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Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?

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Keywords
ANOMALIES, WORK, SANCTIONS, INSURANCE, INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, Job search model, Job search monitoring, Non-compliance, Measurement error, Hyperbolic discounting, Social efficiency

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MLA
Cockx, Bart, Corinna Ghirelli, and Bruno Van der Linden. “Is It Socially Efficient to Impose Job Search Requirements on Unemployed Benefit Claimants with Hyperbolic Preferences?” JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 113 (2014): 80–95. Print.
APA
Cockx, B., Ghirelli, C., & Van der Linden, B. (2014). Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences? JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 113, 80–95.
Chicago author-date
Cockx, Bart, Corinna Ghirelli, and Bruno Van der Linden. 2014. “Is It Socially Efficient to Impose Job Search Requirements on Unemployed Benefit Claimants with Hyperbolic Preferences?” Journal of Public Economics 113: 80–95.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Cockx, Bart, Corinna Ghirelli, and Bruno Van der Linden. 2014. “Is It Socially Efficient to Impose Job Search Requirements on Unemployed Benefit Claimants with Hyperbolic Preferences?” Journal of Public Economics 113: 80–95.
Vancouver
1.
Cockx B, Ghirelli C, Van der Linden B. Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences? JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS. 2014;113:80–95.
IEEE
[1]
B. Cockx, C. Ghirelli, and B. Van der Linden, “Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?,” JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, vol. 113, pp. 80–95, 2014.
@article{4345703,
  author       = {{Cockx, Bart and Ghirelli, Corinna and Van der Linden, Bruno}},
  issn         = {{0047-2727}},
  journal      = {{JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS}},
  keywords     = {{ANOMALIES,WORK,SANCTIONS,INSURANCE,INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE,FINANCIAL INCENTIVES,Job search model,Job search monitoring,Non-compliance,Measurement error,Hyperbolic discounting,Social efficiency}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{80--95}},
  title        = {{Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.03.006}},
  volume       = {{113}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

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