Talking Democracy and Creating Identity

A Poststructuralist Analysis of the EU’s Discourse towards the Mediterranean Region (1989 – 2011)

Dissertation submitted by Vicky Reynaert
in fulfilment of the degree ‘Doctor of Political Sciences’
Ghent University

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Vicky Reynaert
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDECE</td>
<td>Commission pour l’Etude des Communautés Européennes</td>
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<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>CEMR</td>
<td>Council of European Municipalities and Regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Country Orientation Period</td>
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<td>CoR</td>
<td>Committee of the Regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCM</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>DEV</td>
<td>Development</td>
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<td>DevCo</td>
<td>Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>EAD</td>
<td>Euro-Arab Dialogue</td>
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<td>EAEC</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<td>EMRLA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>European Single Act</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMIP</td>
<td>Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMP</td>
<td>Global Mediterranean Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>General System of Preferences</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEE</td>
<td>Institute d'Etudes Européennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Interparliamentary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMS</td>
<td>Journal of Common Market Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Mediterranean Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDA</td>
<td>Mesures D’Adjustements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPP</td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multi-annual Financial Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mediterranean Non-member Country</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Mediterranean Partners</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<td>MU</td>
<td>Mediterranean Union</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plans</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-State Actor</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>Non-Tariff Barrier</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transition Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBM</td>
<td>Partnership Building Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Parti de la Justice et du Développement</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Relations Exterieure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>Renovated Mediterranean Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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Introduction

This doctoral dissertation deals with the relations between the European Union (EU) and the Mediterranean region. More specifically, the discourse of the EU towards the region will be studied. Focus is thus on the EU, rather than on the Mediterranean region. As will be illustrated in the empirical part of this dissertation, the EU has articulated ‘the Mediterranean’ in several ways (the study of these articulations is one of the objectives of this dissertation). Overall, there are ten countries which the EU always considered as part of the Mediterranean area, and which are central in its policies: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia. We therefore mainly focus on the relations between the EU and these countries, to which we refer here as ‘the Mediterranean countries’ or ‘the Mediterranean region’. The relations between the EU and these countries are longstanding. Already in the 1960s, the European Economic Community (EEC) concluded trade and association agreements with several of the Mediterranean countries. These initially limited relations have grown into an elaborated relationship. In order to give the reader an introduction to the topic of this dissertation, a general overview of the different policy frameworks the EU developed for dealing with its Mediterranean neighbours is presented in the first chapter: the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the renewed ENP. More specifically, we look at why the European Communities (EC)/the EU decided to set up, to change or to strengthen the relationship with the Mediterranean region. In addition, the objectives of the EC/EU towards the Mediterranean region and the instruments to reach these objectives are studied. Also the view of the Mediterranean countries is shortly discussed. A very brief evaluation is made of each framework in order to explain why these frameworks were adapted or replaced.

In the second chapter of the dissertation, the academic literature on the relationship between the EC/EU and the Mediterranean region is discussed from an EU perspective. The first part of this chapter goes deeper into the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1960s and on the GMP, while the second part deals with the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1980s. In the third part, we go deeper into the literature on the EMP and ENP (created in 1995 and 2003) and in the fourth part, the studies on the UfM (launched in 2008) are examined. In addition, also the recent policy briefs and articles on the renewed ENP are discussed. The studies are arranged according to their main subject. The theoretical approach of each study is discussed. Which theories of international
relations/European integration are used to explain the Euro-Mediterranean relations? The studies rely upon a set of ontological assumptions and make a series of epistemological and methodological choices. The ontological, epistemological and methodological positions of the authors are discussed. This is important because the ontological and the epistemological position which are adopted in this dissertation are different than most of the other studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The literature review will allow us to make a comparison between the current studies and this dissertation (in chapter 3), and will help us to explain the added value of the research.

In chapter 3, we go deeper into the ontological, epistemological and methodological position on which the dissertation is based. Ontologically, we assume that the social is open, i.e. that everything in the social is overdetermined and that all actions, practices and social formations are discursive in nature. This logic of the social is adopted from Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and is discussed in the first part of chapter 3. In addition, their poststructuralist discourse theory is studied. Subsequently, this ontological position is compared to the ontological position of the current studies on the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region. Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s logic of the social, we take a different approach to the study of Euro-Mediterranean relations. More specifically, we are interested in how the EU tries to constitute a particular society in the Mediterranean region through its discourse. This is the main objective of this dissertation. We formulate three research questions. First, what kind of social order does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region? Second, how does the EU promote this social order in the Mediterranean region through its discourse, and three, why is the social order the EU promotes in the Mediterranean region maintained, i.e. why is the discourse appealing?

Epistemologically, the dissertation is based on retroduction, a third form of interference between induction and deduction. Retroduction moves from data to hypotheses to law. This blurs the distinction between induction and deduction, and provides a post-positivist picture of social sciences. More specifically, a distinction is made between three dialectal moments when a researcher engages in social science. First, there is the moment of problematization, where the researcher identifies a problem. Here, the problematization is that the social order the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region in the past and also more recently is questioned by events in the international relations, events in the Mediterranean region, or internal events and that it has been (re)conceptualized or confirmed (data). Second, a retroductive explanation for these (re)conceptualizations is provided (hypotheses). Retroductive explanation is based on the two ontological assumptions explained above, i.e. it is articulatory in character. More specifically, it is
based on logics. Logics look at the relationship between words and concepts in the discourse of political actors and how this relationship represents a certain social order (social logics), how certain words and concepts are used to create a common identity for different political actors (the Self) which represents the social order the actor is promoting (political logics) and why these words and concepts are appealing (fantasmatic logics). This will eventually lead to theory construction. Retroduction is based on practices of persuasion, which is the third dialectal movement. This is a different epistemological position than the ones which are currently adopted in the studies on Euro-Mediterranean relations. Therefore, retroduction as an alternative paradigm for explaining/understanding Euro-Mediterranean relations and logics as a mechanism of retroductive explanation are compared with the epistemological positions of the current studies on the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region. Based on this epistemological position, we develop a strategy to address the three research questions formulated in the first part of chapter 3. Methodologically, the discourse of the EU will be studied by applying a poststructuralist discourse analysis, based poststructuralist discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In the third part of chapter 3, this methodology is explained: the research design, the texts that are selected for analysis and the method of analysis.

Chapter 4 goes deeper into the different kind of logics identified in chapter 3, and represents the first step in the analysis of the EU’s discourse. More specifically, we study logics in different contexts than the context we are examining here. These logics will help us to identify the logics on which the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region is built. First, we identify social logics in the internal context of the EU, i.e. we look at which social order is constituted within the EU because we assume that the social order which is promoted outside will be similar to the one(s) which are promoted inside, since it are the same actors who articulate these social orders. In this dissertation, the concept ‘social order’ is operationalized within the context of globalization and democratization, which we consider as the two main evolutions which influence the way in which a social order is constituted within the EU. Moreover, we found in chapter 1 that these evolutions also influenced the social order the EU wants to promote outside the EU: the idea of a globalizing world influenced the Euro-Mediterranean relations and democracy is an important objective of the EU. The first research question is reformulated as: ‘What kind of democracy does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region in the context of globalization?’ Second, we go deeper into the definition of political logics. In the academic literature, we look at how other actors have identified political logics in the discourse of the EU and its member states towards third countries. These studies will provide us with a strategy to examine the political logics of an actor more in detail. This strategy will then be
applied in order to identify the political logics in the discourse of the EU. The second research question is reformulated as: ‘Which Selves and Others are constituted in the discourse of the EU?’ and ‘How is the difference between the Self and the Other’ constituted through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical identity?’ Third, we study logics of fantasies or myths which are told about the EU and about the external policy of the EU. Consequently, we will look at which of these myths/logics of fantasies are actually articulated by the EU in its discourse towards the Mediterranean region. The third research question is redefined as: ‘Which logic of fantasy/myth is articulated in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region?’

In chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the discourses of the European Commission (the High Representative), the Council of the EU/the European Council/the member states, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) under the RMP, the EMP, the ENP, the UfM and the renewed ENP are analyzed. The EU is thus not considered as a black box in this study. The European Commission, together with the member states and the (European) Council can be considered as the main policy entrepreneurs in the relations with the Mediterranean region. The European Parliament and the EESC are also involved in the debate on the EC/EU’s policy, although they had less influence on the policy-making. Nevertheless, we study these institutions as well, because we want to find out if they apply a similar discourse than the European Commission and the member states/the (European) Council: we want to find out if there is a hegemonic discourse among EU institutions (hegemony is the central concept in the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe). For each institution, the social, political and fantasmatic logics in its discourse are determined and compared with the other institutions and with its discourse in the past. This will allow us to identify what kind of democracy the EU institutions promoted towards the Mediterranean region between 1989 and 2011, how they promoted these democracies/social orders through their discourses and how this created an identity for the Self and the Other and why this discourse is appealing. The discourses are studied by applying a discourse analysis on the texts drafted by the institutions. In chapter 10, we bring the different conclusions of the previous chapter together in order to draw some general conclusions about the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region.
Chapter 1: The relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean region

1.1 Introduction

The chapter at hand gives an overview of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. After the establishment of the EEC in 1957, the newly created Community immediately concluded relations with the countries that were located at the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. In the beginning, these relations were limited to economic cooperation. The EEC concluded economic association and trade agreements with several Mediterranean countries. In the 1970s, these arrangements were replaced by cooperation agreements, which were brought together in one common framework: the GMP. In the 1980s, the Mediterranean countries were confronted with severe economic and social problems, which were worsened by the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EC.¹ The European Commission replaced in 1989 the GMP by the RMP, but the RMP remained a framework for economic collaboration. The Southern European member states France, Spain and Italy then tried to strengthen their relations with the Mediterranean countries outside the framework of the EC, because they also wanted to address security issues. The results of their efforts are the 5+5 dialogue, the Mediterranean Forum and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), which are all still functioning today, and which contribute to the development of the broader Euro-Mediterranean relations. In 1992, Spain made an attempt to convince its European partners to reinforce the relations with the Maghreb. The Euro-Maghreb Partnership and its equal the Euro-Mashrek Partnership (proposed in 1993), albeit they never took effect, proved to be a useful leg up to the EMP created in 1995. In contrast to the previous frameworks, the EMP also addresses security, political, social and cultural issues.

In 2003, following the enlargement, the EU presented a framework for dealing with the new Eastern neighbours of the Union: the ENP. The Mediterranean neighbours were included in the new policy, which strengthened the bilateral dimension of cooperation. In 2008, France wanted to reinforce the relations between the Mediterranean littoral states, but the other European member states opposed against the solo-effort of France. The proposal for a Mediterranean Union (MU) was turned into a European framework for enhancing the multilateral cooperation with the Mediterranean region: the UfM. This framework built on the EMP; it added an institutional layer. The uprisings and revolutions of 2011 changed the political

¹ The Treaty of Brussels, signed in 1965, brought together the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) in one single structure. From then on, these three communities are referred to as the ‘European Communities (EC)’. 
situation in the Mediterranean region. The EU adapted its policy frameworks in order to cope with the recent changes in the Mediterranean area. In February 2011, the European Commission, the High Representative (together with the European External Action Service (EEAS)) and the member states started to review both the ENP and the UfM. The latter did not function properly because of the problems in the Middle East. The review of the ENP resulted in ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’. Within the framework of this renewed policy, the EU offered to establish a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, and more specifically with those countries which are on the road to democracy.

In what follows, an overview is given of the successive frameworks of cooperation between the EC/EU and the Mediterranean countries. First, we study why the EC/EU (or the member states) decided to set up, change or strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean countries. In addition, we will also discuss the view of the Mediterranean countries on the cooperation with the EC/EU. This is followed by a closer look at each of the abovementioned frameworks: what are the objectives of these frameworks, and how will these objectives be reached? More specifically, what instruments are created and how are they used? To conclude, a short evaluation is made of each framework. Why were the relations rather limited in the beginning and why did the examined frameworks for the relations between the EC/EU and the Mediterranean region not lead to the desired effects? The main objectives of this chapter are to give the reader an overview of the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean relations and to give him/her an insight into the dynamics of the relationship. This introduces the reader into the topic of this dissertation, but also represents a first step in the research that is conducted (see infra).

1.2 A ‘patchwork of agreements’

The relations between the EU and Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia are longstanding. Already in the 1960s the EEC concluded trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon. Algeria was part of the EEC until its independence in 1962, and after 1962 it had a de facto agreement with the EEC. Syria, Jordan and Libya were at that time not interested in formalizing their relations with the EEC (Bicchi, 2007: 55). There were two main reasons for concluding agreements with the Mediterranean in the 1960s. First, the European member states, and especially France as former colonizer had strong commercial ties with the Mediterranean countries (40% of the exports of France went to Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in the 1960s; Gomez, 2003: 26-27). Overall, almost 8% of all exports of the member states of the EEC went to these nine countries (Grilli, 1993: 180). In the 1960s the member states
of EEC mainly imported unprocessed agricultural products and raw materials from the region and they exported manufactured goods. Second, with the formalization of these relations, the EEC, together with the United States (US), wanted to prevent Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean region (Gomez, 2003: 26). Trade regulations were at the heart of all the agreements concluded with the Mediterranean countries, but they differed in the degree of trade concessions that were granted. Morocco and Tunisia concluded in 1969 economic association agreements with the EC. They were granted full access to the European market for their industrial products and received a ‘profitable treatment’ for agricultural goods. Algeria received the same treatment as Morocco and Tunisia after its independence in 1962, although there was no legal agreement. With the other countries, limited trade agreements were concluded. The EEC signed non-preferential agreements with Israel in 1964 and with Lebanon in 1965. Later on, the EC concluded a second preferential agreement with Israel (1970), which stated that the country would receive 50 percent reduction on the common external tariff of the EC for their industrial products and no concessions regarding trade in agricultural products. Similar agreements were concluded with Lebanon and Egypt in 1972, but they received 55 percent reduction on the common external tariff. The EC also asked for reciprocity of trade concessions, but the concessions of the Mediterranean countries were very limited. Because these agreements did not derive from one common core of principles, the EC’s policy at that time is often described by scholars as ‘a patchwork of agreements’ (Bicchi, 2007: 43-60; Gomez, 2003: 30; Pierros et.al, 1999: 75).
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>1/11/1973</td>
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<td>04/06/1964</td>
<td>01/07/1964</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Oc. Palestinian Terr.</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Economic Association</td>
<td>23/03/1969</td>
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Table 1. Overview of the agreements between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries in the 1960s

In the beginning of the cooperation, the relations with the Mediterranean were thus rather confined, for several reasons. First, the EC at that time only had limited competences in the field of external policy: it could conclude membership agreements, association agreements (both political and economic) and restricted trade agreements. The agreements with the Mediterranean countries were limited to economic association and trade (Pierros et.al, 1999: 50-54; Gomez, 2003: 26). In the context of the Cold War, the relations with the Mediterranean countries were less important than the relations with Greece and Turkey, which were allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and which concluded political association agreements with the EC. Overall, there was neither a policy entrepreneur nor a policy window for an extensive Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (Bicchi, 2007: 60-61). Second, the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) constrained the kind of economic association and trade agreements that the EC could conclude with the Mediterranean, leaving the initial choice between non-preferential agreements or free trade agreements. The latter are an exception to the principle of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) established by the GATT. Most of the Mediterranean countries were not satisfied with concluding non-preferential agreements, because the benefits were rather low (like was the case with the agreements concluded with Israel in 1964 and with
Lebanon in 1965). The agreements with Morocco and Tunisia (concluded in 1969) therefore mention that the overall objective is to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA), but in reality only lip service was paid to this objective (Aliboni, 1976: 180). The GATT-rules (although not explicitly mentioned in the agreement) also state that the principle of reciprocity should be respected. But the Mediterranean countries didn’t feel like opening up their markets for the European countries, which hampered negotiations. The principle of reciprocity was mentioned on paper, but never implemented. During the Kennedy Round (1963-1967), the sixth round of GATT trade negotiations, it was decided that developed countries could offer the developing countries preferential, non-reciprocal trade agreements, in order to foster the process of development (Pierros et.al, 1999: 57-58; 69). This facilitated the conclusion of agreements, and arrangements were made with Israel (1970), Lebanon (1972) and Egypt (1972). Third, negotiations on agricultural products were difficult for Italy. Since the country is producing similar products as the Mediterranean countries, its agricultural industry faced direct competition from those countries (Lambert, 1971: 40). This also hindered the negotiations, and especially those with Morocco and Tunisia. The EC already started talking in the beginning of the 1960s with both countries and negotiations were resumed in 1966 after the empty-chair policy of France in 1965. However, Gomez (2003: 28 -29) indicates that Italy ‘embarked on a three year long filibuster’. The agreements were eventually concluded in 1969. These three elements explain why the policy towards the Mediterranean region took a rather slow start and why the offers that were made towards the Mediterranean partners were rather confined. Consequently, the benefits for those countries were limited. They could export industrial products duty-free into the EC or they received a reduction on the common external tariff, but their industrial infrastructure at that time was non-existent or in a stage of infancy. Moreover, the industrial products also had to comply with the European rules of origin (Bicchi, 2007: 58). Their agricultural products, which constituted the main share of their exports, were only granted limited access to the European market (Tsoulakis, 1977: 428).

1.3 The Global Mediterranean Policy

In the 1970s, several internal and international events influenced the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region. First, the EC was confronted with an increase in activism by Arab-Palestinian terrorists. As Cold War tensions decreased in those years, the security challenge for the EC shifted from the Cold War to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, the nature of the economic relations between the EC and the Mediterranean countries changed. On the world stage, the developing countries, united in the G77 asked for more beneficial economic relations...
with the developed countries. In the Mediterranean region, this more assertive attitude of the countries that were once colonies of the European states was accompanied by a wave of nationalizations of the Mediterranean economies. Bicchi (2007: 73-74) indicates that ‘economic relations became progressively politicized’. Moreover, midst 1970s, the agreements the EC had concluded with the Mediterranean countries needed to be adjusted because of the accession of the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and Denmark to the EC. In addition, several of them had to be renegotiated because they were about to expire. Third, the oil crisis, and the subsequent oil embargo had important consequences for the European member states. In 1974, 18, 5% of the oil of the Community was imported from the Mediterranean region (mostly from Algeria and Libya; Tsoulakis, 1977: 424).

These changing circumstances brought the Euro-Mediterranean relations on the agenda of the EC. While Italy tried to strengthen the (political) cooperation with the Mediterranean countries within the framework of the newly created European Political Cooperation (EPC), the European Commission took the opportunity of the adjustment and the renewal of the agreements to present its own vision on the matter. It suggested including developmental elements in the EC’s relations with the region, such as the broadening of the type of goods covered by the agreements and financial and technical cooperation. Although France initially opposed the proposal of the Commission, it changed its mind shortly afterwards. It advocated a broad, global approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations (instead of the ‘patchwork of agreements’ that was in place), as it feared it would have to make increasing trade concessions regarding agricultural products if agreements were to be negotiated with each country separately (Tsoulakis, 1977: 429). More specifically, its initial idea was to enhance the economic relations with the Mediterranean region by the creation of a FTA, and thus to sign one agreement with all Mediterranean countries. With the creation of a European framework towards the Mediterranean region, France also hoped to regain its status as an international power (Grilli, 1993: 186; Bicchi, 2007: 86; 109).

However, this proposal met with resistance from the US, which saw a FTA, and especially the reciprocity of trade concessions as a threat to their interests in the region. Also the UK, which would become a member of the EC in 1973, was against reverse trade preferences. This is partly because of their good relationship with the US, but their point of view should also be seen in the light of the negotiations of the Lomé-Convention at that time. The countries of the Commonwealth of Nations would become parties in the Lomé-agreement. They were against reciprocity of trade concessions, as they did not want to grant full access to their markets for all
the European member states. The UK as former colonizer supported the claim of these countries (Drieghe & Orbie, 2009: 177). The Mediterranean countries from their side were also reserved to grant full access to their markets for all the member states (Grilli, 1993: 186-188). In the debate on the reciprocity of trade concessions, France tried to stand firm, but it only received support from Italy. The UK had the support from Germany, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands (Bicchi, 2007: 99). Eventually, the member states reached a compromise: the demand for reciprocity of concessions was mentioned, but the implementation was left ‘open in time and conditional to the “essential development requirements” of the partner countries’ (Lévi, 1972: 809; Grilli, 1993: 194). In reality, the reciprocity of concessions was never implemented (Bicchi, 2007: 106). This discussion eventually led to the creation of the GMP which was officially launched at the Paris Summit of October 1972. The European Commission was given a mandate to review the trade agreements with the Mediterranean countries (Gomez, 2003: 30-33; Bicchi, 2007: 66-80).

Within the framework of the GMP, the EC concluded cooperation agreements with all Mediterranean countries between 1976 and 1977, except with Israel with which it already had concluded a free trade agreement in 1975, and except with Libya, as Gaddafi was not interested in developing contractual relations with the EC. The main elements of these agreements were the same for all Mediterranean countries: free access to the European market for all industrial goods, free access for agricultural goods not covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), several concessions for agricultural products covered by the CAP depending on the sensitivity, technical cooperation and the establishment of common institutions with each partner: bilateral cooperation councils and committees (Grilli, 1993: 191-197). The agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were slightly more elaborated than the agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, as they contained articles on private investment, mutual exchange of information on the development of the economic and financial situation, and energy. The agreements with the Maghreb countries also contained a non-discrimination clause for the workers with nationality of those countries who are legally employed in the territory of the member states of the EC (Maresceau, 2006: 379). In addition, the EC granted financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries under the financial protocols. The assistance under the first (1978-1981) and the second protocol (1982-1986) was mainly spent on capital projects and technical assistance in the field of production and economic infrastructure in order to promote industrialization and the modernization of the agricultural sector. Under the third protocol (1987-1991), the financial assistance was also available for projects in the field of science and technology and for the trade sector. This aid was non-conditional and ‘demand-driven’, meaning
that the partner governments selected their own priorities and then made a request to the EC for the financing of these projects (Holden, 2003: 350). The GMP, formulated in the EC-framework, was complemented by the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), formulated within the framework of the EPC. The EAD mainly dealt with issues regarding oil. Nevertheless, from the Mediterranean countries, only Algeria played an important role in this dialogue (Grilli, 1993: 189).

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<td>Syria</td>
<td>Cooperation Agreement</td>
<td>18/01/1977</td>
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Table 2. Overview of the agreements between the EC and the Mediterranean countries in the 1970s

However, the GMP received a lot of criticism. Observers stated that the policy actually cannot be called ‘global’, since the policy framework remained limited to economic issues. It did not focus on political or security issues like terrorism or migration, also because that was too sensitive due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the economic cooperation, reflected in the cooperation agreements, did not result in an improvement of the economic situation in the Mediterranean region. The GMP is a policy for economic development that is based on export-led industrialization, while most of the Mediterranean countries had chosen for import substitution industrialization as the way to economic development (Bicchi, 2007: 107). They preferred an inward looking development, which was also reflected in the nationalization of their economies (see supra). In the areas where the Mediterranean countries had a potential comparative advantage, that is textile and clothing, access to the EC market was restricted. In addition, the Mediterranean states were also disappointed with the degree of market access which they were granted in the field of agriculture. Italy again disputed the trade concessions regarding agricultural products to be granted to the Mediterranean countries. It ‘insisted on drawing a parallel between trade concessions and aid: the number of trade concessions (by Southern European countries)
was to be equated to the amount of aid provided (by Northern European countries) in order to distribute the GMP's costs among all member states. The discussion took months, and the limited access for agricultural products was eventually maintained (Bicchi, 2007: 100). Besides all this, the Mediterranean countries were also disappointed with the financial assistance from the EC, which they thought was too low (Biscop, 2003: 24). Gomez (2003: 37) concludes that in the 1970s 'the advancement of economic development in the Mediterranean was simply not a priority for the Community, and that economic self-interest dictated that it preserve the overall balance of its trade relations with the non-member states'.

1.4 The Renovated Mediterranean Policy

At the end of the 1970s, the GMP was openly criticized in both the EC and the Mediterranean countries. Developments outside and inside the EC started to put even more pressure on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. First, the Mediterranean countries had severe economic and social problems. The changing international economic relations made the situation even worse. Oil prices, which represented a major source of revenues for several Mediterranean and Arab countries, dropped. This had an important influence on the amount of financial assistance that Arab oil-producing countries granted to non-oil producing Arab and Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the debt that the Mediterranean countries had accumulated in the 1970s grew rapidly due to increasing interest rates. Several Mediterranean countries had to turn to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to ask for financial assistance. In exchange, they had to implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which had to sound their economies. In general, this meant that they had to cut government expenditure, curb inflation, devaluate high currencies, remove price controls and that they had to privatize their economies and to liberalize trade (Flint, 2008: 59). Second, the EC underwent internal changes with the accession of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986). This had important consequences for the Mediterranean countries themselves and for the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Due to the accession, the export of agricultural products from the Mediterranean countries to the EC dropped since the Southern member states, which produced similar agricultural products as the Mediterranean countries, could now export duty-free into the other member states. The farmers in the new member states of the EC could fully benefit from the CAP, which meant they could now produce more. This loss in trade revenues for the Mediterranean countries made the economic situation even more difficult (Grilli, 1993: 199). The economic problems caused social unrest, and led to the emergence of Islamist movements, which challenged the regimes in place (Bicchi, 2007: 117-119). Moreover, the economic problems led to
migration towards the EC. The Southern member states of the EC from their part were the first to be confronted with the economic and social problems of the Mediterranean countries. By their accession to the EC, these problems became a pressing European problem, since they now could contribute to the formulation of the external relations.

However, it was initially the European Commission that took the lead in the adaptation of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, instead of the member states. The latter were in the first half of the 1980s mainly preoccupied with resurgence of the Cold War and the enlargement (Spain and Portugal were not yet a member of the EC). In 1983-1984, the European Commission issued a report on the consequences of the enlargement on the Mediterranean countries, proposing four solutions to enlighten the burden of the Southern neighbours of the EC. These solutions included the establishment of a FTA (solution 1), more trade concessions (solution 2), more compensation in the form of financial aid (solution 3) or support for diversification of the Mediterranean economies towards areas where there was no overlap with the economies of the Southern member states (solution 4). The EC eventually chose for the latter two: it granted additional preferences for agricultural products that were not in competition with European agricultural products and it raised the third financial protocol with ECU 0.6 billion (Bicchi, 2007: 124-125; Grilli, 1993: 201-202).

In 1989, Spanish Commissioner for External Relations Abel Matutes came with a new proposal to improve the relations with the Mediterranean region. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EC had provided a substantive amount of financial assistance to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). As a reaction to this, Matutes asked a similar aid package for the Southern neighbours. His claim for more money was supported by Italy and the other Southern member states of the EC. Moreover, Matutes, and by extension the whole Commission, set out a new policy strategy for the Mediterranean in a communication to the Council of November 1989. This eventually led to the RMP adopted in 1990. This policy is also called Renewed or Redirected Mediterranean Policy (Gomez, 2003: 49; Grilli, 1993: 128) and has seven objectives: an enhanced dialogue with the Mediterranean countries on several issues, improved access to the European market for Mediterranean goods, stimulating regional cooperation, encouraging the development of the business sector, the protection of the environment, the development of human resources and supporting the economic reforms implemented by the Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 1990). Under the RMP, the EC increased the bilateral financial assistance for the region (three times higher than the previous protocols). Moreover, the EC approved a financial regulation for multilateral aid programmes in order to stimulate the regional integration. The lack
of intra-regional trade was regarded as an impediment for liberalization and economic growth. These ‘MED programmes’ were used to promote decentralized cooperation between local authorities in the EC and the Mediterranean and to promote cooperation on the media, higher education, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), migration and technological cooperation. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) could for the first time apply for this funding. In 1990, the EC provided a special aid package for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Occupied Territories and Turkey, ‘to counter the consequences of the Gulf War’ (Biscop, 2003: 26). The EC also reviewed the existing cooperation agreements to give the Mediterranean countries a better market access for textiles, although it must be noted that the EC was also forced to do so by the Uruguay Round (1986 - 1994), the eight round of GATT trade negotiations (Gomez, 2003: 49-50).

When the RMP was prepared and presented, it already received a lot of criticism, especially from the European Parliament, which stated that the policy changes made were insufficient for the task that had to be carried out in the Mediterranean region (see chapter 5). Also the negotiations on the content of the policy were difficult. Spain and Italy were not pleased with the idea that the European Commission tried to address security concerns (in terms of stability and prosperity), as they preferred a multilateral framework for cooperation outside the EC framework (see infra). They supported the quest of Matutes for more money for the Mediterranean region, but together with France and Greece, they opposed the idea of the Commission of opening up the European market for agricultural goods (Permanent Representatives Committee, 1990). The Northern member states, the UK in front, opposed an increase in funding for the Mediterranean countries. Overall, the RMP is not considered a big success. First, the European Commission had problems with effectively allocating the assistance to the Mediterranean due to several problems: the absorption capacity of the Mediterranean countries, the Mediterranean governments which prevented CSOs to apply for funding at the EC, and ineffective administration and even fraud by the European Commission. Regarding the latter, the Court of Auditors published several damning reports on the management of both the financial protocols and the MED programmes. In 1998, it stated that it had found ‘serious irregularities and weaknesses in the financial management and implementation of the MED programmes and serious confusions of interest… prejudicial to the management of Community funds’ (Court of Auditors, referred to in Pierros et.al, 1999: 145). Second, the increased bilateral assistance did not lead to an improvement of the economic situation. Economic liberals stated that the reluctance of the EC to grant trade concessions regarding agricultural products played an important role in this. Others raised the question if the Commission paid enough attention to the development of industry in the Mediterranean countries. Since the EC was in favour of free
trade, it was argued that the Mediterranean countries should be turned into competitive export industries and that the EC should support this (Pierros et al., 1999: 142-143). Several other factors eventually led to a downswing in the potential benefits from the RMP: the creation of the Single Market, further enlargement of the EU and the increase in trade with the CEECs. Moreover, the Gulf War had a negative effect on the economic situation of the Mediterranean countries. The European Commission admitted that ‘its aid addressed important sectoral needs, but did not have a significant macroeconomic effect’ (Pierros et al., 1999: 164). Moreover, just like its predecessor, the RMP only focused on economic cooperation, and not on political and security issues (Biscop, 2003: 26).

1.5 The search for an enhanced cooperation with the Mediterranean region

Besides the European Commission, also the European member states presented several proposals to enhance the relations with the Mediterranean countries, but mainly outside the EC/EU framework. These efforts were strengthened when it became clear that the RMP would not be sufficient to tackle the economic, social and especially the security problems originating from the Mediterranean region. Especially the Southern member states were in favour of a stronger cooperation, as they were the first to be faced with the consequences of the problems of the Mediterranean countries. More specifically, they were confronted with net inflows instead of net outflows of migrants. Overall, the numbers of migrants and asylum seekers started to rise in the EC, not only because of the problems in the Mediterranean region, but also because of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which brought people from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe. The public opinion regarding migrants started to change, and migration became perceived as a security problem for Europeans. Not only migration was seen as a security problem, but also Islamic fundamentalism. It was perceived as a challenge to the established political orders in the Mediterranean countries, but also to the political orders in the member states. Linked with this, also the fear for terrorist attacks influenced the perception in the EC (Bicchi, 2007: 143-144).

In 1983, France took the initiative for establishing a 4+5 dialogue between four countries that are located on the northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and five countries that are located on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). The main objectives of the dialogue at that time were to strengthen the relations with the Maghreb and to enhance security and stability in the region. In 1991, Malta joined this initiative, which from then on is referred to as the 5+5 dialogue. However, throughout the years, the dialogue advanced with difficulty. In the 1980s,
internal problems in France caused delay in the organization of the meetings, and eventually the first informal meeting could only take place in 1988. The informal meetings led to the organization of two ministerial conferences, in 1990 in Rome and in 1991 in Algiers, which laid down the objectives and the provisions of cooperation. The ministers agreed that they would meet annually to discuss issues of common concern, and then especially issues of political, economic, cultural and ecological cooperation. However, the outbreak of the Gulf War, the domestic crisis in Algeria, the problems between Algeria and Morocco regarding the Western Sahara and especially the United Nations (UN) sanctions against Libya led to the suspension of the dialogue in 1992. Moreover, France on the one hand and Italy and Spain on the other disagreed on how the cooperation with the Mediterranean countries should be organized. While France favoured regional cooperation with the Maghreb countries, Spain and Italy advocated a global strategy, in which the Mashrek countries would also be involved (Khader, 1997: 56-58; Biscop, 2003: 27-28).

Only in 2001 the ministers met again in Lisbon, Portugal. There, they decided to organize a summit of heads of state and government in Tunisia in 2003 in order to reinforce the cooperation between the countries involved in the 5+5 dialogue. The ministerial meeting of 2001 was followed by three other ministerial meetings which prepared the summit that took place on 5 and 6 December 2003. The President of the then European Commission, Romano Prodi, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, Javier Solana, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) were invited as observers to the meeting (Anon., 2003). The Tunis Declaration (2003) adopted at the meeting states that the 5+5 dialogue is built on four pillars, which are very similar to the pillars of the EMP, which was established in 1995 (see infra). These four pillars are security and stability, regional integration and economic cooperation, social and human cooperation, and dialogue between cultures. The last ten year however, cooperation mainly focused on security issues like migration, organized crime and the fight against terrorism. In 2010, the members of the 5+5 decided to establish a regular monitory committee under the auspices of the joint rotating presidency, which prepares the annual meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs, and which follows-up the recommendations made at each meeting. There were also discussions on extending the 5+5 dialogue to a 6+6 dialogue, including Greece and Egypt. However, this possibility was rejected as ‘involving Egypt would mean introducing the Middle East dossier, with all its complications’ (B’chir, 2010a). The 5+5 dialogue, which is a Mediterranean cooperation, is seen by its members as a complementary framework to the EMP/the UfM that strengthens the broader Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (B’chir, 2010b; 2010c).
As Egypt was not involved in the 5+5 dialogue since it is not a Maghreb country, it decided in 1991 to convene its own meeting of the ministers of the Mediterranean countries. France supported the initiative of Egypt, because the meetings of the 5+5 dialogue were suspended at that time (the initiative of Egypt was seen as a new opportunity to continue the dialogue with the Mediterranean countries). Consequently, the foreign ministers of 11 Mediterranean countries, i.e. Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey met on 3 July 1994 in Alexandria, Egypt, where they officially launched ‘the Mediterranean Forum’. The ministers decided to convene annually, and to establish three working groups consisting of senior officials who prepare the ministerial meetings: the political working group deals with all political issues, while the social and economic working group focuses on areas such as energy, tourism, science and technology for development, environment, migration, employment and activation of private sector interaction. The cultural working group has as its main task to activate the dialogue between civilization and cultures, to promote cooperative educational projects, to preserve the common heritage of Mediterranean civilizations and to inform about exchange programmes to ensure a greater understanding amongst the people of the Mediterranean. Like the later EMP, the Mediterranean Forum thus comprises three baskets of cooperation (Moussa, 1994).

The members of the Mediterranean Forum have always stressed that the Forum is ‘an informal framework for dialogue between countries of the Mediterranean basin on matters of common interest’ which is open to new members (under the condition that they have a Mediterranean coastline and that the current members agree with the membership), and that they want to bring a strong contribution to ‘the development and consolidation of the Barcelona Process’ (Oral Conclusions Mediterranean Forum, 1998; 1999). The conclusions of the meetings of the Forum therefore always contain an evaluation of the progress of the EMP/UfM and the ENP. Biscop (2003: 29) indicates that the achievements of the Mediterranean Forum are limited, because it suffers from a lack of funding and because of the disagreements amongst the members on the enlargement of the Forum. He therefore stated that the Mediterranean Forum should be seen as ‘a preparatory framework for the EMP rather than a performing organisation’. However, it should be noted that the Mediterranean Forum does not want to be a fully performing organisation, but rather a ‘regional institution for intergovernmental dialogue’ and that it sees the contribution to the development and strengthening of a broader Euro-Mediterranean cooperation as its only task. Moreover, it should also be noted that, contrary to the 5+5 dialogue and the EMP (see infra), the Mediterranean Forum always kept functioning, which is probably due to the fact that Libya and both Israel and the Palestinian Territories are not members of the
The fear of several countries that including Egypt in the 5+5 dialogue would complicate the dialogue between the countries is therefore undeserved. However, the 5+5 dialogue and the Mediterranean Forum would be rather similar then, as in the latter only Libya and Mauretania are not members of the framework.

In 1990, Spain, together with Italy proposed to organise a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) after the example of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Similarly, the CSCM would consist of three baskets and would have three main objectives: (1) to safeguard security and to create a stable region through the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), the creation of confidence and security building measures and crisis-management, (2) to strengthen the economic and social cooperation and (3) to enhance the understanding between cultures and to cooperate on human rights (Biscop, 2003: 26-27). The Mediterranean countries, but also the countries geographically located in the Middle East, in the Gulf and those bordering the Black Sea would take part in the initiative. The EC, the US and the Soviet Union (SU) were invited as observers (Bicchi, 2007: 158). Although the plans for the new framework were already rather advanced, the CSCM never took off. The US was against the initiative because it could be a threat to their position in the region, and especially to their position in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). It also feared that the CSCM would put into question its naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea. Also the UK (which feared that the CSCM would put into question its presence in Gibraltar) and Germany (which was preoccupied with its reunification) opposed the plans of Italy and Spain. France responded with a ‘non-negative attitude’ since it was in favour of the cooperation under the 5+5 dialogue (Khader, 1997: 54; Gillespie, 1997a: 35). Moreover, the Gulf War and the problems regarding the MEPP made it difficult to establish a genuine dialogue, problems which also affected the 5+5 dialogue and the Mediterranean Forum (see supra).

The Spanish Parliament then convinced the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) to organise an interparliamentary CSCM in Malaga (Spain) in 1992. The interparliamentary CSCM had as its main objective to forward recommendations to governments on how to build a regional system of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, and consisted of parliamentarians from all ‘Mediterranean countries’, including countries like Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia. The interparliamentary CSCM gathered in Valetta (Malta) in 1995 and in Marseilles (France) in 2000. In Valetta, the parliamentarians discussed the possibility of creating ‘An Association of Mediterranean States’ consisting of a Mediterranean Council, an assembly and a secretariat. This idea resembled the proposal of Malta launched in 1992 to organize the Mediterranean relations
after the example of the Council of Europe (Biscop, 2003: 29; Pace, 1999: 217; 225). However, in 2000, the members of the interparliamentary CSCM only decided to work on the creation of the assembly, the PAM and on the fourth meeting of the interparliamentary conference on cooperation and security in Greece in 2005, the members of the interparliamentary CSCM eventually decided to establish the PAM. The PAM was officially launched in 2006 in Jordan, and met in 2007 in Malta and in 2008 in Monaco. The main objective of the PAM is presenting opinions and recommendations to national parliaments and governments, regional organisations and international fora. For example, in 2007 it invited the special ambassador of France to present and to discuss President Sarkozy’s proposal for a MU (see infra). In 2010, the PAM organized a meeting in Malta on the MEPP, together with the UN. It also maintains contact with the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) created under the Barcelona Process (see infra). However, the impact of the PAM is rather limited, as national parliaments, governments, regional organisations and international fora are not obliged to take into account its opinions and resolutions. Stavridis and Pace (2010: 22) argue that the contribution of the PAM to international relations lies in the spread of norms and values of the democratic parliamentary system to authoritarian states or states that are in transition towards a democratic system. It also supports regional integration in the Mediterranean region.

In 1992, Spain made a new attempt to strengthen the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region, and more specifically with the Maghreb, but this time within the framework of the EC. The new attempt can be seen as a reaction to the failure of the CSCM and the difficulties within the 5+5 dialogue. However, it was especially an instrument for Spain to resolve a conflict between Morocco and the European Parliament, which damaged the economic interests of Spain in Morocco. In January 1992, the European Parliament refused to approve the fourth financial protocol for Morocco because the country violated the principles of democracy and human rights. Morocco on its turn therefore refused to extend the EC-Moroccan fisheries agreement, by which Spanish fishermen had access to Moroccan fishery grounds (Anon., 1992). Spain tried to restore the relations with Morocco by proposing the creation of a FTA with all Maghreb countries. The idea for a FTA actually came from Morocco (Gillespie, 1997a: 37). France supported the proposal of Spain, and suggested that both Spain and the European Commission (with Commissioner Matutes) would prepare a report, on the political (Spain) and one the economic situation (the European Commission) in the Maghreb. In their reports, Spain and the European Commission presented a new framework for cooperation with the Maghreb: the Euro-Maghreb Partnership (European Commission, 1992). Following the positive reactions of the other member states on these reports, Spain then proposed to convene a Euro-Maghreb
conference. Negotiations and talks with Morocco and Tunisia on the conclusion of free trade agreements started in the first half of 1992. The idea for a Euro-Maghreb Partnership was officially welcomed at the European Council of Lisbon in June 1992, but shortly after, the Northern member states of the EU were no longer interested in the Euro-Maghreb Partnership, as they were focussing on the problems in the Middle East (Bicchi, 2007: 161-163).

The attention for a Euro-Maghreb Partnership slowly faded out and the focus of the EU shifted from the Maghreb to the Mashrek and the Middle East. The European Commission issued two communications in September 1993, in which it stated that the Mashrek countries should be offered a similar partnership to that presented at the Maghreb countries, which would also be based on an FTA: a Euro-Mashrek Partnership (Pierros et.al, 1999: 138-139). The member states also wanted to contribute to the MEPP. However, the European involvement in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was opposed by the US and Israel. The EU then proposed a framework to deal with the relations with all Mediterranean countries. At the Corfu Summit in June 1994, the European Council welcomed the idea of strengthening the relations with the whole Mediterranean region. Spain suggested organizing a Euro-Mediterranean conference, after the example of the Euro-Maghreb conference it proposed two years earlier. The European Commission was asked to come with a proposal for the organization of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. It presented its proposals in October 1994 ‘Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ and in March 1995 ‘Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ (Bicchi, 2007: 164-165). These proposals were based on the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and a Euro-Mashrek Partnership. Spain, together with France, took the lead in drafting the documents of the new framework based on these proposals. A draft of the Barcelona Declaration (see infra) was first discussed in the working groups of the Council of the EU. The European Commission also intervened in the discussion in order to ‘counter the Council’s domination of the exercise’, but according to Gomez (2003: 74-76) Spain and France still had the most influence on both the Barcelona Declaration and the Work Progamme. Approved by the General Affairs Council, a summary report containing the European position on the Barcelona Declaration served as the basis for the discussion with the Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, the influence of the partner countries in the discussion was rather limited.
1.6 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or ‘the Barcelona Process’

The EMP was officially launched at the Euro-Mediterranean conference of 27 and 28 November 1995 in Barcelona, and is therefore also referred to as ‘the Barcelona Process’. The conference adopted a political declaration, the Barcelona Declaration, signed by all parties and a work programme. The declaration states that the EMP consists of three baskets: a political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership and a partnership in social, human and cultural affairs. The main goal of the political and security partnership is to create a common area of peace and security and the parties agree to act in accordance to international law, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms of all kinds, to develop democracy and the rule of law, to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty, to fight against drugs and to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. The overall objective of the economic and financial partnership is the creation of an area of shared prosperity through the stimulation of the socio-economic development of the Mediterranean countries, the improvement of the living conditions of Mediterranean people and through regional integration and cooperation. With this aim, both the EU and the Mediterranean partners also agreed to establish a deep and comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by 2010. Moreover, the EU promised an increase in its financial assistance to the Mediterranean countries. The social, cultural and human partnership will develop human resources and promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between the civil societies. The work programme of 1995 outlines these goals in more detail, and mentions 24 themes on which the EU and the Mediterranean countries will cooperate: industry, investment, agriculture, transport, energy, telecommunication and information technology, regional planning, tourism, environment, science and technology, water, fisheries, development of human resources, municipalities and regions, dialogue between cultures and civilizations, media, youth, exchange between civil societies, social development, health, migration, terrorism, fight against drugs and organized crime and illegal immigrants (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 1995).

This Committee is set up at senior official level, meets six times a year, and besides the preparation of the conferences, it also discusses and reviews the agenda and the work programme of the partnership. In addition to these general conferences, there are ad hoc sectoral meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts. They provide specific impetus and follow-up for the various activities listed in the work programme. The Barcelona Process also has a parliamentary dimension, initially called the Euro-Mediterranean (Parliamentary) Forum. In 2003, the Forum was transformed into the EMPA. The latter provides parliamentary input and support for the consolidation and the development of the EMP and it adopts resolutions and recommendations, which are not legally binding, addressed to the Euro-Mediterranean conferences (Philippart, 1997: 1-2). In the shadow of the Barcelona Process, several Euro-Mediterranean networks were created (for example the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum, where the CSOs of the EU and the Mediterranean countries meet) which also present opinions and recommendations to the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of ministers of foreign affairs. This multilateral framework made it possible to conduct a dialogue on issues of common interest with all Mediterranean countries at the same time (see figure 1).

Besides this multilateral framework, the EU also has created a separate structure for its bilateral relations with each of the Mediterranean partners through the conclusion of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAs). Following the Barcelona Declaration, EMAs have been signed and entered into force with Tunisia (1995; 1998), Israel (1995; 2000), Morocco (1996; 2000), the Palestinian Authority (1997; 1997), Jordan (1997; 2002), Egypt (2001; 2004), Lebanon (2002; 2003) and Algeria (2002; 2005; see table 3). With Syria, the agreement was initialed in 2004. At that time, the Council of the EU refused to sign the agreement due to the difficult political situation in the country. In 2009, relations between Syria and especially France were restored after diplomatic efforts of Syria to get out of its international isolation. Following the opening-up of the relations, the Swedish presidency invited Syria in October 2009 to sign the in 2004 negotiated association agreement, an offer the country refused as it wanted more time to examine the potential impact of the agreement on its economy (B’chir, 2009a). Following the violent oppression of demonstrators by the Syrian regime in the wake of the Arab Spring, the EU did take no further steps regarding the association agreement. Also with Libya, there were no contractual relations. The EU always had a rather difficult relation with Colonel Gaddafi. In 1999, the EU put sanctions in place against the regime. In 2004, sanctions were lifted, and the EU started talks with the country to enhance the relations. This led to the establishment of a

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2 In the case of Tunisia and Israel: preceding.
programme of financial and technical cooperation in 2010, financed under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI; see infra); although the country officially does not take part in the ENP. Cooperation focused on HIV-AIDS and on migration. In addition, Libya had observer status in the EMP, and could become a full member if it was prepared to accept the Barcelona acquis (which it didn’t). Negotiations for the conclusion of a framework agreement started in November 2008 and were suspended following the conflict that broke out in Libya. Also the financial assistance was suspended (see infra).³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Entering into force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
<td>22/04/2002</td>
<td>01/09/2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
<td>25/06/2001</td>
<td>01/06/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<td>01/06/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<td>17/06/2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>26/02/1996</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
<td>17/07/1995</td>
<td>01/03/1998</td>
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Table 3. Overview of the agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean countries in the 1990s and the 2000s

The EMAAs replace the cooperation agreements which were signed with the Mediterranean countries in the 1970s, and have as their main goal the establishment of the EMFTA mentioned in the second basket of the EMP. The articles of the EMAAs provide market access for all industrial products, but are still limited regarding access for agricultural products. There is a commitment towards progressive liberalization, but initially tariffs and contingent protection remained applicable and were listed in a protocol annexed to the agreement. Similarly, the agreements contain a commitment to liberalization of trade in services and the right of establishment, but no specific arrangements were made, except for Lebanon and Algeria (see infra). Furthermore, the agreements state that the implementation of EU competition and state

³ In addition to this overview of the bilateral relations, it has to be noted that Albania and Mauretania joined the Barcelona Process in 2007. Albania is a potential candidate for accession to the EU and has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Mauretania has contractual relations with the EU under the Cotonou Agreement.
rules are to be decided by the Association Council (see infra) and that there are no binding disciplines on government procurement liberalization (Hoekman, 2007: 6; De Ville & Reynaert, 2010: 196). Each EMAA also has a human rights clause, which means that the agreement can be suspended if one of the parties violates democratic principles and fundamental human rights. The EU thus has a rather powerful instrument to promote norms like democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In addition, each agreement also contains articles on dialogue and cooperation regarding social and cultural issues, and on migration, terrorism, the fight against organized crime and drugs. In case of the Maghreb countries, the non-discrimination clause for workers legally employed in an EU member state as regards working conditions, remuneration and social security which was already mentioned in the cooperation agreements is also inserted in the EMAAs (Maresceau, 2006: 391). Two institutions, the Association Council at ministerial level and the Association Committee at senior official level, are responsible for the implementation of the EMAAs and serve as the place where a bilateral political dialogue on subjects of common interest can take place between the EU and the Mediterranean country. Under the Association Councils, the EU and its Mediterranean partner can even decide to establish sub-committees which address one specific objective of EU-Mediterranean relations. For example, with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, sub-committees are created in order to discuss democracy and human rights (see figure 1).

In order to implement the objectives of the EMP, the EU launched a new financial instrument: Mesures D’Adjustments, better known by its acronym MEDA. For the period 1995-1999, €3435 million was made available. MEDA was different from the financial protocols. First, where aid under the financial protocols was mainly ‘demand-driven’ (and therefore had a ‘very strong sense of ownership’), it was now decided that the financial assistance would be based on a long-term strategic planning, designed by the EU. The European Commission, and more specifically Directorate-General (DG) External Relations – Relations Exterieure (RELEX) took the lead in the allocation of aid (although the major member states are also informally involved). More importantly, DG RELEX was also responsible for the programming of the financial assistance to the Mediterranean region (on paper, the other DGs of the European Commission can also be consulted, but in reality, only DG Trade was involved in the programming for the period 2002-2006; Holden, 2009: 55). For the period 1995-2002, it designed Country Orientation Periods (COPs), which set out the strategy for each country. A National Indicative Programme (NIP), based on the COPs, gave an overview of the programmes and projects to be implemented in each Mediterranean country. The Commission was controlled by the member states through the Mediterranean committee, a management committee. However, the member states mostly
approved the programming strategy of the Commission without alteration. Moreover, although the Mediterranean countries were in theory also consulted when the COPs are drafted, their influence was minimal. The NIP was negotiated with each Mediterranean country separately, but only within the objectives of the COP (Holden, 2003: 351; Holden, 2005: 28-29; Holden, 2008: 234). The European Commission was thus clearly in the ‘driving seat’ when it came to the financial assistance of the EU. Second, where the financial assistance under the financial protocols could be seen as ‘development aid’, MEDA was rather designed to grant technical assistance for implementing structural and economic reforms (Holden, 2003: 351; see also infra).

However, MEDA was confronted with many problems. On the side of the European Commission, it became clear that the Commission did not have enough capacity and expertise to program financial assistance. The Mediterranean countries on the other hand were reluctant to accept this new system of allocating aid. They preferred the old system, where they had more ownership, and they preferred aid for public infrastructure projects, which are much more visible for the population. In the second half of the 1990s however, the situation changed. Following the problems with fraud and nepotism, which became apparent in the 1990s, and which even led to the fall of the Santer Commission in 1999, the EU decided to reform the management of its whole aid policy. These reforms strengthened the changes made under MEDA, since the EU now decided to use a standard programming format, based on Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and NIPs for all aid instruments. DG RELEX stayed in charge for the planning of the financial assistance, and a newly created DG, EuropeAid, became responsible for the programming of one year national finance plans (and thus the implementation of the NIPs) and the evaluation of the financial assistance. The delegations in the partner countries take care of the implementation on the ground. Again, the input of the partner governments was limited. The new CSPs and NIPs for the Mediterranean countries were more detailed than the previous ones (Holden, 2003: 350-354). These changes were implemented under the MEDA II-regulation (2000-2006) which replaced the original MEDA programme. Under MEDA II, the EU made €5350 million available for the Mediterranean countries.

In addition to MEDA, the Mediterranean countries could also benefit from thematic budget lines, that is financial assistance of the EU which is focused on promoting one particular objective. However, it must be noted that the funding for these programmes and projects is insignificant compared with MEDA. Under the impulse of the European Parliament (which had lost its power on the financial assistance of the EU towards third countries following the above mentioned reform of the financial aid), the EU created in 1996 the MEDA democracy
programme in order to foster democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean area. In 1999, the MEDA democracy programme was included into the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (since 2007 called the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)). The Mediterranean countries received €82.6 million from both budget lines between 1996 and 2006. Between 1992 and 2006, the Mediterranean countries could benefit from the LIFE-fund under the heading ‘Life-Third countries’, a budget line designed to support the sustainable development of third countries, and more specifically the environment. The funding for the whole period for the Mediterranean amounted €27.5 million. From 2000 on, the Mediterranean countries also receive funding in order to limit and control migration from their countries to the EU: €35.28 million between 2000 and 2006, mainly under the AENEAS budget line. The Mediterranean countries could also benefit from other budget lines, like sustainable management of natural resources in developing countries, the integration of environmental concerns in the developing strategy of developing countries, the integration of gender in development policy, ‘food aid and food security’ and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and decentralized cooperation. However, research has shown that the funding the Mediterranean countries received from these budget lines was very limited and therefore insignificant (Reynaert, 2007: 116-127).

The EMP was seen as a new milestone in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Contrary to its predecessors, this new policy framework did not only focus on economic cooperation, but also included political and security issues and cooperation in social, cultural and human affairs. The EMP represents a more holistic approach than the early frameworks. Moreover, the creation of a FTA was now the main objective of the EMP, which was also an important novelty. Although the EC did some major attempts to create free trade already in the 1970s, only in 1995 the Mediterranean countries opened up their markets for European products. Not only the objectives of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation were expanded, but also the instruments to reach these objectives underwent some major changes. The main instruments of the GMP and the RMP were the agreements and the financial assistance. Under the EMP, the agreements were renegotiated and extended in scope, addressing all the objectives listed above, including a human rights clause. The financial assistance was redesigned, and the European Commission now had the power to determine the projects that were to be financed by the EU. In addition, the EMP created a new, multilateral framework for political dialogue. The bilateral dialogue was strengthened, and could now address all issues of common interest. Expectations were therefore high, and Gomez (2003: 76) states that ‘it was hard not to be swept along by the tide of euphoria generated by the Barcelona conference’.
Nevertheless, the overall evaluation of the EMP is not very positive. The objectives defined in the Barcelona Declaration proved difficult to reach. In general, the conflict in the Middle East dominated the agenda of the partnership, and especially the political and security partnership. In addition, several topics the EU wanted to discuss in the framework of the first basket, such as cooperation on hard security issues (the EU wanted to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, and after 2001 it wanted to discuss cooperation on the fight against terrorism) and democracy and human rights proved to be too sensitive for the Mediterranean countries. The EU then mainly focused on the establishment of Partnership Building Measures (PBM}s) which deal with soft security issues, such as co-operation among civil protection services on natural and man-made disasters, exchanges of information on international conventions on human rights and disarmament, … Because cooperation in the first basket was very difficult, the EU mainly concentrated on the second basket, the economic cooperation. Most financial assistance was spent to this basket, the EU concluded the EMAAs and it opened negotiations on the liberalization of free trade in agricultural products and in services. It also supported South-South integration: it stimulated Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia to sign the Agadil Agreement for the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean (2004). In addition, the Council approved a system of Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin, which applies to the four countries which are part of the Agadir Agreement and Israel. However, overall, the pace and progress towards the establishment of the EMFTA has been considered to be too slow. 4 Also within the framework of the second basket, the partner countries decided in 2002 to create a ‘Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP)’ within the context of the European Investment Bank (EIB). Before the creation of FEMIP, the EIB already provided financial assistance to the Mediterranean region. The main objectives of FEMIP are the development of the private sector and to create a favourable environment for the private sector, using three instruments: loans, private equity and technical assistance. The projects of FEMIP are not funded through the European budget, but through contributions of the member states. It has to be noticed that the budget of FEMIP is much higher than the MEDA programme: €16, 82 billion between 1995 and 2006.

If we look at the third basket of the EMP, Gillespie (2004: 21) argues that in the first five years of the EMP, the partnership on cultural, social and human affairs was ‘pursued only half-heartedely’. This changed in 2002. Under the impulse of Spain and Sweden, the EU started to work on a genuine cultural partnership. At the Euro-Mediterranean conference of Valencia in

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4 For more information, see De Ville & Reynaert (2010).
2002, the partners adopted the Valencia Action Plan, which contains a specific ‘Action Plan on Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations’ and which focuses on the media, youth and education. This led to several initiatives regarding social and cultural cooperation, such as the establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures in 2005. It has as its main goal to support the activities of the civil society in the region on six domains: education and youth, culture and arts, cities and migration, religion and spirituality, peace and coexistence and media activities. The Valencia Action Plan also contained paragraphs on cooperation in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organized crime and terrorism, as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people. This led to the establishment of a regional cooperation programme that would tackle these problems. The conference also welcomed the idea for a ministerial conference on migration and social integration of emigrants to be held in 2003 (which was eventually held in 2007; Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2002). Migration became an important issue for the EU, and in 2005, with the tenth anniversary of the EMP, it was officially introduced as the fourth pillar of the EMP. The newly approved five year work programme emphasized the cooperation regarding migration, justice and security and social integration.

The difficulties to reach the objectives defined in the Barcelona Declaration and the work programmes were closely linked with another important problem, which became clearly visible at the Barcelona conference which was organized to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the EMP. The 2005 Barcelona conference was supposed to be a meeting of the heads of state and government of all partner countries. Despite the diplomatic efforts of Spain, the leaders of the Mediterranean countries did not show up (exceptions being the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas). Gillespie (2006: 273) indicates that the main reason for their absence is the way in which controversial issues (and then mainly terrorism) were brought onto the agenda. However, their absence also exposed a general discontent about the EMP. In general, the Mediterranean countries had little ownership, which undermined the idea of the EMP as a genuine ‘partnership’. The Mediterranean countries were discontent about both the content of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the institutional framework. Their general feeling was that the EMP is only a vehicle to address the security concerns of the EU and its member states. The determination of the UK to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism at the 2005 Barcelona conference did not really help to take away this feeling. Regarding the institutional framework, most of the meetings within the framework of the EMP were chaired either by the EU presidency or the European Commission.
(which functioned as an ‘unofficial secretariat’), and they also determined the agenda of the EMP. The Mediterranean countries made several complaints about the fact that they were only informed lately or not sufficiently about the agenda of the EMP, by which they could not influence the proposals made by the EU and its member states (Johansson-Nogués, 2011: 22). The feeling of the Mediterranean countries that they had no ownership in their relations with the EU was strengthened through the changes that had been made in the financial assistance.

1.7 The European Neighbourhood Policy

In 2003, the EU was about to enlarge with ten countries that are located in Central and Eastern Europe. Following the enlargement, the UK also wanted to strengthen the European relations with those countries that would become the new neighbours of the EU (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) because it feared that the instability in these countries might spill over into the EU (Smith, 2005: 758-759). Its request was supported by a letter of the Swedish ministers of foreign affairs and trade, who called for a broader and more active policy towards the neighbourhood. In April 2002, the General Affairs Council welcomed the intention of the European Commission and the High Representative to come up with new ideas to strengthen the relations with those countries. In August 2002, the then European Commissioner for external relations Chris Patten and the High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana sent a letter to the Danish presidency presenting their first proposals for reinforcing the relations with Russia and the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS). At the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002, the European member states insisted on including the Mediterranean countries in the new policy (European Council, 2002), first of all because this would balance the Eastern and the Southern dimension of the EU’s new policy, but also the changing international relations and the problems regarding the EMP played an important role here.

After the events of 9/11, especially the member states wanted to strengthen their cooperation on hard security issues with the Mediterranean countries, and the ENP is a new opportunity to do so (besides initiatives under the EMP such as the Valencia Action Plan adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean conference of Valencia in 2002). Furthermore, the publication of a report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on Arab Human Development in 2002 revealed that the lack of democracy hampered the economic and social development of the Mediterranean countries. In addition, the breakdown of the MEPP hampered the cooperation with the EMP. Overall, the Mediterranean countries had the feeling that they had very little ownership in the EMP, as we explained in the previous chapter. All these events played a role in the decision to include the Mediterranean countries in the ENP. Other
authors add that the inclusion of the Mediterranean countries in the new policy was also a strong signal for the Eastern neighbours that this policy could not be seen as a pre-enlargement policy (Cremona & Hillion, 2006: 16).

In March 2003, the European Commission presented a new framework for the relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbours, which was at that time still called ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ (European Commission, 2003a). In January 2004, the initiative received its final name: the ENP. The objectives of this new policy are the same as the objectives of the EMP: promoting stability within and beyond the new borders of the EU and creating an area of shared prosperity and values (European Commission, 2003a). The ENP even goes one step further than the EMP and grants the neighbours the possibility to have ‘a stake in the internal market’. According to Del Sarto & Schumacher (2005: 23-24) and Smith (2005: 765), the EU emphasizes more its interests in the neighbouring regions under the ENP (in contrast with the EMP). This was also the consequence of the European Security Strategy (ESS) which was adopted in 2003. The ESS identifies the challenges and threats to the security of EU and clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with them. One of these strategic objectives is building security in the neighbourhood (ESS, 2003). However, the EU also still referred to the norms and values it wants to promote in the neighbourhood: democracy, human rights, human dignity, liberty, the rule of law and good governance. Especially democracy became more stressed, since the publication of the UNDP report on Arab Human Development. Following this report, the European Commission had already drafted a communication in order to strengthen the EU actions on democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean region (European Commission, 2003b). Also in the ENP, these objectives thus became more stressed.

It is important to note that the ENP does not replace the EMP, but that it is an additional framework for cooperation with the Mediterranean countries. The European Commission (2003a: 15) clearly stated that the ENP would ‘supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements’. The ENP strengthens the bilateral relations with each of the Mediterranean neighbours, which are based on the EMAAs. This was a long term demand of the Mediterranean countries, which initially feared that the EMP would undermine their bilateral relations with the EU (Gomez, 2003: 74). In a one-by-one approach, they feel that they can better voice their particular concerns. The EU did not want to have a one-size-fits-all approach under the ENP, since the history of the relations with each of the neighbours was rather different and because it was clear that such an approach does not work for the Mediterranean region (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005: 29; 36). Differentiation is therefore a key concept of the ENP, and is closely
linked with the principle of positive conditionality that the EU emphasized in its new policy towards its neighbours. The EU offers to strengthen the relations with its neighbours, if they are willing to undertake political and economic reforms. Although the principle of positive conditionality was already present under the Barcelona Process (see chapter 6), the principle was now strengthened as the EU offered the countries the possibility to take part in the internal market, to strengthen their political relations and to receive additional funding. The reasons for the change in strategy by the EU is the fact that the ENP is modeled after the enlargement policy, which uses the instrument of positive conditionality in the form of the Copenhagen criteria, but also stems from the conclusion that the principle of negative conditionality, which was introduced in the Barcelona Process under the form of the human rights clause in both the EMAAs and the MEDA-regulation, was not working.

In order to reach all these objectives and to implement the principles described, the European Commission proposed to conclude new Neighbourhood Agreements (which has not been done yet), to agree on Action Plans with each of the neighbours and to develop a new Neighbourhood Instrument. On 16 June 2003, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) welcomed the communication of the European Commission, and gave it the mandate to present proposals regarding the Action Plans and the new Neighbourhood Instrument, and to launch a dialogue with the partner countries in order to evaluate the EMAAs. In July 2003, a taskforce ‘Wider Europe’ was established within the European Commission, which consisted of officials from DG RELEX who already drafted the ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ document and officials from DG Enlargement, who wanted the ENP to be similar to the enlargement policy of the EU, in which they had expertise. Officials of DG Enlargement were involved into the drafting of the new policy because the then Commissioner of Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, saw this as a new job opportunity for its officials after the enlargement of the EU in 2004. Moreover, the officials of DG Enlargement had expertise in various policy domains (Jeandesboz, 2009: 52-53). The involvement of DG Enlargement in the drafting of the ENP had a strong influence on the principles (see supra) and the instruments that were designed to implement the ENP. First, just like in the enlargement policy, the European Commission prepares country reports which outline the economic and social situation of each country. Based on these country reports, Action Plans are drafted. These Action Plans (which are based on the EMAAs in case of the Mediterranean countries) are modeled after the Accession Partnerships of the enlargement policy, and are negotiated with each of the neighbouring countries (an exception being Algeria, which did not want to conclude an Action Plan with the EU, but which now seems to change its view, B’chir, 2011a). This should enhance the
involvement of these countries into the formulation of the policy, and is referred to by the EU as the principle of ‘joint ownership’. The lack of consultation in the EMP, and especially the MEDA programme was a thorn in the flesh of the Mediterranean countries (see supra), which would now be solved. The implementation of the mutual commitments and objectives contained in the Action Plans is regularly monitored through sub-committees with each country and through the yearly publication of progress reports.

In July 2003, the European Commission presented its document ‘Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’ in which it set out three alternatives for the development of a new neighbourhood instrument: a) focusing on co-ordination between already existing instruments for the neighbouring countries (i.e. MEDA for the Mediterranean countries, Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) for the Western Balkan and the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) programme); b) expanding the content and geographical scope of one of the existing co-operation instruments mentioned above or c) creating a single new Neighbourhood Instrument (European Commission, 2003c: 12). In 2004, the European Commission produced a paper on EU aid policy in which it pleaded for more overall coherence and efficiency of EU aid (Holden, 2009: 172-173). Therefore, it proposed to reduce the number of geographic and thematic budget lines. Within the framework of the ENP, the preference of the European Commission thus went option c, as one single instrument would allow the Commission to overcome co-ordination problems.

The ENPI was officially launched in 2007, and allocated €11.8 billion for the period 2007-2013. Since the ENPI replace MEDA and TACIS, the budget of the ENPI now has to be allocated between the Eastern and the Southern neighbours of the EU. This led several times to tensions between the Southern and the Eastern European member states, which wanted to favour their immediate neighbours. The Mediterranean countries get the lion share of country funding, but it has to be noted that there are more Mediterranean than Eastern partners. In comparison with the MEDA-instrument, the programming of the financial assistance has not changed. The European Commission, and more specifically DG RELEX was responsible for the programming of aid, and thus for the drafting of the CSPs and the NIPs. The member states control the Commission through the ENPI-committee, which replaces the previous comitology committee. The European Commission and the delegations on the ground are responsible for the implementation of the policy. The entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December
2009, however, changed the way in which the EU programmes its financial assistance. The EEAS under the responsibility of the High Representative now drafts the CSPs and NIPs of the Mediterranean countries, together with the European Commission. The former officials of DG RELEX were transferred to the EEAS. The final decision regarding the programming remains with the European Commission (see figure 1).

Although the European Commission proposed to enhance the efficiency of EU aid by reducing the number of budget lines, it has to be noted the Council and the Parliament did not exactly follow the proposal of the European Commission (Holden, 2009: 173). Consequently, the Mediterranean countries can still benefit from funding under other budget lines. The EIDHR for instance, is still in place, and the Mediterranean partners can also benefit from thematic programmes under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). These thematic programmes support actions in the following fields: migration and asylum, food security, Non-State Actors (NSAs) and local authorities in development, environment and sustainable management of natural resources including energy and investment in people. Some of the Mediterranean countries receive humanitarian aid and in general, they are also eligible for funding under the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Under the latter, the EU has set up crisis respond programmes in Lebanon, Libya and the Occupied Palestinian Authorities and Syria.

As mentioned above, several of the Mediterranean countries prefer the ENP above the EMP, because they have the feeling that they can better voice their particular concerns in a one-by-one approach. However, it has to be mentioned that most of the Mediterranean countries are economically and financially dependent on the EU (exceptions being Algeria and Libya, which dispose a great amount of oil). Although they might have the feeling to have more ownership in a bilateral relationship, their ‘bargaining power’ in relation with the EU is rather non-existing. Despite the fact that the Action Plans are negotiated with the Mediterranean partners, it is the European Commission that determines the content of the Action Plans. Because of the lack of bargaining power, the Mediterranean partners cannot choose their path to socio-economic development, and the ENP does not meet certain demands of the Mediterranean countries. Most of the latter are in favor of the implementation of the free movement of workers for their nationals, or even free movement of persons (which was presented as a potential benefit to the partners by the European Commission). However, the European member states are not in favor of this, since they fear that this would lead to uncontrolled migration to the EU. Moreover, if one of the countries receives ‘a stake in the internal market’, it is as ‘close to the EU as possible without being a member’. The Mediterranean countries might adapt all the European acquis, but
they will never be able to take part in the decision-making processes; although Morocco for example still wants to become a member of the EU (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005: 31; 36).

1.8 The Union for the Mediterranean

In 2007, presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy came with a new proposal to enhance the relations between France and the Mediterranean region: the MU. The MU would consist of four pillars: the establishment of a Mediterranean collective security system under French leadership, cooperation in the field of economics, education, technology, water and energy, referred to as ‘joint development’, environmental cooperation and the creation of a common judicial sphere in order to fight corruption, organized crime and terrorism (Sarkozy, 2007: 11-15; Reiterer, 2009: 321). His proposal responded to several concerns of the French electorate at that time. After the problems in the banlieus of Paris, Sarkozy wanted to give a strong signal that he would tackle the issue of migration. At the same time, he tried to convince the French electorate of North African origin to vote for him, by anticipating on the feeling that France and the EU had forsaken the Mediterranean region in the past. Moreover, with the MU, Sarkozy wanted to provide an alternative for the enlargement of Turkey with the EU. The referendum on the European Constitution had clearly shown that the French electorate was not in favour of the accession of Turkey to the EU. Another element that played an important role was the determination of Sarkozy to expand the role of France at the international level (Reynaert, 2009: 442; Gillespie, 2008: 278-279). The MU would be established after the example of the summits of the G8 and the Council of Europe, and would be limited to the countries with a Mediterranean coastline, thus excluding the Northern and Eastern member states of the EU (Sarkozy, 2007: 15). Sarkozy repeated his offer to establish a new framework for cooperation among Mediterranean countries during its victory speech in May 2007.

However, his European Mediterranean partners were rather reticent about the initiative. Spain and Italy definitely wanted to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean countries, but favoured a reinforcement of the Euro-Mediterranean relations instead of creating an institution where France would play a leading role. Spain was the initiator of the Barcelona Process (see supra) and in this capacity, it had convinced the other European member states that the problems of the Mediterranean countries should be dealt with on a European level instead of upon a Mediterranean level. It played a leading role in the design and the implementation of the EMP, and by doing so, it promoted its national interests in the region through the European level. The proposal of Sarkozy would thwart this strategy. Therefore, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos proposed its own initiative to enhance the Euro-
Mediterranean relations: the Euro-Mediterranean Union, which would build on the Barcelona Process and which would consist of a Euro-Mediterranean Council and a Euro-Mediterranean Parliament after the example of the EU (Soler i Lecha, 2008). After a meeting with the special ambassador of France for the MU, Alain Le Roy, on 1 October 2007, Spain, together with Italy started to work on a compromise between its own position and the French proposal. In December 2007, Sarkozy, Prodi and Zapatero reached an agreement (Gillespie, 2011a: 65-66). In their communiqué, the ‘Appel of Rome’, they stated that the UfM, which would consist of the Mediterranean littoral states, would not replace the existing Euro-Mediterranean relations. The initial proposal of Sarkozy thus kept upright, while Spain succeeded in preserving its privileged role in the Euro-Mediterranean framework.

However, also Angela Merkel opposed the idea of a Mediterranean cooperation outside the EU framework. She stated that the attempt of France to develop a new framework for Mediterranean cooperation would affect the political balances within the EU, as France intended to use EU funds to finance its new projects without the Northern and Eastern member states being involved in how EU money would be spent (Merkel, 2007). The UK and Sweden opposed the plan of Sarkozy for the same reason (Balfour, 2009: 100). Moreover, Merkel wanted to prevent that France would play a leading role in the formulation of foreign policy towards the region, which would affect the leadership role of Germany in the EU. Another element that played an important role in the opposition of Merkel against the project was the growing rivalry between both countries. Merkel was angered by the fact that France did no longer consult Germany on matters it wanted to propose on an EU-level. This undermined the German-Franco alliance that came into existence after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Schumacher, 2011: 84-85). The position of Merkel also influenced the other member states. At a meeting of the Olive Group on 18 January 2008, an informal framework for meetings between the ministers of foreign affairs of the European Mediterranean countries, the ministers concluded that all member states of the EU should be included in the new project. After months of cold war between Germany and France, Merkel and Sarkozy eventually met in March 2008 in Hannover. In order to gather the necessary funding for his project, Sarkozy had to give into the demand of Merkel: the MU would be a European project. The European Commission would become involved into the drafting of the structure and content of the UfM, and the European rules would apply. However, a Franco-German document that circulated after this meeting indicates that the UfM would have two co-presidencies, of which one which would be chosen from the Southern European member states. This informal agreement did neither match the then accepted European rules on the external
representation of the EU nor the new rules which were agreed under the Treaty of Lisbon (Reynaert, 2009: 448).

On 13 and 14 March 2008, the European Council officially welcomed the idea for the creation of the UfM and the heads of state and government gave the European Commission a mandate to present a proposal in this regard. In May 2008, the European Commission introduced its view on the future of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The influence of France on the design of the new project was clearly visible: the Commission communication contained all the original proposals of the French government, which were brought in line with the institutional framework created in Barcelona in 1995 and with the then European rules regarding the external representation of the EU. The projects that were listed in the communication were already selected by France and presented to the other European member states in the spring of 2008. To indicate the Europeanization of the initiative, it was renamed ‘the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’. The other European member states now officially had to accept the new framework during the GAERC of 26 May 2008. On 22 May 2008, two days after the Commission issued its communication and four days before the GAERC, Poland and Sweden launched their proposal to enhance the relations with the Eastern neighbours. The timing is of course not a coincidence: if France and the other Southern member states wanted the UfM to be born, they would have to accept that the Eastern dimension of the EU’s foreign policy would also be strengthened. Eventually, the member states concluded a package deal: the European Council of June 2008 welcomed both the communication of the European Commission on the UfM and the proposal of Poland and Sweden (Reynaert, 2009: 448-450).

In the meanwhile, President Sarkozy had launched a diplomatic offensive to convince the Mediterranean partners of the added value of a reinforced multilateral cooperation with the EU. In general, the Mediterranean countries were rather reluctant to accept the French offer of an updated partnership. However, their specific position was mainly determined by their bilateral political and economic relations with the EU. Morocco, for instance, reacted rather critical on the new initiative, but supported the proposal of France, as it wanted to reach an ‘advanced partnership’ in its bilateral relations with the EU. Tunisia also reacted lukewarmly, but accepted the offer as it would benefit from a stronger, multilateral cooperation in the economic sphere. Moreover, at a three-day state visit to Tunisia, President Sarkozy promised that the new secretariat of the UfM would be established in Tunis. This provoked fierce reactions from human rights activists, who accused the French President of only being interested in economic and commercial interests, and not in democracy and human rights. Egypt at the time indicated that it
wanted to strengthen the relations with the EU. It granted its support for the French initiative, but underlined that the EU and the Mediterranean region should enjoy an equal status in the framework, in order to create a genuine Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Reynaert, 2009: 444-446; 451-454). France therefore nominated Egypt as co-President of the UfM, by which it ensured itself of the necessary support of the country. Jordan and Lebanon passively supported the new project, as they see the EMP, and thus also its successor the UfM as an instrument to resolve the political problems in the region and to improve the laborious relations between the Mediterranean countries (Reynaert, 2009: 452).

Israel reacted, at least in public, enthusiastically on the ideas of France, as Sarkozy had always supported the request of Israel for the upgrade of EU-Israeli relations. However, internally, it was rather sceptical about the new initiative. Israel favours bilateral economic relations above a multilateral framework where peace and security are the central objectives. Nevertheless, the country was supportive, because it did not want to turn down Sarkozy’s initiative. Moreover, it understood that the UfM would be ‘a project of projects’, and thus not that politicized and that the initiative therefore would not thwart the bilateral relations with the EU. It also felt that it had the expertise to contribute to the projects presented by France. In addition, it would enhance the country’s legitimacy among the other Mediterranean countries (Del Sarto, 2011: 127-128). Against all odds, also Syria reacted rather positive on the proposal of Sarkozy because it saw the UfM as a means to restore the diplomatic contacts with France (which were broken after the murder on the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri). Algeria initially refused the offer of France for an enhanced Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. It stated that the new partnership would only have advantages for the European countries, and that there would be no added value for the Mediterranean countries. France increased its diplomatic efforts to convince Algeria to become a member of the UfM. One month before the official launch of the new framework, the Prime Minister of France, François Fillon, visited Algeria, but the Algerian President kept its participation under consideration. Three weeks later, President Sarkozy could finally persuade President Bouteflika to come to Paris and to join the UfM. Also Libya refused to become part of the new partnership. Gaddafi always opposed the EMP, stating that a multilateral framework for cooperation between the EU and the Arab African countries drives a wedge between the African countries. Also in the case of Libya France increased its diplomatic efforts by sending a special representative to Tripoli, but Gaddafi kept his ground (Reynaert, 2009: 453-454).
Eventually the UfM was officially launched during a ceremony in Paris in July 2008. It builds on the Barcelona Process, and it adopts its acquis and institutions (including the EMPA), but adds an institutional layer. More specifically, it introduces biennial summits of the heads of state and government of the participating countries, a co-presidency which sets the agenda of the UfM, a secretariat which consists of officials from both European and Mediterranean countries and which is responsible for the projects of the UfM (see infra) and a joint permanent committee, which prepares the meetings of the Euro-Mediterranean committee (see supra), which is from now on referred to as ‘the Senior Officials’ (see figure 1). This has to increase the ownership of the Mediterranean countries in the process, a long standing demand of the Mediterranean countries, and to upgrade the political level of the EU’s relationship with its partners. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro were invited to become a member of the UfM. The UfM confirms the objectives agreed under the EMP, but introduces additional regional and sub-regional projects. This has to make the relations more concrete and visible for citizens. The six projects that are identified are the following: de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, civil protection, alternative energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, higher education and research (the Euro-Mediterranean University) and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008a; see also Johansson-Nogués, 2011). In the wake of the establishment of the UfM, two new institutional bodies have been created: the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (EMRLA), which brings together the representatives of the local and regional authorities of the Mediterranean countries and the EU (which are united within the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR)) and the Assembly of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions, which brings together the representatives of the economic and social councils of the Mediterranean and the EU (which are partly united in the EESC). Both assemblies can issue recommendations, declarations and reports to the institutions of the UfM or the EU.

In contrast with its predecessors, the UfM is thus not a reaction to problems in the region or changes in international relations (Balfour, 2009: 100; Kausch & Youngs, 2009: 964). The original idea of a MU proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy was initially meant to attract the French electorate to vote for the presidential candidate, as it responded to certain concerns of the French voters. After May 2007, the French President promoted his initiative in order to fulfil his election promises and in order to restore the ‘grandeur’ of France at the European and international level. However, as explained above, his European partners looked upon his maneuvers with envy. Their main concern was to limit Sarkozy’s ambition in the Mediterranean by integrating his plan
into the existing Euro-Mediterranean framework. The consequence is that the negotiations at the European side mainly dealt with the institutional structure of this new initiative (for example, the discussion on the co-presidency of the EU in Hannover). Another element that led to the focus on the institutional structure, was the limited amount of money available for financing an ambitious partnership. Moreover, in order to convince the Mediterranean partners of the added value of the proposal, France offered the Mediterranean partners, which had asked for more ownership in the Euro-Mediterranean relations for so long, more institutional influence. The new institutional layer of the UfM was thus used as a side payment, especially in the case of Egypt and Tunisia (Reynaert, 2009: 442-456).

The institutional quarreling between the European member states and between the European and Mediterranean states went on after the launch of the new project. The European member states wrangled about the appointment of the European President of the UfM. At the launch of the UfM in Paris in July 2008, France was inaugurated as the first European President of the UfM. At that time, it also held the presidency of the EU (July-December 2008). During its presidency, it agreed with the Czech Republic, which held the next presidency of the EU that it would remain the President of the UfM between January and June 2009. Moreover, it concluded a similar agreement with Sweden (July – December 2009) by which the competences and responsibilities on the UfM were shared between the two countries. These agreements caused resentments in the other member states. Furthermore, France agreed with Spain that it could become the next presidency of the UfM if France was allowed to stay President during the Spanish presidency of the EU between January and July 2010. This led to a conflict with Belgium, which held the next presidency and which was highly indignant about this infringement of the European rules regarding the external representation of the EU. Moreover, as the Treaty of Lisbon took effect in December 2009, the newly appointed High Representative, Catherine Ashton, now represents the EU in external affairs. In this capacity, she is also responsible for the dialogue with third countries, and thus the right person for the job of European President of the UfM. However, the member states, and then especially France and Spain, were initially not willing to let Catherine Ashton to fulfil this role. The High Representative from her side accepted the existing agreements between Spain and France, stating that the member states should find an agreement on the future external representation of the EU within the framework of the UfM (Reynaert, 2009: 450-451, see infra).

Furthermore, the European member states and the Mediterranean countries wrangled about the location of the secretariat and about the appointment of the secretary general and
especially the deputy secretary generals. Despite the promise of France to Tunisia, three European countries (France, Malta and Spain) and Morocco also put forward their candidacy for housing the secretariat of the UfM. Especially Spain strongly promoted Barcelona as the new capital of the Mediterranean policy, since the city is the birthplace of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. However, Egypt stated that the secretariat should be located in a Mediterranean country, while Syria and Lebanon were in favour of the secretariat being established in a European country. If a Mediterranean city would become the capital of the UfM, this could lead to a normalization of the relations between that Mediterranean country and Israel. Algeria was for the same reason in favour of Brussels, which was not a candidate. Tunisia then decided to withdrawn, stating that it was no longer interested in housing the secretariat, or in the position of secretary general. Spain eventually won the argument, by which Barcelona became the official capital of the renewed Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. France, which realized that the EU had been ‘brutal’ with Tunisia, asked the country to present its candidature for the post of secretary general (B’chir, 2008a). However, Tunisia stated that it was no longer candidate for anything, indicating that it was no longer interested in the UfM (B’chir, 2008b). Despite the fact that the post of secretary general was more or less promised to Morocco, it was eventually Jordan which put forward a candidate for the post. The candidacy of Jordan was supported by the other Arab countries, and eventually Ahmed Massa’deh, the ambassador of Jordan to the EU was officially appointed as the new secretary general (B’chir, 2010d). However, he already resigned on 28 February 2011 because of the difficult circumstances he had to face. He was succeeded by Youssef Amrani, a Moroccan, who took office on 1 July 2011. Nevertheless, on 11 January 2012, also Amrani resigned because he was appointed as Minister Delegate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Morocco. This meant that the UfM had to find once more a new secretary general. Fathallah Sijilmassi, a Moroccan diplomat was appointed on 10 February 2012. Another problem that arose was the selection of the deputy secretary generals. Initially, the ministers of foreign affairs agreed in Marseille on the appointment of five deputy secretary generals, coming from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Italy, Greece and Malta. However, the choice for Israel led to a firm discussion with the other Mediterranean countries, which did not want to give any political responsibilities to Israel. Eventually the Israeli deputy secretary general became responsible for a technical dossier: new technology and communication. Later on, France added a sixth deputy secretary general, and promised it to Turkey without consulting its partners. This led to a discussion with Cyprus (B’chir, 2009b). In return for its deputy secretary general, Turkey eventually promised to drop its opposition against Cyprus holding international posts in other frameworks (Bicchi, 2011: 14). During the first months of the UfM, the European and
Mediterranean countries thus mainly tried to find a solution for institutional problems, instead of focusing on the direction and the objectives of the UfM. Consequently, the UfM did not only face similar difficulties as the Barcelona Process, but the ‘horse-trading’ (Kausch & Youngs, 2009: 964) even led to the downgrading of the multilateral framework.

First, although more ownership is a praiseworthy principle, it made the UfM ‘even more vulnerable to external factors than the EMP’, and especially to the MEPP (Aliboni, 2009: 3). While under the EMP the only thing the Mediterranean countries could do was to protest (by staying away) against the course of events regarding the MEPP as they were ‘guests’, Aliboni (2009: 3) states that under the UfM, the Mediterranean countries are owners, by which they can block the UfM if they want. The first problems arose when the representative of the Arab League wanted to make a statement on the first meeting of the new framework. More specifically, they wanted to make a reference to Arab Peace Initiative, which refers to the right of return for Arab refugees to the territories occupied by Israel. Israel objected against this right to speak for the Arab League, stating that it only has observer status under the UfM, and to the inclusion of a reference to the Arab Peace Initiative. The EU tried to stay neutral in the first conflict between Israel and the other Mediterranean countries, which went down badly with some of the latter. Due to this difference of opinion, the meetings of the joint permanent committee and the senior officials had to be suspended until November 2008. On 3 and 4 November 2008, the ministers of foreign affairs of the partner countries gathered in Marseille for their first meeting, by which they had to find a solution for the problem. The Arab League, however, decided to stay firm and was not prepared to find a compromise on the latter. Eventually, it is stated in the conclusions of the Marseille meeting that the ‘League of Arab States shall participate in all meetings at all level of the Barcelona Process’. A reference to the Arab Peace Initiative was inserted in the text. Israel dropped its opposition against the participation of the Arab League and the reference, since it was promised a deputy secretary general (Johansson-Nogués, 2011: 29). In December 2008, the Gaza War broke out, which lead to a suspension of all meetings under the UfM. Meetings were resumed in July 2009, but in November 2009, Egypt refused to meet with the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Liebermann. This led to the postponement of the ministerial meeting in Istanbul. In 2010, there were sectoral meetings on water, tourism and agricultural, and a conference on labour and employment, but the dialogue between Israel and the other Mediterranean countries advanced with great difficulty. In July 2010, a new summit of heads of states and governments was supposed to take place, where the French presidency would officially hand over the presidency to Spain. However, there was still no solution for the conflict between the Mediterranean partners, and the summit was postponed until November 2010. Following a
breakdown in the peace negotiations, the event was cancelled, and today (April 2012) there is still no date set for the next meeting.

Second, more ownership also led to other problems. As mentioned above, the new secretariat of the UfM is responsible for the implementation of the projects mentioned in the Paris Declaration. It also took over the tasks of the European Commission, which functioned as an unofficial secretariat of the EMP. However, discussion arose regarding the tasks of the secretariat under the former third pillar of the EMP. The third pillar includes objectives such as human rights, the social role of women and intercultural and interreligious dialogue. The European Commission, for instance, promoted the creation of transnational networks between the EU and non-EU organization, where a free debate could take place and which has as its main objective to stimulate political reform in Mediterranean countries. However, these objectives are sensitive issues for several Mediterranean countries. This undermines the political acquis of the EMP (Aliboni, 2009: 4-5). Moreover, human rights and democracy were no longer a priority under the UfM. This led to a depolitization of the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, turning it into a ‘project of projects’ (Kausch & Youngs, 2009: 964).

Third, the UfM is not based on an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Barcelona Process (or the ENP in terms of objectives). Consequently, it does not address the needs of the Mediterranean countries. The six projects which are at the heart of the UfM are all designed by the European countries, and are mainly in the interest of the EU. The Mediterranean countries contributed little to the development of these projects, and they do not longer see the added value of the UfM. The incentives to keep the framework alive are therefore non-existing on the part of the Mediterranean countries. They ask more money to tackle their socio-economic problems, more concessions regarding trade in agricultural products, and especially the implementation of the free movement of persons with their countries (something the European Commission initially wanted to offer them, see supra) or at least the free movement of workers or the liberalization of the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4: the temporary movement of natural persons providing services. In the EMAAs with Algeria and Jordan, commitments regarding the movement of key personal and commercial presence are already included, indicating that a trade-off between Mode 3 (where the EU has a comparative advantage) and Mode 4 (where the Mediterranean countries would benefit) is possible (Bechev & Nicolaidis, 2007: 17; De Ville & Reynaert, 2010: 197-198). It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the UfM is actually not functioning at all. As mentioned earlier, most of the Mediterranean countries preferred the ENP, which main objective was to promote economic reforms.
1.9 The Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy and the review of the Union for the Mediterranean

In the beginning of 2011, almost all Mediterranean countries were confronted with major popular protests. The high food prices, poor living conditions, unemployment, corruption and the lack of liberty inspired the people of the Mediterranean countries in a quest for more democracy. Starting in Tunisia, protests have been spread throughout the whole Mediterranean region and even throughout the Arab peninsula. The regimes in Algeria, Jordan and Morocco managed to keep the demonstrations and protests under control (at least until now) by promising (rather limited) reforms. In all three countries, the constitution has been under discussion. However, most discussions took place in committees consisting of representatives appointed by the King or the President. In Morocco, 98.9% of the voters accepted in on 1 July 2011 the reform on the constitution, which gives more power to the parliament, which strengthens the independence of the judiciary and which obliges the King to select the Prime Minister from the majority party in parliament. In addition, parliamentary elections (planned in 2012) were advanced and organized at 25 November 2011. These elections were won by the Justice and Development Party (better known under its French acronym PJD: Parti de la Justice et du Développement), a moderate Islamist Party. However, the 20 February Movement states that the reforms are not going far enough, and they keep protesting (Ottaway, 2011a).

Also in Jordan, the King promised political reforms through the amendment of the constitution, in addition to a lowering of the food prices and an increase of the salaries of the military and civil service. He therefore established a national dialogue committee which proposed several constitutional amendments. These amendments included the establishment of a constitutional court, the establishment of an independent commission to oversee elections, the strengthening of civil liberties and the limitation of the government’s abilities to issue temporary laws and to dissolve the parliament without resigning itself (Ben Hussein, 2011a; Muasher, 2011). Subsequently, the King appointed a Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, which worked on the amendments proposed. Eventually, these amendments were slightly adapted and adopted in September 2011. However, Islamists and conservatives said that these amendments are not enough, because the Prime Minister is still not selected from the majority party in the parliament but appointed by King Abdullah II (Ben Hussein, 2011b). In Algeria, President Bouteflika initially tried to calm things down by reducing taxes for certain foods, by lifting the state of emergency and by promising that he would work on job creation. However, protests did not cease, and therefore he announced a review of the constitution, which included amendments to
the power of the President and the strengthening of the judiciary. Nevertheless, protest continued. Two of the main opposition parties stated that the composition of the committee was far too limited, that the President had far too much influence on the new constitution and that he will not keep his promise for meaningful changes (Ouali, 2011). It is clear that, until now, the leaders of these three countries succeeded in limiting the impact of the Arab Spring in their countries, mainly because they took the lead in the reform process. In all three countries, the kings and the President composed the commission which had to reform the country. Since they were involved in the reforms, they successfully limited the impact on their powers. However, it remains to be seen if the limited political reform will keep the population satisfied.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, demonstrations have resulted into the overthrow of the regimes of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak and Colonel Gaddafi. In Tunisia, the President of the chamber of deputies, Fouad Mebazaa became interim-President and an interim government was installed awaiting new legislative and presidential elections. In the meanwhile, several interim governments passed in review. In addition to these interim governments, a ‘High Council for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition’ was established. This Council has written a new electoral law and appointed an election commission. However, critical voices disagreed with the composition of the High Council. While some argued that the Council was composed of people which benefited from the system in the past, and which tried to safeguard the privileges they had under the authoritarian rule of Ben Ali; others stated that leftist parties had too much influence in the Council. There was also a discussion about the reform of the country: a minority wanted to draft the constitution before elections were organized. Eventually, it was agreed that elections would be organized to form a constituent assembly which has to write a constitution. These elections were scheduled in July, but were postponed and eventually held on 23 October 2011 (Ottaway, 2011b; Ira & Lantier, 2011; Anon., 2011a). The Islamist Party Ennahda won these elections. The constituted assembly elected Moncef Marzouki as the new President of Tunisia on 12 December 2011.

In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak turned over power to the military, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). The latter suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament and promised new elections in October 2011. The SCAF, together with an interim government, decided to rule the country until new elections took place. In the meanwhile protests did not cease because people feared that the SCAF would install a military junta. Just like in Tunisia, there was a discussion between the secular and Islamic movements and political parties about the order of reforms: should the new constitution be drafted first or should elections be organized
first? The secular movements wanted a new constitution to be drafted first because they feared that if elections were organized first, the Islamist parties would have too much influence on the text of the new constitution, and that they would install an Islamic state. The SCAF appointed a panel which drafted guidelines for the new constitution and they also issued a new election law. Under this new law, international monitoring of the elections was prohibited, young people under the age of 25 (lower house) and 35 (upper house) were excluded from the elections, and at least half of the seats were to be contested by individual candidates, which opened up the possibility that people would buy their seat or that former officials of the Mubarak regime would be able to reside in parliament. The elections for the People’s Assembly, held on 27 November 2011, were won by the Muslim Brotherhood, just like the elections for the Shura Council (January – February 2012). In May 2012, presidential elections will be organized. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how far the SCAF is willing to turn over its power to the new elected parliament and the new President. In November 2011, protests raised against the SCAF, because the latter organized raids against CSOs. For both Tunisia and Egypt, it remains to be seen how the new political situation will be consolidated (Amnesty International, 2011; Fleishman & Hassan, 2011; Anon., 2011b; Ottoway, 2011c).

In August 2011, also Colonel Gaddafi felt from power. At first, protests in Libya started peacefully, but escalated when Gaddafi started to use violence against the demonstrators. The latter united in the National Transition Council (NTC) and tried to remove Gaddafi from power. They took up arms and marched towards Tripoli, but they were initially stopped by the troops of Gaddafi. With the help of NATO, which intervened in the conflict under a mandate of the UN, the NTC succeeded in conquering Tripoli. Gaddafi was eventually killed, and the NTC has formed the provisional government awaiting the elections for a new assembly which are planned mid-2012 (Krauss, 2011). In Syria, the situation is totally different for the moment. Just like Colonel Gaddafi, President Assad of Syria is not willing to constitute a dialogue about meaningful political reforms in his country. He suppresses the protests by ordering his troops to fire on the demonstrators. More than 7600 people died since the beginning of the demonstrations on 15 March 2011 (Gessant, 2012a). Initially, the reactions of the international community were rather reticent. In August 2011, the army of the President besieged the city Hama, killing at least 30 people. This led the Security Council of the UN to issue a statement in which it condemns the actions of the Syrian government. Several countries and organizations have issued sanctions against the country, including the EU (see infra; Changeur, 2011a; Bakri, 2011). In February 2012, over 60 countries met in Syria for a conference where they asked the UN to adopt a resolution on immediate ceasefire. In addition, they developed a plan for humanitarian aid (Gessant, 2012b).
In the meanwhile, UN special envoy Kofi Annan developed a peace plan which was accepted by the Syrian government on 27 March 2012, but the implementation turns out to be difficult.

The EU and its member states closely follow the events in the region. As mentioned above, the establishment of democracy is one of the main objectives of the policies of the EU towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbours. Following the demonstrations and (r)evolutions in the region in the spring of 2011, the EU started to reflect on how it can contribute to the evolution towards democracy in the region. This reflection process coincided with a review of the ENP which the European Commission started in March 2010 (Tocci, 2011). Eventually, the EU’s answer on the events was twofold. In March 2011, the European Commission and the High Representative published a communication ‘a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’. This partnership is an ‘incentive-based approach based on differentiation’, meaning that Mediterranean countries which go faster and further with reforms will receive more support from the EU. More specifically, the Commission and High Representative add that monitored free and fair elections should be the entry qualification for the partnership, and performance will be assessed through progress towards a high standard of human rights and governance. More specifically, the EU will strengthen the cooperation with the civil society, it will tackle the challenges of mobility, promote inclusive economic development, ensure the maximum impact of trade and investment and enhance sectoral cooperation (European Commission & High Representative, 2011a).

At the same time, the EU worked on a reorientation of the ENP in order to implement these changes. This resulted in a communication of the European Commission and the High Representative (2011b) ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’ which has been adopted by the Council in June 2011. Here, the EU goes deeper into its renewed policy, and especially into how it wants to support democratic reforms. It specifies that it wants to promote ‘deep democracy’ in the Mediterranean region. Catherine Ashton added that the EU wants go further than only promoting ‘surface democracy’, i.e. the organization of free and fair elections (Niang, 2011). Therefore, it will also support freedom of association, the rule of law, fight against corruption and security and law enforcement sector reform. The civil society occupies a special place in the EU’s renewed policy. The new strategy of the EU towards the civil society is built on five instruments. Three are already used today: a dialogue with the Mediterranean parliaments through the EMPA and joint parliamentary committees between the European Parliament and the parliament of the Mediterranean partners, a human rights dialogue with the partner governments, which will be reinforced, and the EIDHR. In addition, the EU will create a Civil
Society Facility to support CSOs working on women’s rights, social justice, respect for minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency. The fifth instrument of the new strategy is the ‘European Endowment for Democracy (EED)’, an organization which will support political parties, non-registered CSOs or trade unions and other social partners, but which will function outside the framework of the EU. In addition, the EU wants to intensify the political and security co-operation with the neighbours, to support sustainable economic and social development and to build effective regional partnerships within the ENP.

In order to implement this strategy the European Commission and the High Representative needed an additional €1242 million until 2013 (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 19). The European Commission has also proposed to increase the funding for the ENP to €18, 18 billion under the new Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF; 2014-2020; European Commission, 2011a). However, it remains to be seen if the Council and the European Parliament agree with that. In order to implement the objectives of the renewed ENP, the Council also appointed Bernardino Leon as the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean (Council of the EU, 2011a). Following the approval of this communication by the Council, the European Commission adopted four programmes, from which three are regional: the SPRING programme, which supports democratic transformation, institutional building and economic growth in the wake of the Arab spring (€350 million), the Civil Society Facility mentioned above (€22 million), the Erasmus Mundus Programme (€66 million) and a special measure in order to support poorer areas in Tunisia (€20 million; Gessant, 2011). In the meanwhile, the Polish government focused on the establishment of the EED. However, the funding for this new instrument, which would be a non-governmental organization, turns about to be a major point of discussion between the European member states (Vogel, 2011). In March 2012, discussions on the establishment of the EED were still going on.

Besides this strategy which has been developed for the Mediterranean region as a whole, the EU has also addressed the events in several Mediterranean countries bilaterally. For Tunisia, the EU increased its bilateral assistance from €240 million to €400 million for the period 2011-2013. In the case of Egypt, the EU provided funding for the organization of the elections (€2 million, and it launched a civil society package (€22 million; European Union, 2011c). Regarding the situation in Algeria, Morocco and Jordan, the EU has welcomed the reforms in declarations and statements (European Union, 2011a; European Union, 2011b; Council of the EU, 2011b; Delegation of the EU to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2011). It has also provided additional financial assistance for Morocco and Jordan (Gessant, 2012c). Furthermore, the
Council has decided to offer four countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) the possibility to conclude new trade agreements with the EU. These ‘neighbourhood agreements’ would then replace the current EMAAs. Also Libya could be involved in a later stage (B’chir, 2011b). In the case of Syria, the EU suspended all bilateral cooperation programmes, and it takes no further steps regarding the EMAA that had been negotiated. Moreover, the EU adopted sanctions against the regime of President Assad: it installed a visa ban and froze the assets for/of representatives and companies which work for the regime and it placed on embargo on the import of oil, foreign investment in the oil sector and on the delivery of bank notes to the Syrian Central Bank. Moreover, it prohibited European financial institutions to open offices in Syria, Syrian banks to open new offices in the EU and the member states to provide financial assistance in order to stimulate trade with Syria (Changeur, 2011b; Changeur, 2011c; Anon., 2011c; Changeur, 2011d). In a reaction, Syria suspended in December 2011 its membership of the UfM, stating that ‘these measures ‘run counter to the spirit of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the sovereignty of its member countries’ (B’chir, 2011c). In addition, the EU also provides humanitarian assistance (€10 million) for Syrians who have fled to the neighbouring countries.

During the civil war in Libya, the EU suspended the negotiations on the EU-Libyan Framework Agreement. It adopted sanctions against the regime of Gaddafi, and considered in May 2011 the NTC as the ‘key political interlocutor presenting the aspirations of the Libyan people’ (Brüls, 2011). At the same time, the EU opened an EU Office in Benghazi and it disbursed humanitarian assistance (European Union, 2011d). Moreover, the EU was involved in military operations during the civil war through its member states. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 authorizing its member states to take measures to protect the civilians under threat of attack in the country. The NATO, of which several of the EU member states are also members, was responsible for implementing the military aspects of the resolution (Byczewska, Brüls & B’chir, 2011). Since the civil war has ended, the EU has taken new steps to contribute to the development of Libya. The EU and its member states granted the new regime in Libya the securities they had frozen as a consequence of the sanctions against Gaddafi. In addition, the EU is currently working on a coherent approach towards Libya (Anon., 2011d). It made an extra €30 million available and it refocused the €50 million which was made available for the period 2011-2013.

As a reaction to the Arab Spring, the EU has thus mainly taken bilateral measures and reformed the ENP. In addition, France and the EU also worked on the (institutional) reform of the UfM. The latter did not only need to be reformed in the light of the recent (r)evolutions in
the regions, but also because it is not functioning. There were three scenarios for the UfM: ‘a mixed UfM, half inter-governmental, half Community-led; the creation of a UfM which is totally integrated into the EU’s general Mediterranean policy or the construction of a totally autonomous intergovernmental structure, in which the EU as a Community body would only play a supporting role, as it does in UN bodies for example (B’chir, 2011d). Alain Juppé, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France stated that the European institutions should be involved. His view, however, was in contradiction with the vision of Henri Guaino (special advisor of President Sarkozy who developed the UfM) and the UK, which preferred an intergovernmental approach (B’chir, 2011e). In February 2012, the Council of the EU decided that from 1 March 2012 on, High Representative Catherine Ashton is taking over the presidency for the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs. The European Commission is taking over the co-presidency for the sectoral ministerial meetings that solely concern matters that are the exclusive responsibility of the EU, while the rotating presidency is taking over co-presidency for the ministerial meetings that concern matters falling within actions and responsibilities of the member states. In all the other cases, the European Commission is also taking over the co-presidency, but then it works in full cooperation with the member state holding the rotating presidency of the EU. This means that the European part of the joint presidency is now in line with the Lisbon Treaty, and that the UfM moves away from its intergovernmental structure (B’chir & Gessant, 2012). However, there is not yet a candidate for the post of Mediterranean co-President of the UfM, despite the pressure of Egypt to hand over its mandate. Tunisia has been touted as a possibility, but the new regime in Tunisia is rather reluctant to take up a role within the framework, because the major Islamist Party Ennahda does not want to be part of an international organization if Israel is also a member. Also Jordan is mentioned as a possible candidate, but in March 2012 a definite decision had not been sorted out yet (B’chir, 2012a; 2012b).

2.0 Conclusions

This chapter gave an overview of the development of the different policy frameworks for cooperation between the EC/EU and the Mediterranean countries. More specifically, a closer examination was made of the objectives and the instruments of the different frameworks. In addition, we also studied why the EC/EU (or the member states) decided to conclude, to change or to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean countries, and we looked at the position of the Mediterranean countries on the cooperation with the EC/EU. In conclusion, an overall evaluation of each framework was made. Four conclusions can be drawn from this overview. First, the Mediterranean countries had little influence on the content and the institutional
framework of the cooperation. Because almost all Mediterranean countries are economically and financially dependent on the EU (and also on other donors such as the IFIs), they had little bargaining power in their relationship with the EU. The GMP, RMP, EMP, ENP, UfM and the renewed ENP were almost exclusively designed by the EC/EU. As illustrated, this led to frustration with the Mediterranean partners. Second, throughout the years, the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has become very comprehensive. Initially, in the 1960s and under the GMP, the relations were limited to trade and some financial assistance. Initially, in the 1960s and under the GMP, the relations were limited to trade and some financial assistance. In 1989, the European Commission tried to go further and proposed a strategy for the socio-economic development of the Mediterranean countries. However, the instruments to implement this strategy at that time were very limited. After the establishment of the EU and the creation of the three pillar structure (and especially the CFSP), the relations with the Mediterranean region became more elaborated. Political, security, social and cultural objectives are part of the EMP/UfM and the ENP/the renewed ENP; the EU is cooperating with the Mediterranean partners on all these issues. This means that the EU now tries to influence almost all issues that constitute the social order of the Mediterranean countries.

Third, the European member states were the main entrepreneurs for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: they determined the institutional structure of the policy frameworks, but also the political, security, social and cultural relations. The member states were mainly concerned about the security risks that an unstable or hostile neighbourhood would bring. This was the main incentive for all frameworks of cooperation with the Mediterranean region. In addition, Spain and France were also very eager to strengthen their own status at the international level. The member states always worked in close cooperation with the European Commission. This is a fourth point. The European Commission can be seen as an important policy entrepreneur when it comes to the economic content of the relations. From 1989 on, the European Commission started to think about a strategy to contribute to the economic development of the Mediterranean neighbours of the EU. This resulted in the RMP which has been approved by the member states. In 1992, it was the European Commission which drafted the report on the economic relations between the EU and the Maghreb, which eventually determined the economic component of the proposal for a Euro-Maghreb Partnership. The Euro-Maghreb Partnership formed the basis for the EMP. When the ENP was developed, European Commissioner for external relations Chris Patten, together with High Representative Javier Solana, proposed to give the neighbours a stake in the internal market. Furthermore, the Commission succeeded in strengthening its powers on the foreign policy of the EU towards its neighbours, by which it has a lot of influence on the content of the policy. The European Commission is responsible for the
drafting of the country reports, the Action Plans and the progress reports. It takes the lead in the discussions with the Mediterranean partners, and it can exert influence in the region through its role in the allocation of financial assistance. Since the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the European Commission shares this role with the High Representative and the EEAS. In conclusion, the European Commission thus also played an important role in the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region, just like and together with the member states. In the next chapter, we go deeper into the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Figure 1. The three organizational dimensions of the (Renewed) European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean

DG DevCo: Directorate-General Development Cooperation
EU: European Union's institutions
HR: High Representative
MD: Managing Director
MP: Mediterranean Partners
MS: Member States
Chapter 2: The academic literature on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region

2.1 Introduction

The second chapter of this dissertation deals with the academic literature on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. Overall, the purpose of this chapter is double. First, it wants to provide the reader with a state of the art of the study on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. More specifically, this literature review deals with the articles, books and papers which study the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region at large within the framework of the policies designed by the EU to guide its relations with the Mediterranean countries (excluding the EU’s policy towards the conflict in the Middle East). Focus is thus on the EU and not on the relations of the European member states with the Mediterranean countries. The literature on the foreign policy of the member states will only be taken into account to the extent that it deals with the role of the member states in the development of the policy frameworks designed by the EU to deal with its Mediterranean neighbours (see infra). Besides the focus on the EU, this literature review goes deeper into the studies that deal with the relations of the EU with the Mediterranean region at large. By contrast, there are several authors who have focused on the study of the relations of the EU with one ‘subregion’ (especially the Maghreb, see for example Joffé, 1994; 2008) or on the relations of the EU with one Mediterranean country in particular (see for example Brieg Powel (2009a; 2009b, and together with Larbi Sadiki, 2010) who focuses on the relations EU-Tunisia or Hakim Darbouche (2008; 2010) who mainly studied the relations with Algeria). However, given the focus of this dissertation, these studies will not be discussed in detail. Besides these choices, we also decided not to study the literature on the EAD. The academic literature follows in a large extent the development of the policy frameworks (see chapter 1). Therefore, the first part of this chapter goes deeper into the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1960s and on the GMP, while the second part deals with the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1980s. In the third part, we go deeper into the literature on the EMP (1995) and ENP (2003) and in the fourth part the studies on the UfM (launched in 2008) will be examined. In the fifth part, the most recent studies on the renewed ENP are discussed. Within each part, studies are classified according to their main topic.

Second, this dissertation wants to provide insights into the theoretical approaches that each of the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations apply. Which theories of international relations or which theories of European integration are used to explain the Euro-Mediterranean
relations? The different studies rely upon a set of ontological assumptions and make a series of epistemological and methodological choices. The ontological, epistemological and methodological positions of the authors who have written about the Euro-Mediterranean relations will be examined. The ontological position refers to the position that authors take regarding the nature of the social world. While the extreme objectivists state that international relations is ‘an object’ out there, the extreme subjectivists believe that international relations is an idea ‘that people share about how they should organize themselves and relate to each other politically: it is constituted exclusively by language, ideas and concepts’ (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010: 294). The epistemological position refers to the position that authors take regarding the way knowledge can be obtained about the social world. On the one hand, we find authors who state that political scientists should engage in explaining the world. They see it as their main task to ‘build a valid social science on a foundation of verifiable empirical propositions’. On the other hand, there are authors who state that political scientists can only engage in understanding the world because ‘the historical, legal and moral problems of world politics cannot be translated into the terms of science without misunderstanding them’ (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010: 294). The methodological position refers to the strategy that will be used to acquire that knowledge. Although the term ‘methodology’ can be used in a broader sense to indicate the scientific position of scholars, in this dissertation it refers to the method that is adopted to conduct the research.

The relationship between these three positions is ‘directional’ as ontology precedes epistemology which precedes methodology. Colin Hay (2002: 63) summarizes this relationship as follows: ‘ontology refers to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we can know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring knowledge about that’. In reality however, authors are not always straight forward, and they sometimes adopt a ‘cooperative view of the ontological divide between objectivism and subjectivism and the epistemological divide between explaining and understanding’. This means that they ‘seek out a middle ground which avoids the stark choice between either objectivism or subjectivism, either pure explaining or pure understanding (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010: 294). Within each part of this chapter, the ontological, epistemological and methodological position of the different studies will be discussed. This will give us insights into the main ontological, epistemological and methodological positions of the current studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations (presented in the different tables). Furthermore, this classification will enable us to identify a gap in the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, both in terms of the content (ontology) as in terms of the scientific approach (epistemology & methodology) applied to the study of these
relations. This dissertation will be based on an entirely different ontological position, which incites us to pose different research questions, and on a different epistemological and methodological approach (explained in chapter 3).

2.2 The Seventies: the academic literature on the GMP

As discussed in chapter 1, the earliest relations of the EEC with its Mediterranean neighbours mainly dealt with trade. Following the limited competences of the EEC, trade links were seen in the 1960s as a means to safeguard the special relationship of France with especially the North African countries and to prevent Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean region. The EEC concluded economic association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, and limited trade agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. In 1972, the EC launched for the first time a genuine policy framework for the Mediterranean: the GMP. Trade relations were at the heart of this new policy framework. Consequently, the academic literature on these very first relations of the EEC with the Mediterranean region tried to explain these trade relations. On the one hand, there are several articles which explain the political problems which hampered the creation and the implementation of the GMP and the trade agreements. Focus is then mainly on the problems inside the EEC, and then especially on the discussions between the member states in the Council and on the discussions between the Council and the European Commission regarding the modalities of the trade agreements and the GMP. On the other hand, we find several authors who examined the economic and political consequences of these agreements and the GMP on the EEC, the Mediterranean partners and the rest of the world. In the beginning, the political consequences are rather limited, but this changes with the adoption of the GMP. Indeed, the EEC’s choice for preferential trade relations caused frictions with other countries, such as the US. Its policy was seen an attempt to gain influence in world politics. Consequently, scholars started to discuss the role of the EEC in the world. This literature will be examined here. We will thus not go deeper into the literature on the EAD (like we mentioned in the introduction) because of the limited impact of this framework on the relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean region.\(^5\) It is also important to note that in the literature of the 1970s, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey were considered as part of the Mediterranean policy since they were not yet a member of the EC. Several of the conclusions discussed therefore also refer to the policy towards these countries, and often authors did not make a distinction between the ‘European’ Mediterranean countries, and the ‘non-European’ Mediterranean countries. In

\(^5\) Literature on this topic can be found with Aliboni (1974) & Al-Mani & Al-Shaikhly (1983).
some cases, they even included countries such as Albania and Yugoslavia. Where it is relevant, we will make this distinction in order to make clear for the reader which conclusions exclusively focus on either the ‘European’ or the ‘non-European’ Mediterranean countries. If the distinction is not made, the conclusions apply to the countries located on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea.

First, we consider the articles which go deeper into the intra-European discussions on the development and implementation of the GMP. In 1971, John Lambert examines in his article *The Cheshire Cat and the Pond: EEC and the Mediterranean Area* the potential impact of the enlargement of the EEC with the UK, Ireland and Denmark on the relations with the Mediterranean countries. He focuses on the legal and political issues that will cause problems for the creation of a common external policy towards the region. First, he explains that the Treaty of Rome limits the relations with the Mediterranean countries to commercial relations, despite the fact that the EEC has an interest in creating economic, social and political stability in the Mediterranean. Second, he goes deeper into the rivalry between the European Commission, which wanted to go further and which wanted to create a real economic policy towards the region, and the Council, which was determined to keep the EEC’s foreign policy limited to commercial relations. This hampered the negotiations on the agreements. Third, Lambert discusses the conflicting views between the member states in the Council. While Italy opposed the trade concessions in agricultural products that were to be granted to the Mediterranean countries, the Netherlands opposed the development of relations with Spain for political reasons and France tried to defend its interests in its former colonies. This made it difficult for the EEC to speak with one voice. While sighting ‘what a subtle mosaic its relations with the area have become’, Lambert (1971: 41) goes on with an outline of the relations of the EEC with each Mediterranean country. He concludes by stating that the EEC can do more for the Mediterranean, like granting financial and technical assistance and free movement of workers. In order to do so, the EEC should follow a regional approach and the European Commission should receive a strong negotiating mandate (and thus more power).

In his article *La CEE et les pays de la Méditerranée*, Mario Lévi (1972) goes deeper into the discussion in the Council of 6 November 1972, which outlined the GMP. After describing the eventual conclusions and thus the content of the future EEC-Mediterranean relations, he discusses the position of the member states on the proposal of France about the creation of a FTA, on the trade concessions to be granted for the Mediterranean region and on the geographical coverage of the GMP. While France, Belgium, Italy and the European Commission
were in favour of the establishment of the FTA, the other countries, the UK in front, opposed to principle of trade reciprocity. Despite the fact that Italy wanted to create a FTA with the Mediterranean countries, it was only willing to grant trade concessions for industrial products and not for agricultural products. Regarding the geographical coverage, the European member states agreed that the GMP would apply to all countries which border the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan and which want to be involved in this framework (including the European Mediterranean countries). Exceptions were Albania, Yugoslavia and Libya. Furthermore, Lévi describes the economic importance of the Mediterranean region for the EEC in terms of imports and exports, concluding that despite the naval presence of the US in the region, the Mediterranean is far closer to the EEC than the US. In 1976, Philippe Petit-Laurent published his book *Les fondements politiques des engagements de la communauté Européenne en Méditerranée* in which he goes deeper into the economic and political relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries. After discussing the main actors involved in the development of the region (the EEC, the US, the SU and the Mediterranean countries), the interests and objectives of these actors are outlined. This is followed by an overview of the agreements concluded in the 1960s and of the negotiations on the cooperation agreements in the 1970s. Subsequently, Petit-Laurent goes deeper into the position of each member state towards the EEC’s policy in the Mediterranean and he examines how these positions were formed. France wanted to maintain its (economic) influence in its former colonies and is in favour of reverse preferences. Belgium followed the position of France. The position of the Italian government was dictated by security and economic interests. It wanted to get involved in the Mediterranean region for security reasons, but at the same time it was very reluctant to grant trade concessions regarding agricultural products. By contrast, Germany wanted to grant trade concession regarding agricultural products to Mediterranean countries. The Netherlands was against reverse preferences – it followed the position of the US. In general, the member states agreed that there should be one ‘global’ Mediterranean policy, but they disagreed on how the policy should look like. What trade concessions in agricultural products should be granted to the Mediterranean countries, which position should be taken against Israel, and should the policy of the EEC follow the policy of US or should it rather become a third world power? In addition, Petit-Laurent indicates the difficulties in the institutional cooperation between the European Commission and the Council (which is necessary to conclude an agreement between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries). In the last part of the book, he explains that the different positions of the member states, the institutional framework of the EEC and other international factors such as the position of the US and the SU will hinder the EEC to implement a global approach towards the Mediterranean region.
Loukas Tsoulakis (1977) published in his article *The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is ‘Global’ Policy a Misnomer?* an overall evaluation of the GMP. First, he goes deeper into the origins of the GMP and the interests behind it. For the EEC, these interests are the geographical proximity of the region, the presence of oil, the commercial relations, the investment possibilities for the member states and immigrant labour, which contributes to the economic growth of the Community. For the Mediterranean countries, the potential advantages are the export possibilities for their agricultural products, foreign investments, technology and aid. Moreover, they hope that the EEC will help finding a solution for the conflict in the Middle East. In addition, Tsoulakis gives an overview of the agreements concluded in the 1960s with the Mediterranean countries. Second, he gives a description of the GMP, and the negotiations of each agreement with the Mediterranean countries (including Spain, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey and Yugoslavia). To conclude, he lists the limitations of the GMP: it only deals with trade and aid and the agreements will not increase the export of the Mediterranean countries since they only focus on industrial products and not on agricultural products. Moreover, the GMP does not deal with the internal economic problems of the Mediterranean countries (only with trade) and the policy is not linked with the relations with the countries in the Gulf.

Second, besides the studies on the internal European problems which impede the development and the implementation of the trade relations in the 1960s and the 1970s, there are several books which discuss the economic and the political consequences of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. In 1970, the Institute d’Etudes Européennes (IEE) of the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) published a volume on the relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean, *La communauté et les pays Méditerranéens*. The first chapter of this volume explains the nature and structure of the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1960s and goes deeper into the different forms of association with Greece, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia, Malta and Morocco and Tunisia (Lesort, 1970: 17-36). In addition, Bensalem Guessous (1970: 52-53), the ambassador of Morocco with the Benelux and the representative of Morocco with the EEC, discusses the relations between the EEC and the Maghreb. He finds that, despite the differences between the Maghreb countries, the EEC chose for the same sort of relations with all those countries: association. Therefore, he concludes that the EEC wants to promote economic integration in the Maghreb. Regarding the overall impact of the agreement, he states that the economic association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia will contribute only very slowly to the economic and social development of both countries. However, in general, Guessous perceives these agreements rather as positive because they are concluded in a difficult period for the EEC. He therefore sees the conclusion of the agreement as a sign from the EEC that it wants
to strengthen its relations with its former colonies. Still in this volume, El Kohen (1970: 55-82) describes the judicial and economic nature of the association agreement with Morocco, and Minerbi (1970: 127-144) gives an overview of the development of the political and economic relations between the EEC and Israel between 1958 and 1969.

With the adoption of the GMP, scholars put more emphasis on the political consequences of the policy. The fact that the EEC had chosen for preferential trade relations with Mediterranean countries, granting them tariff preferences, led several scholars to discuss this policy choice of the EEC and to analyze what this choice means for the foreign policy of the EEC in general, its role in the world and the broader economic and political international relations. After all, the preferential trade policy of the EEC in the region was seen as a manoeuvre to create a sphere of influence. A first, although limited attempt was made in the work of Shlaim and Yannopoulos (1976), *the EEC and the Mediterranean countries*. In their volume, they examine the impact of the trade and association agreements on the EEC, the Mediterranean, third countries and even on the GATT. The book is divided in four parts. The authors of the first part study the impact of the agreements concluded in the 1960s on trade flows within the EEC, between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries and between the EEC, the Mediterranean and the US. They conclude that the tariff concessions granted by the EEC explain only to a limited extent the changes into the shares of trade flows between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries. The trade diversion against the US is rather negligible. The second part of the book deals with the economic interdependence between the EEC and the region, and more specifically with the CAP and the consequences it has for the Mediterranean region. It is generally agreed that the restrictive attitude of the EEC towards agriculture hampers the economic development of the countries in the region. In addition, the dependence of the EEC on the surplus labour of the area is discussed. In part three, the authors take a closer look at the impact of the trade agreements on six countries or regions: Greece, Turkey, the Maghreb, Cyprus (studied together with Lebanon and Egypt), Spain and Israel. In conclusion, the fourth part of the book evaluates the EEC’s Mediterranean policy in its totality. These authors discuss the conflicting interests of the member states in the formulation of the EEC’s foreign policy. By doing so, their work complements the articles of Lambert and Levi and the book of Petit-Laurent discussed above. It is concluded that the EEC’s policy towards the Mediterranean is based on regionalism, but that it has uncertain economic benefits, which might weaken the international system of trade and payments. Therefore, it is suggested that the EEC should develop a comprehensive strategy on international trade relations and that it should commit itself to multilateralism.
In 1977, Alfred Tovias describes in his book *Tariff preferences in Mediterranean Diplomacy* the resentments the preferential trade relations of the EEC with the Mediterranean caused in the US. Before the conclusion of the Kennedy Round in 1968, the US adopted a strict position against the granting of trade preferences to third countries, sticking to the regulations agreed under the GATT. Also the EEC at that point kept to the rules and avoided concluding preferential relations, especially since it was preoccupied with internal developments. However, following the request of the developing countries, the US loosened its position towards preferences. The compromise made under the Kenney Round stated that ‘preferences accorded unilaterally by industrialized countries to developing countries can contribute to the process of development’ (Tovias, 1977: 34), leaving the choice for the developing countries between the General System of Preferences (GSP) or concluding special preferential relations with the industrialized countries. Several Mediterranean countries asked the EEC to conclude special preferential agreements with them, on which the EEC responded positively. In the defense of their policy, the Council and the European Commission stated that they only reacted on questions of the Mediterranean countries, while taking into account each case individually following the different political and economic systems of these countries. Nevertheless, the US felt betrayed by the EEC. In the Williams Report, published in 1971, it is stated that the policy of the EEC, i.e. the conclusion of agreements which include reverse trade preferences, threatens the international trade system. In 1972, France then proposed the establishment of a FTA with the Mediterranean countries. Under pressure of the US, which saw this as a threat for its interests, the EEC dropped the quest for reversed preferences. Tovias (1977: 34) states that the EEC has an ‘evident, if unstated, preference for a world based on regional blocs’, while suggesting that it seeks for a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean region. In addition, he points out the dangers of world consisting of trading blocs: tensions might increase between these blocks, and especially between the US and the EEC, which can strengthen the isolationist feelings in the US.

In 1986, Richard Pomfret in his book *Mediterranean policy of the European Community: a study of discrimination in trade* discusses the principle of discrimination in the GMP. Given the fact that the EEC granted trade preferences to Mediterranean countries, its policy was seen as a discriminatory arrangement. The main research question here is what benefits were derived from the existing discriminatory arrangements. Pomfret states that these benefits needed to be large in order to justify the effect on the world trade system. He concludes that the EEC has granted

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6 Although this book is published in the 1980s and not in the 1970s, we discussed it here because it deals with economic consequences of the GMP.
these preferences because it sought a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean region. For the EEC, the effects on its economy were small, but for the Mediterranean countries, the benefits could be substantial. Especially those countries with a flexible economic structure and a policy which is not excessively biased towards import substitution (such as Greece, Spain and Israel) benefited from these preferences. Yannopoulos (1977) comes in his article *Trade Preferences and Economic Development: An Appraisal of the Mediterranean Policy of the EEC* to a similar conclusion: the agreements between the EEC and the Mediterranean were of important economic value for the semi-industrialized countries, so mainly Greece, Spain and Israel. For the non-European Mediterranean countries however, the benefits were less clear, but still considered as important. It has to be noted that Pomfret adds that these potential benefits were threatened by the inevitable instability of the hierarchy of preferences. First, the enlargement of the EEC threatened the favourable position of the non-European Mediterranean countries, as these countries wanted to curb the import of agricultural products and textile from Mediterranean countries. Second, the other developed countries also felt tempted towards a policy of preferential trade. Pomfret concludes in a similar way as Tovias that this might endanger the international trade system, since it will lead to a trading world consisting of trading blocks.

In addition to Tovias (1977) and Pomfret (1986), who characterize the nature of the EEC’s foreign policy as a ‘trading block’ and who warn for its consequences, there are several authors who criticize the GMP using a different theoretical angle. Avi Shlaim (1976) discusses in his chapter *The Community and the Mediterranean Basin* in the book *Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market* edited by Kenneth Twitchett the possibility of the EEC to become a ‘civilian power Europe’. Shlaim characterizes the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean relations as ‘interdependent’. The Mediterranean countries are economically dependent on the EEC, while the EEC is dependent on the Mediterranean region for its oil supply. Subsequently, he argues that the EEC should institutionalize this interdependent relationship through association with the Mediterranean countries. This is a way to exercise political influence in the region and to become a third, ‘civilian’ power in the Cold War context. However, the EEC should not play the traditional game of power politics. Rather it should develop a true coherent trade and development policy. Shlaim states that the GMP cannot be characterized as a policy, since these relations have no clear sense of ‘direction of purpose’. Moreover, rather than granting the Mediterranean countries tariff preferences, the EEC should apply the GSP, and it should increase the financial assistance to the region. This would give the EEC the image of a ‘liberal and outward-looking body conscious of its responsibilities towards the Third World’ and it would turn the EEC into a real ‘civilian power’. In a similar way as Avi Shlaim, Wolfgang Hager (1972)
discusses in his chapter *The community and the Mediterranean* in the book *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community* the possibility for the EEC to become a ‘civilian power Europe’. He departs from the dependency of the Mediterranean countries from the EEC, stating that in order for the EEC to become a real civilian power towards the region, it should refrain from creating its own area of influence by granting tariff preferences to Mediterranean countries. This can lead to the creation of a fragmented world. Instead, he argues that the EEC should diversify its trade relations in order to become the largest trade power in the world. Subsequently, it can then use this power to find a solution for the problems of the developing countries.

In contrast with these liberal interpretations of the EEC’s role in the region, Johan Galtung (1973) provides a structuralist interpretation of the EEC’s role in the world. Although he does not explicitly refers to EEC’s policy towards the Mediterranean region in his work, it is clear from his chapter *The European Community and the Third World Countries* in his book *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* that he sees the non-European Mediterranean countries as part of the Third World (he refers to several Mediterranean countries; although the main focus is on the relations between the EEC and the countries that were part of the Yaoundé Convention). He characterizes the EEC’s policy towards the Third World, and thus to the Mediterranean as ‘neocolonial’ since it is a continuation of the colonial politics of the member states, but now with other means. The power of the EEC comes from its position in the world system: it is part of the center, and it maintains a center-periphery relation with the Third World. It is important to note that Shlaim (1976) came to a similar finding in his work, but he does not conclude from that that the EEC’s policy can be characterized as neocolonial. In contrast, he even states that the EEC’s policy is not neocolonial at all.
Table 4. Overview of the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1970s

This overview shows that the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1970s is already rather elaborated. This is not a coincidence. In this decade, there is a détente in the Cold War between the US and the SU. At the same time, the EEC started to profile itself at the international level. Consequently, the academic world started to reflect on the role of the EEC in the world, and the Euro-Mediterranean relations were welcomed as an interesting case-study. The GMP did not only bring the birth of the EEC’s Mediterranean Policy, it was also seen both by other international powers and observers as an offensive policy, given the EEC’s choice for preferential trade relations. In the literature of the 1970s, we find four research areas. First, there are several scholars who discuss the political problems inside the EEC which hamper the development and the implementation of the EEC’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. These scholars, who adopt an objectivist ontological position, discuss the different positions of the member states (based on document studies and interviews) and explain how difficult it is for the EEC to create one common external policy towards the Mediterranean (Lambert, 1971; Lévi, 1972; Petit-Laurent, 1976). These authors can be considered as the predecessors of the theories of intergouvernementalism which will be developed later on in the framework of the European integration, and which are also used to explain the creation of a common external policy. In addition, Lambert (1971) goes deeper into the relation between the Council and the European Commission, concluding that there is a struggle for power between these two institutions.

Alternatively, there are authors who take the economic relations as point of departure, and who discuss the economic but especially the political consequences of the choice of the EEC for preferential trade relations with the Mediterranean region. These authors also make
statements about the role of the EEC in the region, and by extension, in the world. Here, a distinction can be made between three research areas. On the one hand, Tovias (1977) and Pomfret (1986) adopt an objectivist ontological position and discuss the interests of the EEC in the region. They explain that the EEC strives for a sphere of influence through the creation of ‘trading blocks’. On the other hand, Shlaim (1976) and Hager (1972) adopt a subjectivist position and criticize this policy. They argue that the EEC should become a ‘civilian’ power in the world: a power which takes its responsibilities towards the Third World. These authors pay attention to the values, and thus to the ideas the EEC as an international power should promote in the world. In general, they try to both explain and understand the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Galtung applies a structuralist approach, concluding that the EEC is a capitalist superpower in the making. Doing so, he gives a normative critique on the EEC’s policy. He thus also looks at ‘norms’ through its concept, which means he combines an objectivist and subjectivist approach. Moreover, he tries to both explain and understand the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

2.3 The Eighties: focus on enlargement

In the 1980s, the attention of the academic community for the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean countries started to vanish, for two reasons. First, as explained in chapter 1, the EC was mainly preoccupied with internal evolutions: the negotiations on the European Single Act (ESA) and the enlargement of the EC with Greece, Spain and Portugal. Attention for the Mediterranean countries was rather limited, although the European Commission made a few attempts to ease the pain of the Mediterranean countries following the enlargement. Second, following the revival of the Cold War and the changes in international relations in the 1980s, realist interpretations of the EEC’s role in the world started to get more attention in the academic literature (see for instance Bull, 1982). The Euro-Mediterranean relations were not a case-study. Given the limited changes in the EC’s policy towards the region, scholars were less interested in this topic. Even the RMP, which can be seen as a revival of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, did not receive a lot of attention. Most of the academic literature studying this framework was published in the late 1990s and the 2000s. The RMP is then always referred to as the forerunner of the EMP. Examples are the work of Pierros et.al (1999), Ricardo Gomez (2003; see infra) and Federica Bicchi (2007; see infra). The same accounts for the study of the attempts of the European member states to construct a Euro-Mediterranean cooperation outside the framework of the EC, such as the 5+5 Dialogue, the Mediterranean Forum and the Interparliamentary CSCM. These policy frameworks received very little attention and are often only discussed in studies which deal with the EMP. Examples are Bichara Khader (1997) and Sven Bishop (2003).
For the most part, the academic literature in the 1980s examined the (potential) impact of the enlargement of the EC on the Mediterranean countries. These studies are rooted in the realist tradition: they adopt an objectivist ontological position and focus on explaining and predicting the (potential) impact of the enlargement. In 1980, the Commission pour l’Etude des Communautés Européennes (CEDECE) organized a colloquium on the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean. More specifically, the authors of the conference examined the impact of the enlargement of the EEC with Greece, Spain and Portugal on the cooperation agreements, on the cooperation regarding security, on the industrial cooperation and on maritime and environmental cooperation. The results of this colloquium were published in the book *La communauté économique Européenne élargie et la Méditerranée: quelle coopération*? (1982). The first panel at the colloquium dealt with the effects of the enlargement on security and more specifically with the question if the enlargement will not hamper the EC’s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean region, and how this foreign policy should look like in the near future. It is concluded that the EEC will be able to play a role in the Mediterranean region if its internal coherence is ensured, if it is not confronted with great pressure of external powers and if it consults with other international powers. However, the enlargement will make it difficult to fulfil all three conditions. The second panel examined if the agreements the EEC concluded with the Mediterranean countries will lead to a ‘just and equal’ international economic order. They concluded that the impact of the agreements is limited, because the circumstances since the adoption of the agreements are changed: the EEC has been confronted with an economic crisis. Subsequently, the panel discussed how the EEC’s policy can be reformed: they went deeper into the advantages and disadvantages of a global approach to the Mediterranean region and the compatibility between the GMP and the EAD. The third panel stated that the EEC should develop a common external energy policy and a common external agricultural policy, while the fourth panel also saw some potential positive effects of the enlargement. It can contribute to closer cooperation between the European member states and the Mediterranean countries in other frameworks, such as cooperation on environmental issues.

In 1979, Alfred Tovias published a Sussex European paper *EEC Enlargement – the southern Neighbours* in which he examines and predicts the potential impact of enlargement on non-candidate Mediterranean countries.\(^7\) He concludes that the effects of the enlargement will be considerable for those countries which depend on exports which are already subject to

\(^7\) Although this paper is published in the 1970s and not in the 1980s, we discussed it here because it deals with the impact of enlargement on non-candidate Mediterranean countries.
Community protection (such as agricultural products). It remains to be seen if the new member states will make these restrictions even tighter in order to protect their own markets, or if the third countries are granted the possibility to export more to the EEC. Moreover, Tovias states that the vulnerability of the Mediterranean countries that will not become a member of the EEC depends on their patterns of exports to the EEC and the importance of these exports in their general economic development. Based on his study, he identifies five vulnerable countries: Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus & Malta. Turkey and Egypt are vulnerable because they export textiles to the EEC, Malta because it exports clothing and Cyprus and Morocco because they are producers of agricultural products. These and the other countries will probably ask for compensation for the losses they suffer. Tovias, aware of the sensibility of this issue, suggests that the EEC can either include new items in the GMP such as trade in services and solutions for Non-Tariff Barriers to trade (NTBs) or that it can reinforce the financial and technical cooperation with the Mediterranean.

In a similar way as Alfred Tovias, Richard Pomfret studied in 1981 *The impact of the EEC Enlargement on Non-Member Mediterranean Countries' Export to the EEC*. He states that the exports of the Mediterranean countries will mainly be affected by the accession of Greece and especially by the accession of Spain, because these countries export more typically Mediterranean products. He concludes that especially the export of the Maghreb countries will be affected, because their fruit, vegetables and wine compete with the Spanish products. Also Cyprus and Turkey produce similar primary products as Spain and Greece. By contrast, Israel, Malta and the Mashrek countries have less cause for concern because their export is either less reliant on non-manufactured exports (Israel) or because their export is smaller and less similar (Mashrek countries and Malta). One year earlier, Robert Taylor (1980) came to a similar conclusion in his study for the European Commission *Implications for the Southern Mediterranean Countries on the Second Enlargement of the European Community*. The accession of Spain will have the biggest impact on the trade relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries. Especially Morocco, Tunisia (agricultural products and textile), Cyprus, Turkey (agricultural products) and Egypt (textile) will be negatively affected by the membership of Spain of the EEC. Taylor adds that the EEC should compensate the negative effects for the Mediterranean countries because it risks losing its influence in the region to other rival powers. Therefore, he presents concrete suggestions such as a limit in the EEC support mechanisms for Community manufacturers of processed agricultural products, a cut in the level of subsidies to glasshouse fruit and vegetable producers, strict quality controls for wine, the limitation of new wine plantings and the creation of a STABEX system for agricultural products form Mediterranean countries. In addition, he also suggests treating certain agricultural
products like they are part of the domestic EEC production. For the industrial products (textile, footwear), he suggests enhancing the financial and technical cooperation with the Mediterranean countries.

George Yannopoulos (1983) studied *The impact of the Common Agricultural Policy on developing countries following the enlargement of the European Community*. The ‘developing countries’ are broadly defined here, including the Mediterranean countries. Like the studies discussed above, also Yannopoulos finds that the accession of Spain will have the biggest impact on the trade with the Mediterranean countries. He concludes that the enlargement will disturb the present hierarchy of preferences for Mediterranean agricultural products. It will produce a preference-erosion effect which will undermine the competitive position of the Mediterranean countries. The impact of the effect will depend on size of this effect in relation to the cost differential between the new member states and the developing countries in the products affected, on the extent to which the import market was supplied, prior to enlargement, by third-country producers with no preferential status and on the supply response in the new member states. This will lead to new trade conflicts. Potential solutions to prevent these trade conflicts are the creation of a special export compensation scheme after the example of STABEX, the reform of the CAP or support for the diversification of the economies of the Mediterranean countries. As illustrated in chapter 1, the European Commission eventually decided to increase the financial assistance for the Mediterranean countries and to support the diversification of the Mediterranean economies.

Authors did not only study the impact of the enlargement on trade. Giancarlo Capitani examined in his article *EEC Enlargement and Investment in the Mediterranean* (1980) the potential impact of the enlargement on the Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) in the Mediterranean countries. He notes that between 1969 and 1978 the Mediterranean countries were confronted with a considerably reduce in foreign investment by the Western industrialized countries. The only exception was Spain, which saw an increase in FDIs. Moreover, these investments have not led to a change in the economic structure of the countries and thus an increase in exports for several reasons: low level of economic and industrial development, political instability, unskilled labor force, and so on. Investment also depends on the demand for industrialization of those countries, which was mainly concentrated in a limited number of sectors. Consequently, these countries mainly exported textiles, oil derivatives, chemicals and steel. However, the enlargement is not likely to change this, and the investments will therefore remain low.
Table 5. Overview of the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1980s

<table>
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<th>Subject</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
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<td>Impact of the enlarged trading block</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Objectivism</td>
<td>Explaining</td>
<td>Document study, Interviews, Statistics</td>
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As explained earlier, in the 1980s, the EC was mainly preoccupied with the ESA and with its enlargement, rather than with its external policy towards the Mediterranean region. The scholars who initially focused on the GMP and its political and economic consequences now studied the consequences of the enlargement on the Mediterranean countries. They adopt an objectivist ontological position. These scholars focused on explaining and even predicting the consequences of the impact of the enlargement by studying documents, taking interviews and applying statistics.

2.4 The Nineties and the first half of the Noughties: the academic literature on the EMP and the ENP

In 1995, the EU launched a new policy initiative towards the Mediterranean region: the EMP. As indicated in chapter 1, the EMP was seen as a new milestone in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The creation of the EMFTA became the main objective in the cooperation on the economic field, and the policy did not longer only focus on economic issues, but also on political, security, cultural and social affairs. The EU indicated that it wanted to promote norms such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. Consequently, the academic world refocused its attention on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. After a period of academic ‘silence’ in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the creation of the EMP gave a new boost to the study of the relations between the EU and its Southern neighbourhood. In 1996, the journal *Mediterranean Politics* was launched, which publishes articles which deal with the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Also the EuroMesCo network (established in 1996) and the journal *Mediterranean Quarterly* (launched in 2000) contributed to the development of the academic literature. The initial studies on the EMP dealt with the description of the objectives, the institutional framework and the general development of the new initiative (see for instance the work of Phillipart, 1997; Richard Gillespie, 2002, 2006; Barbé, 1996). The same accounts for the studies on the ENP (launched in 2003; see for example the work of Kahraman,
Besides the studies that describe the development of the EMP and the ENP, there are scholars who deal with the study of the member states’ foreign policy and the way in which they try to promote their national interests through the EMP and the ENP. These authors try to explain the development of a European external policy towards the Mediterranean using an intergouvernementalist perspective. This literature builds on the academic literature of the 1970s which examined the position of the member states towards the creation of the GMP and the relations between the Council and the European Commission. Most authors study one particular country, but there are also a few scholars who combine the study of several member states in order to make an overall conclusion on the EMP and the ENP. It has to be noted that there are also several studies on the policies of the member states on a particular aspect of EU external policy, such as migration, or on related topics such as the MEPP, but these studies will not be discussed here. We will focus on the relations between the member states and the EMP/ENP as a whole. It is generally concluded that Spain has exerted considerable influence on the development of the Barcelona Process, and that it is closely identified with the EMP. Gillespie (1997a) adds in his article Spanish Protagonismo and the euro-med partnership initiative that Spain can therefore lose ‘prestige’ if the EMP would falter in the future, which indeed was one of the main reasons for Spain to counter Sarkozy’s proposal on the MU. Esther Barbé (1998) concludes in her contribution Spanish Security Policy and the Mediterranean Question that Spain’s involvement in the EMP is mainly motivated by security interests. While Gillespie (1997a) and Barbé (1998) in their work apply a rationalist approach towards the study of Spain as a main policy entrepreneur, Michal Natorksi (2007) adopts in his article Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the European Neighbourhood Policy a constructivist approach to the study of the national interests and the role of Spain towards its Mediterranean neighbours. He states that the Spanish national interests are determined by the Spanish perception of the Mediterranean region as a security challenge and by the idea that it might be left alone with its concerns originating in the region. Therefore, the country tried to make a coalition with Italy and France and sought the support of EU institutions to create the Barcelona Process. It pointed out to the other member states that the EU and the Mediterranean are interdependent and that the EU has a certain responsibility in the Mediterranean region. Its diplomatic efforts were perceived by the other member states as valuable, and Spain is now seen as one of the ‘leaders’ of the Barcelona Process. Poland learned from the strategy of Spain to take a leading role in the formulation of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Eastern neighbours. Besides Spain, also France was involved in the creation of the
EMP and the Barcelona Process. However, the academic literature on the role of France is rather limited. An exception is Jolyon Howorth (1996) who refers in his article *France and the Mediterranean in 1995: From Tactical Ambiguity to Inchoate Strategy?* to the diplomatic efforts of France in the development of the Barcelona Process, stating the country was mainly preoccupied with security issues and that it was the main driver behind the diplomatic measures developed within the first partnership.

In general, the Southern European member states have contributed the most to the development of the EMP. By contrast, the Northern European member states are mainly preoccupied with the policy towards the Eastern neighbours. However, according to Richard Gillespie (1997b) in his article *Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process*, there is a growing concern of the Northern member states about the Mediterranean region. They see the Mediterranean countries as an increasing threat for the stability of the EU, and are especially interested in the economic dimension of the cooperation. They support a trade rather than aid approach and therefore, they promote the economic liberalization of the Mediterranean countries. In addition, they insisted on including political liberalization and human rights in the EMP. Tobias Schumacher (2001) confirms in his article *The Mediterranean as a New Foreign Policy Challenge: Sweden and the Barcelona Process* that the EMP ‘nowadays has an emerging northern dimension’, and goes then deeper into the position of Sweden. Although the importance of the Mediterranean for Sweden is rather modest given the geographical distance of the region, it is aware of the fact that the region is a challenge for the EU. It has contributed to EMP by articulating priorities and by the Euro-Islam project.8

However, other authors are less optimistic about the interest and the involvement of the Northern European member states in the Mediterranean region. Nathaniel Copsey (2007) in his paper *The Member States and the European Neighbourhood Policy* examined the policy preferences of Germany, France, the UK and Poland for the ENP. In contrast with the previous studies, his study focused on the ENP as a whole, and not specifically on the Mediterranean region. From the countries that he studied, only France shows a particular interest in the Mediterranean region. In general, he concludes that the examined member states did not positively shape the policy. They rather used their influence to keep issues off the agenda, such as membership for Eastern neighbouring countries. In a similar way as Copsey, Maxime Lefevre, Iris Kempe, Piotr Buras and

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8 Project launched by the Swedish foreign ministers Hjelm-Wallén which aims at bridging the divide between the cultures and religions in the north and the south of the Mediterranean (Schumacher, 2001: 93).
Karolina Pomorska (2006) examined the perspectives of France, Germany and Poland on the ENP in a special issue of *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*. Again it was indicated that Germany and Poland are not interested in the Mediterranean. Maxime Lefevre (2006), who focuses in his contribution on *France and the European Neighbourhood Policy* states that France has three objectives that it wants to reach through the ENP. First, it wants to prevent enlargement of the EU towards the east. Second, cooperation with Russia within the context of the ENP can secure its energy supply from Russia, and third, France wants to balance the EU’s attention for its Eastern and Southern neighbours. However, the country is more focused on the south, as it is confronted with several security challenges such as migration.

Sibel Oktay analyzed in 2007 the preferences of six big member states towards the EMP and the Mediterranean dimension of the ENP: France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Spain and the UK. Her paper *Post-Enlargement Trauma of the Euro-Med Partnership: An Analysis of Member State Preferences* confirms that both Germany and Poland supported the Eastern dimension of the ENP because of security considerations, and that they showed great apathy towards the Mediterranean region. By contrast, the Southern European member states defended the Euro-Mediterranean relations, and they even wanted to strengthen these relations. The UK is also interested in the region (but then especially in the Middle East) because the US is interested in the region. She concludes that the EU’s Mediterranean policy has suffered from the 2004 enlargement, which has shifted the attention to the Eastern neighbours. Therefore, the EU has to strengthen its relations with the Mediterranean region by showing that it has the political will to cooperate with these countries, and by allocating its time and the economic benefits evenhandedly between the Eastern and the Mediterranean neighbours. Oktay’s paper was part of a broader research project on the political economy of Euro-Mediterranean governance.

Within the framework of the same project, Furness, Gandara & Kern (2008) bring together the main results of the research carried out by the Go-EuroMed consortium, a project funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission. The main objective of their paper *The Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Governance* is to ‘discuss the ways in which national governments and the EU have used the EMP framework to work towards their goals in the EMP’s three baskets’ in order to give an insight into the EMP as an institutional framework for negotiations (Furness, Gandara & Kern, 2008: 10). They state that Southern European member states are interested in strengthening the Barcelona Process, while the Northern and Eastern member states rather want to maintain the status-quo. However, in contrast with the previous studies, they see an exception with regard to Germany. They state that Germany is also
in favour of strengthening the EMP. Economic interest groups lobby the government to invest political efforts in the region. In 2007, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) conducted a large project on the ENP. The main objective was to examine the national positions and interest of several member states regarding the ENP. Therefore, 100 expert interviews were conducted with Members of Parliament, high-ranking officials in the administration, experts and media representatives in the selected member states. They found that especially France, Italy and Spain show a strong commitment towards the EMP. Also Sweden has a positive focus on the Mediterranean, as Schumacher already showed in his article, and surprisingly, Austria. However, no explanation has been given as to why Austria shows a strong commitment towards the Mediterranean region (Lippert, 2007; 2008).

However, the most well-known author who has written about the role and the influence of the member states on the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean must be Federica Bicchi, who published her book *European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean* in 2007. In this book, she examines ‘how, when and why the EU or the EC formulated a new foreign policy initiative’. Bicchi starts her analysis in 1957, with the establishment of the EEC, and ends with a limited analysis of the ENP. This means that she also provides an explication for the policy frameworks of the 1970s and 1980s, but from a backward perspective. In her theoretical framework, Bicchi pursues a middle path between rationalist theories and constructivist theories. This middle path is termed ideational intergouvernmentalism. Within this theoretical framework, states are the main policy entrepreneurs. Their main reason to create a common European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is ‘cognitive uncertainty’ about others’ preferences, others’ actions and the consequences of actions. This is an ideational process. This cognitive uncertainty creates a policy window (the structure) in which the policy entrepreneurs (the actors) start a debate which will eventually lead to the creation of European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. In doing so, Bicchi also tries to solve the structure-agent dilemma which is central in theories of international relations. She concludes that the ‘cognitive uncertainty’ was initially caused by the Cold War context, but after the 1970s, this situation changed, as the EC/EU was now confronted with migration, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as new security challenges. France and Spain acted as policy entrepreneurs, and more specifically as brokers. This means that they were open to discuss the structure and content of the policy proposal, rather than that they had strict ideas on how the Euro-Mediterranean relations should be organized. Eventually, the structure of Euro-Mediterranean relations was mainly determined by the member states. In contrast, the development of the content of the policy was mainly left to the European Commission, which policy response has been in economic terms. Indeed, despite the fact that the
European Commission ‘lacks the capacity to force political momentum in EFP making’, it has ‘displayed a degree of activism’ since 1989. Within the framework of the ENP, Bicchi notes that the European Commission has been more active than ever before.

This brings us with the role of the European Commission, which has not been studied extensively, neither in the EMP nor in the ENP. Exceptions are Kelley (2006) and Pélerin (2008) who come to the conclusion that the European Commission actually has the most influence in the ENP. Judith Kelley (2006) in her article _New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy_ uses sociological new-institutionalism combined with historical institutionalism and organizational management theories as a theoretical framework in order to explain how the Commission expanded its role and thus its power over the EU’s foreign policy through the ENP. The ENP shows ‘significant mechanical borrowing’ from enlargement policy: it uses the same kind of key documents and the same mechanisms for promoting economic and political reforms: conditionality and socialization. However, there is still one major difference between the ENP and enlargement policy: there is no membership perspective for neighbouring countries, and the question then arises if the policy is likely to work without the incentive of enlargement. Kelly is rather pessimistic about this and states that while socialization will only have effects in the long-term, conditionality will only work when the Commission acts consistently and when it does not compromise on the political priorities. Pélerin (2008) comes in his chapter _The ENP in Interinstitutional Competition: An Instrument of Leadership for the Commission?_ to a similar conclusion as Kelley: the European Commission has successfully expanded its role in the EU’s foreign policy through the ENP. However, he immediately nuances his statement by adding that the sustainability of this success is uncertain because the Commission remains marginalized with regard to high politics. Moreover, the ENP does not really modify the balance of power in the interinstitutional competition on foreign policy.

Besides the authors who have studied and explained the emergence of a common foreign policy towards the Mediterranean, there are also authors who focused on the implementation of the different objectives that are promoted through the EMP and the ENP. Because there is no room to discuss all this literature in detail, this part of the second chapter will focus on the literature which deals with the most important objectives: the EMFTA, democracy, cultural cooperation and security. Since the EU’s main objective in the region is the creation of an EMFTA, several authors have examined how and if this objective has been implemented. This research is similar to the research conducted in the 1970s on the GMP and the cooperation agreements. Several studies have focused on so-called ‘outcome’ indicators, and looked at the
evolution of trade between the EU and the Mediterranean countries or trade among Mediterranean countries. These studies found that trade between the EU and the Mediterranean region became less restrictive (Hoekman, 2007) resulting in more trade between both regions (Gandara & Büge, 2006) but that trade among Mediterranean countries stays rather limited (El-Rayyes, 2007).

Other studies were interested in the impact of the EU’s measures regarding trade on the economies and the societies of the Mediterranean countries. Building on his work of the 1970s, especially Alfred Tovias extensively studied the EMFTA and its consequences. In his article of 1997, he concludes that the EU’s trade policy towards the region will deepen the asymmetric trade interdependence between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, as the latter will import even more from the EU. This might affect the income side of the budget of those countries, and thus their balance of payments. However, the strive for south-south integration is welcomed as a promising feature of the new EMP. In his contribution of 1998, Tovias departs from his conclusion that the world consists of trading blocks, and he examines the consequences for the Mediterranean countries if they join the ‘European trading block’. He illustrates that this will lead to trade diversion with the US, and that the Mediterranean countries will have to adopt the norms and standards of the EU, without the possibility to take part in the decision-making process regarding these norms and standards (since they are not members of the EU, and since it is not likely that they will become members in the near future). Here, he emphasizes that it is in the best interest of the Mediterranean countries to integrate economically in order to prevent the hub-and-spoke effect: a lack of regional integration among Mediterranean countries might lead investors to invest in the EU and to export to the Mediterranean area, leading to few FDIs in the latter. In 1999, Tovias studied, together with Bacaria, the potential of horizontal trade between the Mediterranean countries. They conclude that the Mediterranean countries can have comparative advantages in the agricultural and agribusiness sector. This should be exploited by the opening of the European internal market for these products and by technology transfers between the Mediterranean countries. In addition, communication and transport facilities should be reinforced, the intra-Mediterranean political relations should be strengthened and structural reforms should be implemented. The EU should, through its financial assistance, counter the potentially negative aspects of the adjustment policies.

Other authors especially emphasize the shortcomings in the EU’s trade policy towards the Mediterranean area, which will hamper the implementation of the EMFTA. Joseph Licari (1998), just like Tovias (1998) warns in his article *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Economic and
Financial Prospects for the hub-and-spoke-effect, and also Escribano & Jordan (1999) emphasize in their contribution to the academic literature that trade integration within the Mediterranean region is necessary for the EMFTA to become beneficial for the Mediterranean countries. Licari also refers to other shortcomings such as the 12-year transition period for Mediterranean countries to implement structural reforms, which is too short, the preferential nature of the EMAA, which will lead to a welfare loss for the Mediterranean countries, the fact that agricultural products are excluded, that the provisions regarding trade in services are limited and that the financial assistance is insufficient. By contrast, Ghesquire (2001) is cautiously optimistic and argues that the benefits of the EMAAs for the Mediterranean countries can be substantial, although they are uncertain. The Mediterranean countries will only be able to benefit from these agreements if they implement structural reforms.

Regarding the latter, several authors have warned for the potential negative consequences of the structural adjustment policies promoted by the EU to create a FTA between both shores of the Mediterranean Sea. In 1997, Anna Syngellakis warns in her article *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and sustainable development: The interface between free trade and the environment* that the FTA can deteriorate the environmental problems of the Mediterranean countries, especially because the link between free trade, economic activities and environmental problems is not explicitly made in the EMP. Therefore, she pleads for the development of a regional model of sustainable development through the Barcelona Process, with the establishment of a Mediterranean Commission on Trade and Environment and the adoption of measures of public participation. Zaafra and Mahjoub (2000) conclude in 2000 that the social impact of the EMFTA on the Mediterranean countries will be considerable. Ivan Martin (2004: 450) confirms this in his article *The Social Impact of Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Areas: A First Approach with Special Reference to the case of Morocco*: ‘the implementation of the free trade areas without the proposed countervailing and accompanying measures could cross this social stability line and end up being destabilizing and detrimental to the development prospects of those countries’. He therefore argues that the trade liberalization under the Barcelona Process should be accompanied by a minimum guaranteed standard of economic and social rights. Diana Hunt (2002) focuses in her article *Employment implications of the Euro-Med free trade agreements* on the consequences of the EMAAs on employment. She considers the impact as substantial and argues that the Mediterranean countries should press for liberalization in agricultural products with both the EU and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This will lighten the impact. In 2007, a Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) ordered by the European Commission, came to the same conclusion: a rise of economic
welfare can be expected, but there might be negative social and environmental impacts if no additional measures are taken, such as an increase in unemployment.

However, the ambitious objective of an EMFTA has not been met in 2010. De Ville & Reynaert (2010) examined the political causes of the slow pace in the establishment of the EMFTA. They argue that the different positions of the different European institutions and member states regarding the idea and the modalities of an EMFTA slowed down the development of the FTA. Because of these different positions, it was difficult for the EU to offer incentives to the Mediterranean countries during the negotiations. Consequently, the EU failed to convince some of its most important partners like Algeria or Syria of the benefits of the EMFTA. Furthermore, the Mediterranean countries failed to integrate economically because of economic reasons such as similar factor endowments and consequent comparative advantages, but also because of political reasons such as the conflict in the Middle East, the difficult relationship between Algeria and Morocco and because of the conflict in Lebanon. In addition, the EU meets with competition from other international actors, such as the US, Russia, China and the Gulf States. Their trade initiatives interfere with the EU’s efforts to establish the EMFTA.

However, the EU’s new trade agreements and the EMFTA were not the only topic that was studied by academics in the 1990s and 2000s. As explained in chapter 1, the EMP was welcomed with great enthusiasm, because for the first time, the EU’s policy towards the region did not longer have an exclusive focus on economic issues. The EU indicated that it also would promote norms and values like for instance democracy, human rights, the rule of law, cultural cooperation, …. This gave rise to an impressive amount of studies which examined the EU’s promotion of these values in the Mediterranean region. This literature is so comprehensive that we decide to study only two values: democracy (because this is the main topic of this dissertation, see infra) and cultural cooperation (which is also dealt with in the empirical chapters, see infra). Regarding democracy, we can make a distinction between four research areas: scholars examined the nature of the democratization policy of the EU and its member states (strategy and instruments), how effectively the EU can promote democracy, the impact of its policy on third countries, and more recently also the substance of EU democracy promotion. These studies led to some general conclusions about the role of the EU as a democracy promoter in the Mediterranean area. First, scholars agree that the EU has two main functional strategies (implemented through several instruments) to promote democracy in third countries: political conditionality and socialization. The first strategy is a top-down approach and consists of offering the Mediterranean countries positive (granting the neighbours a stake in the internal market or
additional funding) or negative incentives (sanctions or withdrawal of money) to provoke democratic reforms, while the second strategy is rather bottom-up and focuses on the diffusion of democratic norms through discourse, political dialogue, financial assistance and technical cooperation (Youngs, 2002; Panebianco, 2006; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Van Hüllen, 2009). However, until now, the effectiveness of these strategies in the Mediterranean was rather limited. Schimmelfennig & Scholtz (2008) empirically proved that positive political conditionality below the level of ‘credible accession conditionality’ did not have any impact in neighbouring countries. The EU did not apply negative conditionality in its relations with Mediterranean countries.

In addition, researchers are rather pessimistic about the effects of socialization. The indirect promotion of democratization (of ‘democratic governance’) through technical cooperation between administrations led to the adoption of rules, but not to their application (Freyburg, et.al, 2009; Freyburg et.al, 2011). The reasons for the rather modest promotion of democracy by the EU in the Mediterranean in the past are believed to be manifold: the fear for the destabilization of the region, which would affect the EU’s security in terms of migration and energy supply, the fear to bring into power Islamist extremists and the nature of the EU as an internally conflicted democratization persona (Schumacher 2002: 233; Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Balfour 2005: 126; Panebianco, 2006: 143-144; Youngs, 2009: 911). Moreover, scholars conclude that in a reaction to EU efforts, the Mediterranean partner governments developed political regimes which allowed them to stay in power and which resulted into a form of ‘staged democracy’ (Pace et.al, 2009: 17). A new area of research in the study of democracy promotion is the focus on the substance of democracy. Jan Orbie & Anne Wetzel (2011) are currently leading a group of researchers who study which elements of an embedded, liberal democracy the EU is promoting in the different regions of the world and who try to determine if the EU has a narrow, shallow, broad or full liberal democracy promotion agenda. It is concluded that the EU promotes a shallow liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region (Reynaert, 2011). From a different ontological and epistemological perspective, the substance of democracy will also be studied in this dissertation.

In contrast with the literature on the EU’s democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, the literature on the cultural cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean region is rather limited. The promotion of the dialogue between cultures was initially one of the main objectives of the partnership in social, human and cultural affairs. However, in the first six years of the partnership, the third basket was ‘pursued only half-heartedly’ (Gillespie, 2004: 24). This changed
at the start of the new millennium, but as explained in chapter 1, the EU actually used the third basket to focus on security issues. The promotion of a dialogue between cultures proved to be very difficult after the attacks of 9/11. This evolution is reflected in the academic literature, where cultural cooperation only received limited attention. Mohammad El-Sayed Selim (2003) states in his chapter *Towards a Viable Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Partnership* that Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation is a crucial part of the EMP. However, there are several problems with the EU’s view on cultural cooperation, such as the fact that the EU tries to promote its own values through the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue between cultures and that there is not enough involvement of the CSOs in the cultural dialogue. Moreover, the EU considers the three partnerships of the EMP as different areas of cooperation, while it would be better for the cultural cooperation and for the EMP if these three partnerships go hand in hand.

In 2005, Tobias Schumacher concludes that the social and cultural cooperation has failed. He lists the causes for this failure: the provisions of the Barcelona Declaration and the work programme are too vague, the objectives of the third basket are not linked with those of the first and the second basket, cultural cooperation was limited to the Euro-Mediterranean Heritage Programme (EMHP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Audiovisual Program (EMAP) and the lack of a common definition between the EU and the Mediterranean of concepts such as culture, dialogue and civil society. His article is part of a broader special issue in *Mediterranean Politics* on cultural and social Euro-Mediterranean cooperation which wants to address the lack of studies on the third basket of the EMP. The other authors in the special issue all evaluate the social and cultural cooperation in the EMP from different angles. Following our choice made above, we will discuss here the studies that focus on the dialogue between cultures, and not on the other topics of the third basket. Rafaella Del Sarto (2005) departs from the ontological assumption that the processes of defining communities and cultures are arbitrary processes, which includes some authors and exclude others. Consequently, she studies how culture is defined within the EMP and concludes that culture is based on the ‘Islam-West’ and ‘North-South’ dichotomy. But this ignores the diversity among and within states. Moreover, it influences the agenda-setting, and ‘it potentially increases the power and legitimacy of political and religious elites in imposing their hegemonic vision of culture and politics’ (Del Sarto, 2005: 326). Therefore, Del Sarto (2005: 327) argues that there should be a re-conceptualization of difference and similarity through the establishment a trans-cultural dialogue (instead of an inter-cultural one) that is based on common values and interests across states and regions.
Helle Malmvig (2005) concludes in her article that the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue between cultures is extremely securitized and politicized: it is controlled by the governments (both the European and the Mediterranean governments) and the access to the dialogue for CSOs is limited. In addition, there are only certain themes which are discussed under the cultural dialogue: human rights, democratic citizenship and rights of women. The securitization of this dialogue gives it ‘an extraordinary legitimacy and urgency’ (Malmvig, 2005: 350). Stephan Stetter (2005) adopts in his contribution a systems theoretical perspective in order to analyze the Euro-Mediterranean cultural dialogue. A system is defined as ‘a communicatively upheld structure that operates and reproduces itself on the basis of system-specific communication codes’. With these codes, it distinguishes itself from the societal environment. Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, Stetter argues that the concept ‘cultural dialogue’ implies that there is a difference in culture between the EU and the Mediterranean region. ‘Culture’ thus becomes a ‘prime differential category between North and South’ (Stetter, 2005: 332), while at the same time, dialogue implies that these differences can or will be overcome. This is paradoxical, and therefore, its institutionalization is problematic. He therefore suggests that the EU and the Mediterranean countries should focus on the shared world societal reference point of their relations (which is different than constructing a ‘shared identity’). The contributions of Schumacher, Del Sarto, Malmvig & Stetter are the most important ones on the cultural relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region. We already mentioned in chapter 1 that culture as an objective of the Euro-Mediterranean relations is pushed into the background within the framework of the ENP and the UfM. Consequently, also the studies on the cultural relations disappeared.

Based on the research on the values the EU is promoting, there are authors who tried to pass a judgment on the role of the EU in the region. Indeed, the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s were marked by a return to the research on the role of the EU. Scholars started to discuss the nature of the EU as an international actor and the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean were used as a case study to test the empirical claims about this nature. First, François Duchêne’s conceptualization of the role of the EU as a civilian power was taken off the shelf and redefined. A civilian power promotes norms and values using politico-economic power (which includes coercion), and maybe even military power (although there is discussion about this). Consequently, scholars examined if the EU acts as a civilian power in the Mediterranean region. Cakir (2003) concludes in his chapter European Union: A civilian or a political power in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that a civilian power approach towards the Mediterranean might overcome the flaws of the CFSP, but that in some cases this approach will
not be adequate to solve some of the major issues in the region, such as the conflict in the Middle East. He argues that the EMP should become a true partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean countries: the Mediterranean countries should have an equal say, and should not feel coerced or manipulated. In his article *The European Community’s MEDA Aid Programme: A Strategic Instrument of Civilian Power*, Patrick Holden (2003) wonders whether the EU is a civilian power in its relations with the Southern neighbours. He examines the financial assistance of the EU towards the Mediterranean countries. It is concluded that the influence of the EU through its financial assistance under the first MEDA programme was rather limited, despite its potential. The reasons for this limited influence are manifold: the lack of the use of indicators to measure progress of Mediterranean countries, lack of intellectual resources, and structural problems within the European Commission. Moreover, MEDA is mainly used to support structural, economic and institutional reforms, and thus the interests of the EU rather than its norms. Stelios Stavridis and Justin Hutchene (2003) examine in their chapter *The Foreign Policy of a Civilian Power? The European Union and the Mediterranean* the relations of the EU with Turkey and Cyprus, with North Africa (especially Algeria) and with the Middle East (the MEPP). They come to the conclusion that ‘despite a number of important civilian means, the EU is not acting like a civilian power, this is promoting democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean’ (Stavridis & Hutchene, 2003: 66). Khasson et al. (2008) come in their chapter *Everybody Needs Good Neighbours: The EU and its Neighbourhood* to a similar conclusion when they examine the objectives and the instruments of the ENP: material interests, rather than norms and values such as democracy and human rights prevail in the EU’s policy towards its neighbourhood.

In addition to this literature, authors also examined if the EU acts as a normative power in the Mediterranean region. In 2002, Ian Manners published his article *Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?* in which he claims that the EU is an ideological power which promotes international norms and values. The EU has the possibility to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations. A normative power differs from a civilian power in that it tries to spread international values without using coercion. As Manners (quoted in Orbie, 2008: 18) stated: ‘the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’. This conceptualization of the EU’s role has been very popular in the academic literature, and gave rise to several articles about the EU as a normative power in the Mediterranean area. Because this literature is rather elaborated⁹, we will discuss the four most

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⁹ See amongst others Johansson-Nogués (2007); Pace, 2009; Whitman & Wolff (2010).
Federica Bicchi (2006) goes deeper into how a ‘normative power’ can be exactly defined. She argues that only when the EU is inclusive (it involves non-members in the development of its policy) and when it is reflexive (it thinks about the consequences of its policy for non-members and adapts its policy towards these potential effects), it can be called a true ‘normative power’. However, the EU’s policy in the Mediterranean can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model, its own norms. Therefore, the EU cannot be seen as a normative power in the Mediterranean, it is actually a civilizing power. Michelle Pace (2007) concludes in her article *Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?* that the EU has a double strategy in the Mediterranean region: it presents itself as a normative power, advocating certain norms, while at the same time it promotes political and economic interests. However, this double strategy is a recipe for paralysis. Pace advises the EU to define a specific strategy towards the Mediterranean, a strategy which is adapted to the needs of each Mediterranean partner. A more critical view to the idea of the EU as a normative power we find with Thomas Diez (2005). He advances that ‘normative power Europe’ is not an objective category, but a discursive representation. It represents the EU as a utopia, and constructs the identity of the EU and the ‘Others’. His conceptualization of the EU as a normative power draws on poststructuralist work on Self/Other constructions. In one part of the article, Diez (2005: 630-632) characterizes the EMP as an instance of normative power Europe: the Barcelona Declaration entails a practice of Othering which represents the Mediterranean countries as violating universal norms and values. However, his research on the EMP is very limited (it only focuses on the Barcelona Declaration) and is not representative for the whole policy. In a similar way as Diez, Ifversen and Kolvraa (2007: 2-3) argue that the policy of the EU towards the neighbourhood is ‘as much about the identity of the Europe as it is about the handling of the relations with the neighbouring states’. Adopting a poststructuralist approach, they analyze the ENP as identity-politics. They also conclude that the EU is presenting itself as a normative power, i.e. the EU has an identity which is based on peace and stability (the Self). It should promote this identity because the Others are not stable and peaceful, because Others want Europe to do so, because its size demands that it plays a role and especially because the values of peace and stability are the values which reflect its history and identity. This doctoral dissertation adopts a similar ontological position as Diez (2005) and Ifversen and Kolvraa (2007), as will be explained in chapter 3.
Another important topic in the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations is security. It has to be noted that the studies which examine security from a realist perspective are rather limited. An exception is the work of Sven Biscop (2003) who studied the security interests from the EU, concluding that there are no direct security threats coming from the Mediterranean, but rather indirect ones. Conflicts, poverty and a lack of democracy are the breeding grounds for extremisms of all kinds, and this might lead to terrorism, also in the EU. Therefore, he argues that the EU needs a comprehensive approach, which also requires a strong politico-military dimension. However, he concludes in 2003 that the political and security partnership has not yet materialized because of the lack of policy regarding the ongoing conflicts in the region and because of the lack of trust between the European and Mediterranean partners. Biscop therefore suggests developing an active conflict resolution policy, and consequently, an enhanced security cooperation.

In contrast with the work of Biscop, most authors studied security from a constructivist perspective. First, we find scholars who examine security through the study of discourse. Michelle Pace (2004) indicates that the EU pictures the Self as a security community, and the Mediterranean region as the Other is mirrored through the identity of the Self. The security community is based on the lowest common denominator agreed between member states and is based on the discourses on immigration, drugs traffic and Muslim fundamentalists. She further states that there is clear discrepancy between rhetoric of the EU and the reality on the ground. Therefore, the EU should have a broader definition of security, which will be reached easier if the EU divides the Mediterranean region into sub-regions. In 2006, Bicchi & Martin examined in their article how the attacks of 9/11 in the US, 3 November 2004 in Spain and 7 July 2005 in London changed security discourses regarding the Islam in the UK, the EU and on the level of the EMP. They conclude that although there is a securitization process involving the Islam at national level, there is no unity of discourse on the political Islam at the European level. At the same time, the Mediterranean countries see the conflict in the Middle East and their lack of economic development as their main security problems. Overall, there is a lack of convergence from the side of the EU on a securitizing agenda in the Mediterranean. This conclusion can also be found in the work of Malmvig (2006). She applies a Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis and demonstrates how the EU at the same time produces two conflicting versions of how security is to be achieved in the Mediterranean region: the liberal reform discourse and the cooperative security discourse. The latter identifies several security challenges as common problems for the EU and the Mediterranean countries, and indicates that they have a shared interest in dealing with these problems. The Other is here seen as an equal partner with which the
EU should live peacefully together. In contrast, the liberal reform discourse sees security challenges as originating in the Mediterranean countries. Therefore, these countries should be turned into liberal and democratic market economies. The Mediterranean is here seen as a radical and inferior Other. Malmvig concludes that the EU’s double-discursive approach undermines the implementation of its policy in the region, and that the EU should choose one coherent security strategy over the other. In a way, also the work of Julien Jeandesboz (2007; 2009) can be discussed in the context of the constructivist security studies, although his work also deals with the role of the European Commission in the ENP. Jeandesboz provides a sociological analysis of the drafting of the ENP. Applying a discourse analysis, he states that the ENP is framed within two narratives: a duty and a threats narrative. Subsequently, he examines how these discourses have been constituted by studying the drafting of the ENP in 2003. He concludes by stating that the threats narrative, and thus security matters are now at the heart of this policy, but that this is not a consequence of the EU wanting to respond to externally given problems. Instead, games of rivalry and cooperation between the different political actors involved in the ENP led to the framing of the neighbourhood as a security threat for the EU.

Furthermore, there are scholars who have combined the study on security communities (concept developed by Deutsch et. al (1957); see also Adler and Garnet, 1998) with theories on new regionalism in order to explain region-building in the Mediterranean region. Several authors departed from the idea that the international system can be divided into regional security complexes. Overall, Europe and the Middle East are considered as separate security complexes (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Security actions within such complexes and between those complexes can either be conflictual or cooperative (through the building of security communities and the reduction of existential threat representations of the Other). Adler & Crawford (2006) state that one of the main objectives of the EMP is the creation of a regional community within the Mediterranean region which is based on security (which is determined by an actor's identity) and which will eventually lead to a security community, but one which is based on Western norms and values, which is seen as an expression of the ‘normative power’ of the EU. Nevertheless, there are some serious obstacles for region building: the rise of nationalism, the persistence of authoritarian regimes, divergence of expectations and objectives of the EU and the Mediterranean partners, economic backwardness of the Mediterranean countries, the legacy of colonialism, the fact that economic liberalization might undermine political liberalization, the EU’s liberal identity and the interaction with Islam, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the American security strategy. Therefore, they suggest some ways to overcome these obstacles: the construction of a sense of common purpose between the West and the Islam, the development
of institutional space where mutual socialization can take place – they refer to the creation of a CSCM, which can then converge with the Greater Middle East Initiative of the US. Their contribution forms the introduction of an edited volume. Several of the other chapters focus on the tools which can be used in region-building: democratization policy, subregionalism, economic liberalization and the multilateral MEPP, while others focus on the relation with one particular country: Turkey or Israel. In this book, Fulvio Attina (2006) focused on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region as different security complexes. Here and in his other works, he makes a distinction between five forms of regional security systems according to the level of the institutionalization of the security cooperation (opposite alliance system, collective security, regional security partnership, loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security community), and qualifies the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation as having potential for become a regional security partnership, which is based on one single security arrangement. However, this is not the case yet, because the conflict in the Middle East, and the difficult cooperation between both shores of the Mediterranean Sea in the field of security impede the construction of such a partnership (Attina, 2004).

Overall, region-building is a popular topic in the area of Euro-Mediterranean relations, but it is not always linked to security as some of the chapters of the book of Adler & Crawford above showed. Some authors studied the structural obstacles for region-building like Adler and Crawford did (see for example Volpi, 2004a), while others focus on the efforts of the EU (see for example Calleya, 2004). One of the main authors here is Michelle Pace (2002; 2006) who studied the discourse of the EU towards the region (not only the security discourse as explained earlier, but the general discourse of the EU). In her book *The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean*, she examines how the Mediterranean is conceptualized as a region by the EU. Her research starts in the 1960s and shows how ‘varying discourses of Mediterraneanness have been central in framing the possibilities of available action for EU decision makers’ (Pace, 2006: 9-10). Pace combined two methods in order to study the discourse of the EU: a textual analysis of EuroMed documents from 1960s to date and of documents of three member states: France, Italy and Spain, and interviews with EU policy-makers in Brussels and in three case country studies: Greece, Malta and Morocco. The different discourses of the member states of the EU and Morocco on the Mediterranean region are based on their history (colonial legacy), identity and economic power. In addition, she shows how these discourses lead to the creation of ‘Otherness’.

Besides these studies on the objectives of the EU in the region, there are scholars who examined the Euro-Mediterranean relations focusing on the instruments of the EU. We already
discussed the studies which focused on the EMAAs, but the EU has also other instruments at its disposal to deal with the Mediterranean: financial assistance, (political) dialogue and interparliamentary relations. Patrick Holden (2005, 2006, and 2008) for example focused in several articles on the aid policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. We already referred to his article in which he studied if the EU can be conceptualized as a civilian power (Holden, 2003). In his book *In search of structural power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument*, he looks at how the EU has exerted 'structural power' in the Mediterranean region through its aid policy. Structural power is in his research defined as 'the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientific and other professional people have to operate' (Strange, 1994, quoted in Holden, 2009: 12-13). However, Holden states that this does not mean that he adopts a purely structuralist vision on international relations, as the concept also entails that there is an actor who can influence the structures of the global political economy. Moreover, he indicates that, although structural power has a strong economic and thus an interest dimension, this does not mean that there is no room for ‘norms’ to be examined through this concept. Quite the contrary, it will ‘allow for an ethically neutral analysis without dismissing ethics in principle’ (Holden, 2009: 14). Holden thus chooses for a middle ground which avoids a stark choice between structure and agent, or between norms and interests. For the Mediterranean region, he concludes that the EU uses its aid policy to enhance its structural power in the region, but that the impact is rather limited. In the past, most of the Mediterranean countries only implemented limited economic reforms, which did not lead to strong economic, social and political development. This threatens the security of the EU.

While Holden focused on the aid policy of the EU, Michelle Pace (2005) studied the role of dialogue in the EMP and the ENP. In her work, which draws upon the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Bruce Tuckman, she argues that a dialogue means that the EU and the Mediterranean partners should move away from the relation of domination which existed in the past and that a dialogue entails an overlap between the Self and the Other. The Mediterranean countries should acknowledge that the EU is going through some challenging times, and should engage more in self-criticism, while the EU should move away from their hegemonic practices. In general, it is concluded that ‘the EMP should move away from being an inherently ‘Western’ praxis towards a EuroMed praxis paving the way for a true dialogic process. This dialogue mission therefore involves a dynamic interplay of Euro-Mediterranean cultures and communities between discourse (being) and practice (becoming)’ (Pace, 2005: 309). In conclusion, Stelios Stavridis focused on the parliamentary dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. We
already referred to his work on the PAM in the first chapter, but he also extensively studied the EMPA and its predecessor, the Parliamentary Forum of the EMP. Regarding the latter, he concludes in 2002 that the Parliamentary Forum suffered from the problems that were affecting the Barcelona Process as a whole: the MEPP, the conflicting objectives (democracy, security), but that there was also a discussion about who would represent the EU in the Forum (the members of the European Parliament or the members of the national parliaments). Also the representation of the Mediterranean countries in the Parliamentary Forum raised questions since non-democratically elected representatives of the authoritarian regimes took seat in the Forum (Stavridis, 2002). In 2010, he made, together with Roderick Pace, a general evaluation of the first years of the EMPA (2004-2008) concluding that the role of the EMPA is important, but that it needs to be strengthened. It should do more substantive work (especially then promoting the development of parliamentary systems and election monitoring), and it should improve the relations with other parliamentary assemblies, and especially with the PAM (Stavridis & Pace, 2010: 111-113).

In general, it can be concluded that between 2000 and 2005 several authors used constructivist and normative theories in order to explain the (development of the) EMP and the ENP. This is especially clear when we look at the security studies, a research area where traditionally realist theories are applied. But also the theory of the EU as a normative power proved to be a popular framework to study the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Nevertheless, halfway the first decade of the second millennium, this starts to change. We already noted that several scholars concluded that the EU promotes its interests rather than norms in the Mediterranean region. Consequently, the theory of the EU as a normative/civilian power proved to be not very useful to understand the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Therefore, authors now go back to more rationalist ideas and they combine normative theories with rationalist insights. Seeberg (2008) was one of the first authors to indicate that the ENP actually can already be qualified as ‘post-normative’ and states that the policy is characterized by ‘pragmatism’. This idea has been further developed in a special issue of EFAR published in 2010. There, it is argued that the EU’s external policy towards the Mediterranean region is indeed founded on a normative basis, but that the way in which these norms are promoted depends on the context in which they are promoted and on the actors with which the EU is engaging (pragmatism). Consequently, the distinction between ‘values’ and ‘interests’ often collapses (post-normative) and the authors argue that ‘the theoretical debate between realism and normativity has become quite sterile as it is ultimately unsolvable because all policies can be interpreted as fundamentally rationalistic and self-interested or normative, or as a combination of both’. Therefore they suggest studying the
‘practices’ of the policies of the EU to see which values and/or interests prevail at what time (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010: 583), and to look at the countries in which the EU promotes its policies. Each article of the special issue therefore focuses on another country or countries (see for example, Seeberg (2010a) who focuses on the relations with Jordan and Lebanon). In addition, there are also scholars who go back to realist traditions. Costalli (2009), in an attempt to counterbalance the enormous amount of studies using constructivism and normative theories, argues that neoclassical realism can provide useful insights into the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. He does so by referring to some ‘realistic’ characteristics of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, i.e. the asymmetric relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region, the fact that the norm promotion of the EU is rather instrumental than content-driven and that economic liberalization, which serves the economic interests of the EU, is the main objective of the EMP and ENP. Even the poor developed security relations can, according to Costalli, be explained by a realist framework. In conclusion, he characterizes the Euro-Mediterranean relations as marked by a ‘half-way hegemon that is trying to enforce a half-way hegemonic strategy’ (Costalli, 2009: 336). The EU will not become a hegemon, establishing a real and successful hegemonic action.
European external policy towards the Mediterranean region did not longer exclusively focus on economic issues, but also on political, security, cultural and social affairs. Consequently, scholars started to examine these new areas of cooperation. In the literature of the 1990s and 2000s, we can, just like in the literature of the 1970s, identify four main ‘research areas’. First, there are several scholars who discuss the development of a European external policy towards the Mediterranean region. Because the member states were the main driving forces behind the EMP, these scholars discuss the different positions of the member states, mainly adopting an intergovernamentalist approach.

Table 6. Overview of the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1990s and 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development of European external policy</td>
<td>Intergovernmentalism (Bicchi)</td>
<td>Objectivism (Objectivism/Subjectivism)</td>
<td>Explaining (Explaining/Understanding)</td>
<td>Document Study Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sociological New Institutionalism</td>
<td>Subjectivism</td>
<td>Explaining/Understanding</td>
<td>Document Study Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Relations</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Objectivism</td>
<td>Explaining</td>
<td>Document Study Interviews Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Objectivism</td>
<td>Explaining</td>
<td>Document Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>Objectivism/Subjectivism</td>
<td>Explaining/Understanding</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU as a civilian power</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Subjectivism</td>
<td>Explaining/Understanding</td>
<td>Document study Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU as a normative power</td>
<td>Normative Theory</td>
<td>Subjectivism</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Document Study Interviews</td>
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Also the position of the member states towards the ENP is studied. These authors often combine an objectivist ontological position with an epistemological position which focuses on explaining, although there are also scholars who adopt ‘a cooperative view on the ontological divide between objectivism and subjectivism and the epistemological divide between explaining and understanding’ (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010: 294) like Federica Bicchi (2007) and Michal Natorksi (2007). Within the ENP, the European Commission played an important role. Kelley (2006) combined sociological new institutionalism and historical institutionalism to explain this role.

Second, the study of the trade relations of the EU in the region can be identified as the second important ‘research area’ in the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Just like in the 1970s, there is a large amount of studies which focus on the trade relations of the EU with the Mediterranean region. The creation of a FTA and the possibility for the neighbouring countries to have ‘a stake in the internal market’ are main objectives of the EU under the EMP and the ENP. The main focus of most studies is on the EMAAs, their shortcomings, and their impact on Mediterranean countries. These scholars mainly adopt an objectivist position and try to explain and predict the development and impact of the trade relations between the EU and the Mediterranean area. The trade policy of the EU towards the region is part of the second basket of the EMP, the economic partnership. Besides this partnership, the EU also has a political and security partnership with the Mediterranean region. The focus on security issues is a novelty in comparison with the previous policy frameworks, and can be considered as the third research area in the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Since the attacks of 9/11, the EU attaches a lot of importance to security issues such as terrorism and migration. Consequently, authors also started to study security as an objective of the EU. Although security is one of the core businesses of the realist scholars, the academics who adopted a purely realist approach are rare (exceptions being Biscop, 2003 and Costalli, 2009). Most scholars who focus on security issues combine an objectivist and a subjectivist ontological position. Security is examined from a discursive perspective, or the study of the promotion of security in the region is combined with studies on new regionalism (security communities).

The fourth research area is the study of the norms the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region. In our overview, we focused on democracy and cultural cooperation because these issues will be dealt with in the empirical chapters. Scholars also tried to define the role of the EU in the region based on this particular aspect of the EU’s policy. The concept of the EU as a civilian power developed in the 1970s was adapted and used to explain and to
understand the EU’s new role in the region in the 1990s. While the concept in the 1970s was used to point the EC on its responsibilities towards the Third World, the new definition refers to the norms and values the EU promotes using the instruments developed within the framework of the EMP and ENP. In 2002, Ian Manners launched the concept of the EU as a normative power, referring to the possibility of the EU to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations. Scholars refined this concept and applied it in order to understand the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. Because of their focus on norms and values, we can state that all these authors adopted a subjectivist approach. However, most scholars compared the EU’s promotion of norms with its promotion of its interests in the region, adopting a cooperative view on the ontological divide between objectivism and subjectivism, and consequently also a cooperative view on the epistemological divide between explaining and understanding. The study of the norms the EU is promoting and the focus on the EU as a civilian or normative power towards the region has dominated the academic debate on the Euro-Mediterranean relations between 2000 and 2005. However, in the second half of this decade, a change has become apparent: scholars now focus more on the interests of the EU, defining the EU’s policy as ‘post-normative’ and ‘pragmatic’. This change is more apparent when one looks at the academic literature on the UfM.

2.5 The second half of the Noughties: the academic literature on the UfM

In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy presented a new idea to enhance the relations between France and the Mediterranean countries: the MU. As explained in the first chapter, this idea eventually led to the transformation of the EMP into the UfM in July 2008. The first references and descriptions on the UfM appeared in policy briefs of think tanks and in profile articles. These policy briefs and articles describe how the initial proposal of Sarkozy became ‘Europeanized’, how this eventually led to the UfM and how the new institutional structure of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and the projects that were selected look like (Gillespie, 2008; Balfour, 2009). Aliboni and Ammor (2009) focus on the complementarity, the added value and the compatibility of the UfM with the other European policies and institutions, concluding that the amalgamation between the old and the new structures will be the most difficult task for the European and Mediterranean partners (complementarity), that the added value lies in more ownership for the Mediterranean countries and in the possibility to bring the project closer to the people and that the UfM might affect the internal EU cohesion in a negative way, but the relations with the US and the Gulf countries in a positive way (compatibility). In addition, most of these policy briefs and articles also refer to the nature of the UfM: it is an intergovernmentalist framework, which is at the same time also
inspired by the functionalist method of Jean Monnet (Balfour and Schmid, 2008; Emerson, 2008). The nature of the new policy framework is especially studied by Aliboni, Driss, Schumacher and Tovias (2008) who argue that the UfM is nothing like the ECSC, since the latter was not business-oriented. Moreover, the ECSC was installed after peace was established at the European continent, which is not the case in the Mediterranean region. The success of the UfM as a functionalist project will therefore be limited. In addition, the report further describes the reaction of both European (Spain, Italy and Germany) and Mediterranean countries (the Maghreb with Tunisia as the frontrunner and Israel) on the proposal of Sarkozy.

The nature of the UfM has been the most popular topic amongst academics who studied the new framework. Michael Reiterer for example goes in his article From the (French) Mediterranean Union to the (European) Barcelona Process. The ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ as Part of the European Neighbourhood Policy deeper into the ‘Europeanization’ of the proposal of France. He calls this Europeanization an example of ‘neofunctionalism in reserve: a negative spillover of the integration process was avoided as other Member States and the European Commission insisted on a common approach to the Mediterranean …’ (Reiterer, 2009: 328). Especially the European institutions played an important role according to Reiterer. In addition, he examines as to what respect the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries within the context of the UfM can be seen as a form of inter-regional cooperation. Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs (2009) go in their article The end of the Euro-Mediterranean vision deeper into how the UfM affects the original spirit of the EMP as a transformative policy. First, the UfM does not provide a solution for the weaknesses of the Barcelona Process, and second, its focus on pragmatic and technical cooperation has led to a depoliticization of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Moreover, it does not go deeper into development and economic integration. The security strategy of the EU does not deal with the root causes of migration, but is based on a ‘surveillance and control’ approach. In addition, Kausch and Young address the lack of strategic ties between the EU and Islamist movements, which are the main actors for economic and social change. In the second part of their article, they examine the impact of the EU’s transformative policy on Morocco, concluding that Morocco has successfully blocked the attempts of the EU to push for far-reaching economic and political reforms. Instead, it has implemented limited, but still meaningful reforms (especially in comparison with the other regimes) for which it has received financial and political support of the EU. But the authoritarian regime is still in place, just like in the other Mediterranean countries.
Dimitri Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaidis (2008: 14) refer in their article *The Union for the Mediterranean: A Genuine Breakthrough or More of the Same?* to the ‘Jean Monnet philosophy of small steps to create stability and prompt development in the South’ which characterizes the UfM. The new framework therefore clearly resembles the birth of the EU, where cooperation was initially limited to energy under the ECSC. However, Bechev and Nicolaidis (2008: 17-18) warn that old and new problems the UfM is facing will make ‘any success difficult’. The problems are, amongst others, the opposition of the other European member states, which watered down the project, the ‘conservative agenda aimed at preserving the status quo’, the conflict in the Middle East, and the fact that the UfM legitimizes the authoritarian regimes in the region. However, they give the UfM the benefits of the doubt. Based on their knowledge of functionalist theories, they provide policy-makers with some advice to make the ‘functionalist’ spirit of the UfM work. They argue that both the European and the Mediterranean countries together should be the driving force behind the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Therefore, the ownership of the Mediterranean countries should be enhanced, in order for the UfM to have a symmetrical bias. This can be reached by installing a co-presidency and a fragmented or floating secretariat. Furthermore, CSOs, businesses and political parties should also be involved in the UfM, as also NSAs play an important role in creating economic and political integration. In addition, they suggest linking the technical, functional projects with some of the original goals of the EMP, such as the liberalization of trade relations (and more specifically trade in services). By doing so, they indicate how a ‘spill-over effect’ can be created from the UfM. They are the first authors to provide a more theoretical based explanation of the UfM, although they do not refer explicitly to the functionalist theories on which their analysis is based.

Their work is followed by at least two other scholars who use a functionalist approach to take a closer look at the nature of the UfM. Peter Seeberg (2010b), in his article *Union for the Mediterranean – Pragmatic Multilateralism and the Depoliticization of EU-Mediterranean relations*, explains the neofunctionalist ideas that gave guidance to the development of the UfM. In the short term, cooperation will focus on uncontroversial projects. In the long term, however, this will lead to a more political cooperation, just like in case of the EU. However, he argues that the neofunctionalist spill-over effect never will take place in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. First, the conflict in the Middle East prevents that the spill-over effect is taking place, and second, the EU has shied away from focusing on political cooperation and norms and values such as democracy and human rights. Rather than pursuing a long-term vision on how the Mediterranean region should be developed, the EU now only focuses on what it can do within the limitations of an authoritarian context and the conflict of the Middle East. Therefore, Seeberg
describes the UfM as ‘pragmatic multilateralism’. This led to a depoliticization and technocratization of the relations with the Mediterranean partners. Patrick Holden (2011) in his article *A New Beginning? Does the Union for the Mediterranean Herald a New Functionalist Approach to Cooperation in the region?* states that, although the UfM indeed might be inspired by functionalist ideas, its development is different than what someone like David Mitrany (the ‘founding father’ of functionalism) had in mind. While Mitrany stated that the institutional framework of an organization should follow its function, this is clearly not the case with the UfM. Within the framework of the UfM, biennial summits of heads of state and government were to be held every two years, while its objective, its ‘function’ is a limited, technical cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. Moreover, unlike the ECSC, the UfM does not have strong institutions and clear objectives in the projects it wanted to promote. He calls any comparison ‘far-fetched’, and therefore, it remains to be seen if the UfM can lead to stronger relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries beyond the gouvernemental level (regionalization). Moreover, he points to the fact that the UfM does not replace the existing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and therefore, trade and economic integration (and thus regionalism) remain the core of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region.

The article of Holden is part of a special issue published by *Mediterranean Politics* on the UfM. Diana Hunt (2011) adds in her article *The UfM and Development Prospects in the Mediterranean: Making a Real Difference?* in the same special issue that the six projects of the UfM even reinforce the key components of the Barcelona Process. Hakim Darbouche (2011) examines in the same special issue if the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the cornerstone of the energy cooperation in the UfM, has the potential to provoke regional energy co-operation. He finds that, if the UfM will lead to more regional energy co-operation, it will be due to international energy market dynamics rather than due to the functionalist character of the UfM. In general, Federica Bicchi (2011: 11) summarizes in her contribution to the special issue the agreement amongst scholars: ‘functionalism might not become the new foundation stone of Euro-Mediterranean relations’. Instead, we see politicization, although in a different form than in the EMP. Both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the possibility for the Mediterranean countries to promote their national interests through the UfM are main drivers of politicization. At the same time, we see a depoliticization of the content, because of the low interest in human rights and democracy.

In addition to the study of the institutional logics of the UfM, several authors also took a more actor-based approach. These scholars focus on the role of the member states in the newly created Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and examine the intergouvernemental negotiations that
eventually led to the strengthening of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Aliboni and his colleagues were the first to do so in their EuroMesCo paper of June 2008 (see supra). In the special issue of Mediterranean politics mentioned above, several authors examine the attitude (are they leaders, laggards or fence-sitters) of the member states regarding the UfM. If they are qualified as leaders, a further distinction is made based on their motivation. Are they strategic leaders defending their own interests, or are they genuine entrepreneurs looking for a consensus in the name of the common good? In addition, these authors take a closer look at the amount of resources these member states invested in the UfM. Mireia Delgado (2011) in her article *France and the Union for the Mediterranean: Individualism versus Co-operation* characterizes France as a traditional leader in the first stage of the development of the UfM (February – March 2008), while in the later stage (from March 2008 on), it softened its role, and it started to co-operate with the other European member states. Then, France can be seen as a genuine entrepreneur, rather than as a ‘traditional’ leader. Building on his previous work on the role of Spain in the EU Mediterranean Policy, Richard Gillespie (2011a) discusses in his article *Adapting to French Leadership? Spain’s Role in the Union for the Mediterranean* the role the country has played in the strengthening of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Adopting a historical perspective, he compares the relation between France and Spain under the EMP with their relation under the UfM. As a conclusion, Gillespie argues that Spain will never be able to take a (co-)leadership role in the UfM, although it might play the role of a broker or an entrepreneur. However, it is important that both countries work together in order to make the UfM a success.

Tobias Schumacher (2011) in his article *Germany and Central and Eastern European Countries: Laggards or Veto-Players?* examines the foreign policy of Germany, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic towards the Mediterranean region, and more specifically the responses of these four countries on the proposal of France to enhance the cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. He characterizes the initial attitude of Germany as a veto-player, and thus as a reverse policy entrepreneur. After it succeeded to turn the proposal of France into the UfM, Germany acted as a ‘loyal, albeit passive player’ (Schumacher, 2011: 85). Poland joined Germany in its criticisms on the proposal of Sarkozy, but it kept a rather low profile, and it never openly opposed the MU. As the MU was to become a European project, it suddenly saw an opportunity to ask for side payments (the strengthening of the relations with the Eastern neighbours) in exchange for their consent to launch the UfM. Therefore, Schumacher states that Poland, together with Sweden, acted as a ‘favour-exchanger’. Hungary and the Czech Republic can be described as ‘unhappy laggards’ regarding the UfM. Although both countries were also rather critical regarding the proposal of Sarkozy, they never expressed their criticism in public in
order to prevent a confrontation with France. At the same time, they also tried to generate side payments in return for their silent support for the new project. For Hungary, this side payment was the conclusion of a strategic bilateral partnership with France, and for the Czech Republic the side payments were the recognition of France that the Czech Republic is the leader of the Central and Eastern European member states and the non-interference of France in its presidency of the EU.

In a similar way as Poland, also Israel can be characterized as a ‘favour-exchanger’ according to Rafaella Del Sarto (2011) in her article *Plus ça change…? Israel, the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean*. It supported the UfM because the EU wanted to upgrade the economic relations with the country. Especially France had supported Israel in its request to upgrade the EU-Israeli relations. While Del Sarto focuses on the reaction of Israel on the UfM, Oliver Schlumberger (2011) describes in his article the reactions of the Arab countries to the proposal of Sarkozy. He confirms the conclusion of Ahmed Driss (in the work of Aliboni, Driss, Schumacher & Tovias, 2008) that the Arab countries were rather critical for the UfM, since they were afraid that it would lead to a normalization of the relations with Israel and a return to ‘European paternalism’. In addition, he discusses the consequences of this new, intergouvernemental policy framework for the actors (non-gouvernemental actors are no longer involved, which is well perceived by the authoritarian regimes but not by the people), for the institutional cooperation (cooperation within the UfM will only occur if both the EU and the Arab partners are having a particular interest) and the policies (depoliticization since there is no longer a focus on ‘high’ politics such as political reform and conflict resolution). In contrast with these articles, which focus on the attitude of some of the Mediterranean countries towards the UfM, Kamleh Khatib (2010) examined the perceptions of all Mediterranean countries in his article *The Union for the Mediterranean: views from the Southern Shores*. Adopting a rationalist approach to the study of perceptions, he concludes that the expectations of the Mediterranean countries about the UfM and their priorities depend on their interests. In general, the Mediterranean countries indicate that the Arab-Israeli conflict and a lack of funding might be the most important stumbling blocks which will hamper this initiative.

In addition to the authors who studied the attitudes and the motivation of the member states and the attitudes and perceptions of the Mediterranean countries, there are some other contributions to the academic literature which go deeper into the intergouvernemental nature of the UfM and its consequences, like Schlumberger did. Roberto Aliboni (2009) discusses in a document *The Union for the Mediterranean: Evolution and Prospects* the problems that the enhanced ownership of the Mediterranean partners will bring. Since the Mediterranean partners have now
more influence on the UfM, Aliboni states that the ‘intergovernmental nature of the UfM is destined to reflect the conflictual situation in the Middle East without any filter whatsoever’, which has indeed been the case since the creation of the UfM. In addition, Aliboni discusses several other problems which are intrinsically linked with the intergovernmental nature of the UfM and which will hamper the functioning of the enhanced Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: the division of competences regarding Barcelona acquis between the European Commission and the secretariat, the organization of Europe’s co-presidency, the structure of the secretariat and the appointment of the deputy secretary generals. Also Gillespie (2011b: 1206-1207) goes deeper into the intergovernmental nature of the UfM, concluding that ‘that intergovernmentalism has largely prevailed alongside renewed French protagonism in the Euro-Mediterranean relations, but that the benefits for all concerned – France, the EU and the Mediterranean partners – are very doubtful, given much stronger politicization of these relations’. From a different (but intergovernmental) perspective, the author of this doctoral dissertation has studied the negotiations that eventually lead to the creation of the UfM. Using negotiations theory, I go in my article De moeizame relatie tussen de Europese Unie and de Mediterrane landen: Onderhandelingen over de Unie voor het Middellandse Zeegebied deeper into the national preferences (economic, political of security preferences) of the European member states to create the UfM. France wanted to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean region because of security interests (especially migration) while the other member states were mainly preoccupied with limiting the influence of France on the project. Second, the preferences of the Mediterranean partners are discussed, concluding that they agreed with the strengthening of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation because they either hoped to strengthen their bilateral ties with the EU or because they received institutional side payments for their participation into the new framework (thus enhancing their ‘ownership’ in the Euro-Mediterranean countries. The article goes on by discussing the negotiations between the European member states and between the EU and the Mediterranean. The national preferences of the partners at both shores of the Mediterranean Sea led to the fact that the negotiations mainly focused on the institutional structure of the new framework, rather than on the content. The incentives for the Mediterranean partners to keep going on with the UfM are very low. This is one of the two main problems the UfM is facing today (Reynaert, 2009).

The other problem is the conflict in the Middle East, which currently still blocks the functioning of the UfM. Besides the focus on the ‘functionalist method’ and the intergovernmental nature of the UfM, academic authors therefore also focused on the relations between the UfM and the MEPP. Bilal Benyaich (2009) describes in his article De Unie voor de
Middellandse Zee: enige kans van slagen? the creation and the development of the EMP and explains how the conflict in the Middle East has hampered the cooperation within the Barcelona Process. Nevertheless, the framework provided the possibility for dialogue between Israel and the Arab World, which was seen as ‘a confidence and security building measure’. Although the ENP was a potential ‘kiss of death’ for the multilateral cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, the UfM provided a new opportunity to strengthen the bond between all European and Mediterranean partners and to create a genuine regional cooperation. Benyaich then describes the transformation of the MU into the UfM, the structure and the six regional projects which will form the heart of the new Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. In addition, he examines conflict resolution as an objective of the UfM, concluding that the EU is actually a ‘non-actor’ in the MEPP. Following his analysis of the Barcelona Process, Benyaich concludes that without a solution for the conflict in the Middle East, the UfM will not work. However, the UfM does not provide a possibility to solve this problem because of four elements. The first element (which is the last one in Benyaich’s article) is the paradigm the EU is using for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: it believes that peace can be reached through trade, while there should be peace first, which can then be continued and strengthened through trade. Second, the EU is reticent to impose conditionality on Israel because of historic reasons, and third, the relations with democratically elected Hamas are difficult for the EU. These relations with Israel and the Palestinians can also be linked with another aspect which makes it difficult for the EU to play a decisive role in the conflict: the identity of the EU. This identity is defined in relation and opposed to an Islamic identity, which lead the EU to favourize Israel.

Rosemary Hollis (2011) tries in her article *The UfM and the Middle East Peace Process: an unhappy symbiosis* to define the relation between the UfM and the MEPP. After studying the relation between the EMP and the MEPP and the UfM and the conflict, she goes deeper into the position and the role of the EU and the three biggest member states: France, Germany and the UK towards the conflict. In addition, the positions of Egypt and Jordan towards the conflict are examined. Eventually, she concludes that both policy frameworks are entangled through instruments and structures, and also through objectives. The Mediterranean countries are not willing to normalize relations with Israel unless it withdraws from the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and this is now also at play in the UfM. At the same time, building a strong relationship also means cooperation in other areas such as economic development and security. In contrast with Benyaich, who sees no possibility for the UfM to function properly without a solution for the conflict, Hollis states that neither the UfM nor the MEPP can be seen as a
dependent variable in the relationship between the two policy frameworks. This entanglement means that the UfM is and will continue to be affected by the conflict.

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Table 7. Overview of the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations after 2008

From this overview of the academic literature on the UfM, several conclusions can be drawn. The first contributions mainly focused on describing the creation, the development and the structure of this new policy framework. These analyses were soon followed by academic articles which try to explain the UfM. First, several authors examine if the UfM is really inspired by the ‘functionalist’ method of Jean Monnet as the French were arguing, and if the method will work. Scholars agree that this will not be the case. In the special issue of Mediterranean politics, the editors summarize that the structure of the UfM is not characterized by functionalism, but by increased politicization. Moreover, instead of a return to regionalism as one might expect from the strengthening of a regional framework, the UfM represents a reinforcement of the bilateral relations of the EU with the region. Besides the articles which focus on explaining the structural and institutional logics of this new framework, there are authors who study the main actors involved in the development of this new framework: the member states, especially France, Spain and Germany. They go deeper into the intergovernamentalist nature of the UfM, and build on previous work on the preferences and positions of the member states on the GMP, the EMP and the ENP (see infra). The special issue of Mediterranean Politics, launched in March 2011, combines both approaches and tries to go beyond the agent-structure problem by examining both and by explaining how they are mutually influencing. In addition, there are some authors who focus on examining the relationship between the MEPP and the UfM. The research on the UfM clearly builds on previous research that has been done on the EMP and the ENP: a large part of the special issue in Mediterranean politics focuses on the role of the member states. These authors combine objectivism and subjectivism, and they try to both explain and understand the
Euro-Mediterranean relations. The research also follows the development of the Euro-
Mediterranean relations. As the UfM means a strengthening of the ‘pragmatism’ of the EU in its
relations with the Mediterranean with a stronger focus on interests rather than on norms, the
academic literature faces a return to rationalist theories to explain this new framework. Several
authors studied the UfM from a functionalist perspective. They adopt an objectivist ontology and
they try to explain rather than to understand this framework using qualitative methods such as
document analysis and interviews.

2.6 The Twenty-Tens: the run-up to the academic literature on the renewed ENP

In 2011, several Mediterranean countries were confronted with popular protests and revolutions.
We already explained in chapter 1 that in a reaction to the Arab Spring the EU adapted the ENP.
In the academic literature, studies now start to appear which focus on the review of the policy of
the EU towards the Mediterranean region. Nevertheless, because the policy was reviewed only
very recently, the amount of studies is still very limited. Rosemary Hollis (2012: 94) evaluates in
her article *No friends of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'* the EU’s policy of
the last 15 years in the light of the Arab Spring, concluding that the EU has ‘betrayed the
professed European values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law, rather than exporting
them’. Instead, it has ‘prioritized European prosperity and stability at the expense of both in the
Arab world’. By doing so, the EU actually has contributed to the Arab uprisings, but rather by
default than by design. Nevertheless, Hollis (2012) does not go deeper into the review of the
ENP. The first references to the renewed ENP appear in policy briefs of think thanks and in
profile articles. These articles and policy briefs describe and evaluate the new policy, like the
profile article of Ana Echague, Hélène Michou and Barah Mikail (2011: 331) in which they
comment on the Commission communication ‘a partnership for democracy and shared
prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’. They call the latter ‘a step in the right direction’,
although they add that the member states should be committed to the policy in order for the
latter to be successful. Later on, Michou (2011) repeats this view in a publication which also
discusses the Communication ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’. In addition, they
study the position of France and Spain on the Arab uprisings, stating that the French policy
towards the Mediterranean region is characterized by pragmatism and the principles of
Realpolitik (first defending Ben Ali and Mubarak and later condemning them). Spain initially
stood at the sideline and later sided with the protesters in several countries, but not in the Gulf
because of its interests over there. Mikail (2011) and Echague (2011) further elaborate upon the
position of France and Spain in other publications.
Other authors who also discuss the renewed ENP draw different conclusions than Echague, Michou and Mikail (2011). Tocci (2011) for example weighs up the pros (more aid, more conditionality, more attention for the civil society) and cons (too much focus on security, too vague and a too limited view on the Euro-Mediterranean relations) of the renewed ENP, but she does not give an overall conclusion. Ayadi and Gadi (2011) state that the EU needs to develop a strategy for the Mediterranean region which is based on a deepening of the trade relations, more financial assistance for democracy and mobility partnerships. This is also the main conclusion of Schäfer (2011): the EU needs a long-term strategy based on new instruments, a clear political position and solidarity. Richard Youngs (2011) on his turn argues that the EU should urgently develop a geo-strategic vision for the region; it needs to be clear what its interests are. Boserup & Tassinari (2012: 101-103) conclude that the reviewed ENP is actually a continuation of the previous policies towards the Mediterranean region; they characterize it as ‘responding to a ‘much-more-of-the-same’ rationale’. The main reasons for this are that the EU is now mainly preoccupied with its own problems (economic crisis) and the belief that this policy in some cases (like in Morocco) actually works. However, because these studies are still rather descriptive, it is not yet possible to draw conclusions about the evolution of the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Will the scholars continue focusing on the interests of the EU? The contribution of Youngs seems a step in this direction. And will they again focus on the position of the member states? The contributions of Echague, Michou and Mikail (2011) and of Echague (2011) and Mikail (2011) lead us to suspect that the roles of the member states will probably be an object of study in the future.

2.7 Conclusions: research areas in the study of Euro-Mediterranean relations

From the above it is clear that the development of the academic literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations closely follows the developments in international relations. In the 1970s, the academic literature about the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries was rather elaborated. The EC at that time showed an increased activism in international relations, and its choice for concluding preferential trade relations with the Mediterranean countries within the framework of the GMP provoked strong reactions with the other international powers; they stated that the EU was seeking a sphere of influence in the region. This led to extensive academic research on the trade relations of the EEC towards the region and the world (besides the focus on the intra-European development of the GMP). The first theoretical studies on the role of the EU in the region and in the world started to appear: the EC as a ‘trading block’, as a ‘civilian power’ or as a ‘capitalist superpower’. In the 1980s however, the EC’s global ambitions faded
away. The resurgence of the Cold War, the completion of the internal market and the enlargement led the EC to focus on internal issues. The relations with the Mediterranean region were pushed into the background (despite the efforts of the Commission to revive these relations through the RMP). Also the studies on the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean countries were limited, and focused on the impact of the enlargement on the economies of the Mediterranean countries.

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Treaty of Maastricht was negotiated, which gave the EU more competences in external relations. Both events gave a new impetus on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In 1995, the EMP was created, a new milestone in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The intergouvernemental nature of the second pillar of the EU and this new partnership led scholars to focus on the role of the member states in the creation and the functioning of the EU’s policy. In addition, academic scholars started to examine the different objectives of this new partnership. Because the creation of the EMFTA is the most important objective of the EMP, and because the ENP wants to give the Mediterranean countries ‘a stake in the internal market’, the trade relations of the EU and its impact were an important object of study. At the same time, researchers examined the different norms and values the EU tries to promote in the region. Especially the promotion of democracy received considerable attention from the academic community. Closely linked with this is the research on the role of the EU as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power in the Mediterranean region. This research also followed from the changes the discipline of international relations underwent due to the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the discipline of international relations failed to predict the collapse of the SU, which led it to focus on what are called by Hay (2002) ‘the big questions’ of political science: the role of theory, the relation between structure and agent and especially the role of ideas. Normative theory re-emerged as theoretical approach, and entered the EU-Studies. The EMP and the ENP with their focus on norms and values such as democracy and human rights were interesting case studies for scholars testing these theoretical approaches. Not only normative theory entered the EU-Studies, also other post-positivist theories such as constructivism influenced the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is especially clear when we look at the security studies. Most scholars studying security did not adopt a realist approach, but a constructivist one. They examined the discourse of the EU on security issues related to the Mediterranean region or explained how identity construction played a role in the security relations between the EU and the area.
In the aftermath of the attacks of 09/11, however, the EU started to focus more on interests in its policy, rather than on norms and values. The economic crisis of 2008 strengthened this tendency. Most authors agree that the EU can actually not be qualified as a pure ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power in the Mediterranean region, but recognize that interests play a very important role in its policies. Seeberg (2008) argues that the ENP is characterized by pragmatism, and that it can be qualified as a ‘post-normative’ policy, i.e. a policy where both norms and interests play a role. The UfM even explicitly retreats from focusing on norms. Following this change in international relations, we see in the academic literature a return to rationalist ideas to explain the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean. In the studies on the UfM, neofunctionalism and intergouvernamentalism (the latter combines an objectivist and subjectivist ontology) are the two main theoretical approaches. Authors who adopted the neofunctionalist approach like Seeberg (2010b) examined if the UfM will lead to stronger Euro-Mediterranean integration, while scholars who approach the UfM from an intergouvernamentalist stance focused on the role of the European member states in the development of this new framework. This tendency might persist in the studies on the renewed ENP.

However, the academic literature does not only closely follow the development of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Most studies also build on earlier research. It is possible to identify three main research areas in the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the 1970s, a part of the academic literature examined the development of a common external policy – the GMP - towards the Mediterranean. These authors studied the different positions of the member states and the relations between the Council and the European Commission. Also in the 1990s and 2000s, academics studied the role of the member states in the development of the EMP and the ENP. An intergouvernamentalist perspective can also be identified in the studies on the UfM. In the past, most authors adopted an objectivist ontology in order to explain the position of the member states (an exception being Natorski (2007)), but more recently, several scholars took a cooperative view on the ontological divide between objectivism and subjectivism and on the epistemological divide between explaining and understanding, like Bicchi (2007) and the authors of the special issue on the UfM. In the 2000s, studies appear which examine the role of the European Commission in the development of the European external policy towards the Mediterranean region. Kelley (2006) adopts a subjectivist ontology and cooperative view on the epistemological divide between explaining and understanding. The study of the development of European external policy is the first research area which can be identified in the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations.
The second research area concerns the study of the EU’s trade relations. In the 1970s, the academic community focused on the EU’s cooperation agreements: their content and their impact on the Mediterranean region. Tovias (1977) and Pomfret (1986) defined the EC as a European trading block. In the 1980’s, Tovias studied the impact of the enlargement of the European trading block on the Mediterranean countries. In the 1990s, Tovias again evaluated the EU as a trading block while studying the EMAAs and their impact on the Mediterranean region. He was accompanied by a dozen of scholars who criticized the EU’s trade approach towards the area. These scholars adopt objectivism as ontology and are interested in explaining the impact of the trade relations on the Mediterranean countries. A third research area which can be identified rests on the study of the EU as a promoter of norms. In the 1970s, the concept of the EC as a civilian power was developed to characterize the EC’s role in a Cold War context, but also to draw the EC’s intention to its responsibilities towards the Third World, and thus towards the Mediterranean region. In the 1990s, the idea of the EU as a civilian power was used to explain why the EU promotes norms and values in its foreign policy, and it served as a conceptual framework to evaluate the EU’s normative policy in the Mediterranean area. The concept normative power served a similar objective. Here, most authors adopt subjectivism as their ontological position, and they focus on understanding or they adopt a cooperative view on explaining and understanding. Besides these three main research areas which already exist since the 1970s, we see the development of a new research area in 1995. With the establishment of the EMP, scholars also started to study the security policy of the EU towards the region. Here, most scholars adopt a cooperative view on objectivism and subjectivism and on the epistemological divide between explaining and understanding (exceptions being Biscop, 2007 and Costalli, 2009). Figure 1 reflects the evolution of the different research areas. In addition, it can be noted that the study of Galtung can be considered as an alternative study in the 1970s, because this work is based on a different theoretical approach (structuralism). This theoretical approach can also be found with Patrick Holden (2009). Both Galtung and Holden (2009: 14) do not adopt a kind of ‘tautological structuralism’, their approaches also allow for ‘agency and purpose’. As we mentioned earlier, they both adopt a cooperative view on objectivism and subjectivism and on explaining and understanding. Although their work cannot be considered as an alternative ‘research area’ (because it are only two studies), they deserve special mention within the framework of this dissertation because our theoretical framework, ontology and epistemology is similar (but not the same): we adopt a poststructuralist approach which advocates a dialectical relationship between agent and structure and between explaining and understanding (see chapter 3).
As we explained in the introduction, this chapter wanted to present the reader a state of the art of the study on the Euro-Mediterranean relations from an EU perspective. At the same time, we also demonstrated how the academic literature developed. This development is closely linked with international events and is often based on previous research. Moreover, we wanted to explain the ontological, the epistemological and methodological positions on which the current studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations are built. By contrast, this dissertation will be built on a totally different ontological position, i.e. the position developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), and on a totally different epistemological position, developed by Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2007). In the next chapter, we go deeper into the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and into the development of retroduction as a third mode of interference (besides induction and deduction). The explanation of this ontological and epistemological position will allow us to make a comparison with the ontological and epistemological positions on which the current studies are built, and it will allow us to illustrate why our approach to the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations is different from the other approaches.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EC as a Trading Block (Tovias, Pomfret)</th>
<th>EC as a Trading Block/ EU as a promoter of trade interests (Tovias, Lican, Ghesquiere)</th>
<th>EU as a Trading Block/ EU as a regional security community (Adler &amp; Crawford, Attina)</th>
<th>EU as a promoter of security interests (Biscoe, Costalli)</th>
<th>EU as a post-Normative Power (Seeberg, Cavatorta &amp; Pace)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Impact on the Mediterranean countries (Tovias, Pomfret, Yannopoulos, Taylor, Captani)</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Patchwork of Agreements”/GMP 1960s/70s</td>
<td>Idealization/Rationalist Intergovernmentalism (Bicchi, Copsey, Okrav, Fumess et al, Lippert, …)</td>
<td>Sociological New Institutionalism (Kelley)</td>
<td>Neofunctionalism (Becher &amp; Nicolaides, Seeberg, Holden, Darbouche)</td>
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<td>Southern Enlargement EEC 1980s</td>
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<td>Renewed RMP ENP 1990s/2000s UfM 2008+ ENP 2011+</td>
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Figure 2. Overview of the development of the research areas in the study on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The figure is inspired on a figure in a book of Jan Orbie (2009: 11) which represents an overview of the development of theories of European integration.
Chapter 3: Ontology, epistemology and methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter goes deeper into the ontology, the epistemology and the methodology on which this research is based. Like we mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, this dissertation builds on the ontological position developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. They developed their ontological position and poststructuralist discourse theory in 1985 as a reaction on the crisis in left-wing thought. This crisis manifested itself both at the theoretical and at the political level. First, the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were confronted with critical and dissident voices who disagreed with the course of the communist party. Second, in Western Europe, society was confronted with the rise of ‘new movements’, such as feminism and ecologism. Socialism, which was at that time based on the idea of the Russian Revolution and on the centrality of the working class, could not provide an answer to these new challenges. Laclau and Mouffe tried to tackle the theoretical crisis of the left-wing thought by presenting the concept ‘hegemony’ as the new logic of the social.\(^\text{10}\) Their theoretical solution for both understanding the strength of right-wing thought and the political problems of the left-wing thought is based on the ideas of the early Marxists theorists. Their logic of the social is based on the logic of articulation as developed by Antonio Gramsci. It entails a very specific view on the social world, and more specifically on the disposition of subjects, on the relation between agents and structure and on the construction of identities. The logic of articulation constitutes the basis of the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, which is built around theoretical concepts such as discourse, field of discursivity, nodal points, logic of equivalence, logic of difference, hegemony and dislocation. In the first part of this chapter, we will first go deeper into explaining this ontological position and the discourse theory. Second, this logic of the social will be compared with the ontological positions that are applied in the current studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Third, this ontological position will allow us to formulate three research questions which will be addressed in this dissertation.

However, one of the main critiques on the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is that they have not given any indication on how their theory can be applied. Moreover, positivist scholars rejected the theory, arguing that it cannot explain social reality since

\(^{10}\) Laclau and Mouffe did not only present a theoretical solution for the crisis of the left-wing thought, but also a political solution. They argue that the hegemony for the left-wing thought should be articulated as a ‘radical, plural democracy’. This part of their work will be discussed in chapter 4 of this dissertation.
it seems to be problem-driven. David Howarth (2000; 2005 and together with Jason Glynos, 2007) has developed a response to the epistemological questions that are raised by the critics of poststructuralist discourse theory. This response is embedded in retroduction as a paradigm to explain social phenomena. Retroduction can be considered as an alternative for induction and deduction as paradigms for explanation in social sciences. However, there are different modes of retroductive explanation, and these modes are determined by the ontological position of the researcher: causal mechanism (critical realists), contextualized self-interpretations (hermeneutics) and logics (poststructuralists). In the second part of this chapter, we will first go deeper into explaining retroduction as alternative paradigm for explaining/understanding Euro-Mediterranean relations and logics as a mode of retroductive explanation. Based on the ontological position explained in the first part, a distinction is made between three kinds of logics: social, political and fantasmatic logics. Second, this epistemological position will be compared with the epistemological positions that are applied in the current studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Third, logics as a mode of retroductive explanation will allow us to address the three research questions we formulated in the first part of this chapter.

In the last part of this chapter, we will go deeper into the methodology of this dissertation. As we explained in chapter 2, the term ‘methodology’ can be used in a broad sense to indicate the scientific position of the researcher, but in this dissertation, it refers to the strategy and to the method that are adopted to conduct the research. Therefore, we will first go deeper into the research design. This design is based on the ontological position we adopt in the first part of this chapter, and determines whose discourse will be studied at which moment in time. Second, it is explained how discourses will be studied, and which texts are selected for analysis. Third, the method for the analysis of these texts is discussed. The main objective of this chapter is to explain the ontology, epistemology and the methodology of this research. Moreover, the comparison of this ontology, epistemology and methodology with the ontology, epistemology and methodology of the studies discussed in chapter 2 will demonstrate to the reader why this research is different from most other studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations and why it can bring new insights into the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region.
3.2 Ontology

3.2.1 The logic of articulation as an alternative logic of the social and the poststructuralist discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe

Hegemony is the central concept in the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. It represents a very specific ontology, i.e. the logic of articulation. Laclau and Mouffe explain their logic of the social by returning to the crisis of Marxism which appeared in the early 1900s and to the solutions developed by several influential Marxist thinkers to overcome this crisis. In their book, they discuss the logics of the social these solutions represent. Consequently, they criticize these logics of the social, and they develop an own ontological position which tries to transcend these logics of the social into a new logic, the logic of articulation. To fully understand the logic of articulation and the concept of hegemony we first need to explain the criticism of Laclau and Mouffe on the ontological positions of the Marxist thinkers. Overall, this criticism can be summarized as followed: Laclau and Mouffe do not believe that the economy is an autonomous space as the Marxist thinkers assumed. This leads them to formulate two basic premises on which their poststructuralist discourse theory is built. This constitutes the theoretical part of their work which will be discussed here.

According to the Marxists theorists, the economy is an autonomous space because its laws of motion are strictly endogenous (this refers to their thesis that the productive forces are neutral), because a unity of the agent can be subsumed at the economic level (this refers to their thesis of the growing homogenization and impoverishment of the working class) and because the relations of production determine the interests of the working class (this refers to their thesis that the working class has a fundamental interest in socialism). By contrast, Laclau and Mouffe state that the economy is not a self-regulated space which develops autonomously. They argue that the development of the capitalist society is not as linear as the Marxist theorists think. First, they explain that production forces are not necessarily ‘neutral’ and that their development is not a natural, spontaneously progressive phenomenon. They illustrate this by referring to labour-power as a part of the process of production. Marxists see labour-power as a commodity which value becomes effective at the moment that the capitalist purchases this labour-power. However, Laclau and Mouffe argue that this is not necessarily the case. Unlike other commodities, the capitalist cannot immediately start to use labour-power by simply purchasing it. He must also make it produce labour, and this can only be done by dominating the workers. Nevertheless, workers will resist against this domination of the capitalist. This influences the organization of the labour process. Consequently, the development of production forces cannot be a neutral
process, since it is influenced by this ‘clash’ between capitalists and workers (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 76-80).

Second, Laclau and Mouffe illustrate that agents - ‘subjects’ - are not unified at the economic level, as Marxists assumed. They argue that a distinction can be made between the conception of the work relation between the capitalist and the worker, i.e. the wage relation that is established because the worker sells its labour to the capitalist (relations of production) and the execution of the work relation, which is determined by the place of the worker in the production process (relations in production). Both kinds of relations developed in another way. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 81) argue that ‘whereas the wage form has become generalized in advanced capitalism, the class of industrial workers has declined in numbers and importance’. The Marxists did not make that distinction. Since they consider labour-power as a commodity, both relations converge. By simply demonstrating how both relations developed separately and how several Marxists theorists tried to find a mechanism for uniting the working class, Laclau and Mouffe illustrate how subjects are not unified at the economic level. Third, this also shows that relations of productions do not necessarily determine the interests of the working class. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 84) argue that this is only the case if the worker is rationalist, i.e. if it is a homo economicus who ‘tries to maximize the economic surplus just as much as the capitalist’ or if he is ‘a spontaneously cooperative being, who aspires to the social distribution of his labour product’. But there is not prove for that, because there is no logical connection between the position of the worker in the relations of production and the mentality of the worker (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 81-85). Based on these three arguments, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the economy is not a self-regulated space, and they postulate two premises which constitute the theoretical basis of their theory.

First, subjects are neither homogeneous nor united. Because subject positions are not united, they are dispersed. However, that does not mean that they are fixed on the location where they are dispersed, that they are separated. Rather, they are ‘floating’ and ‘overdetermined’, which means that they can have different meanings. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 121) argue: ‘the specificity of the subject cannot be established through the absolutization of a dispersion of subject positions’ (which is an objectivist ontological position) nor ‘through the equally absolutist unification of these around a transcendental subject’ (around a certain idea, which is a subjectivist ontological position). Therefore, they state that objectivism and subjectivism are ‘symmetrical expression of the desire for a fullness that is permanently deferred’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 121). Instead, subjects are overdetermined. This makes articulation possible, i.e. the linkage of different
subject positions into one related identity. This means that there is a dialectic relation between
the subject and the structure (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 114-122). This ontological position was
originally developed by Antonio Gramsci. However, Gramsci argued that when an agent
articulates the different subject positions into one common identity, there should be one singly
unifying principle. For Gramsci, this unifying principle still had a class character. According to
Laclau and Mouffe, this is problematic, because the fact that there is one single unifying principle
and that it has a class character is not the consequence of a hegemonic struggle. It is actually
presented as a framework within each struggle occurs. This also means that there are only two
kinds of hegemonic leadership possible. Identity is determined and always in contradiction with
the other possible identity. Or there is a working class hegemony, or there is a bourgeois
hegemony. Because hegemony refers to an economic class, this means that the economic space is
not hegemonic. And this is exactly the criticism of Laclau and Mouffe on all Marxists\textsuperscript{11}, and thus
also on Gramsci: he holds on to ‘economism’, i.e. the idea that the economy, which is seen as an
autonomous space, is the essence of everything. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 68-70) argue that the
economy itself is also structured as a political space, and that it is thus also characterized as
hegemonic. They thus argue that all actions, practices and social formation are discursive in
nature, which is the second premise. These two premises constitute the basis of the very specific
logic of the social of Laclau and Mouffe, and of their discourse theory. We will explain this more
in detail in the next paragraph.

The poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is built around the
theoretical concepts articulation, discourse, field of discursivity, nodal points, logic of
equivalence, logic of difference, hegemony and dislocation. Articulation is thus based on the two
premises which Laclau and Mouffe developed from their argumentation against the idea of the
economy as an autonomous space, and which we discussed in the previous paragraph. We recall
here that they assume that everything in the social is ‘overdetermined’ (they borrow this concept
of Althusser), meaning that everything has several meanings. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 97-98)
reject the essentialist idea that the Marxists adopted (and that also could be found in the theory of
Althusser, despite the notion of ‘overdetermination’), i.e. they reject the idea that the whole
society is determined by the economy, that it is total and that it is ‘closed’. Consequently, because

\textsuperscript{11} In their book, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) explain the different ontological positions of the Marxists, i.e.
the logic of necessity adopted by the Orthodox Marxists such as Kautsky & Plekhanov, the logic of
contingency adopted by revisionists such as Bernstein and radical syndicalists such as Sorel, the logic of
representation adopted by Trotsky and Lenin and the logic of articulation developed by Gramsci.
Regardless their ontological position, they all considered the economy to be the essence of everything
which means they believed in a closed society.
subjects are not essentialist, it is possible that their meanings overlap. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 104) state: ‘the presence of some objects in the others prevents any of their identities from being fixed. Objects appear articulated not like pieces in a clockwork mechanism, but because the presence of some in the others hinders the suturing of the identity of any of them’.

Articulation is then ‘any practice establishing a relation (a ‘moment’) among elements (differences that are not discursively articulated) such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). An articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations is called a ‘discursive structure or a discursive formation’. The structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice is called discourse. Laclau and Mouffe also specify the characteristics of the discursive formation, in order to come to a more detailed definition of articulation. First, they state that the coherence of the discursive formation can be described as ‘regularity in dispersion’. What they mean is that elements (which are dispersed) are no longer determined by economic or material factors, but in relation to other elements (this is the regularity). Similarly, words or concepts (in discourse language: signs) do not derive their meaning through their relation with reality, but through their relation with other signs. These relations have a necessary character because the meanings of the elements depend upon each other. Second, Laclau and Mouffe reject the distinction between discursive and non-discursive. They do not deny that objects exist externally to thought, but they state that these objects cannot constitute themselves outside discourse. They state that ‘at the root of the previous prejudice lies an assumption of the mental character of discourse. Against this, we will affirm the material character of every discursive structure’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 108). This idea could already be found with Gramsci in his reference to the material character of ideologies: ‘they are not simple ideas but they are embodied in institutions, rituals and so forth’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 109). The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought/reality opposition. This means that there is a major enlargement of the field of those categories which can account for social relations. They are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted. Third, following the rejection of the essentialist character of subjects, the discursive formation is open. What they mean here is that the transition from elements to moments is never entirely fulfilled. If every element would be a moment, than this would be a relation of necessity. But this is not the case, and this is exactly what articulation makes possible. Identities are thus purely relational, ‘neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 111). This is what Laclau and Mouffe call the field of discursivity. The field of discursivity ‘determines the necessarily discursive character of any object, and the impossibility of any given discourse to implement a final suture’. They continue: ‘The
impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial fixations – otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible. Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 112). The privileged discursive points of this partial fixation are called nodal points. Based on the latter, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 113) then come to a more precise definition of the concept of articulation:

‘The practice of articulation consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning, and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, as a result, in its turn of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity’.

Nodal points are thus privileged, previously empty signs which give meaning to other signs. These signs are empty because they are open to different meanings during discursive struggles (therefore they are also called ‘floating signifiers’). An example of such a nodal point is the sign ‘democracy’. Democracy can have different meanings, such as liberal democracy, social democracy or conservative democracy (see also chapter 4). When the nodal points are partially fixed, they become privileged signifiers, which give meaning to other signs. All the other meanings that signs can have (which is called the field of discursivity, see supra) are then excluded. In our example: the signifier liberal democracy will give another meaning to the sign market than the signifier social democracy. When nodal points within a discourse start to obtain social dominance, it becomes a hegemonic discourse. How are these nodal points then constructed? We know that everything in the social, also the position of the subject, is overdetermined. The nodal points express something identical underlying all these subject positions. This is called ‘the logic of equivalence’. The problem is of course how we determine the content of that ‘identical something’. According to Laclau and Mouffe, this can only by referring to something external, something which is not equivalent, something which is thus different. This is called ‘the logic of difference’. But: this external ‘something’ cannot be positive, because a relation of equivalence has already absorbed all the positive things. The external identity, ‘the Other’ can only be negative. The Other identity is therefore presented as a constitutive outside which has no commonalities with the Self and is thus often presented as threatening (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 127-128). In our example: the signifier social democracy articulates the state as representing the will of all citizens in a democracy (this is the something identical underlying all subject positions) against the market, which is considered not to be democratic because it does not represent the will of all citizens (and therefore the market is seen as threatening). At the same time, the other
identity is needed because it stabilizes the own identity. Therefore, a hegemonic discourse can never be total or closed: ‘the struggle over what and who are included and excluded from the hegemonic discourse is a central part of politics’ (Torfing, 2005: 15).

Laclau and Mouffe thus have a very specific view on the identity of the Self and the Other and on the relation between the Self and the Other, which they consider as antagonistic. This view is based on the idea that subject positions are ‘overdetermined’. The antagonistic relation is therefore not a contradiction, because a contradiction is based on the idea that subjects are determined. If they are determined, the antagonistic identity is always what the determined subject is not. The antagonistic relation is neither a real opposition, because a real opposition is also based on the idea that subjects are determined. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 125) summarize this as follows: ‘the presence of the Other is not a logical impossibility: it exists, so it is not a contradiction. But neither is it subsumable as a positive differential moment in a causal chain, for in that case the relation would be given by what each force is and there would be no negation of this being’. Antagonism is then a partial and precarious objectification. The antagonistic identity is therefore an identity which prevents the total closure of the original identity (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 122-127).

In conclusion, Laclau and Mouffe now bring all these different theoretical conceptions together in order to constitute the concept of ‘hegemony’. A hegemony, which can be defined as the dominant discourse constituted around certain nodal points, emerges within a field of articulatory practices, defined by Laclau & Mouffe (1985: 134) as ‘a field where elements have not crystallized into moments’ (otherwise there would be nothing to hegemonize). The articulating subject must be partially exterior to the discursive formation it is articulating, because otherwise there cannot be an articulation. More specifically, the articulating subject is located in the field of discursivity. There are two conditions before a hegemony can appear. First, hegemony can only take place through a confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices. Second, the frontiers between these articulatory practices should be unstable. A hegemony will appear when the existing relational system which defines identities is weakened, when there is public contestation (see infra), when an ‘organic crisis’ takes places. Laclau and Mouffe refer to the concept ‘dislocation’. Laclau and Mouffe want to emphasize here that a hegemony only can appear when a society is ‘open’, and that not every social formation structures itself around a single hegemonic centre, single unitary and positive logic (because this would mean that we accept the essentialism of subjects). They accept that the social and the political are plural, and this is the starting point of their analysis: a hegemony entails the articulation of social logics which acquire their meaning
in precise conjunctural and relational contexts. These social logics are limited by other logics. These ‘logics’ bring us to the epistemological and methodological consequences of this ontological position, which will be discussed in the second part of this chapter (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 134-145).

3.2.2 Comparison between the logic of articulation and the logics of the social adopted in the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The ontological position discussed above is very different from the ontological positions that are currently applied in the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. We illustrated in chapter 2 that several authors adopt an objectivist ontological position. These scholars assume that a subject will act rationally, based on its interests. In contrast with Laclau and Mouffe who argue that the positions of subjects are overdetermined, these authors thus assume that the positions of subjects are determined by their interests. These interests are determined by the structure in which the agent lives. This also means that it is assumed that the identity of the subject is based on its interests, and that the antagonistic identity, the identity of the Other, is also based on interests. These identities are described as oppositions, which are seen in reality. This logic of the social is also referred to as ‘logic of necessity’ because the identity of an actor directly follows from its interests. In the academic literature of the 1970s and 1980s, we find Alfred Tovias (1977) and Richard Pomfret (1986) who stated that the EC granted special trade preferences to the Mediterranean countries because it sought a sphere of influence in the region. They pictured the EC as a rational power (agent) whose actions are determined by its interests in the international trade system (structure). Consequently, its identity is based on these interests: they identified the EC as a trading block. In the 1980s, the CEDECE (1980), Tovias (1979), Pomfret (1981), Taylor (1980), Yannopoulos (1983) and Capitani (1980) examined the impact of the enlargement of the European trading block on the interests of the Mediterranean countries. In the 1990s and 2000s, after the establishment of the EMP and the ENP, we find scholars who looked at the consequences of the conclusions of the EMAAs on the trade relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region (Hoekman, 2007; Gandara & Büge, 2006; El-Rayyes, 2007). Tovias (1997, 1998) examined the consequences for the economic interests of the Mediterranean

12 It can be noted that this ontological position is similar to the position of the orthodox Marxists, who argued that the position of a subject is determined by their economic interests and that the worker will act rational (see previous footnote).

13 Also Guessous (1970), Shlaim & Yannopoulos (1976) and Yannopoulos (1977) adopted an objectivist ontological position; they studied the impact of the trade and association agreements on the interests of both the EEC and the Mediterranean countries.
countries if they join the European trading block through the EMAAs, emphasizing that is absolutely necessary that the Mediterranean countries integrate economically in order to prevent a regression in FDIs (Tovias & Bacari, 1999). This analysis is confirmed by several other scholars (Licari, 1998; Escribano & Jordan, 1999; Ghesquire, 2001). Other authors studied the consequences of the EMAAs on the ecological and social interests of the Mediterranean countries (Syngellakis, 1997; Zaafrane & Mahjoub 2000; Martin, 2004; Hunt, 2002). In addition, also authors who studied the security relations adopt an objectivist ontological position (Biscop, 2003; Costalli, 2009). Nevertheless, this literature is rather limited, because most scholars who focus on security take a cooperative view on objectivism and subjectivism (see infra).

Moreover, most authors who studied the development of the common external policy towards the Mediterranean region also adopted an objectivist ontological position. They looked at how the different member states and the different European institutions try to defend their interests within the structures which are laid down in the European Treaties. In the 1970s, Lévi (1972), Petit-Laurent (1976) and Shlaim & Yannopoulos (1976) focused on the interests of the member states, while Lambert (1971) also went deeper into the relation between the European Commission and the Council, concluding that there is a struggle for power between these two institutions. Tsoulakis (1977), on his turn, studied the interests of the EEC and the Mediterranean region as a whole. Also in the 1990s and the 2000s, there are scholars who studied the interests of the member states regarding the creation of the EMP, the ENP and the UfM (see for example, Gillespie, 1997a, 1997b; Howorth, 1996; Barbé, 1998; Schumacher, 2001; Copsey, 2007; Lefevre, 2006; Kempe, 2006; Buras & Pomorska, 2006; Oktay, 2007; Furness, Gandara & Kern, 2008 and Lippert, 2007, 2008; Reynaert, 2009). Pélérin (2008) focused on the role of the European Commission in the ENP, and how it tried to expand its role at the expense of the Council. The identity of the European Commission is here presented as in opposition to the identity of the Council. Also the scholars who used a (neo)functionalist approach to study the nature of the UfM, adopted an objectivist ontological position. They assumed that political actors such as states start to cooperate on very technical issues because cooperation will meet their interests. Consequently, this cooperation will expand because it is functional to expand, i.e. because it meets the interests of different actors (Bechev & Nicolaidis, 2008; Seeberg, 2010b; Holden, 2011; Darbouche, 2011). Besides these scholars, the authors who studied the relation between the UfM and the MEPP also adopted an objectivist ontological position (Benyaich (2009) and Hollis (2011)).
In contrast with the authors who took an objectivist ontological position, there are others who adopt a subjectivist ontological position. They assume that a subject will not act rational, but that its position is determined by ideas, i.e. that its position can be unified around a ‘transcendental subject’.\textsuperscript{14} Because the identity of the actor is based on ideas, this identity is not fixed, but indeterminate. Because identity is now indeterminate, the antagonistic identity can only be determined in relation to the first identity. They are thus contradictory instead of oppositional. This logic of the social is also referred to as ‘logic of contingency’ in contrast to the ‘logic of necessity’ and the ‘logic of articulation’ explained above. In the 1970s, both Avi Shlaim (1976) and Wolfgang Hager (1972) indicated that the EC should not play the game of power politics, i.e. that it should not constitute its identity based on its trade interests. Rather, it should be a ‘civilian’ power, a ‘liberal and outward-looking body conscious of its responsibilities towards the Third World’. In the 1990s, this conceptualization of the EU’s role in the world returned back in the spotlight of the EU-studies, and of the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. While in the 1970s the idea of the EC as a civilian power was presented as an alternative for its behavior as a trading block’, in the 1990s the EU was presented by several theorists as truly being a civilian power. A civilian power is no longer a power which solely takes responsibility towards the Third World, but a power which also promotes norms and values such as democracy and thus ‘ideas’ in the Mediterranean region and in the world. Several authors even went one step further and characterized the EU as a normative power: a power with the possibility to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations, and thus also in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Manners, 2002). In this context, the EU is presented as an ethical subject which defends norms such as democracy and human rights by informing its foreign policy by values which are laid down in international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, it has to be noted that most authors were rather skeptical about the EU’s role as a civilian or normative power in the Mediterranean region (see for example Cakir, 2003; Holden, 2003; Stavridis & Hutchene, 2003; Khashon et.al, 2008; Biechi, 2006; Pace, 2007) or about the norms the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region such as democracy (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Freyburg et. al, 2009; Pace et. al, 2009) or cultural cooperation (Gillespie, 2004; Selim, 2003). Besides the studies on the EU as a normative power in the world and the studies on the norms the EU is promoting, also Natorski (2007) assumed that the position of Spain is determined by ideas, i.e. the idea that the Mediterranean region is a security challenge for Spain.

\textsuperscript{14} It can be noted that this ontological position is similar to the position of several Marxists thinkers, such as the revisionists and the radical syndicalists, who argued that the position of a subject could be unified around the idea that the product of their work should be socially distributed; see supra.
Moreover, also Kelley (2006) adopted a subjectivist ontological position: she explained how the ENP is based on the ideas adopted in the enlargement policy.

In contrast with the scholars who adopt an objectivist or a subjectivist ontological position, there are also authors who combine both positions. They see a dialectic relationship between interests and ideas and between agent and structure. These authors assume that the agent constitutes ideas, but that these ideas, which represent the identity of the agent, are clearly influenced by the structure and thus the interests of the agents. This specific ontological position, which is called ‘the logic of representation’\(^\text{15}\) can be found in the Foucauldian discourse analyses dealing with security conducted in the 1990s and the 2000s (see for example Pace, 2004; Bicchi & Martin, 2006; Malmvig, 2006). The discourse theory of Foucault is based on the ontological assumption that discourses are shaped by non-discursive relations (in contrast with the position of Laclau and Mouffe which reject the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive). Therefore, these scholars accept that there is a dichotomy between ‘an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse constituting of the pure expression of thought’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108). Michelle Pace (2004: 307) for example made this distinction when she concludes about the EU’s Mediterranean policy: ‘The EMP as well as the Common Strategy include several discourses referring to this aim of establishing a zone of peace and stability but does the EU have the collective will and ability to act decisively in this zone?’ It is not a coincidence that most scholars study security discourses: security is seen as the most important, and the most contested interest of the EU in the Mediterranean countries. It is therefore interesting to see how the EU sells, in its speeches, its security policy to the European citizens and to the neighbouring countries. This ontological position is also found in the studies which focus on region-building: the creation of a security community or a regional security partnership (identity of the Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean region based on shared ideas and principles) based on the interests of the EU (Adler & Crawford, 2006; Attina, 2004; 2006). Also Michelle Pace focused on the creation of a regional identity for the Mediterranean region. In her work, she argues that the different discourses of the member states of the EU and Morocco are based on their history (colonial legacy), identity and economic power (Pace, 2006; 2002).

Also Federica Bicchi (2007) identified a dialectic relationship between interests and ideas and between agent and structure. She argues that the Cold War, migration, Islamic

\(^{15}\) It can be noted that this ontological position is similar to the position of Trotsky & Lenin, who stated that the agent, in their theory the party, constitutes narratives (ideas), but these narratives, which represent the identity of the agent, are clearly influenced by the structure (interests).
fundamentalism and terrorism (interests; structure) created ‘cognitive uncertainty’ for the member states (which is an ideational process in which the agent is involved), which creates a policy window (a structure) in which the member states (agents) start a debate about the development of a common external policy towards the Mediterranean. The ideational process is thus here clearly influenced by the interests of the agents. The research on the role of the member states in the UfM (see Delgado, 2011; Gillespie, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; Del Sarto, 2011; Schlumberger, 2011) is based on the same point of departure, but here focus is more on the role the member states play in the creation of the framework: are they traditional leaders (which defend their own interests) or are they genuine entrepreneurs which are the looking for a consensus in the name of the common good (which can be considered as a norm). This research fits within the tendency we identified in the study on the Euro-Mediterranean relations from the second half of the Noughties, and which is based on the idea that all policies can be interpreted as fundamentally rationalistic and self-interested or as normative, or as a combination of both (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010: 583; see also chapter 2). Besides these authors, also Galtung (1973) and Holden (2009) adopted a more cooperative view on the ontological divide between objectivism and subjectivism, and a cooperative view on the relation between agent and structure. Like we explained in chapter 2, Galtung found that the power of the EEC came from its position in the world system: it is part of the center, and it maintains a center-periphery relation with the Third World. Its identity (which is characterized as ‘neocolonial’ since its policy is based on exploitation, fragmentation and penetration) follows from its interests/the structure. Nevertheless, Galtung states in the last chapter of his book that the EEC as an actor (agent) should use its power to implement another policy towards the developing world, which will lead to solidarity, equity and autonomy (which are ‘norms’ and which will change the structure). Patrick Holden (2009) adopted the definition of structural power as developed by Susan Strange. Doing so, he does not take a purely structuralist vision on international relations, because the definition also indicates that there is an actor who can influence the structures of the global political economy. Moreover, as we explained in chapter 2, he also indicates that, although structural power has a strong economic and thus an interest dimension, this does not mean that there is no room for ‘norms’ to be examined through this concept. Quite the contrary, it will ‘allow for an ethically neutral analysis without dismissing ethics in principle’ (Holden, 2009: 14). Holden thus chooses for a middle ground which avoids a stark choice between structure and agent, or between norms and interests.

In contrast to these ontological positions, there are a few scholars who already adopted the logic of articulation, although they do not explicitly refer to the position of Laclau & Mouffe.
The most well-known author here is Thomas Diez (2005), who used the logic of articulation to criticize the normative power approach in the European studies. He argues that normative power Europe is a discursive construction which constitutes an identity for the Self (the EU as a political actor respecting norms and values) and the Other (the Mediterranean countries as political actors not respecting norms and values). Also the study of Rafaella Del Sarto (2005) on the process of defining communities and cultures is based on the logic of articulation. The discourse of the EU on culture constitutes an identity for the EU (the ‘West’) and the Other (the Islam) which suggests that there is a clash between both cultures. Ifversen and Kolvraa (2007) who adopted the logic of articulation in their study on the ENP find that the EU is articulated as a cosmopolitan entity which respects values which are developed within Europe, but which are applicable anywhere. Nevertheless, these studies are rather limited. Diez (2005) only analyzed the Barcelona Declaration, Del Sarto (2005) solely focused on the cultural relationship under the EMP and Ifversen and Kolvraa (2007) only studied the development of the ENP. They do not study the whole policy and they do not examine if this discourse changes when the boundaries of the system are weakened, i.e. when public contestation takes place, or if the public contestation is simply absorbed (see infra). Moreover, they only focus on the main actors (Council/Commission), and not on actors such as the European Parliament or the EESC. Therefore, they do not examine if this discourse is dominant within the EU, i.e. if it is a hegemonic discourse (see infra).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic of the Social</th>
<th>Structure-Agent</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Antagonism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logic of Necessity</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Real Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic of Contingency</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>Contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic of Representation</td>
<td>Structure-Agent</td>
<td>Determinate</td>
<td>Contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic of Articulation</td>
<td>Structure-Agent</td>
<td>Overdetermined</td>
<td>Antagonism</td>
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Table 8. Comparison of the ontological positions adopted in the current studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations and the ontological position of Laclau & Mouffe

3.2.3 Research questions

Based on the previous paragraphs, we are now able to formulate the research questions this dissertation wants to address. These research questions rest on the two ontological assumptions formulated above. Like we explained, these ontological assumptions are different from the assumptions adopted in the current studies on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region explained earlier. Therefore, we will not examine how ‘society’ (how politics and policy) looks like. This is exactly what the other studies on the Euro-Mediterranean
relations already have done: they have looked at what the EU and the member states are doing in the Mediterranean region, and if they are successful. But therefore they assumed that society is determined, and that it is closed. Their idea of how society is constituted is based on how they see the position of the subject in this world, and their views are competing. The realists adopt an objectivist ontological position which entails that the position of the subject is separated, and that it is based on interests. Therefore, they will examine how the EU defends its interests in the Mediterranean region, which agreements it concludes, and if it is successful in implementing these agreements. Or they examine how the member states try to defend their interests in the region through the creation of a common external policy towards the Mediterranean region, and which member state is the most successful. By contrast, the constructivists, and especially the normativists adopt a subjectivist ontological position which assumes that the positions of the subjects are unified around a ‘transcendental’ subject. For them, these transcendental subjects are the norms and values which are promoted in the Mediterranean region. These norms and values tie the European institutions and the member states (subjects) together, in one common identity: normative or civilian power Europe. Most scholars look at which norms the EU is promoting, and if the EU is successful in promoting these norms. Nevertheless, this objectivism and subjectivism applied in the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations are ‘symmetrical expression of the desire for a fullness that is permanently deferred’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 121). Moreover, we do not depart from the idea that discourses are shaped by non-discursive relations. As explained above, scholars who depart from this point of view assume that the identity of a subject is solely determined by its interests, and that discourse should be seen as a narrative, an expression of these interests. Several authors examined the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region, how these discourses change, and on which interests they are based (and these mainly seem to be based on security interests).

In contrast with these ontological assumptions, we assume that the social is open, that everything in the social is overdetermined and that all actions, practices and social formations are discursive in nature. Consequently, we will look at how the EU tries to constitute society through discourse. Society, and thus also politics, is not in any sense given. It is the result of contestation, which might lead to discursive struggle (see infra). It is therefore ‘ideological, contingent on a particular organization of the social order, not natural’ (Edkins, 1999: 2). This leads us to formulate three research questions:
Research questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What kind of social order does the EU promote in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How does the EU promote this social order in the Mediterranean region</td>
<td>through its discourse?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Why is the social order the EU promotes in the Mediterranean region</td>
<td>maintained, i.e. why is the discourse accepted?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Research questions

The first question follows from the assumption that the social order is overdetermined, and that the EU is an articulating subject which will determine the social order. The second and the third question follow from the idea that the social order is discursive in nature. We have to identify the discourse which represents the social order the EU is promoting and why this discourse (and thus the social order) is accepted by political actors/people. The latter allows us to explain why the social order the EU promotes in the Mediterranean region is maintained for a longer time. In addition to these questions, we are interested to see if the discourse the EU (as an organization sui generis) is promoting towards the Mediterranean region is a hegemonic, i.e. a dominant discourse within the EU (see infra).

3.3 Epistemology

3.3.1 Retroduction as an alternative paradigm to explain/understand Euro-Mediterranean relations and logics as mechanism of retroductive explanation

As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main problems with the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is that they have not given any indication on how their theory can be applied. Discourse theorists who adopted their theory, made several attempts to explain their epistemological position. David Howarth (2005: 319) for example, indicated that poststructuralist discourse theory should mainly be understood as a problem-driven research: it carefully problematizes objects of study by seeking their description, understanding and interpretation. This led positivist scholars to reject this theory, since it cannot explain social reality. Moreover, following the ontological position that all social phenomena, objects and subjects obtain their meaning through discourse, poststructuralist discourse theorists claim ‘that there are no extra-discursive facts, rules of method, or criteria for establishing that can guarantee the production of true knowledge’ (Torfing, 2005: 27). Therefore, discourse theory is seen as a relativist method, which again led to severe criticisms from positivist scholars. Therefore, Jacob Torfing (2005: 27) made an appeal to his colleagues to ‘critically reflect upon the questions of method and research strategy’.

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Especially David Howarth reacted on this appeal. Although he indicated that poststructuralist discourse theory should be mainly understood as a problem-driven research that focuses on understanding, he never totally dismissed the possibility that this kind of discourse theory can also explain social reality (Howarth, 2005: 319). Moreover, both Howarth (2000) and Torfing (2005: 19-20) always argued that understanding and explanation should not be seen as ‘readily opposed alternatives’. They state that discourse theory actually blurs the distinction between these two, in that it aspires both to understand and explain social phenomena. In 2007, Glynos and Howarth developed this epistemological position in their book Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory. It is based on the ‘adoption of retroductive reasoning as the paradigm for understanding the task of explanation in social sciences’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 12). Retroduction as paradigm of explanation in social sciences is here presented as opposed to induction and deduction as paradigms of explanation in social sciences.

The positivist epistemology constitutes the basis for the reasoning of Glynos and Howarth. More specifically, they depart from the idea that the main objective of positivism is to provide a deductive model of explanation (which they see as the dominant method in science). This means that an accepted hypothesis, which is derived from descriptions/data, is tested. If the hypothesis is confirmed, it becomes a law which can then be used to explain related empirical phenomena and to predict the future. In this model of explanation, a strong distinction is made between what Glynos and Howarth call the context of discovery (the discovery of the hypothesis from descriptions/data – also known as induction) and the context of justification (the testing of the hypothesis or deduction). The latter, which is dominant in science, is preoccupied with explaining, and assumes an important role for testing, verification, falsification, formalization and presentation of theories (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 20-23). However, Glynos and Howarth argue that the deductive model of explanation, which is borrowed from natural sciences, does not hold for social sciences. They are very critical because the way in which hypotheses are ‘discovered’ from the context (the structure), is subject to the self-interpretation of the ‘agent’ (thus the researcher). Therefore, these interpretations become constitutive for the hypothesis. Glynos and Howarth (2007: 36) state that ‘the situational features comprising the content and the condition of the hypothesis do a lot of explanatory work’.
Therefore, they present an alternative, third form of interference (besides induction & deduction), which is called ‘retroduction’, and which moves from data to hypotheses to law. This blurs the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and provides a post-positivist picture of social science. More specifically, they make a distinction between three dialectal moments when a researcher engages in social science. First, there is the moment of **problematization**, where the researcher identifies a problem (data). Second, he or she will provide a **retroductive explanation** for this problem (hypotheses), which will lead to the **construction of a theory** (law). Explanation refers to the idea that hypotheses are discovered from the context by the researcher (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 38). This can lead to new explanatory categories, new theoretical grammar (law). How is this done? In other words: what are the criteria for a ‘good’ explanation? Glynos and Howarth (2007: 32) refer for this answer to the critical realists\(^\text{16}\) who also adopt a retroductive form of reasoning and who argue that ‘the conditions for a good explanation are satisfied if the postulated mechanism is capable of explaining the phenomenon investigated (evidence); that there are good reasons for believing in the existence of the mechanism (consistency); and that it is not possible to think of any equally plausible alternatives (exhaustiveness)’. This means that retroduction is based on practices of **persuasion**, which is the third dialectal moment in social science practice. They state: ‘Crucially, however, the persuasive aspect of justification extends to the task of convincing the relevant audience about the way the problem was characterized (or re-characterized) in positing the proto-explanation at the outset, pointing us back to the context of discovery’ (by which they illustrate that retroduction blurs the strict distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification as indicated by the positivists; Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 38). This determines the

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\(^{16}\) The critical realists, with Roy Bashkar as a leading figure, were the first to criticize the application of the positivist epistemology in social sciences, which they consider only to be suitable for natural sciences (just like Glynos & Howarth assume). They argue that social structures, in contrast with natural structures, ‘do not exist independently of the activities they govern nor are they simply external to the agent’s conceptions of what they are doing’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 29). They consider theories to be exclusively explanatory, and not predictive, and therefore they reject a purely positivist approach. Instead, they invoked retroductive reasoning, an epistemological position which is also adopted by Glynos & Howarth (2007).
validity of an approach. By persuasion, the researcher intervenes in the academic research and in political reality.

Figure 4. Two pictures of social science (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 33)

This constitutes the ‘formal’ aspects which retroductive reasoning should meet, but there is also a substantial aspect, and this is the mode of retroductive reasoning which is referred to in the previous paragraph. If we go deeper into the mode that is capable of explaining the phenomenon investigated, the critical realists state that causal mechanisms are the way in which phenomena should be explained. However, Glynos and Howarth (2007) disagree and argue that the interpretation of the functioning of the mode (and thus the epistemological position per se) depends on the ontological position of the researcher. More specifically, they illustrate that the logic of the social of the critical realists depend upon a three-fold stratification of the social reality: ‘the real, which is made up of the inherent properties of causal mechanisms linking objects, the actual, which consists of events, and the empirical, which is made up of our experiences of such events’. And: ‘the passage between each of these discrete levels is contingent. Thus, events can occur without being experienced by a subject, and crucially, multiple causal mechanism and tendencies can occur, yet counteract one another, such that no actual event takes place’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 28-29). Consequently, the critical realists assume that social science is limited to examining the empirical, the events we experience. The philosophy of science is in this case confined to ‘the kind of statements we can make about objects or events’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 30). By illustrating this, Glynos & Howarth demonstrate that the
epistemological position of the critical realists is based upon their ontological position. This implies that the mode for a retroductive explanation of the social world might also be based on the self-interpretations of the researcher, as some post-positivists would state. Retroductive explanation can thus have different modes: self-interpretations, causal mechanisms and it can also be ‘articulatory in character’, i.e. based on logics. The latter is the poststructuralist interpretation of the mode of retroductive explanation, and will be applied in this dissertation.

In order to explain the poststructuralist mode of retroductive explanation, Glynos and Howarth (2007: 103-132) return to the two ontological assumptions of Laclau and Mouffe which we discussed above. By doing so, they emphasize the directional relationship between ontology, epistemology and methodology. First, everything in the social is overdetermined. In the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 110): ‘the discursive formation is open, and the transition from elements to moments is never entirely fulfilled’. Second, all actions, practices and social formation are discursive in nature. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 107) reject the distinction between discursive and non-discursive. They do not deny that objects exist externally to thought, but they state that these objects cannot constitute themselves outside discourse. Based on these two ontological assumptions, Glynos and Howarth make a distinction between four ontological dimensions of social reality: the social, political, ideological and ethical practices. They define social practices as ‘the ongoing, routinized forms of human and societal reproduction’, also called a regime (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 104). An example of this is taking the car in the morning to go to work: this happens on a regular basis, and therefore has a repetitive character. It is important to keep in mind that all social practices are located within a field of discursive social relations (second ontological assumption). In some cases, no one will ever question the rules animating the social practice of taking the car to go to work. In that case, this practice will contribute to the reproduction of wider systems of social relations. However, as mentioned earlier, the discursive formation is open (first ontological assumption). It is thus perfectly possible that someone someday will start to question this practice based on an ideal or norm. To return to our example: one day someone might indicate that taking the car to go to work has a negative influence on the environment. This is what we call ‘public contestation’. If practices appear not to invite public contestation (subordination) or these practices prevent the public contestation (domination), then they just remain ‘social practices’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 120-121). Glynos and Howarth (2007: 121) state that ‘social practices are understood to keep public contestation at bay they tend to be unofficial in character, in the sense that they operate in the interstices of official institutional practices, they share an affinity with what Gramsci calls the institutions of civil society or what Althusser calls the ideological state apparatus’.
However, it is thus possible that public contestation starts to appear. Then, there are two possibilities. This public contestation can be prevented from further arising by existing powers, it can be ‘absorbed’. This is a political practice. By contrast, it can also lead to collective mobilization or a discursive struggle. In that case, a dislocation of social relations can take place, and this can provoke new political practices (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 110-113). Political practices, according to Glynos and Howarth (2007: 121), are practices ‘which seek to generate, contain or resolve the public contestation of social norms’. If individuals or movements are successful in challenging existing norms and institutions, this might modify or reorder the system of existing social practices, the regime. Then, political practices are hegemonic. When a dislocation takes place, response can be double. Either the subjects that are challenging the existing regimes recognize the contingency of social reality, i.e. the idea that society is never closed (what Glynos and Howarth (2007: 111) call the authentic, ethical response) or they deny the contingency of social reality and they try to close society (what Glynos & Howarth (2007: 111) call the inauthentic, ideological response).

This detailed ontology of social relations provides the basis for the development of the basic units of explanation: logics.\textsuperscript{17} Glynos and Howarth (2007: 135) explain ‘logics’ as follows. They start by saying that ‘when we talk about the logic of a practice or regime of practices we seek to capture those aspects which make it tick’. More specifically, they will investigate the possibility of phenomena – ‘the kind of statements that we make about phenomena in various spatial and temporal contexts’. They refer to Laclau for a further definition of logic of a practice: it is about ‘the rules of a particular language (or grammar), as well as the conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 136). A distinction is made between three kinds of logics based on the four dimensions that we found in the ontology of social relations: social logics (social practices), political logics (political practices) and fantasmatic logics (ideological and ethical practices).\textsuperscript{18} Social logics refer to the rules of a particular language or grammar (so to the first part of the definition of the logic of a practice). By investigating these rules, we will be able to discover the meaning and function of a social practice: we will identify and characterize the social practice. In order to investigate these rules, we will first have to look at how the actors involved in a certain social practice interpret and justify their social practice (in other words: we will look at their self-interpretation), and we will describe this. More specifically,

\textsuperscript{17} The term ‘logics’ should here be understood in the context of the logic of articulation (the ontological position of this dissertation), i.e. we will now look at the different logics of articulation. The term ‘logics’ does not refer to the different ontological positions, like in the previous part of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{18} These three logics are based upon the work of Jacques Lacan, who made a distinction between three orders: The Real, The Symbolic and The Imaginary.
we will describe and explain the ‘regularity in dispersion’ of discursive formation: we will look at how words or concepts derive their meaning through their relationship with other words or concepts. In conclusion: social logics look at the relationship between words/concepts in the discourse of political actors and at how these words/concepts and this relationship represents a certain social order.

In order to explain and to criticize a social practice, we will need to pass the self-interpretation of the political actors (if we would only examine the self-interpretation of the political actor, we would adopt contextualized self-interpretation as mode of explanation). Therefore, we need to introduce the concepts ‘political’ and ‘fantasmatic’ logics (which will explain and criticize it). Political logics refer to the conditions which makes a practice possible and vulnerable (so to the second part of the definition of a logic of a practice), to the ‘institution of the social’ or to its ‘de-institution (dislocation) or contestation’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 142). By investigating this institution or de-institution, we will be able to characterize political practice. In order to study this institution and de-institution, we need to look at how a regime, a ‘regularity in dispersion’ is limited. Glynos and Howarth (2007: 144) state: ‘Political logics thus provide a conceptual vocabulary to show how these limits are constituted, transformed and absorbed’ and they refer to the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. As explained above, the logic of equivalence refers to nodal points which express something identical underlying all subjects’ positions. This identical something can only be established by referring to something external, something which is not equivalent, and which is thus different. This is called the logic of difference, but this external something is not something positive, because the relation of equivalence has already absorbed all the positive things. It is thus something negative. Glynos and Howarth (2007: 144) add that the logics of equivalence and difference ‘emphasize the dynamic process by which political frontiers are constructed, stabilized, strengthened or weakened’. In conclusion, political logics thus look at how words or concepts are used to create a common identity for different political actors and which represent the social order the articulating political actor is promoting.

In addition to political logics, ‘fantasmatic logics provide the means to understand why specific practices and regimes ‘grip’ subjects’. In other words, we look at why the discourse that is used by the political actor is appealing. Glynos & Howarth (2007: 145) state that the identification of fantasmatic logics ‘contributes to our understanding of the resistance to change of social practices (the ‘inertia’ of social practices) but also to the speed and direction of change when it does happen’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 145). More specifically, it is the role of fantasy
or ‘myths’ either to contain or to suppress public contestation, and thus to prevent a dislocation, or to give direction and energy to new political practices. It does so through the promise of a certain fullness once a named obstacle is overcome (the beatific side of fantasy) or through the promise of a disaster when this obstacle cannot be overcome (the horrific side of fantasy, Glynos, 2008: 10). Moreover, the articulation of fantasy differs depending on whether the logic of equivalence or the logic of difference dominates. In the logic of equivalence, fantasmatic logics will take the form of a narrative in which an internal obstacle blocks the own identity, while in the logic of difference they will take the form of a narrative in which an external obstacle blocks the own identity.

In his later work, Glynos (2008) explains fantasmatic logics more in detail. He states that fantasmatic logics are based on a notion of ‘enjoyment’ (which is a psychoanalytic term adopted from Jacques Lacan), i.e. they have an inherently transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals. In order to clarify his point, Glynos refers to Zizek (1994, quoted in Glynos, 2008: 12), who stated that ‘(w)hat ‘holds together’ a community most deeply is not so much identification with the Law that regulates the community’s ‘normal’ everyday circuit, but rather identification with a specific form of transgression of the Law, of the Law’s suspension’. Nevertheless, it is possible that these logics of fantasy confirm certain relations of domination, instead of overthrowing them. This is illustrated by Glynos (2008) in his paper: he explains how fantasies can work in such a way to sustain certain workplace practices instead of changing them, because the transgression against these workplace practices can assure that the work is done better or faster. He therefore refers to the study of Contu & Willmott (2006) who use Julian Orr’s ethnographic study ‘Talking about Machines’ (1996) to explain the role of fantasy informing workplace practices at the Xerox corporation. This study goes deeper into how individual workers started to repair copier machines without following the rules of the management about how to deal with broken copier machines. The individual workers succeeded in repairing copiers with a greater efficiency and at a higher success rate than would have been the case if they had obeyed the management rules. This gave these individual workers a certain identity by ‘providing them with an opportunity to derive recognition and competitive kudos from them and to partake in comradely exchanges’ (Glynos, 2008: 12). Their identity is based on the logic of great mastery. Nevertheless, Contu and Willmott (2006) illustrate in their study how ‘such ostensibly subversive activity ends up serving the corporation’s bottom line better than would have been possible by simply following management’s directives’ (Glynos, 2008: 12). Fantasies then avoid rather than support a radical contingency of social relations, and are considered as ideological (because they support the impulse of the closure of social relations). Glynos (2008: 13) states: ‘in this Lacanian
perspective fantasy serves to protect the subject from the anxiety linked to a direct confrontation with the radical contingency of social relations’. He adds that the relation between the subject and a fantasy plays an important role in determining the mode of subjectivity. If the subject overinvests in its fantasy, its mode can be called ‘ideological’. However, if the subject succeeds in taking some distance from its fantasy, recognizing the contingency of social relations, its mode of subjectivity is considered as ‘ethical’. To conclude, we will repeat here how logics differ from contextualized self-interpretation and causal mechanisms: logics look at the self-interpretation of agents in relation to the context (and not outside this context; which differ them from causal mechanisms) and they study the structures and conditions which make these self-interpretations possible (which differ them from contextualized self-interpretations).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logics</th>
<th>Function</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social logics</strong></td>
<td>Look at the relationship between concepts/words and how this represents a certain social order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political logics</strong></td>
<td>Look at how words and concepts are used to create a common identity for political actors which represent the social order the actor is promoting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fantasmatic logics</strong></td>
<td>Look at why the discourse is appealing</td>
</tr>
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Table 10. Overview of the functions of logics

3.3.2 Comparison between logics, the other modes of retroductive explanation and positivism adopted in the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations

In the previous paragraphs, we have made a distinction between two different epistemological positions scientists can adopt: positivism, which wants to explain social reality and which wants to discover clear causal laws in social sciences in order the predict the future, and post-positivism, which provides the possibility to adopt a middle position between explaining and understanding. The latter sees an important role for retroductive explanation, which blurs the distinction between context of discovery (induction) and context of justification (deduction). Retroductive explanation can have different modes: self-interpretation, causal mechanisms and logics. The latter is the epistemological position that is adopted in this dissertation. This position is very different than the position adopted by the current studies of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In these studies, we find scholars who adopt a positivist approach, who want to identify causal laws and to predict the future. The methodologies they adopt range from pure descriptive approaches to statistical analyses. Examples are the descriptions of the development of a common European external policy in the 1970s. By describing the establishment of the GMP, these authors
developed some general ‘laws’ which determine the development of a common European external policy, such as the relation between the European Commission and the Council (Lambert, 1971) and the different views of the member states (Lambert, 1971; Lévi, 1972; Petit-Laurent, 1976; Shlaim & Yannopoulos, 1976). Also with the establishment of the EMP, scholars studied the position of the member states towards the development of a common external policy (Gillespie, 1997a, 1997b; Howorth, 1996; Barbé, 1998; Schumacher, 2001). These are examples of inductive reasoning. These laws, which developed into theories (intergouvernamentalism), were then tested by other scholars who tried to provide a more general picture of the development of the EMP, the ENP (Copsey, 2007; Lefevre, Kempe, Buras & Pomorska, 2006; Oktay, 2007; Furn, Gandara & Kern, 2008; Lippert, 2007, 2008) and the UfM (Alboni, 2009; Reynaert, 2009). Aliboni (2009) even predicted that the UfM would not function at all because of the problems linked with its intergovernmental nature. In addition to the scholars who tested hypotheses derived from intergouvernamentalism, Bechev & Nicolaidis (2008), Seeberg (2010b), Holden (2011) and Darbouche (2011) test the hypotheses derived from (neo)functionalism in order to explain the UfM. These are examples of deductive reasoning.

Other examples of studies which adopt a positivist approach are the ones which examine and explain the impact of the agreements concluded between the EEC/EU and the Mediterranean countries on either the EEC/EU or on the Mediterranean region. In the 1970s, several authors studied the impact of the GMP and the cooperation agreements on the trade relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries and on the relations with the US and the GATT (Guessous, 1970; Shlaim & Yannopoulos, 1976; Yannopoulos, 1977; Tovias, 1977; Tsoulakis, 1977; CEDECE, 1980; Pomfret, 1986), while in the 1990s, studies looked at the impact of the EMAA on the trade relations and the evolution to the creation of an EMFTA (Hockman, 2007; Gandara & Büge, 2008; El-Rayyes, 2007; Tovias, 1997, 1998; Tovias & Bacaria, 1999; Licari, 1998; Escribano & Jordan, 1999; Ghesquire, 2001; Syngellakis, 1997; Zafranae & Mahjoub, 200; Hunt, 2002; Martin, 2004; De Ville & Reynaert, 2010). These authors departed from the idea that the conclusion of trade agreements will lead to the creation of greater prosperity within but especially beyond the borders of the EU. This general ‘law’ is then tested (often through the use of statistics) by looking at the conditions in which these agreements are concluded, which then led to the confirmation or the rejection of the hypotheses that trade agreements are leading to more prosperity. In some cases, authors also tried to predict further evolutions, such as Ivan Martin (2004: 450) who stated that ‘the implementation of the free trade area without the proposed countervailing and accompanying measures could cross this social stability line and end up being destabilizing and detrimental to the development prospects of
those countries’. These are all examples of deductive reasoning. Also the potential impact of the enlargement of the EEC in the 1980s is studied from a positivist perspective. These studies focused on explaining and predicting the (potential) consequences for the Mediterranean countries (loss of trade income, Tovias, 1979; Pomfret, 1981; Taylor (1980); Yannopoulos, 1983; no impact on investment, Capitani, 1980) and for the EEC if the EEC does not compensate the Mediterranean countries for their losses (loss of influence in the region, Taylor, 1980). Like the studies on the impact of the trade agreements, the studies adopted a deductive model of explanation and prediction.

Following the position of Glynos and Howarth described above, we are rather critical about the way social science is conducted here, for two reasons. First, in inductive reasoning, the researcher tries to constitute a generalization based on individual instances. However, the ways in which these generalizations are discovered are subject to the interpretation of the researcher of these individual stances. In deductive reasoning, the researcher tests the hypothesis that he or she derived from a general law. However, like Glynos and Howarth (2007: 36) indicated, the relevance of context in attributing sense and significance to data against which the hypotheses are tested, is not taken into account. In both cases, the positivist approach does not pay any attention to the possibility that the interpretation of the researcher can play a role in social science. Second, these studies are not very critical to the policy of the EU in the Mediterranean region. Their critique to the policy is limited to the point where they have to reject the tested hypotheses because they do not confirm the general law. An example of this is the critique of Martin (2004) that the EMAAs will not bring prosperity to the Mediterranean unless the EU takes measures. But the overall policy is not questioned at all, it is only stated that it does not really turn out as expected.

By contrast, a post-positivist approach, or retroductive reasoning takes into account the self-interpretation of the agent because it entails a critical explanation when a researcher moves from data to hypotheses to theory (although they are in studies often presented the other way around: theory, hypotheses and data). In the current studies of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, we find some authors who used retroductive reasoning in order to explain social reality. As explained earlier, retroductive reasoning can have different ‘mechanisms’ (or ‘content’): contextualized self-interpretation, causal mechanisms and logics. The first of these mechanisms, contextualized self-interpretation can be found in the academic literature on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. These studies argue that human beings cannot be treated as an ‘object among objects’ like positivists do. By contrast, they state that ‘both the
subject and object of research consists of meaningful behaviour, and it is at that intersection of their respective system of rules that we can begin to understand and explain the activity under investigation’. Consequently, the main subjects of social sciences are self-interpreting beings with changing self-interpretations (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 54). A researcher examines these self-interpretations and interprets them. Interpreting self-interpretations leads to contextualized self-interpretations. More specifically, they examine the ideas, i.e. the traditions, webs of belief, and ‘institutions’ of actors using ethnographic methods, in-depth interviews, thick description and textual analysis of speeches and official documents. The studies of the EU as a normative power in the Mediterranean region in the 1990s and the 2000s are examples of the research on self-interpretations. The authors of these studies examined the ideas on which the EMP and ENP is based, assuming that the EU promotes certain norms and values in a world where, according to the EU, these norms and values are not respected (Bicchi, 2006; Pace, 2007).

However, if we evaluate the hermeneutical approach to the study of social realities, there are two critical points which affect the value of contextualized self-interpretations as logic of explanation. The first is that this approach only looks at the self-interpretations of the subject: there is a lack of explanatory concepts. And if there are explanatory concepts, these remain very close to the phenomenon that is examined (see for example normative power Europe). Like Glynos & Howarth (2007: 81) state: ‘explanation is understood not in terms of universal subsumption à la the causal law paradigm (subsuming particularities under universal causal laws), but rather in terms of the production of particular normatively informed descriptions’. This leads to problems with regard to the validity of the approach, because this depends on the self-interpretation of the researcher. The second criticism is that most of these studies assume that ‘men’s ideas and beliefs are checkable by reference to something independent – some reality’ (Winch, 1974 cited in Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 68). They do so to counter the criticism that they are relativists. This is for instance the case with the studies on the EU as a normative power. The norms the EU is promoting in the world are not just the norms of the EU, but they are based on international agreements such as the UDHR, which are universal (and thus ‘independent’) because they are signed by most countries in the world (Manners, 2002). However, these authors then subscribe to a conception of society that is closed (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 68).

A second mechanism of retroductive reasoning is a causal mechanism. Causal mechanism in retroduction should be understood as the mechanism that complements intentional explanation as the basic implementation in social sciences. Jon Elster, who developed the concept, believes that the basic element of explanation in social sciences is the ‘individual action
guided by some intention’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 85). He argues that self-interpretations of subjects are central, but that explanation cannot be reduced to that because also causal analysis plays a role in it. More specifically, an intentional explanation is complemented with a mechanism which is not subject to will or intention. This means that ‘causal mechanisms are added to intentional mechanisms, together they exhaust the field of science explanation’, while at the same time, it remains external to intentional mechanisms (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 86). Causal mechanisms are then ‘frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with unknown consequences’ (Elster, 1999, quoted in Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 87). What is then the difference with the causal laws which positivist approaches try to discover? Causal mechanism attaches attention to the self-interpretation of the agent, it cannot predict events, only explain them after they took place and they are general in scope (it stays closer to the context, it is not universal). Indeterminacy is the key concept which explains these differences: the explanation depends on the self-interpretation of the agent, which is not known before and which thus depends on the context. At the same time, causal mechanisms differ from thick descriptions because they are not case-specific, but they are rather general and they can be used across a wide range of historical contexts (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 89).

In the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, this mechanism can be found in the study of Federica Bicchi (2007) on the development of a common European external policy towards the Mediterranean region. More specifically, Bicchi explains that the main reasons of the member states to create a common European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is ‘cognitive uncertainty’ about others’ preferences, others’ actions and the consequences of actions. This is an ideational process. This cognitive uncertainty creates a policy window (the structure) in which the policy entrepreneurs (the actors) start a debate which will eventually lead to the creation of European foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. Therefore she assumes that the interpretation of subjects of social reality (in this case the member states which feel uncertain) will lead to a debate which will lead to the creation of a European common foreign policy (causality). In this case, she examined the creation of these policy frameworks after the creation took place and this lead to the construction of a new theory: ‘ideational intergouvernamentalism’. Also the authors who studied the role of the member states in the creation of the UfM in the special issue of Mediterranean Politics (Delgado, 2011; Gillespie, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; Del Sarto, 2011) use causal mechanism to explain the development of the UfM: they assume that the attitude and the motivation of the actors play a role in agenda setting and decision making of the UfM (causality).
In addition to the study of Federica Bicchi, causal mechanisms can also be found in the study of the EU as a civilian power. These studies depart from the idea that the EU will promote norms and values, but if it will succeed in doing so depends on its power (which is not subject to will or intention because it depends on which instruments it has to its disposal and how it interprets the situation on the ground where it wants to promote these norms). This conceptualization is in contrast with the concept of the EU as a normative power because the latter assumes that the EU’s promotion of norms is totally dependent on the will/the intention of the EU to promote these norms (see for example the study of Bicchi (2006) in which she argues that the EU should be inclusive and reflexive). In the 1970s, both Shlaim (1976) and Hager (1972) focused on the idea that the EU should promote civilian objectives, which then was defined as assistance and responsibility to the Third World. However, especially Shlaim already indicated that the extent to which the EU can act as a true civilian power would depend on its economic power. In the literature of the 1990s and the 2000s, we come across similar conclusions: the EU wants to promote norms and values, but its impact is very limited because the lack of instruments and/or the (EU’s interpretation of) the situation on the ground (Cakir, 2003; Holden, 2003; Stavridis & Hutchene, 2003, Khasson et.al, 2008).

However, if we evaluate causal mechanisms as a mode of explanation, there are several points of criticism which affect the value of this approach. One of these criticisms is that the idea of a causal mechanism is based on the idea of a causal law as ideal. Glynos and Howarth (2007: 91) state: these studies 'aim to universalize the scope of mechanisms by rendering determinate their prima facie indeterminate interactions and triggering conditions’. Therefore, these mechanism are ‘conceived as stunted or ‘proto’ causal laws rather than as alternatives to causal laws’. However, these mechanisms can never reach the status of causal law, exactly because they are dependent on the interpretations of the subject about the context. Instead of accepting this, some scholars who apply causal mechanism as a mechanism have tried to pass this. This might lead to what is called ‘the fallacy of psychologism’. An example of this can be given, using the studies of the EU as a civilian power. Consider the situation in which the concept ‘civilian power Europe’ is used to explain why the EU promotes norms and values in the Mediterranean region. If the EU will act as a civilian power, depends on the interpretation of the EU on the context, i.e. the interpretation of the EU if it is desirable and possible to promote norms. We then offered an explanation of the promotion of norms and values by reference to the concept of civilian power. It is then a small step to state that the EU promotes norms and values in the Mediterranean region because it is a civilian power. This detachment of psychological characteristics from the social context is problematic because these characteristics are socially constructed. In addition, we
cannot construct civilian power Europe as a mechanism within a wider set of social and relational structures, because the mechanism is always dependent on the interpretation of the context. If we would do this, this would lead to the fallacy of idealism, i.e. the idealization of these psychological characteristics. This denies the material existence of social reality. This assumes a specific ontological position, which we have dismissed in the previous part of this chapter (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 97-102).

3.3.3 Addressing the research questions through retroductive explanation based on logics

The previous paragraphs have presented retroductive explanation as an alternative epistemological position in social sciences. Furthermore, we have explained how several studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations already engaged in retroductive explanation based on causal mechanisms or on contextualized self-interpretations and why a retroductive explanation based on logics can provide a better understanding of social reality. We will now explain how our own research can be seen as an example of retroductive explanation. We recall here that retroductive explanation assumes that there are three dialectal moments when a researcher engages in social science. The first ‘moment’ of a retroductive research is problematization, where the researcher identifies a problem. In this doctoral dissertation, we observe that the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region has several times been under discussion the last 25 years. Events in the international relations, events in the Mediterranean region, or internal EC/EU events caused public contestation, and questioned the policy and thus the social order the EC/EU is promoting towards the Mediterranean region. In chapter 1, we explained how this public contestation (in the institutions or in the member states) led to an adaptation of the EC/EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region (we looked at why the EC/EU decided to set up, change and strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean countries). Each time this happened, the social order the EU is promoting has been reconceptualized or confirmed (data).

Consequently, we want to explain this social order and how it is articulated (second moment of retroductive research). This requires three steps. First of all, it requires the identification, the characterization of ‘the assemblage of social logics’. Here, an answer will be formulated to our first research question: what kind of social order does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region? We recall here that Glynos and Howarth (2007: 172) indicated that ‘the identification and operation of social logics requires some reference to- or passage through – the self-interpretations of the subjects’. How can we now identify these social logics? This can be done through the practice of articulation. Articulation is here seen as an epistemological tool based on our ontological point of view. We recall that everything in the social is open, i.e. society
can never be totally closed. This is also the case for the researcher, who will have to articulate theoretical and empirical elements together in order to provide an explanation of the social phenomenon. This requires the practice of judgment enacted by the researcher, and this judgment will be based on intuition and theoretical expertise. What will guide the researcher in making his judgment? Glynos & Howarth (2007: 185) state that the concept ‘family resemblance’ as developed by Wittgenstein can help us. The concept of family resemblance ‘unites a set of patterns on account of a series of overlapping similarities which, though always regional, cover the entire terrain we identify as a concrete practice’. This means that a researcher can identify social logics which appeal to a certain pattern in other contexts than the ones in his/her analysis, and that he/she then can interpret and judge these social logics in the context he/she is studying (because a social logic is always context-sensitive). This is also what we will do in this research. We will identify the social logics in the social orders which are promoted within the EU. In order to do so, we have to go back to the academic literature. In the literature, we find studies about how the European member states and the EU institutions in the context of globalization and democratization try to organize their social order. These studies will be discussed in the first part of chapter 4. These social logics can then be used to identify the social logics in the texts of the EU (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9).

Second, retroductive explanation requires the identification of political logics. Here, an answer will be formulated to our second research question: ‘how does the EU promote this social order through its discourse’? Again we will follow a research strategy based on the notion of political logics as explained by Glynos and Howarth. We will reveal how political logics of equivalence and difference are mobilized by the EU to contain or to impose a social order. As explained above, the political logic of equivalence creates a common identity among all subject positions. The problem was how to determine the content of that ‘something identical’. According to Laclau and Mouffe, this can only by referring to something external, something which is not equivalent, something which is thus different. This was called ‘the logic of difference’. But Laclau and Mouffe also stated that this external ‘something’ cannot be positive, because a relation of equivalence has already absorbed all the positive things. The external identity, the Other can only be negative. The Other identity is therefore presented as a constitutive outside which has no commonalities with the Self. Several authors, and especially Lene Hansen (2006), have refined the strategy to identify the identity of the Self and the Other. These studies will help us to identify the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference in the discourse of the EU. Glynos and Howarth (2007: 163) indicate that the logic of equivalence and difference might seem to be ‘formal’ constructs, which lend themselves to quasi-transcendental formalization, i.e. they
can be applied anytime and everywhere, in any text. However, this is not the case, because also political logics depend on the social context in which they function. Context is thus also very important here. There are already some scholars who tried to define the identity of the EU and third states/regions in the context of the external relations of the EU. These studies, together with the work of Hansen (2006) can help us to refine the notion of political logics in case of EU external policy, and will therefore be discussed in the second part of chapter 4. This will help us to identify the political logics in the texts of the EU (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9).

Third, retroductive explanation requires the identification of the fantasmatic logics. Here, an answer will be formulated to the third research question: ‘why are the practices the EU promotes in the Mediterranean maintained’? In this part of our empirical investigation, we will study the logics of fantasy. More specifically, we will look for the construction of ‘myths’ which explains why the identity that is constructed is appealing for people, and which explains why the promoted social practices are maintained for a period of time. The logic of fantasy or ‘myth’ consists of three aspects: first, it has a certain narrative which promises an ideal when an obstacle is to be overcome or a disaster when this is not the case. Second, it contains a transgressive aspect against affirmed ideals and three, it represents an ideological project. In the literature on the EU, studies on myths are seldom, but recently (2010), a special issue appeared in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS). Especially interesting here is the article written by Ian Manners (2010) about the myths that are being told about the EU’s foreign policy. The articles of the special issue will be used to refine the notion of ‘fantasmatic logics’ and will be discussed in the third part of chapter 4. This will help us to identify the fantasmatic logics in the texts of the EU (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). Overall, social, political and fantasmatic logics are articulated together in an overarching explanatory logic that combines descriptive, explanatory and critical aspects. Retroductive explanation can provide us with new explanatory categories; in our cases different models of democracy which will be refined (see the following chapters and the conclusion) which will contribute to our understanding of democracy. This is how a retroductive practice of articulation involves a dimension of theory construction (even if the revision of ontological assumptions is not explicitly fore-grounded; Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 46-47).

The third moment of a retroductive explanation is persuasion. We already explained that the identification of the logics, i.e. the construction of an explanation requires practices of judgment based on intuition and theoretical expertise. Scholars applying the logic of articulation assume that their own explanation of the open, social reality is also a practice of articulation. Therefore, they reject the possibility to access the final and absolute truth (because that would
assume that society is closed). Therefore, the only thing scholars can do is try to persuade the academic community and policy makers of their explanation (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 190-191).

3.4 Methodology

3.4.1 Research design

Also the research design of this dissertation is based on the two ontological assumptions we discussed above. In this research, we assume that the social is open, i.e. that everything in the social is overdetermined, and that all actions, practices and social formation are discursive in nature. Consequently, society, and thus also politics, is not in any sense given. Public contestation can start a discursive struggle, or it can be absorbed. This means that there are two main questions which have to be addressed. First, who acts when public contestation starts to appear, and second, when does public contestation start to appear? The answer to the ‘who’ question determines which intertextual model will be applied to our research and the number of Selves which will be studied. Lene Hansen (2006) has identified the choice for a particular intertextual model and the choice of the number of ‘Selves’ as two main analytical choices to be made by poststructuralist discourse analysts in the determination of their research design. She makes a distinction between three intertextual models which might be applied in poststructuralist discourse studies: the study of official foreign policy discourse, the study of wider political debate or the study of widely dispersed discourses. When applying model 1, the researcher will study the official discourse, while in model 2, he/she will take into account the discourse of political oppositional parties, the media or corporate institutions. In model 3, a scholar will also study marginal political discourses and/or cultural representations (Hansen, 2006: 59-64). In this research, we already determined that we will look at how the EU tries to constitute the society in the Mediterranean region. This follows from our research questions. More specifically, the EU is considered as a ‘multiple’ Self. Our overview in chapter 1 learnt that the European Commission and the member states/the (European) Council were/are the main policy entrepreneurs in the relations of the EU with the Mediterranean region. They always act when public contestation starts to appear (and in most cases they are also the ‘sources’ of the public contestation). Consequently, we will study the discourse of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states. In addition, we will focus on the discourse of the EESC and the European Parliament. The main reason for doing so is to find out if these institutions, which were/are less involved in the debate and the formulation on the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region, apply a similar discourse as the other institutions, i.e. if a certain discourse is hegemonic within the EU (see also supra).
We will not study the discourse of the CoR. Our research starts in 1989 (see infra) and the CoR is only established in 1994 as a consequence of the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. We are thus not able to see if its discourse changes between 1989 and 1995. Our intertextual model is thus model number 2, the wider political debate, and we will study four different Selves: European Commission, the (European) Council (the member states), the EESC and the European Parliament. Through the study of the discourses of the different EU institutions, it is thus also possible to make a comparison between their discourses. However, the main objective of this comparison is not to explain these discourses by referring to the interests or norms of the different institutions (because that would assume a different ontological position) but to find out if a discursive struggle is taking place between different discourses and if there is one hegemonic discourse within the EU. In addition, it is important to note that we will not study the discourses of the Mediterranean countries for two reasons. First, we already explained that when public contestation started to appear about the EU’s policy, the Mediterranean countries were not (or only very late) involved in the discussion. Second, we already mentioned that we focus on discourse on globalization and democratization (see social logics and see infra) – this is how the social order is operationalized in this dissertation. However, until recently, discourses on democracy were very limited in the Mediterranean countries, because they were/are authoritarian regimes. There was thus no discursive struggle on democracy between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, and not even a discussion.

Now that we know who acts when public contestation is taking place, we will have to determine when public contestation starts to appear. The answer to the ‘when’ question determines the temporal perspective of the study and the number of events which will be studied. According to Hansen (2006: 77-80), a choice can be made between the study of an event at one particular moment in time, a comparison between a smaller number of events or an extensive historical analysis that traces the evolution of a certain identity. Regarding the latter, one needs to select certain events or periods which were more important than others and these moments should be close in time in order to make comparisons possible. As we explained above, public contestation starts to occur if someone starts to question certain practices/policies based on an ideal or norm. In other words: when the frontiers between the articulatory practices are unstable. Then, it is possible that the discourse, and thus also the presented identity, changes. Based on our overview of the Euro-Mediterranean relations in chapter 1, we can identify several times of public contestation: these are the moments when a policy actor starts to question the EU’s policy based on an ideal (for example less migration) or norm (for example more democracy is necessary in the Mediterranean region). We have opted for a comparison between a smaller
number of events (five) and thus five different moments in time. This means that we will compare multiple events, which are related by issue (the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region). The main reason for choosing multiple events is not because we want to present a historical evolution of the EU’s policy and because we want to explain this evolution, but because we want to take into account the possibility that the discourse might change if a dislocation is taking place, and because we want to consider the changes in identity. This will also allow us to consider if a specific discourse remains hegemonic.

Figure 5. Research design (based on Hansen, 2006: 81)

The first of these events is the RMP, launched in 1989. At the end of the 1980s, it became clear that the Mediterranean countries were confronted with severe economic and social problems. These problems were worsened by the changing international economic relations and the enlargement of the EC with Greece, Spain and Portugal. Moreover, due to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the CEECs received a high amount of aid of the EC. Both ‘events’ led to public contestation in the Southern member states and the European Commission. It was the European Commission which started to challenge the GMP and which developed the RMP. Under the RMP, democracy was for the first time mentioned as an objective of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. Given our focus on democracy as the expression of the social order promoted by the EU (see supra and the next chapters), we choose the RMP as the first event to be studied. However, almost immediately after its launch, the RMP was confronted with a lot of criticism from, especially from the member states. The RMP could not solve some of the security problems (migration) where the EC was confronted with, and which were caused by the
economic and social problems of the Mediterranean countries. This led again to public contestation. The member states, and then especially Spain, wanted to do more for the Mediterranean countries. They were the main policy entrepreneurs for the EMP, the second event that will be analyzed in this research.

In 2003, the EU was about to enlarge with ten new member states. The UK argued that the EU should develop a policy for those countries that were about to become the new neighbours of the EU: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The other European member states indicated that the Mediterranean countries should also be involved into the new neighbourhood policy. This provided a new opportunity to deal with the changing relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. The relations changed because of three reasons (and this caused public contestation). First, there were the attacks of 9/11 on the US. In both the US and the EU, focus was now on hard security issues (and especially the fight against terrorism). This became an important objective in the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. Second, in 2002, the UNDP published a report on Arab Human Development in which it questioned the lack of democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean countries. Indirectly, also the policies of the international donors that were active in the region (such as the EU) were questioned. This led the European Commission (2003b) to issue a communication in which it stated that it wanted to strengthen democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean area. Moreover, the Mediterranean countries had very little ownership in the EMP, and a new policy based on bilateral relations and differentiation provided an opportunity to tackle this problem. The ENP is the third event which will be examined in this dissertation. The fourth event is the creation of the UfM. The UfM is based on the MU, the brainchild of President Sarkozy. He wanted to build a Union consisting of the countries that are bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In the formulation of his idea, he indicated that the EMP and the ENP were not sufficient to tackle some of the problems where France was confronted with, such as migration from the Mediterranean area. However, Sarkozy’s proposal and especially his attitude caused public contestation with the other member states, and it was therefore turned into a strengthening of the Barcelona Process in 2008, as we explained in chapter 1. Three years after the reform of the EMP, the EU was confronted with popular protests and demonstrations in the Mediterranean region. These protests and revolutions also caused public contestation in the EU, which has reviewed the ENP (fifth event).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main cause(s) of public contestation</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; social problems in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic &amp; social problems in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks of 09/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Human Development Report 2002</td>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of ownership EMP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude of France</td>
<td>UfM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Spring</td>
<td>Renewed ENP</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Temporal perspective and number of events to be analyzed

3.4.2 Selection of texts

In the previous paragraphs, we already decided that we will study the wider political debate (intertextual model), i.e. the discourses of four different institutions (the European Commission, the (European) Council (the member states), the EESC and the European Parliament) on five (number of events) different moments between 1989 and 2011 (temporal perspective). In order to study these discourses, a poststructuralist discourse analyst should give epistemological and methodological priority to the study of primary texts (Hansen, 2006: 82; Waever, 2002: 26-27). Waever (2002: 26-27) stated: ‘Discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors, their hidden intentions or secret plans’ and ‘What interests us is neither what individual decision-makers really believe, nor what are the shared believes among a population (although the latter comes closer) but which codes are used when actors relate to each other’. Indeed, one of the main objectives of this dissertation is to study how the discourses of the different EU institutions establish an identity for the Self and the Other. More specifically, we are interested in how these institutions construct formal authority and how they employ forms of knowledge. Hansen (2006: 66-67) adds that formal authority can be constructed in texts through the claiming of knowledge, through indicating the ability to take responsibility and through indicating the ability to deploy power (see also chapter 4 on political logics). In addition, she states that ‘knowledge might be constituted through objective forms of fact-finding or through subjective and personal encounters; through historiographic readings of long civilizational structures or abstract models of power; through the explicit invocation of the voice and emotion of an author or the detachment of a distanced observer; through bestowing importance on cultural artifacts and traditions; or through a universal utilitarian subjectivity’
Primary texts developed by the political actor itself are the most suited to identify this kind of information.\(^\text{19}\)

In addition, we have to determine which texts will be analyzed in this dissertation. Hansen (2006) has developed two sets of methodological guidelines for the selection of texts. She suggests that the majority of texts should be taken from the time under study, but that historical material that traces the genealogy of the dominant representations can also be included. Furthermore, these texts should definitely include key texts, although also a larger body of general material can also be taken into account. Based on these guidelines, she developed a 2 x 2 textual selection matrix. Regarding the general material and key texts, Hansen repeats that they should be characterized by a clear articulation of policies and identities (then it is easier to apply a discourse analysis), they should be widely read and attended to (then they have a central role in defining dominant discourses), and that they should have formal authority (this signals power and authority). The amount of texts that has to be read depends on the research question, but it also depends on the availability of the material.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Temporal location</th>
<th>Historical material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time of study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General material</td>
<td>Three criteria</td>
<td>Conceptual histories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Clear articulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Widely read and attended to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Formal authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key texts</td>
<td>Primary reading of broader set of sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Digital search engines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conceptual histories</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Quoted in temporary debates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Re-published</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Textual selection matrix (adopted from Hansen, 2006: 83)

In this dissertation, the discourse of political actors (the European Commission, the (European) Council/the member states, the EESC and the European Parliament) will be studied. Therefore, policy documents, speeches and op-eds are the most important sources for the research.

\(^{19}\) The poststructuralist discourse analysis conducted in this dissertation is thus not based on interviews. One of the main reasons for this is that the text of an interview is constituted through interaction between the interviewer and the interviewees, and that the discourse analyst thus plays a role in producing the text (especially social desirability of the interviewee to the interviewer can affect the discourse). More specifically, it can affect the way in which authority is constructed, the way in which forms of knowledge are employed and how an identity is constructed. This might bias the results.
conducted here. Focus is thus on key texts which are taken from the time under study. More specifically, the discourse of the European Commission will be studied by analyzing the Commission communications on each of the policy frameworks. In the cases where the European Commission had most influence, we also examine speeches of the Commissioners involved in the formulation of the policy. Under the RMP, we analyze two speeches of Commissioner Matutes, and under the ENP, we study two speeches of the then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, and one of Commissioner Verheugen. During the review of the ENP in 2011, the European Commission worked in close cooperation with the High Representative and the newly established EEAS. Besides examining speeches of Commissioner Stefan Füle, we also study the discourse of Catherine Ashton on the promotion of ‘deep’ democracy in the Mediterranean region. Her discourse influenced the Commission communications ‘a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean’ and ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’. Overall, the Commission communications score high on the criteria formal political authority and widely read and attended to, but often less on the criterion construction of identity and policy. The main reason is that they are often the product of negotiations between the European Commission/High Representative and the member states. This is not problematic, but it is something that we have to take into account when studying and discussing the communications. The speeches and op-eds of the Commissioners and the High Representative will be characterized by a clearer articulation of identities and policies. 

The discourse of the (European) Council and the member states will studied by analyzing Council conclusions and texts, documents and op-eds of the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states. The Council conclusions score high on the criteria formal political authority and widely read and attended to, but because they are the product of negotiations between the member states, they score less on the criterion construction of identity and policy. The texts, documents, speeches and op-eds of the ministers of foreign affairs will score higher on the construction of identity and policy, but here the main problem is that they are more difficult to find. Regarding the RMP and the ENP, the member states had less influence on the development

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20 Overall, we thus mainly focus on the Commission communications and speeches/op-eds of the Commissioners and the High Representative and not on the other documents the European Commission has drafted such as the CSPs, the NIPs (negotiated with the Mediterranean countries), the country reports, the Action Plans (negotiated with the third country) and the progress reports because the Commission communications and the speeches/op-eds will contain the clearest articulations of policies and identities. The other documents are only referred to if they can provide a deeper insight in the social order the European Commission is promoting.
of the policy (see chapter 1). Therefore, we did not study their texts. In case of the Euro-Maghreb Partnership and the EMP, we analyze a text of Spain, which was the main member state involved in the development of these frameworks. Under the UfM, we study the speech of Sarkozy on the MU and the speech of Moratinos on the Euro-Mediterranean Union. Both speeches have highly influenced the later UfM. In case of the renewed ENP, we also analyze texts, op-eds and speeches of the biggest member states. The discourse of the European Parliament is analyzed from the resolutions adopted on the Euro-Mediterranean relations and the reports which preceded the resolutions. These texts are articulated by a formal political authority but score lower on the criterion widely read and attended to in comparison with the texts of the European Commission/High Representative and the member states/ (European) Council. In addition, they also score lower on the criterion the articulation of identity and policy. The same accounts for the EESC. Its discourse is analyzed from the opinions it adopted on the different policies. Overall, we are aware of the fact that the official documents of the institutions might score lower on the criterion ‘construction of identity and policy’ than for example speeches. The criteria developed by Hansen (2006) which we applied here, were mainly meant for studying discourses of states. However, the EU is not a state; it functions in a different way. The EU institutions defend their policy in relation to the other institutions through their documents (rather than to the general public through speeches). Because the EU functions in this way, the official EU documents most of the time reflect the policy and identity of the institution. The study of these documents thus makes it possible to find an answer to our research questions. Overall, 143 texts were selected for analysis (43 texts of the European Commission/the Commissioners/the High Representative, 56 texts of the (European) Council/the member states, 14 texts of the EESC and 30 texts of the European Parliament). A list of the texts can be found in annexes I - IV.

3.4.3 Method of analysis

Now that we know which texts will be studied, the only question left is how we will analyze the texts in order to identify the social, political and fantasmatic logics. The method of analysis is

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21 Overall, we do not study the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs or the EMAAs. These documents will only be referred to if they can provide a deeper insight in the social order the European Commission is promoting.

22 As the analysis will illustrate, it was not always possible to identify the fantasmatic logics in some of the discourses of the European Parliament, because its resolutions are often a reaction on the policy proposals of the European Commission (the High Representative) and the (European) Council/the member states (rather than that they represent a separate view on the social order to be promoted in the Mediterranean region).
based on our epistemological position, i.e. retroductive explanation through the use of logics, and on the work of Steven Sterkx (2006). Based on our explanation of the different logics, we already decided that we first have to look at how the actors involved in a certain social practice interpret and justify this social practice. We have to describe and to explain the ‘regularity in dispersion’ of the discursive formation (social logics). For each document we listed above, we will therefore select all statements which contain references to the social order the European Commission, the (European) Council and the member states, the EESC and the European Parliament want to promote in the Mediterranean region during a particular ‘event’ (RMP, EMP, ENP, UfM and the renewed ENP). Second, we have to explain and criticize the social practice, and this can be done by studying the political and fantasmatic logics. In each document, we thus have to identify those words and concepts which constitute an identity for the Self and the Other and which words and concepts make the discourse 'appealing'. Each time, we select the statements in which these words are used. The selection of the statements is guided by the research questions we defined in the previous chapter and which will be refined in the next chapter.

Each statement then receives a label. The labels are also determined by the refined research questions presented in chapter 4, and will allow us to identify the different logics in the discourse of the different institutions (member states). The main objective of the labels is to determine what the statement is about, what makes it tick. We coded each of the documents by hand. For the more recent documents, we used the programme NVivo 9 to help us. It was not possible to code every document by NVivo because the programme does not allow to code large pieces of scanned texts. For the period 1989-1995, almost all documents come from archives, and are scanned. Moreover, NVivo does not allow us to draw reports for each text (only for the different labels), which is necessary for our research since we do not only want to have information about the different labels, we also want to interpret each statement in the larger text. Therefore, NVivo 9 was only used as a help. Subsequently, the statements which received the same label are compared with each other in order to get a clear picture on the position of each institution (or in some cases a member state) during a particular event. Moreover, the meaning of each statement is examined and interpreted in relation to the other statements and to the broader text (and to the other texts of the same institution; to the context). For the interpretation, we do not only look at the context (because then we would apply contextualized self-interpretation as a

23 We found several of these documents in the central library of the European Commission in Brussels. For other documents, we made a request to several institutions such as the European Commission (the secretariat-general, DG DevCo), the EEAS, the Council (General Secretariat of the Council), the European Parliament and the ministry of foreign affairs of Spain.
mode of retroductive explanation), we also rely on the logics we will define in chapter four. In order to address our second research question, we also rely on the theoretical concepts of the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) such as nodal points, logics of equivalence, logic of difference, which we explained above. This will allow us to identify what kind of social order each institution wants to promote in the Mediterranean region, how each EU institution tries to do so, and why this discourse is appealing.

The results of this research will be reported in chapters 5 (RMP), 6 (EMP), 7 (ENP), 8 (UfM) and 9 (renewed ENP). More specifically, for each institution (the Commission, the (European) Council/member states, the European Parliament and the EESC), we first explain the social logics in its discourse, and subsequently the political and fantasmatic logics. This will allow us to make a comparison between the discourses of EU institutions on one particular event. In addition, we will be able to draw conclusions about the position of the different European institutions over different periods of time. In both cases, we will then also be able to see if there is one hegemonic discourse during a particular event and/or across time. For the presentation of the results, it is important that it is transparent, that it is clear for the reader. Therefore, Sterkx (2006: 136) suggests that we illustrate the results presented in the next chapters by statements of the different institutions (member states). In addition, he also states that this should be systematically (this is why each of the next chapters will be structured in the same way) and consistently. The latter will be done by founding the interpretation of the statements on the theoretical concepts of the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and on the different logics defined in the previous chapter.

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter started with an explanation of the ontological position presented by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) in their work *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Their ontological position is based on two premises. First, they state that society can never be totally closed, i.e. that it is not determined by one single principle. Moreover, they reject the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, i.e. non-discursive objects cannot have a meaning outside a discourse. Because subjects are not essentialist, it is possible that their meanings overlap. Meaning can be given through articulation, which is defined as the practice which establishes a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The result of this articulation is a discourse. When a discourse becomes dominant in social reality, it is a hegemonic discourse. Hegemony based on the logic of articulation is presented by Laclau and Mouffe as the new logic of the social. This ontological
position, which is adopted in this dissertation, is very different from the ontological position adopted in the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Most of these studies are based on another interpretation of social reality, which is the opposite of the interpretation of Laclau and Mouffe: these authors assume that society is closed, i.e. that society has an essentialist character and/or they believe that discursive relations are shaped by non-discursive relations. Several scholars see the relation between the EU and the Mediterranean region as dominated by the economic structure of the international relations, and the identity of the EU (European trading block) as determined by its interests. Also the position of the member states in the development of a common external policy is often seen as determined by the geographic structure of the international relations and their identity as based on their interests (security) within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean relations or on their previous (colonial) relations with the Mediterranean countries. Other scholars indicated that the relation between the EU and the region is determined by the EU which promotes norms and values in the Mediterranean countries. The identity of the EU is based on values (civilian power Europe, normative power Europe), and the identity of the Other is based on the idea that this Other does not promote these values. In the study on the position of the member states in the development of a common external policy, authors also departed from the idea that the interpretation of the member states of the context in which these relations take place will determine their position. Their identity is based on the interpretation of their interests, and the identity of the Other on the interpretation that the Other does not have similar interests. Scholars such as Pace (2004), Bicchi & Martin (2006) and Malmvig (2006) studied the discourse of the EU in the Mediterranean region, and assumed that this discourse is determined by interests, and more specifically, by security interests. Based on the ontological premises of Laclau and Mouffe, we then have identified three research questions. More specifically, because the society is seen as open, we ask ourselves what kind of social order the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region. In addition, we also wonder how the EU articulates the social order it promotes. Subsequently, we ask ourselves why this social order is maintained, i.e. why the discourse is appealing.

In the second part of this chapter, we discussed the epistemological position on which this doctoral dissertation is built. We introduced retroduction as a paradigm to explain Euro-Mediterranean relations, and compared it with induction and deduction. There are three different modes of retroductive reasoning: self-interpretations, causal mechanisms and logics. Based on this theoretical explanation, we showed how part of the academic literature which we discussed in
chapter 2 has adopted a positivist approach, while other scholars adopted a post-positivist, retroductive approach based on self-interpretations and causal mechanisms. However, we reject these different epistemological choices. Scholars who adopted a positivist approach do not take into account the possibility that the interpretation of the researcher can play a role in social science, just like they do not take into account that the interpretation of policy-makers can determine the content of the policy. Moreover, they are not very critical regarding the policy of the EU in the Mediterranean region. The scholars who adopted a post-positivist, retroductive approach based on self-interpretations have the opposite problem: they rely too much on the interpretation of the researcher which leads to problems regarding the validity of the approach. Moreover, they believe that the interpretation of policy-makers can be checked by reference to something independent. Also the post-positivist, retroductive approach based on causal mechanisms is rejected: it still aims at establishing causal laws and might forget the fact that subjects are socially constructed and that the context plays an important role. The generalization might lead to the idealization of subjects.

We therefore presented logics as an alternative mode of reductive reasoning. This specific epistemological position is based on the two ontological premises of Laclau and Mouffe: we reject the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, arguing that all actions, practices and social formations are discursive in nature, and we assume that society, and thus also discursive formations, are open. Based on these assumptions, a more detailed picture of social reality was drawn: it consists of social practices (ongoing forms of human and societal reproduction) which can be contested. Political practices generate, resolve or contain this public contestation. These political practices can be ideological (if subjects deny the contingency of social relations) or ethical (if subjects accept the contingency of social relations). Each of these practices can be identified through logics: social logics will allow us to characterize social practices by examining the relationship between words/concepts. Political and fantasmatic logics will examine the conditions which make these social practices possible and vulnerable. Political logics will do so by analyzing how words and concepts are used to create a common identity for political actors which represent the social order the actor is promoting, while fantasmatic logics will look at why the discourse is appealing. Subsequently, we demonstrated how our research is an example of retroductive reasoning: we linked the retroductive logic of explanation with the three research questions and we explained how the three different logics constitute the basis of our research strategy.
In the last part of this chapter, we first determined the research design. The latter is again based on the two ontological premises defined in the first part: the social is open and all actions, practices and social formation are discursive in nature. Policies (and thus also the social order that is promoted) are the consequence of public contestation, and the subsequent discussions between political actors at a particular moment in time. Based on our research questions, we eventually decided to analyze the wider political debate in the EU (intertextual model). More specifically, the discourse of four different institutions (European Commission, the (European) Council (the member states), the EESC and the European Parliament) on five different moments between 1989 and 2011 will be studied. This will allow us to examine if there is one particular discourse which is dominant within the EU, and if this discourse is dominant over time. Second, we explained that the discourses of these institutions will be examined through the study of primary texts. More specifically, we study the key texts of the different EU institutions at each of the determined key moments. The texts are mainly analyzed by hand. From each text, we select statements of the institutions which refer to the social order it wants to promote, and statements which contain words and concepts which reflect this social order and which makes it appealing. Each statement receives a label, and will be interpreted in its context using poststructuralist theoretical concepts, and the logics defined in the next chapter. The results of our research are reported in chapters 5 (RMP), 6 (EMP), 7 (ENP), 8 (UfM) and 9 (renewed ENP) in a transparent, systematic and consistent way. In the next chapter, we will go deeper into the logics in the policy of the EU and its member states.
Chapter 4: Logics in the policy of the EU and its member states

4.1 Introduction

This chapter takes the first step into the identification of the logics in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region, which is the second step of a retroductive explanation. In the previous chapters, we already engaged in the first step of a retroductive explanation, i.e. problematization. In chapter 1, we found that the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region has been several times under discussion the last 25 years. At several moments between 1989 and 2011, events in the international relations, events in the Mediterranean region, or internal EU events caused public contestation, and questioned the social order the EU is promoting towards the Mediterranean region. We explained how this public contestation (in the EU institutions or in the member states) led to an adaptation of the EC/EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region (we looked at why the EC/EU decided to set up, change and strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean countries). Each time public contestation took place, the social order the EU is promoting has been reconceptualized or confirmed. Consequently, we want to explain this social order and how it is articulated. This requires the identification of logics, the second step of a retroductive explanation. We recall here that logics look at the relationship between words and concepts in the discourse of actors and how they represent a certain social order (social logics), how certain words and concepts are used to create a common identity for actors which represent the social order the articulating actor is promoting (political logics) and why this discourse is appealing (fantasmatic logics). This is the way in which the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region will be studied. In chapter 3, we already went deeper into how these different logics can be identified. In general, Glynos & Howarth (2007: 185) suggest identifying first logics in other contexts than the one we are studying here (the external policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean region). These logics will help us to identify social logics in the ‘own’ context.24

Regarding social logics, we recall here that we want to identify what kind of social order the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region. In order to do so, we have chosen to identify first what social orders are promoted within the EU by the European member states and the EU institutions (the ‘other’ context). More specifically, we will study the social logics on which these social orders are based. The concept ‘social order’ is in this dissertation operationalized within the

24 This is what is meant with the ‘first step’ of the identification of the logics, i.e. we study logics in other contexts. The second step is then to identify logics in the EU’s discourse towards the Mediterranean region.
context of globalization and democratization, which we consider as the two main evolutions which influence the way in which a social order is constituted within the EU. This consideration is made based on the academic literature which focused on how social orders are constituted within the EU (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Rosamond, 1999; Hay & Rosamond, 2002). It is important to note that we have chosen to study the ‘internal’ social orders of the EU and its member states because we assume that there might be similar articulations regarding the way a social order should be constituted outside the EU, since we deal in both cases with the same agents: the EU institutions and the European member states. Moreover, based on our overview on the Euro-Mediterranean relations (chapter 1) and the literature review (chapter 2), we know that the two evolutions which we consider as most influential on the constitution of the social order in the EU also influenced the social order the EU wants to promote in the Mediterranean region: democracy is an important objective of the policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean region, and the idea of a globalizing world clearly influenced the policy of the EU. Nevertheless, we do not assume a priori that the articulations on the social order which should be constituted in the Mediterranean region will be exactly the same, since we adopt the position that everything in the social is overdetermined. It is thus possible that there are also other logics, but the identified logics will help us to determine where we should look at in the discourse. Moreover, we have to take into account that logics, although they represent a pattern, are always context-sensitive. In order to study the articulations of European political actors about globalization and democratization, we return to the academic literature. Most of the academic literature has focused on how the European member states have articulated globalization and democratization (an exception being Rosamond (1999) who also studied articulations of EU institutions). We will therefore identify the social logics which were articulated by the European member states in the past and today. In addition, we will also look at potential social logics which are articulated in the literature as an alternative for the current social logics. This entails three steps. First, we have to identify how globalization and democratization are interpreted by political actors. Second, we will have to describe how political actors reacted to globalization and democratization, i.e. how are they dealing with both phenomena? Here, we will analyze the policy-options which are articulated to deal with globalization and democratization. Third, we will examine how they justify their social practices. We will use these social logics to identify the social logics in the EU’s discourse towards the Mediterranean region.

In the second part of this chapter, we go deeper into the political logics. This will allow us to address our second research question: how does the EU promote this social order through its discourse? In order to identify the political logics, we have to study how logics of equivalence and
logics of difference are mobilized by the EU to contain or to impose a certain social order. The logic of equivalence will create a common identity among all subject positions, while the logic of difference will create an external identity, i.e. the Other. In the academic literature, we find several general studies about how a political actor creates an identity for the Self and the Other (Hansen, 2006). Moreover, several authors have already tried to define the identity of the EU (the Self) and third countries/regions (the Other) in the context of the external relations of the EU (Neumann & Welsh, 1991; Neumann, 1996; Rumelili, 2004; Diez, 2005; Del Sarto, 2005; Pace, 2002; 2004; Ifversen & Kolvraa, 2007; Jeandesboz, 2007; 2009). Although these studies sometimes depart from a different ontological position, these studies will help us to understand how political logics can be identified in the discourse of a political actor, and more specifically, the EU. In the third part of this chapter, we go deeper into the logic of fantasy, which explains why an identity that is constructed is appealing for people (or why it is no longer appealing) and why it succeeds in maintaining social practices. In the academic literature, the logic of fantasy is mainly referred to as ‘myth’. A myth has three features. First, it promises an ideal when an obstacle is overcome or a disaster when this is not the case. Second, it contains a transgressive aspect against affirmed ideals and three, it represents an ideological project. Literature on myths about the EU is rather limited. In 2010, JCMS published a special issue on myths about the EU. This issue, and especially the article of Ian Manners (2010) about the myths that are told about the EU’s foreign policy, will be discussed here, because it will help us to identify myths within the EU’s discourse towards the Mediterranean region. Overall, this chapter constitutes the basis for the empirical analysis which is reported in the next chapters.

4.2 Social logics in the policy of the EU and its member states

4.2.1 Studying the social order articulated by the EU and its member states: Globalization

Globalization has been articulated in many ways; it has been and still is a source of endless debate, both within the academic and the political world. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010), globalization is defined in very general terms. It is articulated as ‘fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence, according to which the significance of space or territory undergoes shifts in the face of a no less dramatic acceleration in the temporal structure of crucial forms of human activity’. Following the ontological position adopted in chapter 3, we believe that these fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence are material processes, but we argue that these processes have no meaning outside discourse. Therefore, it is our task to examine the discursive constructions of the concept globalization. How are these fundamental changes in space and time articulated?
These articulations are very diverse. Based on the definition in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010) and the book *Globalization: a critical introduction* of Jan Aart Scholte (2005), a distinction can be made between four dimensions along which globalization can be articulated: time, space, normative judgment and policy-options. The first two refer to the first step in our analysis: the identification of how globalization is interpreted. Normative judgment refers to the third step, because it is linked with how political actors will justify their social practices, and policy-options refer to articulations on how to deal with globalization (the second step). If we look at the dimension of time, several authors and actors have argued that globalization is a recent phenomenon, while others indicate that globalization has manifested itself centuries ago. The latter often indicate that there are several ‘stages’ of globalization, and some define it as a cyclical phenomenon, while others perceive it as a linear process (Scholte, 2005: 19-20). Related to this, some see the process of globalization as inexorable, while others see it as a contingent process (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 152). If we then look at the articulations about changes in space, a distinction can be made between authors/actors who see globalization as really affecting the social order, while others argue that it only has generated superficial shifts (Scholte, 2005: 20). Globalization is articulated as having manifested itself in several ways: on the area of technology (the spread of communication technology), on the area of culture (the proliferation of cultural norms, often referred to as ‘Westernization’, Jacoby & Meunier, 2010: 355), on the area of economics (free flow of goods, services, capital and labour, Abdelal & Meunier, 2010: 350; Fioretos, 2010: 384), on the area of politics (the emergence of global or supranational organizations). Regarding the latter, a distinction can be made between those authors and politicians who insist that globalization has infected the viability of the state, while others argue it has not affected the sovereignty of states. Several authors and actors also emphasize the shifts in governance. The state remains important, but they argue that authority has shifted along supra- and subnational lines. In general, a distinction is then made between global organizations, global firms, global civil society and subnational authorities. In addition, there is a debate about whether globalization is a positive or a rather negative phenomenon (normative judgment). Some people articulate globalization as bringing progress and prosperity. It increases welfare, efficiency and democracy, while others associate it with negative consequences: it undermines security, equity and democracy (Scholte, 2005: 25). Consequently, there are very different discourses about how to deal with this phenomenon. While some political actors indicated that it is a process which should be promoted, others state that it is a process to which countertendencies should be mobilized. The view on how globalization has affected ‘governance’ also determines how actors will deal with it: can we rely on the state, or is it better to rely on regional, supranational or
international organizations, or rather on the functioning of the market, or on civil societies (Scholte, 2005: 24-25)?

Like we mentioned previously, we will take a look at the articulations about globalization in the member states, and to a limited extent, in EU institutions through the academic literature. This will allow us to map out more in detail how political actors within the EU look and respond to globalization, and to identify social logics on globalization. These social logics can then be used to identify logics in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. In the academic literature, there are already some studies which examined discourses about globalization in the EU member states and in EU institutions. Especially Rosamond (1999), Hay & Rosamond (2002) and Hay & Smith (2005; 2008; 2010) studied these topics. More specifically, they examined the relationship between globalization and European integration, adopting a social-constructivist approach. They depart from the assumption that the social construction of globalization is an important element in the process of European integration because it defines the ‘politically possible’ within the EU polity, i.e. it defines its constraints and it create strategic opportunities (Rosamond, 1999: 653). Ontologically, Rosamond (1999) and Hay & Rosamond (2002: 150) distinguish two ways in how to look at discourses about globalization: globalization as ‘an instrumental device deployed in the promotion of a set of extant preferences and (perceived) interests’ or globalization as an idea which ‘might be held constitutive (in part) of the perceived interests of political actors’. The first refers to globalization as an example of communicative action as defined by Habermas, while the second refers to globalization as a discursive practice which establishes power relationships (Risse, 2007: 126). In contrast with the ontological position adopted in this dissertation, these authors see discourses on globalization as an expression of the interests of political actors or as influencing the interests of the actors, i.e. they adopt a cooperative view between objectivism and subjectivism. Furthermore, Rosamond (1999), Hay & Rosamond (2002) and Hay & Smith (2005) study globalization as ‘rhetoric’ and globalization as ‘discourse’, applying a retroductive explanation based on causal mechanisms. Just like Elster (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 86), they assume that the basic element of explanation in social sciences is ‘the individual action guided by some intention’. In their research, they make a distinction between ‘(i) the internationalization of a discourse of globalization as an accurate representation of the relevant ‘material’ constraints’ and ‘(ii) the more intentional, reflexive and strategic choice of such a discourse as a convenient justification for policies pursued for altogether different reasons’ (which are two different ‘intentions’) and (iii) the effects of globalization itself (which remain external to intentional mechanisms; Hay & Rosamond, 2002:
Despite their different ontological and epistemological position, their studies are very useful to identify discourses on globalization in EU member states and institutions.

If we then take a closer look at the empirical analyses of these studies, we find references to the four dimensions (space, time, normative judgment and policy-options) we distinguished above. Rosamond (1999) examined discourses on globalization of certain EU institutions. He finds that Commissioners and DGs in the European Commission started to articulate the concept globalization in speeches and in the first phase of the decision-making process, i.e. the agenda-setting. Discourses on globalization can be identified from the late 1980s on, to persuade the larger public of the creation of one, single European market: it constructs the EU as ‘a valid space in the light of external challenge’ (policy-options). The construction of the EU as a valid space requires three perceptions: ‘the recognition as a particular problem, challenge or threat, the perception of the need/right for a solution for this problem/challenge at European level, and the emergence of a consensus about a particular conception of a regional space in the minds of key actors’, and the concept of globalization played an increasing role in these perceptions (Rosamond, 1999: 662). These practices increased in the 1990s, with DGs Energy and Economy as leading examples (1996-1997). They mainly see the consequences of globalization on the economic/energy field, and the EU as the level on which these consequences should be dealt with (space, policy-option). From all Commissioners, Vice-President Leon Brittan was probably the most straightforward in its articulation of globalization: he calls it a desirable, economic process (normative judgment and space) which should be encouraged through stimulating economic liberalization. However, it affects the viability of states, and therefore the EU is the suited level of regulatory governance (policy-option). In addition, Rosamond (1999: 665) noticed that the 1999 Germany presidency of the EU also articulated globalization as an opportunity (normative judgment), but in contrast with the discourse of Brittan, it stresses the need for more solidarity policies (policy-option). In his study on the European Commission, Rosamond (2000: 15-16) confirms that the invocation of the concept of globalization in the discourse of the Commission can be seen as a strategic exercise to enhance Europeanization and the position of the European Commission. In addition, globalization is mainly articulated as an economic phenomenon. DG Trade sees it as a phenomenon that provides opportunities for the EU, while DG Energy sees it as a threat for the EU. In general, Rosamond (2000: 18) argues that the DGs which are working on the powerful economic domains see globalization as an economic opportunity which should be stimulated (logic of

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25 By contrast, references to globalization are absent from intra-community technical discussions.

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economic opportunity), while other DGs such as energy, industry, social policy, environment and agriculture take a more reactive stance against globalization. Nevertheless, there is no reference to DG RELEX or DG Enlargement in his study.

In his later work, Rosamond, together with Hay (2002) examines more systematically the different dimensions of discourses about globalization, and about European integration. They make a distinction between actors who articulate globalization as a non-negotiable process and actors who articulate globalization as a contingent process (time), and a distinction between actors who articulate globalization as a process which should be defended, and actors who articulates globalization as a process which should be resisted (normative interpretation and policy-option). This gives the following overview.

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<tr>
<th>Discourses on globalization</th>
<th>Positive consequences anticipated</th>
<th>Negative consequences anticipated</th>
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<tr>
<td>Inevitable/inexorable process (non-negotiable)</td>
<td>Globalization as external economic constraint</td>
<td>Globalization as a threat of homogenization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingent process or tendency to which countertendencies might be mobilized</td>
<td>Globalization as a political project which should be defended</td>
<td>Globalization as a political project which must be resisted</td>
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Table 13. Discourses on globalization (adopted from Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 152)

The political actors who see globalization as an inevitable process have a closed view on society, because they perceive globalization as an external economic constraint (space). Society is then defined by one single principle: economic liberalization. This view can be found within the UK, and then especially with the New Labour Party of Tony Blair. Globalization can bring opportunities for those who are willing to adapt themselves to ‘its logic of economic compulsion’ (also called logic of economic necessity; see also Watson & Hay, 2003 for more information about this discourse). In France, globalization as an external economic constraint was articulated by the anti-globalization movement. In contrast with the New Labour Party, they state that globalization has ‘pervasive cultural flows which threaten to dissolve national distinctiveness’ (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 153; logic of cultural compulsion). They thus articulate it as something negative. By contrast, there are also discourses which articulate globalization as a contingent process, presenting a more open view on society. Hay & Rosamond (2002; 154-155) argue that the New Labour government under the leadership of Tony Blair is a good example of this. They present globalization as a ‘good thing’ and a challenge in external fora (in contrast with the internal politics, where they articulate globalization as an economic constraint). The way they
want to deal with it, is liberalization (logic of economic opportunity). In addition, there are then of course also discourses which argue that globalization is a contingent process, but with negative consequences. Again this discourse could be found in France, but rather with the French establishment and the government around Lionel Jospin. They argue that the process of European integration is ‘a bulwark against the undesirable consequences of globalization’ (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 156). European integration will preserve the distinctiveness of the European social model (logic of social opportunity).

In addition, Hay & Rosamond (2002) also examined how discourses on European integration of the member states are linked with discourses on globalization. In the UK, New Labour has articulated European integration as a process that might become an external constraint (this is not yet the case, but it is a threat which has to be expelled; logic of economic compulsion). In Germany, successive governments (Köhl, Schröder) have consistently presented globalization as a non-negotiable process, and European integration as a means to deal with this, although they are not clear about the character of the process of European integration (logic of economic opportunity or logic of social opportunity). As explained above, for France, the process of European integration is the means to resist against the negative consequences of globalization (logic of social opportunity), but European integration itself as an economic constraint (logic of economic compulsion). In Italy, policy-makers have articulated European integration as an external economic constraint to legitimate economic and social reforms (logic of economic compulsion). However, more recently, the Prodi and d’Alema administrations referred to globalization as an external economic constraint in order to legitimate economic and social reforms, because they feared discrediting and delegitimizing the process of European integration (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 158-162).

In 2005, Hay, together with Smith, examined the discourses on globalization and European integration in the UK and Ireland, using the same scheme he developed earlier together with Rosamond (see supra; although they argue that besides being as a positive or negative process, the character of globalization can also be seen as contingent upon certain political choices). They come to the conclusion that the discourses on globalization within the New Labour Party are diverse. Globalization is articulated as both a non-negotiable and contingent process depending on the context, but overall, it is seen as a rather positive process. The articulation of globalization as a non-negotiable process which is positive has informed the New Labour’s domestic political economy policy, while globalization as a contingent process which is potentially beneficially for all, has informed New Labour’s foreign economy policy. In
addition, New Labour’s international development policy is rooted into the discourse that a socialized globalization must be made beneficial for all (globalization as contingent upon certain political choices). In contrast, Ireland’s discourses on globalization (which are also very diverse) are totally different, because these discourses were only articulated after the country’s development into a ‘Celtic Tiger’. Within the context of the domestic economic policy, globalization is articulated as a non-negotiable external constraint, but Ireland’s economic performance is contingent upon globalization. In Ireland’s development discourse, globalization is inevitable but it can be shaped to reflect ‘ethical’ concerns. By contrast, in their foreign economic policy discourse, globalization is articulated as a contingent process which must be made to benefit all. Here we can identify both the logic of economic opportunity and the logic of social opportunity.

If we compare these discourses on globalization with discourses on European integration, we see similarities (both processes are articulated as positive) and differences (especially regarding the nature of these processes). The Blair government has presented European integration as something which does not constrain the British sovereignty. By contrast, it has been presented as a contingent process, as an opportunity which can be beneficial for the British population. It must therefore be defended (New Labour’s domestic political economy), or be made defensible (New Labour’s domestic European political economy). The UK must therefore play a role in European integration, and this role is articulated in terms of globalization: the UK must play a role (in reforming the EU) to defend its interests in globalization. More specifically, there should be a new Third Way. Blair stated in this regard: ‘we have to reform the European social model, not play round with it… Europe has to find its own way – a new Third Way – of combining economic dynamism with social justice in the modern world’ (Hay & Smith, 2005: 146; logic of economic opportunity and logic of social opportunity). In Ireland, European integration has been presented as a means to achieve national sovereignty. It has been articulated as an inexorable process (but often for political reasons through the Irish government’s domestic political economy) and as a contingent process (both domestic and foreign economic policy discourses), but always in highly positive terms. It is a project that needs to be defended (domestic political economy) or be made defensible (foreign political economy). Regarding the latter, Bertie Ahern, the former Prime Minister of Ireland, argued that the EU should be a model ‘for the regulation of economic globalization that extends beyond trade’, i.e. there is a need for economic strength and social justice (Third Way). Nevertheless, in contrast with his British colleagues, he puts emphasis on the latter (Hay & Smith, 2005: 149-150). In the discourse of Ireland, we can thus identify both a logic of economic opportunity and a logic of social opportunity.
In their later work, Hay & Smith (2008; 2010) further examine discourses on globalization and European integration, but now they do not longer exclusively focus on the discourses of the governments or the New Labour Party: they questioned 657 Members of Parliament and civil servants in the UK and in Ireland and applied a factor analysis on the results. Overall, they find that discourses on globalization are structured in terms of the acceptance or rejection of core neoliberal premises, i.e. these premises provide a point of reference for the different views that were identified (Hay & Smith, 2010). In general, both parliamentarians and civil servants in the UK and Ireland see globalization as an economically driven process (space, several respondents also saw it as a technological process), which has benign economic effects (normative judgment), and which is associated with a series of political imperatives (Smith & Hay, 2008: 367-371; Hay & Smith; 2010: 908-909), which means that they see it as a contingent process (time; logic of economic opportunity). The latter is especially the case for parliamentarians. Nevertheless, in their public discourse, they often articulate globalization as a non-negotiable external constraint, which leads Hay & Smith (2010) to conclude that there should be made a difference between public discourses (communicative discourses) and private understandings (coordinative discourses). Also in the survey itself, both parliamentarians and civil servants state that globalization is non-negotiable if they are explicitly asked, but their answers reveal the opposite (Smith & Hay, 2008: 369-370). This does not alter the fact that they articulate globalization as affecting and threatening the autonomy of domestic policy-makers (Smith & Hay, 2008: 372-373). Regarding the policy-options, Irish parliamentarians and Irish civil servants are more likely to see European Integration and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as domestic imperatives in the context of globalization than their British counterparts, just like the civil servants if compared with the parliamentarians over both countries (Hay & Smith, 2010: 908; 911), although they generally articulated that European integration is a threat to the autonomy of policy-makers.

In addition to the work of Rosamond (1999), Hay & Rosamond (2002) and Hay & Smith (2005; 2008; 2010), there are a handful of other authors who focused on the discourse of the member states on globalization and European integration. Vivien Ann Schmidt (2007) for example, examined French elites’ discourses from 1959 on. She notes that references to globalization in the discourses of French elites started to appear in the 1980s, during the presidency of Mitterrand. The Socialist government argued that the European Monetary System (EMS) and by extension the EU would protect the French against globalization, and this is still the French discourse today both on the left and on the right side of the political spectrum (logic of social opportunity). This discourse is combined with a discourse which states that French
leadership in Europe will enhance French identity. Also in 2007, Andreas Antoniades examined globalization discourses of political parties, workers unions, employer associations, the church and the press in both Greece and Ireland through an analysis of their key publications over a period of six years (1995-2001). He comes to two main conclusions: first, in Greece, the concept globalization appears as a new ‘nodal point’ which dominated the discourse and the policies of the actors which were studied, while in Ireland, the concept was relatively absent. Second, in Greece, it emerged as a zone of contestation, something which is debated, especially with regard to the content, while in Ireland, globalization emerged as a zone of consensus: it is presented as the underlying givens of the economy, as something apolitical (an exception being the discourse of Cardinal Connell). The main explanations for these differences in discourses are the differences in political economy and domestic institutions, differences in state agency, in the material environment, and in specific historical experiences of both countries. Emilie L’Hôte (2010) studied the discourse of new Labour on globalization using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, and comes to a rather different conclusion than Hay & Rosamond (2002). She concludes that New Labour articulates globalization as an inevitable, economic phenomenon, which has consequences on the field of security and the environment. However, she states that they emphasize the negative consequences rather than the opportunities that are following from it (L’Hôte, 2010: 373-374; logic of economic compulsion). In a way, also Rawi Abdelal and Sophie Meunier (2010) examine articulations about discourses. They explain how the UK and the US in the 1980s took an ‘ad hoc’ approach towards globalization: it was seen as a positive phenomenon and it was stimulated by promoting further liberalization of markets for goods and capital (logic of economic opportunity). By contrast, the countries located on the European continent adopted the doctrine of ‘managed’ globalization or ‘harnessed’ globalization: globalization guided by rules so that it would lead to a form of ‘procedural justice’. This doctrine is born in France under Mitterrand, and his ministers and staff members brought it to the international institutions (Jacques Delors: European Commission, Pascal Lamy: European Commission, WTO, Chavranski: Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), …). Later on, this position was adopted by the whole EU, even the UK, who saw the idea of managing globalization not as a doctrine which would prevent liberalization, but which, by contrast, would make it happen. The rules for managing globalization needed to be created both at the European and the international level, and multilateralism became the new policy of the EU (logic of economic opportunity and logic of social opportunity).

If we now return to our four dimensions (space, time, normative judgment and policy-options) identified in the beginning of this part of the chapter, we can make some general
conclusions about the European Commission’s and European member states’ articulations on globalization. We conclude that in most European member states globalization is seen as an economic process, having consequences in economic, social, security, environmental and cultural areas (space). Second, there are very different perspectives on the nature of the process (inevitable or contingent; time) and very different normative judgments. In some member states (especially in the UK and Ireland), globalization is generally seen as something positive, while in others (such as in France and Greece), it is generally perceived as a negative process. This has consequences for the policy-options that are explored. In the UK, it is generally argued that it should be promoted, while in France it is stated that it should be managed. There is a general agreement at the European level now that it should be promoted and managed at the same time. Based on these three elements, we have identified four different kinds of ‘logics’ in the discourse on globalization: the logic of economic compulsion sees globalization as an inexorable, but positive economic process, while the logic of cultural compulsion articulates globalization as an inexorable process, with negative consequences for cultures. The logic of economic opportunity captures the idea that globalization is a contingent, positive economic process, while the logic of social opportunity describes globalization as a contingent process to which countertendencies should be mobilized in order to protect social achievements.

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<th>Positive process</th>
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<td>Logic of economic compulsion</td>
<td>Logic of cultural compulsion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingent process</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>Logic of social opportunity</td>
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Table 14. Social logics in discourses on globalization

However, these logics do not go deeper into how globalization should exactly be dealt with. The policy-options are only articulated in very general terms (promotion, management, opportunity). In the studies discussed above, the focus is not on the policy-options, although they are mentioned (the European Commission promotes Europeanization and in a few cases a neoliberal policy; Rosamond, 1999; France wants to strengthen European integration, while the UK and Ireland prefer to promote a new ‘Third Way’ policy (but they do not reject European integration); Hay & Smith, 2005 and later on, the European member states agree to manage globalization both at the European and the international level, Abdelal & Meunier, 2010). Nevertheless, discourses on these policy-options should be examined more systematically. First, we should look at articulations about at which level globalization should be governed – the national level, or rather the regional or the international level (vertical governance)? Second, articulations on horizontal governance should be studied: should the management of globalization be left to the state, the market or the civil society? In relation to the latter question, we ask ourselves how the
management of globalization is articulated together with the promotion of democracy, the second evolution which influenced the constitution of society within the EU. In the next paragraphs, we go deeper into democratization in Western Europe. This will allow us to identify several social logics on democracy, which can then be used to study the EU’s discourse towards the Mediterranean region.

4.2.2 Studying the social order articulated by the EU and its member states: Democratization

In Western Europe, the process of democratization started 200 years ago with the French Revolution. This Revolution made an end to a closed, hierarchical and inegalitarian society which was presented as based on the will of God, and created a society which is based on the power of the people. A new democratic discourse came into existence, which spread the notions of equality and liberty into increasingly wider domains. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 155) state that the democratic principles liberty and equality imposed themselves as the new matrix of social imaginary. The interpretation of these principles determined how political actors tried to organize a democracy. In other words, liberty, equality and democracy became the new fundamental nodal points in the construction of the political. We recall here that nodal points are privileged, previously empty signs that give meaning to other signs. They are empty because they are open to different meanings during discursive struggles. Such struggles took place several times between 1789 and now. During these struggles, these nodal points became partially fixed, and they became privileged signifiers, which give meaning to other signs. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 155-158) identified several struggles in West European history, which eventually led to the promotion of different models of democracy, which they identify in their book. Discussing these models helps us to identify social logics in discourse on democracy within Western Europe, and will help us to identify the social logics in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region.

Laclau and Mouffe start with discussing two struggles: the case of English Chartism between 1838 and 1850 and workers’ mobilization in Italy and Germany after World War (WW) I. These struggles eventually led to the creation of a new hegemonic formation after WWII. This new hegemonic formation, referred to as liberal democracy, was based on three elements: the spread of capitalist relations to the whole set of social relations, the Keynesian welfare state and the means of mass communication (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 159-163). The first of these elements led to a subordination of the individual to the market, both in his/her capacity as a seller of labour-power, as in other social relations such as education, free time, culture, illness and death. The second of these elements, the Keynesian welfare state, is seen as the ‘post-World War accord between capital and labour’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 161). The state supports the functioning of
the capitalist regime, while at the same time it secures benefits for the workers. It provides social services and creates and assures a labour policy. The third element, mass communication, led to the establishment of a new mass culture. This, together with the spread of capitalist relations, has affected traditional identities and the traditional networks of solidarity of a community and family type. It is now the state which intervenes in social services which were in the past provided by communities or families. Liberal democracy articulates liberty and equality in a very specific way. Liberty is here defined as positive liberty (also called political liberty/democratic participation): ‘it is the possibility for individuals to autonomously and deliberately organize their life’ (Berlin, 1996). In the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 172): ‘it is the capacity to make certain choices and to keep open a series of real alternatives’. Therefore, ‘poverty, lack of education and great disparities in the conditions of life are seen as affecting positive liberty’. The fight against poverty, disparity and the proliferation of education are seen as the tasks of the welfare state. Equality is mainly defined as economic or consumer equality: it is the articulation of the individual as a consumer (because he/she is subordinated to the market).

However, this transformation of the social relations has led to the emergence of new antagonisms. These new antagonisms were based on a rearticulation of the concepts of equality and liberty. Laclau and Mouffe noticed the emergence of two kinds of antagonisms in the 1980s. These antagonisms were expressed by new social movements and by the neo-conservative and neoliberal ‘new right’ thought (especially in the US and the UK). Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 159-165) argue that the emergence of new social movements can be seen as the extension of the democratic revolution. The democratic revolution led to a new hegemonic formation, liberal democracy, which made it possible to formulate new rights which were a reaction against this liberal democracy. A specific example of this possibility to formulate new rights is the access to mass communication, such as television, radio, and more recently, the internet. The new social movements reacted against the expansion of capitalist relations of production, the increasing homogenization of social life and against the growing intervention of the state. First, the new movements opposed the subordination of all social life to capitalist relations, such as nature and culture. Examples are the ecology movement, which protested against the waste of natural resources and the destruction of the environment, and the different forms of rebellion of youth. Regarding the latter, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 164) noticed that there is a ‘tendency towards the

26 Because of this emphasis on political liberty as democratic participation, which is often reflected in elections, this model is sometimes also referred to as ‘representative democracy’. Nevertheless, as explained above, political liberty in the model we discussed here is perceived as more than just the opportunity to vote, it is also perceived as the absence of poverty and access to education. Some others therefore also call it a modern form of social democracy (Kurki, forthcoming).
valorization of differences and the creation of new identities based on cultural criteria such as music and clothes'. The creation and valorization of these new identities is a reaction against the increasing homogenization of social life. Second, they opposed the organization of the welfare state because the creation of the welfare state led to a growing bureaucratization, which give rise to new inequalities and conflicts, i.e. new forms of subordination. Examples here are the struggle of the black movement for civil rights in the US in the 1960s and the struggle of the gay rights movement in more recent years. The new social movements tried to rearticulate both liberty and equality. They broadened the notion of ‘positive liberty’ into democratic participation for all (see for example the black movement) while at the same time they articulate equality as based on ecological, cultural … criteria instead of upon economic criteria. Therefore, this model of democracy is sometimes referred to as participatory democracy (Kurki, 2010; Kurki forthcoming).

The second kind of antagonism appeared in the form of neoliberal new right and neoconservative thought. They both oppose the advancing democratic revolution and the liberal democracy, which made the formulation of the rights of the new social movements possible. More specifically, the neoliberal new right and the neoconservatives want to question the articulation between liberalism and democracy since the 19th century. They argue that the democratization of liberalism, which led the liberals to justify the intervention of the state in the struggle against inequalities and the installation of the welfare state, led to a transformation of the concept ‘liberty’. As explained above, liberalism saw liberty mainly as positive liberty: ‘it is the possibility for individuals to autonomously and deliberately organize their life’ (Berlin, 1996). Therefore, this liberalism defended the intervention of the welfare state in the struggle against inequalities. By contrast, the neoliberal new right wants to go back to what they see as the ‘true’ nature of liberalism: liberalism based on a definition of ‘negative liberty’. Liberty is then defined as ‘that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in society’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 172). This kind of liberty is also referred to as ‘the sphere for the self-development of the individual or a group of individuals without the interference of other individuals’ (Berlin, 1996). Within this view, inequality is seen as an important right, the ‘right to difference’, because difference = inequality = liberty. This definition of liberty entails a very specific view on the organization of the relation between the market, the state and the civil society. The capitalist free market economy is the ‘only type of social organization which respects the principle of individual liberty as it constitutes the only economic system capable of coordinating the activities of a great number of people without recourse to coercion’ (Friedman, 1962, quoted in Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 172). State intervention is then considered as an attack on individual liberty. Some neoliberals defend the existence of a state which protects what
legitimately belongs to us, and thus which guarantees law and order. Following their articulation of the concept ‘liberty’, ‘democracy’ is articulated ‘not in terms of exercising fundamental choices concerning policy-making (which refers to the notion of ‘political liberty’) but in the sense of maintaining certain areas of autonomy for individual self-expression’. Therefore, neoliberals try to remove public decisions from political control and to make them the exclusive responsibilities of experts. This is the core of what can be seen as a libertarian democracy. However, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 173) call this rather non-democratic: ‘Although the democratic ideal is not openly attacked, an attempt is made to empty it from all substance and to propose a new definition of democracy which in fact would serve to legitimize a regime in which political participation might be virtually non-existent’.

In comparison with the neoliberal new right, the neoconservatives have a different view on the civil society. For the libertarians, the ‘permanent revolution’ of the market undermines all traditional structures of authority such as the nation and the family. They accept this, and are not only libertarian on economic issues, but also on moral issues: they favour sexual freedom and the decriminalization of drugs. But for the neoconservatives (like the Thatcherists for instance) the continuity of tradition is central in their political philosophy: ‘individualism and choice are supposed to stop abruptly at the boundaries of the family and national identity, where tradition must stand intact’ (Giddens, 1998: 15). Therefore, individual initiative in the economy is allowed, but obligations and duties are promoted in the family sphere and towards the nation. This means that negative liberty is rather limited here, and it is limited by what can be called ‘cultural equality’. Following their emphasis on national identity and family, they are reserved with the multicultural society and with non-traditional forms of family life such as homosexual relationships and single-parent households. Just like the neoliberal new right, the neoconservatives have an aversion against the Keynesian welfare state, and they are indifferent against social inequality. In conclusion, we can state that the market and the civil society are articulated together in this view, what leads to the promotion of a liberal-conservative democracy. Giddens argued in 1998 (:15) that the neoconservatives were in trouble, since their view has an inherent tension: while neoliberalism advocates a permanent revolution of market forces, conservatism adopts a cautious, Burkean approach towards social and economic change. However, if we look at the current evolutions in European societies, we come to the conclusion that the liberal-conservative democracy is not dead at all. In the US (Tea Party), the UK (Tories) and Belgium (N-VA) this view on society is livelier than ever.

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Based on their ontological position (see chapter 3) and based on the developments in the 1980s, Laclau and Mouffe eventually developed an alternative articulation of democracy for the left today. They stress that the left should not return to what can be called a socialist democracy or what has been called the classical social democracy: a democracy based on an absolute notion of equality which rejects liberty. In this model of democracy, every form of domination is incarnated in the state, and both the civil society and the market are subordinated to the state. This domination by the state is presented as desirable, because it represents the will of the citizens in a democracy society. The state is a comprehensive, Keynesian welfare state, which creates a more equal society and which protects the citizens from ‘cradle to grave’ (Giddens, 1998: 7-8).  

However, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 180) notice that this state ‘can be the seat of numerous democratic antagonisms, to the extent that a set of functions within it can enter into relations of antagonisms with centres of power within the state itself which seek to restrict and deform them’. Moreover, history has shown that this can affect democracy, and even lead to an authoritarian regime: in Eastern Europe and in Nicaragua, the state has been transformed into a bureaucracy which imposes its view on society.

Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe articulated a ‘new’ model of democracy which can be defended by the left: radical and plural democracy. This articulation was meant to create a new hegemonic order which articulates the struggle of the ‘old left’ together with the democratic struggles of the new social movements. This required the rearticulation of the notions of equality and liberty. The idea of a radical and plural democracy is, first of all, based on the principle of democratic equivalence. This entails the proliferation of the effects of equivalence to other spheres of society, i.e., the strengthening of specific democratic struggles of the new social movements such as anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-capitalism. Therefore, a hegemonic construction is required in which the struggles against racism, sexism and capitalism are articulated together as one ‘democratic’ struggle. This will eventually lead to the dissolution of the autonomy of the spaces in which each one of these struggles is constituted because they have become equivalent symbols of a unique and indivisible, democratic struggle. However, this kind of discourse would dominate the social as a totality, it would close society, and it would lead, in its ultimate form, to a totalitarian system. As we explained earlier, in the ontological position of

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27 In this context, authors sometimes also refer to socialist democracy as ‘delegative democracy’ (Kurki, forthcoming). In this model of democracy, elections are held, which lead to the appointment of delegates, who, once they are chosen, can decide what is best for the country (which can be in contrast with the promises he/she made in the campaign). The delegates are responsible to the electorate (vertical accountability), but not to other representative or institutions (although they are allowed to give their meaning; horizontal accountability).
Laclau and Mouffe, the society is never totally closed; and therefore, there is room for autonomy, or liberty. It is the recognition that each struggle mentioned above retains its own specificity. The question is then how to define this liberty: it is not, like in liberalism, the defence of individualism. Instead, it is the ‘production of another individual’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 184) and entails the promotion of democratic rights: rights which can only be exercised collectively, and which suppose the existence of equal rights for others. Therefore, it is referred to as ‘democratic liberty’. It is important to emphasize that Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 185) argue that their notion of equality and liberty are compatible because they assume that society is not closed: they state that ‘the conception of a plurality of political spaces is incompatible with the logic of equivalence only on the assumption of a closed system’. Although Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 178) do not go explicitly into how the relation between the market, the state and the civil society should be articulated, it is clear from their work that they articulated the market as subordinated to the state and the civil society: ‘Of course, every project for radical democracy implies a socialist dimension, as it is necessary to put an end to capitalist relations of production, which are at the root of numerous relations of subordination, but socialism is one of the components of a project for radical democracy, not vice versa’.

However, this is not the model of democracy the social democratic parties in the EU adopted after fall of the Berlin Wall. Instead, they rearticulated their identity as Third Way. Third Way politics is developed by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, and was articulated in politics by New Labour in the UK. In Germany, it was spread by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) under the leadership of Gerard Schröder, while in Belgium and the Netherlands, Third Way politics became known as ‘purple’. The latter refers to the colour of the coalition between liberals and socialists. Third Way politics entails the acceptation that markets ‘can have beneficial outcomes which go beyond productive efficiency’: they are peacefully if they are regulated, they allow free choice for consumers if there are multiple producers and they foster attitudes of responsibility, because consumers and producers need to calculate the likely outcome of what they do (Giddens, 2000: 35). This idea should be seen in the light of the fall of communism: social democrats should accept that there is no alternative for capitalism (Mouffe, 2008: 65). However, according to the founding father of the Third Way politics, Anthony Giddens (2000: 36), this does not mean that the social democratic parties in Western Europe should adopt a neoliberal line of thought. He pleads for the regulation of the markets through the adoption of ethical standards which are guaranteed by law. This requires the installation of a ‘new mixed economy’: it looks for a synergy between public and private sectors and it wants to use the dynamics of markets to foster the public interest. In order to do so, a balance has to be found between regulation and
deregulation and between the economic and the non-economic in the life of society (Mouffe, 2008: 67). In a way, Third Way politics is thus based on the ideas of liberal democracy, but these ideas are adapted.

More specifically, the traditional Keynesian welfare state needs to be reformed and modernized. It has to become a ‘risk manager’. These risks are not defined in terms of security (because that is how risk has ordinarily been understood by social democratic parties) but as securing the conditions upon which citizens are able to win upon their own efforts and as highlighting the consequences of practical choices people are making. These are the new tasks of the state, and it will lead to a society consisting of ‘responsible risk-takers’. The civil society should thus consist of individuals which are responsible for their own actions. ‘No rights without responsibilities’ is the slogan of Third Way politics. The state and the civil society should act in partnership and they should both facilitate and control each other. A civil society should protect the individual from state power, and the state protects the individuals from the conflicts of interests in the civil society (Giddens, 1998: 79; 85-86). Third Way politicians and academics articulate liberty and equality in a very specific way. Equality is defined as equality of opportunity; it is the social capability of a person to pursue his or her own well-being (Giddens, 2000: 85-89). This is also how liberty is defined: it is the freedom of the person to pursue his or her well-being.

Third Way politics also emphasize that the notions of left and right in politics are superseded. Giddens (2000: 38) states: we must also leave behind the idea that left and right is the sole and sovereign dividing-line in politics. Left and right certainly will not disappear, but the division between them has less compelling power than it used to do. Indicating globalization as the main cause, he adds that there many political problems in the 2000s which do not fit in the left/right dimension. Consequently, politics without adversaries, without antagonisms is now possible: it will lead to a win-win situation. Solutions can be found which are favourable for everyone in society. However, Laclau and Mouffe (2001: xv-xvii) argue that the Third Way politics articulate democracy as taking place within a neutral terrain where a rational consensus should be found between different interests. They make a distinction between two ‘sub’ models of democracy which might be articulated within a Third Way democracy: aggregative and deliberative democracy. The first model assume that individuals act rationally and instrumentally: they will maximize their own interests. Each person has one vote to appoint a leader who will carry out the policies which represent his/her interests best. This is the main model in most Western societies. The second model, the deliberative democracy, is a reaction to this model, and argues that politics cannot be organized along the principles of the economy. Rather, it should be
organized along the principles of ethics. Therefore, they suggest replacing the instrumental rationality by communicative rationality. Jurgen Habermas is the most important advocate of this model of democracy: he pleads for the organization of the public sphere based on a dialogue where a rational consensus can be found between all individuals based on their individual interests (Mouffe, 2008: 20). This model has been put in practice in several countries (see for example the G1000 in Belgium).

The Third Way democracy has been criticized by Chantal Mouffe. First, she opposes the articulated relation between the market, the state and the civil society, arguing that Third Way democracy confirms the neoliberal hegemonic order, rather than providing a clear alternative for it. Second, she argues that this is the consequence of the search for a ‘rational consensus’ in politics. But politics is not about the exchange of meanings, it is a struggle for power. Liberalism and also Third Way politicians refuse to recognize this, because this undermines the search for a rational consensus, and thus their vision on democracy. By contrast, Mouffe (2008: 37) has argued that conflict is the central element in politics, and that the existence of antagonism is a condition sine qua non for a democracy (therefore, she refers to Third Way democracy as post-democracy). Conflict will lead to collective forms of identification which are strong enough to mobilize political passions. If the possibility to the mobilization of political passions is removed from democracy, these political passions will express themselves in other forms. And in the Western societies, these passions are represented by populist, extreme-right parties. They offer the population a new collective form of identification, based on ‘the nation’, language, religion, culture, ... Collective identities do no longer exist with the traditional parties, and therefore, the attraction of extreme-right parties is great. It is the creation of a new kind of us/them which replaces the opposition between left and right. Mouffe (2008: 75-78) argues that the reaction of the traditional parties on this new phenomenon even made matters worse: they have instituted a cordon sanitaire around these parties, excluding the possibility to exercise power in society. This led the extreme-right parties to challenge the rational consensus politics by articulating themselves as anti-establishment forces which represent the ‘true’ will of ‘the people’. The political philosophy of the extreme-right parties emphasizes the role of the civil society. The boundaries of the civil society, and thus the creation of social identities, are based on criteria such as race, language, religion or family (Huntington, 1957: 456). This civil society incarnates every form of domination in society, and the market and the state are subordinated to it. Equality is redefined as ‘cultural equality’ and liberty is seen as a positive liberty, because it is the role of the civil society to legitimize the state through its civil participation. This model of democracy can be referred to as conservative democracy. However, this positive form of liberty can also derail into a
rational form of liberty, where people are free if they live according to rules which are seen as objective (for instance the rules of religions, language or race) and therefore the only rules that are true. This might affect democracy, and even lead to an authoritarian regime, like was the case with Nazi-Germany (which ideology was based on race).

What we wanted to illustrate with this overview, is that the democratic revolution and evolution is only the terrain upon which a hegemony operates. It does not determine the content of this hegemony. The content of the hegemony depends on the way in which concepts such as democracy, liberty, equality, market, state, civil society are articulated. The last fifty years, we have seen several articulations of the concept ‘democracy’. Democracy is an empty/floating signifier: it is open to different meanings during discursive struggles. In a hegemonic discourse, this signifier becomes partially fixed. It becomes a privileged signifier, which give meaning to other signs. The overview of the democratic evolution of the last fifty years allows us to present an overview of these articulations, and thus of different conceptualizations of democracy: libertarian democracy, liberal-conservative democracy, liberal democracy (representative democracy) & Third Way democracy (aggregative and deliberative democracy), socialist democracy (delegative democracy), radical and plural democracy and conservative democracy (table 15). Each of these conceptualizations is based on another logic or combination of logics. Libertarian democracy for instance, is based on the logic of the market: the state and the civil society are articulated as subordinated to the market. Liberal-conservative democracy is based on the logic of the market and the civil society, while liberal democracy is based on the logic of the market and the state. Similarly, Third Way democracy is also based on the logic of the market and the state, although the concepts liberty and equality are articulated differently. Socialist democracy is based on the logic of the state, and conservative democracy is based on the logic of the civil society. In conclusion, radical and plural democracy is based on the logic of the state and the civil society. In addition, it needs to be stressed that overemphasizing one of the three corners of a democracy (state, market and civil society) can lead to a ‘defective democracy’ or even authoritarian regime (Zijderveld, 1999: 128; Merkel, 2004), like history has shown with the rise and fall of Stalinism (overemphasis on the state and thus equality, which impedes liberty) and Nazism (overemphasis on a civil society based on certain norms and thus a rational view on liberty, which impedes equality). Also Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 173) warned for the overemphasis of the market (see

28 In this work, the conceptualizations representative, aggregative, deliberative and delegative democracy are considered as ‘sub’models of democracy, because they often represent one particular form of the main models of democracy we identified here. Therefore, they are not mentioned in the table. In addition, also participatory democracy is not mentioned in the table because we consider it to be a ‘sub’model of a radical, plural democracy.
supra), with libertarians who try to make public decisions the exclusive responsibilities of experts and for the overemphasis of the state, which can be transformed in a bureaucracy which imposes its view on society, like in Eastern Europe (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 180). The different logics identified in this part of the chapter can be used for the empirical analysis which will be performed in the next chapters of this dissertation. It will allow us to formulate an answer on the question ‘What kind of social order, i.e. what kind of democracy does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region within the context of globalization?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualizations of democracy</th>
<th>Logic of the Market</th>
<th>Logic of the State</th>
<th>Logic of the Civil Society</th>
<th>Liberty</th>
<th>Equality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian Democracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative liberty</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Conservative Democracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative liberty</td>
<td>Cultural equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy/</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive liberty</td>
<td>Economic equality/ Equality of opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Way Democracy</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Democracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No liberty</td>
<td>Total equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Democracy</td>
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<td>Positive liberty</td>
<td>Cultural equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radical-Plural Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic liberty</td>
<td>Democratic equality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Social logics in discourses on democratization

4.3 Political logics in the EU’s policy

In the introduction of this chapter, we already explained that in order to identify the political logics in the discourse of the EU, we have to study how logics of equivalence and logics of difference are mobilized to contain or to impose a certain social order. The logic of equivalence will create a common identity among all subject positions, while the logic of difference will create an external identity, i.e. the Other. Several researchers have already studied identity construction by political actors. In this part of the chapter, we discuss the literature which studies the construction of the identity of the EU (or of the European member states) in relation to third countries (external to the EU). This will help us to find out on what we should focus while identifying political logics in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. The
most important author in this regard is Lene Hansen (2006), who has written a book about Western European security discourses towards the Balkan. In this book, she goes deeper into identity construction. She finds that classical discourses on security tend to articulate the Other as a threat or as a radical Other. This finding is confirmed by some of the studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations: both Pace (2002; 2004) and Jeandesboz (2009) state that the EU presents the Mediterranean region as a security threat. Nevertheless, following the ontological position of Laclau and Mouffe that subjects are neither homogenous nor united, Hansen states that the relation between the Self and the Other is constructed within a web of identities, and that we should thus not look for a simple Self-Other duality. She rejects the idea that a political actor should articulate the Other as a threat or as a radical Other to construct its own identity, this is ‘a temptation rather than a necessity’ (Connolly, 1991, quoted in Hansen, 2006: 39).

This is a claim which is confirmed by other studies on the EU. In their work on the relations between Europe and Turkey, Neumann and Welsh (1991: 331) argue that the Other can also be a ‘positive’ Other (although in Europe, Turkey is still considered as the ‘Barbarian Other’, an image which is based on the Ottoman empire and which affects the relations between the EU and Turkey). In his later work on EU-Russia Relations, Iver Neumann (1996) illustrates how people inside Russia who want to ‘westernize’ Russia refer to Europe (the Other) as superior than Russia (the Self). Thomas Diez (2005: 626 - 628) identifies in his article on the EU as a normative power several ‘forms’ or ‘degrees’ of Othering: representation of the Other as an existential threat, representation of the Other as inferior (Self is superior), representation of the Other as violating universal principles (Self is superior with a universal validity), representation of the Other as different. Diez argues that the Barcelona Declaration, the main document of the EMP (see chapter 1) presents the Mediterranean countries as violating universal standards. It is thus even possible that two different forms or degrees of Othering are articulated together, like the literature also shows: under the EMP, the Mediterranean countries are apparently presented both as a threat (Pace, 2002; 2004) and as violating universal standards (Diez, 2005). Consequently, Hansen states that, since the Other often cannot be situated in a simple Self-Other duality, but rather within a web of identities, we should take this into account when studying how the EU articulates an identity for the Self and the Other.

Besides the different degrees of Othering, Hansen (2006: 46-47) suggests that we should also look at the political substance of identity construction. She argues that there are three analytical lenses which reveal this political substance: space, time and responsibility. Ifversen & Kolvraa (2007) make a similar distinction. These three lenses have equal theoretical and
ontological status: there is not just one which determines the other two. Discourses, Hansen (2006: 46) argues, ‘strive to create stable links in the articulation of spatiality, temporality and ethically’ and ‘there is not just one constellation of the three dimensions of identity which is logically and empirically possible’. First, spatial constructions of identity set out boundaries and delineate space. In foreign policy discourses, this delineation of space is mostly centered around the concept of the nation state, which links culture with territory. Ifversen & Kolvraa (2007) indicate that claims of European identity have already been made within this matrix culture/territory, although this has been difficult, since within the EU cultural practices are very diverse and it is also not possible to refer to one common language. Therefore, people often refer to a common European history, for example the reference to a Christian Europe. Rafaella Del Sarto (2005) who studied the cultural relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region, found this kind of identity construction in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. She argues that the EMP is based on the civilization paradigm/logic: the Other is articulated as the Islam (as opposite to the Self, the West), suggesting that there is a ‘clash’ between civilizations/cultures. She adds that this conceptualization ignores the diversity within cultures. Consequently, she suggest a re-conceptualization of difference and similarity (thus of the Self and the Other) and the establishment a trans-cultural dialogue (instead of an inter-cultural one) that is based on common values and interests across states and regions. Ifversen & Kolvraa (2007: 7) warn that ‘expressions of European cultural identity risk turning into a Euro-nationalism based on essentialism and exclusion’

Ifversen & Kolvraa (2007) refer to two alternatives for the articulation of European identity. First, they suggest that European identity can also be based on political and social values ‘that we recognize as ours’ such as fundamental rights, democracy, social justice, solidarity and secularism. This creates a political identity for the EU, which is different than the cultural identity. The second solution is the reference to higher values which are universal. According to Thomas Diez (2005), the EU has done this in the Barcelona Declaration by articulating the Mediterranean countries as violating universal standards. Regarding the reference to universality, Ifversen & Kolvraa also state that this might transcend notions of a European space. Therefore, it often ‘relies on notions of time and history’, and then it often refers to the past of the EU. Also other authors found that the Other does not necessarily need to be another state, region or person. Ole Waever (1996: 128) for example showed that the identity of the EU is articulated not against a geographical Other, but against a temporal one, i.e. its own past. This point was also made by Neumann & Welsh (1991: 330): they argue that ‘the Other need not necessarily be spatially outside, but may also be an internal Other’.
Second, temporal constructions of identity set out the possibility that identity of actors may or may not change. Here, temporal themes such as development, change, transformation, repetition and progress are important. Does the Other have the possibility to break with its identity, and can it progress towards the identity of the Self? In addition to Hansen, also Ifversen & Kolvraa mention the time dimension, and this dimension also meets the distinction between inclusive/exclusive identity made by Rumelili (2004). She identifies in her work three dimensions which will influence the different degrees of otherness which we identified above. The first of these dimensions is the nature of the identity. Is the identity of the Self articulated as ‘inclusive’, i.e. is it based on characteristics that can be acquired by the Other? Or is it ‘exclusive’, i.e. based on inherent characteristics? In case of the latter, the Other is placed in a situation of ‘permanent’ difference: it cannot acquire the identity of the Self, which is an element of time. Her second dimension is the response of the Other. Does the Other recognize the identity of the Self, or does the Other resist it? In the latter case, it is more likely that the Self will present the Other as a threat or a radical Other. The third dimension is the social distance, because one way for political actors to articulate their identity is to associate or dissociate themselves from other political actors. Rumelili (2004: 36-39) argues that inclusive identities allow for association between the Self and the Other, while dissociation is securing exclusive identities. In the empirical part, Rumelili (2004) concludes that the relationship between the EU and Morocco is based on an exclusive aspect of its identity, i.e. Morocco cannot become a member of the EU because it is not a ‘European’ country (geographically seen). This relationship is secured because the EU dissociates itself from Morocco. Moreover, the latter does not effectively resist this construction of its identity, and therefore, Morocco is not articulated as a radical threat to the EU.

Third, ethical constructions of identity refer to the fact that foreign policy discourses always involve a construction of moral and responsibility. This dimension can also be found with other studies, i.e. Diez’ reference to the Other as ‘violating universal standards’ refers to ethics and his reference to the Other as inferior or threat (which can be found in several other studies; see supra) to morality. Rumelili’s association/dissociation refers to the practice that some political actors symbolize their co-belonging within the same identity community and others not, which is a moral practice, and Jeandesboz’ duty narrative refers to the responsibility of the EU towards its neighbours (Jeandesboz, 2007; 2009). Ifversen & Kolvraa (2007: 10-11) state in this regard that identity will also depend on what the EU does, on how it is performing in the world and on how it fulfills its responsibilities. Hansen (2006: 51) suggests that if one combines the analytical concern with degrees of difference and Otherness with the three dimensions of identity construction (which are also identified by Ifversen & Kolvraa, 2007), this can provide a suited
framework for research on identity construction. After studying the academic literature, we noticed that the idea that there are different degrees of Otherness and different dimensions of political substance can also be found in the studies on the identity of the EU. Therefore, we decided to adopt the framework suggested by Hansen (2006). In order to address our second research question: ‘How does the EU promote this social order through its discourse?’, we thus look at which ‘Selves’ and ‘Others’ are constituted in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. Subsequently, we have three underlying research questions. First, how is the identity of the Self and the Other spatially constructed in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region? Second, how is the identity of the Self and the Other temporally constructed in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region? Three, how is the identity of the Self and the Other ethically constructed in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region?

4.4 Fantasmatic logics in the EU’s policy

In the previous chapter, we explained that fantasmatic logics provide the means to understand why specific practices and regimes ‘grip’ subjects. More specifically, according to Jason Glynos (2008: 10-14) a fantasmatic logic consists of three aspects. First, it either contains/suppresses public contestation or it gives direction and energy to new political practices. It does so through the promise of a certain ideal that will be reached once a named obstacle is overcome or through the ‘promise’ of a disaster when this obstacle cannot be overcome. Second, it contains a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals, and third, it supports a closed view on society because ‘it offers the subject a degree of protection from the anxiety associated with a direct confrontation with the radical contingency of social relations’ (it thus represents an ideological project). In the literature on the EU, there are some studies which focus on the fantasmatic logics in the discourse of the EU. These authors mainly refer to the concept ‘myths’, and they contribute similar objectives to these myths/fantasies as Jason Glynos (2008) did: they provide a common heritage and tradition, as well as a common destiny, it creates solidarity with others who share that identity, and it serves to tell a story of why who governs has the right to do so and why we should obey, i.e. it provides political legitimacy, it creates a link between governing and its subjects (Della Sala, 2010: 5).

Overall, studies on the myths of the EU are still rather limited. In 2010, JCMS published a special issue ‘Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union’ in which myths about the EU are examined. This special issue will be discussed here, but we follow in general lines the classification which is made by Ian Manners (2010) in his article. The study of the different myths
about the EU learns us that almost all of them go back to the genesis of the EU, to the founding events. The cosmogonic myth of the EU is the bull myth, which presents a story about the foundation of the EU: how Europe became destroyed by extreme forms of nationalism (the ‘rape of Europa’), how it was liberated by the USA and how the latter helps rebuilding the continent (the ‘seduction of Europa’) and how Europe made a transition from nationalism to post-nationalism (the ‘transition of Europa’). In this logic of fantasy, we see the creation of certain ideal (peace forever represented by the EU) once a named obstacle is overcome (nationalism). It also contains a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals, because it supports the integration of national states into a supranational constellation, while at the same time, it also represents an ideological project which rejects nationalism and fascism, and which promotes postnationalism as idea and ideology (Manners, 2010: 70).

In the economic myths on the EU and more specifically on European integration, this myth is known as the ‘peace through trade’ or ‘peace through interdependence’ myth; it is probably the most articulated myth on the economic integration of the EU and explains why there is economic integration on the European continent. Erik Jones claims that there are also alternatives economic ‘myths’ on the EU. First, there are the authors who state that the EU started as an economic organization, because it was always meant to start that way. They then refer to the idea that integration almost always starts with economic integration, to the early attempts of economic integration before WWII or to the ideas of great thinkers of the past thousand years, who referred to the idea of ‘Europe’. Second, there are authors who state that economic motives led to economic integration, and third, there are authors who argue that economic integration is the consequence of the leadership of individuals who imposed their preferences, rather than of the economic interests of the member states (Jones, 2010: 96-99). Nevertheless, these three myths give an explanation for economic integration, but they do not explicitly tell the story of an ideal which can be reached once an obstacle is overcome. Therefore, they cannot be considered as a myth in the meaning that we are giving here to this concept. Rather, we should see them as narratives. The other two myths Jones is discussing in his article do refer to an ideal which can be reached. The first, the myth of the irreversibility, states that if a country leaves the monetary union, the highest form of economic integration in the EU, this will have an economic cost. Staying within the monetary union has more economic benefits than opting-out. This myth presents an ideal which can be reached (economic benefits) once an obstacle (the policy problems caused by the economic crisis) has overcome. This also represents an ideological project based on liberalism. The second myth, the myth of instability, tells the opposite story, and is based on the idea that countries will leave the monetary union if the
economic circumstances require so. This myth is today more and more present in the discourse of political actors when dealing with the problems of Greece. For the Greeks, it represents an ideal which can be reached (getting rid of the savings imposed by the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the IMF) once an obstacle has overcome (membership of the Eurozone). It definitely contains a transgressive aspect, and it represents an ideological project (against liberalism). In the Greek media, the EU, and especially Germany, is presented as the ‘threatening’ Other. From the side of the EU, it was even stated that the Eurozone is able to survive without the membership of Greece.

Besides these economic ‘myths’, there are also political myths, which tell stories about the political identity of the EU. These myths reject nationalism and fascism, and during the Cold War also capitalism and communism, and they also are based on the cosmogonic myth of the EU. In the period of the Cold War, there were two myths which were told about the EEC/EC. The first is the third force myth, which tries to construct an independent Europe in the world. There are three variations: the socialist third force myth, which presented Europe as a social democracy halfway between capitalism and communism, the federalist third force myth, which tells the story of the EU as a peaceful, united continent separating the two superpowers, and the Gaullist third force myth, which wanted to create an independent Europe based on an intergovernmental political union. In this logic of fantasy, we see the creation of a certain ideal (respectively social democracy (socialist third force myth), peace (federalist third force myth) and independence (Gaullist third force myth)). It contains a transgressive aspect against the then current norms: capitalism and communism (socialist third force myth), the Cold War (federalist third force myth) and West-Europe as a satellite of the US, and East-Europe as a satellite of the SU (Gaullist third force myth). Moreover, each of these three different myths represents an ideological project (socialism, federalism and nationalism, Manners, 2010: 72). The second myth is the civilian power myth, which presents the EC as a power (but not a fully-fledged ‘super-state’) with economic resources within an interdependent world which will use this power to promote certain norms (in contrast with the US and the SU which are superpowers and which use military power). In the period of the Cold War, the norm to be promoted was the development of the Third World. In this logic of fantasy, we see the promise of a certain ideal (development through commerce and diplomacy) once a certain obstacle is overcome (military based power-conflict exerted by the US and the SU). It contains a transgressive aspect against the current norms (military forces) and represents an ideological project (liberalism).
In the 1990s, we see a return to the myth of the EU as a civilian power in the academic literature, together with the myth of the EU as a normative power. The latter presents the EU as a promoter of norms just by its presence as an institutional hybrid identity. Again we see the promise of an ideal (the spread of universal norms such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, peace, sustainable development, good governance, …) once an obstacle is overcome (the full integration of the member states in the supranational identity). It links the identities of the member states in one common identity, and appeals against ‘national’ or ‘cultural’ norms. Just like the myth on civilian power Europe, it represents an ideological project based on liberalism. However, the myth of the EU as a civilian power differs in that the latter does not present the EU as a promoter of norms by its presence as an institutional identity, but through its economic power. Moreover, for some authors, the EU as a civilian power promotes European norms, rather than universal norms like the concept of normative power Europe predicts (Bicchi, 2006). However, not all studies follow this view.

In addition to the myths of the EU as a normative or as a civilian power, there are some authors who have discussed the myths around several of these political norms mentioned above more in detail. Smismans (2010) for example, goes deeper into the different narratives on the EU’s fundamental rights policy. These narratives cannot be considered to be myths because they do not explicitly present an ideal to be reached when an obstacle is overcome, or a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals. They rather explain the fundamental rights policy of the EU. The first narrative Smismans identifies, presents the fundamental rights protected by the EU as based on the constitutional traditions of the member states, ‘evoking the idea of a common European tradition in the respect of human rights, a tradition that is inherent in the Community legal order’ (Smismans, 2010: 48). This narrative sees human rights protection as something ‘European’. When the people who articulate this narrative refer to the international treaties of which the member states are signatories, they refer to European treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and not to international treaties such as the UDHR. The second one, the constitutionalizing narrative, refers to the inclusion of fundamental rights in the constitutional texts of the EU, and states that the EU itself is founded on these rights (thus not only the member states like in the first narrative), as a reaction against war, nationalism and fascism. The third narrative can be considered as a more specific version of the second one, and deals with fundamental social rights, arguing that ‘the EU is not only attached to human rights and fundamental freedoms but also to fundamental social rights as defined in the European Social Charter and the Community Social Charter’. Here, a reference is made to two European texts, stressing ‘the European heritage of particularly strong protection of these norms’, and not
to international texts, like the standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO; Smismans, 2010: 53). In this regard, these narratives fit within the myth of the EU as a civilian power. Also the fourth narrative can be considered as a more specific version of the second one: the external relations narrative, and here Smismans (2010: 54) refers to the fact that fundamental rights become increasingly a central narrative and driving force in the EU’s foreign policy, to the extent that the EU is now described as a normative power.

Besides Smismans (2010), who discusses the fundamental rights myth of the EU, Heather Macrae (2010) goes deeper into the myth of the EU as a gender equal polity. This myth presents an ideal (equality between male and female) which can be reached once an obstacle is overcome (integration into the supranational identity). It contains a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis the confirmed norms of the member states, where women had and have to fight for inclusion. Within the EU, women will be able to be full and equal members of the European polity (Macrae, 2010: 158). Linked to the idea that EU is good for women inside the EU (as a consequence of its supranational identity), some authors have stated that the EU has a feminine character, especially in its external relations. Ian Manners (2010) has identified a gender myth in the EU’s foreign policy. This gender myth must be situated in the context of the war in Iraq, and has three perspectives. The US is presented as a power which is prepared to use force, i.e. the Martian masculinity (first perspective), while the EU is seen as ‘feminine free-riders on the back of the US’ because they are turning away from power (Venusian femininity; second perspective). The image of the EU as a seduced woman, together with the image of the EU as a civilian power has contributed to this idea. By contrast, others have suggested that ‘the EU may be better constructed as an androgynous mythical actor reflecting the EU’s hybrid polity’, as a sort of metrosexual superpower which uses both war and wisdom: Minervan metrosexuality (third perspective, Manners, 2010: 79). The myth of the EU as a Venusian femininity promises the reach of an ideal (peace) if the integration of the member states in the supranational construction is completed. It also represents an ideological project: ‘As an ideological projection, the gender myth constructs a political differentiation between more left-wing attempts to address the root causes that may motivate terrorist groups (the EU), and more right-wing attempts to wage war on terrorism itself (the US)’ (Manners, 2010: 79). In this regard, it also contains a transgressive aspect against officially affirmed ideals (war to reach security). In addition to Smismans (2010) and Macrae (2010), Lenschow and Sprungk (2010) go deeper into the myth of a Green Europe. They find that the myth of Green Europe is based on ‘recent and empirically traceable activities’ (Lenschow & Sprungk, 2010: 139). Therefore, it needs to be based on further substantial evidence in order to be sustained. If the EU fails to implement its environmental policy on the
ground or if it fails to fulfil the commitments it made on the global level, this might undermine the myth of Green Europe. In addition, they find that the construction of the myth of a Green Europe is not only based on traceable activities, but that it is also used to construct a new identity for the EU and to claim public legitimacy. This new identity is based on the idea of the EU as a power which ensures environmental protection because it has historical experience of creating co-operative governance structures. This ‘transforms the old notion of the EC/EU as ‘motor of peace and stability’ into a modern image of protection’ (Lenschouw & Sprungk, 2010: 151). The myth of Green Europe thus promises the reach of an ideal (protection) if an obstacle (old governance structures) is overcome. In this regard, it also contains a transgressive aspect against officially affirmed ideals.

In addition to the economic and the political myths we identified in the academic literature, there are also myths which focus on the functioning of the EU in the world order. The most well-known myth is the myth of the EU as a multipolar power, which presents the EU as one power among the others in the world (polarity myth) which believes in multilateralism because it is a multilateral forum itself (literalism myth) and which represents a model of regional governance that should be adopted by other regions (governance myth). The transgressive aspect against the officially affirmed ideals lies here in the idea of effective multilateralism against nationalism. It also contains an ideological aspect: European liberal or social democracy which has to compete with the emerging politics and economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS; Manners, 2010: 82). Nevertheless, this myth as presented by Ian Manners can be refined (and then especially the ‘lateralism myth’) if we look at the role of the EU in relation to international institutions. First, the EU can pursue its policy through international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank or the IMF: it can take the lead in the formulation of international agreements, law and rules which are then based on its own policy. This also accounts for multilateralism as a policy objective: the EU can take the lead in formulating how multilateralism should work. In general, this role is better known under the phrase ‘leading by example’. Second, the EU can also just follow the policy of the international institutions, without taking initiative to formulate things differently. In this case, it strengthens the legitimacy and the capacity of the international institutions, because it implements their policy. This again also accounts for multilateralism as a policy objective: the EU can support the multilateral functioning of the international institutions. It is of course also possible that the EU rejects the role the international institutions play, that it promotes its own policy and that this policy cuts across the policy of the international institutions. Regarding multilateralism as a policy objective, the EU can then for instance block the reforms of these institutions. In conclusion, most of these myths or
logics of fantasy can thus be used to explain why the identity of the Self (in our case the EU) which is articulated in the discourse, is appealing: they promise an ideal, they resist against firmly established norms or institutions (Manners refers to escapist pleasure or storytelling) which are mostly represented by Others and they represent an own ideological project. The above identified myths that are told about the EU will now be used to find out which myths the EU itself is articulating in its discourse towards the Mediterranean region.

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has taken the first step into the identification of the logics on which the policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean is built. According to Glynos & Howarth (2007: 185) we can use logics from other contexts in our own analysis. For the identification of the social logics, we decided to study the internal context of the EU. We argued that globalization and democratization are the two main evolutions which constitute the social reality in which the EU and its member states are moving. For the member states of the EU, the main question today is: how to organize a democratic society within the context of globalization? The answer on this question and also the justification of the choice for one particular social order depends on the interpretation of globalization and democratization. It has to be noticed that the academic literature on how globalization and democratization are articulated together is rather limited. Most literature either focuses on globalization or on democratization. Moreover, also the literature on the interpretation of the EU institutions on globalization and democratization is very limited (an exception being Rosamond, 1999). Therefore, we examined in this chapter the studies on articulations on globalization of the European member states on the one hand, and articulations on democratization of the European member states on the other hand. It can be concluded that within the EU, globalization is mainly articulated as an economic process: it is the spread of the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. This process has its consequences in the field of security, economics and on environmental, social and cultural issues. The opinions on the nature of the process and its normative consequences are divided, which led us to identify four different logics on globalization: the logic of economic compulsion, the logic of cultural compulsion, the logic of economic opportunity and the logic of social opportunity. Furthermore, most research has focused on the study as to how globalization has an impact on vertical governance. Several researchers have already examined if the discourse of policy-makers of the member states articulates the EU (a form of regional integration) as a suited level for dealing with the consequences of globalization. There is less research as to how globalization is interpreted as having impact on horizontal governance (the relation between the state, the market
and the civil society) and how it is articulated together with the democratic principles liberty and equality.

The study on the articulations on democratization allowed us to construct a ‘field of discursivity’ entailing all notions of democracy that have been formulated in the European member states the last fifty years. We have added one particular notion of democracy that has been formulated by Laclau and Mouffe. This field of discursivity consists of six different articulations of democracy, six different social orders, and thus six different logics: the logic of the market (libertarian democracy), the logic of the market and the civil society (liberal-conservative democracy), the logic of the market and the state (liberal democracy/third way democracy), the logic of the state (socialist democracy), the logic of the civil society (conservative democracy) and the logic of the state and the civil society (radical and plural democracy). In addition, it is important to notice that these different logics are not necessarily articulated at the national level, i.e. they can also be articulated at the regional or at the global level (vertical governance). Using these different logics identified in the discourses of the member states of the EU on globalization and democratization, we will now examine if similar logics can also be identified in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. We assume that there might be similar articulations regarding the way a social order should be constituted outside the EU, since we deal in both cases with the same agents: the EU institutions and the European member states (but given the idea that the social is open, this is not necessarily the case). Our first research question ‘What kind of social order does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region?’ is further refined as ‘What kind of democracy does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region in the context of globalization?’ Globalization, democracy, liberty, equality, state, market and civil society are the nodal points in the discourse, and will be used as labels during the analysis (see chapter 3).

For the identification of the political and fantasmatic logics, we studied the academic literature on identity construction in the discourse of the EU towards third countries. We identified three different dimensions of identity construction, which can be used to identify the construction of the Self and the Other in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region: the spatial dimension, the temporal dimension and the ethical dimension, or three different ‘sub’logics: the spatial logic, the temporal logic and the ethical logic. The second research question which we identified in chapter 3, i.e. ‘How does the EU promote this social order through its discourse?’ is further refined: ‘Which Selves and Others are constituted in the discourse of the EU’, and ‘How is the difference between the Self and the Other constituted
through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical identity? The Self and the Other are used as a label during the analysis, and are subdivided into three ‘sub’labels: Self/Other spatially, Self/Other temporally and Self/Other ethically. Regarding the logics of fantasy, we studied the literature on the myths that are told about the EU. First, we identified the birth or cosmogonic myth of the EU, which is by Ian Manners (2010) identified as ‘the bull myth’. From this myth, several other myths or logics of fantasy have grown: the logic of the ‘peace through trade’, the logic of the third force, the logic of civilian power Europe, the logic of normative power Europe, the logic of feminine Europe, the logic of Green Europe and the logic of multilateral Europe (in contrast with Manners, we prefer to refer to the term ‘multilateral Europe’ instead of multipolar Europe because this stresses more the role of the EU in international organizations on which we elaborated above). Several of these logics have been refined, or alternative narratives are told.

Our third research question ‘Why is the social order the EU promotes in the Mediterranean region maintained?’ is now further refined as ‘Which logic of fantasy/myth is articulated in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region? Myth will be used as a label in the analysis. Overall, this chapter allowed us to identify logics in other contexts (internal EU context, external relations of the EU). This led us the refine our research questions and to develop labels which will be used during the analysis. Which of these logics are used in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region, and how should we judge and interpret these logics? In the next chapters, we will analyze the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region under the RMP, the EMP, the ENP, the UfM and the renewed ENP.
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<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Refined research questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>What kind of social order does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region?</td>
<td>What kind of democracy does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region in the context of globalization?</td>
<td>Globalization, democracy, liberty, equality, market, state, civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>How does the EU promote this social order in the Mediterranean region through its discourse?</td>
<td>Which Selves and Others are constituted in the discourse of the EU?</td>
<td>Self/Other spatially, Self/Other temporally, Self/Other ethically</td>
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<td>How is the difference between the Self and the Other’ constituted through the articulation of spatial, temporal and ethical identity?</td>
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<td>Why is the social order the EU promotes in the Mediterranean maintained?</td>
<td>Which logic of fantasy/myth is articulated in the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region?</td>
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Table 16. Refined research questions and labels used in the analysis
Chapter 5: The Renovated Mediterranean Policy

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter the discourse of the EC on the RMP is analyzed. As explained in chapter 1, the RMP was officially adopted in 1990. At that time, the Mediterranean countries had severe economic and social problems, which were worsened by the changing international economic relations and by the Southern enlargement of the EC. These problems also caused problems for the EC: it saw the emergence of Islamist movements which could hamper the relations with the Mediterranean countries and the new Southern member states became confronted with migration flows coming from their Southern neighbours. Moreover, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EC focused on the CEECs, leading to the adoption of a generous aid package for those countries. Both ‘events’ led to public contestation in the Southern member states and in the European Commission. The latter, and then especially Commissioner for External Relations Abel Matutes came with a proposal to enhance the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region. The member states in the Council of the EC agreed with the strengthening of the ties with the Southern neighbours, but as explained in chapter 1, the Southern member states were mainly concerned about the concessions they would have to make regarding trade in agricultural products, and the Northern member states were preoccupied with the amount of financial assistance to be granted towards the region. Especially France and Greece had their reservations about market access for certain sensitive agricultural products (Permanent Representatives Committee, 1990). In addition, Spain and Italy did not want the European Commission to address security concerns, because they preferred to deal with these issues themselves. Therefore, they mainly left it to the European Commission to develop the economic and political strategy of the EC towards the region. Bicchi (2007: 155) states that the European Commission can be considered as the main policy entrepreneur when it comes to the development of the RMP. However, this does not mean that the Southern member states did not undertake any action: they tried, amongst others, to revitalize the EAD. In addition, they also addressed the problems of the Mediterranean countries through the Mediterranean Forum and they tried to organize a CSCM, like we explained in the first chapter.

The European Parliament and the EESC adopted several resolutions and opinions on the RMP, but the European Commission and the (European) Council were not obliged to take these into account. Consequently, their influence on the development of this policy framework was rather limited. However, because the European Parliament had to give its assent on the financial protocols that were concluded with each Mediterranean country individually, it had a means to
influence the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean countries. It used this power to influence the political aspects of these relations (see infra). The EESC on its turn adopted three opinions on the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region. Despite the fact that this institution could not weigh on the RMP, it was actually the EESC which initially launched the idea to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean region. Moreover, it presented a totally different approach to the EC’s relations with the Mediterranean countries. In the next section, we will study the social, political and fantasmatic logics articulated in the discourses of the European Commission, the (European) Council, the EESC and the European Parliament.

5.2 Social logics in the Renovated Mediterranean Policy

5.2.1 The European Commission

A closer look at the Commission documents reveals that there are actually no explicit references to the concept globalization. Nevertheless, the process of globalization influenced the thinking of European Commissioner Abel Matutes, who can be considered as the main driving force behind the RMP. This is clear from his speech to the symposium on ‘Human movements in Western Mediterranean’ in Barcelona on 9 November 1989. With this speech, Matutes started a discussion about the EC’s Mediterranean policy, which was reflected in two unpublished working documents (European Commission, 1989a; 1989b) and which eventually resulted in a final Commission communication to the Council in June 1990 (European Commission, 1990). During his address, Matutes (1989a: 51) discussed the Mediterranean policy of the EC, stating that interdependence and global problems are the parameters that are determining political and economic thinking today, and that this will also be the case in the future. Furthermore, he argued that cooperation is a keyword in the management of interdependence and globalization: ‘cooperation is needed on all levels and in all directions. We need cooperation between the North and the South and between the East and the West, without an imbalance between both axes of cooperation’. In the context of the détente between the East and the West, he added that it would be a pity if tension between the prosperous North and the impoverished South would increase and he expressed the fear that the rapprochement between East and West would lead to a marginalization of the countries in the South.

29 The interpretation of the speech of Matutes presented in this dissertation is based on his original speech which was given in Catalan, and on the English summary that can be found in the RAPID Database.
Subsequently, Matutes (1989a: 52; 56) presented the economic and political situation in the Mediterranean region as a risk for the EC, and he argued that it would be dangerous to underestimate this risk. In addition, he also indicated that the economic and social problems of the Mediterranean countries threaten the security of the EC. This is also reflected in the Commission communications: ‘current economic and political trends in the non-Community countries of the Mediterranean afford new opportunities but carry also considerable risks which should not be underestimated. The interests at stake on the Community’s southern flank call for in-depth political debate’ (European Commission, 1989b). In the final communication of 1990, it is articulated as follows: ‘stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean non-member countries are key factors in the stability and prosperity in the Community itself. If the courses followed by the Community and the MNC (Mediterranean Non-member Countries, or) caused a worsening of the economic and social disparities between the two, the Community would be in a difficult position. What is at issue is its security in the broadest sense’ (European Commission, 1990: 2).

More specifically, Matutes (1989a: 53) saw political instability, food shortage and the emergence of fundamentalism as the main problems in the Mediterranean countries. He also stated that because of the development of communication and information technology, the development gap is clearly visible for the people in the Mediterranean region, which will lead to an increasing migration towards the EC. But mass exodus is not a solution. The only solution in the long run is the economic and social development of the Mediterranean countries, and more specifically the creation of employment and prosperity. A revision of the Mediterranean policy was therefore deemed necessary. From this, we can conclude that Commissioner Matutes and the European Commission articulate globalization as interdependence, i.e. as an intensification of the relations across the borders (space), which has potentially negative consequences for the EC, especially in the field of politics and security (normative judgment). However, this is seen as a contingent process (time) because it is assumed that increasing migration from the Mediterranean countries to the EC and/or a deterioration of the relations with those countries do not necessarily have to be the case, on the condition that the EC reacts immediately. A new policy might possibly prevent mass exodus towards the EC. The fact that globalization/interdependence is seen as a contingent process is also indicated by the reference the word ‘parameters’ (Matutes, 1989a: 53). This view meets the logic of economic opportunity as defined in chapter 4: globalization is a contingent process, which can have both positive and negative consequences, and which should be managed in order to reach economic development and prosperity for the Mediterranean countries. This will prevent migration towards the EC.
If we then take a look at how the EC should react on the worsening situation of the Mediterranean countries (policy-options), Matutes (1989b) stated in a speech in October 1989 that ‘economic freedom needs political democracy and vice versa. One needs political stability to devote energies to economic progress and one needs economic progress to create an harmonious society where essential consumption needs are satisfied, where social opportunities are offered’. Here, it is indicated that the free market should offer social opportunities in order to create a democracy, and that there should also be stability in order to create economic progress. However, in his speech one month later, he presents a slightly different view on democracy. Then, he argued that the EC has no other possibility than to support progress towards democracy, and given the evidence that most democracies are developed in societies where there is economic openness, the EC should support economic openness in the Mediterranean region (Matutes, 1989a: 54). Here, the development of the free market is presented as a sufficient condition for the development of democracy. This vision is also articulated in the Commission document ‘Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy: proposals for the period 1992-96’. In the beginning, it is stated that ‘furthermore, the political moves towards pluralism, democratic political procedures and the respect of human rights under way in a number of the MNC are essential to their development and to the creation of a rapprochement with the Community’. Nevertheless, in the rest of the document, democracy is assumed to be reached through the development of the free market (European Commission, 1990). Focus is on economic reforms in order to reach this free market. Political reforms in order to create the ‘democratic political procedures’ are not discussed at all.

The European Commission indicated that there are two reasons to focus on economic reforms. First, it firmly stated that this is the only way to create economic growth and development in the region: ‘the Commission has already voiced the view that there is little choice but to continue and intensify the process of economic reform and to bring about a considerable improvement in the volume and methods available to finance reform and growth’ (European Commission, 1990: 3). In this respect, Matutes (1989b) earlier stated that ‘many countries in the region, in fact most of them with varying degree, suffer one major illness: a non-market allocation mechanism’. In addition, it is indicated that economic reform will lead to economic and political stability: ‘however, the economic and political stability of these countries depends on the process of adjustment succeeding rapidly’ (European Commission, 1990: 13; European Commission, 1989b: 4). This focus on economic reforms was also emphasized in the speech of Matutes to the symposium ‘Human movements in Western Mediterranean’ in Barcelona on 9 November 1989. There, he articulated that the Mediterranean countries have no other choice than to follow a SAP
In order to give legitimacy to its view, the Commission refers to the IFIs which already developed economic reform programmes for Mediterranean countries, and which are considered by the European Commission as the best strategies for the Mediterranean countries. Matutes (1989a: 54) even explicitly stated that it is not the task of the EC to develop an economic strategy for the Mediterranean region. The EC will only support the economic reforms presented by the IFIs. Therefore, the implementation of a reform programme supported by multilateral donors or the implementation of a similar programme approve by these donors is presented as an eligibility criterion for receiving adjustment support (European Commission, 1990: 23).

The second reason for focusing on economic reforms is that these reforms will facilitate trade between the EC and the Mediterranean area. This will convince European businessmen to invest in the region. In this regard, it is important to note that the role of the market in the Mediterranean is articulated as export-oriented. In its first working document, the European Commission (1989a: 7) indicated that one of the main reasons for a lack of private investment in the Mediterranean is that ‘national markets are too small: this is clearly a disadvantage particularly if accompanied by barriers to exports to adjacent markets (which is the case in a number of Mediterranean countries)’. Therefore, the European Commission suggests that the Mediterranean countries should have a better access to the markets of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and other European countries, and that trade among Mediterranean countries should be stimulated (therefore, it wants to support projects of regional or sub-regional nature). The European Commission thus wants to stimulate international trade. Regarding a better access to the market of the Community, the Commission states that it is not advisable to make new proposals regarding access for agricultural products in the near future, and that the inclusion of textile in the cooperation agreements depends on a positive outcome in the Uruguay Round textile negotiations (European Commission, 1990: 5-6).

In addition, the European Commission believes that economic reforms will also lead to the creation of a large number of jobs: ‘One of the major challenges facing the MNC is the creation of large numbers of productive jobs. Operations in this field depend on several factors: a favourable economic policy climate, an effective mobilization of domestic savings and incentives for their productive investment and incentives for foreign investment, particularly European, as well as the development of small and medium-sized enterprises’ (European Commission, 1990: 9). For the Commission, this depends on the governments of the Mediterranean countries: ‘recent economic trends have shown that the economic performance of most Mediterranean
non-member countries depends to a large extent on their ability to manage their economies properly, to draw up effective reform programmes which are acceptable from a social standpoint and to cope with external crisis’ (European Commission, 1990: 4). The European Commission articulates the following role for the state: they have to implement the economic reforms proposed by the IFIs, and to support the development of human resources which are necessary to back-up these economic reforms: ‘The success of economic reforms depends on a series of back-up measures concerning the development of human resources: sharing experiences with people from countries which have already successfully undertaken a reform process, transfer of economic know-how, training in modern management of the economy, strengthening these institutions and the service sector (central bank, financial bodies, public services, local administrations, trade organizations and so on) and, improving training capabilities. This involves a wide-ranging process of changing the institutional fabric of the countries concerned which foreign technical assistance or temporary expert services cannot replace’ (European Commission, 1990: 11).

The role of the state is thus articulated as to support the establishment of the free market. Therefore, the state even needs to be reformed. The EC wants to see a ‘process of changing the institutional fabric of the countries concerned which foreign technical assistance or temporary expert services cannot replace’ which is also an indication that the Commission does not trust ‘the state’ in the Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 1990: 11). In its previous working document, the European Commission (1989a: 7) noted the ‘unwelcoming bureaucracy’ in Mediterranean countries. However, the Commission also indicates that the state should make the reform programmes social acceptable. It even states that the EC can help with that. Indeed, in the annex about the financial assistance to Mediterranean countries, the Commission (1990: 24) states that the EC can support import programmes, and the ‘counterpart funds generated by the import programmes will be used to finance measures aimed at attenuating the negative social repercussions of structural adjustment, and in particular for employment creation in fields linked with environmental protection, land reclamation and, where appropriate, to contribute to the payment of redundancy payments to workers made redundant in the public and semi-public sector’. Nevertheless, this is not articulated as a main objective of the EC’s policy, it is only presented (in the annex) as one type of project which may be financed in the Mediterranean countries, and it is linked with the implementation of import programmes.

Now that we have looked how the role of the market (international, export-oriented) and the role of the state (mainly the support of this market in order to make it function properly and
making the economic reforms socially acceptable for the population) are defined, we can take a closer look at how the individual and the civil society are defined in the document of the European Commission. Individuals are mainly presented as ‘economic’ individuals, who want to have a job. Job opportunities and work are clearly emphasized in the documents of the EC. Furthermore, the Commission states that ‘cultural development in the MNC can also be included in Community cooperation schemes, supplementing what is done at national level by the countries concerned and by the member states. This cooperation should lay special emphasis on cultural exchanges with a view to better mutual understanding. In this connection, special attention will be given to measures involving immigration, as a bridge between the Community and its partners’. Overall, the residents of the Mediterranean countries are mainly presented as people who will possibly migrate to the EC (European Commission, 1990: 11). This is also articulated by Matutes (1989a: 53) in his speech. He emphasizes that the population of the Mediterranean region is about to increase rapidly, and that a lack of food will force people to emigrate towards the EC.

As mentioned in chapter 1, CSOs could for the first time under the RMP apply for funding from the EC. Therefore, the EC launched the so-called MED Programmes. These programmes are proposed by the European Commission and approved by the Council under Council Regulation 173/92 (Council of the EC, 1992a). Subsequently, the Commission proposed four MED Programmes. These four MED programmes will give us an indication on the EC’s view on the civil society. The first of these programmes is MED-URBS, which is actually not meant to support CSOs, but to support municipalities or local authorities. It creates networks of decentralized cooperation for the exchange of know-how in the field of urban management and development between actors in the EC and in the Mediterranean region. The main goal however is to reform the local communities and to improve its capacities (administration, local development and planning methods, local taxation) in order to resolve urban problems. The second of these programmes is MED-MEDIA, which encourages trans-Mediterranean cooperation between public and private media institutions, with as objective to improve the management performances of the media, and then in particular the marketing of MNC audiovisual products and the access to EC and MNC markets. Third, the European Commission launched MED-CAMPUS which stimulates the cooperation between universities within the EC and the Mediterranean region, and which will raise the professional expertise of human resources in the public and the private sector. In conclusion, MED-INVEST wants to support SMEs in the Mediterranean region by creating a favourable environment, by facilitating access to credit, by creating information and support services for development and by stimulating partnerships for
joint ventures (EuropeAid, 1997: 27-30). From this overview, it is clear that the functioning of the civil society is incorporated in the overall objectives as outlined in the Commission communication (which we discussed above): the reform of the state (local communities), the strengthening of the media in order to improve the access for audiovisual products to EC and MNC markets, the development of human resources and the support of the business sector (which all contribute to the economic reform of the Mediterranean countries). Later on, the European Commission also launched MED-MIGRATION, which deals with the issue of migration and MED-TECHNO, which focuses on the exchange of expertise regarding the treatment and reuse of municipal and/or industrial waste water. The latter fits within the Commission’s objective to stimulate the protection of the environment in the Mediterranean Basin (European Commission, 1995).

Now that we have studied how the EC articulates the role of the market, state, individual and civil society in the Mediterranean region, it is worth looking at how equality and liberty are defined in the policy of the EC. In his address to the annual Pio Manzu conference in Italy, Matutes (1989b) argued that ‘economic freedom, political liberty and a closer implication of non-EC Mediterranean countries into the European Community of 1992 are, I think, common objectives’. In the Commission document (1990: 3;9), we also find references to liberty: ‘the political moves towards pluralism, democratic political procedures and the respect for human rights under way in a number of the MNC are essential to their development and to the creation of a rapprochement with the Community’. Just like in the speech of Matutes, this kind of ‘political’ liberty is articulated closely with economic liberty: ‘the first thing that attracts a foreign investor is the climate of confidence inspired by a country (political stability, democracy, opening-up of the economy, clarity of investment codes and so on)’. Because they are articulated so closely together, it can be concluded that the European Commission defines liberty more as ‘negative liberty’, i.e. ‘the condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in society’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 172). In addition, it can be noted that there are no references to equality. Overall, it can be concluded that the European Commission promotes a society in which the free market is presented as essential to development and democracy. The logic of the market is central in its discourse. The main task of the state, the individual and the civil society is articulated as contributing to the establishment of the free market, which is considered to be global (given the references to the IFIs, the trade with EFTA, and the other countries in the region). In addition, liberty is articulated as ‘negative liberty’, while equality is not mentioned. We can therefore conclude that the Commission promotes a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region.
5.2.2 The (European) Council and the member states

Like we mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the European Commission can be considered as the main driving force behind the RMP. The member states on their turn accepted the idea that the EC’s policy should be strengthened. On the meeting of 17 September 1990, the Council stated that it wanted to make ‘a constructive contribution to the solution of the structural problems affecting the Mediterranean and the Middle East from the point of view of that region’s stability and economic and social well-being’ (Council of the EC, 1990a). It did not articulate an alternative view on globalization. The Council thus adopts the view of the European Commission: globalization/interdependence is an economic and technological process (space) which might have negative consequences for the EC, but which also can have positive consequences (normative judgment). Nevertheless, globalization/interdependence is seen as a contingent process (time), which can and should be managed. This view meets the logic of economic opportunity.

Furthermore, the Council mainly adopted the overall development strategy proposed by the European Commission (policy-options). It agreed with the articulated role of the market, state, civil society and individuals. In addition, it also approved the Community support for economic reform in the Mediterranean in concert with the IMF and with the World Bank. Consequently, this was incorporated in the Council regulation of 29 June 1992 on the implementation of the protocols on financial and technical cooperation concluded by the Community with Mediterranean non-member countries. The formulation of the eligibility criterion is slightly different than the formulation presented by the European Commission (see supra), but the main idea is kept: ‘the country concerned must carry out a reform programme approved by the Bretton Woods institutions or implement programmes recognized as similar in concert with those institutions, although not necessarily backed by them, in line with the scale and effectiveness of the reforms at macro-economic level’. However, in contrast with the document of the European Commission, it can be noted that there is no longer a reference to the possibility to use the counterpart funds generated by the important programmes to contribute to the payment of redundancy payments to workers made redundant in the public and semi-public sector or to use it for land reclamation. Only job creation is mentioned (Council, of the EC, 1992b: 2). If the Council refers to mitigating the social consequences of structural adjustment, it mainly means the negative consequences for employment, and less the negative consequences for other social sectors (which are also not mentioned in the documents). In addition, it can be noted that the Council did not accept the proposal to reduce the debt burden of the Mediterranean
region which faced a debt crisis (European Commission, 1990: 3-4). Like we explained earlier, the discussions in the Council actually focused on two aspects: market access for agricultural products and the amount of money to be spent to implement this development strategy. This led the EESC (1990: 32) to conclude that the discussion in the Council ‘reflects a failure to grasp the strategic importance of the Mediterranean issue and the need for Community policy to adopt a global approach’. In its opinion of 1992, it concluded that the view of the Northern governments prevailed, while those of the Southern member states failed to make an impact.

In addition to the economic aspects, it is important to note that the Council issued a statement, in which it underlines the fundamental importance it attaches to respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic values. In 1990, human rights and democratic values in relations with third countries became increasingly important for the EC. This was the consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which led the CEECs to think about membership of the EC. Since these countries were authoritarian regimes, the EC attached a lot of importance on the transformation of these countries into democracies. In 1993, the establishment of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for and protection of minorities became one of the criteria for membership of the EC (the Copenhagen criteria). Also in the Lomé IV Convention (concluded in 1989), which regulated the relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the EC had inserted a reference to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but there was no suspension clause which would allow the EC to suspend the agreement in case of violation of these principles (Börzel & Risse, 2004: 5-10). It is thus not surprising that both the European Commission and the Council inserted a reference to democracy and human rights in the documents on the relations with the Mediterranean region: it fitted within the general development of the EC’s foreign policy at that time. However, it needs to be added that the statement of the Council is rather limited; it just says that ‘the Community stresses the fundamental importance which it attaches to respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic values’. It does not go deeper into what is exactly meant with democracy and human rights. Moreover, in the same statement, the Council argues that it wants to reinforce its support for political and economic reforms, and it also draws attention ‘to the essential role of increased recourse to the market economy in the search for lasting and balanced growth’. In addition, it adds that sustained and harmonious development, the enhancement of people’s capacities and the role of women in development process are the general principles underlying their development policy (Mediterranean Working Party, 1990).
Overall, it can be concluded that the Council generally agreed with the strategy to promote the free market in the Mediterranean region as developed by the European Commission and that it agrees with the belief that this eventually would lead to a democracy (the logic of the market). The Council, just like the European Commission promotes a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region. The member states in the Council did not really contribute to the development of the RMP. Nevertheless, as we mentioned in the introduction and in chapter 1, the Southern member states did try to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean region within the framework of the EPC. Spain, which held the presidency of the EC in the first half of 1989, took the opportunity to revitalize the cooperation councils with the Maghreb. In addition, it helped drafting a collective European position towards the conflict in the Middle East, and it visited the Middle East (Marquina, 1999). However, according to Tovias (1999: 220-221) Spain's policy towards the Mediterranean region under the presidency remained declaratory, and the country mainly focused its attention on Latin-America, rather than on the Mediterranean region. France, which held the presidency in the second half of 1989, tried to revitalize the EAD (which was suspended since 1977). The European Council in Strasbourg in December 1989 lent its support to a Euro-Arab conference which was organized on 22 and 23 December 1989. However, the documents on the foreign policy of France reveal that most of the country’s attention after November 1989 went to the (r)evolutions in Central and Eastern Europe (Ministère des affaires étrangères de France, November & December 1989). This was also the case for the other member states, which were in general also less interested in the Mediterranean region. Germany, for example, was at the end of 1989 and in 1990 mainly preoccupied with its unification. From 1990 on, Spain, Italy and France did several additional attempts to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean area by using other frameworks such as the Mediterranean Forum or by proposing other ways for cooperation (outside the framework of the EC and the EPC): the organization of a CSCM (and later the interparliamentary CSCM).

5.2.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

We already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the EESC had little power to influence the development of the EC’s Mediterranean policy. The Commission and the Council did not have to consult the Committee on their proposals. They were also not obliged to take the opinions adopted by the EESC into account. However, this did not restrain the Committee of giving its view on the matter. Moreover, it was even the EESC, together with the European Parliament, which incited the Commission and the Council to conduct a general review of the Community’s Mediterranean policy. The Committee decided already in January 1989 to draft an
own-initiative opinion on the EC’s Mediterranean policy (EESC, 1989). Later on, it adopted two more opinions (following a request of the other institutions): one on the Commission communication presented on 23 November 1989 and on the Council conclusions of 5 February 1990 (EESC, 1990), and one on the Commission communication presented on 1 June 1990, the Council decision of 18/19 December 1990 which officially adopted the RMP, the draft Council regulation concerning the financial cooperation in respect of all the Mediterranean non-member countries and the Commission recommendations on this Council regulation (EESC, 1992a).

In its opinion of 1989, the EESC argues that the Community should redefine its international political and economic role, because of ‘the changes in the international political situation, the globalization of the economy, the widening imbalances between North and South, and even the completion of the EC internal market’. It states that ‘the new challenges and opportunities, and the increased responsibilities, make the question of European identity and union more pressing’. Globalization is here perceived in economic terms and together with the other elements, this is presented as provoking both challenges and opportunities (EESC, 1989: 16). Subsequently, these challenges are defined in terms of competition with America and Asia: ‘in this latter region (the Mediterranean, vr.), the Community must rapidly make up for lost time: the Mediterranean is now a focus of US and Japanese trade, investment, economic aid and above all, technological “colonization”’. In addition, the EESC also stated that the Mediterranean area is a demographic time-bomb and a hotbed of domestic conflict and social and religious tension. This concerns a risk for the EC, and by the use of the word ‘time-bomb’ we can even argue that the Mediterranean is articulated as a threat to the EC (although the word ‘threat’ is not explicitly used in the discourse). Therefore, the EESC should support the development of the Mediterranean countries (EESC, 1989: 17-18). This view on globalization meets the view of the other European institutions: globalization is a process with potentially negative consequences. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily have to be the case if the EC develops a strategy to help the Mediterranean region in its economic and social development (logic of economic opportunity). However, the policy-options for the development of the region are very different if compared with the policy-options of the European Commission and the Council.

According to the EESC, the EC should leave the assumption that exports are the sole locomotive of development for the Mediterranean countries. Instead, it should articulate a new development strategy for the region. The development of the region ‘will provide the Community with an excellent opportunity to extend its internal market southwards, thus doubling its size’. In this regard, the EESC even suggests that ‘the construction of a strategic Euro-Mediterranean area
must be equated with further southward enlargement of the Community’ (EESC, 1989: 18). According to the EESC, the development of the region needs to follow three steps: economic integration among the Mediterranean countries, integration between the Community’s Mediterranean region and the Mediterranean countries on various domains (transport, communication, agriculture, industry,...) and then the construction of an economic area between the EC and the Mediterranean countries. This proposal, which is the framework in which the proposals and decisions of the other institutions are judged, shows strong similarities with the European Economic Area (EEA) which would be concluded few years later with the countries that were part of the EFTA. This entails a different view on the development of the Mediterranean region than the proposal of the European Commission and the Council because this view is directed towards the creation of an enlarged European market, including free access for agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries and the reform of the CAP. This was of course not discussable for the Southern member states. Overall, it can be noted that the EESC in its opinions focuses on the complementarity of the economic relations between the Mediterranean countries, the Southern European member states and the EC in general.

The main instruments of such a policy are the development agreement, which should contain a coherent set of development projects, commercial contractual and financial commitments and an overall convention or treaty for the whole region. The latter can be designed after the example of the Lomé Convention, but unlike Lomé, it will not deal with development cooperation, but with the joint development of the Community and the Mediterranean countries. This convention should set out the ‘common goals, strategies and decisions for the development of the whole Euro-Mediterranean area’ (EESC, 1989: 21). The EESC refers here also to the proposal of the European Parliament to launch a Mediterranean Cooperation Council (MCC). In addition, the EC should provide financial assistance to the Mediterranean region, and this financial assistance should contribute to risk capital ventures and fuel structural adjustment (EESC, 1989: 18-21). However, in contrast with the strategy of the European Commission and the Council, the EESC does not agree with the strategy to simply track the action of the IFIs regarding structural adjustment. In its first opinion, this is not explicitly articulated, but in the latter two, it is firmly stated that the EC should not just follow the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs: ‘However, here too the Community should do more than simply track the action of the international financial organizations, merely playing a

30 The Mediterranean Cooperation Council is an institution where a dialogue can take place with all Mediterranean countries. It was proposed by the European Parliament, but it was never established (see infra).
complementary role and offsetting the damage done by the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes. It is now widely recognized that the structural adjustment programmes carried out to date have not achieved satisfactory results and have created excessive burdens. At the same time, the IMF seems reluctant to apply to the MNC the new guidelines – partial, but decidedly corrective – introduced for Mexico (see footnote 2 on page 26). The Community’s first task is to adopt a clear position (as the UN has) on the results of the structural adjustment programmes in the MNC and in the developing world in general. In the Committee’s view, the judgment must be negative’ (EESC, 1990: 27).

In the opinion of 1992, the EESC states: ‘In contrast, the Commission’s general political approach to the structural reform programmes ignores the substantial criticism made by the Committee, i.e. that the Community must not simply implement complementary measures offset the damage caused by the IMF’s structural reform programmes without any genuine discussion of thinking behind them, on the basis of results which the Committee, among others, has clearly shown to be negative. The Commission takes no note of the argument put forward in this respect by the Additional Opinion of April 1990 or alternative proposals contained; it repeats that the Member States must continue to support the action of the IFIs in this area. This stance not only remains unacceptable to the Committee, but also differs from the far more reasoned position adopted by the Commission vis-à-vis the Bretton Woods institutions in respect of structural reform programmes in the ACP states’ (EESC, 1992a: 39-40). The Committee therefore suggests that the Community should, instead of just trying to reduce the social costs of adjustment policies, focus on ‘the financing of schemes which offer new or alternative employment, and on an active labour and social policy, providing synergy with the economic change and adjustment measures’ (EESC, 1990: 28).

The EESC generally agrees with the proposal of the European Commission that the economies of the Mediterranean countries should be adjusted. However, they also clearly indicate that economic reforms should be accompanied by social policies and social justice, and they argue that the structural adjustment policies of the IMF are not taking this into account. In this regard, the Committee also criticized the financial protocols for not containing social clauses (EESC, 1992a: 72). Regarding the financial assistance, the EESC suggests establishing a Euro-Mediterranean development bank, but it adds that this new institution should not be modeled after the World Bank, because the project-by-project funding approach adopted by the latter does not fit within the Committee’s proposal to work out a development strategy. Here, the EESC is concerned that the RMP will conflict with the development objectives of the Community, which
is also a major concern of the European Parliament (see infra). The decision as to which projects money should be spent should remain the responsibility of political actors; the Bank should only evaluate projects. In addition, the Committee states that the Community should tackle the question of the debt of the Mediterranean countries through coordination of the action of the member states and coordination with the IFIs and that it should promote private investment.

The EESC also added that the ‘joint development project’ must have a cultural and a political content, besides an economic one: ‘peace among the Mediterranean nations, pluralist growth of their individual societies, respect and mutual recognition of different religions and customs, are all crucial to a fully-fledged, sustained joint development policy’. In addition, it emphasizes that the social partners should play a constructive role in this policy. The EESC considers this as important to improve democracy in the Mediterranean countries. It suggests that the EC improves its relations with the workers’ and employers’ organizations in order to help these social partners to ‘consolidate their arrangements for democratic representation’ (EESC, 1989: 22). In its opinion of 1992, the EESC supports the declaration of the Council on democracy and human rights discussed above, but it regrets the Council has not articulated its view on the dialogue with the social and economic groups, especially because then the EC would not only have relations with the Mediterranean states (EESC, 1992a: 73). The EESC pleads for the possibility for social and economic groups (CSOs) to take part in the political process, by which it promotes a (albeit limited) form of political liberty. In conclusion, we can argue here that the EESC, in contrast with the European Commission and the Council, seems to promote a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region: the market is considered to be the main mechanism for development of the Mediterranean countries, but the state has also a role to play in the social sphere. The state should thus not only support the market. The CSOs should support both the market and the state. Liberty is considered as important (see the reference to pluralism) and the EESC promotes a form of positive liberty. There is no reference to the word ‘equality’, but the EESC does refer to the term ‘social justice’.

5.2.4 The European Parliament

Just like the EESC, the European Parliament had little power to influence the development of the RMP. The Commission and the Council did not even ask the Parliament’s opinion on their proposals regarding the new policy. However, in 1990 several members of Parliament asked for a

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31 The EESC does not promote a Keynesian welfare state (which we identified as one of the key elements of a liberal democracy in the previous chapter). Therefore, we state that the EESC promotes a form of liberal democracy.
motion on what the Parliament called the ‘Revamped Mediterranean Policy’. Consequently, the Committee on external economic relations of the Parliament, under the guidance of Eusebio Can Pinto, drafted a report on the RMP (European Parliament, 1991b). This report eventually led to the adoption of a resolution on the new Mediterranean policy of the EC (European Parliament, 1991a). In addition, the European Parliament was asked for an opinion on the proposal regarding the financial assistance towards the region (this opinion was preceded by a report of the Committee on budgetary control and two opinions, one of the Committee on development and cooperation, and one of the Committee on external economic relations; European Parliament, 1992a; European Parliament, 1992b). The European Parliament also had to give its assent on the conclusion of the financial protocols with each Mediterranean country separately (European Parliament, 1992c). These documents can give us an insight into the Parliament’s view on the matter.

The European Parliament presents a similar view on globalization as the other European institutions and it agreed that the EC should contribute to the development of the Mediterranean region. It argues that ‘... as a result of the changes taking place in the region, the potential risks and the increasing interdependence of the EEC and Mediterranean third countries, mutual relations must be strengthened and improved and must meet the requirements of the present time’ (European Parliament, 1991a: 251). Therefore, it declares: ‘It is in our interests to help them to develop and modernize their economies so that they create jobs and enjoy an acceptable standard of living in their countries of origin. This is particularly important given that the Mediterranean basin (and the Middle East) is increasingly a hotbed of domestic, political, social and religious conflict whose effect are felt within the European countries to which thousands of people from that region have migrated. A solution to all these conflicts will require coordinated action on the part of all the European Community Member States’ (logic of economic opportunity; European Parliament, 1991b: 12). However, the Parliament’s policy-options to deal with the problems of the Mediterranean countries are not really elaborated and thus not strongly articulated. The Committee on development and cooperation of the European Parliament states in this regard: ‘the European Parliament was not consulted on the said new Mediterranean policy, and has therefore not been able to make in time such proposals as it may have considered necessary’ (European Parliament, 1992b: 18). From the limited statements about how the relations with the Mediterranean countries should look like according to the Parliament, we can conclude that it has a similar view as the EESC. In its priorities for the RMP described in the report of the Committee for external economic relations, it is stated that ‘all the countries of the Mediterranean basin could be involved in a vast joint ‘co-development’ project under the
auspices of the Community. Such a project could encompass cultural and political, as well as economic and trade aspects’ (European Parliament, 1991b: 14). Earlier in the same text, it is suggested that the EC should review all policy measures ‘which, together, might ultimately lead to economic integration’. The Committee here means the economic integration of the Mediterranean countries in the internal market, given that the title of the abovementioned priority states: ‘A new opportunity for the Community – to double the size of its internal market by expanding towards the south’ (European Parliament, 1991b: 11; 14). The definite resolution does not explicitly repeat this, but we can conclude that the Parliament, just like the EESC, envisages a development towards an enlarged European market which includes the Mediterranean countries.

However, it is not clear how this enlarged European market should be reached. The explanatory statement articulates the development agreement as the suited instrument. In addition, the MCC is specified as the place where a dialogue between the EC and the Mediterranean countries can take place (European Parliament, 1991b: 19), and also the resolution refers to the MCC (European Parliament, 1991a: 252). In addition, the Parliament refers to the CSCM as a means to cooperate with the Mediterranean countries on environmental matters. However, in the motion for a resolution it is mentioned that the Parliament should call on to the Council to ‘establish a genuine partnership with MNCs, in particular the Arab Maghreb countries, with a view to creating a customs union and free trade area within a reasonable period of time’ (European Parliament, 1991b: 8). The sentence in the definitive resolution reads ‘Calls on the Council to establish a better partnership with the MNCs, in particular the Arab Maghreb countries, with a view of implementing the existing Association Agreement in full’ (European Parliament, 1991a: 254). In this first resolution and the explanatory statement, the Parliament remains rather vague about how the policy should be implemented (suggestions to support projects of regional interest, the development of the business sector, the environment and the development of human resources; European Parliament, 1991b: 15; 16).

In the report of the Committee on budgetary control of the Parliament on the proposal for a Council regulation on the application of the protocols on financial and technical cooperation concluded by the Community with non-member Mediterranean countries, it is indicated that economic reforms are definitely necessary in the Mediterranean countries. In this regard, the Committee on budgetary control states that ‘sound economic structures are indisputably required if a country’s overall economic performance is to improve (...)’ and the Committee on development and cooperation mentions that ‘it is true that macro-economic
reforms are essential in numerous developing countries (…)’ (European Parliament, 1992b: 11; 18). In its amendments to the proposal for the Council Regulation, the Parliament indicates that the non-repayable aid should be provided to ‘projects aimed at supporting economic reforms in the context of a structural adjustment programme (SAP, vr)’ (European Parliament, 1992a: 219). However, with this SAP, the European Parliament does not mean the structural adjustment policies articulated by the World Bank and the IMF as adopted by the European Commission. Quite the contrary, the European Parliament in its documents firmly rejects the choice of the European Commission and the Council for the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs. It is stated that ‘the policy is, however, a questionable one in itself, and there is in any case much debate as to whether the methods used to achieve it have been effective, and as to the social side-effects it produces’ (European Parliament, 1992b: 10). It points out that the European Commission, when it refers to ‘economic reform’ in its communication, it implicitly associates it with the structural adjustment policy of the IMF/World Bank. The Committee on budgetary control calls it ‘inappropriate that the term structural adjustment should ‘slip through’ in the context of a largely procedural text’, and therefore it suggests that the Community should place more emphasis on social programmes mitigating the consequences of structural adjustment (European Parliament, 1992b: 11). This is also suggested in the text of the Council regulation as amended by the Parliament: ‘both the reform and the support programme shall aim from the outset to avoid any detrimental social effects of the adjustment process. In achieving the objectives of economic growth and social justice, particular attention shall be paid to the most vulnerable social groups’ (European Parliament, 1992a: 219). It is also interesting to note that, in its opinion on the matter, the Committee on development and cooperation of the European Parliament indicates that the DG which will be responsible for the management of the fund designed to offset the negative social effects of the SAPs has not enough staff to act independently from the IMF in this regard.

Just like the EESC, the European Parliament thus agrees with the idea that economic reforms are necessary in the Mediterranean countries, but it also clearly indicates that these economic reforms should be accompanied by social policies and social justice. And just like the EESC, it argues that the SAPs of the IMF and the World Bank have negative social effects, and that the EC should develop its own SAP which takes social objectives into account. In addition, the Committee on development and cooperation is also concerned that this policy will conflict with the development objectives of the Community. In this regard, the overall report also states that the task of the EIB in the region, which will manage a large part of Community funding, can be in contrast with the development priorities of the Community. After all, the EIB has a credit-
based view on its lending decisions (European Parliament, 1992b: 18; 10). However, the European Parliament did not only focus on economic and social matters. In the resolution on the RMP it refers to human rights and democracy, and it even calls for the inclusion of a democratization and human rights clause in future financial protocols. It also refers to the fact that the Mediterranean countries should ‘move towards a pluralist democracy’ and it regrets that ‘human rights violations exist in some Mediterranean countries’. There is thus a reference to liberty in its documents. In addition, the Parliament pleads for ‘a more equitable distribution of wealth as well as harmonious development and political stability’. This should be reached by implementing economic reforms (European Parliament, 1991a: 253). In 1992, the European Parliament also refused to give its assent on the conclusion of the fourth financial protocol with Morocco and Syria. In its accompanying resolution, it explains what it means with democracy in the Mediterranean region: the holding of free elections, freedom of opposition parties to participate fully in the political process, freedom of the media and the respect for the rights of minorities. The Parliament is also a strong defender of human rights, and it insists that the Mediterranean countries should respect human rights and international agreements such as the UDHR and the Geneva Conventions (European Parliament, 1992c: 51). From this, it can be understood that the European Parliament articulates liberty as ‘negative’ liberty (given the references to human rights, rights of minorities), but also as positive liberty: the possibility for people to freely organize their life. The concept is articulated in a political way, because it is stated that people should have equal access to the political process. In addition, it is also articulated in an economic way, because the European Parliament pleads for a more equitable distribution of wealth, i.e. more economic equality. Therefore, it can be concluded that, in contrast with the European Commission and the Council, the European Parliament promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region (although it does not promote a Keynesian welfare state), rather than a libertarian democracy.

5.3 Political and fantasmatic logics in the Renovated Mediterranean Policy

5.3.1 The European Commission

How are the Self and the Other articulated in the documents of the European Commission? Taking a closer look at the spatial construction of identity, it can be observed the Commission in its official documents generally refers to the Mediterranean countries as ‘non-member Mediterranean countries’ or as ‘Mediterranean non-member countries’.\(^\text{32}\) From the documents, it

\(^{32}\) In his speeches, Commissioner Matutes generally refers to ‘Mediterranean countries’.
seems that the discourse of the European Commission is open: it is not a priori excluded that some of the Mediterranean countries can come closer to the EC, and, one day, might become a member of the EC (although this is not explicitly stated in the documents). The Commission makes a difference between two groups of countries. In its working document of 1989, it distinguishes between Northern Mediterranean countries and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM; European Commission, 1989a: 5). This distinction is maintained in the document of 1990: one part of the document describes Community instruments which will be used for all the MNCs and the other part goes deeper into the measures that will be taken towards the countries located South of the Mediterranean Sea which have financial protocols expiring in 1991. Further in the document, the European Commission (1990: 5) indicates that ‘Turkey and Yugoslavia are special cases, and the Commission is presenting separate communications regarding them. Proposals will be made on the subject of special cooperation with Cyprus and Malta when the timetable of financial protocols for the two countries so requires’. A clear distinction is thus made between Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and Yugoslavia on the one hand: these are countries which are located North of the Mediterranean Sea and which might become a member of the Community one day, and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia on the other hand. They are considered as different from the EC because they are geographically located South of the Mediterranean Sea. This difference is perpetual. These countries will never be able to progress towards this part of the identity of the Self because the identity of the Self is defined based on inherent, European characteristics (temporal construction of identity).

However, if we look at the spatial construction of the identity the Mediterranean countries are not only defined in geographical terms. They are also articulated as a risk for the EC, and more specifically, a security risk. In this regard, the European Commission refers to the problems of the Mediterranean countries, and the consequences these problems might have for the EC. In both of his speeches, Matutes refers to the demographic evolution of the Mediterranean countries, which will cause difficulties in terms of food supply. In addition, he states that the Mediterranean countries have a strong trade deficit, a huge debt, and that several of them have a negative food balance. Moreover, the Mediterranean is articulated as one single ecological resource, but one which is degrading: scarcity of water, scarcity of agricultural land, desertification, a half million ton of urban waste every day in the coastal areas, air and sea pollution. For the Commission, all these problems will lead to political instability, which will on its turn lead to fundamentalism and migration to the Community. Migration is the main security risk for the Community. Although this is not explicitly stated, mainly the SEM countries are
articulated as problematic for the EC because the problems mentioned by the European Commission are mainly taking place in the countries which are located South of the Mediterranean Sea. However, these problems are considered to be temporal and therefore soluble. The solution for these problems is discussed above and can be summarized by the words ‘economic reforms’ and ‘structural adjustment’.

By performing economic reforms and by adjusting their economies, the Mediterranean countries will meet their international responsibilities. This entails two things. First, the Mediterranean countries have the responsibility to solve their own problems. This is clear from the conditionality measures that are proposed and which need to encourage these countries to implement the reforms. The Commission for example states that the SEM countries could also receive funding outside the framework of the financial protocols. This financial assistance, it argued, would take the form of an incentive to reform. ‘It would be up to the Mediterranean countries which wanted to take advantage of this financing facility to submit a reasoned application’ (European Commission, 1990: 15). Second, by taking this responsibility to solve their problems, they will meet the standards of the IFIs. This is emphasized in the Commission communication (1990: 13; 15; 23) which contains several references to the IFIs, and then especially in regard to its policy towards the SEM countries. In the financial protocols, the implementation of a reform programme approved by the Bretton Woods institutions or the implementation of a programme which is recognized as similar in concert with those institutions is articulated as a condition for receiving financial assistance from the EC.

Nevertheless, the responsibility to solve the problems of the Mediterranean countries is also a ‘shared responsibility’. This again entails two things. First, the European Commission states that it has responsibilities towards that part of the world, and even ‘a duty to encourage the continuing and at times accelerating progress seen in a number of the MNC towards pluralist democracy and a strengthened market economy’. It adds that the Mediterranean region has expectations of the Community, and the EC should express its willingness to strengthen the ties with those countries (European Commission, 1990: 2; 4). Second, the Commission sees it also as the responsibility of the Community and its member states to support the initiatives of the IFIs. During his speech to the symposium on ‘human movements in Western Mediterranean’ in Barcelona on 9 November 1989, Matutes (1989a) stated that it is not the task of the EC to present alternative proposals for the economic support of the IFIs to the Mediterranean region. In the Commission communication (1990: 22) on ‘Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy Proposals for the period 1992-96’, the European Commission even explicitly states that it
respects the ‘leading role of the international institutions’ (in the field of the structural adjustment), and he adds that the Community could usefully support the structural adjustment process in the economies of SEM countries which so wish’. This is also one of the reasons that the main criterion for receiving funding of the EC under the financial protocols is to undertake reform programmes supported by major multilateral donors. The European Commission even urges the member states to support the IFIs to develop SAPs with the Mediterranean countries: ‘the member states should therefore continue to support the international financial institutions’ moves to draw up viable economic reform programmes with the countries concerned’. Reading the documents, it appears from the text that the Commission has a lot of respect for the work of the IFIs, and that it considers a global strategy to be the best for the development of the Mediterranean region. The task of the EC is then only to contribute to this global strategy, and to coordinate its actions with it (ethical construction of identity).³³

These articulations present a very specific identity for the Self and the Other, and then especially for the SEM countries. The European Commission articulates the EC as an actor which respects the decisions of the IFIs. In this regards, it articulates the member states and the institutions of the EC in one common identity. It refers to something identical underlying all actors involved in the policy, and that is the respect for and the support of (the decisions of) international institutions on economic issues and agreements (logic of equivalence). Here, it can be noted that there is no nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission which reflects this identity (as will be the case in the discourses of the EESC and the European Parliament, see infra). In terms of fantasmatic logics, we can say that this discourse is based on the myth of multilateral Europe. Here, the European Commission just follows the policy of the IFIs. Commissioner Matutes (1989a:54) even explicitly states that it is not the task of the EC to develop an alternative economic strategy for the Mediterranean, and that the EC should support the IFIs. The Other is here presented as not yet respecting (the decisions of) the IFIs. It has no commonalities with the Self, and is therefore presented as a risk (logic of difference). Nevertheless, it is indicated that the Other can also reach this identity, if the rules of the international economic institutions are followed. The reference to the IFIs is used by the European Commission to ‘sell’ its policy to the other European institutions and to the member states, but also to sell it to the Mediterranean countries. For Mediterranean countries, it is difficult to reject this policy because this would mean that they also reject the policy of the IFIs in

³³ The European Commission refers in its documents also to the interests of the EC in helping the Mediterranean region, but this is not particularly stressed (in comparison with the references to the IFIs).
the region. This is a political practice which suppresses public contestation. In addition, we must not forget that there is also an aspect of permanent difference in the discourse of the European Commission, because it is clear that the SEM countries will never be ‘European’ because of their geographical location. However, this aspect is articulated less.

5.3.2 The (European) Council and the member states

The analysis of the documents of the Council of the EC already showed that the Council mainly adopted the proposal of the European Commission for the development of the Mediterranean region (see supra). Consequently, it also adopts the identity the European Commission is articulating. There is only one small difference: in the overall decision on the RMP of 18/19 December 1990, the Council makes a distinction between the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), the Mashrek countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and Israel (Council of the EC, 1990b). However, this does not change anything to the overall strategy that is proposed for the whole Mediterranean region. The Council did not dispute the Commission’s decision to develop a strategy for the whole region. Moreover, it did not dispute the Commission’s view of the region as a risk for the Community (spatial construction of identity). This risk can be reduced by implementing economic reforms in the Mediterranean countries (temporal construction of identity). In this regard, the Council also agreed on strong EC support for economic reforms in the Mediterranean countries ‘in concertation also with the IMF and the World Bank’. In the Council regulation regarding the financial cooperation in respect of all Mediterranean non-member countries, it accepted the proposal of the Commission to make the financial assistance conditional upon implementing a reform programme approved by the Bretton Woods institutions. Moreover, it accepts that the responsibility for the reform in the Mediterranean region is partly the responsibility of the EC. The Council states that it will deliver ‘a constructive contribution to the solution of the structural problems affecting the Mediterranean and the Middle East from the point of view of that region’s stability and social wellbeing’ (Council of the EC, 1990a; ethical construction of identity). In conclusion, we can state that the Council thus adopts the identity the European Commission is articulating for the EC and for the Mediterranean countries. The EC is presented in the discourse as an actor which respects the decisions of the IFI, and the Mediterranean countries as actors which do not yet respect these decisions.

34 Here it can be noted that the European Commission did not adopt the references to the ‘Mediterranean countries’ in its proposal for a Council regulation (EEC) concerning the financial cooperation. Instead, it keeps referring to the ‘Mediterranean non-member countries’.
5.3.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

In this paragraph, it is explained how the EESC articulates the Self and the Other in relation to the Mediterranean region, and how this relates to the social logics discussed above. We already indicated that the social order the EESC wants to promote in the Mediterranean region is summarized in the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’. The main objective of the Committee’s policy in the long run is the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the European market. The EESC states that ‘the construction of a strategic Euro-Mediterranean area must be equated with further southward enlargement of the Community’. The EC is thus clearly the focal point in the discourse of the EESC (in contrast with the discourse of the European Commission and the Council). Geographically, the EESC makes no distinction between the different Mediterranean countries: they will all become part of the Euro-Mediterranean strategic area. In the 1989 opinion, the Mediterranean countries are presented as the ‘twelve non-EEC Mediterranean countries’ or as ‘Third Mediterranean Countries’ (TMCs). These countries are Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yugoslavia. In this document, the Mediterranean countries with which the EC has not concluded agreements (Albania and Libya) are excluded (EESC, 1989). In its later opinions, the EESC refers to all Mediterranean non-Community countries, including Albania and Libya. The EESC thus also makes no difference between Malta, Cyprus, Turkey and Yugoslavia on the one hand, and the other countries on the other hand like the Commission and the Council did. It sees the whole Mediterranean area as one single unit, thus including the Mediterranean member states of the EC and the MNCs. In addition, it can be noted that the EESC also suggests that Eastern Europe and the EFTA countries should be part of this Euro-Mediterranean strategic area (EESC, 1990: 22).

In its opinion, the EESC only makes a distinction between the EC and the Mediterranean countries. In a similar way as the European Commission, the EESC presents the Mediterranean region as a security risk for the EC. It even goes one step further and articulates the Mediterranean countries as a security threat for the EC. It refers to the Mediterranean region as ‘a demographic time-bomb’ and a ‘hotbed of domestic conflict and social religious tensions’ (EESC, 1989: 17; spatial construction of identity). However, this identity of the Mediterranean countries is presented as temporal: their problems will be solved if they, in the long run, become part of the EC’s internal market (temporal construction of identity). In this regard, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’ functions as a nodal point in the discourse of the EESC. The EESC articulates a particular identity for the EC because it refers to the internal market as the identical something which underlies the European member states and the European institutions
(logic of equivalence). The Other is articulated as not taking part yet in this internal market. For the moment, it has no communalities with the Self, and it is articulated as threatening (logic of difference). Nevertheless, it is indicated that the Mediterranean countries can progress towards this identity, which will then lead to a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Strategic Area’. Therefore, they should integrate economically and complementary relations should be developed between the Mediterranean countries and the Southern member states of the EC.

According to the EESC, the development of the Euro-Mediterranean strategic area is a shared responsibility (ethical construction of identity). In its 1990 opinion, the EESC states: ‘A joint development policy is the only way of inducing MNC governments to address their responsibilities as regards economic, social and demographic policy’ (EESC, 1990: 24). Nevertheless, the responsibility of the EC is articulated as more important, which fits within the articulation that the EC is the focal point in the new policy. The EC, and more specifically for the Community’s Southern member states, should play a locomotive role in the development of complementary relations. Also the proposal that the EC should draft an own, new approach to structural adjustment and that it should not just follow the IFIs fits in this. The EESC even states that the EC and the member states should make sure that the IMF adopts this new approach. In contrast with the European Commission and the Council, the EESC thus presents a very different identity for the Self and the Other. While the European Commission and the Council picture an international identity for the EC, i.e. the EC as an actor which meets and helps concluding international agreements, the latter articulates a ‘European’ identity for the EC, and for the Mediterranean countries. The reference to the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’ also fulfills the role of fantasy in the discourse of the EESC. In this regard, it is mainly meant to give energy to its proposed practice, because it promises both the prevention of a disaster (the detonation of the time-bomb) and the creation of a certain fullness for the EC: the creation of an own European identity (since the EC is presented as the focal point) and the possibility to play an independent role in world politics. This discourse partially reflects the logic of the third force (the wish to play an independent role in world politics) and it reflects the logic of civilian power Europe, but mainly in the way it was understood in the 1970s: the EC as a power with economic resources which will use this power to support the development of the Mediterranean region. We also see the logic of multilateral Europe, where the EC plays a leading role: it should develop an own SAP and it should make sure that the IFIs adopt the EC’s approach. At the same time, the discourse also proposes a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries (prosperity) once the obstacle (economic underdevelopment) is overcome.
5.3.4 The European Parliament

In the previous paragraphs on the social logics in the discourse of the European Parliament, it is concluded that the European Parliament was rather vague about what kind of social order it wants to promote in the Mediterranean region, and how this social order should be reached. It is therefore also less clear how this social order is promoted. The Parliament pleads for a joint development policy, a ‘joint co-development project’ in which all the countries of the Mediterranean Basin could be involved under the auspices of the Community. This joint co-development project would give the European Community the possibility to ‘double the size of its internal market by expanding towards the south’. In this regard, the Parliament makes no distinction between the Mediterranean countries, because they can all take part in this joint co-development project. In its resolution on the Revamped Mediterranean policy, it refers to the Mediterranean countries in several ways: MNCs, the Mediterranean third countries, the 14 Mediterranean non-member countries and Mediterranean countries. However, it is clear that the Parliament considers Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Libya as the non-member Mediterranean countries, which can be separated from the European countries. A distinction is made between the EC and the Mediterranean region. Just like the European Commission, the Council and the EESC, the Parliament articulates this Mediterranean region as a risk for the EC: ‘this is particularly important given that the Mediterranean Basin (and the Middle East) is increasingly a hotbed of domestic, political, social and religious conflict whose effects are felt within the European countries to which thousands of people from that region have migrated’ (European Parliament, 1991b: 12; spatial construction of identity). In contrast with the EESC, however, it does not articulate the region as a ‘time-bomb’.

This identity is considered as temporal, because these problems will be solved when the Mediterranean countries become part of the internal market (temporal construction of identity). The Parliament does, in contrast with the EESC, not refer to the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’. In its discourse, the concept ‘joint co-development project’ functions as a nodal point. It articulates a particular identity for the EC because it refers to the internal market as the identical something which underlies the European member states and the EC institutions. In the other documents of the European Parliament, the EC is articulated as an actor which respects international agreements on human rights, and more specifically the UDHR and the Geneva conventions. The Mediterranean countries are presented as not yet respecting these international agreements. Both elements are articulated in one identity, and the internal market and the respect
for international agreements on human rights are the ‘identical something’ which underlies both
the European member states and the EC institutions (logic of equivalence; logic of civilian power
Europe), and this is not the case for the Mediterranean countries (logic of difference). For the
moment, they have no communalities with the Self, and they are articulated as a risk.

Nevertheless, they can reach this identity if they start implementing economic reforms
and respecting international agreements. The Parliament considers this as a shared responsibility
(and this is particularly stressed by the European Parliament since it uses the concept joint co-
development project; ethical construction of identity): ‘While it is of course up to those countries
to settle their regional conflicts and to lay down and fulfill the conditions for political, economic
and social development geared towards liberalization of the economy and democratization (the
introduction of individuals freedoms, the organization of free elections, multiparty systems, etc.)
the EEC must help them to acquire the necessary infrastructure to make such development
possible’ (European Parliament, 1991b: 14). Also the resolution on the financial protocols with
the Mediterranean countries and these countries’ respect for human rights and international
agreements makes clear that this is a shared responsibility. However, we have to nuance this
overall conclusion about the discourse of the Parliament, because although it in most documents
articulates the Mediterranean Basin as one whole, it makes at the same time a distinction between
the Maghreb and the other Mediterranean countries. It is clear that they are the preferred
partners when it comes to integration into the internal market; they can be integrated first. The
term ‘partnership’ is used in this regard, and refers to the shared responsibility of both the
Maghreb and the EC.

The reference to the concept ‘joint co-development project’ and the references to
international agreements on human rights such as UDHR also fulfill the role of fantasy in the
discourse of the European Parliament. For the EC, it promises the prevention of a disaster and
the creation of a certain fullness: the creation of an own role in international politics, i.e. the EC
which promotes economic cooperation and respect for human rights. Although the economic
cooperation and the political norms seem to be articulated separately, this is not the case, since
the Parliament wants to include a democratization and human rights clause in future financial
protocols. This represents the story of spreading norms and development through economic
cooperation (but with no intention to impose it). This reflects the logic of civilian power Europe.
The norms to be spread are based on international agreements, so the discourse also reflects the
role of the EC as a multilateral Europe (as defined in chapter 4). In this case, it means that the
EC follows the political norms laid down in international agreements. For the Mediterranean
countries, the concept ‘joint co-development project’ proposes a certain fullness (joint co-development project) when the obstacle (economic underdevelopment) is overcome without that this policy is imposed by the EC (joint co-development project). The latter is, in contrast with the discourse of the EESC, especially stressed in the discourse of the European Parliament.

5.4 Conclusions about the Renovated Mediterranean Policy

In general, we can conclude that all European institutions articulate globalization and its consequences for the relations with the Mediterranean region in a similar way. Globalization is mainly presented as ‘interdependence’. Overall, it is indicated that the difficult economic and social situation in the Mediterranean countries might have negative consequences for the EC (especially in terms of migration). In this regard, the Mediterranean countries are articulated as a risk and by the EESC also as a threat for the EC. At the same time, globalization/interdependence is also presented as a contingent process, a process which can be managed in order to reach economic development and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. This view meets the logic of economic opportunity. However, there is no consensus about how globalization can be managed, and thus about how the EC’s policy should look like. A distinction can be made between the European Commission and the Council on the one hand, and the EESC and the European Parliament on the other hand.

The European Commission and the Council distinguish between the Mediterranean countries that are geographically closer to the EC, the Northern Mediterranean countries and the countries that are geographically further away, the SEM countries. The problems of the first group of countries can be solved by a closer cooperation with the EC, i.e. by coming closer to the EC (and in the long run, by becoming a member). By contrast, the problems of the latter (which are considered as temporal) can be solved by implementing economic reforms based on the programmes of the World Bank and the IMF. The state, individuals and CSOs should contribute to the development of the free market (social logics; logic of the market). The Commission and the Council promote a form of libertarian democracy. This particular kind of social practice is constituted by the references to the IFIs. The EC is presented as an actor which follows the decisions of the IFIs (political logics; the logic of equivalence). This articulates the member states and the institutions of the EC in one common identity. The Mediterranean countries are presented as not yet respecting these decisions, and therefore as a risk (political logics; logic of difference). The reference to the IFIs also fulfills the role of fantasy in the discourse of the EC (fantasmatic logics; logic of multilateral Europe). On the one hand, it suppresses public contestation by both the Mediterranean countries and by the other European institutions against
the social practices presented by the European Commission and the Council by referring to their international responsibility. On the other hand, it gives energy to its practices, because it promises for the Mediterranean countries a certain fullness (i.e. prosperity) when the obstacle (economic underdevelopment) is overcome, while for the EC it promises the prevention of a disaster (which would happen when the Mediterranean region stays economically weak).

The EESC and the European Parliament have a different approach than the European Commission and the Council. In general, they distinguish between those Mediterranean countries which are already part of the EC, and the Mediterranean countries that are not yet part of the EC. The latter are economically underdeveloped, but their economic problems can be solved by integration into the European internal market (in the long run). Therefore, economic reforms are needed, but these should be based on an economic reform programme developed by the EC. These countries should be reformed into market economies, i.e. a free market should be established, but with respect for social policies. In this regard, the state has a double task: the support of the market and the implementation of social policies (social logics; the logic of market and state). The role of the CSOs is to contribute to the development of society as a whole: especially the EESC pleads for the participation of socio-economic groups to the decision-making process in the Mediterranean countries, which is a form of positive liberty. The EESC and the European Parliament promote a form of liberal democracy.

In case of the EESC, this kind of social practice is constituted by the reference to the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’. The EESC articulates a common identity for the EC institutions and the member states which is based on the internal market (which consists of a combination of market economies and welfare policies; political logics; logic of equivalence). The Mediterranean countries are presented as not yet having reached this kind of economic model and the level of economic development which follows from it (political logics; logic of difference). However, they can reach this, and this will lead to a ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’. The reference to the Euro-Mediterranean strategic area also fulfills the role of fantasy in the discourse of the EESC. In this regard, it is mainly meant to give energy to its proposed practice, because it promises both the prevention of a disaster (the detonation of the time-bomb) and the creation of a certain fullness (the creation of an own European identity, the possibility to play an independent role in world politics and the possibility to help the Mediterranean countries to develop) for the EC (fantasmatic logics; logic of third force and logic of civilian power Europe). At the same time, it also proposes a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries (prosperity) when the obstacle (economic underdevelopment) is overcome.
In case of the European Parliament, the proposed social practice is constituted by the reference to the term ‘joint co-development policy’. We should also note here that for the Parliament, the Maghreb countries are the preferred partners in the development of this joint co-development policy. The European Parliament articulates a common identity for the EC institutions and the member states which is based on the internal market (which consists of a combination of market economies and welfare policies; political logics; logic of equivalence), just like the EESC, but also an identity which is based on the respect for certain international agreements which protect human rights such as the UDHR and the Geneva Conventions. The Mediterranean countries are presented as not yet having reached this kind of economic model and the level of economic development which follows from it, and as not yet respecting these international agreements (political logics; logic of difference). However, they are able to implement this economic model, which will lead to joint co-development. The concept ‘joint co-development project’ fulfills the role of fantasy in the sense that it proposes the prevention of a disaster, and it creates an own role for the EC in international politics: it promotes economic cooperation and the respect for human rights (fantasmatic logics; logic of civilian power Europe). These political norms are laid down in international agreements (fantasmatic logics; logic of multilateral Europe - follower). For the Mediterranean countries, prosperity is promised which they can reach themselves with the support of the EC by implementing economic reforms. The EC will not impose this, it is a shared responsibility, and this is (in contrast with the EESC) stressed in the discourse of the European Parliament: it uses the words ‘joint co-development’. In the next chapter, we will study the development, launch and implementation of the EMP. Do the social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the different EC institutions change following a new period of public contestation?
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Table 17. Social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European institutions on the RMP
Chapter 6: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

6.1 Introduction

The chapter at hand goes deeper into the discourse of the EC/EU towards the Mediterranean region on (the preparations to) the EMP. As we already noted in chapters 1 and 5, even with the launch of the RMP, discussions on the cooperation with the Mediterranean region went on. Also the RMP caused discussion. Both the European Parliament and the EESC were not very pleased with the RMP, not only because they thought that the proposed measures were not sufficient to implement the proposed objectives in the Mediterranean region, but also because of the way in which the policy would be implemented. The Southern member states from their side concerned about the concessions they would have to make regarding trade in agricultural products. They preferred to increase the financial assistance from the EC towards the Mediterranean region, rather than to grant the Mediterranean countries market access for their agricultural products. However, this caused discussion with the Northern member states, which are net contributors to the European budget. Moreover, the Southern member states also wanted to address security concerns, something the European Commission was not allowed to do because it did not have the competences to deal with security. The Southern member states also did not want the European Commission to address security concerns, as they considered this as the competence of the member states. This also explains why they were less interested in the RMP, and why they launched their own initiatives. More specifically, Spain strengthened the relations with the Maghreb within the framework of the EPC, the Southern member states with France in a leading role tried to revitalize the EAD, and they also sought to address security issues outside the framework of the EC and the EPC. In 1990, Spain and Italy proposed to organize a CSCM. Because this proposal led to nothing, the Spanish Parliament eventually convened an interparliamentary CSCM which would later result in the establishment of the PAM. A few years earlier, France organized the 5+5 dialogue and supported the Mediterranean Forum. However, as we explained in chapter 1, these initiatives had little impact on the security issues the Southern member states were facing.

Moreover, the RMP did not solve the economic and social problems of the Mediterranean countries. Consequently, the Southern member states remained confronted with migration flows coming from the Mediterranean countries. This led to further contestation in the Southern member states, and it was eventually Spain that took the initiative to improve the relations with the Mediterranean countries. The immediate cause for the initiative of Spain was a conflict between Morocco and the EC which had consequences for the Spanish fisheries.
Initially, Spain focused on the strengthening of the relations with the Maghreb countries, and the discussions between the European Commission and the member states eventually led to the proposal for a Euro-Maghreb partnership (1992). In 1993, the European Commission also proposed the establishment of a Euro-Mashrek partnership. The Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek partnership were never officially launched, but they can be considered as the predecessors of the EMP. Therefore, these frameworks will be studied in the first part of this chapter. In the second part, we will elaborate on how the member states Spain and France, the (European) Council and the European Commission prepared the Barcelona conference which would be held on 27 and 28 November 1995 and which led to the establishment of the EMP. It was illustrated in the first chapter of this dissertation that the Mediterranean countries had very little influence on how the EMP would look like, and that it was mainly the EU that determined the objectives and structure of the new partnership. This will allow us to draw conclusions about what kind of the social order the EU has promoted under the EMP, how it has promoted this social order through its discourse, and why this discourse has been accepted. The EMP was further developed through the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs, through the conclusions of the EMAAs and the financial assistance of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. Also here, the EU was the dominant partner: it set the agenda for the Euro-Mediterranean conferences, it drafted the EMAAs, and it determined the financial assistance to be granted to the Mediterranean countries. The documents about these instruments thus mainly reflect the EU’s policy. In this chapter, we will also refer to some of these documents in order to give a further insight into the social order the EU has promoted in the Mediterranean region (although the main focus remains on the policy proposals).

6.2 The run-up to the EMP: the Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek Partnership

6.2.1 Introduction to the Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek Partnership

The Euro-Maghreb Partnership was presented as solution for a problem that arose following the implementation of the RMP. The refusal of the European Parliament to approve the fourth financial protocol with Morocco, led the latter to refuse to negotiate a new fisheries agreement with the EC. This was especially a problem for Spain, since it were especially Spanish fishermen who now would no longer have access to Moroccan fishery grounds. Consequently, it was Spain that took an initiative to improve the relations between the EC and the Maghreb countries. On the meeting of the EPC of 17 February 1992, it proposed the conclusion a free trade agreement with Morocco. The idea for a free trade agreement actually came from Morocco, which hoped that it would receive access to the European market for its agricultural products (Gillespie,
France supported this idea. As we explained in chapter 1, France already proposed the conclusion of a free trade agreement in the 1970s, but this proposal was rejected by the UK. The EPC meeting asked both Spain and the European Commission to prepare a report on the relations with the Maghreb: Spain on the political relations, and the European Commission on the economic relations. These reports proposed the launch of a Euro-Maghreb partnership. In June 1992, the European Council issued a declaration on the EC’s policy towards the Maghreb (the declaration was drafted by Spain, Bicchi, 2007: 163) but the Euro-Maghreb partnership was never implemented. In the second half of 1992 and in 1993, the EC was mainly preoccupied with the MEPP. The member states asked the Commission to draft a proposal on the EC’s policy towards the Middle East, and the latter came with the proposal for a Euro-Mashrek partnership.

It were thus mainly the European Commission and the member states which were involved in the development of the Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek Partnership. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on the relations with the Maghreb countries. However, the Commission and the member states did not take into account the position of the Parliament when drafting their proposals. In addition, the European Parliament presented several resolutions on the peace process in the Middle East. In one of these resolutions, it stated that it ‘welcomes the Commission action plan on the future of relations and cooperation between the Community and the Middle East’ (European Parliament, 1993c: 162), but it did not go deeper into this. The EESC adopted two own-initiative opinions, one on the economic cooperation with the Maghreb countries, and one on the EC and economic cooperation in the Middle East. In 1995, it adopted a second opinion on the relations between the EU and the Middle East. These opinions will give us an insight into the EESC’s view on the EC’s policy towards the Mediterranean area.

6.2.2 Social logics in the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek Partnership

6.2.2.1 The European Commission

In March 1992, the European Commission delivered the report on the economic relations with the Maghreb to the Council. The report was written under the direction of Commissioner Abel Matutes, who was also the main initiator of the RMP. A closer look at this report reveals that it is written in the same spirit of the RMP. The idea of an increasingly interdependent (globalizing) world has influenced the thinking of the European Commission. The Commission states: ‘It is vital to consolidate this position (the EC as a main focus for peace, democracy and growth, \textit{et c.}) if we are to increase the Community’s weight and influence for a more stable order in an ever more
interdependent, and therefore more vulnerable world. More than the other industrialized countries, the Community is dependent on the outside world: one in four jobs in the European market rests on international trade. It also has closer links with the developing countries and is more vulnerable to the economic, social and demographic effects of underdevelopment among its neighbours to the East and South’ (European Commission, 1992: 4).

More specifically, the economic and political situation in the Maghreb is presented as a potential risk for the EC, although the word ‘risk’ is not used, the European Commission refers to the problems of the Mediterranean region: ‘most Mediterranean countries are facing political instability, rapid population growth, large movements of population and high unemployment. These problems, especially in the case of the Maghreb countries, are also our problems – such is the influence on the region’s security and the potential migratory pressure on the Community’. Therefore, the European Commission concludes that ‘what is required is a new regional policy that makes due allowance for this interdependence’ (European Commission, 1992: 4). Here, globalization is thus defined as interdependence. Interdependence is articulated as an economic process (one of the four jobs in the European market rests on international trade; it has special economic links with the developing countries; the Maghreb with its economic problems is located in its geographical proximity; space) which potentially has negative consequences for the EC (the EC is ‘vulnerable’ for changes in international trade, but also because the economic situation in the Mediterranean region will provoke migration to the EC; normative judgment). However, it is seen as a contingent process because it is assumed that a new policy, which will lead to the economic development of the region, can absorb these negative consequences. This view meets the logic of economic opportunity.

If we then look at the policy-options, the European Commission (1992: 5) states that a new regional policy towards the Mediterranean countries ‘needs a new concept to underpin the new approach to relations between the Community and its next-door neighbours to the South’. This new concept is the Euro-Maghreb Partnership and has as its ultimate goal the establishment of a Euro-Maghreb economic area. This sounds similar to the suggestion of the EESC in its opinions of 1989, 1990 and 1991 to create a Euro-Mediterranean strategic area. However, for the European Commission, this does not mean the extension of the internal market towards the Mediterranean countries, as the EESC proposed. A closer look at the rest of the document indicates that the proposed policy is mainly directed towards the economic development of the Maghreb countries. This is the main goal of the Euro-Maghreb Partnership according to the European Commission and the proposed measures are developed in the light of this objective.
Economic development is necessary because the current underdevelopment in the region leads to instability. In addition, the Commission adds that ‘it is possible to identify a certain number of key factors that are essential to the economic development of the Maghreb, and on which Community action should be focused. These factors are economic reforms, investments and job creation, opening-up to the outside world, containing population growth and political liberalization’ (European Commission, 1992: 6).

Economic reforms towards a market economy are presented as a condition for improving the economic situation in the Maghreb, and also to improve economic and thus political stability. Again, the European Commission refers several times to the IFIs as a sort of justification for its choices: ‘the IMF and the World Bank believe that the economic reform process currently under way in Morocco is proving a successful model, in spite of the country’s social shortcomings’ (European Commission, 1992: 6). Here, it is also indicated that the social costs of the economic reforms should be minimized, that the reform programmes should be made socially acceptable, and that the EC could provide support for sensitive social sectors such as health care, education and accommodation, ‘where the impact of the budgetary measures would be too great’ (European Commission, 1992: 7). In addition, these economic reforms might also attract foreign investments, not only from the EC, but also from Japan and the US. In this regard, the role of the market is again articulated as export-oriented, and it is stated that ‘the Maghreb countries must not open up only to each another, but also to the outside world in general, and to the Community in particular’ (European Commission, 1992: 8). Regional integration among the Maghreb countries is seen as important, but is presented as the task of the Maghreb countries. Nevertheless, the EC can encourage regional integration (the European Commission presents four specific measures in this regard). The FTA is also mentioned, but it is definitely not the main objective in the Commission communication.

Reducing unemployment is another important objective of the European Commission: it indicates that the programmes it will support need to have a significant employment component. The support for small businesses is also an important objective in this regard. Unemployment is seen as a breeding ground for ‘intolerant and anti-democratic ideologies’ and as causing migration towards the EC (European Commission, 1992: 8). Projects in the social sector are directed towards ‘poor rural and suburban regions of large urban centres identified as principal migration sources’ and ‘educated members of the intellectual élite (brain drain) who are more likely to emigrate, through the creation of networks linking professionals in these countries and their European colleagues, with the aim of motivating them to participate in the development of their
own country’ (European Commission, 1992: 17-18). If we look at how the role for the state is articulated, the Commission argues that the state and politics play an important role in the economic reforms: ‘There is an urgent need to overhaul the system to create a favourable environment for economic activity. Any legislation or practices that needlessly restrain economic activity must be the subject of reforms. (…). There remains a great deal to be done if the political will that has manifested itself is to translate into changed attitudes and practices’ (European Commission, 1992: 6). Overall, it can be concluded that the first objective that is presented in the report of the European Commission is the reform of the market, and that the state is presented as the institution that should contribute to the reform of this market.

In contrast with its proposal under the RMP where it only had limited attention for political reforms, the European Commission now devoted a specific part of its report to the political liberalization of the Maghreb countries. In 1991, the European Commission issued a communication in order ‘to establish general lines of conduct for the Community and the member states concerning the relationship between development cooperation policy on the one hand and the promotion and defence of human rights and support for the democratic process in all developing countries on the other’. As a consequence, the European Commission paid more attention to democracy and human rights in its relations with third countries, and thus also with the Mediterranean region. In the 1991 Commission communication, the European Commission argued that the EC cannot promote a ‘European model’ of democracy for its development partners. Nevertheless, it suggested making a distinction between the process of democratizing a society, and the formal and institutional aspects of that process, notably fundamental rights, the opening of political dialogue, free elections guaranteeing a pluralist society, emancipation of economic and social associations and accountability of governments to their citizens. The EC can only support these institutional aspects; the developing countries should choose their own form of political democracy. Nevertheless, the European Commission also stated: ‘the Community’s priority at present is to help the developing countries accede a form of economic democracy appropriate to the society in question and giving all sections of the population a greater role in development’ (European Commission, 1991: 7-8).

The European Commission’s discourse in the Commission communication on the relations between the EC and the Maghreb tells us something about how this particular view on democracy is translated in the relations with the Mediterranean region. The European Commission states with regard to political liberalization: ‘quite apart from the ethical imperative of forging a society based on liberty and respect for the rights of the individual, most of the
evidence points to a close, virtually symbiotic relationship between liberalization and development. The Maghreb countries have undoubtedly initiated a trend towards liberalization, a trend that must now be encouraged directly, through programmes promoting human rights and political support for reform, and indirectly, by creating an environment favouring the consolidation of the rule of law in line with other modern states’ (European Commission, 1992: 10). Political liberalization is here articulated as going hand in hand with economic liberalization. Liberty is mainly articulated as ‘negative liberty’; it is the self-development of the individual without the interference of other individuals or the state. The reference to human rights and to the development of the rule of law fit into this, but also the implicit references to the economic liberty for investors. There are no references to elections or to the possibility of individuals/CSOs to take part in the political process, which would entail the articulation of liberty as ‘positive liberty’. Overall, it can be concluded that the European Commission’s view on the organization of the social order and democracy is not changed if compared with the social order promoted under the RMP. It promotes a society in which the free market is presented as essential to economic and political development and democracy. The main task of the state is articulated as contributing to the development of this free market, which is considered to be global (given the articulation that the Maghreb countries must open up to one other, the outside world in general and the Community in particular). In addition, liberty is articulated as ‘negative liberty’. We can therefore conclude that the Commission tries to promote a kind of libertarian democracy in the Maghreb countries.

This Commission communication on the relations between the EC and the Maghreb was eventually ‘watered down’ by the member states which disagreed, amongst others, with the Commission’s proposal to establish a Euro-Maghreb Investment Bank (Gillespie, 1997a: 36). Bicchi (2007: 161-163) states that shortly after the European Council in Lisbon in 1992, the Northern member states lost their interest in the establishment of a Euro-Maghreb partnership (which was eventually never launched), and that they shifted their attention to the Middle East. In 1993, the Commission prepared a communication on the EC’s policy in the Middle East. This communication should be seen in the context of the peace negotiations that were going on at that time. In August 1993, the Palestinians and the Israelis concluded the Oslo Accords, which would pave the way for negotiations about peace between both parties. However, the US and Israel were not willing to let the EC to play a role in these peace negotiations, despite the efforts of the member states, the Council and the European Commission. The Commission anticipated on the peace negotiations by presenting its own strategy to sustain the peace that was about to be reached, and by stressing that the EC should play a role in the consolidation of peace. In this
regard, this communication differs from the previous ones. The relations with the Middle East are not articulated in the context of globalization and the potential negative consequences this might have for the EC, but in the context of the peace process and the exclusion of the EC from the peace process.

The proposed strategy entailed the promotion of regional economic integration, i.e. the establishment of a Middle Eastern economic area. The European Commission states: ‘In this regard, the Community’s own experience demonstrates that war between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable through economic integration’ (European Commission, 1993a: 2). Nevertheless, economic integration is mainly articulated as economic cooperation, because the European Commission realizes that its own model of integration cannot easily be transposed to the Middle East. Therefore, it suggests developing first regional economic cooperation: ‘Peace will be sustainable in the Middle East if the peace agreements, once concluded, are followed by a long term cooperation process between the regional parties’. In addition, it argues that ‘cooperation has more chance to succeed in the private sector and between business federations, universities, municipalities and technical institutions’ (European Commission, 1993a: 2-3). Institutions should be created to support regional cooperation. It is suggested that it can be useful for the parties to examine as to how their economic prospects can be enhanced by striving for a Middle Eastern economic area, the creation of regional infrastructure and better use of available resources in tourism, education, research, agriculture. Regional cooperation will be supported by the EC in the context of a partnership with the Mashrek countries, a partnership that is similar to the one that is presented to the Maghreb in 1992. In this part of the document, the European Commission goes back to its previous formula for cooperation with the Mediterranean region. The partnership is based on five elements. The first one is political dialogue, and the second free trade. In order to reach regional free trade, the European Commission argues that ‘it will be essential to assist the Mashrek countries in their efforts to reform their political and economic systems, to move to a market economy and to control population growth’ (third element, European Commission, 1993a: 5). In addition, regional integration (fourth element) will be supported and adequate funding (fifth element) should be sought. For its relations with Israel, the Commission presents a similar partnership. The Commission notes in this regard that Israel sees its future as closely linked to the EEA, and that Israel’s level of development should be taken into account. In addition, the cooperation between Israel and the Arab countries should be stimulated.
In conclusion, the European Commission does not articulate the relations with the Middle East in the context of globalization, but in the context of the MEPP. The countries in the Middle East should reform themselves to market economies, in order to make it possible to gear their economies to each other, and to create economies of scale. Regional economic cooperation might lead to regional economic integration, which will sustain peace. But economic integration is mainly articulated as the task of the countries in the Middle East, and not of the EC. Also the creation of institutions which will sustain regional cooperation is seen as a task of the Mashrek countries, but the European Commission suggests here to use the multilateral institutional framework created at the Madrid conference (European Commission, 1993a: 4). The Community will only help to reach economic cooperation, first of all by supporting the evolution towards a market economy. In this regard, the European Commission only refers implicitly towards the role of the state: ‘it will be essential to assist the Mashrek countries in their efforts to reform their political and economic systems’. There is only one reference to CSOs in this policy, i.e. when the European Commission notes that ‘cooperation has more chance to succeed in the private sector and between business federations, universities, municipalities and technical institutions’ (European Commission, 1993a: 3). The European Commission does not promote cooperation in the social, cultural or human area (except if you take into account that the European Commission wants to assist the Mashrek countries in controlling their population growth). The European Commission also refers to democracy: ‘In its relations with the Middle East, the Community will continue to promote democracy, pluralism, the respect for human rights, the tolerance for minorities and coexistence of different cultures and religions’ (European Commission, 1993a: 1). Once again, we see that freedom or liberty is articulated as a negative liberty: the freedom of people to organize their own lives without interference of others. The reference to pluralism, human rights, minorities and the ‘coexistence of different cultures and religions’ can be understood in this regard: not one single individual, culture or religion can impose its will on another individual, culture or religion. The reference of the European Commission to the possibilities of the parties to the peace process to take part in an increasing economic freedom also fits in this (European Commission, 1993a: 5). We can therefore conclude that also in the Middle East, the European Commission promotes a form of libertarian democracy.

Three weeks after the publication of this communication, the European Commission (1993b) presented a communication in which it explained how the EC could help supporting the MEPP. This support consists of two main parts: support for the Occupied Palestinian Territories (which can be considered as emergency aid) and support for regional cooperation between the Mashrek countries, and more specifically for intra-regional infrastructure, which can lead to a
regional community of water, energy and infrastructure and for seminars and workshops which can bring together the decision-makers in the region. In addition, the bilateral relations with the Mashrekg countries need to be upgraded, and the Commission proposes the conclusion of a new agreement with Israel (European Commission, 1993b). Although the EC thus provided financial assistance to MEPP, the US and Israel still opposed the contribution of the member states and the EC towards the peace process. In the end, both the Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek partnership were never launched. In 1994, the member states, and more specifically Spain and France promote the idea to launch a new policy for the whole Mediterranean region. This new policy would be based on the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and a Euro-Mashrek Partnership and would eventually lead to the launch of the EMP (see infra).

6.2.2.2 The (European) Council and the member states

Besides the question to the European Commission to present an economic report, the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states also asked the Spanish Minister of foreign affairs Fernandez Ordonez to draft a report on the political relations between the EC and the Maghreb. Fernandez Ordonez presented his report at the end of February 1992, thus before the report of the European Commission. Also the idea of an increasingly interdependent (globalizing) world influenced the thinking of Fernandez Ordonez. More specifically, he stresses the interdependence between the northern and the southern shores of the Western Mediterranean. This interdependence is in contrast with the economic imbalance between these two shores. Subsequently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs describes the problems of the Maghreb countries (social crises and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism) and, given the interdependence of the two regions, the consequences these social crises and Islamic fundamentalism can have for the EC. While the social crises will lead to illegal migration towards the EC (to which the EC should be prepared), Islamic fundamentalism will lead to racism, which will have consequences for the internal policies of the Mediterranean region (Fernandez Ordonez, 1992: 877-880). Interdependence is thus presented as a process with potentially negative consequences for the EC as a consequence of the economic and social problems of the Maghreb countries. At the same time, it is also presented as a contingent process, since these negative consequences can be managed. This view meets the logic of economic opportunity.

If we then look at the policy-options, Spain presents a new policy which is based on four pillars (political, economic, social and general cooperation). At first sight, the new policy seems to be similar to the C SCM which was about to be organized in 1990 (but rejected by the US), but actually, this is not the case. The new proposal of Spain is based on four baskets, not three, and
two of the original objectives of the CSCM are no longer explicitly mentioned as a goal of this new policy: security and cultural cooperation. Regarding the economic cooperation, Spain referred to the FTA asked by Morocco. Fernandez Ordonez (1992: 880) states that this will strengthen the economic integration between countries in the zones, and that this eventually can lead to the creation of a customs union, after the example of the free trade agreement that was negotiated at that time between the EC and the countries that are part of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The economic pillar should further include the possibility to offer the Maghreb countries a partnership with the EC, the regionalization of the RMP, a solution for the debt crises of the Mediterranean countries, the creation of a regional financial institution, the promotion of public and private investments and the strengthening of the financial cooperation. In addition, he also pleaded for cooperation in social sectors such as food aid, health care and education. In this regard, there should be special attention for migration. In the political field, the EC should develop a policy of good neighbourliness based on principles like the non-use of violence, peaceful solution of conflicts, respect for the sovereignty of countries and non-interference in a country’s internal affairs. In addition, the policy should defend human rights. In this respect, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs argues that we should look for compromises in order to prevent misunderstandings and to respect sensitivities in this regard. Cooperation between parliaments, universities and civil societies is also necessary to stimulate the intercultural dialogue. Besides economic, social and political cooperation, Spain also suggests general cooperation in the field of infrastructure, the environment, energy, … (Fernandez Ordonez, 1992: 880-881).

In this document, Spain does not deeper into the economic cooperation because that is the task of the European Commission. It stresses the FTA between the EC and the Maghreb but it does explain what effects this might have for these countries. The promotion of a FTA between the EC and the Maghreb means that the role of the market in the Maghreb is mainly articulated as export-oriented, and this also entails the opening-up of the markets of the Maghreb countries to the EC. Regarding the social objectives the report sums up the areas of cooperation (see supra), but it does not go deeper into how the objectives should be reached. Cooperation in the political field is articulated in very general, cautious terms. It is clear that Spain did not want to upset the Maghreb countries. Spain argues that there needs to be more democracy, but that the Maghreb countries are working on this. It is therefore not yet totally clear how Spain sees the organization between the market, the state, the individual and the civil society in the region, and how democracy is exactly understood.
In June 1992, the European Council in Lisbon adopted a declaration on the Euro-Maghreb Partnership. The declaration itself was drafted by Spain, and can be considered as a summary of the proposals of the European Commission and Spain (Bicchi, 2007: 163). In the part on the economic field, emphasis is on economic reforms. This is articulated as the main objective of the EC’s policy. These economic reforms will eventually lead economic integration, the introduction of true market economies and the modernization of economic systems. The creation of a FTA is the second objective. In the social field, focus is mainly on migration and on demographic imbalances. Cooperation in the cultural field is meant to promote understanding between peoples and cultures. In political field, liberty is now especially emphasized: the partnership is based on a common commitment to ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in civil, political, economic, social and cultural matters (…), ‘(…) respect for the right of minorities’ and ‘tolerance and coexistence between cultures and religions’. Democracy is here mainly defined as the organization of free and regular elections: the effective participation by citizens in the lives of their states (European Council, 1992). Furthermore, the European Council (1992: 23-24) argues that the relations with the Maghreb countries should be founded on ‘respect for international law, the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council’. Based on these elements, it can be concluded that the European Council promoted a libertarian form of democracy, a democracy which is based on the creation of a free market economy and mainly negative rights (although it also refers to the right for citizens to take part in elections, which is a form of positive liberty). Despite the communication of the European Commission for a Euro-Mashrek partnership, the member states and the (European) Council did not go further into this.

6.2.2.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

In 1992, the EESC adopted an opinion on the relations between the EC and the Maghreb. This opinion contains two major parts. In the first part, the view of the EESC on the Maghreb and on the Mediterranean region is elaborated, and in the second part, the EESC comments on the Commission communication which we discussed above. The opinion builds on the view that was adopted in the previous opinions drafted in 1989, 1990 and 1992. The EESC’s view is based on the idea that the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region are increasingly interdependent: ‘North-South relations in the Western Mediterranean are marked by heavy trade dependence and increasingly unequal development’. In the next paragraphs, the EESC gives more information. It states that ‘recent developments around the world, and in particular in Europe, pose additional challenges to the development of the Maghreb countries’. According to
the EESC, these developments are the completion of the Single Market, the creation of the EEA and its potential expansion to Central and Eastern Europe’. These will marginalize the Maghreb countries because they will be excluded from the international economic system, and this can have negative consequences for the EC in political, security, environmental, economic and social areas. The EESC then goes deeper into the problems of the Mediterranean countries: demographic challenge, religious fundamentalism, environmental problems, political instability and more specifically the Libyan crisis and the problems in the Western Sahara. These problems are considered to be a risk for the EC: they threaten the EC’s security, and Libya is articulated as a time-bomb (EESC, 1992b: 55-56). Overall, globalization is defined as ‘interdependence’ and this presented as an economic process which will have negative consequences for the Maghreb and consequently, also for the EC. However, we can do something about it; this view meets the logic of economic opportunity.

For the EESC, the solution to these problems has not changed: it pleads for the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean strategic area. However, in contrast with the previous opinions, the Committee now strongly emphasizes that regional integration in the Maghreb should be reached first. It states that ‘Maghreb regional integration should not only be furthered by specific measures, but should be accepted as a precondition and implicit objective of all cooperation activities’ (EESC, 1992b: 60). In addition, the relations between the EC and the Maghreb must be made complementary. The EESC criticizes the current trade policy of the EC, because it does not allow the Mediterranean countries to realize their comparative advantage in agriculture, textile and clothing industry. The Committee does not elaborate on what should then be the definitive step, i.e. regional integration between the EC and the Mediterranean region. This is an important difference with the previous opinions, where the extension of the internal market towards the Mediterranean area was frequently stressed. Now it is articulated only once that ‘insertion in the Community economy should have priority over exaggerated export-led policies and import-substitution arrangements’ (EESC, 1992b: 58). The establishment of the MCC and the conclusion of development agreements which were presented in the 1989 opinion as the first two steps of the policy presented in 1989 are no longer mentioned. Although the EESC does not mention this explicitly, the conclusion of a FTA or inclusion in the internal market before regional integration and the development of complementary economic relations might lead to a so-called ‘hub-and-spoke’ effect: the risk that investors will choose to invest in the EC (the hub) and then export to the Mediterranean countries (the spokes), resulting in few FDIs in the Mediterranean region necessary for its economic development.
In this regard, the view of the EESC has changed and at the same time, it is also still very different from the proposals of the European Commission and the Council. In the opinion, the EESC further explains how regional economic integration, which is presented as important to attract foreign investments, can be reached. Economic reforms are important for economic integration, but again the Committee expresses its regrets that the EC just adopts the SAPs of the IMF and World Bank and tries to compensate the social effects. It suggests that the EC designs its own SAP which is then discussed with the international institutions. In addition, cooperation in the social field is stressed in its opinion, and according to the EESC, this cooperation should go further than the proposals of birth control policy by the European Commission. The Committee suggests working together on employment, training and the development of a social charter in which trade union and social standards (based on the ILO) are incorporated. Moreover, it argues that ‘in the Maghreb context, the AMU should be encouraged to adopt a charter of fundamental social rights for workers, based on the Community’s Social Charter (EESC, 1992b: 66-67). The task of the state is both economic and social. CSOs are mainly defined as economic and social organizations, although there is also a reference to young people, university students and staff, scientists and the media. According to the EESC, these CSOs should play a role in the Euro-Maghreb relations, i.e. the EC should also cooperate with these CSOs. At the same time, the EESC also indicates that the EC should promote the role of the socio-economic organizations in the development of the Mediterranean societies. It considers this to be a vital point for democracy. In one particular part of its opinion, the EESC summarizes its view on the development of the Maghreb countries and on democracy:

‘It is necessary to upgrade public institutions and institute radical economic and structural reforms which will establish a fully-fledged market system, broaden the productive base, generate employment and ensure social justice. However, reforms focusing on the growth of democracy, political and trade union freedoms, and respect for human rights, are also needed. Similarly, the indissoluble link between development and democracy means that the Maghreb countries must inject a strong social element into their policies, by promoting fundamental social rights and involving employers’ and workers’ representatives in the various stages of economic management’ (EESC, 1992b: 58).

In conclusion, we can argue here that the EESC, in contrast with the European Commission and the Council promotes a kind of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region (although it does not promote a Keynesian welfare state): the market is considered as the main mechanism for development of the Mediterranean countries, but the state also has a role to play
in the social sphere. The state should not only support the market. Liberty is considered as important and is articulated as both negative and positive liberty, since the participation of employers’ and workers’ representatives in the decision-making process is promoted. The EESC promotes the conclusion of an agreement between capital and labour like we knew/now this in the member states of the EU: the state supports the functioning of the capitalist regime, while at the same time it secures benefits for the workers. Therefore, it also suggests that the EC develops its own SAPs for the Mediterranean countries. This is in contrast with the kind of social order/democracy the European Commission and the (European) Council are promoting, because in their proposals, they only suggest to support the social sectors where the impact of the strict budgetary measures proposed under the SAPs developed by the IFIs are too great. Therefore, this support cannot be considered as a real social policy.

In 1993, the EESC also drafted an own-initiative opinion on the relations between the EC and the Middle East. This opinion was adopted during the plenary session of 28 January 1993, thus before the conclusion of the Oslo Agreements and before the 1993 Commission communication. The EESC’s view on the relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region has not changed: the relations with the Middle East should be part of ‘an overall Euro-Mediterranean joint development policy’. Nevertheless, the Committee realizes that economic integration between the countries in the Middle East is problematic because of the difficult relationship between Israel and the other Mediterranean countries. Therefore, it suggests promoting regional economic cooperation. Nevertheless, it is stressed that ‘economic cooperation can be no alternative to the search for a lasting solution to the complex political problems of the region. All it can do is offer a possible way forward towards finding a solution’ (EESC, 1993: 58). Therefore, ‘economic cooperation should, rather, run in parallel with the political peace process, thus supporting and, possibly speeding up this process, and above all, at a later stage, stabilizing it (identical interests being a guarantee of peace)’ (EESC, 1993: 61). The Committee is also aware of the fact that Israel might be closer to the EC than to the Mediterranean countries, and that the country might be more interested in closer cooperation with the EEA. Nevertheless, it suggests that the EC should use this desire to stimulate Israel to engage in cooperation with the other Mediterranean countries, and it indicates some areas of cooperation such as energy, infrastructure, commerce, health, water, ….The EESC also pleads for involving social partners in the development of regional cooperation, and it repeats its request to include minimum labour standards as set down in the international labour conventions in the agreements concluded with the EC. This can stimulate democracy according to the EESC.
Overall, the proposal of the EESC on the policy towards the Middle East can be considered as a ‘light’ version of the proposal of the Committee towards the Maghreb countries. In 1995, the Committee adopted a new opinion on the relations between the EU and the Middle East in which it gives some remarks and recommendations on the situation in the Occupied Territories. More concrete, it urges the EU to focus on the creation of sustainable jobs, and the donors in general (including the EU) to make aid available. This aid should be spend to implement economic reforms and a new legal framework in order to create a market-friendly framework, while ensuring that social justice is not sacrificed to economic reform and the creation of an institutional basis for society: departments and specialized bodies for e.g. ‘training, housing or social security will have to be established, and also free and independent organizations of employers, workers and other socio-economic groups’. The Committee suggests in this regard involving the ILO (EESC, 1995a: 65-66). This opinion thus generally fits within the overall policy it proposed earlier.

6.2.2.4 The European Parliament

The European Parliament, on its turn, adopted a resolution on the relations between the EC and the Maghreb in a response to the 1992 Commission communication. Just like the other institutions, also the European Parliament refers to the interdependence between the EC and the Mediterranean region. However, in contrast with the other institutions, it mainly stresses the interdependence between cultures: the European Parliament ‘emphasizes the interdependence of cultures and that no one culture has special qualities which may be imposed on others, and that this applies equally to relations between Europe and the Maghreb and to the domestic affairs of each Maghreb country’ (European Parliament, 1993a: 69). In addition, it states that ‘cooperation on cultural and social issues should be a priority in the EC-Maghreb relations’ (see infra; European Parliament, 1993a: 69). Here, interdependence between the EC and the Mediterranean region is considered as an opportunity to cooperate in the cultural field, we identify the logic of cultural opportunity in the discourse of the European Parliament.

Overall, we can state that, just like under the RMP, the view of the Parliament on the development of the Maghreb countries is very similar to the strategy proposed by the EESC. The Parliament emphasizes that regional integration is an important element in the development of the FTA, and it states that this regional integration should be developed in parallel with the integration between the EC and the Maghreb countries: ‘it is difficult to conceive a free trade area which did not develop in parallel with increasingly free trade relations between the Maghreb countries, a process already begun in the context of the AMU’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 14).
In addition, the Parliament indicates that the relations between the EC and the Maghreb should be made complementary. In the light of these two objectives, the trade policy, the CAP and the negotiations on the EMAAs are criticized: ‘In the case of the Maghreb, it is essential that adjustments to the common agricultural policy should reduce competition and favour imports to products for which the Maghreb countries have a comparative advantage’ and ‘The negotiations with a view to separate agreements between each of the three countries and the EC should therefore be conducted with the greatest possible caution’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 14).

Furthermore, the European Parliament is irritated that the Commission follows the IFIs when it comes to several aspects of the economic relations between the EC and the Maghreb. First of all, it denounces that the European Commission first states that economic development will be difficult if the problem of debt is not dealt with, while it further argues that the EC has to wait for international action under the direction of the IMF. It states on the question of the debt problem of the Maghreb countries: ‘How is it possible to claim to want a new spirit of partnership and to speak of ‘the comprehensive footing (of) Euro-Maghreb relations’, while at the same time refusing to address this central question’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 11). Second, although the Parliament considers that ‘it is essential that the Community should be committed to structural adjustment’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 14), it does not agree with the proposal that the EC should correct the negative social consequences of the SAPs developed by the IFIs, ‘in the drafting of which it plays only a marginal role’. It stresses that the EC should ‘draw up a structural adjustment strategy which it should seek to push through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’ (European Parliament, 1993a: 71). In addition, the European Parliament stresses human rights and democracy. The latter it defines as ‘participation and appreciation of the concerns and aspirations of civil society, respect for the fundamental rights of the individual, equality for men and women, and an immediate end to the practice of torture and respect for minority languages and cultures’ (European Parliament, 1993a: 70).

In contrast with the other institutions, the European Parliament emphasizes the development of social (although this is not elaborated) and especially cultural relations between the EC and the Maghreb countries. It also goes deeper into how the cooperation in the cultural field should look like. It articulates that ‘cultural relations are viewed in terms of conflict in connection with two types of movement: movement of persons in the form of migrant workers (travelling to Europe) and tourists (travelling to the Maghreb) and movements of cultural products’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 12; 18-22). It therefore suggests prioritizing cultural cooperation, by promoting joint research, cooperation between media on both sides of the
Mediterranean Sea and the creation of a Euro-Arab University. The proposal of the European Parliament is in this regard slightly different from the proposals of the other institutions. Based on all these elements, we conclude that the European Parliament (just like the EESC) advocates a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. However, the European Parliament only articulated a view on the Euro-Maghreb relations. Just like the (European) Council, the Parliament did not go deeper into the proposal of the European Commission for a Euro-Mashrek Partnership. It adopted several resolutions on the peace process in the Middle East, but it only noted that ‘it welcomes the Commission action plan on the future of relations and cooperation between the Community and the Middle East’ (European Parliament, 1993c: 162).

6.2.3 Political and fantasmatic logics in the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek Partnership

6.2.3.1 The European Commission

How is the Other now defined in the Commission’s report on the economic relations between the EC and the Maghreb, and in the Commission communication on the relations with the Middle East? A closer look at the spatial construction of the identity of the Other reveals that the European Commission (1992: 4) refers to the geographical proximity of the Mediterranean countries, and adds that there is a necessity of ‘making the Mediterranean a drawbridge rather than a moat (…)’. The Mediterranean countries are seen as a part of the wider neighbourhood of the EC, and the Maghreb is presented as a subpart of the Mediterranean region. In contrast with the member states and the (European) Council (see infra), the Maghreb is thus not considered a separate region. The same accounts for the Mashrek countries (and also for Israel): the European Commission tries to promote the same policy for both the Maghreb and the Mashrek (and Israel), i.e. the creation of a partnership with the EC. In the 1993 communication, the European Commission refers to the ‘Arab world’, including the Gulf countries. The Maghreb countries are identified as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, while the Middle East is identified as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Territories, Syria (the Mashrek countries) and Israel. These countries are, just like in its discourse on the RMP, presented as a risk for the EC. They are articulated as facing political instability, rapid population growth, large movements of population and high unemployment (spatial construction of identity). This has an influence on the security of the region, and on the migratory pressure on the Community (European Commission, 1992).

Nevertheless, this identity is articulated as temporal (temporal construction of identity). The solution for the problems of the Maghreb and the Mashrek countries is first of all the
implementation of economic reforms, like we explained above. The EC must help with the economic development of the region: this is again presented as a shared responsibility (ethical construction of identity). Both partners have their own responsibility: ‘For its part, the Community will make a firm and convincing commitment to help relaunch the Maghreb economy, thus testifying to its confidence in the region’s future’ (European Commission, 1992: 11). In the discourse of the European Commission towards the Maghreb countries, the responsibility of the EC is articulated as a moral responsibility. Because the EC itself is a strong actor, it has to do something for its neighbours: ‘the European Community is now seen as the main focus for peace, democracy and growth by all of Europe and the neighbouring countries to the South and East’. Previously, the Commission already referred to the ‘emergence of the European Community as an economic and political focal point’ (…) by which the EC is obliged to redefine its role in the Mediterranean region. In addition, the EC has also this responsibility because of the historical and geographical ties (European Commission, 1992: 4). In its communication on the relations between the EC and the Middle East, the European Commission (1993: 2) refers to the past of the EC in order to demonstrate its own experience in regional integration: ‘The Community’s own experience demonstrates that war between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable through economic integration’. And: ‘the Community, because of its geopolitical situation, its close links with all parties concerned and its own experience with regional cooperation has a major role to play’ (European Commission, 1993: 6). This discourse reflects the logic of peace through trade: it promises a certain ideal which can be reached (peace) when one obstacle is overcome, i.e. nationalism.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the EC wants to impose its will on the Maghreb or on the Mashrek countries in terms of policy, neither in the political nor in the economic sphere. In the context of the regional integration, it is stated that ‘it must be made clear that the Community has no intention of imposing its political will on the Maghreb countries. Rather than seeking to build a political union, the aim is to eliminate as many obstacles to development as possible, without asking the three countries to surrender any sovereignty if they do not wish to do so’ (European Commission, 1992: 9). In the economic sphere, the Commission refers to the IFIs, indicating that the World Bank and the IMF believe that the economic reform process will be successful. The Commission is very careful that the responsibility it is articulating is not perceived as some form of colonialism. In addition, also the Maghreb countries are articulated as having a responsibility: they will implement the reform process and they will take ‘concrete measures to promote regional integration’ (European Commission, 1992: 11). Also with regard to the Mashrek countries, the processes of integration and of progressive institutionalization in
order to sustain integration are presented as the responsibility of the Mashrek countries. For this institutionalization, the European Commission refers to the multilateral institutional framework already created at the Madrid conference.

In the discourse, the European Commission articulates the EC as the main focus for peace, democracy, growth, as an economic and political focal point, and especially as an actor which respects and follows the economic decisions of the multilateral institutions, the IFIs (in the case of the Maghreb, they also respect the multilateral framework adopted at the Madrid conference). In this regard, the member states and the institutions of the EC are articulated in one common identity (logic of equivalence). The Other, the Mediterranean area (Maghreb/Mashrek) is presented as not having reached this level of economic development, as not yet fully respecting the policies of the IFIs. The Mediterranean countries are in this regard different from the Self, and therefore, a risk (logic of difference). Nevertheless, they can reach this level of economic development, if they also respect and follow the policies of the IFIs. In contrast with its discourse on the RMP, it is clear that the European Commission now stresses more the economic strength of the EC. This must be seen in the light of the completion of the internal market in 1992, which strengthened the international identity of the EC. The concepts Euro-Maghreb Partnership and Euro-Mashrek partnership function as nodal points in the discourse of the European Commission, because they refer to a common identity which is already reached by the EC and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries: economic development based on a strategy developed by international institutions. This will then lead to economic cooperation/integration. The term ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that both the EC and the Mediterranean region are on an equal footing, in the sense that the EC will not impose its will to the region (since it follows the strategy of the IFIs), and that the Mediterranean countries should also be good partners of the EC by doing their part of the deal. The concept ‘partnership’ prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EC (also the references to the IFIs fulfill this function) and it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (equal relations with the EC in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development). In addition, this will sustain peace in the Middle East. For the EC, it promises the prevention of a disaster and it articulates the EC as an international actor which helps countries which are not as well developed and which respects international policies. The discourse reflects the logic of the EC as a civilian power: the EC as a power with economic resources within an interdependent world which will use this power to help the Maghreb and the Mashrek countries with their economic development. This economic development will lead to economic cooperation and
integration, which will sustain peace in the Middle East. The discourse thus also reflects the logic of peace through integration, as explained above. At the same time, it also reflects the logic of multilateral Europe, i.e. a Europe which follows the decisions of international institutions.

6.2.3.2 The (European) Council and the member states

As the chapter on the RMP already showed, it were the member states which made a difference between the Maghreb, the Mashrek, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. More specifically, it was Spain who used the difficult relations with Morocco to propose the creation of a FTA with the whole Maghreb, and the organization of a Euro-Maghreb conference in the long run (Le Troquer, 1992: 486). Spain articulates the Maghreb, and more specifically its economies and societies, as close to its own economy and society, and closer to the economies of the EC. Therefore, it is articulated as a separate region, which can be distinguished from the Mashrek and Israel (Vaquer i Fanés, date unknown). Consequently, Spain presents it as a region which should be treated separately in the context of the EC’s Mediterranean policy. But also France made a difference between the Maghreb and the Mashrek. It has far much closer relations with the Maghreb than with the Mashrek, which is illustrated by its attempts to organize the 5+5 dialogue (see chapter 1). This is also one of the reasons why it supported the proposal of Spain.

Nevertheless, the report of Spain starts with a reference to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean region is identified as ‘North Africa’ and as ‘the Western Mediterranean’, and the Maghreb as the ‘island of the West’. The Maghreb includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauretania. The Mediterranean is presented as a vulnerable border of Europe. This border, however, should not only be understood in geographical terms, but also in terms of norms and values. Spain considers the Mediterranean region as the border between Europe and the Third World, and adds that Europe and North Africa do not share the same values. The identity of the Self, which is considered as the sum of Western and Eastern Europe, is defined as sharing a common heritage based on Christianity and Greek Philosophy. The Maghreb is considered as culturally different from Europe (Fernandez Ordonez, 1992: 877). In addition, in the economic and the social field, the Maghreb is presented as problematic: it has a high external debt, a high level of unemployment, a weak and sometimes non-existent middle class (like in Mauretania), internal migration, lack of public services and housing, a high level of illiteracy and an explosion of the population. In the political field, it is articulated that the Maghreb countries have a different view on human rights and politics (spatial construction of identity).
The identity of the Other has thus several aspects (economic, social, political and cultural). Some of these aspects are presented as temporal and thus changeable, and others as definitive (temporal construction of identity). The economic and social aspects of the identity of the Maghreb countries are articulated as changeable. In this regard, Spain states that the EC should stimulate the economic development in order to wipe out the economic and social disparities. In cultural terms, the Mediterranean countries will always remain different from the EC (since the Other does not have the same heritage), and in this regard Spain argues that we should try to understand each other by organizing a dialogue between cultures. In the political field, the Other is also articulated as different, but there are some common principles which can and should be respected by both parties: the non-use of violence, peaceful solution of conflicts, respect for the sovereignty of countries, non-interference in a country’s internal affairs and human rights. The European Council refers in this regard to the principles of the UN Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

The Lisbon Declaration of 1992 actually brings the discourse of the European Commission and the member states in the Council together. In their discourses, the concept ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ functions as a nodal point. We already explained in a previous paragraph that it refers to an identity which is already reached by the EC: economic development based on a strategy which respects decisions of the IFIs. In the discourse of the European Council and the member states, something is added to this identity: the EC also respects certain political principles which are laid down in the UN Charter and in the resolutions of the UN Security Council. The Maghreb countries are articulated as not yet have reached this identity, but if they respect the decisions of the IFIs and the international agreements, this will lead to economic and political development. The EC will help the Maghreb countries because it has the possibility to do so (since it is economically strong) and the Mediterranean should implement the decisions of the international institutions and the international agreements (ethical construction of identity). Then they will have a true partnership with the EC. The concept ‘partnership’ fulfills the logic of fantasy in several ways: it prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EC (also the references to the IFIs, the UN Charter and the UN Security Council fulfill this function); it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (equal relations with the EC in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development). At the same time, however, the EC also articulates a certain distance between itself and the Mediterranean countries, because the latter also have cultural differences which will never change. This is represented by the prefix ‘Euro-Maghreb’ which emphasizes these differences, and in a way also by the term ‘partnership’.
which points to a businesslike relationship: the EC will organize a ‘dialogue’ between the European culture and the Mediterranean culture (see also infra). In this discourse, we see several myths articulated together: the logic of civilian power Europe, the logic of multilateral Europe and at the same time, Spain also articulated a cultural identity for the EC: based on Christianity and Greek philosophy.

6.2.3.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

In contrast with the member states and the Council and in accordance with its proposal for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean strategic area, the EESC sees the Maghreb and the countries of the Near East (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel) as a part of the broader Mediterranean region. Also the EC Mediterranean countries are considered part of the Mediterranean region. The EESC considers the Mediterranean area as one single unit, it refers to the Mediterranean Basin. At the same time, however, a clear difference is made between the EC Mediterranean countries and the ‘non-EC Mediterranean countries’. The latter are articulated as a risk, and even as a security threat for the Community (spatial construction of identity). However, the identity of the non-EC Mediterranean countries can change, if they integrate economically, and if complementary relations between the EC and the Mediterranean are developed (temporal construction of identity).

We already noticed in the discussion on the social logics that the EESC changed its view on the development of the Mediterranean region. It no longer emphasizes the extension of the internal market towards the South, but that it states that economic integration should be the first and foremost objective of the EC’s policy (in case of the countries in the Middle East it proposes economic cooperation). The Committee now suggests that the Mediterranean countries develop their own economic identity which is complementary to the EC’s identity. The EC’s identity is articulated as ‘Greater Europe’. This nodal point refers to a common identity for the EC institutions and member states based on the internal market (consisting of a combination of market economies, welfare policies and industrial development which is based on intermediate and advanced technology). By contrast, the term Mediterranean presents a common identity for the Mediterranean countries based on an internal market, which will consist of a combination of market economies, welfare policies and industrial development which is based on low added-value and on low technology. The concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’ is still a nodal point, just like under the RMP, but now it brings together these two identities in one common objective, i.e. it establishes a link between the two internal markets. This also means that the Self
Therefore, the responsibility for the economic integration of the region lies both with the EC and with the Maghreb/Mediterranean countries (in contrast with the proposal of the European Commission where the responsibility for this is presented as solely the responsibility of the Maghreb, and where the EC only should stimulate this through supporting economic reforms; ethical construction of identity). More specifically, the EESC states that regional integration should be a precondition for all cooperation activities. This is the responsibility of the EC. In addition, in order to facilitate economic integration, the EC should stimulate economic reforms by developing its own SAPs for the Mediterranean region, and by discussing these SAPs with the IFIs. This discourse reflects the logic of multilateral Europe, but instead of the EC as a follower of the decisions of the IFIs, the EC is now articulated as a leader. The SAPs should be accompanied by social policies, and here the EESC refers to the ILO. For social policies, the EC should thus follow the ILO (although the EESC in its opinion of 1992 also presents the EC as potential model to be followed: ‘In the Maghreb context the AMU should be encouraged to adopt a charter of fundamental social rights for workers, based on the Community’s Social Charter’ (EESC, 1992b: 67)). The AMU should be the motor of economic and market integration (this is the responsibility of the Maghreb countries). Also the development of complementary relations is articulated as a shared responsibility. The Committee here refers to the responsibility of the EC, and more specifically to the role of the CAP in developing synergies between Southern Europe and Maghreb agriculture. In addition, it argues that the opening up of the Maghreb markets to the EC (the responsibility of the Maghreb countries) should be made dependent upon the development of specialized areas of production in the Mediterranean area. 

The reference to the Euro-Mediterranean strategic area presents a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries (prosperity) when an obstacle is overcome without giving them the feeling that this development is imposed by the EC (see also the reference to the concept co-development which is stressed in this opinion; EESC, 1992b: 55; 58). This will suppress public contestation. At the same time, it promises the prevention of a disaster for the EC and a certain fullness, i.e. the idea that it helps developing the Mediterranean countries (logic of civilian power Europe).

6.2.3.4 The European Parliament

Just like the European Commission and the EESC, the European Parliament sees the relations between the EC and the Maghreb as part of a broader policy of the EC towards the
Mediterranean. It 'believes that this new policy should provide the basis for the implementation by the Community of a new Mediterranean policy and accordingly upholds its previous position in favour of an overall policy along these lines' (European Parliament, 1993a: 69). We already noted that the European Parliament has the same view on the Maghreb countries like the other European institutions (a risk for the EC; spatial construction of identity), that this can be changed (temporal construction of identity) and that it adopted the same social order as the EESC promotes in its proposals for a new Mediterranean policy. We find in the discourse of the Parliament also the logic of multilateral Europe: the EC as a leader which develops its own SAP and pushes it through the World Bank and the IMF. In addition, the European Parliament stresses the cultural relations between the EC and the Mediterranean region.

Nevertheless, in contrast with the EESC, the Parliament adopted the term ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ of the European Commission and the European Council. The concept functions as a nodal point in its discourse, but in a different way than in the discourse of the other two institutions. The Parliament sees the identity of the EC and the Mediterranean as different (both in economic and cultural aspects) but at the same time, it stresses the ‘similarities’, i.e. what the two partners bring together (for example their focus on regional integration). However, the European Parliament especially refers to the similarities when it comes to the cultural relationship. It articulates that the EC and the Mediterranean region have a common heritage (it refers to the splendours of Arab civilization in Spain), but at the same time, the Parliament argues that because of education and the media, cultural relations are today rather viewed in conflict, and therefore, it stresses the promotion of understanding between peoples and cultures. Overall, the term partnership in the discourse of the European Parliament is articulated more emotional than the businesslike approach of the European Commission. It sees it more like an engagement where the view of the Mediterranean countries is taken into account, while the European Commission and the Council have a more ‘businesslike’ distance which they justify by referring to the fact that they do not want to impose their will. This can be noted in its paragraph on the political dialogue where the European Parliament states that it ‘considers that a partnership can only be established on the basis of equality and respect for the other party and for diversity’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 6) and in the paragraphs on the debt of the Mediterranean countries, where the European Parliament sights: ‘How is it possible to claim to want a new spirit of partnership and to speak of ‘the comprehensive footing (of) Europe Maghreb relations’, while at the same time refusing to address this central question? These two examples show that, despite its innovative and creative approach, the Commission proposal itself
incorporates all the reservations its approach is likely to encounter’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 12).

The Parliament justifies the engagement of the EC by referring to the past of the EC: ‘In view of its nature, the EC is in a better position than any of its Member States to eliminate incomprehension and misunderstanding. Firstly, the EC was established as an expression of the political will to rise above the bloody conflict which had torn Europe’ (European Parliament, 1993b: 11-12). This discourse reflects the bull myth: the EC which overcame nationalist tendencies which provoke conflict. The EC should now overcome religious tendencies provoking conflict between the EC and the Mediterranean region. In addition, the European Parliament argues that the engagement of the EC might prevent destabilization of the Maghreb region. The European Parliament stresses in its discourse the responsibility of the EC to create a genuine Euro-Maghreb partnership (ethical construction of identity).

6.2.4 Conclusions about the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek Partnership

From this analysis, it can be concluded that the idea of a globalizing world influenced the thinking of the European institutions. In the context of the relations with the Maghreb, globalization is defined as ‘interdependence’. It is articulated as an economic process, which might have negative social, political, economic consequences for the Maghreb, and therefore also for the EC. Again, we noted that the Maghreb and often the Mediterranean region in general are presented as a risk for the EC. But globalization/interdependence is also presented as a contingent process, which can be managed. The EC can do something about the negative consequences of this process by developing and implementing a new Mediterranean policy, which should lead to the economic development of the Mediterranean region. The discourses of the European Commission, the (European) Council and the EESC are based on the logic of economic opportunity. The discourse of the European Parliament is based on the logic of cultural opportunity. The relations with the Middle East were mainly articulated in the context of the MEPP.

Just like within the framework of the RMP, there is no consensus about the EC’s policy towards the Mediterranean countries. Again a distinction can be made between the proposals of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, and the resolution and opinions of the European Parliament and the EESC. The proposals of the European Commission and Spain in the Council can be considered as complementary, although they lay different accents (which is not surprising given the fact that the former focuses on the economic
and the latter on the political relations). Similarly, also the proposals of the European Parliament and the EESC are complementary, but here the EESC puts more emphasis on social aspects, while the European Parliament now promotes the cultural aspects of the cooperation.

The European Commission proposes to solve the economic and social problems of the Maghreb (the Maghreb is here articulated as part of the broader Mediterranean following the earlier strategy proposed under the RMP) through the promotion of economic reforms based on the programmes of the World Bank and the IMF (which should be made ‘socially acceptable’), just like it did under the RMP. The state, individuals and CSOs should contribute to the development of the free market (social logics; the logic of the market). In terms of democracy, we concluded that the Commission promotes a form of libertarian democracy. This particular kind of social practice is constituted again by the reference to the IFIs which refers to the international responsibility of both the EC and the Mediterranean countries. These economic reforms can then eventually result in the conclusion of a FTA between the EC and the Mediterranean countries, in economic integration between the Maghreb countries, and in economic cooperation between the Mashrek countries (which will help the peace process). Nevertheless, economic cooperation and economic integration are articulated by the European Commission as both the responsibility of the Mediterranean countries. The member states in the Council with Spain in its leading role accept this view of the European Commission on the economic relations (but in contrast with the Commission, they make a distinction between the Maghreb and the Mashrek), and they focus on political and cultural issues in their documents. For Spain, there are clear and unchangeable differences between the EC and the Mediterranean countries: the Maghreb is defined as ‘Arab’ and Islamic’ and the European culture as based on Christianity and Greek Philosophy. In addition, they are also clear political differences, but here it is argued that there are political norms which should be respected by both the EC and the Mediterranean countries, and these political norms can be found in the UN Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council.

The overall practice is constituted by the concepts ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ and ‘Euro-Mashrek Partnership’. In the discourse, there is one common identity represented for the EC institutions and the European member states, i.e. the respect for international agreements (UN Charter) and decisions of international institutions (IFIs). The Maghreb and the Mashrek countries are presented as not yet fulfilling their international responsibilities, and therefore as different from the EC. Nevertheless, by fulfilling their international responsibilities, they become partners of the EC. The concept partnership fulfils the role of fantasy. It places the Mediterranean countries on equal footing with the EC (at least regarding their responsibility) and
it indirectly refers to their international responsibility which will prevent public contestation. The concept ‘partnership’ also refers to two different kind of fullness (getting rid of the dependency relationship from colonial times and economic development) once an obstacle is removed (taking responsibility to implement economic reforms based on the IFIs). At the same time, the Maghreb and the Mashrek will always remain culturally different from the EC (represented by the prefixes Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek).

By contrast, the EESC and the European Parliament have a different view on the development of the Mediterranean countries. Just like the European Commission, they see the relations with the Maghreb and the Mashrek within the broader framework of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In this regard, they distinguish between the EC Mediterranean countries and the non-EC Mediterranean countries. This distinction is based on economic parameters. The latter are underdeveloped and risk to become marginalized in the world economy, and to become a problem for the EC. The EESC presents the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean strategic area as a solution for the problem of underdevelopment. Although this might seem similar to the strategy presented under the RMP, this is actually not the case. In contrast with its previous opinions, the EESC now emphasizes regional integration of the Maghreb as the first objective of the EC-Maghreb cooperation, and a precondition and objective of all cooperation. For the Mashrek countries and Israel only economic cooperation is possible in the short term. The Maghreb countries should implement economic reforms in function of the regional integration. The installation of the free market is again central here, but social justice is also emphasized. The state should also assure that social rights are respected, it should develop a social policy and it should ensure that socio-economic groups should be involved in policy-making. Therefore, the EC should develop its own SAP (instead of following the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF). The EESC thus still promotes a form of liberal democracy. This approach is different than the approach presented under the RMP, because the EESC now suggests that the Maghreb countries first create their own internal market, and thus their own identity. In this regard, the EC is only partly the reference point, since the second objective to be stressed is the complementary relations with the EC. Within the framework of the RMP, the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the internal market was articulated as the most important objective. In the most recent opinions however, there are almost no references to the extension of the internal market, and also the joint development agreement to be concluded is no longer mentioned. The European Parliament follows this approach, but it is articulated less explicitly then the EESC. Moreover, the Parliament also focuses on the cultural relationship between the EC and the Mediterranean countries.
In the discourse of the EESC, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’, which under the RMP functioned as a nodal point for the identity of the EC, now has a new function: it brings two internal markets together in a common objective which is about to be reached (see also the reference to ‘multi-centred development’ in the texts of the EESC). It unites ‘Greater Europe’ and the ‘Mediterranean’. The concept ‘Greater Europe’ gives a common identity to the EC institutions and the member states based on the internal market (consisting of a combination of market economies and welfare policies and industrial development which is based on intermediate and advanced technology) and the term ‘Mediterranean’ gives a common identity to the Mediterranean based on an internal market (consisting of a combination of market economies and welfare policies and industrial development which is based on low added-value and low technology). The reference to the Euro-Mediterranean strategic area presents a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries (prosperity) when an obstacle is overcome without giving them the feeling that this development is imposed by the EC (see also the reference to the concept co-development) which will suppress public contestation. At the same time, it promises the prevention of a disaster for the EC and a certain fullness, i.e. the promotion of the development of the Maghreb mainly through an economic strategy (the EC as a civilian power). Although the European Parliament promotes a similar social order as the EESC, its discourse is structured around a different nodal point: it adopted the concept ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’. This concept brings together two different identities: the EC’s, based on an internal market and a particular culture and the Mediterranean’s, based on their own internal market which should be reached and a different culture. These will always remain different, but there should be a cooperation based on the similarities. The European Parliament articulates the concept ‘partnership’ as an engagement, rather than a businesslike approach like the European Commission/the (European) Council articulates it. The proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and a Euro-Mashrek partnership constituted the basis for the EMP, proposed in 1994. Which social, political and fantasmatic logics were adopted in this new policy? This will be explained in the next paragraphs.

6.3 The launch and the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

6.3.1 Introduction

As we explained above, Spain’s efforts to develop an overall European policy for the Maghreb led to nothing. However, in 1994, the country made new attempts to convince the EU to draft a new policy towards the Mediterranean region. Therefore, it strengthened its cooperation with France, which ‘behaved as a co-entrepreneur with Spain’ (Bicchi, 2007: 164; Gillespie, 1997a: 38). This cooperation was expressed by the joint letter of the ministers of foreign affairs of Spain and
France, Javier Solana and Alain Juppé addressed to the Belgian presidency in December 1993 in which they asked for a strengthening of the relations with Morocco. They also wrote a letter to the European Commission and the Germany presidency (July – December 1994) asking for ‘more time on the EU agenda for the Mediterranean’ (Bicchi, 2007: 163-164). The efforts of Spain would lead to new initiatives. In June 1994, the European Council (1994a) in Corfu and the subsequent Foreign Affairs Council asked the European Commission to draft a communication on the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. The communication, presented in October 1994, dealt with the relations with all Mediterranean countries, thus not only with the Maghreb, but also with the Mashrek, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (European Commission, 1994). On 31 October 1994, the Council wrote its report about the communication. In this report, it endorses the European Council in Essen (December 1994) to support this step in enhancing the relations with the overall Mediterranean area. The European Council (1994b) accepted the report, and the French presidency (January – July 1995) started with the drafting of the Barcelona Declaration in January 1995. This drafting was mainly the responsibility of the member states France and Spain, but the European Commission was also involved in the discussion (European Commission, 1995a). In June 1995, the negotiations with the partner countries were finished. The only thing that was left to do for the Southern member states, was to convince the Northern member states of the new policy, and then especially of the financial assistance that was to be granted to the Mediterranean partners. As can be expected, tough negotiations followed, but eventually, the Council came with a report (Council of the EU, 1995), which reflects the position of the EU on the EMP. The European Council in Cannes (June 1995) adopted the Council report, which can be considered as the predecessor of the Barcelona Declaration (European Council, 1995; Bicchi, 2007: 167). On 27-28 November 1995, the new partnership was launched at the first Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona.

The EMP was further developed through the EMAAs concluded with the Mediterranean countries, through the financial assistance of the EU towards the region and through the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs. These documents generally reflect the decisions made in Barcelona, but sometimes they give a deeper insight into the social order the European Commission and/or the (European) Council/the member states want to promote in the Mediterranean region (as explained in chapter 1, the Mediterranean countries only had a limited influence on the agenda-setting of the Euro-Mediterranean conference, on the financial assistance and on the EMAA). Therefore, some of these documents are also discussed in the part on the social logics in the discourse of the (European) Council and the member states. The EESC and the European Parliament contributed less to the development of the EMP. The EESC
(1995b) adopted its opinion two months before the organization of the Barcelona conference, while the European Parliament presented its report and resolution only one month before the conference. The resolution was therefore rather modest (European Parliament, 1995a; European Parliament, 1995b). In 1997, the European Parliament presented a report and a resolution on the follow-up of the Barcelona conference, in which it goes deeper into the content of the partnership (European Parliament, 1997a; European Parliament, 1997b). These documents will give us a deeper insight into the EESC’s and the European Parliament’s discourse on the EMP.

6.3.2 Social logics in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

6.3.2.1 The European Commission

The first communication of the Commission, presented in October 1994, builds on the policy proposals for establishing a Euro-Maghreb and a Euro-Mashrek Partnership. This communication was drafted under the supervision of Manuel Marin, who replaced Abel Matutes as the Commissioner for external relations with the Mediterranean countries. In general, the Commission’s view on globalization has not changed. Globalization is still mainly presented as interdependence, and the idea of an increasingly interdependent world still influences its thinking: ‘The Community and the Mediterranean partners share many areas of interdependence (…)’ and then, several of these areas are mentioned: the environment, energy supply, migration, trade, investment, drugs, … (European Commission, 1994: 5). However, globalization and interdependence are mainly perceived in economic terms (space): ‘On the other hand, all Member States would benefit from greater stability and prosperity in the region. This would multiply trade and investment opportunities and reinforce the base for cooperation in political and economic fields. More particularly, at a time of globalisation and reinforced regionalism in North America and Asia, the Community cannot renounce the benefits of integrating its Southern neighbours under commonly accepted rules. Integration must take account of the needs of the Community’s own poorer regions many of which are in the Mediterranean’ (European Commission, 1994: 6). Globalization/interdependence is thus still mainly presented as an economic process which can have negative consequences, but which also can have positive consequences, if it is dealt with (contingent process, time). This view meets the logic of economic opportunity.

The Commission argues that the EU’s Mediterranean policy should encompass the many areas of interdependence. It therefore proposes a long-term strategy, consisting of two elements: the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Zone of Political Stability and Security and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area. Regarding the latter, the European
Commission (1994: 9-11) refers to the creation of a vast EMFTA in conformity with the WTO obligations. This EMFTA will be reached in two steps. First, the conclusion of free trade agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean countries is projected, covering tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products and preferential and reciprocal access for agricultural products of interest to both parties. Second, regional trade cooperation is envisaged through the conclusion of free trade agreements among the Mediterranean countries. From this communication, it is clear that the EU will focus on the first step. The European Commission proposes to provide financial assistance to support the process of economic modernization, structural adjustment, and regional cooperation, to strengthen the North-South economic and financial cooperation, and to support cooperation among Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries themselves and to support the MEPP (European Commission, 1994: 11).

In comparison with the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and a Euro-Mashrek partnership, the proposed strategy for the development of the Mediterranean region has not really changed: economic reforms. However, there is a lot more emphasis on the creation of the EMFTA in comparison with the previous documents. It is no longer articulated that the Mediterranean countries must open up to the outside world in general, and to the Community in particular and that the Community will help with that (European Commission, 1992: 8): it is now firmly stated that the support for economic modernization is meant for preparing them ‘to open their markets in the context of the new Association Agreements’. Also the support for structural adjustment is now articulated ‘in a view to preparing them for entering into free trade with the Union’ (European Commission, 1994: 11). The Commission no longer refers to the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF. Furthermore, the European Commission refers to additional areas of cooperation: industry, energy, information society, sustainable development, transport, scientific cooperation, … and also to social issues such as education, low standards of working conditions, health and safety at work, industrial relations policies and social protection issues, and cooperation in the environmental field (European Commission, 1994: 12-13). However, the Commission does not go into detail on how this cooperation should look like. Regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Zone of Political Stability and Security, focus is on cooperation in the field of security (where the prevention of the proliferation of non-conventional weapons and the development of a code of conduct for the solution of disputes is emphasized) and on the constitution of a political dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean partners, based ‘on the respect of human rights and the principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law which constitute an essential element of their relationship’ (European Commission, 1994: 8). Here,
good governance appears for the first time as an objective in the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region, although it is not clear what ‘good governance’ actually means.

In March 1995, during the negotiations on the Barcelona Declaration, the Commission published a new communication by which it contributed to the content of this Declaration. From this communication, we got a clearer view on what kind of social order the Commission wants to promote in the Mediterranean area. According to the Commission, the priorities for EU action are: assistance with economic transition, assistance with achieving a better socio-economic balance and backing for regional integration. Regarding the first, it is clear that the Commission, in order to establish the EMFTA, wants to see the transformation of the Mediterranean countries into market economies. In the eyes of the Commission, this can be done by supporting the private sector, the promotion of European private investment and by updating the economic and social infrastructure. In this regard, the state needs to be reformed, although the word ‘state’ is not used in the document; the European Commission refers to the ‘administration’. It notes that the political and administrative environment plays an important role in both the promotion of the development of the private sector and the attraction of European foreign investment. In this regard, it pleads for the ‘improvement of the legal and regulatory environment in which firms operate’ and the ‘modernization and simplification of administrative procedures’ (European Commission 1995a: 6-8). Besides the reform of the state in order to support the development of the free market, the Commission sees a second task for the governments: the provision of social services, i.e. basic education, health care, government housing, water supplies, sanitation and other key infrastructure. In this regard, the Commission (1995a: 9) states: ‘social services (…) need to be improved for several reasons: to prevent living conditions from declining (e.g. because of structural adjustment, rapid population growth or a mass exodus from rural areas) and to prevent the economic anchoring of the Mediterranean to Europe from producing worse social disparities’. And the Commission (1995a: 10) continues: ‘Spending on schools is primarily the job of the governments of the countries themselves. However, the scale of the financial needs and the problems that would result for the Community if the social situation worsened mean that it will have to help stop the decline by providing financial support, knowhow and changes of experiences’.

This means that the European Commission presents the task of the state in the Mediterranean countries as supporting and stimulating the free market, but also as providing basic social services. It sees its own task mainly as supporting the state in stimulating the free market, but it now states that it will help the state with its second task, since the situation is too
difficult for the moment. In its proposals for the RMP and the Euro-Maghreb Partnership, the European Commission already stated that the EC should help mitigating the social consequences of structural adjustment, but now, this is far more emphasized in the discourse, and the European Commission also elaborates on how its assistance on social issues can look like (see also the previous communication; European Commission, 1994: 12). Moreover, the European Commission does no longer refer to the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and the IMF (like the EESC and the European Parliament asked); instead it indicates that structural adjustment should be in function of cooperation with the EU (which means that there will be more room for social issues). In the next paragraph on the promotion of harmonious and integrated rural development, the European Commission repeats that the Community should also contribute to the improvement of basic social services in rural areas: health care, water supplies and sewage, electricity and other services. Regarding the role of the civil society, the European Commission remains rather vague. It is stated that CSOs can contribute to development, but it is not clear from the text what is actually meant by this. Similarly, the European Commission is rather vague about what it means by democracy. It is only mentioned as an objective of the partnership.

Overall, it can be concluded that the European Commission now seems to move in the direction of the policy proposals of the European Parliament and the EESC under the RMP and the Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek partnership. The European Commission does no longer refer to the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF, it only states that it will collaborate with financial institutions in order to encourage joint ventures, industrial cooperation and subcontracting, especially between SMEs (European Commission, 1995a: 8). In addition, it now especially emphasizes that the social consequences of structural adjustment/economic reforms should be mitigated (in contrast with its previous communications where this was mentioned as an objective but where this was not especially stressed): one should ‘prevent the economic anchoring of the Mediterranean to Europe from producing worse social disparities’ (European Commission, 1995a: 9). Therefore, support for social services is now presented as necessary, and the European Commission also elaborates upon how this support should look like (in contrast with its previous communications). Although the definition of democracy and the role of the CSOs is unclear, we can cautiously conclude that the European Commission seems to move into the direction of promoting a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region.
6.3.2.2 The (European) Council and the member states

As indicated above, the Council submitted its report on the 1994 Commission communication in October 1994. It stresses three elements. First, the Council supports the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Zone of Political Stability and Security, and repeats that the reinforcement of the political dialogue must be based on respect for democracy, good governance and human rights (European Council, 1994b: 26). Second, it emphasizes that ‘an important element of a future Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would be to start with a process of progressive establishment of free trade between the Mediterranean countries themselves and between the region as a whole and the European Union as proposed by the Commission in its communication. In fostering such a zone, regional cooperation will be a key factor’ (European Council, 1994b: 27). This approach towards the development of the EMFTA is different from the Commission’s approach. The Council articulates first the establishment of free trade between the Mediterranean countries, and then free trade between the region as a whole and the EU. We already explained that this approach would prevent the hub-and-spoke effect which would play if the EU would conclude bilateral free trade agreements with each Mediterranean country. Nevertheless, in the rest of the document, the Council states that it wants to conclude the negotiations on the free trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Israel by the end of the year, and that it wants to open similar negotiations in the near future with Egypt and other eligible Mediterranean countries wishing to do so, which runs counter to its objective to first establish free trade between the Mediterranean countries themselves. Third, Spain proposed to organize a Euro-Mediterranean conference during its presidency, and France offered to take the lead in the preparation of the conference. The European Council in Essen in December 1994 accepted the proposal to organize a Euro-Mediterranean conference, and the preparations could start.

The member states, especially France and Spain, were in control of the preparation of the Barcelona conference and the drafting of the Barcelona Declaration. It is very difficult to determine who exactly proposed what during these negotiations (also because the different working documents are rather difficult to find), but the comparison of the Commission communications and the summary report of the Council on the internal EU negotiations drafted in April 1995 allows us to reveal the differences between the European Commission and the Council which we need for this research. The latter report, with a few minor changes, was adopted at the European Council in Cannes in 1995 as the official position of the EU regarding the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona. This official position very much resembles the Barcelona Declaration which would be adopted on the Euro-Mediterranean conference on 27-28
November 1995. The Mediterranean countries had very little to say about the text of the declaration (see chapter 1 and infra).

Regarding the economic dimension of the cooperation, the Council report presents an agreement between the views of the Council and the Commission: it articulates that ‘the ongoing negotiations between the Union and non-member Mediterranean countries will be concluded as soon as possible and, in parallel, similar free-trade agreements should be negotiated between the Mediterranean countries themselves’ (European Council, 1995: 25). The Council does no longer articulate that free trade between the Mediterranean countries should be reached first, but adds that this can be reached simultaneously with the free trade with the EU (which meets the view of the European Commission which emphasized the conclusion of free trade agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean countries). In order to reach the FTA, the Council report states that economic reforms are necessary: ‘they (the partners, vr.) would give priority to the adaptation and modernization of the economic and social structures of the non-EU Mediterranean countries in order to facilitate the progressive establishment of a free trade area, and in particular to promote the modernization and development of the private sector, as well as its legal and regulatory environment, by means of greater administrative cooperation and by encouraging private investment from local, regional and community resources; to mitigate the social and environmental consequences which may result from economic development, by according in particular the requisite priority to the policies, programmes and projects most directly affecting the day-to-day life of the neediest population’ (European Council, 1995: 25).

In the Commission communications, the Council report of April 1995, the position adopted at the European Council in Cannes in June 1995 and the Barcelona Declaration (see infra), the EU does not go deeper into how these economic reforms will be supported. It is only stated that the EU will have a dialogue with each of the new partners under the new agreements, that it will organize a multilateral dialogue and that it will provide financial assistance. Therefore, it is useful to take a closer look at the MEDA-regulation, published in 1996. This regulation lays down the technical modalities of the financial assistance to be granted to the Mediterranean region. It also goes deeper into the objectives of the financial assistance and the eligibility criteria for receiving funding from the EU. These objectives and criteria are mentioned in Annex II of the regulation, and are clearly from the hand of the European Commission. In its proposal for the Council regulation, the European Commission makes a distinction between four categories of objectives. Three of these are based on the priorities for actions it determined in its Commission communication of 1995: assistance for economic transition (promotion of the private sector and
European investment, upgrading of the economic infrastructure, SAPs), assistance for achieving a better socio-economic balance (participation of the civil society, support for social services, rural development, fisheries, environmental cooperation, development of human resources, strengthening of democracy/human rights, cultural cooperation and youth exchanges, assistance and cooperation for reducing illegal immigration, drug trafficking and international crime) and support for regional integration (developing structures and infrastructure for regional cooperation, …). The social dimension of the EMP is here closer articulated with the economic dimension (in contrast with the Commission communications). The main objective of the economic partnership is to reform the countries into market economies, and the main objective of the social partnership is to counterbalance the negative social consequences of these reforms or to support the transition to the market. In addition, good governance is added as a fourth category (see infra; European Commission, 1995b).

The Council almost entirely approved the proposal of the European Commission. However, there is one important difference in terms of objectives: the support for SAPs is emphasized and elaborated. The support for the SAPs is meant to ‘restore the major financial balances and create an economic environment favourable to accelerated growth’. These support programmes should also include ‘measures to mitigate the negative effects the structural programmes may have on social conditions and employment’ and should be ‘orientated towards the creation of a free trade area with the European Community’ (Council of the EU, 1996: 8). However, what is more important is that one of the eligibility criteria for receiving such a funding from the EU is now defined as follows: the Mediterranean countries are to undertake a reform programme approved by the Bretton Woods institutions or to implement a programme which is recognized as analogous, in coordination with those institutions, but not financially supported by them. The support for the SAPs (also called structural adjustment facilities, SAFs) is granted in the form of budget support. However, the main condition to receive this kind of budget support is thus to have a reform programme approved/recognized by the Bretton Woods institutions, which means that the EU is now supporting again the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF. This condition is confirmed in the MEDA II regulation (Council of the EU, 2000). As we mentioned above, in contrast with the previous policies, the European Commission did no longer refer to the SAPs developed by the World Bank and the IMF in its 1994 and 1995 Commission communications. This was an old request from the EESC and the European Parliament, which suggested that the EU should develop its own SAPs for the Mediterranean region (because that would also give more room for social policies). The condition to undertake a reform programme approved by the Bretton Woods institutions was also not mentioned in the
proposal of the European Commission (and not even in de amended proposal presented a few months later, European Commission, 1995b; European Commission, 1996) nor in the amendments of the European Parliament (European Parliament, 1996a), which means that the Council must have included it into the MEDA regulation. Regarding the support for the economic reforms, the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF served as a guideline for the EU’s policy (which also means that there is less room for social policies). The SAFs eventually became one of the major instruments of the EU to implement the MEDA I programme. Especially in Jordan (€180 million of €254, 1 million) and Tunisia (€180 million of €428 million), support for the SAFs was very high. Besides the SAFs, private sector development was a main objective.

Now that we have looked into how the EU elaborated the support for economic reforms in the Mediterranean countries, we return to the Council report of April 1995, which was adopted at the European Council in Cannes in June 1995 (and which formed the first draft of the Barcelona Declaration) in order to examine how the member states in the Council defined the other domains of cooperation. In contrast with the European Commission which mainly focused on the economic cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, the member states in the Council elaborated on the cooperation in the field of security, and the political cooperation. The cooperation in the field of security is built on four principles (sovereign equality, non-interference, respect for territorial integrity, non-use of force) and three objectives (fight against terrorism, organized crime and drugs, disarmament and non-proliferation and confidence- and security-building measures). In the political dimension of the partnership, the Council strongly

35 A report on the evaluation of the MEDA programme studied whether the EU has also been able to influence these SAFs and the economic reforms, i.e. whether it succeeded in the orientating them towards the EMFTA and if it succeeded in supporting measures to mitigate negative aspects (see supra). Regarding the macroeconomic policy, it was found that the EU mainly followed the view of the Bretton Woods institutions as a result of the division of responsibilities between the EU and those institutions. Regarding the legal and institutional environment, the report states that: ‘In their assessment of the SAFs the evaluators noted that “the European Union has not been able to influence the economic debate and the contents of the conditions. The limited number of experts allocated to these matters has not allowed the European Union to greatly influence the views of the World Bank and of the IMF”. As a consequence, little room was left to specific community conditions directly linked to the long-term interests of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ (ADE, 2003: 47). Furthermore, the report states that the SAFs could be more closely linked to the preparation of the FTA (ADE, 2003: 48), and regarding the social dimension, it concludes that it has materialized through the stability of the rise of social budget expenditures (in health and educations sectors); however, the evaluation carried out on SAFs notes that the redistribution of spending in favour of the targeted populations has been difficult to achieve (ADE, 2003: 8). This means that the EU thus mainly followed the economic programme of the World Bank and the IMF in the implementation of the EMP.
emphasizes the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These are presented as two of the five main principles on which the political partnership is based, but are also mentioned in the three other principles, i.e. the respect for basic texts (reference to the UN Charter and the UDHR), the rule of law (where it is mentioned that the partners have the right to choose their own political, socio-cultural and economic system, provided that it complies with commonly agreed international standards concerning human rights) and pluralism and tolerance (where education on matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms is emphasized as important). Liberty is thus articulated as important. Democracy is mainly defined as the ‘rule of law’. In this regard, the Council report mentions that ‘each partner should be able to commit itself to the development of the rule of law and of democracy in its internal political system (free and regular elections to governing and representative bodies, independent judiciary, balance of powers and good governance)’ (European Council, 1995). Nevertheless, in the Barcelona Declaration, this reference of the EU about how a democracy should look like has disappeared. The statement that the partners can choose their own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system in accordance with international standards regarding human rights is replaced by the statement that partners can choose their own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 1995). These articulations were not accepted by the partners during the negotiations on the Barcelona Declaration, because they feared that the EU would try to impose its own cultural norms to the region, especially in the field of human rights and democracy (Gomez, 2003: 73). This was the most important comment the Mediterranean countries had on the Barcelona Declaration, and their changes were eventually also incorporated in the text.³⁶

³⁶ Another important issue was the fear of several Mediterranean countries that the EMP, designed as a multilateral policy towards all Mediterranean countries, would affect the bilateral relationship they had with the EU and the member states (Gomez, 2003: 73). This was a very sensitive issue. We made a request to the Secretary-General of the Council to consult the working document which reflects the meeting between the EU and the Mediterranean partners in October 1995. Nevertheless, the Council refused to divulge the complete passage on the relation between the multilateral and the bilateral framework, because this might hamper the relations with the Mediterranean countries. Also the passage on the MEPP in the working document is not divulged. Besides these remarks, Gomez (2003: 73) adds that the Maghreb countries were disappointed about the fact that the working documents did not say anything about the status of legal migrants in the EU. Syria questioned the articulation of the section on terrorism and self-determination, and stated that armed conflicts over occupied territories should be seen as ‘legitimate struggles’ instead of acts of terrorism. Moreover, Syria and Egypt questioned the section on the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) by asking that Israel signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These passages were put between brackets in the working document of October 1995, but eventually appeared in the Barcelona Declaration, although some of them were reformulated.
If we look at how the support for democratic principles and human rights is further developed in relation to the Mediterranean countries, it can be noted that all EMAAs contain an essential elements clause, which refers to the respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the UDHR. However, this is not really the consequence of the focus of the EU on democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean countries, but because such essential elements clause was inserted in all agreements which were concluded between the Community and the third countries from 1995 on (following a Commission communication, European Commission, 1995c). The clauses in the EMAAs are also limited to the standard clauses set out in the 1995 Commission communication. There is no definition of the concept ‘democracy’. Democracy and human rights are also mentioned as an essential element in the MEDA-regulation, which regulates the financial assistance of the EU towards the region, but there is no execution-clause, and again no definition of ‘democracy’. In addition, it can be noted that in the MEDA-regulation, good governance is now mentioned as an objective of the Community (Council of the EU, 1996). This objective is inserted by the European Commission (1995b) in its proposal for the Council regulation: ‘Good governance shall be promoted by supporting key institutions and key protagonists in civil society such as local authorities, rural and village groups, mutual-aid associations, trade unions, the media and organizations supporting business, and by assisting in the improvement of the capacity of the public administration to develop policies and manage their implementation’. From this definition, it can be concluded that ‘good governance’ means the support to the civil society and the support to the state in order to develop and implement ‘policies’. Although ‘policies’ in this sentence are not further defined, it is clear that the EU here refers to the policy it is promoting in the Mediterranean region, and that is economic reforms. The EMAAs nor the financial assistance to the region were suspended despite the numerous violations of democracy and human rights. Moreover, democracy and human rights were almost not mentioned during the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of the ministers of foreign affairs and the financial assistance under the MEDA programme for democracy and human rights was non-existent. An exception was the MEDA democracy programme but the amount of funding was insignificant: €22, 85 million for the period 1996-1998.

Besides the political aspect of the partnership, the member states/the Council also elaborated on the social, cultural and human aspects of cooperation in their Council report (the third basket of the EMP). Here, the role of the CSOs is stressed: they should contribute to the development of the EMP: ‘With this in view, they would develop instruments of decentralized cooperation encouraging exchanges between those active in development; leaders of civil and
political society, the cultural world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, trade unions and public and private enterprises’ (European Council, 1995). However, between 1995 and 2005, the EU had only limited attention for CSOs: the amount of funding provided under the MEDA programme was very limited. Regarding the role of the CSOs, Tania Börzel (2009: 25) found that under the MEDA programme the strengthening of the civil society was first of all articulated as a matter of increasing effectiveness (of the EU’s policy) rather than of democratic participation. In addition, the EU supported CSOs through the MEDA democracy programme and the EIDHR. Here, research has found that the EU mainly supported CSOs which focused on human rights, rather than CSOs which work on the democratization. Moreover, the EU mainly supported those CSOs which focused on the rights of women and children (rather than the more controversial political rights of participation and association) and CSOs in the least authoritarian regimes such as Israel and the Palestinian authorities. It can be concluded that the EU mainly promotes a civil society which contributes to the legitimation of its policy in the Mediterranean region, and which is based on the notion of negative liberty (given the strong focus on human rights): a civil society which tries to ‘maximize individual rights, and which tries to avoid that the people’s personal freedom is being trampled upon by other people’s personal freedom’ (Volpi, 2004b: 18).

If we return to the 1995 Council report, it can be found that the main objectives of the social partnership are education and training, health care and social development. It needs to be noted that these objectives are imbedded in the idea of the reform of the Mediterranean countries into market economies. Education, for example, is mainly promoted in order to make sure that companies have enough skilled personnel. The main objectives are: a full exchange of information on systems, policies and action in the field of education and training, the development of vocational training programmes, with the emphasis on the private sector, promotion of cooperation networks among universities and encouragement of mobility of research workers and teaching staff (Council of the EU, 1995). The ADE report (2003: 18) confirms that interventions that aim at strengthening the socio-economic balance in partner countries were often interventions in support of employment (and it gives as an example the development of the educational-vocational training system). Promotion of SMEs was for example also seen as social development. Regarding social development, it is emphasized in the Council report that it should go together with economic development, and the focus is on social rights. Nevertheless, the document does not define these social rights. Later on, in the ADE report, it is found that in order to address the socio-economic balance in partner countries, the EU often supported SAF components which addressed the social balance. This illustrates how
the social development is subordinated to the economic development of the Mediterranean countries (in contrast with the European Commission, which also referred to social objectives such as government housing, sanitation and water supplies). The cultural partnership of the EMP has as its main objective to improve mutual understanding between cultures through the organization of events, the spread of books, the written word, and art and through the improvement of the role of the media, ‘while respecting the identities of all involved’ (Council of the EU, 1995). Later on, the cultural partnership of the EMP mainly focused on the establishment of a dialogue between cultures. This is especially the case after 2001 (the first five years, the attention for cultural cooperation was rather limited). Following the Valencia Action Plan adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Valencia in 2002, the EU and the Mediterranean partners established the Anna Lindh Foundation for the dialogue between cultures to improve the mutual respect between cultures (see also chapter 1). The rest of the third basket of the EMP focused on migration, drug trafficking, terrorism, international crime, judicial cooperation, combating corruption and racism and xenophobia.

Now that we have discussed the position of the member states and the (European) Council on the development of the EMP, we can draw conclusions on how the nodal points market, state, civil society, democracy, liberty and equality are articulated in the discourse of the (European) Council and the member states. It can be noted that there is no reference to the concept ‘globalization’ in the discourse of the member states/the (European) Council. In this regard, it accepts the view of the European Commission. The main goal of the EMP is the creation of the EMFTA. Therefore, the Mediterranean countries should be turned into market economies; the development of the market is the central element. Economic reforms are articulated as necessary to transform the Mediterranean countries into market economies; the support for economic reforms is presented as one of the main objectives of the EMP. The main task of the state is the support to the market according to the (European) Council/member states. In the development/implementation of the EMP, it became clear that the EU chose to follow the SAPs developed by the World Bank and the IMF, just like it did under the RMP. In the discourse of the (European) Council, the role of social policies is articulated in relation to the development of a free market economy (like for instance education, where the main goal is to make sure that companies have enough skilled personnel) or as to alleviate some of the negative effects of the SAPs developed by the IFIs (ADE, 2003: 17). The civil society is initially defined very broadly, and the task of the CSOs is vaguely articulated as contributing to the implementation of the EMP. Later on, in the implementation of the EMP, it becomes clear that the EU mainly articulates a civil society which contributes to the legitimation of the EU’s policy
in the region and to the social order it promotes, and a civil society which is based on the notion of negative liberty. Negative liberty is the central concept in the political cooperation with the Mediterranean: the EU focuses on the possibility for individuals to develop themselves without interference of other individuals, see for example the references to tolerance and the non-discrimination on ground of race, nationality, language, religion or sex, but also the rule of law. In this regard, the (European) Council/member states refer to international agreements such as the UN Charter and the UDHR (see also the essential elements clause in the EMAAs). The definition of democracy was also based on the notion of ‘negative’ liberty, given the references to the rule of law, the independent judiciary and the balance of powers. Also the organization of free and fair elections was initially presented as an objective, but this was no longer mentioned in the Barcelona Declaration or in the further development of the EMP. In this regard, it can be concluded that the (European) Council and the member states promoted a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region, and that this became the dominant position, given the influence of the member states/the (European) Council on the draft and the development of the EMP.

6.3.2.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

On 14 September 1995, the EESC adopted an own-initiative opinion on the preparations of the establishment of the EMP. More specifically, it commented on the two communications of the European Commission and on the summary report adopted by the Council on 10 April 1995, which served as the basis for the negotiations with the Mediterranean partners. In 2001, as a result of the fifth anniversary of the EMP, the EESC again adopted an own-initiative opinion in which it reviewed the implementation of the partnership. It can be noted that the EESC does not refer to the concept globalization or to interdependence in its 1995 opinion. In its 2001 opinion, there is one reference to globalization. It is presented as a process which causes cultural tensions (normative judgment, space). However, these tensions can be managed by the promotion of a (cultural) dialogue between countries (policy-options; logic of cultural opportunity).

The analysis of the EESC’s previous opinions (EESC, 1989; 1990; 1992a; 1992b, 1993) showed that the Committee always presented a different view on the development of the Mediterranean region than the European Commission and the Council. This view was based on the idea of the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Strategic Area. In its opinion of 1993, the EESC emphasized the two major steps the EC should adopt: the promotion of regional integration/cooperation among the Mediterranean countries and the development of complementary relations between the EC and the Mediterranean area. However, the 1995
opinion on the EMP is different. In general, the EESC praises the proposal of the European Commission and the Council. Moreover, it sees itself as the originator of the EMP for two reasons. First, it states that the EMP is based on the idea of a joint development policy as proposed by the Committee: ‘In the Committee’s view, the proposal set out in the Commission’s Communications appears essentially to follow this approach (the joint development policy, \textit{vr.}) and undoubtedly represents a qualitative leap forward in both financial and general terms, calculated to have immediate effects even if it will not be fully felt for a generation’ (EESC, 1995b: 49). Second, it contains a global approach to the development of the region: it does not only focus on trade, and it is based on a multilateral framework. Therefore, ‘the Committee fully endorses this basic strategy (the tripartite structure of the EMP, \textit{vr.}) and, without playing down the difficulties involved, considers it the only way of tackling the area’s serious and complex problems’ (EESC, 1995b: 50). And: ‘the Committee agrees with the broad principles of this approach and is in favour of a global framework agreement boosting the potential for regional cooperation among countries in various areas. This should avert the risks which a return to exclusively bilateral relations could entail for the balanced development of the Mediterranean nations, not least as regards the opening-up of their mutual relations’ (EESC, 1995b: 50). Here, we can note that the EESC is still concerned about the fact that the conclusion of the EMAAs with the Mediterranean countries will lead to a hub-and-spoke effect (see infra). Nevertheless, in contrast with its previous opinion on the relations between the EC and the Maghreb, the EESC no longer insists on the fact that regional economic integration among Mediterranean countries should be reached first, rather it states that the establishment of a FTA can happen in parallel with the regional integration between the Mediterranean countries, just like the Council concluded: ‘In the economic sphere, the Committee first and foremost would stress the inextricable link established in the proposal (including the timespan envisaged) between the establishment of a free trade area – to be implemented in a gradual, selective manner and \textit{in tandem} with regional integration between the partner countries – and implementation of a concurrent structural reform programme’ (EESC, 1995: 45). And: ‘Here the speedy conclusion of the bilateral agreements currently in progress is recommended \textit{along with} the negotiation of similar free trade agreements among the Mediterranean countries, … (EESC, 1995b: 50)’.\textsuperscript{37} The Committee stresses that, in the Mediterranean countries, the establishment of the EMFTA should be accompanied by ‘a concurrent programme of structural, economic and market reform’ (EESC, 1995b: 51). In this regard, the Committee mainly follows the view of the European

\textsuperscript{37} In 2001, in its opinion on the fifth anniversary of the EMP, the EESC will state that horizontal (South-South) integration remains the EU’s greatest task of support in the region (EESC, 2001).
Commission and the Council. Nevertheless, in contrast to the European Commission and the Council, the Committee also stresses that the Community should deal with the debt problems of the Mediterranean countries, that it should open up its market for the agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries and that it should focus on industrial cooperation. This is emphasized in its opinion (EESC, 1995b: 52-53). In its 2001 opinion, the EESC again criticizes the lack of market access for agricultural products (EESC, 2001).

If we then take a closer look at the social and human dimension of the partnership, we see that the EESC follows the suggestion of the European Commission to help the Mediterranean countries with their social spending: ‘The Committee therefore proposes to keep a close eye on the practical progress of operations in many social spheres specified in the Commission documents, and shares the Commission’s conviction that the social dimension of the partnership is intrinsically intertwined with the cultural dimension, especially as regards action to curb racism and xenophobia by fostering greater mutual understanding’ (EESC, 1995b: 46-47). However, in its 2001 opinion, it concludes that ‘the results originally expected in the social sector have not yet been achieved’ and that ‘liberalisation alone, in a context of considerable inequalities, cannot guarantee either economic growth or restructuring of particularly fragmented societies and economies’ (EESC, 2001: 4). Furthermore, the EESC still attaches a lot of importance to the role of the civil society. The civil society is defined as ‘socio-economic players’. In the part on the decentralized cooperation, the EESC states argues that ‘the abiding aim must be to promote the development of small and craft businesses, farming and other cooperatives, socio-economic organizations and local groupings’, and a special part of the opinion is dedicated to the involvement of socio-economic partners in the EMP (EESC, 1995b: 56). Regarding the political cooperation, the EESC adopts the definition of democracy as defined in the Council report of April 1995, and it adds that the EU should consider political sanctions if these norms are extremely violated. In addition, it argues that cooperation with CSOs is the best guarantee to consolidate democracy and human rights (EESC, 1995b: 51). These objectives are also stressed in its 2001 opinion on the EMP (EESC, 2001). Overall, it can be concluded that the EESC mainly agrees with the proposal of the European Commission on the organization of the Euro-Mediterranean relations and the social order to be promoted in the Mediterranean region (although it emphasizes that the EU should deal with the debt problems of the Mediterranean countries, that it should open up its market for agricultural products and that it should focus on industrial cooperation). Therefore, it can be concluded that the EESC promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region.
6.3.2.4 The European Parliament

The European Parliament drafted several resolutions on the EMP. In its first report and resolution, adopted in October 1995, the European Parliament did not discuss in detail the communications of the European Commission nor the reports of the Council; it generally focused on the Barcelona conference that would be organized in November 1995 (European Parliament, 1995a; European Parliament, 1995b). The debate on the proposal to organize a Euro-Mediterranean conference mainly focused on the countries, organizations and institutions that would take part in the conference (including the role of the European Parliament) and the amount of funding to be granted to the cooperation with the Mediterranean region (European Parliament, 1995c). One month after the conference, it adopted a resolution on the Euro-Mediterranean conference (European Parliament, 1996b). Its second resolution and report discussed in detail the Commission communication and the Council report, but this resolution was only adopted in 1997, more than two years after the Barcelona conference took place (European Parliament, 1997a; European Parliament, 1997b). The European Parliament did therefore mainly contribute to the debate on the content of the new partnership after the EMP was launched. Later on, it also adopted resolutions on the EMAAs (European Parliament, 1998) and a general recommendation and resolution on the EU’s Mediterranean policy (European Parliament, 1999; European Parliament, 2000). However, the latter resolutions will not be discussed in detail.

In its documents, the European Parliament does not refer to the concept ‘globalization’ or ‘interdependence’. Nevertheless, the interdependence between the EU and the Mediterranean region clearly influenced its policy: ‘whereas numerous factors creating political, religious, economic, social and military instability are accumulating at the southern and south-eastern borders of the EU and it is therefore the EU’s task to influence this dangerous development in a positive way by having a global and coherent Mediterranean policy and by establishing relations of a new kind based on mutually advantageous cooperation, solidarity, peace and security’ (European Parliament, 1995a: 122). In general, it can be concluded from the first report that the European Parliament accepts the social order proposed by the European Commission. We see

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38 It already drafted a (although very limited) resolution on the Mediterranean policy of the European Union in 1994, calling on the Union ‘to implement a global and coherent policy for the Mediterranean countries with a view to guaranteeing peace, security and stability within this region, together with its general welfare’ and calling on the Council and the European Commission ‘to revive and reactivate the idea of a ‘Conference on Peace and Development in the Mediterranean’’ (European Parliament, 1994: 82-83).
the same view on the organization of the relation between the market, the state, the civil society and the individual. In this regard, the Parliament ‘recalls that attracting investment to the region depends, above all, on the application of market-based economic policies, the existence of a streamlined, honest and efficient public administration and improvements to infrastructures and educational and health facilities; …’ (European Parliament, 1995a: 123). According to the European Parliament, the state needs to be reformed in order to support the functioning of the market, but it also stresses the fact that social repercussions of economic adjustments should be taken into account. In this regard, the Parliament states that it ‘considers the creation of a free-trade area in the region, without prejudice to bilateral agreements between the EU and each Mediterranean state, to be a worthwhile aim with a view to promoting the different interests of those involved, but points out that, in connection with the economic restructuring which this requires, compensatory measures must be planned in good time in order to offset any rise in unemployment following privatizations’. The European Parliament furthermore stresses ‘the values of the EU such as human rights, democracy, social justice and the rule of law’ about which it argues that the EU should take a decisive stand in discussions while it should also take into account the ideas and values of the future partners so as to achieve a fruitful and useful debate which will promote mutual understanding, tolerance and respect for political and social pluralism (European Parliament, 1995a: 123).

In its second report and resolution on the follow-up of the Barcelona conference, the European Parliament indicates a few points which should receive more attention in the relations with the Mediterranean region. In the framework of the political and security partnership, human rights are stressed. Here, the European Parliament refers to the OSCE which it considers as the example for closer and institutionalized cooperation between all partners in the area of human rights: the European Parliament ‘is convinced that, with a view to ensuring compliance with respect for human rights by all participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, a special agreement should be approved and that an authority must be created which, in a manner similar to that used in the OSCE approach, is capable of guaranteeing and enforcing compliance with the agreement, …’ (European Parliament, 1997b: 7). This is also stressed in later recommendations (see European Parliament, 1999 and see the resolutions on the ENP (chapter 7)). In the economic partnership, the question of debt conversion is raised and the conclusion of a multilateral Euro-Mediterranean agreement is emphasized. The latter would lead to closer regional integration between the Mediterranean countries (European Parliament, 1997a; European Parliament, 1997b). However, besides these three main points, it seems that the European Parliament mainly accepts the EMP as it is implemented by the European Commission.
and the Council of the EU. Furthermore, the social order it wants to promote is not clearly articulated in these resolutions which makes it difficult to draw a definite conclusion.

6.3.3 Political and fantasmatic logics in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

6.3.3.1 The European Commission

How are the identity of the Self and the identity of the Other now articulated in the discourse of the European Commission? In the communication of 1994, the European Commission explains how it defines the Mediterranean region: ‘It (the communication, rr.) deals primarily with the Maghreb and the Mashrek countries and Israel, while noting the importance of the Community’s particular relations with Turkey, as well as those with Cyprus and Malta in the perspective of their accession to the Community. Relations with the countries of the former Yugoslavia are beyond the scope of this communication (spatial construction of identity; European Commission, 1994: 1). The Mediterranean countries are again presented as a risk for the EU. They are articulated as political unstable, as facing rapid population growth and provoking migration. This has an influence on the stability of the region, and increases the migratory pressure on the Community. Nevertheless, this identity is articulated as temporal. The solution for the problems of the Mediterranean countries is the implementation of economic reforms, like we explained above. The EU should help with the development of the Mediterranean region, and eventually establish the EMFTA. However, this is not because the EU has a moral responsibility towards the Mediterranean region (as articulated in the commission communication on the Euro-Maghreb Partnership), but because it is in the interest of the EU. This is particularly stressed in the Commission communication of 1995.\footnote{In its previous documents, the European Commission also referred to the interests of the EC in the Mediterranean region (see for example European Commission, 1989b), but this was not particularly stressed as the main reason for cooperation with the Mediterranean countries like in the 1995 Commission communication.} This view is similar to one of the narratives Erik Jones (2010; see chapter 4) articulated: the EU should support economic integration because it is in its interests. The Commission communications therefore mainly focus on the strategy the EU should follow. The European Commission (1994: 12) argues that this strategy will be implemented in ‘partnership’ with the Mediterranean countries; the European Commission refers to a substantive economic policy dialogue which should be conducted with the Mediterranean countries to identify their specific needs. In addition, also the Mediterranean countries are articulated as having a responsibility: they have to implement the reform process: ‘the countries
of the Mediterranean will have to continue their efforts to achieve economic and political stability, privatization and deregulation’ (European Commission, 1995a: 8).

The concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ functions as a nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission. It refers to a common identity which is already reached by the EU and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries (but which is now not yet the case): economic and social development and economic integration. The terms ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that the EU and the Mediterranean countries will have a substantive economic policy dialogue. Nevertheless, this dialogue will take place within the strategy the European Commission has set out within its communications. The Mediterranean countries should also be good partners of the EU by doing their part of the deal: implementing economic reforms. The concept ‘partnership’ fulfills the logic of fantasy in several ways: it prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EU and it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (the promise of equal relations with the EU through an economic dialogue in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development). For the EU, it mainly promises the prevention of a disaster.

6.3.3.2 The (European) Council and the member states

The political logics as identified in the discourse of the member states/the (European) Council are similar to the ones identified in the discourse of the European Commission. In its first documents on the EMP, the European Council is rather vague about which countries are part of the Mediterranean region: in the conclusions of the presidency of June 1994 (European Council of Corfu), it refers to Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, the Mashrek countries, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, while in the conclusions of the presidency of December 1994 (European Council of Essen), also Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are presented as part of the Mediterranean region. The European Council in Cannes in June 1995 refers to the countries on the other side of the Mediterranean and to its ‘eastern and western Mediterranean partners’ (spatial construction of identity). Also for the (European) Council, the Mediterranean region constitutes a risk for the EU, although this is not so explicitly articulated as in the discourse of the European Commission. However, the Mediterranean countries can be reformed, in order to reach stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. The EU should help with the development and the reform of the Mediterranean region, and eventually establish the EMFTA. The EU should do this because it is in the interest of the EU: ‘The Council fully shares the view of the European Commission that the Mediterranean Basin constitutes an area of strategic importance for the Community. Peace,
stability and prosperity in the region are among the highest priorities of Europe' (European Council, 1994b). Again, we see a reflection of the narrative articulated by Erik Jones (2010): the EU should support economic development, economic integration and also political cooperation because it is in its interests. Also the (European) Council documents mainly describe the strategy the EU should follow in the Mediterranean region. Again it is indicated that this strategy will be implemented in ‘partnership’ with the Mediterranean countries: the Council refers to the political dialogue and to the economic dialogue which will be held with each of the partners under the EMAAs. The European Council (1994b) states in this regard: (such a partnership) ‘would also have to take into account the specific needs and capacities of each country concerned’. In addition, also the Mediterranean countries are articulated as having a responsibility: they have to implement the reform process, based on a SAP which is approved by the IFIs, and they have to respect the principles of international law. Here we see the logic of the multilateral Europe, where the EU follows the strategy of international institutions and respects international agreements.40

The concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ functions as a nodal point in the discourse of the (European) Council. It refers to a common identity which is already reached by the EU and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries (but which is now not yet the case): economic development based on a strategy of the IFIs, economic integration, and peace and stability based on the essential principles of international law. The terms ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that the EU and the Mediterranean countries will conduct a dialogue about the policies under the EMP. Nevertheless, this dialogue will take place within the strategy the (European) Council has set out within its documents and which is based on the strategy of the IFIs. The Mediterranean countries should also be good partners of the EU by doing their part of the deal: implementing economic reforms and respecting international law. The Mediterranean countries will then become like the EU. However, at the same time, the Mediterranean countries are also articulated as having differences which will never change, i.e. cultural differences. This is also reflected in the nodal point ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, and more specifically in the prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ which emphasizes the difference between the EU and the Mediterranean, and in a way also by the term ‘partnership’ which in the discourse of the (European) Council

40 Here, it can be noted that Thomas Diez (2005; see also chapters 2 and 4) argues that the Barcelona Declaration is an instance of ‘normative power’ because it entails a practice of Othering in the sense of imposing standards as regarded as universal and representing others as violating those standards. Nevertheless, his use of the concept ‘normative power Europe’ is different than the one applied in this dissertation: we use the logic of normative power Europe to indicate that the EU articulates that it promotes universal norms because of its hybrid identity, which is not the case.
reflects a businesslike relationship based on international ‘agreements’ and on a dialogue between cultures. Del Sarto (2005: 314) indicated that this last objective of establishing a dialogue between cultures presupposes ‘the existence of distinct, and potentially incompatible ‘cultures’ at the international level which mage engage in conflict, or alternatively dialogue, with each other’. This idea is also reflected in the discourse by the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. We agree with Del Sarto (2005: 322) that the discourse of the EU underpins the clash of civilizations’ argument of Huntington, i.e. the idea that the main sources of conflict follow cultural and civilizational lines. For the EU, this can now be solved by conducting a dialogue. However, these articulations ignore diversity and difference within and between states (not all people living in the Mediterranean countries are Muslim), and like Del Sarto argued, this potentially also increases ‘the power and legitimacy of political and religious elites in imposing their hegemonic vision of culture and politics’. This kind of articulations of identity can also lead to the construction of the Other as ‘the enemy’. The concept ‘partnership’ further fulfils the logic of fantasy: it prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EC and it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (the promise of equal relations with the EU through a dialogue (economic, cultural) in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development, and peace and stability). For the EU, it mainly promises the prevention of a disaster.

6.3.3.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

If we then take a closer look at the political logics in the discourse of the EESC, we find that the EESC makes a distinction between various areas of the Mediterranean region: Cyprus and Malta, Turkey, Albania, the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) and Israel and the countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). For each of these ‘areas’ or countries, it discusses the specific problems which the EU should deal with. From these discussions, it is clear that the Maghreb, the countries in the Middle East, Israel and Albania are part of the ‘Mediterranean region’ which should be addressed by the EMP. These countries are also referred to as ‘the countries of the south and the east Mediterranean’ (spatial construction of identity). In the relations with Cyprus and Malta (accession to the EU) and Turkey (EU – Turkey customs union) the main objective of the relationship is different (EESC, 1995b: 57-59). Overall, the countries of the south and the east Mediterranean are articulated as a risk for the EU; the EESC then refers to the political instability of the region, the rise of the population which, in combination with unemployment, will lead to migration to the EU and the worsening pollution of the Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, this can be changed, since it is possible to establish
an area of political stability through stimulating the process of sustainable development (temporal construction of identity).

In its 1995 opinion, the EESC mainly focuses on the responsibilities of the EU towards the Mediterranean region, especially in the economic sphere, and it stresses that the EU should open up its markets for agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries (this is stressed again in its 2001 opinion, EESC, 2001), that it should help finding a solution for the massive foreign debt facing some Mediterranean countries and that it should focus on industrial cooperation. This is what the EESC understands by ‘partnership’ with the Mediterranean region: it should contribute to the development of the Mediterranean region. In this regard, the EESC states: ‘A Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would seem to imply the start of a new type of development process that goes beyond the existing boost in Mediterranean countries’ exports to the EU, which is so far concentrated on a handful of sectors, so as to end the paradoxical situation in which, despite the EU’s political and financial commitment to the structural diversification of the associated countries, a highly defensive stance is still found in economic circles. This has not helped negotiations with the Mediterranean countries, and it is clear that radical solutions – be they protectionist or deregulatory – are not feasible’ (EESC, 1995b: 51). This is a different notion of ‘partnership’ than the businesslike approach of the European Commission and the Council (where the latter is mainly based on the implementation of international agreements), because here the EESC does refer to policy-options which are difficult with the member states and the Council. If the EU can make these ‘sacrifices’, then the EU will be a partner of the Mediterranean countries for the EESC. Then it will actually contribute to the development of the region. This view reflects the logic of the EU as a civilian power. The Mediterranean countries on their turn will be partners of the EU if they focus on economic modernization and social development. Moreover, for the EESC, the term partnership also implies that the EU enters into a political dialogue with the Mediterranean countries, respecting the cultural identity of the Mediterranean countries. It states: ‘The participatory approach implicit in the term ‘partnership’ takes on an overtly political and even cultural dimension if its objectives are to include safeguarding of the cultural identity of the societies (which is reflected in the prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’) concerned as well as economic modernization and promotion of social development. A partnership which extends beyond trade relations must avoid any hint of the sort of paternalistic approach inherent in any attempt to impose rigidly predetermined practices and institutional machinery’ (EESC, 1995b: 51). Although it is not stated so explicitly, the EESC also promotes a ‘dialogue between cultures’, just as the Council did (see supra).
Overall, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ functions as a nodal point in the discourse of the EESC, because it refers to a common identity which is already reached by the EU and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries: economic and social development. The terms ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that both the EU and the Mediterranean region are on an equal footing, in the economic relationship, but also in the political and cultural dimension of the partnership. The concept ‘partnership’ fulfills the logic of fantasy in several ways: it prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EU and it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (equal economic, political and cultural relations with the EU based on dialogue in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development). For the EU, it promises the prevention of a disaster, and it indicates that it will contribute to the development of the region. The prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ reflects that there are cultural differences between the two regions, which cannot be articulated into one common identity.

6.3.3.4 The European Parliament

In the European Parliament, there have been discussions about how ‘the Mediterranean’ should be defined. In the report on the Mediterranean policy of the EU with a view to the Barcelona conference, the Committee on foreign affairs, security and defence, suggested inviting, besides the 15 member states of the EU, all countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea to the Barcelona conference, including Libya, Albania and the five republics of former Yugoslavia if these countries have achieved mutual recognition and if they have settled their current conflicts. Moreover, it suggested inviting all eastern, central and south-eastern European countries which have concluded a Europe agreement with the EU and the remaining countries of the Arab League as observers (European Parliament, 1995b: 7). In contrast with the European Commission and the Council, the Committee on foreign affairs, security and defence here presented a broad definition of the ‘Mediterranean’ (spatial construction of identity). Nevertheless, after a debate in the plenary with the European Commission and the Council, the European Parliament changed its view: it then refers to the 15 member states of the EU and the states of the south and the south-east Mediterranean which have signed cooperation agreements with the EEC as participants to the Barcelona conference (European Parliament, 1995a). This excludes Libya (no cooperation agreement with the EEC), Albania, and the five republics of former Yugoslavia (European Parliament, 1995a: 123). In addition, there was a discussion about how to refer to the ‘region’. Mrs. Aelvoet, member of the Green Group raised the point that in the German (the original) and English version of the text of the Committee, the Mediterranean
region is referred to as the ‘southern and southern-eastern flank of the EU’ which ‘has a distinctly military ring to it’ while an Italian MEP had amended this particular part of the text, and changed this phrase into ‘southern area’. Mrs. Aelvoet also suggests referring to ‘area’ or ‘region’ because this is more neutral (European Parliament, 1995c). Eventually, the European Parliament chose to use the word ‘borders’ in the resolution, which clearly indicates that there is a dividing line between the EU and the Mediterranean region (European Parliament, 1995a). Overall, both in the opinion of the Committee and the resolution, there is a reference to the risks the Mediterranean countries pose for the EU, but it is emphasized that this can be changed: ‘whereas numerous factors creating political, religious, economic, social and military instability are accumulating in the southern and south-eastern borders of the EU and it is therefore the EU’s urgent task to influence this dangerous development in a positive way by having a global and coherent Mediterranean policy and by establishing relations of a new kind based on mutually advantageous cooperation, solidarity, peace and security’ (European Parliament, 1995a: 122). Overall, the European Parliament generally agrees with the strategy implemented by the European Commission and the Council.

Nevertheless, there was a difference in view between the Committee on foreign affairs, security and defence and the European Parliament as a whole on the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region, and on the role the EU should play in the area. In the motion of a resolution, the Committee suggested replacing the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’ proposed by the European Commission with the term ‘inter-Mediterranean partnership’ because ‘the European Union itself is also a Mediterranean entity’. By doing so, the Committee wanted to emphasize the similarities between the EU and the Mediterranean region, and presenting the ‘partnership’ as some sort of engagement. In this regard, it can be noted that Committee stated also that ‘the Conference should not confine itself to analyzing political, economic, social and security aspects, but should pay attention to the cultural, spiritual and moral dimension of human relations in the Mediterranean Basin’. This is a different kind of engagement than the one proposed by the Council and the European Commission (which present the EU and the Mediterranean countries as culturally different and therefore as conflictual); it is a different sort of ethical construction of identity, based on the idea of a common ‘Mediterranean’ identity (although the European Parliament does not go deeper into what it means with that). While the

41 It can be noted that the discourse of the European Parliament does not contain a clear ‘logic of fantasy’ which is due to the fact that its resolutions are mainly a reaction on the proposals of the European Commission and (European) Council/the member states (which were adopted after the
Commission and the Council articulate the Mediterranean countries as ‘business partners’, the Committee presents the Mediterranean countries as partners which share some common identity, and they indicated that they want to build the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region on this idea. Nevertheless, in the resolution, the reference to the ‘inter-Mediterranean partnership’ has disappeared; the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ is here adopted as a nodal point; which reflects more the view of the European Commission and the Council. In its later resolutions, the European Parliament also refers to the establishment of a dialogue between ‘different cultures’ and ‘different religions’ indicating the differences rather than the similarities which bind the EU and the Mediterranean countries together (it then articulates the perpetual and unchangeable differences between the Self and the Other like the other institutions do, temporal construction of identity; European Parliament, 1997b: 6; 18; European Parliament, 1997a).

6.3.4 Conclusions about the launch and the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Overall, we found that the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states articulated globalization as interdependence, and this interdependence is mainly presented as an economic process. It is indicated that it had negative consequences for the economic, social and political situation in the Mediterranean countries and that this situation might have negative consequences of the EU (especially in terms of migration). In this regard, the Mediterranean is articulated as a risk for the EU. At the same time, interdependence is also presented as a contingent process, a process which can be managed in order to promote stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. This view meets the logic of economic opportunity. By contrast, the EESC and the European Parliament do not articulate the concept ‘interdependence’ in their policy proposals on the development of the EMP (but the EESC refers to the cultural interdependence of the EU and the Mediterranean region in its 2001 opinion).

If we then take a closer look at these policy proposals, we found that the European Commission, and the EESC try to promote a form of liberal democracy. Their discourses are based on the logic of the market and the logic of the state: besides supporting economic reforms, they emphasize that the EU should also help the Mediterranean region to strengthen social services implemented by the state, because in some cases the detoriating social situation will also damage the EU. They also indicate that it is important to keep an eye on the social consequences of the launch of the new framework, rather than that they provide a clear alternative for the organization of the Euro-Mediterranean relations.
of the SAPs, which the EU should develop itself. The EESC also argues that the EU should deal with the debt problems of the Mediterranean countries, that it should open up its markets for agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries and that it should support industrial development. Moreover, it stresses the participation of socio-economic groups in the decision-making processes in the Mediterranean countries and in the EMP. The (European) Council and the member states see the social partnership as supporting the economic partnership. They support economic reforms in the Mediterranean region based on the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF. Just like the European Parliament, they support human rights and fundamental freedoms, but they refer to the UN Charter and the UDHR, and not to the OSCE like the European Parliament. This was eventually also the way in which the EMP was implemented. Overall, the European Parliament seems to agree with the social order implemented by the EU in the region.

In their discourses, the European institutions all employed the same nodal point, i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Nevertheless, the ‘logic of the partnership’ is each time used in a different way. For the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, the concept ‘partnership’ represents a businesslike approach: the EU holds a dialogue with the Mediterranean countries within a strategy which is developed by the EU but which meets the decisions of the IFIs and international agreements such as the UDHR and the UN Charter (but the latter is not explicitly articulated by the European Commission). The Mediterranean countries should also respect the decisions of the IFIs and the international agreements; then they are partners of the EU. For the EU, this policy meets its interests and its international responsibilities (narrative of supporting economic integration and political cooperation because it is in the EU’s interests; logic of multilateral Europe – follower), while for the Mediterranean countries, this policy will lead to prosperity and stability. Moreover, the nodal point also represents the difference between the EU and the Mediterranean region by using the prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’: the Mediterranean countries have a different cultural identity, and we should promote understanding between these different cultures (this is also not explicitly articulated by the European Commission). For the EESC, however, the concept ‘partnership’ represents something different: it means that the EU also puts an effort to reach the economic and social development of the Mediterranean region, even if this is difficult for the EU or its member states, such as the opening-up of its markets for agricultural products. In addition, the EESC also stresses that the EU and the Mediterranean countries have a different cultural identity, which is in its discourse also reflected in the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean’. In conclusion, the Committee for foreign affairs, security and defence of the European Parliament mainly articulated the
partnership more as an engagement: the EU should be partners because they have a common ‘Mediterranean’ identity; it stresses the similarities between the EU and the Mediterranean region. Therefore, it first proposed the concept ‘inter-Mediterranean partnership’ (although later on, it adopts the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ as articulated by the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states). These discourses thus each time represent different ethical constructions of identity, while they mainly agree on the spatial and temporal construction of the Self and the Other.

6.5 Conclusions about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In conclusion, we can now compare the social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the different institutions over time. Starting with the European Commission, we conclude that the proposals for the Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek partnership do not differ from the RMP; they were also written under the direction of the same Commissioner, Abel Matutes. More specifically, just like under the RMP, the European Commission promoted a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region, a social order in which the free market is presented as essential to economic and political development and democracy. The main task of the state is articulated as contributing to the development of this free market. Economic reforms are justified by referring to the policy of the IFIs. In addition, liberty is articulated as ‘negative liberty’. The discourse of the European Commission is based on the ‘logic of the market’. Nevertheless, the social order the European Commission is promoting changes under the EMP (then Commissioner Manual Marin became in charge of the external relations with the Mediterranean countries). The European Commission not only states that the state in the Mediterranean countries should support and stimulate the free market, but also that it should provide basic social services. It sees it as its main task to support the state in stimulating the free market, but it will also help with providing these social services. The European Commission does also no longer refer to the SAPs of the World Bank and the IFIs. The discourse is no longer solely based on the logic of the market, but also on the logic of the state. Regarding the role of the CSOs in the Mediterranean region, the European Commission remains rather vague. Similarly, it does not go deeper into the concept ‘democracy’, it is only articulated together with the rule of law, good governance and human rights. Overall, we conclude that the European Commission within the framework of the EMP promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region.

If we then take a closer look at the evolution of the political and the fantasmatic logics in the discourse of the European Commission, we see that the concepts ‘Euro-Maghreb partnership’ and ‘Euro-Mashrek partnership’ have become the new nodal points in the discourse
of the European Commission if compared with its discourse under the RMP. Both concepts refer to a common identity which is already reached by the EC and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries: economic development based on a strategy developed by international institutions. The concepts are here articulated together with the references to the IFIs. The terms ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that both the EC and the Mediterranean region are on an equal footing, in the sense that the EC will not impose its will on the region (it only implements the policy of the IFIs), and that the Mediterranean countries should also be good partners of the EC by doing their part of the deal (implementing the policy based on the policy of the IFIs). The concept ‘partnership’ fulfills the logic of fantasy in several ways: it prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EC (also the references to the IFIs fulfill this function) and it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (equal relations with the EC in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development). At the same time, in the discourse, the European Commission refers to the emergence of the EC as an economic and political focal point, by which it is obliged to take a new look at its role in the region. In addition, the European Commission states that the EC has ‘special responsibilities’ in the Mediterranean region. Here, the European Commission presents the EC as an international actor which should help the Mediterranean countries because they are not as well developed, and as an international actor which respects decisions of international institutions. Here we identified the logic of civilian power Europe and the logic of the multilateral Europe (follower) as fantasmatic logics.

In the discourse of the European Commission under the EMP, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’ has become the new nodal point. Although it is very similar to the concepts ‘Euro-Maghreb partnership’ and ‘Euro-Mashrek Partnership’, it has a different meaning. It refers to a common identity which is already reached by the EU and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries (but which is now yet the case): economic and social development and economic integration. The concept ‘partnership’ now articulates the idea that the EU and the Mediterranean countries will have a substantive economic policy dialogue, although this dialogue will take place within the strategy the European Commission has set out within its communications. The Mediterranean countries should be partners of the EU and implement economic reforms. The concept ‘partnership’ again fulfills the logic of fantasy: it prevents public contestation against the policy proposed by the EC and it promises a certain fullness for the Mediterranean countries both when implementing the policy (the promise of equal relations with the EU through an economic dialogue in contrast with the past where there was a dependency relationship) and when it is implemented (economic development). For the EC, it mainly
promises the prevention of a disaster; it should implement this policy because it is in its own interests. This view meets the narrative articulated by Erik Jones (2010). Here, the European Commission does no longer refer to the ‘responsibilities’ of the EU in the Mediterranean region, and to the idea that the EU should play a role in the Mediterranean countries because of its economic and political power. In addition, it does no longer refer to the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF.

If we then look at the social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourse of the member states and the (European) Council, it can be concluded that the social order these political actors are promoting has not really changed: they support the establishment of a social order which is based on the functioning of the free market and on negative liberty. The discourse of the member states and the Council is based on the logic of the market. Under the Euro-Maghreb partnership, the member states and the Council do not go deeper into the economic cooperation with the Maghreb countries; they agree with the proposal of the European Commission to support economic reforms based on the SAPs developed by the World Bank and the IMF. Under the EMP, the discourse has not really changed: social development is subordinated to economic development. In addition, it was probably the Council which presented the requirement to implement a SAP of the Bretton Woods Institutions, or a similar programme which is accepted by the IFIs, as a condition for receiving a substantial part of financial assistance from the EU. Regarding the political cooperation, the member states and the (European) Council want to support the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in civil, political, economic, social and cultural matters, respect for the rights of minorities, and tolerance and coexistence between cultures and religions. Under the Euro-Maghreb partnership, they refer to the respect for international law, the principles of the UN Charter, and the resolutions of the UN Security Council. In the Barcelona Declaration and the EMAAs, the EU refers to the UDHR. Democracy is in the discourse of the member states and the (European) Council defined as the organization of free and fair elections, which is an element of positive liberty. In the documents that were drafted in the preparation for the Barcelona Declaration, there is again a reference to the organization of free and regular elections, and furthermore to the promotion of an independent judiciary, the rule of law, the creation of a balance of powers and good governance. Nevertheless, as we illustrated, these references disappeared under pressure of the Mediterranean countries. Under the EMP, the EU mainly focuses on the support of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Also in the support for the civil society, the focus is on human rights. In addition, we found that the EU promotes a civil society which can contribute to the implementation of its policy in the Mediterranean region. Besides the political and the social
cooperation, the member states and the Council of the EU also went deeper into the cultural cooperation with the Mediterranean countries. Spain, in its report on the Euro-Maghreb relations, argued that there should be a dialogue between the cultures at the northern and the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (which are different, since the European culture is based on Greek Philosophy & Christianity and the Mediterranean culture on the Islam), and this is also inserted into the third basket of the EMP.

Just like in the discourse of the European Commission, the concepts ‘Euro-Maghreb’ and ‘Euro-Mashrek’ Partnership functioned as nodal points in the discourse of the (European) Council. These concepts have the same meaning as in the discourse of the European Commission; they refer to a common identity which is already reached by the EC and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries: economic development based on a strategy developed by the IFIs. However, the (European) Council added something to this discourse: the EC also respects certain political principles which are laid down in the UN Charter. The EC will help the Maghreb countries because it has the possibility to do so (since it is economically strong) and the Maghreb countries should implement the decisions of the international institutions (ethical construction of identity). Moreover, the (European) Council stresses the distance between both partners, because they have cultural differences which will never change. This is articulated by the prefix ‘Euro-Maghreb’ which emphasizes this difference, and in a way also by the term ‘partnership’ which points to a businesslike relationship. In this discourse, we see several myths articulated together: the logic of multilateral Europe, the logic of civilian power Europe and at the same time, Spain also articulated a cultural identity for the EU based on Christianity and Greek philosophy. From 1995 on, the term ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the central nodal point in the discourse of the EU. It refers to a common identity which is already reached by the EU and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries (but which is now not yet the case): economic development based on a strategy of the IFIs, economic integration, and peace and stability based on the essential principles of international law. The terms ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that the EU and the Mediterranean countries will conduct a dialogue about the policies under the EMP (dialogue on economic issues, dialogue on cultural issues). Nevertheless, this dialogue will take place within the strategy the (European) Council has set out within its documents and which is based on the strategy of the IFIs. The Mediterranean countries should also be good partners of the EU by doing their part of the deal: implementing economic reforms and respecting international law. This is in the interest of the EU; the view of the (European) Council meets the narrative articulated by Erik Jones (2010). However, at the same time, the Mediterranean countries are also articulated as having differences which will never
change, i.e. cultural differences. This is also reflected in the nodal point ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, and more specifically in the prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ which emphasizes this difference between the EU and the Mediterranean region, and in a way also by the term ‘partnership’ which in the discourse of the (European) Council reflects a businesslike relationship based on international ‘agreements’ and on a dialogue between cultures.

The study of the social logics in the discourse of the EESC reveals that the latter slightly changed its view on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. In its opinions of 1992 and 1993, the EESC stresses that the EC should promote cooperation and integration between the countries in the Mediterranean region. In addition, the EC and the Mediterranean countries should developed complementary economic relations, and then they can conclude a FTA. This will provide the ‘hub-and-spoke’ effect. In order to reach economic integration, the Mediterranean countries should implement economic reforms. These economic reforms should be stimulated by the EC, but instead of following the SAPs of the World Bank, the EC should develop its own SAP, and it should also include social policies. The CSOs should also play a role in the socio-economic development of the Mediterranean countries. It was concluded that the EESC promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. In its opinion of 1995, the EESC adopts the view of the European Commission on the EMP: it still promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. However, in contrast with its previous opinion, the EESC does no longer stress that regional integration among the Mediterranean countries should be reached first. Instead, it accepts that regional integration can be reached in parallel with the establishment of the FTA. It focuses on the tasks of the EU in order to create a genuine ‘partnership’ with the Mediterranean region: opening up the markets for agricultural products, the development of industrial cooperation and the development of a solution for the debt problems of the Mediterranean countries.

Although the EESC changed its economic strategy for dealing with the Mediterranean countries, it initially did not change its nodal point. In its 1992 and 1993 opinions, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’ functioned as a nodal point in its discourse, just like in its opinion of 1989, 1990 and 1992. However, the nodal point has a different meaning (which illustrates that it is a floating signifier): it now brings two identities together in one common identity. The identity of Europe (‘Euro’ – Greater Europe) is based on the establishment of integrated free market economies combined with welfare policies and industrial development based on intermediate and advanced technology, while the identity of the Mediterranean should be based on integrated free market economies combined with welfare policies and industrial
development which is based on low added-value and low technology (however, the Mediterranean region has not yet reached this identity, and this should be reached first). Together, these two internal markets (Euro – Mediterranean) can then cooperate (strategic) in order to create an ‘area’ of shared prosperity. By contrast, in its opinion of 1995, the EESC subscribes the general strategy proposed by the European Commission and the Council: the establishment of an EMFTA. It adopts the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ proposed by the European Commission and the Council as a nodal point in its discourse, but in contrast to the European Commission and the Council, the EESC indicates that ‘partnership’ means that the EU and its member states also make concessions towards the Mediterranean countries. Then the EU will contribute to the development of the region, and will it be a ‘partner’. The prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ reflects that there are cultural differences between the two regions, which cannot be articulated into one common identity (similar view as the Council).

The European Parliament on its turn adopted in its resolution of 1992 a similar view on the development of the Euro-Maghreb economic relations as the EESC. It emphasizes that regional integration among the Maghreb countries is an important element, which should be promoted. Moreover, the relations between the EC and the Maghreb should be made complementary. In order to reach economic integration, economic reforms are presented as necessary; the Community should be committed to ‘structural adjustment’, although social policies are also important. It argues that the EC should ‘draw up a structural adjustment strategy which it should seek to push through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’ (European Parliament, 1993a: 71). Nevertheless, in contrast with the EESC, the European Parliament refers to democracy and human rights, and especially to the development of cultural relations. Within the framework of the EMP, we concluded that the European Parliament mainly supported the social order as it is implemented by the EU. As illustrated, the European Parliament only contribute to the debate after the Barcelona Process was already launched; its contribution remained limited to drawing attention to a few issues, of which the most important were the support for human rights and democracy (by the conclusions of an agreement and the establishment of an authority which is capable of enforcing compliance with this agreement) and the need to find a solution for the debt problems of the Mediterranean countries.

If we then take a closer look at the political logics the European Parliament articulates, it was found that the European Parliament adopted the concept ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ as proposed by the European Commission and the Council. In the discourse of the European Parliament, the concept ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ indicates that there is a difference between
the EC and the Maghreb, but at the same time, there are also ‘similarities’, things that the two partners bind together. These similarities are the strive to regional integration, but especially their common cultural heritage. This is why the EU and the Mediterranean countries are ‘partners’. As explained, the European Parliament saw the partnership with the Maghreb more as an engagement, rather than a businesslike approach. This is also reflected in the report of the Committee on foreign affairs, security and defence in their report on the EMP, which proposed to use the concept ‘inter-Mediterranean partnership’ in the European Parliament’s discourse on the EMP because ‘the European Union itself is also a Mediterranean entity’. Again, the similarities between the EU and the Mediterranean region are stressed, and even more than under the previous policy framework. However, in the eventual resolution, this concept was replaced by a reference to ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. Nevertheless, because the resolution is based on the report of the Committee on foreign affairs, security and defence, we can conclude that the concept is still more meant as presenting an engagement instead of the businesslike approach of the European Commission and the Council. Later on, the European Parliament refers to the idea of establishing a dialogue between different cultures and religions, adopting the businesslike approach of the European Commission and the Council. In the next chapter, we go deeper into the social, political and fantasmatic logics under the ENP.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Social logics</th>
<th>Political logics</th>
<th>Fantasmatic logics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>EC as a strong economic actor respecting (decisions of) international economic institutions (logic of equivalence; Self)  The Mediterranean countries as not yet respecting (decisions of) international economic institutions (logic of difference; Other)  Euro-Maghreb Partnership; Euro-Mashrek Partnership nodal points which represent a common identity based on economic development and economic integration (FTA) based on dialogue within the strategy developed by the IFIs (partnership)</td>
<td>Logic of civilian power Europe  Logic of peace through trade (Mashrek) Logic of multilateral Europe (EC as follower for economic norms)</td>
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<td>(European) Council; member states</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>EC as an economically well-developed actor respecting (decisions of) international economic institutions and EC as an actor respecting political principles laid down in the UN Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council (logic of equivalence; Self)  The Mediterranean countries as not yet well-developed, as not yet respecting decisions of international economic institutions and as not yet respecting political principles laid down in the UN Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council (logic of difference; Other)  Euro-Maghreb Partnership nodal point which represents a common identity based on economic development and economic integration (FTA) based on dialogue within the strategy developed by the IFIs (partnership) and on respect for political principles laid down in the UN Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council  Euro-Maghreb as prefix which represents the unchangeable difference between the EC and the Mediterranean countries; Christian Europe</td>
<td>Logic of civilian power Europe  Logic of multilateral Europe (EC as a follower for economic and political norms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EESC</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>EC as an internal market; Greater Europe (logic of equivalence; Self)  The Mediterranean countries as not yet forming an internal market; Mediterranean Basin (logic of difference; Other)  Euro-Mediterranean Strategic Area; nodal point which represents the link between the two internal markets which remain different, but which will cooperate strategically</td>
<td>Logic of multilateral Europe (leader for economic norms, follower for social norms)  Logic of civilian power Europe</td>
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Table 18. Social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European institutions on the Euro-Maghreb and the Euro-Mashrek Partnership

<table>
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<tr>
<th>European Parliament</th>
<th>Logic of cultural opportunity</th>
<th>Logic of the market and the state</th>
<th>Liberal democracy</th>
<th>The EC as an internal market (logic of equivalence; Self)</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>The Mediterranean countries as not yet an internal market (logic of difference; Other)</td>
<td>Euro-Maghreb Partnership; partnership as an element which stresses the similarities between the two regions: regional integration and a common heritage</td>
<td>Bull myth</td>
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<td>Logic of multilateral Europe (leader for economic norms)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Social logics</td>
<td>Political logics</td>
<td>Fantasmatic logics</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>EU as an actor which is economically well developed and which has integration economically (logic of equivalence; Self)</td>
<td>Narrative of supporting economic development/integration because it is in the EU’s interests</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logic of the market and the state</td>
<td>The Mediterranean countries as actors which are not yet economically well developed and which are not yet integrated economically (logic of difference; Other)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; nodal point which represents a common identity based on economic development and economic integration (EMFTA) and based on a dialogue within the strategy developed by the EU (partnership)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(European) Council; member states</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>EU as an actor which is economically well developed, which has integrated economically, which respects decisions of the IFIs, and which respects political principles laid down in the UN Charter and the UDHR (logic of equivalence; Self)</td>
<td>Narrative of supporting economic integration and political cooperation because it is in the EU’s interests</td>
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<td>Logic of the market and the state</td>
<td>The Mediterranean countries as actors which are not yet economically well developed, which are not yet integrated economically, which do not yet respect decisions of the IFIs and which do not yet respect political principles laid down in the UN Charter and the UDHR (logic of difference; Other);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Libertarian democracy</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; nodal point which represents a common identity based on economic development, economic integration (EMFTA) and respect for international law; based on a dialogue within the strategy developed by the IFIs (partnership) while at the same time the unchangeable difference between the EC and the Mediterranean countries are emphasized through the prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’</td>
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<tr>
<td>EESC</td>
<td>(Logic of cultural opportunity)</td>
<td>EU as an actor which is economically and socially well developed (logic of equivalence; Self)</td>
<td>Logic of civilian power Europe</td>
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<td>Logic of the market and the state</td>
<td>The Mediterranean countries which are economically and socially not yet well developed (logic of difference; Other)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; nodal point which reflects that the EU is a partner which will help the Mediterranean countries with their</td>
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development (even if this is difficult for the EU)

| European Parliament (Committee on foreign affairs, security and defence) | EU as an actor which is economically and socially well developed and which respects human right (logic of equivalence; Self) | The Mediterranean countries which are economically and socially not yet well developed, and which do not yet respect human rights (logic of difference; Other) | Inter-Mediterranean Partnership; nodal point which stresses the similarities between the EU and the Mediterranean region; it articulates a common ‘Mediterranean’ identity |

Table 19. Social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European institutions on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
Chapter 7: The European Neighbourhood Policy

7.1 Introduction

The ENP was officially launched in 2003. In the light of the enlargement of the EU with Cyprus, Malta and eight CEECs, the UK started to question the policy of the EU towards the countries that would become the new neighbours of the EU: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (this is an example of public contestation). It proposed to develop a new policy towards the Eastern neighbours. This would eventually lead to the establishment of the ENP. As we explained in chapter 1, the Mediterranean countries were initially not involved in this new policy. However, between 2001 and 2003, three particular events caused policy-makers to question also the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. First, the attacks of 9/11 strengthened the feeling in the EU, and especially in the member states, that there should be a stronger cooperation with the Mediterranean countries on hard security issues. In the past, cooperation on hard security issues with the Mediterranean countries within the framework of the EMP remained rather limited because this was too sensitive for the Mediterranean countries. The second event which led the EU to question its policy towards the Mediterranean region was the publication of the UNDP report on Arab Human Development in 2002. This report revealed that the lack of democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean countries hampered their economic and social development. Third, the conflict in the Middle East hindered the implementation of the EMP. Lebanon and Syria refused to attend the Euro-Mediterranean conferences of Marseilles (2000) and Valencia (2002), which hampered the multilateral political dialogue. In addition, the MEPP also absorbed a high amount of funding under the regional cooperation of the MEDA programme. Moreover, the Mediterranean countries had the feeling that they had very little ownership in the EMP, which undermined the idea of the genuine partnership.

All these events caused public contestation, both within the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Consequently, the EU tried to adjust the EMP. First, the attacks of 9/11 led to EU to incorporate a Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) component in the EMP at the Euro-Mediterranean conference of Valencia (2002) in order to tackle problems regarding migration, drugs, organized crime and especially terrorism. Second, the European Commission (2003b) issued a communication on ‘Reinvigorating EU actions Human Rights and democratization with Mediterranean Partners: Strategic Guidelines’. Human rights and democracy were now mentioned in the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean conferences, and the EU started to provide financial assistance to support both objectives (although this assistance was rather limited). Nevertheless, the idea of creating a new ‘neighbourhood’ policy for the Eastern
neighbours provided an opportunity to rearrange the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. The establishment of a new political practice could resolve the public contestation within the EU (a new opportunity to strengthen cooperation on security and human rights and democracy) and within the Mediterranean countries (because the ENP would be organized bilaterally, this would give the Mediterranean countries more ownership in their relation with the EU). In addition, the involvement of the Mediterranean countries in the ENP would be a strong signal to the Eastern neighbours that they could not become members of the EU.

As explained earlier, the idea for the creation of the new policy came from the UK. More specifically, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Jack Straw suggested in January 2002 in a letter to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Josep Picque (which held the presidency at that time) to offer Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus a ‘special neighbour status’. In March 2002, the Swedish Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Anna Lindh and Leif Pagrotsky, wrote a similar letter, in which they called for ‘a broader and more active policy towards our neighbours in the bow-shaped area ranging from Russia and Ukraine to the Mediterranean’. Although they referred to the Mediterranean region, the Swedish diplomats actually focused on the three countries in the East, plus Russia (European Report, 2002). The General Affairs Council of 15 April 2002 welcomed the intention of the European Commission and the High Representative to submit a proposal for strengthening the relations with the Eastern neighbours (Council of the EU, 2002). European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and High Representative Javier Solana (2002) formulated a first response on the request of the General Affairs Council in a letter to Per Stig Moller, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark who held the presidency in the second half of 2002. At the European Council of December 2002, the Mediterranean countries were also included in the policy (European Council, 2002). It was eventually the European Commission which further developed the ENP in its communications (European Commission, 2003a; 2004; 2006b; 2007). These communications were each time discussed at the meetings of the (European) Council.

However, the European Commission can be considered the main policy entrepreneur: the Commission wrote the policy papers, drafted the country reports, formulated proposals for Action Plans to be concluded with each neighbour and it wrote the progress reports. In addition, it was responsible for the drafting of the CSPs and NIPs. The member states were informally involved, and controlled the Commission through the ENPI-committee. Nevertheless, it proved to be very difficult to overrule a decision of the European Commission, by which the latter had the most power. The country reports, Action Plans and progress reports generally reflect the
decisions which are made in the policy papers. Therefore, the focus in the next analysis is on the policy papers. The latter also score higher on the criterion identity construction and articulation (see chapter 4) than the country reports, Action Plans and progress reports. The EESC drafted two different opinions on the ENP, one on the Commission communication of 2003 which presented the new policy, and one in 2006 on the implementation of the new policy (EESC, 2004; 2006). In addition, in 2005, it adopted an information report on the role of consultative bodies and socio-occupational organizations in implementing the Association Agreements and in the context of the ENP (EESC, 2005). This report will also be analyzed, because it will give us more insights into the EESC’s view on the CSOs in the neighbourhood. The European Parliament adopted two resolutions on the ENP, which were based on two reports: the Napoletano and the Laschet/Tannock Report (European Parliament, 2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b; 2006). The analysis of these documents will reveal the position of the European Parliament.

7.2 Social logics in the European Neighbourhood Policy

7.2.1 The European Commission

In March 2003, the European Commission presented a first communication to the Council and the European Parliament in which it outlined a new framework for the EU’s relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbours. This communication sketches in broad lines the new policy within the context of the changes that took place within the EU after the enlargement towards the East. Just like the previous policies, the proposal for a new neighbourhood policy is based on the idea that the EU and its neighbouring regions are interdependent: ‘Interdependence – political and economic – with the Union’s neighbourhood is already a reality’ (European Commission, 2003a: 3). Interdependence is thus presented as an economic and political process which one cannot escape (time, space), however, it is also articulated as a process which can lead to new opportunities (normative judgment): ‘The Communication argues that ‘enhanced interdependence – both political and economic – can itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable development both within and without the EU’ (European Commission, 2003a: 4). The way the European Commission wants to deal with it is the promotion of economic liberalization. Globalization (defined as interdependence) is thus presented as an (economic and political) opportunity.

In the later communications of the European Commission, the interdependence with the neighbouring countries is not only presented as creating new opportunities, but also as provoking
challenges for the EU. The discussion with the Council and High Representative played a role here. We already mentioned that before the European Commission presented its first outline, High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Chris Patten wrote a letter to the Danish presidency in which they outlined their ideas on the new policy. In this letter, the interdependence with the neighbourhood was indicated as bringing opportunities, but also the challenges were stressed: illegal migration, trafficking and spillover from local and regional crises (Patten & Solana, 2002: 3). This was also emphasized in the letter of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Jack Straw to Josep Picque (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain): ‘Within three years, Ukraine and Moldova will border the EU – with all the attendant problems of cross-border crime, trafficking and illegal migration’ (Jeandesboz, 2009: 39). In its later communications, the European Commission also articulates these challenges. These communications were drafted in the light of the ESS (drawn up by High Representative Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003). The ESS is based on the idea that globalization provokes serious challenges for the EU, which should be addressed. A specific part of the strategy is devoted to the neighbourhood, because these countries are geographically close to the EU and because they can cause security threats: ‘In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe’ (ESS, 2003: 6) and ‘Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed’ (ESS, 2003: 7). Consequently, the neighbourhood was seen in the light of the security of the EU. In the ENP Strategy Paper of 2004, the European Commission states: ‘We have acquired new neighbours and have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges’ (European Commission, 2004: 2). Jeandesboz (2009: 43) confirms that the ESS changes the discourse of the ENP, in the sense that focus in the latter documents is more on security. This also has consequences for how the Self and the Other (see infra) are articulated, and for the strategy that is formulated to deal with the consequences of globalization. In general, we can conclude that interdependence after 2003 is emphasized as having negative consequences in terms of security (normative judgment, space), but these negative consequences can be addressed (contingent process: time). This view meets the logic of security opportunity.

Just like under the RMP and the EMP, economic liberalization is seen as a solution for dealing with globalization, although liberalization is now promoted in another context. Where under the EMP the main goal was the inclusion of the Mediterranean countries in the EMFTA (which assumed regional integration among the Mediterranean countries although this was not
strongly promoted in the follow-up of the EMP), the EU now chooses to integrate the neighbouring countries into the internal market: ‘In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU. To this end, Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)’ (European Commission, 2003a: 4). This goes further than promoting free trade, because the EU now serves as a model for the economies of all neighbouring countries: ‘Common rules and standards are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and reap the benefits of the enlarged EU internal market as well as to create a more stable environment for economic activity. The EU acquis, which has established a common market based on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, ensuring competition and a level playing field based on shared norms and integrating health, consumer and environmental protection, could serve as a model for countries undertaking institutional and economic reform’ (European Commission, 2003a: 10). This proposal shows some similarities to the 1989 opinion of the EESC, which promoted the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean strategic area in which the EU would be the focal point, and where the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the internal market is envisaged. Also in the later Commission communication under the ENP, the integration of the neighbouring countries in the internal market is the main objective of the ENP, although there is far less emphasis on the freedom of persons (see infra).

In the discourse of the European Commission, the role of the state is mainly articulated as to support the free market and to facilitate the access to the internal market. Therefore, it needs to adopt the necessary legislation. The European Commission (2004: 15-16) for example states: ‘The goal of free trade in services with and among partner countries will also require further legislative approximation in fields such as company law, accounting and auditing rules. A comprehensive prudential regulatory framework, combined with efficient and independent supervisory bodies, is particularly important for the financial services area. It will be key to the creation of business and the promotion of investments that these countries ensure that companies are able to operate on a level playing field’. In addition, the state also needs to be reformed; the European Commission (2004: 16) refers in this regard to the ‘strengthening of the functioning of the judicial system, which will contribute to a better investment climate’, to the modernization and strengthening of tax administration and the establishment of independent
competition authorities. In addition, reform of the state is also needed to address security threats: ‘The EU should capitalize on the cooperation initiated in the Mediterranean to introduce reforms to the judicial system, improving police training and other cooperation in the fight against organized crime’ (European Commission, 2003a: 12). Moreover, the state needs to be reformed in order to reach ‘shared’ political values which are laid down in international agreements: ‘The EU should start from the premise that the institutions of state need to be capable of delivering full transition to comply with international political, legal and human rights standards and obligations’ (European Commission, 2003a: 16). These three elements, reform of the state to support the market, to address security threats and to respect international values are returning in each communication, and are referred to as ‘governance’ (see infra).

We already mentioned one difference between the first Commission communication and the later ones: the focus on the free movement of persons. In the first communication, the free movement of persons is emphasized: ‘The impact of ageing and demographic decline, globalisation and specialisation means the EU and its neighbours can profit from putting in place mechanisms that allow workers to move from one territory to another where skills are needed most – although the free movement of people and labour remains the long-term objective. Significant additional opportunities for cultural and technical interchange could be facilitated by a long-stay visa policy on the part of the EU member states’ (European Commission, 2003a: 11). In the later communications, however, references to the four freedoms and especially the freedom of persons disappeared, mainly under influence of the Council: the Commission then only refers in general terms to the internal market. This is also mentioned by Jeandesboz (2009: 46) who argued that there is a clear difference between the first communication and the later ones in terms of the importance that is attached to security and liberties. In the 2003 communication, a separate paragraph is dedicated to facilitating the access to the EU for third-country nationals (if they do not pose a security threat): the establishment of an efficient and user-friendly system and the application of visa free regimes. Focus is here on liberty, i.e. on the liberty of the individual, the third-country national, to go where he or she wants. This is a form of negative liberty. Off course, the prevention of illegal migration is also mentioned, but not stressed. Security is also mentioned as an objective, but is dealt with in a separate paragraph.

However, in the 2004 communication, the focus is more on security (following the ESS), and the potential access for third-country nationals to the EU is articulated together with the fight against organized crime, trafficking of human beings, illegal immigration, terrorism, money laundering and drugs. This communication articulates liberty as liberty from crimes such as
terrorism, money laundering, which is another kind of negative liberty as the one we mentioned above. In the 2006 communication, mobility of nationals of the neighbouring countries is used as a carrot to convince the latter of cooperation with the EU in terms of illegal migration: ‘An enhanced ENP will therefore require a very serious examination of how visa procedures can be made less of an obstacle to legitimate travel from neighbouring countries to the EU (and vice versa). Of course this can only be addressed in the context of broader packages to address related issues such as cooperation on illegal migration, in particular by sea, combating trafficking and smuggling in human beings, efficient border management, readmissions agreements and effective return of illegal migrants, and adequate processing of requests of international protection and asylum’ (European Commission, 2006b: 6). There is thus a clear shift in the notion of negative liberty: from freedom of movement for individuals (nationals of the Mediterranean countries) to freedom from crimes for individuals (European citizens).

Also in other parts of the communications, the liberty of the individual is strongly emphasized, but in another context: ‘Democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and core labour standards are all essential prerequisites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economic development. Nearly all countries of the Mediterranean, the WNIS and Russia have a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance and poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual’ (European Commission, 2003a: 7). Statements on the rights of individuals in the Mediterranean countries almost always refer to ‘negative’ rights: they prohibit actions from one individual, from the state, the market towards (other) individuals. References to ‘positive rights’ which oblige the individual, market and state to act to preserve the rights of (other) individuals are seldom. In the previous example, the European Commission refers to the core labour standards, meaning the standards as promoted by the ILO: ‘Partner countries are committed to respecting core labour standards and to promoting fundamental social rights, as parties to relevant ILO conventions’ (European Commission, 2004: 13). In the annex of the strategy paper, reference is made to the eight fundamental conventions which were identified in 1998 in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at work. These conventions mainly contain negative rights: the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Besides economic cooperation and cooperation in the field of security, the European Commission also refers to cooperation in the social field. In this regard, the 2004 communication
states: ‘the idea is to engage in a dialogue on employment and social policy with a view to develop an analysis and assessment of the situation, to identify key challenges and to promote policy responses’ (European Commission, 2004: 14). In the communication of 2007, the European Commission refers to the possibility to exchanges information on social policies in the context of globalization. This is also framed within the context of the ILO, given the reference to ‘decent work’ which refers to the decent work agenda of the ILO which would be adopted in 2008: ‘Closer cooperation on employment and social development will intensify exchanges on strategies regarding job creation, poverty reduction, social inclusion and protection and equal opportunities, to address common challenges in the context of globalisation and promoting decent work’ (European Commission, 2007: 9). However, this cooperation in the social field, which is mentioned as an objective, is not elaborated (although the European Commission for example states that the IFIs should take into account social policies in their programmes, it does not incorporate social policies in its own programme); only the possibility to cooperation in the context of the ILO is mentioned. Moreover, cooperation in the social field will only be elaborated after 2007, as the next chapter will illustrate.

In addition to the articulation of the role of the market and the state, we also examined how the European Commission articulated the role of the civil society. A closer look at the first Commission communication reveals that the European Commission (2003a) considers the development of the civil society as important because this will promote basic liberties such as freedom of expression and association. The presence of a civil society is thus seen as a guarantee for liberty. The later communications provide a clearer picture on how the European Commission articulates the role of the civil society: in the 2004 communication, focus is on youth and education, and also on CSOs which support human rights and democracy: ‘People-to-people projects will be encouraged, aiming at promoting civil society initiatives in support of human rights and democratisation, supporting youth organisations, and promoting intercultural dialogue through educational and youth exchanges, as well as human resource mobility and transparency of qualifications’ (European Commission, 2004: 23). The civil society is here articulated as based on the liberty of the individual, and not as based on the family or religious groupings. The focus on human rights and democracy indicates that the European Commission wants to promote a civil society based on the notion of ‘negative liberty’: a civil society which ‘maximizes individual rights and tries to avoid people’s personal freedom being trampled upon by other people’s personal freedom’ (Volpi, 2004b: 18).
In the 2006 communication, focus is more on socio-economic groups: ‘More generally, civil society exchanges should also be strengthened, reaching beyond governmental contacts to build bridges in many areas – for example, contacts among trade unions, regional and local authorities (including city-twinning programmes), health practitioners, NGOs, and cultural groups. The cross-border cooperation programmes to be funded under the ENPI will play an important role here, but broader EU-wide exchanges will also be necessary. Many of these exchanges will be predominantly economic and social in character, but cultural exchanges and inter-cultural dialogue will also be important here. An important specific instance of these civil society exchanges will be enhanced business-to-business contacts. Employers’ organisations in the EU and in ENP countries, particularly those for small and medium-sized companies, should be actively encouraged to establish closer links and transfer experience. Civil society participation in the ENP should go beyond exchanges and cooperation programmes. We must encourage partner governments to allow appropriate participation by civil society representatives as stakeholders in the reform process, whether in the preparation of legislation, the monitoring of its implementation or in developing national or regional initiatives related to the ENP’ (European Commission, 2006b: 7). Especially the latter sentence is important, because it articulates a specific task for the CSOs, i.e. the contribution to the legitimization of the state by civil participation. However, here the European Commission promotes a civil society which will contribute to (and which will thus legitimize) the reform processes it is promoting in the Mediterranean region. This is confirmed in the 2007 communication: ‘The Commission will encourage a wide range of stakeholders to engage in monitoring the implementation of the ENP Action Plans, will promote dialogue in the partner countries between governments and the local civil society and seek to bring more stakeholders in the reform process (European Commission, 2007: 11).

In conclusion, we can argue that the European Commission tries to promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region. Focus is clearly on negative liberty, and the social order that is promoted is linked with this: the Commission mainly supports the development of the free market (in order for the neighbours to take part in the internal market). Furthermore, the European Commission defends the existence of a minimal state: a state which guarantees negative rights and which protects what legitimately belongs to individuals, which guarantees law and order. In addition, the state needs to be reformed in order to support the functioning of the free market. The civil society that is promoted is based on the liberty of the individual and just like the state, its functioning is mainly subordinated to the functioning of the free market. The European Commission refers to cooperation in the social field, but this is not elaborated.
7.2.2 The (European) Council and the member states

In the previous paragraphs on the European Commission’s discourse, we already went deeper into the discourse of the High Representative, the member states and the Council on globalization (which is defined as ‘interdependence’). In the letter of High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten on the new neighbourhood policy, the interdependence with the neighbouring countries is presented as bringing opportunities for the EU, but also as provoking challenges (Patten & Solana, 2002: 3). Also in the letter of Jack Straw, the interdependence with the neighbours is reflected as provoking challenges (see supra, Jeandesboz, 2009: 39). Initially, this discourse is not reflected in the 2003 communication of the European Commission. In 2003, High Representative Javier Solana drafted the ESS, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. Within the ESS, globalization is presented as provoking challenges for the EU. Especially the neighbourhood countries will bring challenges because they are geographically close to the EU. The discourse of the member states and the ESS had considerable influence on the ENP, and more specifically on the European Commission, which changed its discourse from ‘interdependence as an economic opportunity’ (2003 communication) to ‘interdependence as a security opportunity’ (later communications). The Council itself mainly refers to the ‘common’ challenges the EU and the neighbours are facing (Council of the EU, 2003a: 5).

In order to deal with these challenges, High Representative Solana and Commissioner Patten suggested strengthening the economic cooperation and the trade links with the neighbours. In their letter, they state that ‘the Commission will consider further moves towards full trade liberalization, including free trade areas where appropriate, and will make relevant proposals accordingly’ (Patten & Solana, 2002: 2). As explained in the previous paragraph, the European Commission suggested giving the neighbouring countries ‘a stake in the internal market’ and promoting the four freedoms, including the free movement of persons. The Council accept the idea that the neighbouring countries will become part of the internal market, it states that the EU’s approach will be based on the following incentives (…): ‘perspectives for participating progressively in the EU’s Internal Market and its regulatory structures, including those pertaining to sustainable development (health, consumer and environmental protection), based on legislative approximation’ (Council of the EU, 2003a: 6). Nevertheless, it rejects the idea of free movement for nationals of the neighbouring countries. Consequently, this objective disappears from the Commission communications. Moreover, the Council focuses more on security issues. The Council debate on the ENP in April 2003 states that ‘criminality, including
human trafficking and illegal immigration, as well as the promotion of human rights are important issues that will require careful examination in the framework of future work on ‘Wider Europe’ (Council of the EU, 2003b: 7). Also in later Council conclusions, enhanced cooperation on legal migration, drugs trafficking and trafficking in human beings and organized crime, the fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are stressed as objectives of the new ENP (Council of the EU, 2003c; 2003d; 2004). This again influences the 2004, 2006 and 2007 Commission communications: we see a shift in the notion of negative liberty. While the European Commission initially stressed the freedom of movement for individuals (for nationals of Mediterranean countries), it changes its discourse under the influence of the Council and it starts emphasizing freedom from crimes for individuals (for European citizens).

In addition, the Council stresses human rights and liberty, although it only mentions freedom of association and freedom of expression, the rule of law, democracy. In contrast with the European Commission, the Council does not refer to international agreements. In general, liberty is presented as ‘negative liberty’. Also the support of the civil society is presented as an objective, although it is left to the European Commission to develop this support: ‘Particular attention will be paid to strengthening of civil society, supporting institutional capacity as well as promoting transparency of state and local authorities’ (Council of the EU, 2003c: 5). In general, the Council thus adopts the ENP as proposed by the European Commission, but it also lays its own accent, especially with regard to security. Deeper economic integration of the neighbours is the main objective of the policy, and the role of the state is to support the free market, and especially to address security threats. The role of the civil society as articulated by the European Commission is generally accepted. We can therefore conclude that the Council, in cooperation with the European Commission, tries to promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region.

7.2.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

In April 2003, just after its presentation of the first communication, the European Commission decided to consult the EESC on the ENP. The EESC presented its opinion in November 2003, together with the results of the fact-findings missions it organized to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Consequently, the ENP is in this opinion mainly discussed with a focus on these three countries, but the EESC also adopted some general conclusions over the ENP as a whole (this opinion is officially published in 2004). In 2005, the EESC presented an information report on ‘the role of consultative bodies and socio-occupational organisations in implementing the
Association Agreements and in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy’. This report provides us information about how the EESC defines the civil society and how it articulates its role in relation to the ENP. In 2006, the EESC drafted another opinion on request of the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner. These three documents give insight into the EESC’s view on the ENP. Because the opinions of the EESC were written upon request of the European Commission, they are mainly a reaction on the Commission communications.42

In its first opinion, the EESC rejects the proposal of the European Commission on the ENP, for two reasons. First, it argues that the ENP just entails an economic model, with no attention to social measures, democracy and European values. Second, it does not believe that the creation of a European economic area (a ‘stake’ in the internal market) along the lines of the current EEA is a suited model for neighbouring countries, because the latter will not have any decision-making power. This is different from the neighbouring countries which are currently part of the EEA, because they can have decision-making power if they want: the door is always open to become a member of the EU, but they ‘decided from their own free will not to join the EU’ (EESC, 2004: 151). By contrast, the Eastern and Southern neighbours will not receive decision-making power. The EESC states that ‘the EEA option is illusory for the eastern neighbours: if they met the requirements, they could just as well become Member States. If they do not meet the requirements, access to the single market would be one-sided or explosive for their economies, with a great risk of social dumping and distorted competition’ (EESC, 2004: 151).

At the end of the document, the EESC formulates some general recommendations, in which it explains its view on the social order to be promoted in the neighbourhood: ‘As regards moves to facilitate access to the internal market of the EU, the EESC recommends a proactive strategy, backed up by adjustments to comply with technical standards and integration of the transport, energy and telecommunication networks. Support should also be provided for the adjustments required to enable the countries concerned to comply with the legal and administrative prerequisites for promoting business activity, e.g. with regard to provisions in respect of intellectual property rights and rules of origin, and to enable them to bolster skills in the field of public administration’ (EESC, 2004: 153). In general, the EESC thus supports economic reforms in order to establish a market economy just like the European Commission

42 In these documents, there is no reference to globalization or interdependence.
and the Council (logic of the market), although it refers to the importance to pursue socially-
balance reforms, just like it did in its earlier opinions: ‘The EU should provide a stronger
counterbalance to the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank by
highlighting ways of achieving socially-balanced reforms and, in particular, by supporting the
reform of social protection schemes. For their part, the World Bank and the IMF should also be
reminded of their duty to strengthen labour market organizations and civil society organizations’
(EESC, 2004: 154). In the information report on the role of consultative bodies and socio-
occupational organizations in implementing the Association Agreements and in the context of
the European Neighbourhood Policy, the ENP is criticized for lacking attention to the social
effects of the policy which is based on ‘economic adjustment and security guarantees’: ‘Indeed,
without this type of action (social action, \textit{mr}) serious social and human imbalances could arise, in
relation to which the recurring suggestion in the NAP (National Action Plans, \textit{mr}) of joint work
on certain social security matters is entirely marginal and inadequate; it should be rapidly
combined with properly financed programmes designed to strengthen the relevant administrative,
planning and management capacities’ (EESC, 2005: 10).

Besides the focus on social policies, the EESC stresses the role of CSOs, which are
identified as workers’ and employers’ organizations, NGOs, enterprises and networks of the
social economy (cooperatives, mutual societies and development associations). In reference to the
Mediterranean countries, it is stated that ‘for the participation of civil society to be effective and
help to strengthen the legitimacy of political decisions, it is essential for the organizations to have
full autonomy (albeit in the framework of necessary rules), to be democratic, representative and
be able always to strive for compatible and fair development of their own country or territory’
(EESC, 2005: 4). At the same time, it also implicitly criticizes the EU institutions, which often
ignore the EESC: ‘A consultative body must be protected against external interference and
pressure, but must also be responsible, effective, autonomous and take an overall view; at the
same time, it must be capable of dialogue with the political and institutional authorities, exercising
its independence in drawing up opinions and assessments. The consultative function must not be
subjected to censorship, nor should it be ignored’ (EESC, 2005: 7). These articulations represent
the conditions under which the CSOs can function properly, within the Mediterranean countries
and within the EU and the framework of the ENP.

If we then take a closer look at the role of the CSOs, the EESC argues that CSOs should
not only be considered as implementers of the policy decided by the government or as implementers of the ENP (EESC, 2006: 309), but they should also contribute to the
development of the policies. More specifically, they should take part in consultative bodies. The EESC (2005: 7) states in its information report: ‘Precisely because of their specific function and composition, the consultative bodies should be asked to give their views both on major reform proposals and on the instruments to implement them. Even the monitoring of reforms and their effects can be usefully carried out by such bodies, which represent not only the interests but also the sensibilities of the various components of civil society’. In order for the CSOs to take part in these consultative bodies, they should be strong and representative. In the information report, the CSOs are mainly defined as the social partners, but also NGOs, enterprises and the networks of the social economy are mentioned. Also in its later opinion, the EESC emphasizes the social dialogue within the Mediterranean countries, and within the framework of the ENP: ‘in particular, the concepts of ‘social dialogue’ and ‘consultative role’ are missing’ (in the documents of the European Commission, vr.; EESC, 2006: 309). In contrast with the discourse of the European Commission and the Council, the EESC focuses on social policies (logic of the state) in combination with the establishment of free market economies (logic of the market). The CSOs should contribute to the socio-economic development of the Mediterranean countries. The EESC promotes a form of political liberty, i.e. the possibility for CSOs to take part in the decision-making process in the Mediterranean countries (and in the development and implementation of the ENP). Therefore, we can state that the EESC promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. The EESC itself refers to the concept ‘participatory democracy’, although they have a different definition of the concept than we articulate (chapter 4), because they mainly refer to participation of social partners (the old social movements). In the definition of Laclau and Mouffe, participatory democracy refers to the role played by new social movements. In the definition of liberal democracy in chapter 4, social dialogue and participation of social partners are included, because these are essential for the continuation of the ‘post-World War accord between capital and labour’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 161).

7.2.4 The European Parliament

The European Parliament adopted two resolutions on the ENP, one on the 2003 Commission communication (European Parliament, 2003a; European Parliament, 2003b), and one on the implementation of the ENP in 2006 (European Parliament, 2005a; European Parliament, 2005b; European Parliament, 2006). From the resolution of 2003, it is clear that the European Parliament adopts a rather different view on the relations between the EU and its neighbours. This view is rooted into the idea that the EU and its neighbours are increasingly interdependent. Globalization/interdependence are considered as processes which poses problems, but which can
have positive consequences, and which is a contingent process, i.e. a process which can be managed. This can be done by developing a new neighbourhood concept (in its report referred to as a ‘good neighbour’ policy: (the European Parliament) ‘declares that the new frontier of the enlarged Union should be regarded as a positive opportunity for the countries and regions directly affected, aiming at building up a network of deepened relations; therefore considers that it should be the task of the European Union to develop with these countries and regions a comprehensive and effective neighbourhood concept, capable of furthering the search for more effective solutions to the problems posed by interdependence and globalisation’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 7). This ‘new neighbourhood concept’ is understood in a different way than the European Commission and the Council. For the Parliament, the ENP should consist of three ‘areas’: an area on political, human, civil and cultural cooperation, an area which focuses on security cooperation and an area on sustainable economic and social co-development. These three areas together constitute the basis for the establishment of a ‘pan-European and Mediterranean region’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 9-11).

The first area, which is also referred to as ‘a common political project based on human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’, is based on the model of the Council of Europe. The Parliament suggests to take the standards on political norms developed by the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE and to incorporate them in multilateral conventions concluded between the EU and its neighbours. These multilateral conventions are grounded in institutions which punish violations, just like the European Court of Human Rights. In this regard, the European Parliament also refers to international agreements (just like the European Commission does) as a basis for concluding multilateral conventions between the EU and its neighbours. Moreover, it pleads for the establishment of institutions which function as the guardian(s) of these conventions (just like it did in its resolutions on the EMP). The second and the third area are based on the model of the EEA, and should according to the Parliament be united in the creation of ‘an Economic Area Plus’: (the European Parliament) ‘considers, in that respect, the opportunity to take into account, as a new option, the setting up of a Free Trade Area which could encompass aspects of the internal market as well as internal and external security’ (“European Economic Area Plus”) between the EU and its European neighbours without ruling out future membership (European Parliament, 2003b: 12). In this regard, the Parliament also stresses regional cooperation between the neighbouring countries (and then in particular between the Mediterranean countries), and between the member states of the EU/candidate member states and the neighbouring countries, in addition to the bilateral dimension of the ENP.
’We must devise a strategy for the present time. Therefore, we need now to define a system of relations that will guarantee not only the creation of a vast area of common security, but also a ‘good neighbour’ policy, by developing the horizontal dimension and so promoting crossborder cooperation between all the countries in the field of the four freedoms (on which the communication is centred). We must not be satisfied with establishing bilateral relations between the EU and each of the countries concerned, but must encourage them all to strengthen relations on a balanced and mutually advanced basis, and to join a virtuous circle of cooperation and integration’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 18).

With its reference to the EEA, the Parliament also means that institutions should be established between the EU and its neighbours to implement the EEA Plus after the example of the EEA institutions: the EFTA surveillance authority and the EFTA court (although this is not explicitly articulated). The Parliament is thus in favour of a multilateral institutional dimension for the Union’s strategy, although it especially stresses the political dimension of the cooperation. During the overall debate in the plenary session of 14 May 2003 (before the official report and the 2003 resolution were adopted), several Members of European Parliament (MEPs) stress the creation of common institutions: ‘There is no doubt that, in theory, as regards the idea of a new momentum, for example, there is the goal of closer relations. However, there will be no common area without common construction. We are far from that, listening to Romano Prodi talk about political rapprochement and gradual integration into the European Union’s economic and social structures’ (Boudjenah, 2003). Another MEP mentions that the expression ‘everything but institutions’ cannot be interpreted as ‘everything but decision-making power’ (Berthu, 2003). In the 2006 resolution, the European Parliament repeats its proposal:

‘(the European Parliament) emphasises that it is the aim of the ENP not only to strengthen bilateral relations between the EU and the neighbourhood countries but also to create networks of cooperation and bring about the development of regional integration between neighbouring countries; takes the view in this connection that consideration should be given to creating for the European neighbour states an instrument along the lines of European Economic Area, covering not only participation in the single market but also political matters; expresses its concern at the serious delays in this area and believes it vital for the Union, together with all neighbourhood policy partners, to undertake to activate all political and institutional instruments capable of supporting the development of the multilateral dimension’ (European Parliament, 2006: 9).
Overall, the Parliament, just like the European Commission and the Council, refers to the structural reforms which are necessary in order to create market economies, although this is less emphasized than in the discourse of the European Commission. In addition, it states that it ‘considers it necessary to develop environmental and social policies that are closely interlinked to the above economic policies’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 11). In its later report, the European Parliament refers to social policy as one of the key areas for action, and to the idea the ENP should be based on the ‘principles of a transparent social market economy’ (European Parliament, 2005b; 5; 15). Furthermore, the European Parliament has very little attention for cultural issues (in contrast to its previous resolutions). Although the Parliament states in the 2003 resolution that it wants to see an area on political, human, civil and cultural cooperation, it especially emphasizes the political dimension in its resolutions. If the European Parliament refers to democracy and human rights, it does not only refer to negative liberties, but also to political liberty: (the European Parliament) ‘emphasises its aim of not settling for the status quo but of committing the European Union to support the aspirations of people of our neighbouring countries to full political freedom, with democracy and justice, and economic and social development, using all diplomatic, financial and political means available’ (European Parliament, 2006: 4). In general, the European Parliament stresses a few elements which were not mentioned in the discourse of the European Commission/the (European) Council, such as an explicit reference to social market economy and an explicit reference to political liberty. Therefore, it seems that the European Parliament inclines towards the promotion of a form of liberal democracy.

7.3 Political and fantasmatic logics in the European Neighbourhood Policy

7.3.1 The European Commission

How does the European Commission now promote the social order we identified above, i.e. how does it promote this libertarian democracy? If we look at the documents, it is important to make a difference again between the 2003 communication and the latter communications. In the first communication, the Commission proposes that ‘the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ring of friends – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations’ (European Commission, 2003a: 4). This phrase – ‘a ring of friends’ was first articulated by Romano Prodi in his speech at the 6th ECSA –World Conference in Brussels (Prodi, 2002). There is thus a rather positive identification of the partners, albeit the identity of the Other is also articulated in terms of difference with the Self. The neighbours are presented as not having reached the level of economic development of the EU yet and as not
respecting international agreements yet, and therefore, they are presented as inferior (spatial construction of identity). However, this changes after 2003. The European Commission does no longer refer to the neighbours as ‘friends’ of the EU. In one sentence in the 2004 communication, the European Commission refers to the ‘ring of countries’ (in contrast with the previous communication where the sentence ‘ring of friends’ was one of the central phrases of the policy): ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy’s vision involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of economic and political integration’ (European Commission, 2004: 5). By contrast, in the light of the security of the EU, the neighbouring countries are now presented as ‘not well governed’, and therefore, more as a potential threat for the EU (rather than as ‘inferior’; spatial construction of identity). Nevertheless, the identity of the Other can change (temporal construction of the identity): ‘in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer integration of the EU’ (European Commission, 2003a: 4).

From the explanation on the social logics, it was concluded that the EU sees itself as an economic model for the neighbouring countries. This model is based on the acquis of the internal market. The EU is now presented as the focal point for the economic development of the neighbourhood. We noted this already under the EMP. In contrast with its discourse on the RMP and the Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek Partnership, where the Commission claimed that the SAPs of the IFIs were the best strategy for the economic development of the Mediterranean countries, it articulated structural adjustment as a means to prepare the Mediterranean countries to enter into free trade with the EU. At that point, the EU became the reference point for the economic development of the Mediterranean region in the discourse of the European Commission, although this happened rather hesitantly. However, under the ENP, the European Commission has become more self-assured: in contrast with its discourse on the RMP and the EMP, it now points the IFIs on their responsibilities. When it lists the sources of finance that can be used to promote the development of the neighbouring countries, it argues: ‘EU technical and grant assistance is not the only means for promoting reform or catalysing private investment. The IFIs have a key role to play in reducing poverty, helping to mitigate the social consequences of transition, assisting accelerated reform and increased investment as well as developing infrastructure and the private sector’ (European Commission, 2003a: 14). Moreover, it clearly
indicates that it will no longer follow the IFIs: ‘The EU should ensure the IFIs take adequate account of the importance of spending on education, health and social safety net provisions in their policies towards the neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2003a: 15). From a follower in the economic field, the EU is now articulated as a leader by the European Commission. In its 2006 communication, the European Commission (2006b: 2) actually notes that IFIs started to align their policies with the ENP Action Plans. This view meets the logic of multilateral Europe, but one which presents the EU as a leader. This leadership role of the EU in the economic field is initially justified by referring to its particular nature as a polity (see infra). However, later on, the European Commission mainly refers to the enlargement. Because of the enlargement with ten new member states, the EU has become an expert in economic reforms: ‘Relations with partner countries will be enriched drawing as appropriate on the experience gained in supporting the process of political and economic transition, as well as economic development and modernization in the new Member States and candidate countries’ (European Commission, 2006b: 6).

However, it is clear that the EU is only a focal point for the economic development of the neighbouring countries. In other policy areas, such as in the political and social field, the European Commission still refers to international institutions/agreements, such as the ILO for social norms (see supra), and the UN Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and the Council of Europe for political norms. For the Mediterranean countries, the UN Human Rights Declaration is the most important norm to follow since they are neither a member of the OSCE nor from the Council of Europe: ‘Beyond the regulatory and administrative aspects directly linked to market integration, key benchmarks should include the ratification and implementation of international commitments which demonstrate respect for shared values, in particular the values codified in the UN Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and Council of Europe standards. Wherever possible, these benchmarks should be developed in close cooperation with the partner countries themselves, in order to ensure national ownership and commitment’ (European Commission, 2003a: 16). This idea fits the myth of a multilateral Europe, with Europe in the role of the ‘follower’. The reference to international agreements points both the other EU institutions as the Mediterranean countries to their responsibilities in the global order (fantasmatic logics).

If we then take a closer look at how the Self and the Other are articulated in the discourse of the European Commission, we can again make a distinction between the 2003 and the later communications. In the 2003 communication, the concept ‘Wider Europe’ functioned as a nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission (the concept was first presented in the letter
Wider Europe presents a common identity for the Self and the Other: a common identity which is based on the internal market (and the four freedoms) and on international political, legal and human rights standards. The concept reflects that the ‘Others’ are friends which can become like us (Europe), if they implement economic and political forms. The European Commission refers in this regard to the joint responsibility of the EU and the Mediterranean countries, but it especially stresses its own responsibility: it states that the EU has a duty not only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism (ethical construction of the identity; European Commission, 2003a: 3). The EU should do so, because the circumstances require so, because of its specific nature as a polity and because the EU should be a world player, which does not only defends economic interests, but also norms and values. Especially the European Commissioners articulated this in their discourses: Prodi (2004), for example, describes Europe as a unique model in the world, and he argues that it is ‘our duty to offer our experience and the model we have developed over half a century of life together, for the sake of peace and reconciliation in other parts of the world’. Verheugen (2002) states that Europe is taking the first steps towards becoming an effective global player which can do much more than simply defend its economic interests (see also Ifversen & Kolvraa, 2007: 24). Ifversen and Kolvraa (2007) argue that the EU presents itself as a ‘normative power’. However, we disagree with them. We find that (if you combine the discourse found in the speeches of the Commissioners and in the communications) the EU mainly articulates a global role for itself (peace, reconciliation, universal values) based on its economic model. Therefore, we consider this discourse as reflecting the logic of civilian power Europe. Ifversen & Kolvraa (2007: 24) have a different definition of a civilian power: they state that a civilian power promotes its economic interests: ‘this quote (the quote of Prodi mentioned above, nr.) reveals that the EU is viewed as exceeding its classical ‘civilian’ nature – that is of being a great trading block or economic player’.

However, this discourse slowly changes. In the second half of 2003, the concept ‘Wider Europe’ disappears. It is replaced by the concept ‘neighbourhood’ (European Neighbourhood Policy). The use of the concept neighbourhood in the discourse of the European Commission reflects the idea that all countries bordering the EU are included into the policy, not only the Eastern neighbours (which are considered to be European (see infra). This concept thus mainly has a geographical connotation. In addition, ‘governance’ and then especially the concept ‘good governance’ starts to appear as a nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission. We already noted that the concept ‘good governance’ appeared under the EMP, first in the communication of the European Commission and later in the Council Report. However, it
disappeared from the Barcelona Declaration after discussions with the Mediterranean partners. In the MEDA-regulation, it was reintroduced as an objective of the partnership, but it was not considered to be an essential element by which the financial assistance could be suspended. The concept ‘good governance’ is not developed by the EU. It was introduced by the World Bank at the end of the 1980s and became a major issue in international organizations working on international development cooperation like the OECD and the UNDP. Through the international organizations, the concept was also introduced into the EU’s policies, first in the EU’s development policy towards Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) and later in the EMP. According to Börzel et. al (2008: 15), it was the European Commission (and more specifically DG Development (DEV)) which mainstreamed the concept in the EU’s external relations. In the case of the Mediterranean countries, the concept became emphasized after the publication of Arab Human Development Report of 2002. The Commission communication of 2003 on ‘Reinvigorating EU actions on human rights and democratization with the Mediterranean partners: strategic guidelines’ which can be considered as a reaction to the report, concludes that ‘further economic and social development is strongly hampered by deeply rooted shortcomings in the structures of governance in the Arab world’ (European Commission, 2003a: 3). Also in the second half of 2003, the European Commission published its first communication on governance and development. The emphasis on good governance in the discourse of the European Commission on the relations with third countries became stronger, and thus also in its discourse on the relations with the Mediterranean countries under the ENP (European Commission, 2003c). At the same time, the concept ‘good governance’ also appeared in the ESS (see infra).

In 2006, both DG DEV and DG RELEX were working on a Commission communication on governance. DG DEV, which held consultations with the other DGs within the Commission, decided that the communication should not be limited to the relations with the ACP. After an intra-institutional conflict between the DG DEV & DG RELEX, the communications of both DGs eventually merged into one communication (Bué, 2010: 245). This communication has a special paragraph on the relations with the neighbourhood, and based on this text, good governance was emphasized in the documents of the European Commission on the neighbourhood policy (European Commission, 2006a). In the 2006 communication, the European Commission proposes to design a new instrument to provide financial assistance to its

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43 It can be noted that in the 2006 Commission communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development, the European Commission refers to the concept ‘democratic governance’. However, this is only the case in the general part of the communication, and not in the part which deals with the relations with the neighbouring countries. The concept does not appear in the Commission communications on the ENP.
neighbours, the ‘Governance Facility’, an additional budget line, aimed at giving the neighbouring countries additional support if they make strong progress in implementing the governance aspects of the Action Plans (European Commission, s.d.).

Overall, the concept ‘good governance’ has no meaning as such: it is a floating signifier which is open to different meanings. However, in the discourse of the EU, the concept is partially fixed, and it becomes a privileged signifier. More specifically, it gives meaning to the concepts market, state and individual/civil society, and it also determines the relationship between these three elements. With good governance, the EU means: the reform of the state to support the free market, to guarantee law and order and to respect the rights of individuals. Also the civil society should contribute to liberty and the free market economy. This nodal point also links the different identities of the EU institutions and the European member states in one common project, i.e. they are ‘well-governed’ because they have created an internal market and because they follow the political and social norms laid down in international agreements (logic of equivalence) and opposes this identity to the identity of the neighbours, which are presented as ‘not well governed’ (not yet part of the internal market, not yet following political and social norms laid down in international agreements; logic of difference), and therefore, as a potential threat. This has become the hegemonic discourse. However, the hegemonic discourse is not totally closed: the neighbours can be integrated in the own project, the own identity (a ‘stake’ in the internal market) and they can become well governed when they implement economic reforms and ratify and implement international agreements (spatial and temporal construction of the identity). The identity of the EU is thus to a certain extent inclusive: it is based on characteristics which the neighbours also can acquire.

The responsibility for the implementation of these economic reforms and the ratification of the international agreements is now mainly put with the neighbours. This is reflected in the concept ‘joint ownership’ (ethical construction of identity). Where in the 2003 communication reference was made to the ‘joint responsibility’ of both the EU and the partner countries (European Commission, 2003: 12), this concept is now replaced a reference to ‘joint ownership’.44 This means that the EU is not imposing anything, that it just offers its help (which is reflected as a gesture of generosity) but that it all depends on the partners if they want to take these steps. ‘The ENP is an offer made by the EU to its partners to which they have responded with considerable interest and engagement. Joint ownership of the process, based on the

44 This is also a concept which is emphasized in the Commission communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development (European Commission, 2006).
awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners’ (European Commission, 2004: 8). More specifically, the EU engages itself, but this engagement depends on meeting targets for reforms (conditionality). These targets are laid down in benchmarks, which are developed in cooperation with the partners (ownership). They are ‘defined with common consent’ (and therefore there is a reference to ‘joint’ ownership; European Commission, 2004: 8). The idea of ‘joint ownership’ is closely linked with the concept ‘differentiation’. As every country may help defining its own benchmarks, it follows from that that there will be differentiation. Ownership is not a concept invented by the European Commission, it is articulated for the first time at the international level, between donors of development assistance. It is for example also formulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2005). However, in the documents of the European Commission, the concept is translated into the specific context of the ENP. The neighbouring countries have ‘joint ownership’, ownership within the framework of the strategy developed by the European Commission (joint). The main reason for the EU to engage itself in the neighbourhood, is that there is an interest for the EU. This was already articulated in the Commission communication of 2003 (but here the Commission mainly referred to the ‘common’ or ‘mutual’ interests, and it also stressed its ‘duty’) but it is more stressed in the later communications, like for example in the 2007 communication: ‘The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighbourhood. The responsibility for this lies primarily with the countries themselves, but the EU can substantially encourage and support their reform efforts’ (European Commission, 2007: 2). This is a different discourse than the articulation that the EU has a ‘duty’ towards its neighbourhood.

We already mentioned that the hegemonic discourse is not totally closed, it is open. Consequently, a discursive struggle is taking place over the notion ‘good governance’. Algeria, for instance, refused to conclude an Action Plan with the EU and Syria was reluctant to sign the EMAA it negotiated with the EU: there is ‘resistance’ by the other. Nevertheless, for the Mediterranean countries, this is only one part of their identity (although this is the part that is most emphasized) because the Mediterranean countries can actually only partially integrate in the EU’s identity, i.e. in the economic, political and social part. But they cannot become a member of the EU (in contrast to the Eastern neighbours, where the discussion is left open). This is stated in the Commission communication of 2003: ‘accession has been ruled out for the non-European Mediterranean countries’, where the Commission (2003a: 5) also refers to article 49 of the Treaty of the EU, which states that ‘Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article
6 (1) may apply to become a member of the Union’. This is also reflected by the concept ‘neighbourhood’, which replaced the concept ‘Wider Europe’ (this concept actually only refers to the Eastern neighbours). The identity of the EU is thus also defined both around inherent characteristics, like geographic location (spatial construction of the identity). The EU associates itself with its Southern neighbours, but at the same time it also dissociates itself from them, although this is far less emphasized than under the EMP. It is remarking that under the ENP, there is almost no attention for cultural issues. This association and dissociation at the same time leads to confusion in the Mediterranean countries, especially in Morocco, which still believes that it can become member of the EU one day.

The concept ‘good governance’ is an appealing and strong concept, first of all because of its wording (fantasmatic logics): who can be against ‘good governance,’ who wants to have bad governance? Second, it also has a universal ‘resonance’ (which gives the EU more legitimacy); the concept is lent from the IFIs, although it reflects the EU economic model. Third, it presents a rational way of doing politics: if every person pursues its self-interest, this will contribute to the public interest as a whole. In order to reach this public interest, it is the task of the public sphere to provide a neutral framework for individuals to pursue their interests and it has to support the functioning of the market. This means that there is no room for conflict in the public sphere. This also means the redefinition of the concept ‘democracy’ in very narrow terms (presented as ‘good governance’): the management of the market and the freedom of individuals instead of the place where fundamental political decisions on the organization of society are taken, and thus where conflict will take place. This clearly delimitates the public sphere. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 73) stated in this regard: ‘Although the democratic ideal is not openly attacked, an attempt is made to empty it from all substance and to propose a new definition of democracy which in fact would serve to legitimize a regime in which political participation might be virtually non-existent’. The model of democracy as promoted by the EU, which tries to remove conflict in politics, has until now not been in opposition with the policy of authoritarians regimes, which do not want any conflict. This explains why there is so little resistance against the ENP, i.e. why there is almost no public contestation from the side of the Mediterranean countries.

7.3.2 The (European) Council and the member states

In the paragraphs on the social logics, we explained how the European Commission’s discourse on the neighbourhood changed as a consequence of the discussions with the Council. Eventually, the discourses of the European Commission and the Council are very similar: they agree on the social order to be promoted in the Mediterranean region. Consequently, also the way in which
the Council promotes this social order is similar to the way it is promoted by the European Commission. Initially, the Council adopts the concept ‘Wider Europe’ (which was developed by Chris Patten and Javier Solana (2002) in their joint letter), while later on, ‘good governance’ is mentioned as an objective of the ENP. Good governance only appears in the discourse of the (European) Council after the publication of the 2003 Commission communication on governance and development, and after the adoption of the EES (2003: 10) where good governance is explicitly articulated: ‘The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’. Later on, the concept can also be found in the Council conclusions and in the ENPI regulation adopted in 2006, where one of the objectives of the Community assistance is ‘promoting the rule of law and good governance, including strengthening the effectiveness of public administration and the impartially and effectiveness of the judiciary, and supporting the fight against corruption and fraud’ (Council of the EU & European Parliament, 2006: 3).

In the Council conclusions, the neighbouring countries are mainly presented as having problems, and these problems also cause problems for the EU because of their geographical proximity. Therefore, the problems of the neighbouring countries are presented as ‘common’ challenges, which can be addressed (spatial and temporal construction of identity): ‘Noting that geographical proximity will generate converging interests and increase the importance of working together to address common challenges (…)’ (Council of the EU, 2003a: 5). The main strategy for addressing these common challenges is deeper economic integration and cooperation on security issues. Although the political logics in the discourse of the Council are less clear, it thus mainly adopts the discourse of the European Commission in this regard (see supra). The main reason for the Council to help the neighbouring countries is because it is in its own interests (see the references the ‘security challenges the neighbourhood brings’, ethical construction of identity). In the ESS (2003: 7), it is stated that ‘It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed’. The Council emphasizes that the ENP should be based on the principle of differentiation; this principle is referred to in almost all conclusions, which indicates its importance for the Council (see Council of the EU, 2003a; 2003b; 2003d; 2004). The Council does not see the neighbourhood as one whole; it makes a differentiation between the different countries which are part of the neighbourhood (in the Council conclusions of June 2003, it also refers to all these countries; Council of the EU, 2003a). The cooperation of the EU with each of
the countries depends on the progress they make towards commonly agreed objectives (the Council also refers to the concept ‘joint ownership’; see for example Council of the EU (2003b; 2004; 2008)). The faster they reach these objectives, the more benefits they receive from the EU (ethical construction of identity). In addition, the Council also states that the cooperation depends on the ‘specificities’ of each country (Council of the EU, 2004). In this regard, the Council makes a distinction between the Eastern neighbours, the Southern neighbours and the Southern Caucasus. It states that the ‘new neighbourhood policies should not override the existing framework for EU relations with Russia, the Eastern European countries and the Southern Mediterranean partners, as developed in the context of the relevant agreements, common strategies, the Northern Dimension Initiative and of the Barcelona Process’ (Council of the EU, 2003a).

Although this is not explicitly articulated, it is indicated that the Eastern neighbours can become a member of the EU one day. In the Council conclusions of March 2003, the Council states that the ENP ‘should be seen as separate from the question of EU membership’, by which it actually means that accession to the EU is not ruled out for some of the neighbouring countries (Council of the EU, 2003d). In the conclusions of June 2003, the Council refers to article 49 of the Treaty on the EU: ‘This (the ENP) should be seen as separate from the question of possible EU accession that is regulated by article 49 of the Treaty on European Union’ (Council of the EU, 2003a). As explained in the paragraph on the political and fantasmatic logics of the European Commission, article 49 states that ‘Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the Union’ (European Commission, 2003a). The Mediterranean countries are not ‘European’ countries because of their geographical position, but in case of the Eastern neighbours, there is a discussion if they can become a member. In addition, also the Southern Caucasus countries are not seen as ‘European’.

7.3.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

The study of the construction of the Self and the Other in the discourse of the EESC reveals that the latter in its first opinion proposes to make a distinction between the different regions of the ENP: ‘Both African and European states are subsumed under the label of ‘Wider Europe’. The EESC recommends separating the regions referred to as ‘Southern Mediterranean’ and ‘Eastern neighbours’ so as to do better justice to the specific features of these countries, and in particular to the already established objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean strategy’ (EESC, 2004: 153). However, more importantly, this would make clear for the neighbours if they, in the long run, can become a member of the EU. Overall, the EESC also disagrees with the formulation on the
‘neighbourhood’ by the European Commission and the (European) Council. The EESC (2004: 152) states: ‘All attempts to formulate a definition of ‘neighbourhood’ which excludes any observations on the subject of membership have tended rather to be regarded as a provocation than as a means of helping to clarify the situation’. This is repeated in its opinion of 2006: ‘The EESC therefore believes that it would be a mistake to have in place a rigid framework that would exclude any possibility of EU membership or raise false hopes’ (EESC, 2006: 98). According to the EESC (2004: 151), the Eastern neighbours can become members of the EU: ‘The EEA option is illusory for the eastern neighbours: if they met the requirements, they could just as well become Member states’. The EESC thus makes a clear difference between those countries which can become a member of the EU (spatial construction of identity) and those countries which will just be part of the neighbourhood (the Mediterranean countries and the Southern Caucasus).

At the same time, it articulates a common identity for the Self and the countries which will never become a member of the EU, and this identity is based on the concept ‘neighbourhood’. This is the nodal point in the discourse of the EESC. In its opinion of 2006, it presents its view on the concept ‘neighbourhood’: ‘In the EESC’s view, the concept of ‘neighbourhood policy’ cannot be seen merely in geographic terms. On the contrary, the very formulation of the ENP – in the various documents mentioned in the third footnote – lends the term a markedly strong sense of a community (or search for a community) of values, cultures and intent. Thus, although the principle of neighbourhood also has geographical connotations, it is underpinned by policies and values. It is therefore possible that other countries may be included in the ENP in the future’ (EESC, 2006: 98). The neighbouring countries (which cannot become a member of the EU) are presented as facing conflicts (in some cases, this is because democracy is not well established; EESC, 2006: 99). Nevertheless, their identity can be partially changed (temporal construction of identity) since they can become members of a community of values, cultures and intent, identified as ‘the neighbourhood’. Then, geography plays no longer a role, while it does play a role in the prospect for membership of the EU.

As we have explained earlier, the social order defended by the concept ‘neighbourhood’ in the discourse of the EESC is a form of liberal democracy. However, the EESC refers to the concept ‘participatory democracy’ which is the second nodal point in the discourse of the EESC. Economic reforms are necessary in order to establish a free market, but they should be socially balanced, social policies should be developed as well and the civil society has a role to play in the socio-economic development of the neighbourhood through social dialogue. Especially the later element is reflected in the nodal point ‘participatory democracy’: it is the possibility for the civil
society to play a role in the development of the policies, which will strengthen democracy. In order to reach participatory democracy, responsibilities lie with both the EU and the Mediterranean countries. The EU must help the neighbours in order to guarantee security and stability for the neighbouring countries: ‘The concern about the possible repercussion of these (conflicts, see supra) within the EU is legitimate, but even more important must be the concern for the security and stability of the partner countries’ (EESC, 2006: 99). Regarding the socially-balanced reforms, the EESC (2004: 154) states that ‘for their part, the World Bank and the IMF should also be reminded of their duty to strengthen the labour market organizations and civil society organisations. This action should be carried out in close cooperation with the EESC, other EU Institutions and the International Labour Organisation’. This is the task for the EU, and more specifically for the European Commission. Here we see the presentation of the EU as a multilateral actor, and more specifically as a leader (fantasmatic logics). The neighbouring countries from their side should implement the socially-balanced economic reforms proposed by the EU (EESC, 2004: 153) and they should organize a social dialogue with the social partners and CSOs (EESC, 2005: 4).

Besides the articulation of an identity for the EU by the EESC in which the ‘neighbourhood’ is the Other, the EESC also articulates its own institutional identity in contrast with the identity of the European Commission and the Council. In this regard, the Other, i.e. the European Commission, the Council and the member states are presented as not respecting the own principles and values that they are promoting in the relations with the neighbourhood: ‘The EESC urges all the institutional players to recognize in practice that the principle of joint ownership implies a strong reference to democratic values: joint ownership must be the guiding principle of relations not only between the EU and the partner countries, but within the EU itself, and between national administration and civil society representatives in the partner countries’ (EESC, 2006: 96). In this regard, the reference to the ‘participatory democracy’ also creates an identity for the EU in the internal context: the EU will only be a participatory democracy if the opinions of the EESC are taken into account.

7.3.4 The European Parliament

In its discourse, the European Parliament makes a distinction between the different regions of the neighbourhood, just like the EESC did. More specifically, in its 2006 resolution, it makes a distinction between the Maghreb, the Middle East and Mashreq, Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus (spatial construction of identity; European Parliament, 2006a). All these neighbouring countries are presented as provoking challenges for the EU, but this can be
changed (temporal construction of identity). However, if we compare the approach of the European Parliament with the approach of the European Commission, the Council and the EESC, we see a rather different picture. For the European Commission, the Council and the EESC, the EU is presented as the focal point for the economic development of all neighbouring countries, including the Mediterranean countries: they have to become part of the internal market and they have to follow the European acquis. Each of the neighbouring countries can have a stake in the internal market, although they cannot take part in the decision-making processes which create this internal market. The point of view of the European Parliament is different, because it wants to establish economic relations with the neighbours after the example of the EEA. The EEA was founded in 1994 by the signature of an agreement between the EU and the countries of the EFTA. The latter had first concluded a FTA among each other before they signed an agreement with the EU. This is important because it might prevent the hub and spoke effect which is likely to take place when each of these countries separately take part in the internal market. Therefore, the European Parliament stresses that the regional and subregional dimensions of the neighbourhood should be strengthened. Moreover, the European Parliament suggests creating common institutions to regulate the EEA Plus, which means that the neighbouring countries also can influence the EEA Plus (since they will have decision-making power). They will not just have to follow the rules of the EU.

Overall, the European Parliament actually suggests that the Mediterranean countries develop their own identity, which is complementary to the identity of ‘Europe’ (spatial construction of the identity). In the case of Europe, regional integration/the internal market and the respect for political norms laid down international agreements (reference to the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN; logic of the multilateral Europe, follower) is articulated as the identical something which underlies the European member states, the European institutions, the other European states such as Norway, Switzerland, … and also the candidate member states (logic of equivalence). This identity of ‘Europe’ is represented in the discourse by the concept ‘Pan-European’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 9; see also European Parliament, 2006b: 9). The Mediterranean countries are presented as not yet economically integrated and as not yet respecting political norms laid down in international agreements (logic of difference, temporal construction of the identity). This identity of the ‘Mediterranean’ is in the discourse reflected by the concept ‘Mediterranean’. It is important to note that the European Parliament especially stresses regional cooperation in the case of the Mediterranean countries, while in the case of the Eastern European countries it promotes a bilateral approach (because they can become a member of the EU): ‘(…) and believes that while there should be significant scope for developing
subregional and regional cooperation in the South, a bilateral approach is more promising in the East as regional cooperation scarcely seems possible in view of these differences’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 9). In this regard, it can be noted that the use of the concepts ‘Pan-European’ and ‘Mediterranean’ also entails that the Self and the countries which might become a member one day (‘Pan-European’) will always remain different from those countries which cannot become a member because of their geographical location (Mediterranean). The European Parliament explicitly refers to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, and thus to European countries, excluding the Mediterranean region: ‘Stresses, in the meantime, that under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union any European States which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union, and clear recognition of the right of countries that explicitly express their European aspirations, like Ukraine, to obtain EU membership when they fulfill all necessary political and economic criteria should be a strong incentive for the cooperation in the framework of the Wider Europe – Neighbourhood Initiative’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 9).

Nevertheless, the concept ‘Pan-European and Mediterranean region’ functions as a nodal point: it brings together two or more identities in one common objective, i.e. it establishes a link (the creation of a region) between two different forms of regional integration through the EEA, and it refers to the multilateral conventions which will be common to both ‘Pan-Europe’ and the Mediterranean. In a way, the Mediterranean countries can thus reach this common identity with Europe, by which Europe is not a closed entity: ‘whereas it is essential for the enlarged EU not to have closed external borders and to define a strategy for the relations with its neighbours to the east and the south, by means of which to share and develop peace, stability, security, respect for human rights, democracy and prosperity in a large shared area, thus making a positive contribution to the construction of a new international order based on multilateralism’ (European Parliament, 2003b: 6). Moreover, because of its ‘open borders’, the candidate member states (the Western Balkan countries and Turkey, European Parliament, 2003b) and other states that are closely linked with the EU or that are neighbours of the EU (the European Parliament mentions Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City State, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein; European Parliament, 2003b: 6-7) should also be involved in the ENP, irrespective the question of future membership. The European Parliament even suggests including ‘Atlantic island countries neighbouring EU outermost regions adjacent to the European continent’ (European Parliament, 2006a). In its documents, the European Parliament points to the responsibility of the EU in the implementation of this policy. The EU should develop a strategy for the neighbours because it will then help constructing a new international order based on
multilateralism (logic of multilateral Europe; leader in promoting multilateralism as a policy objective; fantasmatic logics). The neighbouring countries on their turn should implement the agreed reforms and fulfil the agreed commitments (conditionality; European Parliament, 2006b: 8).

7.4 Conclusions about the European Neighbourhood Policy

Overall, we can conclude that all European institutions (an exception being the EESC which does not refer to globalization) articulate globalization as interdependence. The European Parliament refers to interdependence in more general terms. The European Commission first articulated interdependence as economic and political interdependence: the intensification of economic and political relations between the EU and its neighbours. It is stated that this can bring new opportunities for the EU and its neighbours, if it is managed. It is thus presented as a contingent process. The discourse is based on the logic of economic opportunity and the logic of political opportunity. However, after 2003 (after the launch of the ESS), it can be noted that interdependence in the discourse of the European Commission is also articulated as security interdependence (just like in the discourse of the (European) Council): the intensification of the security relations between the EU and its neighbours. Although in the past the neighbours were also articulated as a security risk for the EU, the security problems were then mainly articulated as the consequence of the economic problems of the Mediterranean region (the articulated security risk was then mainly migration). Therefore, economic development of the Mediterranean region was the main strategy to be followed. However, after 2003, economic cooperation is no longer enough. It is articulated that other security issues should also be dealt with (which do not necessary follow from economic problems), such as terrorism, cross-border crimes and energy security. This explains the focus on security in the EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood after 2003.

There is no consensus between the different EU institutions about how the EU’s policy should look like. A distinction can be made between the European Commission and the (European) Council on the one hand, and the EESC and the European Parliament on the other hand. For the European Commission and the Council, economic liberalization is presented as the first strategy for dealing with the consequences of interdependence. The main objective of the economic liberalization strategy is the integration of the neighbouring countries in the internal market. The EU is presented as the economic model for the Mediterranean countries to follow. The state in these countries needs to be reformed in order to support the functioning of the free market. In addition, the state should be able to deal with security threats and it should be ‘capable
of delivering full transition to comply with international political, legal and human rights standards and obligations’. Within the framework of the internal market, the European Commission initially suggested promoting the four freedoms in the neighbourhood: the free movement of goods, services, capital and also persons. Nevertheless, after a discussion with the Council, the possibility for free movement for nationals of neighbouring countries disappeared from the table.

In addition, following the ESS (drafted by the High Representative and adopted by the European Council, 2003), there was more focus on security in the ENP (which was thus also reflected in the discourse on the interdependence). We see a shift in the articulation of the concept liberty. In the 2003 communication, focus was on the liberty for nationals of Mediterranean countries to move across Europe. However, in the later communications, this disappears. Liberty is then articulated as liberty from crimes for European citizens. In addition, in all communications, liberty for individuals in Mediterranean countries is promoted as the liberty of the individual to self-development without interference of others. The EU thus mainly promotes negative liberties: human rights and fundamental freedoms as codified by the UN Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and the Council of Europe and core labour standards as laid down in the ILO Conventions. For political and social norms, the European Commission refers to international organizations/agreements. The civil society is in the discourse of the European Commission articulated as based on the liberty of the individual (and not on the family or religious groupings). This civil society should promote negative liberties and it should contribute to the reform process the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region. We conclude that the EU promotes a form of libertarian democracy. The discourse is based on the logic of the market (social logics).

The social order the European Commission and the Council are promoting was initially defended by the concept ‘Wider Europe’ (political logics). This nodal point presents a common identity for the Self and the Other: a common identity which is based on the internal market (and the four freedoms) and on political, legal and human rights standards laid down in international agreement (logic of multilateral Europe, follower). The concept reflects that the Others are friends which can become like us (Europe), if they implement economic and political forms. The EU sees itself as having a duty to help its neighbours to develop and the emphasis is on the joint responsibility of the EU and the Mediterranean countries. We identified the logic of civilian power Europe in its discourse (fantasmatic logics). After 2003, the concept ‘Wider Europe’ disappears and then the policy is referred to as ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’. For the
European Commission and the (European) Council, the concept ‘neighbourhood’ mainly has a geographical connotation: it indicates that it is a policy developed for countries which are bordering the EU (political logics). In the second half of 2003, the concept ‘good governance’ starts to appear as a nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission and the (European) Council. With good governance the EU means: the reform of the state to support the free market, to guarantee law and order and to respect the rights of individuals. This nodal point also links the different identities of the member states and the European institutions in one common identity, i.e. they are ‘well-governed’ because they have created an internal market (they are market economies) and because they follow the political and social norms laid down in international agreements (logic of equivalence) and opposes this identity to the identity of the neighbours, which are presented as ‘not well governed’ (not yet part of the internal market, not yet market economies, not yet following political and social norms laid down in international agreements; logic of difference), and therefore as a potential threat. This has become the hegemonic discourse (political logics). The EU should engage itself with its neighbourhood because it is in its interests (fantasmatic logics), and the emphasis is on ‘joint ownership’, which means that the neighbours help with determining the benchmarks for reforms (and implement them), while the EU rewards their efforts (conditionality).

In contrast with the European Commission and the Council, the EESC supports the establishment of a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. It pleads for socially-balanced reforms and it criticizes the Action Plans for their lack of attention to social security matters. Moreover, it argues that CSOs and mainly the social partners should play a role in both the development and the implementation of socio-economic policies (within the Mediterranean countries and within the EU); it supports the organization of a social dialogue. Furthermore, it rejects the economic model the European Commission and the Council are promoting in the neighbourhood, because the Eastern and the Southern neighbours will not have decision-making power. The EESC holds the opinion that the Eastern neighbours should be able to become a member of the EU. The latter is also the view of the European Parliament, which states that ‘everything but institutions’ should not mean ‘everything but decision-making power’. It therefore suggests that the EU’s strategy towards the neighbours should also have a multilateral institutional dimension, and it proposes to create a new order, based on multilateralism; a new ‘neighbourhood concept’: the Pan-European and Mediterranean region which consists of three areas: a common political area based on multilateral conventions (based on the political norms developed by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN which are guarded by international institutions), and an economic and security area. The latter consists of a FTA which could
encompass aspects of the internal market as well as internal and external security. The FTA will be implemented and monitored through common institutions after the example of the EFTA surveillance authority and the EFTA court. In this way, the neighbours will also have decision-making power. In order to reach the FTA, economic reforms are necessary; the main goal is to create a transparent social market economy. The European Parliament also focuses on positive liberties. We conclude that the European Parliament seems to be inclined towards the promotion of a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region.

The social order the EESC and the European Parliament are promoting is thus very similar, and both articulate the concept ‘neighbourhood’ in a different way than the European Commission and the (European) Council. While the latter mainly used the concept ‘neighbourhood’ to geographically define which countries can become member of the ENP, the EESC and the European Parliament attribute another meaning to the concept ‘neighbourhood’. For the EESC, ‘neighbourhood’ refers to a community of values, cultures and intent, where geography does not play a role, so everyone can become part of the ‘neighbourhood’. The concept ‘participatory democracy’ functioned as a second nodal point in its discourse. The European Parliament further defines the ‘neighbourhood’ as a ‘Pan-European and Mediterranean region’. This concept brings together two or more identities in one common objective, i.e. it establishes a link (the creation of a region) between two different forms of regional integration through the EEA, and it refers to the multilateral conventions which will be common to both ‘pan-Europe’ and the Mediterranean. In the next chapter, we study the social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the different EU institutions in the context of the UfM.
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- Nodal point which represents a common identity for the Self and the Other: a common identity which is based on the internal market (and the four freedoms) and on political, legal and human rights standards laid down in international agreement.
- Good governance (after 2003)
  - EU as an actor which is ‘well-governed’ because it has created an internal market (market economy) and because it follows the political and social norms laid down in international agreements (logic of equivalence; Self)
  - The neighbours as actors which are not yet well governed, not yet part of the internal market, not yet market economies, not yet following political and social norms laid down international agreement (logic of difference; Other) and therefore a potential threat
- Good governance reflects an identity which can also be reached by the neighbours + Neighbourhood which reflects that they are bordering the EU; that they are not part of the EU.

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<td>nodal point which represents a common identity for all countries which cannot become a member of the EU (irrespective their geographical location) which is based on a social order which combines the establishment of the free market with social policies. The civil society has a role to play in the socio-economic development of the neighbourhood through social dialogue. This will strengthen democracy and lead to participatory democracy (second nodal point).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
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<td>Pan-Europe (European member states, European institutions, other European states, candidate member states) as an actor which is economically integrated (internal market) and which respects political and security norms developed by international institutions (Council of Europe, OSCE, UN; logic of equivalence, Self) Mediterranean as an actor which is not yet economically integrated and which not yet respects political and security norms developed by international institutions (logic of difference, Other) Pan-European and Mediterranean region; nodal point which establishes a link (the creation of a region) between two different forms of regional integration and it refers to the multilateral conventions which will be common to both ‘Pan-Europe’ and the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>Logic of multilateral Europe (follower for political norms and leader; the EU should take the lead in the formulation of a multilateral order)</td>
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Table 20. Social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European institutions on the ENP
Chapter 8: The Union for the Mediterranean

8.1 Introduction

In chapter 1 of this dissertation, we already discussed in length the negotiations on the establishment of the UfM. From this overview, we drew three main conclusions. First, the UfM is based on the MU, an initiative proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy in order to convince the French electorate to vote for him in the presidential elections of 2007. By the creation of a new framework for cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, he wanted to tackle the migration from the region to France. At the same time, he tried to convince the French electorate of North African origin to vote for him. In addition, Sarkozy also tried to expand the role of France at the international level. The UfM is thus not a reaction on events/problems in the region or on changes in international relations. Second, the other European member states were only concerned about limiting the ambition of Sarkozy in the region. Therefore, they tried to integrate his proposal for the establishment of a MU into the existing framework Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Consequently, the negotiations between the European member states mainly focused on the institutional structure of this new initiative, rather than on the content. Third, the Mediterranean partners from their side were initially rather reticent about the UfM, but Sarkozy succeeded in convincing them by offering them side payments: Egypt became the new co-President of the UfM, Tunisia was promised the secretary general and Morocco a strengthening of the bilateral relations. Overall, the discussion never really focused on the social order to be promoted in the region, in contrast with the renewed ENP (see infra). We therefore do not expect important changes in the social order articulated by the European institutions. We will study the documents of the European Commission, France, Spain, the Council and the European Parliament. The EESC did not adopt an opinion on the UfM. This makes it difficult to study its discourse. On the eve of the summit of heads of state and government of the Euro-Mediterranean countries in Paris on 13 and 14 July 2008, the EESC issued a press release, in which it gave its full support for the UfM. However, it pleaded for a strong involvement of CSOs in the UfM. At the Euromed Summit of Economic & Social Councils and similar institutions held in November 2010, the EESC, together with its partner organizations in the Mediterranean countries, proposed the creation of an Assembly of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions after the example of the EESC within the EU framework. This assembly, which was officially launched at the 2010 Euromed Summit, gives a more structured form to the network of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions which was created within the framework of the EMP.
8.2 Social logics in the Union for the Mediterranean

8.2.1 The European Commission

We already explained that the European member states (especially France) were the main driving forces behind the creation of the UfM. In the beginning of the discussion, the Commission sided with Germany, the UK, Sweden and the Slovenian presidency, arguing that the MU/UfM should be a European project. Only after Sarkozy gave into this request and the European Council officially welcomed the idea of the creation of the UfM, the European Commission became involved into the discussion on how the policy should look like. It received a mandate to present a proposal, which first led to a ‘Commission non-paper on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’. This non-paper, which formed the basis for the discussion with the member states in the Council and the Mediterranean countries, mainly focused on the institutional structure in order to upgrade the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners and to provide more co-ownership for the Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2008a). The communication which followed this non-paper frames the UfM within the EMP and within the broader evolution of the EU’s relation with the Mediterranean region. In this communication, globalization is presented as an economic process which can have positive consequences for the Mediterranean countries, if it is dealt with (logic of economic opportunity). Therefore, they should implement economic reforms. The European Commission (2008b: 3) argues that these reforms should go further and that they should be implemented much faster than in the past: ‘However, it is also true that further and faster reforms are needed if the EU’s Mediterranean partners are to reap the potential benefits of globalization and free trade with the EU and regional integration’.45 Further economic liberalization is thus considered as the best solution for creating prosperity in the region. It is important to note here that in contrast with the ENP, security is not emphasized in this document. It is only mentioned twice in the beginning, as an objective of the EU’s policy towards the region.

Economic liberalization is thus the main strategy to be followed, but this is mainly seen as the responsibility of the Mediterranean countries: ‘While there is more that the EU can do to promote trade, investment and co-operation in the region, the greatest need is for the countries of the region to take up these opportunities as part of their domestic economic policies’ (European Commission, 2008b: 3). Within the framework of the UfM, the EU will promote

45 In this document of the European Commission, globalization is (in contrast with its other documents) not articulated as ‘interdependence’.
regional cooperation and economic integration in the Mediterranean region: ‘the project dimension should be at the heart of the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. The programmes developed under this initiative should have a strong potential to promote regional cohesion and economic integration, and to develop infrastructural connections’ (European Commission, 2008b: 7-8). The projects that were selected focus on the environment (de-pollution of the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Solar Plan and civil protection), the economy (Maritime and Land Highways and the Mediterranean Business Initiative) and education (Euro-Mediterranean University; Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008a: 19-20). The main focus of the EU under the UfM thus is thus on the second basket of the EMP, and more specifically on one particular objective of the second basket, i.e. the promotion of regional cooperation. Despite the reference to economic integration, the EU mainly focuses on regional cooperation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the UfM is also the continuation of the EMP, so the other objectives of the partnership are also still promoted (see for example the Euro-Mediterranean conference of the ministers of foreign affairs on employment and labour organized in November 2008 and November 2010).

If we look at how democracy is defined in this document, it can be concluded that the concept ‘good governance’ is no longer mentioned in the documents of the Commission. However, the European Commission still refers to ‘governance’, and adds the promotion of ‘participatory democracy’ as an objective of the EMP/UfM: ‘The partnership has also overseen efforts to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and continues to promote the embracing of all human rights and freedoms. However, the aim of advancing and reforms and engaging more decisively in the process of strengthening governance and participatory democracy, has been tempered by global and regional events. A very positive feature of the last decade has been the way in which dialogues with different political and economic agents - civil society, including women’s organizations and the media - have become more central to the process’ (European Commission, 2008b: 3). A similar formulation can be found in the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean: ‘Heads of State and Government underline their commitment to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and the embracing of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008a). In addition, the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is especially emphasized here, with reference to international human rights law: ‘They also affirm their ambition to build a common future based on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in international human rights law, such as the promotion of economic,
social, cultural, civil and political rights, strengthening the role of women in society, the respect of minorities, the fight against racism and xenophobia and the advancement of cultural dialogue and mutual understanding’ (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008a: 8). Thus, in addition to the promotion of negative liberties, the EU now stresses more the promotion of political liberty, i.e. the expansion of participation in political life. Based on the Commission communication (2008b: 3), it can be concluded that the focus is mainly on the possibility for CSOs to take part in the decision-making processes in the Mediterranean countries. The discourse of the European Commission is based on the logic of the market and on the logic of the civil society. However, from this Commission communications, it is not clear how the CSOs are exactly defined, and what their exact role is.

If we study the follow-up of the UfM, we get a sharper image of what the EU means by ‘participatory democracy’ and how it further defines the possibility for CSOs to take part in the decision-making processes. In November 2008, the EU and the Mediterranean partners organized for the first time a Euro-Mediterranean conference on employment and labour (it was one of the few meetings which were organized despite the problems in the Middle East). As explained in the previous chapter, in 2004, the European Commission already suggested for the first time to organize a dialogue on social policy with the Mediterranean countries. However, initially, this objective was not further elaborated. During the preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean conference of the ministers of foreign affairs in 2006, the Commission (2006c) proposes to organize a workshop on employment. At the same time, the EESC and the European Parliament were proposing a similar initiative (see for example the 2006 opinion in which the EESC already elaborated on this and the European Parliament resolution on Euro-Mediterranean relations of 2007). This workshop was eventually held on 12 and 13 December 2007 and it cleared the way for a Euro-Mediterranean conference on employment and labour. The main focus of the conference is on jobs, key objectives are: creating more jobs, creating employability and creating better jobs (decent employment opportunities), with special focus on equal opportunities for man and women, opportunities for young people, transforming informal into formal employment and managing labour migration (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008b: 8). These objectives will be mainly supported by exchanging experiences and best practices. In addition, the ministers of foreign affairs stress the role of the social partners, and they ‘underlined the key role social dialogue needed to play in managing socio-economic change in the Euro-Mediterranean region (…)’ (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008b: 1). Overall, the objectives of the conference, also the social dialogue, were articulated within the framework of the policy of the ILO: ‘The Ministers reaffirmed the crucial importance of an effective social
dialogue for enhancing employment, employability, and decent work in the Euro-Mediterranean countries. The Tripartite dialogue between the social partners and the governments is key. At the same time, efforts need to be stepped up in bipartite dialogue between employers and trade unions to enhance their contribution to managing economic and social change. The capacity of the social partners needs to be reinforced in many partner countries. In this context, the cooperation of social partners across the Euro-Mediterranean region should be further developed’ (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008b: 3). This is not a coincidence: in 2007, the countries in the ILO were negotiating a new declaration on ‘Social Justice for a Fair Globalization’. Social dialogue and tripartism are one of the four strategic objectives of this declaration (ILO, 2008). This objective is from then on emphasized within the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. The conference eventually led to the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Social Dialogue Forum (which met for the first time in Barcelona in March 2010), where social partners from both the EU and the Mediterranean region can meet. This initiative should strengthen the capacity of the social partners in the Mediterranean countries, and therefore, cooperation with partners from the EU will be enhanced (Euro-Mediterranean Social Dialogue Forum, 2010). In November 2010, the second Euro-Mediterranean conference on labour and employment was organized. In the conclusions of the conference, the promotion of social dialogue is mentioned as one of the key priorities (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2010). Overall, the EU is now focusing on the ‘social partners’ as the civil society that has to be promoted. The task of these social partners is to contribute to the social dialogue in the Mediterranean countries, and to help managing socio-economic change. Nevertheless, in the Commission communication on the UfM, this was not made clear yet. The discourse of the EU is based on the logic of the market and the logic of the civil society, but the civil society is here defined as ‘social partners’ (just like was the case in the discourse of the EESC). This particular discourse does not meet one of the views of democracy we defined in chapter 4, because in our definition of a liberal-conservative democracy, civil society is based on national identity and family. It does also not meet the definition of a liberal democracy, because the discourse is not based on the logic of the state. A closer look is needed at the exact role of the civil society, and its relation to the market and the state. This will be done in the next chapter.

8.2.2 The (European) Council and the member states

As explained in chapter 1, French President Nicolas Sarkozy was the initiator of the UfM. During his campaign for the French presidential elections, he proposed the creation of a MU with the Mediterranean region. In a speech in Toulon on 7 February 2007, he extensively explains his view
on the Mediterranean region, on the relations between France and the Mediterranean region, and on the structure and content of the new MU (Sarkozy, 2007a). This proposal constituted the basis for the UfM. Therefore, this speech will be analyzed here. In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy repeated his proposal for the creation of a MU in his victory speech (Sarkozy, 2007b). This offer led to strong reactions of the other European member states. As explained, most European member states were concerned about the idea that France would try to organize the cooperation with the Mediterranean region outside the framework of the EU, which would affect their influence on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. As a consequence, the discussion mainly focused on the structure of the new cooperation framework, rather than on the content. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos (2007a; 2007b), was the only one who also went deeper into the objectives of the new framework. In a speech at the University of Malta, and in an op-ed in El Pais, he proposed to reinforce the Barcelona Process through the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Union. Therefore, his view will be analyzed here, together with the documents of the (European) Council.

Nicolas Sarkozy (2007a) stated in his speech in Toulon that we should see the Mediterranean region in the context of globalization. He sees globalization not only as an economic process, but also as a political and cultural process. Moreover, he presents globalization as a process which brings hope, but which also presents challenges. These challenges are especially stressed in his speech. For example, he states that globalization is a threat to cultural diversity. Globalization poses challenges for the Mediterranean countries, and also for Europe, given their geographical interdependence. Nevertheless, we can deal with these challenges, according to the President. Politics can do something about the negative consequences of globalization. In this regard, Sarkozy states that we should not leave everything to the market, the political world should deal with the negative consequences in order to place globalization in service of the people. His view meets the logic of economic, social and cultural opportunity (Sarkozy, 2007a: 8-9).

The French President states that Europe should develop a Euro-African strategy in which the Mediterranean region takes a central place. Europe should do this because it shares a common heritage with the region, but also because it is in its interests. In this regard, he refers to the policies of the US and China in Africa, and he states that globalization will not wait until Europe decides that it finally wants to be a political actor. Referring to the failures of the Barcelona Process, he then states that Southern European member states, and more specifically Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus should create a new framework, since the EMP does
not really work. This new framework is the MU, which will function after the example of the G8 (periodical meetings between the heads of state and government chaired by a President) and the EU (Mediterranean Council after the example of the Council of the EU), and which is an alternative for the accession of Turkey to the EU (Sarkozy, 2007a: 11). In relation to this, Sarkozy states that Europe will only have an identity if it has borders and thus limitations. The MU consists of four pillars, and one of those pillars is the ‘joint development pillar’ which is based on the development of a FTA, and on cooperation in the field of economics, energy, technology, education and water. It also consists of cooperation between companies and universities. The other pillars are environmental cooperation, the establishment of a Mediterranean collective security system and the development of a common judicial sphere in order to fight corruption, organized crime and terrorism (Sarkozy, 2007a: 11-15). In his policy proposal, the French presidency does not refer to social policy or to democracy and human rights. Nevertheless, Nicolas Sarkozy has a political and social view for the Mediterranean region, although this is not elaborated in one of the four pillars of the MU. He refers to humanism; the possibility for the individual to develop him or herself, he believes in ethics, justice, work (as a value), and also in liberty and responsibility. In this regard, he states that social support is the denial of the value work, because it creates dependency. However, this does not mean that the welfare state should disappear. By contrast, the state should help people who have problems; it should give them hope and indicate that they are the masters of their own future. But the value ‘work’ should be restored; work should give people hope and prosperity. In relation to humanism, Sarkozy also refers to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and indicates that the development of the individual should be central in the relation with the Mediterranean region (Sarkozy, 2007a: 16-18). Overall, the French President promotes a ‘Third Way democracy’ as we described it in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, but this is not reflected in his proposal for a MU.

As mentioned earlier, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos, was the first one to respond on the proposal of Nicolas Sarkozy. In his speech at the University of Malta, where he received the degree of Doctor in Literature, he presented his view on the development of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Moratinos starts with discussing the history of Malta, and he identifies four lessons we can learn from this history in order to meet the challenges the Mediterranean region is facing today. The first lesson is that Malta has fought to reach peace. Similarly, Moratinos argues, we should keep fighting to solve the Arab-Palestinian conflict and to reach peace in the Middle East. The Southern European member states, which he articulates as the ‘Olive Belt’, can help with that. Second, the history of Malta shows us the
importance of democracy and tolerance, which we should keep promoting in the region. However, we should not try to impose democracy military, but through political dialogue. Third, we should not see the Other as a threat, and the fourth lesson is that economic development follows from a better education and a free economic environment. According to Moratinos, this is the way in which the Mediterranean region can be developed. These were also the main ideas behind the Barcelona Process (Moratinos, 2007a: 255-256). Subsequently, Moratinos proposes to strengthen the Barcelona Process. The EMP is here presented as an instrument to reach joint objectives, based on shared responsibilities. Moratinos states that it should not be seen as an instrument of the Northern countries to serve its own interests in the Mediterranean region. Nevertheless, he recognized that the EMP has not reached its objectives yet. Moratinos mainly proposes to change the institutional infrastructure, and to establish a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Union’ with a Euro-Mediterranean Council and a Euro-Mediterranean Parliament after the example of the EU. He does not go deeper into the exact objectives of the EMP, and how these should be changed. Instead, he implicitly suggests continuing the social order promoted under the EMP (Moratinos, 2007a: 256-257; Moratinos, 2007b).

Also Italy, Portugal (which held the presidency from July until December 2007) and Greece preferred to strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean region within the framework of the EMP, rather than to create a new framework for cooperation. Spain and Italy eventually negotiated with France, agreeing that the creation of a ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (the concept was launched here for the first time) would not replace the existing Euro-Mediterranean relations. Nevertheless, Germany opposed the plan of Sarkozy, and eventually the latter had to give into the demand of Angela Merkel: the UfM would be a European project, strengthening the EMP, rather than a new, additional framework to the Barcelona Process. As we explained earlier, there was no discussion on the social order the EU should promote in the Mediterranean region. The talks with Spain, Italy and Germany focused on the institutional structure of the UfM, and not on the content. The European Council of 13 and 14 March 2008 approved the principle of the UfM and invited the European Commission to present a proposal in this regard (European Council, 2008a). Consequently, the European Commission, together with France, started to work on this proposal. The proposals to upgrade the political level of the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean region, to provide more ownership and the proposed projects were mainly developed by France (see also Sarkozy’s proposals to organize periodical meetings of the heads of states and governments and its four pillars on which the projects are based). At the European Council of 19/20 June 2008, the other member states adopted the Commission communication, which allowed France to organize a meeting where the new UfM would officially be launched.
(European Council, 2008b). This meeting was eventually held in Paris on 13 and 14 July 2008, where the Paris Declaration was adopted (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008a). As we explained in the paragraphs on the social logics of the European Commission, the Paris Declaration reflects the discourse we found in the 2008 Commission communication.

8.2.3 The European Parliament

The European Parliament adopted three resolutions on the UfM. On 2 June 2008, members of the PPE-DE Group, the PSE Group, the ALDE Group, the Verts/ALE Group and the UEN Group issued a joint motion for a resolution on the UfM (European Parliament, 2008b). This resolution was eventually adopted on 5 June 2008, one month before the UfM would be officially launched in Paris (European Parliament, 2008a). In the second half of 2008, the Committee on foreign affairs of the European Parliament drafted a more elaborated report on the UfM (European Parliament, 2008c), which led to a resolution adopted on 19 February 2009 (European Parliament, 2009). In the latter resolution, the European Parliament comments on the Commission communication, the joint declaration and the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of 3-4 November 2008. It does not present a different view on the UfM, but highlights some of the shortcomings which the framework according the European Parliament is facing. As a result of the meeting of heads of state and government which would be organized on 7 June 2010 (but which would not take place), the European Parliament adopted a new report and resolution on the UfM (European Parliament, 2010a; 2010b). Overall, the European Parliament, just like the member states, mainly focuses on the institutional structure of the UfM, rather than on the content of the cooperation.

The study of these resolutions learns us that globalization is presented as a challenge for both the EU and for the Mediterranean countries, but that it is also presented as a contingent process, i.e. a process which can be dealt with: ‘whereas the Mediterranean basin is becoming an area of key importance and the European Union and partner countries increasingly have shared interests in meeting the challenges of globalization and peaceful coexistence, meaning that there is a need to ensure greater regional cohesion and the development of a joint policy strategy for the area’ (European Parliament, 2008c: 4). In its 2010 report, the Parliament (2010b: 20) states: ‘Europe and its neighbours south and east of the Mediterranean are now at a crossroads in their shared history. There is virtually no other option but to join forces in a spirit of solidarity in order to address the major global challenges whose effects are being felt on a daily basis on both the shores of the Mediterranean’. The European Parliament welcomes the UfM, but stresses that this framework should be built on the EMP, and welcomes the fact that it is promoted within the
framework of the EU institutions. Like we mentioned above, the comments of the European Parliament mainly focus on the institutional structure of the framework (the role of the EMPA, the EMRLA, a Euro-Mediterranean Economic and Social Committee, the secretariat, the presidency) and on the participants (the League of the Arab States, future candidate states). Regarding the content of the cooperation, it can be noted that the European Parliament again refers to the establishment of three areas of cooperation, like it did in its resolutions on the ENP. However, in these references, the European Parliament returns to the three original objectives of the EMP. It does no longer stress the establishment of a ‘multilateral institutional dimension’ in order to manage these three areas.

On the economic cooperation with the Mediterranean region, the European Parliament emphasizes the establishment of a ‘mutually beneficial Euro-Mediterranean free trade area’ (the main goal of the EMP; in contrast with the resolution on the ENP, there is no reference to the EEA; European Parliament, 2008c: 10; European Parliament, 2008a; European Parliament, 2010a; 2010b). It states that ‘the economic and commercial initiatives of the Union for the Mediterranean must favour the economic growth of the region, help improve its integration into the world economy and contribute to reducing the development gap between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean, while boosting social cohesion’ and ‘it points out in this regard that the objective of a free trade area cannot be measured simply in terms of economic growth, but also and above all in terms of job creation’. In order to reach this FTA, a liberalization process is needed, but the social impact of this process should also be taken into account (European Parliament, 2008c: 10-11; European Parliament, 2009). Within the framework of the establishment of the EMFTA, the European Parliament stresses the importance of promoting economic integration in the Mediterranean region, and it ‘highlights the lack of any strategies for economic and regional integration in the Mediterranean basin to support those projects’ (the projects of the UfM, 10; European Parliament, 2008c: 10; European Parliament, 2009). On the cooperation regarding security, the European Parliament refers to cooperation in order to address international terrorism, drugs trafficking, organized crime and trafficking of human beings, the creation of an area free of nuclear armaments and weapons of mass destruction, the settlement of conflict in the region and the management of migration (European Parliament, 2008c: 9-10; European Parliament, 2009). Regarding the political cooperation, the European Parliament stresses the ‘consolidation of a Euro-Mediterranean area based on democratic

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46 Besides political cooperation, the European Parliament also argues that intercultural and inter-societal understanding should be promoted, and it suggests supporting the Alliance of Civilisations as the prime forum for dialogue.
principles and respect for the rule of law and human rights, which should lead to a strong partnership in foreign and security policy’ (European Parliament, 2008a; European Parliament, 2008b). The European Parliament emphasizes the promotion of human rights (in its 2008 report on the UfM, it refers in this regard to the Council of Europe), and it also pleads for a ‘strong and visible support for civil society and democratic political organisations on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. It calls for ‘a strong involvement of civil society and social partners’ representatives in the institutional framework of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (European Parliament, 2008a; European Parliament, 2008b, see also European Parliament, 2010a; European Parliament, 2010b: 7). This means that the European Parliament does not only promote negative, but also positive liberty. Overall, the European Parliament mainly promotes the social order as it is implemented in the Mediterranean region by the European Commission and the (European) Council. Furthermore, the social order it wants to promote is not clearly articulated in these resolutions (because it is mainly a reaction on the proposals of the documents of the European Commission and the (European) Council which makes it difficult to draw a definite conclusion.

8.3 Political and fantasmatic logics in the Union for the Mediterranean

8.3.1 The European Commission

How are the Self and the Other defined by the European Commission in its non-paper and its communication on the UfM? A closer look at the spatiality of identity construction reveals that ‘the Mediterranean region’ is broadly defined in the discourse of the European Commission, like was the case in the past. Besides the countries that were part of the Barcelona Process launched in 1995 (Albania (observer) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauretania (observer), the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (observer)), the European Commission now suggests also involving the other Mediterranean coastal states Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro (European Commission, 2008a: 2)). Related to this, all these Mediterranean countries and the EU are presented as facing similar challenges: ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a means to address many strategic regional questions relating to security, environmental protection, the management of maritime resources, economic relations through trade in goods, services and investment, energy supplies (producing and transit countries), transport, migratory flows (origin and transit), regulatory convergence, cultural and religious diversity and mutual understanding. However, the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, needs to be revisited and
given greater political prominence (European Commission, 2008b: 2). The Mediterranean countries are thus not presented as being a threat for the EU; it is emphasized which problems all these countries have in common (spatial construction of identity).

These problems can be solved, according to the European Commission (see infra; temporal construction of identity). Therefore, regional stability and democracy need to be promoted through regional cooperation and integration. The concept ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ functions as a first nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission: it is the creation of a Union of all European member states and all Mediterranean countries which border the Mediterranean Sea, which will address the common problems they are facing, and which is based on the Barcelona Process. The EU should help addressing these problems by promoting regional cooperation, because this is in the EU’s interests: ‘The Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union in both political and economic terms’ (European Commission, 2008b: 2). This view meets one of the narratives Erik Jones (2010) mentioned in his article: the EU should support economic integration because it is in its interests. The Mediterranean countries on their turn should implement economic reforms in order to reap the benefits of regional integration. Like we mentioned earlier, these reforms are articulated as being the responsibility of the Mediterranean countries: ‘they should take up these opportunities as part of their domestic economic policies’, the European Commission (2008b: 3) refers in this regard also to ‘economic governance’ (European Commission, 2008b: 3). Governance, which refers to political and economic reforms, is a central concept in the discourse of the EU. In addition to the concepts ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ and ‘governance’, the concept ‘participatory democracy’ functions as a third nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission. This concept is here defined as ‘participation to the political life’, and more specifically, as the possibility for CSOs for taking part in the decision-making processes in the Mediterranean countries. The EU should support this, according to the European Commission. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the European Commission sees the role of the civil society. In its discourse, the Commission also refers to other political actors who have a responsibility to the Mediterranean region, especially regarding financial assistance. It states: ‘the European Commission believes that additional funding for regional projects and activities should mainly come from the following sources: private sector

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47 The concept ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ is not invented by the European Commission; it appeared first in the communique of France, Spain and Italy, ‘the Appel of Rome’, on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Nevertheless, in the communication of the European Commission, ‘Barcelona Process’ is added because this reflects that the proposal is embedded into the existing European policy towards the Mediterranean.
participation, bilateral cooperation from EU MS, contributions from Mediterranean partners; international financial institutions, regional banks and other bilateral funds; the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility and the ENPI’ (European Commission, 2008b: 8-9).

8.3.2 The (European) Council and the member states

The study of the political logics in the discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy reveals that the President has a different definition of the ‘Med’ than the European Commission and the Council. The Mediterranean is here mainly culturally defined and is presented as the birthplace of the European citizens; as the birthplace of Europe. He emphasizes the cultural heritage the Jews, Christians, Muslims and atheists share, and which makes their cultures very similar. He states that we are all children of Cordoba and Grenada, children of Arab scholars who brought us the heritage of the ancient Greeks and who influenced us. Sarkozy strongly emphasizes the common heritage of Europe and the Mediterranean, but adds that we became strangers of one another, mainly because of the colonization. He states that Europe has turned its back to the Mediterranean, and neglected the region intellectually, culturally, morally, politically and economically, and that it has focused on the North and the East instead of on the South (Sarkozy, 2007a: 3-4). The Mediterranean countries are now facing serious problems, but these are mainly the consequence of the increasing globalization (spatial construction of identity).

Nevertheless, Europe (read: the Southern European member states) and the Mediterranean countries can do something about these problems (temporal construction of identity). Therefore, Sarkozy argues that the Mediterranean countries should leave the past behind them (the colonization); they should focus on the future. Based on the cultural definition of the Mediterranean, Sarkozy pleads for the creation of a MU, consisting of the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The ‘Mediterranean Union’ is the nodal point in the discourse of the French President, and presents a common identity for the Southern member states of the EU and the other Mediterranean countries, a common identity which is based on the common heritage, and on peace and prosperity. In this regard, Sarkozy states that the Mediterranean countries need to do what Europe has done after the two WWs destroyed the continent, i.e. they should organize economic integration (Sarkozy, 2007a: 7-8). In the press conference after the European Council of 13 March 2008 in Brussels, Sarkozy (2008: 1) again refers to the past of the EU as an example for the cooperation with the Med. He presents the establishment of a ‘Mediterranean Union’ (nodal point) after the example of the ‘European Union’. This view reflects the ‘bull myth’ we identified in chapter 4, i.e. the idea that peace will be reached through
economic cooperation and integration (see the promotion of the establishment of a FTA; fantasmatic logics). In this regard, all the Mediterranean countries should integrate economically (including the Southern European member states) through the establishment of common institutions. The latter is a task for the Southern member states (ethical construction of identity, Sarkozy, 2007a: 10-11).

If we then look at the political logics in the discourse of Moratinos, we find that he suggests that the Southern European member states should contribute to the development of a European policy towards the Mediterranean region, rather than that their main role is to establish a new ‘Mediterranean’ framework (in contrast with Sarkozy). In his discourse, Moratinos states that we should not see the Other in clichés and myths. Moreover, we should not present the Other as a threat to the Self. He argues that terrorism cannot be attributed to one single religion, culture or region. He also adds that the Islam is a ‘floating signifier’ which can be used to explain everything and nothing. Here Moratinos refers to the essay ‘the fox and the hedgehog’ of Isaiah Berlin, stating that we should all be more foxes. The latter rely for their interpretation of the social on several experiences and they believe that the social cannot be understood by one single concept, like hedgehogs do. At the same time, he argues that we should respect the identity and convictions of Others, while at the same time we should insist on living according to the values we share. But this does not mean that we want to impose things. We should define joint objectives (in contrast to the EMP, where the EU defined the objectives), and the responsibility to reach these objectives should be shared. This view on the Euro-Mediterranean relations is reflected by the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Union’ (nodal point) which stresses at the same time the differences between the EU and the Mediterranean (Euro-Mediterranean) and the joint partnership which is presented here (therefore, the concept ‘partnership’ is replaced by the concept ‘Union’; at the same time ‘Union’ also refers to the EU, since the Euro-Mediterranean Union is based on similar institutions as the EU). It represents a common identity which can be reached by both the EU and the Mediterranean, which is based on the objectives articulated in the Barcelona acquis: free trade, democracy, human rights, …. (Moratinos, 2007a: 256-257; Moratinos, 2007b). In his discourse, Moratinos (2007a) does not refer to one of the fantasmatic logics we articulated in chapter 4, although he refers to the past of the Europe, and more specifically, the experiences in Europe with totalitarianism, stating that the latter was one of the most important threats to liberty we faced in modern times.

After Sarkozy negotiated with Spain and Italy on his proposal, the Southern member states eventually referred to the new framework as the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, and no
longer to the ‘Mediterranean Union’. This change in name reflects the change in idea behind this framework: it would not replace the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region; it would not be an alternative for the EU, but an additional framework consisting of Mediterranean littoral states. As we explained already a few times, after the negotiations with Merkel, the UfM would be based on the EMP. The European Council of March 2008 welcomed the idea for the establishment of the UfM, and it asked the Commission to prepare a communication. Eventually, the European Council of June 2008 welcomed this communication, adopting the discourse of the European Commission and agreeing that the ‘Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union in political, economic and social terms’ (European Council, 2008b: 18). The concept ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ is adopted as a nodal point. As mentioned above, the Paris Declaration reflects the discourse of the commission communication, but the concepts ‘governance’ and ‘participatory democracy’ are not mentioned. The declaration refers to ‘democracy’, but democracy is articulated as ‘participatory democracy’, as we illustrated above. In a way, the declaration also reflects the discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy: ‘Europe and the Mediterranean are bound by history, geography and culture. More importantly, they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding. To achieve these common objectives participants agree to continue with renewed dynamism the quest for peace and cooperation, to explore their joint problems and transform these good intentions into actions in a renewed partnership for progress (Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008a: 9). At the Euro-Mediterranean conference of Marseilles in November 2008, the concept ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ is replaced by the concept ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (but the UfM is still based on the EMP; Euro-Mediterranean conference, 2008c).

8.3.3 The European Parliament

Just like the European Commission, the European Parliament defines the Mediterranean region very broadly: it ‘points out that the scope of EU-Mediterranean cooperation must also extend to the other Mediterranean coastal states and stresses that the entire Mediterranean identity of other countries needs to be fully recognised’ (European Parliament, 2008a), but it also adds that there should be ‘one cohesive framework of relations geared to economic and regional integration between the European Union and all the countries of the Mediterranean Basin’ (European Parliament, 2008c: 8, European Parliament, 2009). It states that the UfM does not constitute an alternative to enlargement of the EU and that it does not affect the accession prospects of any current or future candidate state, by which it makes a distinction between the EU and the ‘other’
Mediterranean countries. This comment was especially important for Turkey, which considered the proposal of Sarkozy as an attempt to provide an alternative for the accession of the country to the EU. The European Parliament mainly emphasizes the common challenges the EU and the Mediterranean are facing, in this regard, the Mediterranean countries are not really presented as a risk for the EU, but rather as ‘having problems’. Nevertheless, these problems can be solved, and the solution is the strengthening of the EMP. It refers to the three areas of cooperation it articulated within its previous resolution of the ENP, which are actually based on the three baskets of the EMP. The European Parliament also repeats the objectives of the EMP, such as the establishment of the FTA, and the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, the European Parliament argues that the name of the new framework should be ‘The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, because this makes clear that the UfM is built on the EMP, and that the Barcelona acquis is preserved and respected. This is the nodal point in the discourse of the European Parliament. It states: ‘Notes that the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, held in Marseilles on 3-4 November 2008, proposed that the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ be name the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’; takes the view that this name would help highlight the joint nature of the partnership with a view to the implementation of economic regional integration projects; considers it necessary, however, for the strategic value of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the Barcelona acquis, including the involvement of civil society, to be reaffirmed, taking as a starting point the policies which the European Union is already developing with its Mediterranean partners in the shape of regional and sub-regional programmes and common guidelines for bilateral cooperation (European Parliament, 2008c: 6; European Parliament, 2009). This paragraph makes clear how the European Parliament sees the concept ‘Union for the Mediterranean’: it represents the idea of a ‘joint’ partnership which would lead to economic integration. This concept therefore articulates a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on regional integration. In the rest of the documents, the European Parliament refers to the ‘Euro-Mediterranean partnership’, mainly in order to stress that the original objectives of the EMP (especially with regard to democracy and human rights) cannot get lost. For the European Parliament, the idea of a ‘joint’ partnership also means a greater sharing of responsibilities (European Parliament, 2008a). This sentence mainly refers to the joint policy-making and institutional framework of which the Parliament hopes that ‘it facilitates greater mutual cooperation on the pinpointing of problems and in the search for common solutions’ (European Parliament, 2008c: 9; European Parliament, 2009). In addition, it can be noted that the discourse of the European Parliament does not contain a clear fantasmatic logic which is due to the fact that its resolutions are mainly a reaction on the proposals of the
European Commission and the member states (which were adopted after the launch of the new framework), rather than that they provide a clear alternative for the organization of the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

8.4 Conclusions on the Union for the Mediterranean

In contrast with the previous documents on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region, it can be noted that the institutions now explicitly refer to the concept ‘globalization’ (while in the past, globalization was mainly articulated as ‘interdependence’). The European Commission and the (European) Council (which adopted its communication) present globalization as an economic process which can have positive consequences for the Mediterranean countries, if it is dealt with (logic of economic opportunity). In contrast with the discourse on the ENP, their discourses on the UfM are not based on the logic of security opportunity. The European Parliament presents globalization again in very general terms: it is seen as a challenge, which should be dealt with. French President Sarkozy sees globalization as provoking challenges in the economic, the social and the cultural field, and he argues that politics should deal with its consequences (logic of economic, social and cultural opportunity).

In the beginning of this chapter, we indicated that we did not expect important changes in the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. Indeed, the UfM is mainly a continuation of the EMP, with a strong focus on economic cooperation through the implementation of projects. There is also a link with the ENP: the European Commission refers to the implementation economic reforms by the neighbours (which is a central objective of the ENP). This is in the interest of the EU (fantasmatic logics). This social order is reflected by the concepts ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ and ‘governance’ (the European Commission does no longer refer to the concept ‘good governance’). Governance refers here to the economic and political reforms which should be implemented. Nevertheless, there are changes in the discourse, but these changes are mainly the consequence of earlier developments in the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean, rather than that they are the consequence of a relaunch of the EMP. In the 2008 Commission communication, we noted that the European Commission now starts to refer to ‘participatory democracy’ as a main objective of the EU’s policy towards the region. It then refers to the possibility for CSOs to take part in decision-making processes. In the follow-up of the EMP/UfM, it becomes clear how the CSOs are defined: it are the social partners in the EU and in the Mediterranean countries, which should play a role in social dialogue, and which should help manage socio-economic change. Participatory democracy is the third nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission. Nevertheless, it has a different
understanding of the concept than we articulated in chapter 4, because the European Commission refers here to old social movements (while in our conceptualization, participatory democracy emphasizes the role of new social movements). Its discourse is based on the role of the market and the role of the civil society (social partners), but this does not meet one of the conceptualizations of democracy we identified within the EU. A closer look is needed at the exact role of the civil society (chapter 9 and chapter 10).

The (European) Council and the member states eventually adopted this Commission communication, and thus also the discourse of the European Commission as the ‘EU discourse’. However, before this could happen, a lot of discussion took place between the member states, and it were especially France and Spain which elaborated their view on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Sarkozy wanted to establish a ‘Mediterranean Union’ after the example of the ‘European Union’ (political logics). He referred to the cosmogonic myth of the EU (fantasmatic logics), and argues that the Mediterranean countries can create a similar organization as the European countries did. The European countries which do not border the Mediterranean Sea should not be involved in this. In his discourse, we found that Sarkozy articulates promotes a ‘third way democracy’. However, this was not reflected in its eventual proposal for a MU (social logics). Moratinos suggested strengthening the EMP and to create a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Union’. The term ‘Union’ emphasizes the idea that the Mediterranean countries will become more involved in the policy (which was a long request of the Mediterranean countries), but refers also to the EU, since the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Union’ would be based on the same institutions as the EU. Regarding the objectives of the UfM, Moratinos mainly referred to the objectives already promoted under the EMP.

In contrast to the other institutions, the EESC has not adopted an opinion on the UfM. By contrast, the European Parliament issued three resolutions on the UfM. The European Parliament was a strong advocate of the reinforcement of the EMP. Just like the European Commission and several member states, it did not want to create a new framework for the Euro-Mediterranean relations. This is stressed several times in its resolutions, and it even suggests keeping the name ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ when the member states decided the drop the ‘Barcelona Process’. The Parliament promotes the reinforcement of the institutional framework of the EMP, in order to create a real ‘joint’ partnership in the light of its ideas articulated in the 1990s (see chapter 6). Regarding the objectives, it mainly refers to the original objectives as articulated in 1995. Nevertheless, the social order it wants to promote is less clearly articulated, which makes it difficult to draw a definite conclusion. In the next chapter, we
study the renewed ENP. Will the social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the different institutions/the member states be changed?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Social logics</th>
<th>Political logics</th>
<th>Fantasmatic logics</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| European Commission | Logic of economic opportunity  
Logic of the market  
Logic of the civil society | Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean  
The creation of a Union of all European member states and all Mediterranean countries which border the Mediterranean Sea, which will address the common problems they are facing, and which is based on the Barcelona Process  
Governance  
EU as an actor which is ‘governed’  
The Mediterranean countries as actors which are not yet governed, because they have not yet implemented economic and political reforms  
Participatory democracy  
nodal point which refers to ‘participation to the political life’, to the possibility for CSOs for taking part in the decision-making processes in the Mediterranean countries | Narrative of supporting economic integration and political cooperation because it is in the EU’s interests |
| Spain; France & (European) Council | France: Logic of economic, political, social and cultural opportunity; logic of the market and the state; third way democracy  
Spain: logic of the market; libertarian democracy  
(European) Council: logic of economic opportunity, logic of the market; logic of the civil society | France: Mediterranean Union  
nodal point which represents a common identity for the Southern member states of the EU and the other Mediterranean countries, which is based on the common heritage, and on peace and prosperity (after the example of the EU)  
Spain: Euro-Mediterranean Union  
nodal point which represents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean countries (which will remain different; prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’) based on the idea of a joint partnership  
(European) Council:  
Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean  
nodal point which represents the creation of a Union of all European member states and all Mediterranean countries which border the Mediterranean Sea, which will address the common problems they are facing, and which is based on the Barcelona Process | France: Bull Myth  
(European) Council: Narrative of supporting economic integration and political cooperation because it is in the EU’s interests |
Governance

EU as an actor which is ‘governed’
The Mediterranean countries as actors which are not yet governed, because they have not yet implemented economic and political reforms

Participatory democracy
Refers to ‘participation to the political life’, to the possibility for CSOs for taking part in the decision-making processes in the Mediterranean countries

<table>
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<tr>
<th>European Parliament</th>
<th>Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean nodal point which represent a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on regional integration</th>
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Table 21. Social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European institutions on the UfM
Chapter 9: The Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy

9.1 Introduction

Since 2009 the organization of the EU’s foreign policy has changed. On 1 December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. One of the main objectives of the new Treaty is to enhance the consistency and coherence of the EU’s foreign policy. In order to reach this objective, the Treaty assigns a special role to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Unlike the former High Representative, who only assisted the Council of the EU in matters of CFSP, the new High Representative is now the President of the Foreign Affairs Council and the vice-President of the Commission of the EU (Treaty of Lisbon, art. 18). Due to his/her ‘double-hatted’ position, the High Representative must be able to fulfil ‘a bridging function between the EU institutions and the different dimensions of EU external relations’ (Van Hoonacker & Reslow, 2010). In order to perform this task, the Treaty states that the High Representative will be assisted by the EEAS, consisting of a central administration and EU delegations in third countries and in international organizations. The organization and the functioning of the High Representative and the EEAS was made subject of negotiations between the High Representative, the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament (Treaty of Lisbon, art. 27). These negotiations took place between December 2009 and June 2010.48

As a result of the negotiations, the distribution of competences regarding the ENP has changed. The European Commission remains responsible for presenting proposals and thus the development of the ENP, in cooperation with the High Representative and the EEAS. Furthermore, the EEAS prepares the decisions regarding the programming of the budget in cooperation with the European Commission, which has to take the final decision about the programming. From 1 December 2009 on, the European Commission thus has to coordinate with an additional actor (besides the member states) on important policy aspects such as the development of the ENP and the programming of the financial assistance for the neighbours. The European Commission remains responsible for the implementation of the ENP. Almost immediately after the High Representative and the EEAS took on their tasks, they were confronted with the protests and revolutions in the Mediterranean region. As explained in chapter 1, this led to public contestation, and the EU institutions and the member states started to review the ENP. This review will be analyzed in the next paragraphs.

48 For more information about this, see Reynaert (2012).
9.2 Social logics in the Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy

9.2.1 The European Commission and the High Representative

Following the protests and demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt, High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Stefan Füle immediately started to reflect on how the EU should deal with this new situation. As explained earlier, the EU was at that time also working on a review of the ENP. In the beginning of February 2011, Ashton published two opinion articles, one in The Guardian (Ashton, 2011a) and one in the Financial Times (Ashton, 2011b), presenting her view on how the EU should deal with the (r)evolutions in the Mediterranean region. The High Representative also started a discussion with the member states. This discussion eventually led to the presentation of a communication ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ in the beginning of March 2011 (European Commission & High Representative, 2011a). In the same month, High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Füle also held a debate with the European Parliament. During this debate, they both held a speech, representing their view on the review of the ENP (Füle, 2011a; Ashton, 2011c). The review of the ENP which took place in 2010, the discussions with the member states and the debate with the European Parliament eventually led to a second communication, which was presented to the Council, the European Parliament, the EESC and the CoR in May 2011: ‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b). Throughout 2011, Ashton (2011d; 2011e) and Füle (2011b; 2011c; 2011d) also gave different speeches on the Arab Spring and the EU’s policy. All these documents give an insight into the Commission’s and the High Representative’s view on the events and on the EU’s renewed ENP.

Analysis of these documents shows that there are no explicit references to globalization or interdependence, although the idea that the EU and its neighbouring regions are interdependent shapes the policy: ‘To the East and South of the European Union (EU) lie sixteen countries whose hopes and futures make a direct and significant difference to us. Recent events have brought this into sharper relief, highlighting the challenges we face together’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 1). In their conclusions of the same document, the Commission and the High Representative (2011b: 21) state: ‘Cooperation with our neighbours is the only means to take on the challenges and threats that do no respect borders – such as terrorism, irregular migration, pollution of our common seas and rivers. It allows us to tackle sources of instability and conflict’. Nevertheless, interdependence is also seen as an opportunity: ‘Our neighbourhood offers great opportunities for mutually beneficial integration and co-
operation, for example large and well-educated working populations, sizeable markets still to be
developed, and win-win solutions in energy security’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 21). The interdependence with the neighbours is thus seen as having potentially negative consequences for the EU, especially in terms of security (normative judgment). However, at the same time, it is also seen as an opportunity (normative judgment). The opportunities are here mainly articulated in economic and in security terms: large and well-educated working populations, sizeable markets and win-win solutions in energy security. This view meets the logic of economic opportunity and the logic of security opportunity: the (problems following from the) interdependence can be dealt with (it is a contingent process) and it can generate benefits for the EU. Similarly, the (r)evolutions in the region are presented as both a challenge and as an opportunity: ‘The uprisings across north Africa and the Arab world pose great challenges to Europe and the rest of the world’ (Ashton, 2011a) and ‘We have a once in a lifetime opportunity to build deep and lasting democracy and prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean – doing so will require vision, perseverance and a team effort from all Europe’s institutions’ (Ashton, 2011e: 3). Füle (2011b) expresses it as follows: ‘Now it is time to bring our interests in line with our values. Recent events in the South have proved that there can be no real stability without real democracy’.

The strategy for dealing with these challenges and taking advantage of the opportunities according to the European Commission and the High Representative is to support democracy and economic development - at the same time. Ashton (2011d: 2) states ‘the goal is clear: the promotion of what I call ‘deep’ and sustainable democracy and – with it – economic prosperity. We know full well that democracy is hollow without food, safety, and jobs’. In another speech, she argues: ‘Political and economic reform must go hand in hand. Together they reinforce each other, attempted separately, both are likely to fail’ (Ashton, 2011b). According to Ashton, there needs to be ‘economic opportunity’ and sustainable economic and social development: political transformation will only succeed with economic opportunity. Economic development will be reached through economic growth, and this growth through export and FDIs. In order to reach this growth and development, the Mediterranean countries should transform into free market economies. The development of the free market is the central element in the policy of the EU. This will eventually lead to the conclusion of a deep and comprehensive free trade area and for the most advanced partners, a progressive economic integration into the EU internal market. The latter is the main objective of the ENP, and thus also of the renewed ENP (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 8).
In addition to this, the support of the progress towards deep democracy is the new element in the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative. Deep democracy is the nodal point in the opinions and speeches of Ashton and in the communications, and is compared with ‘surface democracy’, which means that people only have the opportunity to vote. By contrast, ‘deep democracy’ means, besides free and fair elections, also freedom of expression, association and assembly, a free press and media, the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and a right to a fair trial, fighting against corruption (an ‘impartial’ administration) and security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 3; Ashton, 2011a). Although the Commission and the High Representative state that there is no set model for political reform, they consider these elements as common to all ‘deep and sustainable’ democracies (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 3). These elements are thus presented as ‘universal’. In one of his speeches, Füle (2011b) adds to these elements that the EU will also pay attention to another closely related element: equality and nondiscrimination. Nevertheless, this equality is seen in relation to human rights, and thus to ‘liberty’: ‘The EU holds that everyone is entitled to the enjoyment of human rights, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language and religion, or to social or other status. I fully intend to fight discrimination in our neighbourhood’. Furthermore, he stresses gender equality and human rights. In the communications, there is less attention for equality – it is mentioned only once (in contrast to freedom, pluralism, human rights, which are articulated numerous times). This discourse partially reflects the discourse in the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU external relations which was adopted by the Council in November 2009. Here, the EU states that ‘while there is no single model of democracy, democracies share certain common features. These include the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the principle of non-discrimination, which provides that everyone is entitled to enjoyment of all human rights without discrimination as to race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or status. Democracy should ensure the rights of all, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, of indigenous people and other vulnerable groups’. In this Agenda for Action, the EU also stresses support for elected representatives and political parties and institutions, independent media and civil society’ (Council of the EU, 2009: 3-4).

However, it is important to note that several of the elements of a deep democracy (which entail reforms of the state) as articulated in the communications, are also seen as favourable for security and for economic development (and more specifically for the creation of a market
economy): ‘partner countries’ efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law and to fight corruption will also have a positive impact on the business environment, facilitating increasing foreign direct investment and technology transfer which in turn stimulate innovation and job creation’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 7). Overall, in the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative, the main task of the state is presented as facilitating the access to the internal market. The partner countries should conduct policies which improve the business environment and which supports small and medium-sized businesses and employability. In addition, they should implement EU rules and practices in order to reach the deep and comprehensive free trade area (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 7-8). Therefore, the state also needs to be reformed (see for example the strengthening of the rule of law). Reform of the state is also needed to address security: ‘A key element in this (mobility between the EU and the Neighbours, it) is the strengthening of capacity building in the Mediterranean countries on borders/migration/asylum and more effective law enforcement cooperation to improve security throughout the Mediterranean’. In return for these reforms, the EU can open up the movement of persons between the EU and the third country through visa facilitation agreements. In this regard, there is no real change in comparison with the discourse on the ENP. Nevertheless, in addition to this, the European Commission and the High Representative now argue that these reforms of the state will also contribute to more democracy (fight against corruption, independent judiciary, but also security and law enforcement sector reform). Economic and security reforms are presented as leading to economic development and security, but also as leading to the establishment of a democracy. In its communication, they for example state: ‘To support democratic transformation, Comprehensive Institution-Building programmes similar to those implemented with its Eastern neighbours will be set up: they will provide substantial expertise and financial support to build the capacity of key administrative bodies (customs, enforcement agencies, justice) and will be targeted in priority towards those institutions most needed to sustain democratization’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 16-17).

However, it is not sure if this will be the case. It is for example possible that the promotion of an independent judiciary leads to a situation where the judiciary is independent in matters of commercial law, but at the same time is subordinated where ‘matters of vital interest to the government are concerned’ (Beetham, 1997: 84). Beetham (1997) argues that a market can be supportive for a democracy, but only under certain conditions. It implies that the market is democratic, that the government is not subordinated to dominant economic interests in the economy and that the market is in some way controlled by the state in order to prevent that it
leads to economic and social inequalities (by installing a welfare state) or undermines the integrity of the democratic public sphere. The market and democracy might be conflictual. In the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative, there is little reference to ‘social policies’ which might control the market against creating economic and social inequalities. They only state that they will organize an ‘enhanced dialogue on employment and social policies’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 8). The European Commission and High Representative do not really see it as a task of the EU to support social policies (although this was mentioned as an objective in a previous communication on the ENP; European Commission, 2010).

In the communications, the civil society is considered as an important element in a ‘deep’ democracy. Overall, the European Commission and the High Representative articulate two tasks for the civil society. First, the role of the civil society is presented as controlling the government, and then especially as monitoring the reforms (which we described above) implemented by the government: ‘The EU will support this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 4). In this regard, the European Commission and the High Representative support a civil society which will contribute to (and which will thus legitimize) the economic and security reform processes it is promoting in the Mediterranean region. This was the task the European Commission also articulated under the ENP in 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, in contrast with the discourse on the ENP, but in agreement with the discourse on the UfM, the High Representative and the European Commission now also state that the CSOs should contribute to policy-making processes. The European Commission and the High Representative suggest reinforcing the EU’s support for CSOs in the neighbourhood by creating a Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility, which main objectives are ‘developing the advocacy capacity of CSOs and increasing their ability to monitor reform and participate effectively in policy dialogues’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011a: 6). Following the earlier developments under the UfM (see supra), the European Commission and the High Representative mainly refer to social partners as CSOs, such as trade unions and employers. In this regard, they state that ‘social dialogue between trade unions and employers plays an important role in sustaining reform efforts. New trade union and employers’ associations are now emerging. This provides an opportunity for more effective social dialogue’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011a: 6). This sentence reveals how the European Commission and the High Representative see social dialogue: it is embedded in the overall
reform policy it is promoting. This is important because it constitutes the boundaries in which the social dialogue can take place. This was not clear yet from the documents on the UfM.

In conclusion, we can state that the renewed ENP is similar to the ENP presented in 2003: the main focus is still on the market, and the task of the state is still mainly articulated as supporting the free market and the integration of the Mediterranean countries into the internal Market, and as guaranteeing security. In contrast with the ENP, democracy is articulated more explicitly. For example, the EU now wants to promote the organization of free and fair elections, which it did not do under the ENP (a reference to elections was for the first time inserted in the 2010 Commission communication on the ENP; but it was not mentioned yet as an objective). Nevertheless, several of these core elements of a democracy that are articulated are in favour of a free market economy, and a ‘law and order’ function of the state. It is unsure if this will automatically lead to more democracy. We argued that in order to have a balanced democracy the market should also be democratic, and this is not explicitly articulated by the European Commission and the High Representative. The task of the CSOs is, besides controlling if the government has implemented economic reforms, taking part in policy dialogue, and then especially in social dialogue, in order to make the reforms sustainable. In other words: the civil society has to contribute to the legitimation of the market reforms the European Commission and the High Representative are promoting. The functioning of the civil society is still subordinated to the function of the market, which leads us to conclude that the European Commission and the High Representative still seem to promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region. However, according to the European Commission and the High Representative, this support for the CSOs will also lead to more democracy, because it provides an opportunity to political participation. The question arises if this will be the case. In the next chapter, we will elaborate on the role of the civil society that is promoted by the EU under the renewed ENP.

9.2.2 The (European) Council and the member states

Besides the European Commission and the High Representative, also the member states engaged in the discussion on the review of the ENP. In a reaction to the events in Egypt in January 2011, the European Council issued on 4 February 2011 a declaration in which it condemned the violence of the regime against the protesters. In addition, it stated that the EU should support transition and transformation processes, which consist of ‘strengthening democratic institutions, promoting democratic governance and social justice, and assisting the preparation and conduct of free and fair elections’, and it asked the High Representative to develop a package of measures
for these processes, and to link the ENP and the UfM to these objectives (European Council, 2011). Following this request, Ashton started to work on the communications discussed above (European Commission & High Representative 2011a; 2011b). The Southern member states France, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta drafted a non-paper in which they gave their opinion on the review of the ENP (Southern member states, 2011). They sent this non-paper to the High Representative on 16 February 2011 in order to have a discussion on the matter during the Foreign Affairs Council and the preceding dinner on 21 February 2011. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini (2011a) explained his view in the Financial Times on 17 February 2011. Later on, he clarified his main idea, i.e. ‘a Marshall Plan for Mediterranean economic stability’ in an opinion which was published on different websites, such as Europe’s world (Frattini, 2011b). This idea was also promoted by the US, and more specifically by President Obama.

In addition to the Southern member states, also the Central and Eastern member states presented their view on the matter. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle sent a letter to Ashton on 18 February 2011, which was not made public. The main ideas presented in the letter appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ, 2011). In March 2011, Westerwelle (2011) issued a government policy statement on the events in the Mediterranean region, and on the reaction of Germany and the EU, which allows us to identify the discourse of Germany on the review on the ENP. The Dutch and Danish ministers of foreign affairs wrote an op-ed in the newspaper European Voice, presenting their ideas for a new era in the relations with the Mediterranean region (Espersen & Rosenthal, 2011). Poland also contributed to the debate by commenting on the non-paper of the Southern member states, and by proposing the creation of a EED (see supra). At that time, the country was preparing its presidency of the EU (July – December 2011). Minister of foreign affairs Radoslaw Sikorski gave different speeches on the events in the Arab world, and on the review of the ENP (Sikorski, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c). In March 2011, Polish MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (2011) wrote on op-ed on the policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean region, which was published by EurActiv. Based on this op-ed, MEPs of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania drafted their own non-paper on the review of the ENP, which they sent to Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle. Although this non-paper was written by MEPs, it is clear that they do not represent a European point of view, but a nationalist/regional view on the ENP (Eastern MEPs, 2011). These documents, together with the conclusions of the Council, give us an insight in the view of the member states, and in the discussion with the European Commission and the High Representative.
The non-paper of France, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta is written in a very formal way. There is no reference to the concepts globalization or interdependence, although the idea that the EU and its neighbouring countries are interdependent informed the policy proposals (Southern member states, 2011). Also the op-eds of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini do not explicitly refer to the concepts globalization or interdependence, but it is clearly articulated that the interdependence with the Mediterranean region plays an important role in his proposal: ‘The Mediterranean region is vital to Europe’s peace, stability, and economic growth’ (Frattini, 2011b). This interdependence is presented as a challenge for the EU: ‘The Mediterranean poses dramatic new challenges for European security. Events in Libya may add a fresh wave of refugees to the 5000 Tunisian migrants who landed on the coast of Sicily this week alone. Human traffickers, criminals and terrorists stand ready to exploit the chaos stemming from the collapse of the old order. Europe must act quickly, or this “arc of crisis” will lead to more illegal immigration, terrorism or Islamic radicalism’ (Frattini, 2011a). This view can also be found with the other Southern member states (but it is not articulated explicitly), when they propose to strengthen ‘the fight against organized crime, illegal traffic and illegal immigration’ (Southern member states, 2011). The interdependence with the neighbours is thus presented as having potentially negative consequences for the EU, especially in terms of security (normative judgment). However, at the same time, it is seen as an opportunity (normative judgment) because Europe can do something: ‘But it is also an opportunity for European and Mediterranean countries to work together in the interests of all’ (Frattini, 2011a). It is thus also seen as a contingent process (logic of security opportunity).

This is also the view of the Central and Eastern European member states. Guido Westerwelle, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany refers in his address for the Bundestag to the migrants who are arriving at Lampedusa, arguing that ‘we cannot take all these people’. Therefore, he states that we need to help these people to find a future in their own countries: ‘Acting and helping people in their own countries is the best policy to keep the stream of refugees under control’. At the same time, he presents the events in Arab world as an opportunity, because these countries can become economic partners of the EU and of Germany (Westerwelle, 2011a). The ministers of foreign affairs of the Netherlands and Denmark have a similar view: ‘Helping the region to prosper will create economic opportunities for Europe as well. Creating jobs for young Arabs will reduce the incentives to leave. Combating the root causes of migration is every bit as important as curbing illegal migration’ (Espersen & Rosenthal, 2011). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Sikorski (2011a) expresses his view as follows: ‘Let’s face it, we are maybe at risk from spoil over the instability the transformation generates in
the short term’, while the MEPs of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania argued that it is not only our moral duty to help the Mediterranean countries, but that it is also ‘in our vital security and economic interests, to build around us a ring of democratic and prosperous countries’ (Eastern MEPs, 2011). The views of the member states thus meet the logic of security opportunity and the logic of economic opportunity.

Nevertheless, the member states presented different possibilities to deal with the security risks and the economic opportunities the events in the Mediterranean region brought to them. The Southern European member states France, Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta suggest centralizing all actions of the EU and its member states towards the region within the framework of a macro-regional strategy, the ‘Mediterranean macro-region’. This Mediterranean macro-region would be modeled after the strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the strategy for the Danube Region, which are considered as the first ‘macro-regions’ of the EU. Within such a region, the different countries involved decide for a closer cooperation in order to address the common challenges the region is facing. Also non-EU countries can take part, like in the strategy for the Danube region. This region covers eight countries which are members of the EU (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Romania) and six countries which are not (yet) members of the EU (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine), which work together to address common challenges such as uneven socio-economic development, environmental threats, lack of transport connections, insufficient energy connections, …. The main objective of such cooperation is regional integration through territorial cooperation. In the beginning, the main focus is on projects which advance functional cooperation. For the Southern European member states, there are several reasons for articulating such a strategy. First, one of the main aims of a macro-region is to coordinate existing EU policy instruments in a flexible way, such as the funds of a wide range of EU policies, which are otherwise carried out in a fragmented way: regional policy, EU social funds, research and development programmes and the ENPI (Wallaert, 2011: 159). This might lead to more funding for the Mediterranean countries. In addition, the Southern European member states also ask for an increase of the EU’s financial engagement towards the Mediterranean region, adding that if the amount of funding per person per year is compared, the Eastern neighbours are favoured at the expense of the Southern ones. Second, this strategy leads the attention away from the original objective of the ENP: the integration of the Mediterranean countries into the EU internal market. This objective requires the Southern member states to open up their markets for the agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries. Moreover,
the neighbours ask for the free movement of their nationals on EU-territory, something which the Southern European member states are not in favour of.

Third, with the macro-regional strategy, the Southern European member states promote a form of regional integration in which the Northern member states are not involved, which was the original idea behind the MU presented by Sarkozy in 2007. Within the macro-regional strategy, the states involved in the region draft and implement the policy, but the responsibility and accountability remain at EU-level. For the Southern member states, it is a new opportunity to draft a policy without the involvement of the Northern member states. Fourth, this macro-regional strategy might give a boost to the UfM. The Southern European member states argue that both frameworks should remain separated. Like we explained in chapter 1, France was working at a reform of the UfM at that time. Turning it into macro-regional strategy would mean that the UfM would have a mixed nature: intergovernmental because states play the first violin in drafting and implementing the strategy, with the European Commission as an overall coordinator (supranational). Nevertheless, it would also mean that the problems of the UfM are adopted into the strategy, something which the Southern member states want to prevent. They therefore argued that both policy-frameworks should be synergetic; a large part of their paper is dedicated to the relaunch of the UfM (Southern member states, 2011).

In addition to the macro-regional strategy, which provides a framework for the overall policy for the region, the Southern European member states argue that the EU should offer each Mediterranean partner a ‘global and yet differentiated partnership’ which combines an enhanced political dialogue, cooperation against organized crime, illegal traffic and illegal immigration, financial assistance in return for reforms and support for the civil society. Regarding the financial assistance for reforms, it is stated that the EU should help with ‘the transformation of the political, economic model of the Mediterranean countries, as well as with the reform their institutions, taking into account the aspirations of the population regarding good governance and the respect for democratic and pluralist values’. This support can take the form of sending an Election Observation Mission, twinning or the exchange of best practices (Southern member states, 2011: 2). In conclusion, the Southern European member states try to promote a form of regional integration between them and the Mediterranean countries. Therefore, these countries need to implement economic and political reforms: the state needs to be reformed in order to support the free market – the Southern member states refer to the concept ‘good governance’ here. Regarding the support for the civil society, the Southern member states argue that the EU should favour CSOs which are working on education, professional training and economic and
judicial advice. In this regard, the tasks of the CSOs are then to train people in order for them to take up a job in a free market economy. The role of the state and the civil society is articulated as supporting the free market. It is remarkable that there is almost no reference to the concept ‘democracy’ in their text, it is only mentioned once. There is one reference to ‘liberty’, i.e. ‘pluralistic values’ and none to equality (Southern member states, 2011).

Italy sided with one of the main proposals of the other Southern European member states, i.e. an increase in financial assistance for the region. Frattini states that this financial assistance should be allocated to programmes which stimulate growth and create jobs. Moreover, he adds that the EU should develop a Marshall Plan for Mediterranean economic stability. The money should be used to modernize the economies and to remove trade and economic barriers between Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the EU should work together with the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and also with the US. In contrast with the other Southern member states, however, Frattini (2011a) adds that the EU should consider granting all countries an ‘enhanced’ status of association, i.e. progressive integration into the EU’s internal market and participation in a number of EU programmes. This would lead to an equal partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Overall, he states that ‘Europe’s strong support for the region’s economic development must remain the top priority’ (Frattini, 2011b). In his op-ed, Frattini (2011a) refers to social inclusion as a new pillar of the order the EU should promote, but the way to get there is economic development. In addition, the civil society should also be supported. The way to develop the civil society is to offer young people the possibility to study in Europe. Moreover, Frattini (2011a) adds that ‘offering the opportunity to study and train in Europe would also be the best way to curb illegal immigration and trafficking’. The main role of the support of the civil society is thus articulated as preventing people to migrate towards the EU. In the op-eds of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, there is almost no reference to ‘democracy’ – Frattini (2011a) states that ‘the pace of democratic transition in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere must be determined by each country’. Moreover, there is only one reference to the principle of liberty: ‘my proposed development and stability pact would include a commitment from each country to improve governance, meet international obligations and respect individual rights, including for women and religious minorities’ (Frattini, 2011b). Besides an economic policy, the EU should also develop a security policy, and Frattini therefore proposes to organize a CSCM just like Italy proposed in the 1990s.

The proposal of Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle is based on three principles. First, he pleads for the principle of ‘more for more’: the countries which implement
political reforms can receive more financial assistance from the EU in the form of budget support than those countries which are not willing to implement these reforms. In the latter case, the EU can give assistance for education, justice and the parliament. Second, he argues that the EU should open up its market for agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries. In this regard, he states that the strategic purpose and the main principles of the ENP remain valid (Westerwelle, 2011). Third, he proposes that more young people from the Mediterranean countries should be able to study in Europe (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung). The EU should thus promote mobility. In contrast with the Southern European member states France, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, Germany pleads for more market access instead of for more money for the Mediterranean countries. In this regard, Germany is supported by the Eastern member states, which reacted strongly on the remark of the Southern member states that the Eastern neighbours are favoured above the Southern neighbours in terms of financial assistance. The Minister of European Affairs of Poland, Mikolaj Dowgielewic, argues that ‘As the EU, we have equally important duties in the East. They are different than in the South, but equally vital’ (Sopinska, 2011). Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (2011) and the Eastern MEPs (2011) state that ‘It is a fundamental mistake to believe that there is a zero-sum game between the South and East dimensions of our neighbourhood. Both dimensions are equally underfinanced and neglected’ and ‘An approach, preferred by some, which says ‘if there is a problem, let’s give more money is not a sufficient answer’ (Eastern MEPs, 2011; Saryusz-Wolski, 2011).

For the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the renewed ENP should be based on the principle ‘more for more’ (just like Germany proposes). The ‘more for more’ principle should be applied on two policy domains: economic reform and democratization. First, the EU should support economic development in the Mediterranean region, because economic development will support flagging democracies (Sikorski, 2011a). Sikorski (2011b) states that democracy is correlated with a well-lubricated free market economy. He puts the conclusion of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) as the central objective of the renewed ENP. However, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs is also aware of the fact that economic development might not automatically lead to democratization. He refers to China to illustrate his point. Therefore, he suggests supporting the process of change, ‘which is already happening’ by the establishment of the EED. The EED should ‘train future elite, help trade unions, engage NGOs, use the new social media, get youth groups, women involved in this great project of democratizing our neighbourhood’ (Sikorski, 2011a). This eventually should lead to a ‘Euro-
The Mediterranean Community of Democratic States’ after the example of the Community of Democracies (Sikorski, 2011a; 2011b).

Also for the MEPs of the Eastern countries, the conclusion of DCFTAs is the main strategy to follow, although they actually articulated this as the main strategy for the Eastern neighbours: ‘Experience shows that economic integration is a crucial component for political association. Therefore, the EU should advance on concluding DCFTAs as these are the core economic agreements aiming at gradually integration’. They add that the EU should give them prospects for visa liberalization, that the EU should put more effort in conflict resolution, and in cooperation in the field of energy and transport. Their main strategy to reach democracy is to work with people and societies, rather than with governments (Eastern MEPs, 2011). The ministers of foreign affairs of the Netherlands and Denmark have a similar view as Germany and the Eastern member states. They argue that the EU should expand its internal market to the South, in order to create a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area’. Therefore, three steps are needed. First, the EU should open its markets, especially for agricultural products. Second, the EU ‘must ensure that Arab countries make optimal use of existing bilateral trans-Mediterranean trade agreements with the EU’. In contrast to the Eastern member states, they do not plead for the conclusion of new agreements. Three, the EU should promote market liberalization. These economic reforms should be entangled with political reforms, and therefore, they suggest establishing a ‘transformation platform’ were the member states, the EU institutions, the UN, the US and the IFIs can coordinate their efforts in supporting democracy. They do not go deeper into how democracy should look like, but it is clear that a free market economy is articulated as the basis for a democracy (Espersen and Rosenthal, 2011).

Eventually, the Council conclusions emphasize three elements regarding the review of the ENP. First, it welcomes the emphasis on the civil society in the communication (which is a proposal of Poland and the Eastern MEPs), it supports the continuing integration of the neighbours into the internal market (Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Eastern MEPs) through the establishment of the DCFTAs (Eastern MEPs) and it focuses on mobility (Germany, Italy). Regarding the increased financial support the European Commission and the High Representative proposed in their communication, the Council states that it will decide upon this in accordance with the normal budgetary procedures (Council of the EU, 2011a; 2011b). It thus

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49 Community of Democracies is ‘a global intergovernmental coalition of democratic countries, with the goal of promoting democratic rules and strengthening democratic norms and institutions around the world’. Poland is one of the founding fathers of this coalition. It was established during a ministerial meeting in Warsaw in 2000 (community-democracies.org).
seems that especially the proposals of the Northern and the Eastern European member states were withheld. Through the discussion with the High Representative and the European Commission, these three elements were also already inserted in the communication of May 2011 (see for example the establishment of the EED), which forms the blueprint of the new policy.

Overall, it can be concluded that most of the member states strongly focused on the economic cooperation with the Mediterranean countries and on the economic reforms in order to transform these countries into market economies, assuming that this will stimulate the establishment of democracies in the Mediterranean region. It is striking to see how the word ‘democracy’ is almost not mentioned in the documents of the Southern member states, Italy, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. We conclude that most member states promote a form of libertarian democracy; their discourses are based on the logic of the market. Poland has a slightly different approach. In contrast with his colleagues, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski seems more aware of the fact that economic liberalization might not automatically lead to democratization. On the one hand, he states, just like the other ministers of foreign affairs, that economic development will support democracy. In this regard, he even states that democracy is correlated with a free market economy. On the other hand, he promotes the establishment of the EED; he explicitly suggests to support CSOs in order to stimulate democratization processes. The EED can ‘train future elites, help trade unions, engage NGOs, use the new social media, get youth groups, women involved in this great project of democratizing our neighbourhood’ (Sikorski, 2011a), although he does not go deeper into the tasks of these CSOs, which makes it difficult to determine the social order he wants to promote in the Mediterranean region.

9.2.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

In 2011, the EESC adopted several opinions/resolutions on the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region. In March 2011, it adopted a resolution on the situation in the Southern Mediterranean countries, calling the EU ‘to take ambitious measures, revising the mission of the Union for the Mediterranean, to provide political and institutional, economic, social and technical and humanitarian assistance to the Mediterranean countries that are already on the path towards democratic transition’ (EESC, 2011a). It adds that support for the civil society should be a strategic component of this approach. In September 2011, the EESC drafted an own-initiative opinion, in which it explains how it sees the support for the civil society in the Mediterranean region. This opinion is a reaction on the communications of the European Commission and the High Representative on the ‘partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern
Mediterranean’ and on the review of the ENP (EESC, 2011b). In December 2011, the EESC published a separate opinion on the latter communication, following a request of the European Commission and the High Representative (EESC, 2012). These documents will give us an insight into the EESC’s view on the events in the Arab world and the review of the ENP. The EESC (2011c) also adopted an opinion on the promotion of renewable energy in the Euro-Mediterranean region, but this one will not be discussed here.

A closer look at the opinions reveals that there is no reference to the concepts globalization and interdependence, but the idea that the EU and the Mediterranean countries are interdependent has influenced the policy. The Mediterranean countries are presented as countries which are producing migration flows towards the EU. These migration flows are articulated as a ‘pressure’ for the EU. Nevertheless, these problems can be dealt with according to the EESC: ‘The EESC believes that the wave of immigration to EU countries can only be stemmed by providing practical help to the societies of North Africa and the Middle East, based on specific economic and social assistance programmes aimed at improving the competitiveness of their economies, supporting local SMEs and agriculture, regional development and social cohesion, and the opening up of remote regions’ (EESC, 2011b: 33). This view meets the logic of economic opportunity. In contrast to some of its previous opinions, the EESC does not present an alternative framework for the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Instead, it gives some comments on the proposals of the European Commission and the High Representative. In general, it agrees with the broad policy lines endorsed by the Commission and the EEAS, but it tries to emphasize some elements, although they are not always consistent. In the September opinion for instance, the EESC stresses that it considers subregional development and development of the south-south cooperation as essential for the Mediterranean countries. Here, it does not refer to the overall strategy of the EU to integrate the Mediterranean neighbours into the internal market. In the December opinion, however, it endorsed the objective of the DCFTAs to economically integrate the neighbours into the EU. In general, the EESC states that the EU should support economic development: ‘fighting corruption, ensuring good governance and creating an efficient public administration are fitting and necessary conditions for economic prosperity and to attract the absolutely essential Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that will shore up the democratic governments and generate new jobs’ (EESC, 2011b: 35). In general, the EESC thus articulates that the state should be reformed in order to support the free market. This will lead to the creation of jobs and economic prosperity. At the same time, it refers to several grievances which need to be addressed urgently in the Mediterranean countries: the uneven or unequal distribution of wealth and prosperity; the
explosion in prices of basic food staples, which eventually became unaffordable for ordinary people; the need to protect individual rights and social and trade unions; and the demand for economic and social welfare (EESC, 2011b: 34). Nevertheless, the EESC does not really go deeper into how the EU should help with that. In contrast with its previous opinions, social policies are now far less emphasized.

As might be expected, the EESC mainly focuses on the support for CSOs in the Mediterranean countries, stating that this will lead to the establishment of democracy in the region. ‘It will only be possible to establish democratic values and processes by adopting the principles of representative democracy founded on free elections and independent political parties and by supporting and strengthening civil society and socio-economic organisations that operate under secure, free and independent conditions’ (EESC, 2011b: 34). The role of the CSOs is double. First, they have to be independent from the governments, and to promote human rights: ‘The EESC insists that the environment for civil society activities, protection of human rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights and freedom of religion, is an essential criterion in the assessment of a country’s governance (EESC, 2012: 89). This view on the civil society embraces the concept of negative liberty: liberty is the sphere for the self-development of the individual without the interference of other individuals (therefore, there is a strong emphasis on human rights; there is a reference to the UDHR). The second task for the CSOs is to contribute to the legitimation of the state through civil participation (which is a form of political liberty): ‘In this context, the EESC stresses that greater and more targeted support should be offered to employers and trade union organisations and other socio-professional groups, since they are important facets of social, economic and political life and potential guarantors of stability. Some of them indeed played a key role in the mobilisation for democracy’ (EESC, 2012: 89). CSOs are again mainly articulated as socio-professional organizations such as employers and trade-unions. In this regard, the EESC states that ‘social dialogue between employers and workers in the Mediterranean region should be stepped up and that its Employers Group and Workers Group could contribute to the achievement of this objective. In addition, the EESC calls for a structured social dialogue to be promoted through a Social Forum. The EESC will continue to cooperate closely with the ILO to promote social dialogue in the region’ (EESC, 2011b: 33). Nevertheless, this social dialogue is here also articulated together with the approval of the economic strategy as proposed by the European Commission and the High Representative: ‘During the negotiation and implementation process of the DCFTA and other agreements it is important to make mandatory provision for civil society involvement and to establish a mechanism for permanent dialogue with it’ (EESC, 2012: 90). Overall, the EESC
accepts the social order proposed by the European Commission and the High Representative. Its reference to ‘economic and social welfare’ seems to indicate that it is also more in favour of form of liberal democracy, but it does not go deeper into this (like for example the European Parliament does and like it did in the past). Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that the EESC promotes a similar social order in the Mediterranean region as the European Commission and the High Representative. This social order will be further defined in the concluding chapter.

9.2.4 The European Parliament

Like we mentioned above, High Representative Catherine Ashton started a discussion with the European Parliament in March 2011. On 22 March 2011, the Parliament referred to the Committee on foreign affairs as the Committee responsible for drafting the report on the review of the ENP. The parliamentary Committees on development, on budgets, on employment and social affairs, on industry, research and energy, on regional development, on culture and education, on civil liberties, on JHA and on constitutional affairs gave their opinion on the matter. The Committee on foreign affairs delivered its draft report on 19 July 2011 (European Parliament, 2011b); the final report was tabled on 24 November 2011 for plenary (European Parliament, 2011c), and discussed during the plenary sitting of 14 December 2011. During this sitting, a resolution on the review of the ENP was adopted (European Parliament, 2011a). Like the other actors, the European Parliament does not explicitly refer to the concepts ‘globalization or interdependence’. The idea that the Mediterranean countries are geographically located close to the EU, and that both regions are interdependent is always present in the discourse (even if it is only through the use of the concept ‘neighbours’), but it is not particularly stressed in the documents of the Parliament. Related to that, in contrast with the discourse of the European Commission, the High Representative and the Council of the EU/the member states, the relations with the neighbours are not articulated as a possible security threat for the EU. On the contrary, the Parliament stresses several times that the renewed ENP should not only focus on security: ‘whereas, in this new context, relations with these countries should be given fresh impetus, based on cooperation focusing on democracy and prosperity on both shores of the Mediterranean, and not only security and migration control’ (European Parliament, 2011b: 5).

In this document, the European Parliament reaffirms its objective that ‘for the Southern partnership, the aim is to bring the two shores of the Mediterranean closer together with a view to establishing an area of peace, democracy, security and prosperity for their 800 million inhabitants’ (European Parliament, 2011c: 13). This objective was central in the 2003 resolution on the ENP, and is now again repeated. The Parliament goes deeper into each of these three
areas (area of peace and democracy, area of sustainable economic and social development and area of security (the latter is not discussed here)), and the document reveals that the European Parliament changed its view regarding the ‘area of peace and democracy’. Under the ENP, the European Parliament suggested establishing a ‘common political project based on human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’ based on the model of the Council of Europe, and the UN. The EU should conclude multilateral conventions with its neighbours, based on the political norms developed by the Council of Europe and the UN (European Parliament, 2003a). Also in its 2008 report on the UfM, the European Parliament refers to the Council of Europe. Today, with the review of the ENP, the European Parliament does no longer refer to international organizations when it comes to political norms. Before the Arab Spring, it was difficult to promote political norms, especially in relation to authoritarian regimes. The European Parliament, just like the other European institutions, preferred to remind the Mediterranean countries of their international obligations – it felt strengthen by the international community. Therefore, it also mainly focused on human rights and fundamental freedoms, rather than on democracy.

However, since the Arab Spring, the people of the Mediterranean countries share something similar to the EU and the Europeans: (a tendency to) democracy, which can be considered as a common value. The EU is now presented as the model to follow for the neighbours, instead of the Council for Europe, the UN or other international agreements: ‘Whereas respect for and promotion of democracy and human rights – particularly women’s rights – justice and the rule of law, fundamental freedoms – including freedom of speech, conscience, religion, association and the media-, strengthening of security, democratic stability, prosperity, the fair distribution of income, wealth and opportunities, the fight against corruption and the promotion of good governance are founding principles and aims of the EU which must constitute common values at the core of the ENP review (European Parliament, 2011c: 5). The European Parliament attaches a lot of importance to liberties, and it considers freedom of religion as a priority. Moreover, it also refers to equality, i.e. the fair distribution of income, wealth and opportunities. It refers to all these elements as ‘deep democracy,’ a concept which it borrowed from the High Representative. In its document, the European Parliament almost exclusively focuses on the people of the Mediterranean countries when it talks about deep democracy: it calls on ‘the EU and the Member States to focus their cooperation within the ENP on twinning EU democratic actors such as trade unions, NGOs, relevant employers’ organizations, farmers, women, participants in religious dialogue, consumers, youth, journalists, teachers, local government bodies, universities, students, climate change actors and their
emerging counterparts in ENP countries’. Consequently, political parties, parliaments and especially CSOs are articulated as the main actors which the EU should support. This will lead to a ‘partnership with societies’. The task of the civil society is articulated as the involvement in public affairs, empowering citizens on the path to democracy, playing their proper role in defining ENP strategies, ‘holding governments to account, monitoring and assessing past performance and achieved results’ (European Parliament, 2011c: 8-9).

The main objective of the second area, the ‘area of sustainable economic and social development’ is to create a big ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’, and the establishment of DCFTAs is seen as the first step to reach this space. In order to reach these DCFTAs with the neighbours, the European Parliament calls on the EU ‘to assist them in their reform efforts and to open its internal market, subject to the necessary alignment of safety and quality specifications, to European standards, and to engage with them in a mutually beneficial process of gradual, balanced opening of their markets; underlines that the EU should assess the political, social and environmental circumstances of each country with reference to their participation in the future DCFTA’ (European Parliament, 2011c: 12). This is also a different approach than in the resolution it adopted on the ENP, because in the latter, the European Parliament suggested to establish a EEA Plus, after the example of the EEA. Like we mentioned in chapter 7, the EEA was established after the neighbouring countries which were not members of the EU had first concluded a FTA among each other. This is important because it might prevent the hub-and-spoke effect which is likely to take place when each of these countries separately will take place in the internal market. The European Parliament stresses in its most recent resolution the regional and subregional dimensions of the ENP, but it does not articulate that there should be preferably first economic integration among the Mediterranean partners, like it did in its 2003 resolution (European Parliament, 2003a: 10). Rather, it argues that the conclusions of DCFTAs will probably facilitate South-South integration: ‘reaffirms that, for the Southern partnership the aim is (...) to assist the partners in building democratic, pluralistic and secular states, namely through institutional capacity building programmes, as well as to develop mutually beneficial balanced and ambitious arrangement for trade in goods and services, preceded by the relevant impact assessments, that can lead to DCFTAs, which will surely represent the first step towards a big ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’, which could also help to alleviate the economic problems of our neighbouring partners in the South and facilitate South-South integration’ (European Parliament, 2011c: 13). In contrast with the previous resolutions on the ENP, the European Parliament now stresses the integration of the neighbouring countries in the internal market rather than that they first create an own ‘economic identity’. The conclusion of new Association
Agreements with the neighbours is therefore a step which is welcomed by the European Parliament.

In this regard, it sees economic reforms as necessary to reach the status of a free market economy, and to take part in the internal market – the market economy is also presented as one of the central values of the ENP. This will lead to economic growth, and thus to sustainable economic development. The democratic reforms which are promoted will also stimulate economic growth. The European Parliament ‘stresses that sustainable democracy, functioning and de-bureaucratised institutions, the rule of law and quality education not only promote political stability, social welfare and cohesion, but also stimulate economic growth….’. At the same time, economic reforms will also support the establishment of a democracy. The European Parliament ‘calls, therefore, on the EU to encourage structural reforms in the economic, social and legal arena as part of its support of democratic transitions, noting emphatically the close interweaving of democratic and socio-economic development’ (European Parliament, 2011c: 11). They are thus presented as mutually supportive. In contrast with its previous resolution on the ENP, the Parliament does no longer refer to the term ‘social market economy’, although the Committee on employment and social affairs refers to this concept in its opinion. Nevertheless, it pleads for the European Commission to support certain social policies and to promote social rights, such as ensuring that the minimum wage provides an adequate standard of living for workers and their families and that adequate time should be foreseen for notices of termination of employment taking into account the employee’s length of services. In addition, the European Parliament asks that the EU supports administrative building in employment and social affairs (in contrast with the European Commission & the High Representative) and it points to the important role social dialogue can have in regard to the socio-economic challenges in the region (European Parliament, 2011c: 11-12). It also asks the European Commission to use Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as the guiding policy framework for medium-term, pro-poor economic growth and the equitable distribution of wealth according to the needs of the country instead of the CSPs (see also chapter 1).\(^{50}\) This is a difference with the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative (and also with the discourse of the member states and the EESC), which do not go deeper into how social policies performed by the state in the Mediterranean countries should look like. What is also important to note, is that the European

\(^{50}\) PRSPs are documents drafted by the Mediterranean countries, and they describe the countries’ macro-economic, structural and social policies for a certain period of time. Domestic stakeholders and donors are also involved in the drafting through a participatory process. The documents are used by donors to provide aid to those countries. The drafting and implementation of a PRSP is a necessary condition for receiving funding by the World Bank and the IMF.
Parliament does not refer to the ILO conventions, despite the suggestions of the Committee on employment and social affairs. The social policies and the social rights mentioned in the text are now implicitly presented as ‘European’ norms.

In conclusion, we can state that the European Parliament promotes the following social order for the Mediterranean countries: the state should be reformed in order to support the free market economy. However, in contrast with the discourse other institutions, the European Parliament articulates that this structural adjustment policy should also be accompanied by social rights and social policies. In contrast with its discourse on the ENP, the European Parliament now refers more to ‘democracy’ (while in the past focus was mainly on human rights), it adopts the concept ‘deep democracy’ from the High Representative and the European Commission. The European Parliament sees democratic and economic reforms as mutually reinforcing, suggesting to support both at the same time. The role of the civil society is also double, because they should empower people to the path on democracy and to play their role in defining ENP strategies and to hold governments to account, and to monitor and assess past performance and achieved results. This task refers to monitoring both economic reforms and social policies. Based on these elements, it can be concluded that the European Parliament promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region.

9.3 Political and fantasmatic logics in the Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy

9.3.1 The European Commission and the High Representative

How are the Self and the Other now articulated in the documents of the High Representative and the European Commission? If we take a closer look at the political logics in the discourses of Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle, it can be noted that they make a distinction between the countries where a revolution broke out (Tunisia, Egypt and later also Libya) and the other Mediterranean countries which can still be considered as authoritarian regimes (spatial construction of identity). Nevertheless, all the Mediterranean countries are articulated as not yet democratic (giving the references to the fact that democracy is a process and a continuous struggle which thus also accounts for Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, see for example Füle, 2011a). It is important to note that the establishment of a market economy is considered to be an element of a deep democracy, and it is articulated that the Mediterranean countries have not yet reached this. The Mediterranean countries are presented as a potential threat for the EU (they can choose a government that turns against the West, and undermine any prospect of bringing lasting peace to the Middle East). Nevertheless, this identity is considered to be temporal, because it is articulated
that the Mediterranean countries can become genuine democracies. Füle (2011a): ‘I said last time that recent events have disproven the offensive statement that the Arab world is not “ready for democracy”’.

The responsibility to lead the Mediterranean countries on their path to become ‘deep democracies’ is articulated as a shared responsibility, a shared responsibility of different actors. First, the EU should help the Mediterranean countries with their transition processes: ‘it must not be a passive spectator’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011a: 2). There are two main reasons for that. First, as we mentioned earlier, the problems of the Mediterranean countries are presented as a threat for the EU. It is thus in the interest of the EU to help those countries, or the EU will come into trouble. However, for the European Commission and the High Representative, this is not the main reason. Second, and more importantly, the EU should help the Mediterranean countries because ‘we know how long and painful the journey towards liberty can be’ (Ashton, 2011a). In the discourse, Catherine Ashton (2011a) refers several times to the history of the EU: ‘The EU itself was born in the ashes of conflicts that reminded us how terrible life can be when democracy breaks down’. Her discourse reflects the ‘bull myth’ we discussed in chapter 4, although it is slightly adapted to the context: Ashton refers to how Europe became destroyed by authoritarian regimes, how it became liberated by the people who believed in freedom and by the US, and how the latter helped to rebuild the continent. Ashton now articulates this myth to legitimize the assistance of the EU towards the Mediterranean region: the Mediterranean countries are destroyed by authoritarian regimes, they are liberated by people who stood up for freedom, and in the case of Libya also by the EU and its member states, and now the latter will help to rebuild the region, just like the US did for ‘us’. Nevertheless, knowing how sensitive this topic is for Mediterranean countries, Ashton is also very careful in her discourse. She states that ‘…, we can no more force the people of a sovereign country to choose democracy than we can tell the sun to shine or the grass to grow’. Regarding Tunisia and Egypt, she states that ‘we can help new democracies decide how they choose their rulers; we must not influence whom they choose’ (Ashton, 2011b). Nevertheless, in using the concept ‘deep democracy’ she refers to Europe: ‘What we in Europe have learned the hard way is that we need “deep democracy”: respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech, an independent judiciary and impartial administration. The reference to the history of the EU plays also an important role here. It presents the EU as a model because it has a similar history as the Mediterranean countries: it has been destroyed by authoritarian regimes. In this case, the EU is seen as the sum of its (old and new) member states. The EU thus represents an ideal (liberty and prosperity) which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries once obstacles are overcome (a change in the political
system and integration in the internal market). The EU will help with that: ‘After years of stagnation, we need to offer new opportunities to the large young populations of the region’ (Ashton, 2011b). The discourse is also based on the logic of civilian power Europe (the economic model is still presented as the basis, also for political development). This suppresses public contestation within the Mediterranean countries, but also within the EU, because it reflects a change in the policy (which was not very successful in the past). Here, the EU is thus presented as a kind of model for democratic transformation in the Mediterranean region, while it is at the same time also presented as something universal (because of the reference to the fact that the EU must not influence whom they choose, and by stating that ‘while reforms take place differently from one country to another, several elements are common to building deep and sustainable democracy …’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011b: 3). The idea that democracy is something universal was also reflected in the EU Agenda for Action of Democracy Support, where the EU stated that ‘Though democracy systems may vary in forms and shape, democracy has evolved into a universal value’ (Council of the EU, 2009: 3). Nevertheless, the concept ‘deep democracy’ is not as universal as it seems, because it is embedded in economic and security cooperation with the EU, and it entails adopting EU rules regarding the internal market.

Second, following the articulations that the EU should not impose democracy, the transition of the Mediterranean countries to true democracy is articulated as also being the responsibility of the Mediterranean countries themselves: ‘the democratic transitions have to be home-grown. It is for the people of the region to determine what lies next’. And therefore: ‘the guiding philosophy is “more for more”: those partners that go further and faster with reforms should be able to count on greater support from the EU’. This was one of the main principles of the ENP, and is now repeated. Third, there should be coordination with the international institutions and international actors on several issues. Ashton (2011b: 1) stated: ‘While Europe has a leading role, we are not the only actor in the region’. In its promotion of economic development, the European Commission and the High Representative argue that ‘the international financing institutions (IFIs) can contribute to this effort. Funding could come from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and, if other non-EU shareholders agree, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)’ (European Commission & High Representative, 2011a: 8). From these articulations, it is clear that the European Commission and the High Representative want the EU to take a lead in determining how economic development should be reached (and to convince other actors from its approach), something which it did already under the ENP (in contrast with its discourse under the RMP). This also reflects the logic of multilateral Europe, with the EU as a leader.
In conclusion, deep democracy is the new main nodal point in the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative. Overall, the concept ‘deep democracy’ has no meaning as such: it is a floating signifier which is open to different meanings. However, in the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative, the concept is partially fixed, and it becomes a privileged signifier. More specifically, it gives meaning to the concepts market, state and civil society, and it also determines the relationship between these three elements. With deep democracy, the European Commission and the High Representative mean: the reform of the state to support the free market and to guarantee law and order. The civil society should contribute to the establishment of the free market economy, not only in monitoring the implementation of reforms, but also in contributing to policy-making processes and to social dialogue within the framework of these reforms. This is stressed in comparison to the ENP. This will lead to ‘deep democracy’. This nodal point also articulates the member states and the institutions of the EU in one common identity. It refers to something identical underlying all these actors, and that is the economic and democratic transition they all went through either in the 1940s or in the 1980s; Ashton refers to both WWII (the old member states) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (the new member states). In terms of fantasmatic logics, this discourse is thus based on the ‘bull myth’. The Other is here presented as not yet being a democracy. It has no commonalities with the Self, and is therefore presented as a threat (logic of difference). Nevertheless, it is indicated that the Other can also reach this identity, if they implement the necessary reforms. The EU and the international institutions will help with that.

This discourse is different than the discourse of the European Commission under the ENP. There, the concept ‘good governance’ was the main nodal point. With good governance, the EU meant: the reform of the state to support the free market, to guarantee law and order and to respect the rights of individuals. Also the civil society should contribute to liberty and the free market economy. This nodal point also linked the different identities of the member states in one common project, i.e. they are ‘well-governed’ because they have implemented economic reforms and created an internal market and because they follow the political and social norms laid down in international agreements (logic of equivalence) and opposes this identity to the identity of the neighbours, which are presented as ‘not well governed’ (logic of difference), and therefore, as a potential threat. This was the hegemonic discourse. As illustrated above, the European Commission and the High Representative do no longer refer to political and social norms laid down in international agreements as the norms the Mediterranean countries should follow (although they still state that the international agreements on human rights should be ratified). ‘Deep democracy’ refers to the European political and economic norms, instead of universal
norms. The EU now refers to its own political model (in contrast with the concept ‘good governance’, ‘deep democracy’ is not a concept which is used on the international level) that it wants to promote. This also fits within the change of discourse we noticed from 2009 on, with the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations, where the EU states that it ‘should intensify its efforts to promote democracy-related norms and elements through its activities within international organizations’. The EU thus evolves from a follower of political norms to an actor that wants to play a leading role within international organizations.

9.3.2 The (European) Council and the member states

The discussion on the different positions of the member states on the review of the ENP already revealed that there are several discourses on the relations between the Self and the Other. Overall, it can be argued that the Mediterranean countries are articulated as a ‘risk’ (sometimes as a threat) for the EU by the member states (spatiality). This identity is considered to be temporal, since the Mediterranean countries can change according the member states. Nevertheless, there are several ways how their identity can be transformed. In the discourse of the Southern member states, the concept ‘Mediterranean macro-region’ is the main nodal point. This concept articulates a common identity for the Southern member states and the Mediterranean countries based on the idea that they all border the Mediterranean Sea (the word ‘Mediterranean’ excludes the Northern member states) and based on the concept of regional economic integration (represented by the word macro-region, which leads the attention away of the broader integration into the internal market). In order to establish this Mediterranean macro-region, the EU should ensure a better coordination of its actions towards the Mediterranean countries. Within this macro-region, the EU should conclude ‘differentiated partnerships’ (second nodal point) with each of the Mediterranean countries, which should become ‘rational countries’. For the Southern member states, the Mediterranean countries are currently not rational, but this can be changed if they implement institutional reforms, taking into account norms such as democracy, pluralism and good governance (these are additional nodal points in the discourse of the Southern member states). This is seen as a shared responsibility: the Mediterranean countries should implement reforms, while the EU should reward these countries for these reforms by giving them more financial assistance. In addition, the EU should also strengthen its political dialogue and cooperate with the Mediterranean countries in the fight against organized crime, illegal immigration and illegal traffic. Overall, the EU should help the Mediterranean countries in order to integrate economically with the Southern member states because this is their common interest (fantasmatic logic; Southern member states, 2011).
By contrast, the discourse of Italy is totally different. Here, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Stability’ is the main nodal point. It represents a common identity for both the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on ‘stability’. At this moment, the Mediterranean countries are seen as producers of regional instability, while they should become producers of regional stability, just like the EU, just like ‘us’. In this regard, Frattini (2011b) refers to the ‘Arab friends’ which are along the far shores of ‘mare nostrum’. The use of the concept ‘mare nostrum’ is very important here, because it refers to the history of Italy, and more specifically the Roman Empire which had power over all the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Frattini adds: ‘they (the Mediterranean countries) are part of our collective history, and they deserve a better future that we can help them to build’ (Frattini, 2011b). In other words: the Europeans, and especially Italy, should help these countries in order to become like us. However, the EU should mainly help the Mediterranean countries because it is in its interests. Frattini (2011a) refers to the common interest of the EU and the Mediterranean region: ‘But it is also an opportunity for European and Mediterranean countries to work together in the interests of all’. The Mediterranean countries should accept the help of the EU, because ‘we’ are their natural partner. Helping the Mediterranean countries can be done by the conclusion of a pact, an ‘equal partnership’ between the EU and the Mediterranean countries (second nodal point). This partnership consists of the integration of the Mediterranean neighbours into the internal market, participation in EU programmes and regular summits between the EU and Mediterranean countries, i.e. the Mediterranean countries become like the Self (Frattini, 2011a). It is mainly articulated the responsibility of the EU and other international donors that the Mediterranean countries modernize their economies. Therefore, the EU should develop a ‘Marshall Plan for Mediterranean economic stability’, which does not only refers to the own history of the EU (the Marshall Plan for Europe after the second WW) but which also refers to the special relation of the EU with the US, which are now again articulated as the preferred partner (Frattini refers to the trans-Atlantic partnership), together with the World Bank and the IMF. The responsibility for this change in the Mediterranean countries is at the same time also articulated as a shared one: there should be a commitment of each country to improve governance, meet international obligations and respect individual rights, including for women and religious minorities, but the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs also warns for ‘excessive conditionality’ from the side of the EU, so the responsibility mainly remains with the Self. In addition, Frattini also articulates in its discourse that the Mediterranean countries can remain different from the Self, i.e. they should not necessarily follow the EU when it comes to the democratic transition of the country (reflected in the prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’). Here, it is articulated that the Mediterranean
countries should follow international obligations, i.e. international agreements (logic of multipolar Europe – follower; Frattini, 2011a).

Like we explained above, the ministers of foreign affairs of the Netherlands and Denmark have a similar view on the organization of the social order in the Mediterranean region. In their discourse, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area’ is the main nodal point. The concept articulates a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean neighbours, i.e. an identity which is based on the EU internal market which is extended to the south. The extension of the internal market is mainly articulated as the responsibility of the EU, i.e. it should remove barriers on its markets, concluding an agreement on a set of pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin and promote market liberalization. The task of the Mediterranean countries is to bring their legislation into line with the rules of the EU’s single market. Regarding the political reforms, the ministers of foreign affairs suggest establishing a transformation platform, where the member states and the EU institutions can work together with the UN, the US and the IFIs in order to coordinate their efforts to support democracy. They thus suggest working together with other donors. Espersen and Rosenthal (2011) stress that the EU should help the Mediterranean region because it is in Europe's interests: ‘Helping the region to prosper will create economic opportunities for Europe as well. Creating jobs for young Arabs will reduce the incentives to leave. Combating the root causes of migration is every bit as important as curbing illegal migration’.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Guido Westerwelle (2011), had a similar proposal, although he does not articulate the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area’. He refers to the ‘partnerschaft’ or ‘Nord-Süd-Pakt’ with the Mediterranean region. In discussing the elements of the renewed ENP, he stresses the responsibility of the EU, i.e. the opening up of the EU internal market for agricultural products, the possibility for young people of the Mediterranean countries to study in the EU and the financial assistance of the EU, but at the same time, he stresses that this is a ‘shared’ responsibility: the countries which implement political reforms can receive more financial assistance from the EU in the form of budget support than those countries which are not willing to implement these reforms. This is the ‘Pakt’ which is concluded between the EU and the Mediterranean region, the Mediterranean countries will be ‘partners’ if they implement these reforms. Regarding these political reforms, Westerwelle (2011) does not go deeper into if these reforms should be implemented after the example of the EU or if the Mediterranean countries should follow international agreements, like Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark argue. Rather, he argues that each country should follow its own way (by which
they will remain different from the EU, i.e. the reference to ‘Nord-Süd’). In his discourse, Westerwelle (2011) stresses that Germany should help the Mediterranean region (it refers to its own history). However, he especially emphasizes that it is in the interest of both Europe and Germany to help the Mediterranean countries (he refers to their economic interests).

This point of view is different from the view of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski; he argues that it is ‘natural that we want our neighbours to be like us. It follows that the European Neighbourhood Policy should involve spreading our norms, values and models of political and economic governance’ (Sikorski, 2011a). Furthermore, despite the argument that there should also be differentiation among neighbours (which are divided in the members of the EEA, the potential and actual candidate states, the Eastern neighbours of the EU in the East and the Southern Mediterranean countries), Sikorski explains how ‘our model’ looks like: it is based on democratic and free market standards. The main nodal point in his discourse is the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States’ (Sikorski, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Here, the Self, the EU is articulated as consisting of democratic states, while this is not yet the case for the Other. Nevertheless, the Other can change, and the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States’ articulates a common identity for the Self and the Other: a community of democratic states. His discourse is different than the discourses of the other ministers of foreign affairs and MEPs because he argues that economic development is not a sufficient condition to create democratic societies. He therefore refers to China, which is here articulated as the Other, and argues that China is a model of the past (Sikorski, 2011a). The EU, and especially Poland, should help the Mediterranean countries; it should share the lesson learnt in the past: ‘Poland is interested in the success of transition to democracy. We have gone through that ourselves, its ups and downs, and we are ready to share our lessons learnt’ (Sikorski, 2011a). Sikorski (2011a, 2011b) refers frequently to the history of Poland, and suggests giving each country in the Mediterranean country ‘a buddy’ which can help them introduce to democracy: ‘Taking the system analogy, Poland, the EU and the Community of Democracies should be such buddings, helping others making through the transition’ (Sikorsi, 2011a). However, he also states that he does not want to impose anything, he suggests that the EU and Poland ‘share advice with a friend who’s about to embark on a journey that we’ve gone through’ (Sikorski, 2011b, 2011c). Sikorski also refers to the interests of the EU, but this is not particularly stressed in its discourse in comparison with the references to the idea that the EU and Poland should help the Mediterranean countries in their transformation to democracy. The discourse of Sikorski is, in contrast with the discourse of the other member states, based on the logic of civilian power
Europe. The EU should use its power to help the Mediterranean countries in their democratic transition (which is based on our model of political governance; fantasmatic logics).

In the discourse of the Eastern MEPs, the concept ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs)’ is the main nodal point. It is a rather neutral concept which unites the EU and the Mediterranean countries in a common economic identity, which is based on the EU internal market. Regarding the political identity of the neighbours, the Eastern MEPs also refer to the Self, and more specifically to the democratic transition in the Eastern member states: ‘In particular, the Union’s experience of promoting democratic reforms in the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood should serve as a template for the South. In this respect, the democratic transition know-how acquired by the Central and Eastern European states constitutes a highly valuable political capital to be used especially in those domains which pose challenges to the reform processes in both the East and the South neighbourhood’. For the EU, the responsibility for economic and democratic change in the neighbourhood is a shared responsibility. The EU has a moral duty, but it is especially in its interests to help the neighbours: ‘It is thus not only our moral duty, but also in our vital security and economic interests, to build around us a ring of democratic and prosperous countries’ (Eastern MEPs, 2011). Moreover, the renewed ENP should be tied to the conditional principle of ‘more for more, which should thereby establish a practice of mutual engagement between the affected parties’. However, they do not go deeper into what the EU should be doing, only to what the neighbours should do: implementing economic and political reforms (Eastern MEPs, 2011). As explained earlier, the discourse of MEP Saryusz-Wolski is very similar, although he does not refer to the concept ‘DCFTAs’. By contrast, he is the only one who refers to the main goal of the ENP as ‘the creation of a ring of friends’, which was the original phrase used by the European Commission.

9.3.3 The European Economic and Social Committee

A closer look at the articulation of the Self and the Other reveals that the Other, the Mediterranean countries are articulated as a problem for the EU (it causes ‘pressure’, especially in terms of migration (spatial construction of identity). Nevertheless, this identity is considered to be temporal, since the problems of the Mediterranean countries can be solved by implementing economic programmes (see supra). Regarding the economic programmes, we already explained that the EESC accepted in broad lines the economic strategy presented by the European Commission and the High Representative: the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the internal market through the conclusion of DCFTAs. In the discourse of the EESC, this objective is represented by the concept ‘Euromed region’, i.e. an integrated economic region including the
EU and the Mediterranean region (EESC, 2011b; 2012). In contrast with the other European institutions, the EESC does not refer to the EU as a model for political norms, but it refers to international agreements such as the UDHR: ‘it calls on countries that have not yet ratified the existing universal and regional conventions and agreements on political, civil and cultural freedoms, and on economic and social rights, which are based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to do so without delay’ (EESC, 2012: 4). In addition, it also refers to international organizations such as the ILO for social standards to be followed (EESC, 2012: 5). The discourse thus reflects the idea of a multilateral Europe, which follows political and social norms laid down in international agreements.

Nevertheless, the EESC adopts the concept ‘deep democracy’ in its discourse, although it does not refer to ‘European norms’. The EESC attributes in this regard a slightly different meaning to the concept than the European Commission and the High Representative. With ‘deep’ democracy, the EESC means the strengthening of the civil society: ‘The EU has rightly emphasized the need to foster ‘deep’ democracy by strengthening civil society and elevating its role in the democratisation process and in enrooting good governance standards in the ENP region’ (EESC, 2012: 4). The concept ‘good governance’, which is mentioned three times in the discourse of the EESC and which also functions as a nodal point, is always articulated in relation to the capacities of the civil society in a democracy (to be independent from the government and the possibility to take part in a social dialogue; EESC, 2012). The concept thus has another meaning for the EESC than it had for the European Commission under the ENP (which illustrates that it is a floating signifier). Regarding the responsibility for the economic and political implementations, the EESC states that it ‘agrees with the principle of differentiation and conditionality and with the need for greater flexibility in relations with the partner countries. At the same time however, it asks the EU to ensure that the application of a less for less principle will not harm the potential of a partner country to progress with the reform process according to its own pace and absorption capacity. Just like in its previous opinion, the EESC also points at the responsibility of the other European institutions in the policies (in its September opinion, it has a specific paragraph on the role of the European Commission; EESC, 2011b).

9.3.4 The European Parliament

A closer look at the political logics in the discourse of the European Parliament reveals that the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’ functions as a first nodal point in the discourse of the European Parliament. It presents a particular identity for the EU because it refers to the internal market as the identical something which underlies the European member states and the
European institutions. The Other, the Mediterranean countries are presented as not yet economically developed, and therefore as different from the EU (but not as a security threat as we have indicated above). Here, we can also note that the European Parliament does not make a distinction between the Mediterranean countries, it only makes a distinction between the EU and the Mediterranean region (spatial construction of identity). Nevertheless, the differences between the EU and the Mediterranean countries in economic terms are considered to be temporal: if the Mediterranean countries implement reforms, they can become part of a common ‘Economic Space’ (temporal construction of identity). These reforms should also lead to social cohesion. The concept ‘Economic Space’ refers to the integration of the Mediterranean countries in the internal market, and thus to a common identity. At the same time, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’ also entails that the Self (the EU and the other European countries – referred to as ‘Euro’) will always remain different from those countries which cannot become a member because of their geographical location (Mediterranean region). This is also clear when the Parliament refers to the European aspirations of some of the neighbouring countries, and thereby explicitly refers to the Eastern neighbours, excluding the Mediterranean region: ‘Acknowledges the European aspirations and the European choice of some partners and their commitment to build deep and sustainable democracy and stresses the necessity of a new and distinct relationship between the EU and the EaP (Eastern Partnership, *ex*) countries, supporting their work to consolidate sustainable democracies and market-economies’.

In addition to the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’, the concept ‘deep democracy’ functions as the second nodal point in the discourse of the European Parliament. This concept also presents a particular identity for the EU because it refers to the internal market and democracy as the identical something which underlies the European member states and the European institutions. The Other, the Mediterranean countries are presented as not having reached the status of a deep democracy, and are therefore considered as different. Nevertheless, again this identity is presented as temporal, because when the Mediterranean countries implement democratic reforms, they will become ‘deep democracies’. Regarding the responsibility for both the economic and democratic reforms, the European Parliament refers to the ‘principle of mutual accountability’. The European Parliament refers to the ‘more for more approach’ adopted by the European Commission and the EEAS: the Mediterranean countries should implement economic and political reforms, and in return, they will receive more financial assistance (ethical construction of identity). Overall, both concepts ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’ and ‘deep democracy’ are articulated as two processes which will reinforce each other. If compared with the discourse of the European Parliament under the ENP, it can be concluded that the
social order the EU wants to promote in the Mediterranean region has not changed: the European Parliament supports the establishment of a form of liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the political logics in the discourse of the EU have changed: the EU is now presented as the model which should be followed, both in the economic (integration in the internal market is preferred above regional integration) and in the political field (the EU is the democratic model to be followed, rather than the Council of Europe or the UN). In addition, it can be noted that the discourse of the European Parliament does not contain a clear ‘fantasmatic logic’.

9.4 Conclusions about the Renewed European Neighbourhood Policy

In contrast with the discourse of the different EU institutions on the UfM, there is very little reference to the concept ‘globalization’ in the discourses on the renewed ENP. Instead, the different EU institutions again use the term ‘interdependence’, and then they mainly refer to the interdependence in terms of security (besides the economic interdependence), like was the case in the discourse on the ENP. Overall, it is indicated that the (r)evolutions in the Mediterranean countries might have negative consequences for the EU (especially in terms of migration). The Mediterranean countries are then articulated as a risk for the EU, and sometimes even as a threat. At the same time, however, the interdependence can be managed and the interdependence can be turned into an opportunity, especially in a security opportunity, but also in an economic opportunity. In contrast with the other institutions, the European Parliament stresses that the EU should not only focus on security, but especially on democracy.

If we then look at the policy-options articulated by the different institutions, it can be concluded that the member states made several proposals to upgrade the ENP. What is remarkable is that they almost never refer to the concept ‘democracy’ in their discourses. They mainly focus on the development of the market, which they consider to be a necessary condition for democracy. The Southern member states, the Eastern MEPs and Westerwelle do not go deeper into democracy, while Frattini (2011a) states that ‘the pace of democratic transition in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere must be determined by each country’. However, he refers to international agreements which should be respected. The ministers of foreign affairs of the Netherlands and Denmark suggest coordinating the EU efforts on political reforms with the UN, the US and the IFIs. There is one exception, and that is the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski, who stated that the development of the free market will not automatically lead to democracy, and he refers to China as an example. Therefore, he suggests supporting the development of the civil society in the Mediterranean area through the establishment of the
Overall, we concluded that the member states and the (European) Council mainly promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region.

Just like the member states, also the European Commission and the High Representative focus on the development of the free market (the objective of the ENP is still the integration in the internal market). In addition, they present some reforms which will support the functioning of the market or which guarantee law and order, but which are also presented as democratic reforms. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if this will be the case. Moreover, also the support for the civil society (which is mainly defined as the ‘social partners’) is in function of the market reforms: the organization of a social dialogue between workers’ and employer’s organizations should make the reforms socially acceptable. According to the European Commission/the High Representative, this support for the civil society is an important element in the support for deep democracy.

In the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative, the concept ‘deep democracy’ replaces the concept ‘good governance’ (the concept ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ is kept as the second nodal point). Deep democracy presents a common identity for the member states and the European institutions; it refers to their common history, to the economic and democratic transition they all went through (bull myth; fantasmatic logics). The Mediterranean countries have not yet made this transition, and are therefore presented as a risk (political logics). Nevertheless, they can make this transition, and the EU will help with that (logic of civilian power Europe; fantasmatic logics). Therefore, it will also coordinate with other international actors (logic of multilateral Europe (leader); fantasmatic logics). The (European) Council and the member states eventually adopt ‘deep democracy’ as the nodal point in the new discourse of the EU, although they initially had other political and fantasmatic logics in their discourses (Mediterranean macro-region, Euro-Med Stability, Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area, Partnerschaft & Nord-Süd-Pakt, DCFTAs and Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States).

The EESC mainly follows the proposal of the European Commission and the High Representative. Its discourse is based on the logic of the market: structural adjustments are presented as necessary to integrate the neighbours into the EU internal market and to reach economic development and prosperity. This will eventually lead to the establishment of a Euromed region. This nodal point represents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean countries: it is an integrated economic region including the EU and the Mediterranean region. By contrast, the EU is not presented as a political and social model to
follow, here, the EESC refers to international agreements and organizations such as the UDHR and the ILO (logic of multilateral Europe – follower). In addition, the EESC stresses the role of the civil society. The CSOs should be able to protect and promote human rights (therefore, they should be independent from the governments). At the same time, in its documents, CSOs are mainly defined as socio-economic organizations, which should be able to conduct a social dialogue. Also in its discourse, this social dialogue is articulated within the context of the economic strategy developed by the EU. For the EESC, this will strengthen democracy. In its documents, the concepts ‘deep democracy’ and ‘good governance’ both function as a nodal point; they refer to the role and the capacities of the civil society in a democracy (in contrast with the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative under the ENP and the renewed ENP).

The European Parliament also agrees with the main objective to integrate the Mediterranean countries into the internal market. Therefore, economic reforms are presented as necessary. Democratic reforms are presented as supportive for economic growth, while economic reforms are supportive for democracy. At the same time, the European Parliament also states that the EU should support certain social policies and certain social rights. We concluded that the European Parliament promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. In its discourse, the concepts ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’ and ‘Deep democracy’ function as nodal points. ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’ presents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on the internal market, but also indicates that the Mediterranean countries will always remain different, i.e. that they cannot become a member of the EU (the prefix Euro-Mediterranean). Only the Eastern neighbours might become members one day. Deep democracy also represents a common identity which is based on economic development and respect for democracy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Social logics</th>
<th>Political logics</th>
<th>Fantasmatic logics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Commission High Representative</strong></td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>Deep democracy</td>
<td>Logic of the bull myth</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logic of security opportunity</td>
<td>EU as internal market and respecting democracy (logic of equivalence; Self)</td>
<td>Logic of civilian power Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logic of the market Libertarian democracy</td>
<td>The Mediterranean countries as not yet economically reform and not yet respecting democracy (logic of difference; Other)</td>
<td>Logic of multilateral Europe - leader</td>
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<td><strong>Southern member states</strong></td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>Mediterranean macro-region</td>
<td>Narrative of supporting economic integration because it is in the EU’s interests</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logic of security opportunity</td>
<td>a common identity for the Southern member states and the Mediterranean countries based on the idea that they all border the Mediterranean Sea (Mediterranean) and based on the concept of regional economic integration (macro-region)</td>
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<td>Logic of the market Libertarian democracy</td>
<td>Mediterranean macro-region</td>
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<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Stability</td>
<td>Narrative of supporting economic integration because it is in the EU’s interests</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logic of security opportunity</td>
<td>nodal point which represents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean region based on stability, while at the same time, the Mediterranean can choose their own path to democratic transition (Euro-Mediterranean; (but they should follow international obligations)</td>
<td>Logic of multilateral Europe – follower for political norms</td>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>Logic of economic opportunity</td>
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<td><strong>The Netherlands &amp; Denmark</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Eastern MEPs</strong></td>
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<td><strong>EESC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area</strong></th>
<th>Nodal points which represent a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean region (which will remain different; prefix ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ based on the EU internal market)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partnerschaft &amp; Nord-Süd-Pakt</strong></td>
<td>Nodal point which represents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean region: they (who each politically develop in their own way; Nord-Süd) conclude a ‘Pakt’ in order to develop the Mediterranean region economically.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States</strong></td>
<td>Nodal point which represents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean region based on a community of democracies, which will remain different in other areas (Euro-Mediterranean) although this is not explicitly articulated</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs)</strong></td>
<td>Nodal point which represents a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean region based on the EU internal market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU as an internal market and a place where CSOs can play a role</strong></td>
<td>(logic of equivalence; Self) The Mediterranean countries as not yet part of the internal market, not yet economically reformed and as place where CSOs not yet play a role (logic of difference; Other)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Narrative of supporting economic integration because it is in the EU’s interests**

**Logic of multilateral Europe**
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<tr>
<th><strong>European Parliament</strong></th>
<th><strong>Logic of the market and of the state</strong></th>
<th><strong>EU as internal market and respecting democracy (logic of equivalence; Self)</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Liberal democracy</strong></td>
<td>The Mediterranean countries as not yet economically reform and not yet respecting democracy (logic of difference; Other)</td>
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<td>Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space</td>
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<td>Deep Democracy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nodal points which represent a common identity for the Self and the Other: a common identity which is based on the internal market and on the respect for democracy</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 22. Social, political and fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European institutions on the renewed ENP
Chapter 10: Conclusions

10.1 Introduction

As a way of finalizing this dissertation, this chapter brings the conclusions of each chapter together in one overarching conclusion. The structure of this overarching conclusion follows the epistemological approach that is adopted in this research. As explained in the second part of chapter 3, we have chosen for a very specific epistemological approach to the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations: ‘retroduction’ is adopted as a paradigm to both explain and to understand social reality. This post-positivist approach rejects the positivist epistemology which is dominant in social sciences and which makes a strong distinction between the context of discovery (the discovery of hypothesis from data/descriptions, induction) and the context of explanation (the testing of the hypothesis, deduction). The positivist epistemology, which is also applied in other studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations (see chapter 2) is rejected for two reasons. First, the scholars who adopt a positivist approach do not take into account the possibility that the interpretation of the researcher can play a role in social science. Second, they are not very critical regarding the policy of the EU in the Mediterranean region (see chapter 3).

10.2 Problematization

A post-positivist, retroductive approach is based on three dialectal moments. The first moment is problematization, where the researcher identifies a problem. In this doctoral dissertation, we observed that the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region has been several times under discussion the last 25 years. At several moments between 1989 and 2011, events in the international relations, events in the Mediterranean region or internal EU events caused public contestation, and questioned the social order the EU is promoting towards the Mediterranean region. In chapter 1, we explained how this public contestation (in the EU institutions or in the member states) led to an adaptation of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region (we looked at why the EC/EU decided to set up, change and strengthen the relations with the Mediterranean countries). Each time public contestation took place, the social order the EU is promoting has been reconceptualized or confirmed (data). In addition, we concluded in the same chapter that the Mediterranean countries had little to say about the frameworks the EC/EU established for dealing with the Mediterranean countries (they had thus little to say about the social order the EU is promoting). It was mainly the EC/EU which determined the objectives, the instruments and the institutional structure of the GMP, RMP, EMP, ENP, UfM and the renewed ENP. More specifically, it were the European member states which were the main
entrepreneurs for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: they determined the institutional structure of the policy frameworks and the security, political, social and cultural relations. The European Commission was the main policy entrepreneur when it came to the economic content of the relations. Moreover, the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region has become very comprehensive throughout the years: political, security, economic and cultural objectives are part of the EMP/UfM and the ENP/renewed ENP. This means that the EU now has a say on almost all issues that constitute the social order of the Mediterranean countries.

The study of the social order the EU tries to promote in the Mediterranean region through its discourse was the main objective of this dissertation. This objective followed from our ontological position, which is based on two assumptions on the nature of the social world, and which we explained in the first part of chapter 3. First, we assume that everything in the social world can have different meanings, the meaning is not fixed a priori (the social is ‘open’). Objects, actions, practices and social formations receive their meaning because someone gives it this meaning, because someone articulates this meaning. This also means that we assume that everything in the social is discursive in nature (second assumption). This is a different ontological position than the other scholars on the Euro-Mediterranean relations have adopted (see chapter 2 and 3). They often assumed that the social practices of political actors are determined by their interests (the objectivists) or by ideas (the subjectivists). We were not interested in examining if the EU succeeds in promoting its interests or norms in the Mediterranean region, or if the member states succeed in promoting their interests or norms through the creation of a common external policy towards the Mediterranean region, because this has already been studied. By contrast, we were interested to see how a political actor like the EU gives meaning to the social order in the Mediterranean region. More specifically, we wanted to find out what kind of social order the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region, how it promotes this social order through its discourse, and why it is ‘meaningful’, why the discourse is appealing (which is also the reason why the social order is maintained). These are the three main research questions of this dissertation.

10.3 Retroductive explanation

In order to address these research questions, we needed to explain the social order the EU tries to promote and its discourse, which is the second dialectal moment of a post-positivist, retroductive approach. However, retroduction can have different ‘modes’, and these modes are based on the ontological position of the researcher: self-interpretations, causal mechanisms and logics. The first researchers examine self-interpretations of human beings, and interpret them. This leads to
contextualized self-interpretations. More specifically, they study ideas, traditions, webs of belief of policy-makers using in-depth interviews, textual analysis of official documents and speeches, thick description and ethnographic methods. In the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, we found studies who apply this approach. However, following Glynos & Howarth (2007), we argued that these researchers rely too much on their own interpretations, which leads to problems regarding the validity of the approach. Researchers who apply causal mechanisms depart from the idea that ‘the basic element in social sciences is the ‘individual action guided by some intention’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 85). Doing so, they attach importance to the self-interpretation of the subjects (in contrast to the scholars who apply the positivist epistemology). This intentional explanation is complemented with a mechanism which is not subject to will or intention, a causal mechanism. These causal mechanisms differ from thick descriptions because they are not case-specific, but they are rather general, and they can be used across a wide range of historical contexts. In the academic literature on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, we found studies who apply this approach. However, we also rejected this approach, because it still aims at establishing causal laws and it might forget the fact that subjects are socially constructed and that the context plays an important role. The generalization might lead to the idealization of subjects.

Instead, we proposed a retroductive approach based on logics. Logics are based on the ontological position we adopted earlier. In the second part of chapter 3, a more detailed picture of social reality was drawn: it consists of social practices (ongoing forms of human and societal reproduction) which can be publicly contested. Political practices generate, resolve or contain this public contestation. These political practices can be ideological (if subjects deny the contingency of social relations) or ethical (if subjects accept the contingency of social relations). Each of these practices can be identified through logics: social logics allow us to characterize social practices by examining the relationship between words/concepts and how this represents a social order. Political and fantasmatic logics examine the conditions which make these social practices possible and vulnerable. Political logics allow us to analyze how words and concepts are used to create a common identity for political actors which represent the social order the actor is promoting, while fantasmatic logics look at why the discourse is appealing.

In order to identify these logics in the discourse of the EU, we studied public texts that were drafted by the EU, and more specifically by the different EU institutions and the member states. We examined the discourse of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states because they were the main policy entrepreneurs. Moreover, we also studied the
discourse of the European Parliament and the EESC which were less involved and which had less influence on the formulation of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region. We wanted to find out if these institutions applied a similar discourse as the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, i.e. we wanted to find out if there is one hegemonic discourse within the EU institutions. We studied these discourses at five different moments in time (each time when public contestation started to appear because then the articulatory practices are unstable), in order to see if the discourse and the identity constructed by the institutions changed between 1989 and 2011. Focus was on primary texts, because the latter are suited to identify which codes are used when actors relate to each other (and to the public) and how the different institutions construct formal authority and knowledge in order to convince other institutions and the public. In contrast to other discourse analysts (especially the ones who apply a Foucauldian discourse analysis and who assume that discourses are shaped by non-discursive relations), we were not interested in the thoughts or motives of politicians and civil servants in the institutions. The texts that we selected have formal authority, are widely read and attended to and are characterized by a certain articulation of policies and identities. These texts were analyzed according to a specific method. First, we identified for each text all statements which contained references to the social order the different institutions want to promote in the Mediterranean region during a particular ‘event’ (RMP, EMP, ENP, UfM and the renewed ENP). In addition, we also selected the statements in which the words and concepts are used which constitute an identity for the Self and the Other and the statements with words and concepts which make the discourse appealing. Each statement received a label. Subsequently, the statements which received the same label were compared with each other in order to get a clear picture on the position of each institution during a particular event. Moreover, the meaning of each statement was examined and interpreted in relation to the other statements and to the broader text (and to the other texts of the same institution). For the interpretation, we did not only look at the context (because then we would apply contextualized self-interpretation as a mode of retroductive explanation), but we also relied on the logics defined in chapter 4, and on the theoretical concepts of the poststructuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe.

10.3.1 The identification of the social logics

A retroductive explanation thus requires three steps. First, we identified the social logics in the discourse of the EU. This allowed us to address the first research question: ‘what kind of social order does the EU promote in the Mediterranean region?’ In chapter 4, we operationalized the concept ‘social order’ within the context of democratization and globalization. Democratization
and globalization are considered to be the two main evolutions which influence the way in which a social order is constituted within the EU. We studied the ‘internal’ social orders of the EU and its member states because we assumed that there might be similar articulations regarding the way a social order should be constituted outside the EU, since we dealt in both cases with the same agents: the European institutions and the European member states. Moreover, based on our overview on the Euro-Mediterranean relations (chapter 1) and the literature review (chapter 2), we knew that the two evolutions which we consider as most influential on the constitution of the social order in the EU also influenced the social order the EU wants to promote in the Mediterranean region: democracy is an objective of the EU in the Mediterranean region since 1989, and the idea of a globalizing world clearly influenced the policy of the EU.

In the academic literature on the EU and especially the member states and globalization, we identified four different logics on globalization: the logic of economic compulsion, the logic of cultural compulsion, the logic of economic opportunity and the logic of social opportunity. Second, in the studies on democratization within Europe, we found that the field of discursivity on democracy consists of six different logics: the logic of the market (libertarian democracy), the logic of the market and the civil society (liberal-conservative democracy), the logic of the market and the state (liberal democracy/third way democracy), the logic of the state (socialist democracy), the logic of the civil society (conservative democracy) and the logic of the state and the civil society (radical and plural democracy). It is important to note that we did not assume a priori that we would find the same social logics in the discourse of the EC/EU towards the Mediterranean region (which was also the case), because logics are always context-sensitive. Overall, we wanted to find out what kind of democracy the EU promotes in the Mediterranean region within the context of globalization.

Our study on the articulations on globalization in the discourse of the different EC/EU institutions towards the Mediterranean region revealed that they mainly define globalization as ‘interdependence’, i.e. the intensification of mainly economic, political and security relations across borders (space). In the discourse of the EC/EU institutions, it is stressed that because the Mediterranean countries are immediately bordering the EC/EU, this interdependence causes problems, challenges, risks and threats for the EU (normative judgment). Nevertheless, overall, it is articulated that the interdependence can also have positive consequences or that the negative consequences can be dealt with (normative judgment), if the interdependence is managed (time, contingent process). Consequently, the EC/EU then presents a policy which can help managing this interdependence. This kind of discourse, the presentation of interdependence which will
have negative consequences (for the Mediterranean region and for the EU), unless it is managed, gives legitimacy to the policy of the EC/EU towards the Mediterranean region; it provides the possibility to present the EC/EU as the actor which should help the Mediterranean region (for several reasons, because it has a duty, because it is in its interests, … see the ethical construction of identity and the fantasmatic logics).

In the discourses of the European Commission, the (European) Council and the member states on the RMP, the Euro-Maghreb/Euro-Mashrek Partnership, the EMP and the UfM, it is especially emphasized that the management of the interdependence can and should have positive economic consequences for the Mediterranean countries. We concluded that these discourses were based on the logic of economic opportunity. If economic development in the Mediterranean region is reached, this will also have positive consequences for the EU (in terms of security; less migration). This discourse gives legitimacy to the EC/EU to develop an economic policy for the Mediterranean region. The discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states on the ENP and the renewed ENP are also based on the logic of economic opportunity, but here it can be noted that interdependence is also articulated as security interdependence: the intensification of the security relations between the EU and its neighbours. Although in the past the Mediterranean neighbours were also articulated as a security risk for the EU, the security problems were mainly presented as the consequence of the economic problems of the Mediterranean region (the articulated security risk was then mainly migration). Therefore, economic development of the Mediterranean region was the main strategy to be followed. However, in their discourses on the ENP and the renewed ENP, the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states articulate that economic cooperation alone is no longer enough, because also other security issues should be dealt with which do not necessarily follow from economic problems, such as terrorism, cross-border crimes and energy security. Here we stated that the discourse of the European Commission and the (European) Council is also based on the logic of security opportunity. This discourse legitimizes the EU to focus more on security issues, as we have seen in chapters 7 and 9.

The discourses of the EESC and the European Parliament are often also based on the logic of economic opportunity, although this is less emphasized than in the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states. Interdependence is also articulated in more general terms. The main reason for this is that the EESC and the European Parliament often only comment on the proposals and decisions of the European Commission and the (European) Council. In the discourse of the European Parliament on the Euro-Maghreb
Partnership, interdependence is articulated as ‘cultural interdependence’. This cultural interdependence is presented as an opportunity for cultural cooperation, and legitimizes the policy proposal of the European Parliament. After we examined how interdependence is articulated in terms of space and time and after we analyzed how it is judged, we took a closer look at the policy-options for dealing with this interdependence. More specifically, we studied articulations on vertical and especially on horizontal governance. In the first case, we analyzed at which vertical level interdependence should be managed according to the different EU institutions: the national, the regional or the international level. Although this was not often emphasized in the analysis, we indicated this in the different empirical chapters. In the latter case, we analyzed at which horizontal level interdependence should be managed according to the different EU institutions: the state, the market or the civil society. We combined this research with the study on what kind of democracy the EC/EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region. The market, the state and the civil society are considered to be the three corners of a democracy.

If we look at the results of our research on democracy, we can conclude that the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council on the RMP are structured around the logic of the market (the market is presented as global/international). The role of the state is articulated as to support the establishment of the free market. Therefore, the state even needs to be reformed. Both the European Commission and the (European) Council refer to the reform programmes of the IFIs. The European Commission adds that the economic reforms should be made socially acceptable and that the negative social consequences of structural adjustment should be attenuated (although this objective was only mentioned in the annex of the 1990 Commission communication). The Council accepts the proposal of the European Commission that the negative social consequences of structural adjustment should be counterbalanced, but in the Council regulation on the financial protocols, it removes the possibility to use funds to contribute to the payment of redundancy payments to workers made redundant in the public and semi-public sector or to use it for land reclamation (as proposed by the European Commission). It only mentions job creation. In both the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council, the role of the civil society in the Mediterranean countries is articulated as contributing to the functioning of the market. Overall, the functioning of the state and the civil society is thus clearly subordinated to the functioning of the (global) market. Liberty is mainly articulated as negative liberty, and there is no reference to equality. Because the logic of the market and the principle of negative liberty are central in their discourses, we conclude that the European Commission and the (European) Council promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region under the RMP (although we do not
see a total retreat of the state like some libertarians would prefer, see chapter 4). The same
discourse is also found in the economic report of the European Commission on the cooperation
with the Maghreb and in the report of Spain on the political, social and cultural cooperation with
the Maghreb. Spain brings both reports together in the Lisbon Declaration. The discourse has
not changed: the EU still promotes a democracy which is based on the establishment of the free
market and on negative liberties (human rights (political cooperation), respect for the rights of
minorities, tolerance and coexistence between cultures and religion (cultural cooperation)).
Regarding the political cooperation, the (European) Council/the member states refer to the UN
Charter and the resolutions of the UN Security Council. We conclude that the EU promotes a
form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region under the Euro-Maghreb Partnership.

The European Commission changes its discourse in the run-up to the EMP. In the
documents drafted after 1993, the logic of the market is still central. However, economic reforms
are now articulated as necessary in order to reach the EMFTA (which will lead to the creation of
a ‘regional’ market instead of contributing to the development of the global market) and the
European Commission does no longer refer to the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF.
Moreover, in contrast with its previous positions on the development of the Mediterranean
region, the European Commission seems more aware of the negative social consequences that
structural adjustments can bring. Therefore, it suggests that the state in the Mediterranean
countries should provide basic social services for the population, and that the European
Commission can help with that. Although the European Commission does not promote the
development of a Keynesian welfare state, it advocates the support for social services such basic
education, health care, government housing, water supplies, sanitation, … . Furthermore, the
European Commission is rather vague about the role of CSOs (they should contribute to
development) and about what it means with ‘democracy’. There are no references to liberty or
equality. Despite this rather limited information, we find that the discourse of the European
Commission is based on the logic of the market and the logic of the state, and therefore, we
cautiously conclude that the European Commission promotes a form of liberal democracy in the
Mediterranean region (although it of course does not promote liberal democracy as it was
installed in Western Europe after WWII). Also the member states/the (European) Council
emphasize more the social dimension of the cooperation with the Mediterranean region (they
even made it the third basket of the partnership). However, the social development of the
Mediterranean countries is here clearly articulated in function of the economic development of
the Mediterranean countries. In the Council report, focus is on education, for example the
development of vocational training programmes, ‘with emphasis on the private sector’ or on
strengthening of links between education and business’ (Council of the EU, 1995). This view is confirmed when the Council reintroduces the implementation of the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF as a condition for receiving a part of the financial assistance of the EU. Money for social development is then often spent on SAP components which address social balance (and then mainly on interventions in support of employment and the promotion of SMEs). If we look at the role of the civil society, we see that the EU mainly promotes a civil society which contributes to the legitimation of the EU’s policy in the region and to the social order it promotes. In addition, it promotes a civil society which is based on the notion of negative liberty. Negative liberty is the central concept in the political cooperation with the Mediterranean region: the EU focuses on the possibility for individuals to develop themselves without interference of other individuals, see for example the references to tolerance and the non-discrimination on ground of race, nationality, language, religion or sex, but also the rule of law. Also the definition of democracy was based on the notion of negative liberty. For their political cooperation with the Mediterranean region, the (European) Council/the member states refer to the UN Charter (like they did in the Lisbon Declaration of 1992) and also to the UDHR. Because the discourse of the (European) Council/the member states is based on the logic of the market and on the concept of negative liberty, we conclude that they still promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region. Because they were the main policy entrepreneurs in the EMP, this was also the form of democracy promoted by the EU in the Mediterranean region.

In 2003, the EU starts reflecting on a new policy for its Eastern neighbours. This would eventually lead to the establishment of the ENP. The study of the documents of the European Commission reveals that its discourse is based on the logic of the market. The main objective of the ENP is to integrate the neighbouring countries into the EU internal market (regional market). Therefore, the neighbouring countries should be transformed into market-based economies: the state needs to be reformed in order to support the functioning of the free market (in contrast with its previous discourse, the Commission does no longer refer to the economic strategy of the IFIs). Furthermore, it is articulated that the state should guarantee negative rights and that it should protect what legitimately belongs to individuals. In contrast with the European Commission’s discourse on the EMP, cooperation in the social field is far less emphasized and is not elaborated. The civil society that is promoted in the Mediterranean countries should monitor the implementation of the ENP Action Plans, and it should guarantee basic liberties such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. Negative liberty is a central concept in the discourse of the European Commission. Because the discourse of the European Commission is based on the logic of the market, and because negative liberty is a central concept, we conclude
that the European Commission promotes a form of libertarian democracy in the neighbourhood. As explained in chapter 7, the (European) Council and the member states adopt the communications of the European Commission, and thus also the discourse of the Commission, but they especially emphasize security, and a very specific form of negative liberty: the freedom of crimes (such as terrorism, drugs trafficking) for individuals (but then mainly for European citizens).

However, the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council seem to change after 2007. They seem to have more attention for social policies, although the focus is, besides on employment and labour, especially on the role the CSOs can play in these policy fields. In its documents on the UfM, the European Commission stresses the role of the CSOs in the decision-making processes in Mediterranean countries. Later on, it is clear that they mainly refer to the possibility for the social partners to take part in a social dialogue with each other, with the government and with the EU. This is further stressed in the discourse on the renewed ENP. As we have explained in chapter 9, we noted that the discourse of the European Commission/the High Representative is still based on the logic of the market (and this is also the case for the discourses of the different member states). The state needs to be reformed in order to support the functioning of the free market and to guarantee law and order. The European Commission and the High Representative now state that these reforms will also lead to more democracy. Although the EU in general seems to focus more on social policies, a closer look at the documents reveals that in the context of the renewed ENP, this focus is mainly ‘instrumental’. This is clear if we take a look at the exact role for the CSOs that is articulated. According to the European Commission/the High Representative, the CSOs should, besides control if the government has implemented economic reforms, take part in a policy dialogue in order to make the reforms promoted by the EU sustainable. This limits the boundaries in which the social dialogue can take place, and subordinates the functioning of the civil society to the functioning of the market. The European Commission/the High Representative (and the (European) Council which adopted their communications) still seem to promote a form of libertarian democracy in the Mediterranean region. According to the European Commission and the High Representative, however, the support for the civil society will also support democracy, because the possibility to take part in a policy dialogue is a form of political liberty for CSOs. There is thus ‘political participation’. However, the question arises if this is also really the case. In the next paragraphs, we will elaborate on the role of the civil society that is promoted by the EU under the renewed ENP, in order to refine the politico-conceptualizations of democracy and the role of the market, the state and the civil society in these models of democracy we identified in
chapter 4. This is an element of theory construction (which is after problematization and retroductive explanation the next step of retroductive reasoning) although the revision of the ontological assumptions is not fore-grounded here.

If we look at the evolution of the discourses of the European Commission (the High Representative) and the (European) Council/the member states over time, we can conclude that their discourses are always structured around the logic of the market. The state and the civil society are subordinated to the market. This is the hegemonic discourse between 1989 and 2011. Because the European Commission (the High Representative) and the (European) Council/the member states were the main policy entrepreneurs in the different policy frameworks, we can state that the EU promoted a form of libertarian democracy towards the Mediterranean region. However, this kind of democracy is problematic. As we explained in chapter 7, the concept ‘democracy’ is actually redefined in very narrow terms (in the discourse on the ENP, it is articulated as ‘good governance’): it is the management of the market and the freedom of individuals instead of the place where fundamental political decisions on the organization of society are taking. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 173) stated about this kind of democracy: ‘Although the democratic ideal is not openly attacked, an attempt is made to empty it from all substance and to propose a new definition of democracy which in fact would serve to legitimize a regime in which political participation might be virtually non-existent’. And this is exactly what happened in the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean region: the EU’s policy legitimized the authoritarian regimes in which political participation was non-existent. Its approach therefore did not provoke ‘public contestation’ from the side of the regimes. However, eventually the people in the Mediterranean region resisted against this lack of political participation. In the elections that followed in Tunisia and Egypt, they voted for parties which provided them a collective form of identification based on Islam. In a reaction to the events, the EU also tries to promote more political participation under the renewed ENP, mainly through the support of the civil society.

The CSOs are in the discourse of the EU mainly defined as the social partners, such as the employers’ and the workers’ organizations. The European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states do not refer to a civil society based on national identity or families, nor do they refer to the new social movements. They do not promote a form of liberal-conservative democracy or a form of participatory democracy (as we defined in chapter 4). They refer to the ‘old social movements’, which brings us closer to the definition of a liberal democracy, where the role of the social partners is to maintain and to contribute to the post-World War accord between capital and labour. In the latter form of democracy, the role of the
social partners in the social dialogue is to negotiate with each other based on their interests. The main objective is then to find a compromise between these two sets of pre-existing opposing interests. However, a closer look at the Euro-Mediterranean relations reveals that this is not the role for the social partners the EU is promoting. By contrast, the role of the social partners is articulated within the overall objective of the integration of the neighbours in the internal market. The latter is presented as the main objective of the EU’s policy. The social partners are consulted in order to reflect on the content of the rules that should establish the internal market, and their modalities. This should help to make the market reforms socially acceptable and sustainable. This leads to what is called ‘integrative negotiation’, negotiations which integrate the social partners within the overall goal of the EU, i.e. the establishment of the internal market. The EU plays an important role because it initiates the process, and because it provides information. Eventually this leads to a process of deliberation, rather than a process of negotiation based on a set of pre-determined interests. This is the new task of the social partners, and it also removes confrontation (since all social partners are working towards one common goal presented by the EU). Didry & Jobert (2011: 10) express this as follows: ‘the practice of social dialogue, whatever its diversity, is based on a conception of partnership that values participation and consultation much more than negotiation between participants’. Social dialogue therefore takes the form of a civil dialogue. This process that is promoted here in the relations with the Mediterranean region is not unique, since it represents the European social dialogue which is promoted within the EU by the European Commission, and which is explained by Didry and Jobert (2011) in their chapter Social Dialogue and Deliberation: a New Dimension in European Industrial Relations. Also Dukes and Christodoulidis (2011: 5) refer to the European Commission (2002), which defined social dialogue as ‘a process, in which actors inform each other of their intentions and capacities, elaborate information provided to them, and clarify and explain their assumptions and expectations. This is not the same as bargaining, but provides a setting for more efficient bargaining by helping to separate the digestion of facts, problems and possible solutions from negotiating feasible courses and the distribution of costs and benefits’.

Because ‘communicative action’ is central in this approach, several authors referred to the concept ‘deliberative democracy’ of Habermas (the concept is used to explain democracy within the EU based on the study of the social dialogue and the role of social partners). However, Dukes and Christodoulidis (2011) argue that this conceptualization is problematic. As we explained in chapter 4, Habermas pleads for the organization of the public sphere based on a dialogue where a rational consensus can be found between all individuals based on their individual interests (Mouffe, 2008: 20). Nevertheless, in the model promoted by the EU, the
social partners are articulated as the most important political actors, and not the individuals. Referring to the concept ‘deliberative democracy’ implies that the social partners represent all individuals affected by the agreement. Moreover, the CSOs should then find a consensus based on their interests. However, like we explained above, the CSOs can only promote their interests within the framework presented by the EU. They are thus not determining the outcome, but are used to make the reforms acceptable. Their functioning is thus totally subordinated to the functioning of the market. We suggest calling the social order promoted here ‘integrative libertarian democracy’. However, this kind of ‘democracy promotion’ undermines the role of the CSOs in the public sphere, rather than that it supports them. Again, the public sphere is redefined as the management of the market instead of the place where fundamental political decisions on the organization of the public sphere are taken, and where conflict will take place. Political participation is understood as the possibility to find a rational consensus on the reforms the EU is implementing.

Besides the discourse of the European Commission/the High Representative and the (European) Council/the member states, we studied the discourse of the EESC. Also the discourse of this institution was based on the logic of the market, the market is considered to be the main mechanism for the development of the Mediterranean countries. In the discourse on the RMP, structural adjustment is presented as necessary in order for these countries to take part in the EC internal market. However, in contrast with the discourse of the European Commission and the (European) Council at that time, the EESC does not want the EC just to follow the SAPs of the World Bank and the IMF and to reduce the social costs of these structural adjustments. Instead, it argues that the EC should develop its own SAPs which have sufficient attention for social policies and which contain a plan for an active labour and social policy. The discourse is not only based on the logic of the market, but also on the logic of the state. Moreover, the EESC articulates a specific role for CSOs, which they define as workers’ and employers’ organizations: they should be involved in the development of the EC’s policy. This will also strengthen their position in the Mediterranean countries, which will contribute to the establishment of democracy. In contrast with the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states at that time, the EESC already promotes a form of positive liberty. Based on these elements, we concluded that the EESC promotes a form of liberal democracy towards the Mediterranean region. If we then look at the discourse of the EESC in relation to the Euro-Maghreb Partnership and the relations of the EC with the Middle East, we conclude that the discourse has not changed; the EESC still promotes the establishment of a form of liberal democracy in the region. However, in contrast with its previous opinions, the EESC states that regional integration
among Mediterranean countries should be promoted first, before integration is taking place between the EC and the Mediterranean region, in order to prevent a hub-and-spoke effect.

In its opinion of 1995 on the EMP, regional integration among Mediterranean countries is no longer promoted as a condition sine qua non for cooperation with the EU. Instead, the EESC here mainly follows the position of the European Commission on the EMP. In addition, it stresses the role of the civil society, which is still mainly defined as ‘socio-economic players’ and more specifically the role these organizations can play in the consolidation of democracy in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, we concluded that the EESC promotes a form of liberal democracy in the area. Also in its documents on the ENP, we see a similar discourse. The latter is based on the logic of the market, but the European Commission and the (European) Council are criticized because they have only limited attention for the social effects of structural adjustment and for social actions such as social security matters. In addition, it is again stated that the CSOs (socio-economic players) should not only be seen as implementers of the policy of the government or the ENP, but that they should contribute to the socio-economic development of the Mediterranean countries and to the development of the ENP; there should be a social dialogue. However, in its documents on the renewed ENP, the EESC emphasizes less the social policies the EU can promote in the Mediterranean region (like it did in the past). Here, it again emphasizes the role of the CSOs (which are defined as the social partners): they should promote human rights and take part in the social dialogue. However, this social dialogue is also articulated within the context of the economic strategy of the EU. In this regard, its discourse resembles the discourses of the European Commission/the High Representative and the (European) Council/the member states, in contrast with its previous discourses. We concluded that the EESC now seems to be more inclined to the promotion of a libertarian democracy, and more specifically, an ‘integrative libertarian democracy’.

If we look at the discourse of the European Parliament on the RMP, it can be concluded that the European Parliament articulated the same social order as the EESC: it promotes the establishment of a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. Its discourse is based on the logic of the state and the logic of the market. In contrast with the EESC, the European Parliament focuses less on the role of CSOs, and more on human rights and the democratization process. Regarding the latter, it articulates democracy as the organization of free elections, the freedom of opposition parties to participate fully in the political process (positive liberty), the freedom of the media and the respect for the rights of minorities. Regarding human rights, the Parliament refers to the respect for international agreements such as the UDHR and the Geneva
Conventions (negative liberty). We conclude that the European Parliament promotes a form of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. In its 1992 resolution on the relations between the EU and the Maghreb, we find the same discourse. In addition, the European Parliament goes in this resolution deeper into the cultural relations with the Maghreb, where it stresses the possibility for joint research, cooperation between media on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea and the creation of a Euro-Arab University. If we look at the resolutions and reports on the EMP, we see that the European Parliament mainly accepts the EMP like it is promoted by the European Commission and the (European) Council.

This is actually also the case under the UfM: the European Parliament accepts in broad lines the social order as it is already promoted by the European Commission and the (European) Council. Within the context of the ENP, however, it can be noted that it also refers to concepts like ‘social market economy’ and it stresses political liberty (which the other two institutions did not do). Although it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion about the social order the European Parliament wants to promote in the Mediterranean region, we concluded that within the context of the ENP, the European Parliament is more inclined towards a form of liberal democracy. In its discourse on the renewed ENP, the European Parliament is clearer about which kind of social order it wants to promote in the Mediterranean region. Its discourse is still based on the logic of the market, but now it emphasizes that the EU should support certain social policies (performed by the state) and that it should promote social rights, such as ensuring that the minimum wage provides an adequate standard of living for workers and their families and that adequate time should be foreseen for notices of termination of employment taking into account the employee’s length of services. The role of the civil society is articulated as empowering the people on their path to democracy, playing a role in defining ENP strategies, and holding governments to account and monitoring and assessing past performance and achieved results. Because its discourse is based on the logic of the market and the logic of the state, we conclude that the European Parliament promotes a liberal democracy in the Mediterranean region. Overall, we can conclude that the EESC and the European Parliament promoted another kind of democracy towards the Mediterranean region than the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states. The discourses of the latter were/are thus not hegemonic inside the EU.

If we then try to draw an overall conclusion about the policy-options that are articulated in order to deal with ‘interdependence’, we noted that the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states preferred the development of the market (horizontal
governance). This market is first articulated as global (under the RMP) and later as regional (the EMFTA and the EU internal market; vertical governance). The state at the national level should support the establishment and the functioning of the global and later the EU internal market, and needs to be reformed. In addition, the Mediterranean countries cannot become a member of the EU (regional organization, vertical governance), which means that they do not have the possibility to influence the decision-making processes on the internal market. The civil society at the national level should also support the establishment and the functioning of the EU internal market. By contrast, the EESC and the European Parliament often stated that the Mediterranean countries should have decision-making power. Therefore, the EESC for example suggested in its discourse on the Euro-Maghreb Partnership that the Mediterranean countries should first integrate economically and create their own regional organization (for example the AMU) and that they should then conclude an agreement with the EU, because then they will be able to exercise power in relation to the EU and to prevent the hub-and-spoke effect. In its discourse on the ENP, the European Parliament suggested that the EU establishes a new international order based on multilateralism, where the EU concludes multilateral conventions based on the political norms developed by the UN, the Council of Europe or the OSCE, and where it establishes an EEA Plus with common institutions to regulate this EEA Plus (it explicitly rejects the ‘everything but institutions’ approach). In addition, the EESC also pleaded for the organization of the civil society at the regional level, it advocated the establishment of the Assembly of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (which was launched in 2010).

10.3.2 The identification of the political logics

Second, we identified the political logics in the discourse of the EU. This allowed us to address our second research question: ‘how does the EU promote this social order through its discourse?’ Political logics look at how a social order is constituted, transformed and absorbed. Therefore, we studied the logic of equivalence or the logic of difference in the discourse of the EU institutions. The logic of equivalence refers to nodal points which express something identical underlying all subjects’ positions (they create a common identity for these subject positions). This identical something can only be established by referring to something external, something which is not equivalent, and which is thus different (an external identity is then created). This is called the logic of difference, but this external something is not something positive, because the relation of equivalence has already absorbed all the positive things. The Other, the external identity which is presented as a constitutive outside which has no commonalities with the Self, is thus something negative. Therefore, we studied how words and concepts are used to create a common identity.
for political actors which represent the social order the political actor is promoting. Logics of equivalence and difference ‘emphasize the dynamic process by which political frontiers are constructed, stabilized, strengthened or weakened’ (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 144). In the academic literature, we found authors who examined identity construction by the EU and its member states, and who refined the strategy to identify the identity of the Self and the Other. Hansen (2006) suggested that we should look at the different degrees of Othering, and at the same time also at the political substance of identity construction: space (spatial construction of identity), time (temporal construction of identity) and responsibility (ethical construction of identity).

The different nodal points we identified in the different discourses of the EU institutions reflect this political substance. If we glance through the discourses articulated by the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, we noted that in their discourses on the ENP, both institutions articulate the EC as an actor which respects the decisions of the IFIs. This creates a common identity for the European institutions and the member states (logic of equivalence), although there is no specific nodal point which reflects this identity. The Mediterranean countries Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia are articulated as not having reached this identity yet (logic of difference) and therefore, they are presented as a risk (spatial construction of identity). However, it is possible that they reach this identity (temporal construction of identity), if they implement the economic reforms prescribed by the IFIs. The implementation of the economic reforms is a shared international responsibility (ethical construction of identity). At the same time, both the European Commission and the (European) Council made a distinction between the countries mentioned above and the countries that are located in the north of the Mediterranean Sea, such as Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and Yugoslavia and which can become member of the EU one day. This is not possible for the other countries, they will never be able to progress towards the ‘other’ parts of the identity of the Self (which are inherent European; these countries are ‘different’, spatial construction of identity).

In 1992, specific nodal points appear in the discourse of both institutions: Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashrek Partnership. In the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, the EC is presented as a strong economic actor respecting (decisions of) international economic institutions (common identity for the EC institutions and the member states), while the Mediterranean countries are articulated as not yet respecting the decisions of the IFIs. Therefore, they are presented as a risk for the EC (spatial
construction of identity). However, this can change (temporal construction of identity), if they implement economic reforms. This is a shared international responsibility (ethical construction of identity). The concepts ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ and Euro-Mashrek partnership reflect the common identity which is already reached by the EC and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries: economic integration and economic development based on a strategy developed by international institutions. The (European) Council and the member states add an extra element to this common identity: it is also based on political principles laid down in the UN Charter. The term ‘partnership’ articulates the idea that both the EC and the Mediterranean region are on an equal footing, in the sense that the EC will not impose its will to the region (since it is following the strategy of the IFIs and political principles laid down in international agreements), and that the Mediterranean countries should also be good partners of the EC by doi ng their part of the deal. The prefixes ‘Euro-Maghreb’ and ‘Euro-Mashrek’ represent the unchangeable cultural difference between the EC (culture is based on Greek philosophy and Christianity) and the Mediterranean countries (culture is based on Islam; spatial construction of identity). The concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ is based on the concepts ‘Euro-Maghreb’ and ‘Euro-Mashrek’ partnership (for the (European) Council and the member states it has the same meaning), but the European Commission articulates the meaning of the concept slightly different: it articulates a common identity which is already reached by the EU (economic development based on economic integration and social policies) and which can be reached by the Mediterranean countries. With ‘partnership’ it means the organization of a substantive economic dialogue with the Mediterranean countries within the economic strategy it has set out in its communications. For the (European) Council and the member states, this dialogue takes place within the strategy developed by the IFIs. In 2008, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ is definitely replaced by the concept ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (and later by the concept ‘Union for the Mediterranean’). This concept reflects a common identity for the EU and all Mediterranean countries which border the Mediterranean Sea (Mediterranean; spatial construction of identity which is broader than under the EMP) and which will address the common problems these countries are facing (Union), and which is based on the EMP (Barcelona Process). The ‘Union’ thus refers mainly to the common challenges, and to the possibility for more ownership (due to the new infrastructure) rather than to the idea of a joint responsibility (which is not really the case). In addition to the concept ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ also the words ‘governance’ and ‘participatory democracy’ functioned as nodal points, replacing the concept ‘good governance’.
Within the context of the ENP, the concept ‘Wider Europe’ was first presented as the new nodal point in the discourse. This concept represents a common identity for the EU institutions and the member states based on the internal market (and more specifically the four freedoms) and on political, legal and human rights standards laid down in international agreements. The neighbouring countries have not yet reached this identity (and therefore, they are presented as inferior; spatial construction of identity), but they can become part of this identity (temporal construction of identity) if they implement reforms (and this is a joint responsibility; ethical construction of identity). However, as we explained in chapter 7, this changes after 2003, when the concept ‘Wider Europe’ is replaced by ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ which makes the difference between ‘Europe’ (the EU and the (potential) candidate member states) and the ‘neighbours’ more clearer (which is especially important for the EU in relation to the Mediterranean region) indicating that the latter will remain different from the EU (because they are geographically not ‘European’; spatial construction of identity). In addition, good governance starts to appear as a nodal point. This represents a common identity for the European institutions and the member states; they are well governed because they have created an internal market (they are market economies) and because they follow political and social norms laid down in international agreements. The neighbours have not yet reached this identity (and therefore, they are seen as a threat) but this can change, if they implement reforms (and this is mainly the responsibility of the neighbours). After the Arab Spring, the concept ‘good governance’ was replaced by the concept ‘deep democracy’. It represents a common identity for the European institutions and the member states (based on their common history: the internal market and the respect for democracy). The Mediterranean countries are not yet part of the internal market, and they are not yet respecting democracy (therefore they are a risk for the EU; spatial construction of identity). Nevertheless, they can be part of this identity if they implement economic and political reforms (temporal construction of identity), and these reforms are a shared responsibility (ethical construction of identity). The member states initially used other nodal points in their discourses, but in the long run, they accepted the discourse of the European Commission and the High Representative.

The EESC and the European Parliament often used other nodal points than the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, because they wanted to promote a different social order. This social order is then constituted differently in the discourse. In their discourses on the RMP, they used the concepts ‘Euro-Mediterranean strategic area’ and ‘joint co-development project’. In both discourses, they articulate a common identity for the European institutions and the member states based on the internal market (which is built on a
combination of market economies and welfare states). The European Parliament also refers to political norms laid down in international agreements. The Mediterranean countries can reach this identity, if they implement economic reforms (and for the European Parliament, if they respect international agreements). However, they have not reached this identity yet. For both institutions, the reforms are a shared responsibility, but the EESC puts more emphasis on the role of the EC, while the European Parliament stresses the shared responsibility: it is a joint co-development project. Within the framework of the Euro-Maghreb/Euro-Mashrek Partnership, the EESC keeps referring to the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean strategic area, while the European Parliament already adopts the concept ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’. Later on, they both adopt the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, but this concept reflects their own social order, which differs slightly from the social order supported by the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states. As we noted, with the term ‘partnership’, the EESC really means ‘taking up the responsibility for the development of the neighbours’ (and not just conducting a dialogue like the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states mean), and conducting policies which might be difficult for the EU (debt conversion, access for agricultural products). For the European Parliament, the term ‘partnership’ reflects an engagement, a cooperation based on equality and on the similarities both shores of the Mediterranean Sea share, without the EU imposing its will on the Mediterranean countries.

Within the context of the ENP, the EESC and the European Parliament adopt the concept ‘neighbourhood’ to reflect the social order they are promoting. Nevertheless, they articulate the concept neighbourhood in a different way than the European Commission and the (European) Council. In contrast with the latter institutions which used the concept to geographically define which countries can become members of the ENP, the EESC refers to the neighbourhood as a community of values, cultures and intent. Geography does not play a role, so also countries which are not immediately bordering the EU can become members. The concept reflects a common identity which can be reached by the neighbours, and which is also reflected by the term ‘participatory democracy’ (which functions as the second nodal point). The social order can be summarized as follows: economic reforms are necessary in order to establish a free market, but they should be socially balanced, social policies should be developed as well and the civil society has a role to play in the socio-economic development of the neighbourhood through social dialogue. The European Parliament on its turn suggests developing a new neighbourhood concept and proposes the term ‘Pan-European and Mediterranean region’. This concept brings together two identities in one common objective, i.e. it establishes a link (the creation of a region) between two different forms of regional integration through (the institutions of) the EEA, and it
refers to the multilateral, political conventions (and institutions which punish violations) which will be common to both ‘Pan-Europe’ and ‘the Mediterranean’. When the European Parliament discusses the UfM, it refers to the objectives of the EMP. Therefore, it prefers the term ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (which it adopted from the European Commission) to the term ‘Union for the Mediterranean’. This concept therefore articulates a common identity for the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on regional integration. The word ‘Union’ reflects for the European Parliament the joint policy-making and the institutional framework of which the Parliament hopes that ‘it facilitates greater mutual cooperation on the pinpointing of problems and in the search for common solutions’. The European Parliament also refers to a greater sharing of responsibilities. This articulation is very similar to its earlier articulations on ‘the partnership’. After the Arab Spring, both the EESC and the European Parliament adopt the concept ‘deep democracy’ of the High Representative and the European Commission. For the European Parliament, the concept has the same meaning as the European Commission and the High Representative attributed to it, while for the EESC it has a different meaning: the strengthening of the civil society. In addition, it refers to political norms laid down in international agreements such as the UDHR. The EESC also adopted the concept ‘good governance’, which refers here to the capacities of the civil society in a democracy. In addition to ‘deep democracy’, both institutions adopt a concept which reflects the economic policy they want to promote in the Mediterranean. For the EESC, the concept ‘Euromed region’ represents the idea of an integrated economic region including the EU and the Mediterranean region, and for the European Parliament, the concept ‘Euro-Mediterranean Economic Space’ reflects the possibility for the Mediterranean countries to become part of the internal market without having decision-making power.

With the study of the political logics, we explained how words and concepts are used to construct an identity for the Self and the Other which represent the social order the different EU institutions want to promote. At the same time, we noted that the European institutions often used the same nodal points, although they promote a different kind of social order. This was for example the case with the nodal points ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, ‘neighbourhood’, Union for the Mediterranean, and also ‘good governance’ (see the latest opinion of the EESC). This illustrates how these concepts are floating signifiers, which are open to different meanings and this also illustrates how a discursive struggle is/has taking/taken place between the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states on the one hand, and the European Parliament and the EESC on the other hand. If we then look at the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference, we can conclude that the logic of difference prevailed in the discourse of the
EU, the Other was presented as a ‘risk’, ‘threat’, ‘different’, ….. However, the Other can change to become part of the identity the EC/EU has already reached (logic of equivalence), although it cannot totally change (it has a different culture, it cannot become a member of the EU because of its geographical position, …).

10.3.3 The identification of the fantasmatic logics

Third, we identified the fantasmatic logics in the discourse of the EU. We wanted to know why the discourse of the EU is accepted by political actors and people. This allowed us to explain why the social order the EU promotes in the Mediterranean region is maintained during a period of time. As our research has shown, public contestation took most of the time place within the EU. Each time this happened the social order (the policy, the discourse) had to be made acceptable especially for both political actors/people within the EU and at the same time, also for political actors/people within the Mediterranean region. This is done by articulating ‘myths’ or ‘logics of fantasy’. They provide legitimatization and have three features. First, a myth either contains/suppresses public contestation or it gives direction and energy to new political practices. It does so through the promise of a certain ideal, a certain fullness that will be reached once a named obstacle is overcome or through the promise of a disaster when this obstacle cannot be overcome. Second, it contains a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals, and third, it supports a closed view on society because ‘it offers the subject a degree of protection from the anxiety associated with a direct confrontation with the radical contingency of social relations’ (Glynos, 2008: 10). In the academic literature, we found different myths or logics of fantasies that are told about the EU’s foreign policy: the logic of the ‘peace through trade’, the logic of the third force, the logic of civilian power Europe, the logic of normative power Europe, the logic of feminine Europe, the logic of Green Europe and the logic of multilateral Europe. However, we wanted to know which of these myths or logic of fantasies are actually used by the different EU institutions in their discourses towards the Mediterranean region. This has not yet been studied.

Our study on the fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the different EU institutions over multiple events allows us not only to reveal how social and political practices are made acceptable, but also how the discourses change each time public contestation takes place. Initially, the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states followed the economic policy of the World Bank and the IMF in the Mediterranean region. They followed the economic norms of the IFIs, articulating that it is not the task of the EC to develop an economic strategy for the Mediterranean region. We found that the discourse of both institutions under the RMP was characterized by the logic of multilateral Europe, presenting an EC that takes up its
international responsibilities and which expects that the partner countries will do the same (this is the ideal that should be reached). This suppresses public contestation, both within the EC (the public contestation which might appear in other European institutions and in some of the member states) and within the Mediterranean countries. Especially for the Mediterranean countries, it is difficult to reject the policy of the EC, because that would mean that they reject the policy of the IFIs and their international responsibilities. At the same time, it also contains a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals because it presents the idea of effective multilateralism against nationalism (for both the EU and the Mediterranean countries) and it presents an ideological project, a closed view on society, which is based on neoliberalism.

We find the same discourses in the proposals for a Euro-Maghreb and a Euro-Mashrek Partnership, although the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states show some more self-awareness. First, the EC is presented as a focal point for peace, development and growth, and second it is argued that the EC has a moral responsibility towards the region. This reflects the logic of civilian power Europe, presenting a Europe that, besides taking up its international responsibilities, also wants to use its own economic power to help with the development of the Mediterranean region. This ‘help’ is reflected in the proposal for the conclusion of a FTA with the Maghreb. It proposes a certain ideal (development through commerce) once a certain obstacle is overcome (the problem of economic integration). This myth suppresses public contestation within the EC (within the Southern member states which were confronted with migration coming from the Mediterranean region and also within the EESC and the European Parliament (which stated that the EC should develop its own international identity and which criticized the social order under the RMP). At the same time, it also suppresses public contestation within the Mediterranean countries, especially within the Maghreb countries (which wanted to have a better market access). It contains a transgressive aspect, because it proposes economic integration, and it presents a closed view on society, which is based on neoliberalism. In addition, the discourse also reflects the logic of ‘peace through trade’, given the reference to the EC as a focal point for peace. This discourse, however, is clearer in the proposals for the Euro-Mashrek partnership, where the European Commission refers to its own past to reflect the EC’s experience with economic integration and to explain the role it can play in the Middle East (in a situation where the US and Israel were not willing to let the EC to play a role). Here again, a certain ideal (peace) is proposed when an obstacle is overcome (nationalism). This is also transgressive vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals. Regarding political norms, the (European) Council/the member states refer to the UN Charter and the resolution of the UN Security Council (logic of multilateral Europe). In this regard, they present again a
Europe that takes up its international responsibilities in the political field, and which expects that the partner countries will do the same. This suppresses public contestation against the promotion of political norms within the Mediterranean countries and within the other European institutions.

If we then study the discourse of both the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states on the EMP, we find that the European Commission does not refer to economic strategy of the IFIs. Instead, it presents an own economic strategy which should lead to the establishment of an EMFTA. However, it is no longer stressed that the EU should promote the EMFTA because it has a moral responsibility, although this idea is at the basis of the Euro-Maghreb Partnership and therefore also at the basis of the EMP. The European Commission now stresses the EU’s economic interests in its discourse, mainly to convince the other EU institutions and the member states of the policy. Initially, the (European) Council/member states also refer to these economic interests, but eventually, they decide to follow the economic strategy of the IFIs. Doing so, they present a Europe which will take up its international responsibilities, and which expects the partners to do the same. This is also the case for the political norms, where the (European) Council/the member states refer to the UN Charter and the UDHR. This suppresses public contestation, both within the EU (the public contestation which might appear in other European institutions and in some of the member states) and within the Mediterranean countries (logic of multilateral Europe). For the Mediterranean countries, it is difficult to reject the policy of the EU, because that would mean that they reject the policy of the IFIs and of the UN. At the same time, it also contains a transgressive aspect vis-à-vis officially affirmed ideals because it presents the idea of effective multilateralism against nationalism (for both the EU and the Mediterranean countries) and it presents an ideological project, a closed view on society, which is based on neoliberalism.

Under the ENP, the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states definitely decide to leave the economic path of the IFIs. Especially the European Commission presents the EU as the economic model to follow for the Mediterranean countries: the Mediterranean countries should become part of the internal market. Commissioners Prodi and Verheugen state that the EU represents a unique model and that it should become a global player, a global player which does more than promoting its interests (Verheugen, 2002), and which uses its model ‘for the sake of peace and reconciliation in other parts of the world’ (Prodi, 2004). We identified the logic of civilian power Europe in the discourse of the European Commission. In contrast with its previous discourse, the European Commission now presents the EU as an actor which should cooperate with the IFIs and which should convince them from
the EU’s economic approach. This discourse definitively suppresses the public contestation which in the past appeared with the other European institutions, i.e. that the EU should not follow the strategy from the IFIs, but that they should follow their own approach. The idea of the EU as a global power is now the ideal to be reached; this will spread prosperity in the world and in the neighbourhood. However, the social order the EU is promoting has not changed; the European Commission and the (European) Council still promote a libertarian democracy. The ‘new’ myth that is articulated here successfully prevents a dislocation of the social relations. For the Mediterranean countries, it promises a certain ideal (economic prosperity) once an obstacle is overcome, once they are part of the internal market. It also prevents public contestation coming from the Mediterranean countries, because the EU will now contribute to their development by giving them full access to the internal market (they will have more ‘ownership’). After 2003, however, the discourse and the logic of fantasy change. It is then mainly articulated that the EU should promote its own interests in the neighbourhood, which is mainly meant to suppress the public contestation (on security issues) coming from the member states. This is also articulated in the proposals for the UfM. Here, we should also note that for the political and social norms, the European Commission and the (European) Council refer to the UDHR, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and to the ILO. This suppresses public contestation in the Mediterranean countries, which were very reluctant towards the promotion of these norms by the EU (also because it reminds them of the colonial period, as we explained in chapter 6).

Overall, the discourse again changes after the Arab Spring. In contrast with its discourse on the ENP, the EU is now not only presented as the economic model to follow, but also as the political and social model. The European Commission/the High Representative state that the Mediterranean countries should become ‘deep democracies’. Although this sounds universal, the support for deep democracy is embedded in the security and the economic cooperation with the EU (where the eventual goal is the integration in the internal market). That the EU is the focal point, the model to follow for the Mediterranean countries, is reflected in the discourse of the European Commission/the High Representative (and eventually also in the discourse of the (European) Council since it adopts their communications). In the discourses, we find several references to the cosmogonic myths of the EU (it is built on the ruins of WWII and the Berlin Wall), which justifies the actions of the EU in the Mediterranean region (‘we should do the same for the Mediterranean region as the US did for us after WWII’). However, the EU is also presented as a model because it has a similar history as the Mediterranean countries: it has been destroyed by authoritarian regimes. In this case, the EU is seen as the sum of its (old and new) member states. The EU thus represents an ideal (liberty and prosperity) which can be reached by
the Mediterranean countries once obstacles are overcome (a change in the political system and integration in the internal market). Here we identified again the logic civilian power Europe (the economic model is still presented as the basis, also for political development), but the political dimension is far more stressed. This suppresses public contestation within the EU, because it reflects a change in the policy, and then especially in the promotion of political norms, which was not very successful in the past. By stressing the political dimension of the civilian power myth, the European Commission/the High Representative and the (European) Council try to prevent a dislocation of the social relations.

In contrast with the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states, the EESC and the European Parliament already argued in the framework of the RMP that the EC should not follow the economic strategy of the IFIs, but that it should develop its own strategy, and that it should convince the IFIs to adopt its approach. This discourse also reflects the logic of multilateral Europe, but here Europe is presented as an actor which should take a lead in the formulation of the economic policy of the IFIs. In addition, both institutions also argued that the EC should use its economic power to contribute to the development of the Mediterranean region, and that it should play an own role in world politics (although the latter was less reflected in the discourse of the European Parliament; logic of civilian power Europe). We find a similar discourse in the documents of the EESC/the European Parliament on the Euro-Maghreb/Euro-Mashrek Partnership and on the EMP. However, they only articulated that the EU should play a leading role when it comes to economic development. For political and social development, they refer to the UDHR, Geneva Conventions (European Parliament) and to the ILO (EESC). Over time, the EESC and the European Parliament keep defending these fantasmatic logics (see the discourse under the ENP, UfM, renewed ENP), but the logic of civilian power Europe and the logic of multilateral Europe (Europe as a leader for economic norms) are less emphasized in the later frameworks because the European Commission (and the High Representative) and the (European) Council/the member started articulating these logics in their discourses. In the discourse after the Arab Spring, it can be noted that the EESC keeps referring to the ILO and the UDHR for social and political norms (in contrast to the other institutions, also the European Parliament) which present the EU as the political and social model to follow).

In conclusion, with the study of fantasmatic logics, we thus explained why the discourses of the different European institutions were acceptable for political actors/people, and why social practices are maintained for a period of time (until public contestation again appeared). At the
same time, we also found that the fantasmatic logics in the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states changed almost each time public contestation took place (logic of multipolar Europe; follower - logic of civilian power Europe – logic of civilian power Europe with emphasis on political norms). However, the social order these actors are promoting, has not changed. The logics of fantasies actually contributed to the prevention of the dislocation of social practices because they each defend the logic of the market. Doing so, they prevent the radical contingency of social relations. Instead, they contribute to the promotion of an ideology (neoliberalism). This is how the social logics and the fantasmatic logics are linked. If we then look at how the political and fantasmatic logics are linked, we first observed that the logic of difference prevailed in the discourse of the EU, the Other was presented as a ‘risk’, ‘threat’, ‘different’, … (see supra). The Other who prevents the identity of the Self is also noticeable in the fantasmatic logics: if the EC does not succeed in convincing the Mediterranean countries to follow the economic reforms of the IFIs, this will hamper the image of the EC as a multilateral power. If the EC/EU does not succeed in contributing to the economic and the political development of the Mediterranean countries, this will hamper its image as civilian power. The ‘external obstacle’, in this case the Mediterranean countries, thus blocks the own identity. Two more conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. If we look at the evolution of these fantasmatic logics (and especially the evolution in the discourse of the European Commission (the High Representative) and the (European) Council/the member states, we see the evolution of the EC/EU as an actor which initially only follows the decisions of international institutions or international agreements to an actor which becomes self-aware, and which presents its own economic and political model. The evolution of the discourse also reflects the growth of the EU as an actor at the international scene; it reflects the evolution of the identity of the EU. In addition, it can be concluded that the discourses of the different EU institutions are mainly based on the ‘logic of peace through trade’ (or the bull myth), the logic of multilateral Europe (leader and/or follower) and the logic of civilian power Europe. Other logics such as the logic of normative power Europe, the logic of feminine Europe and the logic of Green Europe were not found in the discourses of the different European institutions towards the Mediterranean region.

10.4 Persuasion

Overall, with the previous paragraphs, we wanted to articulate the social, political and fantasmatic logics together in an overarching explanatory logic that combines descriptive, explanatory and critical aspects. The retroductive explanation provided us with a refined politico-economic model of democracy, integrative libertarian democracy (a new explanatory category), which further
defines the role of the civil society and which contributes to our understanding of the kind of democracy the EU is promoting in the Mediterranean region. At the same time, however, we are very critical about this model of democracy promoted by the EU under the renewed ENP, as it will not contribute to the establishment of genuine democracies in the Mediterranean region. The third dialectical moment in a post-positive approach is persuasion, i.e. convincing the relevant audience about the way the problem was characterized and explained. With this dissertation, I want to convince other researchers of my alternative approach to the Euro-Mediterranean relations and of the explanation/understanding of the discourse of the EU towards the Mediterranean region that is given. The research tried to deliver an added value in several ways (substantially, theoretically, epistemologically and socially).

First, by adopting a different ontological, epistemological and methodological approach to the study of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, this research addressed different research questions than the current studies on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Overall, we tried to explain and to understand the discourses of the different EU institutions on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. We examined how globalization is articulated by the different EU institutions (which only Ben Rosamond had already done, see chapter 2) in their discourses towards the Mediterranean region (which has not yet been studied) and illustrated how ‘interdependence’ is constructed in order to legitimate EC/EU action in the Mediterranean region. In addition, we studied how the social order, how democracy is constructed in the discourses of the different EU institutions (instead of looking at why and how the EU promotes democracy towards the Mediterranean region, and if it is successful in doing so, since other scholars have already examined this). Moreover, we studied how the EU institutions constituted an identity for the Self and the Other in their discourse through the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. We did not assume that the discourse is a reflection of the interests or norms of the institutions; we examined how identity is spatially, temporally and ethically constructed in the discourse. In conclusion, we also studied which myths the EU institutions articulate in their discourse. We used the (limited) literature on myths which are told about the EU in order to examine which myths the EU institutions are articulating themselves.

Second, by going deeper into what kind of democracy the EU is promoting, this dissertation contributes to a broader theoretical debate that recently appeared within the EU-Studies and which focuses on the models of democracy the EU is promoting and how these models are defined. Jan Orbie and Anne Wetzel and their team study which elements of an embedded liberal democracy the EU is promoting in third countries and try to determine if the
EU has a narrow, shallow, broad or full liberal democracy promotion agenda (see chapter 2; Wetzel & Orbie, 2011). Milja Kurki and her team of researchers identified several models of democracy (see chapter 4; Kurki, 2010; Kurki, forthcoming), and they studied which model the European Commission and the EEAS are promoting in general (so not to one region specifically). They characterize the EU’s model as ‘fuzzy liberal’. We add to this research that the EU’s model towards the Mediterranean region can be characterized as ‘libertarian democracy’ (or neoliberal democracy like Kurki would call it), but that the model promoted by the EESC and the European Parliament towards the region can be defined as a form of liberal democracy. With the new focus on social partners, we refine our conclusion, and argue that the EU is now promoting an ‘integrative libertarian democracy’ in the Mediterranean region.

Third, by applying the epistemological approach developed by Glynos & Howarth (2007), this dissertation contributes to the development of a way to apply the poststructuralist discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. As we explained in chapter 3, one of the main critiques on the work of Laclau and Mouffe was that they had not given an indication on how their theory can be applied. Several authors therefore tried to develop a response to the epistemological and methodological questions raised by the critics of poststructuralist discourse theory. Glynos & Howarth (2007) elaborated on the epistemological approach, but to our knowledge, their approach has not yet been applied. We developed a research strategy (see 3.3.3 on how to identify the logics in the discourse of the EU institutions), which also elaborated on the link between the ontological and epistemological position. Furthermore, we combined this approach, ‘the identification of logics’, with the work of scholars who already went deeper into methodological issues such as Lene Hansen (2006) & Steven Sterkx (2006). We do not follow exactly the approach of these authors; we rather try to develop the link between the epistemological and methodological approach and indicate how logics can be identified in texts.

Fourth, I hope that my research can give an incentive to politicians and civil servants to think about the social order they are promoting and about how they articulate the Other. The social order they are promoting is closed, because the EU internal market is considered to be the guiding line, the ‘essence’ of everything. The ‘economy’ is not structured as a political space. As explained, this suppressed democracy (despite the attempts of the EU to promote democracy) and played into the hands of the authoritarian regimes. Eventually, the suppression of democracy led to revolutions in the Mediterranean region. As we noted, Islamist parties eventually won the elections in Tunisia and Egypt. This is not a coincidence, because these parties provide a collective form of identification based on Islam (while this is less the case for the other parties).
This is also not the case for the political model the EU is now trying to promote in the Mediterranean region. The latter leaves no room for political participation, for ‘conflict’, which is central in politics, and is not affective and not appealing (therefore, Mouffe calls it a form of postpolitical democracy). As a reaction to the victory of the Islamist parties, some people/politicians within the EU will be tempted to present the Islamist parties as archaic, as conservative, as extreme. They will present their reaction as rational, and as defending universal values. In other words, they will constitute the identity of the Other in order to preserve the identity of the Self, but there is a possibility that they will do this in a very moralistic way (the Other is presented as evil) instead of in a political way. Consequently, the Islamist parties will be presented as enemies which should be ignored and/or defeated. This is a view which endorses to the clash of civilizations’ argument of Huntington and which ignores the differences between Islamist parties, but one which will not help us any further.

10.5 Suggestions for further research

The research that is presented here focused on the discourses of the different EU institutions on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. As explained in chapter 3, we chose specifically to discuss the wider political debate on the Euro-Mediterranean relations (intertextual model 2). The broader, ‘marginal’ political discourses and/or cultural representations (intertextual model 3) are not examined. This can be a path for further research. Scholars can for example study the discourses of NGOs such as CONCORD and Eurostep (a network of autonomous European NGOs) which lobby the EU on its external policy in order to find out if these NGOs have alternative discourses on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, or if they join the discourses of the EU institutions. Moreover, we did not yet look at the discourses of the Mediterranean countries because they had little influence on the frameworks for the Euro-Mediterranean relations and because there was no open debate on democracy possible (neither within the Mediterranean countries nor with the EU). However, the Arab Spring opened a new political debate which might lead to democratization in the Mediterranean countries. This might provide new opportunities for researchers to examine discourses on democracy in the Mediterranean countries, and to compare discourses from the political parties which have the most political influence within Mediterranean countries with the discourses of the different EU institutions. This can reveal if these political parties have a similar view on the constitution of the social order as the EU has, and this can lead to some conclusions about the compatibility of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region with the policies promoted within the Mediterranean countries.
Another interesting path for further research can be found in comparing the EU’s discourse towards the Mediterranean region with the EU’s discourse towards other regions in the world, for example SSA or Latin-America. This can allow researchers to draw further conclusions about what kind of democracy the EU is promoting in the world. In addition, this research might also reveal patterns in the political logics the different EU institutions articulate. Does the European Parliament, for example, always articulate the relationship with third countries as an engagement? Moreover, this research can reveal some patterns in the fantasmatic logics. Are the discourses of the European Commission and the (European) Council/the member states towards SSA for example between 1989 and 2003 also based on the logic of multilateral Europe – follower? In other words: does the EU also follow the economic strategy of the World Bank and the IMF in its policy towards these regions? And do we also see a gradual change in the discourse? This kind of research can provide further insights in the discourse of the EU as an international political actor.
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Annexes

Annex I: Documents on the Renovated Mediterranean Policy

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Annex IV: Documents on the Union for the Mediterranean

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