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Experimental philosophy and intuitions on what is art and what is not

(2015) TEOREMA. 34(3). p.159-175
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  • 1161213N
Abstract
It is generally agreed upon that philosophers of art rely on their intuitions to justify or criticize proposed definitions of art. Experimental philosophers, however, have questioned the role of intuition in philosophy, since empirical research shows that philosophers’ intuitions are neither widely shared nor reliable sources of justification. This article aims to apply these experimental challenges to the project of defining art. It will be demonstrated that while experimentalists are right in claiming that philosophers' intuitions cannot be used as epistemic grounds for the definition of art, experimental research itself cannot contribute much to the project of defining art.
Keywords
Definition of Art, Philosophy of Art, Experimental Philosophy, Intuition

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Citation

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MLA
Monseré, Annelies. “Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not.” TEOREMA, edited by Luis M. Valdés - Villanueva, vol. 34, no. 3, 2015, pp. 159–75.
APA
Monseré, A. (2015). Experimental philosophy and intuitions on what is art and what is not. TEOREMA, 34(3), 159–175.
Chicago author-date
Monseré, Annelies. 2015. “Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not.” Edited by Luis M. Valdés - Villanueva. TEOREMA 34 (3): 159–75.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Monseré, Annelies. 2015. “Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions on What Is Art and What Is Not.” Ed by. Luis M. Valdés - Villanueva. TEOREMA 34 (3): 159–175.
Vancouver
1.
Monseré A. Experimental philosophy and intuitions on what is art and what is not. Valdés - Villanueva LM, editor. TEOREMA. 2015;34(3):159–75.
IEEE
[1]
A. Monseré, “Experimental philosophy and intuitions on what is art and what is not,” TEOREMA, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 159–175, 2015.
@article{5876534,
  abstract     = {It is generally agreed upon that philosophers of art rely on their intuitions to justify or criticize proposed definitions of art. Experimental philosophers, however, have questioned the role of intuition in philosophy, since empirical research shows that philosophers’ intuitions are neither widely shared nor reliable sources of justification. This article aims to apply these experimental challenges to the project of defining art. It will be demonstrated that while experimentalists are right in claiming that philosophers' intuitions cannot be used as epistemic grounds for the definition of art, experimental research itself cannot contribute much to the project of defining art.},
  author       = {Monseré, Annelies},
  editor       = {Valdés - Villanueva, Luis M.},
  issn         = {0210-1602},
  journal      = {TEOREMA},
  keywords     = {Definition of Art,Philosophy of Art,Experimental Philosophy,Intuition},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {159--175},
  title        = {Experimental philosophy and intuitions on what is art and what is not},
  volume       = {34},
  year         = {2015},
}

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