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Optimal regulatory design in banking in transition economies

(2006)
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(UGent)
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Abstract
The chapters in this dissertation are all related to the optimal regulatory design of banks in transition economies. The contributions in this dissertation are mainly empirical, but also contain some significant theoretical insights. The countries under investigation are Russia (Part I) and Central and Eastern Europe (Part II). In a first chapter we empirically evaluate the current financial supervisory authority arrangement within the central bank, investigating whether the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) uses its supervisory information to complement monetary policy. In a second chapter, we empirically study the bank licensing policy of the CBR. We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives - individual bank stability and systemic stability - and the regulatory forbearance that follows from it. A third chapter assesses how the interplay between a system of repressive reserve requirements and capital requirements can impact bank risk behavior in Russia. A fourth and fifth chapter shift attention away from Russia and prudential regulation towards the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and bank market structure. In chapter four, we investigate the determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern Europe. We assess to what extent the relatively high bank margins in Central and Eastern Europe can be attributed to low efficiency and noncompetitive market conditions, or to regulatory reforms. We systematically compare Central and Eastern European banks with Western European banks. In chapter five, we study the effect of different bank entry modes on the interest rate for loans.

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MLA
Claeys, Sophie. Optimal Regulatory Design in Banking in Transition Economies. Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, 2006.
APA
Claeys, S. (2006). Optimal regulatory design in banking in transition economies. Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent, Belgium.
Chicago author-date
Claeys, Sophie. 2006. “Optimal Regulatory Design in Banking in Transition Economies.” Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Claeys, Sophie. 2006. “Optimal Regulatory Design in Banking in Transition Economies.” Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
Vancouver
1.
Claeys S. Optimal regulatory design in banking in transition economies. [Ghent, Belgium]: Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; 2006.
IEEE
[1]
S. Claeys, “Optimal regulatory design in banking in transition economies,” Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent, Belgium, 2006.
@phdthesis{470381,
  abstract     = {{The chapters in this dissertation are all related to the optimal regulatory design of banks in transition economies. The contributions in this dissertation are mainly empirical, but also contain some significant theoretical insights. The countries under investigation are Russia (Part I) and Central and Eastern Europe (Part II). In a first chapter we empirically evaluate the current financial supervisory authority arrangement within the central bank, investigating whether the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) uses its supervisory information to complement monetary policy. In a second chapter, we empirically study the bank licensing policy of the CBR. We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives - individual bank stability and systemic stability - and the regulatory forbearance that follows from it. A third chapter assesses how the interplay between a system of repressive reserve requirements and capital requirements can impact bank risk behavior in Russia. A fourth and fifth chapter shift attention away from Russia and prudential regulation towards the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and bank market structure. In chapter four, we investigate the determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern Europe. We assess to what extent the relatively high bank margins in Central and Eastern Europe can be attributed to low efficiency and noncompetitive market conditions, or to regulatory reforms. We systematically compare Central and Eastern European banks with Western European banks. In chapter five, we study the effect of different bank entry modes on the interest rate for loans.}},
  author       = {{Claeys, Sophie}},
  language     = {{und}},
  pages        = {{XVIII, 167}},
  publisher    = {{Ghent University. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration}},
  school       = {{Ghent University}},
  title        = {{Optimal regulatory design in banking in transition economies}},
  url          = {{http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/000/972/939/RUG01-000972939_2010_0001_AC.pdf}},
  year         = {{2006}},
}