Ghent University Academic Bibliography

Advanced

De controversiële erfenis van Benjamin Libet: vrije wilsceptici en hun critici over het belang van Libet-type experimenten in het debat over vrije wil en verantwoordelijkheid

Jan Verplaetse UGent (2014) PANOPTICON. 35(2). p.106-119
abstract
The controversial legacy of Benjamin Libet. Free will skeptics and their critics on the importance of Libet-type experiments in the free will and responsibility debate. To most legal scholars free will is indispensable philosophical assumption underlying our penal law system. Since the 1980s Libet-type experiments (LT) tend to criticize this assumption by showing that unconscious brain processes instead of conscious and deliberative thoughts do initiate our decisions. Here, after summarizing the main findings, we review three branches of criticism: (a) methodological considerations, (b) objections made by philosophy of science, (c) metaphysical remarks that also concern moral and legal consequences. At the end of this review we discuss the possible impact of these neuropsychological investigations on matters of penal law such as legal accountability.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
journal title
PANOPTICON
volume
35
issue
2
pages
106 - 119
ISSN
0771-1409
language
Dutch
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A2
copyright statement
I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher
VABB id
c:vabb:391069
VABB type
VABB-1
id
5870891
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-5870891
date created
2015-02-28 10:28:01
date last changed
2016-12-19 15:39:12
@article{5870891,
  abstract     = {The controversial legacy of Benjamin Libet. Free will skeptics and their critics on the importance of Libet-type experiments in the free will and responsibility debate. To most legal scholars free will is indispensable philosophical assumption underlying our penal law system. Since the 1980s Libet-type experiments (LT) tend to criticize this assumption by showing that unconscious brain processes instead of conscious and deliberative thoughts do initiate our decisions. Here, after summarizing the main findings, we review three branches of criticism: (a) methodological considerations, (b) objections made by philosophy of science, (c) metaphysical remarks that also concern moral and legal consequences. At the end of this review we discuss the possible impact of these neuropsychological investigations on matters of penal law such as legal accountability.},
  author       = {Verplaetse, Jan},
  issn         = {0771-1409},
  journal      = {PANOPTICON},
  language     = {dut},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {106--119},
  title        = {De controversi{\"e}le erfenis van Benjamin Libet: vrije wilsceptici en hun critici over het belang van Libet-type experimenten in het debat over vrije wil en verantwoordelijkheid},
  volume       = {35},
  year         = {2014},
}

Chicago
Verplaetse, Jan. 2014. “De Controversiële Erfenis Van Benjamin Libet: Vrije Wilsceptici En Hun Critici over Het Belang Van Libet-type Experimenten in Het Debat over Vrije Wil En Verantwoordelijkheid.” Panopticon 35 (2): 106–119.
APA
Verplaetse, J. (2014). De controversiële erfenis van Benjamin Libet: vrije wilsceptici en hun critici over het belang van Libet-type experimenten in het debat over vrije wil en verantwoordelijkheid. PANOPTICON, 35(2), 106–119.
Vancouver
1.
Verplaetse J. De controversiële erfenis van Benjamin Libet: vrije wilsceptici en hun critici over het belang van Libet-type experimenten in het debat over vrije wil en verantwoordelijkheid. PANOPTICON. 2014;35(2):106–19.
MLA
Verplaetse, Jan. “De Controversiële Erfenis Van Benjamin Libet: Vrije Wilsceptici En Hun Critici over Het Belang Van Libet-type Experimenten in Het Debat over Vrije Wil En Verantwoordelijkheid.” PANOPTICON 35.2 (2014): 106–119. Print.