A POST-STRUCTURALIST ACCOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Dissertation submitted by Vjosa Musliu in fulfillment of the degree ‘Doctor in EU studies’

Promoter and co-promoter: Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie and Dr. Eline De Ridder

A POST-STRUCTURALIST ACCOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Dissertation submitted by Vjosa Musliu in fulfillment of the degree ‘Doctor in EU studies’

Promoter and co-promoter: Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie and Dr. Eline De Ridder

A word of thanks!

Over the past five years in my ‘Belgian experience’, I have been blessed with a lot of people without whom this project would have simply been impossible.

At the outset of this PhD, it seemed that starting this whole journey was more difficult than finishing it. I am indefinitely indebted to the love, help and guidance of Brunilda Pali (there are no words), Stephan Parmentier and Sarah Bracke. For the cherished days in Leuven, Eda Özdek and Maren Tattara.

I am very grateful for the academic guidance and patience of first and foremost Jan Orbie. I want to thank him for his guidance, support, being a great promoter and most of all for creating the space for each and everyone one of us at the Centre to engage freely with our research. Thanks to Eline De Ridder, Dan Bulley, Dvora Yanow, Lilly Ling, Fabienne Bossuyt, Roxana Rodrigues for their comments, suggestions and constructive criticism on a number drafts and papers. For the immense help during the field work: Jusuf Thaçi, Anne Blanksma-Çeta, Artan Çollaku, Arif Muharremi, Nenad Maximović, Donikë Qerimi, Kaltrina Hoxha, Shqipe Neziri.

To Catherine and Hans Van Laake, BASILEUS team, Dubi Kelmendi, Bella Murati, Erinda Mehmeti.

Thank you to all my colleagues at the CEUS, for your friendship and the team spirit, particularly Bruno Vandecasteele and Bregt Saenen.

All the thanks in the world to my parents, Sadije and Irfan Musliu, for their beautiful spirit, energy, love and patience. To my brother and sister, Vigan and Gresa - the frame of my happiness and love. To my extended family: Ylli Haliti (dashuria), Isuf Mushica, Mimoza Musliju, Thomas Moens, Dafina Qerimi, Betil Hafizmustafa, Engjëllushe Spahillari.

Above all and most of all, to my love, Evrim! For his love, friendship, compassion, patience, academic guidance, and countless discussions over matters I talk about in this thesis. For being a promoter, an editor, a reviewer and a passionate thinker. There is no part in this journey that would have ever happened without you!
List of Abbreviations
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE – Council of Europe
EAR – European Agency for Reconstruction
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
EU - European Union
EULEX – European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IR – International Relations
KDL – Kosovo Democratic League
KFOR – Kosovo Force
KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPE – Normative Power Europe
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SAA – Stabilisation and Association Agreement
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
UFO – Unidentified Flying Objects
Genealogy of the puzzle. A personal story

“This is the hour of Europe” said Jacques Poos, former President of the Council of the European Union in 1992, at the beginning of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, indicating that this is a European problem, thus requires a European solution. What followed in former Yugoslavia throughout the 90s and whose hour was it really, is less important in this part. Important to note is that the events of the 90s have made former Yugoslavia and to some extent the Balkans, a European matter. Since then, the idea of interventions and missions in the region was never off the table. What followed in the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s breakup and NATO intervention was a sequence of peace agreements, territorial arrangements, instalment of NATO forces, United Nations missions and agencies, EU missions and altogether a structural approach from the Western structures in changing the situation in the region.

Growing up in a setting where discrimination towards certain groups was an established way of living, had influenced me to think of war, uprising and resisting as a form of liberation. During the war in Kosovo between what was then the third military power of Europe – Serbia - and a porous Albanian guerrilla movement, the very idea of military intervention was seen as salvation, as the right hand of God. I remember being thrilled the night NATO started bombing Serbia’s military sites. In my understanding of a 12 year old, that was something that would stop the massive flow of refugees, the abandoned, ghost cities and the bestial images of killings. The intervention did eventually ‘save’ my life and the lives of my family. The entrance of NATO soldiers after Milosević surrendered was followed by an unprecedented welcome of the remaining local Albanians in Kosovo. It was a sort of bestial happiness – as if God had landed in front of us. And there I was! Covering NATO tanks with flowers, thinking that they were there because my life mattered, like all human life should mater. What followed was the ‘making’ of Kosovo as a church or a worship site where everybody came to light a candle to clean their souls. Agencies, donors, sponsors, NGOs, humanitarian organisations, human rights groups, academics, volunteers of various causes were coming to Kosovo to help these poor people. The notion of a poor victim became statutory in our new social identity.

It was later in high school during the philosophy classes that the notion of liberty had infected me with the very questions of what was really happening there. Later in Tirana, at an American university, what may seem ironic, surrounded by critical professors and literature, the rosy picture of those brave soldiers who saved me and my family was further
contextualized and de-mythicized. It took me years to understand the perverse nature of (non)interventions albeit with the right cause, after being acquainted with Rwanda 1994, Somalia 1993, the Kurdish issue, the Palestinian question and other places plagued by calamities like my own. In the late 90s, an anecdote was circulating that during the war in Kosovo the former Italian defence minister, while having dinner, saw footage of Kosovo refugees in peril and exclaimed “Oh my god, they are blonde”! And this is perverse not just in the Freudian way but in its very concept, where the narrative of intervention is not just legitimized to save these human lives but how much their coloured eyes and blondish hair have moved you. Oversimplified, I was back in understanding that while humanitarian cause and intervention were a given, this was after all a struggle of ‘whose hour was it going to be’.

What the intervention brought in Kosovo was an installation of two consequent foreign missions that de facto set the country’s path and its political choices to date. We were asked not to talk about the war, because that was not politically correct towards the ‘other’ (i.e. the Serbs). The word conflict was instilled instead. History was asked to be rewritten in ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ tones. The ‘year zero’ had started for Kosovo, where memory, history, culture did not matter much before the democratic future awaiting us. I realised that if I was interested in any kind of question on freedom and liberation they would have to take a deep intellectual and epistemological question. It was a personal conflict in trying to find the balance how does one sees intervention as a human who was saved by it and by somebody who wants to go deeper in understanding how does intervention work? For whom there is an intervention? When does the intervention stop? What turns interventions into missions? How long do missions stay? Do they ever go away? Who signs their time frame?

Later in Leuven, studying at a typical Western European university, a whole more complete picture of my emotional and intellectual puzzle with interventions and missions was revealed. Dots were connected between, on the one hand pathologizing the ‘other’ (the Balkans) as something intrinsically troubled due to regional deep seated, irrational hatred in the mainstream academic narrative, and having that narrative calling, justifying and legitimizing ‘interventions’ on the other hand. Nonetheless, this is not, and should be not read as a story for Kosovo. It is rather a story of the oppressed. The oppressed, the marginal silenced and tucked in, be that in faculties of knowledge, theoretical assumptions or the narrative of interventions itself.
Abstract

This thesis offers a Derridean perspective to the notion of international interventions and missions by focusing on the case of Kosovo. It argues on a reconceptualization of ethics as foreign policy, interrogating questions of how to rethink ethics as justice and how to rethink the notion of (non)intervention. The structure is built around four primary questions that are dealt with in four consecutive articles utilizing four of Derrida's concept: deconstruction, hospitality, autoimmunity and home respectively. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is dedicated to the introduction of the thesis, a theoretical and methodological discussion, data generation and interpretation and an overview of thesis’ structure. The second part is reserved for the four articles, each employing a particular concept of Derrida, to shed light on the dynamics of Western/EU missions in Kosovo. Part three provides a summary of main issues covered in the thesis, concluding remarks and a debate for further research. In its final part, the thesis calls for de-missionizing of the spread of democracy, be that as an aim to civilize, modernize or, Europeanize, others. De-missionizing is essentially related to de-pathologizing the other as something intrinsically corrupt and de-objectifying the other as a structure in need for intervention. This would in turn lead to a more democratic way to construct relations with others.
Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................................. 5
Genealogy of the puzzle. A personal story ....................................................................................................................... 6

PART I ............................................................................................................................................................................. 12

1. The narrative of the puzzle ........................................................................................................................................... 13
2. Beyond narratives in EU studies and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) .............................................................. 15
    2.1 International Interventions .................................................................................................................................. 15
    2.2 EU interventions and missions ............................................................................................................................ 17
    2.3 Interventions in the Balkans .................................................................................................................................. 26
3. Methods and methodology: interpretivism and deconstruction ........................................................................... 32
    3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................... 32
    3.2 Interpretivist Research ........................................................................................................................................ 34
4. Data Generation .......................................................................................................................................................... 45
    4.1 Interviewing ........................................................................................................................................................... 46
5. Data interpretation ......................................................................................................................................................... 50
    5.1 Post structuralism ................................................................................................................................................. 52
    5.2 Derrida. Theories and methods of deconstruction .............................................................................................. 53
    5.3 Deconstruction at work - how to read the articles .............................................................................................. 57
6. Conceptual map ............................................................................................................................................................ 60
    6.1 Kosovo – NATO, the UN and the EU .................................................................................................................... 63

PART II ........................................................................................................................................................................... 66

Article 1 | Deconstructing the ‘mission’. What’s in a name? ......................................................................................... 67
Deconstructing the ‘mission’: What’s in a name? ........................................................................................................... 68
    1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 68
    2. Derrida’s deconstruction and international missions .......................................................................................... 72
        2.1 (Self) invitations to intervene ............................................................................................................................ 76
    3. New Holy Trinity - Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights. The EU Mission in Kosovo ......................... 79
        3.1 Pathologizing ‘the other’ ................................................................................................................................... 80
        3.2 Objectifying ‘the other’ - in the name of development ................................................................................ 83
    4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 86

Article 2 | Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo ............................................................................................... 88
Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo ................................................................................................................ 89
    1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 89
2. Tracing ‘Hospitality’ in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) ........................................... 92
   2.1 The scrutinized ‘conditioned hospitality’ of enlargement ........................................ 94
   2.2 The ‘unconditioned hospitality’ of the EU mission in Kosovo ................................. 99
3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 107

**Article 3 | Autoimmunity of democracy promotion. The case of Western missions in Kosovo** ................................................................. 108
Autoimmunity of Democracy Promotion. The case of Western missions in Kosovo ....... 109

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 109
2. Autoimmunity contextualized ............................................................................... 111
   2.1 Democracy ......................................................................................................... 113
   2.1 Europe ............................................................................................................... 117
3. In the name of ‘international standards’ ................................................................. 120
4. In the name of ‘European values’ ........................................................................... 126
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 132

**Article 4 | MetaKosovo: local and international narratives** ...................................... 135
MetaKosovo: local and international narratives ................................................................ 136

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 136
2. Kosovo’s narratives ............................................................................................... 141
   2.1 Kosovo as historical justice ............................................................................... 141
   2.2 Kosovo Project: From UNMIKISTAN to EULEKSPERIMENT .................................. 152
3. Conclusion: ‘Unfinished’ ...................................................................................... 154

**Part III** ..................................................................................................................... 157

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 158

1. General Conclusions ............................................................................................. 158
   1.1 Aporias, Kosovo and the EU ............................................................................. 159
   1.2 Deconstruction and beyond .............................................................................. 164
   1.3. Research limitations ....................................................................................... 167
2. The Gordian Knot: knowledge production, cartographies of power and missions ..... 171
   2.1 Interpretivism in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and EU Studies, and the
      Humanization of social science ......................................................................... 171
   2.2 Derrida and the Hospitality of Foreign Policy Analysis .................................... 173

**List of interviews** .................................................................................................... 178

**ANNEX I** .................................................................................................................. 181

**ANNEX II** ................................................................................................................ 182
ANNEX III ................................................................................................................................. 183
ANNEX IV ................................................................................................................................. 184
ANNEX V ................................................................................................................................. 185
ANNEX VI .................................................................................................................................. 186
Bibliography | Introduction ............................................................................................................. 187
Bibliography | Deconstructing the ‘mission’. What’s in a name?......................................................... 203
Bibliography | Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo ............................................................. 208
Bibliography | Autoimmunity of democracy promotion. The case of Western Missions in Kosovo ......................................................................................................................... 213
Bibliography | MetaKosovo: local and international narratives ............................................................ 220
Bibliography | Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 225
PART I

Part I is dedicated to the introduction of the thesis, a theoretical and methodological discussion, data generation and data interpretation, and an overview of the thesis’ structure.
1. The narrative of the puzzle

This research puzzle was initially conceptualized to look for aspects of compatibility between what the EU mission does in Kosovo on the one hand with the sociological reality in Kosovo on the other. After the first PhD year, I realized that the problem I was interested in, stretched out all the way to the very concept of international missions. The aim was in turn re-contextualized to analyse the concept of having mission(s) in Kosovo and how this is related to the political and social context on the ground. Using post-structuralist theories - deconstruction as conceptualized and practiced by Derrida - integrated into an interpretivist research framework, the topic is in the contours of EU external relations/EU enlargement, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and ethics in foreign policy. At its outset, the focus was strictly on the EU mission deployed in Kosovo. However, during the field work, coming to the bottom of how intervention and mission were perceived by locals in Kosovo, the concept of the mission itself was deconstructed for me from the interviewees. Their discourse would see the missions, interventions, structural and non-structural presence in a linear format of ‘Western mission structure’. Consequently, the research puzzle also grew bigger. It made no sense to look at the EU in a vacuum, without seeing it contextualized in this broader missionizing structure.

Kosovo was subjected to the whole package of Western/international mission, first with military/humanitarian intervention from NATO, the post-conflict peace building with the UN mission, the set of agencies for human rights, free trade and liberal economy with the OSCE, IMF, World Bank and finally, strengthening democracy and the rule of law from the EU agencies and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Observing the performance and state of the art of the international missions in Kosovo, I was systematically provoked by the gratitude and humbleness of the Kosovo Albanians (primarily) for the international intervention on the one hand, and an overall dissatisfaction and agitation of Kosovars in general towards the international missions within Kosovo on the other. The streets around most Kosovar cities are named after signatories of American interveners such as William Walker, Madeleine Albright; one of Pristina’s main squares has Bill Clinton’s statue. This gratitude cohabitated well with street art and graffiti displaying utter dissatisfaction with the missions as non-responsive and neo-colonial. The first step to understand this relationship was during my master thesis (2009-2010) where I analysed the EU funds per sector given to Kosovo and compared it with Kosovars estimated needs and necessities (calculated and measured through the statistical research of the UNDP and a set of interviews conducted in Pristina that same year). I discovered a mismatch between on the
one hand what the EU spends on Kosovo and how it allocates its funds and what the Kosovar society feels to be needing on the other. The findings of the research were relatively expected given the research’s nature of looking for a binary opposites answer whether the mission is compatible or not.

Reading on other interventions and missions primarily in former Yugoslavia, it became clear that the incompatible relationship between the intervener and the subject of intervention is not exclusive either for Kosovo or for the Western Balkans in general. In fact, research on interventions and foreign missions reveals an uneasy/asymmetric relationship between the intervener, missionizer and the subject of the intervention.\(^1\) However, the very qualitative dimension of how this relationship is incompatible was missing in the overall literature. For whom was it first incompatible? Was this who relevant in the way how missions are given? The ‘overlooking’ of these questions, appeared to be more of a result of the approach in the study field itself. By and large, EU studies – and more importantly studies on EU’s relations with third countries (non-EU) – tend to be euro-centric.\(^2\) There exists significant literature indicating what the EU’s the policies/programs are for instance in Sierra Leone or East Timor. Yet, little is known about what happens with these programs in the ground; what is the share/opinion/ownership of the locals on these projects.

Motivated by the normative assumption that when missions are put forward as ‘responsibility to help the locals’, they ought to represent (as in be compatible with) what the locals need to be ‘helped’ with. I problematize this throughout four main questions that are dealt with in this thesis separately in four articles:

---


1. What is the concept of *mission* in Western metaphysics and how does that play out in the case of Kosovo?

2. How is the interplay of the EU mission with the locals in Kosovo on the one hand, and in what way that influences the process of enlargement for Kosovo?

3. How is the relationship between the broader missionizing structure deployed in Kosovo on the hand, and the local Kosovar on the other?

4. How is the local identified in Kosovo and who is local and international in Kosovo?

Each of these questions are dealt with in the consequent articles using four of Derrida’s concepts: *deconstruction*, *hospitality*, *autoimmunity* and *home* respectively. The thesis relies in gathering and articulating evidence from field work (interviews with local and international actors in Kosovo), *text* as discourse (modes of communication from the international structures in Kosovo and modes of communication from the locals). The overall aim of this thesis is to argue on the reconceptualization of ethics as foreign policy, how to rethink ethics as justice and the notion of (non)intervention, and lastly how to rethink ethics as respect and dignity in how ‘other’ is pathologized, objectified and dominated.

---

**2. Beyond narratives in EU studies and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)**

In this part I situate my research in the broader realm of literature of international interventions and missions focusing on *international interventions, EU interventions and missions,* and *EU interventions in the Western Balkans.* I conclude this part with a discussion on the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this research with regard to the broad tendencies in the EU and FPA literature.

**2.1 International Interventions**

The scholarship in international interventions and missions falls in a broad range of literature, including democracy promotion, development aid, security studies, humanitarian intervention, peace-building, conflict resolution state-building, peace studies etc. The mainstream literature operates within the frame of liberal peacebuilding and as such is preoccupied with the ‘lessons learned’ from the missions deployed and how future interventions can be improved. Most of these studies show a tendency of ‘fixing’ the intervening agent, strengthening its agency and capabilities to do more and to do better.  

---

Autesserre, Benner and Rotmann, Howard focus on how the international bureaucratic procedures affect the deployed UN peace operations. Knoll, Outi focus on the legitimacy of missions in the settings where they deployed and question whether co-government models between the local and the intervener would increase missions’ legitimacy. Focusing on the case of Kosovo and East Timor, Herbert analyses how mandates of UN missions in different geo-political contexts affect the performance of UN mission; somewhere else, he questions whether the large deployment of these missions will create a social gap between the international and local ‘worlds’, which will in turn become a target of narratives of local actors. Pickering, Fridl focus on UN missions with regard to mediation and peacebuilding. Edelman looks at UN missions with lenses of development aid and argues that by the logic ‘do no harm’, the UN learns through practice. Wolfram analyses the peculiarities of the UN


missions within the realm of *humanitarian interventions*, and argues that the failure to establish security first creates serious credibility burden for the international missions.10

The scholarly work who embarks on a critique of international interventions is torn between scholars for whom the act of immanent critique and the promotion of emancipation in academic discourse seem to provide sufficient level of resistance, and those critics who demand the production of alternative solutions to resolve the unfulfilled potential of mainstream approaches. In other words, on the one hand there are scholars who in response to the shortcomings, failures and consequences of the practice of liberal peace-building, interrogate the performance, effectiveness and implications of mainstream peace-building praxis.11 Here attention is given to the local level of analysis, which in mainstream realist-liberal terms denotes that of civil society.12 On the other hand, there are scholars who reject or modify the propositions made by mainstream scholars who predominantly employ problem-solving and a positivist logic of inference in their analysis.13

### 2.2 EU interventions and missions

From the end of World War II, the European security was defined, organized and handled by external superpowers (the USA in the West, and the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe). Throughout this period, the security of Europe was mainly thought of in terms of military structures (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and in a very classical (realist) way where a balance of power, the arms race and alliances were the key concepts to be found at the heart

---


of security considerations. Filtenborg et al. claim that “during the Cold War period, the European Community (EC) abstained from developing any common policies towards its Northern and Eastern periphery owing to the constraints imposed by the bipolarity of the world system”.14 Wolff and Rodt explain that NATO, OSCE, WEU, UN and Council of Europe—the main building blocks of Europe’s Cold War security architecture—survived easily into the 1990s, but they needed to reinvent themselves and develop new and more effective instruments and policies to address the challenges of a changed security situation.15

At that time, much debate has centred around the developing architecture of the European Union’s (EU) relations with its ‘near abroad’. The fall of the Iron Curtain opened up new possibilities for the EU to exert increasing influence over a range of countries which have gravitated strongly towards the economic power of the Single European market (SEM) and the political discourse on Europe’s (re) unification. In addition, it also led for a new realist – more liberal conception of security, such as human security, societal security among others.

From the early 1990s, the characteristics of the European security debate changed dramatically and so did the perceived role of the EU and its relations with its third parties. The end of the Cold War, the successive conflicts in the Balkans, the attacks of 9/11 and the decision of the US to wage international war on terror, reshaped the role of the EU as a security actor in the world. For Wolff and Rodt, the perception of far graver threats in post-communist Europe, large parts of which had aspired to EU membership since the early 1990s, prompted the EU to adopt a much more pro-active policy of managing ethno-political conflicts outside its boundaries than within them. This approach, they add, was deemed necessary because of the greater risk posed by such actual and potential conflicts in likely new member states and the EU’s ‘new neighbourhood’.16 It was the launch of CSDP shortly after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in June 1999, the momentum to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). The creation of ESDP paved the way for EU’s first crisis management missions abroad. Since 2003, the EU has launched over 20 missions and operations, among which missions of police, Security Sector Reform missions, border,


16 Ibid.

The different nature of EU missions deployed, was also followed with a wide range of definitions and approaches in how the EU was to be defined. As such a significant debate focused on the nature of EU’s power. In the 1970s, Francois Duchêne coined the term *civilian power* for this new role - a power that would be based on non-military means but would also pursue the civilisation of international politics. In line with that, Ian Manners talked about *Normative Power Europe (NPE)*, in which the EU shapes conceptions of what is ‘normal’, binds itself to international norms and pursues these norms even against its own material (i.e. mostly economic interests). Aggestam talked about *ethical power Europe*, a power that would see itself bound by ethical standards that are traditionally seen as standing outside of foreign considerations. Zimmerman called it a *realist power*, while Sangiovanni, Treacher coined it *an emerging civilian power*. For Hettne and Söderbaum the changing Europe was *soft imperialist*; for Charillon, the EU was a *security regime*. Wood called it *pragmatic power Europe*,

---


to explain that when external actors resist its normative agenda and have substantial leverage, member states tend to impede the composite arrangements they are integral to.\textsuperscript{25} Klasnja argued on \textit{soft power Europe} when talking about EU's ability to build political, economic, legal, and social institutions cause changes at the domestic level with regard to enlargement.\textsuperscript{26} In reading these identifications for the EU, Thomas Diez argued that a prominent strand in the literature is that the EU’s role is seen as being different – better! – than that of traditional great or superpowers.\textsuperscript{27}

The debate on the nature of EU’s power and its power towards others became topical in a number of fields among which foreign policy, crisis management, conflict resolution, state-building to name a few, embarked on the wave of studying the new role of the EU. With regard to literature on EU as an external actor, significant attention is given both descriptively (what the EU is and what it does. See the work of Keukeleire, Smith, Hill, Laidi)\textsuperscript{28} and prescriptively (what it should do. See for more Orbie and Wetzel, Gloanec and Rupnik, Lavenex).\textsuperscript{29} A third group of scholarly work takes a fundamental and conceptual questioning and critique of the intrinsic features of missions and missionizing of the EU. Instead of looking for ways how the EU should do more and better, this strand questions the entire idea of EU involvement in third countries. This grouping of literature is not


\textsuperscript{29} Jan Orbie & Anne Wetzel (2012). "On narrow paths and through shallow waters? Discussing the substance of EU democracy promotion." \textit{European Foreign Affairs Review} 16(5).


exhaustive, rather a simple guideline in mapping the strands in literature. Below I will briefly discuss the first two groups to further conclude the section with a small overview of literature in the third group, where this thesis is also positioned.

Literature on EU interventions stretches out from studies in CFSP, EU external relations, Europeanization, EU integration, democracy promotion, conflict resolution among others. With regard to CFSP operations, Grevi, Helly and Keohane, Asseburg and Kempin, Bossong, among others, commented on the peculiarities and experiences of these operations for the first two decades. Focusing on the EU as a civilization, Adler argued that CFSP can in fact be interpreted as a set of practices (such as multilateralism, co-operative security, preventive diplomacy, political dialogues, etc.), as can the EU more generally, especially when considering it in the guise of a ‘normative power’. On an institutionalist analysis, Breuer, Juncos and Pomorska, focus mainly on the socialization dynamics that influence political decision making with regard to CFSP operations. Recent rational institutionalist studies of Dijkstra, Klein, analysed the level of agency of the Council Secretariat and the Commission vis-à-vis the member states. Asseburg and Kempin, Emerson and Gross, Grevi, analyse case studies of missions to provide snapshots of the EU’s problems with regard to planning, financing and staffing of civilian CSDP missions. Keohane argues that stronger and more

---


coherent institutions and better coordination of member states, better coordination between Brussels and the deployed team, as well as better partnership between the UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE are determinant to the success of the missions. With his ‘public administration turn’ in CSDP studies, Trondal addresses the executive role of bureaucracies and their impact on the deployed missions. Bicchi’s sociological analysis focuses on the EU as a community of practice, i.e. a group of people who routinely get together on a common or similar enterprise with the aim of developing and sharing practical knowledge.

With regard to the EU missions, the belief holds that the EU can and/or should export/impose its values and be a ‘force for the good’, be it as a military force or otherwise. The deployment of the EU missions, is also looked with lenses of Europeanization, democracy promotion, European integration. A number of concepts have been deployed in order to frame the essence of this process. Grabbe, Goetz, Fischer, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, Bauer et.al. have sought to conceptualise it as exporting Europeanization beyond the territorial confines of the EU. For Olsen, Hix and Goetz, the European version, which is to say the spread of EU rules, political organisation and modes of governance beyond its territory and


Klaus H. Goetz ibid."Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?": 1032-1051.
‘a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration’, can then be called Europeanization. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier explain that successful rule adaptation of the EU’s external governance, where the EU applies a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, through which it provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions.

Other scholars like, Lavenex, Lavenex and Wichmann, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, Dimitrova and Dragneva have argued of a process of external governance, that is the ability of the EU to project certain aspects of its own governance regime to its neighbours. Orbie and Wetzel focus on the substance of democracy promotion the EU is involved with, discussing the advantages and the disadvantages of development aid, foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy and Enlargement. On a similar account, Makinda focuses on EU democracy promotion in Africa. Different authors have embarked on democracy promotion as democratization by extension; a discursive battleground between the perception of the intervener and the intervened.

---


Keukeleire with his *Structural Foreign Policy*, argues that when thinking about EU foreign policy, researchers and practitioners need to be thinking less about the ‘EU’ and European rules of the game, and more about the ‘foreign’, pointing out that the ‘Brussels agenda’ should be more synchronized with ‘third country’ agenda.\(^{46}\) Mayer and Vogt embark on finding ‘moral and ethical arguments’ and justifications on which the Union ought to base its global policies asking what ethical foundations might there be for developing a larger role for the EU in regional politics and global governance, or what moral factors could potentially limit the scope of the EU’s external ambitions?\(^{47}\)

What is peculiar in the consulted literature above, which is the mainstream literature in academic curricula of EU studies, is that it focuses exclusively on the process of ‘EU learning lessons’.\(^{48}\) Like the EU itself, this literature is in the search for ‘best examples’ and ‘lessons learned’ in how the EU should do more and better next time.\(^{49}\) Observing the temptation of academics and practitioners for the EU to play a greater role in world politics, Diez argued on a *EU superpower temptation*. This paradigm is not only evidenced in scholarly work who is more in tune with the technicalities of EU’s deployed mission, but it is also evidenced in more conceptual discussions on the role of the EU. For instance, Manners’ *Normative Power Europe (NPE)*, which claims to have given the field of study a more distinctive voice, is nonetheless entrenched in this *Eurocentrism*. On the one hand, there the (self)ascribed identity of the EU, which conceptualizes itself as an ideal, superior agent endowed with a set of normative values. On the other hand, there is academic scholarship which codifies this self-perception of the EU into a faculty. However, this is not pertinent to positivist inquiries only, nor only to scholarly work engaging with problem solving analyses.

---

\(^{46}\) Stephan Keukeleire et.al. (2008). Key Challenges for European Foreign Policy. Debate and Book Launch


In her critique to the international and EU intervention in Africa, Rutazibwa notices that few studies underline assumptions that guide contemporary ethical involvement, to explain its failure; consequently, very little scholarly energy has been put in the study of the possibility that the involvement as such might be problematic, and not just the way we go about it.50 Examples of these works are spread in different schools and methods. On a Gramscian approach, Turkes and Gokgoz, talk about EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans as a hegemonic project arguing that EU’s aim is to restructure the Western Balkans in line with neoliberalism.51 On a poststructuralist inquiry Münever Gebeci coined the Ideal Power Europe - the meta-narrative produced and reproduced in EU Foreign Policy literature – in which the others are supposed to imitate it, the ideal, desirable, superior model. For her, this neglects local particularities giving legitimacy to the EU to create the normal, the superior, valid interventions.52 For Diez, there is a need to focus less on the core norms of the EU and how they are pursued through EU foreign policy, however worthwhile this may also be. Instead, he adds, we need to recognise that these ‘European’ values and norms are themselves contested and fraught with tensions.53 With a post-colonial gaze, Rutazibwa argues for an ethical retreat of the EU from Africa.54 Oliver P. Richmond, Chandler and the rest in the critical camp argue on how liberal peace-building (as intervention) facilitates a counter-productive environment that ultimately develops a weak and unaccountable local polity, fragments local sovereignty and maintains fragile peace.55

---


2.3 Interventions in the Balkans

A similar trend of literature is evidenced with regard to the EU – Kosovo, the EU – Western Balkans relations. In 2009, the *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, devoted a special issue to matters of intervention and missions in the tenth anniversary of NATO intervention in Kosovo. In his introductory article Alex Bellamy wrote that with the beginning of NATO’s intervention, Kosovo has served as a stage for the interplay and clash of post-Cold War trends and interests, in international law, security studies, diplomatic history, military strategy, area studies, international relations (IR) theory, media studies and many other disciplines.56 Particularly with regard to EU missions in the Western Balkans in general and Kosovo in particular, the plethora of literature includes strands from Europeanization and EU enlargement, crisis management, democracy promotion, state-building, CFPS etc.

The first bulk of literature is largely *descriptive*, in that it analyses what the EU is and what it does with others. Drawing on rationalist approaches, Sedelmeier explained the *Europeanization* of candidate countries with the so called external incentives model, foreseeing that the conditionality as a strategy is only effective under clearly defined conditions, a credible membership perspective, and that domestic adjustment costs are not prohibitively high for incumbent governments and do not threaten their power base.57 Those analysing *Europeanization* with constructivist/sociological institutionalist lenses such as Noutcheva, Freyburg and Richter have highlighted the importance of factors such as legitimacy and identity.58 Bauer analyses the processes of domestic, institutional and political changes in third countries.59

---


A solid amount of literature has embarked with lenses of democracy promotion in the Western Balkans. Lavenex has looked at democracy promotion as *external governance*; Borocosz and Kovacs have approached it as “adaptation of internal modes as a condition to join the Union”; on a similar take Vachudova, Dzihic and Wieser have argued about *democratization as enlargement*; Fagan has looked at democracy promotion programs in the development of civil society; Wolff and Rodt, Lyon, Szocsik have analysed democratization via ethnic accommodation and decentralization policies sponsored by the EU. For Le Gloannec and Rupnik, rather than democracy promotion, the Balkans is receiving *democratic security*.

Other widespread grounds in studying EU missions in the Western Balkans include gazes from state building with Juncos, Bieber, Greičevci analysing patterns of EU efforts to state-building its future member states; Papadimitrou and Petrov, Koeth highlight on the

---


difficulties of EU’s involvement in contested states taking Kosovo as an example; Kasapas has analysed EU’s transitional justice efforts in the Western Balkans. In lenses of crisis management the EU involvement is seen as “the most proper tool to stabilize the Balkans”. EU crisis management and coherence/efficiency studies point to institutional design problems and are characterized by a neo-liberal dimension. Tocci argues that the EU has emerged as an actor in conflict resolution beyond its borders at the turn of the twentieth century, concomitantly with the development of its fledging foreign policy, shaped by Union’s self-perception and nature as a ‘peace through integration project’ within its frontiers. Emerson and Gross have looked at the EU crisis management missions in the Western Balkans as a tripartite program Europeanization, EU Enlargement and conflict management.

A second bulk of literature has embarked on with prescriptive analysis – what the EU should do. Fawn and Richmond proposed ‘shared sovereignty’, in which the relation of local actors with internationals should be conditional upon shared governance. In the study of EULEX, Malesic analyses how the participation of judges and personnel affect the performance of the

---


69 Mus, J. (2008). Western Balkans in the Policy of the EU and its Member States. Western Balkans and the European Integration, Perspectives and Implications. R. Sadowski. Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies


mission in the ground. Keukeleiere advocates for a more bottom-up approach when studying EU’s missions pointing that the focus on the ‘local agenda’ as opposed to ‘Brussels agenda’ can provide greater insight to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the EU’s foreign policy on missions.

In contrast to the scholarly work discussed above, which focus on an epistemological paradigm of improving missions to achieve better policy outcomes or focus on the political and institutional structures to explain the failure of them, a third bulk of literature takes a fundamental conceptual questioning of the intrinsic features of missions and missionizing. Embarking on critical theory, Chandler talks about the creation of a hyper reality in the Western Balkans where the discursive language of choice is that of crisis. Turning the focus to the local as subject of intervention, Visoka examines the emergence and implications of local resistance against the practice of liberal peace-building in post-conflict Kosovo, as pursued by the international community and local authorities. Bulley has taken Derrida and the concept of hospitality to explain EU enlargement packages for the Western Balkans and the countries of ENP. Comparing the EU to the comparatively nation state examples in foreign policy (Great Britain), Bulley argues that “EU foreign policy enacts responsibility by offering hospitality to the countries and regions surrounding it though three policies: the policy of enlargement, the policy towards the Balkan countries and the European Neighbourhood Policy”.

The research puzzle in this thesis is traced and conceptualized in two streams. The first one is rather methodological, in that it seeks to turn to the subject of missions to understand the mission and its relation to the local Kosovars (the subject of the mission). The stories of the


78 Ibid.
locals are quite the marginalized narrative in informing the studies on missions. This is particularly the case on missions deployed in Kosovo. Due to two unprecedented missions’ status – UNMIK operating in a semi-protectorate system in a de facto newly emerging political entity and the EU with its first and greatest CFSP mission deployed to date – the focus stretches on the peculiarities of the missions, technical/sui generis arrangements, the mission’s mandate in a non-fully fledged country etc. As such, on a methodological level, I have sought to conduct interpretivist research to focus more on the local’s narrative by engaging in a more inter-subjective conceptualization. These intellectual inquiries are largely stumbled with the question of why the local is important? Why mapping the discourse of locals in Kosovo with regard to EU and international presence in general should be of concern here? I always find a logical fallacy in the rhetoric of similar questions. In studying the existence and materialization of interventions and missions for the locals, to bring democracy and prosperity to the locals, why the question of ‘why the local’ should be posed after all? Unless we silently subordinate and objectify the local as a subject to be intervened on, shouldn’t the question of this relationship be (primarily) addressed to the local? Or why a rather more ‘equal’ relationship between the intervener and the subject of intervention is important, for whom and why. For Spivak, giving the voice to the people concerned, limited by all the elements that get lost in translation, due to language or the different power positions between ‘subaltern’ and western researcher. In her fieldwork in Somaliland, Rutazibwa provided the decolonized western ethical foreign policy research agenda would greatly benefit from an ample and systematic participation of non-western researchers in the non-west.


83 ‘Subaltern’ denotes a social group who are socially, politically and geographically outside the hegemonic power structure of the colony and the colonial homeland. Initially coined by Gramsci, ‘subaltern’ has become a topical term in critical theory and post-colonialism in the work of Gayatri Spivak, Fernando Coronil etc.

Here, to understand these foundational problems, I first sought to analyse the history and the logic of intervention in the Western historical trajectory, deconstruct the intervener and interpret who intervenes, on what grounds and how. In this realm of deconstruction, I posit the international missions in Kosovo and try to interpret their existence and role in the broader conceptualization of Western metaphysics. In addition, I also engage in interviews with local and international actors in Kosovo to hear their stories from the field and to see how do their narratives play out in the broader picture of intervention and missionizing. This elucidates how the subject of intervention (the local population) understands, conceptualizes and relates to the mission. In my understanding how the locals perceive themselves in relation to the mission, how do they define their needs, what is their system of values, on what historical, social, political grounds we could contextualize their needs, hence their perception towards the mission, requires an interpretive approach to inter-subjectivity.

The second stream is rather theoretical, in that it seeks to displace this comfort how interventions, missions are studied in FPA. To do this, I will use deconstruction as conceptualized by Jacques Derrida to deconstruct the very genealogy of interventions and missions and how does this plays out in a contemporary context and in its interplay with Kosovo. Deconstruction is thought of as a rethinking of Eurocentrism and Western metaphysics, and it sheds light on marginal and marginalized discourses and narratives by bringing them to the fore. This methodologico-theoretical symbiosis provides this niche of an epistemological retreat in studying settings of interventions and missions. Finally, as far as the area of study is concerned, this is one of the few deconstructivist/interpretivist accounts on Kosovo as a case study and as such is a contribution in a stylized dichotomy of positivist and constructivist research.

The thesis is seen as a contribution on two main levels. First, on a rather theoretical level it speaks to decolonization of knowledge and engages with knowledge production from different spectrums while avoiding putting political/imperial hierarchies of core/periphery, centre/backyard etc. Second, looking at intervention and mission as foreign policy tools in EU studies, the thesis builds the critique of how the subject of intervention is viewed, in what ways it is objectified, and what happens to its agency.
3. Methods and methodology: interpretivism and deconstruction

What follows is an overview of the thesis, theories and methodological choices used and finally an overview of the four articles. In this part (‘part 3’), I explain the emergence of interpretative research first by elaborating on its definition and second by proceeding with the major ontological ‘misunderstandings’ on it as a method.

‘Part 4’ and ‘Part 5’ are dedicated to the methodological choices of data gathering and data generation methods. Evidence is given with regard to field work and how the data gathered will be read with four concepts of Derrida 1) deconstruction; 2) hospitality; 3) autoimmunity and 4) home and how they will be used in the thesis.

In ‘part 6’ I explain the major concepts used and the philosophical stances I embark on when writing.

3.1 Overview

The history of social science evolution is a history of ideas on how to engage with knowledge and what paths of knowledge production we take. Throughout the 60s-70s, there is the first schematic division in behavioural sciences between quantitative and qualitative methods.⁸⁴ The first is the positivist strand identified by objective reality – the belief that there is a reality outside of us that can be verified through scientific methods. It holds to the belief that like the physical world, society is governed by general laws and the intuitive knowledge is utterly rejected. Thus, quantitative – positivist methods are ontologically (theory of existing) realist, and epistemologically (theory of knowledge) objectivist.⁸⁵ Throughout this period, the qualitative methods albeit different, were still developed within a positivist framework. Pressured to resemble the quantitative methods - to fit/resemble the ‘known’ - the strand was later called qualitative positivism.⁸⁶ In the early 70s, interpretivism and interpretivist methods came out primarily identified as a strand which refused to resemble positivist methods.⁸⁷ Interpretivism is ontologically constructivist (our reality is socially constructed and as such it does not just exist governed by general laws), epistemologically it is interpretivist - anchoring in the logic that there is no such thing as objective reality in social sciences but it is prone of

---


⁸⁵ Ibid.


interpretations and inter-subjective evaluation. The work of the American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz and his book *The interpretivist turn* (1973) had further impact in bringing interpretive ethnographic studies from anthropology to public administration, policy analysis, organizational studies etc. For D’Cruz, the entry of area studies such as Women’s/Gender Studies, Minority Studies pushed for a more “multicultural based curriculum and critique of academic scholarship regarding patriarchal and monoculturalist bias in the university in particular and the operation of reason more generally”.

Literature studies have had a similar development parallel to the methods. The cognitive turn with the study of metaphors and categories was a breakthrough in acknowledging that language is not transparent. For instance, we have agreed to call this ‘table’ but the word in itself designates nothing. The example of ‘table’ is rather simple, but when we have to deal with less ‘consensual’ terms in studying social phenomena like ‘reality’, ‘values’, ‘needs’, we engage more fundamentally with ‘interpretation’. One of the myriad of ways to intervene in text is *deconstruction*. Like all other approaches, it interprets. At the same time, like in all studying inquiries we deconstruct – we look beneath; we try to find explanations. In mapping the interpretive research methods, Yanow and Shea provide *deconstruction* as one of the interpretive methods along with metaphor analysis, (critical) discourse analysis, narrative analysis and post-structuralist analysis. Like interpretivists, post-structuralists believe that it is useful to focus on contexntualized meaning making, rather than on universal truths or an all-encompassing reality. In this meaning-focused approach, culture, language, and discourse are explored in terms of how they contribute to the experience and identity of people in context. The ‘problem’ with transferring methods from different disciplines is the question of what is brought in the new field, and what elements are potentially lost/modified/overlooked throughout the way. That is, what aspect of deconstruction will I

---


89 Ibid.


end up taking – once I decided to bring it into IR (broadly speaking) from literature studies. Geertz called this interpretation of interpretation, or what we commonly refer to as hermeneutics, in which there is the layer of the research setting, the meaning the researcher gives to it, the meaning the third reader gives etc. This is what French literary critic Roland Barthes has called “the death of the author” arguing against the practice of incorporating the intentions and biographical context of an author in an interpretation of a text, and instead establishing that writing and creator are unrelated. Rather than problems to be tackled and solved throughout the way, this is more of a ‘problem’ to be aware of.

3.2 Interpretivist Research

To its great extent, this research relies on gathering, understanding and explaining the text - from discourse, documents, speech acts and interviews – in the interpretivist method informed by the work of Yanow, Edkins, Campbell and Shea. Interpretative research is based on the presupposition that we live in a social world characterized by the possibilities of multiple interpretations. In this world, there are no “brute data” whose meaning is beyond dispute. Dispassionate, rigorous science is possible – but not the neutral, objective science stipulated by traditional analytic methods (as represented by the scientific method). Holding that stories are as valid as science, the interpretive research strand seeks synthesis and interpretation to analysis. Toning down the positivist mania for ‘scientific’, ‘objective’, ‘valid and reliable’ research, is what distinguishes most interpretivist from the positivist strand. According to the wide range of post-positivists authors, these research methods are particularly suitable to research questions that explore discrepancy between word and deeds; contrasts between policy meanings as intended by policymakers – “authored” texts – and the possibly variant and even incommensurable meanings – “constructed” texts – made of them

96 Calling ‘interpretivist’ methods is rather porous linguistically. It is commonly defined as interpretative, interpretivist, interpretive.
99 I use the word ‘analysis’ and ‘analyzing’ to explain the development of an argument. This does not mean I subscribe to ‘analysis’ in opposition to interpretation and synthesis. The term is merely chosen pragmatically.
by other policy relevant groups. Thus, when engaging with research and knowledge production, I (as an author) am not detached, unaffected, non-present in the writing. Quite the contrary, personal background, life experience, ideological stance, sexual orientation, living style are all to a large extent present in the knowledge production the researcher engages with. In his account *Thus Spoke Franco: the place of history in the making of foreign policy*, Quero argues that identities and memories are not merely things we think about but things we think with and they have no existence beyond our polities, or existence, or social relations and our histories. “We write and speak our histories by fitting words to world, world to world and word to worlds, and foreign policy is no exception in this”.

In the past decade an increased contribution of interpretive methods has been sought in many social science fields such as communication sciences, anthropology, sociology, political science etc. While *positivist research* argues that we can know only things that are made explicit, in *interpretive research* the analysis of implementation is typically presented as a set of factual prepositions, where those facts are treated as explicit and objective realities that can be discovered by direct observation and participation.

In her essay *Practices of Policy Interpretation*, Dvora Yanow explains that until the early 2000s, “the inner interpretive debate was a continuous argumentation in opposition to/in defence to positivism”. Along with other ‘post positivistic’ strands like hermeneutics, phenomenology, social constructivism, critical theory, discourse analysis and deconstruction, interpretive research shares the same tenet that meaning as such cannot be taken for granted but requires attention. “We no longer have to fight against a crude positivism, but at the same time there seems to be a growing resistance against theoretical positions which

---


emphasize the interpretive nature of knowledge”\textsuperscript{107}. This PhD thesis is no exception in that it has to clarify its stance, structure and philosophy of engaging with knowledge production in response to the mainstream – the positivist strand. If written on an orthodox positivist fashion (statistical analysis of surveys or the like), it would have been unnecessary to explain what positivist research is all about and how does statistics really work in explaining social science phenomena, even less in ‘justifying’ its meta-scientific merits. I do not necessarily empathize with the defensive/conflict of identities in defining what interpretivism is. I maintain it is a strand on its own right and integrity whose legitimacy does not derive in explaining it within the positivist framework and epistemology. However, throughout this research, working with marginal and marginalized theories and methodologies, one gets closer to this hierarchical explanation by understanding what Yanow has explained as “to educate, not to defend”\textsuperscript{108}. In order to elucidate the differences between positivist and interpretivist research I will position them in their ‘traditional’ corners and focus primarily on where they differ, even though social sciences is not a domain of such a dichotomous division given that a lot of mixed methods and methodologies are narrowing the gap.

Before proceeding with a discussion on the ontological and epistemological premises of interpretivist research, it is imperative to point out though, that while in certain academic environments, this debate will not be necessary and, more importantly, would be considered outdated, in others, justifying the scientificity of interpretivist research and proving its scientific personality is necessary. Study fields are crowded with debates that disqualify theories on grounds of scientific fallacies. In his account on the relation of critical theory and international relations, Roach argues that similar debates have been present in IR as well, with discussions questioning whether Marxism was or was not a science.\textsuperscript{109} For him, in these scenarios questions should be posed as to “what types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand: Is it science?”\textsuperscript{110}


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
3.2.1 Epistemological and Ontological ‘misunderstandings’ on interpretive methods

Challenging the positivist approach that there is no objective truth, interpretivist methods counter the behaviourist hegemony and advocate a plurality of approaches highlighting interpretative approaches.\(^{111}\) **Ontologically**, they challenge the rationalist conception of human nature: interests and actions are not always rational. Instead, they emphasize the social construction of actors’ identities in shaping interests and actions. In what follows, I first start with a macro or philosophical discussion of what both research strands are all about. I continue with the methodological differences and finally I will situate these differences in the case of this particular study.

All science, including the social – be it positivist or post-positivist – is based on natural science. However, when transferring the natural/scientific methods into social sciences they have not properly adjusted to the subject of study. Controlled scientific/quantitative studies and laboratory like experiments are not necessarily/not always the best to study social phenomena. Thus, the way positivism has conceptualized social science in some cases is not only implausible but lacks the human touch as well.\(^{112}\) For example, the study of ‘psychology’ as we know it in the Western tradition is the parsimonious case of ‘lab’ scientific study canonized as science to study the human mental functions and behaviours. Studies of depression in psychology trace their ‘foundations’ in a series of animal laboratory experiments.\(^{113}\) Breeding argues that 85% of studies in behavioural psychology are with mice and rats which are then extrapolated to human beings. “Although humans and mice share a lot in common, the limitations of the later do not provide sufficient evidence to generalize to human beings”.\(^{114}\) The rest of the experiments (15%) are reported to be done with chimpanzees, dogs and other animals.\(^{115}\) The very notion of depression and learned helplessness in human psychology relies on a chain of studies conducted on dogs in which


\(^{115}\) Ibid.
dogs are consequently shocked on a wired environment until they give up and go to apathy.\textsuperscript{116} This was then generalized to human depression called helplessness – according to which a person, when he enters a depression, goes through the same ‘trauma’ and shock for a couple of times. Other similar examples include lab experiments where mice are continuously attacked and defeated and the observed reaction is \textit{anxiety}. That in turn is also the foundation of psychological definition of anxiety in humans.\textsuperscript{117} Apart from the obvious ethical problem with the study, in another section, we will discuss how objectifying the subject of study and thinking less of it in social sciences is also a problem transferred from this methodological philosophy. Richardson argues that most of the social sciences we know of today were born out of the European Enlightenment with the goal of understanding human social behaviour to quell social conflict; later with the rising importance of the scientific method as a basis of doing all science the idea of doing science for social change was repressed and positivist perspectives of understanding social science took over.\textsuperscript{118}

What follows the controlled, experimental approach of an objectified subject of study in front of a detached, neutral scientist is allegedly producing neutral, scientific and objective results. Postcolonial scholar Ramon Grosfoguel clearly situates the dialectics of positivism and post-positivism on a more ideological discussion by looking at it in the paradigms of Western metaphysics and how post-positivism is essentially what Derrida would call “its binary opposite”. Grosfoguel argues that Rene Decartes - \textit{I think, therefore I am} - is the Western foundation of science and it came up as a challenge to the Church’s monopoly of knowledge production when ‘God becomes I’ and ‘I’ becomes the viewpoint of all viewpoints; of all particularities. “There is the production of all Christian attributes just in a secular way. Knowledge is universal in time and space. Objective in terms of neutrality”.\textsuperscript{119} The “I” here (the researcher) does not exist, he is not present. \textit{He} is detached and is writing from an objective – neutral position. \textit{He} is not situated. \textit{He} , the author, is generally the

\begin{itemize}
  \item Decolonial Group (2012). Ramon Grosfoguel: Cartography of power. n. C. Days, Decolonial Group.
\end{itemize}
empirical, male, Western, heterosexual, producing knowledge. In this hegemony one is not supposed to be particular – to be subjective (i.e. interpretivist); subjectivity is orientalised, downgraded into perceptionism, emotion and academic invaluability. This is what Grosfoguel calls *espistemicide* – the destruction of all knowledge that is ‘particular’ – Islamic, non-hetero, Hindu, Maya, women etc. “This idolatry universalism is inherently racist, because rationality is only in the hands of certain human beings”.¹²⁰ That is why in social sciences nowadays the researcher who is personally involved with his subject of study is always questionable in terms of objectivity and neutrality as if other researchers who are ‘detached’ from the case they are studying are able to conduct rigorously objective research. For Koukkanen, this is “epistemic ignorance” in that indigenous people are too quickly interpreted as not more than a ‘difference’.¹²¹ He does not question whether indigenous people are being allowed to speak or not in the academy. He argues that quite the contrary, the situation is the opposite. “They are not only ‘given’ a voice but urged to speak and express their views and perspectives in the name of diversity and decolonization, yet remaining in the fashion of ‘one indigenous person per event/publication’.”¹²² This of course stretches out beyond meta theoretical discussions. Provoking with his question *Can Non-Europeans Think?* in 2013, Dabashi asks why is European philosophy *philosophy*, but African philosophy *ethno philosophy*, the way Indian music is *ethno music* and European music is *music*? Why museums in New York, London, Paris etc. are filled with animals and non-white peoples and their cultures featured inside glass cages, but no cage is in sight for white people and their cultures?¹²³

I maintain that both positivism and West/Eurocentrism are the two cornerstones of Western metaphysics. With regard to IR and FPA scholarship this has led to the hegemony of Westphalian approach. From the treaty of Westphalia, this approach spread throughout the five centuries of colonialism and imperialism. It is based on three premises: 1) that the international system is made up of state; 2) sovereignty is the main principle by which states interact with one another; 3) trade or commerce is the legitimate venue for inter-state interactions. For Ling, the hegemony of Westphalia approach as a singular logic of violence

---

¹²⁰ Ibid.


¹²² Ibid.

in world politics has determined both in what we do in wards and in knowledge and what qualifies as knowledge. In 2001, Derrida called for the New Humanities – the need for enlarging and re-elaborating the concept of Humanities. “The opening of the university on its outside, on its other, on the future and the otherness of the future”. With interpretivism, the aim is to open the studies in foreign policy in particular and social science at large; to humanize social sciences by developing a respectful relationship between the researcher and the study subject by engaging in an equal, non-hierarchical relationship. As such, I (as researcher) am not operating in a ‘laboratory’ where I observe monkeys being tested with experiments, note down their reactions, draw categories and models of what I observe and test it in further laboratories for generalization. In studying social phenomena, the interpretivist researcher engages with people (morally and ethically in the human form and acknowledging their subjectivity and agency in the sociological form). However, in criticising eurocentrism and positivism, it cannot be maintained that all interpretivist research is necessarily post-positivist. The same applies for deconstruction too. For Haverland and Yanow, both positivism and post-positivism are ontologies and as such interpretivism is a methodology which can fit in each of these.

In the following section I elaborate on the differences of the two strands on methodological lines. Consider ordinal categories in quantitative research where the question is as follows “are you pregnant?” In all sorts of research there is a dichotomous/mutually exclusive choice in how to respond to that. One is either pregnant or not. One cannot be halfway, almost, not quite, or quite pregnant. Thus, some questions fit better to positivist methods. Now, let us consider that we are researching the relationship between depression and pregnancy. A first difference in how both research strands would embark is methodological. For the positivist project there is a definition of ‘depression’ and ‘pregnancy’ that is beyond dispute and it looks for questions of the sort: Does pregnancy cause depression? What causes depression in pregnant women etc. The interpretivist project is first and foremost interested in deconstructing (deconstructing as in critically looking at the concept, not necessarily Derridean

---


deconstructing) the concept of depression and contextualizing (socially, politically, economically) the issue of pregnancy. Typically this project asks “how do pregnancy and depression relate? In what way is pregnancy related with depression?” The second difference is that of methods employed. In the first project, typically there is a written survey\(^{127}\) where there is no interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. The questions need to be as accurate, direct and as unambiguous as possible. Examples of these questions could include “a) why do you feel depressed? a) do you feel depressed because of pregnancy etc. An interpretivist researcher would engage in this study first by understanding what the medical, biological, psychological, cultural, economical and religious understandings are of depression and pregnancy. Which of these ‘understandings’ is more dominant for the group of women under study and why. Second, there is step down into treating ‘depression’ cases and pregnant women not as patients who are given a piece of paper to circle alternatives, but rather to engage into conversational interviews and understand first how they define depression? What does it mean for them to be pregnant socially, psychologically? etc. The research then builds the study synthesizing on the one hand, the way the interviewees construct their discourse when answering, the state of being they are in at that moment, the place where the interview happens, the way they interact with the researcher, their willingness to talk in the beginning and throughout the interview, their body language, mimic and on the other hand, the researcher’s own understanding of the issue from literature review, background, knowledge and other ‘particularities’.

Finally, let me contextualize this discussion in the case of my thesis. First, whatever the methodological and ideological choice, my guess/hypothesis is that there is some sort of asymmetry between the EU missions and the countries/societies needs where they deploy. One way to embark on this study is taking the EU funds per sector on Kosovo on the one hand and compare it with the available data that UN agencies conduct in every country – what societies feel to be the most urgent need, what is the most important security issue, what do they think of inter-ethnic policies, how satisfied are they with EU funds, etc. In this model, I will not be questioning any establishment. I am accepting the terms and conditions of why there is a EU mission, how does the EU mission define its priorities in Kosovo and I am drawing a conclusion based on a set of surveys. In this case however, I do not know how do the locals define what ‘need’ is, which inter-ethnic policies they are more satisfied with and why and most important of all, I as a researcher am not engaging in a critical

\(^{127}\) Other more qualitative methods can be employed as well, in data analysis they are translated into numbers – they are interpreted quantitatively.
understanding of the entire concept of how the mission came to existence, who gets to
design the funds per sector, for whom are these sectors important etc. The other way to
engage with this puzzle is first and foremost, to interrogate and deconstruct the puzzle itself.
What is the philosophy behind the puzzle? Why and how should we be preoccupied with
posing questions about interventions in general? Further, to understand the metaphysical, not
merely the factual evidences how the mission came to exist? That would require an
understanding of who gets to missionize and who or what is the subject of missionizing? This
interrogation or deconstruction is extended to all parts of puzzle, the EU, West, the local, Kosovo to
unravel their underlying stories before dwelling in drawing conclusions on their relationship.

3.2.2 Reliability and Validity
It is important to clarify that ‘interpretive’ does not mean ‘impressionistic’. Even though they
emphasize the centrality of interpretation and, hence, subjective meaning, they are
nonetheless, methods: systematic, rigorous, methodical.\(^{128}\) The steps of these methods
typically cannot be set out as in discrete and regularized fashion as those of cost benefit, or
regression analysis and their counterparts.\(^{129}\) In a typical positivist research, one would be
concerned with writing the surveys, setting the sample, writing the questions, categorizing
them etc. A good study in this case needs to reliable, valid and generalizable. In an
interpretivist research, there is selecting the interviewees/texts, designing the questions,
deciding on how to ‘read’ the data etc. A good study in this case is denoted by two principles.
First, trustworthiness\(^{130}\) – has the researcher been able to gather and understand all data in
the proposed research puzzle; and second, positionality\(^{131}\) – how has the researcher built its
relationship with the interviewees. Thus, both interpretivist and positivist research (albeit
different inquiries in knowledge production) have a systematic/organized way of data
collection. The main difference, however, lies in the process of data analysis and
interpretation. In the first case, the researcher is detached from the findings and is
preoccupied with maintaining its objectivity assuming that there is an objective reality out


\(^{131}\) Ibid.
there which can be understood with careful, scientific research. In the second case, the researcher admits first that there is no objective reality (or objective, or reality) to begin with, and second what Yanow has called *accepting the humiliation* that even if it exists it can never be captured. As such, this research is conscious of being ontologically fragmented, epistemologically interpretative but methodologically trustworthy.\(^{132}\)

Another ‘misunderstanding’ of the interpretivist approach is the issue of *validity* of knowledge production. Because narratives and stories of the interviewees are central to this thesis, we will discuss the notion of validity in terms of on the one hand, the status and the nature of stories interviewees tell and on the other hand, the role of the researcher in engaging with these stories. While the second researcher seeks ‘explanation’ – seeks casual statements that can be proven or disproven. Hummel reminds us that when people tell their stories, they construct their world.\(^{133}\) Etymologically, validity means justifiable – having a solid foundation or justification.\(^{134}\) The concept of validity is a ‘prototype’ concept rather than a definitional one. Both validity and reliability are statistical terms. When brought into social sciences they have not necessarily adjusted to the field of study of the non-physical world. The same applies to the concept of generalizability. For an interpretivist researcher, *validity* is seen more as a ‘proper understanding’ concept rather than as a purely methodologically proven stage. “The fundamental criterion for a story is the ability of the listener to literally recognize in the original sense of knowing the familiar and even the unfamiliar story”.\(^{135}\) That way, the conception for the validity standards, relevance comes first and factual standards come second. This principle seems to favour and value more the ability of the researcher to go deeper into the inner structure of understanding people’s stories, rather than having a ‘neutral’ passive listener who would try to ‘understand’ the stories yet not as an integral part of a reality ‘going on’ there. In the first case, the interpretative researcher is


concerned with understanding the “outcome of organizing and contextualizing essentially contestable, incompletely verifiable prepositions in a disciplined way”.136

Validating stories (knowledge) is not a mechanical process rather than an argumentative practice. Validation of claims about understandings experience requires evidence in the form of personally reflective descriptions in ordinary language and analysis using inductive processes that capture commonalities across individual experiences.137 Elliot Mishler argues that in interpretivist research “we do not find stories, we make stories”.138 The way the interviewees argue about processes in the local setting reveals to a great extent their cognitive structures of what constitutes a problem, an advantage and/or an achievement. As such, the fidelity of ‘political narratives’ does not indicate that narratives are representable for the entire society.139 It is an indication of their mental frameworks in how they perceive issues and how they choose to deal with them. While looking at the interviewee as a part of a ‘conceived’ reality, Hummel argues that this is not an individual by himself, rather, he/she lives already in a pre-existing context.140


4. Data Generation

The research puzzle of this thesis is not easily solved by applying one single and clear research method, given the relatively high theoretical nature of the inquiry. As mentioned previously, I rely on qualitative research to deconstruct and interpret the existing literature on EU external relations with the Western Balkans, Western literature on Western Balkan studies, literature on Western and Christian metaphysics, text from the EU and its institutions, and 34 semi-structured interviews conducted in Kosovo with locals and internationals. According to Mason, the term data ‘generation’ rather than ‘collection’ is intended to encapsulate the much wider range of relationships between researcher, social world and data which qualitative research spans. He explains that it is more accurate to speak of generation than collection of data, “precisely because most qualitative perspectives would reject the idea that a researcher can be a completely neutral collector of information about the social world. Instead the researcher is seen as actively constructing knowledge about that world according to certain principles and using certain methods which express, their epistemological position”.141 Interviews, observation, and document analysis constitute the central interpretive methods for accessing local knowledge and identifying communities of meaning and their symbolic artefacts. Interpretive policy analysis often begins with document analysis, focusing initially on newspaper (and other media) coverage and extending to transcripts of committee hearings, various reports, legislation, or agency documents. These provide background information for conversational interviews with key actors. Document analysis and interviews may be preceded by or supplemented with observation or ethnography.142

Foreign policy has been defined and redefined by different authors. Bulley argues that any attempt to define what foreign policy is will always be insufficient because whatever we understand by ‘foreign policy’ must be interpreted, relayed and described through discourse.143 Bulley looks at foreign policy as text144 that can be read and interpreted. That is, I

144 Text in Derrida shall not be confused with ‘writing’ in its normal sense. Although he focuses on the close reading of ‘texts’ (the standard sense), Derrida’s approach is not exclusively textual and linguistic. He uses the word ‘text’ in its normal sense as well as in his special sense. A text, in this special sense, is an open differential network, a fabric of traces. Baxi, M. (2012). Derrida on Western Metaphysics. Gujarati Sahitya Parishad, Franco- Gujarati Literary Links
acknowledge that ‘foreign policy’ as such cannot be present and studied, but what we engage with in here is studying and interpreting it through text/language representation. In looking foreign policy as text, I gather my data in modes of communication primarily in: 1) interviews; 2) official documents, reports, spoken and written discourse. Although not forming a methodical part in this thesis, special attention during the field work has been given to visual modes of communication such as billboards, leaflets and graffiti used both by international structures and local Kosovaars too. In his account on political cartoons, Danjoux argues that they provide a safe haven for latent fears, unfounded beliefs, and opinions too extreme, or socially unacceptable, to be openly expressed.145

4.1 Interviewing

In this study, 34 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Kosovo. This was seen as the best method to hear and understand the stories, and narratives of the research participants. Semi-structured interviews have a combination of a list of closed and open-ended questions. In contrast with the informal conversational interview, the semi-structured interview is ‘structured’ to make sure that essentially the same information is obtained from a number of people by covering the same issues.146 Billiet argues that topics in semi-structured interviews are not to be taken in a strict order and the exact detailed wording of the questions to elicit responses about those issues is not determined in advance. “The interviewer is thus required to adapt both the concrete wording and the sequence of the questions to the specific respondents in the context of the actual interview”.147 According to him, this gives the interviewer the freedom to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to word questions spontaneously and to establish a conversational style. In light to reflexivity and positionality,148 all interviewees were acknowledged of my research and the topic in broad terms.149 Being myself a ‘local’, I deliberately choose not to be ‘detached’, ‘objective and neutral’ (whatever that would mean) to the stories they were telling, although it is


147 Ibid.


149 Soss, J. Ibid. Talking Our Way to Meaningful Explanations. A Practice-Centered View of Interviewing for Interpretive Research, M.E.Sharpe
understandable that there is a (slight) difference between a local who has lived there all the time and me as a researcher who has not been physically present in Kosovo for the past ten years. In deconstructing and understanding the interviews I tend to be more conscious about this (slight) difference of me and the interviewees as locals perceiving things rather differently.

The interviews were conducted in Kosovo between 2012-2013 with experts, practitioners and scholars of rule of law, human rights, political science, practitioners and implementers of EU programs for Kosovo, academics and researchers, civil society activists, art workers and journalists. On average, there were two interviews per day and I tried to cover a set of background questions for all the local interviewees a) what is that persons’ wartime experience – are there human casualties within the close family b) has the person an international working/studying experience c) is the person employed by international and donor organizations and d) would the person want to leave Kosovo. The aim was to set a contextual basis which will be helpful to read the interviews. The first 10 interviews were chosen based on the previous experience during the Master thesis and the network created while working as a journalist in the region. The rest of the interviews were chosen through the snowball technique – recommended people from the initial interviewees. A standard email was drafted and distributed one month in advance to the interviewees, although it became clear to me they were preferring less formal and long ago planned arrangements. With most of them I had to ‘re-arrange’ one day before the interview. Even though people in Kosovo have been ‘researched’, ‘interviewed’ and ‘asked’ on political issues, they were nonetheless still very willing to meet and discuss.

The interviewees were men and women of 25 – 45 years old, from different parts of Kosovo, yet the vast majority actively engaged in Pristina. The interviews were spread throughout two years (November 14 – 30, 2012; April 03-18, 2013; October 05 – 21, 2013), followed with two visits at EULEX headquarters, one visit at the EU Office in Pristina, one visit in the EU office in Northern Mitrovica, and one visit to the Mitrovica’s Municipality situated between the northern and southern part of the city. 25 interviews were conducted with Albanians in Pristina, Gjilan, South Mitrovica. 4 interviews were conducted with Serbs in Gračanica and North Mitrovica. 5 interviews were conducted with international officials working with the EU and residing in Kosovo. Four out of thirty interviews were conducted off record with
the request of the interviewees. Being the capital, Pristina was chosen due to the high concentration of the ‘target group’ I interviewed. South Mitrovica was chosen as a case where the international structures of intervention are perceived to have failed so far, with the divided city into the Northern part with the Serbs and the Southern part with the Albanians. The city of Gjilan is considered the only in Kosovo not to have experienced a frontal war within the city in 1999 and to this day has a comparatively larger concentration of Serbs in comparison to other cities with Albanian majority. Gračanica is the second most important city for the Serbs in Kosovo after North Mitrovica, while the later was chosen given its importance for Kosovo Serbs in general, the high concentration of Serbs and also because since 1999, it has acted as a parallel capital city of Kosovo, for Kosovo Serbs. Interviews with the locals (both Albanians and the Serbs) were typically conducted in the outer environment, usually a coffee place, while all but one interview with EU officials were conducted within their personal offices. The interviews typically lasted for one hour. I relied in taking notes while revising and creating a ‘conceptual scheme’ after each interview. Although 34 interviews is a relatively low number, after the second round, the element of saturation point was evident.

Methodologically, the interviewees were considered as ‘storytellers’. As a researcher I have been concerned with understanding, conceptualizing and operationalizing their ‘frames of reference’. In his field study in New Zealand, Swaffield defines ‘frame of reference’ as an analytical model representing the attitudes (beliefs, feelings, opinions) expressed by a policy actor when discussing a particular issue”. According to Yanow, frames are often expressed through language, cognition (or perception), and action. It is not entirely clear which one shapes (or causes) the other. The interviews could be summarized around three main topics 1) the story of Kosovo as they define it 2) how do they see the international presence in Kosovo (the UN and the EU); 3) what do they think about their relationship with the locals; 4) how do they define themselves as locals; 4) what do they think of the EU’s presence and its policies in Kosovo. It is important to note that the timing of the interviews coincided with several political developments both within Kosovo and with regard to

150 Notes taken throughout the interviews (in Albanian, Serbian and English) along with full names and addresses of the interviewees are available upon request.
151 Saturation refers to the situation when very little if any evidence is gathered in the interviews.
153 That is do we understand (or see) housing as decaying because the concept is available to us, or do we develop the language of decay because we understand housing to be falling apart?
Kosovo-EU relations. First, in November 2012, Albania celebrated its 100th anniversary, a feast which was extended to the Kosovo Albanians. Cities around Kosovo were covered with elements of banal nationalism (Albanian national flags, slogans and other national symbols), in addition to the new Kosovar flag. The anniversary seemed to have re-brought the debate of what is Kosovo’s identity now, in relation to Albania, in relation to the new Kosovar state etc. Second, the EU mediated negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade were continuing, on issues that albeit technical proved to be inherently political as they were touching on elements of sovereignty. Third, for the first time since 1999, Kosovo organized its elections in the Northern municipalities of Kosovo (North Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić and Zubin Potok) and finally, EULEX managed to extend its authority in the northern part of Kosovo after nearly five years of its deployment. All of these developments have to be mentioned and thought as a contextual setting in reading the data generated from the interviews.

Considering the relatively short time assigned for this PhD thesis, other research methods (i.e. focus groups) could have been more time efficient to reach a bigger number of constituencies. However, the choice for interviews was unequivocal mainly due to sociological reasons. Some of the questions during the interview were rather ‘personal’ – the background questions – or other questions might be too related with one’s job/career/personal opinion, the interviewees would not prefer to say in front of many people. Also, in my view, Kosovo Albanians tend to be rather introverted when it comes to discuss issues pertaining to Kosovo’s recent history, which I feared might lead in them being ‘reserved’ in their narratives in focus groups. Other than that, the whole concept of engaging in interviews goes beyond its methodological importance. The interviews were largely intimate in character focused on the personal narratives. This required a more inter-personal communication with the interviewee. I wanted to devote special time to each of the participants in this undertaking, being careful to grasp more of their intersubjectivity and mental framework. Most of all, in the plethora of academic and empirical research on Kosovo, the intervention and the missions there has not been a systematic interest to the narrative of the locals. My decision to focus on it exclusively is not simply to fill “the gap in literature” but to deliberately call for attention towards the narrative of the people where missions are deployed and to start looking at countries with missions as the right of the people who live in it.
Lastly, I want to clarify why have I intentionally chosen not to interview politicians or people active in politics. First of all, my interest was to hear narratives of people outside the nomenklatura, yet, politically active. Second, with the end of the war and the instalment of the government in Kosovo, the ‘international mechanisms’ (i.e. the EU, the UN, the World Bank and Quint countries) have been determining in setting the political agenda for Kosovo. There has been an internalization of the EU and the international agenda in the political processes in Kosovo first because Kosovo is still not a fully-fledged country, and second, the EU is Kosovo’s greatest donor by financing the vast majority of its political, economic and state building processes. This setup has somehow unified the government’s agenda and EU’s programs and international policies in general. Thus, I tend to see the government and the donors of Kosovo (particularly the EU due to its political leverage) following the same political agenda.

5. Data interpretation

There is a tension between the goal of social science to reduce the complexity of social reality through the construction of parsimonious models and the need to refrain from oversimplification that significantly distorts reality. Yanow offers a four step model to interpretive policy analysis. First, identifying the artefacts (language, objects, acts) that are significant carriers of meaning for a given policy issue, as perceived by policy-relevant actors and interpretive communities. The ‘data’ of interpretive analysis are the words, symbolic objects, and acts of policy relevant actors along with policy texts, plus the meanings these artefacts have for them. These data remain in the possession of the actors after the researcher-analyst has gleaned them. The second step is to identify communities of meaning/interpretation/speech/practice that are relevant to the policy issue under analysis. Third, identifying the ‘discourses’: the specific meanings being communicated through specific artefacts and their entailments (in thought, speech and act). Finally, identifying the points of conflict and their conceptual sources (affective, cognitive, and/or moral) that reflect different interpretations by different communities.


Shenhav argues that “the fact that any political narrative is looked at in competition with other narratives naturally raises the question for their respective adherence to “reality”. Even if we assume that reality is a construct made up of various representations, it still remains to be determined how compatible a particular narrative is with the analogous”.  

In this context, the real challenge for a framer is to construct a frame that will reflect the largest possible sharing of stories which share a major understanding on a particular phenomenon. Understanding the ‘population’ you are about to research, knowing the sample to go for data collection and knowing the feeling of a saturation point of that society is intrinsically linked with knowledge of the local context – its political, social, historical and cultural patterns.

For a deconstructionist, the spoken/written language is never a perfect reference to a knowable object, because neither the ‘signifier’ nor the ‘signified’ remains fixed. Further, understanding the consequences of a policy for a broader constituency requires “local knowledge” – the very mundane, expert understanding of and practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience. The discourse of the documents and the interviews, will be deconstructed with Derrida. Below I will explain how deconstruction and more generally intervention in the text will be applied. Because deconstruction is the grand concept informing the philosophy behind the thesis and behind other concepts of Derrida used throughout the thesis, deconstruction will be for the most part elaborated here in the introduction. For the reader it is important to bear in mind that at times deconstruction is used as a theory and/or philosophy, whereas at some points it is used as an ‘intervention’ in the text directly. The other three concepts will in turn be elaborated in their respective articles. What precedes this discussion is firstly an overview of post-structuralism, its epistemological and ontological underpinnings.

---


5.1 Post structuralism

Post structuralism operates with a notion of deconstruction which is a general mode of unsettling concepts and conceptual oppositions which are otherwise taken to be settled. It can be understood as a strategy of interpretation and criticism directed at theories and concepts which attempt closure and totalization, providing instead a mode of unsettling of “decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre”.

Accordingly, post structuralism is most interested in attempted closure, in the ways in which theoretical frameworks are not self-sufficient or closed, but vulnerable to pressure from an outside. Yet, it is not a war against totality, because arguably, that would presume a possibility of yet another totalization, which again for post structuralism would be impossible. Questioning whether conventional approaches to ethics in international relations embody the ethos of criticism, Campbell argues that post structuralism is a semio-critical activity, ever searching for an seeking to dismantle the empirico-rational positions where power fixes meaning.

For Derian, post structuralism disturbs the convention in IR that theory and practice are distinct phenomena or more fundamentally, that reality is independent of any language used to describe it.

In the past twenty years, the discipline of IR has debated the merits of critical thought and the question of ethical and political implications of poststructuralist thought. For Campbell, otherness, representation, violence, complicity, responsibility are imperatives that call forth not an ungrounded faith in the testing of theory via evidence, but an ethically and politically committed ethos of criticism.

In this debate, Derian mentions three main reasons why should we bother ourselves with post structuralism in IR, which according to him other current IR approaches fail to encapsulate. First, as an intellectual tool to understand the ways of postmodernity, or as he prefers to call it, late modernity. Second, because it offers an ethical way of being highly contingent, highly relativist. Third, because it provides a reflexive methods for constantly challenging and testing the validity of the first two claims.

---


By and large, most of the post-structuralist strands share some basic tenets in how they see the world. Through constructivist lenses, one would look at how norms, values, rules, and identity inform the foundation of the mission. Foucaultians would address the nature and the functioning of power. The legitimation of power disguises the effects of sovereign power: namely, the repression and the subjugation of other discourses. In this sense, knowledge is power insofar as the dominant knowledge of sovereign power masks the operations of dissident power. Loytard on the other hand argues that the meta-narrative represents a particular form of legitimation, in which one referent serves to legitimize all other practices, norms, and conventions of society. He asks who then has power and what he has in mind? What is the aim of someone who possesses power? Critical realism moves from discourses to underlying reality to critique while opposing forms of deconstruction and discourse theory such as Laclau and Mouffe, for being unable to move from discourse, thus failing to ontologies their arguments. Laclau and Mouffe focus first on the importance of ideology as opposed to Marxim’s traditional focus on the mode of production and in particular Althusser’s notion of the ideological interpellation of subjects. Bakhtin circle on the other hand lies with the rejection of ‘psychological’ in ‘objectivist’ approaches to discourse theory.

5.2 Derrida. Theories and methods of deconstruction

Deconstruction, or as Derrida calls it ‘intervention’, “de-totalizes self-enclosed totalities by placing them face to face with their internal differentiation enabling us to see partiality of the partial, not by itself giving an absolute reading, but by attempting to show that no absolute reading is at all possible.” Deconstruction and the contours of Derrida’s concepts are generally framed as a problematic with what we ordinarily call ontology. Derrida opposes this


169 Ibid.

with what he calls *hauntology*—something that rejects foundations of ontological existence that is representative of the bodiless apparition of the ghost rather than the solidity of the physical world. With hauntology Derrida calls for a systematic dissolvent and de-totalization of establishments.

Roach argues that Derrida’s resists absolutising difference, as there is a danger of making difference a value in itself and giving it a special status as superior to identity. As such, Roach continues, what is at stake for post-structuralism in a politics without sovereignty: a politics without centre that aspires to hold everything in its place”.

In deconstruction, Derrida explains that Western metaphysics is based on the binary opposites of good vs. bad, rationality vs. spirituality, nature vs. cultures etc. These binary opposites do not have a peaceful co-existence but in fact, they are violent hierarchies. As a branch of philosophy, metaphysics deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time and space. For Derrida, the word ‘metaphysics’ “is a shorthand for any science of presence”. He treats metaphysics as an exemplary system of defence against the threat of writing. In these hierarchies, things are posit intact, pure, self-identical or fully present being or reality and then to show that everything that is different from the original purity can be treated in terms of derivation, deviation, complication etc. In his interview with Jean Birnbaum, Derrida explained that deconstruction is “a gesture of suspicion towards Eurocentrism”.

Thus, what distinguishes Derrida’s deconstruction from other post-structuralist methods is this exhaustively questioning modus without pointing it/or seeking to position answers to a certain ideology (i.e. post-colonial research’s focus on control and exploitation; neo-Marxism’ social inequality and power etc.). Derrida’s deconstruction is loose on which direction it takes its critique and the questioning. It could well lead to all of these and none at the same time;

---


173 Derrida, J. "Positions ".


175 Ibid.


and/or goes beyond them, questioning also the control and exploitation, the social inequality, power and status and the like. According to Bulley, one of the obvious differences between Derrida and Foucault for example, is that Foucault's genealogies examines historical practices and how power is exercised at various levels through their change and development. He argues that Derrida is more interested in seeking out these binaries and then overturning and displacing them by finding the 'undecidables' that destabilise what seems to be a coherent narrative/text. These undecidables are terms/concepts/practices which appear within the dominant narrative, but at its margins, referring to something 'beyond' that narrative and thereby challenging its completeness. They challenge and disrupt the binary oppositions through which the text/discourse makes a meaningful narrative.

Another dimension in which Derrida’s deconstruction is different from other discourse approaches and why in turn is a better fit in this thesis is the very text (discourse) centric approach it has. Sometimes it is forgotten or overlooked how much history, politics and violence is in the choice of words and how much one could discern from an ordinary talk. Derrida also mentions that ordinary language is not neutral or innocent, because all types of metaphysical presuppositions are also involved in ordinary language. No other approach is so immensely text-centric and persistent in dissolving meanings of discourse. When it comes to the missionizer-local relationship – which indubitably suffers from an unequal relationship – the discourse exercise and the importance of the text as such becomes even higher. In the case of Kosovo, because of its political status and butterfly effect of the sovereignty issue, the communication and discourse of the international actors – NATO’s humanitarian intervention, UN protectorate-like administration, and the EU mission – is particularly welcoming to deconstruct in Derrida’s fashion. Derrida, who has perennially been focused with the marginal, the invisible, the less advantaged as opposed to the mainstream and the powerful has exploited in this direction unravelling this way how much ‘injustice’, power, status, imperialism, superiority and racism is tacked in the text.

Post-colonial, feminist, critical and queer theories among others also associate themselves with their own targets of the marginal, with the oppressed, just like deconstruction. Yet, unlike each of the above mentioned strands, deconstruction aligns itself with the marginal as a principle, not with a particular marginal (women, gay, local, etc.). What further distinguishes deconstruction and Derrida in general not only from the strands mentioned above, but even

more so from other post-structuralist methods is his interest in overturning and displacing binaries by finding the ‘undecidables’ (terms, concepts, practices) that destabilize what seems to be a coherent narrative texts. While other, primarily Western, philosophers are preoccupied with the determination to capture reality, truth, presence, Derrida is after the dissolving of establishments, meanings and definitions.

Arguably, deconstruction has its own strands and usages in different disciplines. Phiddian argues, that there are those who insist that deconstruction is essentially political, and that it is a method for discovering the oppressed others beneath phallogocentric discourse. They use deconstruction as a hermeneutic of suspicion, as an instrument for unpicking the structures and rhetoric of racism, patriarchy, psychological repression, class.179 Dickens on the other hand, argues that deconstruction has come to be seen by some as providing a powerful conceptual tool for radical social and political critique. One of his most significant arguments is that deconstruction provides the principles necessary for a radical critique of capitalist-patriarchal institutions that undermines their legitimation from within.180 For Ahn however, deconstruction is hospitality, which means the welcoming of the other. The word ‘hospitality’ means to invite and welcome the ‘stranger’ (l’étranger), both on the personal level – how do I welcome the other into my home? – and on the level of the state – raising socio-political questions about refugees, immigrants, ‘foreign’ languages, minority ethnic groups, etc.181 Particular in Derrida’s fashion of deconstruction is that “…in all conversations there’s a hidden patterning of power”.182 For him power is not the name of something we possess, rather it emerges out of social situations. What guides deconstruction’s methodical shaking of the textual structures is, of course, the text itself. Obviously, not through what it shows explicitly. In such case the practice of deconstruction would be a mere variant of what is traditionally called interpretation. Rather, the text guides deconstruction through what it tries to hide in and through what it says, through the symptoms it manifests.183

5.3 Deconstruction at work - how to read the articles

Deconstruction is a very personal intervention. Most authors who engage with it to read text do not follow a standardized methodological technique. Earlier when we talked about the transfer of different methods and theories to other fields of studies other than that of their origin, we explained that one needs to be aware of what is being transposed into the new field, what is not and what is potentially left out to better fit the field. Because this thesis is still in the contours of IR and FPA, questions raise as to how will that fit in the field? Talking about the ethical turn in thinking about text and literature, Derrida reminds us that disciplines/genres cannot be separated as blanks. For him, there is no such thing as legal text, literary text, but altogether, there is discourse. For him, deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique, nor a method and cannot be transformed into one. When taking deconstruction to read text, scholars may be tempted to define it as methodology or method or the like. I am not opposed to calling it a methodology or a theory as long as these two do not mean a rigid set of principles that are to be forcefully applied to questions. Without trying to define deconstruction as a method, technique or the like, deconstruction in this thesis has taken the shape of a meta-theory informing in turn all the other concepts used by Derrida (employed along the entire thesis) and as a micro-discussion intervening in a text as otherwise well-defined methods would do (employed in Article 1). By meta-level, I am referring to the philosophy of engaging with text, a philosophy paradigmatically concerned and aligned with the marginal, the oppressed, in all its forms, intensities, attribution etc. Deconstruction as a meta-discussion has framed the research puzzle in first looking at the story of Western missions from the perspective of the marginal in the political and academic narrative – the local - and in understanding the interplay of power relations of the intervener with the intervened. Further, aligning with otherwise marginal and/or marginalized methodological tools in addressing the puzzle. In Of Grammatology, Derrida talks of a ‘rationality’ that predominates writing in an enlarged and radicalized sense, where he inaugurates ‘deconstruction’, not the demolition but the de-sementation of all the significations that have the source in that of the logos. The method consists of two related steps: the reversal and displacement of binary oppositions and the general displacement of


the system. In the first step, Derrida explains this as an artificial separation merely for the sake of clarity, and looks to reverse or overturn the violent hierarchies imposed by Western thought, making the first term superior to the second. The second step displaces this system by moving toward the irruptive emergence of a new “concept”, a concept that could never be included in the previous regime. This double process reveals the interdependence of seemingly dichotomous terms and their meaning relative to a particular history. It shows them to be not natural but constructed oppositions, constructed for particular purposes in particular contexts. These new “concepts” are what Derrida calls ‘undecidables’ – “faulty lines in an apparently impregnable text, points at which the text disrupts itself. Such undecidables cannot be reduced to an opposition (they are neither, for instance, fully present nor absent) but reside within it, ‘resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term’, and thus without ever becoming dialectical. For him, politics is also an unrelenting negotiation between calculation and the incalculable, the possible and the impossible, autonomy and heteronomy.

The two steps of Derrida’s deconstruction can be found in the article as followed. The first step is evidenced in the first three articles whereas the last step is found in the last (fourth) article. This map is to show deconstruction’s flow in the thesis as a whole. Yet, it cannot be taken as if its steps were taken separately and have been applied as such in separate articles. In Article 1 Deconstructing ‘Missions’. What’s in a name, the broader concept of ‘mission’ is deconstructed, problematizing on the dynamics of having and deploying missions, the power dimensions they entail and also who gets to missionize and how. The concept of invitation for the mission is problematized in turn, to see who has the authority to issue invitations and ways out for the missions. Having deconstructed the broader spectrum within which missions and interventions occur, the first step is further extended to reverse and displace binary opposites of the concrete materialization of EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo – EULEX. EU Mission in Kosovo: Hospitality and Hostility explains the dynamics of Derrida’s concept of hospitality. Here we problematize on the hospitality at home (the deployment of EULEX) and hospitality abroad (Kosovo’s membership to the EU). Deconstruction’s first

---

187 Derrida, J. "Positions ".

188 Ibid.


190 Derrida, J. "Positions ".
step is further extended in Article 3 to analyse the materialization of the broader international missions in Kosovo. Here the concept of *autoimmunity* is used to deconstruct the way how Kosovo makes sense primarily as a ‘success story’ of democratic peace and intervention but not for the subject itself. Deconstruction’s second step – general displacement of the system – comes to the fore with regard to Article 4 *MetaKosovo: local and international narratives*, in the pursuit of re-establishing *home* for Kosovo, to find out that like any other statement, ‘home’ and Kosovo are defined by their impossibility. Below I have provided a table displaying the usage of concepts throughout the four articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis</th>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Derrida</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 – reversal and displacement of binary opposites</td>
<td>A1: The international mission in Kosovo. What's in a name?</td>
<td>Deconstruction</td>
<td>Concept of mission in the Western metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 – reversal and displacement of binary opposites</td>
<td>A2: Hospitality and Hostility: The EU and Kosovo</td>
<td>Hospitality</td>
<td>The EU mission in Kosovo and the EU enlargement for Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 – reversal and displacement of binary opposites</td>
<td>A3: Autoimmunity of democracy project</td>
<td>Autoimmunity</td>
<td>The set of missions, NATO, UN, EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2 – general displacement of the system</td>
<td>A4: MetaKosovo: local and international narratives</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>International and local narratives on Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Conceptual map

What follows in this section, is an overview of the international interventions and missions in Kosovo, followed by an elaboration of the main concepts used in the thesis. This thesis makes rampant reference to interventions, missions and the missionizers on the one hand, and the locals – Kosovo’s population on the other. Oxford Dictionary defines mission as “1) an important assignment given to a person or group of people, typically involving travel abroad…. 2) the vocation or calling of a religious organization, especially a Christian one, to go out into the world and spread its faith….3) a strongly felt aim, ambition, or calling”.

The missionizer as such is the structural and discursive presence of the international missions in Kosovo which includes NATO, UN and its agencies, World Bank, IMF, EU and its structures, EU agencies in Kosovo and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX. The missionizer is defined as the structure who is on the mission to democratize Kosovo. Intervention, the first phase of mission also defines the same structures above and although there is a rather blurred line between which comes first and which follows, in this thesis intervention is seen as temporal involvement/engagement of the mission and is a definition used for the NATO bombing campaign against Serbian military sites. The mission however, is what followed NATO intervention and how intervention as involvement was institutionalized as practice. NATO campaign can easily be looked at as part of the mission.

Deconstructing the discourse on the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, Bulley argues that “responsibility for the rights and well-being of our fellow humans no longer stopped at the borders of a state. This duty to promote human rights now appeared genuinely universal, even if it involved the violation of a potentially dangerous state’s sovereignty”. I maintain that as long as wars, ethnic cleansing and conflicts are a natural course of events simply as floods, tsunamis and natural disasters, international humanitarian interventions are unavoidable. What happens once the ‘humanitarian intervention’ ends and how the site of intervention is missionized is what this thesis problematizes with. The locals are the receptors of the missionizers’ project, remaining in the fault lines between being part of the project design for their country/society and playing a rather procedural role in fulfilling the missionizers’ project. The missionizer and the local are defined by different

---


system of values, histories, political and social legacies and they are deconstructed and interpreted within their specific identity contours.

Lastly, the events of the 90s in former Yugoslavia, have been called disintegration, dissolution, break-up, fall, deconstruction, dismemberment etc.\(^{193}\) The same ‘discursive richness’ appears to be the case on Kosovo as well. Main alternatives still revolve between a conflict and a war. While in the vernacular of Kosovo Albanians and the daily communication, there is an unambiguous usage of the war,\(^ {194}\) for the international community in Kosovo it is a conflict.\(^ {195}\) For the Serbian population at large what happened in 1999 was NATO aggression.\(^ {196}\)

Literature on Kosovo is no exception on this issue. Renown authors on the region such as Tim Judah, Noel Malcom feel the need to specify their chosen attribution (war vs. conflict) in their works as to avoid any confusion, because usually, authors who embark with war instead of conflict are typically seen as favouring the Kosovo Albanians.\(^ {197}\) In this thesis the events of Kosovo in 1999 are referred to as the war in Kosovo, not to take sides but to denote

---


that 10,000 victims, over 3000 missing people, 1 million displaced\textsuperscript{198} (statistically speaking only) is a step away from conflict.\textsuperscript{199}

Albeit its extensive usage throughout this thesis, I have not engaged with a political or geographical debate in defining what \textit{West} is, \textit{West} in opposition to what and how. Just like Derrida maintains that not everything that has to do with Islam or ‘Arab Muslim world’ or ‘world’ is a ‘world’, the same goes for \textit{West} or the \textit{Western world}.\textsuperscript{200} \textit{West} is not an attempt to map the hemispheres of power (even less so to map it from a Euro-centric perspective); nor does it denote (strictly) the geography of the Western European countries and the US. Looking at the Western-Christian metaphysics, the West comes quite below the Pyrenees with Spanish and Portuguese being involved in religious missions. Instead, we look at ‘West’ as seen and conceptualized by the natives/locals – the sites of intervention and missions. In Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Iraq, Congo, East Timor, ‘West’ is a linear/unitary concept denoting the time/space civilizing missions with the initial Spanish Christian missionaries, the continental European developmental missions of enlightenment, the colonial powers, and today’s US, UN and EU structures of democratizing missions. For local people in Kosovo the consequent interventions and missions deployed are just part of the same set. “Kosovo is a Western project. There is a recycling of the same people and logic from UNMIK to the EU mission’\textsuperscript{201}


ibid.

ibid.


\textsuperscript{201} Ylli Hoxha (2012). Interview. V. Musliu. Prishtina.
With *metaphysics*, Derrida refers to *Platonism*. “Traditionally (going back to Plato’s myths but also Christian theology), we think that there was an original pure state of being (direct contact with the forms or the Garden of Eden) which accidentally became corrupt. In contrast, Derrida tries to show that no term or idea or reality is ever pure in this way; one term always and necessarily “infects” the other.”\(^{202}\) He maintains that metaphysics is a white mythology which assembles and reflects Western culture where the white man takes his own Indo-European mythology, his logos that is the myth of his idiom, for the universal form of that which it is still his inescapable desire to call Reason.\(^{203}\)

### 6.1 Kosovo – NATO, the UN and the EU

The European Council and the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb, in 2000 launched the framework of Stabilization and Association Process. This was later reiterated in EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, marking this way an important step in ‘institutionalizing’ the relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries (Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia and Montenegro). The framework of Stabilization and Association Process was launched. There the prospect of EU integration was given for all the above-mentioned countries provided that the performance of the countries in relation to democracy, human rights, good governance and rule of law would reach the ‘European standards’.\(^{204}\) Kosovo was not mentioned in the summit due to its political status, but the discourse of the Thessaloniki Summit re-introduced the concept that ‘the future of the Western Balkans lies within the EU’.

Kosovo, which was given its autonomy in 1945 within Yugoslavia, was part of the later until 15 June 1999, when the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia signed a treaty which ended the Kosovo war.\(^{205}\) The war between Serbia and Kosovo’s Albanian majority incited the NATO intervention as a

---


\(^{205}\) Malcom, 1999

Throughout the cohabitation in former Yugoslavia, the Albanian majority in Kosovo is reported not to have been fully represented at the federal level as compared to other nationalities. Considering that after the end of the Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, in 1912 Kosovo was divided between Montenegro and Serbia both of which became part of Yugoslavia in 1918, Albanians kept voicing that they were put by force in the federation, a concern which was to materialize later on. Ever since, Kosovo (as southern Serbia’s province) was the least developed (both economically and culturally) part of former Yugoslavia.
response to the “violence and repression in Kosovo”. The bombing resulted with the surrendering of Milosevic and the signing of the Kumanovo agreement that put an end to the conflict and paved the way to the deployment of a UN mission in Kosovo which was operational until 2008. On February 17, 2008 Kosovo declared its unilateral independence, a move swiftly backed by the US and its allies, but strongly opposed by Serbia, Russia and China. The EU on the other hand, did not maintain 'en block' recognition due to five of its member states (Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romani and Spain) opposing Kosovo’s independence. Post-independence paved the way to the EU rule of law mission being deployed to help/advice Kosovo in strengthening the rule of law and its democratic stability. Even though the EU has not issued a recognition ‘en block’ for Kosovo, it is by far the single largest donor providing assistance to Kosovo and the South Eastern European region as a whole and is at the forefront of the reconstruction effort. Since 1999, Kosovo has received more than €2 billion in EU assistance. The funds concentrate on “fostering Kosovo’s development of stable institutions…and ensuring Kosovo’s European future”. Since 2009, the EU has deployed its greatest CFSP mission in Kosovo to help Kosovars with the rule of law and democracy.

During the two phases of international administration (before and after Kosovo’s independence), the international community together with local actors failed to lay the seeds of a stable peace in Kosovo. While the international community was interested in maintaining a fragile peace and stability, Kosovar authorities demanded independence and state-building, allowing Belgrade to exploit the opportunity created by this dual agenda to

---


207 All information regarding EU and Kosovo agreements, documents and financial resources can be found at the website of the European Union Office in Kosovo website http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm


promote its own national interests in the bargaining process in Kosovo. Subsequently, the contested nature of Kosovo’s independence led to multiple international organisations acting with overlapping, and status-neutral mandates, thus challenging the consolidation of independent Kosovo’s domestic and external sovereignty.


PART II

Part II is reserved for the four articles, each of them employing a particular concept of Derrida, to shed light on the dynamics of Western/EU missions in Kosovo.
Article 1 | Deconstructing the ‘mission’. What’s in a name?

Forthcoming in co-authorship with Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie at European Foreign Affairs Review (2014) 19: 3.
Deconstructing the ‘mission’: What’s in a name?

Abstract

This article problematizes on the concept of ‘mission’ in international interventions, who is entitled to missionize and how the missionized subject is conceptualized. By looking at the international missions in Kosovo (the UN and particularly the EU), we problematize how the EU mission in Kosovo is still entrenched in this trajectory of ‘missionizing’ that makes it bear the stigma of a non-responsive and non-sensitive structure to the local. Employing Derrida’s deconstruction, we explain that the criticism (academic, dogmatic, ideological, empirical) on the international missions is not much related on how they operate in the deployed countries nor the policy choices they make. Rather, looking at the path dependency of the missions in the Western historical and civilizational trajectory, we maintain that the problem derives from the idea and the very concept of mission as intervention in itself.

Key words: Derrida’s deconstruction, Western metaphysics, mission, Kosovo, EU.

1. Introduction

To understand the broader metaphysical foundation of intervention as a development and the international missions, this article looks at the EU mission in Kosovo (along with other international missions deployed in it in the post-war period) to shed light in how international missions come and need to exist. Using Derrida’s deconstruction, the article problematizes on questions what is the power of the mission as agency? How is the structure conceptualized? How does a mission become necessary and what are the ‘critical conditions’ that require the establishment of a mission? Who decides that? Where is the idea of having a mission inseminated? Whose and for whom are these missions essentially?

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy has come to embody the very idea of legitimate statehood in international politics, largely through defining a new standard of civilisation, in which “democrativeness” determines the limits of international society and helps to construct relations with non-democracies “beyond the pale”. The early 1990s witnesses an increase in ‘missions’ deployed abroad by the EU, the UN, the US and other international organizations making missions the iconic model of international intervention to end intra-state wars, regime/system changes, ethnic and religious conflicts etc. Interventions for democracy promotion and/or peace building were spread (Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, 

---

Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, East Timor, and former Yugoslavia) under the paradigmatic Western-democratic project, focusing primarily on human rights, rule of law and democracy. Orbie and Wetzel argue that EU democracy promotion is becoming more and more a focus of EU foreign policy, even though it is still unclear what the EU aims to further achieve in third countries. In his critique to ethics of foreign policy, Paris argues that peace building and democratizing missions represent an updated version of the *mission civilisatrice* or the colonial-era notion that the ‘advanced’ states of Europe had a moral responsibility to ‘civilize’ the indigenous societies they were colonizing.

Important to clarify at this stage is that if looking at the recent history, the metaphysics of missions and missionizing do not bear the stamp of the European Union per se. As a matter of fact, this ideology finds itself very much present in the case of the United States’ interventionism. The United Nations and the EU can sometimes be considered as following the tradition/trajectory. Thus, rather being the ‘inventor’ of the missionizing ideology, the case of the EU in Kosovo shows it to be merely a propagator. When it comes to the Western Balkans, for the first time in its history, the EU is involved in the process of building its future member states. Along with the development and democratizing agenda, the EU has paved the way for bringing the former Yugoslav countries to the EU. In the case of Kosovo however, the stigma of missionizing as civilizing becomes a bit stronger. Unlike other countries in former Yugoslavia who became fully-fledged sovereign states after the dissolution of the federation, Kosovo still struggles in finalising its statehood. De facto it is no longer part of Serbia, although its international code recognition points it to be part of Serbia. Its internationally cited name is ‘Kosovo (as defined under the UNSCR/1244)’ – a denomination still used while under UNMIK. For the EU, Kosovo is known as ‘Kosovo* (without prejudice to the UNSCR/1244)’. Thus for the very first time, the EU was seen to get in a ‘serious relationship’ with a non-country.

In this article, we engage with a meta-theoretical critique to understand the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the mission as such. By this we also seek to surpass the


criticism of the democratizing mission in terms of its practical application. The problem we deconstruct hereon, is how the 'mission' as an idea and structure of the current democratizing agenda remains rather detached of the local realit(y)(ies) which in turn makes them look as an extension of the previous 'civilizing' Western missions. The article looks at how the concept of Christian missioning, colonizing missions and the late developmental missions mirror the idea of today's democratizing missions. Understanding the materialisation of the mission’s idea in the case of Kosovo, in addition to the field work in Kosovo, the article is based on 1) literature on Christian missions and missiological texts to understand the early concept of ‘missions’ and ‘missionizing’; 2) two study visits at the Colonial Museum in Tervuren, Belgium.

In the plethora of international missions literature there is a recurring theme pointing that somewhere in the trajectory the relationship of the mission with the subject concerned starts to crack. An argument that comes along frequently is that international missions show the tendency to remain intact of the local realit(y)(ies) where they deploy, not only because of arguments of their inherent mission civilisatrice nature, but also for the arbitrary modes of intervention and the insensitivity towards local peculiarities; the dominance of neo-liberal intervention and other reasons related to power extension towards the ‘non-Europe’.

Literature on 'interventions' and foreign (western) missions falls largely into a normative set of binary opposites – that is looking at them as well or not well intentioned; as responsive or non-responsive to the cause etc. Positivist informed literature looks at this issue from the perspective of “what went wrong”. Post-positivist literature (critical theory, post-colonial)

---

215 Ibid.


explain how the uneven dynamics between the local and the intervener challenge the very concept of intervening ‘to do good’. The constructivist pursuit would look at how norms, values, rules and identity inform the foundation of the mission. Foucaultians would address the nature and the functioning of power. Other post-colonial theories as employed by Jean Baudrillard and/or David Chandler would re-emphasize the logic of simulation and the neo-colonial aspects of missions respectively. This article discusses what is so inherently problematic (to say the least) that galvanizes criticism towards foreign missions in general and to EU missions in particular. Epistemologically, how do we deal with tautological findings of the locals reporting that the internationals “are not interested in the ‘local’ or needs, only in it as a canvas for the projection of Western values and institutions”. Or why are ‘natives’ (locals) globally so disillusioned and alienated by it? In focusing on the EU mission, we do not merely look on its ex-post results, rather we look at the metaphysical foundations of how the mission comes and needs to exist.

---


Because of the of enlargement agenda as the only sound project for the countries in the Western Balkans, when it comes to the EU-Western Balkans relations, there is not enough literature taking post-colonial, neo-Marxist, feminist or other post-positivist strands. In this regard, by deconstructing the EU mission we shed light on a set of issues altogether – cultural, historical, metaphysical, political and imperial. Deconstruction provides a more comprehensive way of studying the case of Kosovo. As an intervention in text, deconstruction is known for questioning the establishment, the knowledge, the given, the ‘common sense’. Kosovo in itself, is also a very ‘questionable’ entity and its existence is constantly deconstructed in the political, economic, sociological, nation-building, and national identity sense. The article contributes to the debate and the rethinking of intervention and missionizing in foreign policy. A lot of what Derrida is involved in his work is his relentless questioning and reversing hierarchies providing this way an intervention in the colonial thinking. This article also speaks to dimensions of decolonization of thinking by dissolving hegemonic establishments and foundations. Defining ‘deconstruction’ as a way to intervene in text, the interpretivist school explains that “alike all other approaches, deconstruction interprets. And like in all other studying inquiries, we deconstruct, as we look beneath and we try to find explanations. The important dimension is which aspect of deconstruction is used once taking it from literature studies to bring it to social sciences”.

2. Derrida’s deconstruction and international missions

Albeit the uncomfortness he displayed toward the term itself, Derrida had numerous occasions to define deconstruction, one of which is particularly important for this article. This definition is rather metaphysical and relies on 1) attacking the Platonistic (own italics) hierarchies (e.g. order vs. chaos) – or what he refers to as Western metaphysics, meaning that order could be reduced down to variation of chaos; 2) redefining chaos and pointing out that every order/chaos is temporal; 3) changing the term's orthography, for example, writing “différence” (evidenced when we recognize the temporal nature). Derrida argues that
Western philosophical tradition rests on binary oppositions: unity/diversity, identity/difference, presence/absence, and universality/specificity; democracy/dictatorship; rule of law and order/chaos and anarchy; civilised/uncivilized etc. The leading terms are accorded primacy; their partners are represented as weaker or derivative. Yet, the first terms depend on and derive their meaning from the second to such an extent that the secondary terms can be seen as generative of the definition of the first terms. Transmitting the ‘leading terms’ of the binary opposites has become the new ‘modernist cause’ for the West to export. The receiving end is downgraded to a degraded structure in need for intervention. In this inner dynamic, the giver (of the good values) gains the power, its presence becomes a necessity and its intervention is seen as a salvation. And through the repetition it turns into a duty and becomes an institution – or what Derrida calls fetishism. A duty to intervene, to protect, to end conflicts, to help after natural disasters, also to enlighten, to civilize, and to democratize.

Linguistically, ‘mission’ is “any important task or duty that is assigned, allotted or self-imposed…”. Another explanation of it is “a group or committee of persons sent to a foreign country to conduct negotiations, establish relations…or the like”. At the Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885 – which paved the way to the colonization of African peoples – the European colonial powers agreed to ‘bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being”.

229 Ibid.
233 Cambridge Dictionary Online.
being’, with the aim of ‘instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessing of civilization’.

This legacy is interesting to shed light on how the trajectory of missions and missionising travels in time and how it remains entrenched in the broader metaphysical premises of the missionary as superior and the ‘other’ who needs to be intervened/missionized/enlightened/saved/democratized. The Berlin Conference or as it is usually referred to as Scramble Africa represents the epitome of Western superiority (or more generally any sort of imperialism) in which land as a mere geographical denomination was divided between the European powers of that time.

Grosfoguel reminds us that we cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power over the juridical-political boundaries of a state, that is, by achieving control over a single nation-state; global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration or to the political/economic structures of power. At the EU-Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki 2003, the EU set forward the project of ‘EU integration’ for the Western Balkans as a salvation. “We all share the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, solidarity and a market economy, fully aware that they constitute the very foundations of the European Union…and the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries…and the on-going enlargement encourages the countries (of the Western Balkans) to follow the same successful path”. The Summit also determines that the Western Balkans countries belong to the EU club, not to Russia or any other system. The European Union Office in Kosovo points out in its mission statement that “the Office plays a pivotal role in realizing the European agenda in Kosovo…and helps to consolidate the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms…”. Similarly, the mission statement of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) states “EULEX is concentrated to fight corruption…and to achieve the EU’s best practices in Kosovo”.

In a similar vein, “civilizing mission” is not fixed nor does it conform to a single interpretation. Weist suggests that in relation to the Christian missionaries of the nineteenth

---


century imperialism, the notion of a “civilizing mission” often had a positive connotation, implicit image of Christian missionaries as “a special breed of heroic persons bringing Christ to foreign lands”. By contrast, the suggestion that they might be undertaking a “civilizing mission” is considered to be offensive and overly deterministic. This is because the “civilizing mission” has been linked to the discredited concept of imperialism. However, even though the nineteenth-century style of imperialism no longer prevails, the theme of the “civilizing mission” is still commonly referred to in the field of contemporary international relations.

When we explain how the legitimacy of the missions to intervene comes to exist, we look at the Christian, developmental, colonization missions and therefore map what we perceive to be the tautology of a) pathologising ‘the other’ by making its moral/political/cultural problems as something biological and clinical; b) objectifying ‘the other’ as something invaluable/inferior. We have conceptualized these two themes to then compare how the new democratizing missions mirror the ideological/conceptual/political/discursive of the previous Western missions, which in turn sheds light on the problems with the missions at its core. What follows is an explanation of how/by whom the missions in Kosovo were invited, to further deconstruct this as a logic of pathologizing and objectifying the other.


For more see Donelly 1998; Gong 1884; Seabrooke and Bowden 2006; Wight 1991.
2.1 (Self) invitations to intervene

When every discourse guarantees that ‘democracy’ is the only acceptable type of political regime for emancipated humanity that has come of age and that has no other purpose itself, then the very idea of democracy loses its colour, becomes blurred, and perplexes us.

Jean Luc-Nancy

In none of the cases (Berlin Conference and Thessaloniki Summit) there has been a decision/an agreement between two equal partners, which have an ownership in the decision of the mission or in the mission itself. The decision to missionize is taken by the intervener – the developed, prosperous, Western-democratic agent. Being endowed with these values, the intervener gives itself conceptual legitimacy to transmit this ‘miracle’ to the local. The local – ‘the other’ – is the ‘tribal’ ‘orientalist’/the ‘Balkans’, plagued by chaos, disorder and inefficiency. “The aim of the international community…was to build this poor, mountainous and tribal land based on “Western” values”, two former UNMIK officials report in their book – which has become an ostensibly quoted in the field. In opposition to the ‘local’, Bilgin argues, the international sees itself un-reflexively as Western, muscular, masculine (though gender equal), capitalist, efficient, normatively and governmentally superior, and able to supplant non-liberal, customary, everyday forms of politics, society, government and economy.

---


240 In 2003, Kosovo was under the UN administration and no specific mentioning was given to it per se. The discourse had an ‘en block’ strategy for the people of the Western Balkans.

241 By local I don’t merely refer to the local population in its form of existence. Beyond the material dimension, the local refer to the social construct and mind-set of the local population; the local perception of needs and development as well as the historical past and mentality which reflects very much on what is considered to be the overarching ‘reality’ nowadays; customs, traditions and indigenous practices. This however also includes aspects of ‘modernity’ and the impact of liberal state institutions and markets.


In the post-war Western Balkans the introduction of a democracy agenda has been a rather hegemonic choice in replacing the old/inglorious system. The “yes” to democracy was to imbue not only the “yes” to European values but a “no” to everything ‘bad’ the previous system brought. The ‘yes’ in quotation marks here is the ‘implied approval’ of the locals. It is a fabricated consensus after the missions got installed. Because an intervention usually comes as a salvation after a crisis, war or dictatorial regime, or else, the “yes” is implied. Yet, the inability to choose, not having the freedom to say “yes” or potentially “no” should be thought more thoroughly when we look at ‘missions’ and the steadily unsatisfactorily relation they build with the context where they deploy. In *Rouges* Derrida argues that “wherever freedom is no longer determined as power, mastery, or force, or even as a faculty, as a possibility of the “I can”, the evocation and evaluation of democracy as the power and the *demos* begins to tremble”.

In the trajectory of international presence in Kosovo, two different invitations were made both for the UN and the EU. After the conflict with Serbia, Kosovo came under UN administration, whose paradigmatic aim was to create “a peaceful environment for all inhabitants of Kosovo… and ensuring human rights protection”. The invisibility/absence of the agency (as a subject) who makes the decision for the deployment provides that the UN mission is indeed invited by the cause of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the duty to bring peace. This establishment was also aided by the fact that in practice the ‘winner’ (NATO had bombed Serbia for 78 days) and the ‘defeater’ (Milosevic surrendered after NATO’s campaign) were signing an agreement on a newly created entity that would come under UN administration.

The invitation for EULEX’s deployment is rather different in comparison to that of the UN. EULEX was a planned, operationalized and coordinated action. Peculiar in its case was the attempt to simulate and create an agency of inviting it. Article 1 of Ahtisaari’s Plan provides that “The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary power to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of this Settlement… Kosovo

---

245 Derrida, J. (2003). *Rouges*. Stanford, Stanford University Press. He questions that if one values freedom in general, before any interpretation, then one should no longer be afraid to speak without or against democracy. Is the right to speak without taking sides for democracy, that is, without committing oneself to it, more or less democratic?

246 www.unmikonline.org

247 After failing to reach an agreement in the negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, former UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari compiled his plan for Kosovo, setting the blueprint for its independence.
shall also issue an invitation to the international community to assist in successfully fulfilling its obligations to this end.”. In this case the invitation for the mission is made by a foreign subject but stated in a format as if indeed the locals have asked the UN to further require for the deployment of a EU mission. Why is this interesting? The decision is not only made by a ‘peace sponsor’ but he goes further in proposing and stating that the locals shall issue the invitation (i.e. recite the invitation he wrote). The intervener is unequivocally clear what the locals want and powerful to decide what they need to be inviting and what sort of mission they need to be subjected to. On the one hand, the aim is to create the idea of some sort of ownership (procedural ownership at least) that the local has in calling for a mission. On the other hand, the local becomes merely a reciter of the wishes/needs as defined by the intervener, but the local has no agency to think/conceptualize/articulate and ‘issue’ an invitation. The tradition of deciding for Kosovo continues to date, as Prishtina based researcher Engjëllushe Morina says “we still don’t decide for ourselves. Even those decisions we pretend to have made are pre-set from the state donors.”

Talking about hospitality, Derrida argues that “absolute hospitality must break hospitality by right, or duty of the juridico-political laws of hospitality which are always conditional...like the asylum and immigration laws in any country, they put a variety of conditions upon hospitality, ask a variety of questions etc.” Unconditional (absolute) hospitality according to him is impossible to organize; it will be utopic as no state could write it into laws. On the one hand, we could cynically suggest that the invitation is in a way surpassing the post-structuralist debate on absolute hospitality. When talking about ‘absolute hospitality’ - not only welcoming the ‘other’ as another human, but the welcoming of the animal, of the tree, the plant etc., Derrida says that “humans offer hospitality only to humans”. A ‘rational’ mind would think what a strange thing would be for a human to offer hospitality to an animal let alone a plant, given the ontologizing discourse that hospitality is a human virtue. Derrida likes to take certain concepts to their limit to see their ontological metamorphosis. The discourse seems to offer this wishful thinking of post-modernist hospitality when setting forward that Kosovo as such belongs to all of its inhabitants. As such, it is a step ahead the

---


251 Ibid.
post-structural concept of identity, of hospitality, of home and as such, supersedes Derrida’s conceptualization of ‘hospitality to the other’.

Beyond ironies, the problem here stretches towards the concept of home as the precondition of hospitality is lost. The guest has become the host as it has the power to invite itself. Bulley argues that hospitality requires some notion of an ‘at-home’ for its possible performance. “Despite the contradictory nature of hospitality and the ontological ‘at-home’, both must be negotiated to keep them as open, responsible and ethical as possible. This giving place means not simply allowing them to occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking no questions, but that they literally take our place. If they take our place then we are no longer in the simple position of host. Effectively, the positions have been reversed – we are now a guest.”

In the case of Kosovo, the very concept of home and consequently hospitality is taken upside down. If we would think of home as a state, half of the interventions in Kosovo (except NATO) have occurred in nobody’s home, as Kosovo was under the UN administration and de facto was not part of Serbia any longer. In such scenario, could we talk about hospitality as home in Derrida’s fashion, or even could we talk about it as a deterritorialization of responsibility in the way Campbell does? In a rapidly changing world and the changing concept of sovereignty, can we re-think/humanize home in foreign policy as an issue not necessarily legally defined as a political entity with an internationally recognized border, a seat in the UN etc.?

3. New Holy Trinity - Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights. The EU Mission in Kosovo

What follows is a positioning of the EU mission in Kosovo in the broader perspective of the Western missions. The concept of spreading ‘goodness’ – belief system, development aid, ideological system – to the ‘other’ who is not part of ‘our moral system’ is not new. What happened throughout the evolution of the ‘mission’ is its secularization – bringing the modern democratizing missions to ‘the other’. The ‘otherness’ of the local as morally and politically inferior to the West has been largely elaborated in Said’s Orientalism, Todorova’s


253 In his work on the conflict of Bosnia and Herzegovina, David Campbell one of the prominent Derridian scholars in IR argues that when it comes to intervention “a deterritorialization of responsibility is needed. Our responsibility toward the other should not be limited by his/her existence within the inviolable borders of a nation-state (a ‘home’). Intervention could have been taken to defend a non-ontological multiculturalism.
Imagining the Balkans, and in the works of Grosfoguel. We maintain that this relationship is constructed first by *pathologizing* the other and its cultural/political traits as something almost *biologically* sick; second by *objectifying* the other as a site/laboratorium for exportation of the good/superior deeds. In *pathologizing* we look more at the discourse of labelling the other, while in *objectifying* we draw attention to the mission’s action. However, far from being two separated categories, as will be shown below, they are far more overlapping. Mona Ozouf explained that with the development of *reason* in the enlightenment era, the Biblical Holy Trinity (God, the father, the son) – the exemplification of the Christian missions – is secularized. She adds that the new holy trinity becomes *liberty, equality and fraternity*. We maintain that the new holy trinity has become *democracy, rule of law and human rights*. Today the EU’s civilising identity is a self-conception of its relationship to and treatment of the non-European other, but historically, civilizing missions have been colonialist projects, rooted in military power.

3.1 Pathologizing ‘the other’

Derrida says that the logic of *development* is the logic of Western dominance, and is located in the ‘metaphysics of white mythology’. Yet, its problem as ‘intervention’ is not merely embedded in its intentions but stretches out into further implications. In his work on development and colonization, Dossa argues that the idea of development is the core myth of Western Christianity, while ‘representing a secularisation of Biblical eschatology’, and underlining the Occident’s secular upward march. Development is constitutive of Western Christian identity and it becomes its ‘evangelical’ mission, self-acclaimed role to save others.

---

254 In the Greek, Jewish, but especially Christian and Islamic tradition there is a privileging of the *male* figure in ethics, law, and politics, and particularly in a certain democratic model. Initially the revolutionaries of 1789 did not include the word *fraternity* – a term which also doesn’t appear in the Declaration of Human Rights nor in the Constitution of 1793 nor in the Charter of 1830. It appears only as an addendum to the Constitution of 1791 as Mona Ozuf calls it the completion of another trinity. In fraternalism or brotherhoods, in the confraternal or fraternizing community, what is privileged is at once the masculine authority of the brother (who is also a son, a husband, a father), genealogy, family, birth, autochtony, and the nation.


The men of the 16th and 17th century were universalists owing the universality of their Christian faith; throughout the 18th and 19th century universalism became the development aid. Today they are activists of political theology of human rights, democracy promotion and rule of law. Speaking on the British missionaries of the 18th century for instance, Cox argues that “when arrived overseas, the missionaries built elementary and secondary schools, universities, theological training schools, vocational training centres, clinics and hospitals among others”. Local education expert in Pristina, Pupovci, evidences the same pattern in the consequent missions in Kosovo. “During 2000-2004, there was a massive flow of reconstruction funds. There are numerous cases when 2-3 different schools were built by different donors in a village with no more than 200 people”.

Upon arriving in the Americas, the Christians encountered that the ‘indigenous’ had no God – had no religion (as conceptualized in Christian metaphysics). The absence of God was equal to the absence of soul – until the Pope institution declared that “these people might have a soul but it is an animal soul” – which makes it not human. Or as Pope George has claimed “half devil, half child”. Like in the missiological texts, the locals are stripped off their subjectivity when addressed as “these people” as something which has no identification, no representation and certainly no agency. In UNMIK’s discourse, locals in Kosovo are addressed to as “inhabitants”. The English dictionary defines ‘inhabitant’ as “a person or an animal that is a permanent resident of a particular place or a region”. As such, calling the local people ‘inhabitant’ takes out of them the sociological identity and in turn objectifies them. The local thus becomes a laboratorial subject for scientific/positivist/controlled experiments. Being detached from this ‘object’ of study, the missionizer experiments, notices, and draws results as ‘lessons learned’ to be repeated/checked/validated in other ‘laboratories’. Interestingly enough, both local and international EULEX workers use the term “EULEXperiment”, to exemplify how the greatest ESDP mission to date is testing


262 Oxford English Dictionary

263 EULEXperiment is a slogan designed by the then nationalist/radical movement Vetevendosje! who has been steady in its criticism towards what they call the neo-colonial missions in Kosovo.
its capabilities in Kosovo. “EULEXperiment – is the best term to indicate of what we’re doing here”. An example of taking off local’s subjectivity is evidenced in the EU’s discourse towards ‘ethnic minorities’, where instead it refers to “communities”, which in turn is a mutilation of the ethnic identity attribution. “The rule of law is commitment and merit of each individual from all communities”. ‘Community’ is defined as “a particular area or place considered together with its inhabitants”. Prishtina based artist, Heta, explains that “this is the only case and the first experiment of a non-nation state. In its Constitution Kosovo has ‘communities’ and not citizens, or ethnic groups/ethnic minorities because it is pictured to become the place of communities not the place of its actual ethnic configuration”.

Another unwavering evidence of this argument is exhibited at the Colonial Museum in Tervuren, Belgium (See Annex I). “Belgium wants to make Congo a model colony. The colonial authorities want to forget the past. Citing ‘civilizing mission’ they look towards the future”. Both the UN and the EU missions in Kosovo have been notorious for their approach of “leaving the past in the past”, that is besides the judicial institutions, no debate has been promoted in dealing with the past by talking about it be it in the form of transitional justice, healing process or the like. In the aftermath of the conflict, the term ‘war’ became unusable and instead the word ‘conflict’ was infused; establishing this way an attempt for collective amnesia. Prishtina based civil society actor, Ylli Hoxha, explains that “In the perception of the EU, the only difference between Kosovo and Congo is that we (Kosovo) are part of the enlargement package”.


265 European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (2010). The rule of law is commitment and merit of each individual from all communities. Prishtina, EULEX.

266 Cambridge Dictionary Online.


268 In his renown account on nationalism “Imagined communities”, Benedict Anderson coined the term collective memory – that is a shared sense of heritage and commonality with many human beings of our “group” (i.e. nation) we have never met.

3.2 Objectifying ‘the other’ - in the name of development

Throughout the thousand-year span during which Europe was converted to Christianity, one prominent mission theme was that of competition between “civilised” religion of the sacred book of Roman laws, and the “uncivilised” religion of orality and nature-based spirits.\(^{270}\) These interactions between “civilised” and “barbarian” communities were critical in structuring the explicit standard that accompanied and followed Europe’s more robust engagement with the rest of the globe, in the form of imperialism and empire building. This way, in line with the supremist and expansionist European attitude, the mission society in Europe agreed, in principle, that the colonisation of India had a divine purpose; it was the duty of the colonisers and missionaries to civilise and Christianise the natives\(^{271}\) and this way, India "had to be dusted, disinfected, and injected with a Western style of education, jurisprudence, and religion".\(^{272}\)

On this self-proclaimed legitimacy, the religious missionaries embarked on to spread the ‘good’ monotheistic-Christian belief to tribal and primordial areas. This idea was already established with Pope Gregory the Great who wrote in 601 what has become a classic missiological text on cultural accommodation:

The heathen temples of these people need not be destroyed, only the idols which are to be found in them…If the temples are well built, it is a good idea to detach them from the service of the devil and to adapt them for the worship of the true God…If we allow them these outward joys, they are more likely to find their way to the true inner joy.\(^{273}\)

The deterministic discourse implying the ultimate solution to the worship of the true God not only signals a hegemonic choice, but also undermines the existence of anything locally

---


Bowden argues that the clear precursors of the ‘classical’ civilization dialectic can be found in medieval times in relations between Christendom and the Infidels, and even more noticeably in European encounters with the New World

\(^{271}\) Dharmaraj, J. (1990). Nineteenth and Twentieth Century European Mission to India: Reconsideration. Faculty of Lutheran School of Theology, Illinois, Chicago University. PhD.


worshipped as having any value. The statement establishes that the locals believe in the devil –
as defined and mythologized by the West – and as such shall be saved from this savage
tradition. The ability/freedom to choose is confined to the “worship of the true God” as
opposed to the “service of the devil”.

Paris argues that “like European colonialism a hundred years ago, today’s peace-building
operations convey norms of acceptable or civilised behaviour into the domestic affairs of
less-developed states”.274 This resembles how the UN and the EU have dealt with the
legacies of previous systems in Kosovo. For them, institutions/systems practiced by the
locals and existing prior to the intervention are either stigmatized as something intrinsically
inefficient, corrupt and unprofessional as opposed to the ‘European values’ of democracy,
human rights and rule of law. “They have discredited the socialist legacy as something utterly
inefficient”,275 argues Nita Luci, lecturer of social anthropology at University of Prishtina,
explaining all the orientalist logic behind the statement. In their book Peace at any price King
and Mason (former UNMIK employees in Kosovo) explain that “in the aftermath of the
conflict, the EU was “hoping to clean the inefficient socialist legacy and to enable the
economic environment to catch up with the remaining part of the continent”.276

On this discourse, the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo was seen as the ultimate salvation
for ‘Balkan inefficiency’,277 not only to break the ‘inefficiency’ trajectory but also to be the
ultimate corrector of previous inglorious systems which have established rotten institutions
and traditions. “We are here to offer advice. But the Balkans are good in signing documents
but not in implementing them”,278 argues chief of staff at the EULEX headquarters in
Prishtina, pointing to the problem as something deeply entrenched in the culture and the
identity of the region. In 1996, after the war had broken in the Balkans, the Carnegie
Commission sponsored a report on the Balkans, as a sequel to its 1914 Inquiry. The report

Studies, 28(4): 637-656.


277 At this point, it would be necessary to also look at the metamorphosis of the term ‘Balkans’. Throughout
time, the term has been defoliated of its intrinsic geographical meaning and today it represents a different
political/moral/ideological/civilizational/cultural cluster. Inefficiency, ethnic hatred, system failure, primordial
nationalism have been pathologized as ‘Balkans’.

states that in the Balkans the “veneer of civilization is very thin indeed” and the West should “help to transform the proverbially chaotic, bloody, and unpredictable Balkans of the past into a stable, peaceful, and dependable South-eastern Europe of the future”.  

Another EULEX official argues that “there is an utter lack of professionalism in every single sector in Kosovo… and here (in Kosovo), everyone, from the bus driver all the way to the members of the parliament are trying to find a grey area to do things”. This discourse points out that notwithstanding the good will of the mission to endow Kosovo with a set of ‘best practices from the EU’, the environment is the exact opposite pole of the values making it practically impossible to take it to the right track. The term Balkans and/or Balkanization in contexts like these incites firm reaction particularly in Pristina based artists and cultural workers. Albert Heta, head of Stacion Cultural Centre explains that “the Balkans exists only in the mind of Europe (the political Europe). There was rule of law and a system of regulation in here throughout the 60s, 70s and 80s. Law and order did not start with the EU”.

The argument that states in the region suffer from historical ‘path dependencies’ which have undermined the relations between states and their societies is quite the norm in the dialectics of the EU mission in the region. Valentin Inzko, the Austrian official serving as the EU High representative in Bosnia argued the lack of political progress was a result of what he felt that Bosnia suffered ‘from a “dependency syndrome” that dates back centuries, to when it was part of the Ottoman Empire’ – and setting forward that the mere existence of an EU mission is to actually break that evil, orientalist tradition. In a similar vein, when confronted with the question when would EULEX potentially leave Kosovo? senior EULEX official alarms that “EULEX judges are a must. Imagine how this country would be if we would leave”.

---


280 Annonymous Interview, 16.11.2012, Pristina.


4. Conclusion

Kagan argues that after having found its own perpetual peace, the transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice, the metaphysics of good versus evil supports Europe’s ideal of a civilizing mission at home and abroad. The battle between the two binary opposites – European democracy, liberal values, human rights vs. authoritarian, and non-democratic regimes – ‘creates’ the need for the figure of Europe to intervene. Edward Said writes that the rhetoric of the civilizing mission is “what has been called ‘a duty’ to natives, the requirement in Africa and elsewhere to establish colonies for the ‘benefit’ of the natives, or for the ‘prestige’ of the mother country”. This identifies not only the asymmetrical relationship between the so-called ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ but also sets forward the self-proclaimed duty to ‘civilize’ the uncivilized.

In conclusion, when dwelling into these type of studies, it is important to be aware of the dimensions, ideologies and politics of how we engage with both the local and the mission. Arguably, there is a fertile ground for academic criticism towards international missions. First, is the tendency of pointing to missions’ unresponsiveness leading to the fetishizing the ‘local’ as such on the one hand, while simultaneously keeping the focus on the problems of deployed missions? Do we also in turn orientalize principles of autonomous recovery and self-determination of the local? Second, accepting that system/regime change, war, and other forms of system reformation are natural circles of mankind, how does this inform and influence the way intervention, mission comes to existence? How does it legitimize it? How do we think of autonomous recovery at the same time? Where is the thin line of epistemological entrapment into yet another set of binary opposites of missionizing and autonomous recovery? The range of ‘solutions’ does not need to be downgraded to alternatives that while trying to be more responsive to the ‘local’, end up in producing ‘models/frameworks’ which denote the ‘locals’ (subjects of intervention) as a homogenous category. That would merely be a recycling of the top down/patronizing approach. An important step to surpass this is for missions to consciously and healthy drop from the trajectory of holy trinities where they constantly save/purify/emancipate less glorious systems. Interventionsmissions (if they unequivocally need to happen) should engage more genuinely and respectfully with

---

individual cases of ‘locals’, acknowledge its agency and respect the ‘difference’ as a learning diversity that would also shape the ‘intervener’.
Article 2 | Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo
Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo

Abstract

This article explains that when it comes to EU-Kosovo relations, both the EU and Kosovo are hosts and guests at the same time. While the EU is first a host in the enlargement process and the visa regime, with Kosovo as the guest, the EU is also a guest in Kosovo with its deployed mission. Kosovo on the other hand, is a host towards the present EU mission on its territory. At the same time, as an aspiring member state, it is a guest in the shared ‘EU home’ (EU as the home of 28 countries). Derrida’s concept spectrum of hospitality is composed of conditioned and unconditioned hospitality and ultimately hostility. With conditioned hospitality, an analysis of the politics of EU enlargement for Kosovo is undertaken, demonstrating that the EU oscillates between the thin lines of, on the one hand, (conditioned) hospitality in terms of offering Kosovo the enlargement package, and hostility on the other with its visa regime towards Kosovo. The article finds that even though absolute (unconditioned) hospitality is said not to exist and to be impossible to implement, the existence of the EU mission in Kosovo is the first case of unconditioned hospitality.

Keywords: hospitality, hostility, Kosovo, EU, enlargement.

1. Introduction

Derrida explains hospitality as welcoming the other. It means to invite and welcome the ‘stranger’ (l’étranger), both on a personal level – how do I welcome the other into my home? – and on the level of the state, which raises socio-political questions about refugees, immigrants, ‘foreign’ languages, minority ethnic groups etc.285 For Derrida hospitality appears to be as close as one can get to being synonymous with the ethical.

“Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality”.286


Central to the whole concept of hospitality and the politics of hospitality is the concept of home, which not only makes the act of hospitality possible, but at the same time distinguishes the host of a home from the guest as a subject of hospitality.

For both ‘Kosovo’ and ‘the EU’, the concept of home is inherently problematic because it is linked to demarcating borders, as to what is foreign or domestic, and what constitutes inside and outside. As such, bringing into this discussion both the EU as a supranational structure and Kosovo as unfinished state (in the Westphalian principle) is particularly delicate, as the notion of physical/state borders is crucially important in both cases. At the beginning of the 1990s, Derrida argued that the task of realizing an ethics of hospitality is difficult everywhere, but especially in Europe. As a “union”, he continues Europe is hyperbolically anxious about borders, with the tendency to close up on the outside to the extent that it claims to be open on the inside. To oversimplify, internally, the EU’s energy is devoted in making borders (legal, cultural, institutional) obsolete. The trajectory of pooled/shared sovereignty continues with the prospect of fully attaining a ‘European home’ beyond nation states. Externally, the EU is anxious about protecting its borders both with its careful waves of enlargement and also regarding ‘unwanted’ guests through immigration. Kosovo on the other hand, struggles to attain internationally recognized borders and as such be a legitimate in a host of its own home in the Westphalian system.

EU-Kosovo relations identify both forms of hospitality to be applicable. On the one hand, the EU as ‘host’ of the ‘EU home’ offers ‘conditioned hospitality’ to Kosovo with the enlargement package. On the other hand, even though it has been claimed to be merely a poetic act and something that no state can write into law, ‘unconditioned hospitality’ is evidenced with regard to EU’s ‘guest’ status with the deployment, mandate and longevity of the (primarily) European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Ultimately, the EU slides into ‘hostility’ in its visa regime policy. Lastly, the article shows the EU’s altered personality in being both conditionally hospitable and hostile towards Kosovo, and at the same time being subject to an unconditional hospitality within Kosovo. This in turn provides original insight, first with regard to the study of EU enlargement and second with regard to Derrida’s take on unconditional hospitality, marking one of the few encounters with his concept in practice.

Nevertheless, when we think about hospitality we should in no time think about the
distinction between host and guest in terms of clearly defined boundaries. Derrida
distinguishes between conditioned hospitality, that is, welcoming the other under certain
conditions – the showing of documents, asking for a visa and similar procedures. Hospitality
is due to the foreigner, certainly, but remains, like the law, conditioned, and thus conditioned
in its dependence on the unconditionality that is the basis of the law”.  

Unconditioned hospitality, for Derrida, obliges one to accept the visitor, regardless of whether he or she is a
foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether the new arrival is
the citizen of another country, a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing,
male or female. The absolute, unconditioned law of hospitality, as Derrida himself acknowledges,
is impossible to practically implement or organise. Such a pure hospitality ‘can have no legal
or political status. No state can write it into laws and as such it can only be poetic.’

For him, the distinction between visitation and invitation is the other mode to explain
unconditioned and conditioned hospitality. “Hospitality of visitation (pure hospitality) consists in
letting the visitor come, the unexpected arrival, without asking for any account, without
demanding his passport”. He adds that in contrast to invitation, visitation does not select
the guests nor does it expect or prepare for the other’s visit. “If I am unconditionally
hospitalable I should welcome the visitation, not the invited guest, but the visitor. I must be
prepared, or prepared to be unprepared, for the unexpected arrival of any other.”

For Derrida, invitation “remains a scrutinized hospitality, always under surveillance,
parsimonious and protective of its sovereignty.” For Homer, invitation is the most
common form of conditioned hospitality practised by individuals, family units and social
groups where the host selects the guest to whom his/her hospitality is to be offered, and
expects a possible payback.

---

289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
292 Borradori, G. (2003). Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida,
The University of Chicago Press.
293 Homer quoted in Hu, C.-y. (2013). “The Im/Possible Host/Guest: Hospitality in a Passage to India.”
Interngrams 14(1).
2. Tracing ‘Hospitality’ in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

Derrida is not the first to have been preoccupied with ‘hospitality’. His concern comes from Kant’s universal hospitality, which Derrida characterizes as ‘conditioned’ for it is ‘dependent on and controlled by the law and the state police’. Bulley argues that hospitality is not a notion of obvious importance in FPA, “partly because it is a liminal concept”, that is existing on the border between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ but disturbing the differences between the two. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between positions. On the one hand, it invites to first and foremost demarcate ‘borders’; it requires a definition of what is ‘domestic’ and what is ‘foreign’, what is ‘home’ and ‘abroad’; who is a host (the subject offering hospitality) and who is a guest (the subject being welcomed). On the other hand, it disturbs this clear distinction between two ‘alternatives’, precisely because to talk about hospitality we do not necessarily need to have clear-cut delimitations of guest and host.

In the past 20 years, the concept of hospitality has gained popularity in international relations and ethical foreign policy literature. The fact that ‘hospitality’ is still not a very popular concept in IR and foreign policy studies at large is not at all comforting, especially given the trend of xenophobia, the rise of right-wing movements, anti-immigration laws and not at least racism. Bulley argues that as a “liminal concept that works on the border of the way that traditional international relations (IR) has been thought, hospitality still allows the enactment of ethics as it welcomes the outside into the inside”. He adds that as such, hospitality is of immediate and obvious importance to international political theory as a sub-discipline that is defined by contesting and cross-examining the separation between inside and outside.

---

294 In his article “To Perpetual Peace: A philosophical Sketch”, Kant sets forward ‘cosmopolitanism’ as the prerequisite for universal hospitality according to which the right of an alien is recognized not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another’s country Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace. A philosophical Essay. New York, George Allen & Unwin LTD.


297 See for more the work of David Campbell, Dan Bulley, Roxana Rodrigues.


However, when hospitality is examined in IR, such as in a confrontation with Kant, the emphasis is placed on granting hospitality to individuals, especially, the refugee”. In EU studies in general, (especially concerning enlargement and the EU’s external relations) the notion of hospitality offers new paths for an emancipatory debate on the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the EU and its politics of enlargement; on the EU’s welcomed guests and those less welcome, or simply not welcome; how hospitality takes place in the era of ‘pooled/shared’ sovereignty; on enlargement’s politics of space between self and the other.

In his account ‘Ethics as Foreign Policy’, Bulley brings forward the concept of ‘conditioned hospitality’ to explain the shifting meanings of ‘Europe’ and its borders with regard to the enlargement package to the Western Balkans and what he calls, the far more ‘circumscribed hospitality’ for European Neighbourhood Policy. Looking at the shifting meanings of ‘European identity’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘non-European’, Petersen compares the EU’s ‘hospitality’ during accession of Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 with the of enlargement strategy for Moldova and Ukraine. The shifting identities of Europe and who is entitled to be called European are also evidenced in Neuman’s work where he discusses the meaning for the boundaries and identity of Europe of Morocco’s rejected membership application in 1986, which received the response that only Europeans can apply for the project, hence establishing that Morocco is unequivocally non-European on the one hand, and the inclusion of East Germany which became a member without application, referendum or even ratification.

What follows is the application of the two laws of hospitality and their manifestation in the EU’s relations towards Kosovo by looking at the discourse produced by the EU and the evidence from field work in Kosovo.

---


2.1 The scrutinized ‘conditioned hospitality’ of enlargement

The Western Balkans has been present in the EU’s foreign policy agenda since the 1990s. After the ‘Kosovo crisis’ in 1999, the EU opened the possibility for ‘virtual membership’ (virtual hospitality) for the Balkans on grounds of 1) the proclaimed solidarity of the EU with crisis areas and 2) the duty to help those plagued by catastrophes. Bulley used ‘virtual membership’ quoting Romano Prodi in 1999. The later used the term to give stimulus and advantages of close cooperation, provided that certain conditions are met. For Bulley, this ‘virtual membership’ was a result of the ambiguity of the EU’s spatial imaginary of home and family and how would the Western Balkans fit in. In this article we observe a scrutinized conditioned hospitality for Kosovo in particular and the Western Balkans countries in general, in that a set of criteria had to be met before even beginning to consider the granting of ‘conditioned hospitality’. The virtual hospitality was further strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, where the EU confirmed “its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans is within the European Union”, making the group of these countries, which Schimmelfennig has termed ‘eligible’ for membership.

For the EU, “the Balkans have for over a decade been a top priority for our foreign policy efforts. Nowhere is the EU expected to deliver more… They lie on our doorstep”.

Notions of the Balkans as the EU’s backyard, front-yard, doorstep etc. appear constantly in EU texts on the Balkans. From this perspective, the Balkans can potentially be considered to be a subject of the EU’s hospitality because it is physically (geographically) somewhere around (in the back, in the front, next door etc.). For Bulley “the familial imaginary of the EU is both geographical (bounded by the 15, and by 2004, the 25 member states’ borders)


306 By ‘eligible’, Schimmelfennig refers to countries that are in Europe and democratic, but not yet in the EU. Although the boundaries of ‘Europe’ were never set, Schimmelfennig’s definition of countries ‘in Europe’ includes the current 28 member states, the Western Balkans, Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey. Democracy is measured by Freedom House classifications of political rights and civil liberties. For more see: Schimmelfennig, F. (2008). "EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness." Journal of European Public Policy 15(6): 918-937.

and moral (based on a range of ethical and political values seen as ‘European’). A similar narrative or ‘rhetorical entrapment’ was evidenced firstly in offering EU enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) after the end of communism. The heads of state and government of the EC maintained in 1989 that “[t]he current changes and the prospects for development… require overcoming the divisions of Europe”. Secondly, the enlargement prospect for CEE is also framed as ‘re-uniting’ Europe with its ‘other’ half. The metaphor of a ‘re-uniting’ or ‘return to Europe’ points to the way that CEE countries belong not only to geographical Europe, but have traditionally shared the values and norms of European culture and civilization and, that they always aspired to belong to the West during the years of the "artificial" division of the continent. This ‘manipulation of European identity’, was used by both leaders of CEE and the EU.

The countries who joined the EU in the previous rounds have all been ‘conditioned’ on the fulfilment of certain criteria; hospitality was granted, provided that the guest had ‘adjusted’ a number of issues about itself. While the rules of enlargement were rather more of a procedural agreement for the initial six members, consequent members of the ‘European family’ were conditioned with lists of criteria, obligations and standards to fulfil prior to membership. In fact the further the ‘family’ has expanded, the firmer the rules and obligations incumbent upon would-be member-state have become. Like in the case of CEE, in the Western Balkans the conditions deriving from the acquis communautaire are supplemented with the ‘Stabilization and Association Agreement’, which is primarily concerned with commitments for reform in the domains of politics, economics, trade and


310 European Council 1989. See the Conclusions of the Rhodes summit (December 1988) and the Dublin summit (June 1990) for similar statements. Quoted in ibid.

311 Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenczky argued after Hungary’s request for EU membership that the country “return to this Community to which it has always belonged”. Romanian ambassador to the EU, Ene, said that “Romania has been part of West European traditions. Statements taken from ibid.

312 Commissioner Frans Andriessen quoted in ibid.

human rights. Yet, the democratic criteria for the CEE countries were more limited in comparison to the conditions for the Western Balkan countries. The new requirements are to address the post-conflict regional challenges of reconstruction, stabilization and reform. The extra conditions for EU enlargement for the Western Balkans and for Kosovo, have already been seen as evidencing the “multi-dimensional nature of EU conditionality in South East Europe” gearing towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform, or as the “creeping of membership of South East European countries”. For most scholars, the extra conditions for the Western Balkans are a result of the inner political peculiarities of the respective countries (cooperation with ICTY, regional cooperation, the issue of Kosovo), rather than extra requirements from the EU strictly speaking.

While these findings are technically true, there is an epistemological pitfall in this research edifice. These studies operate within external action of the EU, but they do not profoundly question its external action. ‘Hospitality’ on the other hand, invites a debate of borders, exclusions and inclusions, stretching out the discussion to the very idea of enlargement as a willingness to be hospitable and/or hostile, without necessarily being entrenched in the technical and political peculiarities of the process itself. When it comes to the case of Kosovo, we argue that the conditioned hospitality has had a spill-over effect in the extra


319 Rutazibwa evidences such anomaly with regard to the ‘first-do-no-harm’ of the contemporary Western foreign policy. For more see: Rutazibwa, O. U. (2013). In the name of human rights. The problematics of EU ethical foreign policy in Africa and Elsewhere. Centre for EU Studies, Ghent, Ghent University. PhD: 135.
conditions deriving from the already conditioned hospitality: 1) structural changes; and 2) Stabilization and Association Agreement. The later was further conditioned with yet another criterion - dialogue with Serbia, making this entire process a scrutinized conditioned hospitality.

2.1.1 Structural Changes

The enlargement prospects of the Western Balkans have been envisioned as resulting in fundamental societal, political, system changes that would ultimately bring the region closer to 'European values'. The 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission states that "enlargement policy needs to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region where states are weak and societies divided". For Romano Prodi, the European Commission’s tenth president, it was “the moral duty of the EU to take care of the Balkan countries”. In several cases, taking the region in the ‘European home’ seems to take on ‘religious’ tones whereby getting on to the ‘European path’ and/or ‘adhering to European values’ is a form of ‘salvation’. The salvation of breaking free from weak and divided societies, and embracing European values.

The prospect of offering EU membership to Kosovo, inter alia, has been presented as a restorative project after the dissolution of Yugoslavia after which Kosovo would undergo structural changes in coming closer to embrace ‘European values’. In his speech Towards a new international morality: the humanitarian interventions, Solana described the ‘horror’ in the Balkans where “entire societies could fall prey to warlords, rallying the tribe against the enemy, the stranger, or simply the ‘other’, right in the heart of Europe, one hour flight from Rome, Vienna or Athens”. The structural or transformative power the EU would exert was to bring the region to centres which are not sites of such horrors. For the head of the European Union Office in Kosovo, Samuel Žbogar, "we [the EU and Kosovo] have to build together a culture of non-tolerance on corruption. This is the European way". The rhetoric of embracing European values (sometimes European standards, best practices,

---


highest international standards and European values are used interchangeably), is very much present in the EU’s discourse towards Kosovo. Although nowhere reference is made to what explicitly the ‘European standards’ to be fulfilled are (are they the same as or different from international standards; which international standards?), reference is porously made to issues pertaining to multi-ethnicity, the internal market, rule of law etc.

2.1.2 SAA and the ‘Prishtina-Belgrade’ dialogue. ‘Normalization of relations’ through enlargement prospects

The signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) marks the opening of contractual relations between the EU and the countries of the region and paves the way for membership. The SAA is based on EU’s *acquis communautaire* in that the respective countries’ legal structures should be harmonized with EU legislation.\(^{324}\) Yet, unlike in previous rounds of enlargement, in the case of Western Balkans the EU decided to start the SAA negotiations with chapters 23 and 24.\(^{325}\) As they deal with issues pertaining to the rule of law and democratic order, they are considered the most important chapters, and provide in this way an enhanced difficulty for the membership trajectory”. Even then, the very opening of SAA talks is conditional upon several criteria. “Before opening SAA negotiations, the EU examines whether a sufficient degree of stabilisation is in place”.\(^{326}\) The set of conditions is further determined by a dialogue for the ‘normalization of relations’ between Kosovo and Serbia. Although labelled ‘technical dialogue’, the rounds of negotiations showed it to be inherently political. In April 2013, the two negotiating governments completed the so-called “Brussels Agreement”,\(^{327}\) which was hailed as a historic agreement for Kosovo and Serbia and a major achievement of EU foreign policy. Agreement was reached on areas that regulate the relations between Kosovo and Serbia with regard to regional representation and trade and international customs among other things. This was the first time two leaders from Kosovo and Serbia would sit to discuss matters pertaining both countries since the late 1990s. For Catherine Ashton this indicated “a step away from the past and, for both of them

\(^{324}\) European Commission Summaries of EU Legislation


(Kosovo and Serbia), a step closer to Europe”. For EU Commissioner Füle, the agreement represented “the most striking recent example of the transformative power of the EU accession process and a clear signal that even the most difficult decisions can be made if there is strong motivation and political will”. 328 If the ‘normalization of relations’ is a historical day for both parties, does this indicate that relations have so far been abnormal? What would that in turn mean? For local Kosovo scholar, the ‘historicity’ of the ‘normalization of relations’ comes because, in the EU’s gaze, the Serbian-Albanian question is ethnic not political. By their definition, he continues, these are two nations that have conceptual problems with the existence of the other. Consequently, “everything that is not an outburst of our primitive ethnic passions is indeed a historical achievement”. 329

This scrutinized, and at the same time, heavily conditioned hospitality is first and foremost confusing. On the one hand, the EU pledges its support and commitment to bring Kosovo to the ‘European family’. On the other hand, every step that it takes seems to become more hesitant in terms of realizing its commitment, by continuously asking for more requirements to be met, putting into a bigger question mark whether this still remains hospitality?

2.2 The ‘unconditioned hospitality’ of the EU mission in Kosovo

While enlargement for Kosovo is the exemplification of scrutinized conditioned hospitality, looking at the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), we suggest that the ‘EU in Kosovo’ is an example of what can be the closest link to unconditioned hospitality. In Of Hospitality Derrida explains that hospitality is not simply a matter of allowing them (the other) to occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking no questions, but it literally means that the other takes our place. If they take our place, then we are no longer in the simple position of host. The question of hospitality is no longer just about us giving hospitality to the other, it is about hospitality being granted to ourselves in our own ‘at-home’, which is always the home of the other. “Our home is no longer where we can relax, feel free to be ourselves, but where we are persecuted”. 330 The other can arrive at any time, without invitation, and take what he likes in our place. The ‘at-home’ becomes where we are


held hostage. To exemplify, EULEX will be taken as the guest, Kosovo will be taken as the host and, as such, as being able to offer hospitality.

The invitation for EULEX issued in Ahtisaari’s Plan – which was later enshrined in Kosovo’s Constitution – provides that “Kosovo shall issue an invitation to the international community to assist in successfully fulfilling its obligations to this end.” The Council Joint Action, which set forward the invitation for EULEX, states that member states of the EU answered Kosovo’s request for assistance and agreed to provide the European Union Rule of Law Mission “to help build up and strengthen the rule of law, support a functioning democracy, as well as aid Kosovo along its European processes.”

What was clearly a self-invitation for EULEX’s deployment, (self-invitation in the sense that the Western democratic structures were transferring mandates to one another), came to be known in the official and public discourse as an invitation from Kosovo’s authorities calling EULEX to offer assistance and mentoring of Kosovo’s democratic and rule of law consolidation. “EULEX shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening in independent multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and best European practices.”

Let us momentarily ‘neglect’ the issue of ‘invitation’ as a (ceremonial) precondition for hospitality. After all, in a number of non-Western environments (Albanian included) the issue of ‘invitation’ is not a precondition for hospitality and/or for the manifestation of the guest and host roles. Homer’s Odyssey provides that in Greek culture the host receives guests, provides them with food and shelter, helps them regain their energy and keeps them

---


away from danger and harm.\textsuperscript{335} Hu observes this as its ‘unconditioned’ character. This tradition is also evidenced in Saudi Arabia and a number of other Gulf countries.\textsuperscript{336} A similar account of hospitality, the treatment of the guest and the responsibilities of the host are excruciatingly elaborated in the Albanian \textit{The Code of Lekë Dukagjini}.\textsuperscript{337} The account provides that the guest is welcomed anytime it shows up and the host is to be hospitable, irrespective of the ‘invitation’. Any guest (known and unknown) is to be welcomed, fed and offered shelter… asking about when the guest is to leave or how long is he/she about to stay is dishonourable for the host.\textsuperscript{338}

How does this speak to EULEX’s situation in Kosovo? As part of its ‘monitoring’ role, EULEX has sovereign powers in its own mission. It decides its own ‘job description’ and priorities; it renews its mandate every other two years and its staff has immunity over Kosovo’s jurisdiction. It enjoys certain executive authority (responsibility) in performing its tasks, especially in prosecuting war crimes cases and corruption affairs.\textsuperscript{339} So far, EULEX’s performance has been subjected to one audit process conducted by the European Court of Auditors.\textsuperscript{340} This constellation of EULEX as a guest accepted unconditionally and beyond dispute comes very close to what Derrida describes as ‘absolute hospitality’. Going back to the conceptualization of ‘home’ in IR and FPA as in ‘sovereign states’, Kosovo is not a state/home for EULEX as such, as it is not recognized by the EU ‘en block’.\textsuperscript{341} Although as a structure EULEX operates within the framework of Kosovo’s legislation, its mandate is

\textsuperscript{335} Homer quoted in Hu, C.-y. (2013). "The Im/Possible Host/Guest: Hospitality in a Passage to India." \textit{Intergrams} \textbf{14}(1).


\textsuperscript{337} The Code of Lekë Dukagjini is a code of law instituted among the tribes of Northern Albania. Transmitted orally for generations, the laws of the code served for more than five centuries as the foundation of social behavior and self-government for the clans of Northern Albania, even while the region was nominally under Turkish rule. Although the influence of the code has diminished in Kosovo since early 1990s due to its notorious account on blood feud, few dimensions of honor, respect and particularly hospitality are still embedded in the social conduct and everyday culture in (primarily) rural Kosovo. Gjeçov, S. (1989). \textit{The Code of Lekë Dukagjini}. New York, Gjonlekaj Publishing Co. .

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{341} The EU, as a supranational entity of 28 member states, has not recognized Kosovo as independent, but has instead left it up to its member states to decide their own relations with Kosovo. Out of 28, 5 member states do not recognize Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and Spain).
given by the United Nations, to which Kosovo is not an independent state and as such not ‘home’. However, since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, the discourse has shifted from the binary opposite of ‘state’ and ‘not-state’/province, into to what extent can it be called a state, based on how many countries have recognized it, and how many international structures recognize it as independent etc. This discussion spills over to a more societal level of conceptualizing ‘home’ too. If not a fully-fledged ‘home’, how are its hosts and guests defined? How is the blurred line between these two? As a host, Kosovo (its institutions and people) do not question (cannot and are not entitled to) how long the mission is going to stay, whether the mission will abide their house rules etc.

Quoting Benjamin Franklin’s famous saying, “fish and visitors stink after three days”, on his interplay of host and guest dialectics in Christian missions, Brandner argues that after a period of time the guest is either to become a resident or move on. Remaining in the status of guest is impossible both for the host – who cannot sustain all the work in maintaining a guest for a long time – and for the guest who yearns for independence. In 2011, three years after EULEX’s deployment, it was initially civil society in Kosovo which recommended a ‘time frame’ for EULEX’s exit strategy. The same year, Kosovo’s government intensified its calls to end EULEX’s mandate through a joint coordination. The discourse of EU officials in Kosovo is that “EULEX will leave when Kosovo’s rule of law and democratic principles are sound and sustainable”. For EULEX Chief of Staff Thomas Meuhelman, if EULEX were to leave, “Kosovo wouldn’t be able to stand on its feet. The international support is very much needed”. In her work on EU’s involvement in Africa, Rutazibwa notices what she calls the ‘inequality mechanism’ of the intervener as the “benevolent that comes in order to alleviate the receivers’ suffering”.

---


343 Ibid.


hospitality, Derrida maintains that there does not need to be a clear cut division of guest and host, because that one precondition for the host, to be called such, is that he/she needs to maintain his/her own mastery; “he controls the threshold, he controls the borders”. With EULEX setting the rules in the house in which it is staying as a guest, it changes the dynamics of behaviour, it governs the local (albeit through supervision and monitoring), and ultimately it becomes a host. Kosovo’s people become guests in their own home.

The inversion of the position of guest and host is a recurring theme in literature dealing with relationships between colonizers and colonized and their shifting roles of guests and hosts. In his account on Indian hospitality to English visitors, Hu argues that colonialism “commences the inversion of the host/guest because those who originally occupy the position of the host and offer hospitality to the outsiders are now turned into the colonized by their colonizers”. On a similar note, in his travel narrative A Passage to India, Foster argued in 1924 that in colonial hospitality, the locals were subject to their foreign ‘masters’, who usurp their homeland and as the “master”, the colonizers discover that they need to replicate their original home in order to “be at home”. Foster reminds us that though theoretically speaking the English who come to India are visitors/guests, the political reality in which the English colonize India makes the English self-acclaimed hosts. Meanwhile, the Indians, now the reluctant guests of their English colonizers, attempt to reverse their role and reclaim their position as hosts. A similar situation, albeit with differences in content and aims, appears to characterise EULEX’s status as guest/host precisely because of Kosovo not being a fully established ‘home’.

2.2.1 Hostility

“Hospitality” is a series of combinations: of “hospitality, hostility, hostipitality”. It is precisely the action to defend ‘home’ as such that can lead to hostility; and this is true for both its conditioned and unconditioned forms. Hostipitality for him reveals the way hospitality

---


and hospitality are joined within the same undecidable un-ethical concept. Speaking on EU enlargement, Bulley argues that whatever the conditions or lack thereof that it sets, enlargement will inevitably fall into the category of ethical undecidability of hostipitality as the necessary filtering and choosing (of who and what is included) also necessitates a violent exclusion. For him, this exclusion occurs on a spectrum from those geographically distant (such as Latin America and Asia, who are absolutely excluded), to neighbourhood countries (who are largely excluded), to the Balkans (who are excluded until they stop being other and become the same).

Looking at the EU’s visa regime for Kosovo, this part demonstrates how the EU slides into hostility. The EU invented “negotiations on visa liberalisation” for the Western Balkan countries, provided that a whole range of conditionality requirements on enlargement would be fulfilled by the respective countries. After acknowledging the progress made, the EU granted visa waivers to the citizens of Serbia (without Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia in December 2009. The non-inclusion of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina was met with fierce criticism. Since ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina can hold passports of their ‘mother’ states – which were granted visa liberalization – that led to a bizarre situation in which only the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not able to travel visa free. Criticism in Bosnia and Herzegovina went viral claiming that this is another “discrimination of Srebrenica’s victims”. The EU was presented as “anti-Muslim” given the high percentage of Muslim population in both Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. By December 2010, the EU granted a visa waiver to citizens of Albania and Bosnia and

---


356 Particular focus was given to signing an EC readmission agreement and improving border controls, to reforming public administration and fighting organized crime, the EU talked about visa-free travel. Grabbe in Trauner, F. (2009). "From membership conditionality to policy conditionality: EU external governance in South East Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* **16**(5): 774-790.


358 Trauner, F. and E. Manigrassi (2014). "When visa-free travel becomes difficult to achieve and easy to lose: the EU Visa Free Dialogues after the EU’s experience with the Western Balkans." *European Journal for Migration and Law* **16**.
Herzegovina, leaving this way only Kosovo with the visa regime in place. On the one hand, the exclusion of Kosovo was seen as to indicate a further step from the EU side to deal with it as a state on its own, not as part of Serbia. On the other hand, the EU closed its doors to Kosovars, thereby reverting into hostility. This closeness of the EU ‘borders’ from ‘others’, has been coined ‘fortress Europe’ by Kramsch et.al. For Houtum and Pijpers, the EU is beginning to look like a ‘gated community’ also referred to as ‘defended neighbourhood’, a form of housing found mainly in developing countries with large internal income differences such as Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, as well as in the US, whereas for Seyla Benhabib this indicates who are the new ‘barbarians’ that are denied access.

In addition to exclusion from the visa free regime, there has been an enhancement of the procedures for applying and acquiring a Schengen visa for Kosovo citizens. Though 70% of its population are younger than 35, Kosovo remains one of the most isolated countries in the world. Even compared to countries like Afghanistan – currently on the list of countries characterised by warfare and high risk – citizens of Kosovo can travel visa free to only five countries (Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and the Maldives) while Afghans can travel to 22 states without a visa. This isolation incites fierce criticism, both among Kosovars who experienced visa free travel in the Yugoslav heyday and equally among those born in the mid-1980s where the barriers to travel were quite the norm. For Astrit Salihu, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Prishtina, the isolation of Kosovo is not only against the very idea of what the EU stands for, but is also in opposition to the whole concept of the EU presence in Kosovo. “I teach European philosophy in an auditorium of a

---


364 All data on Kosovo’s population census are available for consultation at Kosovo Agency of Statistics http://ask.rks-gov.net/

hundred students, only two of them had been able to travel to these European centres”

One can argue that not many Belgian or Portuguese students in their 20s have been able to travel to Rome, Berlin or Prague. The fundamental difference is that unlike their Kosovar counterparts, they are first of all *not denied* the possibility to do so, they are not required to present a long list of medical, employment, education, and legal documents to be considered for a visa, nor to pay 30% of their parents’ monthly salary for a visa application.

Maintaining a very security-centric approach, the European Commission has repeated that the restriction will stay in place until it is guaranteed that Kosovo “can ensure that relevant reforms are implemented and rules and procedures are respected so as to minimize the associated security risks for EU Member States”. For Hajrulla Çeku, head of the NGO Ec ma ndryshe, the EU’s visa regime towards Kosovo has less to do with fulfilling the requirements foreseen by EU’s roadmap for visa liberalisation; rather, it is much more a result of its constructed discourse on Kosovars as asylum seekers threatening EU security.

The EU’s hostility towards Kosovo is not merely a result of the EU closing its doors to Kosovars as ‘non-EU’ and/or ‘others’. The same policy (albeit with nuances) is maintained to the vast majority of so-called developing countries and countries with lowly records on the rule of law, democratic principles etc. Consequently, Kosovo is not the foremost case to evidence hostility in place. What makes it peculiar in this case is that this is happening towards a country in which the EU is investing quite a lot to make it part of its own family. On the one hand, the EU has envisioned a ‘European future’ for Kosovo by giving it a membership prospect. Further, the EU takes concrete actions to ensure Kosovo’s adjustment to ‘European values’. Since 1999, the EU is Kosovo’s biggest donor per capita in the world and it has deployed its biggest CFSP mission to date there.

On the other hand, the EU is not offering the possibility for Kosovo to have and develop contact with its ‘European future’ and, by closing its doors, it sends the message that Kosovars remain ‘others’, not European enough.

---


367 Evidence of monthly salaries can be found at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/kosovo/wages


3. Conclusion

When in the position of host towards Kosovo as guest, we have seen the EU with its Janus-face; offering a scrutinized conditioned hospitality with its enlargement package, while at the same time being hostile with regard to its visa regime policy. As a host, the EU is largely seen as trying to minimize the ways and opportunities to welcoming Kosovo into its family, while at the same time, it makes a strong promise for its ‘European future’. When in the position of guest in Kosovo, we have seen the EU becoming metamorphosed from guest into a host.

With regard to the EU as host and its hospitality towards Kosovo, we should ask whether this scrutinized conditioned hospitality is still hospitality? This article has demonstrated that in the case of Kosovo, there is a slippery slope in the procedures of conditioning the conditions for conditioned EU membership. How much hospitality is there left to speak of? Or is this a very difficult, almost unwanted ‘conditioned hospitality’? Is it an indirect form of hostility instead? These questions become even more relevant when, in parallel to this scrutinized conditioned hospitality, the EU’s slides into hostility in regard to the visa regime towards Kosovo.

Looking at the EU as guest, we have come to witness what can be the closest link to ‘unconditioned hospitality’ with the changing nature of EU from guest into a host. Though reference was made to a number of traditions on hospitality which treat the guest as king (Albanian included), it would be presumptuous and naïve to think of EU’s reversed identity to be a result of the local tradition of hospitality. More than anything, the role reversal of guest and host brings to light a number of power and political dimensions. Because it is not recognized as a state by the EU as such, is Kosovo actually a ‘home’ such as we have spoken so far? Is this reversal possible in non-finalized states/homes, only? Or is this more a trait of a power imbalance like the one evidenced in the literature on the colonial heritage? In the era of ‘liberal interventionism’ and the evolving trajectory of post-national, post-modern states, shall we give up home in the sense that there is neither need for well-defined home as such, nor for guests and/or hosts? Finally, the very condition of the hospitality of the EU is closely linked with its hostility, similar to how its position of guest is inherently subordinate to the condition of host. This in turn makes hospitality a hostility to otherness. As such the conditioned hospitality of enlargement, with its selection of the same and exclusion of the other, cannot help but be both hospitable and hostile.
Article 3 | Autoimmunity of democracy promotion. The case of Western missions in Kosovo
Autoimmunity of Democracy Promotion. The case of Western missions in Kosovo

Abstract

This article discusses how the international project for democracy building/democracy promotion in Kosovo, while aiming to establish democracy and the rule of law, suffers from fatal contradictions and self-inflicted damage commits suicide as its modus operandi opposes the very concept of democracy. Looking at the text of three major international structures/stakeholders in Kosovo – KFOR, UNMIK and the EU – the article problematizes how, while aiming to promote democracy and reconciliation in the post-war setting, all three institutions slide into non-democratic actions. Derrida has explained these phenomena with the concept of ‘autoimmunity’, which exemplifies the failed attempt of an organism to recognize its own constituent parts as self, leading to an immune response against its own cells and tissues. The article shows cases in which, while aiming to install “international standards” and the “European values” of democracy, rule of law and human rights in Kosovo, the international missions has essentially been behaving in a manner in contradiction to its stated aims for the country.

Keywords: autoimmunity, Kosovo, mission, democracy

1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the war in 1999, Kosovo experienced the deployment of the full package of Western humanitarian aid, democracy and peace building structures: a 50,000 NATO-led international peacekeeping force under the name of KFOR;371 around six thousand peacekeeping officers under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK);372 and about five thousand other experts from the World Bank, IMF, USAID, OSCE and EU, who were stationed mainly in Pristina373 – the capital of around two million people. Each and every structure was in its way contributing to the introduction and implementation of the overarching democratizing project for Kosovo.

Like the international presence itself, the case of Kosovo and the whole project of democratic peace for Kosovo has received a lot of attention in academia and the media. A


372 All information about UNMIK, its structure, mandate and mission are available at: http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/default.aspx

large body of literature deals with the deployed missions itself, their performance, strengths and weaknesses, lessons to be learned and so on. In this setup, why is it still relevant to write on Kosovo and the international missions which operated and continue to operate there? Why would their existence, performance and legacy still matter? The two main reasons the article addresses are formative. First, Kosovo is still subjected to a large international presence. Since 2009, the European Union has launched its largest CFSP mission to date (EULEX) to promote the rule of law. Second, albeit with differences in scope and mandate, we have observed that there is continuity in terms of how the international missions and their structures in Kosovo try to promote democracy and the rule of law, while precisely by not adhering to these principles themselves.

By applying Derrida’s concept of autoimmunity, the article elicits an original debate inviting literature both from democracy studies and the studies of interventions alike. The potential of the concept of autoimmunity is not limited to problematizing the international missions in Kosovo, nor to merely casting light on the problems of the missions in a (still) contested country. Rather it proposes that the very idea of democracy promotion in general can also be problematized by being brought in to the loop of the discussion. With regard to the plethora of contributions to the literature mentioned previously, we come to yet another argument as to why applying autoimmunity and Derrida to the case of international missions in Kosovo is important. The vast majority of this literature is preoccupied with fixing how the missions perform; drawing 'best lessons' from comparing missions over time and space; questioning the technical and performance characteristics. Yet, a very marginal section of this work


shows a tendency to problematize the concept of intervening and/or missionizing as such;\textsuperscript{379} in reflecting on the foundations of democratic peace\textsuperscript{380} and in questioning cartographies of power in who gets to ‘export’ democratic peace and who is (usually) the receiving recipient.\textsuperscript{381}

This article adopts the concept of autoimmunity to first challenge the narrative of the democratic project and international state building as such and second to display its autoimmune character.

Keeping faith with the exemplified notions of autoimmunity in the three cases, this article explains the autoimmune character of the ‘mission machinery’ in Kosovo as an embodiment of Western / European intervention within the project of democracy building. The article testifies that in the case of Kosovo, democracy is autoimmune because the international missions are not elected and therefore not accountable to the citizens of Kosovo. Consequently, their presence is not subject to the principle of checks and balances, which is formative for democracies. Instead of searching for responses to / examples of autoimmunity in every case elaborated, the article invites the reader to look for autoimmunity in the project of each structure and their ‘togetherness’ in the overall democratizing project for Kosovo. Focusing on the text – speech acts, billboards, leaflets – of KFOR, UN, the EU and EULEX – as structural exemplifications of the democratic project for the past 15 years, the article concludes how the acts of these structures have been autoimmune for their very democracy project.

2. Autoimmunity contextualized

Autoimmunity is not a concept of obvious relevance to studies in political science and/or international relations at large. Derived from biology, autoimmunity refers to the failure of an organism to recognize its own constituent parts as self, thus leading to an immune response against its own cells and tissues.\textsuperscript{382} In Rouges, Derrida explains autoimmunity as a process: while attempting to protect itself, it destroys itself, playing in this way both the role of


medicine and poison.\textsuperscript{383} In this regard, autoimmunity is a type of suicide, as an organism, while attempting to protect itself, attacks the vital elements that keep it alive. This is not the first time Derrida brings concepts from other fields (biology, psychoanalysis etc.) to explain processes that are inherently political.\textsuperscript{384} Within studies in political science and international relations, autoimmunity is mostly used in the literature on terrorism\textsuperscript{385} and sovereignty studies.\textsuperscript{386} In the sphere of IR at large, Derrida has employed autoimmunity to explain a number of questions and concepts in philosophy, three of which deserve particular attention in this article – ‘democracy’, ‘Europe’ and ‘colonialism’.\textsuperscript{387} All three concepts come together in the case of the EU and other international missions in Kosovo. Democracy as the overarching project sponsored in Kosovo from the Western liberal democratic structures; Europe, both with its deployed mission in Kosovo, but also Europe as the European future envisioned for Kosovo through the prospect of enlargement;\textsuperscript{388} colonialism, more precisely features of colonial like behaviour and/or fragments of neo-colonialism evidenced in the narrative of local Kosovars.\textsuperscript{389}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{384} He did the same with the notion of ‘pharmakon’ – the poisoned medicine – which can both cure and kill at the same time, depending on the amount used.
\end{flushright}
2.1 Democracy

Discussing democracy’s autoimmunity, is very much preconditioned in first defining democracy as such. A definition (however loose) is a challenge in more than one way because of its evolution in time, space, and not less its outcomes. For Przeworski et al, democracy is representation and accountability. For Plotke it is representation. For Polletta and other advocates of deliberative democracy, freedom is essentially the core of democracy. In spite of this, in 1991 Schmitter and Karl, argued that a remarkable consensus has emerged concerning the minimal conditions that polities must meet in order to merit the appellation of “democratic”. The classic approach of Schumpeter suggests that democracy is “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. Schmitter and Karl accept certain aspects of the classical procedural approach to modern democracy but differ primarily in their emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens. “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm of their elected representatives.”

For Robert Dahl, who has offered a generally accepted list of what constitute the “procedural minimal” criteria of democracy, the characteristics include among others 1) consensus – the agreement of citizens on the substantive goals; 2) the participation of citizens in politics; 3) responsiveness – rulers must be held accountable; and 4) checks and balances – an overall ‘supervision’ of state institutions. In reading Derrida, Bulley argues that Derrida associates democracy with freedom / liberty (eleutheria) and license (exousia), which is also whim, free will, ease, freedom of choice, and the right to do as one pleases. Thus, from Ancient Greece onwards,

---


Democracy for Derrida is a suicidal concept – in that it has the ability to kill itself by working against itself. “Democracy is autoimmune first of all because its concept or quasi-concept is “undecidable”;\footnote{399 Derrida, J. (2003). Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides. Philosophy in time of terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. G. Borradori.} it is essentially void of any content or meaning in and of itself, that it is outside the linguistic matrix in which it is located.\footnote{400 Derrida, J. (2003). Rouges. Stanford, Stanford University Press.} The concept is thus always open to iteration and re-inscription, its meaning in some sense is always still to come. For Jacques Ranciere, democracies on the one hand, send armies to bring to other people by force that democracy which is supposed to mean the self-government of the people; on the other hand, they unrelentingly complain that democracy is ungovernable, that the democratic government is threatened by a moral danger which is the excess of democratic life.\footnote{401 Rancière, J. (2009). Should Democracy Come? Ethics and Politics in Derrida. Derrida and the Time of the Political. Pheng Cheah & Suzanne Guerlac. USA, Duke University Press.}

Derrida talks about two cases of democracy’s autoimmunity which I will classify as 1) \textit{intrinsic}, meaning that democracy’s autoimmunization is traced at the very concept of it; 2) \textit{political / procedural} and has to do with the ‘election’ as a cornerstone of democracy. Autoimmunity is \textit{intrinsic to democracy} which in Derrida’s argument comes from democracy being rooted in the freedom of speech.\footnote{402 Derrida, J. (2003). Rouges. Stanford, Stanford University Press.} Democracy is the only system, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has the right to criticize everything publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, in history and its name.\footnote{403 Naas, M. (2006). ""One nation....indivisible": Jacques Derrida on the autoimmunity of democracy and the sovereignty of god." Research in Phenomenology 36(15).} It contains within it the possibility of welcoming an undemocratic regime, and of inviting (and to some extent encouraging) terrorist attacks, as well as the possibility of producing another attack against itself in an attempt to divert these threats.\footnote{404 Derrida in Haddad, S. (2004). "Derrida and Democracy at Risk." Contretemps 4(September): 29-44.}
enemies has traditionally been focused in tracing democracy’s enemies in the ‘outside’, be that with communism as its ‘other’ / enemy throughout the Cold War or with ‘religious fundamentalism’ / terrorism in the post 9/11 world. With autoimmunity, Derrida sets forward the proposition that the ‘enemy’ of democracy is within the concept as such and within it as a system. To clarify what he means by that, it is relevant to refer to two examples he elaborates in Rouges and Real and Symbolic Suicides, respectively. Derrida mentions that 9/11 is an autoimmune action of democracy, in which the system is compromised from inside. Most people in the al-Qaeda network were US citizens. That is, they were brought up in the US, educated in American universities with American values of democracy, multiculturalism and so on. It was in turn these people who waged the attack with the hijacked planes against the US itself. The perceived threat to the democracy of the United States following 9/11 led to US democracy attacking itself by suspending certain democratic rights and liberties of its citizens in the name of security.

Political / procedural autoimmunity is traced in the elections of democracies, where a sovereign vote may end democracy while using the democratic right to do so. Derrida points to the example of the elections of 1992 in his native Algeria, where democratic elections were suspended when it became likely that a majority would elect a party that has as its objective the end of democratic rule and the installation of a theocratic regime. In the name of democracy, then, the democratic leaders in Algeria suspended the democratic process temporarily so that the opposing party would not, once elected, put an end to it permanently. A similar example has been noticed in the elections of 2006 in Gaza. While the US and the EU were calling for fair and democratic elections, Hamas’ victory by 44.55% to Fatah’s 41.43% showed that the results from the very important democratic vote were nonetheless null, as both the EU and the US pledged not to work with Hamas which both of


409 Ibid.
them regarded as a terrorist organization. Algeria and Gaza are rather accidental examples and they do not ‘map’ democracy’s autoimmune practices in new / emerging / weak democracies. Other cases are evidenced throughout the past 20 years in countries like France, Austria and the UK. For instance, the victory of Marine Le Pen of France, and of Nigel Farage in the UK in the European Parliamentary elections of 2014 with their anti-EU platforms reconfirms the autoimmune from within. Both parties trace their development in their guaranteed right to compete and be elected for European Parliament elections, which both ultimately challenge its very core existence and instead argue for a retreat to a traditional country based sovereignty. The pervertibility of democracy in this case is double sided, with the autoimmune condition of Le Pen and Farage’s victories as a result of a possibility created by a democratic system of elections, on the one hand, and the inability of the EU to question the result because of the principle of acceptance embedded in the democratic values on the other. In another example, the heads of government of fourteen EU members decided to cease cooperation with the Austrian government and impose political sanctions after Jörg Haider of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) came to power in 2000 on grounds of the party’s right-wing extremism manifested in its anti-Semitic, anti-immigration, Euro-sceptic program. For the first time in its history, the EU was imposing a diplomatic sanction on a member state with supporters of sanctions arguing that Europe is a “community of shared values” that must clearly distance itself from the “insulting, anti-foreigner and racist utterances of Jörg Haider.” Defending democratic principles, Die Zeit newspaper argued that by imposing sanctions the EU was breaking “the fundamental right of each democracy to decide freely which parties its citizens can vote for and which of these parties should form government.”

Cases like that of Haider and his party are rather common throughout Western Europe, and not only there. This is not a tendency to collect what may appear sporadic cases to ultimately argue democracy’s suicide. More than a sound argument, that would be a fetishization of

---


412 Ibid.

413 Joschka Fischer quoted in ibid.

‘elections’ as an institution in democracies. At this point it is imperative to enquire about the meaning of actions like these mean for democracy as such? Is Austria less democratic since Haider’s victory and do similar cases ‘kill’ democracies? Rather than claiming the death of democracy in Austria, what these cases have shown is democracy’s vulnerability to auto-immunize against itself.

2.1 Europe

“Europe is the most beautiful, and also the allegory of autoimmunity.”

Jacques Derrida

With regard to Europe, Derrida’s thinking is itself “internally differentiated, complicated, and often paradoxical, being traversed by an array of ethico-political motifs such as democracy, justice, responsibility, and hospitality.” Two of his works in which he talks about Europe deserve attention and will be looked as responses to one-another. The first is The Other Heading. Reflections on Today’s Europe written in 1992, and the other is his co-signed letter with Habermas in 2003 after the intervention in Iraq, February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe.

In The Other Heading, Derrida sees two ‘contradictory imperatives’: on the one hand, or under one heading, Europe “cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing authority” that “would control and standardize, subjecting artistic discourses and practices to a grid of intelligibility”; on the other hand, or the other heading, “it must resist and renounce the proliferation of a multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms” – must resist and renounce, in short, difference for its own sake. Experiencing the aporetic desire both for unification and for maintaining the difference that makes cultural identity possible, Europe must undergo what Derrida calls “the experience and experiment of the impossible” – the drive conditioned by two contradictory laws. He picked up on this contradiction in


417 With aporia, Derrida refers to the experience of the possibility of the impossible. It is argued that Derrida uses aporia as a logical tool by which he views the world. He observes its operation in parallel sets of dualities: among others, he finds aporias at work between the measurable and immeasurable, the conditional and unconditional, the same and other, and the guest and host. See for more: Derrida, J. "Positions ."

his discussion with Elisabeth Roudinesco in 2004, describing as autoimmune the paradox that we are liberating ourselves from ethnocentrism, and eventually from Eurocentrism, in the name of its European filiation. The contradiction lies in that “Europe itself, yesterday and today: not only does it give itself weapons to use against itself and against its own limitations, but it gives weapons to all the peoples and all the cultures that European colonialism itself has subjugated.”

Written in the wake of mass demonstrations around the world against the waged war in Iraq in 2003, the Habermas-Derrida text calls the nations of Europe to forge their European identity and to formulate a common foreign policy in order to serve as a counterweight to US global power. The document urges the European political community to take responsibility for global peace, international law and justice, principles that seem to have been abandoned by the US government. Central to this letter is the underlying message of the ‘responsibility’ of the ‘European identity’ that has to be the “locomotive” of change. How would that memory be? More importantly, how would one ask ‘responsibility’ from the memory itself, by addressing to a group of nations? It was in the Other Heading that Derrida spoke of Europe as memory and heritage, arguing that the discourse on what constitutes Europe, or what points and promises in the name of Europe, is the heritage before which, and in response to which, responsibility arises. Hence the duty to respond to the call of European memory, to recall what has been promised in the name of Europe, to re-identify Europe; opening Europe, from the heading that is divided because it is also a shoreline: opening it onto that which is not, never was, and never will be Europe. The same duty also dictates welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity: two concepts of hospitality that today divide our European and national consciousness.

---


421 “It is born precisely of the call of this heritage which comes before us, which is other to us, which pulls us away from our roots, which liberates us from all linguistic limitations, and finally which opens us to the other. This responsibility to which we are called by European memory obliges us precisely inssofar as it is foreign to us-foreign because it calls us-to liberate ourselves from the limitations which are ours. Derrida, J. (1992). The other heading. Reflections on today's Europe. Indiana University Press.

422 Ibid.
Up to this point, though Europe’s autoimmunity can be traced, this does not exactly link it with the case in point – the Western and European missions in Kosovo. Here I will argue for a new form of autoimmunity. This form of autoimmunity is political and appears with the exporting of democracy overseas. The exporting of democracy and the imposition of democratic values is firstly autoimmune as a process – the arbitrarily imposition of liberal democratic values, and secondly as an outcome – that by imposing liberal democratic values to establish a democratic order, the act of democracy project itself becomes non-democratic. This contextualization brings us to Derrida’s point on colonialism’s autoimmunity. He does not dwell on an analysis of this, but mentions it as a tangent while talking about Europe.\textsuperscript{423} Derrida makes reference once again to Algeria’s fight for independence from France and argues that autoimmunity was “the violent imposition of a culture and political language that were supposed to be in line with a Greco-European political ideal that helped fuel a so-called civil war, one that was really a war for independence waged in the very name of the political ideals extolled by the colonial power.”\textsuperscript{424} This final dimension is particularly relevant in the case of missions in Kosovo for primarily two reasons. First, the arbitrary imposition of the European / international model of democracy in Kosovo has traces of neo-colonial heritage. Second, the criticism towards the international structures and the local resistance towards the practices of the international missions is much more a criticism towards the ‘Europe’, the ‘democracy’ as an arbitrary imposition, with neo-colonial nuances, rather than against the first two per se.

Aspects of the discourse of the international structures in Kosovo will be hereon deconstructed on a chronological basis. Thematically, we will explain how the ‘international standards’ for democracy building played out for KFOR and the UN further shift with ‘European standards / values’ of the deployed EU mission. The article does not stop to, nor is it interested in, discussing the structure, mandate and technicalities of the above-mentioned structures. It rather posits them in the broader Western model of the ‘democracy promotion’ trajectory.


3. In the name of ‘international standards’

“They [the international community] talk about diversity, melding in and multiculturalism, while both UNMIK and EU structures entrench themselves in buildings with high walls, with barbed wires on top, and have no contact with the local population”.

Albert Heta, head of Centre for Contemporary Art, Stacion, Pristina

In addressing the democratic path Kosovo ought to be undertaking, the discourse of KFOR, the UN and to a lesser extent, of the EU structures in Kosovo, makes rampant reference to concepts like ‘international standards’, ‘highest international standards’, and ‘best international standards’; the same applies to the European Union Office in Kosovo and EULEX who make extensive usage of ‘European standards’, ‘European values’, and ‘the European way’. It is not clear though what these standards and/or values are.

A ‘popular’ example in political communication of international structures in Kosovo is a KFOR billboard of 2005 in which a cat and a dog are sitting next to each other in a relaxing fashion, with the caption “If they can be tolerant, so can you....Become tolerant!” (see Annex II). Let us for a moment put aside the military identity of KFOR as a structure and see it embedded in the intervention and missionizing structure whose aim is to end hostility and eventually bring democracy to Kosovo. In most of the cultures there is a clear symbolic of cat and dog as antagonized animals perennially in conflict. Their fight is not a survival one. A lion fights with a zebra to feed itself. But this is not the case between a dog and a cat.

---


427 Similarly, these concepts were widely used during EU’s democracy promotion in Central and Eastern European Countries. For more see: Eline De Ridder & Dimitry Kochenov (2011). “Democratic Conditionality in the Eastern Enlargement: Ambiguous Window Dressing.” European Foreign Affairs Review(13): 589-605.
which makes their fighting all the more mystifying. These are two animals fighting for something which is outside of the rules of nature – the survival circle. And so are the Serbs and the Albanians. They are somehow perennially in a struggle, in a fight that defies common sense. Studies in veterinary psychology devote special focus to ‘habituating’ the cat and dog as pet animals living under the same roof. For Gina Spadafori, pet columnist, under no circumstances should cat-dog introductions be handled by throwing the animals together and letting them work out things on their own. “The process must be supervised, and they must be handled with planning, care and patience.”

Going back to the billboard, the message pathologizes the conflict, inferring it to be utterly irrational, yet not impossible to be contained. Two local Serbian interviewees deconstruct the billboard best. “They [the international community] need us to stay here, so that Ahtisaari and Ashton can say ‘look we made it. They are living together.”

We see here how the whole idea of multi-ethnicity is autoimmune to itself. While intending to send the message of multi-ethnicity in the virtues of tolerance, coexistence etc., KFOR sends the message that tolerating the other essentially means keeping it in the abundantly clear boundaries of ‘othering’.

The whole concept of multi-ethnicity (embedded in the democratizing project) being autoimmune to itself is particularly present in the document of the UN envoy to Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari. Advocating the so-called ‘best practices from the most prosperous Western democracies,’ the document is seen as the most advantageous example of human rights, minority protection and inter-ethnic policies. Its Constitutional Provisions provide

---


Interview X 3 (2013). Interview. V. Musliu. Mitrovica (North)

430 The official name of the document is “The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement”, commonly referred to as Ahtisaari’s Plan. After failing to reach an agreement in the UN mediated negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, Ahtisaari compiled his plan to resolve Kosovo’s status, establishing the blueprint for its independence. The principles mentioned in the Plan were to be enshrined in Kosovo’s Constitution following its declaration of independence, and were the cornerstones of Kosovo’s state building agenda.


that Kosovo “shall be democratic, multi-ethnic, have an open economy and have no official religion.”\footnote{United Nations Security Council (2007). Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Security Council.} Each of these ‘decrees’ represent a deliberate intervention into dimensions of identity, ideology and history of the local reality. First, deciding arbitrarily to become democratic, multi-ethnic, to have an open economy and no official religion, and furthermore internalize it in the Constitution\footnote{Ahtisaari’s plan foresaw the establishment of the International Civilian Office (ICO) to guarantee that the premises mentioned in it would be respected and implemented from the decision making institutions in Kosovo. The job of the ICO was also to supervise whether the legislative framework in Kosovo’s Assembly will be in accordance with the principles advocated in Ahtisaari’s Plan. In many ways, the Plan and the presence of the ICO were there to guarantee an enhanced level of democratic accountability and compatibility with democratic principles.} is undemocratic \textit{in practice}, as it erodes the very basic principle of ‘democratic standards’ of debating and reaching that consensual agreement. This comes closer not only to the more emancipatory concept of deliberative democracy,\footnote{Elster, J. (1998). \textit{Deliberative Democracy}. Australia, Cambridge University Press.} but is also a cornerstone of the so-called more classical definitions of democracy.\footnote{See for more: Dahl, R. (1982). \textit{Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy}. New Haven, Yale University Press.} The discussion of whether in a different scenario – that of the ability to choose – Kosovo would still plump for the option of being “democratic, multi-ethnic, and having an open economy and no official religion”, is not all important at this part. The very message that deciding on democracy is to be done non-democratically – not taking into account people’s choice or will – is a representation of its autoimmunity. We are going to ‘make’ you democratic by not adhering to democratic procedures / principles, or in other words by killing the principles that lead to it. In a similar fashion, Rutazibwa notices that with regard to the Cotonou Agreement in EU-Africa relations, “privatisation, liberalisation and market economy are suddenly the only way forward to which both parties subscribed.”\footnote{Rutazibwa, O. U. (2010). "The Problematics of the EU’s Ethical (Self)Image in Africa: The EU as an ‘Ethical Intervener’ and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy." \textit{Journal of Contemporary European Studies} \textbf{18}(2): 209-228.}
The concept of ‘multi-ethnicity’ and how it is to be realised in policy practice is not only omnipresent in the document but is basically its *modus operandi*. Multi-ethnicity was established, notwithstanding the fact that Kosovo’s population (especially after the war) was rather homogenous with above 90% Albanians. Decentralization along ethnic lines was put forward as the model for local governance and most of all as a way to guarantee the rights and the protection of ethnic minorities. Extensive language rights are guaranteed for all minorities provided that they comprise 5% of the population in a community, while in most European countries with far more mixed ethnic and linguistic groups, the threshold is 20%. In trying to ascertain the “best” or “highest” international standards intended in this case, we see this to be the practice in Finland – Ahtisaari’s birthplace – one of the countries with the best record of minority protection in the world. Here Swedish is an official language due to the 5% of Swedish speaking Fins. The ‘5% model, which was reached by way of more than a hundred years of controversies and debate in Finland, is therefore suggested to Kosovo a mere eight years after the war with Serbia, in a country transitioning from war to ‘peace’ and from socialism to democracy and open market. In trying to implement multi-ethnicity in this way, the project as such works against itself, first by being an arbitrary choice for the local constituents in the absence of debate on the decision and premises of multi-ethnicity; and second, by suffocating a number of multi-layered processes of transitional justice, conflict resolution, that could potentially lead to a more embedded debate on multi-ethnicity and extended minority rights. For Hajrulla Çeku, head of the NGO *Ec Ma Ndryshe* in Kosovo, Ahtisaari’s Plan did not give people the opportunity to decide what they wanted.

“It set forward that Kosovo will have a text-less national anthem – a post-modernist experiment; our flag will have Kosovo’s map on it, to fulfil the optical illusion of a state, which is ironically similar to the flags of two very dysfunctional states – Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

---


Practices like these have been largely elaborated in critiques of the liberal peace. For Chandler, these are cases of post-liberal states that are “not designed to be independent political subjects in anything but name,” but their relationship of external dependency means that the domestic political sphere cannot serve to legitimise the political authorities or reconstruct their societies.

Below we will talk about two different ways in which Ahtisaari’s Plan enforces the principles of multi-ethnicity, both leading to multi-ethnicity’s autoimmunity. In the first case, Kosovars are stripped of their national, ethnic and sociological identity for the sake of the multi-ethnic project aiming to promote “…the peaceful and prosperous existence of all its inhabitants,” which sets forward the idea that Kosovo has *inhabitants* not *citizens* (Inhabitant has been regularly used in UN’s communication towards Kosovo, while in EU documents reference to ‘population’ is noticed). Why would this semantic difference deserve attention? Oxford Dictionary defines inhabitant as “a person, or animal that lives in or occupies a place.” As such, Kosovo has *inhabitants* – who are merely dwellers in this particular location – but it has no *citizens*, as in “persons with legal and political status by which they are entitled to a set of rights and privileges.” By this token, the term *citizen* has a sociological and legal attribute, while *inhabitant* does exactly the opposite – stripping the subject off of its sociological identification. The idea of infusing the ‘multi-ethnicity’ project in an otherwise clearly ethnic based identified environment is autoimmune to itself as it calls for multi-ethnicity while stripping the subject off its sociological agency. Arguably, this practice is not limited to Kosovo. During the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia, in negotiations mediated by the EU, NATO and the US, Solana proposed that the Framework Agreement should not mention any ethnic attribution. It was only after major pressure from the ethnic groups in Macedonia that the document mentions that “Macedonia is defined as the state of Macedonians,

---


446 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/inhabitant?q=inhabitant


448 The Ohrid Agreement in 2001 ended the armed conflict between Macedonia and the Albanian guerrilla.
Albanians, Turkish, Serbian and Vlach people who live there.” The same ‘technique’, albeit different in content, is also evidenced with the wording of ‘communities’ in place of ethnic groups and/or ethnic minorities. While with inhabitants Kosovars are mutilated of their sociological agency, in the second case they are mutilated of their ethnic attribution, for the sake of the multi-ethnic project. For Hoxha and Çeku, “this neo-colonial approach has disfigured and alienated the locals’ history and identity for the sake of the multi-ethnic standards.” On a similar take, Chandler argues that the EU’s promotion of good governance has done little to promote democratic political processes in either Kosovo or Bosnia and, as such, the population is seen as “bearers of human rights – rather than as ‘citizens’ with rights of political equality.”

In the second case, ethnic and religious differences are made abundantly clear, firstly to propagate the rights of minorities in the multi-ethnic project and secondly to codify practices of double standards for ethnic minority accommodation. With Ahtisaari’s provisions, Kosovo’s parliament has had 20 seats for minorities, of which 10 were reserved for Kosovo Serbs, while the others were reserved for the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and Gorani communities. Any seats won through elections were granted in addition to the reserved ones. Up until 2014, this praxis indicated mixed results on issues pertaining to multi-ethnic representation. With guaranteed seats, the Serbian minority was less willing to get organized in party politics, and as a result less enthusiastic about participating in the institutional life and being part of the projected multi-ethnic picture. The plan foresaw the abandonment of the practice after two electorate mandates following the adoption of the Constitution. Yet, in the parliamentary vote for the establishment of the so called

---


454 Ibid.
“Kosovo Armed Forces” in 2014, Kosovo Serbs conditioned their pro-vote for the army with the request of extending the practice of the reserved seats for yet another mandate. According to civil society members in Kosovo, continuing the reserved seats for the Serbian minority because of their conditioning undermines inter-ethnic relations and may lead to public opinion coming to see the guaranteed Serbian presence in the parliament as a risk.\footnote{455}

4. In the name of ‘European values’

Moving on to the European Union and its structures’ discourse in Kosovo, a shift is evidenced from ‘international standards’ of democracy to democratic standards as ‘European values’. In fact, the shift is not so much a shift from one single well-defined set of ‘international standards’ to ‘European values’; rather, at times the discourse seems to meld international standards with ‘European values’ and the other way around. For instance, the resolution of Kosovo’s status is not just foreseen to be completed through the ‘best international standards’ but it “should be based on European values”;\footnote{457} strengthening the decentralization process envisioned through ethno-politics is now given as a “European value of cohabitation and multiculturalism”\footnote{458}.

Since 1999, the EU has been “investing major political and financial efforts to building lasting peace and democracy, and to facilitate Kosovo’s progress towards a democratic, multi-ethnic society.”\footnote{459} For Koeth, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Western Balkans in general are a litmus test for EU foreign policy and the EU’s constructed subjectivity as an international actor.\footnote{460} Therefore the way the Balkans are handled in this period is formative for how the EU constructs itself as a subject. For Xavier de Marnhac, former head of EULEX, “Kosovo’s success is directly linked to EULEX’s and EU’s

\footnote{455}{In 2014, Kosovo’s Parliament discussed the transformation of “Kosovo Security Forces” into “Kosovo Armed Forces”.}
\footnote{457}{Commission of the European Communities (2009). Kosovo - Fulfilling its European Perspective. Brussels.}
\footnote{458}{European Union Office in Kosovo / European Union Special Representative in Kosovo (2011). EU project provides training for teachers on multiculturalism Pristina, European Union Office in Kosovo / European Union Special Representative in Kosovo.}
success.” Solana talked about the Balkans as a ‘journey’ that “we must help them to complete”. We must also, he says, “help the straggler (Serbia) along.” The metaphor of the ‘road to Europe’ is often used by Patten, and it develops further. For example, in a speech to Bosnians, Patten suggests that the EU can “help build that road….we can flag the staging posts, and applaud you as you pass them”, all of which means they will ensure that “BiH never has to walk the road to Europe alone.” This metaphor has been similarly put in place by the then European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in Kosovo. On a 2005 billboard, EAR placed Kosovo in the centre of a picture, with a beautiful mountain scenery in the background where the EU flag waved. The road toward that mountain, and eventually to the EU flag was depicted as long and curvy shaped, conveying in this way the idea of the EU being always further away, behind Alp like mountains. In the background was a clear blue sky with a radiant yellow sun. For local anthropologist Luci and contemporary artist Heta, the scenery in the billboard represents the EU’s stance and vision of what Kosovo can and has to become. “For each step taken towards this long road, we will get applauded like skiers surpassing the flags in the skiing stages.” They add that each step Kosovars take forward would imply a further step in becoming more European. “The only other options are either to move slowly,” like Serbia, the straggler in Solana’s words, “or to move backwards. But sideways movements appear to be impossible.” In addition to this, we suggest that this idyllic representation of a European future, of what Kosovo should want to become, marks the road that Kosovo has to take. If we go back to Derrida’s exemplification of democracy as freedom to choose as one pleases, the billboard seems to offer neither a ‘choice’ of the path to be taken, nor, as such, the ‘freedom’ in choosing.


464 The European Agency for Reconstruction used to manage EU’s main assistance programmes in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. Up until 2008, when its mandate ended, EAR had handled a portfolio of three billion euros.


While the ‘European future’ is autoimmune with regard to choice as the very precondition of democratic decision, examples will be provided below to show the autoimmunization of the criteria for the ‘European future’ on a more micro level. The first example of ‘true European values’ is imprinted on Kosovo’s flag in which six white stars are posited in an arc above a golden map of Kosovo, on a blue field. Each of the six stars represent a “community” - as in ethnic minority – in Kosovo. The flag was commissioned by the UN and the EU and was designed by a local Kosovar. As in other examples of inversed ownership, the production of such an image is an example not only of how “Europe sees Kosovo,” but also how it is envisioned for Kosovo to see Kosovo. The same flag was adopted for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 10 white stars (resembling the 10 cantons) were posited on top of a yellow triangle (the tripartite federation) on a blue field. Both flags have a significant resemblance to the EU flag, this way making Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina the first real EU countries, even though none of them are part of the EU. Both flags were conceptualized and designed to tone down any groups’ national identification with the flag, setting forward the EU’s idea of united in diversity with a post- and/or non-national flag. Kosovo’s flag was introduced for the first time at Kosovo’s Assembly following the declaration of independence in February 17, 2008. In this way, the foundation of the new state (in its political sense) was associated with the new flag, signalling that the history and remembrance of ‘Kosovo’ was born that exact day. The process of adjusting to the usage, identification and the embrace of the new flag is still underway. Two million Kosovars, who up until that moment had been using their national flags, were introduced to the newly founded state, new national anthem and a new flag. The is the construction of ‘year zero’ for Kosovo by the EU; not only was a new ‘state’ as structure formed that day, but also a new nation (the Kosovar nation) identified with the EU-flavoured national symbols was born. The ‘year zero’ also marks the amnesia of an existence of a Kosovo as a one dimensional

467 Albanians 92%; Serbs 1.5%; Bosniaks 1.6%; Roma 0.5%; Turks 1.1%; Ashkali 0.9%)
470 The logic of Year Zero is that culture and tradition within a particular group must be destroyed and a new culture and tradition must replace it from scratch. History, memory, evidence or people before Year Zero are not considered important. Rather, the gaze is turned to the creation of a perfect new culture, memory, people that will replace it. For more see: Ponchaud, F. (1978). Cambodia: Year Zero. Modern History Sourcebook.
struggle for independence from its Albanian population, but instead sets it forward as victory of the struggle for democracy of all Kosovo’s ‘communities’.

The second example of ‘European values’ is enshrined in Kosovo’s national anthem. The international community had established a ‘competition’ in which “Europe” – a melody composed by a local Kosovar was chosen. The selection of an anthem without lyrics, would not have any reference to a particular ethnic group.471 “The anthem of Kosovo is text-less. You can’t sing it; chant it, or feel it for that matter. You are muted in a way,”472 argues Luci. Again, the same practice of a text-less national anthem has been used for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case. Does this make Kosovo truly or more European than any other EU member states who happen to have flags in Billig’s format – as elements of banal nationalism to remind us of history, myths, forefathers, struggle, collective identity etc.? All of these elements/processes; the flag, the national anthem, are quintessentially linked with Derrida’s definition of democracy as embedded in the demos’ freedom to choose and debate. And this is not because all of the above are the symbols upon which the identity of a state, group, nation is built, rather because of a democratic right to be part of the decision making process that led to these processes instead of a mere spectator of the final outcome.

Is the EU simply transplanting its (self-ascribed) post-modern, post-national identity? Drawing on Paul Valery’s work on the raise and decline of Europe, Derrida makes rampant reference to this autoimmune feature, albeit not focusing strictly on either a particular geographical area, or on missions as such. For him, the ‘Decline of Europe’ – as the autoimmunity of Europe – belongs to this “age of the finite world that Europe itself has precipitated by exporting itself, and by Europeanising the non-Europeans, awakening, instructing, and arming those who aspired only to remain as they were.”473 For him, this Eurocentric mondialisation474 – Europe exporting itself – suffers from an autoimmune crisis

471 Until “Europe” was chosen the anthem, Kosovo had used EU’s hymn “Ode to Joy” in all its official ceremonies including the declaration of independence in February 17, 2008.


474 With [Eurocentric] mondialisation, Derrida argues the difference between mondialisation on the one hand, and globalization on the other. Mondialisation which can be literally translated as “worldwide-ization” which represents more than the geometrical or geopgrahical ‘globe of globalization, which lacks the social, historical sense, history and memory of the ‘world’ that is present in the French word. Derrida, J. (2003). Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides. Philosophy in time of terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. G. Borradori.
insofar as its attempts to establish itself worldwide results in a breakdown of its own immunity to change and transformation. “What is exported, in a European language, immediately sees itself called into question again in the name of what was potentially at work in this European legacy itself, in the name of a possible auto-hetero-deconstruction. Or, autoimmunity.” For Derrida, this autoimmunity is traced back deeply in the European thought and identity, which according to him not only gives itself weapons to use against itself and against its own limitations, but it gives political weapons to all the peoples and all the cultures that European colonialism itself has subjugated.

The EU’s efforts to promote multi-ethnicity have expanded to agencies and structures which, albeit not part of the EU, share the philosophy of multi-ethnicity as a part of ‘European values’. The Council of Europe in Kosovo has been extensively involved in co-publications with the European Union Office in Kosovo primarily on projects related to cultural heritage and multi-ethnicity at large. For instance, in a co-publication of the European Union and the Council of Europe in “support and promotion of cultural diversity in Kosovo”, published in 2012, 14 strip stories on otherness, urban identity, non-material cultural identity, tourism, European heritage etc. are explained in the following manner. The stories are built around a group of aliens (UFOs) who have just landed on Earth and are trying to figure out the ‘cosmos’ and the way humans live in it (See Annex III). The Council of Europe in Kosovo has a long tradition of raising awareness, making public debates and also providing programs and lectures for Kosovo’s academic personnel (teachers, lecturers, professors) in how they should revise their curricula’s to better incorporate the concept of ‘cultural heritage’ and also on how they shall teach their pupils and students on cultural heritage in the broader paradigm of multi-ethnicity. In critical and post-colonial studies there is a recurring theme of the missionizer’s – endowed with the democratic values – ‘lecturing’ attitude towards the ‘primordial’ local who has not yet reached the level to appreciate these values. Derrida reminds us that one sign or symptom of democracy’s

---


autoimmunity is the way canonical discourses of democracy from Plato to Aristotle onwards have had difficulty distinguishing between the goods and evils of democracy, freedom from license or democracy from pedagogy. As such, he continues, “the perfectibility of democracy is related to the “hyperbolic essence,” the “autoimmune” essence”.479 In the Council of Europe’s publication, which is nevertheless not a marginal approach of how the local is spoken to, and thus should be seen embedded in the overall discourse, the newly arrived UFO represents the local Kosovar, unaware of the (Western-democratic) concept of cultural heritage and thus unable to know its importance. In addition to the patronizing discourse, the alien-earthly human dichotomy, is again the recurring ‘year zero’ with the EU for Kosovo, in that talking and notions of protecting cultural heritage and even multi-ethnicity had not existed there before the EU and its fellow international missionizing organizations had stepped into Kosovo. Former Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo was part of, was a federation of four religious groups and a handful number of sects. Kosovo itself is home to a number of Islamic, Christian and Orthodox sites dating back to the 11th and 14th centuries. Albanians of Kosovo themselves share both Islamic and Christian religion with intermingling traditions and cultures from both, and with situations where churches and mosques are built within the same yard.480 Although a number of religious and cultural sites was destroyed during the war, their century long preservation had been in place long before the introduction of the Council of Europe’s and/or the EU’s lectureship on cultural heritage and the wonders of its preservation.

It is interesting to point out that both the Council of Europe in Kosovo and the EU structures display the picture of Prizren city when they want to make the point of what cultural heritage is and how important it is. Dating back to the 2nd century AD, the city has a rich Ottoman architecture, is home to a diverse ethnic population and hosts important religious sites of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Orthodoxy and Dervish sects.481 The picture of Prizren with all that it represents is shown to Kosovars as a symbol of what the EU wants to promote in Kosovo, as if Kosovars have not been stakeholders in making and preserving Prizren as it is today.


Throughout these strips, the problem of cultural heritage and the solutions for its protection are traced and found in a rather irrational conflict between the two humans (corresponding to the Serbs and the Albanians) and the UFOs (the internationals) trying to make sense out of the situation. While the whole booklet is addressed as ‘teaching cultural heritage to aliens’ – in which scenario the locals are the aliens and the ‘lecturers’ are the internationals – in some of the strip stories, the internationals become ‘the UFOs’ trying to understand the problems and the conflicts of the ‘humans’ – locals. In the strip named “The other,” for instance, a group of UFOs decide to “study the behaviour of humans” while watching them having a disagreement. The UFOs reach the conclusion that while this problem is easily solvable, “it is completely different with humans.” Positing the problem of heritage as a result of a conflict between two groups (the Serbs and the Albanians), the narrative pathologizes the conflict as such, setting forward that the problem has something that is uniquely distinctive to “these humans”. The international missions deal with Kosovo as a struggle of two homogenous, culturally conflicting groups where everyone is simply put in one of the two categories. As with the cases with decentralization and human rights, the missionizing structures in Kosovo have ethnicized cultural heritage in the Albanian-Serbian dichotomy. The ‘solutions’ for cultural heritage are also looked at through the lenses of ethnic conflict. “The EU is not interested in protecting the civic cultural heritage (like the communist heritage, the anti-fascist legacy etc.). Protection is given to Christian Orthodox heritage claimed as cultural heritage but works instead as conflict management.”

Prishtina-based scholar of philosophy, Agon Hamza, argues that the trend of “culturalization” of ethnic studies (in the Balkans and elsewhere) is a serious problem in academia.

5. Conclusion

This article has contributed to the debate the idea that it is not only with regard to the so-called ‘top-down’ democracy promotion projects in third countries that practices turn out to be essentially undemocratic, but rather that the problem is traceable back to its very core – to democracy as a system itself. At a conceptual debate, the passage to democracy,


483 Ibid.


democratization, will have always been associated with license, with taking too many liberties, with the dissoluteness of the libertine, with liberalism, indeed perversion and delinquency, with failing to live according to the law, with the notion that ‘everything is allowed’, that ‘anything goes’. The practices of the international structures in Kosovo discussed in this article display the autoimmunity of democracy in the concept, practice and result, showing this way the suicidal characteristic of the entire democratic project. Keeping faith with Derrida’s elaboration on the autoimmunity of democracy as such, in this article we have revealed the suicide of the democratic project in the missions deployed in Kosovo. We have to go back for a moment to Churchill’s statement that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” However, the democratic vote has had its products like Berlusconi in Italy, Erdogan in Turkey, Kjaersgard in Denmark and the like. This is not to discuss whether there is a need to ask for a ‘more democratic’ system of democracy. This is to remind ourselves that like any other concept ‘democracy’ is not an empty term, and, what is more, it is what we decide to do, signify, label or export with it.

In the case of the missions for democracy in Kosovo, autoimmunity is not only evidenced because democracy, as Derrida reminds us, has the ability to commit suicide while trying to implement itself. In addition to that, due to Kosovo’s peculiar political status, we witness that not only does democracy as such commits suicide, but the very mirage or the idea of democracy never quite takes form – because it is imposed rather arbitrarily. There has not been a ‘socialization’ of the subject with the process, there has not been the necessary and somewhat healthy journey of reaching to the promise of democracy. For instance, the ‘5% rule’ on language use attained through hundred years debate and still discussed to this very day in Finland, when implemented in post-war Kosovo, does not actually reflect nor does it contain the same democratic value, not only because technically there has not been a process leading to it, but because the very imposition of it, kills its own intent.

If we are to turn the gaze towards the long-term effects of these choices, like the democracy sponsors would probably do, consolation is to be found in the idea that in the long term, Kosovo would have socialized with these practices and had internalized them. Until it has internalized them properly, democracy will remain to come, will remain behind the Alps. The


further away from the Alps – from democracy and the EU – the longer the process for European values and democracy to come. They are thus never here, never present, and ultimately never enough. So is the aspiring subject willing to get closer to the metaphor of the ‘Alps’. It is never democratic enough, never egalitarian enough, never multi-cultural enough and thus never good enough. Its status is also ‘à-venir’ in that it has to pass through stages to prove itself, by appearing (symbolically and/or theoretically) a ‘real’ member of the club and by embracing the ‘EU sponsored’ elements of national identification and politico-economic choices.
Article 4 | MetaKosovo: local and international narratives

Under revision at the British Journal for Politics and International Relations, co-authored with Prof. Dr. Jan Orbic
MetaKosovo: local and international narratives

Abstract

This article examines local narratives on Kosovo and their role in crafting and articulating interpretations of Kosovo and international missions. Using the concept of ‘home’, as used and conceptualised by Jacques Derrida, the article reverses the order of who is ‘guest’ and ‘host’ in Kosovo and how that defines the local narratives on the subject. In the first part, attention is paid solely to letting local narratives deconstruct themselves, while in the second part we let them deconstruct the international narrative on Kosovo. The aim of the article is to present Kosovo as a battleground of division and commonality among the narratives and at the same time as an ‘impossible’ ‘home’ of all its narratives. In conclusion, some thoughts pave the way for the idea of ‘renegotiating’ the concept of ‘home’ with particular focus on ‘home’ in interventions and missions and its ultimate influence on the ethics of intervention.

Key words: hospitality, Derrida, Kosovo, EU.

1. Introduction

This article looks at the competing narratives on Kosovo – narratives of its local population – in relation to the international narratives on Kosovo. Establishing Kosovo as ‘home’, we set forward Derrida’s deconstruction of the dialectics of host and guest in offering and being subject to hospitality, respectively.

The war between Kosovo Albanian majority and Serbian military ended in 1999. NATO bombing against Serbia in 1999, was followed by KFOR deployment (NATO-led international peacekeeping force), responsible for establishing a secure environment. In June 1999, after the withdrawal of Serbian military troops, Kosovo was officially under the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNIMIK), whose mission was “…to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advance regional stability in the western Balkans” De jure, Kosovo was still part of Serbia, while de facto the state of Serbia was not present in Kosovo any longer. After rounds of UN mediated negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, the inability to solve Kosovo’s political status

---


was due to parties’ diametrically opposite views. Serbia was asking, Kosovo’s reinstatement in Serbia; Kosovo on the other side was asking for independence. In 2007, the UN mediated negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, UN envoy Marti Ahtisaari compiled his plan to resolve Kosovo’s status, setting the blueprint for its independence. In 2008, Kosovo declared its unilateral independence, a move swiftly backed by the US, the UK, and other Western European countries, yet to this very day, opposed by Serbia, Russia and China among others. Kosovo has been recognised by more than 100 states. The European Union has not recognised Kosovo’s independence ‘en bloc’ either, and has come up with the definition of ‘status neutral’, leaving it up to its member states to decide on their own relations with Kosovo. While UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo is de-facto inexistent since the declaration of independence and the adaptation of the Constitution in 2008, in 2009 the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was deployed to help and monitor Kosovo’s institutions with rule of law programs, particularly in the area of police, judiciary and customs.

While Serbia maintains its staunch opposition to its independence, Kosovo’s status remains contested at the international level as it is not yet a member of the United Nations. Firstly, due to its political status, at the international level, Kosovo remains a fault-line between an independent state and as part of Serbia at the same time. In this setup, the international project is ‘testing’ the creation of the very first post-Westphalian/post-modern political entity bypassing the issue of status settlement. Moreover, because of the high degree of international intervention and missions, Kosovo has many more of the characteristics of a protectorate/semi-protectorate than those of a state. This way, the roles of the ‘host’ (the local) and the ‘guest’ (the missioniser) have been reversed. The missioniser has become the ‘host’ in that it decides, makes decisions and acts on behalf of Kosovo as ‘home’ and on the other hand, the local has become the ‘guest’ playing along with the rules set by what was

---

initially the ‘guest’.\textsuperscript{494} The implication of this reversal at the local level has further entrenched the discourse of ethnic groups along the lines of ‘finishing’ and/or contesting the state - in Westphalian terms. Such claims not only speak to the very idea of having and opposing an independent state; they are quintessentially linked to the very concept of belonging to a state – as in subject of identification.

Since 1999, Kosovo has been a pivotal case in analysing Western democratic interventions and missions. Most studies embark from a positivist and Euro-centric viewpoint analysing the legal and political peculiarities and their implications for the missions;\textsuperscript{495} others take a more constructivist turn in analysing how norms and values have played out in this context.\textsuperscript{496} To a large extent, these literature strands are not preoccupied in questioning the asymmetrical power relations of the mission and the missionized. Fewer accounts take a more critical approach in shedding light on the controversies of international state building towards the locals as subject of interventions\textsuperscript{497} or leftist approach providing the politics of capitalism in the day-to-day democratic missions.\textsuperscript{498} Little or no debate at all has taken on post-structuralism or Derrida’s concepts to dwell into international intervention and state-building in Kosovo, politics of EU enlargement etc.\textsuperscript{499} With Derrida, the article initially invites for an inverse of the guest and host roles, in their initial position to further contribute

\textsuperscript{494} In “Deconstructing the EU Mission in Kosovo. What’s in a name?”, we have detailed how the EU mission in Kosovo has altered the notion of ‘home’, as the concepts of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ have been reversed.\textsuperscript{494} There, we have argued that the mission, being omnipotent in residing and acting, has turned into ‘host’ and the local people have become ‘guests’.


to the debate of the politics of ‘home’ in international relations and its politics in the case of ‘unfinished’ countries subjected to international interventions and missions.

Derrida mentions ‘home’ when deconstructing the concept of hospitality, that is inviting and welcoming the ‘stranger’, both on a personal level – how do I welcome the other into my home? – and in the level of the state raising socio-political questions about refugees, immigrants, foreign languages, minority ethnic groups etc.\(^{500}\) For Derrida, ‘home’ is the precondition for *hospitality*. “The unconditional desire for the home, which is impossible to renounce also ‘should not be renounced’, for without the home, ‘there is no door nor any hospitality’\(^{501}\), thus ‘home’ has also no meaning without ‘host’ and ‘guest. Operationalizing Kosovo, we refer to it as ‘home’ of its citizens, groups, communities etc. The agency of ‘host’ will be given to its local people and the ‘international’ presence in Kosovo will be treated as ‘guest’.

This ‘reversal’ is important, firstly, to shift the gaze to local narratives in understanding how Kosovo is conceptualised. Secondly, the developments of the 1990s in Kosovo, along with other processes that led to Yugoslavia’s breakup, are largely (and not always rightly) explained as a result of inter-ethnic hatred. This led to what Edkins called ‘grand narratives’ which conceal the fragility of possible ‘solutions’.\(^{502}\) Being all encompassing, the grand narratives are linear and as such they offer an oversimplified ‘cause’ of the problem in question and ultimately another oversimplified ‘solution’ in how to deal with it. She argues that in grand narratives, searches for solutions assume they know what the ‘problem’ is and focus on the need to solve it, not to engage with the results or implications of what is happening or has happened. Aligning with Edkins, in this article we ‘trouble’ the linear narrative on Kosovo, to further reverse the pre-established concept of the conflict and argue that, like in any other conflict/war, the events of 1999 in Kosovo were a struggle for domination and power. Amending Clinton’s famous motto:, “No, it’s not the old myths and ethnic hatred. It’s the political power struggle, stupid”.\(^{503}\) We go beyond the dichotomous view renegotiating the way narratives on Kosovo are presented – as an ‘either/or’ equation


between the Serbs and the Albanians and the international actors as the non-aligned, objective actor who seeks to do something in Kosovo beyond petty ethnic politics.\footnote{Lene Hansen has engaged with similar work on the discursive practices on the Balkans and the narratives on national identity formation. For more see: Hansen, L. (1996). "Slovenian Identity: State-building on the Balkan Border." \textit{Alternatives: Global, Local, Political} 21(4): 473-495.}

Narrative research is widely used in interpretivist social science and is generally to give voice to otherwise marginalized discourses and/or groups.\footnote{(See the work of Edkins, Yanow, Shenhav.)} David Campbell suggests that a concern with narratives can be important when it comes to making judgments about competing accounts of contentious issues, issues of both interpretation and representation should be taken into account, because far from being one mode of historical representation among many, they are a “meta-code” for the creation of shared meaning.\footnote{White in Campbell, D. (1998). \textit{National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia} Manchester, Manchester University Press.} Narratives are not restricted to a \textit{post factum} shaping of events;\footnote{Ibid.} it is not merely the “facts” that define the actions but also the “structural and figurative apprehensions of these facts”.\footnote{White in ibid.} MetaKosovo is an inspired term from Campbell’s MetaBosnia, where he sets forward his concern with the array of practices through which competing narratives of ‘Bosnia’ come to be, rather than assuming a pre-given, externally existing Bosnia. He brings the concept from White’s usage of Metahistory in which he wrote that in knowledge production in history, “when it is a matter of choosing among these alternative visions of history, the only grounds for preferring one over another are moral or aesthetic ones.”\footnote{Ibid.} MetaKosovo deconstructs narratives on Kosovo, what each means, and how each narrative claims ownership in its own story and ultimately claims ownership on Kosovo. \textit{Local} and \textit{international} narratives are looked in a competing battleground, to conclude that though the concept of home is never quite finished and always prone to interruptions, in ‘unfinished’ states, it is permanently vulnerable of the impossibility to be home as such.
2. Kosovo’s narratives

Being a project of several ‘stakeholders’, Kosovo has a number of narratives, none of which are compact; rather, they are constantly deconstructed in their inner struggles. From the conducted interviews, two groups of narratives become visible: narratives of locals and narratives of internationals. The first, Kosovo as historical justice, denotes the stories of its peoples, ethnic/cultural groups and explains Kosovo as the memory, identity and future of its own population. The second, Kosovo project explains Kosovo as home where democratic values of international intervention are at stake. Here, Kosovo is a success story of the interveners, primarily: 1) the merits of NATO’s first attack on a sovereign land as ‘humanitarian intervention’; 2) as a success story of conflict management and peace building under the most ambitious UN mission in history; 3) as a triumph of Western democratic values in a post-conflict/post-socialist setting; and 4) as a site of ‘European values’ and ‘best European practices’, unfolded via the EU presence in Kosovo and the largest Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mission deployed to date, (EULEX).

2.1 Kosovo as historical justice

In the ‘local narratives’, we re-return ‘home’ to Kosovo’s people, acknowledge it as their historical justice and let their ‘home’ deconstruct itself. ‘Home’ in this narratives is also read as a sense of belonging, dignity and respect – not only of having a ‘home’ as such, but more importantly being the host of it.

2.1.1 Albanians: Kosovo fetish

In the Albanian narrative, we deconstruct the representation of Kosovo as myth in the interviews, anecdotal evidence, literature on Kosovo’s national struggle, and media discourse (television and news portals). Three news sources available online were consulted: ‘Koha’, the web-portal of one of Kosovo’s oldest daily newspapers; ‘GazetaExpress’, the


electronic newspaper mostly read in urban areas; and ‘Telegrafi’, the first web-based news portal in Kosovo and has the highest clicks per day. Considering that ‘myth’ and ‘mythologies’ are rather common references in writings on the history and politics of the Balkans, it is important to clarify that myth in this case does not imply anything to do with the ‘truthfulness’ of stories. Rather, it is more a term to indicate sacredness of Kosovo in the Albanian narrative. This is neither an attempt to claim a linear narrative of Kosovo Albanians, nor to look at ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’ as homogenous and static categories; these concepts are always contested and dynamic. However, literature on nationalism and field work evidence reveal that when it comes to the paradigmatic issue – which for societies in the making is the foundation of a state – there is an overarching consensus on statehood – Kosovo’s statehood in this case. Looking at the ‘reproduction’ of its historical past, we develop that [for Kosovo Albanians] ‘independence’ has framed Kosovo’s history for the past hundred years and to a large extent continues to frame its present as well. In this narrative, Kosovo is the historical justice of people who have lived in inhumane conditions in the Yugoslav federation. It is the Kosovo entrenched in the national (imagined) memory and a dreamlike project for making it an independent state.

The post factum narratives of the Kosovo Albanians provide as if the fight for ‘independent Kosovo’ has always been linear, uninterrupted, cohesive and unambiguous. The imagined linear and non-contested project for ‘independent Kosovo’ is far more shaped in what Campbell calls the post factum phase of events rather than as an undisputed and uninterrupted project for the past hundred years. Craig Calhoun notices that “schoolbooks of histories of nations commonly present them as always already there, they’re actually product of a struggle”.

Particular ‘interruptions’ of this project are noticeable from the time when extended autonomy was required during the Ottoman period; extension of cultural and national rights throughout different interceptions of the Yugoslav federation in the 70s a period which the Kosovo Albanians remember as the golden age of their existence in Yugoslavia; from the 80s onwards, especially with the codification of a ‘Dardanian’ Kosovo conceptualized by what was known as Kosovo’s President in the 90s, Ibrahim Rugova, the ‘independence’ project takes more of a shape that is reflected in the post factum phase. Lastly, KLA’s motto of uprising against Serbian military in Kosovo was initially calling

---


for Kosovo’s unification with Albania and was later ‘metamorphosed’ into an independence project. Albert Heta notices, the idea of making Kosovo a new independent state [independent from Albania as well] is a clear example of how far the ‘negotiation’ of the so called national project has gone. “Therefore, this state [Kosovo as it is now] is a ‘betrayal’ to the original idea of what was conceptualized to be done with it as a national project”.

For the Albanians, Kosovo’s (remembered) organised struggle for self-determination is traced back to 1878 along with other nation-state movements in the region at the threshold of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The word ‘remembered’ is used because, rather than being an event as such, it describes more a social imaginary, which for Anderson is “not as a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of society”…and it presents the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. As such, Kosovo has never been a ‘state’ in its own right, rather, part of something bigger (the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia etc.). It has never been a ‘home’, rather a part (room, corridor, back yard) of bigger homes, or mansions. For a long time, the issue of ‘independence’ and ‘statehood’ in Kosovo has been a project of different segments of society which do not necessarily share ideological, political and cultural identity. The project of building a ‘home’, and more importantly being the ‘host’ of it, has had as its promoter the pacifists of Kosovo’s Democratic League (KDL), who refused to resort to violence against Serbian troops, maintaining that a Gandhi-like ideology of resistance and pacifism was the only way through. Yet Kosovo as ‘home’ has also been a project of the guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – the insurgent against the Serbian army in 1999. The collective memory and the current struggle of the nation, considers independence as something sacred: sacred to religious levels characterised by devotion, adoration and, most importantly, sacrifice.

Hobsbawm argues that nationalism is a civic religion that replaces religion, “because of the near pathologic character of nationalism, nations, inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrifice”.

In a similar vein, Anderson reminds us that while

---


historians, diplomats, politicians and social scientists are quite at ease with the idea of ‘national interest’, for most ordinary people of whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is interestless. Just for that reason, it can ask for sacrifices.

While never materialised, Kosovo is this ‘home’ that has been dreamt of and fought for. It has always been idealised, produced and reproduced in the collective narrative. In *Spectres of Marx*, Derrida writes that as soon as there is production, there is fetishism, idealisation, autonomisation and automatisation, dematerialisation and spectral incorporation – fetishization on which capitalist abstraction is based - which eventually turns concepts into religion.  

For him, only reference to the religious world would enable this sort of autonomy of the ideological and its automaticity. ‘Home’ for Derrida renders the “misty realm of religion” and the secret introduced into fetishism and ideological and ultimately allows the production and fetishising autonomisation of this form. The collective memory views an ‘independent Kosovo’ as a perennial cause; it repeats it throughout the imagined historical events and struggles and idealises it as sublime, turning it ultimately into a fetish. It becomes a mirage, and at the same time loses its intrinsic meaning. It is not thought of simply as a ‘home’ to live in and be able to own materially. Rather, it is an ideal, a reparation and above all, justice.

In time, Kosovo had been downgraded into this ideology inseminating resistance, pride, sacrifice and sense of collectivity. Most Kosovo Albanians who saw Kosovo ‘liberated’ in 1999, had a vague or no memory of a normally functioning state apparatus. The ‘state’ (Serbia/Yugoslavia) was the enemy and the structure to be feared, resisted and escaped from. The ‘state’ (Kosovo) they were asking for was a restoration of their lost possibility of having a ‘home’ and being acknowledged as ‘hosts’. The fetishism of what ‘state’ is also lingers after all these years in daily political life. In the account of their experience in

---


519 Ibid.


Kosovo, two UNMIK officials wrote that “after so many years of life and death, struggling, survival and sacrifice, the Kosovar voter was not educated to request from the elected politicians to deal with day-to-day issues like irrigation or waste management”.

On a similar note, Kosovar journalist Baton Haxhiu argues that “it is difficult to make that shift now…to think of a state as a state that is there to simplify and regulate your life. It is in our subconscious that we don’t deserve liberty as people but we have it because something supernatural has happened”.

Fetishised, Kosovo becomes the political and social identity of the Albanians. Campbell argues that identity is always defined by difference, saying that there are no pre-existing foundations that determine an identity; instead they are constructed through the differences between inside and outside. First as the need to identify with an independent state as ‘home’, second, in opposition to the other (Serbia and the Serbs), not only as perpetrators but also in the obstruction that Serbia makes to the very idea of having an independent Kosovo. In Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics, Laclau and Zac argue that people underscore a generally felt need to belong to society, because it is this sense of belonging that establishes our identity and allows for agency. In ‘unfinished’ societies, the sense of belonging and identifying with one’s country is even higher. For instance, toponyms like “Kurdistan”, “Catalonia” or “Quebec” become a common vernacular in the identity of the respective groups. Throughout the Yugoslav period, refusing to say “I come from Yugoslavia” from Kosovo Albanians was common, notwithstanding that it would not arbitrarily imply any sort of ethnic attribution. The vast majority would have preferred to respond “I am from Kosovo”, as to denote that they did not see themselves as part of the political state they lived in. Rather, they saw themselves and hence wanted to be acknowledged as people, ‘hosts’, of this imagined ‘home’. The term ‘unfinished’ does not stand in front of its obvious binary opposite ‘finished’. If Kosovo, Kurdistan etc., were to be referred to as ‘unfinished’ countries, that does not automatically imply that Switzerland, Belgium etc. are ‘finished’


cases. When operationalizing the narratives and their engagement with the necessity of having a ‘home’, we should bear in mind to treat Kosovo as ‘unfinished’ – not home yet – in the sense of not having achieved to set the Westphalian contours of a state (i.e. internationally recognized borders, legitimacy etc.). Currently, it is rather common to see Kosovars at conferences or international meetings stating that “I come from the Republic of Kosovo”. This, however, should not be seen as a mere identification with a ‘republic’ in a material way. “Kosova Republikë” (Kosovo is Republic) was a common illegal graffiti slogan in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, when Kosovo’s autonomy had been revoked and it implies on-going struggle.

2.1.2 The Serbs: Kosovo the injustice of international aggression

In the Serbian discourse, the events of 1999 are not known as a war between Serbia’s government and the Albanian majority. In the interviews with Serbian respondents, in the Serbian media, and Serbian school books, the events of 1999 are referred to as “NATO aggression”, which was then followed by the internationalisation of Kosovo’s case. The removal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the installation of international structures is also seen as a Western project for creating an Albanian Kosovo while belittling the Serbs. This in turn defines the historical injustice.

In this narrative, Kosovo is also unfinished as ‘home’ and identity. Whose ‘home’ is it now that it is not part of Serbia anymore? What is its identity and more importantly how does it affect the identity of local Serbs? These questions are not merely rhetorical, considering how porous the concept of ‘home’ is in the case of Kosovo. For instance, since the end of the war, Kosovo Serbs have been living in three different political contexts/‘homes’ at the same time, depending on which area they were located. Their narratives should also be viewed in this shifting context. The Serbs in south-east Kosovo were living under the ‘Albanian system’ and later in ‘independent’ Kosovo; the Serbs in the south and Gračanica have been living in “Kosovo under UNSC1244” (Kosovo’s official denomination while under UNMIK), while


those in the north have been living in ‘Serbia’. Northern Kosovo is almost exclusively inhabited by Serbs and it includes cities of North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan. Because there has not been a uniform legal system of governing and the ‘borders’ (political and administrative) were porous, one could basically ‘choose’ under which authority to live.

The city of Mitrovica – divided at the bridge over the Ibar/Ibër river between an Albanian part in the south and a Serbian part in the north – marks the ‘border’ between the four ethnically Serbian municipalities and the rest of Kosovo. Derrida argues that *boundary* (as in border) defines the line where one thing ends and another begins, and as much as it is about identification, it is about exclusion.\(^{530}\) Derrida exemplifies the border distinction pointing that whereas in the case of the Swiss-Italian border in Mont Blanc is not only recognized as convention and nobody really cares which rocks of the mountain are to be excluded or included from each country, in the case of the Berlin Wall the exclusion did not apply to rocks but rather to people. Until 2013, the ‘border’ marked the end of the local and European structures jurisdiction (police, courts etc.), making the ‘north’ a fault line between Serbia and Kosovo. Except from UNMIK, since 1999, Serbian municipalities in the north have been outside of the local jurisdiction and control, while it took more than three years for EULEX to deploy its control in the northern part due to local Serbs uprising against it. Showing their opposition to what they call Kosovo’s secession from Serbia, they have protested and resisted new establishments while maintaining ties with Serbia instead. The ‘border’ has become more solid, which for Kosovo Albanians has been the greatest and most dangerous failure of the international community. For UNMIK, any intervention to include the north in ‘Kosovo’s’ jurisdiction was off the table because it would have incited violence from the Serbs and would have jeopardised the ‘stability’ achieved in Kosovo;\(^{531}\) EULEX, on the other hand, cannot take action because they “lack the capabilities to do so and most importantly because any move to do so would imply that EULEX is supporting Kosovo’s independence and that would outrage the Serbs”.\(^{532}\)

The ‘*border*’ at the bridge does not only mark the division of Albanians and Serbs and even Serbs and the ‘others’ of Kosovo. When passing Mitrovica’s bridge, one also transcends


\(^{531}\) Ariana Qosaj Mustafa (2013). Interview. V. Musliu. Prishtina.

‘Kosovo’ and finds oneself in Serbia. The cars carry Serbian number plates (if they carry any), mobile phones receive the message ‘Welcome to Serbia’ and one is automatically connected to Serbian phone companies. Schools, institutions and the like have the labels of Serbian ministries and institutions. In supermarkets one can only purchase goods ‘Made in Serbia’ and everything is paid in ‘dinar’ – Serbia’s currency.\(^{533}\)

‘North’ is least of all a geographical notion. When passing the ‘border’/bridge, one also travels in time. The city’s scenery goes back to the socialist/Yugoslav setting of the 1990s. A state of emergency and ‘securitisation’ is immediately felt as there are no signs of police or any security structure, and EU officials patrol in bullet-proof cars and vests. Banal nationalism as exemplified by Billig\(^{534}\) is omnipresent, with ‘patriotic’ slogans and Serbian flags. Elements of banal nationalism are equally present in the Albanian inhabited cities. It is not mentioned in the ‘Albanian narrative’ because the existence of two ‘national flags’ in the their case, (the Albanian double headed eagle flag and the newly introduced Kosovo flag) deserves a more thorough elaboration than the space allow it in here. While in a silent war with the Albanian majority, the Serbs in the north are fierce opponents of the international presence too. They see the US and the EU/EULEX – not so much the UN – as structures which are there to make Kosovo an independent state in which the Serbs are side-lined by the Albanian majority. The feeling of being abandoned/betrayed by Serbia itself has increased, since negotiations started between Belgrade and Prishtina.\(^{535}\) Posters of Serbia’s and Kosovo’s prime ministers shaking hands in EU High Representative Catherine Ashton’s office are omnipresent in the city, captioning “We will never forget”. “For 15 years, I protest against the Prishtina’s secessionism. And now what? Dacic goes to Brussels and kisses with Thaçi and Ashton”, argues a local in North Mitrovica.\(^{536}\)

For Serbs in Gračanica and other parts of Kosovo, the situation is slightly different. Although retaining the dissatisfaction with Kosovo (eventually) becoming a fully-fledged independent state – an Albanian-hosted ‘home’ – most of them are already part of Kosovo’s

---

\(^{533}\) Kosovo has used the euro as its currency since January 2002


\(^{536}\) Annonymous Interview 1 (2013). Interview. V. Musliu. North Mitrovica. Kosovo’s PM, Hashim Thaçi, former leader of the KLA, has been on Serbia’s black list for almost 20 years. Serbia’s PM, Ivica Dačić was the spokescperson of Slobodan Milošević in 1992.
institutions and/or work with the international structures in Kosovo. For them, the post-
1999 period is all about the Albanians, but because Kosovo has to appear ‘multi-ethnic’ and
‘tolerant’ abroad, the international structures want to keep the Serbs to make that point.

“We [the Serbs] are merely a decoration here. Brussels and Washington need us here so that they can
say that Kosovo is the country of everyone. Least of all it is of the Serbs; it’s not of the Albanians either.
The West lures the Albanians with power just to make its agenda happen”, argues Nenad Maximović,
local Serb in Gračanica working with NGOs. 537

For him, Kosovo Serbs are not on the agenda of any of the ‘stakeholders’ who have power
over Kosovo. He adds that The EU is negotiating with Dačić and Thaçi on Kosovo’s future,
but interests of Kosovo Serbs are not represented. “Serbia is trying to buy its own way to the
EU; Kosovo is buying its independence and the EU is showing they deserved the Nobel
Prize”538. Overall, the Serbs in Kosovo struggle with another fault line, on the one hand,
opposing what appears to be a Kosovo Albanian hosted ‘home’ and arguing for Kosovo’s
restoration as part of Serbia, and on the other hand, trying to redefine their place in the
upcoming ‘home’ and redefining the meaning of ‘home’.

2.1.3 Multi-ethnic Kosovo: The insignificant ‘others’

Literature on developments of the 1990s in Kosovo is entrenched in narrative of two
characters (the Albanians and the Serbs) and one single topic – the Balkan, tribal-like
eruption of violence, rooted in myths and historical past.539 Other minorities (ethnic,
religious, cultural, etc.) hardly trigger even a marginal debate.540 This has not only further
mystified the whole debate of what exactly happened during the war but it has also


538 Ibid.

539 Hamza in Albert Heta (2010). Politics of Contemporary Art. Are you a traveller or a tourist?, Prishtina,
Stacion Centre for Contemporary Production.

for Contemporary Art.


1999." Political Science Quarterly. 123(3).

Statebuilding 3(2).
influenced policy choices on how to deal with it. If other groups are marginalised in the narrative and are treated as a liminal anomaly, we must at least ask why. Being smaller in number and structurally detached from high politics, Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, Croats, Ashkali have remained outside of the dichotomous debate. In the international community’s discourse, minority politics, human rights, or even the whole concept of cultural heritage have been downgraded as ‘rights’ to accommodate the Serbian minority in the new settlement.\textsuperscript{541} The Plan is heavily based on the logic of granting asymmetrical power to the Serbs. Based on the concept of multi-ethnicity, the document offers extended rights for the ethnic minorities with particular emphasis to the rights of Serbs. Extended religious and linguistic rights are foreseen for the Serbian minority alongside with 10 reserved parliamentary seats for Kosovo Serbs and 10 others for other ethnic minorities. The values of ‘communities’ and minorities appear to be not that important when it comes to other, non-Serb minorities.

The Roma, for instance, who in the eyes of the Albanians are seen as collaborators of the Serbs during the war, are ‘shifted’ into the domain of the Serbs.\textsuperscript{542} The politics of ‘home’ in the case of Roma is not as simple as and as easily generalizable as with other ethnic minorities in the case of Kosovo, precisely because of Roma’s diasporic identification. Because a thorough ethnographic and sociological analysis of it is beyond this paper’s scope, the article analyses them as one of the ‘group’ in a volatile ethnic environment. Throughout 1999-2010, around 200 Roma families were internally displaced by UNMIK to what was to be a temporary camp near Plemetin. Medical evidence provided that most Roma children born in the camp carry toxic substances in their blood.\textsuperscript{543} For ten years, human rights organisations, such as International Committee of the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, European Roma Rights Centre, Society for Threatened People, Refugees International, have highlighted how this camp is located near industrial zones, and contaminated with lead and other forms of toxic waste. In this case, the inhumane conditions of Roma were not hampering the ‘multi-ethnic’ image of Kosovo as much as was, for instance, the inability of Serbs and Albanians to sell their home-grown vegetables at a joint market. After all, the Roma scandal was a violation of human rights principles (strictly speaking); it


\textsuperscript{542} Kosovo has used the euro as its currency since January 2002

did not constitute a violation of ‘community rights’, ‘opportunities for the communities’ or the ‘multi-ethnic’ image of Kosovo. This does not only display the utter discriminatory logic of attribution but most of all it detaches the concept of minority rights from the basic human rights concept and ultimately displaying the pervertibility of ‘multi-ethnicity’.

Rrahmon Stollaku, a local Roma from Fushë-Kosova, initially employed at the Ministry for Communities and the Return, explains how Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians are simply not seen as part of the problem/solution. Despite the 10% quota for employing non-Albanian communities in public institutions, Serbs were mostly favoured, for political reasons. “Nobody will be shocked if there is an open discrimination towards a Roma, but if that happens against a Serb, all international media will be alarmed”. Shpejtim Limani, a local from Gadime (after Albanians, Ashkali community is the second largest in this town) argues that despite the ‘population percentage’ of Ashkali minority, the Serbs are given priority in employment and education.

Kosovo’s Turks did not openly ‘favour’ any particular side during the war, but were nonetheless seen as allies of the Albanians both by the later and the Serbs, mainly due to religious proximity. Concentrated in Prizren and eastern Kosovo, they were more organised to benefit in the post-war period with the Albanians in power, by developing further ties with Turkey and benefiting from decentralisation to extend their cultural and linguistic rights. As with other ethnic minorities, a quota is set for their representation in public institutions, although this in no way represents their accommodation in society at large.

Bosniaks and Croats have a rather hybrid post-war identification. Whereas during the war they were seen as opponents of the Serbs due to the previous wars in their mother states,

---


they were not as well accommodated in the aftermath, due to linguistic and cultural proximity to the Serbs. Along with the Roma, they remain on the margins of both the Serbo-Albanian struggle and the international project.

In the case of Roma, Turks, Bosniaks and Ashkali, Kosovo tries to become *multi-ethnic* by sidelining them. ‘Multi-ethnicity’ mentions Serbs as a marked category, whereas the rest are simply ‘others’. They are insignificant not only being marginalised in the narrative but above all being a group of ‘others’, with no name or agency. It becomes imperative to ask then how a minority group or, in EU’s language “a community” is defined? Who and for whom the picture of Kosovo as a home of “all communities” is important? The concept of ‘multi-ethnicity’ and ‘home of all communities’ implies importance, relevance and equality. Yet certain groups appear to be more important and more relevant for the *multi-ethnic* picture.

2.2 Kosovo Project: From UNMIKISTAN to EULEKSPERIMENT

The missionizer will be reinstated in the position of ‘guest’, to further understand the construction of international narrative of Kosovo as ‘home’.

UNMIK’s period (1999-2008) was characterised by the logic of “*stability*” above all. Defined in terms of inter-ethnic relations, lack of physical violence between Serbs and Albanians marked ‘*stability*’ and *all* other issues were subordinate to it. This was even in cases where basic democratic principles had to be violated, such as the case with Prishtina-based newspaper *Dita* in 2000. After reporting that a suspected Serb, who had been involved in the war against the Albanians, was employed by UNMIK, the head of UNMIK at that time, Bernard Kouchner, passed a controversial regulation in “prohibiting media to incite violence” and the newspaper was closed. The regulation stated that “owners, operators, publishers and editors shall refrain from publishing personal details of any person, including...

---

549 It is essential to mention that in the first years after the war, speaking in Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian was as dangerous as being an Albanian during the war. Valentin Krumov, a Bulgarian UN official was shot in Pristina in 1999 because he had spoken Serbian. The aftermath of the war was a state of emergency for people seeking revenge. Pristina was going through a socio-urban challenge with a massive migration of families from different cities and/or areas. For many people, the first and only contact with hearing Serbian was the war experience.


name, address or place of work, if the publication of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety or security of any such person through vigilante violence or otherwise.” Failure to comply with the rules would result in the “seizure of equipment and/or printed material; and suspension or close down of operations”. The regulation had further implications in prohibiting other media from engaging with investigative journalism and/or openly criticising the international administration. The aim to maintain ‘stability’ was utterly undemocratic, not only in practice but also in content. Practices like these – where the locals were lectured about democracy while the mission was not adhering to basic democratic principles itself – led to frustration and the coining of the term ‘UNMIKISTAN’ (See Annex IV). The ending ‘stan’ is Farsi for land, widely used in other Middle-Eastern languages. For instance, ‘Afghanistan’ means ‘the land of the Afghans’. That in turn means that Afghanistan is not the land of anybody else. It is not the land of Algerians, for instance. By the same token, UNMIKISTAN not only denotes Kosovo as ‘the land of UNMIK’ but at the same time it tells that this is not ‘the land’ of somebody else. It appropriates it. UNMIK had an unprecedented and all-encompassing mandate, being in charge of the executive, legislative and judicial functions with which it practically ‘appropriated’ Kosovo. During interviews, locals were using UNMIKISTAN to indicate that the mission had turned Kosovo into a corrupt/oligarchic/poor/former Soviet-like republic, where debate, power and decision-making rested in a higher nomenclature, detached from its population.

During the EU mission “‘multi-ethnicity’, “rule of law” and “European values” above all’ became omnipresent. Like its predecessor, EULEX is trying its best ‘models’ in promoting democracy in Kosovo. This has created a sense of living in a laboratory where locals are used as units of analysis in the subsequent experimentation process. When it comes to EULEX, the criticism is fiercer, firstly because expectations were much higher than what the mission seems to be able to deliver, and secondly, because it was seen as an opportunity to break the

553 Ibid.
554 Ibid.
inefficient’ trajectory of UNMIK. For instance, EULEX took on UNMIK’s practice of impunity of high-level officials as a commitment for its rule-of-law program. However, despite the action taken in dramatic scenes, where ministers, deputies, bank governors were publicly arrested, no one in high levels of power was ever judged.\footnote{Kalaja, B. (2012) The War against Corruption through Media Spectacles. Preprint.} The high-profile accused were released on grounds of lack of evidence, recalled to court again and released. Actions like these have lowered mission’s popularity, coining it ‘EULEKSPERIMENT’ – a graffiti omnipresent in Prishtina (See Annex V).\footnote{‘EULEKSPERIMENT’ is a creation of the activists of ‘Vetëvendosje! Movement’. A political and social movement established in 2004, “‘Vetëvendosje!’ (Self-determination) has been very active with its criticism towards the international presence in Kosovo. Since 2010, it is a political party in Kosovo’s parliament with 12%. See Figure 2.} ‘EULEKS’ is the Albanian and Serbian pronunciation of EULEX, while the bold ‘KS’ letters are commonly used as a code for ‘Kosovo’. While experimenting with the mission, they are also experimenting with us locals too, argues local security studies scholar Abit Hoxha. “The recent EULEX advertisements have on their background “Mission Impossible” movie theme song.”\footnote{Abit Hoxha (2012). Interview. V. Musliu. Prishtina.} It is rather unclear though, whether fighting corruption is impossible for EULEX itself or whether it is impossible to fight corruption in Kosovo. Part of EULEX communication campaign, were flyers saying “EULEX has done nothing to fight corruption and serious crime… More than 200 people and counting…” (See Annex VI), to cynically respond to local criticism. Legal expert Betim Musliu, argues that on top of everything, EULEX seems to be failing in its own public relations too. “One cannot brag about procedural acts. ‘Success’ in the judiciary is claimed on closed cases and verdicts.”\footnote{Betim Musliu (2012). Interview. V. Musliu. Prishtina.} Interestingly EULEKSPERIMENT is not only popular amongst locals. Several EULEX officials use the term too. “EULEKSPERIMENT indeed! A lot of what we do in Kosovo is experimental. Some of the experiments are successful, others less successful”\footnote{Alessandro Tedesco (2013). Interview. V. Musliu. Prishtina.}

3. Conclusion: ‘Unfinished’

In this article, we have tried to ‘give’ Kosovo back as ‘home’ to its own people and by reinstating their ‘host’ status we have acknowledged their narrative as a story of their ‘home’. Yet, the very attempt in defining Kosovo as ‘home’ and more so, proclaiming its ‘host(s)’ and ‘guest(s)’ was faced with the very impossibility to do so. Although the reader was initially...
required to accept the original roles of locals as ‘host’ and missionizer as ‘guest’, the
distinction overthrew itself. While we have seen the locals claiming Kosovo as ‘home’ on
grounds of historical justice, identity and nation-state formation, Kosovo is also a constructed
‘home’ where the international missions edify Western democratic values of ‘humanitarian
intervention’, peacebuilding and democracy promotion. Furthermore, in establishing and
promoting its values in this ‘home’, in deciding for how long to stay in implementing these
values, in having the authority to edify the ‘best models’, the missionizer earns the status of
a ‘host’. Derrida’s concept of ‘undecidability’ – as in the impossibility of attributing something
with certainty – is nowhere so organically linked as in the case of Kosovo. Undecidability
as the attempt to trouble dualisms, or more accurately, to reveal how they are always already
troubled; that it doesn’t conform to dichotomy and as such is both present and absent at the
same time. Kosovo as ‘home’ and its narratives deconstruct themselves ceaselessly and
turn it into the point of division and commonality of all narratives. Both international and local
narratives are always already both subject and object, yet fully neither at the same time. They
exist and are destroyed by their own logic. Their autoimmune subjectivity is inherently
undecidable. They themselves are incapable of accepting ‘ownership’ and this reveals their
own instability.

On the one hand, all the narratives claiming Kosovo, see the latter as ‘home’. At the same
time, it is not fully ‘home’ of any of the narratives. As such, it cannot be ‘home’. The
impossibility of identifying Kosovo within narratives also makes it an ‘undecidable’. The
difficulty lies in identifying it as ‘home’, and identifying the ‘host(s)’ and the ‘guest(s)’. Here,
Kosovo is a battleground of competing/struggling stories – stories of ‘host(s)’ and ‘guest(s)’.
Each of them struggles for supremacy and legitimacy. At the same time, each of them
struggles for survival. The Albanian narrative seeks legitimacy as justice after the catharsis,
seeks supremacy as the right of the ‘victim’ and survival to build and own a ‘home’ (as in a
sovereign state). The Serbian narrative seeks legitimacy for the ‘home’ they had and asserts
that they are equally a victim of a broader project of intervention. Narratives of the Roma,
Turks, Bosniaks struggle primarily with survival in a dichotomous battleground between the
Serbs and the Albanians but also as narratives on their own. Lastly, the international
narrative seeks legitimacy in Kosovo as its successful project, a success story of interventions
and missions – despite contestation from locals. Every narrative which claims it, ‘deserves’ it

564 Ibid.
and at the same time each of them is contested, implausible and weak. That is, each of them both ‘own’ it and at the same time are alien to their ‘owning’.

On the other hand, Kosovo is also an arena of shared/common narratives. If we were to think home as the place where ‘ethics’ are, Kosovo is ‘home’ to all narratives that trace in it their stories, histories, memories, values and also ethics. It is a point of commonality primarily for the two dichotomous narratives, seen as binary opposites or mutually exclusive stories. The Serbs and the Albanians have reached a historical point in their claims on Kosovo, where they share Kosovo as a state beyond ‘home’ (beyond sovereignty). For the Serbs, Kosovo as their previous ‘home’ is beyond remedy, for the Albanians Kosovo as their new/legitimate ‘home’ is beyond reach. Thus it is ‘home’ of both and none at the same time. It is not present in either way. Above all, all narratives presented in this article share the “Kosovo to come” – Kosovo that is not here, not present. Talking about democracy to come, Derrida argues that “for democracy remains to come, not only it will remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but belonging to the time of the promise”. So it is with Kosovo. In all of the narratives, it exists only as a promise. It is a promise to happen in the future. As for now, it is only possible as impossible. Its impossibility is the condition of its possibility. As such, it is defined as the very ideal of Kosovo, by the lack of its presence. It inscribes support or adherence to believe in it. Finally, Kosovo as ‘home’ is hospitable to all narratives, just as much as it is hostile. What does this mean then for the concept of ‘home’ and its position towards intervention? What about the concept of mission? Even though the concept of ‘home’ offers both the possibility to welcome the other and be hospitable, it incites brutal responses towards others in the name of protecting the ‘home’; it should be defended for the very notion of a desire to have a ‘home’. On similar grounds, Derrida has defended the ‘home’ as “the unconditional desire, which is impossible to renounce and should not be renounced, for without home, there is no door nor any hospitality”. Thus the very existence of it makes the welcoming of the other and more broadly ‘hospitality’ possible. We do not have to choose or give up options or narratives; rather, we can engage deeper with renegotiating ‘home’ as always to come.


Part III

Part III provides a summary of main issues covered in the thesis, concluding remarks and a debate for further research.
Conclusion

1. General Conclusions

In shedding light on the puzzle, this thesis evidences four premises stemming from the four articles.

a) With ‘democracy, rule of law and human rights’ becoming the New Holy Trinity of the West, the missionizing of the other is materialized on two premises 1) pathologizing the other as something intrinsically corrupt and 2) objectifying the other as a something that is to be studied, experimented with, to test models that can be further tested for generalizations. Pathologizing leads to fragments or echoes of neo-coloniality as the local Kosovar is stripped of its sociological agency, while objectifying leads to fragments of racism as the local is stripped of its human agency.

b) With regard to the EU relations with Kosovo, the EU operates in thin lines between hospitality and hostility. With regard to the EU mission deployed in Kosovo, EULEX, we find out what can be the closest link with Derrida’s unconditioned hospitality given that the mission has taken the position of a host in Kosovo, meanwhile the locals have turned into a guest.

c) With regard to the spectrum of missions in Kosovo, while they try to establish democracy in Kosovo, they slip into non-democratic acts, making this way the project of democracy in Kosovo ‘to commit suicide’ – in Derrida’s words – displaying this way the autoimmune character of democracy and democracy promotion.

d) Finally, in deconstructing local and international narratives on Kosovo, an attempt was made to re-instaking Kosovo as home of its citizens, placing this way the missionizer in the position of guest, and the local in the position of a host. The very attempt to do so systematically deconstructed itself indicating the impossibility to re-instate Kosovo as home.

What follows in the first part of this conclusion is a final remark on EU’s relations with Kosovo, followed by a summary of the four articles and what binds them together. The first part concludes with a discussion on the methodological and theoretical limitations of this research. The second part, is devoted to a methodological and theoretical discussion for future research in FPA and the field of IR more broadly finalized with ideas for future research agenda.
1.1 Aporias, Kosovo and the EU

The EU’s relations with Kosovo can be grouped among three sections. Spectres of missionizing, denoting the relations between Kosovo on the one hand, and the EU and its agenda embedded within the broader Western democratic project. Spectres of EU enlargement, regarding the EU enlargement agenda for Kosovo in particular and the Western Balkans in general. Spectres of Kosovo, addressing problems stemming from political and identity premises, in particular with regard to its agency as a non/half-independent state and how does that play out in its relations with others.

What is gathered from the four articles is that the intervener first pathologizes Kosovo as something intrinsically corrupt. Along with the rest of the Western Balkans, pathologizing almost exclusively comes under Balkanization. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines Balkanization, as a division of multinational state into smaller ethnically homogenous entities. The term was initially coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans. To this day, Balkanization has come to be associated with a number of ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘diseases’ in several fields including computer science, medicine, history, demography studies etc. Todorova argues that what has been emphasized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behaviours devised as normative by and for the civilized world. She adds that whether the Balkans is European or not is a matter of political and academic debate, “but they certainly have no monopoly over barbarity”.

Talking about West, in his account Freud and the non-European other, Edward Said acknowledges that to the European, the non-European world contains only natives, and “the veiled women, the palm trees and the camels make up landscape, the natural background to the human presence

of the French”. It is the European clinical psychiatrist who establishes the native as a savage killer who kills for no reason\textsuperscript{573}. What is important for Todorova in her account is the question to explain the persistence of such a frozen image. Here, the question is how this frozen image plays out in the relations between Kosovo and the EU and Kosovo.

Second, the intervener, the Western democratic agent, who is imbued with values and norms and the legitimacy to spread them, acts as omnipotent, all-encompassing power while the other is \textit{objectified} into a structure with no agency that has to follow. On this logic, Kosovo is asked to embrace the \textit{international standards} and \textit{European values} of democracy. Trying to transpose the democratic agenda at any cost, the missionizing machinery slides into non-democratic acts first by creating an unequal relationship with the intervened and stripping it off of its sociological agency – bringing fragments of neo-colonialism, and second, by stripping the local off of its human agency – sliding into racism. Concretely this can be evidenced on the self-invitation upon which the EU has launched its greatest CFSP mission to date in Kosovo, EULEX, in what it calls to help Kosovo authorities with strengthening the rule of law. Albeit its ‘monitoring’ role, EULEX, has sovereign powers in Kosovo. It decides its own ‘job description’, priorities; it renews its mandate every other two years and its staff has immunity over Kosovo’s jurisdiction. It enjoys certain executive authority (responsibility) in performing its tasks, especially in prosecuting war crimes cases and corruption affairs\textsuperscript{574}. So far, EULEX’s performance has been subjected to one audit process conducted by the European Court of Auditors\textsuperscript{575}. I have argued that this constellation of EULEX as guest accepted unconditionally and beyond dispute, who acts and behaves like a sovereign while stripping the local of its agency and sovereignty, comes very close to what Derrida describes as \textit{unconditioned or absolute hospitality}.

\textit{Spectres of EU enlargement}. In the case of the Western Balkans, the EU is for the first time in its history involved in the process of building its future member states, by supporting their state-building and aid programs. EULEX mission is also an edition to this overarching program. Although schematically I put EULEX in \textit{Spectres of missionizing}, EULEX is a linking point of the EU’s mission in Kosovo and the EU’s enlargement agenda for Kosovo. Yet, unlike in other cases of the Western Balkans, the EU’s support for state-building in Kosovo


is not to foster institutions of an already fully-fledged state. There is a two-fold ‘experiment’ stemming from this. One, for the first time, the EU enters into contractual relations with a non-country aspiring to become a member state. The EU’s contractual relations with regard to enlargement have always been conducted with internationally recognized independent states. Two, the EU is for the first time trying to build its true/genuine EU member state, a structure floating between an independent state, a (semi)protectorate and a post-modern entity, among others. To exemplify, Kosovo’s state identity elements (flag, national anthem, constitution) have more resemblance with the EU than any other old/new EU member state. Despite the significant high percentage of the Albanian majority, Kosovo is declared a multi-ethnic state. Its sovereignty is transferred to Brussels, what Chandler has coined as the inversed sovereignty. Does this make Kosovo the first genuine candidate for EU membership? Is the EU expected to be more hospitable in making Kosovo part of the ‘European family’, given the EU’s financial and conceptual support in making Kosovo genuinely ‘European’?

What is observed with regard to these questions is the EU sliding from hospitality to hostility. In its enlargement package for Kosovo, the EU appears fairly cautious in its attempt to make the European agenda happen for Kosovo. I have called this a scrutinized conditioned hospitality to indicate the enhanced difficulty of the enlargement criteria for Kosovo. In addition to being a scrutinized conditioned hospitality, the EU appears uncertain of the whole prospect of invitation issued for Kosovo’s membership to the EU. This uncertainty is further substantiated observing the EU’s visa regime towards Kosovo, what I evidence to be Derrida’s hostility principle. As such, the EU seems to be entangled within diametrically opposite stances of its own. In one stance, it projects Kosovo as a reincarnation of its self-ascribed identity. In the other, it reverts back to its insecurities and alienates itself from its agenda and alienates Kosovo from the ‘path’ promised in Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. On Derrida’s pursuit I call this entanglement of the EU’s stance towards Kosovo as the aperetic EU. From ancient Greek, aporia means difficulty of passing, puzzlement, while in philosophy it generally denotes a philosophical puzzle, an expression of doubt. With aporia, Derrida refers to the experience of the possibility of the impossible. On the one hand, the EU argues on the imperativeness of its structural presence in Kosovo. On the other hand, in promising Kosovo a place in the European home, the EU is offering hospitality to the ‘Kosovo to come’, to the Kosovo which will eventually internalize and represent the EU’s values of multi-ethnicity, of post-national identification. The ‘Kosovo to come’, as Derrida would argue is never present, never here, but always in the future. The EU is sliding into hostility towards the
‘Kosovo’ which still lags behind the European values, with not well consolidated democracy, weak record of rule of law and human rights.

Here, it is imperative to ask whether this is EU’s inability and the inability of its structures deployed in Kosovo to bring the later closer to the European family, or is it Kosovo’s inability to embrace the European values? In The Other Heading, Derrida argued that Europe must undergo “the experience and experiment of the impossible” – that is experiencing the aporetic desire both for unification and for maintaining the difference that makes cultural identity possible⁵⁷⁶. It appears the EU is confronting itself with yet another ‘experience and experiment of the impossible’. After having constructed Kosovo and more generally the Balkans as ‘other’ and to some extent as the EU’s ‘other’, the EU is now facing its own impossibility of undoing Kosovo’s ‘otherness’ and asking the later to undo its own ‘otherness’.

Spectres of Kosovo. Much like the EU, Kosovo appears to be entangled in its own aporias with regard to its place in the ‘European family’. It sees itself not as EU’s well defined ‘other’, rather as an interception/interruption between the EU/West and another ‘other’, be that Turkey, the ‘Arab World’ or something else. Todorova talked about the Balkan’s transitionary status and the Balkan’s imputed ambiguity where “the West and the Orient are usually presented as incompatible entities/antiworlds, whereas the Balkans has always evoked the image of a bridge or crossroad⁵⁷⁷. With the establishment of its ‘European future’, Kosovo has been brought up to face a multi-layered ambiguity with its own. What is Kosovo? What is the meaning of Kosovo without its ‘European future’ and the prospect for EU integration? What is Kosovo to be within the EU? On what grounds and on what political/legal status will its European membership take place?

With regard to its identity, Kosovo is a liminality between its socialist and collectivist heritage on the one hand, and the promise of democratic, liberal system on the other. This ‘liminality’ has been caused first by a historical and geopolitical factor and second, by the international missions in Kosovo. Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, Kosovo experienced its first alienation with its socialist and collectivist heritage. Associated with the previous regime, they were disregarded as systems of governing, yet, remaining very much present within the

---


political culture and identity. This heritage continues to this day although it is ‘muted’, in that it exists but it does not get to speak nor to manifest itself with its own name. For Mehmet Kraja, an academic from Pristina, Kosovo alienates itself from everything that is non-Western (social democracy, leftism etc.) because it is afraid of identifying itself with what it really is. The second alienation with its heritage and history Kosovo experienced with the confrontation of the ‘missions and structures for democracy’. The socialist legacy and the history as memory was systematically disregarded from the international structures, be it in the form of cultural heritage, collective culture or system of governance. The memory and remembrance of the wartime has been forsaken to ‘open way for the future’ castrating this way the post-war healing process and downgrading it into donor financed projects for transitional justice. The commemoration of the birth of Kosovo as a state from the international structures was conceptualized as its ‘year zero’ disregarding its past and history while seeing it only as a project of the ‘European family’. This in turn is a cohabitation between a self-‘mutation’ of its own heritage on the one hand, and a ‘mutilation’ of Kosovo’s history, memory and identity from the international missions on the other. All of these aspects combined lead to a (silent/muted) resistance from the local constituents against the intervener. The similarity of local resistance to the international governance of post-conflict societies shares many similarities with local resistance in colonial and post-colonial contexts. Those who engage in critical approaches to international interventions acknowledge an exploitative albeit non-material relationship between the intervener and the intervened, evidencing the multi-dimensional nature of power manifested not only by the powerful international actors of ruling local elites, but also reflected by the weak and powerless population.

I first call for de-missionizing of the spread of democracy, be that as an aim to civilise, modernize or, Europeanize, others. It is the missionizing of causes, as rooted in Western metaphysics that is inherently problematic. Second, with regard to Kosovo, the de-missionizing would go hand in hand with de-pathologizing Kosovo as clinically ill in need for intervention. Third, de-objectifying Kosovo by acknowledging its agency, eroding this way the possibility for it being a site for controlled experiments to test ‘best European/international models’ and ‘draw lessons’ for further replications. Essentially, I am calling for a more


democratic philosophy to construct the relations with ‘others’. That would include first and foremost acknowledgment of the other as equal and engaging in an open, equal and transparent relationship.

1.2 Deconstruction and beyond
Throughout the thesis, Derrida’s deconstruction has been both used as a meta-discussion being central as a mode of thinking and as a micro-discussion, as an intervention in text employed in Article 1. The two steps of deconstruction have been spread out in the four articles presented in this thesis. The first step – the reversal and displacement of binary oppositions – clarifies the differences and looks to reverse/overturn the violent hierarchies imposed by Western thought, making the first term superior to the second. This step has been firstly put in place in Article 1, where the concept of intervention and missionizing was deconstructed and analysed embedded in the trajectory of the Western metaphysics. The article provides that like in the Christian missionaries, ‘democracy, rule of law and human rights’, has become the New Holy Trinity of Western democracy missions. The first step is further extended in Article 2, where the nature of EU’s relations with Kosovo is deconstructed. Embarking with the concept of hospitality, the article finds out a scrutinized conditioned hospitality in regards to the EU enlargement package for Kosovo on the one hand, and for the first time an appearance of Derrida’s unconditional hospitality regarding the EU mission in Kosovo on the other. Finally, deconstruction’s first step is exemplified in Article 3 with an account of mission’s autoimmunity, exemplifying the suicidal tendency of the democratic agenda in Kosovo. In the name of ‘international standards’ and ‘European values’, the democracy agenda shows the vulnerability of committing suicide as it slides into non-democratic actions itself.

Deconstruction’s second step – the general displacement of the system and moving towards the irruptive emergence of new ‘concepts’ – is employed in the last article. In Article 4, a general displacement is called on re-establishing Derrida’s conceptualization of ‘home’ to re-instate the position of ‘guest’ (missionizer) and of ‘host’ (locals). The article embarks on displacing grand narratives on Kosovo as home of both its local citizens and of the international structures (non)present in Kosovo. Deconstructing both local and international

580 Derrida, J. "Positions ".
581 Ibid.
narratives, the article posits all narratives in a battleground and calls for de-Balkanizing of narratives on Kosovo.

In addition to deconstruction, other concepts of Derrida such as hospitality, autoimmunity and home are used as main concepts in each consecutive article. The debate of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ is a recurring theme along the four articles. Deconstructing the concept of mission in the case of Kosovo (both of the EU and UN missions) in Article 1, the first reversal of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ positions is evidenced, a reversal similarly found in the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Employing the concept of hospitality and the interplay of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ relations, Article 2 exemplifies the reversed role of guest and host with regard to the EU’s relation with Kosovo and the EU mission in Kosovo. Article 3, goes further in exemplifying the reversed roles of guest and host in the broader missionizing structures and agendas in Kosovo, extending the view to NATO forces in Kosovo, the UN administration, and the Council of Europe. Article 4 embarks on re-instating the positions of ‘guest’ and ‘host’ in their initial positions, that is acknowledging Kosovo as ‘home’ of its citizens, and acknowledging its citizens as ‘host’ while positioning the missionizer as ‘guest’. This last article carries the most important weight in the thesis, in that it deliberately calls for returning the gaze to the local, a pitfall I have identified embedded not just in the relations between the intervener and the intervened but also with regard to an epistemic violence in knowledge production where the local is generally absent. Yet, this re-instatement of home to the locals was interrupted from its inception, given Kosovo’s peculiar political status on the hand, and the nature of its relations with EU on the other. This impossibility to establish ‘home’ reconfirms once again Derrida’s assertion of the impossibility of home as such.

In the following page is a table overview of the articles presented in this research.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meta-Discussion Deconstruction 582</th>
<th>Micro-Discussion</th>
<th>Conceptual findings</th>
<th>The <em>mission</em> deconstructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art.1</td>
<td><em>Step 1</em> – Concept of mission in Western metaphysics</td>
<td>Deconstruction</td>
<td>Reversal of guest &amp; host evidenced</td>
<td>‘Democracy, rule of law and human rights’ as the <em>New Holy Trinity</em>. Pathologizing and objectifying the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.2</td>
<td><em>Step 1</em> – the EU mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>Hospitality</td>
<td>Reversal of guest &amp; host exemplified with the <em>EU mission</em> in Kosovo</td>
<td>EU mission in Kosovo: Unconditional hospitality EU enlargement: Aporetic Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.3</td>
<td><em>Step 1</em> – the mission machinery in Kosovo (EU, UN, NATO)</td>
<td>Autoimmunity</td>
<td>Reversal of guest &amp; host exemplified with the <em>mission machinery</em> in Kosovo</td>
<td>The suicide of democracy promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art.4</td>
<td><em>Step 2</em> – Kosovo as ‘home’, re-instatement of guest and host relations</td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Re-instatement of guest &amp; host in their initial position and the impossibility of home</td>
<td>Multiple narratives. Aporetic Kosovo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

582 Step 1 – reversal and displacement of binary oppositions. Step 2 – general displacement of the system
1.3. Research limitations

The first three limitations I want to address are methodological. The first two are linked with 1) limitations beyond the 34 interviews conducted and 2) limitations within the 34 interviews. The first is primarily related to the insufficient time assigned for this PhD project (36 months). Findings would have been more robust with a wider pool of research participants in the field work. First, with regard to the relationship between the missionizer and the local, including former EU, UN employees and other employees of international structures in Kosovo would bring more inter-personal experiences on how the mission functioned. The same applies to former politicians and/or peace negotiators from Kosovo and other Western Balkans. Second, more interviews with non-Albanian ethnic groups, primarily Roma, Serbs, Turks; LGBT community, war veterans, religious leaders would have further deconstructed local narratives on Kosovo providing this way a deeper understandings of aspects underlined in MetaKosovo: local and international narratives in Article 4.

The second limitation speaks to the concept of interviewing the set of people ‘active’ with civil society (broadly speaking) such as journalists, analysts, researchers, professors, art workers. This selection comprised of a pool of people who have a regular job, have at least college education, have worked at some point with international organisations in Kosovo or projects paid by the later and this way they form part of the so called ‘elite’ clique in Prishtina. I am talking about a known trend of ‘elite creation’ from donor-oriented civil society, evidenced in transitional societies after the collapse of communism. This is not a problem of how representative ‘this sample’ is. From the outset, I have not read these stories as a generalization of the overall population in regards to the international missions. My concern is turning the gaze to the local, by interviewing this category of people, how local are their narratives, their critique? How different is their narrative from other locals? In ceaselessly trying to align with the marginal in the discourse, how marginal are the local narratives presented in this thesis? Are they also in turn marginalizing towards other more marginalized voices? What stories are silenced/subjugated when turning the gaze to these particular voices?

A third methodological limitation is about the interpretivist school and its concerns with the issue of narratives as stories and text. The compilation of narratives presented here does not occupy an authentic position to claim an ultimate/unrevealed truth from the subaltern. Rather they are presented as yet another fragment in the bigger story of Kosovo. Neither am
I as an author trying to occupy the *authenticity* in presenting a story. This comes as imperative to point out, especially considering the normative statement this project has taken in turning the gaze to the locals and in calling for attention to the locals. With this I have not *missionized* myself as a narrator to provide the marginalized story as the ultimate truth. However, we should be aware of the ‘privilege’ of both the storytellers (interviewees) and the ‘narrator’ (the author/the interviewer) in crafting and articulating this story. This of course carries a certain dimension of agency and power in itself and also comes at the expense of ‘silencing’ other stories.

In terms of *theoretical* limitations I would like to set forward a couple of questions and concerns with regard to Derrida and his philosophical underpinnings. I embarked with deconstruction and Derrida to primarily challenge the premises of Western metaphysics and its materialization in its current democratic missions. An Algerian Jew who developed his intellectual thinking in Paris, Derrida called himself a European philosopher, was genuinely interested in the European *logos*, and wanted to leave a mark in the European philosophy. In a number of occasions Derrida has been crucified as ‘Eurocentrist’, ‘the last Eurocentric’ etc. In *The Other Heading. Reflections on Today’s Europe* and even more so on his co-signed letter with Habermas, *February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy*, Derrida displays what I call his *Europhilia*. What do I mean by *Europhilia*? In some of his statements, especially in his co-signed letter with Habermas, Derrida seems to suggest the preservation of ‘Europe’ not merely for the sake of ‘Europe’ but for the world at large. He talks about *Europe* being endowed with a sort of responsibility of heritance. “Europe has the privilege of being the good example, for it incarnates in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditionality and so forth” says Derrida adding that the empirical types of non-European societies, then, are only more or less historical; at the lower limit, they tend toward non-historicity.\(^583\) Being a *Europhile* and having Eurocentric views is not a criticism in itself, but the fact that applying deconstruction from a Eurocentric view has its own limitations, in *how far* and *what* can one go deconstructing. Deconstruction is limited to the metaphysics of the researcher (the knowledge, background etc.) who is using it. Therefore, this debate focuses on limitations of *who* gets to use deconstruction, rather than *how* deconstruction is used.

---

Gayatri Spivak, the scholar who made Derrida accessible to the American scholarship, notes that there is "something Eurocentric about assuming that imperialism began with Europe\textsuperscript{584}. Victor Li took this debate to pose the question whether there is something Eurocentric even in the European auto-deconstruction of Eurocentrism, an auto-deconstruction seen as originating only in Europe\textsuperscript{585}. The question that I extend here is essentially whether auto-criticism is essentially different from criticism? Whether auto-deconstruction is essentially not deconstruction? What agent speaks of either of them, and what agent defines the difference between the two? What is the difference between reading Derrida from scholars well-embedded in the European faculty on the one hand, and from L. Ling’s Daoism of World Politics, Cristina Inoue’s Nature’s Duality and the Challenges of the Anthropocene, Anna Agathangelo’s Thinking about freedom or any other scholarship to which ‘European cosmology’ is not central on the other hand? I find it imperative to bring this discussion forward without being obliged to ‘announce’ Derrida as a (non)Eurocentrist. In keeping faith with his deconstruction I maintain that a deconstruction of his intellectual persona should equally maintain even though the ‘answer’ to that might be as aporetic and undecidable, thus impossible to achieve.

The second limitation relates to Derrida’s inclusion in FPA and IR at large. In the introduction I raised a discussion of what happens when schools of thought, theories and methodologies are transposed from one field to another? Is there something lost in translation amid the transfer? Has something similar happened in bringing Derrida to FPA and EU studies in this case? The mainstream IR scholarship is canonized as a field of study to prescribe solutions, offer alternatives, provide orientation. Derrida, his concepts and post-structuralism at large questions, critiques and problematizes, but it does not give forward (obvious) solutions or alternatives. This is the ‘curse’ of post-structuralism and Derrida, if I may, in the canonized mainstream IR and FPA. I understand the hesitance of agreeing with post-structuralism, but it is imperative to give credits for what it has done to the philosophy of social sciences and the patterns of knowledge production. Embarking on with Derrida one has to accept the humiliation of not being able to provide models, alternatives or solutions. One has to learn how to live with ghosts, in Derrida’s words, in living with the unknown, with the uncertainty. What Derrida offers is the possibility to open up everything,


everything that has become established, canonized and given. On this openness, we can engage with deconstruction of cosmologies and metaphysics.

This in turn, brings me to the last point in regards to Derrida’s thought. In the last decade of his life, Derrida is quoted to have said: “I’m no good for anything except taking the world apart and putting it together again (and I manage the latter less and less frequently)”\textsuperscript{586}. The camp of Derrida’s critics argues that deconstruction does nothing more than dissolving foundations and leaving the pieces for other to put back\textsuperscript{587}, that the continues dissolvent of totalities leads to cynicism and parody\textsuperscript{588}, and that deconstructionists lose their sense of reality by arguing that there is nothing outside text\textsuperscript{589}. What ‘there’s nothing outside of text’ refers to is the impossibility of comprehending non-linguistic phenomena other than through discursive practices. Dan Bulley, arguably Derrida’s most articulated scholar in Foreign Policy Analysis, asks whether deconstruction leaves us in a moral wasteland where all ethical action is fundamentally impossible. His question is directed to the possibility of abandoning or ignoring ethics as foreign policy because it has shown itself to be an unachievable goal?\textsuperscript{590}. In this Derridean wasteland, where we are ceaselessly exposed to the impossibility and the undecidability of ethics as foreign policy, of interventions and missions as foreign policy, it is precisely within these undecidabilities that I see and retain the ethical. For it is their impossibility (impossibility of democracy, ethics etc.) that inherently makes them possible.


\textsuperscript{590} Bulley, D. (2011). \textit{Ethics as Foreign Policy, Britain, the EU and the Other}. London, Routledge
2. The Gordian Knot: knowledge production, cartographies of power and missions

In the outset of this thesis, a lengthy discussion situated the positivist and interpretivist debate to map cartographies of power in knowledge production. In addition to engaging with this debate for methodological purposes, this thesis maintained that there is an almost uninterrupted connection between positivism and the Western metaphysics whose implications are to be seen in how ‘the West’ perceives itself and its ‘others’, and how it constructs its relations with ‘others’. In The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences. Positivism and its epistemological others, Steinmertz talks about positivist haunting in describing the surprising longevity of positivism – especially in latent, unexamined, or unconscious forms in the human sciences. Patterns of latent positivism, objectifying and experimenting on subjects of study in academic scholarship, are in turn traced in the materialization of interventions and missions. In tackling the problematics of the intervener/intervened relationships I am not only calling for a de-missionizing of spread for democracy at the implementational level. I am first calling for humanization of social sciences and more specifically the spectrum of IR and FPA, in methodological and theoretical levels. Second I am calling for a more hospitable scholarship of the EU studies and IR in general by disrupting the degree of ‘Eurocentrism’ and ‘Western metaphysics’ in EU studies and more broadly in IR and FPA. By hospitable, I am referring to non-European, non-Western cosmologies.

2.1 Interpretivism in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and EU Studies, and the Humanization of social science

In Foreign Policy Analysis and EU studies, interpretivism opens up new modes of engaging with research especially for studies who take a more normative and conceptual stance at the EU foreign policy and EU’s relations with ‘third parties’. The so-called ‘narrative turn’ in IR with Shapiro, Edkins, Campbell, has already introduced this as one of the formative approaches that can be further extended in the EU studies.

Methodologically, the humanization of social science is quintessentially linked with de-objectifying the other in studying relations between two or more subjects. This would first imply a shift in the ‘scientific focus’ from controlled experiments and testing models of study to engage with stories, narratives and other modes which acknowledge people’s sociological attribution. Second, by turning the gaze to locals, to the subaltern, to the marginal/the oppressed not

---

simply to bring a ‘perspective from within’, but to also deliberately call for attention to the subaltern and to acknowledge its agency in faculties of knowledge. On a more theoretical pursuit, the humanization of social science is to be looked at as bridging the gap between the mania for detached, neutral and universally scientific inquiries on the one side, and particularities and inter-subjectivity on the other. I am not suggesting subjectivity as a replacement of objectivity. What we need to think through is an understanding of objectivity that is far removed from the logic of positivism. In *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche talks about a different objectivity as an approach to knowledge that can embrace the necessity of perspectivism. 592 This methodologico-theoretical nexus of turning the gaze to the locals while deconstructing discourses and narratives aligning with what is otherwise marginal, oppressed, provides this niche of an epistemological retreat in studying settings of interventions and missions.

In making the EU studies and FPA at large more hospitable, as a response to Eurocentrism/Wesphalian-centric, I have given forward Derrida and four of his concepts. By hospitable I am referring to the welcome, the openness, openness both as a virtue and vulnerability towards complementary/contradictory alternatives of reality which are more rooted in the lived experiences of people in Africa, in the Amazones, in Asia, the aborigines, the native Americans etc. Speaking on Eurocentrism, Dabashi argues that as inheritors of multiple empires, the Europeans have come to believe that their particular philosophy is ‘philosophy’ and their particular thinking is ‘thinking’ and everything else is ‘dancing’. 593 This sense of ‘universality’ of European’s ‘thinking’ has also been attacked by Grosfoguel who argues that in-front of this universal, scientific Western/European ‘thinking’ the rest (Islamic, non-hetero, Maya, Hindu) are downgraded into particularisms, subjectivism etc. causing this way an epistemicide in knowledge production. 594 In calling for a more hospitable environment beyond Eurocentrism, I should clarify this is not a call for anti-Eurocentrism, not because as a strategy that would be very predictable but because it is equally missionary and equally totalizing. Below I will provide how Derrida’s accounts of making FPA and IR at large more hospitable, offer or at least provoke a more democratic way in studying interventions and missions in FPA and IR at large.

---


593 Dabashi, H. (2013) Can non-Europeans think?

2.2 Derrida and the Hospitality of Foreign Policy Analysis

“The ethics and the future of the academy require hospitality”.

Jacques Derrida

Talking about deconstruction, Derrida said himself there is no democracy without deconstruction and no deconstruction without democracy. “They are indissocable, inasmuch as they each entail the right to criticize anything”. Each of his other concepts in addition to deconstruction, such as hospitality, autoimmunity, home, are all ceaselessly open and inviting to de-totalize their self-enclosed meanings. Each of them is hospitable to disrupt its establishments to the point that they become impossible to exist. Each of their parts de-totalizes themselves further leaving almost no trace of their initial form. And it is in this form that Derrida in general offers new space for a more democratic discussion.

Although deconstruction has been elaborated and used in foreign policy analysis, especially in EU external relations, other concepts conceptualized and used by Derrida remain largely unexplored. Hospitality, is primarily important as a concept in IR and foreign policy studies at large, especially given the trend of xenophobia, the rise of right-wing movements, anti-immigration laws and not at least racism. In particular with regard to EU enlargement, Derrida’s conceptualization of hospitality and its two laws (conditioned and unconditioned hospitality) provide a new spectrum in getting to the fundamentals of enlargement policies, whom is invited and welcomed to join Europe, who is refused etc. Because it is quintessentially linked with the concept of home, hospitality touches upon dimensions on EU’s subjectivity as a host and its consequent guests. What has probably ‘shadowed’ hospitality in these discussions (at least in typical Western scholarship) is its lesser (acting like) substitute – tolerance. Tolerance in particular has demarcated studies on multiculturalism,


597 Ibid.

religious and ethnic conflicts, migration etc. Derrida distinguishes between ‘tolerance’ and ‘hospitality’. For him the word tolerance first of all is marked in a religious war between Christians and the non-Christians with the Edict of Nantes (1598) in which the Huguenots were permitted to worship as long as they wouldn’t question king’s authority. As such, Derrida argues, tolerance is a Christian value in which the Christian must tolerate the non-Christian. In Philosophy in a time of terror, Derrida and Habermas engage in a debate with Giovanna Borradori, with Habermas arguing that tolerance is a paternalistic term that would be better off being replaced by the concept of “hospitality” or “friendship”, as the very act of ‘tolerance’ retains an element of doing mercy. Derrida adds that ‘tolerance’ is the opposite of hospitality, as it is always on the side of “reason of the strongest” in which “I limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control of my ‘home’, of my sovereignty. It is careful hospitality”. So far, non-mainstream theories were tolerated in social sciences labelled as particularistic, provincial, indigenous etc. marking this way their detachment from what the codified ‘universal’ knowledge. In this regard, rather than tolerating other spectres of engaging with knowledge production, even though they are defined non-scientific and non-rigorous in one particular epistemology, offering hospitality to these strands can actually provide a more all-encompassing and democratic way of producing knowledge.

Tolerance’s ultimate project is ‘multiculturalism’. Much like tolerance is the opposite hospitality for Derrida, multiculturalism is the opposite of the idea of embeddedness of differences. For Žižek, multiculturalism represents the ideal form of ideology of the global capitalism, in which each local culture is treated the way the colonizer treats colonized people – as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be carefully studied and ‘respected’. He argues that


602 In 2013, Patrick Jackson also argued for a more hospitable IR. Unlike in this case, he proposed a variety of positions on the mind-world look up: mind-world dualism versus min-world monism putting forward the four positions in philosophical ontology: neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism and reflexivity. Jackson argues on setting a new lexicon in IR as a way of encouraging conversations on philosophical issues which according to him are not much discussed in the field. See for more: Jackson, P. (2013). "Preparing the Ground for a More Hospitable International Relations." Millenium - Journal of International Studies 41.
multiculturalism involves patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one’s own particular culture.

It is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’ – it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position.\(^603\)

As such, for him multiculturalism is a racism….as it does not oppose to the Other the particular values of his own culture, but nonetheless retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate properly the other/particular cultures. The respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority. In turn, when I call for a more hospitable environment, I am not doing it for the goal of multiculturalism rather than for what Derrida calls friendship\(^604\) or what Ling calls embeddedness.\(^605\)

Derrida’s conceptualization of autoimmunity is another concept that is to provide insightful dimensions in studying democracies and democratic systems of governance. This research has taken a step further in employing autoimmunity to the study of ‘democracy promotion’ in Kosovo. In evidencing the suicidal tendency of ‘democracy promotion’ with the application of autoimmunity, the findings seems to ally themselves with other literature who partakes in the criticism of the substance and form of democracy promotion.\(^606\) The niche and the difference of the argument is that unlike other strands of literature, autoimmunity interrogates first and foremost the very concept of democracy as such, arguing that democracy itself has the tendency to be suicidal. Autoimmunity falls in a much broader scope of FPA and IR, particularly in international interventions, international state-building, post-conflict studies, development aid. Its obvious importance with regard to EU studies and the

---


\(^605\) L.H.M. Ling (2014). The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations, New York, Routledge

\(^606\) Jan Orbie & Anne Wetzel (2012). "On narrow paths and through shallow waters? Discussing the substance of EU democracy promotion." European Foreign Affairs Review 16(5).
EU external relations/EU enlargement is given the EU’s tendency to ‘reproduce itself’ – its system of governance – outside of its own borders. While in Article 3 democracy’s autoimmunity might seem to have been demonized, autoimmunity as Derrida reminds us is not an absolute ill or evil. Because it enables an exposure to the other, to what and to who comes, it remains incalculable. Without autoimmunity nothing would ever happen, or arrive, we would no long wait, await, or expect, no longer expect one another or expect an event. For me, autoimmunity is a self-destruction which enables life to continue and enables the welcoming of the other. It is not inherently ‘an end’ and a permanent destruction rather than an interruption of something that opens space for a new beginning. Only by opening itself up to the other, threatening to destroy itself, the organism has the chance to receive the other.

Lastly, home is another concept that can be further employed in EU studies literature. While Campbell deserves most of the credit for codifying this concept in IR, it is Bulley who has used it extensively with regard to EU external relations and EU enlargement in his account Ethics as Foreign Policy. Like hospitality, home is inherently linked with the inside and the outside, with the host and guest, the sovereign and the non-sovereign etc. Because it has to do with borders it offers new insights into studies on sovereignty, post-national/post-modern structures, supra-national entities. Although home is as aproetic, as impossible and as undecidable as the other concepts used by Derrida, it is precisely Derrida who reminds us to protect home because without home ‘there is no door nor any hospitality’.

All of these concepts provide an openness to welcome the outside, the other. They all equally expose their ceaseless vulnerability in being attacked, threatened while welcoming the other. It is by allowing this sort of threat and openness that Derrida with his concepts offers this liberty and openness to engage with questions, to question, disrupt, destroy and construct. It is with openness, openness as embededness, openness to the point that threatens the very core of our own, of our own cosmology and metaphysics that we can make sure a more hospitable environment. At the level of knowledge production, this hospitality speaks to inviting


other labelled particularistic, non-scientific, non-objective modes of knowledge production, even though they may threaten the universalist, objective knowledge. Disregarding openness and hospitality, we essentially revert to the easiness of closing ourselves in the comfortable shells that in turn creates rigidity and morass. At a more political level, it is this disregard of hospitality and more broadly the concept of embeddedness that explains failures to understanding the logic of the Arab Spring(s), the patterns of Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab conflict, and essentially how interventions and missions abroad fail to understand the failures (simply put) of their own missions and interventions.

What is to follow the de-misonizing, de-pathologizing, de-objectifying missions and in turn a more hospitable environment in policy and academia? Why should we bother with any of these? This essentially implies not tolerating but embedding, not ‘evidencing’ ills but understanding patterns or simply put, not constructing others and creating unequal relationships. Is looking at the other as equal, associated with looking at oneself as non-superior? When the other is not the other but is a simple other not much distinct from you, but embedded in you and the other way around, how will the concept of missionizing change? Why would you missionize something that is awful a lot like yourself? Where does the legitimacy from missionizing then is going to spring? Can we dare to imagine the usefulness of interventions and missions, whatever their noble cause, after we have established that maybe they (others) do not necessarily need to be democratized, modernized, purified, because on the hand whatever the system of culture they have is not pathologically corrupt and on the other hand, whatever our values are, are not necessarily the best and/or superior.
### List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Genc Kadriu</td>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>15.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Artan Çollaku</td>
<td>Expert at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. Head of Association and Stabilisation Unit at Ministry of European Integration, Government of Republic of Kosovo</td>
<td>15.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Avdi Smajljaj</td>
<td>Professor of Political Theory</td>
<td>16.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Anne Blanksma-Çeta</td>
<td>EULEX Officer of Communication</td>
<td>16.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Artan Canhasi</td>
<td>Political advisor with EULEX</td>
<td>17.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nita Luci</td>
<td>Professor of Anthropology</td>
<td>19.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Abir Hoxha</td>
<td>Scholar of security studies</td>
<td>21.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shenoll Muharremi</td>
<td>Former head of ‘European integration’ program at the Government of Republic of Kosovo</td>
<td>21.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ylli Hoxha</td>
<td>Researcher at Kosovo based think tank “Foreign Policy Club”. Joined “Vetëvendosje!” party in 2013</td>
<td>22.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nenad Maximović</td>
<td>Expert with Gračanica based Institute for Peace and Tolerance</td>
<td>23.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Baton Haxhiu</td>
<td>Journalist, Media owner</td>
<td>26.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dukagjin Pupovci</td>
<td>Head of Kosovo Education</td>
<td>26.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Title</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Betim Musliu</td>
<td>Journalist of Judicial Affairs</td>
<td>26.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Astrit Salihu</td>
<td>Professor of Philosophy</td>
<td>27.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hajrulla Çeku</td>
<td>Head of Pristina based NGO ‘Ec Ma Ndryshe’</td>
<td>27.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>EULEX Official 1</td>
<td>Operations unit</td>
<td>27.11.2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Arif Muharremi</td>
<td>Worker of Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>02.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Florian Qehaja</td>
<td>Head of Pristina based think tank ‘Kosovo Centre for Security Studies’</td>
<td>02.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ariana Qosaj—Mustafa</td>
<td>Senior Researcher at Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development</td>
<td>03.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Artan Mustafa</td>
<td>Editor in Chief of ‘Life in Kosovo’ Newspaper</td>
<td>04.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Kreshnik Hoxha</td>
<td>Researcher, columnist</td>
<td>04.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Albert Heta</td>
<td>Head of Centre for Contemporary Art, Stacion</td>
<td>08.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Engjëllushe Morina</td>
<td>Chair of Prishtina Council for Foreign Relations</td>
<td>09.04.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Catherine Fearon</td>
<td>EULEX Head of Communication and Planning</td>
<td>03.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Emin Mushica</td>
<td>Civilian officer at Kosovo Police Forces</td>
<td>05.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Alessandro Tedesco</td>
<td>EULEX Program Officer</td>
<td>08.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Tihana Leko</td>
<td>EULEX Evaluation Programme Officer</td>
<td>08.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Thomas Muehlmann</td>
<td>EULEX Chief of Staff</td>
<td>08.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Anonymous Interview 1</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>16.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Anonymous Interview 2</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>16.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Anonymous Interview 3</td>
<td>Tradesman</td>
<td>16.10.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Interviewer</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Anonymous Interview 4</td>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>23.11.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Besim Ismajli</td>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>23.11.2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX I

‘The Belgian Congo’. Colonial Museum Tervuren, Belgium (Visited in April 2012)

The Congo becomes a Belgian colony in 1908. After annexation, Belgium intends to regain its respectability by making the Congo into a 'model colony'. The colonial authorities want to forget the past. Citing a 'civilizing mission', they look towards the future.

Although the colonial administration develops, the State – as before – relies on the Church and the Capital. The traditional worlds are maintained within the social transformations brought by colonization.

After the Second World War, Belgium adopts an ambitious programme for the economic and social development of its colony, known as the Decennial Plan.
ANNEX II

“If they can be tolerant, so can you….Become tolerant”. Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Reklamat-e-KFOR-it-ma-shajn%C3%AB-inteligjenc%C3%ABn-me-nan%C3%AB/356605516279?sk=photos_stream&tab=photos
ANNEX III

ANNEX IV

‘Voyage en UNMIKISTAN. Udhëtim në UNMIKISTAN’, 2004. Available from:
ANNEX V

ANNEX VI

‘EULEX has done nothing to fight corruption and serious crime….’


Derrida, J. "Positions ".


Diez, T. (2014). Sepaking Europe, Drawing Boundaries: Reflections on the Role of Discourse in EU Foreign Policy and Identity. EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of


Muriel Asseburg & Ronja Kempin, Ed. (2009). *The EU as a strategic actor in the realm of security and defence? A systematic assesment of ESDP missions and operations*


Stephan Keukeleire et.al. (2008). Key Challenges for European Foreign Policy. Debate and Book Launch


Bibliography | Deconstructing the ‘mission’. What’s in a name?

Cambridge Dictionary Online.


Derrida, J. "Of Hospitality."


European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (2010). The rule of law is commitment and merit of each individual from all communities. Prishtina, EULEX.


Bibliography | Hospitality and Hostility. The EU and Kosovo


2013.


Hu, C.-y. (2013). "The Im/Possible Host/Guest: Hospitality in a Passage to India." Intergrams 14(1).


Trauner, F. and E. Manigrassi (2014). "When visa-free travel becomes difficult to achieve and easy to lose: the EU Visa Free Dialogues after the EU's experience with the Western Balkans." *European Journal for Migration and Law* 16.


Bibliography | Autoimmunity of democracy promotion. The case of Western Missions in Kosovo


Derrida, J. "Positions ".


European Union Office in Kosovo / European Union Special Representative in Kosovo (2011). EU project provides training for teachers on multiculturalism Pristina, European Union Office in Kosovo / European Union Special Representative in Kosovo.


Interview X 3 (2013). Interview. V. Musliu. Mitrovica (North)


Bibliography | Conclusion


Derrida, J. "Positions ".


European Court of Auditors (2012). European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the

with Jurgen Habermas and Jaques Derrida. G. Borradori.

Jan Orbie & Anne Wetzel (2012). "On narrow paths and through shallow waters? Discussing
the substance of EU democracy promotion." European Foreign Affairs Review 16(5).

Kim L. Schmidt et.al. (2008). "Neurosteroids, immunosteroids, and the Balkanization of
endocrinology." General and Comparative Endocrinology 157: 266-274.

Pristina, Gazeta Jeta në Kosovë (Life in Kosovo Newspaper).

L.H.M. Ling (2014). The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist
International Relations. New York, Routledge


Modeling and Measuring the Integration of Electronic Communities." Management Science


Political Science 1: 215-331.


Phiddian, R. (1997). "Are Parody and Deconstruction Secretly the Same Thing?" New


