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Germany's institutional power and the EMU regime after the crisis : towards a Germanized Euro area?

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Abstract
In this article we examine the constraints on Germany’s influence over the reforms of the macroeconomic governance regime of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Drawing on the insights of historical institutionalism, we show that the German government’s control over the process is constrained by the increased sunk costs of European monetary integration and the unintended negative spillovers from its management of the Eurozone crisis. While the German government attempted to promote the domestic societal interests underpinning its creditor preferences by deflecting the burden of macroeconomic and institutional adjustment onto the debtor countries, negative feedback loops linked to the pursuit of these preferences induced it to accept a less orthodox and increasingly accommodative central bank to make the EMU sustainable.
Keywords
historical, institutionalism, Germany, power, Euro crisis, governance reform

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Chicago
Vermeiren, Mattias, and Federico Steinberg. 2016. “Germany’s Institutional Power and the EMU Regime After the Crisis : Towards a Germanized Euro Area?” Ed. Michelle Cini and Amy Verdun. Jcms-journal of Common Market Studies 54 (2): 388–407.
APA
Vermeiren, M., & Steinberg, F. (2016). Germany’s institutional power and the EMU regime after the crisis : towards a Germanized Euro area? (M. Cini & A. Verdun, Eds.)JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 54(2), 388–407.
Vancouver
1.
Vermeiren M, Steinberg F. Germany’s institutional power and the EMU regime after the crisis : towards a Germanized Euro area? Cini M, Verdun A, editors. JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES. John Wiley & sONS; 2016;54(2):388–407.
MLA
Vermeiren, Mattias, and Federico Steinberg. “Germany’s Institutional Power and the EMU Regime After the Crisis : Towards a Germanized Euro Area?” Ed. Michelle Cini & Amy Verdun. JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 54.2 (2016): 388–407. Print.
@article{5897344,
  abstract     = {In this article we examine the constraints on Germany{\textquoteright}s influence over the reforms of the macroeconomic governance regime of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Drawing on the insights of historical institutionalism, we show that the German government{\textquoteright}s control over the process is constrained by the increased sunk costs of European monetary integration and the unintended negative spillovers from its management of the Eurozone crisis. While the German government attempted to promote the domestic societal interests underpinning its creditor preferences by deflecting the burden of macroeconomic and institutional adjustment onto the debtor countries, negative feedback loops linked to the pursuit of these preferences induced it to accept a less orthodox and increasingly accommodative central bank to make the EMU sustainable.},
  author       = {Vermeiren, Mattias and Steinberg, Federico},
  editor       = {Cini, Michelle and Verdun, Amy},
  issn         = {0021-9886 },
  journal      = {JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES},
  keyword      = {historical,institutionalism,Germany,power,Euro crisis,governance reform},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {388--407},
  publisher    = {John Wiley \& sONS},
  title        = {Germany's institutional power and the EMU regime after the crisis : towards a Germanized Euro area?},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12255},
  volume       = {54},
  year         = {2016},
}

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