Academic Bibliography

 Search 200 years of publications by Ghent University researchers.
Advanced search
1 file | 250.19 KB
Add to list
  1. Search results
  2. Mechanism design with two alternative...

Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

Thierry Marchant (UGent) and Debasis Mishra
(2015) SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. 44(2). p.433-455
Author
Organization
Abstract
We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. In unbounded domains, if we replace our range condition by an independence condition, then every implementable allocation rule is an affine maximizer. Our results extend Roberts’ affine maximizer theorem (Roberts, In: Laffont J-J (ed) The characterization of implementable choice rules, 1979) to the case of two alternatives.
Keywords
ROBERTS THEOREM, PREFERENCE AGGREGATION, SOCIAL CHOICE, IMPLEMENTATION, MONOTONICITY

Downloads

  • Download
    (...).pdf
    • full text
    • |
    • UGent only
    • |
    • PDF
    • |
    • 250.19 KB

Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Marchant, Thierry, and Debasis Mishra. “Mechanism Design with Two Alternatives in Quasi-Linear Environments.” SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, vol. 44, no. 2, 2015, pp. 433–55, doi:10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4.
APA
Marchant, T., & Mishra, D. (2015). Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 44(2), 433–455. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4
Chicago author-date
Marchant, Thierry, and Debasis Mishra. 2015. “Mechanism Design with Two Alternatives in Quasi-Linear Environments.” SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 44 (2): 433–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Marchant, Thierry, and Debasis Mishra. 2015. “Mechanism Design with Two Alternatives in Quasi-Linear Environments.” SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 44 (2): 433–455. doi:10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4.
Vancouver
1.
Marchant T, Mishra D. Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. 2015;44(2):433–55.
IEEE
[1]
T. Marchant and D. Mishra, “Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments,” SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 433–455, 2015.
@article{5814723,
  abstract     = {{We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation rule is a generalized utility function maximizer. In unbounded domains, if we replace our range condition by an independence condition, then every implementable allocation rule is an affine maximizer. Our results extend Roberts’ affine maximizer theorem (Roberts, In: Laffont J-J (ed) The characterization of implementable choice rules, 1979) to the case of two alternatives.}},
  author       = {{Marchant, Thierry and Mishra, Debasis}},
  issn         = {{0176-1714}},
  journal      = {{SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE}},
  keywords     = {{ROBERTS THEOREM,PREFERENCE AGGREGATION,SOCIAL CHOICE,IMPLEMENTATION,MONOTONICITY}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{433--455}},
  title        = {{Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0837-4}},
  volume       = {{44}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}
Altmetric
View in Altmetric
Web of Science
Times cited: