in former Yugoslavia adopted “Bosniaks” (Bošnjaci, sing. Bošniak) as their official name, finally effectuating the same merging of nation and faith as exists among Croats and Serbs. While the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the SDA and the Bosniacs with a national ideology, the SDA defended the interests of Islam and presented the Islamic Society with a moral authority that, similarly to what happened in Croatia and Serbia, went against the mandatory secular character of the state.  

The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a religious institution has pursued the same policy as their Croat and Serb Christian counterparts. Among the Muslim claims were the restoration of the religious holidays, the restitution of vakufs (immovable properties held by religious foundations), confiscated by the communist regime, the building of new mosques, the introduction of halal food in schools, hospitals, barracks and prisons and so on. Other demands were the introduction of religious instruction in schools, of moral and religious consultants in the army, spaces for prayer in public buildings, the opening of a Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, of religious teachers colleges in Zenica and Bihać, and of a number of new madrasas. Muslims religious scholars increasingly hold important public offices, which actually represents a violation of the principle of the separation of religion and state. Actually, many members of the SDA who hold important public functions have a religious training. However, like the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia, the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not almighty: the establishment of sharia courts was not even seriously taken into consideration and vakufs have only partly been restituted. A timid prohibition on the sale of alcohol in restaurants during Ramadan is poorly implemented. 

The aftermath of nationalism
As religion—in the broadest sense of the word, including culture, specific historical bonds and suchlike—constitutes the basic component of the national identity of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, making them different nations, it is understandable that religious institutions and religious leaders continue have played an important role in the process of nation and state building even after the establishment of their respective nation states. The Serbian Patriarchate still considers itself as the protector of all Serbs, not only those living in the Republic of Serbia, but also of the those in Croatia, in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia, actually all over the world. A particular Serbian “nationalized” variety of Orthodoxy called “Svetosavlje” (“Holy-Savahood”), after Holy Sava, the early thirteenth-century founder of the Serbian church) stands for the merging of nation, church, and state. The Croat Catholic Church as well ascribes to itself the role of saviour of the Croat nation, but at the same time remains conscious of its belonging to a word-wide ecclesiastical organization to which it is accountable. The Vatican supports Croatian (and Slovenian) nationalism of a Catholic brand, but also exerts, together with a number of Catholic organizations abroad (for instance Pax Christi), a moderating—and therefore not always welcomed—influence on extreme and aggressive nationalism. Among the Bosniaks, a pan-Islamist current has been very strong, but, as we saw, a nationalist interpretation of the “Bosniakhood” ultimately prevailed. Religion has also to a large extent determined the mutual perception of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs. They not only attribute a great importance to their own creed, but often also ascribe particular mostly negative characteristics to the others’ creeds. To the Croats, Catholicism is a superior European religion, which profoundly distinguishes them from “the Balkan” or “Byzantine” or “Asian” part of Europe. Orthodoxy is seen as primitive and aggressive, and Orthodox Christians as essentially unreliable. Many Serbs consider the Catholic church as a major enemy, not so much for dogmatic reasons, but because they regard it as an internationally organized, retrograde and reactionary force, and most of all because of the involvement of Croatian Catholic priests in the Ustaša regime. Serbs consider their being (Orthodox) Christians as an undeniable indication of their Europeanness and perceive Islam as an even more retrograde, “Oriental” religion that is incompatible with Christianity to the extent that Muslims and Christians allegedly cannot live within the borders of the same state. Both Croats and Serbs—in spite of the latters’ anti-Western rhetoric—attach a great importance to religious identity also because they consider their being Christians as an indication of Europeanness and as an argument for EU accession, while, paradoxically, the EU itself refuses to be identified exclusively with Christianity and insists on a religiously and ethnically “unmarked” European citizenship. And yet another paradox: as Serbian anti-Westernism is mainly a legacy of Russian slavophilia with much deeper roots than the 1999 NATO military intervention, Bosniaks usually appear to be less burdened with anti-Western feelings than the Serbs.

In spite of a few common communiques of the Franjo Kuharić and Patriarch Pavle during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which they openly declared themselves against the outrages committed by the belligerents against civilians, in fact they almost unconditionally supported Tuđman’s and Milošević’s nationalistic and irredentist policies. Although since the enthronement Josip Bozanić in 1997 the Croat Catholic Church as a whole has become more restrained and less unanimous in its sustaining extreme forms nationalism, though the archbishop continues ignoring ultra-nationalistic bishops glorifying former Croat fascist leaders, minimizing Croat war crimes as “incidental excesses” and to justifying Croat “national heroes”, indicted of war crimes. Bozanić himself never visited the Holocaust memorial in the Jasenovac concentration camp. The Catholic priest Vjekoslav Lasić celebrated commemorative masses for Ustaša leader Ante Pavelić, but was eventually reprimanded.
The Serbian Patriarch Pavle initially enthusiastically supported the Milošević regime considered it as a genuine defender of the threatened Serbs in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Milošević’s increasing compliance with the demands of the international community with regard to the Serbs in the Croatian Krajina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered by the patriarch as treason. Pavle repeatedly defended Serbs indicted of war crimes and pleaded against their extradition. He disapproved of Milošević’s policy in Kosovo, as its failure became obvious, but was a fierce opponent of Kosovan independence. This attitude was shared by Artemije (1991-2010), bishop of Raška and Prizren (Kosovo), who in the late 1990s condemned the atrocities committed by both Serbs and Kosovars, but also remained firmly opposed to Kosovan independence. After the peace agreement in June 1999, Artemije cooperated with KFOR and UNMIK to the end of improving the living conditions of the Serbs that had remained in Kosovo after 1999, however avoiding contacts with the Kosovan authorities as much as possible. In spite of its distancing from extreme nationalism, the Serbian Patriarchate had not denounced its traditional anti-Western feelings and conservative, not to say reactionary political sympathies. In 2003, the Patriarchate canonized bishop Nikola Velimirović, a notorious anti-Semite and great admirer of Dimitrije Ljotić, the Serbian fascist leader and collaborator, who by the way enjoys a great popularity in Serbia. It appears that in Croatia nationalist extremism in the church has remained limited to individual priests or particular organizations that, to be sure, find a breeding ground in official views of the church, while in Serbia nationalist stances of representatives of the church have a more theological, almost mystical character and more explicitly reflect official views of the Patriarchate. Like Bozanić in Croatia, the new Serbian patriarch, Irenej (2010- ) takes more moderate stances. Although he disapproves of the international recognition of the independence of Kosovo and defends the interests and the unity of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia, he has been supportive to the pro-Western policy of the recent Serbian cabinets. Religion played a crucial role in the accelerated ripening process of a Bosniak national consciousness in the 1990s. Important additional factors behind this ripening were the concern to maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, perceived as the “fatherland” of the Bosniak nation, and the warfare and ethnic cleansing, which produced a strong feeling of solidarity and commonality on a religious and national basis. These factors events have decisively contributed to the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina acquiring its authoritative position among the Bosniaks. However, many features that may strike a Western watcher as indications of a thoroughgoing Islamization of contemporary Bosniak society do not differ in essence from similar phenomena among Catholic and Orthodox Christians. Some of these features, as the massive construction of mosques, the wearing of headscarves by girls and women, the prohibition to drink alcohol and to eat pork are likely to catch the attention of a Christian observer more than the mushrooming of chapels and churches in Croat and Serb inhabited regions to which s/he is more acquainted. The financial support of Iran and Saudi-Arabia and the presence of five-six hundred or some thousands (according to the sources) of “Afghans” (mujahideen) certainly have led to a more strict and in some cases even fundamentalist observing of religious obligations. Bosniaks probably perceived the war in Yugoslavia much more in religious terms than Croats and Serbs: they often labeled it a “džihad” (jihad) or “Holy War” and the term “šehid” (shahid) or “martyrs for the sake of faith” for Bosniak war casualties was even more widespread. However, Iranian and Saudi-Arabian cultural meddling, which came with the arms deliveries during the war, often turned out to be alien to the Bosniak way of “being Muslim” and, in addition with the (more familiar) Turkish influences divided Bosniac society rather than permeating it with radical Islamist convictions. When the war was over, the
international community, and in particular the US, made successful efforts to push back especially Iranian interference in Bosniak affairs.\textsuperscript{47} In spite of Iran and Saudi-Arabia massively supporting the construction of mosques and madrassas in Kosovo as well, Kosovan Albanians have remained rather lukewarm Muslims. The large-scale deliberate destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries in the aftermath of the war and during the outbursts of Albanian aggression in 2004, occurring to methodically to be reduced to individual terrorist acts, was nevertheless inspired by the nationalist determination to remove all traces of Serbian presence in Kosovo, rather than by religious intolerance.

Religious minorities

Every Yugoslav successor state contains numerous minor religious communities, which legally enjoy the same rights as the “dominant” religion but are actually treated as foreign bodies within the border of the nation state which is considered as “private property” of one particular ethno-religious community. In Serbia, the most important of them are listed in the Constitution and in the abovementioned Law on Churches and Religious Communities. These religious minorities are divided over nearly thirty ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{48} The right to religious instruction in schools is granted exclusively to those religious communities that are nationally or ethnically based, for instance Islamic instruction to Muslims/Bosniaks\textsuperscript{49}; Catholicism to Croats and Hungarians \textit{et cetera}. This excludes the neo-Protestants creeds, which are not linked to a particular ethnic group, from being entitled to religious instruction in public schools.\textsuperscript{50} The Serbian Patriarchate sustains some form of dialogue with all churches and religious communities, except for the neo-Protestant ones, which are—not without reason—blamed for proselytizing and being financed from abroad.\textsuperscript{51} As they constitute less than 0,7\% of the population, the apprehension of the Patriarchate is probably exaggerated.\textsuperscript{52} “Protestantization”, that means conversion to one of the neo-Protestant churches, is particularly widespread among the Roma population.\textsuperscript{53} On the one hand, the mostly foreign priests have no bias against them and readily accept them within their communities; on the other hand membership of these communities allows the Roma to boost their poor social status. Among the Muslim population, as we observed in Kosovo, Sufi brotherhoods used to play a similar role.

The situation of the Catholics—mainly of Hungarian, Croat or other non-Serb ethnic origin—in Serbia to some extent depends on the relations of the Serbian state and the Serbian Patriarchate with the Vatican and with neighbouring Catholic Croatia. After the war, the Serbian government, trying to escape from its position of international culprit, was disposed at improving relations with Rome. Representatives of the Holy Seat visited Belgrade in May 2001 and their visit was returned by a delegation of the Serbian Patriarchate in February 2003.\textsuperscript{54} However, the reluctance of the Croat Catholic Church and the Vatican to publicly apologize for the massacres of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II appeared to be an insuperable obstacle to the normalization of the relations. During his visit to Banja Luka in Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 2003, Pope John Paul II asked “from this city, marked in the course of history by so much suffering and bloodshed, […] the Almighty God to have mercy on the sins committed against humanity, human dignity and freedom also by children of the Catholic Church, and to foster in all the desire for mutual forgiveness."\textsuperscript{55} To the dissatisfaction of the Serbs, the subtle use of the word “also” made clear that the Pope did not blame solely the Croats for these “sins”. John Paul II repeatedly expressed his desire to visit Belgrade, but neither he nor his two successors so far did.

The Muslims in the Serbian Sandžak—who in general now call themselves Bosniaks—represent a greater challenge to the Serbian state than the Catholics. During the
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the local SDA worked for the integration of the Sandžak in Bosnia; after the war, some Sandžak-Bosniak politicians were prepared to cooperate with the Serbian government, others were less inclined. In 2007 the Islamic Community of the Sandžak changed its name into Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska Zajednica u Srbiji), remaining a mešihat (local office) of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo, though. Since 1993, when it separated from the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia, the leader has been mufti Muamer Zukorlić, an assertive Muslim who campaigns for the recognition of the Sandžak Muslims as Bosniaks by the Serbian government. From 1994 on, there has existed also a rivalling official Islamic Community of Serbia (Islamska Zajednica Srbije), led by Reis-ul-ulema Adem Zilkić and covering Serbia without Kosovo, which understandably is not recognized by the Islamic Community in Serbia—and vice versa. Since 1993, an Islamic Community of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës) has defended the interests of the Kosovan (Albanian and Slav) Muslims. To complete the picture, mention should be made of a Council of the Islamic Community of Kosovo for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveda, founded in 1971, which is subordinated to the Islamic Community in Serbia. In addition in 2003, an Islamic Community for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveda was founded, which is part of the Islamic Community of Serbia. Macedonia after the 2001 Ohrid Agreement offers a rare example of ethno-religious community, the Muslim Albanians that received an equal status with the majority ethno-religious community, the Orthodox Macedonians. This was due to de mediation of the international community during the negotiations on the Ohrid Agreement and is much to the dissatisfaction of the majority group. People belonging to a minority religious community are not by definition subjected to discrimination, but there can fall victim to considerable social pressure and ostracism as they are considered as not fully belonging to the nation and potentially disloyal to it. People who belong to such a minority religious community or have a spouse from an other ethnic origin or are born in an ethnically mixed family may escape unfair treatment opting for one of the small, new or traditional Protestant churches that do not belong to one particular nation. In the Serb populated region of the Croat Banovina, Orthodox Christians occasionally join the Baptist church—in the same way as they previously used to declare themselves “Yugoslavs” instead of Croats or Serbs. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relations with minor religious communities are regulated by the constitution, which came with the Dayton Agreement. Eager to regulate the relations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, the authors of the Agreement overlooked that there are still other ethnic/religious groups in the country. In 2006, the Roma Dervo Sjdij and the Jew Jakob Finci, both being constitutionally ineligible to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, started a lawsuit with the European Court for Human Rights. The latter in 2009 decided that the provision was discriminatory, as a result of which the Bsonian Parliament initiated a constitutional reform. To some Bosniak politicians (among whom late Izetbegović), the relations of the Muslim community with the Orthodox and Catholic communities might appropriately be based on the Islamic or Ottoman tradition of the dhimma in a modern version. According to the concept of the dhimma, the Muslim majority or dominant group offers protection to Christians and Jews (so-called ahl al-kitab, “People of the Book”) in exchange for submission. Bernard Lewis and Benjamin Braude in their authoritative Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire define dhimma more adequately as “discrimination without persecution”. Not surprisingly this Muslim approach to “religious pluralism” failed to inspire confidence to people that remembered the dhimma as the “Turkish yoke”. Some groups like the Torbešes and the Gorani, Slav Muslims in Macedonia and Kosovo respectively, hesitate giving prevalence to their ethnic or religious affiliation. However, as
their leaning towards a “Turkish” identity suggests, the latter identification seems after all to predominate.  

Ecclesiastical “territorial conflicts”

A particular aspect of the churches involvement in nationalist struggles represents the issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. There are no disagreements among the Catholic archbishoprics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina concerning the jurisdiction over their dioceses. The borders between these dioceses have been established centuries ago by the Vatican in accordance with the then political borders. The Patriarchate of Serbia, however, has serious disagreements with the recently (re)established churches of Montenegro and Macedonia. The Montenegrin Church was founded in 1217 as a diocese of the autocephalous church of Serbia and promoted to the rank of metropolitans in 1346, when the Serbian church became a separate patriarchate. In 1463, most Serbian dioceses passed under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople; the Metropolitanate of Montenegro though was assigned to the Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1553, it passed again under the jurisdiction of the reestablished Patriarchate of Peć. After the latter was abolished in 1766, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro was not included into the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the other Serbian dioceses, but became an autonomous Montenegrin church with seat in Cetinje, ruled, from the beginning of the 18th century on, by prince-bishops from the Montenegrin Njegoš dynasty. After Montenegro was absorbed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenia in 1918, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro (extended with two dioceses at the coast, whence the addition “and the Littoral” to its name) merged with the Patriarchate of Serbia. In the 1993, Montenegrin nationalists working for Montenegrin independence, referring to the autonomy of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro in the period from 1766 to 1920, unilaterally reestablished the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. According to the Patriarchate of Serbia, however, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro might have been autonomous de facto, but canonically had always belonged to the Serbian Patriarchate. The Metropolitan of Montenegro, Amfilohije (1991- ), from 2007 to 2009 also performing the duties of the bedbound Patriarch Pavle, is a politically active Serbian nationalist who strongly opposes the establishment of an independent Montenegrin Church. The issue has turned into a major bone of contention between the pro-Montenegrin Liberal Union of Montenegro and the pro-Serbian Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro, and between Montenegrin nationalists and pro-Serbian Montenegrins in general.

An application for the registration of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was duly submitted to the Montenegrin authorities and was granted in 2000. The initiative had been backed by several Montenegrin politicians, among whom president Milo Đukanović himself. In 2006, after Montenegrin gained independence, the Montenegrin Church finally split from the Serbian Patriarchate. Currently, both churches—the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the Serbian Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral—exist juxtaposedly, which causes serious problems, all the more so as the new Montenegrin Church claims the properties of the Metropolitanate, that means of the Serbian Patriarchate. For the time being, none of the other Orthodox patriarchates in the world has recognized the Montenegrin Church, as is canonically required. Moreover, the Serbian Patriarchate still seems to enjoy a considerable moral authority, not only among the many Montenegrins with a Serb national consciousness. The credibility of the Montenegrin Church has been somehow damaged by the questionable biography of its leader, Metropolitan Mihailo (1996- ), who was excommunicated by the Serbian and the Constantinopolitan Patriarchates (allegedly for adultery, embezzlement and insubordination) in 1995 and was ordained in 1998 by patriarch Pimen of an equally canonically unrecognized alternative Bulgarian Orthodox church.
The Serbian Patriarchate is involved in a similar conflict in Macedonia. From the beginning of the 11th century until 1767, there existed an Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1767, its dioceses were included into the Patriarchate of Constantinople; in 1913, after the Balkan Wars, the dioceses on Serbian territory became a part of the Serbian Patriarchate. After a Republic of Macedonia was created within the Tito’s federal Yugoslavia in 1944, Macedonian nationalists demanded the restoration of a Macedonian church in the form of the restored Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1958, the creation of a Macedonian church, led by an “Archbishop of Ohrid and Skopje and Metropolitan of Macedonia”, was officially proclaimed. This could not happen without the support of the Yugoslav communist government, which obviously tried to curtail the mighty Serbian patriarchate. In 1967, the Macedonian church leader assumed the title of “Archbishop of Ohrid and Macedonia”, explicitly claiming independence on the same footing as the Patriarch of Serbia. The Patriarchate of Serbia refused to recognize the Macedonian Church, as did any other Orthodox patriarchate in the world. After the Republic of Macedonia became an independent state in 1992, negotiations about a canonical recognition were started between the Serbian and Macedonian church and state leaders, but to no avail. In 2002, an agreement reached in Niš, leaving only a symbolic authority of the Serbian patriarchate over the Macedonian church, was eventually rejected by the Macedonian side. This created a new and even more complicated situation, reminding of the deadlock in Montenegro: in addition to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, supported by the government in Skopje, the Patriarchate of Serbia created its own autonomous Archbishopric of Ohrid, with seat in Niže Pole near Bitola, which was to administer the dioceses of the Serbian patriarchate in Macedonia. Archbishop Jovan of the Serbian Ohrid Archbishopric has been considered a traitor by the Macedonian Orthodox Church and has frequently been harassed by the Macedonian authorities.

Actually, both conflicts are complicated canonical questions in which both sides have valid arguments. However, the Serbian view goes against the Orthodox tradition of state churches, especially after Macedonia and Montenegro gained independence, in 1992 and 2006 respectively. Moreover, both the Macedonian and to a lesser extent the Montenegrin church have a long historical traditions that support their claims. Neither the Macedonians, nor the Montenegrins (at least the majority of them) are Serbs. It seems as if the idea of a Greater Serbia has somehow survived in the territorial aspirations of the Serbian Patriarchate.

Instead of a conclusion

Since the end of the 1980s, the number of believers in Yugoslavia and later in the Yugoslav successor states has spectacularly increased. While the number of non-believers amounted to 31.6% in 1987, in 2002 only 2.7% of the overall population of the Yugoslav successor states declared to be atheists or not religious, and the number of “atheists/not religious”, as they were labeled in the inquiries, would have been almost zero, if there were not 13.8% of them in Slovenia and 5% in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This sudden increase of religiosity cannot be explained exclusively by the need of spirituality after four decades of allegedly compulsory atheism. Widespread atheism or agnosticism or lukewarm believe in “some power” was a result not so much of communist propaganda, but mainly, as in Western Europe, of modernization, materialism and consumerism in a legally secularized society. What really occurred in the late 1980s and the 1990s, during the process of disintegration of the multinational federal Yugoslavia and the creation of new ethnic nation states, was that religion turned into what Mirko Blagojević calls a “defensive, integrative, homogenizing means of ethnic mobilization” (zaštitno-integrativna, homogenizujuća, etnomobilišuća funkcija religije). This was in particular the case with Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, between
whom religion was the chief national distinctive feature. Whenever, though, as among Slovenes and Kosovars, religion was redundant as a national distinctive feature—because language served that purpose—it occupied a much more modest place in national identity building and consequently in politics and society in general. The seeming increase of religiosity was due to the fact that displaying religious belief and participating in religious practices was regarded as an expression of ethnic belonging and a token of loyalty to the nation. As Paul Mojzes phrased it in the previous chapter in this volume, religion was a question of “belonging rather than believing and/or practicing.” Sometimes the term “cultural religiosity” is used to denote this massive, but rather declarative belonging to a religious community, while the number of churchgoers and authentic believers remains limited.67

Although reliable figures are hard to obtain and often contradict each other, there appear to be considerable discrepancies between the number of self-declared Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims and the number of people who declare to believe in God and to follow the teachings and commandments of their faith. The number of churchgoers (on Sundays, on special occasions as Eastern and Christmas) is easier to establish, but not very reliable as in the case of mass attendance especially in small rural communities social pressure plays an important part. Anyhow, in the early 1990s, 92.8% of the Serbs in Serbia thought of themselves as religious. While in 2010 77.9% of the population of Serbia declared to be Orthodox Christians, only 63.2% believed that “a God” exists and only 27.8 declared to unreservedly believe in the doctrine of their church. Tellingly, close to 39.1% labeled themselves as “traditional believers” (tradicionalni vernik), who “participates in some rituals of his faith and observe its customs, but is not active in her/his religious community”.68 The concept of a “traditional believer”, however, seems to suggest also that the historical bond with national religious traditions prevails over authentic religiosity. In Croatia too, the number of “real” believers is much lower than that of the self-declared Catholics.69 In fact, surfing the wave of nationalism, Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox religious institutions themselves contributed to reducing religiosity to a mere component of national identity, instead of elevating it to a genuinely ecumenical source of spirituality and morality.

All this is not to minimize the number of people who feel a genuine need for a spiritual dimension in their lives. In this respect the relative revival of monastic life among Croats and Serbs is indicative.70 However, cloisters and monasteries are often perceived as strongholds of the national identity as well. Some people in search for an apostolic Christianity turn to the neo-Protestant churches that had not compromised themselves with nationalism and worldly power. Moreover, one may assume that as a result of the religious instruction in schools the number of religious people is growing and largely compensates for those who after the ebbing away of nationalist fervour inevitably display less religious zeal.

Religious authorities of whatever creed in the Yugoslav successor states defend traditional family values. They prefer the role of women in society to be limited to the kids and the kitchen and condemn homosexuality, gay marriages, and abortion.71 Although they seem to have the approval of a large segment of the population, they nevertheless stimulate conservatism and intolerance in political and social life. The problem, as Richard Farkas points out, is partly in the contradiction between religion and democracy. “At its roots, classic liberal democracy is grounded in the idea that man can define and pursue his interests in the framework of a tolerant and constrained political community. Religion, in point of fact, is a necessarily prescriptive and standard-setting phenomenon supported by a hierarchy with unyielding confidence in its own perceptions. (…) The various peoples of Southeast Europe have come to recognize this discrepancy and have articulated their concern about the intimacy of church and state and the destination that that portends for society. Their instincts tell them that the church may prevail and, in doing so, neutralize the effort to develop democratic forms of politics.”72
However, none of the Yugoslav successor states unquestioningly follows the programme of their religious leaders. Whether by personal conviction or under pressure of international institutions, politicians are prepared to take into account the secularist reserves that many people foster concerning too powerful a role for the religious institutions in the state.


2 The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article II, 3; Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Article 14 and 41; Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Articles 8, 38, 39; Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Articles 9, 19, 48; Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Articles 11, 43, 44; Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Articles 7, 14, 41; Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, Articles 14, 46. Available on Constitutionline.org, (http://legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions; accessed on 27 December 2013). For all quotations from the constitutions of the Yugoslav successor states further in this chapter, we refer to the website Constitutionline.org.


5 The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed in 1994, prior to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, included as Annex 4 in the Dayton Agreement. It was repeatedly, but not fundamentally amended. The last version dates from 2009.

6 “Država materijalno pomaže pravoslavnu crkvu, sarađuje sa njom u svim oblastima, a naročito na čuvanju, njegovanju i razvijanju kulturnih, tradicionalnih i drugih duhovnih vrijednosti.” In the Serbian version of the constitution on Legislationline.org, this paragraph has not been removed.


9 Both the 1992 Constitution of Macedonia and the (many) amendments to it can be found on Legislationline.org.


11 When the Church issues a birth certificate, it has the same validity as a state-issued one, even though it does not contain all valid information such as change of names and surnames.
Since Croatia has a law that allows people to change their names to Croatian ones so to ‘integrate’, these people then take their certificate on baptism from the Church to avoid revealing information they converted, which is not the case with state-issued birth certificates that reveal all changes toward personal statuses. I am indebted to Branislav Radeljić for this information.


17 Just like Franc Rode, Andrej Bajuk as a child emigrated to Argentina because his parents feared communist reprisals after World War II. After half a century spent abroad, both returned to Slovenia in the late 1990s.


19 For details and the relevance to EU requirements, see Zachary T. Irwin. “Sweden and Slovenia. Civic Values and the EU on the Periphery.” In: Fink-Hafner and Ramet. Democratic transition in Slovenia, p. 113-115.


34 Barišić, “Institucionalizacija”, p. 121.
36 Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use”, p. 527-528.
37 For the discussions among nationalists and pan-Islamists, preceding this renaming, see Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque”, p. 90.
42 Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use”, p. 528-529.
45 Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use”, p. 531.
49 That means officially “Muslims in the ethnic sense”, but most of them now call themselves “Bošnjaks”.
52 Blagojević, “Religijsko-konfesionalna identifikacija”, p. 47.
54 For more details about the rapprochement of the Vatican and Serbia, see Radić, “Religion, Kirche und Staat.”, p. 493-496.
59 Ivecović, “Nationalism and the Political Use”, p. 531.
65 Henkel, “Religions and religious institutions, p. 53.
68 Blagojević, “Religijsko-konfesionalna identifikacija“, p. 46-47, 49. The latter figures refer to all creeds in Serbia (without Kosovo), but there is no reason to assume that the proportions should be different among Orthodox Serbs.
69 Bremer, “The catholic Church”, p. 256.
71 For Serbia, see Drezgić. “Religion, Politics and Gender See”, p. 966-967, and the analysis of the Serbian Patriarchate’s discourse on homosexuality as “a sin”, “an abnormality”, or a “mental illness” in Miloš Jovanović. “Silence or Condemnation: the Orthodox Church on homosexuality in Serbia.” *Družboslovne razprave* 29 (2013), no. 73, p. 79–95.