This book is the second in the framework of an interdisciplinary project ("CONFLIPOL"), which aimed at demonstrating how the "politicisation" of internal or international conflicts leads to changes in the political field of interaction. The approach is broad and vast. The initial volume, published in 2010, demonstrated how internal conflicts created "the political", aloof from other societal spheres, and were interwoven with processes of politicisation from the Middle Ages on¹. The emphasis is on bottom-up actors' conceptions, practices and political language, rather than on top-down construction of the state. Alain Hugon and Yann Lagadec, the present volume's editors, trace a roadmap for the analysis of international conflicts (9-23) around four spheres: conflicts and state construction (25-91), mobilisations and resistances (93-167), occupation and politicisation (169-219) and, finally, new public spaces (221-313).

In spite of this clear repartition, numerous alternative themes emerge throughout the book. The selection of contributions is very extensive, conformable to the editors' original intent. After reading through all fifteen articles, one could wonder whether the joint analysis of domestic and international politics constitutes anything new at all. Common theoretical explanations are rare, and synthesis is near impossible, due to the extreme variety of cases across space and time. The studies collected in the volume aim to transcend the formal-institutional stage, and show how relationships between the public at large and government were transformed by international conflict. Constructions of authority and "the political" show various lively processes and debates, wherein similar factors produce different outcomes. As pointed out in Laurent Bourquin's conclusions (315-321), the classical emergence of the state from a fiscal-military complex² and the autonomisation of the political discursive arena are linked. Yet, this is not a new insight. The interest of this book lies in the detailed case studies.

Martin Wrede (77-90) presents the case of the German traditional arch-enemies: France and the Turk. Jan Sobieski's 1683 victory on the Kahlenberg marked a watershed in the German perception of the Ottoman Empire, ending apocalyptic representations of a danger perceived as imminent and real. For Austria, although Turkish wars did not disappear, the Prussian menace surpassed that of the Sultan. A fiercer competitor for the title of "Second Turk" was, of course, Louis XIV. Istanbul and Paris were depicted as similar places of moral depravation and military aggression. Sobieski's victory turned Louis into the sole enemy. Revoking the Edict of Nantes turned the King of France into the 'primogenitus Satanae', in spite of French ambitions to act as guarantor of Protestant freedoms and liberties. Yet, 'Ludovicus impius' was still considered a fellow Christian. Polemical insults were not congruent with cultural and commercial affinities, or even political necessity in the management of the European Balance.

Hervé Drévillon tackles the quintessential interaction of international conflict: warfare (107-125). The controversy on the 'limited' character of Ancien Régime warfare can not only be

¹ Laurent Bourquin & Philippe Hamon (eds.), La politisation. Conflits et construction du politique depuis le Moyen Âge (Rennes, 2010).
read as an addition of military capability and casualties. Drévillon argues that the step from a ‘war of princes’ to a ‘war of populations’ is at the heart of the historiographical discussion. Mass mobilisation is often presented as a synonym of intensification, whereas the author notes the total absence of consensus on the criteria to call the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars a watershed. Neither (proportionate) losses nor army sizes exceeded those of Louis XIV’s time. Consequently, only the political criterion formulated by Clausewitz, can be said to have been relevant. War as an affair of government is intrinsically more limited and controlled than if left to the passions of the vulgus. Drévillon argues that the restrained violence of the ‘guerre en dentelles’ was the product of cruel and brutal army discipline. Troops feared above all murderous platoon fire. For Voltaire, instinctive popular ferocity was reined in by the moderation of transnational and civilised European elites. Enlightenment and Revolution ameliorated the soldier’s image by turning him into a citizen, in contrast to the brutal customs of war. Inalienable honour and dignity became common to individual soldiers as well as citizens. The 1791 Military Code symbolized this development, separating military discipline and criminal law. For contemporaries, the turn of the 18th century changed the relationship between populations and armed conflict, but not in the essentialist terms often used in military historiography.

Valérie Toureille (169-182) treats the case of the écorcheurs (literally: road runners who strip off human skin from corpses, 170) during the Hundred Years War. Professional mercenary gangs raided the French and Burgundian countryside, the Estates of the latter duchy convening no less than fifteen times between 1436 and 1443, in order to bribe potential aggressors (173). Toureille explains the outburst of pillaging and cruelties after the peace of Arras by the need for mercenary captains to pay out the promises made to their men (175). She links these practices to customary medieval ius in bello. The main culprits are pardoned and integrated in the French military afterwards (178). Toureille does not turn a blind eye to their mischiefs, but states that they were no worse than other French men of war. Moreover, pillaging on enemy souls suited the King’s strategic objectives (179). If the latter took action at Burgundian diplomats’ request, this only served to enlist undisciplined bands for public service and thus to establish a state monopoly on the exercise of violence.

Jean-Marie Le Gall (221-244) elaborates on urban politicisation around the battle of Pavia, where Francis I was taken prisoner by Charles V (1525). The event passes almost unnoticed in French historiography (222). Le Gall admits this is correct regarding the uncontroversial geopolitical, external aspects of the lost battle. However, Queen Louise of Savoy, acting as Regent, had to face several calls for internal political economic reforms by regional estates, cities and courts (234). Especially the “bonnes villes” of the kingdom were associated to policy, implying concessions, e.g. for the ratification of the peace treaty of Moore with England (239). In the latter case, the Parisians refused to have their personal possessions mortgaged as a security for British claims against the French crown (241). The treaty, concluded on 30 August, had not been approved by the Parisian general assembly by the end of the year. These events explain why Charles V could hope that the fear of a major political crisis in France would push his captive, Francis I, to concessions (243). The latter famously reneged his own signature once returned to France. The internal quarrels caused by his absence were more urgent than a reliable peace agreement.

Edmond Dziembowski (245-258) presents French public opinion during the Seven Years War and the War of American Independence. In 1778, foreign secretary Vergennes was warned by the publicist Favier that excessive anti-British propaganda would come across as
official endorsement for Anglo-American principles of popular sovereignty (246). Favier feared that provinces as Brittany or the Languedoc might end their voluntary union to the French crown, just as the Dutch Republic had done with that of Spain. Dziembowski points out that French official propaganda had been busy for twenty years educating the public on conflicts with Britain. Struggles far away were presented as relevant. The ministry emphasised the fragility of the quarrel-ridden British parliamentary system, countering the pernicious influence of anglophile French authors as Montesquieu (248). However, as the military odds turned against France, official propaganda started translating British pamphlets and newspapers critical to Pitt the Older’s government. This tendency resurfaced with the War of American independence, albeit with texts of a fundamentally different nature. The ideas of John Locke and Thomas Paine were printed in French by official governmental publications, as if Ancien Régime censorship had been abolished with a single “suicidal” (255) stroke. As conservative a man as Vergennes, who treated the 1782 Genevan insurgents of “fanatics”, would have closed his eyes for the radicalism of the Declaration of Independence? Dziembowski sees the explanation in the disconnect between the minister’s awareness of geopolitical balances (favourable to France in 1776), on the one hand, and the radicalisation of internal political thought, on the other hand (256).

David González-Cruz focuses on foreigners in Spain and Latin America during 18th century wars (281-298). Generally speaking, the Spanish Bourbons were averse to strangers trading in their colonies. In case of an armed conflict, alien private property was eagerly seized to compensate for war expenses (288). Yet, the special relationship with Britain after the Peace of Utrecht, and foremost that with France, made exceptions necessary. Merchants exploited the quickly changing relations of alliance and enmity, declaring themselves French citizen or Spanish resident according to the most favourable legal status of the moment. The Revolution caused a shift in perceptions, as French refugees became symbols of subversive ideas (289).

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