Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science : explanatory power, understanding, and the 'mere description' worry
- Author
- Raoul Gervais (UGent)
- Organization
- Abstract
- In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the 'mere description' worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.
- Keywords
- Explanation, Mechanism, Understanding, Strong anticipation, SYSTEMS, Dynamical cognitive science, Dynamical models, PHILOSOPHY, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
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Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-5685708
- MLA
- Gervais, Raoul. “Mechanistic and Non-Mechanistic Varieties of Dynamical Models in Cognitive Science : Explanatory Power, Understanding, and the ‘mere Description’ Worry.” SYNTHESE, vol. 192, no. 1, 2015, pp. 43–66, doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5.
- APA
- Gervais, R. (2015). Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science : explanatory power, understanding, and the “mere description” worry. SYNTHESE, 192(1), 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5
- Chicago author-date
- Gervais, Raoul. 2015. “Mechanistic and Non-Mechanistic Varieties of Dynamical Models in Cognitive Science : Explanatory Power, Understanding, and the ‘mere Description’ Worry.” SYNTHESE 192 (1): 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Gervais, Raoul. 2015. “Mechanistic and Non-Mechanistic Varieties of Dynamical Models in Cognitive Science : Explanatory Power, Understanding, and the ‘mere Description’ Worry.” SYNTHESE 192 (1): 43–66. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5.
- Vancouver
- 1.Gervais R. Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science : explanatory power, understanding, and the “mere description” worry. SYNTHESE. 2015;192(1):43–66.
- IEEE
- [1]R. Gervais, “Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science : explanatory power, understanding, and the ‘mere description’ worry,” SYNTHESE, vol. 192, no. 1, pp. 43–66, 2015.
@article{5685708,
abstract = {{In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the 'mere description' worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.}},
author = {{Gervais, Raoul}},
issn = {{0039-7857}},
journal = {{SYNTHESE}},
keywords = {{Explanation,Mechanism,Understanding,Strong anticipation,SYSTEMS,Dynamical cognitive science,Dynamical models,PHILOSOPHY,SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{43--66}},
title = {{Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science : explanatory power, understanding, and the 'mere description' worry}},
url = {{http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5}},
volume = {{192}},
year = {{2015}},
}
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