Cultural Taste and Social Mobility

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Chapter 1

Introduction
1. The cultural and the social

a. Culture and cultural taste

In sociology, the study of culture has expanded rapidly during the last couple of decades—in what has been referred to as the cultural turn (e.g., Friedland and Mohr 2004; Wuthnow and Witten 1988, Binder et al. 2008). The role of Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., 1977, 1984, 1990) is vital in this shift as he brilliantly outlined how culture plays a central role in stabilizing, legitimizing and perpetuating social inequality. For example, Reay (2011: 3) argues that the cultural turn has simultaneously been a Bourdieusian turn. Bourdieu studied cultural and symbolic stratification, and most of his work elaborates on the Weberian conception of class as lifestyle cultures, and how lifestyle characteristics can function as independent sources of power. Ever since, sociological research on culture has thrived.

Studying French data collected throughout the sixties, Bourdieu (1984) observed a match between the social position of individuals and their cultural preferences and practices. That is, there is a homology between the social space and the cultural space. Bourdieu distinguished three different social classes—i.e., the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie and the working class—which all have different lifestyles. He also acknowledges different fractions within these classes, but for the moment it suffices to mention that the social position of individuals is expressed in their tastes, as each class exhibits characteristic preferences and practices. For example, legitimate culture—i.e., cultural practices and artefacts such as opera, classical music, golf, fine arts, etc.—is located at the top of the social stratification system; illegitimate culture—such as popular music or brassband—is situated at the bottom of the social ladder.

Though Bourdieu’s observations—and especially the theoretical framework that accompanied it—are without a doubt invaluable, his work has not remained unchallenged. While few sociologists today would challenge the idea of the existence of a homology between the social space and the cultural space (an exception here is, for example, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), several authors have argued that the nature of the homology as expressed by Bourdieu no longer applies and that it needs to be updated. For example, comparing data from 1982 with data from 1992, Peterson and Kern claim a historical shift in the nature of the homology (Peterson and Kern 1996; see also: Peterson 1992; Peterson and Simkus 1992). In this shift from snob to omnivore—which is especially tangible among younger generations—individuals occupying positions high in the social hierarchy no longer exclusively consume highbrow culture, but include preferences for lowbrow culture in their cultural profiles. The existence of the cultural omnivore has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies, and results consistently show that omnivores are highly educated, young, and belong to the upper social strata (e.g., Peterson 1992; Van Eijck 2001; Peterson 2005). However, the evidence for the fact that the rise of the omnivore is a recent historic shift is not that convincing (e.g., Roose and...
For example, according to some authors, omnivorosity was already present from the fifties onwards (Van Eijck et al. 2002; Jaeger and Katz-Gerro 2010; Katz-Gerro and Jaeger 2013). Similarly, Lahire argues that the claim that omnivorosity is something new “confuses a change in the model of reality (the scientific point of view on the world) with a historic change of reality itself” (Lahire 2008: 182). Either way, the literature on omnivorosity portrays an alternative version of the homology as outlined by Bourdieu, but confirms the existence of a match between the cultural and the social.

It is exactly because there are social patterns in cultural preferences and practices—whatever the specific nature of the homology—that they become sociologically relevant. Social patterning enables culture to become a cue for position in the social stratification system, and for culture to become an accurate and powerful status marker in social interaction. In this way, studying culture is key to understand how inequality in society is made and sustained. So, in this PhD thesis I study culture. But what is culture? A wide variety of definitions of the concept prevail across and within disciplines in social science. A major division in the way culture is conceptualized is “the one that separates studies of culture as an implicit feature of social life from studies of culture as an explicit social construction” (Wuthnow and Witten 1988: 50). The implicit approach considers culture as abstract features of social life, such as norms, values, symbols, traditions, signs, schemes, etc. (e.g., Jepperson and Swidler 1994; Wuthnow and Witten 1988). The explicit approach deals with culture as symbolic products which are explicitly produced. The empirical approach in this PhD thesis aligns with the second approach as I empirically study culture as a specific realm in social life, entailing cultural practices, cultural artefacts, the arts, folk culture, etc. (e.g., Wolff 1999; Spillman 2002). However, this does not mean that I am not interested in the more general and tacit understanding of culture. My empirical strategy to study explicit culture not only aims at improving our understanding of culture in its explicit form, but also to further our understanding of culture in its implicit form (cf. Acord and DeNora 2008). In this way, I applaud Binder et al. (2008: 8) in their claim and “[…] happily embrace the chameleon-like nature of culture as a concept and the many shapes and forms culture takes”.

More specifically, I study culture to further our understanding of the role of culture in the process of social inequality by studying implications of social mobility. My focus on mobility is an empirical strategy to address two recent—and closely associated—evolutions in cultural sociology. (1) In the first place, several cultural sociologists have recently called for a recognition that individuals are ‘multi-socialized’ and argue that the ‘singleness’ and ‘homogeneity’ of individuals has been grossly overestimated in cultural sociological theory (e.g., Lahire 2011). (2) Additionally, sociological thinking on ‘culture’ has changed radically during the cultural turn, and more and more sociologists recognize that individuals “know much more of their culture than they use” (Swidler 2001: 13). Socially mobile individuals have been confronted with two different contexts of socialization—contexts with substantial differences in terms of culture—making them the perfect research topic to
study whether and how a multitude of socializing influences can be combined and reconciled within individuals. I focus on intergenerationally socially mobile individuals—that is, individuals occupying a different position in the social stratification system compared to their parents—and study their aesthetic dispositions (chapter 4), their cultural practices (chapter 5) and their taste profiles (chapter 6).

b. Social patterning explained: Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus

The social patterning of cultural practices and preferences is an empirical regularity which has been observed time and again (e.g., Bourdieu 1984; Gans 1974; Veblen 1953/1899; Warner et al. 1949; Weber 1978). To explain this observation, sociologists have routinely turned to Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus. Bourdieu formulated numerous definitions of the habitus. This is one of Bourdieu’s (1977: 83) earliest and—in my opinion—best formulated definitions of the habitus: “[…] a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems.”

The existence of such a preconscious and prediscursive structure has been confirmed by psychological research as dual-processing studies find that human cognition consists of two basic processes: One fast, automatic and largely unconscious; the other slower, deliberate and largely conscious (e.g., Cerulo 2010; Evans 2008; Martin 2010; Vaisey 2009). The habitus aligns with the first process which is responsible for practical consciousness, such as habits of judgement and evaluation. So, the habitus is a motivating, cognitive structure which orients perception and subsequently expresses itself in all domains of life, such as in ways of walking, in ways of talking, in bodily habits, in aesthetic preferences; that is, in ways of being.

In other definitions, the social origins and the social implications of the habitus are more central. For example: “The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures […]” (Bourdieu 1990: 53). Two aspects in this definition are key, that is, habitus as a structuring structure, and habitus as a structured structure. This duality of the habitus as being structured and at the same time structuring can—as argued by Lizardo (2004)—be traced back to Piaget’s conceptualization of knowledge acquisition where the key function of the mind is to construct structures by structuring reality (Piaget 1977; Lizardo 2004; see also: Lahire 2011).

**Structured structure.** The habitus—as a system of dispositions/schemes—is formed by the environment of the individual: Individuals are disposed because they are exposed (Bourdieu 2000: 140) and the habitus is “a virtue made out of necessity” (Bourdieu 1990: 54). It refers to the conditionability of humans to acquire arbitrary capacities as second nature (Bourdieu 2000). These arbitrary capacities are inscribed by past experiences which are always situated in the conditions of existence, and more specifically, in childhood experiences. The habitus is “embodied history,
internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history” (Bourdieu 1990: 56). So, individuals raised in comparable conditions of existence tend to have a similar habitus. Subsequently, because the habitus expresses itself in all domains of life, these individuals will exhibit similar lifestyles.

**Structuring structure.** Because of the social patterning, cultural preferences and tastes become markers of social position. This has pervasive consequences in social interaction and for social structure. For example, research convincingly shows that culture and tastes—as expressions of the habitus—are relevant for building social networks and that ‘cultural matching’ is an integral part of constructing intimate relationships (e.g., Edelmann and Vaisey 2014; Lizardo 2006; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010). As argued by DiMaggio (1987: 443): “Taste, then, is a form of ritual identification and a means of constructing social relations (and of knowing what relationships need not be constructed)”. This cultural matching also has repercussions for more consequential situations, such as job interviews (e.g., Lizardo 2013; Ridgeway 2013), or opportunities for educational success (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron 1979; DiMaggio 1982a). Ridgeway and Fisk (2012) use the term ‘gateway interactions’ to refer to interpersonal encounters within organizations—e.g., educational or health institutions—that influence individuals access to valued life outcomes by which inequality is evaluated (a good job, a high educational level, a good health, etc.). These organizations are predominantly populated by people from a middle class background, which implicitly infuses these organizations’ culture and practices with a middle class bias, giving individuals with a habitus developed in higher social strata advantages over others.

This aligns with the concept of cultural capital. Cultural capital refers to the social implications of a familiarity with high culture. That is, culture can function as a resource in the sense that “it provides access to scarce rewards, is subject to monopolization, and, under certain conditions, may be transmitted from one generation to the next” (Lareau and Weininger 2003: 567). This is in line with the Weberian tradition where elite status groups generate specific cultural traits, styles and tastes and where this status culture is used to monopolize scarce goods for the status group (DiMaggio 1982a). The term cultural capital stems from and is most prominently present in educational research to explain the finding that pupils originating from higher social strata have higher success rates (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron 1979). For example, pupils’ affinity with high culture is perceived to be a valid indicator of their skills and competence in school. Therefore, educators consider pupils with higher levels of cultural capital as more intelligent and more competent, which results in higher chances of school success.

**Emerging forms of cultural capital.** In the literature, cultural capital is consistently assumed to refer to an affinity with high culture and has often been measured as familiarity with highbrow arts—i.e., cultural forms such as opera, classical music, literature, etc. However, the content of cultural capital—or elite status culture—is arbitrary (DiMaggio 1982b). So, recently, several authors have
argued that the content of cultural capital may have altered because of technological and social changes in society (e.g., Prieur and Savage 2011, 2013). In this—still young and relatively limited—literature on emerging forms of cultural capital authors claim that the traditional forms of highbrow culture have lost their monopoly in signalling status and proclaiming positions of social dominance.

In my opinion, this literature on the emerging forms of cultural capital has yet to convince, and this because of three reasons. In the first place, the authors fail to define the content of these emerging forms. For example, they argue that contemporary cultural capital entails “scientific expertise, technology, information systems and more generally the capacities to handle methods of various kinds” (Prieur and Savage 2013: 264). Or it entails “a screen-based, Anglo-cosmopolitan commercial culture that is appropriated with a certain ironic stance versus a Eurocentric, cerebral, ascetic and serious highbrow culture” (Roose 2014: 2). Additionally, authors in this literature fail to show convincingly how these new cultural forms are institutionalized as elements of elite status culture and—associated to this—how they are distributed unequally. As will be argued in chapter 3, institutionalization is a key element in imbuing cultural forms with status (see also: Lareau and Weininger 2003). Thirdly, their conception of cultural capital moves away from the homology argument. It does not contain characteristics which are exclusively situated in upper social strata. In this sense, it is puzzling how these new forms could signal elite status culture (and additionally, how they could be transferred intergenerationally). For example, one point where this literature falls back on heavily is that “The evidence suggests that legitimate culture, in Bourdieu’s sense, is in retreat. No one in the working class is much in awe of the consecrated […]” (Warde 2007: 1 in Prieur and Savage 2011: 573; see also Roose 2014). However, this does not neutralize cultural capital: It does not matter what the lower classes think of high culture; that is why it is called symbolic violence. No matter what working class people think of high culture, they will still be disadvantaged due to their lack of familiarity with high culture in gateway interactions (Ridgeway and Fisk 2012). For example, in the educational context, educators—predominantly from non-working class backgrounds—will continue to consider, both consciously and unconsciously, high culture as an indicator of ability and competence.

However, despite my scepticism towards this literature, these authors highlight an important point. That is, the content of cultural capital may be radically different in contemporary societies as opposed to France in the sixties where the concept has its roots. A parallel—and, in my opinion, more promising—literature makes similar claims on possible transformations of cultural capital. Authors in this literature have argued that distinction is nowadays more grounded in the ways cultural products are consumed, as opposed to what cultural products are consumed. Central argument is that the objectified form of taste—that is, preferences for certain cultural objects—has lost its potential to signal status as a result of societal changes (Holt 1998). This literature extends Bourdieu’s notion of the aesthetic disposition and conceptualizes aesthetic dispositions as the propensity to perceive and
appreciate art in a certain way (Daenekindt and Roose 2011, 2013a, 2014b; Hanquinet, Roose and Savage 2014; Roose 2008; Rössel 2011; Schwarz 2013). In chapter 2, I discuss this developing field in the literature and reflect on this supposed change.

c. Bourdieu under scrutiny

During the past decades, Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus has received some fundamental critiques. Especially Bourdieu’s notion of disposition—and the causal characteristics he attributes to it—has been challenged. Stephen Turner (1994, 2002, 2007) is particularly relevant here. Turner argues that Bourdieu’s theory does not offer a realistic and plausible mechanism “[…] by which the internal thing, such as a disposition, can be transmitted […]” (Turner 1994: 63). As outlined in the previous part, Bourdieu considers dispositions as preconscious and prediscursive inclinations that orient perception and action. Essentially, Turner argues that Bourdieu’s conception of dispositions does not allow to transfer these dispositions from one individual to another one, i.e., the problem of transmission (Turner 1994). So, within Bourdieu’s framework, it is puzzling how dispositions inside the individual can emerge as results of socialization, and how they can fulfil the causal role Bourdieu assigns to them.

The development of dispositions plays a key role in Bourdieu’s thinking, and Turner’s critiques thus fundamentally challenge the theory of the habitus. A further implication of the problem of transmission is the sameness assumption (Turner 1994). The sameness assumption argues that dispositions and expressions of these dispositions—such as, preferences—map in a one-to-one fashion. That is, individuals with the same preferences share dispositions. This is a logical consequence of Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus. However, this assumption has proven to be untenable by studies originating from a variety of disciplines in social science. Discussions on this topic are fragmented across different fields of research, but roughly meet under the topic of the Attitude-Behaviour Consistency problem—that is, the ABC problem. Both in sociology and psychology, numerous studies have shown that attitudes, dispositions, and values are poor predictors of individuals’ behaviour and action (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Gross and Niman 1975; Schuman and Johnson 1976). This radically changed the sociological conception of culture and of how culture influences action (e.g., Swidler 1986, 2001; Vaisey 2009).

For a long time, culture was considered to ‘get into’ individuals, and subsequently to be enacted unproblematically by individuals. Following this logic, it makes sense that culture has been ignored as a topic of study for a long time—this logic was dominant until before the cultural turn—as every thought and action could be considered a perfect manifestation of the underlying latent construct of culture (e.g., DiMaggio 1997). This motivational view on culture has largely been associated to Talcott Parsons’ interpretation of Weber’s value-rational action (e.g., Swidler 1986; Vaisey 2008) and the ABC problem played a key role in abandoning this model of culture. The observed inconsistencies
between behaviour and values/attitudes rule out the possibility that cultural beliefs function as motives for action (Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2009). This resulted in the toolkit/repertoire model of culture which claims that embodied culture does not motivate behaviour (Swidler 2001) and that individuals “rely on cultural values as guides to action only to the extent that values provide rationales for predetermined ends” (Kaufman 2004: 340, emphasis added). If culture is a repertoire, we should expect inconsistency (Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2008, 2009), because—as Swidler (1986: 277) argues in her pioneering publication—“all people know more culture than they use”. More recently, Vaisey proposed an adapted model of the repertoire/toolkit model, arguing for a dual-process model which grants both a justificatory and motivational role to culture (Vaisey 2009). This wave of recent—and highly fascinating—studies on how culture enters cognition and how it subsequently is used by individuals illustrates the complexities—but also, our still imperfect understanding—of ‘culture in action’ (e.g., Cerulo 2010; Ignatow 2007; Lizardo 2015; Lizardo and Strand 2010; Martin 2010; Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2009). Anyway, few sociologist today cling to the old Parsonian model of culture and this changed conception of culture highlights the plausibility that individuals are bearers of different, inconsistent, and—possibly—contrasting forms of culture; an idea which will be quite central to my approach of social mobility.

So, in line with these arguments, Bourdieu’s idea that dispositions are socialized into individuals and subsequently orient action, may have to be reconsidered. Bourdieu’s model does not offer a solution to this (e.g., debate between Lizardo 2007 and Turner 2007). In chapter 2, I address this debate on these possible shortcomings of Bourdieu’s theory. Using data from an audience survey in Flemish art museums, I empirically address the sameness assumption as formulated by Turner (1994) to further our understanding of the social origins of the social patterning of cultural preferences and practices.

2. Cultural hierarchies

a. Cultural products and legitimacy

As I already put forward in my discussion of cultural capital, the position of cultural forms in the cultural hierarchy is arbitrary and socially constructed. But how are associations between status and cultural products established? That is, what makes certain cultural products and practices legitimate, and others illegitimate? In sociology, there is a long tradition of considering legitimacy as the result of social processes and as a social process itself (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1967). Inspired by Weber (1978), Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway (2006: 55) argue that “legitimation occurs through a collective construction of social reality in which elements of the social order are seen as consonant with norms, values, and beliefs that individuals presume are widely shared, whether or not they personally share
them”. So, legitimate culture entails cultural products which are presumably considered valuable, appropriate and worthy in the (apparent) consensus in society. Research in aesthetics often considers the difference between high and low culture as ‘natural’ and intrinsic to qualities of cultural products. Sociological research, in contrast, clearly separates the process of the material production of the product with the process of legitimation and consecration. Bourdieu (e.g., 1983, 1985) talks about the symbolic production of works of art, referring to the production of the value and the recognition attached to works of art.

For example, in the 19th century Shakespeare was appreciated by a socially heterogeneous audience. Shakespeare’s plays were popular entertainment in the U.S. (Levine 1984, 1988). Social boundaries did exist and were drawn, but these boundaries crossed the audience and did not express themselves in categories of culture. For example, when an English visitor attended theatre play in the U.S. “[…] she observed coatless men with their sleeves rolled up, incessantly spitting, reeking ‘of onions and whiskey’. She enjoyed the Shakespeare but abhorred the ‘perpetual’ noises […]” (Levine 1988: 25). Later, the works of Shakespeare were reinterpreted as complex and thus labelled as “high culture” (Levine 1988). This created the current view that Shakespeare’s oeuvre is sacred and assumed to be only accessible for and appreciated by the educationally initiated elite. Studies on the evolution in legitimacy of aesthetic criteria and of cultural products consistently refer to the central role of institutions.

b. Legitimacy and institutions

The production of culture perspective was introduced in the sixties and seventies by Richard Peterson, and was a huge catalyst for the sociological research on culture (DiMaggio 2000). As stated by its founder, the production of culture perspective “focuses on how the content of culture is influenced by the milieu in which it is created, distributed, evaluated, taught and preserved” (Peterson 1994: 165). Initially, studies embracing this perspective focussed on the fabrication of cultural products and art (Peterson and Anand 2004). For example, Howard Becker (1974, 1982) showed how works of art are the results of cooperative activity of many people, highlighting the dependency of artists. Later on, this perspective also generated studies focussing on changing aesthetic criteria, and changing status associated to certain cultural products and genres. In this strand of the literature, Peterson and the production of culture perspective were especially relevant by introducing organisational sociology and institutional theory in the study of culture (Anand 2000). This approach highlights the need to study institutional influences—such as organisations and markets—on cultural products and on the status associated with them. Institutional theory became firmly established in the late seventies (Greenwood et al. 2008) with classic publications, such as the ones from Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). These publications highlight the idea that organisations are
influenced by normative pressures, and that—in order to understand behaviour in and the structure of organisations—we need to pay attention to the wider institutional context in which they are embedded.

In the context of cultural sociology, this shift in thinking resulted in studies on the extent of institutionalization of culture. Institutionalization refers to “the processes by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 341). A seminal—and in my opinion, still underappreciated—work which perfectly illustrates this institutional approach to culture is DiMaggio’s work on cultural entrepreneurship in Boston. In this study, DiMaggio (1982b) describes how status differences between cultural products were created and legitimized by constructing an organisational base for high culture—that is, how they became institutionalized. In America, before 1850, there were no boundaries between art and popular culture; a differentiation and hierarchization of culture did not exist. There were cultural institutions, such as museums, but these presented curiosities, such as bearded women and animal curiosities, next to—what would now be considered as—fine arts (DiMaggio 1982b: 34). DiMaggio describes the process where the social elite in Boston—who controlled the cultural institutions—succeeded in isolating a segment of culture as theirs, and defining it as prestigious. Consequently, by exclusively situating this culture in their cultural institutions, this elite succeeded in differentiating their culture from popular culture and forging an institutional system which embodied and elaborated the(ir) high-cultural ideal.

Ignoring these processes of symbolic production of culture results—as argued by Wolff (1999: 503; see also: Inglis 2013)—in an ahistorical and unsociological approach where the categories of analysis are un(der)theorized and unproblematically considered as given. I agree, and thus want to reflect on possible changes in the status associated to cultural products in Flanders. This is especially relevant considering this PhD thesis’ topic of intergenerational social mobility where different generations—and so, possibly—different cultural hierarchies are at play. I do this in chapter 3, where I study how the educational system as an institution can affect the status associated to culture.

3. Social hierarchies

a. Social inequality and mobility

When sociologists study social inequality, and the transmission of social inequality across generations, they are looking for mechanisms of segregated socialization: They seek mechanisms that socially structure processes of socialization resulting in the situation where social groups are imbued differentially with culture or where these groups have different forms of culture. This differential
distribution of culture subsequently affects the individuals’ chances in life. But what groups should be considered, that is, what dimensions of inequality are relevant and should be studied?

A substantial amount of sociological scholarship considers occupation as the key dimension of social inequality. This line of thinking can be traced back to the thinkers such as Marx and Dahrendorf and focusses on the division of labour and the associated relations of exploitations. Also, the shift in stratification research from the 80s onwards, focussing on assets and resources as results of individuals’ actions, prioritizes occupation (Savage et al. 2005). In these approaches, characteristics such as occupational position, occupational prestige, relations on the work floor etc. are considered to lie at the heart of the study of social inequality. Why would occupational characteristics be relevant for inequality and the intergenerational transmission of inequality? For example,—a quite straightforward mechanism—economic capital increases one’s life-chances and is easily transferred to descendants. Another often used—and more sociological—account is the one expressed by Kohn (1977), who argues that working class individuals will stress conformity in the upbringing of their offspring. Middle classes parents, in contrast, will value self-direction much more. This has pervasive consequences: “The family, then, functions as a mechanism for perpetuating inequality. At lower levels of the stratification order, parents are likely to be ill-equipped and often will be ill-disposed to train their children in the skills needed at higher class levels” (Kohn 1977: 200). While these mechanisms makes sense to explain—for example—poverty or voting behaviour, they are not straightforwardly applicable to differential distribution of cultural tastes and preferences. For example, Savage et al. (2013) conclude that the Goldthorpe scheme—where individuals’ employment position is central—has proven to be quite useless to explain identities, and cultural and social activities.

Other relevant and often studied dimensions of social inequality include gender, ethnicity, religion, etc. By no means trying to devalue these dimensions (they are extremely relevant!), I argue that—in the study cultural tastes and preferences—educational inequality is the most relevant dimension. Therefore, in this PhD thesis I operationalize social position as educational attainment and, subsequently, social mobility as educational mobility. My argumentation for this choice—instead of occupational position/mobility which is the more common operationalization—is threefold:

(1) Recently, more and more authors, especially in the UK, have argued for a multidimensional and a de-centred—stratification has no ‘core’ in the economic realm—approach to social stratification (e.g., Atkinson 2011; Skeggs 1997; Flemmen 2013; Savage 2008; Savage et al., 2013). Applying this multidimensional approach to social inequality, implies considering stratification as a continuous hierarchy, instead of categorical (Flemmen 2013). While I completely agree with this continuous conception of social stratification, empirically studying social mobility necessitates a categorical approach. Therefore, in this PhD thesis, I revert to social strata as categorical entities from analytical necessity. Educational credentials capture other aspects of social inequality—such as occupational
level and income—as these are to a large extent influenced by educational level (e.g., Card 1999; Scherger and Savage 2010). In this way, educational stratification most closely fits the multidimensional approach of social inequality.

(2) Focussing on educational attainment, rather than occupational position, yields some important analytical advantages in the study of mobility. For example, focussing on occupational inequality/mobility creates problems to allocate large segments of the population, such as homemakers and non-working or retired individuals (e.g., Crompton and Scott 2000; see also: Monden and De Graaf 2013). Additionally, occupational status can change considerably throughout one's life-course—i.e., intragenerational mobility—which problematizes the measurement of mobility of, for example, an individual of 30 years by comparing his/her occupation with that of his/her 60 year old father. Educational attainment, in contrast, is much less likely to change after early adulthood.

(3) Educational level is substantially associated with culture—much more than occupation. The educational system as an institution is intrinsically linked to culture, to the status differences in cultural objects, and subsequently plays a key role in the unequal distribution of culture to different social groups in society (cf. Chapter 3). Furthermore, thinking about culture and the individual, an important distinction should be made between direct/exclusive appropriation and indirect/symbolic appropriation (Bourdieu 1984; Lizardo 2008). The former referring to the capacity to purchase and own cultural objects; the latter referring to the capacity to access cultural objects symbolically. In contemporary cultural sociology, the former is seldom studied, and the bulk of attention has been spent on the latter. Also, the focus of this PhD thesis—studying aesthetic dispositions, cultural preferences, and cultural practices—aligns with symbolic appropriation. This form of appropriation is strongly associated to education, as education is the best predictor for embodied appreciation of culture (e.g., Bourdieu 1997; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007; Gans 1974; Silva 2006) (Note: even the relationship between ownership of cultural works and wealth—for example, measured by income or occupation—has decreased over time (Lizardo 2008; Van Eijck and Bargeman 2004)). Also in Flanders, the predominant importance of education as a structuring element in the cultural field has been evidenced by empirical research (e.g., Roose, Van Eijck and Lievens 2012; Roose and Vander Stichele 2010; Vander Stichele and Laermans 2006).

Based on these three arguments, I operationalize social position as educational attainment and social mobility as educational mobility. Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), I differentiate four levels of educational attainment. Before turning to social mobility effects research, allow me to outline Bourdieu’s stance on social position. This elaboration will highlight the ways in which I intend to contribute to cultural sociology.
b. Bourdieu and social inequality/mobility

Bourdieu (1984) considers society as a multidimensional space, where individuals’ social positions are determined by three axes: (I) The first dimension relates to the volume of economic, social and cultural capital, i.e., the sum of the three forms of capital. This volume of capital represents resources individuals can use to maximize life chances and determines the class to which individuals belong—be it, the bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie or the working class. (II) The second dimension pertains to the composition of the total amount of resources. For example, do the resources predominantly contain economic capital, or cultural capital? Different compositions of capital give rise to different fractions within classes. (III) The third dimension depicts change in axis I and axis II over time. This dimension acknowledges the relevance of the social trajectory of individuals in the social space. At best, this dimension is mentioned in sociological research on culture, but thorough research on the consequences of social movements across the social space is largely absent in both theoretical and empirical research in cultural sociology (exceptions are Van Eijck 1999; Friedman 2012). Therefore, I focus on consequences of social mobility in this PhD thesis.

So, social mobility denotes the third axis in Bourdieu’s social space as presented in *Distinction* (1984) where he acknowledges the relevance for social trajectories as an important part of individuals’ social position. However, as already stated, this dimension is largely neglected in cultural sociology. Paradoxically the reasons for this neglect may be associated to ideas expressed by Bourdieu himself. In the empirical part of *Distinction*, and in most of Bourdieu’s other work, this dimension is largely absent. For example, in ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’ (1989)—a publication where he summarizes the theoretical principles which are at the base of *Distinction*—he exclusively discusses the first two axes, and does not even mention the third dimension. Additionally, Bourdieu’s view on socialization and his claims on the social origin of the habitus somehow eliminate the possibility of relevance of the experience of social mobility. Throughout his oeuvre, Bourdieu consistently stressed socializing experiences during childhood as the seedbed of the habitus. Admittedly, Bourdieu’s stress on the everlasting impact of the social position of origin on the habitus is relaxed in his later writings, but even in these works the social position of destination are presented as largely irrelevant in the formation of the habitus (Bennett 2007; Daenekindt and Roose 2013a).

Bourdieu argues that the habitus is endlessly transformed as it always remains open to new experiences (1994). However, because of the characteristics of the habitus, it protects itself from change as these new experiences are always perceived through the lens of the primary habitus. “Through the systematic ‘choices’ it makes among the place, events and people that might be frequented, the *habitus* tends to protect itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible […]” (Bourdieu 1990: 61). So, the habitus inclines individuals to avoid contexts to which it is not well adapted. As such, the habitus is a
remarkably durable construct in Bourdieu’s theory (see also: Atkinson 2010; Erickson 1996). In this sense, Bourdieu considers the habitus a rigid and unitary structure, instilled in childhood experiences.

In theoretical clams in his later works, Bourdieu (e.g., 2000, 2007) relaxes the predominance of the social position of origin. But even here he considers the imprints of the social position of origin as long-lasting in the conviction that socially mobile individuals—and their habitus—can never completely adapt to their new social environment. Bourdieu himself was upwardly mobile as his father was an uneducated postal worker (Santoro 2011). He describes his experience of upward mobility as “my path through social space and the practical incompatibility of the social worlds than it links without reconciling them” (Bourdieu 2007: 1). He describes this experience as strainful, as being “[c]aught between two worlds and their irreconcilable values” (Bourdieu 2007: 99), and as giving rise to “a destabilized habitus, torn by contradiction and internal division, generating suffering” (Bourdieu 2000: 160).

So, Bourdieu outlines a model where individuals are socialized into a specific social position during childhood, and where they are rarely influenced by other socialization contexts. However, is this a tenable and/or plausible assumption in contemporary differentiated societies? For example, as voiced in the sociological classic The Homeless Mind: “[…] compared with modern societies, most earlier ones evinced a high degree of integration. Whatever the differences between various sectors of social life, these would ‘hang together’ in an order of integrating meaning that included them all” (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974: 62-63). This perfectly illustrates the dated view of socializing spheres in society as expressed by Bourdieu: Parallel to processes of modernization—and the associated differentiation and segmentation—different sectors of life increasingly ‘hang together’ and are decreasingly defined by one unifying theme, such as social position. So, individuals in contemporary society have multiple social affiliations, which do not necessarily coincide (e.g., Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974; Blau and Schwartz 1984; DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Lahire 2011). Additionally, personal networks are now more fluid, and less defined by family and/or geography (Castells 1997; Wellman and Wortley 1990; Lizardo 2006). So, during the life-course—and even during childhood socialization—individuals are confronted with heterogeneous socialization forces.

These ideas are not new, but due to the often uncritical reliance on Bourdieu’s model, cultural sociological research continues to consider socialization as a very rigid, homogeneous and straightforward process. This traditional view on socialization has also been refuted by more recent research on socialization where authors state that socialization is never complete and where they stress its contextual character (e.g., Arnett 2007; Corsaro 2005; Harris 1995, 1998). So, cultural sociology needs to reframe its theoretical framework in order to make it suitable to account for these ‘structural mismatches’ where individuals are ‘out of place’ by ending up in a social milieu to which their social background—and the habitus which was supposedly exclusively formed there—did not prepare them.
Sources of structural mismatches are numerous, for example social mobility, (parental) heterogamy, migration, network heterogeneity, *etc.* (*e.g.*, Berger, Berger and Kellner 1974; Lahire 2011). Out of the different forms of structural mismatches, I focus on social mobility in this PhD thesis. The reasons for this choice are twofold: (1) Despite the numerous references to social mobility in debates on cultural taste and its social implications, the absence of empirical research on the topic is startling (exceptions are: Van Eijck 1999; Friedman 2012). For example, in the citation-classic of Peterson and Kern (1996), the authors mention social mobility as one of the key reasons for the emergence of the cultural omnivore. (2) Additionally, in thinking about the role of culture in social inequality, social mobility as a structural mismatch is in my opinion an obvious choice to study, because of its intrinsic relation to processes of inequality. In this way, social mobility—more than other forms of structural mismatches—will associate to very pervasive differences in culture between the two contexts of socialization.

*c. Social mobility effects research*

Research on effects of social mobility has been dominated by the work of Pitirim Sorokin. Following his classic work on social mobility, sociological theory embraced certain specific ideas about the consequences of social mobility for the individual. Sorokin (1927) argued that the experience of social mobility results in a greater versatility and plasticity of human behaviour; he subsequently linked mobility to mental diseases. Similarly, Durkheim ([1897] 1930) associated rates of social mobility to rates of suicide. Cooley ([1909] 1983), who links the mere possibility of social mobility to feelings of inferiority, made similar claims. This set of ideas connecting the experience of social mobility—both upwards and downwards—with a wide variety of negative psychosocial effects is commonly referred to as ‘Sorokin’s dissociative thesis’ (Ellis and Lane 1967).

Intergenerational social mobility refers to a situation where individuals have a different position in the social hierarchy—be it higher or lower—than their parents. Habits, attitudes, and preferences acquired in the social position of origin may not be suitable in the social position of destination. Sorokin argues that, social mobility requires a “corresponding accommodation of body, mind, and reactions” (1927: 508). He considers this process of accommodation a necessary part of the experience of social mobility and sees it as inherently problematic and detrimental to the individual: Because the socially mobile individual is never completely able to overcome the influence of the social position of origin, that person “is doomed to think and to look at the world through the glasses of his ‘social box’” (Sorokin 1927: 509). It is precisely the need to be versatile and to adapt to the new social status position that leads to a range of mental problems.

Research on the dissociative thesis has thrived in the 1960s and 1970s. The inconclusiveness of its findings is characteristic for these studies (*e.g.*, Ellis and Lane 1967; Kessin 1971; Litwak 1960;
Mirande 1973; Stacey 1969; Stuckert 1963). This inconclusiveness is echoed in other domains of social mobility effects research, especially with regard to fertility (e.g., Bean and Swicegood 1979; Berent 1952; Hope 1971; Kasarda and Billy 1985; Scott 1958; Stevens 1981) and political orientation (e.g., Jackman 1972; Knoke 1973; Lopreato 1967; Lopreato and Chafetz 1970; Lipset and Bendix 1959; Segal and Knoke 1968; Thompson 1971). The inconsistencies and contradictions in the findings and conclusions are striking. Despite the mixed findings and the absence of convincing evidence for the dissociative thesis, “sociologists seem reluctant to accept the disconfirmation of a favourite hypothesis” (Seeman 1977: 757; see also: Marshall and Firth 1999).

The reasons for these inconsistencies can be found in the analytical strategy and statistical methods used. Duncan (1966) and Bean et al. (1973; see also: Vorwaller 1970) have noted serious shortcomings in most of these studies as they do not compare characteristics of mobile individuals with those of their immobile peers at social position of origin and social position of destination. Thus, many of the mobility effects claimed by these past studies may be due to additive origin and destination effects, rather than the experience of social mobility itself (Vorwaller 1970: 493; see also: Houle 2011; Tolsma et al. 2009). Those studies that do take into account characteristics of the social position of origin and the social position of destination have applied statistical methods that do not adequately disentangle origin and destination effects from mobility effects (Sobel 1981, 1985; Hendrickx et al. 1993).

The statistical problems in modelling mobility stem from the linear dependency of social mobility on both social position of origin and social position of destination (Blalock 1967; Hope 1975). In 1981 Sobel introduced a statistical technique that allowed the modelling of effects of social position of origin, of social position of destination, and of social mobility simultaneously, i.e., Diagonal Reference Models (DRM) (e.g., Sobel 1981, 1985; Hendrickx et al. 1993). In the late 80s and early 90s, some applications of DRM were published (e.g., Clifford and Heath 1993; De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath 1995; De Graaf and Ultee 1990; Sorenson 1989; Weakliem 1992), but it is only since 2000 that this method has been consistently applied to study social mobility effects. This coincides with the emergence of accessible packages and scripts to estimate these models—e.g., an SPSS tutorial (Tolsma et al. 2009), a DREF subcommand of the GNM R package (Turner and Firth 2007), a STATA package (Lizardo 2007). Thus, recent studies have focused on consequences of social mobility by applying DRMs on a wide variety of subjects, such as antagonistic attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Tolsma et al. 2009), personal satisfaction (Marshall and Firth 1999), cultural taste/practices (Daenekindt and Roose 2013a, 2013b, 2014a), preventive health care (Missinne, Daenekindt and Bracke 2015), or voting behaviour (Weakliem 1992; Nieuwbeerta, De Graaf and Ultee 2000).
d. Statistical method: Diagonal Reference Models

To analyse the effects of social mobility, I apply Diagonal Reference Models (DRM’s). DRM’s were developed by Sobel (1981, 1985) specifically to model effects of social mobility. This statistical method was developed in response to previous methods to study social mobility effects—i.e., the linear additive model and the square additive model. Both former models were found to be inadequate to study effects of social mobility (Blalock 1966; Sobel 1981, 1985; Hope 1971, 1975; Hendrickx et al. 1993).

The linear additive model (Lenski 1954, 1956; Jackson 1962) can be presented as

\[ Y = b_1 * X_1 + b_2 * X_2 + b_3 * (X_1 - X_2) + \epsilon \]

In this model \( X_1 \), \( X_2 \) and \((X_1 - X_2)\) represent respectively the social position of origin, the social position of destination and social mobility. The effect of social mobility is represented by \( b_3 \). Blalock (1966) showed that this equation is unidentifiable: Because \( X_1 - X_2 \) is a linear transformation of \( X_1 \) and \( X_2 \), it is impossible to estimate unique values for \( b_1 \), \( b_2 \) and \( b_3 \), without making any a priori assumptions.

The square additive model was developed by Duncan (1966) in which a baseline model—which only includes social position of origin and social position destination—is compared in terms of explained variance with an extended model which also includes the effect of social mobility as an interaction effect, i.e., the additive explained variance. The problem with this model is—as both Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981) argue—that Duncan’s model does not distinguish between effects of origin, destination and social mobility. For example, in the baseline model, respondents in a specific social position of destination will include both stable individuals as mobile individuals. Therefore, Duncan’s model is not able to compare characteristics of socially mobile individuals with stable individuals (see also: Clifford and Heath 1993).

In response to the problems related to previous statistical methods to study effects of social mobility, Sobel proposed Diagonal Reference Models (DRM’s). The method models the value of dependent variables of socially mobile individuals as a function of the two groups of associated socially immobile individuals. The baseline model proposed by Sobel (1981) is

\[ Y_{ijk} = p * \mu_{ii} + (1 - p) * \mu_{jj} + \epsilon_{ijk} \]

Subscript \( i \) and \( j \) respectively represent the social position of origin and destination. \( Y_{ijk} \) is the value of the dependent variable in cell \( ij \), which has \( k \) observations. \( \mu_{ii} \) and \( \mu_{jj} \) are both estimates of \( Y \) in the diagonal cells. The former refers to the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of origin, while the latter refers to the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of destination. These estimated means are used to estimate the value for the dependent variable for mobile individuals. The characteristics of these immobile individuals are considered to represent the “core” culture of the different social strata. By offering the possibility of comparing socially mobile individuals with their
immobile peers in both social position of origin and social position of destination, this statistical
technique directly expresses theoretical thinking about social mobility (Cox 1990; Sobel 1981, 1985;
Tolsma et al. 2009).

4. General outline

In this PhD thesis, I study the link between cultural taste and social mobility. Before turning to social
mobility, I present two case studies. In these chapters, I critically reflect on cultural sociological theory
and on the cultural field in Flanders. I believe these case studies to be a valuable outset of my study of
and approach to social mobility. In the first case study (chapter 2), I scrutinize Bourdieu’s theory of
the habitus, and reflect on recent suggestions in the literature that distinction has shifted from the
‘what’ to the ‘how’ of cultural consumption. I use data from an audience survey in two art museums in
Flanders (n = 1,448), i.e., S.M.A.K. and MSK (more information on these data and the central
variables can be found in the chapter itself and—more elaborately—in the appendix). I contrast
manifested preferences towards artefacts of various artists with how people appropriate works of art.
These ‘ways of preferring’ are measured using items reflecting abstract evaluation criteria people use
to assess/evaluate works of art and are considered proxies for aesthetic dispositions. Additionally, this
chapter introduces different ‘levels’ of taste, which structure the studies on effects of social mobility.

In chapter 3—the second case study—I immerse myself in the institutional approach of culture
and reflect on possible changes in status associated to cultural products in Flanders. I reflect on how
the educational system as an institution infuses certain cultural products/activities with status.
Additionally, I study whether there are trends in this infusion over the course of the 20th century. My
focus on the educational system—and its curricula—is based on two arguments: (1) In the first place,
the educational system plays a pervasive role in the process of institutionalization as it is a powerful
agent in the generational transmission of social constructs (Zucker 1977) and one of the dominant
institutions in the diffusion of cultural classification systems in society (e.g., DiMaggio 1987). (2)
Secondly, trends in the educational system can provide insights into trends in wider society. An
important constraint for educational organisations in what and how they teach is that—in order to
maintain trust, confidence and legitimacy—they need to conform to institutionalized norms and values
viable in broader society (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 2006; Rowan 1982). In this sense, my focus on the
educational system may also grant insights into legitimate cultural classification systems in wider
society. In this chapter, I use data from the survey ‘Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003-2004’
(Lievens et al., 2006), based on a representative sample of the Flemish population (n = 2,849). I also
use this data for chapter 4, 5 and 6, and more information on these data and the central variables can
be found in the respective chapters and in the appendix.
Subsequently, I consider the relation between social mobility and different ‘levels’ of cultural taste. This differentiated approach is necessary to get at a comprehensive understanding of the relation between cultural taste and social mobility as research has shown that different ‘levels’ of culture are not necessarily consistent with one another (*cf. ABC problem; cf. chapter 2*). In chapter 4, I address the relation between social mobility and aesthetic dispositions, to study the supposed unity and durability of the habitus. Central query is whether Bourdieu’s idea of a rather static, class-based habitus—and its associated way of appropriating works of art as voiced in *Distinction* (1984)—still holds. Or is the idea of the habitus as a more permeable, malleable entity—as recently voiced by Lahire (2008, 2011)—more accurate? I approach this by studying aesthetic dispositions of socially mobile individuals towards films. Aesthetic dispositions refer to the deep, underlying expectations people have about the arts and can be considered as an empirical translation of what Bourdieu refers to as habitus.

In chapter 5, I focus on the association between social mobility and cultural practices, where I explicitly differentiate between private and public practices to improve our understanding of possible strategies of impression management and status consequences of mobility. By contrasting private and public manifestations of aesthetic preferences, I gain insight into the relative importance of social and competence-related motives for cultural consumption (Kraaykamp *et al.* 2007). In this chapter, I focus on a wide variety of cultural practices—*i.e.*, television, music, media use, books, *etc.*—to maximize the range of empirical generalizability.

Finally, in chapter 6, I focus on taste profiles—*i.e.*, combinations of different preferred cultural genres. I focus on listening behaviour to different musical genres of socially mobile individuals to understand how socializing influences of different social contexts can be combined. Additionally, this chapter empirically addresses theoretical claims from the literature on cultural omnivorousness by focussing on the relation between social mobility and the ‘breath’ of cultural taste. Succinctly, in this PhD thesis, I want to improve our insights into the malleability of cultural taste and the associated processes of socialization in an attempt to make cultural sociological theory more suitable to deal with heterogeneous socializing influences, and—ultimately—to further our understanding of the role of culture in processes of social inequality.

5. References


1. Introduction


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PART I

CULTURAL TASTE
Chapter 2

Ways of Preferring: Distinction through the 'What' and the 'How' of Cultural Consumption

**Abstract**

In this article, we contrast the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of cultural consumption. We use data from an audience survey in two art museums (n = 1448) and contrast manifested preferences towards artefacts of various artists – that is, (dis)liking Duchamp, Rubens, Kandinsky, Pollock and Van Gogh – with how people appropriate works of art. These ways of preferring are measured using items reflecting abstract evaluation criteria people use to assess/evaluate works of art and are considered proxies for aesthetic dispositions. Our results indicate that taste profiles – that is, certain combinations of (dis)liking different artists – are not very strongly related to socio-demographic characteristics and to social status position. However, among individuals having the same preferences, we find differences in ways of preferring. These differences are associated with socio-demographics and also with social inequality. This suggests that in the context of art museums, distinction is not – or only slightly – embedded in manifested preferences, but more in dispositions, that is, in ways of preferring. These findings corroborate theoretical challenges of the premise that dispositions are socialized into individuals and that this explains the social patterning of cultural practices and preferences.
1. Introduction

The social patterning of cultural preferences and practices is one of the most consistent findings in sociology (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984; Gans, 1974; Veblen, 1934 [1899]; Warner et al., 1949; Weber, 1978 [1968]). This empirical regularity is routinely explained by Bourdieu’s (1990) theory of the habitus with its central notion of ‘disposition’: Individuals are disposed by their environment, and the social conditions of existence result in a system of dispositions, that is, the habitus. These dispositions are ‘applicable, by simple transfer, to the most varied areas of practice’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 170), ranging from food and eating, over manners and uses of the body, to tastes in clothes, music and so on – that is, in cultural preferences and practices. In this way, culture and aesthetics are shaped by individuals’ position in the social field – thus becoming status markers – and subsequently naturalize and perpetuate social inequality.

In Bourdieu’s model, dispositions and preferences are implicitly considered equivalent because dispositions are at the foundation of preferences. Several authors have suggested that distinction nowadays is more grounded in the style of consuming, rather than in the products consumed (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013a; Hanquinet et al., 2014; Holt, 1998). However, considering Bourdieu’s model, it is puzzling how these styles of consumption can function as status markers since dispositions are expressed/replicated in their overt manifestations, that is, in preferences. How culture is appropriated – that is, the different ways culture is appreciated – has been mainly ignored in the empirical literature, which is surprising considering the central role of the notion of ‘disposition’ in the arguments sociologists use to explain the social patterning of cultural preferences and practices. Central question in this article is to what extent aesthetic dispositions can predict tastes. For this, we very much draw on the inspiring work of Stephen Turner (1994, 2002), which has – as rightfully noted by Lizardo (2007: 319) – been under-acknowledged. Turner challenges ideas which are central to sociology (of consumption) and to social science in general. He provocatively questions the prevailing social scientific view on the concept of ‘practices’ and the notion that practices are socialized into individuals through schemes and dispositions. In line with Turner’s arguments and Lahire’s (2003) call for empirical research on socio-cognitive structures – such as schemes and dispositions – we empirically address to what extent the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of cultural consumption are equivalent.

We explicitly consider two aspects of cultural consumption as possible manifestations of social inequality, that is, what cultural products individuals appreciate and the way these products are appropriated. Is distinction grounded in the cultural products individuals prefer, or does their way of preferring act as an additional source of status demarcation? To what extent do ‘what’ and ‘how’ of cultural consumption serve as independent sites for the reproduction of social inequality?
2. Theory

2.1. Has distinction gone underground?

In Western societies, highbrow arts participation is considered a manifestation of cultural capital, a means of maximizing life chances and opportunities by accumulating and monopolizing scarce economic, social and cultural resources (Bourdieu, 1986). However, a number of authors have challenged the idea that ‘high’ cultural goods have the monopoly of ensuring and proclaiming positions of social dominance. Research shows, for example, that contemporary social elites express omnivorous taste patterns including a marked preference for some popular cultural forms (e.g. Peterson and Kern, 1996). According to most studies in this voluminous literature on omnivorousness, this finding challenges ‘traditional’ cultural hierarchies and the idea of the distinguishing force of highbrow culture. Yet, other authors argue that the apparent change in manifested preferences obscures the persistence of cultural hierarchies within genres and cultural categories (Atkinson, 2011; Johnston and Baumann, 2007) or that cultural capital is not so much about what is consumed but about how culture is appropriated (Daenekindt and Roose, 2011, 2013a; Hanquinet et al., 2014; Holt, 1998; Lizardo, 2008; Roose, in press).

Taste is routinely conceptualized and operationalized in its objectified form, that is, in preferences for particular cultural objects. Holt (1998) argues that this form of taste has lost its potential for distinction and that distinction has gone underground. Because of the increased production and accessibility of consumer goods – a context of cultural abundance as Wright (2011) calls it – the objectified form of cultural consumption may still indicate boundaries between rich and poor, but may say less about other dimensions of social inequality, such as cultural capital. For example, individuals can have the monetary means to buy and own a cultural product – that is, to directly appropriate it – but lack the capacity to symbolically appropriate it (Lizardo, 2008: 4). Holt (1998) additionally argues that the objectified form of cultural taste can only function effectively within a stable hierarchy of high and low culture. The blurring of boundaries within the cultural hierarchy weakens the potential of the objectified form as a source of distinction (see also Lizardo, 2008). So possibly, the way individuals appropriate cultural objects serves as an additional site where social boundaries are expressed and reproduced.

2.2. Art museums and their audiences

Focusing on ways of preferring necessitates a committed population. For this reason, we resort to a specific form of cultural participation, namely, visiting art museums. Bourdieu (1984) argues that in art museums the aesthetic disposition becomes institutionalized as this context favours ‘attention

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1 This idea has not remained unchallenged (e.g. Atkinson, 2011; Daenekindt and Roose, 2014; Johnston and Baumann, 2007; Rimmer, 2012).
towards form rather than function, towards technique rather than theme’ (p. 30). The works presented in an art museum have been granted the status of ‘works of art’, strongly suggesting that these works deserve/require an appropriation including a high degree of erudition. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of artworks originating from a lot of different styles arouses a stylistic relativism and thus neutralizes the function of representation (Bourdieu, 1984). It is well known that museum audiences – despite their relative socio-demographic homogeneity – are characterized by a great variety of motives and preferences (e.g. Becker, 1984; Hanquinet et al., 2014; Jansen-Verbeke and Van Rekom, 1996; Thyne, 2001). Thus, heterogeneity in terms of attitudinal characteristics and the commitment to the arts make an art museum audience the perfect population to study ways of preferring, especially considering the fact that art museums are the perfect context for aesthetic contemplation.

As demonstrated extensively by previous research, art museum visitors constitute a relatively homogeneous group in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. Bourdieu, 1997; DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004; DiMaggio and Useem, 1978a; Grenfell, 2007; Kirchberg, 1996). In general, studies indicate that art museum visiting decreases with age and that there are slightly more women than men among the visitors. The most striking and most consistent characteristic over different countries and times is the high position of visitors on different dimensions of social inequality: Visiting art museums is related to occupation, income and educational level. Similar socio-demographic profiles have been found for other audiences of the fine arts, such as classical concerts (Roose, 2008), opera (Rössel, 2011) and theatre (Maas et al., 1990).

The consistency of the elite nature of fine arts audiences is usually explained by Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993a) theory of social reproduction. This theory departs from the central concept of habitus. The habitus orients ‘thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and actions’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 55) and is the product of the position of the individual in the social field and the associated life conditions. Thus, individuals occupying positions close to one another in the social field tend to have a similar habitus. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu (1977) defines habitus as

a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems. (p. 83)

The habitus contains – among other things – dispositions towards art, that is, the aesthetic disposition. The aesthetic disposition comprises a cultural competence which grants its bearer the ability to decode and subsequently appreciate fine arts. Works of art are coded, and in order to appreciate an artwork, one has to possess the appropriate registers to decode it. This cultural competence is acquired through processes of socialization to which members of higher social strata are predominantly subjected to.
2.3. Dispositions and the sameness assumption

A disposition ‘designates a way of being, a habitual state [...] and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 214). Especially in Distinction, Bourdieu illustrates his thinking on dispositions with the concept of the aesthetic disposition. The aesthetic disposition refers to the ability and the propensity to perceive artworks with other codes and schemes than the ones used to perceive everyday reality and to perceive art ‘in a truly aesthetic manner, that is, as a signifier which signifies nothing other than itself’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 8). Art perception is a mediate deciphering operation, and the deciphering capabilities of the perceiver thus influence the signification revealed to him or her. According to Bourdieu, individuals from lower social strata tend to apply the same schemes and codes appropriate for everyday reality on artworks, thus explaining their wish for realistic representation in art and their strong preference for functional aspects of works of art. This goût de nécessité contrasts with individuals from higher social strata who are able to transcend the schemes and codes of everyday perception and include appreciation for formal aspects of art in their art-for-art’s sake approach (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984, 1993a).

While Bourdieu’s theoretical contributions are without a doubt invaluable, his ideas have not remained unchallenged. Of particular interest here is a critique put forward by Stephen Turner (1994, 2002, 2007) focusing on the problem of transmission and the related sameness assumption.2 Because Bourdieu’s theory departs from internal inclinations – that is, individuals are disposed by their environment – there needs to be a mechanism ‘[...] by which the internal thing, such as a disposition, can be transmitted [...]’ (Turner, 1994: 63). Turner argues that Bourdieu’s theory is not consistent with conceivable mechanisms through which socialization can occur. Put bluntly, Turner argues that processes of socialization – that is, transmission from one individual to another – only work for overt things, but not for hidden and tacit things such as schemes or dispositions. In this way, the problem of transmission problematizes Bourdieu’s argument that the social patterning of preferences and practices is rooted in dispositions. Similarly, Lahire (2003) argues that

Bourdieu committed psychology to clinging to a set of concepts which have become petrified and have hardly changed in 30 years, but which – like all scientific concepts – were nothing but a kind of summary of what was at that time the most advanced psychological research into the development of children. (p. 332)

Subsequently, Lahire problematizes the practice of simply assuming the existence of socio-cognitive processes, such as transferability, and calls for a need for empirical research in this domain.

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2 Turner’s critiques are not specifically directed at Bourdieu but at practice theory, with frequent jabs at Bourdieu.
Turner goes on by challenging Bourdieu’s implicit assumption of dispositional homogeneity of specific cultural preferences and practices. According to Bourdieu’s theory, individuals close to one another in the social field develop similar dispositions, which in turn explains the similarity of their cultural practices. This implies a one-to-one mapping between dispositions and practices. Turner (1994) however argues that ‘overt behaviour in two people may have a quite different causal ancestry in each person’ (p. 19). ‘The sameness of an external performance is not necessarily a result of sameness of internal structure’ (Turner, 1994: 59). Turner obviously has his own share of critics (e.g. Gross, 1998; Lizardo, 2007), and his theory indeed mainly criticizes without giving solutions. However, his arguments cast doubt on the validity of some ideas which are quite central to the sociology of consumption – and sociology in general – and may suggest a need to reconsider some of these ideas.

We intend to contribute to this debate by addressing the sameness assumption put forward by Turner. If dispositions are at the root of preferences and practices, then dispositions and preferences are equivalent. In this case, dispositional differences between individuals could not act as a source for distinction since these differences are exactly expressed in their overt form. So, our research question is as follows: Are the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ – as two aspects of cultural consumption – equivalent? In line with Turner’s sameness assumption, we formulate the sameness hypothesis which claims that dispositions and preferences are equivalent to one another; they map in a one-to-one fashion. This hypothesis can be considered the null hypothesis, and a rejection of this hypothesis would imply that underneath the external similarities of practices, there are a variety of dispositions present. That is, individuals with similar practices/preferences may have very different ways of preferring. This would open up the opportunity for dispositions to also function as status markers and to play a key role in the manifestation and reproduction of inequality in social interaction.

2.4. Aesthetic dispositions and ways of preferring

As Halle (1992) famously argued, we know very little about what is going on in the head of individuals when they look at art. In this line of thinking, aesthetic dispositions have been conceptualized as the propensity of individuals to perceive and appreciate art in a certain way, and there have been attempts to measure them (e.g. Daenekindt and Roose, 2013a; Hanquinet et al., 2014; Roose, 2008; Rössel, 2011; Schwarz, 2013). The approach of Rössel (2011) and Schwarz (2013) stresses modes of engaging with cultural objects – what Schwarz calls ‘techniques of art tasting’ (see also Atkinson, 2011). Another approach focuses on abstract evaluation criteria that make art objects deserve appreciation (Daenekindt and Roose, 2011, 2013a; Hanquinet et al., 2014; Roose, 2008). We work in line with this second approach. We measure aesthetic dispositions by means of survey questions assessing abstract evaluation criteria, which we believe to provide valid proxies of aesthetic dispositions. As Vaisey (2009) argues, ‘Interviews may not be the best way to understand how people
make judgements. Carefully constructed and implemented, forced-choice surveys may be better suited to the study of the culture-action link’ (p. 1688). As Vaisey (2009, 2014) argues, survey-respondents use as little cognitive effort as possible, thus relying more on heuristics and intuition. Therefore, surveys draw disproportionately on the practical process of human cognition and may thus be more accurate to grasp internalized schemes and dispositions – compared to other methods. Filling in a questionnaire simulates more the routine everyday choices people make and thus taps more to the fast, automatic and largely unconscious component of human cognition – compared to the slow, deliberate and largely conscious component. In this way, interviews may give more access to post hoc justifications, whereas survey questions are better to get at motivational dispositional structures that are consciously less accessible.

Inspired by claims that the aesthetic experience should not be treated as a monolithic entity (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson, 1990), studies have conceptually differentiated aesthetic dispositions based on different expectations towards the arts. Different discourses exist as to what constitutes art and as to how art should be produced and evaluated. These aesthetic paradigms change and/or replace each other over time (Becker, 1984; Bergesen, 1984). Because different paradigms have a seedbed in and find footing in different social groups, different aesthetics may compete and coexist at the same time, manifesting themselves in a variety of expectations towards the arts (see also Bergesen, 1984; Hanquinet et al., 2014). Insights into aesthetic dispositions of individuals are imperative to get a full understanding of the aesthetic experience. Based on the literature, different aesthetic paradigms can be differentiated.

*The critical aesthetic.* The critical aesthetic amounts to a critical stance towards society, that is, art should raise issues of injustice in society. This is in line with proponents of the Frankfurt school and their ideas surrounding the potential of art to perform critical and emancipatory functions (cf. Tanner, 2003). Art is appreciated as a vehicle to bring about social, political and cultural change by challenging norms, traditions and exposing inequalities and injustices (cf. Gallhofer and Haslam, 1996).

*The functional aesthetic.* The functional aesthetic is reminiscent of the taste for necessity as outlined by Bourdieu (1984; see also Bennett, 2011). Bourdieu argues that taste is developed in relation to the conditions of existence of individuals, that is, their place in l’espace social. In his empirical results, he found an aesthetic among the working classes which stresses functional aspects of the aesthetic experience, rather than formal aspects. In this way, this aesthetic favours art which does something to spectators and brings them into another world. This aesthetic is contrasted by a more distanced approach Bourdieu found among individuals occupying higher positions in the social field, that is, the doctrine of l’art pour l’art, an aristocratic asceticism where form – rather than substance – is central to the aesthetic experience and key to appreciation of art.
The functional aesthetic expresses itself in an aptitude for an emotional and escapist aesthetic experience. In this experience, art is appreciated when it moves spectators, when it relaxes them and when it makes them forget day-to-day worries. This resonates with Elias’ suggestions on the social function of leisure to escape and counterbalance the stress of everyday life (Elias and Dunning, 1993).

The modernist aesthetic. The modernist aesthetic is a reaction/challenge to the classical aesthetic which favours beauty, harmony, realism and craftsmanship in artworks. In the classical aesthetic, the display of craftsmanship is central in the judgement of art (cf. Becker, 1978), and beauty has traditionally been considered as the paradigmatic aesthetic quality (cf. Kieran, 1997). Additionally, the idea of realism is central and pertains to the idea that works of art can be evaluated on their mimetic values, that is, the extent to which artworks imitate objects from nature realistically (cf. Bergesen, 1984). The modernist stance opposes to these classical conceptions and centres on an art-for-art’s sake attitude and views art as formalist, aesthetic and without function (Milbrandt, 1998).

The postmodern aesthetic. This aesthetic is grounded in the idea that knowledge, truths and values are not absolute, but cultural constructs. It is situated in a break, a shift away from modernity and its modus operandi (cf. Featherstone, 2007; Milbrandt, 1998). Multiple views and tolerance for ambiguity are considered of paramount importance. This goes together with an effacement of older categories and boundaries, most notably, the boundary between high culture and mass/popular culture (Featherstone, 2007; Jameson, 1983).

2.5. Empirical strategy

Our theoretical framing considers three levels of cultural consumption, which differ in terms of self-consciousness. The first level refers to taste and to actual preferences and judgements about particular cultural objects. The second level contains abstract evaluation criteria and expectations towards the arts. The third level refers to dispositions acquired during socialization. While these dispositions are considered inaccessible potentialities, we believe that our evaluation criteria present an attitudinal approximation of the aesthetic dispositions in the Bourdieusian sense.

Our empirical strategy to test the sameness hypothesis consists of three steps: (1) In the first step, we differentiate different taste profiles. We want to create clusters within the art museum audience consisting of individuals who resemble one another as closely as possible in terms of manifested preferences – that is, preferences towards artefacts of a number of artists.

(2) In the second step, we want to know whether these taste profiles are associated with aesthetic dispositions. Furthermore, we want to see how these taste profiles are related to socio-demographic characteristics and, especially, whether or not these profiles are related to characteristics of social inequality. This will provide insight into the extent to which manifested preferences are
associated with mere differentiation or whether these preferences function as status markers within the context of art museums.

(3) In the third step, we focus on visitors of the art museum audience with the same manifested preferences. We investigate whether there are dispositional differences among visitors with the same taste profile. If the sameness assumption applies, we should not find any dispositional differences. If we find dispositional differences, we will – like in the previous step – include socio-demographic characteristics to get at an understanding of whether these dispositional differences within taste profiles are indicators of mere differentiation or whether they play a role in status demarcation, that is, in social distinction.

3. Data and methods

3.1. Data

We use data from a large-scale audience survey in Ghent (Belgium). Data were collected in two art museums, that is, the municipal museum of contemporary art (S.M.A.K.) and the museum of fine arts (MSK) between 13 March and 13 April 2012. By means of time sampling, we randomly selected 40 periods of 2.5 hours. During weekdays, every visitor was contacted; during weekends, we systematically selected every second visitor when he or she entered the museum (cf. Roose, 2007). We obtained a realized sample of 1448 with a response rate of 61%.

3.2. Measures

Ways of preferring. To measure aesthetic dispositions, we include items in our questionnaire which are grounded in the four aesthetics described in the theoretical part. The respondent has to evaluate different propositions on the aesthetic experience on 6-point Likert items. By means of these items, we arrive at an attitudinal approximation of aesthetic dispositions. To get a grasp at the different aesthetic dispositions typical for the art museum audience, we perform an exploratory factor analysis on 12 items using IBM SPSS (2012), version 21.0. We retain four factors (eigenvalue ≥ 1). Regression scores are computed for each respondent and thus have means of zero and standard deviations (SDs) which approximate 1. The factor solution is presented in Table 1.

The first factor captures the critical aesthetic, that is, the extent to which individuals value art when it expresses criticism about society, when it raises issues of injustice and so on. The second factor refers to the modernist aesthetic and clearly distances itself from more classical approaches towards the arts which stress beauty, craftsmanship and realism. The third factor depicts the functional aesthetic and stresses the potential of art to relax and to ‘escape’ reality. Finally, the fourth factor is the
postmodern paradigm and expresses an aesthetic that manifests itself through the blurring of boundaries (e.g. ‘there is no such thing as bad art’) and the centrality of ideas in works of art.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art should be involved in societal debates</td>
<td>.781</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should be critical of society</td>
<td>.814</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>-.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should question social values</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should depict reality accurately</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.653</td>
<td>-.036</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One line or colour can suffice to create art</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art doesn’t have to be beautiful</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should make you forget day-to-day worries</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.767</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should bring you in another world</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.525</td>
<td>-.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should make you relax</td>
<td>-.146</td>
<td>-.292</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The idea of an artwork is more important than the execution</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.218</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can enjoy every work of art</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>-.121</td>
<td>.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no such thing as bad art</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taste profiles. Respondents are presented a list of artists. For each of the artists, respondents can indicate to what extent they appreciate each artist on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘don’t appreciate at all’ to ‘appreciate very much’ or whether they did not know the artist.\(^3\) We recoded answers from 1 to 3 as ‘dislike’, and answers 4 and 5 were recoded as ‘like’, thus arriving at trichotomous variables: (1) dislike, (2) like or (3) don’t know.

To construct the different taste profiles – that is, specific combinations of liking, disliking or not knowing different artists – we perform latent class analysis (LCA). This method allows us to explore latent structures among a set of observable categorical items (Lazarsfeld and Henry, 1968) and will be used here to discern different preferential profiles present in the art museum audience. For reasons of sparseness, we cannot include all artists presented in the questionnaire. We include five artists who can be considered proponents of different styles of art and which differentiate the art museum audience in terms of aesthetic preferences, that is, Marcel Duchamp, Peter Paul Rubens, Wassily Kandinsky, Jackson Pollock and Vincent Van Gogh. We selected these five artists in an attempt to do justice to the wide variety of preferences in the art museum audience. The LCA cluster solution we get using these five artists is very robust. For example, if we substitute Rubens with Caravaggio, we get the same cluster solution. We also performed a cluster analysis on a wider range of artists using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). MCA allows us to include more artists compared to LCA

\(^3\) Bourdieu (1984) defines taste as manifested preferences. In line with Bourdieu, and most consumption studies, we use the concept of ‘preferences’. However, our survey items assess ‘appreciation’, instead of preferences. As rightfully noted by one of the reviewers, preferences may not necessarily coincide with appreciations. Appreciation may refer more to liking that may be justified using abstract reasoned criteria which are socially valid rather than to the idiosyncrasies of (often arbitrary) personal preferences. However, this is an empirical issue and should be addressed in future research. To follow up on previous research and current discussions, we use the term ‘preferences’ throughout the article and consider it interchangeable with ‘appreciations’.
due to reasons of sparseness. Both methods result in the same preferential clusters. Therefore, we present and continue with the LCA cluster solution, which takes considerably less place in the article, compared to the presentation of an MCA cluster solution. Table 2 presents the model fit indices of the different LCA models, which were estimated using Latent GOLD 4.5 (Vermunt and Magidson, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCA-model</th>
<th>L²</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>BIC (L²)</th>
<th>AIC (L²)</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-cluster</td>
<td>217.3122</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-1215.2751</td>
<td>-180.6878</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-cluster</td>
<td>162.3931</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>-1191.0060</td>
<td>-213.9069</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-cluster</td>
<td>134.1383</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>-1140.0725</td>
<td>-218.8617</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of four clusters, we obtain model fit (p = .18). The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) favours the four-cluster model, while the Akaike information criterion (AIC) favours the six-cluster model. We select the five-cluster model which is – according to both model fit indices – the second best model. Furthermore, it is – as it has a cluster less and thus uses less degrees of freedom – a simpler model than the six-cluster model. While the solution of the four-cluster model and the five-cluster model is very similar, we favour the five-cluster model because it yields a solution which makes a lot of sense theoretically. Furthermore, this solution discerns – in contrast to the four-cluster solution – a cluster of uninterested visitors. We are not really interested in this cluster – as its members do not actually prefer anything, they do not really have a way of preferring – but it is useful to isolate these individuals, thus filtering them out of the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duchamp</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>.2030</td>
<td>.1414</td>
<td>.6592</td>
<td>.3651</td>
<td>.0784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like</td>
<td>.7054</td>
<td>.0750</td>
<td>.2331</td>
<td>.5814</td>
<td>.0720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>.0916</td>
<td>.7835</td>
<td>.1078</td>
<td>.0535</td>
<td>.8496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rubens</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>.0978</td>
<td>.1498</td>
<td>.2194</td>
<td>.6658</td>
<td>.6963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like</td>
<td>.9022</td>
<td>.8337</td>
<td>.7806</td>
<td>.3342</td>
<td>.0335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0165</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.2702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kandinsky</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>.0588</td>
<td>.1221</td>
<td>.4777</td>
<td>.2423</td>
<td>.0949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like</td>
<td>.9216</td>
<td>.3676</td>
<td>.5125</td>
<td>.7141</td>
<td>.1569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>.0196</td>
<td>.5103</td>
<td>.0098</td>
<td>.0436</td>
<td>.7482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pollock</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>.0941</td>
<td>.1286</td>
<td>.8481</td>
<td>.1530</td>
<td>.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like</td>
<td>.8994</td>
<td>.1772</td>
<td>.1038</td>
<td>.7650</td>
<td>.1267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>.0065</td>
<td>.6942</td>
<td>.0122</td>
<td>.0820</td>
<td>.8706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Van Gogh</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>.0172</td>
<td>.0790</td>
<td>.1377</td>
<td>.3076</td>
<td>.6907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like</td>
<td>.9770</td>
<td>.9210</td>
<td>.8623</td>
<td>.6832</td>
<td>.2624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>.0059</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0091</td>
<td>.0469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cluster sizes | 2843 | 2654 | 2197 | 1935 | 0371 |
The conditional probabilities of the five-cluster model are presented in Table 3. The first cluster is the biggest cluster as it constitutes 28% of our sample. It consists of visitors liking all the included artists, as all conditional probabilities for liking are high. For example, .70 for liking Duchamp denotes that individuals belonging to this cluster have a .70 probability of liking Duchamp. Based on the conditional probabilities, this cluster is termed ‘art lovers’. Visitors in the second cluster (27% of the sample) have high probabilities for liking the classical, consecrated artists – for example, .83 for Rubens – combined with high conditional probabilities for not knowing more modern artists such as Duchamp or Pollock. Due to their lack of knowledge of more recent and less consecrated visual artists, individuals in the second cluster are termed ‘naïve visitors’. The third cluster – 22% of the sample – comprises visitors who share the preferences – that is, the ‘likes’ – of individuals from the second cluster. They like Rubens and Van Gogh (.78 and .86, respectively). However, instead of not knowing the more modern artists, they know artists like Duchamp and Pollock, but overtly dislike them. This can be seen because the conditional probabilities for disliking Duchamp and Pollock are .66 and .88, respectively. We term this third cluster the ‘classics’. The fourth cluster – 19% of our sample – consists of the ‘modernists’. These visitors have high conditional probabilities for modern artists – for example, they like Pollock – but overtly dislike figurative artists such as Rubens. The fifth cluster consists – as mentioned earlier – of visitors who do not like any of the included artists and is also the smallest cluster in the audience (4%). They dislike all artists or do not know them. In the scope of this article, we are not really interested in these ‘indifferent visitors’, but it is useful for the analyses to exclude them from the other clusters.

**Social position.** We operationalize social position as educational level. Previous research has shown educational level to be an excellent predictor for social position (e.g. DiMaggio and Useem, 1978b), and in Flanders, the cultural field is especially structured along educational lines (e.g. Roose et al., 2012). Because art museum audiences are generally higher educated than the general population, we only differentiate between two educational levels. Thus, we distinguish (1) secondary education or lower (29.6%) and (2) higher education (70.4%).

We control for age (mean: 45.3 years; SD: 18.09) and gender (53.3 % female). Additionally, we add a variable which indicates whether or not the respondent took any sort of art education. This variable is used as a proxy to some sort of self-acquired cultural capital. Furthermore, this setting is expected to be an environment where dispositions are more easily discursified. In our sample, 39.5% took some sort of art education.

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4 We also included a more differentiated measure of educational level in preliminary analyses (not shown), that is, secondary education or lower (29.6%), higher education, but no university (32.5%), and university (37.9%). However, between the two highest educated categories, no differences were found. Therefore, these two categories were merged.
4. Results

4.1. Dispositional differences between taste profiles

In the first place, we want to see whether or not there are dispositional differences between the taste profiles. Table 4 presents the mean scores of the different clusters on the aesthetic dispositions. We clearly see that the art lovers and the modernists have a similar dispositional profile. In the same vein, the dispositions of the classics and the naïve visitors are very much alike. What is also clear is that the dispositional differences between the clusters are predominantly aligned along the modernist disposition. This is also clear when we request post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction (results not shown, available on request).

The predominance of the modernist disposition as the main dispositional difference between the taste profiles becomes even more clear when we control for socio-demographic variables. By means of a multinomial logistic regression, we get a better idea of the profiles of the different preferential clusters (see Table 5).

First, we investigate dispositional differences between the taste profiles, which are especially expressed in terms of the modernist disposition. For example, naïve visitors and classics clearly score lower on the modernist disposition compared to modernists. Additionally and interestingly, the multinomial logistic regression shows that the taste profiles are very similar in terms of socio-demographic variables. Gender is unrelated to cluster membership, and for age we only find members of the classics to be older than the modernists. In terms of art education, we find that individuals who followed art education have higher chances of belonging to the art lovers compared to the modernists. This makes sense because art education provides the individual with very wide and varied cultural registers, allowing them to enjoy works of arts originating from very different aesthetic traditions.

Table 4. Mean scores of the preferential clusters on the aesthetic dispositions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aesthetic dispositions</th>
<th>Art lovers</th>
<th>Naïve visitors</th>
<th>Classics</th>
<th>Modernists</th>
<th>Indifferent visitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>-0.718</td>
<td>-1.197</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>-3.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernist</td>
<td>0.3496</td>
<td>-0.4422</td>
<td>-2.612</td>
<td>0.3387</td>
<td>-1.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.1468</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-1.193</td>
<td>0.1329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodern</td>
<td>0.1773</td>
<td>-0.0493</td>
<td>-2.549</td>
<td>0.0196</td>
<td>0.0361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to educational level, we find— and this is striking – that the taste profiles are very similar. We find that naïve visitors are lower educated compared to modernists. However, modernist, classics and art lovers appear to have a very similar educational profile. So, in terms of social inequality, these profiles do not differ substantially. If we include income, we do not find any difference between the different profiles either (results not shown, available on request). The similarity of the socio-demographic profile of the taste profiles is striking, suggesting that preferences do not function as status markers within the context of art museums.
### Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression (reference category: modernists): Logits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Art lovers</th>
<th>Naïve visitors</th>
<th>Classics</th>
<th>Indifferent visitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>-.258</td>
<td>.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aesthetic dispositions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.188</td>
<td>-.141</td>
<td>-.664**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernist</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>-.326***</td>
<td>-.106***</td>
<td>-.912***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodernist</td>
<td>.320*</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>-.243</td>
<td>.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.751***</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>-.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art education</td>
<td>.610**</td>
<td>-.652**</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>-.951*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>-.217</td>
<td>-.180</td>
<td>-.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>.012*</td>
<td>-.096***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

### 4.2. Dispositional differences within taste profiles

To study dispositional differences within the taste profiles, we perform multivariate analysis of variance (MANCOVA) within every profile, with aesthetic dispositions as dependent variables. If the sameness assumption holds, we should not find any effect in these different MANCOVA’s which are presented in Table 6.

#### Table 6: Dispositional differences within taste profiles.

**MANCOVA within art lovers.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Modernist</th>
<th>Postmodernist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>-.225</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>.334**</td>
<td>.626**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>.239**</td>
<td>-.169</td>
<td>-.151</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Education</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.179*</td>
<td>-.172*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>.137*</td>
<td>-.234*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001.

**MANCOVA within naïve visitors.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Modernist</th>
<th>Postmodernist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>-.378</td>
<td>-.502*</td>
<td>-.645**</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>.339***</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.005*</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>- .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Education</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.345**</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-.273**</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.339***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001.

**MANCOVA within classics.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Modernist</th>
<th>Postmodernist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>-.805**</td>
<td>-.255</td>
<td>-.338</td>
<td>-.525*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>.331**</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.157*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Education</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>-.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001.

**MANCOVA within modernists.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Modernist</th>
<th>Postmodernist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.761*</td>
<td>-.218</td>
<td>-.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>.286*</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.008*</td>
<td>.011*</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Education</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.399***</td>
<td>.165*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.336</td>
<td>-.126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .001.

We observe that there are effects from age and gender within the taste profiles. For example, we see that in every profile female visitors appreciate functional aspects of art more than male visitors.
This corroborates research on aesthetic dispositions of the audience of classical concerts (Roose, 2008). As to age differences, we find significant age differences within the modernists and the naïve visitors as to the functional disposition.

Furthermore, we find differences within taste profiles which are aligned along characteristics of social inequality. First, we find dispositional differences within preferential clusters between individuals who have followed art education and those who did not. These differences express themselves in the modernist and the postmodernist disposition. Among the art lovers, the naïve visitors and the modernists, we see that individuals who took art education score higher on the modernist disposition (.179, .345 and .399, respectively). Additionally, among the modernists, art education is related to higher scores on the postmodernist disposition (i.e. .165), while among art lovers it is associated with lower scores on this disposition (i.e. -.172). This negative association within the art lovers may indicate a sort of ceiling effect. Because these art lovers already have very high scores on the postmodernist disposition, art education might function as a restraint within this taste profile.

Second, educational differences express themselves in dispositional differences within taste profiles. Within the art lovers and within the naïve visitors, higher education is associated with lower scores on the postmodernist disposition (-.234 and -.339, respectively). Furthermore, within the naïve visitors, we find that higher educated individuals have a lower appreciation for functional aspects of visual art (-.273). These results indicate that within taste profiles – that is, clusters of individuals who have very similar preferences – we can find dispositional differences. These differences are associated with the characteristics age and gender, but also with characteristics which are related to social inequality.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this article, we empirically explored the sameness assumption, an assumption central to the sociology of consumption which has been challenged on theoretical grounds by Turner (1994, 2002). First, we find that the different taste profiles within an art museum audience do not strongly differ from one another in terms of socio-demographic variables and/or social position (measured as educational level). Second, we find that visitors with the same taste profiles – that is, individuals who like, dislike or don’t know the same artists – may have quite different aesthetic dispositions towards the arts. Not only do we find these dispositional fault lines traversing taste profiles to align with socio-demographic variables – for example, gender and age – but these fault lines also align with our indicator for social inequality – that is, educational level.
What do these results imply? First, they suggest that we need to re-evaluate and re-think some of the basic mechanisms central to Bourdieu’s theory as our results do not support the sameness assumption. Within taste profiles – that is, individuals with the same preferences towards a set of artists – we find a variety of aesthetic dispositions to be present. This challenges the theoretical claim made by Bourdieu (1984, 1990) that preferences are rooted in dispositions, and suggests that – as Turner (1994) puts it – ‘overt behaviour in two people may have a quite different causal ancestry in each person’ (p. 19).

Second, our results suggest that manifested taste is not – or only to a small degree – associated with distinction in the context of art museums. Whether individuals like Rubens and dislike Duchamp or the other way around is not really a source of distinction in this particular setting. This makes sense because all of the included artists are consecrated. Their works are being exhibited in the most famous art museums worldwide. However, in our opinion, this does not mean that our results do not have implications for settings beyond art museums. Cultural distinction is not an instrumental strategy – as was, for example, suggested by Simmel’s (1957) in his account of fashion (see also Daenekindt and Roose, 2013b) – but rather is shaped by habitualized schemes and action as a result of different socialization experiences. Cultural preferences and practices are unconscious expressions of the individual’s position in the social field (Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, our findings may be generalized to other contexts than art museums and have broader appeal to sociologists of consumption and cultural sociologists.

What does all of this mean for social reproduction? Did distinction really ‘go underground’ and can ways of preferring function as status markers? A central claim in our article is that aesthetic dispositions are not observable to bystanders. In this way, they cannot function as status-rendering characteristics as in the Bourdieusian model of social reproduction. However, possibly – this is an issue that should be addressed empirically in further research – our conception of ways of preferring is to some extent related to Rössel’s (2011) and Schwarz’s (2013) interpretation of appropriation of art. Styles of consumption (Rössel, 2011) and tasting techniques (Schwarz, 2013) can be visible and thus possibly status-rendering. As Schwarz (2013) notes, ‘people also read the ways in which others consume cultural objects’ (p. 423). However, we believe that the potential of these styles of consumption as a source of distinction is more limited in terms of scope compared to the objectified form of cultural consumption. For a characteristic to function as a status marker, it needs to be discerned and subsequently associated with status by bystanders. In this way, we believe styles of consumption to be able to function as status markers in specialized contexts, that is, in contexts where art lovers meet, for example, a museum, an opera, a wine tasting. Only in these contexts the individual will encounter bystanders who will recognize and value certain styles of consumption. Distinction by means of ‘what’ is being preferred is somehow ‘exhausted’, ‘worn out’ in a context where all participants express appreciation for legitimate cultural products. It is exactly in these settings that
styles of consumption – as understood by Rössel and Schwarz – may emerge as a new source of distinction and serve as a basis for social exclusion. In settings outside these specialized art contexts, there is plenty of variety in the status associated with cultural objects, which feeds the potential to distinguish by means of the cultural products themselves. Additionally, because consumers are less likely to be surrounded by other connoisseurs in these settings, their style of consumption might not be noted by bystanders, let alone, recognized in terms of associated status.

While we are convinced to have reliable proxies of aesthetic dispositions, it may still be argued that we only measure abstract evaluation criteria and grasp nothing from the underlying dispositions. Consider this worst case scenario, where the proxies included in the analyses do not measure anything of the underlying aesthetic dispositions and exclusively reflect abstract evaluation criteria. Would this make our analyses meaningless? No, and this is for two reasons. (1) Our results show that the sameness assumption does not apply. However, picturing the continuum ranging from pre-suppositional dispositions to actual consumed cultural objects, our attitudinal proxies of dispositions lie towards the end of the pre-suppositional dispositions. There is no reason at all to think that the results would be any different in the – fictitious – best case scenario where we would be able to measure dispositions perfectly. This is because the abstract evaluation criteria can be considered to lie in between the two other levels of cultural consumption, that is, the theoretical dispositions and the actual acts of consumption. (2) Additionally, again assuming the worst case scenario, our results still have important implications as they refute the encoding–decoding model of cultural consumption. In this model, any act of aesthetic appreciation requires an act of deciphering. Furthermore, this model states that the cultural code used in this act of deciphering has to match the code the cultural producer used to ‘encode’ the cultural product (Bourdieu, 1993b; Lizardo, 2011). This semiotic intellectualism is central to Bourdieu’s (1984) Distinction and his earlier work (e.g. Bourdieu, 1993a; he relaxes his position on this in his later work; for a discussion on this see Lizardo (2011)). Our results indicate that it is possible to consume and appreciate cultural objects in different ways by applying different evaluation criteria. This finding alone has pervasive implications for the understanding of the aesthetic experience.

For this article, we were inspired by ideas from Stephen Turner (1994, 2002). His critique on Bourdieu is – in our opinion – ground-breaking and challenges some very basic assumptions which are central to consumer research and to sociology in general. We hope that this article can serve as an impetus to further re-think and challenge some of these basic assumptions and to further theoretical reflections and debates with empirical research.
6. References


Chapter 3

De-institutionalization of High Culture? Realized Curricula in Secondary Education in Flanders, 1930-2000

Abstract

Based on findings and suggestions originating from educational research, several cultural sociologists have claimed that the educational system has contributed to the erosion of the institutionalized character of fine arts throughout the 20th century. However, empirical research to substantiate this claim is scarce. We focus on secondary education in Flanders to study the centrality of high culture. Our goal is twofold: (1) We want to reflect on the ways the educational system can—via the process of institutionalization—infuse certain cultural products with status. (2) Additionally, we offer an exploratory analysis by studying whether the extent of institutionalization of traditional high culture in the educational system has decreased over the course of the 20th century. Our analyses indicate that—in the period 1930-2000—both high and low cultural forms are increasingly being represented in the school context. However, we find that the increment of high culture is especially situated in the academic track—the most prestigious track, designed to cultivate the future elite. In this way, throughout the 20th century, the educational system continued to channel high culture to the upper social strata of society, thus infusing these forms of culture with status.
1. Introduction

Institutions play a central role in the creation and preservation of “high culture” as a status marker. The symbolic boundary between what constitutes art and what counts as non-art is maintained and reinforced by state institutions from the 18th century onwards. Some cultural products and activities are considered worthwhile endorsing, others are judged vulgar or mere entertainment. Cultural forms typically associated with bourgeois culture—such as classical music, opera, and literature—have been included in school curricula and are sponsored, celebrated and diffused by the state, thus granting them a high degree of legitimacy and consecration (e.g., Bourdieu, 1983; 1984; 1985; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; DiMaggio, 1982, 1991a). This institutional embeddedness provides the structural basis for the legitimacy of certain cultural forms to function as status markers and to be associated—in a very natural and self-evident way—with prestige and social status.

Several authors have argued that the importance of high culture as a status marker has dwindled. For example, Peterson and Kern (1996)—comparing data from 1982 with data from 1992—claim that a historical shift took place and that members of the social elites no longer exclusively consume highbrow culture, but also participate in lowbrow genres. This spurred several authors to the conclusion that highbrow arts have lost their monopoly in signalling and proclaiming positions of social dominance (e.g., Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson, 2005). Similarly, the literature on emerging forms of cultural capital claims that social advantages nowadays arise from familiarity with digital communication and technology, rather than a familiarity with traditional forms of high culture, such as classical music and opera (Prieur and Savage 2011, 2013). A number of explanations for this change have been proposed, such as the high rates of social and geographical mobility, value changes and a trend towards tolerance and openness (e.g., Daenekindt and Roose, 2014; DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004; Peterson and Kern, 1996). Others have stressed that the extent of institutionalization of high culture has declined over time. In this process the position of the arts is challenged because dominant institutions in society such as the state, the educational system, museums, elite newspapers, no longer exclusively grant legitimacy to high culture (Bryson, 1999; DiMaggio 1987, 1991; DiMaggio and Bryson, 2000; DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004; Van Eijck and Knulst, 2005). For example, DiMaggio and Bryson (2000) note the rise of the term ‘culture war’ in the press during the 80s and 90s. Additionally and paradoxically, artists themselves—e.g., Damien Hirst, Jeff Koons, Andy Warhol—challenge the consecrated position of traditional fine arts by including popular or vulgar aspects into their works (Crane, 1992).

In this article, we want to focus on the role of the educational system in this process of de-institutionalization and study whether the position of high culture in curricula changed during the 20th century. As societies have become increasingly differentiated, globalized and diverse in terms of culture, education needs to prepare students to be able to cope with multiple cultural worlds and
literacies, which results in more diversified, multicultural and eclectic courses and curricula (e.g., Brint, 2006; McEneaney and Meyer, 2000; Verdoodt et al., 2010). So, it makes sense to assume that the exclusive focus on high culture and on the Western canon in school curricula has decreased. Thus, educational and curricular evolutions during the 20th century may have contributed to the less institutionalized position—and the associated change in status—of high culture, a position expressed by several authors in cultural sociology (e.g., Bevers, 2005; Corse and Griffin, 1997; Roose and Daenekindt, 2015; Roy and Dowd, 2010; Van Eijck and Knulst, 2005; Verboord, 2003; Verboord and Van Rees, 2008, 2009).

However, the empirical underpinning of this de-institutionalization thesis in the educational system is meagre. Firstly, while there may be evidence for the fact that curricula in general have become more multicultural and diverse worldwide (e.g., McEneaney and Meyer, 2000), this does not necessarily imply that this trend also expresses itself in aesthetic/art education. As Verboord and Van Rees argue in their study on literary education “the erosion of boundaries between ‘high art’ and ‘low art’ may not be as clear-cut as has recently been suggested” (Verboord and Van Rees, 2008: 321). Secondly, empirical analyses on trends in school curricula are mainly based on very broad conceptions of art courses. For example, Benavot et al. (1991) use a broad category of courses labelled “aesthetic education”, which includes arts, handicraft, singing and dance; a category which makes conclusions on the de-institutionalization of the fine arts quite a stretch. Thirdly, research on art and aesthetics in curricula all too often focuses on official curricula or on textbooks, and may not be able to grasp the cultural products/practices that are actually presented and taught in class. While eclecticism and multiculturalism may have entered the official arts curricula, schools and teachers still have a lot of freedom as to what is actually presented in the school context and what aspects of the curriculum they stress/prioritize (Clandinin and Connelly, 1992; Schwab, 1983). As discussions on the legitimacy of cultural products often remain implicit (Janssen et al., 2011), possible changes in the institutionalized status of cultural products may be difficult to detect by exclusively focusing on official curricula or textbooks.

In this article, we want to reflect on how the educational system as an institution infuses certain cultural products/activities with status. Additionally, we want to see whether there are trends in this infusion over the course of the 20th century. Thus, we explore the extent of institutionalization of different cultural forms in secondary education using types of school-related cultural participation as indicators. Secondary education is one of the dominant institutions in the diffusion of cultural classification systems in society and the educational system in general ensures the production of individuals who are imbued with the differentiation and hierarchization of cultural products in a given society (Bourdieu, 1985: 23). We address cultural practices in school—rather than official curricula or textbooks—to grasp which forms of culture schools and teachers prioritize and actually present in the school context.
2. Theory

2.1. Cultural classification systems and institutionalization

A cultural classification system refers to “the way that the work of artists is divided up both in the heads and habits of consumers and by the institutions that bound the production and distribution of separate genres” (DiMaggio, 1987: 441). It refers to the dominant discourse in a society on the differentiation and the associated hierarchization of cultural products. This discourse is socially constructed, and the position of cultural products in the cultural classification system is never fixed. Boundaries between cultural products and genres are constantly being contested (Baumann, 2007; Corse and Griffin, 1997; Crane, 1992; DiMaggio, 1987; Levine, 1988). The literature provides convincing data and arguments for the need of an institutional embeddedness of a hierarchization to gain legitimacy and to attain a universally valid and self-evident character (e.g., Baumann, 2001, 2007; DiMaggio 1982, 1991a, 1991b; Dowd et al., 2002; Lamont, 1992; Levine, 1988; Janssen, 1999; Janssen et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2006; Shapiro and Heinich, 2007; Verboord, 2003, 2010). Especially DiMaggio’s work on the cultural entrepreneurship in nineteenth-century Boston illustrates how the boundary between high and low culture is being substantiated by building organizations and institutions around it that support and propagate this boundary (DiMaggio, 1982).

As Selznick famously stated, to institutionalize is to infuse with status (Selznick, 1957, 1996). Additionally, as argued by Bourdieu (1983: 318-319, 1985: 23), the symbolic production of works of art—i.e., the production of the value, the recognition attached to works of art—is the result of the interplay between different agents, e.g., journalism/newspaper coverage (e.g., Kersten, 2014; Verboord, 2010; Van Venrooij and Schmutz, 2010), film festivals (Baumann, 2001), or non-profit organisations, such as art museums (e.g., DiMaggio, 1982) or symphony orchestras (e.g., Dowd et al., 2002). Especially the educational system plays an influential role (e.g., Baumann, 2001; Bourdieu, 1983; 1985; Van Venrooij and Schmutz, 2010). In this article, we want to reflect on how the educational system institutionalizes cultural products and practices as high culture. Additionally, we want to study whether the institutionalized status position of cultural forms has been affected over time.

Our focus on the educational system is based on two arguments. In the first place, the educational system plays a pervasive role in the process of institutionalization as it is a powerful agent in the generational transmission of social constructs (Zucker, 1977). The educational system enables individuals—i.e., consumers—to recognize, value and appreciate art:

The education system fulfils a culturally legitimizing function by reproducing, via the delimitation of what deserves to be conserved, transmitted and acquired, the distinction between the legitimate and the illegitimate way of dealing with legitimate works (Bourdieu, 1985: 23).
Additionally, trends in the educational system can provide insights into trends in wider society. An important constraint for educational organisations in what and how they teach is that—in order to maintain trust, confidence and legitimacy—they need to conform to institutionalized norms and values viable in broader society (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 2006; Rowan, 1982). In this sense, our focus on the educational system may also grant insight into legitimate cultural classification systems in wider society.

2.2. Internal stratified nature of the educational system

The educational system is not a homogeneous institution and the extent of propagating high culture will differ between primary schools, secondary school and universities. Additionally, within secondary education, there are pervasive differences in terms of the presence of high culture between educational tracks (Bevers, 2005). Secondary education in Flanders—i.e., the Northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium—has a strong track-based educational system (e.g., Van Houtte et al., 2012). In contrast to the North-American setting, tracks in Europe exist as well-defined, separate segments in the educational system. Thus, tracks refer to clearly differentiated curricula and secondary education is generally divided in an academic, a vocational and a technical track (e.g., Brunello and Checchi, 2007). In Flanders there are three main tracks: academic, technical and vocational. There is a clear hierarchy in these tracks, as the technical and especially the vocational track are esteemed less compared to the academic track (e.g., Demanet and Van Houtte, 2013; Boone and Van Houtte, 2013; Van Praag et al., 2013).

The idea behind tracking is that pupils are grouped based on their abilities and their aspirations, thus creating homogenous groups which would benefit teaching—an idea that has been criticized since the practice of tracking has a lot of unintended negative consequences (e.g., Hallinan, 1994; Rosenbaum, 1975; Van Houtte and Stevens, 2010). The academic track prepares pupils for higher education—and is widely considered the most demanding and prestigious track—while the vocational track is designed to prepare pupils for the job market. The status-differences between the different tracks comprise different aspects. For example, while allocation processes from primary to secondary education depend on specific educational systems ¹, research has shown that these allocation processes are socially biased as pupils from lower social strata are underrepresented in the academic track (e.g., Boone and Van Houtte, 2013; Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede, 2007; Vanfossen et al., 1987). Additionally, it has been shown that the practice of tracking has detrimental social psychological effects for pupils in vocational and technical tracks, for example on their self-esteem (e.g., Hallinan,

¹ In the Flemish educational system, there are no standardized tests which are used in the allocation process from primary to secondary education. For an excellent overview on these processes—and their implications—applied on the Flemish context, see Boone and Van Houtte (2013).
1994; Van Houtte, 2005). Also, tracking is strongly correlated to prospective status positions in society (e.g., Blau and Duncan, 1967; Meyer, 1977). In these ways, curriculum differentiation between tracks is intrinsically linked to status (e.g., Alexander et al., 1978; Rosenbaum, 1975). Because both educational tracks and culture are associated with status, different forms of culture can be expected to be present in the different tracks.

2.3. School curricula

The content of curricula is always a selection of the available knowledge, practices, values, etc. characteristic for a society. So, much like the struggles that take place over what is legitimate and what is illegitimate art, the content of curricula is an arena for symbolic struggles over what needs to be taught. Subjects included in the curriculum are “surrounded with an aura of special significance” (Brint, 2006: 99; see also: Meyer, 1977); recognition in the curriculum is a form of cultural status and a legitimation of this status at the same time. Or as Bourdieu puts it, schools ensure “[…] the elevation of works into ‘classics’ by their very inclusion in curricula” (Bourdieu, 1985: 26).

In the process of institutionalization, some organizations get interpenetrated by an institutional logic, others do not (Zucker 1987; Dunn and Jones 2010). This openness/vulnerability depends on the organization’s distinctive history and its goals, motives, and values (Selznick 1957; Zucker, 1987; see also DiMaggio, 1991). In the same way, the contents of curricula in secondary education are a strong reflection of the historical and ideological origins (Kamens et al., 1996). Educational systems—especially in Europe—have a strong elitist tradition (Kamens et al., 1996). For example, in Flanders, the technical track was only developed in the course of the 19th century, as a reaction to the industrial revolution—much later than the academic track (D’hoker and Henkens, 2005). The technical track was completely separated from the ‘intellectual culture’ of the academic track and was characterized by a strong utilitarian stress. Only from the twenties onwards, general courses such as hygiene, mother tongue and mathematics were introduced in the technical track. The academic track has its origin in the idea of creating the future elites who would “accept the mission and values of the dominant power” (Kamens et al., 1996: 119; see also D’hoker and Henkens, 2005). In this sense, the content of the academic curriculum tends to be especially relevant for the social elites (e.g., Bauman, 2007; Brint, 2006; Goodson, 1994).

In curriculum research, a distinction is generally made between the intended (or official) curriculum—i.e., what policy makers intended—and the realized/delivered curriculum—i.e., what is actually being taught in the classroom (e.g., Cuban, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Valcke, 2010). In this sense, the teacher/educator can be seen as a curriculum maker himself/herself (cf., Clandinin and Connelly, 1992). “Teachers will not and cannot be merely told what to do. […] There are thousand ingenious ways in which commands on what and how to teach can, will, and must be modified or circumvented in the actual moments of teaching.” (Schwab, 1983: 245). Additionally, while national curricula are
actually quite popular worldwide, Flanders is in this respect an exception, as schools are given a lot of autonomy to prioritize goals, or to add aspects to the official curriculum (D’hoker and Henkens, 2005; Valcke, 2010). Especially in such decentralized educational systems official curricula and realized curricula might diverge substantially (Stevenson and Baker, 1991).

So, official curricula and/or textbooks are not necessarily good indicators of the curricula that are constructed and enacted in the school context (e.g., Verhouven and Verloop 2002). For this reason, we focus on cultural practices occurring in the school context. School excursions that are part of the pedagogical project of the school—such as cultural or sports activities—are compulsory for students in Flanders. ² These practices may, for example, be framed in the classes of art, literature or history and may give us a better understanding as to what schools and educators believe is worthy and necessary to pass on to pupils. For high culture, we include ‘visiting museums’ and ‘attending theatre’. These measures for high culture fit with the traditional Bildungsideal, where the mind has to be cultivated by reading literature and poetry, visiting museums and attending classical concerts, opera and theatre (Van Eijck and Knulst, 2005). For low culture, we include ‘visiting musicals’ and ‘going to the cinema’. Cinema attendance can be characterized by internal variation in terms of high and low culture. However, attending cinema deviates from the traditional conception of Bildung; as does attending musicals. The distinction between high and low culture as presented here—and thus ‘fixing’ certain forms of culture as high or low—is a bit awkward because, as the literature described above convincingly argues, the status of cultural goods is socially constructed and always in flux. However, this distinction is necessary here for analytical purposes and because our data do not allow to assess possible shifts within cultural practices over time.

We are aware that the cultural practices included are crude measures of ‘culture at school’, but we are convinced that these are valid proxies and that they can give us indications of trends in the presence of culture in the educational system. We will use these cultural practices as indicators of realized curriculum to grasp the extent of institutionalization of cultural products in the educational system, where we consider inclusion in the curriculum as indicator of institutionalization. Institutionalization is not simply present or absent, it exists in different degrees and once something reaches high levels of institutionalisation there is a resistance to change (e.g., Zucker 1977: 730). Decreases in levels of institutionalization—sometimes referred to as processes of de-institutionalization—require major shifts in the environment (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).

² School excursions that are part of the pedagogical project of the school—such as cultural activities or sports activities—are compulsory for students. Only when these excursion last longer than one day, they lose their mandatory status (unless otherwise stated in the school regulations) (Flemish Ministry of Education and Training, 2014). Because it is highly unlikely that the cultural activities listed in our survey exceed one day, we can assume that when these activities are organized by a school, all students participate.
2.4. Time/change: possible cultural pedagogic regimes

Curricula are not stable over time, because changes in society and culture are mirrored in curricula changes (cf., Bevers, 2005; Brint, 2006). As societies become increasingly differentiated in terms of social roles, schools and curricula are key in preparing and allocating individuals to this wide and increasing variety of roles. Also, during the second part of the 20th century, upcoming values such as liberalism and multiculturalism and processes of globalization and glocalisation had a profound impact on curricula (McEneaney and Meyer, 2000). So, a general trend in curricula worldwide is the inclusion of racial, ethnic and regional minorities, females and lower status groups and in culture, literature and art, canons are weakened (Bryson, 1999; McEneaney and Meyer, 2000; Verboord and Van Rees, 2009). For example, Frank et al. (1994) find that, in the period from 1910 to 1990, history curricula at U.S. universities become broader, for example by including a wider range of social subgroups in the covered material. Also, in the 60s and 70s, minority groups started fighting the absence of literature of their members in the canon (Corse and Griffin, 1997; see also: Bryson, 2002). A similar trend is observed in music education, where low genres such as rock and pop were included in music education during the 70s (Dyndahl and Nielsen, 2013). History, literature, art, and language courses all broaden and diversify (e.g., McEneaney and Meyer, 2000) bringing along an erosion of the boundary between “high” and “low” culture.

So, by the end of the sixties, a pervasive change occurred in terms of representation of “high” and “low” culture in curricula. Yet, it is hard to imagine that these societal changes immediately changed the opinion and practices of teachers and educators employed at that time. The translation of the societal changes in the sixties into curricula changes—both official and realized curricula—must have taken some time. In this way, we may differentiate three cultural-pedagogic regimes. (1) In the first cultural-pedagogic regime—the pre-sixties—there is a strong emphasis on the classics, on consecrated art. (2) The second regime is the consequence of the societal changes during the sixties and ranges from the early sixties to the early eighties. This results in more eclectic official curricula, but this eclecticism may not have entered the realized curricula yet, as the employed teachers and educators are the product of the first cultural-pedagogic regime. (3) In the third regime—beginning in the mid-eighties—the societal changes of the sixties manifest themselves into the dominant values and views of teachers educators, as they are formed in the second regime.

Another trend in curricula—crosscutting and developing in the background of these three regimes—is the increasing inclusion of activities taking place outside the formal academic program. This increase during the 20th century is founded in a changing attitude of educators towards extra-mural activities. Educators increasingly recognize activities/practices as a vital part of the educational experience and their potential as effective socialization mechanisms to attain educational objectives (e.g., Berk, 1992).
2.5. Hypotheses and empirical approach

Considering the internally stratified nature of the educational system, we want to conceptually distinguish two scenarios of institutionalisation; a distinction which in the literature on institutionalization has gone largely unnoticed. In the first scenario, high culture is predominantly present in the academic track—the prestigious, status-generating stratum of the educational system which channels individuals into high status jobs. In the second scenario, high culture penetrates every educational track—that is, every aspect and every stratum of the educational system. Both scenarios can have different consequences in terms of the institutionalisation and consecration of cultural forms as prestigious. In the first situation,—where these forms of culture are predominantly disseminated to (future) elites—these cultural forms are associated with high status and thus play a role in the reinforcement of social inequality. In this scenario, pupils who are being channelled to become future members of the social elites, are socialized—much more than other pupils—to acquire a taste for these forms of culture. This situation can apply when the elitist origins of the educational system continue to express itself in curricula. In the second situation, high culture—being disseminated to all strata of society—loses its potential to express status differences, and thus becomes some sort of “default”—that is, status-neutral—culture. Or as could be argued, an expression of national taste, not being able to signal symbolic boundaries between social status groups. This scenario applies when societal changes and the associated developments in curricula resulted in a situation where traditional high culture is no longer predominantly associated to the academic track in the educational system. These two scenarios result in two hypotheses:

1) Traditional high culture continues to be predominantly associated to the academic track, i.e. the most prestigious stratum of the educational system.

2) Traditional high culture loses its exclusive association with the academic track and in this sense the contribution of the educational system to the infusion of these cultural forms with status weakens.

To test these hypotheses, we focus on cultural practices enacted in the context of secondary education. Based on the literature, we differentiate different cultural-pedagogic regimes, and investigate whether trends can be found in the presence/absence of “high” and “low” cultural practices in the different tracks over time in secondary education in Flanders.
3. Data and methods

3.1. Data

We use data from the survey “Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003-2004”, based on a representative sample of the Flemish population—i.e., the Dutch speaking population of Belgium. Data were collected from 2,849 randomly selected individuals by means of computer-assisted face-to-face interviews (Lievens et al., 2006). Response rate is 61.0. The questions that we use—assessing cultural participation in the school context—were only presented to heads of the family or their partners, which restricts our data to 2,363 respondents.

3.2. Measurements

Cultural practices in the school context. We use the presence of cultural activities within the school context as a proxy of the institutional embeddedness of different cultural products in the educational system. Respondents were asked whether or not they participated in a range of cultural activities organized by the school between the age of twelve and fourteen years. The reason to focus on this age-period is because pre-tests revealed that this period was best remembered by individuals as this is an important transition period in the educational career—i.e., twelve is the age where individuals move from primary education to secondary education (Lievens et al., 2006: 204). We have two different cultural practices indicative for high art, i.e., “visiting a museum” and “attending a theatre, a ballet or a dance performance”. For low cultural practices we have “attending a show or musical” and “going to the cinema”.

Cultural-pedagogic regime. The age of the respondents ranges from 17 to 85 (mean = 50.37; SD = 16.09). So, the oldest individuals in the data were born in 1918 and the youngest were born in 1987. This means that the questions on the school-related cultural activities address the period 1930 to 2001. In line with the cultural-pedagogic regimes described and demarcated in the theoretical part, we construct three periods based on the age of the respondents. The first group consists of individuals younger than 34 years old, and thus pertains to the cultural-pedagogic regime after 1980-1983 (n = 418). The second period—age 35 to 54—spans from 1961-1964 to 1979-1982 (n = 826), and the third period—older than 55—pertains to the cultural-pedagogic regime before 1960-1963 (n = 455). Because cultural activities were assessed retrospectively during the age of 12 to 14 and because data were collected in 2003 and 2004, there is a small overlap between the different regimes. To increase readability, we will refer to the three regimes as (I) pre-60s, (II) 60s-80s, and (III) post-80s.

Educational track. Secondary education in Flanders comprises of four tracks, i.e., the academic track, the technical track, the vocational track and the artistic track. The artistic track is only possible in the second and the third grade of secondary education—so, after the age of twelve to fourteen. Additionally, this track in Flanders is marginal in terms of number of students (only 11 people in our
data). So, this track was omitted from the analysis. Individuals not having entered secondary education are also omitted \((n = 629)\). In the survey, the highest educational level of the respondents was assessed. So, for individuals with a degree in higher education, we do not have information on the track they followed. However, because the academic track prepares for higher education, while the other tracks do not and are more oriented towards the labour market, individuals with a degree in higher education are added to the academic track.  

This resulted in the following categories: academic track \((n = 774)\), technical track \((n = 564)\), and vocational track \((n = 361)\). Table 1 presents the cross tabulation of cultural-pedagogic regime and educational track.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-60s</th>
<th>60s-80s</th>
<th>Post-80s</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational track</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical track</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic track</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>455</strong></td>
<td><strong>826</strong></td>
<td><strong>418</strong></td>
<td><strong>1699</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Results

4.1. High cultural practices: “museums” and “theatre, ballet or dance performance”

Table 2 presents the relative frequencies of the high cultural practices. We see that these relative frequencies increase over time. For example, we see that 23.1 per cent of the individuals who were enrolled in the academic track before the sixties visited a museum in the school context. This percentage rises to 37.6 per cent in the period 60s-80s, and to 47.5 per cent after the 80s. This trend can be observed for both high cultural practices, in all three educational tracks.

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3 In 2009 very similar data were collected in Flanders—i.e., “Participation Survey 2009”—which contain 3,144 respondents (Lieveens and Waege, 2011). These data hold information on the exact track individuals with a degree in higher education followed in secondary education and contain the same questions for the high cultural practices in school. Analyses on these data reveal the same trends, thus providing a convincing argument that our classification of higher educated individuals in the academic track does not bias our results. The reason why we use the data “Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003-2004” instead of this more recent data is because the “Participation Survey 2009” does not include items on low cultural practices.

4 One of the reviewers wondered why gender and/or social origin are not included in the model. Including these variables could reveal, for example, gendered patterns of education. While these are interesting topics, they are beyond the scope of this article and we will address them elsewhere. In this article we are specifically interested in curricula. We use information of individuals to operationalize the content of curricula of a certain educational track during a certain cultural-pedagogic regime. Controlling for gender and/or education would distort our theoretical focus and our analytical approach by shifting the focus from curricula to individuals.
3. De-institutionalization of High Culture?

Table 2. High cultural practices. Relative frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-60s</th>
<th>60s-80s</th>
<th>Post-80s</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visiting museums.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational track</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical track</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic track</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending a theatre, ballet or dance performance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational track</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical track</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic track</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To compare the increments between the different tracks, we perform binomial logistic regressions, with the cultural practices as dependent variable; 0 is a non-occurrence; 1 is an occurrence. In the first model, we only include the main effects, i.e., educational track and cultural pedagogic regime. In the second model, we include interactions between both variables. Adding the interactions to the model results in a drop in -2LL of 13.9 for “museums” and 15.1 for “theatre, ballet or dance performance”. A \( \chi^2 \)-test shows that for both forms of high culture, adding the interaction effects significantly improves the model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regressions.

Table 3. Logistic regression for high cultural practices. Logit coefficients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visiting museums:</th>
<th>Attending a theatre, ballet or dance performance:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main effects only</td>
<td>Model including interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.921***</td>
<td>-2.096***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational track (ref: academic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>-0.417**</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>-0.454***</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-pedagogic regime (ref: pre-60s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s-80s</td>
<td>0.890***</td>
<td>1.169***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-80s</td>
<td>1.602***</td>
<td>1.799***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational * 60s-80s</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.104**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical * 60s-80s</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.870**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational * Post-80s</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical * Post-80s</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.892*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>2301.276</td>
<td>2287.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi² for Log likelihood difference</td>
<td>( \Delta = 13.901** )</td>
<td>( p = .007617 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

For visiting museums, we see that the odds of visiting museums in the school context significantly increase over time. That is, the odds of visiting museums are \( e^{1.169} \) times bigger in the 60s-80s compared to the pre-60s; and \( e^{1.799} \) times bigger after the 80s compared to the pre-60s. Additionally, we see that this increment in both periods is weaker in the vocational and technical track.
compared to the academic track, as is indicated by the logit parameters of the interaction terms, i.e. -1.104 and -0.531 for vocational and -0.870 and -0.892 for technical track.

The results for attending a theatre, a ballet or a dance performance are very similar to those for visiting museum. That is, firstly, we notice an increase in the odds of attending one of these performances over time, indicated by the logit coefficients of 1.194 and 1.605. Secondly, this increment over time is stronger in the academic track compared to the vocational and the technical track—as is indicated by the logit coefficients of the interaction terms.

4.2. Low cultural practices: “show or musical” and “cinema”

Table 4 presents the relative frequencies of the low cultural practices in the school context. We immediately notice that these frequencies are remarkably lower than those for the high cultural practices. What is similar to the high cultural practices, is that for both low cultural activities we notice an upward trend in all three educational tracks. For example, attending a show/musical in the academic track increases from 1.9 before the 60s, to 5.4 in the period 60s-80s, and to 8.8 after the 80s. One exception to this upward pattern is the small decrease in cinema attendance from the pre-60s to the 60s-80s. Again, we perform binary logistic regressions to compare the trends between the educational tracks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-60s</th>
<th>60s-80s</th>
<th>Post-80s</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Going to the cinema.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational track</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical track</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic track</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attending a show or musical.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational track</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical track</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic track</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly we estimate two models for the low practices. The first model exclusively consists of the main effects of educational track and cultural-pedagogic regime, while the second model includes interactions between track and regime. In contrast to the models for high culture, including the interaction terms for low culture does not result in a better fit of the model. Log likelihood differences for cinema and show/musical respectively are 2.219 (p = .696) and 4.559 (p = .336), indicating that the interaction effects do not improve the models. Table 6 presents the results of the main effects only models for “cinema” and “show/musical”.
The results provide evidence for an upward trend in low cultural practices in the school context. For example, the odds of going to the cinema are $1.61 \times (e^{.477})$ times bigger in the 60s-80s compared to the pre-60s; and $2.90 \times (e^{1.066})$ times bigger after the 80s compared to the pre-60s. This upward trend is also present for shows/musicals. Because we do not find support for the interaction effects, this means that this upward trend does not differ in steepness between the different educational tracks.

5. Conclusion

We investigated changes in the presence of “high” and “low” culture in secondary education in Flanders to study whether the position of high culture has been challenged in the course of the 20th century. We find that both high and low cultural practices are increasingly present in the school context for the period 1930-2000. This trend can be observed in all three educational tracks, i.e., the academic, the technical, and the vocational track. However, for high cultural practices, this upward trend is stronger in the academic track compared to the vocational and the technical track. For low cultural practices, we find no difference in strength/speed of increment between the different tracks.

Our findings lie in between the two hypotheses outlined in the theory. The general increase of cultural practices can be framed in the trend where educators increasingly recognize the potential of extra-mural activities as socializing mechanisms. This can be seen as an indication of hypothesis 2, i.e. traditional high culture loses its exclusive association with the academic track. However, the stronger increment of high culture in the academic track associates with the first hypothesis, i.e. traditional high culture continues to be predominantly associated to the academic track. This stress on high culture can be considered a remnant of the elitist history of this track, which continues to express itself in the academic curriculum throughout the 20th century. The technical and vocational tracks were not designed to cultivate future elites. This historical and ideological origin cushions the expression of the general trend of increment in cultural practices in high culture in these two tracks. Because high culture is especially present in the academic track, the educational system continues to channel these forms of culture to the upper social strata of society and to infuse these forms of culture with status.
We made an argument for the pervasive effects of curricula on cultural classification systems by focusing on cultural practices embedded in those curricula. However, the influence of curricula and institutionalization of certain forms of culture in the educational system is not limited to the cultural practices present in the school context. Cultural practices presented in the school context may generate generic dispositions, which can be transposed to other cultural media and to other cultural fields (Bourdieu, 1984; Coulangeon, 2008). These transposable dispositions in turn can create social patterning in cultural practices which—while not addressed in curricula—may have been caused indirectly by the educational system. Subsequently—in a process of symbolic association—the status of these cultural products can be enhanced by the status of the individuals who consume them (Baumann, 2001; Lieberson, 2000).

In this article, we measured presence of different forms of culture in the curriculum by means of retrospective questions to respondents about cultural practices. This approach has the advantage that it measures cultural practices that are actually present in the school context—as opposed to aspects which are only present in the official curricula, but not in the realized curricula. Furthermore, by focusing on these cultural practices, we get an idea as to what forms of culture educators value most, and consider relevant and important to pass on to pupils. Of course, we were limited by the cultural practices included in the survey. Further research is necessary to assess whether our findings can be generalized to other cultural practices. In this sense, our analyses should primarily be considered as exploratory. Another drawback of our approach is that we measure the focal variables by means of retrospective questions. However, because our conclusions are related to the differences between the different tracks and to the differences between the two forms of culture, we are convinced that our conclusions are not biased by memory-effects, or more generally, by the nature of our measurement of cultural practices. There is no reason to assume differential memory-effects between the tracks, or between high and low culture. In this way, this article provides tentative evidence suggesting a persisting institutional embeddedness of high culture in the educational system throughout the 20th century.

So, the educational system continues to play a key role in channelling—both directly and indirectly—certain forms of culture to specific positions in society. The relevance of the different forms of culture for social inequality has been extensively addressed in the Bourdieusian tradition (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977), but is—in relation to educational degrees—more explicitly present in theories on credential society (e.g., Collins, 1979). According to Collins (1971, 1979) the content of education is seldom tied to requirements of employers and jobs—which is especially true for the academic track. This spurs credential theorists to highlight cultural aspects of educational degrees for social inequality by considering education as status culture (cf., Weber, 1978). In this view, educational credentials are more relevant in terms of signalling affinity with certain forms of culture rather than work-related knowledge, competences and skills (e.g., Collins, 1971, 1979). This
affinity may especially be transferred by means of cultural practices in the school context. Considering this, the cultural dimension of curricula can be a very powerful and pervasive mechanism for the academic track to maintain its claimed superiority relative to the other tracks. So, while we have considered the role of the educational system on the legitimation of the cultural classification system, a parallel process might be at work where cultural practices are used to construct/maintain symbolic boundaries between different educational tracks. Either way, we hope—by providing tentative evidence for the persisting institutional embeddedness of high culture—that this article will urge the reader to reflect critically on the different ways culture can be present in the school context and on the complex interplay between the educational system and the status associated to cultural products and practices.

6. References


3. De-institutionalization of High Culture?


PART II

SOCIAL MOBILITY
Chapter 4

A *Mise-en-scène* of the Shattered Habitus: The Effect of Social Mobility on Aesthetic Dispositions Towards Films

Abstract

This article focuses on the effect of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions towards films. Central query is whether Bourdieu’s idea of a rather static, class-based habitus—and its associated way of appropriating works of art as voiced in La Distinction (1984)—holds anno 2011. Or is his idea of the habitus as a more permeable, malleable entity, as argued in his later work and recently voiced by Lahire (2008), more accurate? Our strategy is to investigate whether socially mobile individuals adhere to the dispositions acquired from their social context of origin (socialization hypothesis) or whether they adapt to attitudes and dispositions viable in their new social environment (adaptation hypothesis). We use data from a large-scale survey of the Flemish population ($n = 2,849$) and consider three aesthetic dispositions towards films, viz. the innovative, the emotional, and the action disposition. Results show that the effects of social mobility are a complex matter and differ according to highbrow or lowbrow orientation and to the associated social status of the dispositions at hand. These findings call for a differentiated view of the effects of primary and secondary socialization processes associated with social mobility.
1. Introduction

There is a considerable sociological tradition that examines taste and cultural consumption as sources of social distinction. Veblen introduced the idea of conspicuous consumption (1953 [1899]), Bourdieu proposed an elite taste as opposed to a common taste (Bourdieu, 1984), and Peterson claimed a shift from an elite-mass to an omnivore–univore status hierarchy (Peterson, 1992). This tradition has produced a large number of empirical studies that relate positions within the social hierarchy to taste preferences and consumption patterns (e.g. Dimaggio and Useem, 1978; Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; Van Eijck and Lievens, 2008).

This article intends to contribute to that tradition in two ways. First, it focuses on the effect of social mobility on cultural taste. Social mobility—both upward and downward—refers to an individual’s change in social position over time. In this article, we study the effects of intergenerational social mobility—i.e. the change in social position that occurs between parents’ and their children’s generations. As socially mobile individuals are subject to multiple socialization contexts, they may be confronted with conflicting social norms and differing expectations about how to behave and what attitudes or opinions are socially acceptable/viable. Blau states that ‘the dilemmas faced by mobile individuals in their interpersonal relations inhibit social integration and are responsible for many aspects of their attitudes and conduct’ (Blau, 1956: p. 290). Bourdieu also acknowledges that the social trajectory of individuals affects their cultural behaviour and attitudes—as depicted by the third dimension of the social space in his magnum opus La Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu argues that the class-based habitus is open to change, since it is constantly being influenced by new experiences such as those that are the result of crossing into a social milieu different from the one the individual was born into (cf. Atkinson, 2010). These new experiences, perceived through the lens of the primary habitus, may give rise to internal discordances, contradictions, or rupture (Bourdieu, 2000). It is these processes and dilemmas as described by Blau and Bourdieu we intend to consider: to what extent does social position of origin affect someone’s taste? Does the primary habitus continue to influence attitudes and behaviour despite a change in social environment or does anticipatory socialization push people’s aesthetic preferences in the direction of the social position to which they aspire? By addressing these issues and examining multiple contexts of socialization and the way an individual’s current taste and dispositions reflect these, this article will consider some of the ideas recently put forward by Lahire (2004, 2008). Lahire dismisses the concept of the habitus as a static, class-based entity developed solely in the lived experiences during childhood.

The second way this article contributes to the tradition is to use aesthetic dispositions as indicators of taste and restrain from using actual cultural behaviour. Aesthetic dispositions refer to the deep, underlying expectations people have about the arts and can be considered as an empirical
translation—albeit only a partial approximation—of what Bourdieu refers to as habitus (Bourdieu, 1984). Thus, our analysis deals more with how people consume than with what they consume. How do people appropriate works of art and what kinds of expectations are dominant within that appropriation? In this way, we avoid validity problems due to superficial changes that may occur in the symbolic value of actual cultural activities and/or objects (Peterson, 2005; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007). Cultural behaviour is a form of social action (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007: p. 3) and is as such most likely also influenced by motives other than mere taste, especially when public practices are taken into account (Roose, 2008b; Roose and Vander Stichele, 2010). Therefore, we focus on taste and dispositions, without either minimizing the value of research on cultural behaviour or challenging the idea that taste and behaviour are complementary measures of cultural capital (Yaish and Katz-Gerro, 2010). Research in the field of cultural consumption and taste about the consequences of social mobility is scarce. The analyses that exist focus on consumption patterns (Roe, 1992; Van Eijck, 1999) or on a combination of preferences and behaviour (Stein, 2005).

2. Theory

2.1. Social Mobility

It is in social mobility’s consequences that sociological significance lies, argues Sorokin (1927)—consequences in line with the dilemmas discussed by Blau (1956) and Bourdieu (1984). Indeed, downwardly mobile individuals must choose between the risk of rejection by the more prestigious group and the risk of rejection by their new social environment for not adapting to behaviour and attitudes typical of the new social position. Upwardly mobile individuals must choose between abandoning their previous social ties, values, and habits and abandoning hopes of translating mobile success into social acceptance by the more prestigious group (Blau, 1956).

It is in the context of the consequences of social mobility that Van Eijck (1999) uses the maximalization and the socialization hypothesis. The maximalization hypothesis assumes that mobile individuals will be inclined to display their highest status. For downwardly mobile individuals, that status is the status of the parents, for upwardly mobile individuals it is their newly achieved status. The socialization hypothesis considers primary socialization to have greater influence on cultural behaviour and taste than secondary socialization, both for upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. Van Eijck’s results for the Netherlands support the socialization hypothesis: upwardly mobile individuals participate more in popular culture than in highbrow culture, giving the upper strata of society a more heterogeneous consumption pattern—some would argue, a more omnivorous consumption pattern (Van Eijck, 1999).
However, a third pattern is possible. A situation in which behaviour and attitudes of downwardly mobile individuals are mainly guided by their primary socialization may be viewed either as an indication of the lifelong influence of the social position of origin or as an indication that dispositions are primarily guided by the socialization context associated with the highest social status. If at the same time the cultural practices and tastes of upwardly mobile individuals are predominantly affected by secondary socialization, neither the socialization nor the maximalization hypothesis applies. We call the third possibility the adaptation hypothesis, in which mobile individuals adapt to their new social position—even if this implies adopting habits associated with a lower status. Stein (2005), for example, finds that mobile individuals are more oriented towards the lifestyle—measured as a combination of preferences and behaviour—of the social group in which they arrive, providing evidence for the adaptation hypothesis. Merton’s idea of ‘anticipatory socialization’ also becomes relevant (Merton, 1968). Anticipatory socialization refers to the adoption by mobile individuals of the attitudes, the values, and the judgemental standards of the social group to which they aspire, but do not yet belong. In other words, individuals anticipate their future social mobility. The rejection of the socialization hypothesis is implicit in this argument, as primary socialization is not expected to remain decisive for the rest of an individual’s life, but to be replaced by other forms of socialization. Roe (1992), for example, provides evidence of anticipatory socialization with regard to musical taste. Roe finds that individuals that expect a high socio-economic position in their future, adopt highbrow taste and reject lowbrow music in anticipation of this higher social status. An analogous pattern is found in individuals who anticipate a lower social status in their future. However, there is currently no empirical evidence about the extent to which effects of social mobility on cultural behaviour can be generalized to aesthetic dispositions. Are aesthetic dispositions subject to the socialization, adaptation, or maximalization hypothesis? Or does the effect of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions depend on the specific nature of the disposition?

Based on the insights provided by the literature discussed above, we arrive at three different possible effects of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions. The specific nature of each hypothesis derives from the specific combination of the effect of social mobility on the upwardly mobile individual and the effect of social mobility on the downwardly mobile individual. Table 1 presents the possible combinations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current dispositions predominantly guided by:</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upwardly mobile primary socialization (lower status)</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downwardly mobile primary socialization (higher status)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upwardly mobile secondary socialization (higher status)</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downwardly mobile secondary socialization (lower status)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upwardly mobile secondary socialization (higher status)</td>
<td>Maximalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downwardly mobile primary socialization (higher status)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upwardly mobile primary socialization (lower status)</td>
<td>(Empirically illogical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downwardly mobile secondary socialization (lower status)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2. Aesthetic Dispositions

Aesthetic dispositions refer to ways in which individuals appropriate works of art, to the relative importance of certain aspects of the aesthetic judgement over other aspects. These insights about the aesthetic experience originate in the thinking of Parsons (1976, 1987) and Mockros (1993), whose work can be situated in developmental psychology. These authors state that the way individuals judge a work of art depends on their level of artistic development in a sequence of developmental changes. They describe an evolutionary course that individuals go through, in which individuals develop a more ‘mature’ judgement at each progressive stage. As these stages progress, judgement about a work of art becomes less related to personal preference and more related to technical and historical analysis. Parsons labels the first stage ‘favouritism’, which is characterized by the intuitive attraction to colours and shapes. In the fifth and last stage—‘tradition’—an individual judges an artwork within the context of its historical period and tradition (Parsons, 1976, 1987). What is relevant to our study is the outcome of their studies; that is, the variation that occurs between individuals concerning the emphasized aspects of the aesthetic experience and the way this variance relates to competence in and experience with arts.

As valuable as the insights of Parsons (1976, 1987) and Mockros (1993) are, they underrate the socially structured nature of these stages and their related dispositions. Bourdieu, however, explicitly points out their social ‘embeddedness’. He also considers dispositions as evaluative schemes: ‘the transposable disposition, armed with a set of perceptual and evaluative schemes is available for general application, inclines its owner towards other cultural experiences and enables him to perceive, classify and memorize them differently’ (Bourdieu, 1984: p. 28). He relates the position of individuals in the social space to their evaluative praxis, their dispositions, with the habitus functioning as a go-between. ¹ He sees taste, therefore, as a forced choice that has its origin in the conditions of existence of the individual (Bourdieu, 1984: p. 175). In his empirical results, Bourdieu finds an opposition between aristocratic ascetism and taste for necessity. For example, while the working-class preference for ‘solid’ furniture is an illustration of the choice of the necessary, the practice of aestheticizing every object in the home—even those strictly defined by their function—is typical of aristocratic ascetism (Bourdieu, 1984: p. 379). Hence, lower educated individuals, given their conditions of existence, tend

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¹ Generally, Bourdieu defines habitus as ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them’ (Bourdieu, 1990: p. 53). However, Bourdieu’s definitions vary between his publications. In this context we refer to Lizardo (2004) who reconstructs the intellectual origins of the idea of habitus.
to incorporate substance and function into their taste (taste for necessity), rather than incorporating a more formal approach to works of art (art for art’s sake), which is more typical of higher classes.

Van Eijck’s study (1999) focuses on the effect of social mobility on behaviour, on actual cultural consumption patterns, rather than on taste or dispositions. There are some obvious differences between both outcomes, as motives other than mere taste may guide behaviour. Cultural behaviour is a form of social action, which makes it susceptible to social motives. Individuals may choose to attend a certain concert to keep someone company, or they may watch a television programme to be able to join in a conversation about it with colleagues the next day, and so forth. Furthermore, status considerations may play a substantial role in the individual’s choice between forms of behaviour; as behaviour tends to be more conspicuous than dispositions. These status considerations are highly relevant in situations where an individual crosses from one group to another, since conspicuous action is susceptible to social sanction or approval. Conspicuous acts also ensure acceptance from a social group, with the possible side effect of rejection by another group. Since most acts of consumption are conspicuous, they function as markers of one’s identity. Dispositions, however, are more hidden and thus less vulnerable to judgement of others. This visibility aspect is central to Blau’s discourse; Blau focuses on choices that confront mobile individuals. These choices entail sacrificing (or adapting) certain social obligations and customs and are thus guided by social sanction and social acceptance (Blau, 1956). Therefore, by focusing on aesthetic dispositions instead of behaviour, we try to move beyond behavioural cosmetics and their associated sanction/approval.

We want to apply these ideas about the differentiated structure of the aesthetic experience to the reception and perception of films. The arguments for the popularity of music as a relevant measure of taste largely apply to film as well (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: p. 18). First, everybody is familiar with movies and as such, film consumers do not comprise a specific socio-demographic group. Second, just like music, films are characterized by a great variety of genres and subgenres, ranging from lowbrow to highbrow. Holt argues that distinction in consumption has gone underground. It is not the consumed objects or genre preferences that serve as a basis for distinction, but the consumption style (Holt, 1998). In line with this, we intend to focus on how people watch and assess a movie, on what aspects of a movie people consider important when exercising their aesthetic judgement.

An empirical example of the approach linking social origin—and cultural capital—to the way people appropriate and assess works of art can be found in Roose (2008a). Roose analyses aesthetic dispositions towards classical music and shows that different audience segments—audience segments that also differ in socio-demographic composition—have different expectations about music. Two of the dispositions Roose uses—innovative and emotional—readily translate to film as an art form. The innovative disposition refers to the extent that a person considers formal innovation and an orientation towards the way movies function as a medium—for example, special or creative camera work, an
original direction or style—important in evaluating a movie. It inclines the individual to assess movies in terms of the possibilities and limitations of the medium itself. The emotional disposition is much more message oriented; it refers to the ability of a film to move the viewer emotionally. Movies portray characters one can relate to, because they often portray or convey real-life situations. In addition—and as a pendant to the feminine, psychologically oriented character of emotional dispositions (O’Connor and Boyle, 1993)—we include the more physical Aktion Genußschema (Schulze, 1995). The Aktion Genußschema denotes the potential of a cultural product to stimulate the senses through depicting action, violence, and adventure. This masculine disposition seems very relevant to our study, since films as a medium generally have the potential to live up to such expectations (a whole genre of film is named after this disposition). Gender issues also become highly salient in the consideration of emotional and action dispositions. Additionally, O’Connor (1997) argues that there are interaction effects between class and gender in the experience of television viewing. After presenting The Ballroom of Romance to both males and females from different occupational groups, she concluded—based on group discussions—that the responses of the men were less demarcated by class than the responses of the female participants. Our analyses will investigate whether dispositions are gendered and whether socially mobile males and females react differently in terms of their dispositions towards movies.

The nature of the three considered dispositions—innovative, emotional, and action—can readily be linked to Bourdieu’s thinking. The medium-oriented approach to movies—the innovative disposition—is an approach that we can expect from people who are trained in the medium, experienced movie watchers, people who possess the cultural competence and experience to view movies as art objects. Because of their sustained contact with the medium itself and with other forms of art via education or art school, these connoisseurs watch movies in a contemplative way, paying attention to the possibilities of the medium itself and to how the medium is used to communicate content. In line with Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus from the field of production, one could also view this medium-oriented approach towards film as an autonomous approach, as opposed to a heteronomous approach (Bourdieu, 1992; Sapiro, 2003). An inclination towards formal innovation therefore can be seen as an exponent of a formal, highbrow approach to movies—indicative of art for art’s sake. A heteronomous approach is characterized by appropriating works of art for what they do and for how they relate to personal experiences independent of their form. The dispositions related to emotional and action functions represent the heteronomous, message-oriented approach to films. They are indicative of a more intuitive taste—a consumption that primarily focuses on content, be it emotional or physical—a taste more characteristic of lowbrow viewers.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of possible expectations about films or works of art in general. Other possible expectations are presented in the literature (e.g. Parsons, 1976, 1987; Mockros, 1993; Schulze, 1995; Roose, 2008a; Rössel, 2011). For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to have
a number of theoretically related, contrasting dispositions in terms of highbrow/lowlbrow orientation and associated social background.

2.3. Social Mobility and Aesthetic Dispositions

There is no consensus in the literature on the effect of multiple socialization contexts on taste and cultural behaviour. Bourdieu stresses the importance of primary socialization for the development of dispositions and to behaviour throughout an individual’s life (Bourdieu, 1984). According to Bourdieu, the habitus is the product of lived experiences and social circumstances as experienced during early childhood, and it continues to colour and influence praxis in later life. If this idea holds, it is the parental social position that relates to aesthetic dispositions—this is the rationale behind the socialization hypothesis. Upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals stick to the aesthetic dispositions characteristic of their social position of origin, providing evidence that the habitus results from primary socialization and remains durable and relatively stable throughout one’s life.

However, another trend in the literature—going back to Merton (1968) and recently endorsed by Lahire (2004, 2008)—addresses the importance of multiple socialization contexts in relation to cultural behaviour and aesthetic dispositions. This idea parallels Simmel’s idea (1955) that an individual stands at the intersection of many social groups. Such an approach does not deny Bourdieu’s central ideas, but applies them in a current, less class-rigid societal context. The influence of primary socialization is assumed to be less durable (cf. Erickson, 1996) and greater importance is given to socialization contexts other than the nuclear family. Anticipatory socialization is one possible mechanism through which this may occur (Merton, 1968). This way of thinking supports the adaptation hypothesis: people adapt their attitudes and behaviour to the new social and material environment. Consequently, mobile individuals adapt to the aesthetic dispositions characteristic of their new social and material context.

A third possible pattern of how aesthetic dispositions are influenced by social mobility is the maximalization hypothesis, which refutes the pure socialization hypothesis, since primary socialization remains influential only for downwardly mobile individuals. An explanation for the maximalization hypothesis draws on the development of a cultural competence, a deciphering ability (Bourdieu, 1993). This refers to the ability of individuals to decode works of art and is associated with the amount of cultural capital. Downwardly mobile individuals developed this ability during childhood and do not lose this in their transition to lower social strata. Upwardly mobile individuals acquire this competence during their upward social mobility simultaneously with their expanding cultural capital. Regarding the effect of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions, our expectations can be divided into two sets of hypotheses:
(I) We expect individuals from lower social strata to have lower scores on the innovative disposition and higher scores on the more message-oriented dispositions (emotional and action) than individuals from higher social strata. Similarly, we expect individuals from higher social strata to have higher scores on the innovative disposition and lower scores on the emotional and action dispositions.

(II) The possible effects of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions are summarized in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Influence of position of origin on current aesthetic disposition is stronger than the influence of the position of destination.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Influence of position of destination on current aesthetic disposition is stronger than the influence of the position of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>The socialization context with strongest influence on current aesthetic disposition is the socialization context associated with the highest social status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Data and Methods

3.1. Sample and Methods of Data Collection

We use data from the survey Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003–2004. This large-scale survey collected data about a great variety of cultural behaviours, attitudes, and dispositions from 2,849 randomly selected individuals by means of computer-assisted, face-to-face interviews (Lievens, Waeghe and De Meulemeester, 2006). The response rate was 61.0 per cent (AAPOR, 2009).

3.2. Measures

Aesthetic dispositions. The measurement of aesthetic dispositions is based on an exploratory factor analysis including 11 items. Eight items are retained, which results in three scales. Respondents were asked what they found important when watching a film, and to indicate how important each item was using a 7-point Likert scale. Answers ranged from never important to always important. Regression scores were computed for each individual. Table 3 presents the pattern matrix after factor analysis with Promax rotation.

The analysis yields three factors (Eigenvalue 1). The first factor refers to the innovative disposition, to the extent to which individuals consider originality and innovative directing important. It denotes how content or plot is formally treated and represented. The emotional and action dimensions, the second and third factors, refer to a more functional, message-oriented approach to film viewing: viewers appreciate films because of the ability of a film to affect them. For the emotional
dimension, this has to do with the ability of a film to move a viewer emotionally. The action dimension expresses the extent to which people appreciate violent scenes, action, and adventure—from dodging bullets to exterminating alien species to discovering long-lost treasures.

| Table 3 Pattern matrix of aesthetic dispositions after factor analysis with Promax rotation |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Disposition | Item | 1   | 2   | 3   |
| Innovative | be original in outline or style | .740 | .011 | −.051 |
| | use special or creative camera work | .730 | −.073 | .080 |
| | be innovative in directing | .773 | .062 | −.038 |
| Emotional | be moving | .017 | .752 | −.048 |
| | be romantic | −.090 | .778 | −.005 |
| | contain characters you can relate to | .141 | .470 | .110 |
| Action | contain violent scenes | −.003 | .103 | .671 |
| | contain action and adventure | −.015 | −.078 | .743 |

Original wording of questions: “When watching a film, what aspects do you find important? To what extent do you think that a film should...?” with seven answer categories ranging from never important to always important.

%Social mobility and educational level.\%

The questionnaire includes questions about the highest educational attainment of the respondent, the respondent’s mother, and the respondent’s father. These variables measuring educational level consist of four categories: (i) primary school, (ii) lower secondary school, (iii) higher secondary school, and (iv) higher education. Because we focus on the link between the different socializing contexts individuals experience and individuals’ aesthetic dispositions, measuring social mobility based on educational mobility is a legitimate approach: according to Dimaggio and Useem, education, as opposed to occupation and income, is the most salient determinant of involvement with the arts (Dimaggio and Useem, 1978). Moreover, Bourdieu also finds a strong relationship between level of education and preferences (Bourdieu, 1993). Because dispositions require knowledge and training, educational level is a good indicator. Furthermore, Van Eijck and Bargeman have found evidence that traditional boundaries relating to gender and economic resources are diminishing in relevance within certain areas of arts consumption. Age and education, however, are becoming more important (Van Eijck and Bargeman, 2004). As an indicator of position of origin, we take the average of the educational attainment of both father and mother (Van Eijck, 1999).

| Table 4 Descriptive statistics of categorical variables |
|-----------------|-----|-----------------|-----|
| Gender          | n   | Education parents     |
| Male            | 1,151 | Primary school | 1,134 |
| Female          | 1,230 | Lower secondary school | 628 |
| Education respondent |     | Higher secondary school | 415 |
| Primary school  | 634  | Higher education | 204 |
| Lower secondary school | 487 |                |     |
| Higher secondary school | 681 |                |     |
| Higher education | 579  |                |     |
Gender and age, in years and centred around the mean, are also included in the analysis. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the categorical variables included in the model.

4. Analysis

We analyse our hypotheses using Diagonal Reference Models (DRMs), a statistical technique specifically developed by Sobel (1981, 1985) to study the effects of social mobility. DRM compares favourably with other methods for studying effects of social mobility, for example, the square additive model or Hope’s Diamond Model (Hendrickx et al., 1993; Stein, 2006). The use of DRM has proved seminal in a wide variety of subject areas modelling the effects of social mobility on fertility (Sobel, 1985), political behaviour (Weakliem, 1992), antagonistic attitudes (Tolsma, De Graaf and Quillian, 2009), and so forth. Using DRM, we are able to disentangle the effects of social position of origin, social position of destination, and social mobility itself.

Theoretical starting point is the idea that individuals on the diagonals, that is, immobile individuals, represent the core of a specific social position. In this article, we model the aesthetic dispositions of individuals on the off-diagonals as a function of the dispositions of the reference individuals, that is, those on the diagonals. The baseline model for a dependent variable is

\[ Y_{ijk} = p \cdot \mu_{ii} + (1-p) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \]  
(Model 0)

The baseline model with covariates is

\[ Y_{ijk} = p \cdot \mu_{ii} + (1-p) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \]  
(Model 1)

Subscript \( i \) refers to the position of origin; subscript \( j \) refers to the position of destination. \( Y_{ijk} \) is the value of the dependent variable in cell \( ij \) of the mobility table, with \( k \) observations. \( \mu_{ii} \), the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of origin and \( \mu_{jj} \), the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of destination, are the population averages. The \( p \) parameter refers to the importance of the position of origin for the dependent variable in question, relative to the position of destination (1 - \( p \)). When we link this parameter to our hypotheses, a \( p \)-value higher than 0.5 provides evidence supporting the socialization hypothesis: the position of origin has more influence on current disposition than the position of destination does. In the same way, \( p < .5 \) is evidence for the adaptation hypothesis: dispositions are guided mainly by the secondary socialization context.

The maximalization hypothesis states that the socialization context associated with the highest social status guides current aesthetic dispositions. In order to test this hypothesis, we create a dummy variable, \( x_{ijm} \): Downwardly mobile individuals score 1; upwardly mobile individuals score 0. The maximalization model is

\[ Y_{ijk} = (p + mx_{ijm}) \cdot \mu_{ii} + (1 -(p + mx_{ijm})) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \]  
(Model 2)
In this model, the salience parameter for position of origin for the downwardly mobile individual is \((p + m)\); for the upwardly mobile individual \(p\) remains the parameter for the impact of position of origin. As it is theoretically impossible to interpret values lower than zero or higher than one, restrictions were placed in this final model on the parameter estimates, that is, \((m + p) \leq 1\).

5. Results

Table 5 shows the parameter estimates from the diagonal reference models with innovative, emotional, and action disposition as dependent variables. For the innovative disposition, Model 2 provides the best fit to the data. Looking at the estimated means for the different positions in the social hierarchy, we see that it is chiefly the least educated individuals who differ from the other three groups. They score lower (\(\mu_{11} = -0.215\)) compared to higher educated individuals (e.g. \(\mu_{33} = 0.209\)). The relative impact of position of origin is different for upwardly versus downwardly mobile individuals. For upwardly mobile individuals the relative effect of the position of origin is the \(p\) parameter, for downwardly mobile individual it is \((p + m)\). This means that for downwardly mobile individuals the innovative disposition is determined by context of origin (0.285 + 0.615). For upwardly mobile individuals the impact of context of origin is relatively low (\(p = 0.285\)), that is, \(p\) differs significantly from 0.5. For the upwardly mobile individual, therefore, mainly the position of destination has an effect. These results support the maximalization hypothesis for the innovative disposition.

Table 5 Parameter estimates from the diagonal reference models. Dependent variables: innovative, emotional and action dispositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility parameters</th>
<th>Model 0</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 0</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 0</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(p): Relative impact of origin</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>.545</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.335</td>
<td>.404</td>
<td>.389</td>
<td>.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m): Maximalization parameter</td>
<td></td>
<td>.615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_{11}): Primary education</td>
<td>−.481</td>
<td>−.168</td>
<td>−.215</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>−.189</td>
<td>−.191</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_{22}): Lower secondary education</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>−.181</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_{33}): Higher secondary education</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>−.262</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_{44}): Higher education</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>−.208</td>
<td>−.519</td>
<td>−.379</td>
<td>−.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates (\beta_{gender}): Women</td>
<td></td>
<td>−.174</td>
<td>−.171</td>
<td></td>
<td>.581</td>
<td></td>
<td>−.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta_{age}): Age (centered)</td>
<td></td>
<td>−.012</td>
<td>−.012</td>
<td></td>
<td>−.002</td>
<td></td>
<td>−.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since adding the maximalization parameter did not result in an improvement of the model fit for the emotional or the action disposition, we reject the maximalization hypothesis for these dispositions. As
expected, lower educated individuals score higher on both message-oriented dispositions. For example, the average scores for individuals on the diagonal with higher education is -0.519 for the emotional disposition and -0.199 for the action disposition compared to -0.189 and 0.370, respectively, for individuals with primary education. Looking at the \( p \) parameter for both dispositions, we see that these dispositions are not guided by one specific socialization context, but by both, as these parameters do not differ significantly from 0.5. Both the socialization context of origin and the socialization context of destination play a role in the development of the emotional and action dispositions.

Furthermore, we see clear gender differences. As expected, women are much more appreciative than men are of the emotional aspects of films (\( \beta_{\text{gender}} = 0.581 \)), and compared to women, men are far more appreciative of action-related content in films (\( \beta_{\text{gender}} = -0.478 \)). Women and men do not react differently to social mobility in terms of aesthetic dispositions: the inclusion of interaction effects of social mobility and gender on dispositions did not increase the fit of the models.

6. Conclusion and Discussion

In this article, we investigated the effect of social mobility on cultural taste using aesthetic dispositions towards film as indicators of taste, thereby focusing on how people appropriate movies instead of what kind of movies they watch. Inspired by Roose (2008a) and Schulze (1995), we considered innovative, emotional, and action dispositions towards films. Inspired by earlier research on the effect of social mobility on cultural consumption (Roe, 1992; Van Eijck, 1999; Stein, 2005), we chose educational mobility as indicator of change in social position. Our results confirm our first set of hypotheses dealing with the effect of current social position on aesthetic dispositions. Individuals from higher social strata score higher on the innovative disposition, demonstrating a desire to be confronted with formally innovating films, and lower on the two message-oriented dispositions, demonstrating the wish to be emotionally moved and the wish to see action and adventure. These findings are completely in line with the distinction Bourdieu makes between an autonomous and a heteronomous approach and between an aristocratic ascetism and a goût de nécessité (Bourdieu, 1984).

Furthermore, our results reveal clear gender differences. Men are more appreciative of action and adventure compared to women, while women prefer romantic and emotional content in movies more than men do. This confirms some of Bennett, Emmison and Frow’s earlier findings (1999), for example, that women prefer genres such as romance, musicals, and drama, whereas men generally prefer westerns and adventure films. Moreover, men’s film preferences show that they like movies about heroic (male) characters that act tough, shoot and kill, while women prefer films about relationships and romances (Bennett, Emmison and Frow, 1999). In addition, Roose (2008a) finds that the relative importance of an emotional response to music is structured according to gender, that is, the
emotional disposition is more important to women than to men. However, this gender difference decreases as frequency of concert attendance increases, that is, when cultural capital increases (Roose, 2008a). As such, our results corroborate claims from other studies that point to the gendered nature of dispositions and taste.

Turning our attention to the second set of hypotheses, we see that aesthetic dispositions relate in different ways to social mobility. For the innovative disposition, the maximalization hypothesis applies. This means that downwardly mobile individuals stay faithful to the taste profile characteristic of their primary socialization context, while upwardly mobile individuals partially conform to their new socialization context. The outcome of this process is that all mobile individuals are disposed towards the sort of medium-oriented appreciation of films that is associated with the socialization context highest in status—be it a high position of origin or a high position of destination. For the emotional and action dispositions, the results do not support any of the three hypotheses—neither the maximalization, the socialization, nor the adaptation hypothesis applies. Instead, the results indicate that both socialization contexts guide these two message-oriented dispositions, with no hint of one having primacy over the other. Of course, we do not know which disposition a particular social situation may trigger or activate, as ‘taste is first of all an opportunism of the moment and of situations’ (Hennion, 2007: p. 111). This uncertainty gives impetus for further research into which social contexts activate or trigger which dispositions.

Human beings are disposed because they are exposed (Bourdieu, 2000). Next to being exposed to the context of origin, mobile individuals are exposed to the context of destination and to the process of social mobility itself. Sorokin argues that this process of social mobility creates an array of new values—and thus also aesthetic values—through a cross-fertilization of ideas (Sorokin, 1927). These ideas originate from interpersonal contacts situated within different social strata and are very likely to be different as aesthetic values are deeply stratified. In general, the results of our analysis imply that mobile individuals—throughout and after the process of social mobility—partially adapt to their new socialization context. This is the case for both men and women, as we find no gender-linked differences in the effect of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions. The only exception to this general finding is that of downwardly mobile individuals, who are guided solely by their socialization context of origin with regard to dispositions associated with high social status. The innovative disposition—typically a highbrow feature—refers to a willingness and ability to judge a movie in terms of medium-oriented features such as direction, formal originality, and innovativeness. It is part of a cultural competence, a deciphering ability that is acquired through years of exposure to the medium, its history, and to other media and forms of art—something that requires great effort and investment on the part of the respondent (cf. Bourdieu, 1993). Upwardly mobile individuals partially acquire this competence while adapting to their new social environment.
It is interesting to compare our results with those of Van Eijck (1999), in particular, those regarding how the aesthetic dispositions of mobile individuals differ from their real behaviour, their consumption pattern. Van Eijck’s results support the socialization hypothesis: upwardly mobile individuals participate less in highbrow culture and they consume more popular culture than individuals who have experienced little or no upward mobility (Van Eijck, 1999). Why does social mobility have a different effect on cultural behaviour than on attitudinal characteristics? Lahire argues, ‘practices and tastes are in no way equivalent’ (Lahire, 2008: p. 182). Adaptation to new dispositions requires a greater investment than simply adopting a certain form of cultural behaviour. Our results imply that the process of social mobility causes individuals to adapt to their new socialization context in terms of dispositions. However, this adaptation is never complete. Mobile individuals remain bearers of their social position of origin. Bourdieu suggests that mobile individuals can never have the same familiarity with a culture as those who are born into it (Bourdieu, 1984: p. 331). These parvenus lack the confidence possessed by those born into a culture to express the cultural habits of their new social position. This may be because individuals are not able to adapt completely to new dispositions. Considering the different effects of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions, it appears that the consumption of cultural products is much more rooted in the social position of origin than the way these cultural products are consumed is. Further research on the differences between behaviour and aesthetic dispositions—especially in relation to social mobility—is necessary to comprehend the underlying processes.

Our findings perhaps most closely align with the later writings of Pierre Bourdieu and the work of Bernard Lahire. In Pascalian Meditations (2000), Bourdieu refers to the multiplicity of intra- and intergenerational movements resulting in a destabilized habitus, a habitus torn by contradiction and internal division (Bourdieu, 2000: p. 160). In addition, in Esquisse pour une Auto-analyse (2004), Bourdieu depicts his own habitus as a habitus clivé—a habitus characterized by internal division—that is a consequence of the experienced contradictions resulting from his upward social mobility. Indeed, in his later works, Bourdieu renounces the singular unity of the habitus that is characteristic of his older work, such as La Distinction. Lahire (2004) makes similar assertions, stressing multiple contexts of socialization. Furthermore, in recognizing the existence of consonant and dissonant taste profiles, Lahire rejects the idea of the habitus as a singular unity (also see Bennett, 2007). Our results support these claims and suggest that the habitus indeed lacks unity, an idea illustrated by the inconsistent effects of social mobility on aesthetic dispositions as part of one’s habitus.

Lahire (2008) is correct that future research should focus on intra-individual differences. However, the subject matter needs to change as well. Future studies should consider complementing research on cultural consumption with research about aesthetic dispositions or attitudes, and should analyse behaviour and dispositions simultaneously. Our data did not allow for this type of analysis; this is the greatest limitation of this study. Of course, this is seminal ground for future research. The
strength of this article lies in its consideration of a number of issues that have been unresolved in earlier research into the relationship between social mobility and cultural behaviour and attitudes, and into the influence of multiple contexts of socialization on aesthetic dispositions.

7. References


Chapter 5

Cultural Chameleons: Social Mobility and Cultural Practices in the Private and the Public Sphere

Abstract

This article investigates whether the cultural practices of socially mobile individuals are predominantly associated with social position of origin or with social position of destination. Using data representative of the Flemish population of Belgium (n = 2,849), we find evidence of a substantial association with the social position of destination, which we argue to be both profound and superficial. By contrasting private and public practices, we find that (1) both private and public practices are predominantly related to social position of destination and (2) that public practices are more strongly correlated with social position of destination than private practices. This suggests that underlying cultural preferences are mainly associated with the secondary socialization context and, moreover, that in the public sphere socially mobile individuals overstretch their conformity – probably to fit in – and in a way become cultural chameleons.
1. Introduction

A vast number of sociological studies demonstrate that cultural taste is socially embedded and a result of an individual’s position in the social structure (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; Erickson, 1996; Nagel and Verboord, 2012; Purhonen et al., 2011). The argument is that individuals are socialized to conform to values and to exhibit behaviour appropriate for their social environment. The social background and practices of the family of origin, the individual’s educational trajectory, as well as the influence of her/his peers function as agents of socialization. While it is known that these different socializing agents play a role in the development of an individual’s cultural taste and practices, it remains unclear as to how they relate to one another in this development. This article focuses on two questions. First, are cultural practices of socially mobile individuals more strongly associated with the social environment they grew up in or are they more in line with the social position of destination? Second, we study whether socially mobile individuals try to blend in socially in the new socialization context by applying strategies of impression management. That is, do socially mobile individuals pretend to conform to cultural practices viable in their new social environment by misrepresenting their genuine preferences in public, or is their conformity more profound – actually rooted in their preferences and thus visible in both the private and the public sphere?

Socially mobile individuals have experienced different contexts of socialization characterized by different – and possibly incompatible – discourses and schemes regarding appropriate cultural taste and behaviour (cf. Featherman and Lerner, 1985). So, their practices may be predominantly shaped by childhood socialization or they may be more in line with the socialization context the individuals eventually end up in. That is, are socially mobile individuals able to conform to expectations regarding appropriate cultural preferences viable in their new social stratum – be it through anticipatory socialization or during/after the experience of social mobility? Or are they moulded by their social position of origin, feeling out of tune in their new social environment and thus condemned to lapse into superficial adaptation to ensure social integration?

It has to be stressed that the theoretical framing of this article analytically inclines towards the importance of social structure and social mobility on the formation of cultural practices. Of course, cultural practices may also influence life chances and increase/decrease opportunities for social mobility, for better or worse. For example, DiMaggio finds that cultural practices – as part of someone’s cultural capital – are correlated with school grades, and thus related to chances of social mobility (e.g. DiMaggio, 1982). That is, those individuals that are ‘out of tune’ in terms of cultural practices in their primary socialization context may have higher chances of being socially mobile. Obviously, both processes, i.e. social mobility affecting cultural practices and cultural practices affecting social mobility, take place. However, our theoretical framing inclines towards the former; a
choice founded on our theoretical background but by which we in no way intend to deny the possibility of the alternative causal interpretation.

As to the relation between social mobility and cultural practices, we distinguish superficial from more profound conformity to the dominant schemes and discourses of the different socialization contexts. By contrasting private and public manifestations of aesthetic preferences, we gain insight into the relative importance of social and competence-related motives for cultural consumption (Roose and Vander Stichele, 2010; see also Kraaykamp et al., 2007). The way aesthetic preferences are manifested is dependent on the social context. Concert attendance and going to the cinema, for example, are more conspicuous (cf. Veblen, 1899) and in that sense expected to be more susceptible to perceived social pressure and anticipated social esteem than private practices. In the same way, public practices can be expected to have a bigger impact on future life chances compared to private practices. A related question is whether socially mobile individuals misrepresent their genuine aesthetic preferences in public – possibly spurred by motives related to facilitating integration in a new social environment or to acquiring social status – without having a profound association with the aesthetic preferences viable in their new socialization context.

2. Theory

2.1. Social mobility

Our research questions pertain to the individual experience of social mobility and how it is expressed in everyday life, in the choices people make and the way these are socially structured, e.g. in preferences for different cultural products and practices. Sorokin (1927) defines social mobility as the shifting of individuals within social space and claims that socially mobile individuals exhibit distinctive attitudes and values as a result of a cross-fertilization of attitudes and values originating from different social strata (Sorokin, 1927). In this article, we focus on (vertical) intergenerational mobility, that is, the change of position within the social hierarchy between parents and their children. Just like Park’s marginal men, socially mobile individuals live on the margin of two cultures (Park, 1928). While the nature of the transition of socially mobile individuals and marginal men is different, the basic mechanism is identical: Because of mobility – be it geographical or social – individuals move from a familiar social environment to an unfamiliar one. Park claims that in this transition individuals become ‘enlightened’: Less bound by conventions and freed from tradition, ‘these individuals look upon the world in which they were born and bred with something of the detachment of a stranger’ (Park, 1928: 888).

In Distinction, Bourdieu (1984) shows how the position of the individual in the social space gives rise to the habitus. This habitus – a socially constituted and largely unconsciously evolved
system of dispositions – expresses itself in cultural preferences and practices which are considered appropriate in the social environment in which the habitus was bred. The social origins of the habitus manifest themselves in all domains of life, from food and eating, over manners and uses of the body, to tastes in clothes, literature and music; that is, in ways of being. Immobile individuals tend to take values and norms characteristic of their social stratum for granted. Socially mobile individuals, however, have been confronted with different social environments – and their associated discourses on appropriate cultural practices – and have internalized different expectations. Thus, they become aware of the arbitrariness of each set of norms and values which they have been confronted with and are forced to choose (Coser, 1975, 1991; see also Blau, 1956). This is not to say that a multiplicity of expectations automatically results in conscious choices, but the possibility of a conscious and reflexive perspective is higher than in the absence of multiple expectations (Coser, 1975: 239; see also Park, 1928).

Furthermore, as Swidler argues (1986), culture is a ‘tool kit’ for constructing strategies of action. Socially mobile individuals face alternative forms of action and hence social mobility results in a more diverse and elaborated toolkit which individuals can draw from, which may be associated with cultural omnivoroussness (e.g. Peterson, 1992). Because socially mobile individuals have been subject to different contexts of socialization, they have been confronted with different cultural registers, providing them with a dispositional foundation for an omnivorous taste pattern (cf. Bryson, 1996; Emmison, 2003). As such, social mobility presents socially mobile individuals with alternative courses of action. Applied to cultural practices, this means that because they are aware of the arbitrariness and the social consequences of certain forms of cultural behaviour, socially mobile individuals may deploy cultural practices for other motives than mere aesthetic enjoyment, i.e. to manage the presentation of self in everyday life (cf. Goffman, 1959; Veblen, 1899). We are interested in the cultural practices individuals select in particular situations: Do they use cultural practices as props in public (cf. Goffman, 1959), even though these may not reflect their aesthetic preferences? For this reason, we focus on specific cultural practices, as these are more suited – compared to taste patterns such as cultural omnivoroussness – to deploy in specific situations in everyday interaction because of their conspicuoususness (cf. Veblen, 1899).

2.2. Origin, destination or maximization?

Traditional socialization theory considers parental socialization as having a deep and lasting influence on preferences, values and behaviour in adulthood, as children are expected to be much more malleable compared to adults (e.g. Brim, 1968; Rosow, 1974). The importance of childhood socialization is also expressed by Bourdieu in some of his publications. According to Bourdieu, socially mobile individuals can never completely adapt to their new social stratum as ‘these self-made men cannot have the familiar relation to culture which authorizes liberties and audacities of those who
are linked to it by birth, that is by nature and essence’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 331). Also Kraaykamp and Van Eijck (2010) argue that family socialization is the most effective socializing agent for arts appreciation and contend that aesthetic preferences are mainly guided by the primary socialization context. In a recent empirical study, Ter Bogt et al. (2011) find evidence for the existence of a continuity between musical preferences of parents and their children. However, they admit this effect to be modest, which results in the following question: To what extent are cultural preferences and practices associated with the secondary socialization context? The situation in which cultural practices are predominantly associated with the primary socialization context will be referred to as the origin hypothesis.

However, traditional socialization theory has been criticized for its view on socialization as too straightforward and unidirectional. It considers children as adults-in-the-making and as passive receivers who need to be shaped to fit in society (e.g. Thorne, 1993). Recent empirical findings challenge some of these insights and contemporary socialization theory reframes the process of socialization as a group-to-group relationship instead of a dyadic relationship between parent and child, and stresses the importance of socialization by peers and peer cultures (cf. Harris, 1995, 1998). Of course, this emphasis on socialization by peers does not necessarily imply that parental socialization loses its relevance. As Corsaro argues, decisions about children’s interactions with peers are in the first place made within the family context (2005: 112). For example, it is the parents who decide in what type of peer settings and institutional contexts they allow their children to spend their time (Lareau, 2003). Yet, the emphasis on parental socialization ignores the fact that children thrive in many different environments.

Similar ideas have been expressed in cultural sociology as several authors point to the influence of different contexts of socialization and argue that Bourdieu overestimates the lifelong influence of the social position of origin (Erickson, 1996; Lahire, 2004, 2008). Contemporary socialization theory states that socialization is never complete and stresses its contextual character (Arnett, 2007; Harris, 1995, 1998). Because of the multiplicity of heterogeneous socialization contexts (cf. Berger et al., 1974), the significance of the primary socialization context would be rather modest. For example, recent empirical research in cultural sociology shows that aesthetic preferences of mobile individuals are more likely to foreshadow their future social position than their position of origin (Roe, 1992; Tanner et al., 2008). These authors argue that the cultural taste of individuals is predominantly associated with the secondary socialization context. We refer to this situation as the destination hypothesis.

It is possible that the way social mobility expresses itself in cultural practices depends on the direction of mobility, as upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals are confronted with a different experience. Therefore, we consider a third possibility, i.e. the maximization hypothesis, which refers
to a situation in which practices are predominantly guided by the socialization context associated with the highest social status (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013; De Graaf et al., 1995; Ganzeboom, 1982; Van Eijck, 1999). For downwardly mobile individuals this is the primary socialization context; for upwardly mobile individuals this is the secondary socialization context. Upwardly mobile individuals express practices typical of their new socialization context to show their newly acquired social position and higher status. Downwardly mobile individuals stick to cultural activities characteristic of their former social environment. In both cases, individuals maximize their status by clinging to the cultural practices associated with the social environment with the highest status – be it context of origin or destination. Maximization may occur consciously in the quest for social status, i.e. maximization of status. It is also possible that this pattern results from a maximization of cultural competence: To be able to enjoy certain cultural activities, specific knowledge or competence is needed. As practices common within higher social strata are generally more complex – either in terms of stimuli and/or in terms of appropriation (cf. Bourdieu, 1968) – mobile individuals persist in a preference for more complex forms of culture. Upwardly mobile individuals learn to appreciate more complex forms of art in anticipation, during or after their transition to a higher social stratum and thus exhibit practices typical of the secondary socialization context. Downwardly mobile individuals have been confronted with this deciphering ability in their primary socialization context and maintain this competence after their social decline. To try to get at some of the mechanisms related to cultural competence and/or status, we contrast private practices with their public counterparts.

2.3. Private/public taste: Cultural competence or aesthetic dissimulation?

In his analysis of the domestic sphere as a context for art and culture, Halle argues that status and social standing do not play a major role in the choices for art (1993). Private consumption is primarily related to aesthetic enjoyment (Kraaykamp et al., 2007; Roose and Vander Stichelen, 2010). However, for activities and commodities that are more conspicuous also social motives may be involved, such as gaining prestige, having the opportunity for networking, being in the company of someone, etc. As such, social motives are expected to be more strongly linked to public than to private taste.

The ‘publicness’ of practices varies along a continuous spectrum (Kuran, 1995). At the one end of this spectrum there are private practices known only to a single person. The other end covers public practices expressed in the presence of total strangers. In his analysis of religious practices, Kuran discusses a false and pretended conformity to religious beliefs to prevent persecution: Individuals pretend to conform, but in the privacy of their homes they continue to practise their former religion. Kuran calls the act of intentionally misrepresenting one’s genuine preferences under perceived social pressure ‘preference falsification’ (Kuran, 1995; see also Zagorin, 1996).

Similar processes may be applicable to cultural practices of socially mobile individuals. Knowing that practices signal social position and being aware that practices in public have social
consequences, socially mobile individuals manage the presentation of Self (cf. Goffman, 1959). They apply strategies of impression management and do not express – or rather overstress – their genuine preferences outside the domestic sphere. Upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals are confronted with different dilemmas. Therefore, their motives for applying preference falsification may differ (Blau, 1956). Upwardly mobile individuals have to choose between social acceptance of the new, more prestigious social group versus valued ties and customs from their social past. Downwardly mobile individuals have to choose between losing affiliation with their former, more prestigious social group and becoming accepted by their new social environment (Blau, 1956: 290).

We argue that there are different mechanisms to link social mobility and taste. The nature of each mechanism is inferred from the combination of the association of social mobility with a private cultural practice, e.g. listening to classical music at home, and its public pendant, e.g. attending classical concerts. When the private and the public versions of a cultural practice are similarly related to mobility, we contend cultural competence to be at work. In this situation, we assume that the manifested preferences originate from the possession of the registers and dispositional schemes to be able to enjoy certain cultural activities. However, when public manifestations of preferences are related differently to social mobility than private manifestations, other aspects than sheer cultural competence may be at work. We refer to this situation – in line with Kuran’s religious dissimulation (1995) – as aesthetic dissimulation, and distinguish four different forms. The first form consists of a superficial adaptation to the new social environment aiming at social integration: public activities mirror the secondary socialization context, while private praxis is more in line with the social context of origin. In line with Rosow (1965), we use the term ‘chameleon socialization’ to refer to this situation in which individuals conform outwardly, but not/less in terms of inner values/preferences.

The second form of aesthetic dissimulation refers to a situation in which practices at home are predominantly in line with the social position of destination, while public activities are more strongly associated with the social position of origin. This pattern suggests that mobile individuals use the public sphere to maintain social relationships with family and friends from their social position of origin. Furthermore, this pattern indicates that aesthetic preferences are profoundly in line with the new social environment, but that socially mobile individuals do not want to abandon the social relations with people from their former socialization context. Possibly, they want to stay identified with and remain socially embedded in their social position of origin. We call this form of aesthetic dissimulation ‘social nostalgia’.

In the third type of aesthetic dissimulation, public cultural practices are guided by status considerations. Both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals use public activities as a means to acquiring status. In this situation, the public version of a cultural practice is predominantly guided by the social position associated with the highest social status, while its private counterpart is more in line
with the social position associated with lower social status. Both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals prefer public activities associated with higher social positions, while at home they resort to practices which are typical of lower social strata. So, in public, socially mobile individuals play a role, they try to generate favourable perceptions through impression management by overdoing practices associated with higher social status in public in their new social environment. At home they stick to activities more associated with lower social status. We term this second type of aesthetic dissimulation as ‘status seeking’.

Theoretically, a fourth form of aesthetic dissimulation can be identified which constitutes the opposite of ‘status seeking’. This possibility – which we term ‘status evasion’ – denotes the situation in which private cultural practices are more associated with status than with public practices. In this last form of aesthetic dissimulation, socially mobile individuals shun expressing practices associated with higher social status in the public sphere, despite the fact that they perform these practices at home. Possible motives for ‘status evasion’ can be related to not wanting to come across as snobbish or not feeling at home in situations where status-acquiring practices are performed. In our opinion, status evasion is unlikely to occur.

Table 1 presents the different mechanisms through which social mobility can be associated with taste, i.e. cultural competence and the four forms of aesthetic dissimulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underlying mechanism of the effect of social mobility</th>
<th>Downwardly socially mobile</th>
<th>Upwardly socially mobile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural competence related</td>
<td>private = public</td>
<td>private = public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic dissimulation: chameleon socialization</td>
<td>private &gt; public</td>
<td>private &lt; public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic dissimulation: social nostalgia</td>
<td>private &lt; public</td>
<td>private &gt; public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic dissimulation: status seeking</td>
<td>private &lt; public</td>
<td>private &gt; public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic dissimulation: status evasion</td>
<td>private &gt; public</td>
<td>private &gt; public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

>, <, =: Respectively, is more, less or equally associated with practices characteristic for higher social strata.

3. Data and methods

3.1. Data

We use data from the survey Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003–2004 of a representative sample of the Flemish population, i.e. the Dutch-speaking population of Belgium. Flanders is the northern part of Belgium, which has a very high population density and is highly urbanized. This data set has detailed information on a great variety of cultural practices and attitudes collected through computer-assisted face-to-face interviews which resulted in a realized sample size of 2,849 (Lievens et al., 2006). Response rate is 61.0 per cent (AAPOR, 2011).
3.2. Measures

Two criteria are important in our choice of public and private practices. First, we select activities that cover a variety of cultural domains, viz. music, television and cinema, media use, travelling, books and book fair attendance. With the choice for this wide spectrum of cultural practices, we aim at maximizing the range of empirical generalizability. Second, we include practices that can be performed in both the private and the public sphere and that differ in terms of the social strata they are associated with. Practices are classified to be associated with higher or lower social strata, based on our experience with the Flemish cultural field and their association with SES measures in preliminary analyses (not shown). Public practices, e.g. concert attendance, are dichotomized, because the frequency of attendance is small. To make our measures for private practices consistent with their public counterparts, we also dichotomize private activities.

**Music.** Musical taste very well fits our criteria. Music can be consumed in a wide variety of social contexts: from listening at home to attending concerts. Furthermore, music is consumed in every social stratum. So we can easily include musical genres associated with different social strata and different social spheres. Respondents are presented several genres, such as ‘classical music’, ‘jazz’, ‘baroque music’, ‘pop/rock’, ‘folk/traditional music’, ‘dance’ and ‘schlager (popular Flemish music)’. For listening at home, the reference period is the previous month; for concert attendance, the previous six months. Frequency of attendance as well as frequency of listening at home are recoded into ‘never’ and ‘once or more’.

**Television.** Television is almost exclusively consumed in the private sphere. As practically everybody is watching programmes of some sort, we use the frequency of watching certain channels to get at differences in the associated social status. As Elchardus and Siongers point out, public channels in Flanders are legally required to provide a high-quality selection of programmes. Furthermore, they have to give priority to informative and cultural programmes. Private channels are more directed at entertainment and serve popular taste (2007: 220). We consider two channels that are associated with the opposite extremes in the cultural stratification system in the Flemish context, i.e. Canvas – a public channel with a lot of highbrow cultural content – and VTM – a commercial channel with primarily lowbrow entertainment programmes. Respondents have to indicate how frequently they watched both of these channels during the previous month on a five-point scale between ‘daily’ and ‘not in the past month’. We consider watching Canvas ‘daily’ or ‘multiple times a week’ as an indicator of television preferences characteristic of higher social strata; watching VTM ‘daily’ or ‘multiple times a week’ is considered indicative of television preferences viable in lower social strata.

**Cinema attendance** is included as the public pendant of television preferences. We have information on respondents’ attendance at different cinemas in the past six months. Attendance at large cinema complexes that programme new blockbusters – associated with lower social strata – is
opposed to attendance at small cinemas that offer art house movies – associated with higher social strata.

Media use. This refers to what extent respondents actively search for information on a variety of topics in papers, magazines, brochures or the Internet during the past month. We consider frequency of inquiring on international political news as an activity typical of higher social strata. The frequency of looking for news on accidents and disasters is associated with lower social strata. A five-point scale ranging from ‘never during the past month’ to ‘daily’ is used to record the answers. Answers are dichotomized: ‘never’ and ‘once’ versus ‘more than a few times a month’ or more.

Travelling. Respondents reported on the aspects they find important when going on a holiday on a seven-point scale ranging from ‘never important’ to ‘always important’. Scores four to seven are recoded as ‘important’. Preferences typical of the higher social strata are ‘visiting historical buildings, churches and monuments’. For the lower social strata, we use an item that assesses the importance of ‘amusement and parties’ in holidays.

Books and book fairs. While book-related practices are generally associated only with higher social positions, we include reading books and attending book fairs because they nicely indicate private and public practices related to books. For reading books, we construct a variable that distinguishes respondents who have read at least one novel or poem during the past month with those who did not. The public counter-part is having attended a book fair during the past twelve months. Table 2 presents an overview of the various cultural practices we include in the analysis, each with their relative frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated with higher social strata</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classical music</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baroque music</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jazz</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvas (public television channel)</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media use: international political news</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading novels and poetry</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated with lower social strata</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop/rock</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dance</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlager/popular Flemish music</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk/traditional</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTM (commercial television channel)</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media use: accidents and disasters</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social mobility. We operationalize social mobility as educational mobility. Previous research finds education to be a better predictor of cultural practices than socio-economic status (Ganzeboom et al., 1987; Nagel, 2004), that is, educational groups in particular differ in dominant discourses and schemes on appropriate cultural behaviour. Also, studies have shown that education is a very important
predictor of occupational position and income (e.g. Blau and Duncan, 1967; Card, 1999). The survey assesses the educational level of the respondents and of the respondents’ parents. Answers were recoded into four categories: (1) primary school, (2) lower secondary school, (3) higher secondary school, and (4) higher education. As indicator for position of origin, we take the average of educational attainment of both parents and round it up (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013; Sorensen, 1994; Van Eijck, 1999). Table 3 presents the mobility table.

Table 3: Mobility table: relative cell frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin: Educational level parents</th>
<th>Destination: Educational level of the respondent</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Lower secondary</th>
<th>Higher secondary</th>
<th>Higher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td></td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control variables. Gender (51.6 per cent female) and age in years (centred around the mean of 44; SD: 18.3) are included in the analysis as control variables. Because we focus on private/public practices, we also include indicators of social network size and household income. A lack of an extended social network or a low income may function as a barrier for public participation. The measure for social network is based on a name generator. Respondents had to indicate the number of alters present in their leisure network. Answers are recoded into three categories: ‘0–4’, ‘5–9’ and ‘more than 10’, which we include as a set of dummy variables with ‘0–4’ as reference category. Income is measured by asking respondents to what extent they get around with their current household income. Answers range from ‘very hard to manage’ to ‘very comfortably to manage’ on a 7-point scale. This subjective measure originates from economic literature in which it is termed the income satisfaction approach (Dubnoff et al., 1981; Van Praag, 2004).

3.3. Statistical procedure

To study consequences of the experience of social mobility and to be able to analyse which socialization context is predominantly associated with cultural practices of socially mobile individuals, we use Diagonal Reference Models (DRM), a statistical method developed by Sobel (1981, 1985; also see, e.g., De Graaf et al., 1995; Tolsma et al., 2009). Central in DRM is the idea that immobile individuals represent the core of a specific social position. Characteristics of mobile individuals are predicted as a function of the characteristics of immobile individuals situated in the corresponding social position of origin and destination. So, we model private and public taste of mobile individuals, i.e. the off-diagonals, as a function of the immobile individuals, i.e. the diagonal of the mobility table. Our baseline model (with covariates) is
\[ Y_{ijk} = p \cdot \mu_{ii} + (1 - p) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} + \epsilon_{ijk} \]  

(Model 1)

Subscripts \(i\) and \(j\), respectively, refer to the social position of origin and destination. \(Y_{ijk}\) is the value of the dependent variable in cell \(ij\), which has \(k\) observations. \(\mu_{ii}\) and \(\mu_{jj}\) are both estimates of \(Y\) in the diagonal cells. The former refers to the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of origin, while the latter refers to the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of destination. The relative importance of the position of origin is represented by the \(p\)-parameter. \(P\)-parameters significantly higher than 0.5 indicate that \(Y\) is predominantly associated with the social position of origin, i.e., in line with the origin hypothesis. Vice versa, \(p\)-values significantly lower than 0.5 indicate a stronger relationship with the social position of destination, i.e., consistent with the destination hypothesis.

The maximization hypothesis states that taste of mobile individuals is in line with the socialization position associated with the highest social status. To test this hypothesis, we construct the dummy variable \(x_{ijm}\): Downwardly mobile individuals score one, upwardly mobile individuals score zero. This allows the salience parameter for origin to vary between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. In the model, the salience parameter for position of origin for downwardly mobile individuals is \('p + m'\), for upwardly mobile individuals the parameter for position of origin remains \('p'\). The maximization model is:

\[ Y_{ijk} = (p + mx_{ijm}) \cdot \mu_{ii} + \left(1 - (p + mx_{ijm})\right) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} + \epsilon_{ijk} \]  

(Model 2)

Because our dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression models are used. For example, model 1 for a dichotomous variable thus becomes:

\[ \pi(x) = \frac{e^{p \cdot \mu_{ii} + (1 - p) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} + \epsilon_{ijk}}}{1 + e^{p \cdot \mu_{ii} + (1 - p) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} + \epsilon_{ijk}}} \]

where \(\pi(x) = E(Y \mid x)\) is the conditional mean of \(Y\), given \(x\).

4. Results

For all cultural practices, we estimate the base model, i.e., the restricted model, and the maximization model, i.e., the extended model. Results show that for all cultural practices the extended model does not provide a better fit, because the maximization parameter in the extended models is never significantly different from zero, which indicates that the salience parameter of the social position of origin does not differ significantly between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. Hence, the maximization hypothesis is rejected for all cultural practices in both social spheres. Pseudo \(R^2\)s are calculated as squared polychoric correlations between predicted and observed values of the dependent variables (Long, 1997; Veall and Zimmerman, 1996).
Due to a lack of space, we cannot discuss the results of the analyses of all cultural practices. Therefore, we present only the results for two musical genres: classical music and popular Flemish music/ schlager. These results are illustrative of the findings of all other practices which are summarized in Table 5. Full results of all analyses are available on request.

4.1. Music consumption

Classical music. Table 4 shows the parameter estimates for the preferences for two musical genres in the private and public sphere. If we first take a look at the DRM intercepts, i.e. the preferences of immobile individuals, we see that higher educated individuals have higher odds of listening to classical music versus not listening (0.597 = e^-0.516 and 0.139 = e^1.969) compared to lower educated individuals (0.033 = e^-3.407). Also concert attendance is stratified as we expected: Higher educated individuals have higher odds to attend classical concerts than lower educated individuals. For the p-parameters, we consider the 95 per cent confidence intervals to check whether they differ significantly from 0.5 and conclude that the destination hypothesis applies for listening to classical music in the private and public spheres. Both p-parameters (p_{private} = 0.371 and p_{public} = 0.138) are significantly lower than 0.5. This means that both for upwardly as well as downwardly mobile individuals, private and public highbrow musical taste predominantly resembles the taste of immobile individuals who have the same educational level as the mobile individual, i.e. the destination hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Classical music</th>
<th></th>
<th>Schlager</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobility parameters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p: relative impact of origin</td>
<td>.371 (.053)</td>
<td>.138 (.089)</td>
<td>.315 (.133)</td>
<td>.000 (.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m: maximization parameter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM intercepts: musical preferences of immobile individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>µ_{11}: primary education</td>
<td>-3.407 (.321)</td>
<td>-8.309 (.1034)</td>
<td>1.037 (.319)</td>
<td>-5.548 (.950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>µ_{22}: lower secondary education</td>
<td>-2.363 (.288)</td>
<td>-6.567 (.623)</td>
<td>.914 (.265)</td>
<td>-5.043 (.892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>µ_{33}: higher secondary education</td>
<td>-1.969 (.270)</td>
<td>-6.009 (.531)</td>
<td>.620 (.275)</td>
<td>-5.435 (.773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>µ_{44}: higher education</td>
<td>-.516 (.288)</td>
<td>-4.726 (.542)</td>
<td>-.180 (.299)</td>
<td>-4.546 (.793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobility parameters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of the covariates on musical preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β_{gender: women}</td>
<td>.036 (.100)</td>
<td>.470 (.201)</td>
<td>.027 (.100)</td>
<td>.520 (.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β_{age}</td>
<td>.035 (.004)</td>
<td>.047 (.007)</td>
<td>.004 (.004)</td>
<td>.018 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β_{income: income}</td>
<td>.032 (.036)</td>
<td>.072 (.071)</td>
<td>-.090 (.034)</td>
<td>.023 (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network size*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β_{n: 5 – 9}</td>
<td>.089 (.116)</td>
<td>.054 (.250)</td>
<td>.253 (.113)</td>
<td>-.005 (.389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β_{n: 10 or more}</td>
<td>.282 (.128)</td>
<td>.450 (.260)</td>
<td>.325 (.127)</td>
<td>.538 (.397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.19 .12</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effects of the control variables in all analyses are in line with findings common in the literature (e.g. Katz-Gerro and Sullivan, 2010; Nagel, 2004). For classical music we find that older individuals have higher odds of listening to classical music at home \((e^{0.035} = 1.036)\) and attending classical concerts \((e^{0.047} = 1.048)\). We also find a gender difference: women visit classical concerts more frequently than men do \((e^{0.470} = 1.599)\).

Schlager/popular Flemish music. By considering the 95 per cent confidence interval, we see that the p-parameter for listening to schlager at home does not significantly differ from 0.5 (0.315). Neither parental nor own educational level of socially mobile individuals is more strongly associated with listening at home to popular Flemish music. However, the p-parameter for schlager concert attendance is significantly lower than 0.5 (0.000), providing evidence for the destination hypothesis: Public taste for popular Flemish music of mobile individuals is similar to the preferences of immobile individuals with the same educational level.

4.2. Other cultural practices

In Table 5, the p-parameters from the analyses on the other cultural practices are presented. Results confirm the patterns we found for classical and popular Flemish music. Private and public practices that are associated with higher social strata are consistent with the destination hypothesis. This means that these practices are predominantly related to the own educational attainment of mobile individuals. That is, they conform to their new social environment both publicly and privately.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural practices associated with higher social strata</th>
<th>Cultural practices associated with lower social strata</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private: Destination</td>
<td>Private: Origin and destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural practices associated with higher social strata</td>
<td>Cultural practices associated with lower social strata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private: Destination</td>
<td>Private: Origin and destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: Destination</td>
<td>Public: Destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural practices associated with higher social strata</td>
<td>Cultural practices associated with lower social strata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private: Destination</td>
<td>Private: Origin and destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural practices associated with higher social strata</td>
<td>Cultural practices associated with lower social strata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public: Destination</td>
<td>Public: Destination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Summary of the DRM-analyses on various cultural practices: p-value and standard errors.

Between parentheses: the standard error of the p-parameters. Maximization hypothesis rejected for all cultural practices.
For cultural practices viable in lower social strata, we find the following pattern: Neither parental educational context nor own educational attainment is predominantly associated with private practices. Public practices, however, are mainly associated with the own educational level, i.e. the destination hypothesis. So, both private and public cultural practices associated with lower social strata are partially in line with expectations from the new social environment. However, public pendants of these practices are more in line with the social position of destination compared to the private pendants, suggesting that socially mobile individuals overstate their conformity in public.

A similar argument can be made for practices associated with higher social strata. Even though all p-parameters for these practices are significantly lower than 0.5 (supporting the destination hypothesis), all p-parameters of the public practices are lower than those of their private counterparts. So, while both private and public practices characteristic of higher social strata are predominantly associated with own educational level, public practices are even more strongly related to the socially mobile’s educational credentials compared to their private activities (e.g. baroque music $p_{private} = 0.358$ and $p_{public} = 0.148$).

So, for practices associated with higher as well as lower social positions, we find evidence of chameleon socialization. And while the results for practices viable in higher social strata are less clear-cut in corroborating chameleon socialization, they suggest that processes of chameleon socialization also apply there.

5. Conclusion and discussion

In this article, we studied cultural practices of socially mobile individuals. First, we found evidence that their cultural taste is more strongly linked to their own acquired educational level compared to the mean educational level of their parents. This implies – considering educational level as a proxy for the social environment – that both the social position of origin and destination matter, and, moreover, that the social position of destination has the strongest association with actual cultural taste of socially mobile individuals.

In Distinction, Bourdieu depicts the habitus as a product of childhood socialization within the social position of origin that continues to colour individuals’ lives. Our results suggest that the importance of childhood experiences may be exaggerated as we find practices of socially mobile individuals to be mainly in accordance with the secondary socialization position – be it because of changes during/after the experience of social mobility, or because these individuals acquired cultural practices during childhood socialization which are ‘inappropriate’ for the social position of origin. Our results are in line with recent empirical studies claiming that traditional socialization theory overestimates parental socialization and the lifelong influence of the lived experiences during
childhood (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013; Erickson, 1996; Stein, 2005). These studies suggest the
habitus to be less rigid, more malleable and more adaptable to other contexts of socialization. It is
obvious, however, that if the habitus is not a monolithic entity but rather incorporates different aspects,
some parts of it may be more durable than others and react differently to the experience of social
mobility. This may cause an even greater amount of intra-individual behavioural variation (Daenekindt
and Roose, 2013; Lahire, 2008).

Second, we found a discrepancy between the way the experience of social mobility is associated
with private and public manifestations of preferences. For the socially mobile, public cultural activities
are more strongly related to the new social environment than activities that are inconspicuous and
limited to the privacy of the homes. We call this situation chameleon socialization and argue it to be
guided by motives for social integration. That is, while their preferences partially conform to the
norms and values of the new social environment, socially mobile individuals overdo/overstress this
conformity in the public sphere to facilitate social integration in a new social environment.

Actually, cultural chameleons act in ways reminiscent of Bourdieu’s idea of cultural goodwill:
they recognize and aspire to conformity with the cultural practices viable in their new social
environment. While cultural goodwill is generally considered to be related to upward social mobility
and to the petite bourgeoisie, our results imply that similar processes are present for downwardly
mobile individuals. They also try to conform to the cultural practices dominant in their new social
environment. This suggests that the motives behind cultural goodwill may not necessarily be status-
related, but more related to social integration.

By taking the private–public dimension into consideration, we emphasize the importance of
recent ideas stressing the situational character of cultural taste (Hennion, 2007; Roose and Vander
Stichele, 2010). As Bourdieu claims: ‘dispositions do not lead in a determinate way to a determinate
action; they are revealed and fulfilled only in appropriate circumstances and in the relationship with a
situation’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 149). Furthermore, it highlights the importance of a more contextualized
outlook on the study and measurement of cultural practices. By de-contextualizing cultural practices
through using general genre labels as a measurement instrument, surveys have a hard time capturing
the intra-individual variability in cultural behaviour that may depend on context. So, the equation of
cultural preferences with actual behaviour hampers the possibility to detect intra-individual variation
in cultural practices (cf. Lahire, 2008).

Furthermore, distinguishing private and public sphere has, to our knowledge, not yet been done
in research on social mobility. We maintain that this dimension is relevant in this research domain
because social mobility can lead to feelings of being out of place (Blau, 1956), which in turn can lead
to embarrassment and strategies of impression management (Goffman, 1956, 1959). Distinguishing
the private and public sphere allows the range of impact of the effects of social mobility to be
measured. It sheds light on whether social mobility only has superficial effects, or whether the effects go deeper and penetrate the social identity and very Self of socially mobile individuals.

In this article, and this applies to a whole lot of other research in this tradition, we were not able to make any causal claims because we lack information on the cultural practices during childhood. An alternative interpretation of our findings is that cultural practices – as part of someone’s cultural capital – affect chances for social mobility and that it is especially the cultural activities in the public sphere that spur mobility chances and should be considered as indicators of cultural capital. However, way our findings are interpreted, it is hard, if not impossible, to get at the complex interconnection between cultural practices, social position and mobility in the social space by using survey research and we hope this article may serve as an impetus for further research on the experience of social mobility.

We have associated a change in private practices with a ‘deep’ adaptation and a change in only the public activities with a ‘superficial’ change. An alternative argument could be made. For example, Lahire (2008) claims that private practices are characterized by a certain amount of freedom; this in contrast to public practices which demand a commitment, an engagement. However, if a practice related to a certain cultural product, e.g. opera, is only performed in public, and not in the freedom of the private sphere, this is in our opinion an indication that this engagement to the cultural product is much more associated with social motives than it is with aesthetic dispositions alone. In this article we have operationalized social mobility as educational mobility. We argued that this measurement of mobility is the most relevant for cultural practices in Flanders. However, other dimensions, e.g. occupational mobility, may be relevant as well, perhaps more so for other forms of practices (Westoff et al., 1960).

6. References


Chapter 6

Social Mobility and Cultural Dissonance

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Abstract

Cultural omnivorousness has been associated with the cultural tolerance or cosmopolitanism of the upper social strata. Building on a large-scale survey in Flanders (Belgium) (n=2849), we find that dissonant taste profiles—i.e., the combination of musical genres from different brow-levels, of which omnivorousness is one manifestation—are not only characteristic of the social elites. These profiles are also present in lower social strata and are partly the result of social mobility: Both upwardly, as well as downwardly, socially mobile individuals include cultural activities characteristic of the social position of origin and destination in their cultural profiles. We argue that the omnipresence of this “cultural dissonance” questions the idea that tolerance and cosmopolitanism are exclusive characteristics of higher social strata and that boundary-crossing per se functions as a status-marker.
1. Introduction

Ever since their detection in the U.S. in the early 1990s (Peterson, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 1992), omnivores have received much attention in cultural sociology, as their presence challenged the way in which the relationship between cultural practices and socio-economic position had been conceptualized (Bourdieu, 1984). Omnivorousness—or combining consumption in legitimate with illegitimate cultural genres, thought typical for the higher social strata—was considered to have replaced highbrow culture as a status-marker and prompted many to re-think the nature of symbolic boundaries, the validity of cultural hierarchies, and hence, the nature and principles of social distinction. For nearly two decades now, sociologists have vigorously tried to replicate Peterson’s findings in different countries and in a variety of cultural and social settings. Results consistently show that omnivores are young, highly educated, members of the upper social strata and that they can be found in various cultural domains—from musical tastes and film preferences to reading habits (e.g., Peterson, 1992; Roose and Vander Stichele, 2010; Van Eijck, 2001; Van Eijck and Lieve, 2008; Van Rees et al., 1999; Vander Stichele and Rudi Laermans, 2006; Warde et al., 1999). Peterson and colleagues argue that this shift from snob to omnivore among the social elites “can be seen as a part of the historical trend toward greater tolerance of those holding different values” (Peterson and Kern, 1996, p. 905) and is partly explained by processes of upward social mobility. That is, the influx of social climbers in the upper social stratum affects its heterogeneity in terms of cultural practices, as individuals from lower social positions hold on to the cultural preferences in which they were raised (see also Van Eijck, 1999).

Yet, sociological analyses on omnivorousness have not remained unchallenged, not only in terms of their added value for theories on social distinction and inequality, but also in terms of their empirical underpinnings (Atkinson, 2011; Friedman, 2012; Lahire, 2008; Rimmer, 2012; Savage and Gayo-Cal, 2011). According to Bernard Lahire for example, individual singularities are ignored and research has lapsed into cultural caricaturing of social groups (Lahire, 2008, p. 167). He talks about cultural dissonance rather than omnivorousness, which he considers to be only one of the possible forms of dissonance. He argues that boundary-crossing taste patterns are not exclusively situated in the upper social strata, but that in contemporary society, people are subject to heterogeneous socializing influences and, hence, dissonant cultural profiles can be found in every social position (Lahire, 2008, 2011 [2001]).

In this article, we focus on social mobility as a source of heterogeneity in the socializing experience and its association with musical cultural profiles: Socially mobile individuals are confronted with different sets of expectations related to cultural practices; each set being characteristic of a particular social environment in which they have been socialized. The aim of this article is to investigate whether intergenerationally socially mobile individuals are more dissonant in their
listening behavior compared to non-mobile individuals. If intergenerational mobility—both upwardly and downwardly—is associated with dissonant cultural profiles, then this would mean that “the boundary between cultural legitimacy ... and cultural illegitimacy ... does not only separate different social classes statistically, as discrete categories, but divides up the different cultural practices and preferences of individuals, across all classes of society” (Lahire, 2008, p. 168; emphasis added). This would imply that intra-individual variation in cultural practices is not only prevalent in the upper classes and, hence, that the importance of omnivorousness as a status-marker, as the literature post-Peterson claims, may be unduly exaggerated (cf., Atkinson, 2011).

2. Theory

2.1. Social position and cultural taste profiles

In line with Lahire (2004), we define dissonant cultural profiles as the combination of legitimate and illegitimate cultural activities, and we contrast them with consonant cultural profiles that exclusively consist of legitimate or illegitimate cultural practices. The basic idea of cultural dissonance—i.e., its boundary-crossing character—is also central to omnivorousness. Crossing the boundary between genres of different brow-levels is the common denominator of the (many) different conceptualizations of omnivorousness (cf., Ollivier, 2008; Peterson, 2005). In that sense, dissonance and omnivorousness are similar. However, most operationalizations of omnivorousness exclusively focus on highbrow omnivorousness, implying that all omnivores are situated in higher social strata (Peterson, 2005; for exceptions, see the examples of Cappeliez and Johnston, 2013; Sonnett, 2004). And indeed, most authors argue that omnivorousness is situated in higher social strata, while individuals from lower social positions exhibit a more univorous, lowbrow taste. This difference is routinely explained by pointing to a lack of cultural competence necessary to appreciate highbrow culture (e.g., Katz-Gerro and Jæger, 2013; Peterson, 1992; Van Rees et al., 1999; Warde et al., 1999) or by a lack of cultural tolerance, openness or cosmopolitanism among the lower classes (Bryson, 1997, p. 150; DiMaggio and Bryson, 2000).

However, Lahire contends that cultural dissonance is also present in lower social strata. In this line of thinking, there are different forms of cultural dissonance, of which cultural omnivorousness is only one. He goes on by arguing that cultural dissonance—rather than consonance—actually is characteristic of cultural profiles in highly differentiated societies (Lahire, 2004, 2008). There are a number of reasons for these consonant, highbrow cultural profiles to have become exceptional in favor of dissonant profiles. For example, there is the decline of faith in highbrow culture as a necessary part of a person’s Bildung—a waning in the belief that only knowledge of a limited number of consecrated, canonized works ensures the development of independent, self-reliant, critical citizens (cf., DiMaggio,
1991; Gans, 1974). Also, the wide variety of situations and contexts by which to participate in cultural activities, as well as the various reasons and motives to engage in culture account for dissonant cultural profiles. For one and the same individual, some legitimate practices may be consumed for purposes of intellectual or cognitive stimulation, while for another, more illegitimate cultural genres, such as “listening” to dance music, may primarily serve recreational, relaxation purposes. Moreover, one may even suggest that esthetic preferences are only one of many possible motives for doing culture. For example, the choice for attending a concert may primarily be guided by social considerations instead of pure esthetic motives—i.e., to enjoy the company of someone or having been invited to attend (cf., Roose, 2008). Furthermore, research has shown that heterogeneous networks relate to more diverse taste patterns (Lizardo, 2006) and that cultural practices may be used in strategies of impression management to fit in new social environments (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013b). Also, technological developments, such as Internet and television-on-demand, allow people to have access (in the privacy of their homes) to a quasi-limitless cultural offering 24/7—this is what Wright (2011) calls a context of cultural abundance. In addition, the increased mixing of genres and “crossovers” in cultural production play a role in the genesis of cultural dissonance (Lahire, 2008).

However, the most important reason for intra-individual variation in cultural activities—and the focus of this article—is that highly differentiated societies allow for a heterogeneity of socializing experiences. “Every (individual) body plunged into a plurality of social worlds is subjected to heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory principles of socialization” (Lahire, 2011 [2001], p. 26). This argument is similar to the insights of Peter Berger and colleagues in The Pluralization of Social-Life-Worlds (Berger et al., 1974). Heterogeneity of socializing experiences is present within and between different stages of life. Even during childhood socialization—which is often considered the most homogeneous socializing period during lifetime—the individual is surrounded by opposing principles of socialization (Berger et al., 1974). For example, there is a possibility for opposing principles of socialization between school and family or even within the family itself in the shape of parental heterogamy (Lahire, 2004, p. 15, 2011 [2001], p. 31). Among the different (possibly interrelated) forms of contradicting socializing forces—e.g., heterogamy, geographical mobility, heterogeneous social networks—we focus on social mobility. Because cultural preferences are strongly associated with social strata and because of their central role in the manifestation and reproduction of social inequality, we expect mobility to be strongly related to cultural taste patterns.

In this article, then, we focus on the association between social mobility and the presence/absence of dissonance in cultural profiles by using the listening to various musical genres as a case in point. Research shows that musical taste is a valid measure for cultural taste in general (Peterson and Simkus, 1992), that musical practices are strong indicators of class socialization (Coulangeon, 2005), and that they are very well suited to study taste differentiation (Van Eijck, 2000). Cultural dissonance evidently goes beyond activities related to one specific cultural medium. If we
find an association between the heterogeneity of socializing experiences and practices related to one cultural medium—i.e., musical practices—it is very likely that this heterogeneity will also cause dissonance between dispositions, between cultural media, between social contexts and all possible combinations between them.

2.2. Social mobility

Ever since the pioneering days of Sorokin (1927), social mobility has been a central topic in sociology (e.g., Blau and Duncan, 1967; Erickson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzboom et al., 1991; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956). Socially mobile individuals have been confronted with at least two different contexts of socialization: the social position of origin and the social position of destination, each associated with its own culture, habits, preferences and associated discourse on practices, motives for participation, ways of preferring, etc. For example, upwardly mobile individuals originate from a social environment where lowbrow practices are typical and end up in a social environment where highbrow practices also are viable. For downwardly mobile individuals, the opposite logic applies. As Blau argues “social mobility puts individuals under cross-pressure” (Blau, 1994, p. 41). This experience of cross-pressure may express itself in a destabilized habitus generating suffering (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 160), in uneasiness and emotional disequilibrium (Friedman, 2012, 2013), and in feelings of being out of place—which may spur mobile individuals to strategies of impression management in attempts to fit in in the new social environment (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013b). How do socially mobile individuals react to these heterogeneous, dissonant—at first sight, incompatible—expectations regarding appropriate cultural behavior, and how does this experience of social mobility manifest itself in cultural taste patterns?

The ideas on heterogeneous socialization can be traced back to Merton’s arguments associated with the concept of sociological ambivalence. In his role-set theory, Merton points to the possibility that expectations emanating from different social positions are incompatible. Sociological ambivalence refers to a situation with “incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior” (Merton and Barber, 1976, p. 6). This results in the impossibility of conforming to both sets of expectations, and it puts the individual under cross-pressure (Blau, 1994). Merton specifies mechanisms by which to cope with these contradictions (Merton, 1968 [1949]; see also Coser, 1975, 1990). One of these mechanisms depends on the different degrees of involvement in role-relationships. Expectations originating from a role-relationship with only peripheral concern can be ignored in favor of those from role-relationships that are more central in the individual’s life (Merton, 1968 [1949]). Applied to social mobility and musical cultural profiles, this refers to a situation in which one context of socialization—be it origin or destination—has a predominant impact on the cultural profile, whereas the other only has a negligible influence.
Merton (1968 [1949]) also mentions another mechanism for coping with sociological ambivalence. When both contexts of socialization are equally important, flexibility is forced upon individuals, “as differences are ‘ironed out’, through negotiation and compromise” (Coser, 1975, p. 246). In the context of cultural practices, a dissonant cultural profile can be considered a compromise between both sets of expectations, as a dissonant profile encompasses the practices that are characteristic of all social strata—be it lower or higher. In this way, cultural dissonance conforms to both sets of expectations emanating from the two different contexts of socialization.

2.2.1. The social reproduction model: the origin hypothesis

We expect both contexts of socialization to have an impact on the current cultural profiles of socially mobile individuals. However, different arguments can be made as to whether the social position of origin or the social position of destination has a predominant effect. While socialization during early childhood is often considered to be deep and lasting, individuals are continuously confronted with new experiences, behavior, and attitudes in new social settings (Becker, 1964; Maccoby, 2007; Mortimer and Simmons, 1978). Yet, social mobility research has shown “how destination depends on origin” (cf., Duncan, 1979). Parents control the contexts in which their children are socialized, for example, by selecting schools, by enrolling children in extra-curricular activities, and by managing their children’s playgroup.

Some authors stress the lived experiences during childhood as the seedbed of dispositions and the associated preferences and practices. The basic personality is shaped during childhood, whereas socialization during adulthood is considered to be mainly involved with specific norms and superficial personality characteristics (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984; Mortimer and Simmons, 1978; cf., Wrong, 1961). While Bourdieu does not deny that the habitus—i.e., the system of dispositions—is open to new experiences, he contends that these new experiences are always perceived through the lens that was acquired and established during childhood (Bourdieu, 1994). “The habitus—embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history—is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 56). In this perspective, children are considered to be much more malleable compared to adults, and the imprints during childhood are expected to last throughout the entire lifespan. This perspective is often referred to as the cultural reproduction model (Aschaffenburg and Maas, 1997; DiMaggio, 1982). Also, psychological studies find musical preferences to be very stable across time (Delsing et al., 2008; Rentfrow and Gosling, 2003). Furthermore, these studies claim musical taste to be associated with personality characteristics and consider musical preferences as a stable personality characteristic (Ter Bogt et al., 2011). According to this rationale, musical cultural profiles are assumed to develop during childhood and, hence, socially

\[1\] In more recent publications, Bourdieu takes a more nuanced position in this matter, for example in Pascalian Meditations (Bourdieu, 2000)—especially in Chapter Four, “Bodily Knowledge”.

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mobile individuals stick to the cultural profile characteristic of their context of origin. The ideas from Peterson and Kern (1996) on omnivorousness are consistent with this argument. They claim that social mobility increases the heterogeneity in higher social strata because socially mobile individuals hold on to the cultural practices they grew up with. In line with this reasoning, we expect musical cultural profiles of socially mobile individuals to be predominantly shaped by the socialization context of origin (origin hypothesis). For upwardly mobile individuals, these are lowbrow cultural profiles; for downwardly mobile individuals, these are highbrow cultural profiles.

2.2.2. The cultural mobility model: destination or encompassment?

Some authors question the lasting influence of socialization during early childhood (Erickson, 1996; Lahire, 2004, 2008, 2011 (2001)). In the cultural mobility model, “childhood experience and family background may only partially and modestly determine a person’s stock of cultural capital” (DiMaggio, 1982, p. 190; see also Aschaffenburg and Maas, 1997). However, this model—due to its focus on highbrow culture—is not clear as to what happens with the cultural resources originating from childhood experiences. For example, individuals originating from lower social strata exhibiting lowbrow preferences and practices in childhood may pick up highbrow preferences and practices during their educational career. But what happens to those lowbrow preferences and practices? Do individuals give them up, or do they remain an important part—next to the added highbrow characteristics—of someone’s cultural repertoire? In line with these two possible outcomes of the cultural mobility model, we formulate a second and a third hypothesis—next to the origin hypothesis.

Lahire argues that individuals are multi-socialized. He criticizes Bourdieu for his assumption that the habitus—as the product of early childhood experiences—is able to guide individuals throughout the rest of their lives (but see footnote 1). Individuals are often confronted with situations for which the habitus has no ‘answer’. While Bourdieu (e.g., 1990) argues that, in these situations, individuals just expand their habitus by assimilating these new experiences, Lahire contends that these experiences cannot always be assimilated and that schemes internalized during childhood need to be suppressed (Lahire, 2011 (2001)). So, while the origin hypothesis assumes childhood experiences to have an imprint for the rest of individuals’ lives, Lahire argues that new situations—when these are not in line with the childhood experiences—may force individuals to relinquish schemes adopted during early childhood and adapt to new social situations. Empirical research has found evidence for the arguments, as esthetic dispositions (Daenekindt and Roose, 2011, 2013a), cultural practices (Daenekindt and Roose, 2013b) and cultural lifestyles (Stein, 2005) of socially mobile individuals are influenced by the social position of destination. In line with this reasoning, upwardly mobile individuals should participate in highbrow cultural practices; downwardly mobile individuals should develop lowbrow cultural profiles. So, we expect musical cultural profiles of socially mobile
individuals to be predominantly shaped by the socialization context of destination (destination hypothesis).

Both hypotheses outlined above—i.e., origin and destination hypotheses—assume that the sets of expectations emanating from the two different contexts of socialization are incompatible. But to what extent does this assumption hold? If upwardly mobile individuals expand their cultural competence, and if downwardly mobile individuals just stick to the broad cultural competence they grew up with, then both sets of expectations are not necessarily incompatible. Because dissonant cultural profiles contain tacit knowledge, attitudes and practices enabling one to conform to expectations characteristic of both higher and lower social strata, dissonant cultural profiles can be considered as a mechanism to cope with sociological ambivalence.

Moreover, it is unlikely that socially mobile individuals will cut off every social bond with family and friends from their social position of origin. So, by having social encounters across different social strata, socially mobile individuals maintain a broad cultural repertoire. Thus, cultural dissonance can be seen as an ability to fit in any given social environment. As Erickson (1996, 2008) argues, a wide variety of cultural resources is very useful because individuals can use and apply their cultural resources in a multitude of social contexts and social fields. Sorokin makes similar arguments and contends that—while immobile individuals find it difficult to take other perspectives—socially mobile individuals, in contrast, can switch perspectives (Sorokin, 1927). These mobile individuals possess an intellectual flexibility, which makes their judgment variable in accordance with their position and circumstances (Coser, 1975, p. 250). Or, in the words of Emmison, they can “code-switch” (Emmison, 2003, p. 223; see also DiMaggio, 1987) in accordance to the situational social context.

Upwardly mobile individuals expand their cultural resources throughout the process of social mobility. Downwardly mobile individuals have built up a wide variety of cultural resources during early childhood, which gives them the ability to fit into new social environments. This situation echoes the cultural mobility model, as individuals are able to pick up cultural resources later in life. Cultural resources are added to—in contrast to the destination hypothesis, where they replace—the cultural resources gathered during childhood. The ability of these mobile individuals to pick up additional cultural practices may be generated by the effect social mobility has on esthetic dispositions. For example, Lizardo and Skiles (2012) consider omnivorousness to be the contemporary manifestation of the esthetic disposition—the propensity and ability to stress form rather than content in the esthetic experience (cf., Bourdieu, 1984). The experience of social mobility may stretch the esthetic disposition, make it more flexible and, in this way, make it also applicable to lowbrow cultural products. In this way, Lizardo and Skiles argue, individuals from the social elites are able to enjoy formal and structural aspects of lowbrow cultural products, while ignoring/suppressing aspects of the content which would—in absence of this flexibility—hamper esthetic appreciation.
Alternatively, it is also possible that social mobility results in a variety of dispositions, as socially mobile individuals may have picked up both lowbrow dispositions—i.e., a functional, content-driven approach to cultural objects—and highbrow dispositions—i.e., directing attention to form and style—in both contexts of socialization. Friedman, for example, finds that upwardly mobile individuals combine both highbrow with lowbrow styles of appreciation in their consumption of comedy (Friedman, 2012), suggesting that social mobility brings about a diversity of dispositions, which gives such individuals the ability to switch dispositional perspectives depending on the brow-level of cultural products. Being confronted with lowbrow products, these individuals approach lowbrow products with a functional perspective—prioritizing matter over form/style—and switch to a more art-for-art’s sake approach stressing style and form when being confronted with highbrow cultural products.

So, a third possible effect of social mobility on cultural profiles can be termed as the encompassment hypothesis, which states that we expect socially mobile individuals to adopt the most dissonant cultural profile with which they were socialized. This cultural profile may stem from the social position of origin or the social position of destination, and it encompasses the less dissonant cultural profile. This effect of social mobility is in line with the theoretical framework of Lahire (2008, 2011 [2001]). He argues that heterogeneous socializing influences—in our article: social mobility—ensue in dissonant cultural profiles.

3. Data and methods

3.1. Sample and method of data collection

We use data from the survey “Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003–2004”, based on a representative sample of the Flemish population—i.e., the Dutch-speaking population of Belgium. The survey contains information on a great variety of cultural behavior, attitudes and dispositions, and it was collected from 2849 randomly selected individuals by means of a computer-assisted face-to-face interview (Lievens et al., 2006). Its response rate is 61.0 percent (American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2011). Flanders is the Northern part of Belgium, which has a high population density and is highly urbanized. Some 10 percent of the total population (total population is 6.2

\[2\] In social mobility research, this pattern is also being referred to as maximalization or the maximization hypothesis (e.g., Daenekindt and Roose, 2011, 2013a; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2000), hinting at the maximization of social status (e.g., De Graaf and Ganzeboom, 1990; Van Eijck, 1999). We use a different term to differentiate from status maximization and to stress the idea behind this pattern—i.e., the range of practices characteristic of higher social strata encompasses the practices viable in lower social strata.
Social Mobility and Cultural Dissonance

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Musical cultural profiles

Respondents were presented different musical genres and were asked to indicate the frequency of listening to each of these genres during the past month on a 5-point scale between “not during the last month” to “daily”. Answers were recoded into dichotomous variables—“did not listen in the past month” and “listened more than once during the past month”. We dichotomize these variables because—for the purpose of the present article—we are interested in the breadth of cultural profiles rather than differences in frequency of listening within profiles between different musical genres.

We consider six different musical genres—i.e., “pop/rock”, “dance”, “chanson or singer-songwriter”, “folk”, “classical music” and “opera”. Based on our experience and knowledge of the Flemish cultural field, we include pop/rock and dance music in the lowbrow scheme; chanson/singer-songwriter and folk in the middlebrow scheme; and classical music and opera in the highbrow scheme. The place of these genres in the cultural hierarchy is similar to other Western European countries and the U.S. While the status associated with specific cultural genres is always in flux (e.g., DiMaggio, 1991; Janssen et al., 2008), the genres we included are known to be relatively stable as to their associated brow-level in Flanders. It is for this reason that we omitted genres like jazz, for example, which are less stable in terms of their position in the cultural stratification system (cf., Peterson, 1994). Because we have two genres for each of the three cultural schemes, we have enough genres to understand boundary-crossing in musical taste. 3 To grasp the different patterns of listening behavior in Flanders, we perform Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This method allows us to explore latent structures among a set of observable categorical items (Lazersfeld and Henry, 1968), and it will be used here to discern different taste profiles present in the Flemish population. Table 1

3 One reviewer was critical as to our measure of taste patterns because the number of included genres—i.e., six—according to him/her, was too low in number—especially compared to the number of genres addressed by Peterson, Bryson, etc. We do not agree with this, and we are actually convinced that our measure is superior to the often used count-measure of omnivorousness (simply counting the preferred genres). This count-procedure indeed allows one to include more genres, but it is not able to grasp boundary-crossing taste patterns, as all information on the nature of the combined genres is omitted. In our operationalization, we have two convincing—relatively stable over time—genres for each scheme, and by means of Latent Class Analysis, we can very clearly grasp the different taste patterns present in our data. Furthermore, by means of this method, we see what particular boundaries are crossed within each taste profile.

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presents the goodness of fit measures of the different estimated models. The obtained p-values indicate a good fit for models 5, 6 and 7. Based on the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC), model 5 would be preferred, whereas the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) favors model 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>L²</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>BIC (L²)</th>
<th>AIC (L²)</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>1-cluster</td>
<td>2733.205</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>2279.987</td>
<td>2619.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>2-cluster</td>
<td>1280.221</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>882.6610</td>
<td>1180.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>3-cluster</td>
<td>367.5819</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>25.6799</td>
<td>281.5819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>4-cluster</td>
<td>78.3840</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-207.6595</td>
<td>6.3840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>5-cluster</td>
<td>26.1248</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>-204.4602</td>
<td>-31.5752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:</td>
<td>6-cluster</td>
<td>11.9735</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>-162.9530</td>
<td>-32.0265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:</td>
<td>7-cluster</td>
<td>8.1716</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>-111.0965</td>
<td>-21.8284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the p-value, BIC and AIC, we would initially opt for model 5. However, when we look at the bivariate residuals, which are presented in Table 2, we see that the correlation between folk and chanson is unacceptably high in Models 4 and 5—i.e., higher than 1, which indicates that the correlation between both variables has not been adequately explained by the model (Magidson and Vermunt, 2004). In Model 6, this correlation between both genres becomes .1752. Furthermore, the clusters in model 6 make a lot of sense theoretically, and they clearly distinguish different taste patterns in terms of dissonance. For these reasons, we ultimately prefer model 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dance</th>
<th>Pop/Rock</th>
<th>Chanson</th>
<th>Folk</th>
<th>Classical music</th>
<th>Opera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>m4: .2027</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m5: .0245</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m6: .0071</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m4: .1738</td>
<td>m4: .2954</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m5: .0813</td>
<td>m5: .0302</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m6: .0064</td>
<td>m6: .0079</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m4: .0292</td>
<td>m4: .0137</td>
<td>m4: .30.1520</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m5: .0157</td>
<td>m5: .0083</td>
<td>m5: .2.1901</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m6: .0064</td>
<td>m6: .0004</td>
<td>m6: .1752</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m4: .0003</td>
<td>m4: .0047</td>
<td>m4: .0772</td>
<td>m4: .7720</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m5: .0018</td>
<td>m5: .0044</td>
<td>m5: .0019</td>
<td>m5: .0762</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m6: .0070</td>
<td>m6: .0172</td>
<td>m6: .0011</td>
<td>m6: .0023</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m4: .5050</td>
<td>m4: .0179</td>
<td>m4: .8605</td>
<td>m4: .2529</td>
<td>m4: .6197</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m5: .0098</td>
<td>m5: .0243</td>
<td>m5: .0708</td>
<td>m5: .1020</td>
<td>m5: .1963</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m6: .0222</td>
<td>m6: .0022</td>
<td>m6: .0229</td>
<td>m6: .0003</td>
<td>m6: .1560</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conditional probabilities and clusters sizes of model 6 are presented in Table 3. The first cluster consists of individuals exclusively preferring lowbrow music, as the conditional probabilities for pop/rock and dance are very high (respectively .95 and .91). The third highest probability is the one for folk music (.64). Based on these conditional probabilities, the first cluster is termed “exclusive
lowbrows”. Individuals in the second cluster have a more dissonant cultural profile compared to the first one.

These individuals also listen to folk and chanson—next to pop/rock and dance. Because these individuals include middletrow genres in their cultural profile, the second cluster is termed “inclusive lowbrows”. Cluster 3 has low conditional probabilities on every item and, thus, consists of individuals who do not listen to any musical genre (or, at least, none of the genres that were included in the survey)—i.e., the “non-listeners”. The fourth cluster catches the “omnivores”. The conditional probabilities are high for every musical genre. Cluster five and cluster six are the counterparts of cluster one and two. Cluster five consists of “inclusive highbrows”—i.e., these individuals include highbrow music next to middletrow genres in their cultural profile. Individuals in cluster six—the “exclusive highbrows”—exclusively listen to highbrow musical genres (i.e., classical music and opera). Additionally, the cluster analysis shows that dissonant cultural profiles are indeed the norm in Flanders, as only 28 percent of the sample holds a consonant lowbrow profile while only 6 percent exhibits consonant highbrow profiles. Inclusive lowbrows and inclusive highbrows respectively constitute 20 percent and 10 percent of the sample. Both these profiles cross one cultural boundary by combining two cultural schemes, and they are thus equally dissonant. The omnivores—the most dissonant taste profile, that crosses two cultural boundaries—constitute 16 percent of the sample.

### Table 3. Conditional probabilities for ‘once or more’ listening at home for LCA-model 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dance</td>
<td>.9076</td>
<td>.8731</td>
<td>.0888</td>
<td>.9289</td>
<td>.1395</td>
<td>.0751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop/Rock</td>
<td>.9517</td>
<td>.9772</td>
<td>.2616</td>
<td>.9144</td>
<td>.4051</td>
<td>.1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk</td>
<td>.6445</td>
<td>.9378</td>
<td>.2155</td>
<td>.9552</td>
<td>.9793</td>
<td>.1398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanson</td>
<td>.2260</td>
<td>.9347</td>
<td>.1729</td>
<td>.9731</td>
<td>.7626</td>
<td>.5103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical music</td>
<td>.2010</td>
<td>.4033</td>
<td>.0605</td>
<td>.9716</td>
<td>.8750</td>
<td>.8939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opera</td>
<td>.0199</td>
<td>.0023</td>
<td>.0064</td>
<td>.5692</td>
<td>.5002</td>
<td>.5020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster size</td>
<td>.2601</td>
<td>.2022</td>
<td>.1947</td>
<td>.1585</td>
<td>.1073</td>
<td>.0563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.2. Social mobility

We operationalize social mobility as educational mobility. We would have liked to also include occupational mobility, but the survey did not have any reliable measure for that type. Still, we are confident that the use of educational mobility captures some of the cross-pressure and ambivalence as a result of different socialization contexts. Research has shown that educational level is a better predictor for listening behavior (e.g., Van Eijck, 2001) compared to occupational status. This also applies for cultural practices in general (e.g., DiMaggio and Useem, 1978). Furthermore, educational level is generally considered to be the best indicator of cultural capital. Our data contain information on the educational level of the respondents and of that of their father and mother. Answers were recoded into (i) primary school, (ii) lower secondary school, (iii) higher secondary school, and (iv) higher education. As a proxy of the social position of origin, the mean educational level of father and
mother is used (e.g., Daenekindt and Roose, 2013a, 2013b; Van Eijck, 1999). Table 4 presents the mobility table.

Table 4: Mobility table: relative cell frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin: Educational level parents</th>
<th>Destination: Educational level of the respondent</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Lower secondary</th>
<th>Higher secondary</th>
<th>Higher</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td></td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3. Control variables

Age (mean: 44.14; SD: 18.3) and gender (49.8 percent females) are included in the analysis as control variables. Previous research has found differences in taste patterns between men and women (e.g., Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009). Age is included because of its central role in the literature on omnivorosity (e.g., Peterson, 2005; see also Purhonen et al., 2011). While reports in the literature on the effects of gender on the inclusiveness of cultural profiles are mixed (e.g., Katz-Gerro and Sullivan, 2010; Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009), studies consistently showed that younger individuals are more inclusive in their taste patterns compared to older individuals (e.g., Peterson, 2005).

3.3. Statistical procedure

To analyze the effect of social mobility on cultural profiles—i.e., membership of the different discerned musical cultural profiles—we perform Diagonal Reference Models (DRM). Using DRM, we can simultaneously estimate effects of social position of origin, social position of destination and social mobility (Sobel, 1981). DRMs were developed by Sobel (1981, 1985) to estimate effects of status inconsistency. Central to DRM is the idea that immobile individuals represent the core of a specific social position. Characteristics of mobile individuals are predicted as a function of the characteristics of immobile individuals situated in the corresponding social position of origin and destination. Applying this to our research question, this means that the musical cultural profiles of socially mobile individuals are modeled as a function of the musical cultural profiles that are characteristic of the social position of origin and the social position of destination. Our base model (with covariates) is

\[ Y_{ijk} = p \times \mu_{ii} + (1-p) \times \mu_{jj} + \left( \sum \beta_b x_{ijb} \right) + \epsilon_{ijk} \]  

Model 1

Subscript \(i\) and \(j\) respectively represent the social position of origin and destination. \(Y_{ijk}\) is the value of the dependent variable in cell \(ij\), which has \(k\) observations. \(\mu_{ii}\) and \(\mu_{jj}\) are both estimates of \(Y\) in the
diagonal cells. The formers refers to the cultural profile characteristic of the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of origin, while the latter refers to the cultural profile characteristic of the corresponding diagonal cell for the position of destination. To allow the relative importance of the position of origin to vary between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals—which is necessary to test the encompassment hypothesis—we add a dummy variable $x_{ijm}$ to this model: downwardly mobile individuals score one, upwardly mobile individuals score zero. This allows the salience parameter for origin to vary between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. In this model, the salience parameter for position of origin for downwardly mobile individuals is “$p + e$”, for upwardly mobile individuals, the relative impact of the position of origin is “$p$”.

$$Y_{ijk} = (p + ex_{ijm}) \cdot \mu_{il} + (1 - (p + ex_{ijm})) \cdot \mu_{jj} + \sum \beta_{b}x_{ijb} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$  

Model 2

Because the dependent variable—i.e., the different cultural profiles—is categorical, a logit transformation is applied. Furthermore, we estimate an adjacent-category logistic model because our dependent variable is not a strict nominal categorical outcome but, rather, has some sense of ordinality in it. A regular multinomial analysis would completely ignore this ordinality and, thus, would not be able to address the research questions adequately. Therefore, we apply the adjacent-category logistic model in which each value on the dependent variable is compared to the next ordinal value (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Applying adjacent categories allows us to maintain the ordinality in the dependent variable without having to attribute arbitrary distances between them (Winship and Mare, 1984). We consider two senses of ordinality—in terms of amount of dissonance—in the dependent variable. The first one ranges from non-listeners via exclusive and inclusive lowbrows to omnivores, while the second one ranges from non-listeners via exclusive and inclusive highbrows to omnivores.

4. Results

Including the encompassment parameter in the analysis results in a better fit of the model. So, we reject the origin and destination hypothesis, which assume the same effect of mobility for upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. The results of the DRM-analysis including the encompassment parameter are presented in Table 5.

Central to Diagonal Reference Models is the idea that the characteristics of the immobile individuals represent the core of a specific social position. So, the diagonals refer to the cultural profiles distinctive for each social position—in this case, indicated by educational attainment. Results show that, for immobile individuals, education is associated with the extent of dissonance in musical cultural profiles. For example, the odds ratio of having an inclusive lowbrow taste compared to an exclusive lowbrow cultural profile for immobile individuals with primary education is lower compared to the one for higher educated immobile individuals (e.g., $0.165 = e^{1.801}$ vs. $1.239 = e^{2.15}$). Immobile
higher educated individuals have more dissonant cultural profiles compared to immobile lower educated individuals—confirming existing empirical research on omnivorosity. This logic applies to all comparisons, except for the ones between omnivores vs. inclusive highbrows and exclusives lowbrows vs. non-listeners, which do not reveal a clear socially stratified pattern. So, the diagonals indicate that there is more dissonance among the higher social strata. Furthermore, we see that both omnivores and inclusive highbrows are situated in the upper social strata showing no difference in terms of stratifying variables.

We find age-differences between the different cultural profiles. For example, in line with the literature, we find that individuals with an exclusive highbrow cultural profile are significantly older than those with an inclusive highbrow profile—indicated by the logit coefficient of .020. No significant age-differences between inclusive highbrows and omnivores are found.  

We experimented with the cutoff points of the age categories, trying to create age groups that were in the educational system under “the same cultural regime”. Again, parameter estimates were

4 One reviewer wondered whether the findings actually were about social mobility or more about the parallel processes of expanding higher education and eroding boundaries between high/popular culture. While this is a valid point, we do not believe this to be the case. If our findings would result out of parallel processes in the educational system and in the cultural stratification system, age would play a more prominent role in our results. We tried to model interactions of age on the p-parameter, which resulted in a much worse fit of our model. Furthermore, we also executed the model as it is presented in this article on different age groups. The point estimates are very similar across different age groups.

Table 5. Results DRM-analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exclusive lowbrows vs. non-listeners</th>
<th>Inclusive lowbrows vs. exclusive lowbrows</th>
<th>Omnivores vs. inclusive lowbrows</th>
<th>Exclusive highbrows vs. non-listeners</th>
<th>Inclusive highbrows vs. exclusive highbrows</th>
<th>Omnivores vs. inclusive highbrows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobility parameters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$: relative impact of origin</td>
<td>.268 (0.076)</td>
<td>.500 (0.219)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$: encompassment parameter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM intercepts: cultural profiles of immobile individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{11}$: primary education</td>
<td>4.016 (-1.801)</td>
<td>-4.149 (-5.699)</td>
<td>1.788 (-1.362)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{22}$: lower secondary education</td>
<td>4.262 (-1.206)</td>
<td>-4.171 (-4.831)</td>
<td>1.668 (-0.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{33}$: higher secondary education</td>
<td>4.353 (-1.658)</td>
<td>-3.686 (-4.179)</td>
<td>2.403 (-4.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{44}$: higher education</td>
<td>2.215 (-1.188)</td>
<td>-2.859 (-2.650)</td>
<td>-1.213 (-1.213)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Effects of the covariates on cultural profiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{gender}$: women</td>
<td>.177 (-.310)</td>
<td>.319 (.532)</td>
<td>-.440 (.302)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{age}$: age</td>
<td>-.085 (-.023)</td>
<td>.057 (.053)</td>
<td>-.020 (.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. The DRM intercepts and the effects of the covariates are logit coefficients.

$^a$ Standard errors of this logit equation are not estimated to keep the model identified.
For example, our results indicate that women have a lower probability of having an inclusive lowbrow vs. an exclusive lowbrow cultural profile compared to men—indicated by the logit coefficient of .310. At the same time, women have a higher probability of having an omnivorous vs. an inclusive lowbrow cultural profile compared to men—indicated by the logit coefficient of .319. So, no clear differences between men and women are found in terms of cultural dissonance. This is in line with the literature that reports mixed results of gender on the inclusiveness of cultural profiles (e.g., Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009).

The mobility parameters indicate to what extent cultural profiles of socially mobile individuals are guided by the social position of origin. The p-parameter of .268 shows the relative importance of social position of origin for upwardly mobile individuals. Upwardly mobile individuals originate from a social environment where more consonant cultural profiles are typical compared to the social environment they end up in (indicated by the diagonal intercepts). This p-parameter indicates that cultural profiles of upwardly mobile individuals are predominantly guided by the social position of destination. That is, upwardly mobile individuals tend to exhibit more dissonant cultural profiles compared to individuals from the same social position of origin who did not climb the social ladder.

The relative importance of social position of origin for downwardly mobile individuals is represented by the sum of the p-parameter (.268) and the e-parameter (.500). This sum—.768—refers to the fact that cultural profiles of downwardly mobile individuals are predominantly guided by social position of origin. In the social position of origin for downwardly mobile individuals, cultural profiles are generally more dissonant compared to the environment in which they end up. This means that downwardly mobile individuals stick to the cultural profile in which they were raised. So, downwardly mobile individuals are more dissonant compared to immobile individuals with whom they share their actual social position.

To summarize, downwardly mobile individuals, who have been socialized with more dissonant cultural profiles in their primary socialization context, do not lose their openness toward different musical genres. Even if they end up in a social environment where cultural consonance is the norm, they stick to the dissonant cultural profile they grew up with. Upwardly mobile individuals, on the other hand, who have been confronted with more consonant cultural profiles in their primary socialization context and who move to a higher social stratum, show more dissonance in their cultural profile compared to individuals with the same primary socialization context who were not upwardly mobile.

very similar across the groups. Of course, the standard errors were much bigger due to loss of statistical power.
5. Conclusion and discussion

In this article, we investigated the effects of social mobility on listening behavior. Three conclusions can be drawn from our empirical analyses. (1) We found that cultural omnivores—i.e., individuals who combine low-, middle- and highbrow-musical genres—are disproportionately situated in higher social strata. This finding is in line with a whole tradition of research on omnivorousness (e.g., Peterson, 2005; Van Eijck, 2000). (2) However, next to omnivorousness, other dissonant cultural profiles can be distinguished, profiles that are more typical for lower social strata. (3) Furthermore, we found that cultural dissonance can be partly explained by social mobility: Socially mobile individuals exhibit cultural profiles that are more dissonant compared to the cultural profiles of their immobile peers.

While some authors tried to expand the idea of omnivorousness by distinguishing different forms of omnivorousness (e.g., Cappeliez and Johnston, 2013; Ollivier, 2008; Sonnett, 2004), the literature on cultural omnivorousness continues to associate the idea of boundary-crossing in cultural practices with higher social strata and to hold onto the idea that boundary-crossing profiles function as statusmarkers. Indeed, the most dissonant cultural profile—i.e., omnivorousness that crosses two cultural boundaries—is associated with higher social strata. Apart from omnivorousness however, other forms of cultural dissonance exist—crossing only one cultural boundary—situated in lower social strata. Thus, different forms of cultural dissonance—and boundary-crossing—may not necessarily be socially distinctive and they hint at processes of social differentiation rather than social inequality.

In this sense, we wish for this article to be an impetus for further research. Firstly, we see it as contributing to a call for conceptual clarity with regard to omnivorousness and cultural dissonance. We propose to reserve the concept of omnivorousness for the most dissonant form of dissonant cultural profiles, which is situated in higher social strata. Furthermore, we want to stress that dissonance and openness toward different cultural modes is not an exclusive character of individuals from higher social strata and, thus, that the social distinctiveness of omnivorousness does not lie in its boundary-crossing aspect per se, as dissonance is also present in lower social strata. We argue that the high social status of omnivorousness is not to be found in the alleged openness or cosmopolitanism of its bearer, but in the different cultural genres of which it is composed—i.e., highbrow genres. Secondly, our results show that dissonant cultural profiles are the norm in Flemish society, as only one third of our sample exhibits consonant taste profiles. This makes it hard to consider dissonance as a status marker. Thirdly, our results indicate that there are no clear stratified differences between omnivores and inclusive highbrows. So, both these patterns are associated with the same status, even though they differ in their extent of dissonance. The similarity between both profiles lies in the fact
that both profiles include two highbrow genres. We see this as an indication of a more a pre-Peterson conception of cultural status-markers (i.e., highbrow genres are associated with high social status).

This is not to say that the crossing of boundaries between cultural schemes is irrelevant for (research on) social inequality. However, in the context of social mobility, we are inclined to stress the instrumental perspective on boundary-crossing in cultural profiles (DiMaggio, 1987; Erickson, 1996). Dissonance in cultural profiles can be used as an instrument to cope with heterogeneity in social life. Cultural dissonance, and the associated passing knowledge of different genres, allows its bearer to establish and to maintain relationships with people from different social groups and to cross social boundaries (DiMaggio, 1987; Emmison, 2003; Erickson, 1996; Lizardo, 2006). It allows the individual to switch between cultural modes and—combined with an understanding of the rules of relevance (Erickson, 1996)—to connect with a wide variety of people and to adapt to a wide variety of social contexts and situations.

As to the effects of social mobility, on the one hand, we find that downwardly mobile individuals—who originate from higher social strata—maintain the cultural dissonance they were raised with. On the other hand, upwardly mobile individuals are able to expand and accumulate their cultural capital during their life course. In this way, our findings are consistent with previous research which shows that individuals are able to acquire cultural capital during their educational careers—in line with the cultural mobility model (e.g., Aschaffenburg and Maas, 1997; DiMaggio, 1982). Yet, we also find that the cultural genres in which individuals have been raised are maintained within the culture repertoire of the socially mobile.

A related issue is causality: does social mobility result in changes in cultural profiles, or do dissonant cultural profiles contribute to increased life chances, possibly resulting in upwards mobility? While these questions cannot be adequately answered with cross-sectional data—and while both mechanisms obviously play a role—we believe that our results stress the importance of social mobility affecting cultural profiles. The rationale that dissonant taste patterns are a means to increase life chances is in contrast with our finding that both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals tend to have dissonant cultural profiles. If dissonance would lead to increased life chances, we would not find dissonance among the downwardly mobile.

While dissonance can be seen as an ability to cope with social heterogeneity, cultural dissonance also has a structural origin in a differentiated social environment—as opposed to the “cultural” explanation of dissonance by means of values, such as tolerance, openness, etc. It is by being confronted with, what Merton (1976) terms, incompatible normative expectations—or in Lahire’s (2011 [2001]) vocabulary, heterogeneous socializing influences bounded up with different social positions—that individuals are able to translate the heterogeneity of their social environment in their cultural profiles. In this article, we focused on one source of incompatible normative expectations.
(i.e., social mobility). Socially mobile individuals have been confronted with socializing influences of the social positions of origin and destination. It is very unlikely that socially mobile individuals will cut off every social bond with friends and family from their social position of origin. Hence, combined with the social contacts from their newly acquired social position, we expect socially mobile individuals to have heterogeneous networks—diverse in terms of social position—from which both stems the opportunity and the need to develop a varied and elaborated cultural toolkit.

Our findings corroborate arguments that Bourdieu overestimates the lifelong influence of the lived experiences during childhood (e.g., Aschaffenburg and Maas, 1997; Erickson, 1996; Lahire, 2008). Our analysis highlights the malleability of cultural profiles: Cultural practices are not simply the result of dispositions that are firmly established during childhood. Furthermore, one set of dispositions—e.g., esthetic dispositions—cannot account for the variety of intra-individual differences that exist within and between different social contexts. Individuals can expand their cultural toolkit and adapt their cultural practices if these changes are forced upon them by the social environments in which they thrive. This is the case for most individuals in highly differentiated societies, leading to the omnipresence of cultural dissonance in contemporary societies. In that way, this article highlights the need for a less rigid understanding of social position in the literature. Studies in this line of research all too often build on the assumption that all individuals are uni-socialized. Instead, individuals are multi-socialized (Lahire, 2011 [2001]). For example, many individuals are not socialized by one social class—be it as the result of social mobility, partner heterogamy or other forms of heterogeneous socializing influences. In this article, we operationalized social mobility as educational mobility. The argument for this was that—because education is the strongest predictor for listening behavior—the cultural gap between social position of origin and the social position of destination is the biggest in this dimension of social mobility. However, other dimensions of social mobility—e.g., occupational or income mobility—may also be relevant. This article shows the relevance and the necessity to pay attention to the heterogeneity of the socialization experience in order to get at a thorough understanding of cultural preferences and practices—and especially—of dissonance in cultural profiles.

6. References

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Chapter 7

Conclusion and Discussion
In this PhD thesis, I presented five empirical chapters. But what do these chapters mean together and what are the general implications? I will outline this in the current section, which is structured in three parts. In the first part, I restrict my discussion to social mobility. In the second part, I discuss the implications of this PhD thesis beyond the topic of social mobility. Finally, in the last part, I situate my findings and conclusions in upcoming trends in cultural sociology.

1. Social mobility

Analysing intergenerational social mobility implies comparing social positions across different generations and periods. So, historical processes are inherently at play, and need to be considered when thinking about social mobility. While I always kept this in mind when I wrote the different chapters, reflections on this issue may have been underacknowledged in the different empirical studies and deserve explicit consideration here. The main reason why historical processes should be reflected upon is that they could generate problems for the analyses and especially for the conclusions I draw from the analyses. Two sets of processes are particularly relevant: (a) changes in the field of cultural production and consumption, and (b) changes in the educational system.

a. The field of cultural production and consumption

During the 20th century—and especially from the sixties onwards—several substantial transformations took place in the field of cultural production, such as the booming of the entertainment industry, the advent of internet, the further dissemination of television, etc. (cf. Roose and Daenekindt 2015). Because of these changes, individual consumers now have an unprecedented access to a wide variety of cultural products—a situation Wright (2011) refers to as cultural abundance. My analyses and the conclusions I draw from them need to be reflected upon in light of these changes.

As I addressed in the introduction (and also in chapter 3), the status associated to cultural products and practices is arbitrary, and the result of processes of legitimation at certain times and places. Think about how jazz evolved from a folk-communal genre towards fine arts throughout the 20th century—a process referred to as aesthetic mobility (e.g., Peterson 1972, 2005). So, possibly, different generations are instilled with different cultural classification systems. If this is the case, my measures for different schemes of culture—highbrow, middlebrow or lowbrow—could be biased in the sense that they systematically measure different things for different generations, and so, possible status transformations of cultural products/genres included in the analyses may have biased my conclusions. I do not believe this to be the case for two reasons.

Firstly, the status associated to cultural products is socially constructed, but once a cultural product is infused with status—that is, once it is institutionalized as high culture—it shows a resistance to change (cf. Chapter 3). For example, classical music and opera have been associated with high status throughout the 20th century. By making this point, I do not want to downplay studies on
status transformations of certain cultural products. On the contrary, I am truly fascinated by them (this fascination was the initial motivation to write chapter 3). However, these studies are—as also argued by Van Venrooij (2014)—based on case studies of specific cultural genres/products. In this sense, I believe the literature to overestimate the status-fluctuations of cultural products as a result of extrapolating conclusions drawn from case studies.

Secondly, in my analyses, I tried to account for these possible changes by selecting genres and products which are relatively stable in terms of status. This is exactly the reason why, for example, jazz is not included in my measure of cultural dissonance in chapter 6 (even though jazz is available in the data). Additionally, the results from chapter 5 reassure me that my findings are not biased by possible status transformations of the included cultural genres/practices. Chapter 5 includes a very varied and wide range of cultural genres, products and practices. It addresses classical music, jazz, watching certain television channels, reading papers and magazines, attending book fairs, motives for travelling, etc. The results are consistent across the different genres/products and practices included in the analyses, suggesting that my findings and conclusions are not biased by genre- and product-specific characteristics and/or evolutions.

b. The educational system

In the introduction, I made an argument for operationalizing social mobility as educational mobility, as opposed to other forms of mobility—e.g., occupational or income mobility. In that part, I mainly focused on the advantages of this measure. However, this operationalization is of course not perfect and a reflection on possible implications of the operationalization is appropriate here. Throughout the 20th century, the educational system in Flanders has been marked by evolutions towards democratisation, and the educational level of the Flemish population has increased consistently. This suggests that the meaning of an educational degree may be different for individuals who obtained it during the sixties, and individuals who graduated during the nineties. In this sense, my measure of social position may systematically mean something different for different generations. I am aware of this problem and of the fact that my analyses do not account for them. However, I do not believe this problem to systematically bias my findings and conclusions.

So, due to changes in the educational system, my operationalization of social mobility may systematically underestimate the extent of true downward mobility. This is evidenced by the low number of downwardly mobile individuals in my mobility table. While upwards mobility typically outnumbers downward mobility in different operationalizations of mobility (e.g., Hout 2015), this will be more the case with educational mobility. Furthermore, this underestimation of downwards mobility will likely be stronger among older individuals in the data. Why did I not account for this in the statistical analyses? Well, because Diagonal Reference Models are not yet extended to account for structural mobility. To check for the transformations in the educational system, I resorted to the
following procedure: I partitioned the data in different age groups, and estimated the statistical models on each of them. The parameter estimates of these models were similar (of course, standard errors inflated because of loss of statistical power). This suggests that my findings apply for different age groups, and that my findings hold in different periods during the process of democratisation of the educational system. Additionally, my findings are perfectly in line with findings of recent studies which have used other operationalizations of social mobility (e.g., De Graaf et al. 1995; Missinne et al. 2015; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1993; Paterson 2008; Tolsma et al. 2009). These arguments reassure me that my findings and conclusions are not biased by my operationalization of social mobility.

c. General findings

The three empirical studies on social mobility (chapter 4, 5, and 6) highlight the strong socializing effects of the social position of destination. That is, socially mobile individuals adapt different aspects of their culture to their new social status position. This is in line with research on effects of social mobility which also finds evidence for the importance of the social position of destination on other outcomes, e.g., political preferences (De Graaf et al. 1995; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1993), preventive health care use (Missinne et al. 2015), social participation (Paterson 2008).

Both chapter 5 and chapter 6 show how cultural tastes and practices of socially mobile individuals predominantly reflect tastes and practices viable in the social position of destination. There are two notable specifications on this general pattern: (1) As evidenced in chapter 5, outside the privacy of their homes, mobile individuals exaggerate—be it consciously or unconsciously—their adaptation to the culture of the social position of destination. This applies for both upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. For upwardly mobile individuals, this finding is reminiscent of cultural goodwill. Cultural goodwill refers to the aspiration to belong to the upper social strata by trying to conform to their high aesthetic standards which—according to Bourdieu (1984)—stems from motives related to status. However, I find that downwardly mobile individuals also exaggerate their conformity to their new social status position in the public sphere. That is, outside the privacy of their homes, they express cultural tastes and practices which are more lowbrow compared to the tastes and practices they perform in the privacy of their homes. This suggests that socially mobile individuals overstate their conformity to the new social environment to facilitate social integration. More generally, this suggests that cultural sociology unjustly downplays motives/consequences related to the display of tastes which are unrelated to status. (2) Additionally—as evidenced in chapter 6—socially mobile individuals adapt their cultural toolkit by including new cultural forms viable in the new social status position, but they do not dismiss the cultural resources gathered in the primary socialization context. So, socially mobile individuals have a wider variety of tastes and practices present in their cultural repertoire. The findings of chapter 5 and 6 easily reconcile and, together, allow for a clear-cut
interpretation: Cultural tastes and practices are not stable characteristics and are transformed and reshaped throughout the life-course and the social position of destination has an important role in this transformation.

However, the relation between social mobility and aesthetic dispositions—which is examined in chapter 4—reveals a more ‘messy’ pattern. That is, some dispositions are predominantly shaped by the social position of origin (Daenekindt and Roose 2011), others predominantly by the social position of destination, and still others are predominantly moulded by the socialization context with the highest social status. These ‘messy’ findings reveal the relative inaccessibility of processes of socialization—and so, of social mobility—on these individualized aspects of culture, which are deeper embedded in the individual compared to tastes and practices. Dispositions are—compared to tastes and practices—harder to invalidate (cf. Wuthnow 2007). This highlights—in line with the central argument of chapter 2—the idea that culture in individuals is layered, and that these different layers are not necessarily aligned with one another.

2. Beyond social mobility

As I have outlined in the introduction, my focus on social mobility is foremost a strategy to further our understanding of culture—both in its implicit and in its explicit form. So, what does this PhD thesis tell us beyond the topic of social mobility? I believe the wider implications of my PhD thesis to lie especially in the way sociologists think on ‘culture inside the individual’. To make this more clear, I will discuss the wider implications of my PhD thesis in two parts, each one related in a different way to this individualized culture. (1) Firstly, where does this individualized culture come from? (2) Secondly, how are these cultural resources transferred into individuals?

a. Individualized culture. From where?

The empirical chapters on social mobility show how an individual’s cultural repertoire changes and expands during and/or after the experience of social mobility: Socially mobile individuals have more diverse and more elaborate cultural toolkits at their disposal than their socially immobile peers. These chapters show the malleable and the expansible character of individualized culture. While I do believe social mobility to be a particularly pervasive source of the variety of culture individuals have, social mobility is obviously not its only structural origin. As expressed in the introduction, I consider social mobility—in line with a long standing tradition in sociology (e.g., Blau 1994; Merton 1968[1949])—as one of the many possible forms of structural mismatches. Cultural sociological thinking often ignores the relevance and consequences of such structural mismatches (a notable exception consists of studies considering network variety as a source of structural mismatches, e.g., Edelmann and Vaisey 2014; Erickson 1996; Relish 1997; Mark 1998; Lizardo 2006).
The bulk of cultural sociological research still heavily relies on traditional theories of socialization. In these theories, childhood socialization is stressed, and this period is considered a process in which the child is shaped and moulded to become a fully functioning member of society (Corsaro 2011). The main problem here is that individuals are exclusively considered as a passive and receiving actor in the process of socialization. Additionally, overstressing childhood socialization assumes that socialization is finished after childhood. This assumption is also present in Bourdieu’s thinking by claiming that the schemes and dispositions formed during childhood experiences are able to guide individuals in situations during later stages in life (Bourdieu 1990). However, individuals are often confronted with situations for which the habitus has no ‘answer’. While Bourdieu (e.g., 1990) argues that, in these situations, individuals just expand their habitus by assimilating these new experiences, Lahire contends that these experiences cannot always be assimilated and that schemes internalized during childhood need to be suppressed (Lahire 2011). New situations which are not in line with the childhood experiences may force individuals to relinquish schemes and dispositions adopted during early childhood and adapt to new social situations. Despite convincing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from other fields in sociology, most cultural sociological studies continue to hold on to a dated view on socialization and to downplay the variety of socializing contexts—and their importance—individuals thrive in.

b. Individualized culture. How?

If individualized culture is social in its origin by being developed in response to an individual’s social position and his social trajectory, an additional question surfaces: How do these social structures infuse individuals with culture? Throughout this PhD thesis, I extensively addressed Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus. According to this theory, individuals develop dispositions during childhood experiences by being exposed to the social environment. These dispositions consequently express themselves in cultural tastes and cultural acts. A key argument in this PhD thesis is that this is not a plausible mechanism. This for two reasons: (1) Firstly, the causal role Bourdieu attributes to dispositions in his theory is problematic. For example, Bourdieu (1990: 74) argues that “[…] schemes are able to pass directly from practice to practice without moving through discourse and consciousness”. Current insights from socialization theory show the implausibility of these mechanisms which Bourdieu’s argument fundamentally relies on (e.g., Corsaro 2011; Harris 1998; Turner 1994). This is not so much a critique on Bourdieu as a thinker, because his theory departs from mechanisms of socialization which were thought of as plausible mechanisms at the time Bourdieu developed his theory. This is more a critique on sociologists who have uncritically adapted Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, without questioning underlying mechanisms which may have been dated. (2) Secondly, my findings in the empirical studies on social mobility clearly show that Bourdieu overestimates the long-lasting influence of childhood socialization, as cultural tastes and practices are predominantly shaped by the new social status position. These two points together suggest that we need to reconsider Bourdieu’s
theory of the habitus. Moreover, and more generally, they suggest that cultural sociology needs to consider individualized culture as more malleable and rethink the mechanisms by which culture gets inside individuals.

3. So what?

A central goal of sociology is to move beyond mere description of social inequality, and to fundamentally understand how social inequality is made. In the introduction of this PhD thesis, I argued the relevance for studies of tastes to lie in the role of taste in processes of social inequality. In this view, taste plays a significant role in social reproduction, as taste is conceptualized as a capital that provides its owners with social advantages. The basic argument—which I addressed more elaborately in the introduction—is: Because tastes are socially structured, they become status markers and they take on a structuring role. In light of my findings, I wish to reflect on this argument in two ways.

a. The symbolic power of cultural taste

If individuals’ tastes are constructed by combining genres from different socialization contexts—for example, different social strata—does this distort the homology, and subsequently, erode the distinguishing force of cultural tastes? If tastes are less rigidly structured by social position—as my results suggest—does it affect their structuring role? Perhaps, as is suggested by the literature on cultural omnivorousness, other forms of taste are becoming status proclaiming?

Studies on cultural omnivorousness were initiated by Peterson and colleagues who coined the term omnivorousness in the early nineties, and have thrived ever since (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Simkus 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996). Omnivorousness refers to taste patterns which include preferences for both low- and highbrow cultural products. Because research in this tradition predominantly observes this phenomenon among individuals with high social status positions, most authors in this literature conclude that omnivorousness is the new form of status and that Bourdieu’s conception of status is outdated: Distinction no longer ensues from tastes for high arts—such as liking opera—but it ensues from boundary crossing taste patterns—e.g., liking both opera and popular music—, or so the view of most researchers in this tradition. The rise of the omnivore is claimed to be a historical transition and Peterson and Kern (1996) tentatively offer several explanations for the omnivore’s emergence. One of these explanations refers to social mobility, which is said to mix individuals with different tastes. For example, because upwardly mobile individuals introduce the tastes they were raised with to upper social strata, individuals from upper social strata become more omnivorous. In this sense it is puzzling to understand how social mobility could explain the exclusive
emergence of the cultural omnivore in upper social strata, as a similar logic should apply to downward social mobility. Why does the same mechanism not hold here, resulting in more omnivorous taste patterns in lower social strata? Similarly, other forms of structural mismatches should—if the argument from Peterson and Kern is consistently extended—result in more omnivorous taste patterns in all segments of society.

It is exactly this view which considers omnivorousness as an exclusive characteristic of the upper social strata that has been challenged recently (Lahire 2008; Johnston and Baumann 2007; Daenekindt and Roose 2014). For example, omnivorousness is often operationalized as a count variable—that is, by summing the different preferences of respondents (Peterson 2005). This can be problematic considering that most standardized surveys are biased towards highbrow cultural genres (Roose and Daenekindt 2015): If highbrow genres are characterized by a greater differentiation in surveys, it is hardly surprising that individuals from higher social strata are more omnivorous—in terms of such count-variables—than individuals from a lower social strata. So, researchers critical of claims in the literature on omnivorousness have argued that boundary crossing taste patterns can be found in different social strata (e.g., Lahire 2008)—a claim I have confirmed empirically in chapter 6. If boundary-crossing taste patterns are present in every social stratum, it is puzzling how the boundary crossing character of omnivorousness could be a source of social status. In chapter 6, I also find that taste pattern including forms of highbrow culture remain disproportionately situated in upper social strata. This suggest a pre-Peterson conception of cultural status markers: That is, distinction and status continue to be associated with legitimate forms of culture—such as opera, classical music, literature—but not with boundary crossing per se.

So, I argue that boundary crossing taste patterns are present in every social stratum, yet I maintain Bourdieu’s notion that status is inscribed in traditional form of high culture—e.g., opera, classical music, etc. How can both these claims be reconciled? If individuals from higher social strata appreciate a wide variety of cultural products, ranging from lowbrow to highbrow, why would status only be associated to highbrow culture? For this, we need to turn to status construction theory. Status construction theory shows how nominal differences between individuals—such as cultural preferences—become status differences. Empirical studies in this line of research show that, when different social groups have distinguishing attributes, status beliefs associated to these attributes are constructed in social interaction (e.g., Berger, Ridgeway and Zelditch 2002; Ridgeway 2006; Wagner and Berger 2002). So, status beliefs are formed in social interaction (of course, the structural distribution of these attributes in society influences to a large extent the conditions of these micro processes). However, before status beliefs can emerge from certain attributes, these attributes need to be perceived and acknowledged in social interaction. And this is a key point where cultural sociology falls short. Cultural sociology routinely observes boundary crossing taste patterns—such as omnivorousness, or cultural dissonance—by means of survey questions. These survey questions
assess, for example, musical preferences completely independent of context and situation. So, surveys give us information on the wide variety of musical genres an individual may listen to, but they do not give us any information in what contexts these preferences are expressed. However, it is crucial to understand which parts of taste patterns are visible in social interaction to understand how status beliefs are formed on each of the included genres. My second point will come to a similar conclusion: Cultural sociology needs to apply a more micro-approach and include situation and context in its empirical approach to further its understanding of tastes as status markers.

b. The layered nature of cultural taste

As I already outlined in the introduction and in several chapters, various authors have argued that distinction may have shifted to the way cultural products are appropriated, rather than what forms of culture are appropriated. Because of the increased production and accessibility of consumer goods, consuming certain cultural objects may still indicate boundaries between rich and poor, but may say less about other dimensions of social inequality, such as cultural capital (Holt 1998). Individuals can have the financial means to buy a cultural product—that is, to own it—but lack the capacity to symbolically appropriate it (Lizardo 2008: 4). Lizardo situates the emergence of ways of preferring as an accurate status marker in a historical perspective and associates it to the enhancement of overall wealth in the process of industrialization (Lizardo 2008). So, the way individuals appropriate and prefer art may serve as an additional site where social boundaries are expressed and reproduced. It is exactly because different ‘levels’ of culture—here, ‘what’ and ‘how’—are not necessarily aligned that the possibility emerges for each level of taste to function as status markers (this argument is addressed more elaborately in chapter 2).

If individualized culture is layered—and the different layers are not aligned—what levels of culture result in social distinction? For example, individuals may manifest preferences for lowbrow culture, but may consume these in a very art-for-art’s sake approach, and in that sense, in a very highbrow form of art appropriation. A thorough understanding of cultural tastes—and their social implications—necessitates acknowledging this layeredness. In chapter 2, I argued that styles of consuming may be status proclaiming in specialized contexts, but that these styles may go unnoticed in less specialized social arenas. That is, once a sort of baseline cultural matching has been established by means of forms of consumed culture—that is, in contexts where everybody likes wine, or other specific cultural products—more subtle aspects of taste kick in and status is inferred from the ways these forms of culture are consumed.

So, again, I believe we need to pay attention to a more situated deployment of tastes in social interaction. Every social act is situated; it takes place in a certain social context. Considering the varied and diverse taste patterns individuals hold, cultural sociology needs to address this situational deployment of culture. Individuals may indicate on context-free survey questions that they prefer a
wide variety of cultural products, but in what contexts do they consume each cultural product? Moreover, how are aesthetic preferences manifested and perceived in social encounters, and how does this differ between cultural forms and between situations? I am not only referring to strategies of impression management where an individual may hide lowbrow preferences, but also to the situational deployment of culture. Why are certain parts of individualized culture manifested in certain situations, while others are suppressed?

In sociology, not much work is done on situated taste except for theoretical suggestions, and anecdotal evidence. For example, Hennion (2007: 111; see also DeNora 2000) notes that ‘taste is first of all an opportunism of the moment and of situations’. While I applaud these new ideas in sociology, they are insufficient to completely understand how the situation needs to be incorporated in the sociological conception of dispositions and taste. If status ensues from manifesting cultural taste in social interaction, cultural sociology needs to focus on these contextualized manifestations to further understanding on ‘status proclaiming’. That is, looking beyond the decontextualized tastes individuals report in surveys or during interviews, and studying tastes individuals manifest in specific social settings. For example, by recognizing that cultural hierarchies may be field-specific (Erickson 1996; Roose 2014). Tastes for high culture can function as status markers in contexts in the upper social strata, but possibly, other social contexts are characterized by other forms of dominating culture. In this way, we can complement our thinking on taste as a social advantage in society, with localized advantages of tastes. Additionally, focusing on specialized settings—such as art museums, wine tastings—can help us understand how cues of tastes are ‘read’ (e.g., Michael 2013; Schwarz 2013). In this way, focusing on specific contexts of social interaction can increase our understanding of how tastes are perceived, acknowledged and associated to status differently based on the social setting and the social observer.

Cultural sociology needs to zoom in more closely in two ways. (1) It needs to zoom in on situated deployment of culture—stepping away from the positivist obsession of population data and the idea of representativeness. (2) Additionally, it needs to zoom in on the individual itself—by including insights from cognitive sciences and considering different levels of culture and their different roles in processes of social inequality. Research in these lines of thinking is necessary to improve our understanding of culture and cultural taste. How does culture enter individual cognition? How does it subsequently shape judgment and action? How is culture enacted in specific contexts? How is culture—and its different ‘levels’—perceived (differently) in social encounters, and how do they bias social evaluations? These are just a few questions where cultural sociologists are currently working on and I eagerly look forward to forthcoming publications on them. Fascinating times are ahead for cultural sociology, and I hope that my PhD thesis will contribute—even if modestly—to these future developments.
4. References


7. Conclusion and Discussion


In this appendix I provide additional information on the used data and on the central variables used in the empirical chapters—additional to the information present in the chapters themselves. The information on the central variables comprises of two parts: (1) The questions and answer labels from the questionnaires (between parentheses I each time provide the original Dutch formulation). (2) Descriptive statistics.

**1. Audience survey in S.M.A.K. and MSK**

These are data from a large-scale audience survey in Ghent (Belgium). I collected these data in two art museums in Flanders (Ghent), *i.e.*, the municipal museum of contemporary art (S.M.A.K.) and the museum of fine arts (MSK) between 13 March and 13 April 2012. Time sampling was used: I divided this period into 84 different blocks of 2.5 hours. Subsequently, I randomly selected 40 periods. The following table presents the 84 blocks and the 40 selected blocks (selected blocks are shaded in the table). In each selected block, both MSK and S.M.A.K. visitors were surveyed. Students—who were trained and closely supervised—were used to help with the data-collection. In each museum two students were present to hand out questionnaires to visitors during the selected blocks. During weekdays, every visitor was contacted; during weekends, every second visitor was systematically selected when s/he entered the museum (*cf.* Roose 2007). Non-eligible visitors were individuals younger than sixteen, individuals not speaking Dutch, and individuals visiting the museum in organized groups. Self-assessed questionnaires were used and a realized sample of 1,448 with a response rate of 61 per cent was obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schematic overview of the sample (selected blocks are shaded).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 1: 10.00 — 12.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 2: 12.30 — 15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 3: 15.00 — 17.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 1: 10.00 — 12.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 2: 12.30 — 15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 3: 15.00 — 17.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These audience data were used for chapter 2 and the central variables are ‘aesthetic dispositions’ and ‘preferred visual artists’. The operationalization of the aesthetic dispositions is based on two sets of questions. The used question for the first set is:

“We want to assess which aspects you consider important when you look at a work of art. Please indicate for each of the aspects ranked below to what extent you consider them important. These aspects relate to visual arts in general. To what extent do you think it is important that a work of art...” (We willen nagaan welke aspecten u belangrijk vindt wanneer u een kunstwerk bekijkt. Kunt u voor elk van onderstaande aspecten aangeven in hoeverre u ze belangrijk vindt? Deze aspecten hebben betrekking op beeldende kunst in het algemeen. In welke mate vindt u het belangrijk of onbelangrijk dat een kunstwerk…)

Descriptives: Relative frequencies of the first set of questions on the aesthetic experience (valid percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very unimportant (zeer onbelangrijk)</th>
<th>Unimportant (onbelangrijk)</th>
<th>Rather unimportant (eerder onbelangrijk)</th>
<th>Rather important (eerder belangrijk)</th>
<th>Important (belangrijk)</th>
<th>Very important (zeer belangrijk)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art should be involved in societal debates (...zich mengt in het maatschappelijke debat)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should be critical of society (...kritisch is tegenover de maatschappij)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should depict reality accurately (...de realiteit zo accuraat mogelijk weergeeft)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should make you forget day-to-day worries (...u de dagelijkse bekommernissen even doet vergeten)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should bring you in another world (...u in een andere realiteit brengt)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art should make you relax (...u in de eerste plaats ontspant)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question for the second set is:

“The following statements relate to visual arts in general. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of these statements.” (Volgende stellingen hebben betrekking op beeldende kunst in het algemeen. Kunt u aangeven in welke mate u het met elk van deze stellingen eens of oneens bent?)

Descriptives: Relative frequencies of the second set of questions on the aesthetic experience (valid percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completely disagree (volledig oneens)</th>
<th>Disagree (oneens)</th>
<th>Rather disagree (eerder oneens)</th>
<th>Rather agree (eerder eens)</th>
<th>Agree (eens)</th>
<th>Completely agree (volledig eens)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art should question social values (kunst moet maatschappelijke waarden in vraag stellen)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One line or colour can suffice to create art (één kleur of één lijn kan volstaan om een kunstwerk te creëren)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art doesn’t have to be beautiful (kunst hoeft niet mooi te zijn)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The idea of an artwork is more important than the execution (het idee van de kunstenaar is belangrijker dan de uitvoering ervan)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can enjoy every work of art (ik kan van elk kunstwerk genieten)</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no such thing as bad art (ziechte kunst bestaat niet)</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For preferred visual artists, the following question was used:

"Below you will find several artists of visual arts. Please indicate for each to what extent you appreciate them." (Hieronder staan enkele kunstenaars van beeldende kunst. Kunt u voor elk aangeven in welke mate u deze al dan niet apperceeert?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptives: Preferred artists (valid percentages).</th>
<th>Don't appreciate at all (apprecieer ik helemaal niet)</th>
<th>Don't appreciate (apprecieer ik niet)</th>
<th>Neutral (neutral)</th>
<th>Appreciate (apprecieer ik)</th>
<th>Appreciate very much (apprecieer ik heel erg)</th>
<th>Don't know (ken ik niet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcel Duchamp</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Paul Rubens</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassily Kandinsky</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Pollock</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent Van Gogh</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6, I use data from the survey ‘Cultural Participation in Flanders 2003–2004’. These data are based on a representative sample of the Flemish population—i.e., the Dutch-speaking population of Belgium. A stratified cluster sample was used with municipalities as primary sampling units (n = 189), and individuals as secondary sampling units. Municipalities was operationalized by means of postal codes, and the probability of municipalities to be selected was proportional to its number of inhabitants. The survey contains information on a great variety of cultural behaviour, attitudes and dispositions, and it was collected from 2,849 randomly selected individuals by means of a computer-assisted face-to-face interview (Lievens et al. 2006). Its response rate is 61.0 per cent. Both the content of the questionnaire—its variety and scope—and the rigorous methodological execution make this a unique data-set, which has also been praised internationally as this data-collection “can be singled out as a benchmark study” in cultural sociology (Kirchberg and Kuchar 2014: 187). For more information on these data, I refer to Lievens et al. (2006).

The central variables in chapter 3 pertain to cultural activities in the school context. These variables are based on two questions. The first question:

“I will ask you a couple of questions on possible activities you did yourself when you were between 12 and 14 years old. I will read a list of activities. Each time say yes when you did that activity, no when you did not.” (Ik wil u nu enkele vragen stellen over mogelijke activiteiten die u zelf deed toen u tussen 12 en 14 jaar oud was? Ik zal een lijst met activiteiten voorlezen. Zeg telkens ja wanneer u die activiteit toen deed, neen wanneer u die niet deed.)

Each time the respondent indicated that s/he did the activity between 12 and 14 years old, a second question was asked:

“If yes, in what context did you do that activity?” (Zo ja, in welk verband oefende u die activiteit uit?)
Answer categories on this question were: Alone (alleen); with parents (met ouders); in school context (in school verband); with friends not in the context of school (met vrienden niet in schoolverband). The central variables for chapter 3 were based on answer of this last category, i.e. in school context. This resulted in the following crosstabulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High cultural practices</th>
<th>Visiting museums (een museum of tentoonstelling bezoeken)</th>
<th>Vocational track</th>
<th>Technical track</th>
<th>Academic track</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-60s</td>
<td>60s-80s</td>
<td>Post-80s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical track</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Academic track</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attending a theatre, ballet or dance performance (een toneel, ballet of dansvoorstelling bijwonen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low cultural practices</th>
<th>Going to the cinema (naar de bioscoop gaan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-60s</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60s-80s</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-80s</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central variable in chapter 4 pertains to aesthetic dispositions of individuals towards films. The following question was used to operationalize this:

“When you watch a movie what do you find important? Please indicate to what extent you consider the following aspect never important or always important? [You can use card 12 to answer] To what extent do you find it important that a film…” (Als u een film bekijkt wat vindt u er dan belangrijk in? Kan u telkens zeggen in welke mate u de volgende aspecten nooit belangrijk of altijd belangrijk vindt? [U kan kaart 12 gebruiken om te antwoorden.] In welke mate vindt u het belangrijk dat een film…)
In chapter 5, I study a wide variety of cultural practices. The descriptives for the practices can be found in the following table. More information of the specific nature of each of these practices—and how they were assessed—can be found in the empirical chapter itself.

| Overview of cultural practices included in the analysis and their relative frequency. |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Private                        | Public                          |
| Associated with higher social strata |                                |
| Classical music                | Classical music                 |
| 41.2                           | 4.4                             |
| Baroque music                  | Baroque music                   |
| 17.2                           | 1.3                             |
| Jazz                           | Jazz                             |
| 43.5                           | 1.5                             |
| Canvas (public television channel) | Small cinemas showing art house movies |
| 37.8                           | 5.5                             |
| Media use: international political news | Holidays: historical buildings, churches and monuments |
| 66.7                           | 48.3                            |
| Reading novels and poetry      | Book fairs                       |
| 37.0                           | 11.2                            |
| Associated with lower social strata |                                |
| Pop/rock                       | Pop/rock                        |
| 68.9                           | 4.9                             |
| Dance                          | Dance                            |
| 39.8                           | 1.3                             |
| Schlager/popular Flemish music | Schlager/popular Flemish music  |
| 64.1                           | 1.8                             |
| Folk/traditional               | Folk/traditional                 |
| 44.3                           | 1.6                             |
| VTM (commercial television channel) | Big cinema complexes               |
| 49.8                           | 42.5                            |
| Media use: accidents and disasters | Holidays: amusement and parties |
| 52.7                           | 41.3                            |

More information on the used questions.

**Private**: 'Classical music', 'Baroque music', 'Jazz', 'Pop/rock', 'Dance', 'Schlager/popular Flemish music', 'Folk/traditional'.

I will now list several musical genres. Indicate each time how many times you listened to it during the past month (Ik zal u nu een aantal muziekgenres opsommen. Zeg voor elk genre hoe vaak u er de voorbije maand naar geluisterd heeft).

**Private**: 'Canvas', 'VTM'.

I will now list different television channels. Indicate each time how frequently you watched these during the past month. With ‘watching’ I mean, pay attention to it for at least 10 minutes (Ik zal u nu een aantal televisiezenders voorlezen. Kan u telkens zeggen hoe vaak u deze de voorbije maand heeft bekeken? Met kijken bedoel ik minstens 10 minuten aandacht hebben voor).

**Private**: 'Media use: international political news', 'accidents and disasters'.

I will now list a number of subjects on which people can inform themselves. Indicate each time how frequently you informed yourself in the past month by means of newspapers, magazines, brochures, or specifically chosen television programs (Ik zal u nu een aantal onderwerpen waarover men zich kan informeren. Kan u telkens zeggen hoe vaak u zich bij benadering de voorbije maand hierover heeft geinformeerd in kranten, tijdschriften, brochures, of specifiek gekozen televisieprogramma’s).

**Private**: 'Reading novels and poetry'.

How many novels or poetry collections did you read approximately during the past six months (Hoeveel romans en poëziebundels heeft u bij benadering de voorbije zes maanden volledig of minstens voor de helft gelezen?).

**Public**: 'Classical music', 'Baroque music', 'Jazz', 'Pop/rock', 'Dance', 'Schlager/popular Flemish music', 'Folk/traditional'.

I will now list different types of concerts. Indicate each time whether you attended them during the past six months (Ik zal u nu een aantal soorten concerten voorlezen. Zeg telkens of u die de voorbije zes maanden heeft bijgewoond of niet).

**Public**: 'Small cinemas showing art house movies', 'big cinema complexes'.

I will now list different types of cinemas. Indicate each time whether you watched a movie during the last 6 months in… (Ik zal u nu enkele soorten bioscoopven voorlezen. Zeg telkens of u de voorbije 6 maanden een film heeft bekeken in…).

**Public**: 'Holidays: historical buildings, churches and monuments', 'holidays: amusement and parties'.

The following questions concern travelling. With travelling I refer to holidays outside the home. This can be a short trip as well as a long trip, a trip within Belgium as well as a trip to other countries. Day trips for your job or in the context of your education are not included (De volgende vragen gaan over reizen. Met reizen bedoel ik een vakantie buitenshuis, het kan dus zowel een korte als een lange reis zijn, en zowel in België als in het buitenland. Een daguitstap of reis die u maakt in het kader van uw werk of opleiding tellen hier niet mee).

**Public**: 'Book fairs'.

I will now list different literary events. Indicate each time whether you attended these during the past 12 months (Ik zal u nu een aantal literaire evenementen voorlezen. Zeg telkens of u die de voorbije twaalf maanden heeft bijgewoond of niet.)

For the final empirical chapter—i.e., chapter 6—I studied cultural profiles in terms of listening behavior. The following question was used:

“I will now list several musical genres. Indicate each time how many times you listened to it the past month.” (Ik zal u nu een aantal muziekgenres opsommen. Zeg voor elk genre hoe vaak u er de voorbije maand naar geluisterd heeft.)
Descriptives: Relative frequencies of listening behavior (valid percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Daily (dagelijks)</th>
<th>Several times a week (meermaals per week)</th>
<th>A few times during the past month (een paar keer de voorbije maand)</th>
<th>Once (een enkele keer)</th>
<th>Not during the past month (niet de voorbije maand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dance (dance)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop / rock (pop / rock)</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folk (folk of volksmuziek)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanson (kleinkunst of chanson)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical music (klassiek werk)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opera (opera)</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. References


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