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The fake, the flimsy, and the fallacious: demarcating arguments in real life

Maarten Boudry UGent, Fabio Paglieri and Massimo Pigliucci (2015) ARGUMENTATION. 29(4). p.431-456
abstract
Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life . On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
keyword
BAYESIAN-APPROACH, Fallacies Demarcation Fallacy Fork Pseudoscience Argumentum ad ignorantiam Genetic fallacy Post hoc ergo propter hoc Ad hominem Ecological rationality Probabilistic reasoning Pragma-dialetics, RATIONALITY, EVOLUTION
journal title
ARGUMENTATION
volume
29
issue
4
pages
431 - 456
Web of Science type
Article
Web of Science id
000363482400003
JCR category
LINGUISTICS
JCR impact factor
0.814 (2015)
JCR rank
71/179 (2015)
JCR quartile
2 (2015)
ISSN
0920-427X
DOI
10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A1
copyright statement
I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher
id
6843128
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-6843128
date created
2015-06-23 10:47:05
date last changed
2016-12-19 15:42:47
@article{6843128,
  abstract     = {Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life . On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic {\textquotedblleft}fallacies{\textquotedblright} in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it},
  author       = {Boudry, Maarten and Paglieri, Fabio and Pigliucci, Massimo},
  issn         = {0920-427X},
  journal      = {ARGUMENTATION},
  keyword      = {BAYESIAN-APPROACH,Fallacies Demarcation Fallacy Fork Pseudoscience Argumentum ad ignorantiam Genetic fallacy Post hoc ergo propter hoc Ad hominem Ecological rationality Probabilistic reasoning Pragma-dialetics,RATIONALITY,EVOLUTION},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {431--456},
  title        = {The fake, the flimsy, and the fallacious: demarcating arguments in real life},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1},
  volume       = {29},
  year         = {2015},
}

Chicago
Boudry, Maarten, Fabio Paglieri, and Massimo Pigliucci. 2015. “The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life.” Argumentation 29 (4): 431–456.
APA
Boudry, M., Paglieri, F., & Pigliucci, M. (2015). The fake, the flimsy, and the fallacious: demarcating arguments in real life. ARGUMENTATION, 29(4), 431–456.
Vancouver
1.
Boudry M, Paglieri F, Pigliucci M. The fake, the flimsy, and the fallacious: demarcating arguments in real life. ARGUMENTATION. 2015;29(4):431–56.
MLA
Boudry, Maarten, Fabio Paglieri, and Massimo Pigliucci. “The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life.” ARGUMENTATION 29.4 (2015): 431–456. Print.