URBAN POLITICS IN MOROCCO

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF STATE POWER

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Dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Political and Social Sciences, option Political Sciences

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Promotor: Prof. Dr. Sami Zemni
... and the mighty multinationals have monopolized the oxygen
so it’s as easy as breathing for us all to participate
yes they’re buying and selling off shares of air
and you know it’s all around you
but it’s hard to point and say “there”
so you just sit on your hands and quietly contemplate.

(Ani Di Franco, Your next bold move)
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAVB</td>
<td>Agence pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>Agence de Développement Sociale</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMDH</td>
<td>Association Marocaine des Droits Humains</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDCM</td>
<td>Association Nationale de Diplômés Chômeurs au Maroc</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANHI</td>
<td>Agence Nationale pour l’Habitat Insalubre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANRT</td>
<td>Agence Nationale de Réglementation des Télécommunications</td>
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<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Accompagnement social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Agence Urbaine de Casablanca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AURS</td>
<td>Agence Urbaine de Rabat-Salé</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDH</td>
<td>Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Centre d’Expérimentation, de Recherche et de Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDG</td>
<td>Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Confédération Démocratique du Travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGEM</td>
<td>Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Compagnie Générale Immobilière</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGCL</td>
<td>Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>Emerging Capital Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>European Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERAC</td>
<td>Etablissements Régionaux d’Aménagement et de Construction</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euros</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBPMC</td>
<td>Fondation Banque Populaire pour le MicroCrédit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDT</td>
<td>Fédération Démocratique du Travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFNEAT</td>
<td>Fonds Nationale d’Equipements et d’Achats de Terrains</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONDEP</td>
<td>Fondation pour le Développement Local et le Partenariat Microcrédit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSH</td>
<td>Fonds de Solidarité de l’Habitat</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Habitats Clandestins</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAU</td>
<td>Institut Nationale d’Aménagement Urbain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDH</td>
<td>Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substituting Industrialization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Moroccan dirham</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASEN</td>
<td>Moroccan Agency of Solar Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North African</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIF</td>
<td>Moroccan Infrastructure Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Maîtrise d'Ouvrage Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATUHE</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de l’Environnement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHUAE</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Habitat, de L’Urbanisme et de l’Aménagement de l’Espace</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUHTE</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat, du Tourisme et de l’Environnement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBG</td>
<td>Oxford Business Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCE</td>
<td>Office de Commercialisation et d’Exportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Office de Développement Industriel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONA</td>
<td>Omnium Nord Africain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Party of Authenticity and Modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARHI</td>
<td>Programme National d’Action pour la Résorption de l’Habitat Insalubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIZ</td>
<td>Qualified Industrial Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABR</td>
<td>Société d’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDAU</td>
<td>Schéma Directeur de l’Aménagement du Territoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small to Medium-sized Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNI</td>
<td>Société Nationale d’Investissement</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRS</td>
<td>Société du Tramway de Rabat-Salé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWF</td>
<td>Sovereign Wealth Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Tanger City Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFZ</td>
<td>Tanger Free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMSA</td>
<td>Tanger Mediterranean Special Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMT</td>
<td>Union Marocaine des Travailleurs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFP</td>
<td>Union Nationale des Forces Populaires</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>US dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFP</td>
<td>Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSBP</td>
<td>Villes Sans Bidonvilles Program</td>
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General introduction

How do you start the introduction of a PhD on political change in the Arab World – with Morocco as a specific case study – right in the midst of rapidly changing political evolutions? Less than two months before the deadline of this study, the people of Tunisia hit the streets and chased away president Ben Ali. Soon after, revolutionary politics unfolded in Egypt. Also in the rest of the Arab world, the people would not sit quietly and watch how everything went back to normal. “Leaders in the rest of the Arab world are nervous—and so they should be”, stated The Economist, “the mobile telephone, satellite television and the internet all have the potential to weaken their capacity for keeping their people in the dark and under their control”.¹ In other words, the Tunisian and Egyptian upheavals were just the beginning. The events that followed in Libya even turned extremely violent compared to the ‘relatively’ peaceful revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. As such, the question whether the Arab World was (finally) experiencing its own genuine democratic transition will surely spark the debates – yet again – between believers and non-believers.² The issue of democratization has dominated the study of political change in the Arab world over the last 20 years. Despite the wide range of different opinions and explanations, a bulk of the political analyses can be divided into two broader branches. First of all, transitologists believed that the Arab World was, just as elsewhere in the world, subject to a linear transition to (liberal) democracy. For sure, the current events will inspire some of them to see a confirmation of – what they consider to be – a global logic. Already during the first days of the Egyptian revolt, Amr Hamzawy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that “Egypt stands today assuredly on the threshold of transition toward democratic governance”.³ Secondly, and opposed to the first branch of scholars, a growing group of sceptics began to criticize this ‘transition paradigm’ and argued that we should rather pay attention to “what in fact is going on” in the Arab World (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 188). According to these scholars, Arab authoritarianism had proven again and again its renewal, resilience, persistence, robustness, etc… (Ibid.).

Evidently, the current massive upheavals will certainly re-invigorate the debates on democratization and authoritarian persistence and alter the actual balance between the different views. But are these broader traditions of Middle East scholarship capable of providing us with satisfying explanations to what in fact is going on in the Arab World today? Suddenly, in the heat of the moment, everybody talks about political change. To be sure, I do not wish to deny the incredible importance of what is happening at the moment. No doubt about it, the toppling of various authoritarian leaders in the Arab World is a huge transformation. But how do we explain this phenomenon? I can imagine that, at the moment of writing this sentence, many experts, scholars, students, political analysts, etc… are glued to their computers, television or radio, eager to find out if the change they have been looking for all those years is actually (and finally) occurring.

² See for example the contrast between the article of Robert Springborg “Game over: the chance for democracy in Egypt is lost” and the one by Parag Khanna “Getting on the right side of history”. Both appeared in Foreign Policy Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/03/getting_on_the_right_side_of_history; http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/02/game_over_the_chance_for_democracy_in_egypt_is_lost (accessed 04/02/2011).
But is it not possible that precisely the fact that many of them were actually looking for something particular (i.e. a democratic transition or authoritarian persistence), that this has blinded them at the same time to see what has actually been changing for years, even decades? Of course, most observers agree that the recent demonstrations did not come out of nowhere. Over the past decade, the Arab World has seen an increase in social protest (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). Additionally, there is a wide-spread consensus about the fact that socio-economic grievances are at the basis of current public discontent. But still, are there not more complex and fundamental causes that can explain what we have seen these past two months?

According to Michel Dunne, editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin, the revolt in Tunisia proved – and disproved – two intriguing aspects about political change in the Arab World. First, Tunisia debunked the long-held analysis that only a country with a strong political opposition can seriously challenge and eventually overthrow an authoritarian regime. Secondly, and maybe more importantly, “Tunisia showed that the youth bulge about which demographers and other analysts have been fretting for two decades is indeed a political time bomb” (Dunne, 2011). The Tunisian uprising, she emphasised, was rooted in the problems of youth unemployment. These same problems occur in other Arab countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan and Morocco. Similarly, the youth bulge in these other countries could also be one of the mean reasons for the current political instability. Another argument that is very popular at the moment is that the protests, which were initially sparked by economic grievances, are primarily about ‘bad’ Arab governance. The protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and other countries were part of a rising tide of popular dissatisfaction with illiberal, unreformed Arab rule. The nature of domestic political government was thus the real problem. Internal corruption among a small minority of elites, the lack of political freedom, the human rights abuses, etc. were no longer accepted by the majority of the Arab populations.

While I do not necessarily want to deny the validity of these statements, I wonder whether these arguments are sufficient to explain the current events? Can a critical explanation be reduced to mere demographic trends or ‘bad’ governance? Or, to cite The Economist again, are the popular uprisings the mere result of the decreasing capacity of authoritarian Arab regimes to keep “their people in the dark and under their control”? Or are the real dynamics behind the current uprisings more complex? And to understand this complex nature of the current events, shouldn’t we look at the more global and structural mechanisms at work and try to map the much more variegated forms of political agency that are involved in the making of contemporary Arab political life? In other words, I don’t think we can attribute the reasons for massive public discontent, frustration and anger simply to the dissatisfaction with the politics of the “Arab regime” and/or the pressures of overpopulation. The rapidly evolving transfor-

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4 Professor Joel Beinin argued that also in Egypt, one of the most extraordinary aspects of the revolt was that there was no identifiable leadership. See Beinin, J. Egypt at the tipping point, 31 January 2011, in Foreign Policy, available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/31/egypt_at_the_tipping_point (accessed 01/02/2011).

mations everyone is speculating about today, cannot be properly understood without seriously and critically taking into consideration the fundamental political changes of the last three decades. It are these changes that are the central focus of this study. To be honest, I had in mind a slightly different introduction. But despite – or maybe because of – the current events, the main research question of this project remains prevalent: How do we interpret political change in the Arab world today? Or more precisely, how do we understand contemporary political change without falling into the ideological trap of seeing change as a phenomenon that is almost automatically linked to the issue of (and balance between) either democratization or authoritarian persistence? In other words, how do we avoid ideological blindness (i.e. seeing change in relation to this one possible narrative: a transition to liberal democracy) and look critically (i.e. from the perspective of critical theory) at the actual political evolutions in the Arab World?6

Increasing global market integration has triggered radical reforms in many Arab countries over the last three decades. Approximately 30 years ago, several countries in the region faced severe deficit crises and were forced to adopt structural adjustment measures. These structural adjustments and the following neoliberal reforms marked a turning point in the processes of political change in the region. There is of course no shortage of critique of the ways in which neoliberal assumptions have managed to articulate themselves to the charisma of contemporary globalization. Yet, in spite of the compelling nature of this broader critique, coming from a range of disciplines and different traditions of critical theory (e.g. Rose, 1999; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Harvey, 2003; Brenner, 2004; Robinson, 2004; Bayart, 2007), there is still room for more explicit case studies, especially in the developing world and more particularly in the Arab World, that explore the contingent formations of neoliberalism on the ground and the specific ways in which neoliberal agency has shaped the possibilities and constraints of political life. A first problem, however, is that the political dimension of (neoliberal) economic reform in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region has often been ignored or misunderstood within the area study’s literature. My concern here is to suggest the significance of these changes for the government of people and places in contemporary Morocco; and – scaling up – to think about what these changes might imply for mainstream accounts of Arab political life, which often remain locked in debates on mere endogenous trajectories of regime change, democratic transition and authoritarian persistence (cf. chapter 1). Moreover, I argue against the often taken for granted hypothesis that ‘bad’ governance should be (or can be) just replaced by ‘good’ governance in order to ensure a democratic transition, general welfare, economic development and more (political) freedom. Contrary to this hegemonic discourse and perception, the implementation of neoliberal reforms did not bring forth overall economic growth and prosperity – not even if these reforms would be implemented properly according to the rules of the game (e.g. Dillman, 2002) – but leads to a inherent geography of uneven development in which some places are privileged over others (Harvey, 2006). What’s more, the reality of contemporary neoliberal capitalism leads not so much to uneven development between nation-states or between centre states and peripheral states as it produces increasing social inequality within national and regional boundaries, and especially within the arising mega-cities of the Global South.

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6 What I mean by ideological blindness and critique will be further elaborated in chapter 1.
This study takes Morocco as a case study. Also in Morocco, the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1983 was the symbolic watershed moment from which the current political transformations are to be explained. In less than three decades, the economic landscape of the kingdom has been radically transformed. Yet, how do we interpret these changes? Morocco has often been considered as a more moderate political system compared to some of the other authoritarian regimes in the region. Additionally, especially since king Mohamed VI’s accession to the throne, the country has willingly presented itself as a model reformer to the outside world. In the first years of his reign, king Mohamed VI carried out limited political reforms, substantial social reforms and above all significant economic reforms. In his discourses, he repeatedly stressed the importance of good governance, human rights, economic development and citizen participation. This sudden change in style, compared with the more repressive image of his father Hassan II, even earned Mohamed VI the epithet of ‘king of the poor’. And although the optimism of a ‘Moroccan exception’ took a setback after the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 – the public authorities immediately answered with repressive measures in order to deal with the political crisis (Zemni & Bogaert, 2006) – many observers still praised the country’s economic openness to the rest of the world. Some also believed that the implementation of important social policies such as the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) and the Cities Without Slums Program (VSBP) testified that there was still evidence of a real transition towards more political liberalization (e.g. Navez-Bouchanine, 2009; for a similar more general argument see also Malka & Alterman, 2006; Storm, 2007).

I argue that the reforms of the last three decades are indeed evidence of a fundamental political transformation. However, this transformation cannot be understood in terms of mainstream assumptions linking economic liberalization and free market reform to democratization. Neither can it be understood as just an incomplete implementation of economic reform, a form of crony capitalism, in the course of which a small minority of domestic corrupt elites, close to the monarchy, skim off all the capital surpluses of that reform. To the contrary, these – maybe at first sight – plausible explanations neglect a more profound process of political change. The changes of the last 30 years in Morocco, and by extension in the whole Arab world, reflect three phenomena related to neoliberalism that are still not sufficiently understood and remain understudied. First of all, the neoliberal reforms reflected a profound shift from (some form of) state-developmentalist towards intrinsically authoritarian modalities of neoliberal government. As a result, authoritarianism in Morocco has been transformed by the ways in which the interests of ruling domestic elites and (global) economic elites are increasingly intertwined. This gave rise to new arrangements where “market requirements” now determine and justify the (authoritarian) modality of government. As a result, the making of a new political world in the Arab region was not only determined by “the regime”, or by internal state-society relations, but also, and increasingly, by interests and interventions

7 Developmentalism (as the Southern variant of Fordism-Keynesianism) manifested itself of course differently across the region. Morocco, for example, has never adopted a completely state dominated economic sector and compared to other countries in the region, such as Egypt, the Moroccan authorities showed themselves particularly modest in terms of providing social security for its citizens (Najem, 2001; Catusse, 2009a; see also chapter 2 and 3). Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that the Moroccan political economy did not contain some specific characteristics of a developmental state model before the structural adjustment of the early 1890s (Waterbury & Richards, 2008; Catusse, 2009a).
related to global capitalism and contemporary neoliberal globalization. Secondly, the introduction of neoliberal reforms and the formation of a Moroccan neoliberal project are not subject to a unitary set of principles. Neoliberalism is not just this ‘one size fits all’ model. This would be to neglect the crucial implication of local political agency and the constitution of differentiated forms of “actually existing neoliberalism” everywhere in the world (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). As I will argue, the local is not just a product of the global. To the contrary, the local is an agent in globalization. More precisely, the local production of contemporary global capitalism is the result of the localization of wider political interests and projects that involve local, regional, national and global actors who are assembled through and within new political configurations (MP Smith, 1998; Massey, 2005; see also Gupta, 1995). Finally, neoliberalism is not some ideology or political rationality immune to change itself. Through the elaboration of specific case studies, I want to explore the transformative and contingent character of neoliberal government and neoliberal governmentality without making rash conclusions about an alleged evolution towards post-neoliberal forms of government (for a similar argument see Challies & Murray, 2008). The crises of the 1980s, the protests against drastic austerity measures, and the negative socio-economic outcomes for the majority of the poor population, are some of the dynamics that have set into motion the development of new perspectives on government, new modalities of state intervention and new ways of market-support which may have radically changed the modalities and rationalities of neoliberal government but not necessarily the balances of political (class) power.

One of the main hypotheses of this study is that the socio-economic changes of the last three decades resulted out of a political project that cannot be understood properly without taking into consideration its dialectical intertwining with the contemporary project of global capitalism and global class forces. Neoliberalism in Morocco has given form to a particular class project that cannot only be understood in terms of endogenous political legacies. Here, class should not so much be understood as a defined group of actors with a set of fixed characteristics (e.g. ownership over the means of production), but rather as a process of appropriation of surpluses and capital accumulation (Ruccio, 2011; see also chapter 3). As such, I use class as a political concept and not so much as a sociological concept.8 The (Moroccan) state plays a crucial role in this class project. Or more precisely, differentiated forms of state agency and state power are engaged in the production of the Moroccan neoliberal project. Often, neoliberal reform and state authority are seen within a negative correlation, as if market-oriented reform automatically reduces state sovereignty and state control. Yet, this is a misconception. State power has been used actively to give form to actually existing neoliberalism. What’s more, the success of neoliberal reform depends on state intervention. Consequently, the growing reliance on market-oriented policies not only entailed a process of deregulation but also re-regulated political life across an increasingly variegated landscape of spaces to be governed. Furthermore, to the extent global class actors are now involved in local politics, these actors do not so much negatively affect state authority but are drawn within reach and become active players on the field of the state (Panitch, 1998; Allen & Cochrane, 2010). State power has thus not necessarily been undermined but rather redefined. Power and authority are then not so much slipping away from local au-

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8 I want to thank Matthias Lievens for this particular distinction. Additionally, of course, class is here not used in an absolute way in the sense that it replaces all other forms of social relations.
authorities but are subject to renegotiation within new assemblages of state power (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). As a result, the state – or the Arab regime for that matter – cannot be perceived as this coherent entity. As I discuss, neoliberal reform initiated the elaboration of new forms of spatially differentiated government and regulatory arrangements that manifest themselves differently across space. More specifically, in this study I will pay attention to both new modes of (indirect) state intervention and new forms of state-institutional transformation. Therefore, we should not make the mistake of seeing the state as an actor in itself but focus instead on the multiple and variegated actors that use state power to pursue their goals and interests.

It is on the urban and not the national scale that the scope and significance of the contemporary political changes are most clearly revealed. Consequently, the city presents itself as the site par excellence to study the current political transformations. Neoliberal policies have intensified urban disparities, turning cities, especially in the Global South, more and more into spaces of extremes (Bayat & Biekart, 2009). I will consider the urban politics that characterize the production and government of both ends of the urban extreme in Morocco. I use the concept of urban politics as it is understood by David Harvey, namely “in the broad sense of political processes at work within a fluidly defined but nevertheless explicit space” (Harvey, 1989a: 127). In this view, the urban space is not exclusively defined by the urban territory and political agency is not reduced to the local or national authorities but comprises the wide range of social complexes and social power relations that are drawn within the reach of the urban or impact upon its constitution. It is a much broader conception of politics which includes, but is not reduced to, local and national state networks. Considering these urban politics, I will draw evidence from two particular case studies. First of all, I examine the changing modalities and rationalities implicated in the government of slums in Morocco. By looking at different modes of government between the early 1980s and the 2000s, I demonstrate a significant transition in Moroccan neoliberal government. Furthermore, by examining the current national Villes Sans Bidonvilles program (Cities Without Slums – VSBP), I explain how slum dwellers are being required to participate in the making of a specific political world in which the ability to claim and articulate political rights are circumscribed not only by “the Arab regime,” but also by the sanctions and incentives of “the free market” (Parker & Debruyne, 2011). Secondly, I elaborate on the political dimension of a high-end urban development scheme in the valley of the Bouregreg river between the twin-cities of Rabat and Salé. The Bouregreg project is a salient example of how the contemporary city is perceived as an economic “growth machine” (Molotch, 1976) and how cityscapes are redesigned and restructured to satisfy the desires and interests of (global) capital. Furthermore, at the end, I connect these two case studies by showing the specific political logics behind the neoliberal urban spatial fix.

The specific choice for these case studies was inspired by the striking neglect of mainstream political analyses of the ways in which the Arab city reflects a hegemonic project (Parker, 2009). There are exceptions of course. Pioneering work such as the book edited by Yasser Elshestawy (2008) focuses explicitly on contemporary urban transfor-

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9 I do not want to argue that the state and the Arab regime can be seen as one and the same political entity, only that they are subject to the same kind of imagination. I will address this matter in chapter 1.
mation in the Arab world. It tries to bring accounts on Arab cities within the framework of global city theory (cf. Sassen, 1999) and demonstrate that many cities in the region are plagued with many problems similar to other world cities (Elshestawy, 2008: 5-6). However, Elshestawy’s volume remains rather descriptive and documents above all the physical transformation of the urban environment, without really exploring the particular agency and the regulatory and institutional contexts that make these transformations possible in the end (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). Accordingly, a specific focus on cities cannot be subject to the same mistake made by many state-centred analyses by reifying the city – just like the state – as an actor in itself. In this view, places like the city, would then be conceived quite apart from the crucial social dimensions that shape it: power and social class hierarchy (Molotch, 1976). Mapping out these social dimensions is not an easy thing to do and requires the comprehension of the intrinsically dialectical character of the process of urbanization. In the Urban Revolution the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre analyzed the political and social dynamics of ever increasing urbanization. According to Lefebvre, the urbanization of society was a historical process that reflected the transformation of contemporary society from an agrarian over an industrial to, finally, an urban society (Lefebvre, 2003). As such, he was convinced that we needed new methodological and theoretical tools to grasp the urban phenomenon not only as a production of capitalist relations but also as a producer of new conditions for capital accumulation. For Lefebvre, the modern city was “not the passive place of production or the concentration of capitals, but that of the urban intervening as such in production (in the means of production)” (Lefebvre, 1996: 109-110). In other words, those forces that shape the city are eventually also shaped by the urban space. According to Edward Soja, Lefebvre was one of the first spatial theorists who pointed out the essentially dialectical character of the relationship between spatial and social structures (Soja, 1980). To a similar extent, we could argue that the area study of the Arab region urgently needs new methodological and theoretical tools to grasp the (urban) political transformations under neoliberal globalization and the inherently dialectical relation between local politics and global capitalism. Some new methodologies and theoretical perspectives will be suggested and elaborated in the following chapters.

This study is subdivided into five chapters. The first chapter elaborates on my methodology and reflects on my fieldwork. I begin the chapter by positioning myself vis-à-vis the debate between transitologists and post-democratization studies (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). I specifically critique these perspectives for failing to understand crucial dynamics of ‘what in fact is going on’, and argue that critical theory can offer us some new insights that allows us to move away from some of the prevailing frameworks of expla-
nation. Critique refers here not just to criticism, but rather to a process of understanding which specifically focuses on the particular conditions and power structures that shape our current social reality and determine our current forms of thinking. As such, the practice of critique entails the continuous questioning of the status quo. I consider this conception of critique as a fundamental part of my methodology. The second chapter deals with some of the more theoretical foundations of my project. Three broader themes will be addressed here. First of all, I explore the political nature of contemporary globalization. Secondly, I further elaborate on the specific role of the state and its dialectical relation with global capitalism. Two specific critical perspectives on the state will be presented and weighed up against each other: Foucauldian perspectives on state on the one hand, and Marxian analyses of state on the other. Both perspectives have different conceptions of power and highlight different emphases. The third theme that I want to discuss is the issue of the formation of actually existing forms of neoliberalism and the importance of the city in its constitution. As I will, discuss, neoliberal projects lead to a geography of uneven development that has its specific local characteristics, outcomes and dynamics. Nevertheless, despite these local specificities, neoliberal discourses and rationalities have a global reach.

The third chapter focuses on the history of three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the specific transition within Moroccan neoliberal modalities of government. On a global scale, this transformation in neoliberalism can be described as a transformation from a phase of “roll back neoliberalism” to a phase of “roll out neoliberalism” (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Since the introduction of a SAP in 1983, Morocco entered a phase of radical economic restructuring and retrenchment. “Roll back neoliberalism” refers to this destructive moment when state power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects. Nevertheless, this phase implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back of particular (developmentalist) state functions. Moreover, I will discuss the politics of “accumulation by dispossession” that coincided with this particular phase of neoliberal restructuring (Harvey, 2003). Yet, during the 1990s, “market failure” and increasing socio-economic pressures will lead to a transition in neoliberalism and bring Morocco into a phase of “roll out neoliberalism”. This phase is more creative and is characterized by new forms of institution-building, new modes of regulation and new configurations of spatially differentiated government that transfer the ability to govern political and economic life from traditional to new governmental arrangements. I will argue that in Morocco, this phase was mainly characterized by two developments. First of all, by the re-invention of social policy (Catusse, 2005). The negative social impact of earlier structural adjustments urged public authorities to pay more attention to the question of (urban) poverty and resulted in the redefinition of social policy and social development. Secondly, by the invention and creation of new governmental arrangements – e.g. “new state spaces” (cf. Brenner, 2004) – that have given rise to Morocco’s urban revolution. Especially, since the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI, Morocco’s cities are being prepared to compete with other cities in the region for foreign investments, tourism and outsourced industrial and commercial activities. To conclude this chapter, I engage in a discussion with the conception of the “state bourgeoisie”. In contrast to what some suggest, I think the concept of class is a valuable tool to describe contemporary political agency in Morocco.
In the following two chapters, the two specific Moroccan developments (the re-invention of social policy and the formation of new state spaces) will be explored more in-depth. In the fourth chapter, I compare different modalities of urban government during the phases of roll back and roll out neoliberalism in relation with the urban problematic of the slums. Additionally, both in the early 1980s as well as in the beginning of the 21st century, a moment of violence has accelerated the elaboration of new modalities of government. In 1981, Casablanca was struck by the first “IMF-riots” (Clément, 1992). Two decades later, Casablanca (again) was confronted with several suicide bombings on 16 May 2003. Both moments of violence involved slum dwellers. Consequently, after each crisis, the slums became a primary political concern for the preservation of stability and the securitization of the city. Moreover, as these events took place in the economic capital of the country, the city of Casablanca became a “ville laboratoire”, a test-case and model for other Moroccan cities (Catusse, e.a., 2005). This chapter focuses predominantly on the specific and changing methods, techniques and rationalities of urban government. I argue that there is an important difference in government between the two periods that followed each crisis. While the reforms after the riots of 1981 targeted above all the physical environment through which people move (the urban territory), the reforms after the events of 2003 intervened foremost at the level of the individual slum dweller and targeted above all the slum population. The conceptual distinction between these two general strategies of spatial organization is embedded within a theoretical framework which Michel Foucault has introduced as the study of governmentality. It integrates his different conceptions of power, i.e. the difference between sovereign power and biopower. Departing from a Foucauldian analysis, the particular shift in Moroccan urban government can be best explained with the distinction made by Mariana Valverde between “sovereign city planning” and “cities of security” to delineate the specific methods of power and the techniques of government involved in the attempt to increase social control over the so-called “spaces of high-risk” (Rachik, 1995). As I will also demonstrate, the intention to enhance the social control over the slums, coincides with specific strategies to maximize profit. As such, the re-making of development in Morocco was equally inspired by the exploration of new frontiers of capital accumulation and the exploitation of what Ananya Roy has called “poverty capital” (Roy, 2010).

The final chapter deals with the project of the Bouregreg Valley. This project is one of the flagship projects of Morocco’s urban revolution. This chapter deals with critical perspectives in order to rethink the nature of the Arab state, this time not so much in terms of its methods but rather in terms of its institutional and social character. More specifically, I want to draw attention to the institutional transformation of the Moroccan state and the specific assemblages of power and agency that are gathered within new institutional configurations. By drawing on the case of the Bouregreg project this chapter investigates the dynamics of agency formation implicated in the creation of a new state space and considers what it reveals about state respatialization and the rise of new governmental arrangements that have been often elided in mainstream literature on the MENA-region. Furthermore, a project like in the Bouregreg Valley reveals the particular “spatial fix” in the Moroccan neoliberal project. It also reveals specific efforts to redevelop the urban space that prioritize its exchange value, especially that of the inner-city, over and above its use value (Lefebvre, 1996). As such, the city itself,
its built environment and its infrastructural capacities have become important solutions for the worldwide “capital surplus absorption problems” (Harvey, 2010a). Additionally, this spatial fix entails a process of “creative destruction”. This refers to a more violent side of neoliberal urban restructuring. As David Harvey reminded us, “violence is often required to built the new urban geography on the wreckage of the old” (Harvey, 2010: 176).

With this study, I want to argue that uneven development in Morocco, and by extension elsewhere in the Arab region, is not a (temporary?) problem of some regions, cities or even populations that are “lagging behind” and need to “catch up” in order to reach our level of development (in the sense that they are “developing” and we are “developed”). To the contrary, uneven development is the inherent result of neoliberal capitalist globalization itself. Contemporary neoliberal globalization is the result of a political project which assembles the interests of local and global class forces and contrasts with the interests of the majority of the Arab populations. My two case studies reveal some of the essential dynamics behind this political project in Morocco. Consequently, I argue that in contrast to the popular notion of globalization, usually pictured as some kind of unavoidable process to which we all have to adapt – and hence beyond the scope of national and/or local political agency – the various projects involved in its making are actually not so politically neutral as they appear to be (Parker, 2009: 113). Therefore, I wish to contribute to a more critical reflection about political change in the Arab world, without reverting to normative questions about whether there is or there isn’t a democratic transition (towards our model of liberal democracy), and without ignoring critical analyses and reflections on – to some extent – similar transformations in “democratic” societies in the world as a result of their interaction with and role in the formation of contemporary global capitalism. This last element opens up a whole new space for comparison and liberates politics in the region from their stigma of ‘Arab exceptionalism’.

Before I continue, I wish to make a final note on the format of this PhD. Many of the arguments that are elaborated in this text, have been explored before in articles that have been either published (or been accepted for publication) or are currently under review. Nevertheless, I consciously chose not to submit a PhD based only on ready-made and publishable articles – despite the fact that this is now a possibility at our university. I consider a PhD first of all as an exercise. Undoubtedly, by trying to fit one’s work into the limited format of an article, or a series of articles, and, subsequently, by trying to answer to or comply with the requirements, demands and discourses of certain journals, an important part of the exercise risks to get lost or skipped. Some of the ideas and problems I wrestled with over the course of these last four years are still not ready-made. To the contrary, they are reflections of still ongoing intellectual struggles. Yet, at the same time, I am convinced that is useful, even necessary, to present them at one point – despite the fact that a lot of these thoughts and arguments are not ready-made.

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12 An interesting personal experience was that for three years in a row, students have asked me spontaneously whether we couldn’t see similar evolutions in Belgium after I gave my class on urban political transformations in Morocco.

13 Obviously, the whole idea of this particular format reflects a certain market logic from which even the university as an institute doesn’t seem to be able to escape.
(and maybe never will be) – because the motive of academic work, to my point of view, is not so much the presentation of ideas as it is the result of *debate*. Furthermore, social science is the practice of a craft and the outcome of intellectual craftsmanship (Mills, 1959). But this craft needs time and space and will undoubtedly be subject to trial and error. Therefore, a beginning scholar needs the space and the opportunity to engage with a wide range of perspectives, struggle with them, and, in the end, figure out which directions he/she wants to follow in the future. The exercise of writing the monograph has been such a practice for me. It represents a project, my project, that will be perfectionized, reworked and probably re-invented over the years to come. As such, from a personal perspective, writing this monograph maybe wasn’t the most strategic option (in the short term), but it was certainly the most productive one (intellectually).
Chapter 1

Method, fieldwork and critique as methodology

In Morocco only several days and I already was set up in a hotel, an obvious remnant of colonialism, was having my coffee in a garden, and had little to do but start “my” fieldwork. Actually, it was not exactly clear to me what that meant, except that I supposed I would wander around Sefrou a bit. After all, now that I was in the field, everything was fieldwork (Rabinow, 2007: 11)

To be a critic by profession and to proclaim that one understands nothing about existentialism or Marxism (for as it happens, it is these two philosophies particularly that one confesses to be unable to understand) is to elevate one’s blindness or dumbness to a universal rule of perception, and to reject from the world Marxism and existentialism: ‘I don’t understand, therefore you are idiots.’ (Barthes, 1972: 34)
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben starts his book on method with the following insight: “anyone familiar with research in the human sciences knows that, contrary to common opinion, a reflection on method usually follows practical application, rather than preceding it” (Agamben, 2009: 7). Not coincidentally, this chapter has been written once all other chapters were drafted. Over the course of my four years of research, my ‘methods’ have evolved considerably, and not in the least, changed radically. Yet, this particular evolution has not been – following Agamben’s allusion – the result of a well thought out methodology before my actual fieldwork started. It was rather the result of a continuous struggle in the field. This (contingent) process of continuously evolving research methods and approaches not only profoundly altered the scope of my project, it also radically changed me. In that sense, this project not only represents an attempt to understand a particular case, it equally represents, for me at least, a journey (although far from completed) in the understanding of myself, my aspirations and ambitions, my growing engagement as an activist-scholar, and finally, my ongoing development and maturation as an academic. Before elaborating more on this process, let me start by situating what this study project was almost about. This project started as a study on democratic transitions in the MENA-region, more specifically in Morocco and Egypt.¹⁴ My original goal was to investigate both the exogenous and endogenous mechanisms that impacted upon political transition in both countries. As a trained political scientist, I started my research by getting to know the mainstream debates on political change in the Arab World. However, in the process, I quickly got frustrated. I realized that I radically differed in opinion from some of the perspectives that were dominating the area study. As a consequence I started to look elsewhere and I turned to critical theory from both inside and outside the area study to find some answers to my questions.

This project departs from a fundamental critique on a certain tendency within many mainstream accounts on Arab politics. Over the past 20 years there has been a dominant tendency to understand the dynamics of politics in the region in relation to a specific end stage, namely, liberal democracy. Whether current political transformations were perceived as a gradual evolution towards that end stage, or whether contemporary (authoritarian) politics were perceived to be rather persistent and resilient in the face of that end stage, I argue that precisely the framing of general research questions within this binary logic has obfuscated or hindered our ability to see many of the actual dynamics and characteristics of contemporary political change in the Arab World, and more specifically, the particular nature of the undeniable and decisive impact of contemporary globalization on the processes of change. With this argument, I build on and situate myself within a longer history of critical theory and critical debates on the nature of Arab politics (cf. Heydemann, 2000; Mitchell, 2002; Catusse, 2006; Parker, 2009), on the tensions between the area studies and the social sciences disciplines (cf. Tessler, 1999; Ludden, 2000; Mitchell, 2003; Biglin, 2006), on the particular position of a peripheral area in the capitalist world system and the relation between Third World politics and capitalist globalization (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980; Amin 2003; Ruccio, 2011), and finally, on the impact of imperialism and culturalism on the study and imagination of Arab politics (cf. Amin, 1989; Said, 2003). Additionally, departing from these wider critiques, I want to highlight two substantial issues that, to my point of view, have been

¹⁴ The original title of my PhD-proposal was (in Dutch): “Democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa: a comparative study between Morocco and Egypt.”
understudied and misunderstood in many contemporary political accounts, namely: the question of space and the role of the city. In my opinion, the urban space is probably the most prominent field of study from where we can retrace and explain the contemporary political transformations. Yet, despite a few exceptions, I am convinced that the significance of these two issues remains largely unrecognized. As such, by taking into account the issue of space and the role of the city as specific guidelines, this project attempts to provide alternative perspectives to understand contemporary change in the Arab World, and more specifically in Morocco.

**Not beyond but away from the regime paradigm: from an a-spatial to a spatial analysis of political transition**

In the area study of the Arab region, the question of the ‘regime’ and its willingness and/or resilience to a ‘democratic’ transition has dominated the study of political change over the last 20 years. Even longer ago, in the heyday of the liberal modernization theory, questions of regime change and democratization in the Arab region were already at hand, albeit in a different context. Democratization theories can be viewed as an offspring of modernization theory. The latter has, since the late 1950s, provided a popular framework of analysis of Third World politics in Western social science (Guazzzone & Pioppi, 2009b). The narrative of modernization theory has evolved around the assumption that political trajectories in the rest of the world would eventually follow the trajectory of the core-countries of European (and Western) modernity. Contemporary narratives on globalization have the same structuring characteristics. Just as in the old story of modernity, Doreen Massey argues, contemporary globalization is also a tale of “inevitability” (Massey, 2005: 82). Therefore, ever since the end of the cold War and the euphoria about the so-called “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989), scholars on Arab politics have wondered about the exceptional position of the Middle Eastern region during the third wave of democratization – which actually started already in the 1970s but really took off with the transitions in Eastern Europe during the 1990s (Huntington, 1991). From then on, it was said, “democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global!” (Diamond, 2010). Yet, the Arab region seemed to be somehow bypassed. As Larry Diamond has put it:

> By the time the *Journal of Democracy* began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117 – three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one – the Middle East. Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception – the Arab world. Fifteen years later, this exception still stands (Ibid.: 93).

As a result, over past two decades, the authoritarian persistence and resilience of Arab regimes was considered both symptomatic of, and responsible for, the crisis of social,

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15 With regard to the recent social upheavals in the region, we see many commentators and political analysts making the comparison with Eastern Europe and the revolutions that started in 1989. Many observers are now speculating about the Arab region’s own Berlin-Wall moment.
Method, fieldwork and critique as methodology

political and economic development in the region (Parker, 2004). Indeed, as Parker notes, the resilient nature of the ‘Arab regime’ in the face of a prolonged crisis of political legitimacy “has come to constitute a, if not the, central theme in contemporary political sociology of the Middle East” (Ibid.: 1). Explanations ranged from an emphasis on culture and/or religion (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2001), to the nature of the economy and the dependency on rents such as oil and foreign aid (Beblawi, 1990; Luciani, 1990), to the involvement of foreign imperial powers (e.g. the US) who supported authoritarian leaders to serve their interests (Quandt, 2001), to the internal regime survival tactics and domestic political structures (Brumberg, 2002; Brownlee, 2002; Ghalioun, 2004; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004), and finally, to the lack of a vibrant, independent and democratic civil society (Kamrava & O Mora, 1998; Hawthorne, 2004; for similar perspectives on Morocco, see for example Maghraoui, 2002; Cavatorta, 2005; Ottaway & Riley; 2006; Joffé, 2009). Additionally, some have investigated the particular characteristics of authoritarian rule in the Arab monarchies (L Anderson, 2000; Ottaway & Dunne, 2007). Yet, despite this very broad range of explanations, the preoccupation with the nature of the ‘regime’ can be divided into two, at first sight, opposing bodies of literature. First, especially during the 1990s, a what Morton Valbjørn and André Bank typified as ‘democrazy’ branch of Middle East scholarship emerged, characterized by so-called willing ‘democracy-spotters’ (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). This body of literature emerged in the wake of scholarship that engaged with the study of the third wave of democratization. Formulated on the basis of the experiences in Latin-America and Eastern Europe, “transitology” postulated the possibility of a linear transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy, depending on the existence of structural preconditions, rational choice of the ruling elites and, of course, a free market (Guazzzone & Pioppi, 2009b: 2; see also Schmitter & Karl, 1994). The ambition for area specialists was to demonstrate that the Arab region was subject to the same global logics as elsewhere (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). Lise Storm, for example, has argued that contrary to the beliefs of many scholars at the time, Latin America succeeded in undergoing a transition to democracy, so why couldn’t sceptics about the MENA-region be wrong? As such, she argued that:

My book takes the position that the development of democracy in the MENA cannot be categorically dismissed. Moreover, although these countries are lagging far behind the countries of most other regions, some democratic development has indeed taken place. Although it may seem to some scholars that the countries in this particular region are not moving towards democracy (…), I maintain that just because the movement has been rather limited and slow it does not mean it should not be studied (Storm, 2007: 5; emphasis added).

The obvious problem with the transitologist’s representation and perception of political change is that it is presented as a process disembodied from space. The transition paradigm tells us a story about the inevitability (and glorification) of the global logics – read Western logics – to which the Arab region is equally – eventually – subjected. Consequently, the possible differences between countries and political systems around the globe will then be explained as if some countries and/or systems are just “behind” (Massey, 2005: 5). According to Doreen Massey, these kinds of political and academic narratives do not allow us to imagine other (non-Western) countries and political forces
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in the world to have their own specific trajectories, their own particular histories, and the potential for their own (different) futures. Within the transitologist’s perspective the research cases are not recognized as coeval others, but rather as cases situated on a logical historical timeline, arguing that those who are ‘behind’ are merely situated at an earlier stage. Allegedly, there is only one possible narrative on political change. The study of these so-called countries that are ‘lagging behind’, then comes down to a simple question, as for example the one Storm (2007: 163) poses herself in the case of Morocco: “Today, fifty years after independence, how far has Morocco come?”

The assumed unavoidability of the global logics (i.e. contemporary globalization) are usually framed within a simplistic and automatic association between democracy and the free market, and even more astonishing, accompanied by the assumption that anti-systemic projects (e.g. communism or Islamism) are, in advance, uncritically regarded as non-democratic (Ibid.: 184, footnote 1, and 194, footnote 61). From a more critical point of view, this belief in capitalist modernization and unification, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is inspired by what Guy Debord called, “the current ideology of democracy – in other words, (…) the dictatorial freedom of the Market” (Debord, 1995: 9; see also below). Moreover, this kind of ideological perspective is what Massey labelled as an a-spatial perspective on politics because the cosmology of the one and only possible narrative obliterates the multiplicities and the contemporaneous heterogeneities of space (Massey, 2005). A-spatial because spatial difference is convened into a temporal sequence. The French philosopher Michel de Certeau warned us that by privileging progress (i.e. time), the conditions of its own possibility (space itself) tend to be forgotten. Space then becomes the blind spot of both scientific and political technology (De Certeau, 1984: 95; see also Lefebvre, 2003). This is exactly what happened with modernist theories like transitology. Different ‘places’, Massey argues, are then interpreted as mere different stages in a single temporal development (e.g. modernization theory) (Massey, 2005: 68). Potential differences in political, social and economic trajectories are occluded and every country in the world is assumed to follow “the same (‘our’) path of development” (Ibid.:82).

Still, according to Valbjørn and Bank, transitology must be credited because it nuanced the then prevalent neo-Orientalist presumptions about Islam’s inherently undemocratic nature and the problematic picture of the Middle East as an immutable region. However, at the turn of the new millennium, the transitologists have been met with growing criticism within the area study of the Middle East. With regard to the political situation, this region still seemed to be “the least free region of the world” (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 187). Even the optimism about Morocco, long considered as an exception to

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16 To prove their point, and make it more ‘scientific’, scholars on transitology often reduce the complex question of democracy to some quantifiable parameters which can be measured (e.g. transparent elections).
17 Additionally Massey argues that the effect of such a narrative is very political: “because space has been marshalled under the sign of time, these countries have no space – precisely – to tell different stories, to follow another path. They are dragooned into line behind those who designed the queue”. Ironically, Massey adds that – and this will also be part of my central argument in this study – “not only is their future thus supposedly foretold but even this is not true, for precisely their entanglement within the unequal relations of capitalist globalisation ensures that they do not ‘follow’. The future which is held out as inevitable is unlikely to be reached” (Massey, 2005: 82).
18 Although, in the aftermath of 9/11 we have seen a strong comeback of neo-Orientalism and culturalist explanations of Middle East Politics (cf. Zemni, 2006a).
the wider authoritarian trend in the region, was shattered to pieces with the obvious return to authoritarian politics and the repression against the Islamist opposition after the violent suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003 (Zemni, 2006b; Zemni & Bogaert, 2006; Catusse, 2008). Indeed, some scholars proclaimed the “end of the transition paradigm” and thought it was time for the “democracy-promoting community” to realize that the label of “transitional countries” was no longer applicable to many countries in the world, not in the least to the Arab countries (Carothers, 2002). This gave rise to a branch of Middle East scholarship that tried to bring the area study into the “era of post-democratization” (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010). Valbjørn and Bank argue that this branch denounced the transitologist’s perception of “political development within a pseudo-universalist, teleological and normative autocracy/democracy scheme”. They critiqued the limited scope of these studies which was based on the question “how far a particular society has come in a universal democratic transition to the ‘post-historical’ era” (Ibid.: 187). The way out of this normative connotation, i.e. framing it as a process towards more democracy, was done by redirecting the focus from “something desirable but absent” (democracy) to a concern for “what in fact is going on” (Ibid.: 188; some examples are Brumberg, 2002; Brownlee, 2002; Maghraoui, 2002; Volpi, 2004; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Cavatorta, 2005; Joffé, 2009). Post-democratization, so it was said, spends more attention to the actual political developments in the particular countries that were at scrutiny:

This critique derives from observations of how the Arab Middle East, after more than a decade of countless nominal reform initiatives, continues to be predominantly authoritarian. The natural answer from this perspective to the question of ‘what in fact is’ will be ‘authoritarianism’. Instead of posing questions about reasons for the ‘failure of democratization’ (i.e. the absence of something desirable) we therefore should seek to get a better understanding of the ‘success of authoritarianism’ (i.e. something actually present). This change of perspective has given rise in recent years to a major and fertile debate on Arab authoritarianism, its renewal, resilience, persistence, endurance, robustness, durability and sustenance (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 189)

Yet, if the seemingly more objective question of “what in fact is” is reduced to the seemingly simple answer “authoritarianism”, they still seem to suggest implicitly that Arab political systems are somehow objecting certain global forces or a global logic. The basic underlying question that informs both these two so-called opposing bodies of literature actually remains the same: what about the condition of (liberal) democracy in the Middle East region? Of course, Valbjørn and Bank try to put forward as convincing as possible that one has to make a distinction between “optimistic expectations (i.e. democratic transition) and the depressing reality (i.e., the persistence of authoritarianism)” (Ibid.: 188). But it is exactly their framing of authoritarianism as a “depressing reality” which makes them not necessarily less normative than the so-called democracy-spotters. As such, in the post-democratization era, the question of authoritarianism, whether they like it or not, is still regarded as a residual category or phenomenon – i.e. as the absence of democracy (Parker, 2004). A substantial problem with their approach is not so much their critique on theories of democratization, but rather their own uncritical stance towards (liberal) democracy itself, and above all the neglect of the underly-
ing forces that undermine it everywhere in the world (to use Debord’s remark: they are not free of the current ideological dimension of democracy either). Following up on Massey’s insight on single temporal perspectives and a-spatial frameworks, post-democratization studies have the tendency to categorize ‘regimes’ in a similar way:

As the number of countries falling in between outright dictatorship and well-established liberal democracy has swollen, political analysts have proffered an array of “qualified democracy” terms to characterize them, including semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, and virtual democracy (Carothers, 2002: 10).

Everything between the two extremes (whatever they may actually represent) is then situated within the “grey zone” (Ibid.). The post-democratization literature thus has a similar a-spatial view of political trajectories, maybe not in the sense that it focuses exclusively on ‘catching up’ (or why Arab regimes are not catching up), but more in the form of a narrative which implicitly suggests a distinction between ‘good democracy’ (we) and ‘bad authoritarianism’ (the depressing reality). In contrast, the spatial view of people like Massey and other critical thinkers, tries to intervene in or supersede this ‘dichotomy of (Western) logic’ (authoritarian/democratic) and analyze the dynamics of “neither A nor B” (Agamben, 2009: 20). The same counts for my own methodology: to use Agamben’s reasoning again, it is attested above all through the “disidentification and neutralization” of the binary logic (either A or B). Yet, from an a-spatial point of view, the ways out of the binary logic are indiscernible since they cannot be grasped “by means of bivalent caesurae” (Ibid.: 20).19

Additionally, the intrinsically interesting question posed by Valbjørn and Bank about “what in fact is going on” doesn’t seem to be able to break loose from an endogenous and regime-centred perspective on political change. The problem is not so much that current post-democratization or post-transition paradigms are wrong about the authoritarian character of politics in the Arab World, the real problem is that their own understandings of contemporary neoliberal globalization and of the liberal myths about free-market democracy are actually obfuscating many of the political transformations in the region (thus what is really going on), and above all, neglect the complex dynamics of power behind these changes. For example, both transitologists and post-democratization scholars still view “the regime” as the key to understand Arab political life. In fact, these approaches ultimately erected a stereotype of the “Arab regime” that actually got in the way of understanding the complexity of social forces that are manifesting themselves in the current political orders of the region (Parker, 2006: 84). Regimes are typically considered as power-centres that control both the state and domestic society. As a result, the scope of the regime’s power is than considered as something congruous with the cartographic boundaries of the national state.

In Morocco, the regime is often equated with the makhzen. Literally, the word makhzen

19 Here, I am using a particular insight of Agamben, not necessarily the general idea of his book. With the expression “neither A nor B” Agamben refers to the neutralization of the dichotomy between the general and the particular through what he defines as the ‘paradigm’.
– derived from the verb *khazana*, to hide or preserve – can be translated in English as “magazine” (warehouse, depot) (Claisse, 1987). It referred to the place where the sultan’s taxes were stored during the period before the French Protectorate (1912-1956). Traditionally, the term *makhzen* became a synonym for the royal family, its entourage and the apparatus of the pre-modern state. Today, the term is still used in common parlance and has become a – sometimes vague and polymorphic – concept to denote central power (the regime) in Morocco (Ibid.; Catusse, 2008: 19). Without going too much into detail, today, the *makhzen* still represents and denotes the ruling clique around the royal family (i.e. the royal advisors, the ulama, the superior army officers, the eminent families, leading business men, etc.) (Claisse, 1987). Yet, Myriam Catusse raises the concern that a one-sided focus on the *makhzen* in order to understand the nature of Moroccan politics has often obstructed political analyses – both inside and outside academia – to really grasp the complexity of political forces and political transformations in contemporary Morocco. Moreover, the continuous and obvious political dominance of the monarchy and the *makhzen* has often created the false impression that there are no other sources of power and that nothing really changed in Morocco over the course of the last few decades (Catusse, 2008: 27; see for example Entilis, 2007).

Additionally, the stereotype of “the regime as a black box that contained the institutional programming of a society” has also created the assumption that *the* regime controlled *the* state, and consequently, the Arab state has often been depicted as a coherent entity that claimed the control over its territory and the society within its national borders (Parker, 2006: 97). In this view, regime power emerges from an institutional core which exerts, via direct intervention, its hegemony over subordinated institutions, spaces and scales. In this view, the regime is still presented as the privileged site of political formation, intervention and inquiry (see more specifically chapter 5), while Arab states are seen as bounded entities, with their own internally generated authenticities, and defined by their difference from other geographical imaginations of space, that are obviously situated on the outside (Massey, 2005). ‘Other’ social forces that somehow impact on regime-politics (e.g. US-support and Western imperialism, the capitalist market, EU-democracy promotion policies, etc.) are than often categorized as the external dimension(s), the external context or the international factors (cf. Cavatorta, 2004; 2005). Insofar as the dynamics of globalization are taken into account, they are considered to be subordinated and subjected to endogenous political legacies of state building and regime consolidation (Parker, 2009). In contrast, my own approach leans strongly on the approach elaborated by, amongst others, Christopher Parker. The underlying proposition of his critique is that contemporary dynamics of (neoliberal) globalization have highlighted serious shortcomings in current mainstream analyses’ capacity to identify and study political change in the Arab region (Parker, 2004; see also Parker, 2006; 2009; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009; Bogaert 2011; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011).

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20 The ulama are the religious authorities
21 This didn’t mean that the makhzen was perceived as a static system. It evolved constantly and new influential actors were drawn in, while others could lose their prominent status. Allain Claisse notes, for example, that due to economic liberalization in the 1970s and the 1980s, many emerging business elites worked their way into the sphere of influence of the monarchy. The same counts for the emergence of new state-technocrats (cf. chapter 3). For more detailed information on the makhzen see Waterbury (1970), Leveau (1985) and Claisse (1987).
The privileging of the nation-state as the arena within or scale at which change processes – or a lack of change – are supposedly unfolding, is something I want to avoid (Parker, 2004: 22). Yet, this doesn’t mean that such an approach distances itself “explicitly from both the democratization and authoritarianism ‘paradogma’ in favor of looking above, below and beyond the level of regime”, as Valbjørn and Bank would like have us to believe (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 191, italics added). With this argument, they, first of all, draw the spatial imaginary of ‘the regime’ again as somehow bounded and opposed to ‘outside’ forces located above, below and beyond. Secondly, by picturing these alternative approaches as a way of looking at ‘politics beyond the regime’ – for the sake of categorization and clarification let me describe the alternative approach I refer to as a critical spatial approach – they are actually including these kind of alternative perspectives into the vocabulary of their ‘either A or B’ scheme (included through its exclusion), while completely missing the point of an analysis that investigates the dynamics of neither A nor B (Agamben, 2009). The obvious and expected critique then follows that there is “a risk of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ if the strong focus on politics beyond the regime is at the expense of an understanding of the dynamics of the regime” (Valbjørn & Bank, 2010: 191). With this critique, one can maybe try to save the intrinsic vocabulary of “the authoritarianism strand of the post-democratization trend”, but not necessarily enhance the understanding of political change in the Middle East (Ibid.).

Furthermore, because of the prevalent assumption that the regime controls the state, theory could only explain the absence of transition in terms of a coherent state’s domination over the economy and civil society (Parker, 2006: 97). It is precisely this particular conception of the regime – and by extension of the state that is controlled by the regime – that resonates with what Massey has described as the billiard-ball view of the world (Massey, 2005: 72). In this particular view, political entities such as the regime or the state are seen as bounded in their full identities and through their interaction (e.g. through inter-state relations) a clear distinct inside and outside can be distinguished. Parker explains that such a conception fails to recognize the complex ways in which state agency became enmeshed with the social complexes of capitalist agency and capital formation (Parker, 2006: 97). In contrast, many scholars with backgrounds in political geography have convincingly argued that purely national territorial conceptions of the state and state power are no longer, if indeed they were ever, able to make sense of the nature of the state. A state whose power, in reality, has been used in rather diffused, dispersed and fragmented ways can never be fully understood by focusing exclusively on the national scale (Allen & Cochrane, 2010; see also Abrams, 1988; Agnew, 1994; Swyngedouw, 2000; 2004; Brenner, 2004; Jessop, 2008).

Consequently, what this study underwrites, is not so much the attempt to study power located outside (supposedly above, below, or beyond) the regime, but the necessity to move away from both a one-sided regime centred perspective and a billiard-ball-like or state-centred view of politics in favour of new ways of thinking about (authoritarian) modalities of government. In short, this study follows approaches that favour more relational thinking, considering political space as an open construction and production,

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22 Valbjørn and Bank also explicitly refer to, amongst others, Parker’s article in Political Geography (2009) to make this point.
with attention to institutional restructuring within a global market environment and the specific economic, social and political rationalities that underpin these transformations. This kind of more complex conception of political power – or what Parker has called the “complexes of power” that constitute the dynamics of change – attempts to “recombine global and local, state and market, public and private, and “traditional” and “modern” to unravel the diffuse, open, relational and sometimes contingent outcomes of political transformation behind the seemingly ubiquitous and authoritarian image of the “Arab regime” (Parker, 2004: 7). The continuity of authoritarian outcomes of political government cannot be understand by making a distinction between the regime on the one hand, and politics located somehow outside it on the other hand, but by conceptualizing the dialectical interrelation between local and global agents of transformation. The billiard-ball view of the regime occludes the social relations and political practices, and their “relentless production”, within contemporary rounds of neoliberal globalization (Massey, 2005: 82). It occludes the “spatial reach” of dialectically intertwined power-geometries within and across national territorial boundaries and their momentary assemblage in particular sites, scales, spaces (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). As long as the social, economic and political crises in the Arab world are viewed as the sole responsibility and outcome of internal, endogenous dynamics related to the authoritarian persistence of the Arab regimes and their relation with their domestic Arab societies, the crucial impact of neoliberal globalization, the important political role of local agents in the production of that kind of globalization and the production of uneven development will remain obfuscated. It is my dissatisfaction with this particular tendency to understand Arab politics that has informed and stimulated my search for alternative answers and perspectives. But before I elaborate on these alternative perspectives on political transformation in Morocco, let me first explain how I came to my results and conclusion.

**Fieldwork and critical theory**

The advantage of writing a methodology chapter at the end, is that by then the project seems relatively logical, structured and coherent, at least from my point of view. The stress about ‘what the hell am I doing?’ seems long gone. The recollections of the concrete details, doubts and frustrations of my everyday life in ‘the field’ now seem futile. However, when I think back upon my four years, I do realize how much my fieldwork has been a real struggle at certain moments. And an often chaotic one too. No doubt, the months that I spent in Morocco were, from a social and personal perspective, a very exciting and fascinating experience. I never had the feeling that I was alone and I met some very good friends. Nevertheless, professionally, it hasn’t always been a piece of cake. Regarding my research method, I had no standardized techniques, no previously set-up methodological scheme nor a chronological set of procedures to follow up on once I was in Morocco. My brother is a director and he entrusted me that, before you could even think about starting to shoot a film, every new film project needs a well developed shooting script in which every next step is carefully worked out and calculated. I didn’t have a shooting script. I remember taking off for my first visit to Rabat with only two answered e-mails. I had absolutely no clue how my first five weeks would evolve. My main strategy was ‘looking around’ and ‘talking to everybody I could get my hands on’. So basically, I just improvised. Luckily, after that first visit,
I ended up with 37 interviews (which was good for my confidence) and a list of valuable contacts to continue next time. But when I reconsider it now, I would probably have done it completely different. At a more profound level of self-reflection, there are numerous moments during fieldwork when you start questioning yourself and doubt your capabilities. The aspirations, excitement and confidence that I felt when I had an appointment with what I thought to be an important contact, were quickly ruined when I realized that he or she didn’t take me really serious.\textsuperscript{23} Especially, fellow academics can be tough. They could really give you the look of ‘what are you going to ask or tell me about Morocco?’ I will never forget the endless discussions with Montse, my colleague and roommate in Rabat, at the kitchen table with coffee and cigarettes, about the purpose of it all: social science, being a scholar, our position in the field, our relation to our subject, the confrontation between theory and empirical work, etc. Every time we had a ‘bad day’ we would cheer each other up and try to convince ourselves about the value of what we were doing. In contrast, a good interview, new information or an interesting new insight could really give you a boost as well, and encourage you to continue. So, with its ups and downs, doing fieldwork is something that I learned above all during my fieldwork and not in textbooks.

Despite the fact that I now reached the end of my PhD-project, I still haven’t really figured out what I am exactly. I still consider myself a political scientist, although I have found more satisfying answers and challenges in other disciplines (e.g. geography, anthropology, sociology and its many subdivisions). This kind of ‘identity crisis’ has impacted upon my fieldwork as well. Let me give a few examples. To begin with, I am deeply influenced and fascinated by (political) geography and the ways the discipline reflects upon the question of space. However, it sometimes frustrated me that I didn’t always thought as ‘spatial’ as for example Alejandro, an architect and good friend I met in Rabat. When we were strolling through the city, I was fascinated by the way he was able to ‘spatialize’, in a very concrete and visual manner, many of our discussions on urban transformation. In addition, when I tended to act too much as a geographer, my research adviser, Sami Zemni, quickly reminded me that I was about to lose my original research focus and advised me not to try to be something or somebody that I am not (especially in such a relatively short period of time). At the time, it was sometimes difficult to draw the lines, but now I realize that he was absolutely right. Another example was the issue of the government of slums in Morocco. This topic informed an important part of my research. Although, I studied most of the literature on Moroccan slums, I had many doubts whether I was capable of saying something useful without really doing a thorough ethnography of social and political life in the slums. It frustrated me that I wasn’t an anthropologist or a sociologist. And even if I wanted to be, the fact that I wasn’t able to speak the Moroccan dialect in order to discuss seriously complicated things with slum dwellers, frustrated me even more.\textsuperscript{24} Finally, the rather eclectic search

\textsuperscript{23} I think my (relatively young) age was an important factor. Especially, when I found out that people generally estimated me to be younger than I really was. Therefore, I noticed that during my different stays in Morocco, I was gradually paying more attention to the way I looked and dressed myself.

\textsuperscript{24} The issue of the language is something that frustrates me still. Thinking that I would eventually end up in Egypt I started taking classes in (some kind of) Egyptian dialect in Ghent. However, realizing after two years that I wasn’t going to go to Egypt and noticing that my very limited and broken mixture of Egyptian and Middle Eastern darija wasn’t going to serve me at all in Morocco, I kind of lost my motivation to continue to study the language and change to another dialect. By then, my research was consuming most of my
for entry points – since the ‘regime’ wasn’t one of them – has pushed me, especially in the beginning, in all kinds of directions of which I eventually only appropriated a few. Nevertheless, the more directions I took, the more complicated the general picture became. That is why I am now convinced that I eventually took the right decision to leave the idea of a comparative study between Morocco and Egypt behind me. I consciously opted for an in-depth study of just one case in order to develop new insights which then could be applied eventually to other cases. Luckily, my search for answers and new challenges over the past four years made me certain of one thing. Basically – and this I experienced up until my last visit in 2010 – the more answers I found, the more questions it raised.

**Some reflections on fieldwork**

Social science research mainly entails two large dimensions: gathering data and interpreting data. Fieldwork obviously plays a crucial part in the first dimension but its effect on the second shouldn’t be underestimated either. Let me first elaborate on the process of gathering data and reflect on their interpretation (the process of understanding) afterwards. Before I can explain how I gathered information in Morocco, the first question is of course: why Morocco? Maybe the more appropriate question would be: how did I end up in Morocco? I had done my master’s thesis on Egypt and my original plan was to continue working on Egypt. However, my research advisor thought it was tactically interesting to formulate a research proposal based on a comparative study of two case studies, in this case two countries. He followed Morocco more closely and it seemed obvious to include this country. Back then, I wasn’t really excited about the idea of Morocco but I realized that this ‘tactical move’ would increase my chances of getting funded. In any case, if we would receive the funding, I assumed I would be mainly focusing on Egypt anyway and deal with Morocco on the side. In the end, it turned out to be a completely different story. Because of the parliamentary elections in Morocco in September 2007 and because my advisor thought Rabat would be “a soft landing” compared to Cairo, I decided to go to Morocco first. The rest is history. I never made it to Egypt.

Overall, I spent 38 weeks (nearly 10 months) in Morocco divided over 6 fieldtrips.\(^25\) My first fieldtrip (August and September 2007) was decisive for the delineation of the particular topics I would deal with during the rest of my research. By then, I still hadn’t a real clue what would be the particular focus. As a mentioned above, I just mainly looked around and improvised during this first visit. My initial plan was to investigate the case of the partial privatization of water and electricity in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca. During my fieldwork preparations, I had read several news articles on increasing social protest against the rising consumption prices. Although I didn’t continue with this particular case – one of the reasons was that the issue of ‘privatizing’ water and electricity, and social protest had been dealt with extensively by other authors (cf. Allain-El Mansouri, 2005; De Miras & Le Tellier, 2005; Zaki, 2005; 2008)

\[^25\] Of course, I would have preferred to have spent more time and especially longer periods of time. The longest period I stayed in Morocco was almost two and a half months (in the spring of 2008). However, doing fieldwork also implies making compromises with those you leave behind. And in the end, I think I succeeded in finding a good compromise.
– some of my interviews with the people from Lydec\footnote{Lydec is a subsidiary of the French multination Suez Environment. The company is implicated in a public-private partnership with the local authorities in Casablanca and works together with the authorities in social development projects to provide resettled and restructured slums and other forms of informal housing with water and electricity.} eventually oriented me towards the question of the government of slums.\footnote{My advisors’ specific interest in the government of slums played also a crucial role in my orientation towards the question of the slums.} It was also during my first fieldtrip that I met Montse, a fellow colleague who worked on the particular case of the social protest of unemployed graduates in Morocco. Thanks to her, I had not only a place to stay but also a critical colleague with whom I could exchange thoughts and reflections on our ongoing research. She stirred up my interest in social protest. Although, the question of social protest didn’t become a central focus point in my own research, I worked together with Montse on a side-project which resulted in an article. Our work together inspired me to think about the particular ways in which the practices of protesters can teach us something about prevalent perceptions on Arab political life and more precisely, about the “imagination of the state” in Morocco (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011).

I ‘discovered’ my second case study – the urban development project of the Bouregreg Valley – after being only a few days in Rabat. I remember walking by a billboard together with my advisor. We were both immediately drawn to it. Although the Bouregreg Valley, located between the cities of Rabat and Salé, was still an empty place, the billboard was a forerunner of the radical transformation the cityscape was going to experience. We immediately decided that we had to talk to one of the people working for the state agency that was responsible for the project. Not much later, we walked into one of the buildings of the agency, ‘hoping for the best’, asking the guard if we could talk to somebody, anybody. It was the following interview that convinced me to continue working on the Bouregreg project. The questions raised by this particular case influenced my interest in the urban environment, more specifically in the dialectic between political change and urban transformation. I wanted to find out what such a project could teach me about state transformation and respatialization, the rescaling of politics and the ‘spatial reach’ of assemblages or complexes of power that are involved in its development.

Over the course of four years (2007-2010), I conducted 169 interviews and assisted or participated in 6 workshops in Morocco related to my research topic.\footnote{Besides several participations in international conferences.} My interviewees included a wide range of actors and ‘experts’: public officials from different state agencies, ministries, semi-public agencies, NGO-workers and civil society activists, members of political parties and social movements, journalists, academics, members from private companies and consultants, and finally, members from international development and donor agencies (e.g. USAID, French Development Agency, European Commission, etc.). Some people I interviewed several times. This often led to a more informal relation with some of my respondents and helped me not only to gain valuable information but also enabled me to expand my own network based on their contacts. Of course, not all of my interviews were directly useful for this project. Especially during my first visit, I literally interviewed everybody I could lay my hands on in order to expand my social network and pick up as many interesting details and insights on
Morocco as possible. This helped me, above all, to broaden my general knowledge. Afterwards, especially during my last three stays, I selected my interviewees more purposively. I built my network mainly based on two strategies. First of all, I met a lot of people by just ‘dropping by’ their organizations, offices, etc… Sometimes, I returned home empty-handed but often I was lucky and I managed to speak the official or person I had in mind. These contacts were mainly found via newspaper articles, websites, policy documents and literature research. Secondly, I trusted upon my existing network to find new informants or particular experts that could inform me about some particular aspects of my research objectives.

The process of interviewing and finding new interesting people can be a frustrating activity. Especially when it is 30 degrees outside and things aren’t evolving according to plan. Sometimes, for example, you adjust your planning to one person you really want to meet. But if that particular person is difficult to reach or cancels earlier made appointments, you can lose a lot of valuable time. Also, some informants want to be so kind – or they just want to be in control – to organize an interview with one of their contacts themselves. Again, this can mess up your schedule if things aren’t running smoothly. Generally, I had little difficulty to get into contact with the people I wished to see. However, there was one golden rule I quickly discovered: if you want to meet people, call them because they almost never answer your email! That is why I left so unprepared the first time and why I never made an appointment before I arrived in Rabat in the following fieldtrips. Even the few times I called in advance, I usually got the following answer: “ok, call me again when you arrive in Morocco”. Unfortunately (but also interestingly) I found out that the closer you got to people or institutions connected to the Moroccan Ministry of Interior, the more difficult it became to arrange an interview. I even attempted once to ‘drop by’ into the Ministry of Interior itself. Unfortunately without any result (didn’t got past the first guard). Even when I had a phone number it remained very difficult. For example, I called to the director of Idmaj Sakan several times to try to speak with him about the VSBP. Yet, he was either busy, sick or unsuited (according to himself) to talk with me on the subject. The Urban Agency of Casablanca (AUC) is another example. The AUC is placed directly under the control of the Ministry of Interior. It is a very powerful institutional player at the level of Casablanca. As such, I wasted probably more than 15 phone calls and a fax for an appointment which eventually, when I arrived, couldn’t take place after all due to a rescheduling. Instead, I was directed to somebody else – someone ranked lower in the

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29 As such, the specific contact who gave me the mobile phone number of the director of the Bouregreg state agency helped me in a fundamental way to advance that particular case study. Before I had tried to get into contact with specific officials from the Bouregreg state agency but I didn’t seem to get access to the main building. I didn’t got past the secretary who told me to send a fax which they eventually never replied. Once I called and spoke to the director directly on the phone, he was willing to talk to me and introduced me even to several of his staff members. Moreover, they felt more authorized to speak to me because they were contacted by the director himself or because I had introduced myself with a recommendation of the director.

30 The Ministry of Interior is traditionally the central locus of the monarchy’s political power. It is one of the so-called sovereign ministries and its head is appointed by the king regardless the results of legislative elections and political majority in parliament.

31 Idmaj Sakan is a public operator responsible for the resettlement of slum dwellers in Casablanca. This organization is placed directly under the authority of the governor of Casablanca (hence, the Ministry of Interior).
bureaucratic hierarchy – who didn’t entrusted me with more than the usual ‘langue de bois’. Three fieldtrips later, I attempted again to speak to someone of the AUC. This time however, I didn’t call beforehand. I decided to just drop by. I even had prepared myself carefully. I managed to walk in with an ‘official request’ from the librarian of the French research institute, Centre de Jacques Berque, to exchange documents and information with their documentation centre. But my hopes were up too high. I didn’t got past the secretary (of the AUC governor nota bene! Damn it, I was so close!) and I returned home with little or no useful information. She gave me a bunch of folders that dated back more than 10 years at least.

As far as the content of an interview goes, it was not a surprise either that more detailed and sensitive (political) questions were more difficult to pose in interviews with state officials. I remember one experience particularly. It was during an interview with an official of Al Omrane, one of the agencies responsible for the VSBP. Right at the moment when I asked her about the tense relationship between Al Omrane and Imdaj Sakan in Casablanca and the specific influence of the Ministry of Interior in this relationship, she suddenly stood up and told me she had something urgent to do. She pushed me a folder in my hands and left her office for five minutes. When she came back she started talking about something completely different. Every attempt to come back to my previous question was answered very vaguely or avoided. It could have been a coincidence of course, but it felt like she had tried to break the rhythm of the interview. There was no indication whatsoever that could explain why she had to leave so suddenly. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that these kinds of interviews cannot be really interesting. Repeated discourses, small details and personal opinions can be very useful to understand bigger pictures of vision and change.

I chose not to record my interview sessions but take notes instead. I do realize that a lot of information probably got lost this way. Nevertheless, it was a conscious choice. First of all, it was a matter of time. Transcribing interviews can be a very time consuming occupation and the particular format of my interviews made taking notes more suitable. The format of the interviews was semi-structured or even open. I always tried to prepare questions but I wanted enough space to anticipate their opinions and stories. I attempted above all to have a discussion with my respondents and wrote down those things or opinions that seemed interesting or useful. My interviews were important additions to other sources such as literature, press articles, observations, etc., but not the most important source as such. Additionally, recording can have a restraining effect. I wanted to create a setting – as much as possible – in which my respondents felt at ease to discuss their issues with me without having the feeling that they were being taped and had to be careful about what they said (taking notes can also have that effect).

32 The French expression for ‘the official woolly discourse’.
33 In contrast to Imdaj Sakan, Al Omrane is under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing, Urbanism and Spatial Planning (MHUAUE). Rumour had it at that time that the engagement of both ministries in the VSBP at the urban scale of Casablanca has caused severe political tensions between both of them. Of course, I wanted to find out more about that.
34 Interview (Rabat – 04/06/2010).
35 There were some occasions where I wished I had taped the interview. I remember one interview with an official of the public Social Development Agency (ADS). It lasted for almost five hours and I didn’t even manage to ask all of my questions. Also during the interview, two new members of ADS, joined us, which
such, I used my interview material not so much as primary sources but mainly to clarify certain of my arguments and assumptions, add additional details to ground a specific hypothesis or learn more about the specific rationality behind certain policies.

Interviews were not the only aspect of my fieldwork and my methods. Observation was also an important technique. My work on urban transformation required me to really get to know and experience the two cities where I did most of my fieldwork (Casablanca and Rabat). As a result, ‘walking in the city’ was an elementary strategy to experience the city. As de Certeau noticed, walking was a way of experiencing the urban beyond its mere panoramic view and its theoretical conceptions (De Certeau, 1984: 93). I spent hours strolling the streets, the medina, the markets, and of course the Bouregreg site. I also participated in manifestations or – more comfortably – enjoyed a tea in front of the Balima hotel – with its excellent view – when the unemployed graduates were protesting in front of the national parliament. The numerous people I met and talked to during these numerous strolls are not counted as interviews. Nevertheless, they often provided me with insightful information and details. Visiting different urban sites is really interesting to get to know the city a little bit better, but can be tough as well sometimes. I had the chance to visit some Moroccan slums or resettlement projects in the district of Sidi Moumen (Casablanca), Douar el Kora (Rabat), and even in smaller cities such as Temara and Larache. As a stranger there is a good chance that they see you as an intruder or a voyeur (Zaki, 2005: 29). Or even worse, they see you as someone who can directly and immediately ameliorate their situation (something you know you can never accomplish). I remember two women in Douar Tomas (Sidi Moumen) who asked me to note down their address (street number and the number of the barrack). They hoped that I would give this to ‘the organization’ I worked for (thinking it was an NGO). My contact had to explain them that I was just a student, but still they insisted. Another guy asked me, that very same day, if I could maybe watch out for a job. He was prepared to do any kind of job. Again, I tried to explain him that I was only a student and that there was little I could do. Still, he gave me his phone number. Without wanting to overdramatize these experiences, these were some of the moments where I not only studied uneven development but really experienced it. These were the moments that underscored my privileged position and the unequal relationship between me, as a researcher, and my subject.

This brings us directly to the question of objectivity. When one thinks about ‘science’, one often associates it with hard evidence, objectivity (the preclusion of subjective observations and interpretations) and the formulation of falsifiable hypotheses and theories. The friend of my mother in law has a PhD in chemistry and during one of our many interesting conversations about philosophy and science, I noticed his hesitation (and even slight reluctance) to call me a “scientist”. After all, I wasn’t doing a PhD in natural or exact sciences. The human or social sciences have struggled with this stigmatization. Many social sciences disciplines have often tried to adopt more positivist approaches in order to preclude subjectivity. Political science for example, has become increasingly

made it pretty complicated to keep track of everything that was said and take notes at the same time (Interview Temara 31/05/2010). I did tape an interview once with an official of USAID in 2007. But I am a real layman when it comes to technology. When I arrived home, I noticed that the recording completely failed (Interview Rabat September 2007).
influenced by quantitative empirical approaches (e.g. statistics, rational-choice models, etc.) since the behaviourist revolution of the 1950s (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007). Methods and interpretations were to be reduced to that which was explicitly observable and calculable. Statistics are an excellent example. They are very useful propaganda for “objective” research because they let the “facts” speak for themselves. In reality, however, statistic data simulates an ‘objectivity’ which depends heavily on the legitimacy of the questions asked (Gadamer, 1989: 300). As such, social phenomena cannot be isolated to be studied separately from every unexpected influence. Moreover the human sciences are irrefutably connected to modes of experience that lie outside ‘science’ (Ibid.). According to the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, a truth is communicated in these modes of experiences – he refers to the example of experiencing philosophy, history and art – that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science. The knowledge pursued by a ‘science of art’ cannot replace or surpass the ‘experience of art’ (Ibid.: xxi). As such, as I indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the relationship between the scholar and his field is not a passive relationship. Not only is it impossible to erase the researcher’s own subjectivity towards the phenomena he or she studies, the study-object itself will also have its impact on the researcher. Starting from my particular experiences of doing fieldwork, I can now say that it has had a significant impact on me as a person. The research field affects the scholar (and vice versa).\(^\text{36}\)

As a consequence, knowledge is produced by and dependent on the particular research questions that are being posed, the subjectivity involved and the particular situatedness of the researcher. “Facts are made”, argues Paul Rabinow in his outspoken reflection on his fieldwork in Morocco, “and the facts we interpret are made and remade”. As such, he continues, “they cannot be collected as if they were rocks, picked up and put into cartons and shipped home to be analyzed in the laboratory” (Rabinow, 2007: 150). In contrast to positivist or quantitative research approaches, the interpretative method or interpretive modes of knowledge production do not falsely pretend to be able to erase subjectivity (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007). This particular research approach sees understanding more as a process which will inevitably be determined by the ‘interpreter’ and his own social, historical and cultural background. This process of understanding – as Gadamer describes it – contains therefore a tension between the strangeness of the phenomenon one tries to understand and the interpreter’s own “fore-understanding” (Gadamer, 1989: 294-295). This implies two things. First, the process of understanding is always mediated by the positionality of the interpreter (the researcher), without which the information would be meaningless (Cerwonka & Malkki, 2007: 26). This positionality will be determined by the researcher’s background, as well as the priorities, questions and prejudices he or she brings to bear in trying to understand a phenomenon (Ibid.). This process does not entail a one-way communication starting from the researcher itself. To the contrary, it involves, what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons”. By horizon, he refers to the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point (the positionality of the researcher). Our attempt to understand will therefore be first of all determined by the prejudices we bring with us. Gadamer calls this the “the horizon of the present”. Yet, our horizon of the present is not

\(^{36}\) Especially in anthropological and ethnographic studies, Rabinow refers to the dialectic process between reflection and immediacy embedded within fieldwork. Neither the subject nor the object remains static during the process (Rabinow, 2007: 38-39; see also De Smet, 2007).
fixed but continually in the process of being formed (e.g. testing one’s own prejudices) and co-influenced by the horizons that emerge out of the research. Hence, the process of understanding entails a tension between the researcher’s horizon of the present and the history and character of the phenomenon he studies. As a result, through their fusion, the horizon of the present will be superseded and (new) knowledge will be produced.

Secondly, and this is directly related to the first remark, the process of understanding (the interpretation), involves (or has to involve) more than just the reproduction of an objectively observable reality. It goes beyond this stage and that is why, Gadamer (1989: 296) argues that “understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well.” In other words, facts are made, knowledge is produced. Theory will play a crucial role in this knowledge production process. Whether we like it or not or whether we are conscious about it or not, empirical data are always produced and read through the theoretical lenses we are familiar with or drawn to. With regard to economics, the Marxist economist David Ruccio (2011: 215) argues that “all economic “facts” are theoretical, in the sense that they only exist and make sense within theoretical frameworks”. As such, he continues that each different economic theory produces its own set of facts, and in turn, each theory will interpret and understand its facts – and that of other theoretical frameworks – differently, depending on the particular concepts that are used to produce and read them (Ibid.). Furthermore, we interpret the world through concepts, presumptions and paradigms that we acquired not only through ‘scientific training’ but also from culture more generally. Accordingly – and inevitably – within the process of understanding there hides an immanent danger for blindness, or what Henri Lefebvre referred to as, blind fields. Blindness can occur when we look at new fields or phenomena with eyes (concepts) that were shaped by the practices and theories of other fields (e.g. interpreting neoliberal globalization with the concepts of neo-Orientalism, modernization theory or transitology). This blindness is not innocent.

37 An obvious example is the study by Lahcen Achy (2010) of the Carnegie Middle East Centre. He “proves” that poverty has been reduced in Morocco and that Morocco already reached the Millenium Development Goals set for 2015 with regard to poverty. He bases his analysis partly on the proportion of the population living on less than $1 or $2 per day. Compared to a decade ago this proportion decreased respectively from 2% to less than 1% and from 20% to 8%. Striking is that he does not really take into account inflation nor the considerable increase in prices of consumer goods in Morocco over the last decade (which was a cause for numerous social protests), despite the fact that he acknowledges the significant economic growth and the relatively impressive per capital growth in GDP during the last decades. Furthermore, he underpins his argument by claiming that, overall, poverty has been reduced by 40% (from 16.2% to 9% of the population) on the basis of the national poverty line. Many observers have already warned us to be careful to interpret these official Moroccan figures as they tend to contradict figures released by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). By the way, the differences between official government figures and data from the UN has caused a political polemic in Morocco in the summer of 2010. Following their own parameters, UNDP concluded that 28% of the Moroccans live under the poverty line. The Moroccan government accused the UN for a lack of “rigor and professionalism” (see article by former Telquel-editor Mohamed Benchemsi – Morocco: so what is the real poverty rate. Available at: http://www.moroccoboard.com/viewpoint/126/1180, accessed 14/02/2011; the official numbers used by UNDP are available at: http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Morocco.pdf, accessed 14/02/2011). Furthermore, while Achy acknowledges the increased socio-economic inequality between 1990 and 2007, he sees this as only one of six pressing challenges of the future and not as the most important one, let alone that he emphasizes the political dimension of those mechanisms that produce and reproduce inequality in Morocco. In contrast, the analyses in this project will give a completely different perspective on issues such as poverty, inequality and economic development.

38 The same goes the other way round of course. The process of bringing new concepts and theories into a
or trivial (e.g. due to a lack of intellectual capacities, lack of education, cultural differences, or by ‘just’ using the wrong concepts, etc.). As Lefebvre has put it:

Blindness, our not-seeing and not-knowing, implies an ideology. These blind fields embed themselves in re-presentation. Initially, we are faced with a presentation of the facts and groups of facts, a way of perceiving and grouping. This is followed by a re-presentation, an interpretation of the facts. Between these two moments and in each of them, there are misrepresentations, misunderstandings. The blinding (assumptions we accept dogmatically) and the blinded (the misunderstood) are complementary aspects of our blindness (Lefebvre, 2003: 30).

However, both Lefebvre and Gadamer are arguing that despite the inevitability of blind fields, and despite the impossibility of attaining absolute knowledge, or absolute truth, this doesn’t mean that all processes of understanding are equally valuable. These processes are always ideologically embedded and consequently entrenched by power (i.e. the power of ideology). This is what Lefebvre refers to as the ‘blinding’: “the luminous source (knowledge or ideology) that projects a beam of light, that illuminates elsewhere” (Ibid.: 31). Furthermore, it is also through the work of Michel Foucault and later Giorgio Agamben (with his conceptualization of the camp) that we gained considerable insight in the intimate relation between the process of knowledge production and power; between the use of power and particular practices of inclusion and exclusion (e.g. Foucault, 1979; 1991; 2007; Agamben, 1998). Although, the researcher cannot just dispose himself of the prejudices and the fore-understanding he takes to the field, Gadamer distinguishes between those prejudices that are productive for our understanding and those that hinder our understanding (the misunderstanding – or the “blinded” to use Lefebvre’s notion) (Gadamer, 1989: 295). Consequently, it is the task of critical theory, not only to engage in a critical process of understanding (see below), but also to expose the ideological nature of those interpretations and explanations that fail to do that. In transition theory, for example, the ideological character of the analysis is obscured by the abstract generality and so-called universality of its concepts (e.g. democracy, transparency, free market, etc.). No doubt, it concerns a misplaced universality dictated by ideological power – in contrast to the real universality of capitalism which should be critically analyzed – and consequently leads to misunderstanding.

Even a naïve faith in empiricism (an alleged objective scientific method) is blinded by

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39 The specific conception of power in the work of Foucault and that of, for example, Lefebvre differs significantly. Foucault liked to remind us of the very different forms and structures, in other words the concrete mechanisms, through which power is manifested, penetrates and governs life. He did not want to fix that power in any clear point or agency (“power is everywhere”) but rather consider and explain its pure and simple occurrence. Lefebvre, in contrast, always maintained a reference to the subjects from which power derives and emphasized the human (class) agency behind these forms of power (to be discussed more in detail in chapter 2). Agamben, who draws for a great deal on Foucault, also tries, in contrast to Foucault, to position (sovereign) power. Sovereign power, according to Agamben, decides on life and death and situates itself outside the ‘law’ (although it makes the law). For Agamben, the Homo Sacer and the concentration camp were ‘paradigms’ – and not just historical phenomena – through which he wanted to illustrate the working of sovereign power and make a broader historical-problematic context more intelligible. Through these paradigms he intended to explain our modernity (see also Agamben, 2009).
ideology. To give concrete example. I remember very well my first MESA-conference in Montreal in November 2007.\footnote{MESA stands for Middle East Study Association. The Associations holds its annual conference every year in November.} In one of the sessions on transition and post-democratization theory, a well-known and established scholar in the field started to talk to me about one of the presentations we had just seen. If I remember well, the discussion was about one of the empirical models (the prisoner’s dilemma) used in the session and its usefulness (or from my point of view incapability) to explain political change and/or conflict in a particular country (I think it was Lebanon). I never forgot a particular argument he entrusted me back then: “look, if there are free and fair elections, I consider a country to be democratic”. He was sympathetic to my critical stance towards particular kinds of empirical models but he needed a way to be able to determine and measure ‘democracy’. Herbert Marcuse has illustrated the ideological character of this kind empiricism in his classic work \textit{One-Dimensional Man} of 1964. He gives the example of a study by Janowitz and Marvick that attempts to “judge the extent to which an election is an effective expression of the democratic process” (Marcuse, 2002: 117, quotation marks also in original text). Such a judgement, Marcuse argues, requires an evaluation of the election process in terms with the democratic requirements and as a result, it also requires a definition of “democratic”. Janowitz and Marvick offered the choice between two kinds of definitions: one according to the mandate theory and another according to the competitive theory of democracy. Yet, they rejected the first – the mandate theory which suggests that the electorate imposes its will on the representatives – because they thought it was “unrealistic”. After all, it assumed a level of articulated opinion and ideology among the electorate not likely to be found in the US nor in any other democratic country in the world. As such, they chose to operationalize the second definition “according to which a democratic election is a process “of selecting and rejecting candidates” who are “in competition for public office””. Their operationalization of the definition of democracy according to the principles of competitive theory was based on three specific criteria by which the authors claimed to assess the political character of competition.\footnote{Briefly: the three criteria were 1) “competition between opposing candidates which pervades the entire constituency”; 2) “engaging in equal efforts to maintain their own electorate and win independent voters”; and 3) “engaging in equal efforts to win the elections” (for more details see Marcuse, 2002: 118).} Without going to much into detail, Marcuse believed that these criteria actually described the factual state of affairs in the American elections of 1952, which was also, at the same time, the actual subject of analysis. As such, the criteria produced a certain reality which they nevertheless pretended to be measuring:

In other words, the criteria for judging a given state of affairs are those offered by (or, since they are those of a well-functioning and firmly established social system, imposed by) the given state of affairs. The analysis is “locked”; the range of judgement is confined within a context of facts which excludes judging the context in which the facts are made, man-made, and in which their meaning, function, and development are determined. Committed to this framework, the investigation becomes circular and self-validating. If “democratic” is defined in the limiting but realistic terms of the actual process of election, then this process is democratic prior to the results of the investigation. To be sure, the operational framework still allows (and even calls for) distinction between consent and ma-
Manipulation; the election can be more or less democratic according to the ascertained degree of consent and manipulation. The authors arrive at the conclusion that the 1952 election “was characterized by a process of genuine consent to a greater extent than impressionistic estimates might have implied” – although it would be a “grave error” to overlook the “barriers” to consent and to deny that “manipulative pressures were present.” Beyond this hardly illuminating statement the operational analysis cannot go. In other words, it cannot raise the decisive question whether consent itself was not the work of manipulation – a question for which the actual state of affairs provides ample justification. The analysis cannot raise it because it would transcend its terms towards transitive meaning – toward a concept of democracy which would reveal the democratic election as a rather limited democratic process (Marcuse, 2002: 119).

What Marcuse identifies as ideological is precisely the (deliberate) rejection or neglect of those concepts that can go beyond the self-validating nature of the scientific (i.e. towards a transitive meaning). Equally, in the area study of the Arab World we can find examples of similar empirical exercises to measure democracy and “electoral competitiveness” (cf. Stepan & Robertson, 2004; see also Storm, 2007; Diamond, 2010). But a critical analysis of the ideological lenses through which the world is interpreted, should not only be restricted to the more rigid empirical approaches. The parallel with the transition paradigm that is used to describe political change in the Arab world is also evident, although in a kind of reversed way. The transition paradigm promotes also an analysis that is “locked” from the beginning, although not in a self-validating way, but in the way that it doesn’t find validation or desperately tries to find validation for something actually not there: democracy (whatever the prevalent definition may be – but we see that the competitive theory is also the most common one). Within the so-called post-democratization theories, the parallel is even more striking. These analyses are often “locked” exactly the same way. To explain it with the argumentation of Marcuse: the criteria for judging the given state of affairs of authoritarianism are those offered by the given state of affairs in the countries that are “analyzed”. That is why the obvious answer “authoritarianism” to the question of “what in fact is” is actually hardly illuminating (cf. Valbjørn & Bank, 2010).

Post-democratization studies are similarly circular and self-validating. Many processes of understanding actually locked themselves in the black box of the regime. As a result, as Marcuse also observed, many of the determining and constituting facts and evolutions that can actually illuminate our understanding of actual political change, remain outside the reach of the methodology and concepts of these mainstream accounts – think about for example the spatial impact of neoliberal globalization, the role of class power in the constitution of actually existing neoliberalism in the Arab world, etc.). And by virtue of this limitation the analyses of transitology and post-democratization theory block the apprehension of actual political transformations. They have become an element of the ideology that sustains the blindness (Ibid.: 122). We must bear in mind that paradigms both constitute and clarify a broader problematic context (Agamben, 2009).

42 However, I doubt whether Agamben would consider the paradigms of both transitology and post-democratization as genuine useful paradigms. Nevertheless, the objects used by these academic branches
and determines clarifications. The specific paradigms of either transitology or post-
democratization theory are blinded by the established “truths” of hegemonic ideology. By proclaiming and constituting the existing social reality (hegemony) as its own norm, these mainstream analyses actually fortify, often unconsciously, the – what Marcuse calls – “faithless faith” in current reality and the ideology that underpins it. As such, Marcuse notes (this time citing Theodor Adorno) that these social sciences are victims of that ideology and submitted “to the overwhelming power of the established state of affairs” (Marcuse, 2002: 122-123). The analyses, which reject or ignore ‘transitive’ concepts (explaining the hegemony), commit themselves, according to Marcuse, to a false consciousness, or to use Gadamer’s terminology, a false process of understanding (misunderstanding). It is exactly this power of ideology which Lefebvre sees as the cause for blind fields to occur.

Therefore, the positionality of the researcher (and knowing about his or her positionality) is not necessarily a limitation to the process of understanding, or more generally, an irrevocable weakness embedded within the social sciences (compared to the exact sciences), but rather a necessary condition for the production of knowledge. Even if it were possible at all, to erase subjectivity within social science methods, it would at the same time erase our capacity to ‘understand’ and subsequently completely hand over the social sciences to hegemonic power and order. To a similar extent, we shouldn’t be over-romanticizing subjectivity either, and fall in the same trap on the other side of the objectivity-subjectivity spectre. Gadamer’s idea of positionality (one’s horizon) and that of others who advocate an interpretative approach should not be confused with the idea that our insights and interpretations are “simply reducible to our subjective bias” (Cerwonka & Malkii, 2007: 31). The idea behind the fusion of horizons is that the positionality of the researcher intertwines with the horizon of the research and the experience of fieldwork. As such, the interpretive approach is not just a rejection of all principles related to scientific thoroughness, the search for truth or the rejection of the validity of social science methods and rules, in favour of some romantic or indulgent notion of subjectivism (Ibid.). This would make any version, any narrative or any conception of truth and knowledge equal, and consequently, redundant.

According to Allaine Cerwonka, the interpretive approach involves a theoretical reconceptualization of objectivity, away from its very narrow (and positivist) notion. It is to take into account the ‘scientist’ own fore-understanding in his pursuit for knowledge, understanding and critique, in order to be aware of his role in the production of that knowledge and the fact that this production is never without interest. There is no value-free research and there are no neutral or a-political intellectuals (Robinson, 2006). As such, by making objectivity itself an object of inquiry, Craig Calhoun and Joseph Karaganis argue (drawing on Bourdieu) that social science is not so much confronted with its own limits but becomes more scientific. In other words, capable of avoiding the theoretical distortions of (positivist) objectivity claims and capable to account for (democracy and/or authoritarianism) could be described as objects “that, standing equally for all others of the same class, defines the intelligibility of the group of which it is a part and which, at the same time it constitutes”. Agamben referred to the Foucauldian paradigm of the panopticon which allowed “statements and discursive practices to be gathered into a new intelligible ensemble and in a new problematic context” (Agamben, 2009: 17-18; for a definition of the paradigm as envisioned by Agamben see Ibid.: 31).
its own constitutive blindness (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001). That is why, if we return to Gadamer, the purpose of the hermeneutic task (the process of understanding) is not to cover up the tension between the positionality of the researcher and the specific context (horizon) of his research with positivist or empiricist models and criteria, or with seemingly objective questions (in contrast to the normative and teleological ones of transitology), or with naïve propositions (e.g. so-called universal concepts like democracy; the a-spatial view on transformation towards an end of history, or the in-between "grey zone", etc.), but rather to consciously bring it out (Gadamer, 1989: 305). In other words, it is not so much necessary to develop a pre-determined procedure of understanding, as “to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place” (Ibid.: 295, emphasis added).43 Only by doing that we are able to take into account the power of ideology and indicate common misunderstandings.

**Critical theory**

Henri Lefebvre argued that there is no true social science without the critique of existing reality (Lefebvre, 2009: 55). This axiom, as he saw it, strongly ascribes to the principles of critical thinking or critical theory. The term ‘critical theory’ is generally associated with the *Frankfurt School*. It was within the Frankfurt based Institute for Social Research that a group of social theorists – its most famous core-members were Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno and Herbert Marcuse – explored the concept of ‘critique’ as a methodological, theoretical and political problem. They derived their ideas from the Enlightenment and the works of Kant, Hegel and of course Marx. As a concept, critical theory was launched for the first time in 1937 by Max Horkheimer, to distinguish his work and that of his colleagues with what he called ‘traditional philosophy’, but also to distinguish the Frankfurt School from orthodox Marxism (cf. Therborn, 1996; Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001; Brenner, 2009). In contrast to liberal and/or mainstream Enlightenment thinking the Frankfurt School understood the danger of the intellectual satisfaction embedded within European enlightenment as if it were a process towards universal reason or a grand, perfected and closed system of knowledge (today this would be the contemporary a-spatial view on “the end of history”). This was the essential argument of Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The contradiction they saw was simple but powerful. The dialectic entailed that the emancipatory power of the ideals of enlightenment, first formulated as a critique on the power structures and forms of domination embedded in the prevailing myths of the 18th century (e.g. religion), had replaced those myths and in the process of doing so, the ideals of Enlightenment became the new myths of 19th century and early 20th century capitalist society (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2007). Instead of leading to freedom and emancipation, the new institutions and processes (e.g. nation-state, the market, schools, prisons, etc.) that were created by the then dominant social forces (the bourgeoisie) actually came to dominate modern rationality. It dominated the majority of the population in the Western capitalist societies and increasingly deprived them of their power to critique and challenge these institutions and processes. As such, the Frankfurt School tried to understand and demonstrate how the liberation (or emancipation) that might have attended the growth of human power and aimed at the establishment of people’s

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43 As such, authors like Gadamer and Agamben ascribe an ontological character (instead of a methodological character) to the process of understanding or intelligibility. Interpretation (or the paradigm in Agamben’s case) refers to “being” (see also De Smet, 2007).
sovereignty (the Enlightenment) eventually turned against itself and produced the horrors of the 20th century (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001).

In the tradition of critical theory, “critique” refers not just to criticism, but rather to a process of understanding and a deep examination of the conditions and power structures that shape our current social reality and determine our current forms of thinking. Calhoun and Karaganis derive four core dimensions out of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School that are still valid for contemporary critical theory. First of all, critical theory departs from the idea that the conditions of knowledge itself are not self-evident, but must be examined critically. This refers to the positionality of the one that produces knowledge. Few people will of course deny that knowledge is produced and that “knowledge is power”. However, the crucial questions at hand for critical theory are: power for whom?; power exercised by whom?; and finally, to what end? (Robinson, 2006). Consequently, critical theory sees it as a part of its task to analyze the different languages, concepts, ideologies and theories that are used to understand the empirical world. Secondly, critical analysis reveals that social reality is not simply a matter of surface appearances but a product of underlying causes and conditions that cannot be properly understood by mere empirical generalization. This is reminiscent of Marx’s famous claim that there would be no need for science if everything were as it appeared to be (Harvey, 1989a: 10; Brenner, 2009: 203). Theory was thus required to explain and understand why certain phenomena are what they are. Contemporary globalization is thus not simply a fact of human nature but the result of a historical process. One of the key aspects of the critical approach, Calhoun and Karaganis argue, involved the uncovering of ‘reification’, in other words the “tendency for products of human action to appear as though they were ‘things’, products of nature rather than human choices” (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 180). For example, it follows that the breakthrough of capitalism in Morocco was the result of a French colonial project and their efforts to promote and experiment with urbanization (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980; Rabinow, 1989; Wright, 1991). And as I will demonstrate in this study, the particular Moroccan integration into the processes of neoliberal globalization are the result of conscious political choices and strategies, beneficial for some but unlikely to improve the lives of many.

Thirdly, critical theory also seeks to analyse social theory itself. In this process, critical analyses attempt to explain why certain theories reach limits they cannot transcend, and unveils why other theories are ideologically biased. Scientific theory must thus be seen in its historical terms, not as a method to uncover timeless truth, but as a process of analyzing and understanding an ever changing world (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 181). As a result, critical theory is never stagnant. To the contrary, it is the product of current social reality. It wouldn’t exist without that reality and it evolves with the evolution of capitalism. The theories of Marx and early Marxism were for example one of the major manifestations of the dialectics of modernity (Therbron, 1996). Marxism wouldn’t exist without modern capitalism. And just as the critical theory of the Frankfurt School was a dialectical offspring of the interbellum period and Keynesianism, contemporary critical (urban) theory is a product of neoliberal globalization and contemporary capitalist urbanization. This argument is related directly with the fourth dimension of critical theory: namely that it is shaped by a critical engagement with society. This does not simply mean that critical theorists have preferences and opinions about society, but
rather that they seek to achieve a unity of theory and practice. Engagement with critical theory is thus an action in society and not some kind of external view on society (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 181). Indeed, this is what the early Frankfurt School theorists, following Marx, called praxis. They were all influenced by Marx’s eleventh these on Feuerbach which states that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1992: 423). First of all, this is done by raising critical awareness and providing the analytical instruments to understand the world we live in. Critical theorists insist on the historical embeddedness of theory. Social science cannot be neutral (it would otherwise be irrelevant); any attempt to place ourselves outside history and politics would result in – at best – pseudo-sciences (e.g. empiricism) (Harvey, 1989a). Therefore, a critical thinker rejects the idea of theory presented as if it could adopt a position outside history and politics, as if theory could somehow explain the world and social change without itself being transformed by it (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 181).

This last point contradicts with the common imaginary of the social scientist or philosopher living in his ivory tower. It also contradicts with the often made caricature – even in my own department – and the common misunderstanding of two kinds of researchers. On the one hand, it is said, there are those who are drawing on extensive empirical knowledge, slogging through the mud of their fields, not concerned with grand theories but looking for what is really happening in the field. On the other hand, the caricature goes, there are those who are drawing on big abstract theoretical frameworks, absorbed by their theoretical books, thinking they can figure out the world form behind their desks. I am not saying that such a distinction a priori does not exist, but to make such a distinction to position oneself vis-à-vis others is to deny (or not be aware of) the inherent dialectic between critical theory and practice. More concretely, making such a distinction almost automatically is failing to see the whole purpose of critical theory, and by extension, failing to be critical. The simplistic assumption regarding what the anthropologist Akhil Gupta sees as the natural superiority – the assertion of authenticity – implicit in the knowledge claims that are generated by the fact of just “being there” should be seriously questioned (Gupta, 1995). Fieldwork (as simply being there) is in itself not enough (although absolutely necessary) to comprehend how for example the state, and political transformation more generally, comes to be constructed, produced and represented (Ibid.). What follows from the notion of praxis, is that critical theory does not strive for an absolute truth, but constantly questions the status quo. Critical theory is always contextual, embedded within the dialectics of social and historical change (Brenner, 2009). In other words, theory lies in the complexity of the particular cases one attempts to understand (Mitchell, 2002: 8). Moreover, critical theory does not only analyze and criticize ‘traditional’ or mainstream theory, it also constantly analyzes itself. Like history itself, critical theoretical enquiry remains open-ended (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001).

44 Samir Amin notes that with the decline of Marxist and Keynesian thought since the hegemony of neoliberal thought, critical analysis of the real world has been increasingly replaced with a theory of imaginary capitalism by theorists of the so-called “pure economics”. Critical thought, according to Amin, was then replaced by pure sorcery (Amin, 2003: 16).
My project relies on a critical interpretive approach. In contrast to some mainstream theories, which try to describe social activities and relations in a context of some natural order (e.g. contemporary globalization), this study aims to understand the very structures and rationalities (the hegemony) that produces the existing social reality in Morocco in order to explain its current transformation. Liberal and other mainstream theories of political change have raised little or no questions about the fact that many of the existing social relations are determined and defined by the requirements of contemporary capitalism. Instead, these theories often consider capitalism as something natural that stands above human agency (and not as something produced by it). To give a simple example, the world according to liberalism can be divided in ‘developed’ countries (reached some kind an end-stage) and ‘developing’ countries (lagging behind), thereby misunderstanding and/or completely neglecting the particular evolutions and co-existing dynamics of uneven development not only between North and South, but also within the ‘Western’ part of the world and within the countries of the global South. Thereby, they also neglect the fact that uneven development is both the condition and result of contemporary capitalism. As a result, (neo-)liberal theories and their conceptions of the world have become today’s powerful myths. They cannot be demystified by these theories themselves (because, after all, they are self-validating). To qualify my research as critical in the sense discussed above, I argue that the current existing social relationships of power in Morocco are both the product of historical processes and subject to their particular and contingent interaction with these processes. They are thus also the source of its particular and open-ended future.

According to several scholars, it is incumbent upon contemporary critical theory to gain an understanding of the current process of globalization on the one hand, and the processes of capitalist urbanization on a world scale – hence closely related to the first issue – on the other hand. Critical globalization studies understand globalization as a (political) project rather than a given (Robinson, 2006). Its particular constellation is the result of strategic and political choices and actions (see chapter 2). Critical urban studies understand the city, its urban space, as a politically, socially and ideologically mediated and contested space – that is, subject to continuous (re-)constitution and outcome of historically specific relations of social power (Brenner, 2009). This project tries to combine both approaches and focuses explicitly on the forms of actual existing neoliberal urbanization in Morocco that emerged specifically since the period of structural adjustment at the beginning of the 1980s, in order to give new insights about the underlying dynamics of wider social, political, economic and cultural change in Morocco – and by extension the Arab World. It is striking how little attention has been paid in mainstream political accounts on the Arab world to urbanization and neoliberal globalization (and the interaction between the two). The production of urban space as a hegemonic project and its interrelation with processes of state-reformation have been either grossly neglected, underestimated or misunderstood (Parker, 2009).

45 That doesn’t mean that liberalism has no critical potential per se. In a post-capitalist hegemonic order – thinking optimistically for a moment – liberalism could provide a critical source of inspiration, just as 18th century Enlightenment provided a critical source for the pre-capitalist hegemonic order. Although, most likely, completely new critical theories would emerge and be dialectically related to the new hegemonic order.
When I refer to neoliberalism as a concept, or more concretely to “actually existing neoliberalism” (see chapter 2), I do so in a critical manner. The notion of neoliberalism refers not to a pure – a one size fits all – model, but rather to a set of principles, a form of regulation, and a rationality by which contemporary government in Morocco is guided and can be defined. With the worldwide triumph of capitalism over and above all other social systems, especially since the 1990s, actually existing forms of neoliberal government can be observed in almost every part in the world. The critical analysis of the particular entry points I based this research on, the Bouregreg site and the Villes Sans Bidonville program, provide some new insights to understand and interpret neoliberal political transformations in Morocco. Consequently, it was not my intention, if it would be even possible at all, to claim to have found a new (timeless) truth about ‘the state’ or the ‘regime’ in Morocco. To the contrary, the one essential conclusion I draw from these sites of inquiry, may be, first of all, that there is no such truth. There is no essence to understand the nature of political transformation, the nature of authoritarian persistence or the nature of the “Arab regime”. So my intention is not so much to develop a – or the – prescription for understanding the regime, but to critique false thinking of what it really is. As I demonstrate, political transformation is for a large part a continuous and contingent process – strongly embedded of course in the historical context in which changes take place.46

Critical theory rejects a disciplinary division of labour (Therborn, 1996; Brenner, 2009). Instead, it follows an interdisciplinary, or even more radically, a “post-disciplinary approach” (Sayer, 1999). Critical analysis is then identified more with the process of understanding itself, rather than with the laws and boundaries of the imperative questions posed by a specific discipline. Thinking outside the framework of a single discipline means adopting those conceptual tools and methodological strategies related to the challenges of understanding a particular social phenomenon, rather than making them fit within the requirements of a traditional disciplinary division of labour (Brenner, 2004). The work of many critical thinkers have informed this project, yet two – at first sight – uncomplimentary critical traditions are predominant and have strongly influenced my own ideas, narratives and understanding of the current political transformations in Morocco. First of all, the writings of Marxist or radical (urban) scholars of the post-1968 period such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and more recently thinkers like Neil Brenner have informed this project in fundamental way. Secondly, my work relies also on the insights of Michel Foucault and Foucauldian studies on governmentality through the work of for example scholars like Beatrice Hibou, Thomas Lemke and Mariana Valverde. However, Marxist and Foucauldian analyses have long been considered as conflicting. Michel Foucault himself gave mixed messages about his stance towards Marxism, acknowledging at times he quotes from Marx “without feeling obliged to add that authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase”, while elsewhere he expressed his hostility towards Marx and Marxism, denouncing “the sort of entity constructed around a proper name, signifying at once a certain individual, the totality of his writings, and an immense historical process deriving from him” (cited in Marsden, 1999: 20-21). Despite this ambiguity, Foucault’s work was an implicit critique of the traditional (orthodox) understanding of – and its tendency to reify – some of the main

46 This is something Christopher Parker also discussed with me on many occasions.
Method, fieldwork and critique as methodology

categories of Marxism: e.g. ideology, class, state and its economic top-down analysis of power (Marsden, 1999: 21).47

One of the main differences between these two traditions lie in their conception of power. While Marxist inquiries have always been concerned with finding some kind of ‘essential nature’ or exact location of (class) power, Foucault and scholars on ‘neoliberal governmentality’ were more concerned with another kind of – some would say more empirical – question: how and by what means is power exercised (Rose-Redwood, 2006)? Foucault criticized classical Marxist tendencies because they were more preoccupied with the definition of class than with the understanding of the nature of the struggle itself (Marsden, 1999). While Marxist scholars are generally more concerned with questions of capitalist accumulation and the specific agencies that control the processes of that accumulation (i.e. the political project behind contemporary globalization and urbanization), the concept of governmentality has helped us to understand how neoliberalism not only incorporates a (class-dominated) political program or a vision on the state, but a whole new understanding of human nature and social existence that has penetrated and influenced our image of society (Read, 2009). The governmentality approach privileges the study of methods and technologies of power. Moreover, it directly links the process of government with the modes of thought and the political rationality that underpins these methods and technologies (Lemke, 2002; for a more detailed discussion see chapter 2).

Therefore, according to Thomas Lemke who draws on Etienne Balibar, despite the critique that both approaches delivered upon each other, most studies on governmentality should not be seen as a rupture with critical Marxist theory, but as a “tactical alliance” (Lemke, 2002) or an unspoken dialogue (Marsden, 1999).48 On the one hand, Marxist critiques on neoliberalism have pointed out how and why, despite being more than just a political program, class agency has been involved in the spreading of the neoliberal project all around the world. On the other hand, governmentality informs us, how that very project is underpinned by a rationality (a mentality) which intervenes at the level of the individual, i.e. the government of the body (bio-politics). It reminds us, Lemke argues, that political economy relies on a political anatomy of the body (see also Foucault, 2007; 2008). And within a neoliberal governmentality, not only the individual

47 Also within the Marxian traditions there was a great dissatisfaction with the increasingly rigidifying orthodoxy in some Marxist interpretations. Scholars such as Henri Lefebvre, Edward Soja and David Harvey tried to re-open some of the debates and called for the explicit incorporation of the social production of space. They developed a geographic dimension of Marx’s theory of capital accumulation in order to explain the empirical conditions of postmodernity, without abandoning Marx’s law of motion (cf. Soja, 1980; Harvey, 1990; Lefebvre, 1991). Marx himself would probably also have opposed this rigidity of ‘orthodox’ or ‘classical’ Marxism, as Richard Marsden shows by a careful re-reading of Marx’s early and later work. Marsden argues that Marx wrote very little on method because “he opposed in principle all a priori, preconstituted methods – dialectical or otherwise – and would have opposed attempts to extrapolate from his work a method of general applicability” (Marsden, 1999: 100). After all, even during his own life, Marx already rejected some of the early interpretations of his own work and famously stated that if this was Marxism, he was not a Marxist (Marx, 2006: 33).

48 In the literature we can retrace such tactical alliances. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have picked up on Foucault’s notion of biopower (i.e. the government of living beings) in their study on the functioning of ‘Empire’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Neo-Gramscian scholars such as Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop have linked the notion of ‘hegemony’ to the theories of Michel Foucault and his work on discipline, power and governmentality (Poulantzas, 2000; Jessop, 2008).
body, but also collective bodies, institutions (e.g. the public administration), corporations and states have to be made ‘efficient’, ‘flexible’, and ‘autonomous’ (Lemke, 2002:60). Moreover, the notion of governmentality gives insight in how the project of neoliberalism transforms from being a mere project to become much more than that: namely, a universal truth. As Lemke has argued, the concept of governmentality construes the impact of neoliberalism. It views neoliberalism not just as an ideological rhetoric, as a political-economic reality, or as class strategy, but above all “as a political project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke, 2002: 60; see also chapter 2). If globalization today is considered as a genuine natural order, if capitalism is considered to be a universal system without alternative (it can be at best only adjusted or ‘corrected’), if the role of ‘science’ is reduced to the production of technocratic, market-driven and market-oriented forms of knowledge (and therefore losing its critical potential), the explanation for this state of affairs cannot just be found in class interests or profit motives, and maybe not even in ‘consent’, but only in a kind of deeply entrenched mentality, a way of thinking, a particular conscious that lies at the basis of what we really believe is true.

With regard to my own project, I do not claim to answer all the questions that have been raised here. This is not the place either, to elaborate further on the epistemological nature and differences between these two rich bodies of critical literature. Nevertheless, as this project is further outlined over the next four chapters, the reader will notice that I have been deeply influenced by these two branches of critical theory. Yet, as mentioned above, through my engagement with critical theory, I did not come up with a new grand system of knowledge, perfected in order to sustain any new influence, any thorough critique, as if I even succeeded in ruling out my own blindness. Instead, this project offers an approach to improve our existing understanding of political transformation in the contemporary Arab world. It offers, as Calhoun and Karaganis emphasize, “epistemic gain”, not absolute truth. In other words, I do not necessarily want to prove something, only explain it. Consequently, this project is not finished but open-ended. It recognizes the need for radically new debates and acknowledges that all existing theories will need to be revised – sometimes radically changed or even rejected – in the light of new historical experiences (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001: 196).
Neoliberalism seems to be everywhere. This mode of free-market economic theory, manufactured in Chicago and vigorously marketed through principal sales offices in Washington DC, New York, and London, has become the dominant ideological rationalization for globalization and contemporary state “reform”. What began as a starkly utopian intellectual movement was aggressively politicized by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s before acquiring a more technocratic form in the self-styled “Washington Consensus” of the 1990s. Neoliberalism has provided a kind of operating framework or “ideological software” for competitive globalization, inspiring and imposing far-reaching programs of state restructuring and rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts (Peck & Tickell, 2002: 380).

We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is. We are variously urged to respect the state, or smash the state or study the state: but for want of clarity about the nature of the state such projects remain beset with difficulties (Abrams, 1988: 59).
This chapter explores the (more theoretical) foundations of new perspectives to consider political change in the MENA-region. Three broader issues will be discussed. First of all, I want to explore the political nature of contemporary globalization. The phenomenon of globalization has often been treated as a given – an influential given nonetheless. Yet, the impact of this process is still often perceived quite apart from domestic or local political society and agency, or at best, as some kind of external dimension. In contrast, I want to emphasize the dynamics of how local agency is not only affected by the global, but also participates in the production of that global. Secondly, I want to elaborate on the role of the state in these dynamics. But in doing so, we need to understand its nature and the nature of its agency. Many studies on globalization have reflected on the tension between the nation-state and the international dimension. However the understanding of this tension strongly diverges. Some have argued that increasing globalization affected state sovereignty. In contrast to that particular perspective, I want to argue that the essential mechanism of this tension is not a zero-sum game, but rather a dialectical complexity through which both the state and the form of globalization are modified and transformed. To fully grasp the significance of this dialectic we have to renounce the imagination of the state as a coherent entity and/or a single actor. The state is not an actor in itself and can thus not be conceived apart from the crucial dimensions that shape the contemporary capitalist state: power and class hierarchy. Furthermore, in order to understand political change we have to look at the government of people and places within specific contexts and map out the particular implication of state agency, while recognizing at the same time the multiple and variable forms through which this agency is manifested. As such, in relation to the specific local context, the specific interests and the specific political struggles, state agency and state power will manifest themselves differently across space. This bring us to our third and final argument: the importance of the city in the constitution of actually existing forms of neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The neoliberal city became the key arena for new configurations of political, economic and social power. It is the strategic arena in which current neoliberal forms of government are unfolding. And although the city has always been crucial to capitalism and capitalist expansion, the specific dynamics of urbanization have changed under neoliberalism. But neoliberalism is not some ‘one size fits all’ model, as if we could neglect local agency and the social specificity of local contexts. Neoliberal reforms thus always impact and depend on a setting of already existing institutional frameworks, social structures and political struggles. Consequently, neoliberal political projects are manifested – just like the state – differently across space. By bringing these three topics together, this chapter wants to demonstrate that political change in the Arab World cannot be properly understood without taken into consideration its relation with global capitalism.

**Neoliberalism as a political project**

Contemporary narratives of globalization often present this phenomenon as a kind of inevitable force or inescapable process. Globalization is then pictured as an almost natural process, very often with little reference to (local) agency. Essential features and consequences such as global market integration and commercial exchanges, the improvement in means of transportation and communication, migration, new global health and ecological challenges, and last but not least, the spread of so-called universal
values and norms, all seem to suggest that different places all over the world are becoming irreversibly and ever more connected. A truly global economy is often claimed to have emerged beyond the reach and control of local governments and nation-states. This picture has mesmerized and captured the imagination of many scholars, journalists, analysts and politicians. Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union there seems no escape from it anymore. While, in a sense, this assumption is not necessarily untrue, it is the almost natural character of this process that is problematic. The most outspoken example was the famous essay *The End of History?* published by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 (published as a book in 1992). During the final moments of the Cold War, Fukuyama claimed that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such”. As a liberal Hegelian, he was convinced that we now had reached “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4).

Two remarks should be made here. First of all, scholars working on the Arab region have criticized this liberal optimism from at least two different angles. Some believed, following in the footsteps of culturalist thinkers such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, that a “clash of civilizations” would now replace the left-right dichotomy that seemingly ended with the end of the Cold War. Others departed from a more realist perspective, pointing out to the authoritarian persistence of Arab regimes and therefore seriously questioned the possibility of a regional democratic (r)evolution in the near future. However, what both of these reactions against Fukuyama’s thesis have in common, in contrast with the latter, is that they do not adequately take into account (or very little) the way in which the government of people and places not only resists, but is being shaped by powerful models, rationalities and principles that are derived from the current project of globalization (Parker, 2009).

Secondly, and even more importantly, what both these general approaches to Arab politics do have in common with Fukuyama, is that they do not critically question the ‘post-political’ vision that is embedded within the argument of the latter. The culturalist approaches only reduced politics to cultural issues, while the post-democratization studies mainly limited their argument to the more empirical question ‘why did Fukuyama’s prediction did not come out’?, ignoring thereby more fundamental questions as for example: what are the fundamental politics behind Fukuyama’s thesis and what is the nature of the political struggles that rise out of the attempts to promote the political project he presents? In essence, both approaches do not at all question Fukuyama’s liberal ideological bias and his utter a-spatial view on politics (he sees history as a single temporal development), but only his supposedly naïve assumption that some ideal type of liberal democracy would eventually spread out around the world. Fukuyama himself partly anticipated this critique, stating that “the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real

49 Not surprisingly, as I mentioned in a footnote in the introduction, the current events in Tunisia and Egypt are now often compared with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent revolutions in Eastern Europe.

50 Of course, Fukuyama’s account has an obvious ideological bias (see chapter 1).

51 My work departs above all from a fundamental critique of transitology and post-democratization studies (see chapter 1). My disagreement with the culturalist approaches, and above all their tendency to essentialize culture as separate objects, rather speaks for itself through the arguments presented in this work.
material world”. Nevertheless he was convinced that there were powerful reasons to believe “that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4).

As such, these mainstream critics, and especially the ones situated within the debate between transitology and post-democratization studies (cf. chapter 1), are – just as Fukuyama’s thesis – embedded within or permeated by a neoliberal governmentality that has replaced critical attempts to understand political disagreement and the nature of (class) struggle with a vision on technologies of government that fuse around a consensus on the virtues of liberal democracy, economic liberalization and technocratic management (Swyngedouw, 2007; see also Mouffe, 2005). This is what both Erik Swyngedouw and Chantal Mouffe understand as the post-political vision. In this chapter, I want to elaborate on a detailed discussion of neoliberalism, highlighting its political character and emphasize the significance of neoliberalism (or neoliberal globalization) for our understanding of contemporary political change in Morocco. In doing so, I want to follow up on the argument of authors like Massey (2005: 5), who have stressed that ‘globalization’ is not so much the result of a law of nature, but a project; a political project. Globalization, in this view, is a process that has been reproduced and transformed by political agency, while at the same time it constrains that agency.52

In addition to this view, I want to distance myself from the particular understanding of the project of globalization as something that has been merely imposed upon a country like Morocco by, for example, foreign imperialist powers. Rather, I agree with David Harvey (2003) who considers globalization to be the result of a complex dialectic between territorial and capitalist logics of power. According to Harvey, territorial logics of power make up the political, diplomatic and security strategies invoked and used by state power or ruling elites. Capitalist logics of power concern the specific ways in which economic power intervenes through and across space, within, towards or away from certain territories. This happens through the daily practices of production, commercial exchange, financial and technological transfers, labour migration and so forth (Ibid: 26-27). The contradictory fusion of these two logics of power, with their often distinct interests, make up the (sometimes very) different forms of “actually existing neoliberalism” across the globe. It is not my intention to elaborate in detail on the extreme complexity of the current process of globalization. After all, globalization as a process is way too complex to be reduced to the mere expansion and metamorphosis of capitalism – albeit it is a dominant aspect of that process (see for example Bayart, 2007). What I want to focus on more precisely, is the current neoliberal manifestations

52 This is because agency is also subjected to specific relations and structural mechanisms of power, domination and exploitation. Here, I am inspired by Richard Marsden who sees the relation between social structure and human agency as dialectical. He states that “understanding of this relationship has been bedeviled by voluntarism, that is, a belief that individuals create social structure, and reification, that is, a belief that social structure determines the actions of individuals. A realist conception of social structure entails this alternative to voluntarism and reification: individuals do not create social structure (the error of voluntarism), because it pre-exists them, having been established by the long-since dead. Rather, they reproduce and occasionally transform this structure. Social structure does not determine the actions of individuals (the error of reification), because it is both the medium and effect of that action. Rather, social structure both facilitates and constrains human action. Structure is the condition of agency, and agency is the condition of structure (…). Agency and structure are indivisible aspects of the same social reality” (Marsden, 1999: 40-41).
of global capitalism in relation to the Moroccan case and its relevance for our understanding of political change.

(Good) governance: a post-political perspective on reform

The lack of attention to the neoliberal context of globalization, does not mean that current processes and aspects of global market integration or expansion are completely left out of mainstream and/or liberal accounts. Of course, references to the ‘global’ affect contemporary political discourse and scholarly analysis. They often stress the inevitability of ‘reform’, and – more specifically – the necessity of reorganizing national economic and political life to reflect the demands and incentives of the ‘global market’. To give one example, in the 2007 trade and investment guide of the American Chambers of Commerce, Mustapha Mechahouri, the Moroccan minister of Foreign Trade at that time, addressed American investors in the following way (AmCham, 2007: 6):

As economic actors and experts the users of this guide are certainly aware that the current intensive shift towards globalization is putting the economies of developing countries, such as Morocco, under increasing pressure and requires large scale reforms and structural adaptations. For this reason, the Kingdom of Morocco is now engaged in huge reforms, initiatives and restructuring programs to accelerate its integration into a broad free trade zone alongside Mediterranean countries, Arab countries, the United States of America, and other nations as part of the globalization process.

These kind of references are frequently made to acknowledge and legitimize the policy reforms that are being applied. Nevertheless, the association with inevitability and necessity reveal a depoliticized conception of reform, drawing a definite line between the realm of economics and politics. While contemporary globalization may be the object of policy, it is thought to have little to do with the process of policy-making itself (for a similar argument on culture and policy: see Kapoor, 2008: 19). From this perspective, social and economic policies responding to the dynamics of globalization are typically viewed as mere technical and instrumental measures. Globalization itself is somehow seen as located outside the scope of policy. Contemporary globalization is considered to affect ‘local’ and/or ‘national’ policy and not the other way around. The fact that the ‘outside’ (the global) is presented in a-political terms, also suggests it is immune for critical analysis. In this view, local policy has to adapt to the global, as if the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ are situated within a certain hierarchy, ignoring the fact that they are actually both part of the same process and influence each other’s constitution.

Since the early 1990s, this depoliticized and technocratic perception on how to deal with globalization was promoted by the World Bank and other donor agencies in the developing countries through the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the discourse of ‘good governance’. The concept of good governance served as a general guiding principle and “policy metaphor” for international donor institutions who expected adherence from recipient governments to put in place the reforms that satisfied the donor’s requirements (cf. Doornbos 2001, 2003). The World Bank defined good governance as

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53 By the end of the 1990s, good governance became above all a policy metaphor for the Post-Washington Consensus (see chapter 3).
“sound development management” which referred to the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992: 1). Furthermore, the concept of good governance rests on two core values, namely ‘inclusiveness’ (i.e. equal participation and equal treatment) and ‘accountability’ (i.e. transparency and contestability) (World Bank, 2003). As such, the World Bank states that good governance is not only a means to ensure growth and social improvement, but also a “fundamental dimension of human development itself” (Ibid.: 15). Presented as a set of objective principles embedded within so-called universal values (i.e. Western values and norms), the concept of good governance has been detached from individual governments and their actions. Even though the World Bank acknowledges the fact that good governance in itself may not generate economic growth, it is still a prerequisite for development and growth. After all, examples of “enlightened leadership with poor governance” are, according to the World Bank, nothing more than historical accidents (Ibid.: 11; see also Zemni & Bogaert, 2006: 116).

This disconnection between good governance as a guiding principle on the one hand, and the domestic affairs of individual states on the other hand – as if the good governance guidelines belong somehow to that global sphere to which local politics have to adapt – is obviously related to the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement which state that “the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member”. The same article concludes that therefore “only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions” (IBRD Article IV section 10). The effect was that the concept of governance became complementary with an allegedly politically neutral methodology for economic reform. Consequently, it also meant that the more technical-sounding the recommendations and interventions were, the more publicly justifiable they would be (Jenkins, 2002; Kapoor, 2008). ‘Governance’ became a collective term for techniques of coordination, efficiency, accountability and administrative-managerialism. The seemingly objective and universal undertone (also symbolized with the adjective ‘good’) could be used to invite judgment on how a country, a region, a city or an agency should be governed (Doornbos, 2001). Judging by this discourse, good governance was no more than a form of technical assistance along the lines of the instrumental logic of the market. In short, it was seen as a set of principles that could be applied to any country anywhere in the world; a simple manual to deal with the challenges and – even more so – the opportunities of globalization. Consequently, there is an extensive body of literature on governance that takes contemporary globalization for granted, and subsequently, also “takes it for granted that the political and social cleavages between those who profit from globalization and those who do not can be bridged by ‘modern’ or ‘good’ governance” (Lemke, 2007: 57). In the case of Morocco, the works of Ali Sedjari (2008) and Mostapha Fikri (2005) are salient examples. “In this view”, Thomas Lemke argues, “poverty and wealth have nothing to do which each other, and economic growth, ecological considerations, political democracy, social solidarity, healthy living

54 The World Bank distinguished four main areas of governance: improving public sector management (the institutional capacities to manage the economy and deliver public services), accountability (holding public officials responsible for their actions), the establishment of legal frameworks for development (i.e. the rule of law and independent judiciary), and finally improving transparency (free access to information and transparency of government procedures) (Ibid, 1992; see also Kapoor, 2008).

etc. appear to be equally achievable – without radically changing established political and social structures” (Lemke, 2007: 57).

As such, the concept of good governance fails to capture the seemingly paradoxical and simultaneous existence of poverty and wealth as part and result of the same order (i.e. the current capitalist order). It fails to think poverty and wealth together (as part of the same whole), which is, in contrast, an important feature of critical theory and dialectical thinking (Groys, 2009). David Harvey’s conception of the “geography of uneven development” attempts to uncover that seemingly paradoxical capitalist logic (Harvey, 2006). From his point of view, and that of many other critical thinkers, the relation between capital and power, and more particularly class power, helps us to understand this paradox. Yet, relations of power, exploitation and domination are totally absent from the good governance discourse. Instead, a governance perspective would argue that poor people are not rich yet. Those who do not profit from globalization are, in other words, just “lagging behind”. Poverty, in this view is an unfortunate phase. If countries, regions, cities, etc. were to seize the opportunities of globalization, the good governance guidelines would provide the necessary technocratic methodology to increase their chances (or so it is claimed). This narrative on globalization is exactly what Massey describes as an a-spatial narrative. It is an important component in the continuing legitimation of the view that there is only one particular model of development and only one path to modernization (Massey, 2005: 84). Poverty and wealth are situated as merely different stages on the timeline of history. The potential differences between the cultural, political and economic trajectories of Morocco and other ‘developing’ countries are occluded and reduced to something irrelevant when it comes to applying good governance. As such, the promotion of good governance has an “anti-political effect”, because the seemingly neutral and technocratic discourse that underpins it, does not allow the role of the promoter (e.g. the World Bank) to be formulated as a political one (Ferguson, 2006). By reducing reform to a technical problem, the concept of good governance is a means through which the question of reform is depoliticized (Ibid.: 273; see also Lemke, 2007). In reality, however, the final intentions are very political. Good governance is a metaphor for an ideal type of Western-style liberal democracy. The key aim is to import specific state-market relationships that are characteristic for Western liberal capitalists systems (Doornbos, 2003: 6).

In addition, the concept of good governance also conveys a moralistic tone, implying not only that Third World countries have ‘bad’ governance, but also that other countries, more specifically the Western countries, are the model of good governance. The international or Western donors are then the arbitrators of what is good and bad (Kapoor, 2008: 30; see also Rose, 1999). And even if the use of the specific concept of good governance may be on the decline lately, the more general discourse on governance still carries the same stigmata (Ibid.; Doornbos 2001). Consequently, the political question of how to deal with globalization is pushed into the background while contemporary issues of government are now played out in the “moral register” (Mouffe, 2005). Instead of a political struggle between ‘right- and leftwing’ visions on globalization we are now faced with a struggle between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, between good and bad governance.

56 I will come back to the issue of uneven development later in this chapter.
Politics are reduced to a moral engagement.\textsuperscript{57} This moral register is also incorporated in the post-political perspective. It tries to overcome pluralism and political antagonism in the public sphere (ibid.). The overall problem with this perspective is that it envisages some sort of consensus politics “beyond hegemony” and as such overlooks the fact that “since power relations are constitutive of the social, every order is by necessity a hegemonic order” (Ibid.: 106). Consequently, it is the task of critical theory to expose the hegemonic forces behind the project of contemporary globalization. And “neoliberalism” is the collective term by which these forces are often described.

\textit{Neoliberalism: a political perspective on reform}

Neoliberalism, as a form of economic policy, is generally described and characterized by free trade and market liberalization, deregulation, fiscal discipline, privatization and commercialized social programs (Grimson, 2008). It is considered as a modern variant of classical liberalism centred on the belief – or at least rhetorically – that the self-regulating capacity of the market would entail the need to restrict the power and influence of state bureaucracies (Radice, 2008). But reducing the notion of neoliberalism to a narrow understanding of free-market policies would be to deny – similar to the rhetoric on good governance – the implicit political character of neoliberalism. From another point of view, and in contrast a very political one, anti-globalist discourses see neoliberalism generally as a code word for America’s overwhelming power and imperialist ambitions. Through its control over the World Bank and the IMF, the United States are considered to be dictating the rules of the game everywhere in the world. Especially in the 1980s and the 1990s, a lot of Third World countries were pressured to adopt new regulations and reforms to open up their markets for American – and by extension Western – capital and goods. Nowadays, so-called Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Partnership Agreements are seen as the political instruments that carry out Western neo-colonialism and testify the latter’s continuous imperialist ambitions. Additionally, since the invasion of Iraq, critics pinpointed and warned us that the US would not refrain from military intervention in order to secure important oil reserves for its own interests and those of its own major oil corporations. In contrast to the above mentioned, more classical (free-market, minimal state) view on neoliberalism, this view relates neoliberalism very much to state power. Both views are true to a certain extent, but the reality is of course more complex. Before elaborating on the specific role of the state and the formation of actually existing forms of neoliberalism, I want to highlight briefly how neoliberalism came into being and what its specific political character exactly is.

The ascendency of neoliberalism originated out of a critique on Fordism and later Keynesianism through the works of Friedrich Hayek and then Milton Friedman. The latter taught at the University of Chicago and became the face of the notorious Chicago School (Peck & Tickell, 2007; Klein, 2007). Neoliberalism can essentially be considered the next stage in the worldwide capitalist development. A stage in which the spread and the consequences of the capitalist mode of production are becoming ever more global and have the tendency to displace all pre- or non-capitalist social relations. Around the turn of this century, the vast majority of the world population had been integrated into the capitalist system and into capitalist production relations. William

\textsuperscript{57} I indebted to Chris Parker for this insight.
Robinson points out that this vast process of increasing commodification of social relations is expansionary in a double sense (Robinson, 2004: 6-7). First of all, capitalism has known an “extensive enlargement”. Imperialism and colonialism have spread capitalism around the world in the 19th and 20th century. This process culminated with the end of the Cold War. Especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, very few countries in the world remained outside of the system of world capitalism. Global capitalist forces played a crucial role in the geographic spreading of capitalism and the integration of ever more countries in this global system (if necessary through war). Secondly, the process of commodifying social relations has also been deepened, especially during the last three decades. Specific sectors and human activities that were previously located outside the space and logic of capitalist production are increasingly brought into it. For example, public services such as health care, transport, education, garbage collection, postal services and the provision of primary goods like water and electricity are being – fully or partly – integrated into the capitalist logic. This is what Robinson calls the “intensive enlargement” of capitalism.58

This intensive enlargement of capitalism involved not only the increasing marketization of social life. It has also generated and assembled new ways of thinking and new methods of (self-)government into a broader art of government embedded within a neoliberal governmentality (cf. Rose, 1999; Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008). This particular view on neoliberalism – to be elaborated more specifically in the fourth chapter – is based on the works of Michel Foucault and draws attention to the specific processes by which the conduct of populations are not only governed by agencies, institutions (e.g. the state apparatus), and so forth, but also by discourses, norms, identities and specific techniques for the disciplining, regulation and even self-regulation of people (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). Power is central in this perspective. Understanding neoliberal governmentality requires the understanding of the mechanisms and impact of power. Yet, power, in this view, should be understood more in terms of methods and not necessarily in terms of its institutional forms (Mitchell, 2006). Also, from a Foucauldian perspective, the effects of power should not only be described in negative terms, as if power only oppresses, punishes, excludes or censors. Power is also a productive force (Foucault, 1979). It produces, via different techniques, discourse and norms, a certain socio-spatial ordering. As such, the study of governmentality tries to draw attention to the productive power in the creation of calculable and governable subjects and spaces. It focuses on the methods and power which bring people so far as

58 In Third World countries, governments were/are under pressure to privatize their public assets in order to keep state budgets and deficit spending under control. These reforms often coincided with considerable social costs. State subsidies on primary consumption goods – one of the essential features of the developmental state’s social contract in many Third World countries – had to be reduced and this affected the poor populations the most. In Morocco, for example, the distribution of water and electricity in the biggest cities was allocated to the French multinationals Suez (in Casablanca) and Veolia (in Rabat, Tangiers and Tetouan). This allocation has been arranged via public-private partnerships at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. As a result of the rising prices of water and electricity, the public-private contracts provoked considerable popular protest actions, especially between 2006 and 2008. The movement “contre la cherté de la vie” (against the expensiveness of life), for example, gained momentum in those days with several organized sit-ins and protest actions (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). Since my last visit to Rabat in the spring and summer of 2010, Veolia now also provides almost all bus transportation within the city. Yet, the negotiations leading up to this concession were equally followed by several (more or less spontaneous) strike actions by disgruntled bus drivers who feared to lose their jobs.
to eventually regulate themselves and perceive themselves as moral subjects (Kenis, 2010). More specifically in chapter 4, I demonstrate how biopower, besides other forms of power (e.g. class power), was essential to the intensive enlargement of capitalism in Morocco, especially when it came down to the attempt to integrate the urban poor into the capitalist market.

Since the turbulent 1970s and the worldwide economic recession, this double process of capitalist enlargement has taken on a new dimension. The strong recession of 1973, exacerbated by the oil shock and the Arab-Israeli war, demonstrated the increasing inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism and capital accumulation (e.g. the contradictory power relation between capital and labour) (Harvey, 1990). Fordism-Keynesianism was a model of accumulation essentially based on the (limited) re-distribution of wealth and a national state-supervised class compromise between the capitalists and the labour force (Robinson, 2004). This compromise between capital and labour was the result of the early 20th century class struggles and was based upon the premise that national governments would try to overcome crises, assure long-term growth and development, and stabilize capitalist production by intervening in the processes of production and distribution via deficit spending, regulation, taxation and re-distribution. As such, it gave individual states extensive control over capital outflows and considerable liberty to determine their fiscal and monetary policies (Harvey, 2003). This has lead to the rise of the social-democratic welfare state in Western countries and the developmentalist and populist states (based on import-substituting industrialization) in the Third World (see also Amin, 2003). The emergence of the latter was the result of the wave of de-colonization after World War II and the colonial and post-colonial class struggles. The ascendency of Arab socialism in the 1950s and the 1960s was the dominant equivalent of developmentalism in the MENA-region and it constituted the ideological basis of important and influential political forces such as Nasserism in Egypt and the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq.

The world economic crisis of the 1970s marked the beginning of the end of the political hegemony of Fordist-style regimes of production. One of the problems back then – from the perspective of capital and besides the fiscal crisis of the development state – was the excessive power of the labour force within the Fordist and Keynesianist regimes of production (cf. Harvey, 2003; 2006; 2010a; Amin, 2003; Robinson 2004). The pre-neoliberal context, in which the capitalist mode of production was still very much bounded within national economies, gave considerable powers and possibilities to organized labour to pressure the capitalist class to compromise. The social living

59 Although, both traditions come from a completely different background, the governmentality studies relate in many ways to the Gramscian analyses of hegemony and consent to coercion (on the latter topic see Harvey, 2003; Morton, 2007).

60 What follows is a brief discussion on the ascendance of neoliberalism. For an extensive and more detailed discussion on neoliberalism and the transition away from its predecessor, Fordism-Keynesianism, I suggest further reading of the works of David Harvey (1990; 2003; 2006; 2010a), Samir Amin (2003) and William Robinson (2004).

61 This crisis of capitalism actually started already at the end of the 1960s when the fading development potential was marked by a general drop in private profit rates (over-accumulation). This has prompted those in possession of capital to either delay further investment decisions or favour those investments that boosted their competitiveness that not necessarily corresponded to the expansion of productive capacities (Amin, 2003: 45).
conditions of individual workers was an important object of struggle and during the first three quarters of the 20th century organized labour won several victories over wage levels and living standards worldwide. Consequently, neoliberalism can be seen as a reaction against this political economic order. Two of the most important effects of neoliberal policy were the disciplining of labour and the liberation of capital from the constraints imposed by Fordism-Keynesianism. As such, the crisis of the 1970s marked the beginning of a period of radical restructurings in the capitalist system and the search for new modes of capital accumulation. First of all, the abandoning of the gold standard as the material basis for money values – resulting in the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s – gave way to the formation of a new global financial architecture which liberated finance capital from excessive state control (Harvey, 2003). This gave much more autonomy to the financial and the banking system. This transition to a new regime of “flexible accumulation” gradually finished with the rigidities of Fordism and rested on increased flexibility within labour processes, labour markets, production processes and patterns of consumption (Harvey, 1990: 141-172). Flexible accumulation privileged finance or investment capital over productive capital as the coordinating power of the capitalist system. Moreover, this shift was facilitated by new technological and organizational innovations (e.g. the emergence of the internet, the mobile phone and improved means of transportation, outsourcing, industrial delocalization, etc.). As in previous epochs of capitalism, the structural crisis and the following (neoliberal) restructuring coincided with a technological revolution that transformed the organizational models of labour and eroded the efficacy, even the legitimacy, of existing forms of working-class or popular struggle and organization both in the capitalist West as in many Third World developmental states (Amin, 2003: 16).

Politically, neoliberal policies really gained their momentum in the 1980s with the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the US. Notions as ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganomics’ became synonyms for the neoliberal restructurings in their respective countries. To a lesser extent, similar market-oriented restructurings were pursued in other European countries and up until today the achievements of the social-democratic welfare states are under severe pressure to be liberalized and privatized. In the Global South neoliberal restructurings were pushed through by the World Bank and the IMF via Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As such, neoliberalism formed an attack on ‘big government’ in the West and pressured developing countries to open their markets for capitalist interests. The hegemony of neoliberalism symbolically replaced that of Fordism-Keynesianism with the adoption of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ in the mid-1990s. This defined and promoted the US- and UK-models of neoliberal government as the answer to the global economic problems (Harvey, 2006: 33). The term ‘Washington Consensus’ – pay attention to the anti-political emphasis on consensus – was used for the first time by the economist John Williamson. It referred to a set of reforms that were broadly supported by Washington-based institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the US government and the Federal Reserve Bank (Mestrum, 2005). From then on, these institutions openly promoted the neoliberal recipe: i.e. the promotion of export-oriented growth; the deregulation of financial markets in order to allow capital to move freely across the globe; the liberalization of trade to break down trade barriers that were put in place by most Third World countries to protect their industries; and, finally, the recommendation to privatize public
assets in order to provide new outlets for capital investment. Although John Williamson and the World Bank have tried, each in their own way, to answer the criticisms on this highly controversial concept, the main message, namely that development must be market-based in order to alleviate poverty and generate wealth, has endured (cf. Burki & Perry, 1998). Countries who do not follow these enduring messages of the Washington Consensus do so, according to the World Bank, “at their own peril” (World Bank, 2010a).

Institutionally, the neoliberal hegemony was established on the world stage through the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Harvey, 2003). In the end, all these events (SAPs, the Washington Consensus and the establishment of the WTO) put pressure on the rest of the world to follow the path down the neoliberal road. This radically altered the process of globalization itself. It is therefore fair to claim that neoliberal globalization differed radically from earlier forms of globalization. In an answer to more sceptical views on globalization, questioning the so-called ‘newness’ of the current dynamics (e.g. Hirst and Thompson, 1996), William Robinson stressed that these sceptics fail to see what is qualitatively new about contemporary globalization.

Departing from a Marxist definition of capitalism, viewing the capitalist system essentially as a production relation, Robinson argues that although the total amount of trade relations may have stayed relatively stable compared to the post-World War II period or even the pre-World War I period, the real changes have occurred within the modalities of production. Therefore, Robinson makes a distinction between the “world economy” of the Bretton Woods era and the “global economy” of the neoliberal era (Robinson, 2004: 6-16; see also Castells, 1994). The transition from a world to a global economy implicated an important change in the capitalist mode of production. In a world economy, the production processes were still largely confined to each country’s national economy (i.e. due to the state’s power to control capital outflow). These national economies were then linked to one another through trade and finance in an integrated international market. In contrast, the current global economy is characterized by the increase of capital mobility and the

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62 Williamson himself rejected the perversion of the term ‘Washington Consensus’ as a synonym for neoliberalism or market fundamentalism (Roy, 2010: 15).
63 For an insight in Williamson’s response to his critics, I refer to an overview of his writings on the website of the Peterson Institute for International Economics: http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=15
64 This didn’t mean that the World Bank did not change its discourse in fundamental ways. Since the late 1990s the Bank adapted its discourse of economic orthodoxy (materialized with the SAPs) and progressed to what some observers called the ‘post-Washington consensus’. Through this shift the World Bank stressed for instance the importance of institutions and institutional reform. This would also be the main argument of the good governance discourse. However, this new focus would not undermine neoliberalism as such, but only demonstrate its transformative character. Critical theory has argued therefore many times that neoliberalism should not only be equated with the roll back of particular forms of institutional control (mainly state forms of control), but also with the support or roll out of important institutions and forms of regulation (e.g. the state and state (re-)regulation) to ensure market-oriented development and protect capitalist interests (see for example Peck & Tickell, 2002). This transformative character of neoliberalism will be discussed more in detail in chapter 3.
65 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argue that the world economy was not more open in terms of total trade and worldwide capital flow compared to the period of the Bretton Woods agreement and the period before the first World War. Put simply, you could say they didn’t really see any quantitative changes in the current phase of globalization compared to the pre-neoliberal era. This doesn’t mean, however, that they failed to recognize some substantial changes at all (cf. Hirst & Thompson, 1996).
liberation of processes of production from nation-state boundaries. In other words, the emergence of the global economy entailed the ‘globalization’ of production processes.

As a result, production systems are now surpassing national boundaries on a considerably much larger scale to become integrated into global circuits – e.g. the manufacturing of individual parts in one country, the assembly in another and the management in a yet another country. Additionally, the increased liberty and mobility of capital has allowed it to search for the most favourable conditions everywhere in the world – e.g. with respect to labour costs, institutional environment, political stability, tax and legal regimes, etc. This has resulted in arrangements such as outsourcing, subcontracting and increased business networks and relations. Morocco, for example, is keen to develop its off-shoring sector to strengthen the country’s position as a potential destination for foreign businesses (mainly targeting Spanish and French capital). By improving the country’s attractiveness and competitiveness in terms of infrastructure, quality of services, human resources and tax legislations, Moroccan policy makers aim to develop offshore zones in cities as Casablanca, Fez, Rabat, Tangiers and Marrakesh. According to the Moroccan authorities, this is supposed to boost Morocco’s GDP by approximately 100 billion Moroccan dirham (MAD) and create 100.000 new jobs by the year 2015. Current prime Minister Abbas El Fassi wants Morocco to become “a magnet for many companies who want to relocate”. The increased mobility of capital also significantly increased both the weight of international financial activity and the emergence and autonomy of multinational corporations has during the post-Bretton Woods era (Peck & Tickell, 2007). In short, what is important for our understanding of the political transformations under neoliberalism is not so much the degree of globalization, which is the dominant focus of some of the more sceptic views, but rather the form of globalization (Massey, 2005: 85).

In his editorial for the renewed New Left Review, Perry Anderson writes that “whatever limitations persist to its practice, neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided across the globe: the most successful ideology in world history” (P Anderson, 2000: 13). In the TV-program ‘Conversations with History’, he continues to argue in an interview with Harry Kreisler from the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, that neoliberalism “has a universality as a core doctrine”. According to Anderson, we can find adepts of this doctrine in every corner of the world. Consequently, despite the fact that neoliberalism is much more than a doctrine, that it is also a technique of government (Ong, 2006), a hegemonic signifier for ‘best practice’ governance (Leitner, e.a., 2007), or a general restructuring strategy (Peck & Tickell, 2007), that manifests itself differently across space (Hackworth, 2007), it is still important to understand the scale of neoliberalism as a global political project. With regard to the Arab region, Aggestam, e.a. (2009) argue that due to neoliberal reforms the political trajectories of Arab political systems are now more alike than ever. Despite the fact

67  1 euro is 11,2 dirham (rate of 16/08/2010).
68  Morocco plans training project in bid to lure offshore investors, article Available at: www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2008/03/28/feature-01, (accessed 28/03/08).
how important it may be to point out and nuance the specific local differences, neoliberalism, as a set of principles of how the market should regulate socio-economic life, risks of being occulted and depoliticized behind so-called ‘softer’ or ‘moderate’ versions of market fundamentalism. Here, Anderson warns us that: “In this sense, adapting Lenin’s maxim that ‘the democratic republic is the ideal political shell of capitalism’, we could say that the Third Way is the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today” (P Anderson, 2000: 7). Moreover, it are the scholars on neoliberal governmentality who convincingly show how neoliberal principles are deeply entrenched in our everyday practices and beliefs and how its political rationality radically breaks with “welfarism” at the level of moralities, explanations, vocabularies and governing methods, even beyond the popular understanding of left and right (Rose & Miller, 1992). Whether in Morocco, Belgium, the UK or many other countries in the world, political actors of the so-called social democratic left contributed to the propagation and implementation of neoliberal policies.

From a critical perspective, in order to fully grasp the political nature of neoliberalism, Harvey’s description of neoliberalism is very insightful. He sees neoliberalism above all as a class strategy. The neoliberal phase of world capitalism should be seen as a period of the “restoration of class power” (Harvey, 2006; see also Amin, 2003). A comprehensive understanding of the notion of class is not that straightforward as it may seem (see also chapter 3). Class is a concept that has been approached from within very different disciplines departing from different traditions. Erik Olin Wright distinguishes three broad traditions which should be integrated together into a more broader understanding of class. First of all, within the “stratification approach”, which is also the most common and popular understanding, class is principally perceived in terms of individual attributes and living conditions. Somebody living in a five bedroom mansion in the expensive neighbourhood of Souissi in Rabat would then obviously be categorized within a different class than the modest shopkeeper living in the more popular neighbourhoods of Yacoub al Mansour or Al Akkari. But the stratification approach comprises more than that. Generally, attributes such as sex, ethnicity, education, social income, religion, geographical location (e.g. the urban-rural distinction), and so on, are also considered factors that can explain certain patterns of behaviour and living conditions. However, what is missing from this approach, is any causal relation between the social conditions of the different classes. In other words, there is no causal connection between the conditions of poverty and wealth.71

A second approach, which Wright calls the “opportunity hoarding approach” (also considered the Weberian perspective), defines classes by their specific access to and exclusion from certain socio-economic opportunities. For example, access to education (the difference between public and private schools) can be explanatory as to why certain social groups have access to higher income jobs than others. The critical difference with the first approach is that the latter sees a causal relation between the economic advantages of one class and the disadvantages of another. For example, higher education

70 For an excellent discussion on the Third Way ideologues and the depoliticized effect of their consensus thinking, see Mouffe (2005).
71 In this approach classes can be ranged from upper classes, to middle classes, to lower classes and finally the underclass (those peoples who’s living conditions are not secure with respect to their most basic needs)
would lose its ‘competitive advantage’ if everyone would have access, so the privilege of having access to higher education, depends to a significant extent on its scarcity. Within this approach class differences can be divided into three broad categories: the capitalists (privileged access to the means of production), the middle class (privileged access to higher education and the acquisition of specific skills), and finally the working class (excluded from either higher education, the acquisition of skills and capital). Here, in the opportunity hoarding approach, relations of power enter in the analysis to explain the conditions of inclusion and exclusion. However, the approach still neglects the relations of power within the activities of the included and excluded.

The third approach distinguished by Wright, associated with the Marxist tradition, integrates mechanisms of domination and exploitation. Marxist understandings of class are therefore relational in both senses, drawing attention to the structuring effect of domination and exploitation on both the conditions and activities of different class actors (E.O Wright, 2009). As a result, (traditional) Marxist perspectives basically make the distinction between two broad categories: those who control the means of production or share a common relationship to the processes of production, and those who have no means of production but sell their labour and produce for the capitalist class. Therefore, classes are constituted on the basis of their polar relationship, which means that one end of the pole is only possible in relationship to the other (Robinson, 2004: 37). In other words, there are no capitalist without workers, just as there were no slave owners without slaves, or lords without vassals in pre-capitalist modes of production. Within this boarder framework, the concept of class can also be used to analyze different groups and their social conflicts within the same class. These class fractions distinguish between different fractional interests. For example: industrial capital, financial capital and commercial capital. Additionally, within a global economy we could also make a distinction between national and transnational fractions of classes (Ibid.).

By following a more integral conception of class strategies, crucial for our understanding of neoliberal politics is its exploitative character and the concomitant relations of power embedded within class relations. Neoliberal reform, whether in Morocco or elsewhere, entailed the increase of capitalist class power over subaltern classes and their social interests – this did not imply, however, that class relations of power replaced all other social relations of power. Additionally, this perspective on neoliberal reform is closely related with a more dialectical understanding of economic development and underdevelopment. As mentioned above both poverty and wealth are interdependent (they are produced and reproduced by the same order) and the result of the same overall logic of power, also in Morocco. This opens up, for example, a radically different perspective on newly launched social development projects such as the Villes Sans Bidonvilles Program (VSBP) and the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH).

As I demonstrate in the following chapters, a program like VSBP is not just any social program to alleviate poverty. To the contrary, it is a particular project that fits perfectly

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72 In chapter 3, I will continue the debate on class by adding another perspective, one that does not look at class from a perspective of mere property control (or even more limited: property ownership), but more broadly as the process of appropriating surpluses. As such, I want to contradict certain perspectives that suggest that a class analysis is not entirely suited to understand the political transformations of the Moroccan case. For now, it suffices to stick to the argument of Erik Olin Wright and William Robinson.
within a neoliberal rationality and, as a result, incorporates exploitative class relations. As a consequence, programs like VSBP fundamentally redefine social policy in Morocco according to free market requirements and should therefore be viewed rather as new frontiers of capital accumulation, than as real sustainable solutions to the pressing socio-economic problems of Morocco (Roy, 2010; see also chapter 4). As a result, these kind of programs are more likely to reproduce social inequality instead of alleviating poverty. Moreover, the specific neoliberal rationality behind a program such as VSBP enables us to link these development projects with other kinds of projects, who – at first sight – seem to have a completely different logic. This is what I tried to do by considering the broader political transformations that are represented by both the VSBP and a high-end urban development project such as the one in the Bouregreg Valley. These two different projects represent two different extremes of a more general project of change. By taking into account the neoliberal logic and the class relations of power that are embedded within these kinds of projects, we can tell a radically different story compared to the dominant a-spatial and ideologically biased narrative of globalization.

The question is then raised by Wright, whether the focus on exploitation and domination doesn’t imply a moral judgment, in contrast to a more neutral ‘scientific’ description (EO Wright, 2009: 107). Wright argues that concepts as exploitation and domination are important because they accurately identify certain key issues in understanding class. I would like to add that not taking into account the neoliberal dynamics of exploitation and domination within the current processes of political change would be – at the least – equally subjective, uncritical or even worse, scientifically incomplete. Furthermore, many accounts on political change in the Arab region have always put emphasis on forms of domination and exploitation outside the capitalist logic: for example, relations of kinship, clientilism, neo-patrimonialism and co-optation. However, especially since the opening of domestic markets for global capital through structural adjustment, these specific types of networks and power relations are more and more intertwined with processes of class formation (cf. chapter 3). Therefore, those contemporary studies that focus on mere endogenous networks and structures of power to explain political change or the lack thereof, are missing an important point. By drawing the particular connections and class relations between the project of neoliberal globalization and domestic processes of political transformation, we can sketch a much more complete and integrated picture of the political mechanisms of exploitation, domination and socio-economic inequality.73

Of course, Harvey’s description of neoliberalism as the “restoration of class power” may have the advantage of bringing political power and agency into our understanding of contemporary globalization, but it also narrows the focus down almost exclusively to the European and North American context. It is obvious that the neoliberal vanguard regimes headed by Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US were important to construct, in the name of economic liberalization, specific capital-centric regimes that were beneficial for an exclusive and very rich minority of the Western

73 There are some insightful analyses which try to bring in “an external dimension” in their analysis of domestic politics (e.g. Cavatorta, 2004; 2005). However, the picturing of some kind of ‘external’ influence neglects the complex interdependency and fusion of class relations beyond national boundaries. Global class relations risk of being pictured still too much as some outside factor that forces itself upon Morocco.
population (Peck & Tickell, 2007). It was also obvious, that these political attacks were meant to break the class compromise of the Keynesian welfare state. Yet, the same form of class power did not needed to be ‘restored’ in non-Western countries such as Morocco. Structural adjustment was not a deliberately chosen option by many political leaders in the Arab region. However, despite the fact that the implementation of neoliberal policies wasn’t a deliberate political choice, Myriam Catusse argues that structural adjustment hasn’t necessarily affected the dominant position of political elites in Morocco:

The social structures of the *ancient regime* have not been weakened by the structural adjustment but have shown themselves capable of adjustment and, in certain ways, have consolidated themselves. The heirs of the great families of the Souss region and of the city of Fez have been able to modernize their activities. Returning from studies abroad in Europe and increasingly in the United States, they are the “golden boys” of a rapidly evolving capitalism who do not hide their success (Catusse, 2009a: 211).

Structural adjustment has not really affected ruling coalitions in many Arab states. The ruling elites in Morocco have adapted to a new reality. What’s more, they helped constructing that new reality. And this was not just a necessary “survival strategy” (Dillman, 2001). As the Moroccan state sold off its economic assets at bargain prices and adopted neoliberal policies, the future of the Moroccan bourgeoisie was well assured (Clément, 1986). Moreover, structural adjustment didn’t affect state power and state control in such a way that it threatened the position of the ruling elites. Quite the reverse, we could speak of a rather smooth synergy between neoliberal restructuring and the more particularly Moroccan institutional configurations and domestic political style of economic exploitation; namely the rule of the *makhzen* (Bayart, 2007: 41-42). Nevertheless, neoliberal reform did create or extend the conditions for capitalist class formation alongside older neo-patrimonial and clientilistic formations of power. It was thanks to the control over the state apparatus and eventually the reformation of that apparatus that these political elites manifested and reproduced their power. At the same time, they gave form to the current process of globalization in Morocco.

**Neoliberal globalization and the state**

Discussions on political change in a globalized world cannot avoid the issue of the state and the conditions of state (re-)formation. Much has been written, of course, on the role and the nature of the state in contemporary globalization. Within critical theory, various authors have dealt with the question of the state and state theory. First of all, various Marxist thinkers have tried to capture some essence of the state in relation to class power. They tried to study the spatial and/or institutional transformation of the state in a globalizing world through the changing relations and constellations of class forces (cf. Poulantzas, 2000; Robinson, 2004; Morton, 2007; Jessop, 2008; Lefebvre, 2009). Secondly, scholars on governmentality, following a more Foucauldian approach, 74 This point is also mentioned by Harvey (2006: 42). In addition we have to remark that Morocco had already some sort of market-based economy before the implementation of a SAP in 1983. So some kind of class formation was already established, especially during the 1970s with the Moroccanization of the economy. This will be discussed more in detail in chapter 3.
have tried to de-essentialize the state as an apparent coherent entity and a-historical actor. They depart from an analytics of government which directs the focus away from specific state institutional forms towards particular techniques, effects and methods of power (cf. Rose & Miller, 1992; Dean, 1999; Mitchell, 2006; Ferguson, 2006; Lemke, 2007; Foucault, 2007; 2008). Finally, critical anthropologists and ethnographers have tried to retrace the state by looking at its multiple, mundane and variegated everyday practices on the ground and the way these practices are being imagined (cf. Gupta, 1995; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Yang, 2005; Ismail, 2006). I am not going to try to match these different perspectives or give my own general theory of the state. Parts of their theoretical arguments will be reflected in the discussion of the particular case studies in chapter 4 and 5. However, what I derive in this chapter from, amongst others, the authors mentioned above, is the particular synergy between globalization and state reformation, and subsequently, since neoliberal globalization is a class project, the close connection between the state and class power.

Many studies on globalization and the political history of modern age can be seen as reflections on the tension between the nation-state and the international dimension (Hibou, 2004a). A very popular perspective, especially in the 1990s, argued that increased globalization implicated a challenge to the sovereignty of the state. This challenge, it was said, would decrease the economic, political and cultural importance of the state. It’s central role would be hollowed out and implicate it’s decline (cf. Strange, 1995; 1996; Cable, 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Schmidt, 1995; Clapham, 2002). This, however, is a misconception. Contemporary globalization has not necessarily led to a reduced sovereignty of the state. A good number of critical scholars have come up with powerful counterarguments. They see the tension between the state and globalization more as a phenomenon of entanglement (Hibou, 2004a.). David Harvey, for example, points attention to the complex dialectic between territorial and capitalist logics of power (Harvey, 2003). Jean François Bayart argues that the state is largely a product of globalization (Bayart, 2007). Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell have emphasized the various ways in which the state has been first rolled back but then rolled out again (Peck & Tickell, 2002; 2007). Béatrice Hibou, finally, refers to the “privatization of the state” to highlight this entanglement (Hibou, 2004a; 2004b). In the end, all these authors reject in some way or another the simple fact that the autonomy of the state somehow decreased in recent decades due to globalization. Or, in other words, that the state would be in some kind of crisis today. In contrast, they argue that what we observe in many – if not almost all – countries of the world, is not so much a crisis of the state, but rather a radical transformation of the specific modes of state intervention.

In order to fully grasp the significance of this dialectic relation between state and globalization, it is important to step away from the image of the state as a coherent entity and a single actor (Hansen & Stepputtat, 2001). Although, the state may still be the most important political entity, this doesn’t mean we should treat it as a unity, static through time and space. As I already mentioned in chapter 1, we should move away from the tendency to consider the Arab regime as an endogenous political force or container (black box), supposedly in control of the state, in order to understand political change. Change will be more likely detected by looking at the government of people and places within specific contexts. After all, as I will demonstrate more in detail in
chapter 5, local places can be agents in globalization (Massey, 2005: 101, see also below). The specific dynamics in these locales have their own specificity and the state is involved in differentiated ways. As a result, different locales can give a different image of the state and the particular modes by which state power is used by political forces. In paying attention to the specific ways in which the local produces the global, we can also differentiate the various and continuously transforming methods and institutions through which the state is (re-)configured. There are different manifestations of state power that all tell a story of how and why the government of people and places has been transformed. The government of the Bouregreg Valley is not exactly the same context in which slums are governed. The state – like neoliberalism – manifests itself differently across space. Therefore, to really see the political changes of the last three decades in Morocco, it is probably more opportune to look at specific methods of governmental intervention and specific manifestations of institutional power and control. Through this approach, the fluidity and constant changeability of state power (and power relations in general), state methods and state institutions can be demonstrated in order to refute rash and false conclusions such as for example the claim that “the reality of power and politics in the Magrheb region [has remained] as it has been since the independence” (Entilis, 2007: 23).

Rethinking the neoliberal state

A common misconception about neoliberal capitalist globalization is that it negatively affects the sovereignty of the nation-state. Especially since the end of the Cold War and the pronouncement of the so-called end of history, the question of what would happen to the state under globalization, gained increasing attention. Many scholars predicted a crisis of the state, and some even announced its apparent end (e.g. Ohmae, 1995). Bayart distinguished three broad explanations that underpinned the beliefs of the doom mongers of the state: trade and economic liberalization, the increasing regionalization of the international system and the increasing numbers of civil wars and ethnic conflicts (Bayart, 2007).

A well-known study that underlines the first premise, is Susan Strange’s book *The retreat of the state*. She based her arguments on a perception of a clear zero-sum game in which processes of increasing globalization and increasing state power are mutually exclusive. From the 1970s onwards, Strange argued, the territorial boundaries of states no longer coincided with the political authority over economy and society. She argues that both the accelerating pace of technological change and the changing market relations have contributed to the decline of state power and the supremacy of markets over states. This supremacy is the result of the power “exercised impersonally by markets and often unintentionally by those who buy and sell and deal in markets” (Strange, 1996: 13).

In contrast, Harvey argues that the struggle for market shares and foreign investments are not necessarily a sign of state decline – i.e. picturing the subordination of the state

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75 Bayart notes that even before the end of the Cold War and the worldwide turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s, the “logic of blocs” during the Cold War had its own impact on the perception of state sovereignty (Bayart, 2007: 47).

76 I am going to focus essentially on the first dynamic (trade and economic liberalization) because the other two dynamics are not really applicable to the Moroccan case (for a further discussion see Bayart, 2007: 29-82).
to some inevitable force of globalization – but rather the proof that state power has been used to improve the conditions for the capitalist class (Harvey, 2006). The struggle for markets has made the rich even richer and the state played a key role in these neoliberal class projects. Reducing these manifestations of class power to the “impersonal power of the market”, not only depoliticizes but also utterly ignores the agency behind the creation and reconfiguration of markets. The specific solutions to the worldwide crisis in the 1970s were not the result of some natural or invisible hand, but the result of political choices. Interestingly, the retreat of the state thesis has been questioned by some scholars of Arab politics, but not from the same point of view. In contrast, they speculated whether economic liberalization would weaken the power of the ruling elites and concluded that market liberalization has not affected the authoritarian durability of Arab regimes (cf. Dillman, 2001; 2002; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004). As such, they also questioned the hypothesis that structural adjustment or economic liberalization would automatically lead to a state’s retreat and a loss of state control. However, in the end, they did not necessarily scrutinize the underlying theoretical premises (i.e. the hypothesis of state decline under globalization), but argued instead that in the Arab region, it was often not the “impersonal competitive market” that determined the allocation of resources but the particular networks and personal relations between political elites (e.g. through clientilism, co-optation, etc.): “The new “rules” [were] either not known, not followed, or [were] bent in order the preserve rents and tap new ones” (Dillman, 2001: 201). Dillman stated that neoliberal economic reforms promoted by the EU could be beneficial over the long term. It was only the current “incomplete implementation” of these reforms that allowed for the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of a few and the continuous domination of the state over the market (Dillman, 2002: 82).

Several critical scholars have tried to give a more nuanced and complex picture of the tension between the state and neoliberal globalization. They didn’t go as far as to predict a retreat of the state, but did distinguish some real challenges to the power and influence of the state as the dominant regulator of capitalist development. They emphasized that globalization was now increasingly regulated by either ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities (Friedmann, 1995; Sassen, 1999; 2003), ‘global networks’ (Castells, 2005; 2007), transnational capitalist classes (Skilair & Robbins, 2002; Robinson, 2004) or even a new global form sovereign power proper to ‘Empire’ that governs the entire world (Hardt & Negri, 2000). While I do not want to discredit the numerous insightful and critical arguments made by these authors on the changing geography of capitalist globalization, they all tend to propose a shift away from the state as the key locus for the regulation of globalization. More specifically, they tend to see globalization as a process that above all confronts and reduces the political autonomy of the traditional nation-state. Of course, I do not want to assert that every state is equally powerful or that there are no pressures on states or state elites to imply certain restructurings and reforms (e.g. the pressure of institutions as the World Bank and the IMF for structural adjustment).

77 Most of the studies do not specifically focus on the arguments of Susan Strange but on the more broader theoretical connection made between democratization and trade liberalization.
78 For a more state-centric and detailed critique on these different perspectives see: on the global cities literature (MP Smith, 1998; Brenner, 1998); on global networks (Hirst, 2005: 21-24); on Empire (Mouffe, 2005: 107-115).
79 Of course, I do not want to assert that every state is equally powerful or that there are no pressures on states or state elites to imply certain restructurings and reforms (e.g. the pressure of institutions as the World Bank and the IMF for structural adjustment).
tion, the emergence of new kinds of transnational networks, etc.) do not necessarily reduce the state’s power but changes the state’s modes of intervention. The extent to which state power is still one of the main authors and enforcers of globalization, rather than being just a passive victim, has been underestimated in most of these accounts (Panitch & Gindin, 2005: 101).

Leo Panitch (1998) gives five reasons why we should not rush into any rash conclusions. First of all, states and state elites do not necessarily lose authority to global or transnational capitalists, but draw them within reach (see also Allen & Cochrane, 2010; to be elaborated more in chapter 5). Secondly, state power is still largely necessary to establish essential infrastructures and juridical conditions of markets and private property. Third, the explicit rules that installed the global neoliberal order, in other words, the rules in terms of capital movements, trade, investment climates, and currency exchange, are still dependent on state regulation. Fourth, in the process of making this neoliberal order, states haven’t withdrawn from the economy, just restructured their relation to it (see below). And finally, Panitch argues that the international (trade) agreements, international treaties, and the establishment of the frameworks and rules through which international agencies and institutions govern, are still forged via inter-state relations. Consequently, the capitalist state, according to Panitch and Gindin (2005), is relatively autonomous, in the sense that capitalist state agencies and state institutions still have the capacities to act on behalf of the system as a whole, while, at the same time, they also depend on the success of capital accumulation for their own legitimacy and reproduction.

The relation between processes of globalization and state formation should thus be seen more as a process of entanglement. In contrast to the argument that the globalization, and more specifically the global flow of goods, capital and technological know-how, would challenge and reduce the political autonomy of the state, Bayart argues that globalization itself is actually the motor behind state (re-)formation. And this was not only true for the post-Bretton woods era. He reminds us, for example, that it was:

well and truly our foundational nineteenth century that implanted the state south of the Sahara as a system of territorial sovereignty that made politics autonomous. Globalization demanded it: the European powers, the United Kingdom first and foremost, passed from an ‘imperialism of intention’ to an ‘imperialism of result’ as soon as they discerned in the absence of centralized political formations one of the main obstacles to investment and occupied by force of arms the regions they had not managed to penetrate economically as much as they would have desired (Ibid.: 76-77).

Consequently, in contrast to the context of the rise of the modern state in Europe, which was associated with the rise of capitalism and could be considered as an organic outgrowth of the processes of social and economic development at that time, the modern Third World state was “not an outgrowth of the society as such, but an imposition upon it from outside, by the colonial powers or other international processes and conjunctures” (Zubaida, 2009: 125-126). Morocco was no exception. To the contrary, the current Moroccan state apparatus originated out of the colonial heritage. Furthermore, in
order to understand Morocco’s current processes of capitalist urbanization and the implication of state power in these processes, some answers can be found in the colonial efforts to urbanize the country. Since the beginning of the French Protectorate in 1912, the first resident general Hubert Lyautey installed a strong centralized bureaucratic state apparatus. But this state apparatus and the concomitant French ambitions also required urban infrastructure. Consequently, Lyautey then further embarked upon an ambitious urban project to foresee the country with the necessary infrastructure for its integration in the economic realm of the colonial system. The impact of this urban project is still discernible today and accounts for many of the contemporary social problems.

Lyautey gathered around him a group of young architects and urbanists, under the direction of Henri Prost, to work out a specific urban design and prepare the country’s integration in the (French) capitalist sphere of influence. The French had basically an open field to pursue their plans. Before the Protectorate, only around 8% of the Moroccan population lived in the original cities, the medinas (Catusse, e.a., 2005). The newly created colonial cities served as urban laboratories to experiment with new forms of urban government that eventually could serve the home country (Rabinow, 1989; Abouhani, 2005). Especially cities as Casablanca and Rabat were subject to the French experiments with avant-garde urbanism (Rivet, 2004: 224). This resulted in the construction of the European city or the ‘ville nouvelle’ next to the historical medinas. The French administration considered the latter unsuitable for proper economic integration. As such, during the colonial period, the subsequent periods of urban planning – first under Prost and later under that other influential French architect and urban planner, Michel Ecochard – were first and foremost driven by economic interests (Rachik, 1994). Planning anticipated the circulation of the automobile and the instalment of industrial complexes (e.g. the port of Casablanca). In addition, the French built railroads and all-weather roads in order to improve the mobility and the transport of goods. Today, by taking a walk through the Moroccan city-centres of Casablanca, Rabat or Fez, one can still clearly see the contrast between the dense medina with its small narrow streets and the European part of the city with its large boulevards, open squares and parks.

The emergence and growth of the Moroccan cities can, on the one hand, be subscribed

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80 Today’s urbanization rate is estimated at 55.1% of the total population (numbers of 2004) according to the Moroccan Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP) (see: http://www.hcp.ma – accessed 20/08/2010).

81 During the Protectorate, the French urban project gave rise to a system of social and spatial segregation, separating the European immigrant population, who were living predominantly in the ville nouvelle, from the indigenous population who lived in the medinas. Janet Abu Lughod (1980) described this system of social and spatial segregation as “urban Apartheid”, referring above all to its ethnic dimension. Despite the fact that this concept has been criticized – because in contrast to South Africa the separation in Morocco was never really absolute and never legally imposed (cf. Rabinow, 1989; Rivet, 2004; Holden, 2007) – Mike Davis (2006a: 139) argues that the problems of many Third World cities today are rooted in colonial urbanism and the projects of ethnic class division. As he stated: “the European empires generally refused to provide modern sanitation and water infrastructures in native neighbourhoods, preferring instead to use racial zoning and cordon sanitaires to segregate garrisons and white suburbs from epidemic disease”. Besides political and economic reasons, demographic, hygienic and cultural arguments were also the basic arguments for this segregation in Morocco. As Prost himself argued: “[Lyautey’s vision on urban planning] included one essential condition: the complete separation of European agglomerations from native agglomerations. The European population centres must be separated from those of the indigenous populations for political, economic, sanitary, and aesthetic reasons, as well as for town planning purposes” (Abu Lughod, 1980: 131).
to abstract global processes (e.g. colonization, the search for new markets). On the other hand, the continuous production and transformation of its urban space, and by extension any other urban space, can also be understood in relation to profound transformations in the mode of production and in relation to class and property (Lefebvre, 1996). As such, Lefebvre emphasized that the city cannot be fully understood without considering the institutions that gave rise to the city and, at the same time, emerged from it. The most important one, of course, being the state apparatus. Hence, it is important to study the processes of globalization in relation to the institutional contexts from which they emerge. In this regard, the Moroccan urban project must thus above all be understood as a colonial state project in a context of increasing globalization. It was through the institutions and technologies of French administrative power, through the colonial state apparatus, that the Moroccan (peripheral) integration in the capitalist market was realized. Eventually, once the French left the country in 1956, this state apparatus was inherited by the Moroccan elites and the entourage of King Mohamed V.

After the independence in 1956, the French had left a strong state apparatus. The necessary infrastructural and institutional means were available for the centralization of state power under Moroccan rule. Moroccan urban and rural elites took over the pivotal positions left by the French, thereby securing economic and political power in the hands of a wealthy domestic minority.82 The monarchy, eager to commit the elites to the new political regime, allowed them to indulge their appetite for wealth accumulation and within a decade, a privileged class had developed with close ties to the throne. Moreover, commercial ties with Europe during the decades before the Protectorate had helped establishing a domestic economic class that had changed their modes of accumulation according to more capitalist principles (Waterbury, 1970: 160-161). This merchant-capitalist class, foremost located in the cities, didn’t rely anymore on war and plundering for the accumulation of their wealth but on commercial activities. Additionally, they relied on the one institution or set of institutions which was capable of serving their interests: the state. The French from their part had great interest in keeping this transition to a post-colonial Morocco as smooth and peaceful as possible. In keeping good relations with the Moroccan elites, the country’s economic dependency from France could be preserved. Frantz Fanon has reminded us that the European powers had every interest in a peaceful transition towards decolonization in order to preserve the economic and political dependence of the Maghreb states vis-à-vis the European powers (Fanon, 1967).

As such, the new independent states and their institutional frameworks remained crucial to determine the level and the specific ways of economic integration. And this remained true during the subsequent period of economic and financial liberalization (Bayart, 2007). Only a few decades later, during the economic crises of the 1970s and the 1980s, SAPs were negotiated bilaterally between the Third World state governments

82 This was also visible in the way residential space in the Moroccan city, especially Rabat, maintained a dualistic structure after the Protectorate. The modern centre, left vacant by the departure of many French officials, was taken over by Moroccan urban elites who had lived in other high status urban areas. In the specific case of Rabat, many of the residential spaces in the modern centre were taken over by the traditional bourgeois from Fez. As such, we can conclude that the socio-spatial segregation of the city was maintained after the independence, although this was rather based on class relations rather than ethnic ones (Findlay, Findlay & Paddison, 1984; see also Abu Lughod, 1980).
and the international donors. These SAPs were the beginning of a radical transformation of the state and again, globalization – this time in its dominant neoliberal form – was the motor behind it. This transition towards more liberalized capitalist economies, via privatization and structural adjustment, was again above all a public policy in order to overcome the financial crisis of the Arab state. Free market reform should therefore not simply be understood as the result of (outside) pressures undermining state policy. In contrast, the reforms that intended economic liberalization should be considered a set of measures “initiated by the state (sometimes in collaboration with international capital) for its own reasons, rather than under pressure from the private sector” (Ayubi, 1997: 161). As I have pointed out earlier, in the case of Morocco, these economic ‘adjustments’ were not only a story of international (imperialist) pressure upon a ‘peripheral state’. The eventual implemented policies also served the political and economic interests of the Moroccan ruling elites (cf. chapter 3).

Throughout the history of capitalist globalization, the national state has thus always played a key role for establishing and regulating the conditions of that globalization, even during the neoliberal phase (Jessop, 2008). Yet, it is undeniable that since the rapid globalization of the production processes, i.e. the emergence of a truly global market economy and the liberation of financial and investment capital, the modalities of state intervention have changed profoundly. Hibou made an important contribution in her work on Sub Saharan and North African states, arguing that contemporary globalization not necessarily leads to the loss of state power but to the redeployment of state power into more indirect modalities of state rule (Hibou, 1998). This phenomenon, which she called the “privatization of the state”, entails a process in which public power entrusts private agents with certain tasks (security, economic functions, etc.). This leads to the privatization of certain domains of sovereign power and coercion (Hibou, 2004b). In other words, privatization should be understood as a new form of state intervention and not so much as a phenomenon that works against the state and undermines its authority. After all, it are those people who control the state that are responsible in the end for the privatization of certain functions, sectors and services. They determine the conditions of privatization:

[...] far from becoming impotent in the economic field, the state is adapting not only to external constraints, but to internal ones also. This adaptation takes the form of privatisation of states, a privatisation that is not so much a loss of control as an option for indirect government, using private intermediaries on an increasing scale. This option is not necessarily a choice (forced or otherwise); it results from the entanglement of multiple strategies and reactions by public and private actors. The privatisation of the state is not synonymous with the domination of private interests and the supremacy of economic causality within it; however, it corresponds closely with changes in relations between public and private spheres and between the economic and the political (Hibou, 2004a: XVIII).

As a result, the privatization of the state entails the continual renegotiation of social power relations between different elites on the field of the state. The coalescence between economic and political positions of power confuses clear conceptual distinctions
between public and private, market and state, and finally between the economic and the political (Hibou, 1998).

The current presence of many French corporations and multinationals in Morocco is a good example. It proves that the regulation of globalization still depends on relations between states, in this case the good relations between the French and the Moroccan state elites. Especially the relationship between late King Hassan II and former president Jacques Chirac was very productive for the interests of French private concerns in the Moroccan economy (Tuquoi, 2006). France was and still is the most important Moroccan trade partner, the primary supplier of foreign direct investments, and one of the most important financiers of Moroccan loans. According to Dominique Bocquet, head of the regional economic office at the French embassy in Rabat, the reason why Morocco is still France’s most important destination for foreign direct investment is because of “the desire of the French public authorities to get the investors to look more in the direction of Morocco, but also [because of] the capacity of the Moroccan authorities to attract [these investors]” As a result, all the most important French banks and insurance companies are present in the Moroccan market. Vivendi, one of France’s biggest multinationals, is the majority shareholder of the largest Moroccan telecommunication company: Maroc Telecom. French companies such as the hotel group Accor are important investors in Morocco’s tourist sector. Other multinationals such as SUEZ and Veolia have signed public-private partnerships (PPPs) with the Moroccan government for the distribution of water and electricity and the processing of waste in the cities of Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers and Tetouan. French companies are also very present in major Moroccan infrastructural projects, such as Bouygues in the construction of the industrial port Tanger Med in Tangiers, and Alstom, a world leader in transport and energy infrastructure, in the construction of the tramways in Rabat and Casablanca and the high-speed train between Casablanca and Tangiers. Only recently, Alstom also won its first contract in the Moroccan wind power market by signing a contract with Nareva Holding for a wind farm in Akhfenir. The latter is a subsidiary of the group Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), the leading Moroccan industrial and financial group. According to Nadia Lamlili, a journalist with the economic magazine Economie Entreprises, the dominance of Alstom in Morocco is due to the diplomatic efforts of current French president Michel Sarkozy.

The growing involvement of (foreign) private actors, Hibou points out, did not entail a loss of state autonomy but a transformation of state modes of intervention. State control is now exercised more indirectly. Consequently, the relationship between the state and the economy should not be seen as a fading one, but rather as a restructured one, in which state apparatuses have reorganized and redefined their role in representing and regulating social actors and markets (Panitch, 1998). Let me give a few examples. First of all, consider the PPPs between the French multinationals Suez and Veolia and the

83 French direct investment in 2008 amounted to 8,1 billion Euros compared to 2,4 billion in 2004. Between 2006 and 2009 the volume of the French investments augmented with 40% (weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 45).
84 Ibid. (own translation; emphasis added).
86 Interview (Casablanca, 05/06/2010).
Moroccan state. Although the state partially privatized important public services such as the distribution of water and electricity, it didn’t give up its political control over that service. The contracts involved usually represent very lucrative markets and the bidding procedures often lacked transparency. It is the *wali* (regional governor), directly accountable to the Ministry of Interior, who decided to award the concessions without necessarily having given all potentially interested investors an opportunity to bid (Denoeux, 2007). Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior still keeps institutional control over price fluctuation and the infrastructural networks (Allain-El Mansouri, 2005). Secondly, the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) is another salient example of the changing modes of state intervention. The CDG, established in 1959, is a financial institution to manage public servant pensions. Today, it has become the largest publicly owned investment bank and a major stakeholder in several urban and regional development programs across the country (e.g. offshore, social housing, the development of new satellite cities (the *villes nouvelles*) and numerous participations in the tourist sector and the industry). The CDG functions as a private investment bank but it is owned by the Moroccan state. Its CEO is directly appointed by the King and thus accountable only to him. Third, the royal family’s grip on the Moroccan domestic market is another indicator of the rather dubious way in which state power is engaged in private enterprise. Through its control over ONA, the monarchy is not only the centre of political power in Morocco. It has established itself also as one of the most important economic actors in the country.

Hibou’s reference to a process of state privatization is therefore crucial to understand the neoliberal dynamic of the state. In contrast to the primary objectives of the welfare state in Europe or the developmental state in the Global South, the fundamental mission of “the neoliberal state”, as it is referred to by David Harvey (2006), is first and foremost concerned with the creation of a good business climate and the optimization of the conditions for capital accumulation. Concerns for employment or social well-being (e.g. social security; health care) come in second place. These latter issues are considered to be dependent on the business climate. It is then believed that the better private business flourishes, the better created wealth can trickle down. The neoliberal state involves the creation of new systems of government that integrate and intermingle state and corporate interests. Through the application of money power, Harvey argues, these new modalities of government ensured the disbursement of surpluses through the state apparatus in favour of corporate capital and ruling class interests. A salient example is the contemporary (re)shaping of the urban process and the promotion of investments in urban renewal as an outlet for capital surpluses (Harvey, 2008: 38; see also below). Furthermore, the privatization of public assets can also be seen as a *state-led strategy* to open up new opportunities for capital investment and stimulate the business climate.

In addition, Hibou also points out that one of the consequences of the privatization of

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87 Interview with geographer Béatrice Allain-El Mansouri (Rabat, 20/09/2007).
88 Only recently, ONA merged with that other major Moroccan Holding, the Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI), to become the absolute dominant domestic private Holding in Morocco. The holding is controlled by the Royal family via the participation of the royal holding SIGER (an anagram of REGIS). ONA/SNI is active in the mining industry, food industry, distribution sector, the financial sector, telecommunications, etc. (See Telquel, n° 418, 3-9 April 2010).
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The state is its de-institutionalization (Hibou, 2004b: 41). Herein lies probably one of the explanations why some authors like Susan Strange tend to see a retreat of the state. However, Hibou sketches here only part of the picture. The changing modes of state intervention are not only resulting in more indirect forms of government and political control, as Hibou argues, but result also in new forms of state institutional government on sub- and supra-national scales.89 In his critique on the ‘global cities’ literature, Neil Brenner argues that the current phase of neoliberal globalization has resulted in the reconfiguration and reterritorialization of the state, rather than simply in the erosion of the state, to create a city-centric capitalism (Brenner, 1998). As a result of this political, geographical and institutional reorganization, the transformation of the state under neoliberalism not only entails a process of de-institutionalization but also its re-institutionalization. Neoliberalism entails a particular kind of statecraft (Parker, 2009). New forms of spatially differentiated government and regulatory arrangements are introduced which transfer the ability to govern political and economic life from traditional state institutions to new governmental arrangements. These arrangements are often – at first sight – not associated with the government or the state. As Brenner highlighted, the urban scale represents the strategic institutional arena in which these contemporary neoliberal forms of government are unfolding. One example is the way in which state power has been rescaled and reterritorialized into “new state spaces”. These state spaces must be understood as new institutional configurations in which political power has been resituated in an attempt to influence the geography of capitalist accumulation (Brenner, 2004). Arrangements such as in the Bouregreg Valley are a salient example. They constitute the new modalities of neoliberal statecraft through which social space is being produced and reproduced by capitalist strategies (discussed in detail in chapter 5).

Conceptualizing the state: the art of government, class forces and state spatiality

On the cover of the 2008 special summer issue of Telquel, King Mohamed VI is pictured in a stylish business suit. The weekly magazine opens with the telling title “L’Etat c’est lui” and asks herself the following question: does the economic boom justify absolute power?90 This particular representation or imagination of the Moroccan state tells a great deal about the specific implication of state power in the economic development of the country. It also tells us something about the specific imagination of the state: i.e. personified through the monarch. It is not my intention to picture the state as the only relevant territorial actor in the project of neoliberal globalization. This would be far too limiting. However, the state is still the political entity that is best able to orchestrate the processes of

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89 The European Union would be a salient example of how individual states now operate on a supra-national scale within a new institutional configuration. In the case of Morocco I will only concentrate on new sub-national institutional configurations.

90 Telquel, n°335-336, 2 August – 5 September 2008. This issue was published right before the global economic crisis.
globalization (Harvey, 2003). In fact, the World Bank recognized that even in societies that are highly market-oriented, only the state can provide the rules to make markets work more efficiently and correct them when they fail (World Bank, 1992: 6). But if the state – as an institution, or a set of institutions – is still this key player in the regulation of global processes: how then do we conceptualize it? What do we mean when we talk about the state and state formation in neoliberal globalization? And how do we understand it’s crucial role in the different neoliberal projects on the ground? These are some important questions that are directly linked to the discussion in the previous paragraphs. The brief presentation of some examples above already pictured the state as a dispersed material force. It is beyond the scope of this research to attempt to formulate a general theory of the state. Moreover, I am not sure whether this would even be desirable. Nevertheless, I do want to touch upon two important issues. First of all, the continual transformation of state, especially under neoliberalism, makes it extremely difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish a single state strategy. The multiplication of actors, the modalities of indirect rule and the processes of re-institutionalization effectively rule out the conceptualization of a single state that acts as an essential unity upon its society in a particular way and embedded in a particular political system (e.g. authoritarian, democratic, semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic). Secondly, drawing on the critique of Foucault, we could ask ourselves if there is not a danger of over-emphasizing the role of the state as an institution in the context of a much broader genealogical evolution towards a neoliberal governmentality? Foucault wanted to step away from all too structural explanations. Instead he drew attention to a micro-analysis of power.

Consequently, following up on this second point, the suggestion follows whether we should not try to abandon the state as a dominant analytical framework and replace this more ‘institutional-centric’ approach with an “analytics of government”? Instead of taking institutions as the point of departure, an analytics of government traces political transformations in new governmental technologies and forms of knowledge which can be embedded, of course, in certain institutional settings (Lemke, 2007). The political transformations should therefore not be automatically attributed to the policies of an autonomous state, appearing as free-standing apparatus from society (Mitchell, 1991: 92). To the contrary, scholars working on governmentality have tried to avoid the trap of state-centrism by focusing on a broader meaning of ‘government’. This conceptualization of government is not necessarily tied to the nation-state (Dean, 1999). For Foucault, the word government did not so much refer to the state as such, nor its institutions, but rather to particular techniques of management and methods of security that take the population as their object (Mitchell, 2006; see also chapter 4). While we have the tendency today, to link the concept of government with the state, Foucault argued that well into the 18th century the problem of government was placed in a more general context: “Government was a term discussed not only in political tracts, but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts” (Lemke, 2002: 50). In addition to the management of the state, the act of governing also related to the management of the household or the family, even to the management of the self. As a result, many people govern: the father governs his family, the superior his convent, the teacher his classroom, the priest his church, and the individual eventually himself. The manner in which the “Prince” governs his state is just a particular mode of government (Foucault, 2007:...
The concept of government incorporates all kinds of techniques, ranging from practices of “governing the self” to “governing others” (Lemke, 2007: 45). Therefore, Foucault warned us not to overstate a certain characterization of the state or to reduce it to a unity, an individuality (e.g. the king), a rigorous functionality, or some number of functions (e.g. the reproduction of the relations of capitalist production) (Foucault, 2007: 109). He suggested that it was not so much the state’s takeover of society that is important to understand contemporary political life, but rather, what he called, the “governmentalization of the state”:

Governmentalization of the state is a particularly contorted phenomenon, since if the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have really become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation, the governmentalization of the state has nonetheless been what has allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and what private, what is and is not within the state’s competence, and so on. So, if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality (Ibid.:109).

Foucault intended to show how the modern state and the modern individual co-determined each other’s emergence, not by limiting the field of power relations to the government of the state but by showing how power relations historically concentrated themselves in the form of the state – without ever being reducible to it (Lemke, 2002: 58). Specific institutions are therefore in a way subordinated to methods and knowledge when it comes to analyzing government. The state is only an episode in government rather than that government is an instrument of the state (Foucault, 2007: 248). As such, for Foucault the state itself is only a specific technique or method of government. Consequently, as mentioned before, government refers to power in terms of its specific methods rather than its institutional forms (Mitchell, 2006: 179). Neoliberal government and neoliberal political transformations are thus much more than just a collection of principles translated through a set of institutions or a set of guidelines to reform those institutions. Neoliberalism, for example, is also intimately tied with the government of the individual. This is the ‘biopolitical’ nature of neoliberalism and this nature determines its characteristic methods, knowledge and rationalities. Therefore, the study of neoliberal governmentality theorizes not only how individuals are dominated and exploited but also how they are controlled more indirectly (e.g. self-control) through certain governmental techniques. The focus is thus on the individual and how he is formed as a subject. The theoretical strength of the concept of governmentality lies in its ability to construe neoliberalism “as a political project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists” (Lemke, 2002: 60). Neoliberal governmentality is then a new form of governmentality, a new way in which people are made subjects: the homo-economicus is turned into an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself in which he is his own capital, his own producer, and his own source of earnings (Read, 2009;

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91 This doesn’t mean that Foucault didn’t deal with the problematic of the state. In fact his lectures of 1978 and 1979 focus on the genealogy of the modern state (see Foucault, 2007; 2008).
This doesn’t mean that Foucault did not recognize the importance of political or governmental intervention to preserve the project of neoliberalism. In the past, Foucault’s approach has often been described as anti-statist but his lectures at the College de France proved his interest with changing forms of statehood and statecraft (Jessop, 2007). Unlike the negative image of the state in classical liberalism (in which the market must be protected from the powerful state), Foucault argued that the market mechanism and the impact of competition promoted by neoliberalism, can only arise if they are produced by the practice of a government (Lemke, 2001). As such, it is above all the analytical departure from the state as an essential unit – in other words the narrow definition of the state as an autonomous policy-making actor claiming control over its territory and interacting with its opponents (e.g. Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985) – that is rejected by most scholars of neoliberal governmentality. In their view, the state cannot be reduced to a free-standing entity, like a proper person, located apart from and opposed to other entities, like for example society (Mitchell, 1991). Furthermore, the governmentality approach rejects the taken for granted separation between the market and the state, or between the state and (civil) society (Lemke, 2002; Mitchell, 2006).

This critique on the conception of the state as an essential unity is something we also encounter within Marxist perspectives that have engaged with Foucault (e.g. Poulantzas, 2000; Jessop, 2008), but also within those perspectives that draw more on a Lefebvrian approach, trying to integrate the concept of space into a broader theory of the state (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; 2009; Brenner, 1999; 2001; 2004; Harvey, 2006). As Lefebvre himself stated:

I find that this is truly a modern fairy tale, to imagine the State facing off against the citizen, both with needs and desires that clash with and confront each other. And this in place of ruthlessly seeking to overcome the fissure between the State and the citizen! The State is treated as a proper personality, facing the individual, with the same characteristics as the individual but on a greater scale. This is the surrendering of political reflection to the State (Lefebvre, 2009: 63).

Interestingly, the governmentality approach, in comparison to these Marxist approaches, equally rejects the “retreat of the state” hypothesis in current neoliberal globalization. Thomas Lemke argues that the notion of neoliberal governmentality indicates that the so-called “retreat of the state” is in fact a prolongation of government, in the sense that neoliberalism encompasses the transformation of politics and the restructuring of power relations in society:

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92 A good example of the homo-economicus is given by Jason Read when he states: “The contemporary trend away from long term labor contracts, towards temporary and part-time labor, is not only an effective economic strategy, freeing corporations from contracts and the expensive commitments of health care and other benefits, it is an effective strategy of subjectification as well. It encourages the workers to see themselves not as “workers” in a political sense, who have something to gain through solidarity and collective organization, but as “companies of one”” (Read, 2009: 30).

93 It is useful to state that both Lefebvrian and Foucauldian approaches were different reactions against orthodox Marxism and an attempt to escape the determinism of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ within French Marxism at the time when the French Communist Party was still a dominant political movement in post-war France.
What we observe today is not a diminishment or a reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors. This encompasses, on the one hand, the displacement of forms of practices that were formerly defined in terms of nation state to supranational levels and, on the other hand, the development of forms of sub-politics “beneath” politics in its traditional meaning. In other words, the difference between state and society, politics and economy does not function as a foundation or a borderline, but as an element and effect of specific neoliberal technologies of government (Lemke, 2002:58-59).

It is obvious that both the governmentality approach and the Marxist ‘spatial’ approach – to be discussed more in detail below, but already mentioned with Brenner’s concept of new state space – emphasize the continuous changeability of the state form. The state is thus not some essence but a process, constantly reconstructed and reconfigured. Yet, there are some important differences (nuances) in the way they approach the state and state power. The first difference concerns the primacy given to (state-)institutions. The attentive reader already noticed that Lemke’s reference to the displacement of state sovereignty resembles Hibou’s conceptualization of the privatization of the state. Hibou also departs from a governmentality approach (Hibou, 2004b). In contrast Brenner – who draws on a more structuralist reading of Lefebvre – warned us not to neglect the important institutional changes that do play an essential role in the production, regulation and reproduction of capitalist spaces (Brenner, 2001). These (new) institutional configurations have a significant effect on the government of peoples and places within and beyond national states. Only the state apparatus can manage space on a grand scale (Lefebvre, 2009: 238). Think about, for example, long term investments into the built environment, the road network, airspace routes, the communications network, etc. As such, Brenner argues that attempts to evade state-centrism (e.g. the state as coherent actor), entails the danger of neglecting the state’s institutional role as a site, medium and agent of globalization (Brenner, 1999). And herein lies the subtle yet crucial difference between both approaches. While Brenner stresses that state-institutions are the motor behind the production of capitalist space and neoliberal globalization, the governmentality approach argues that it is not so much the state (or the state-institutions) that defines and monitors the market economy (i.e. in the form of contemporary neoliberal globalization), but it is the market itself (and the rationalities that arise from it) that becomes the organizing and regulative principle of the state (Lemke, 2001: 200). This last perspective is something we can also retrace in Bayart’s notion of the continual process of state formation as a product of globalization.

The second difference concerns the different conceptions of power. This is closely related to their different perspectives on the state. Foucault himself wanted to avoid a sort

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94 By the lack of a better name I refer to the Marxist spatial approach when I want to refer to writers as Lefebvre, Harvey and Brenner who explicitly integrated space in their analysis of the state. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t important differences in the way these authors integrate the notion of space in their analyses (cf. Soja, 1980).
of schematism that consisted “of locating power in the State apparatus, making this into the major, privileged, capital and almost unique instrument of the power of one class over another”. With this statement he clearly rejected the orthodox Marxism of his time. Yet, he also clearly stated that he was not necessarily rejecting Karl Marx himself (cited in Hunt, 2004: 606). Nicos Poulantzas remarked that Foucault’s attack was “either against his [own] peculiar caricature of Marxism or against the Marxism of the Third International and the Stalinist conception that a number of us have been criticizing for a long time now” (Poulantzas, 2000: 146). Foucault also never really criticized, for example, Althusser’s concept of “ideological state apparatuses” by which the latter did precisely suggest that the state orchestrated more widely dispersed forms of power (Hunt, 2004). Instead of departing from a macro-perspective of the state, assuming that power is appropriated by some centre, Foucault preferred to investigate power from below, exploring the micro-physics of power; the anonymous strategies, the specific form of its exercise, and the very sites where power is exercised over individuals (Lemke, 2002; Jessop, 2008). The study of these micro-physics, as Foucault argued in Discipline and Punish, presupposes that the power exercised on the body was not so much a property but a strategy. Its effects should therefore be attributed to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, etc., instead of being attributed to ‘appropriation’:

In short, this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those ‘who do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that that these relations go right down into the depths of society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes […] (Foucault, 1979: 26-27).

Agamben notes that Foucault constantly sought ways to abandon those analyses of power that explicitly attributed it to some sort of possessor (e.g. a state or a class). Foucault was more preoccupied by the very mechanisms through which power penetrated the very bodies of subjects and determined or impacted upon the government of their forms of life (Agamben, 2009: 12). As such, he did not necessarily wanted to give an explanation of power, or give a face to power, but only explain how power works. Moreover, to Foucault “power was everywhere”, not so much in the sense that it somehow embraced everything but rather that it arises from everywhere (Foucault, 1990: 93). For him, power was an “abstract machine”, present everywhere and prior to its concretization in any particular field. That is why Foucault objected, in contrast to more classical Marxist interpretations, that power had specific roots: e.g. in the relations of

95 According to Foucault, this schematism of locating power in the state apparatus cannot be found in Marx (Hunt, 2004: 606).
96 According to Althusser, the “ideological state apparatuses” were “multiple, distinct, ‘relatively autonomous’ and capable of providing an objective field to contradictions which express, in forms which may be limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms” (Althusser, 2006: 94-95). He contrasted the ideological state apparatuses (e.g. different churches, the family, system of schools, press, radio and television, trade-unions, etc.) with the “repressive state apparatus” which he conceived more as a unity.
production or the social division of labour (Poulantzas, 2000: 68). Power was not situated in a centre or in a position of exteriority, but rather immanent in various types of social relations (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations, etc.): power relations were internal conditions and not superstructural (Foucault, 1990: 94). There was “no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations” (Ibid.:94). Consequently, from a Foucauldian point of view, power should thus not be captured, ascribed to or sought in central points or unique sources of sovereignty such as the state, because power is neither an institution, nor a structure (Ibid.: 93). According to Foucault, power came from below and, as a result, it had a productive effect. This is also exactly why the concept of neoliberal governmentality considers the state and its institutions to be a product of neoliberal rationalities (i.e. in the form of technologies of power emerging from the political rationalities that underpin them), and not the other way around (i.e. neoliberalism as a product of state institutional agency).

In the study of neoliberal governmentality, there is therefore not much primacy given to class, class power and their objective to control state institutions in order to pursue their specific interests. After all, the concept of governmentality implicates that domination always involves the interaction of multiple forms of power (Hunt, 2004). The idea of power concentrated into one locale (e.g. class) did not represent this complexity. The Foucauldian idea that people are under the control of a political and/or economic authority has less to do with their compliance to any administrative centre or its pronouncements, but rather with the effectiveness with which subjects have internalized its meaning (Allen, 2004: 23). It is precisely this perspective on the immanent landscape of power that has been criticized by Marxist thinkers like Stuart Hall. It is Foucault’s agnostic position towards any kind of convergence of power that makes it so difficult to rhyme it with Marxist conceptions of power:

His ‘power’ is dispersed precisely so that it cannot, theoretically, be traced back to any single organizing instance, such as ‘the State’. It voids the question of the economic precisely because it cannot, in his view, be crystallized into any set of global relations – e.g. class relations (Hall, 1980: 67).

The same view can be found in Lefebvre’s criticism. He denounced Foucault’s tenden-
cy to omit the state’s role in producing and maintaining power relations and the capacity of specific state institutions to condense and mobilize power resources and (class) relations (Lefebvre, 2009). And since power was everywhere, Foucault also suggested that resistance was everywhere because resistance could never be seen in a position of exteriority in relation to power (Foucault, 1990: 95). Consequently, according to Stuart Hall, resistance was ultimately a concept without a home because “there is no theoretical reason why it should appear, no accounting for its appearances, and nothing to check its assignment as just another aspect of the ‘positivity’ of power” (Hall, 1980: 67). This is maybe exactly why Lefebvre referred to Foucault as “the ideologue of the system” (Lefebvre, 1996: 25).

Despite the fact that the concept of governmentality successfully shows how neoliberalism is much more (or even something else) than just an ideology generated by the state or a dominant class, how it has become a mentality that can also be retraced in the quotidian experiences of capitalist society, and how it has extended across other social spaces (beyond the realm of the market) to become an image of society (Read, 2009), it would still be a mistake to deny the significance of the very moments of condensation or convergence of power. More specifically, I still think it is necessary not only to acknowledge but also to pinpoint the very class agency behind particular neoliberal projects, especially in the non-Western World.98 By focusing too much on the permeability of neoliberal rationalities in our ‘way of life’, by considering the capacity of these rationalities to determine individual behaviour, something that stretches well beyond the simple capacity and interest of any class project, the risk exists neoliberalism in this view is deprived of its political character. If we don’t consider the use and abuse of class agency and/or other dominant social forces and the ways in which they appropriate neoliberalism as an ideology, as a restructuring strategy and as a general political project, than we risk to depoliticize neoliberalism. It is this very political character, captured so vividly in the more utopian nature of Lefebvre’s work, the possibility and capacity to distinguish between friend and enemy (to use Carl Schmitt’s (2001) characterization of the political), that potentially gives a home to resistance (and distinguishes this perspective from for example the notion of good governance). That is exactly why the two different perspectives on neoliberalism (Marxist and Foucauldian) are compatible. Not in the way that they can be thrown together into one overall theoretical framework, but in the way they tell something about each other’s departing positions. In the end, it is important to realize that Foucault reacted against a particular kind of Marxist orthodoxy and not against the theoretical assumptions of Marx himself.99

According to John Allen, the whereabouts of power shouldn’t be confronted and locked into a binary logic that forces us to choose between either a centred view (power is lo-

98 By acknowledge, I mean that Foucauldian approaches do not necessarily deny the existence of class agency, they just do not use class agency as central tenet in their analyses.
99 Thomas Lemke opens for example one of his articles with a telling quote from Foucault: “I often quote concepts, texts and phrases from Marx, but without feeling obliged to add the authenticating label of a footnote with a laudatory phrase to accompany the quotation. As long as one does that, one is regarded as someone who knows and reveres Marx, and will be suitably honoured in the so-called Marxist journals. But I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people are incapable of recognizing Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who doesn’t quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, does he feel it necessary to quote Newton and Einstein?” (cited in Lemke, 2002: 49).
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cated in certain institutions) or a decentred view (power is everywhere). Neither a mere “centred or a decentred view of power is particularly helpful in terms of understanding the spatial trappings of power” (Allen, 2004: 19). While the concept of governmentality directs our attention to the contingency of the event and the underlying powers (rationalities, techniques, dispositions, etc.) that disperse it, Marxists interpretations point to the very processes through which power, exploitation and domination become condensed in specific sites and institutions from which struggles can arise (Hunt, 2004).100 Marxist critiques on neoliberalism have focused on the question why the neoliberal project spread around the world and emphasized the crucial role of class agency in this spread. Especially in the so-called ‘developing world’, where neoliberal governmentalties have not yet fully penetrated every aspect of social life, class power reveals that very attempt.

Both conditions (governmentality and class power) thus produce and reproduce each other. As the market-logic increasingly regulates social and political life around the world, this regulation is made possible by institutions and class agency. While new institutions may arise from new forms of regulation and the rationalities that underpin them; they will, in turn, re-regulate and re-produce capitalist spaces. This continuous process of re-regulation and re-production will be, in a way, constrained by the very range and logic of earlier established institutions. Just as power stretches beyond class relations, it will be captured and mobilized by these class relations to be used in their interest. What the consideration of both perspectives clarifies is that there are centres of political, economic and cultural power, but that these centres are rarely a concentration of all powers (Allen, 2004: 24). The current dialectic between class power and neoliberal governmentality is the reason why the hegemony of neoliberalism is so powerful. And maybe, because it has become so global (to the technological innovations, the globalization of the production process, etc), the neoliberal hegemony has become more powerful and more encompassing (but never completely) than earlier configurations of capitalist hegemony. It is this very ‘globalness’ (to the extension that it subjectifies and universalizes the homo-economicus as an entrepreneur all over the world) that has increased the possibilities for the repression and domination of potential homes of resistance and contestation.101

It is this globalness that multiplies the possibilities and opportunities for the formation of new forms of actually existing neoliberalism and their scattering around the world in the form of new modalities and rationalities of government. It is thus the very entanglement and interrelation between contingency, mentality and class power on a global scale that makes neoliberal hegemony so durable (but of course never indefinite!). Even if the recent worldwide financial and economic crisis has put into question some of the macro-economic dynamics of neoliberalism (e.g. speculation), it has not yet put into question the way the market regulates (or needs to regulate) everyday life. To conclude,

100 This distinction between governmentality and the (Lefebvrian) Marxist approach is of course a pure theoretical approach. It is not my intention to say that there is no overlap between these perspectives among scholars who follow a more Foucauldian approach (e.g. Lemke) and scholars who follow a come from a Marxist approach (e.g. Poulantzas and Jessop).
101 Yet, at the same time we could say that, today, more people than ever resist capitalism in some way or another.
I want to share a final thought on why both critical approaches to power are complementary. It is not because we acknowledge that ruling class agents, and their strategic positions in society, are profoundly determined, legitimized and very often also generally accepted through rationalities, ideas and mentalities with genealogies that stretch far beyond and overrule the rather simple objective observation that these class agents accumulate capital at the expense of subaltern social groups and classes in society; in other words, it is not because we realize that class power is not so much possessed as it is exercised as an effect of the strategic position of certain classes in society (Foucault, 1979: 26-27), that we should all at once deny the fundamental political problem of class agency and class strategies. To the contrary, Foucault’s insights on governmentality – and because of the extensive global reach of contemporary neoliberal governmentality – precisely suggest and explain why the “strategic positions” of the capitalist classes are so powerful, and why any thorough political revolution will be extremely delicate, fragile and difficult. Because it needs not only to remove the ruling classes from their strategic positions, it also has to abolish the very rationalities, ideas and mentalities that has put them in these positions in the first place (therefore any political revolution maybe has to coincide also with a psychological revolution). Within critical theory, we have to not only pinpoint the very politics in neoliberal globalization (the class strategies), but also try to understand why and how class strategies and class positions have become the “normal state of affairs”. The fact, for example, that the good governance discourse utterly denies or ignores the political dimension cannot just be ascribed to a deliberate act or even a (global) conspiracy. The root problem situates itself much deeper; as mentioned, within the very ideas, rationalities and beliefs of people.

But let us return to the question of the state. If the state is this key institution in the regulation of globalization, it is crucial, as I mentioned, not to present it as “the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (Abrams, 1988: 82). In other words, the discussion above has provided the arguments to avoid state-centrism (i.e. the reification of the state as an essential unit). The state should be seen a complex phenomenon. The understanding of this complexity should than by followed by two simple questions. First, who makes the decisions? Secondly, where are these decisions made? The first one relates to the issue of class, the second to the issue of state spatiality. I argued above that neoliberal globalization is connected to the political ambitions of the capitalist class worldwide (how dispersed and contradictory specific class strategies may be in the end). But if neoliberal globalization is related to a class project, and if the state is a key player in the regulation of that globalization, then this would entail that state power is closely tied to class power. Although I intend to come back to this question in the next chapter, it is opportune to outline some first arguments here. The association

102 As such, it remains to be seen whether the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt – just like the Eastern European revolutions in the past – will improve the conditions of the subalterns in the long term. And although he class nature of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were highly obvious, it is probable that genuine democratic reform would still reproduce – to a certain extent – similar class hierarchies.

103 The question is whether we can relate the Moroccan state to capitalist class power and class struggle in the Marxist connotation of the concept? I will argue in chapter 3 that since the 1970s, and especially since structural adjustment non-capitalist relations of power and rule are increasingly extended, complemented and replaced with capitalist class relations. Furthermore, some scholars, like for example John Waterbury, have criticized the use of the concept of class and class analysis (cf. Waterbury, 1991). As I will discuss, these authors make the mistake of viewing class too much as a rigid sociological concept while it should be
between state power and class power rejects, first of all, the traditional liberal-pluralist image of the state as a neutral institutional framework for the articulation, organization and implementation of societal interests (Brenner, 2001). Just as globalization is not an a-political process, the state apparatus is not an a-political arrangement. The role of the neoliberal state, privileging the creation of a good business environment and the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) over the social well-being of its citizens, is related to the political decisions and interests of a dominant class or dominant class fractions. As a result, the state itself can be seen as a strategic site for the organization of the dominant class in its relationship to the dominated classes (Poulantzas, 2000: 148). This relationship is defined by struggle. The state is thus a site that represents the current condensation of social forces that manifested itself through struggle (Ibid.: 150). It was through struggle that the capitalist class and class fractions have restored/formed their power during the transition from the Keynesian/developmental state towards the neoliberal state.

From this point of view, Adam David Morton emphasizes the importance to include ‘foreign’ class actors into the discussion on the state. He argues that the globalization of the production process and the emergence of a global market induced the formation of particular state forms through which a process of internationalization between different fractions of classes could occur (Ibid.: 132). As such, Morton stresses that foreign capital and foreign class interests should not necessarily be presented as autonomous forces outside and beyond the power of the state. These international connections between social forces are converging within the constitution of the state apparatus. Foreign capitalists are drawn within reach (Panitch, 1998; Allen & Cochrane, 2010). The Bouregreg Valley in Morocco is a perfect example. Both foreign capital coming from Abu Dhabi (via the company Al Maabar) and the Moroccan state agency that coordinates the project are conjoined in the Bab al Bahr Development Company. This joint venture is responsible for the coordination and development of the first stage of the Bouregreg project. It also represents a space where state power is (re-)negotiated between domestic and foreign elites. It is thus important to stress that this internationalization of class interests and class connections doesn’t mean that neoliberal state forms have become simple “transmission belts” from the global to the national, or simple local servants for global market interests (Morton, 2007: 133). Despite the fact that the state is intimately interwoven with the logics of globalization, David Harvey, who draws on Giovanni Arrighi, reminds us of the dialectical interplay between the ‘territorial’ and the ‘capitalist’ logics of power. The capitalist investor will look for profitable outlets as long as these outlets generate more capital. If capital is free to move around the globe, the capitalist will pay little attention to geographical boundaries for his investments. In contrast, politicians and statesman seek ways to augment their own power vis-à-vis the power of colleagues in other states:

used, according to my view, more as a political concept.

104 With this notion of the ‘internationalization of class interest’, Morton (2007: 140-145) also argues against a particular interpretation of the state in “global system theory” which stresses that the current epoch of globalization not only leads to the transformation of the state but also to its supersession as an organizer for capitalism by transnational state apparatuses consisting of transnational class alliances (e.g. multinationals, capital investors, cross-national mergers, forms of outsourcing and subcontracting, etc.). (For a discussion on the formation of the transnational state see: Robinson, 2004; see also Sklair & Robbins, 2002).
The capitalist seeks individual advantage and (though usually constrained by law) is responsible to no one other than his or her immediate social circle, while the statesman seeks a collective advantage and is constrained by the political and military situation of the state and is in some sense or other responsible to a citizenry or, more often, to an elite group, a class, a kinship structure, or some other social group. The capitalist operates in continuous space and time, whereas the politician operates in a territorialized space and, at least in democracies, in a temporality dictated by an electoral cycle. On the other hand, capitalists firms come and go, shift locations, merge, or go out of business, but states are long-lived entities, cannot migrate, and are, except under exceptional circumstances of geographical conquest, confined within fixed territorial boundaries (Harvey, 2003: 27).

The territorial logics of power thus make up the political, diplomatic and security strategies used by state elites. The capitalist logics of power involve strategies of production and investment, commercial exchange, labour conditions, migration, etc. These two logics converge in numerous occasions as state elites, for example, attempt to create favourable business conditions to attract capital inflow. In doing so they are using the monopoly powers of the state to try to offer exclusive privileges to whoever can take advantage of them (Ibid.: 107). As such, class or other forms of alliances emerge between ruling elites and capitalists for reasons of economic growth, foreign pressure, local bourgeois pressure and/or global market integration. But territorial logics can also work against capitalist logics. Obvious reasons are domestic political stability and security concerns. In the case of Morocco: the subsidy of consumer goods, the hiring of unemployed graduates under pressure of their protests, the protection of local bourgeois interests, the protection of domestic economic sectors, the toleration of the informal market are a few examples (although these last three have also their own capitalist logics). Consequently, the two logics are distinctive and in no way reducible to each other, but at the same time they are intimately related and interwoven (Ibid.: 183). This dialectic perspective of Harvey contrasts sharply with the point of view of Susan Strange who thinks that “political causes and economic causes are as incommensurable as apples and oranges, and so are political and economic outcomes” (Strange, 1996: 28).

Then the question remains: where are political decisions made? “Is not the secret of the state, hidden because it is so obvious, to be found in space?”, as Lefebvre (2009: 228) wonders. One of Lefebvre’s major contributions was to bring attention to the question of space and the political character of the production of space. According to Lefebvre, the production of space was inherent to the mode of production (Lefebvre, 1991). Each mode of production had its own produced space (Lefebvre, 2009: 234). Lefebvre

105 The unemployed graduates mobilize and protest almost daily in front of the national parliament to claim their right to be employed in the public sector. These movements have emerged since the beginning of the 1990s (see also chapter 3). Through negotiations between state officials and protest group leaders many of them eventually find their way into the public sector after months, even years of protest (see Emperador, 2007; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011).

106 It is important to note that Lefebvre does not see this relation as absolute. The characteristics of produced space cannot be reduced to the general characteristics of the mode of production. Neglecting the impact of other phenomena (culture for example) or subordinating these phenomena completely to the
made a distinction for example between produced spaces of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. As such, within the contemporary city we can still find remnants (monuments, buildings, etc.) of previous modes of production (whether or not appropriated by the current mode of production). But also within the different stages of capitalism, variations within the mode of production are related to variations in produced space. The neoliberal mode of production, characterized by the globalization of the production process and the deregulation of capital restrictions, has had its own impact on the production of space (e.g. the impact of financial speculation on the built environment, but also the specific spatial imagination of the global city). This process of the production of space should thus be considered as a very dynamic process. However, space has been often considered by many as a-political because it is conceptualized as a seamless whole (Massey, 2005: 41). In other words, space has been considered more as a fixed moment, an immobile moment, a picture that captures a dynamic time-process.

Yet, when space is reduced to a stasis, then, Massey argues, the “very life, and certainly the politics, are taken out of it” (Ibid.: 30). A more dynamic perspective on space, and especially its inherent connection to social relations – for Massey social relations can only be fully understood when they are spatialized – is crucial to locate manifestations of state power. If the state is a strategic site for the organization of certain configurations of social relations, and if you consider space as dynamic, open and relational, than understanding state spatiality obliges us to see the formation of the state as an ongoing, continual and dynamic process that can be retraced both in time and space. So, besides the impact of particular modes of production on space (and vice versa), we should also pay attention to the ways in which state power moves through space. Political transformation should therefore not only be considered in time, which is the dimension of change, but also in space, which is the dimension of the social and the contemporary co-existence of contradictions and polar opposites (Ibid.). As such, the politics of the state can be heterogeneous, contradictory and coeval. In this view, the state itself turns out to be this heterogeneity in space. From an institutional perspective, Tim Bunnell and Neil Coe, drawing on Brenner, have dubbed this reality the “spatial selectivity” of the state, i.e. the ways in which certain policies and reforms impact on particular groups of people in particular zones and spaces (Bunnell & Coe, 2005). The state has diverse and distinct spatial imprints, it takes on different forms in different places and this is an ongoing process. It produces a variety of institutional and governmental arrangements that in turn produce quite different results on the ground. Mapping the spatialization of the state gives us the opportunity to gain insight in the multiple, co-existing state forms and its specific configurations of social relations. The creation of new state spaces, economic would be a mistake.

107 Massey argues that space and time should be thought together. Additionally Both Massey and Lefebvre stress that space is a social product that is open, ongoing and always unfinished, relational and multiple. Space is thus an ongoing production. Consequently, new modes of production are not constructing entirely new spaces from scratch, but built on existing spaces. That is why Edward Soja talks about a socio-spatial dialectic. The political organization of space can express certain social relations but at the same time space reacts back on the evolution of these social relations. As such, according to Edward Soja, space is not only the product of the social, but produces it as well (Soja, 1980).

108 One of the effects of neoliberal globalization is exactly the discrepancy between the spatialization of the state and the state-image. The latter pictures an illusion of coherence, and in Morocco’s case, even an association with a proper personality (the king) (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Bogaert & Emperador, 2011).
free trade zones, offshore islets and other state projects spread within the geographical boundaries of the nation-state have led to the displacement of state sovereignty in multiple locations. In chapter 5, these issues of state-spatiality will be discussed in the context of the project of the Bouregreg Valley.

**Actually existing forms of neoliberalism**

I discussed the political character of contemporary globalization and the specific role of the state in the regulation, production and reproduction of that globalization. But neoliberalism is not just this one policy framework that is applied in every local context in the exact same way. Of course, we see that there are certain kind of principles and political strategies that are applied almost everywhere in the world. As a result, it becomes possible to compare different places with one another, no matter how far off they are located from each other, or how different they are (culturally, socially and politically). New majestic urban development schemes are implanted in the whole Arab region, just as in the whole world, following the same competitive urban logic. In the case of the MENA-region, Dubai has become an extreme example and similar developments in the rest of the region are often compared to this “Dubai model” (M Davis, 2006b; Kanna, 2009; Barthel, 2010). Furthermore, social development programs, for example slum upgrading programs, follow the same kind of market-oriented logic in Morocco as in India and other parts of the globe (Davis, 2006a; Huchzermeyer, 2008; Roy, 2010; see also chapter 4). Yet, it would be too limited, even wrong, to focus only on the similarities between different places and local settings and consider them all part of some globally unified system. This would imply some (extreme) kind of ‘reversed exceptionalism’. Neoliberalism is thus not some ‘one size fits all’ model or concept. This would mean to neglect local agency in the globalization of politics and the historic specificity of local contexts. As mentioned earlier, there is an overwhelming tendency to consider local politics and the production of (local) space as a product of the global, as if the local is somehow subordinated to the global (MP Smith, 1998; Massey, 2005). Local places and local politics are than often pictured as the victims of the ‘natural’ process of globalization. According to Massey, this picture is problematic for two reasons. First of all, it propagates an implicit understanding of the global as a sphere that is always emanating from somewhere else, and, as a result remains always something “unlocated”. In this view, the global has an impact on the local sphere, but it can never be localized itself. Secondly, this understanding of globalization presents the local without independent agency of its own in its relation to the global (Massey, 2005: 101). Consequently, when it comes to the interpretation of local agency, two kinds of confusion occur. On the one hand, there is a depoliticized perspective on local agency. Local actors are then just taking the inevitable and necessary actions in accordance to the ‘reality of globalization’. On the other hand, it can lead to the tendency of essentializing local agency or local politics in its apparent opposition against the ‘outside’ forces of globalization. This would be to ignore the contradictions between different forms of local agency and the conflation of local class interests, local governments with the so-called global actors (private and/or public).

However, the understanding of complex phenomena as the ‘privatization of the state’, the ‘internationalization of class interests’, the dialectic between the territorial and
capitalist logics of power, or even the use of alternative concepts as ‘globalization’ (in contrast to globalization) all point to the fact that local places are not just produced through globalization but that they are also ‘agents in globalization’. With this expression Massey doesn’t argue that ‘whole places’ are somehow unified actors, but she urges upon an analysis which takes into account the “local production of the neoliberal capitalist global” (Massey, 2005: 101). Ipsita Chatterjee, for example, has illustrated in the case of India how local spaces (e.g. cities) “ground” top-down neoliberal principles into local policies in accordance with prevalent place particularities of religion, class and caste. Consequently, she argues that neoliberalism is simultaneously local and global (Chatterjee, 2009). Taking into account local agency and the historical specificity of local contexts enables us to see the diversity of “actually existing neoliberalism” and emphasize “the contextual embeddedness” of neoliberal reforms insofar as they are produced within national, regional, and local contexts (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Neoliberal reforms are always introduced within a context of already existing institutional frameworks, policy regimes and political struggles. Neoliberal restructuring thus never begins with a clean sheet. The production and regulation of (new) capitalist spaces depends thus on the configuration of social power relations already present in a specific local place (country, region, city). Yet, just because of a particular global-local interplay and the variegated ways in which top-down neoliberal principles are grounded, its evolution will also be rather contingent (cf. Wilson, 2004), and arise out of or transformed through the social conflicts that are brought with it (cf. Leitner, e.a. 2007).

Within the open and ongoing process of socio-spatial transformation, local agency and local conflict play a crucial role in the processes of deregulation and regulation, de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, etc. Consequently, the specific and variegated ways in which neoliberalism takes shape in a local context will depend on multiple structural, relational and geographical factors: local class or other social group interests, social struggle, foreign capital interests and opportunities, geopolitical power balances, geographical location, infrastructural capacities, etc. Political change will be the result of an interaction between inherited local landscapes and the specific interpretation and application of neoliberalism by the various actors that are involved.

**Uneven development**

Actually existing forms of neoliberalism generate social polarizations which cannot be overcome but are actively produced and displaced. Contrary to the hegemonic discourse of international donor agencies such as the World Bank saying that the pressing socio-economic cleavages in developing countries can be bridged by ‘good governance’, the implementation of neoliberal policies does not bring forth overall economic growth and prosperity, but leads to a specific geography of uneven development in which some places, territories and sectors are privileged over others as sites for capital accumulation. In general, capitalism has two major characteristics that are important

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109 Glocalization is a concept that tries to incorporate the complex institutional and relational changes that occur within the global-local interplay during increasing globalization. It refers on the one hand, to the rescaled institutional reforms both towards supra-national scales and sub-national scales (region, urban, etc.) and, on the other hand, to the process in which economic activities and networks are becoming simultaneously more localized/regionalized and transnational (Swyngedouw, 2004).

110 It is not my intention to give an in-depth theoretical discussion on the concept of uneven development.
to understand the dynamics of uneven development. Both of these characteristics are
intimately related. First of all, capitalism is determined by the inherent contradictions
of capital accumulation. One of the major contradictions of capitalism is the *simultaneous*
development of enormous wealth and the concentration of capital on the one hand,
and poverty, social marginalization and dispossession on the other. It is thus the co-ex-
istence and coevalness of poverty and wealth, dispossession and exploitation, and their
inherent interdependence that characterizes capitalist development. Secondly, there is
the problem of the containment of processes of capital accumulation. In other words,
the question of how to deal with the constant fluidity and motion of these processes.
With regard to the issue of motion, the concept of uneven development has the advan-
tage to depict the circulation and accumulation of capital as a process in time and space
(i.e. as a spatiotemporal process), while the tendency in much social theory is either to
exclude spatiality or treat space as a fixed container (Harvey, 2006: 77). Harvey has
stressed that capital is not a thing but rather a process that exists only in motion, i.e. the
constant circulation of capital (Harvey, 2010b: 12). Through this activity, this motion,
it lays the foundations of uneven development.

The conception of uneven development, and here I continue to draw on Harvey, both
integrates the co-existing and inherent contradictions of capital accumulation and the
issue of spatiality (first of all by thinking them together). Capitalist activity is driven
by competition, the search for the lowest costs and the highest profits at the best loca-
tion. It is constantly seeking to improve and enlarge its opportunities for profit making.
Capital is therefore constantly moving and searching for growth opportunities and new
sites for accumulation. If this motion would suddenly stop, capitalism as a systemic
process would tumble down; there would be no surplus value creation anymore. One of
the problems is that this motion, this capitalist activity is also spatially constrained. Ex-
changes of goods and services (including labour power) almost always involves changes
of location, but these changes (spatial movements) are often constrained by frictions of
distance, technological limitations and certain territorial and social boundaries (Harvey,
2003: 94). Any equilibrium (between friction and motion) within the “space-economy”
that emerges out of the processes of capital accumulation (but also out of struggle), will
always be momentarily, accidental and under pressure to be interrupted by the search of
capitalists for excess profits (Harvey, 1989a: 137, 143). The concept of uneven devel-

Here I just want to highlight the dialectical character of capitalist development. For a detailed discussion on
a general theory see Harvey (2006: 71-116); for a discussion on urban politics and uneven development see

In the world development report of 2009, the World Bank recognizes the importance of an understand-
ing of economic geography to understand the dynamics of uneven development. But in contrast to Harvey,
who refers to the increasing “capital surplus absorption problem” in order to demonstrate the social, en-
vironmental and economic limits to ever expanding economic growth (Harvey, 2010a), the World Bank
seems to advocate completely the opposite, arguing that more growth, more integration and more marketi-
ization are the solutions to solve the urban geographic problems of density, division and distance (World
Bank, 2009; on the MENA-region specifically see World Bank, 2010b). As such, the World Bank advocates
the break off of all possible geographical and spatial frictions and barriers for capital circulation. This is
exactly what Harvey and others consider to be the motor behind uneven development in the first place.
And this because of the ‘coercive laws of competition’. More global market integration facilitates capital’s
mobility and capitalists possibilities to seek the locations with the highest profit rate (i.e. not necessarily
the location with the highest social benefits or the highest redistribution of wealth). The World Bank thus
constantly seeks to reformulate neoliberalism’s class project in order to deliver the political basis for capital
accumulation.
unstable equilibrium, these movements and frictions, refuting therefore the image of capitalism as a static structural configuration. Uneven development is thus an essential feature of capitalist development. What’s more, capitalism survives through uneven geographical development (Harvey, 2006). Increased capital mobility and the privatization of public assets are some of the main resources for capitalists to accumulate capital in contemporary neoliberal globalization.

The question of poverty is a good example. The dominant trend is to consider poverty as a result of people’s inadequate integration, or even exclusion, from the benefits and opportunities of the free market environment. This vision is supported by most US politicians and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank in fact, acknowledges the “spatial disparities” in living standards in the MENA region and argues it is up to policy-makers to let “the market determine the spatial distribution of economic activity” (World Bank, 2010b: 11). In the eyes of the World Bank, uneven development and poverty are seen as consequences of inadequate market integration. The promotion of trade liberalization and economic growth are then obvious solutions. Special attention is usually given to the enhancement of the capacities of poor people (a form of empowerment) to seize the opportunities of economic liberalization (e.g. micro-credits, subsidized housing loans, training programs, etc.). As such, the main perception on poor people’s problems is that they are just ‘lagging behind’. For example, the World Bank refers to the spatial disparities as “lagging areas”, seeing uneven development predominantly as a problem of rural-urban disparity. Morocco in fact is the area with the biggest rural-urban disparity in the whole MENA-region (World Bank, 2010b: 6). As such, poverty is seen as the technical problem that is related to inadequate market integration. This is a discourse that we find also in Morocco, among many politicians, experts, state-officials, etc... Whether it concerns the VSBP targeting the slums or the Bouregreg project targeting economic growth and the promotion of tourism, both projects were explained to me on several occasions as an obvious solution for the socio-economic disparities of the country. Within these projects the link between market integration and poverty reduction was pictured as self-evident.

Ray Bush has contradicted this “neo-classical bias”. He argues that the “poor are poor precisely because of their incorporation into the reality of the contemporary capitalist economies” (Bush, 2004: 675). Poverty, he argues, does not emerge from the poor man’s exclusion but from his particular inclusion in the neoliberal capitalist economy. It concerns a “differential incorporation” which entails exploitative labour regimes, a decline in employment due to the privatization of public assets, the prioritization of investment in rent-seeking economic sectors (e.g. real estate) over redistribution.

112 According to David Harvey, who has based his idea of uneven development upon a careful reading of Marx, it is strange that Marx has often been depicted as a static thinker: “no, what Marx seeks out in Capital is a conceptual apparatus, a deep structure, that explains the way in which motion is actually instantiated within a capitalist mode of production. Consequently, many of his concepts are formulated around relations rather than stand-alone principles; they are about transformative activity” (Harvey, 2010b: 13).

113 The neo-classical bias is “the assumption that markets can be accessed equally between people and the state and workers and consumers; that markets are neutral arenas to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources and that the state can, at best, help facilitate the smooth running of markets, but must not regulate them” (Bush, 2004: 677).
etc... As such, Ray Bush wants to direct our focus on “the crucial issue of how poverty is created and reproduced” (Ibid.: 674). The narrative that global market integration will automatically alleviate poverty completely ignores the very mechanisms of power behind capitalist uneven development: exploitation, domination, dispossession and oppression. This narrative has also an a-spatial character. As long as inequality is considered in terms of temporal stages of progress and backwardness, alternative political stories will be disallowed and the production of poverty within and through globalization will be obstructed from view (Massey, 2005: 84). Additionally, this a-spatial narrative of market integration has a very political character. Where does this need for greater incorporation come from? Why it is proclaimed in virtually all poverty alleviation strategies? By whom are these strategies and discourses generated and in whose interests are they actually (Ibid.: 686; see also Bush, 2007: 21)? Bush argues that it would be wrong to assume that economic growth automatically leads to less poverty. It all depends on how that economic growth is distributed, who benefits from capital accumulation and who doesn’t. If the capitalist logic is to seek growth and the highest possible profits, there will always be a tension between that specific drive and wealth redistribution. Not surprisingly, despite the improved macro-economic performances after the structural adjustments in the MENA-region, a decline in purchasing power of the average citizen, increasing uneven development and social inequality coincided with global market integration (Bush, 2004).

To comprehend the paradox of capitalist development, we have to consider its dialectics. The very contradictions and transformations that lead to the interrelated co-existence of poverty and wealth, accumulation and dispossession, domination and oppression are not the specific problems that need to be (from a capitalist point of view), or even can be, resolved through capitalist development. And when there are apparent moments of resolution, we need to look at the new contradictions that these resolutions internalize – contradictions that may become problematic on a much grander scale in the future (Harvey, 2010b: 62-63). Slavoj Žižek points to these dialectics of contemporary globalization through the comparison of the circulation of capital and people:

in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people is the reality of economic globalisation. (Žižek, 2008: 102).

The dialectic of actually existing forms of neoliberalism, its conflicting tendencies, struggles and contradictions are symbolized through “creative destruction” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 2007, Harvey, 2008). In order to create new orders, old
ones have to be destroyed. The promotion of economic growth and the accumulation of capital within a neoliberal framework not only involves the destruction of certain achievements, institutions and policies (public housing, public space, public sector jobs, welfare institutions, social services, food subsidies, full employment, etc.) but also the creation of new ones (tax reduction regimes, free trade zones, public-private partnerships, new state spaces, inner city regeneration projects, etc.). Both destruction and creation are intimately intertwined. This reality of contemporary neoliberal capitalism leads not so much to an unevenness between nation-states or between centre states and peripheral states as it produces a geography of uneven development within national and regional boundaries, and especially within the arising megacities of the Global South. It is creating the Manichean city described so vividly by Mike Davis in his famous book ‘Planet of Slums’ (M Davis, 2006a). The way in which urban regions compete with each other sets the stage for the current geography of uneven development and places urban politics at the centre of neoliberal globalization. Urban regions are the cornerstones of the current spatial organization of neoliberal globalization. Neoliberal urbanism is the next stage within the continual and contingent historical process in which capitalism attempts to create the preconditions of its own perpetuation (Harvey, 1989a).

**Neoliberal urbanism and the Arab World**

A lot of attention has been paid to the emergence of the ‘global city’ as a key locale in the regulation of the global economy and as evidence for the declining significance of the national economy. But the impact of neoliberal capitalism cannot be reduced to the key role of a few global cities. It has generated far-reaching transformations which concerns basically every city in the world. No Moroccan city, for example, can claim that it is able to participate in, let alone determine, the direction and management of the global economy (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007). But this doesn’t mean that cities as Casablanca and Rabat have not experienced similar political transformations. Of course, the claim that contemporary capitalism is city-centric seems to state the obvious. Capitalism and urbanization were always closely interrelated. David Harvey has argued in detail how capitalism had to urbanize from the very beginning in order to reproduce itself. Urbanization has always been a vital condition for the rise and expansion of capitalism. A built environment that supported capitalist production, consumption and exchange was crucial to capitalism in order to dominate over other modes of production. But the dynamics of capitalist urbanization differed through time and space (Harvey, 1989a). The transformation of the city cannot only be understood in terms of the effects of globalization or global processes, but should also be understood in terms of the profound transformations in the mode of production (Lefebvre, 1996). Just as the process of capital accumulation is inherently contradictive, the urbanization of capital has created and embedded these contradictions within the city-space. Consequently, each stage of capitalism had its own dominant forms of urbanization (or urbanization of capital). Harvey (1989a) has shown how the mercantile city mobilized the surpluses (e.g. through the violent appropriation of the means of production)\(^\text{115}\), how the industrial city played a key role in the production of surpluses (e.g. through the exploitation of labour), and how the Keynesian city absorbed these surpluses (e.g. through the promotion of the demand-side and massive public investments). Finally, the contemporary

\textsuperscript{115} Cities in Europe were built with appropriated capital (through primitive accumulation) coming from the colonies.
The neoliberal city has become an “entrepreneurial city”, in which urban government had to be much more innovative and take an entrepreneurial stance to economic development (Harvey, 1989b).

Throughout the history of the modern city both the spatial division of labour and the spatial division of consumption had a significant impact on the urban process and the way the city was shaped. Marxist theories had the tendency to focus predominantly on production processes. Yet, the circulation and accumulation of capital are equally dependent on the expansion of effective demand. The question is then: where does that demand come from and how is it organized? Harvey points out that the spatial division of consumption (e.g. through the creation of vacation, leisure, entertainment and other consumption places) had its own specific impact on the urban process. This involved relatively permanent structurations of social and physical spaces, both within and between urban regions and urban centres (Harvey, 1989a: 17-58). The reliance on public investments, especially in the built environment, typified the dominant focus on consumption and the expansion of demand-side urbanization within the Keynesian/or Fordist city. The world-wide crisis in the 1970s marked the end of state developmentalism and consequently also the end of publicly steered demand-side urbanization. The specific transformations that started during the 1970s, the transition from a international market economy to a global market economy and the deregulation of state control over capital circulation, made neoliberal capitalism city-centric in a way it hadn’t been before. To begin with, state power had been ‘glocalized’ in the sense that it was resituated on supra- and sub-national scales. This re-situation of state and capitalist power on the urban scale made cities relatively autonomous within the global market economy. This entailed a shift from competition between capitalist states towards an increasing competition between urban regions. Therefore, an understanding of the new emerging urban political regimes is crucial for the understanding of the political transformations under neoliberal globalization. As mentioned above, the crisis of the Fordist developmentalist model gave way to a transformation process in which government has been re-invented, re-institutionalized and re-territorialised (Brenner, 1998; 1999; Swynedouw, 2000; 2004; Hibou, 2004a; 2004b). And to the degree in which urbanization was part of the problem, it had to become part of the solution (Harvey, 1989a: 44). As such, the ascendancy of neoliberalism radically changed the urban process. This change can be interpreted in two ways: spatially and politically.

First of all, the neoliberal city entailed significant changes in the spatial divisions of labour and consumption which culminated into a specific “spatial fix” (Ibid.; Hackworth, 2007; see chapter 5). The strong processes of spatial organization in the Keynesian city focused strongly on the promotion of suburbanization through public investments. This was to anticipate the peripheral growth of the city from a demand-side perspective and to create consumer landscapes. This was the particular way in which the Keynesian inspired urban policies hoped to solve or fix the capital surplus absorption problem. Yet, as a result, inner city development was often neglected and this caused growing pockets of abandonment and deprivation within the city-centre. The changes brought forth by the economic crisis of the 1970s reversed that process. The liberation of capital and the following de-industrialization of the economy in advanced capitalist societies entailed a spatial reorganization of the city. The city centre now became the primary
locus for the absorption of capital surpluses. Through the promotion of tourism, real estate development, financial centres, beautification projects and slum relocation the spatial fix of neoliberal urbanism shifted towards the inner centre at the expense of the middle-class suburbs. The changing competitive conditions within the global market economy, obliged local government to reinforce their own competitive position and the inner city became an important component of the city’s ‘unique selling position’. In order to fixate global capital flows, local state intervention shifted from redistribution mechanisms and the control over capitalist urban production processes towards more market-oriented strategies and the support of private urban enterprise and private investment in the built environment (Weber, 2002). Urban regions now had to compete themselves for investments, employment, image, etc., by trying to lure capital investment, integrate in the global capital circuit and offer unique packages of physical (e.g. the built environment) and social (e.g. educated labour force) infrastructure, labour conditions, tax-regimes, political stability, security, and finally, particular cultural, environmental and life-style qualities (Harvey, 1989a). Cities needed to become attractive for capital. Hence, the increasing importance given to city-marketing, services, leisure possibilities, tourism, etc. The legitimation for this strategic shift is based on the assumption that supporting private interests would first of all stimulate economic growth and then coincide with a so-called ‘trickle-down’ effect.

A typical strategy for the contemporary neoliberal city is the reliance on large-scale urban development projects or “mega-projects”. These projects are part of local government’s effort to reinforce the competitive position of urban economies in a context of rapidly changing global competitive conditions (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002). They are one of the key strategies for the commercial redevelopment of the city-centre and a key aspect of the neoliberal spatial fix. However, there are some important social aspects that are related to or generated by neoliberal urban policies. First of all, neoliberalism entails the imagination of the city more in relation to outsiders (e.g. tourists and foreign investors) instead of thinking the city in function of the original city-dweller. The exchange value of the city is privileged over and above the use value of the city. The urban centre has become a highly valued consumption product and capitalism’s creative and innovative nature has been demonstrated through the city’s double role: as a place of consumption and by the consumption of place (Lefebvre, 1996: 73). The development of business and exhibition facilities, conference centres, amusement parks, luxury resorts, etc. all symbolize this trend. An essential feature of neoliberal urbanism and urban entrepreneurialism is the world-wide phenomenon of gentrification (N Smith, 2002). According to Neil Smith the impulses behind the process of gentrification are now globalized and part of the urban strategies everywhere in the world. Mega-projects and urban regeneration play a big role in pushing lower middle classes and poor urban residents out of the city-centre. Rising housing prices and the emergence of upper class consumption places and facilities (luxury goods stores, domestic caterers, etc.) are causing life to become more and more expensive. As a consequence,

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116 This doesn’t mean that further suburbanization stopped. It continued at a rapid pace but not according to the Keynesian managerialist patterns. Current outgrowth reflects the social polarization characteristic of neoliberal policies. It is not based on the redistributive mechanisms. For example, the proliferation of gated communities and second homes for the wealthy have a whole different dynamic than state supported suburban housing for the middle classes (Hackworth, 2007).
poor people often see themselves obliged to move out of the centre to more affordable locations. Sometimes, this is even a deliberate policy. Slums in Third World cities are relocated (often by force) into the urban peripheries, or even further away into satellite cities.

In general, both Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith have argued that gentrification in the neoliberal city is in most cases a corporate sponsored and state-facilitated process. It is the “knife-edge neighbourhood based manifestation of neoliberalism” (Hackworth, 2007: 149; see also Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Other social, often devastating, effects of neoliberal urban policy are the privatization of public space and public funds, the socialization or nationalization of investment risks together with the protection of private interests by public authority (a consequence of the PPPs). Yet, the social costs of neoliberal urbanism in general, and mega-projects in specific, are often counterbalanced by the argument that there is no other alternative. If a city wants to generate growth it has to follow the neoliberal path. However, Bent Flyvbjerg has argued that both in the industrialized and industrializing countries, the benefits and added value of mega-projects are heavily overrated and the risks are often intentionally covered up (Flyvbjerg, 2005). The immense social and economic costs of eventual failure will then have to be carried by society as a whole. This bring us directly to the political question of the neoliberal city.

The liberation of capital from the constraining power of the Keynesian nation-state entailed new processes and forms of regulation in which cities are not just passive places that absorb production and consumption surpluses, but become themselves the command centres for the attraction and absorption of capital. The neoliberal city is therefore a political project and the object of a class strategy. In fact this has always been the case. As Harvey argues, cities are constructed through geographical and social concentrations of capital surpluses. Yet, these surpluses are always extracted from somewhere and from somebody while the control over the surpluses often lied in the hands of a powerful minority (Harvey, 2008). Human agency, or more particularly class agency, should thus be placed at the centre of the analysis of urbanization processes. As Christopher Parker stated: “while pavement, steel and concrete can be rolled out to enable and direct the flow [of capital], they do not set it in motion” (Parker, 2009: 113). Yet, the particular ways and strategies by which the process of urbanization is given shape have changed over time (not in the least due to changing class relations). As such, the neoliberal city became the key arena for new configurations of political, economic and social power. As mentioned above, Brenner highlighted the way in which the urban scale now represents the strategic institutional arena in which current neoliberal forms of government are unfolding. I also mentioned that the state, or state power, has never been absent in this transformation. Contemporary mega-projects are, for example, almost always state-led and state-financed.

The real novelty about neoliberal urban policy is that the government of the neoliberal city involved the subordination of formal government structures (e.g. parliament, municipal government, etc.) to new institutions and agencies (Swyngedouw, Moulaert &

117 Bent Flyvbjerg has done (together with others) extensive research to investigate impact of mega-projects and compared the promises with the eventual costs (see Flyvbjerg, e.a. 2003).
Rodriguez, 2002). In chapter 5, I will discuss in detail how the Bouregreg Valley has turned into a ‘new state space’. In this particular case, governmental powers were transferred to a state agency that wasn’t accountable to the general public, neither pretended to be, as is often the case with ‘pseudo-democratic’ reforms in the Arab World (Volpi, 2004). Hence, these forms of urban government show a significant deficit in terms of representation, accountability, and the right to the city. The concept of the “right of the city”, developed by Lefebvre (1996), and the question for whom the neoliberal city has exactly been restructured and redesigned, is a very important one. In the case of Morocco, it not only demonstrates the durability of authoritarian government but also its transformation from neo-patrimonial, clientilistic and kinship based forms of authoritarianism towards the more ‘universal’ (?) authoritarian character of neoliberal modalities of government. Here, I don’t want to argue that neoliberal modalities of government replaced the former modalities of authoritarian government. Rather, I want to argue that already existing forms of authoritarian government have been extended and intermingled with neoliberal modalities of government.\textsuperscript{118}

Based on the discussion above, the Arab city, obviously, lends itself as the privileged site to observe the political transformations of the last three decades. Nonetheless, mainstream political analyses on the Arab World have seldom paid attention to the ways in which a cityscape reflects a hegemonic political project (Parker, 2009). Within the area study, very little attention has been paid to neoliberal urbanism, and by extension to neoliberal political reform in general (some important exceptions are Catusse, 2008; Guazzone & Pioppi, 2009a; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009; Kanna, 2009; Fawaz, 2009; Kanai & Kutz; 2010; Parker & Debruyne, 2011). But also, within the emerging literature on global cities and city-networks the Arab cities are usually left out (Elsheshtawy, 2008; Malkawi, 2008). Of course, the process of urbanization in the Third World, or in the Arab World more particularly, differs significantly from Western cities. First of all, the “developing” cities experienced a spectacular growth in the 20th century that was nothing compared with earlier periods of urban demographic expansion. The growth of the Third World cities in the post-colonial era took on a whole different intensity compared to urban development in Europe. While the processes of urbanization, urban growth, demographic expansion and industrialization were a gradual long term process in the history of European cities, many cities in the Arab region were confronted with rapid and chaotic urbanization and its subsequent social pressures (Malkawi, 2008; El Ouazzani, 2008). Secondly, Third World urbanization was characterized by capital shortage and labour surpluses (Harvey, 1989a: 25). Cities in the Third World were characterized by an urbanization without economic growth: i.e. a strong demographic expansion of the cities without a proportionate expansion of the urban economy. This urbanization without growth, especially since the 1970s, was even exacerbated by the global political conjuncture: i.e. the worldwide debt crisis and the subsequent IMF-led structural adjustment of the Third World economies (M Davis, 2006a).

\textsuperscript{118} Swyngedouw, e.a. argue that the new systems of urban government and ruling networks under neoliberalism also make possible more discretionals forms of management, i.e. the role of lobbies, family ties, business connections, and forms of clientilism (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002: 565). In Morocco we see a reversed evolution, i.e. the transformation of already existing discretionals forms of elite government into more market-oriented forms of elite government.
As a result, the Arab cities were confronted with some serious challenges. Despite the fact that their demographic evolution had little to do with economic growth, rural migration continued unabated because poor farmers still hoped to find a better future in the city (Ibrahim, 1975; Abu lughod, 1980; Naciri, 1984a). According to Mike Davis, this phenomenon surprised many experts and contradicted orthodox economic models that predicted that a negative growth of the urban economies would reverse the rural-urban migration trends. Nothing was further from the truth. Part of the mystery could be clarified by the fact that the neoliberal policies of deregulation and financial discipline also negatively affected the domestic agricultural sectors and therefore accelerated the rural exodus of surplus rural labour to the urban agglomerates (M Davis, 2006a). This was also the case in Morocco. Neoliberal reforms accelerated the privatization and concentration of large landholdings in the hands of a few elites at the cost of the fragmented and small landholding majority among the Moroccan farmers (D Davis, 2006). Additionally, the recent implementation of a free-trade agreement between Morocco and the US, ratified in 2004, is expected to further impoverish the majority of the Moroccan farmers and limit their opportunities to compete in a global market. By mandating the elimination of export subsidies and price supports for grains in Morocco, it is more than likely that the US will supply nearly all wheat to Morocco in the coming decade (Ibid.). As a result, rural poverty, which increased rapidly during the 1980s and the 1990s, is estimated to continue to increase by the World Bank (from 28.3% to 34.3%) due to the deregulation of trade protection. Extreme poverty in Morocco will probably even double from 6.6% to 11.7% in the coming years or decade (World Bank, 2004: 62). Moreover, the World Bank also concluded that because of the specific dynamics of urbanization in Morocco, rural and urban poverty are closely related (Ibid.: 2). Consequently the phenomenon of “over-urbanization” was thus primarily “driven by the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs” (M Davis, 2006: 16). The result was a spectacular growth of slums or other kinds of informal housing, not only in Morocco, but everywhere in the Global South. Since the 1970s, Mike Davis argues, slum growth even outpaced the general process of urbanization everywhere in the South (Ibid.: 17). This was the price paid for structural adjustments and neoliberal urbanism, resulting in increasing inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation within and between the different urban regions.119

119 Françoise Navez-Bouchanine warns us not to see the socio-spatial fragmentation in the Maghreb cities as just a recent effect (i.e. since the 1970s and the 1980s). The socio-spatial fragmentation of the modern city has its historic origins that go back to the colonial period (see also Abu Lughod, 1980). Furthermore she argues that the phenomenon of fragmentation is not a static phenomenon that can be reduced to distinctions between legal and illegal or formal and informal urban spaces. Navez-Bouchanine urges us to see fragmentation more as a dynamic phenomenon that cross-borders the boundaries of formal/informal and legal/illega. For example, the fragmentation between or within formal neighbourhoods can sometimes be greater than between certain formal and informal neighbourhoods. This is because of the dynamic way in which the degree of fragmentation can constantly decline and increase depending on social agency both from above (public actions, state intervention) and below (neighbourhood action, social networks, etc.) (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002a). Moreover, these actions from below have their own significant effect on the production of urban space. Asef Bayat refers to these forms of agency as the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” (Bayat, 2000; 2002). The concept describes specific ways in which ordinary people (re-)appropri ate urban space for their own benefits. In other words, the “silent, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people [e.g. street vendors, squatters, car parkers, etc.] on the propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives” (Bayat, 2002: 19). Nevertheless, neoliberal policies have certainly intensified urban disparities turning cities more and more in to spaces of extremes (Bayat & Biekart, 2009).
Yet, neoliberal urban policies are still not widely seen as the overall problem. To the contrary, very often they are perceived as part of the solution to overcome the growing inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation in the Southern cities. Therefore, it is interesting, even absolutely necessary, to compare neoliberal policies in both the Western World and the Global South. In both parts of the world the liberation of global capital has inspired cities and local government to join the competitive race for the fixation of some of that world-wide flow of capital. One important point of comparison with Western cities is the politics of mega-projects. Usually, when these forms of urban neoliberalization are brought into connection with the Arab World, they are almost immediately associated with the Gulf region and more specifically with the city of Dubai. No doubt, Dubai – which is the fastest growing city in the world – has been the most documented and the most spectacular case. The megalomaniacal images of real estate development projects such as The World (the group of islands in front of the seashore), the 7-star hotel Burj Al-Arab, and the Burj Dubai (the largest tower in the world) certainly contributed to the fantasy of this Dubai model. Yet, neoliberal urban development strategies are, of course, not something that is specific to the case of Dubai or the other Gulf cities. They were copied also in the rest of the Arab region, often under impulse of investment money coming from the Gulf region. However, the first signs of the financial mess of over-investment and high-risk rent seeking urbanization became painfully clear when a lot of ongoing projects, in Dubai for example, were abandoned and stopped (temporarily) in the aftermath of the financial meltdown of 2008 and the global economic crisis that followed. Yet, two years later, it seems like the reliance on urban mega-projects only took a temporarily set-back.\textsuperscript{120} Also in Morocco, in spite of the global economic uncertainty at the moment, the current mega-projects remain on schedule.\textsuperscript{121} Projects like Tanger Med, Casa Marina and the Bouregreg project are priorities for the Moroccan authorities. Examples in the rest of the Arab World are also numerous. The Journal of Built Environment dedicated its summer issue of 2010 on Arab mega-projects (Barthel, 2010). This issue tries to look beyond the case of Dubai and deals with similar cases in Lebanon (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010), Algeria (Zitoun, 2010), Syria (Clerc & Hurault, 2010), Egypt (Deboulet, 2010), Morocco (Mouloudi, 2010; Barthel & Planel, 2010; Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010), Mauritania and Sudan (Choplin & Franck, 2010).

Consequently, since a few decades, there has been a systemic change in the whole Arab region. There is a growing influence of Arab business-oriented elites ready to invest, integrate and participate in the global market economy (Barthel, 2010). The fact that so little has been written on Arab neoliberal urbanism raises the question, however, whether Arab urbanization can be compared to the neoliberal urban politics described by authors like Neil Brenner, Erik Swyngedouw, Neil Smith and David Harvey? After all, these authors worked almost exclusively on processes of neoliberal urbanization in the West. Pierre-Arnaud Barthel argues that we should be careful to compare recent processes of Arab urbanization, and in particular Arab mega-projects, with for example neoliberal urban development in Europe and the US. I agree to a certain extent. As I have argued earlier, forms of actually existing neoliberalism do differ from country to country. As such, specific urban developments in Morocco will differ from develop-

\textsuperscript{120} Oxford Business Group newsletter on Dubai: A slower pace (03/04/09).
\textsuperscript{121} Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco: Urban Outfitters (03/03/09).
ments in Belgium and other places. But we must avoid the tendency to essentialize – and therefore automatically oppose – neoliberal urbanism in both the West and the Arab World (something Barthel tends to do). To begin with, forms of neoliberal urbanism will also vary within and between the different countries and regions of the Western World. Likewise, neoliberal urbanism in the Arab region will vary from country to country, even city to city.

Of course, we cannot be blind for some important differences. Barthel sums up some important arguments. First of all, in terms of public resources, the process of Arab urbanization cannot be compared with the Western countries. Consequently, the social polarization will be much more confronting in those countries with less public resources. But this is a phenomenon that is typical for all Third World countries in the Global South to some degree. Secondly, it is certainly true that neoliberal projects in the Arab region take place in a specific authoritarian political context. The involvement of the king in Morocco is much evident, even necessary. Moreover, opposition to these projects is a much more delicate issue in a country like Morocco than in any of the liberal democracies in the West. Additionally, Barthel argues that the specific decision-making process has shifted from formal governmental institutions to sites outside these institutions – what he calls the *informalization* of the decision-making process – and, as a consequence, there is a severe lack of public participation (see also Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). Yet, he considers this particular context to be an important difference with Western developments (Barthel, 2010: 139). However, it would be a mistake to idealize the decision-making process in Western countries and ignore the implicit class power behind it. Several critical scholars have argued convincingly that large European urban development projects equally lack public participation, and overall, the decision-making process has shifted equally towards non-democratically controlled institutions and agencies. Also, within the context of European projects, real decision-making power should be located in more discretionary forms of management: e.g. lobby groups, family ties, business connections, and different forms of clientilism (Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002).

Furthermore, Barthel argues that the involvement of Gulf investors is another peculiarity of prestige projects in Arab metropolises. Nevertheless, a quick look at the websites of some of the most important investment companies in the Gulf, the so-called Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF), reveals that Gulf capital is implicated all over the world. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority has significant investments in Europe and the US. The same goes for the Kuwait Investment Authority and the Dubai Group. Only a few years ago, a world-wide debate emerged on the role of SWFs in the world economy and their impact on the security of national states, especially the US. It is true, however, that ever since the events of 9/11 damaged the reputation of Arab investors in the US and the rest of the Western World, investment money coming from the Gulf states is now flowing more easily to other Arab countries (Bogaert, 2008). In short, despite

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122 See for example the following websites: [http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/dubai.php](http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/dubai.php); [http://www.adia.ae/En/Investment/Portfolio.aspx](http://www.adia.ae/En/Investment/Portfolio.aspx); [http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/Marketable_Securities/Portfolio_Management/Pages/default.aspx](http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/Marketable_Securities/Portfolio_Management/Pages/default.aspx); (Accessed 05/09/2010).

123 See for example the article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* of May 2008 titled: *Sovereign Wealth Funds to the rescue: are they saviours, predators, or dupes?* An article written by Ibrahim Warde.
important differences, mainstream political science on the Arab World can learn a great deal from critical perspectives on neoliberal reform in Western cities. As such, it is absolutely necessary to further bridge the academic interchanges between different disciplines and area-studies. In the end, there will be of course important local variations when comparing Arab countries with Western countries. And of course, democratically elected governments in Europe and US makes it more delicate for the capitalist class to push true their private interests at the expense of the rest of society. Nevertheless, departing from the critical perspective described in this chapter, it is above all the specific authoritarian character of neoliberal modalities of government that makes it so interesting to compare cases from the Arab World with similar forms of neoliberal policy in the rest of the World. In doing this, we notice the global convergences of modes and rationalities of government in different parts of the world.

Conclusion
As Peck and Tickell stated in the opening quote, neoliberalism does seem to be everywhere: as an ideology, a class strategy, a technology of government, even as a deeply entrenched rationality that produces and shapes our contemporary political societies. In this chapter, I discussed the political nature of neoliberal globalization, the role of the state in that political project and the contextual embeddedness of its local manifestations. First of all, neoliberal globalization is a political project. More specifically, it is a class project. The establishment of new measures, new regulations and new policies to increase capital mobility worldwide has significantly altered the class relations since the 1970s (early 1980s in Morocco). Secondly, the state apparatus plays a vital role in the regulation and formation of that project. Today, without state power there would be no spread, no re-arrangement and no intensification of contemporary global capitalism. I do agree with the governmentality approach that the state is just a (temporary) institution and not so much a universal from which some of the lineages of neoliberal capitalist power can be traced. As such, we should not treat the state as an actor in itself, but pay more close attention to those rationalities and methods of power that gave rise to the contemporary capitalist state and are manifested through its apparatuses. However, we should also avoid to empty the concept of the state and view power as something emerging always from everywhere without ever being able to trace it back to an organization or a structure, or without linking it to a particular crystallization of social relations – e.g. class relations. The state – how diffuse its materialization may be – is still an important home for class power. And in the sense that increasing globalization draws global or transnational capitalist relations into local politics, it does not necessarily mean that the state has lost authority or autonomy, but rather that these ‘external’ relations are drawn within reach (cf. chapter 5). In other words, authority and government are not the result of a zero-sum game between local and global actors – as suggested by some – but it is shared and negotiated between these actors on the field of the state. By positioning a governmentality approach against a Marxian analysis of (state) power, I do not want to suggest we should chose between one of them. To the contrary, as John Allen argued, our understanding of the whereabouts of power should not be locked in a binary logic, but engage with the important insights offered by both these
critical approaches (even if we don’t succeed to craft the perfect argument in the end).\textsuperscript{124} Finally, this chapter has put forward the argument that urban politics and the increasing competition between cities and city-regions in global capitalism have radically changed the configuration of uneven development. In the remaining three chapters I want to dig deeper into the case of Morocco and explore the particular mechanisms in which urban politics have shaped actually existing neoliberalism in Morocco.

\textsuperscript{124} Here, I do not want to suggest that these two approaches are the only possible approaches to consider contemporary political transformation.
Chapter 3

Three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco

Relatively few developing countries have had as good a performance as Morocco in the second half of the eighties. Inflation has been below 5% since 1987 while GDP has grown at an average rate of 5% since 1985. The current account turned from a deficit of 12.3% of GDP in 1982 to a surplus in 1987 and 1988 and a deficit of 3.5% in 1989. The budget deficit was reduced from double digits of GDP in the 1976-84 period to the 4% to 5% range in 1988-1989. This performance occurred at the same time that structural reforms and a stabilization program were taking place. The reforms undertaken in the eighties included liberalization of agriculture prices, opening up of the trade regime, and elimination of most price controls. The reforms in agriculture, for example, brought about an important drop in the negative effective protection of the sector and have consequently helped bring about a major output response in cereal production (World Bank, 1990b: i).

Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than any direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” intentions, but is purely “objective,” systemic, anonymous. Here we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: “reality” is the social reality of the actual people involved in interaction and in the productive processes, while the Real is the inexorable “abstract,” spectral logic of capital that determines what goes on in social reality. One can experience this gap in a palpable way when one visits a country where life is obviously in shambles. We see a lot of ecological decay and human misery. However, the economist’s report that one reads afterwards informs us that the country’s economic situation is “financially sound” – reality doesn’t matter, what matters is the situation of capital... (Žižek, 2008: 12-13).
To the day one month after the above cited World Bank report came out, violent riots broke in Morocco. They spread out all over the country, but were especially concentrated around cities in the Northern region such as Tangiers, Fez and Meknes. After earlier violent disturbances in 1981 and 1984, it became clear that the socio-economic reforms implemented in Morocco since the beginning of the 1980s, perceived as absolutely necessary after a severe debt-crisis, were hitting ordinary citizens the most. The implementation of the first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1983 generated new and radical reforms. It was the watershed moment from which the current political transformations and the concomitant Moroccan state-reformation process are to be explained (Catusse, 2008). To begin with, the state bureaucracy and its public administration had to be downsized to meet the new requirements of neoliberal reform. The well known formula’s of market liberalization, deregulation, fiscal discipline and the privatization of industrial activities and public services constituted the new governmental toolbox to decrease public deficit. Before the 1980s, the Moroccan political economy contained specific characteristics of a “state-developmental model” based on the principle that the state was the main driving force and the direct stimulator for the generation of economic growth (Catusse, 2009a). But this changed after 1983. More generally, the so-called Third World debt crisis at the end of the 1970s marked the beginning of the end of developmentalism (the Southern variant of Fordism) and a definite turn towards the fundamentals of neoliberal government. In that sense, and symbolically, the first SAP should not only be seen as an economic, but also a political and a social rupture. First of all, characteristic of neoliberal reform is the reconfiguration of political and economic life so as to reflect market incentives and demands. Secondly, the processes of political change were not confined to the internal or domestic Moroccan political scene. Local ruling elites, international institutions, global corporations and investors, NGOs, civil society and foreign governments were all embedded within growing networks and (transnational) political spaces making government more a “global enterprise” rather than simply a national one (Cohen & Jaidi, 2006: 3; see also Zemni & Bogaert, 2009).

In this chapter I want to give an overview of the neoliberal reforms in Morocco and demonstrate how a common hypothesis related to neoliberalism – the retreat of the state – is a misconception. Here, I draw on the arguments of scholars such as Catusse and Hibou who have shown that the powers of the state have not been restricted but rather redeployed (Catusse, 2009a; see also Hibou, 1998). As such, understanding the role of the state remains of primary importance to understand political agency in neoliberal transitions. Furthermore, I will not only demonstrate the Moroccan transition to neoliberalism but also a transition in actually existing Moroccan neoliberalism. The process of alternance, the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI, and a changing international context (e.g. the changing discourse of international institutions such as the World Bank) are crucial events that contributed to the reconfiguration of neoliberal government in Morocco. The re-invention of social development and the strong ambitions of urban redevelopment are characteristic of this particular transition in Moroccan neoliberalism. Finally, I also want to address and explore the question of class. Who rules in Morocco? The state may still play an important role in neoliberal political agency, but we should not make the mistake of reifying the state as a political actor in itself. The state cannot be seen separate from the power and (class) hierarchies that underpin and give from to its constitution. However, class analyses have been often ignored. One
of the reasons is that in the case of Morocco, and the Arab world in general, those who control the means of production and distribute capital surpluses are not perceived as an autonomous and independent class (cf. Waterbury, 1991; Aggestam, e.a., 2009). Yet, this specific perception on class is rather limited and risks to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, I argue that we should not focus too much on trying to define class based on a set of predetermined sociological categories, but interpret class more as a political process; the process of surplus appropriating. From this perspective, the notions of class and class politics are actually particularly helpful in understanding the scope and nature of political agency in neoliberal Morocco.

**Political transformations in Morocco (1980-2010): a neoliberal transition and a transition in neoliberalism**

The start of a fundamental process of political change in Morocco has often been situated in the early 1990s and not so much at the beginning of the 1980s with the implementation of the first SAP. Since the 1990s, Morocco has often been referred to as a model reformer in the MENA-region. Trying to leave the turbulent 1980s behind, late king Hassan II set Morocco on a path of political and social reform. This involved the so-called *alternance* process. The riots in Fez in December 1990 against the US-led invasion of Iraq (an invasion that was supported by the Morocco government), the increasing international criticism with regard to Morocco’s human rights record, the continuation of the conflict in the Western Sahara and the publication of Gilles Perrault’s *Notre ami le Roi* (1990), which denounced Hassan II’s thirty years of human rights violations and criticized France’s policy of turning a blind eye to these violations, were some of the main events which urged the monarchy to implement serious political reforms to ensure its survival and maintain its political grip (Sater, 2010). At the beginning of the decade, Hassan II tried to give a political sign to the outside world by creating the Advisory Council for Human Rights (CCDH), releasing many political prisoners and closing the infamous prison of Tazmamart.125 The actual political reform process started in 1992 with a constitutional reform, followed by another one in 1996. The monarchy also undertook several attempts to set up talks and negotiations with its political adversaries. This general reform process eventually led to the *alternance government* in 1998 which brought the historical opposition parties USFP, Istiqlal and PPS – since 1992 unified as an opposition to the established powers in the so-called *Koutla al-demouqratyya* or Democratic Block – into the government (Zemni & Bogaert, 2006).126 On 4 February 1998, the leader of the USFP, Abderrahman Youssoufi, was appointed prime minister. These events sparked the hope, especially among foreign observers, that a genuine process of democratization was under way. However, the *alternance* government remained a very heterogeneous coalition and the king was still in control of the so-called sovereign ministries: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Religious Affairs.127

126 PPS (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme) was the smallest of the three opposition parties beside the social democratic USFP and the conservative Istiqlal. The latter two had a history that went back to the struggle of independence.
127 For a detailed discussion on the specifics of the constitutional reforms of 1992 and 1996; the electoral reforms and a general overview of the alternance process see: Storm (2007) and Sater (2010).
Mohammed VI, who ascended the throne in 1999, further expanded the political reform process. He immediately proved his willingness to reform by getting rid of the widely despised minister of interior, Driss Basri, and acknowledging the government’s responsibility during the “années de plomb” (Vermeren, 2002). Additionally, the new king now openly stressed the importance of good governance, human rights and citizen participation in many of his royal discourses. Furthermore, Mohamed VI pushed through notable reforms such as the changes made to the Moudawana (family code) and several measures leading to a considerable improvement in human rights and freedom of press (Vermeren, 2009). Together with some important electoral reforms, these measures tempted many observers to speak of a Moroccan exception to the wider trend of authoritarian durability in the Arab region. By the end of the 1990s, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch stated that Morocco had significantly improved its human rights record and the World Bank and other international institutions lauded Morocco as being one of the ‘success-stories’ of reform in the region (Zemni & Bogaert, 2006). Within academic circles this process was looked upon with much more prudence and scepticism. Nevertheless, some observers saw promising evolutions (e.g. Malka & Aelterman, 2006). However, the story of a Moroccan exception took a setback when several suicide bombers struck Casablanca on May 16th 2003. The monarchy returned to more authoritarian methods of government and arrested thousands of Islamist suspects. After the violent events, security became an absolute priority, often at the expense of earlier achievements and progressions made in for example the domain of human rights (Zemni, 2006b; Zemni & Bogaert, 2006). Nevertheless, despite the rising criticism on the stagnation of the reform process, some still believed that Morocco’s social policies implemented after 2003 – as an immediate answer to the socio-political crisis – were evidence of a real transition. These policies were embedded within a discourse displaying a strong commitment towards democratization, poverty alleviation and social development at the highest levels of the state (Navez-Bouchanine, 2009). The Villes sans Bidonvilles program (VSBP) and the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) are two of the most salient examples.

I argue that these new social policy commitments are indeed evidence of a fundamental political transition. But the origins of this transformation should not be situated just in the 1990s, but can be traced back to the beginning of the 1980s. Furthermore, this transformation cannot be understood in terms often provided by mainstream narratives linking economic liberalization and market reform to democratization. Rather, it reflects a profound shift towards intrinsically authoritarian modalities of neoliberal government. As a result, authoritarian durability in Morocco transformed in the ways in which the interests of ruling elites and (global) economic elites are increasingly intertwined. It gave rise to situations where “market requirements” justify authoritarian and securitized interventions at the expense of genuine democratic participation. As a result, populations are being required to participate in the making of a new political world.

128 The term “Les années de plomb” (the years of lead) refers to the period (the 1970s and the 1980s) of severe social and political repression by the Moroccan monarchy.
129 However, we have seen that the freedom of the press has been under pressure the last few years. Some critical magazines and journalist have been fined for a lack of respect to either the king, the religion or the national state boundaries (the issue of the Western Sahara). With these fines and juridical battles the Moroccan authorities have tried to silence certain critical voices. The critical weekly magazine Le Journal had to close its doors in 2010 because it could not pay of their debts anymore.
in which the ability to claim and articulate political rights are circumscribed not only by “the regime,” but by the sanctions and incentives of “the free market,” and by the enduring myths of contemporary globalization (cf. Parker, 2009; Parker & Debruyne, 2011). Furthermore, the political transition in Morocco of the last three decades is not only characterized by a transition towards neoliberal modes of government but also by a fundamental transition within Moroccan neoliberalism. We therefore have to pay closer attention to state institutional reform, new methods of government, the political rationalities that underpin them, and the social and economic consequences of these shifts. In doing so, it becomes obvious that neoliberalism is a process rather than a final stage or a pre-determined model.

This transformation process within neoliberalism has been described by Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell as a transformation from a phase of roll back neoliberalism to a phase of roll out neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002; 2007). Since the introduction of a SAP in the beginning of the 1980s, Morocco entered a phase of serious economic restructuring and retrenchment. “Roll back neoliberalism” refers to this destructive moment when state power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects. The disengagement of the state from the economic sphere was the main objective. Yet, this implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back of particular (developmentalist) state functions. In Europe and the US this involved the destruction of the Keynesian welfare state institutions and functions. In the Global South, neoliberal reform, mostly implemented through programs of structural adjustment, rolled back the achievements and functions of the developmental state (e.g. import-substituting industrialization (ISI), job security in the public sector, health care, etc.). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Moroccan political economy contained specific characteristics of a ‘state developmental model’ based on the principle that the state and the domestic economic sector were the main driving forces for growth (Catusse, 2009a). But the severe state budget deficit at the beginning of the 1980s and the pressure from the IMF to comply with the prescriptions of structural adjustment, generated a radical turn. Fiscal discipline, market liberalization, the downsizing of the public sector and the privatization of important public assets were some of the main measures that were introduced to control budget deficits in Morocco. These drastic austerity measures did, however, not come without severe social costs and provoked a decade of violent urban street protests and nationwide social disturbances. Riots broke out in cities like Casablanca (1981), Marrakech (1984) and Fez (1990 and 1991).

Because of the turbulent 1980s and the limits of early neoliberal reform, an important reconstitution of the neoliberal project occurred. This resulted in the elaboration of more socially inspired state interventionist policies which evolved during and coincided with the Moroccan political reform process of the 1990s (the alternance process). Despite the fact that Middle Eastern and North African countries had been prompted to liberalize their economies since the early 1980s, foreign investments and overall economic growth remained unstable (D Davis, 2006; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). Therefore, besides

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130 The authors refer almost exclusively to the North Atlantic zone. Their description of the internal shifts in neoliberalism is an attempt to generalize the various and distinct processes of actually existing neoliberalism. In the case of Morocco, I am convinced that the concepts of roll back and roll out neoliberalism give us the opportunity to see the political changes of the last 30 years from another angle.
some political measures to improve Morocco’s human rights record, the democratic deficit and the rights of women, the Moroccan authorities also engaged in the political reconstruction of its market to attract more foreign investments and promote economic growth. The transition to this phase can be associated with what Peck and Tickell portray as the ascending moment of “roll out neoliberalism”. ¹³¹ It refers to a more creative phase of neoliberalism that is characterized by new forms of institution-building, new modes of regulation and new configurations of spatially differentiated government that transfer the ability to govern political and economic life from traditional to new governmental arrangements (see below). Therefore, in contrast to the more common idea of a “retreat of the state”, neoliberalization, as a market-building project, involves the making of a new “destructively creative” social order with the iterative roll back of those institutions and social forms associated with the former order (e.g. Keynesianism and state developmentalism), together with the roll out of new state forms, new modalities of government and new modes of regulation (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 33). In chapter 2, I already emphasized the specific changing role of the state in the development of new modalities of governmental agency to facilitate and coordinate the various processes through which societal spaces are being produced and reproduced by capitalist strategies (i.e. the processes of re-institutionalization, re-regulation and reterritorialization). In addition, as I will argue in chapter 4, these newly adopted modes of state interventions and state-led programs were also intended to include those citizens who were socially marginalized and excluded by earlier neoliberal restructurings. Both VSBP and INDH have introduced such new market-oriented modalities of government. As such, the Moroccan state apparatus played a crucial role in the transformative character of neoliberalism (and vice versa), manifested itself through specific local formations of state craft (cf. chapter 5). As such, the alternance can not only be understood as the start of a (limited) process of democratic reform, but should also be seen as the start of a process of fundamental political transformations within actually existing neoliberalism in Morocco.

The transition from roll back neoliberalism to roll out neoliberalism was a global transition, particularly noticeable in the discourse of international institutions such as the World Bank. The crisis of the 1980s and the severe protests actions that rose against structural adjustment policies around the world, set into motion a new political and academic discourse of ‘market failure’ (Roy, 2010). After the so-called “lost decades” – between 1980 and 1998 there was an average zero per capita growth in Third World countries and an increasing income divergence between rich and poor countries – a major shift occurred in development policies (Easterly, 2001). The focus shifted from structural adjustment to the promotion of ‘good governance’. Although structural adjustment as a development practice became only institutionalized in the early 1990s as the ‘Washington Consensus’, the shift towards good governance as the dominant development policy compelled the international donor community to revisit this ‘Washington Consensus’ which had dominated economic policies since the 1980s (Santiso, 2001).³² In the negative aftermath of the SAP-era, it was now clear that mere market

¹³¹ Characteristic of the period of roll out neoliberalism in Europe and the US were the “Third-Way con- tortions of the Clinton and Blair administrations” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388-389). In contrast, roll back neoliberalism could be associated with the free-market projects of Reagan and Thatcher.

³² It was however not until the economic crisis in Argentina (2001-2002) that the IMF was finally to
deregulation and price incentives were not enough to spur economic growth in the developing countries and under impulse of the then Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, the idea emerged that supporting a free market economy required state capacity (Kapoor, 2008: 29). As a result, the state, first conceived as part of the problem, became to be considered part of the solution. This change in discourse gave rise to the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ and the recognition of the important role of governments in regulatory economic policy (Stiglitz, n.d.).

The publication of the world development report of 1997 with the telling title “the state in a changing world” marked a stepping stone in the discursive transformation of neoliberalism (World Bank, 1997). Other reports followed and they all emphasized the role of governmental institutions and institution building to support an inclusive (free) market environment (e.g. World Bank, 2001). The particular shift in the 1990s implied a renewed vision on the role of the state which was clearly different from the dominant perspectives of early neoliberal orthodoxy and structural adjustment. While the so-called ‘first generation’ of neoliberal reforms aimed to stabilize and liberalize the national economies of developing countries (e.g. by rolling back state engagements in ISI-policies, food subsidies, and public sector expansion), the ‘second generation’ of neoliberal reforms turned away from the idea of autonomous self-regulating markets and aimed at reforming and strengthening governing institutions. The general explanation was that the previous failures in the developing world to spur economic growth and global market integration were generated by the incapacity of institutionally weak states. Although “state-dominated development has failed”, the World Bank insisted, “so will stateless development”. Therefore the World Bank urged to rethink the state because “development without an effective state is impossible” (World Bank, 1997: 25). In place of the advocacy for a “minimalist state”, the international institution now advocated the important role for the state in protecting and correcting markets (Panitch, 1998). In the case of the MENA-region the World Bank was convinced that weak governance had contributed to weak growth because poor governance had “shackled the business environment”:

Many factors contribute to the region’s disappointing economic performance, with weak governance at the origin of many. Governance helps determine policy formulation and implementation that, in turn, determine whether or not there is a sound, attractive business environment for investment and production. Businesses react to incentives, costs, and constraints, which are often summarized as the “business environment” or, more narrowly, as the “investment climate.” Influencing the environment for business and investment are the actions of the government in shaping and implementing policies. Needed are good policies – and good administration of policies. One without the other would be ineffective. For most MENA countries, the bureaucratic environment for doing business still lags behind that of their comparators elsewhere in the world. (World Bank, 2003: 10).

This particular political shift was not at all the prelude for the emergence of a post-

admit the failure of its monetary and structural adjustment policies (Roy, 2010).
neoliberal order – hinted at cautiously by some observers (cf. Öniş & Şenses, 2005) – but rather an indication for the fact that the core macro-economic objectives of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus needed strong institutional support in order to succeed. The former macro-economic objectives now needed to be underpinned and supported by those institutional and social prerequisites in order to achieve what neoliberal theory promised. As a result, the increased attention given to the state did not just entail that neoliberals now accepted the definite comeback of state intervention as such. It rather entailed that neoliberalism would seriously influence how state intervention was to be deployed. This gave way to new perspectives on government, public management and public intervention. Past ideas on state intervention (e.g. developmentalism, protectionism, import-substitution, etc.) were replaced by more market-oriented perspectives on public policy (e.g. new public management, workfare, good governance, etc.). ‘Government’ now had to incorporate and adjust to the principles of economic enterprise and apply to cost-efficiency, technocratic management and competition. The following statement of the former wali (governor) of Greater Casablanca, Driss Benhima, in the weekly magazine Maroc Hebdo in 2001, was revealing in regard to this new vision on government:

In the current world, the enterprise is the framework of defining government [gestion]. In fact, it has imposed this framework upon several non-economic organizations, and several administrations are currently governed [gérées] according to the running principles of enterprise (cited in Catusse, 2008: 195, own translation).

The appointment of highly skilled young technocrats – often trained in the US and in France – within the public agencies and institutions has brought in new values that are embedded in a neoliberal culture and adhere to international capitalist principles (Ibid.). Driss Benhima wasn’t the exception. In an interview with weekly magazine Telquel, the current minister of industry, trade and new technologies, Ahmed Chami, also pleaded his allegiance to this new technocratic culture, promising himself that he would run his ministry as a private company.

Ultimately, this global shift towards state-led market-oriented policy and good governance had an extra advantage for the international donor agencies. The political eco-

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133 Some observers referred to the Post-Washington Consensus as a form of “inclusive neoliberalism”, emphasizing the attention given to poverty alleviation and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) while pointing to the contradictory nature of the new consensus between neoliberal macro-economic policies and poverty-sensitive social policies (Ruckert, 2006). PRSPs were introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and the IMF as a new framework to enhance domestic poverty reduction policies and promote the cooperation between local governments and development partners (including the World Bank and the IMF). However, I don’t think that current poverty reduction policies, like for example the VSBP in Morocco, which is also promoted by the World Bank and other international donors, are inherently contradictory with the macro-economic objectives of neoliberalism. As will be discussed in chapter 4, these kind of market-oriented social policies are not just intended to reduce poverty but can also be viewed as strategies to increase the possibilities for capital surplus absorption (e.g. the social housing market) and integrate the (already limited) assets of a vast population of urban poor into the regular market-economy.


nomic theories that underpinned this shift anticipated in a way the criticisms of political adversaries who had denounced the devastating social impacts of structural adjustment. In the eyes of the World Bank and the IMF, it was now clear that the particular causes for the failure of SAPs as a development policy had little to do with the neoliberal dogmas per se. The actual increase of social inequality after structural adjustment was supposedly due to specific conditions that were not really their responsibility in the end. With the new discourse on good governance the World Bank now seemed to suggest that it were not so much the development objectives themselves that were the root of the problem (i.e. the Washington Consensus), but rather the domestic governance frameworks of the recipient countries (Jenkins, 2002). The responsibility for failure was thus passed on to the ‘developing’ countries. This said, the assumption was that free market policies would eventually prove to be effective, according to the international donor institutions, as long as the supportive institutional and legal frameworks were put in place.

Structural adjustment in Morocco: the phase of roll back neoliberalism

The 1960s and the early 1970s can best be described as the era of étatism and bureaucratic expansion in the Arab region (Ayubi, 1997). Strong bureaucratic control over the national economy and ISI-policies formed the basis for the developmental state in the region, and as I mentioned earlier in chapter 2, the ascendancy of Arab socialism was the dominant equivalent of developmentalism in the Arab World. It constituted the ideological basis for popular political forces such as Nasser in Egypt and the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq. But just as Egypt was the trendsetter for public sector expansion and ISI, it was also “the mother of Arab liberalizations” (Ibid.: 129). The economic crisis of the early 1970s and especially the soaring fuel prices generated the failure of planned industrialization in Egypt (Waterbury, 1985). President Anwar Sadat’s open door policy (infitah) of 1974 marked the beginning of a wave of economic liberalization in the rest of the region. Many countries followed in the 1980s. Especially those countries with a lack of oil resources (e.g. Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, etc.) suffered economically and their state deficits rose rapidly by the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the rise of oil-prices after 1973 was at first a huge boost for the rent-economies of the oil producing countries in the region. And Morocco shared in the benefits. The country disposed of some of the most important phosphate reserves in the world and export prices quintupled after 1973. Also in other non-oil producing countries in the region, the increased oil revenues helped to offset some of the looming problems ahead. Egypt, for example, benefited from lucrative economic rents such as foreign Arab aid in the war against Israel and the remittances of Egyptian migrant workers in the Gulf. This so-called “semi-rentier” effect compensated for the loss of efficiency of its own state-led industrial complex (Beblawi, 1990). As such, oil-importing countries in the region were thus also capable to benefit partly from the increase in petrodollars. However, the economic growth generated at that time was primarily rent-based and largely disconnected from the performances of the domestic industrial and agricultural sectors (Rivlin, 2001). As a result, their rent-dependency and the significant oil shocks of the 1980s made these economies very unstable and turned various countries in the region into a severe recession.

Growing import bills coupled with stagnant exports led to increasing budget deficits
which were mostly financed by foreign loans (both private and multilateral) (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 218). As such, there was another event that triggered the debt-crisis in the Arab region and the rest of the Third World. In 1979, Paul Volcker, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, pushed through a draconian monetary policy. During the following years, the rate of interest was often raised overnight and rose from an average of 8% in 1978 to a staggering 20% in 1981. The interest rate didn’t return to less than double digits until after 1984. This so-called “Volcker-shock” implied that money became much more expensive. The measure was taken in order to find a way out of the crisis of stagflation at that time. The primary goals of the Volcker-shock were to tackle the rising inflation, reverse the declining credibility of the American dollar and restore the Federal Reserve’s control over monetary policy. This anti-inflationary commitment by the Federal Reserve would become the anchor of a neoliberal dollar-based world economy. While the very mechanisms of this process were economic, several critical scholars argued that the overall strategy was essentially a political move to the benefit of central banking and finance capital and against the interests of organized labour and manufacturing capital (cf. Panitch & Gindin, 2003; 2005; Harvey, 2006: 17-23; Klein, 2007: 198-201; Ruccio, 2011: 214-240). Besides plunging his own country into recession and unemployment, the decision made by Paul Volcker also marked the beginning of the infamous Third World debt-crisis and the ‘lost development decades’, as many developing countries now found themselves unable to service their debts to the New York investment banks (Corbridge, 2002). According to Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, the Volcker shock was one of the decisive moments that introduced neoliberalism on a global scale (Panitch & Gindin, 2005).

The Third World debt-crisis which exacerbated quickly in the early 1980s was then counterbalanced by determined interventions of the IMF and World Bank who prioritized the economic orthodoxy of anti-inflationary policies. In turn for debt re-scheduling, the recipient countries were required to proceed with a structural adjustment. As such, the ‘Third World debt-trap’, followed by structural adjustment could also be seen as a way to hook in even the poorest countries in the world into the system of capital circulation (Harvey, 2003). According to a radical approach, external debt rescheduling was a mechanism by which capitalists and governments in advanced industrial “core” countries, extracted wealth from peripheral countries (Ruccio, 2011). Capitalists, Harvey argues, will always try to reduce the frictions of distance and the barriers for the movement of capital. If surpluses of capital and labour could not be absorbed anymore within certain territorial boundaries and regimes of regulation, then the logical solution was to find new exits for capital and new opportunities for investment in order to avoid the devaluation of capital. This is exactly what happened in the 1970s. One of the main problems after the crisis of 1973 was to find new ways to absorb greater and greater amounts of surplus capital that had piled up in the oil-rich Gulf States. These surpluses were eventually recycled by American investment banks and lent to the developing

136 Many of the petrodollars were recycled through the American investment banks and dispersed back into the world. By lending money to many of the governments in developing countries the investments banks lured these countries into a debt trap after the Volcker shock (1979-1982) (see Panitch & Ginding, 2005; Harvey, 2006). The Third World debt crisis symbolically began with the announcement of Mexico on August 18, 1982 that it could no longer service its debt. After this announcement many commercial banks cut off their lending to many other Third World debtors (Easterly, 2001).
countries (Harvey, 2010a). When debt servicing became increasingly difficult or even impossible, the resources of those countries in trouble could then easily be accumulated and integrated into the global circuit of capital under the strict rules of structural adjustment and debt repayment (Harvey, 2003).

SAPs generally sought to stimulate national savings by cutting back subsidized credit and state interference in price mechanisms. They also tried to liberalize and encourage agricultural production by ‘getting the prices right’ and abolish or phase out those policies that held down the prices of basic products like sugarcane, wheat, oil, cotton, etc. Finally, SAPs also tried to streamline the public sector and promote privatization as a development strategy in order to finance loans and reduce state deficits (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 218-227). SAPs were for instance introduced in Morocco (1983), Tunisia (1986), Jordan (1989) and Egypt (1991). In general, these reforms mainly affected the livelihoods of the poorest populations. Before the era of structural adjustment, the MENA-region had relatively reasonable income levels and redistribution mechanisms. Yet, the immediate effect of the SAPs was an increase in the cost of living, especially in the urban areas, and the layoff of redundant labour (e.g. in the public sector). Public sector cutbacks were a very sensitive measure as public employment had often been a means, also in Morocco, to buy the loyalty of the increasingly educated middle class. To put it in the worlds of Mike Davis (2006a: 152), the end of the 1970s marked the beginning of the “urban poverty’s big bang”. Ray Bush notes that despite (or because of) the economic restructuring of the region there were some improved economic performances. Nevertheless, he argues, since the 1980s, real purchasing power parity of the average citizen fell, uneven development between countries increased and income inequality grew (Bush, 2004). Consequently, drastic neoliberal reforms coincided very often with urban mass protests in the region, with violent disturbances as for instance in Egypt (1977), in Morocco (1981, 1984, 1990), in Tunisia (1984), and in Jordan (1989).

The pre-SAP decades in Morocco

Unlike other Arab countries – like for example Egypt – where the influence of Arab socialism had a significant impact, Morocco never completely embraced a state dominated sector nor did it follow the political path of many of the other states in the region (cf. Leveau, 1997; Najem, 2001; Catusse, 2008). In that sense, Morocco was a bit of an outsider. First of all, king Mohamed V and later Hassan II, who ascended the throne in 1961, installed a multi-party system. By positioning the monarchy symbolically above party-politics, the king could supervise the political scene as an arbiter and employ a divide and rule strategy. Secondly, most other Arab countries implemented

137 It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate in great detail the political economy of Morocco before the 1980s and the shifting political alliances since the beginning of the Protectorate. For more detailed information: (see, amongst others: Waterbury, 1970; Leveau, 1985; Zartman, 1987; Santucci, 1992; White, 2001; Sater, 2010).

138 This was not done without a power struggle. In fact, the first decade of the new Moroccan state was characterized by an overt political confrontation between the nationalist movement who had fought for independence and the makhzen (the king’s entourage). But thanks to a complex strategy of divide and rule and different relations of state clientilism and patronage, the makhzen managed, in the end, to establish its political hegemony at the cost of the nationalist movement and other social forces (e.g. the military). It was only after two failed coups in the early 1970s that Hassan II established firm control. A Moroccan colleague
policies to promote rapid industrialization often at the expense of the agricultural sector. The monarchy did not follow that trend. On the contrary, it actively developed and prioritized the agricultural sector after the independence in 1956. The palace saw a stable rural landowning class as one of the essential foundations of its power base (Pennell, 2000: 306). Investments in the countryside were first of all an attempt to pull the large propertied classes into the patronage network of the ruling elites. Additionally these investments were also an attempt to halt the continuous rural exodus towards the cities. As such, the palace intended to limit the political weight of the cities and the urban nationalist movement. Indeed, during the first years of independence, the monarchy was mixed up in a political power struggle with the Istiqlal party, the nationalist party who had played a significant role in the struggle for independence. Thirdly, while important regional countries such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq turned to the Soviet Union for support, Morocco turned to the West. The US and especially France were its most important allies (Tuquoi, 2006). Morocco clearly opted for political and economic alliances outside the Maghreb region. Between 1976 and 1980, Moroccan exports to other Maghreb countries never exceeded more than 2% of the national total, while imports even never exceeded more than 0.2%. From the mid-1970s, the United States was the main weapons supplier for the Moroccan army forces and Morocco turned to Saudi Arabia for oil imports. Furthermore, never did any country receive more French bilateral aid as Morocco after 1975 (Pennell, 2000: 342-344). Finally, in contrast to other Arab countries who opted for a planned economy, Hassan II had always opted for a controlled liberal economic system.

This didn’t mean, however, that the Moroccan economy did not contain specific characteristics of a developmental state model. In Morocco, as elsewhere, the root causes

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139 Through the monarchy’s support of large landownership, it even managed to drive a wedge between the more conservative Istiqlal members and the leftist movement around Mehdi Ben Barka. Among the fist there were many landowners – such as Istiqlal’s agriculture minister Omar Abdeljalil who benefited from the state’s promotion of the agricultural sector. The more leftists members of the Istiqlal advocated a land reform – among them former prime minister Abdellah Ibrahim – to the benefit of the (landless) peasants. Eventually, the movement around Ben Barka left the Istiqlal to form the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP). Furthermore, no Moroccan government wanted to expropriate the foreign (mostly French) landowners in the beginning in order to limit the flight of foreign capital (see Pennell, 2000: 306; Sater, 2010: 91).

140 With Algeria for example, the Moroccan government still has a discordant relationship to the present day. The Algerian support for Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro) in their struggle for an independent Western Sahara is still one of the main reasons for the troubled relationship between the two countries.

141 Despite the clear alliance with the Western Bloc, Pennell notes that Hassan II did not ignore the Soviet Union and he kept good relationships with the Russian leadership in the 1960s and the 1970s. In 1978, Morocco singed an important fishery deal with the Soviet Union which turned out to be the largest commercial deal between the Soviet Union and a developing country that was ever to be signed (Pennell, 2000: 344). During the first five-year plan (1960-1965), import-substituting industrialization and agrarian redistribution of land were pushed forward as key strategies for economic independence. This was established under the socialist Irbahim government. However, after only six months these plans were already shelved when Hassan II dissolved the government and opted for agricultural modernization (i.e. irrigation) in favour of the large foreign and domestic landowners (Sater, 2010).
for structural adjustment can be traced back to the convergence of ISI-policies, the commodities price boom of the 1970s and the accumulation of international indebtedness (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 243; see also World Bank, 1987). The involvement of the state in the economy gradually increased in the first two decades after the independence. After all, it was through state intervention in the economic field and through neo-patrimonial practices and state clientilism that the monarchy assured itself of the loyalty of the rural elites, foreign capital and the traditional urban bourgeoisie in its struggle against its political opponents. The state-administration’s role in the economy was used to protect the private interests of those families closely tied to the monarchy. Consequently the Moroccan state apparatus was above all an instrument in the hands of a minority who used it to secure their own privileges (Waterbury, 1970; Ben Ali, 1997). Over the years, substantial state support was given to the domestic industry and agricultural crops received price support. Yet, these forms of state intervention and state control over the economy were not at all inspired by socialist or populist motives but by mere economic necessity. To be sure, the ruling elites’ economic ideology was always liberal and they supported the private sector. Although the public authorities nationalized many of the former French-owned major industries such as phosphates – via the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP) – state intervention in the Moroccan industry during the 1950s and 1960s could be attributed more to the structural weakness of the domestic private sector than to a coherent developmentalist strategy (Kaioua, 1996: 113). For example, the Moroccan state was obliged to nationalize a large portion of Morocco’s export trade in 1965 (e.g. citrus fruit, artisanal products, vegetables) through the Office de Commercialisation et d’Exportation (OCE) because no domestic private group or investor was able to take on this organization (Waterbury, 1970: 132).

Since the independence in 1956 there were significant attempts to build an industrial sector. These efforts were taken on by the Moroccan state administration in cooperation with both domestic and foreign private capital. The rise of the textile industry, for example, was closely related to early ISI-policies adopted in the first five-year plan (Cammett, 2007). Nevertheless, the share of industrial output in the Moroccan GDP remained very modest compared to other sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Additionally, the subsequent national economic plans (three year Plan of 1965-1967 & and five year Plan of 1968-1972) clearly subordinated industrial activity to the agricultural sector. The industrial sector was developed mainly to support and accompany the latter (Jaidi, 1992). In short, until the end of the 1960s, the agricultural sector was prioritized over the industrial sector, the Moroccan private sector remained relatively weak and the domestic economy still continued to be dominated by foreign capital.143

Yet, the current socio-economic strategies reached their limits at the end of the decade. The political discourses of the 1960s, emphasizing the country’s agricultural vocation, were replaced by another type of discourse at the beginning of the 1970s, now focusing more on the role of industry as the engine of the Moroccan economy (Jaidi, 1992; Ben Ali, 1997). The unabated rural exodus, the chaotic urban expansion and the natural and structural limits of the agricultural sector reinforced the belief to expand and deepen

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143 The French Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas, for example, controlled no less than 50 companies through its participation in the kingdom’s largest holding Omnium Nord Africain (ONA) (Sater, 2010: 95).
state intervention in the economy.\textsuperscript{144} Moreover, the oil boom of 1973, which caused the
strong rise of international export-prices of phosphates, provided the government with
considerable resources for public spending via the state-led OCP.\textsuperscript{145} Also, at the begin-
nning of the 1970s, it became clear that the Moroccan society was changing rather radically (e.g. the continuous urbanization). This was putting more and more pressure on existing relations of power and patronage. The urban peripheries were exposed to the consequences of rapid population growth, housing shortages, economic involution and increasing unemployment. Improved education and increased demographic pressure on the urban regions resulted in an urban middle class that had little prospects for the future. The frustrations resulting out of the social inequalities led to widespread disaf-
fection which threatened the existing political order and the stability of the monarchy (Joffé, 1988). It became even more evident that the monarchy had to change its political strategies when two coup attempts (in July 1971 and August 1972) radically demonstrated that the social basis of the monarchy needed to be altered.\textsuperscript{146}

As such, several strategies were adopted to boost the economy and renew the monar-
chy’s social pact with the elites. First of all, with the 1973-1977 Plan, the monarchy
gradually shifted its priorities from the rural to the urban regions. ISI-strategies were re-
invigorated and public capital invested primarily in the production of basic consumer
goods such as sugar, dairy products, oil and fodder, strategic products such as cement
and strategic sectors such as mining. Secondly, land redistribution was also part of the
implementation of the new social pact and with the promulgation of the \textit{dahir} (royal
decree) of 3 March 1973 foreign owned agricultural property was to be expropriated
and distributed among large Moroccan landowners.\textsuperscript{147} Between 300,000 and 400,000
hectares were expropriated and transferred into Moroccan hands. Most of these lands
were controlled by two state-controlled holdings, SODEA and SOGETA. It assured the
participation of some of the wealthiest elites of the country, many of whom were part of
the royal family. Accordingly, in the end, only those with high connections within the
state-administration benefited from the agrarian reform (see Swearingen, 1987; Pen-
nell, 2000; Ben Ali, 1997; White, 2001). Thirdly, the favourable economic rents were

\textsuperscript{144} One of the reasons for the political economic shift was the structural crisis of the agricultural sector
in the 1970s. Some important factors were population growth, changing trade relations with the European
Community, periodic droughts, price settings to sustain and subsidize the urban poor and favoritism to-
wards the industrial farmers at the expense of small scale farmers (for extensive discussion see Swearingen,
1987).

\textsuperscript{145} Until today, the OCP remains the most important public company in the Kingdom with more than
30,000 employees. It produces 3\% of Morocco’s GDP and represents 30\% of Moroccan exports (Catusse,
2009b: 63).

\textsuperscript{146} After the coups, Hassan II attempted to reduce the influence of the military in the Ministry of Interior
(General Oufkir, then minister of Interior, was accused to be the instigator behind the second coup). He also
turned to the nationalist movement, including the leftist UNFP (which was severely repressed during the
1960s) for negotiations. As a result of the search for a new political consensus between the monarchy and
the nationalist movement, the UNFP broke up and one of the fractions formed the USFP. This new leftist
party distanced itself from the ‘revolutionary option’ espoused ten years earlier by Mehdi Ben Barka. The
monarchy from her side complied with some of the demands of the nationalist bourgeoisie by adopting
nationalist policies such as the Maroccanization of the economy, the Arabization of education, etc. (for a
detailed discussion see Sater, 2010: 30-52).

In Moroccan law, a \textit{dahir} is a royal decree. It is an instrument by which the king legally enforces his deci-
sions.
also used to invest massively in the expansion of the public sector and redistribute some of the national wealth through employment policies and job security. In addition, the government continued to subsidize essential food items. As such, the palace tried to establish a more stable social pact with the working classes and managed to purchase the loyalty of an emerging middle class and growing group of educated youth in the cities. Finally, the monarchy also tried to strengthen the private sector. Besides the implementation of several protectionist measures (e.g. import taxes and import-licenses), the government issued the **Moroccanization law** in order to secure at least 50% of Moroccan ownership in domestic firms and promote an emerging corporate class (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali, 2007). These laws were promulgated by the **dahir** of 2 March 1973.\(^{148}\) With this law the palace sought the return of Moroccan assets into Moroccan hands.\(^{149}\) By June 1975, 49% of the targeted Moroccan companies were moroccanized (54% of the commercial sector and 45% of the industrial sector) (Rami, 2007: 68).

The political relationship between the monarchy and the Moroccan bourgeoisie was very complex. In the past, the palace had always acknowledged the existence of an important and influential urban bourgeoisie such as the Fassis in the north and to a lesser extent the Soussis in the South.\(^{150}\) Through special favours and practices of clientilism, the palace had managed to incorporate the traditional merchant families (mostly Fassis) into the royal sphere of influence. Yet, at the same time, and via the state’s grip over the economy, the palace also tried to control and circumscribe their power (White, 2001).\(^{151}\) After all, Hassan II was reluctant to see the emergence of a strong independent bourgeoisie that could eventually form a counter force to his political power. With the Moroccanization of the economy, the monarchy sought to deepen and strengthen its ties with the bourgeoisie while it encouraged the controlled emergence of a capitalist elite


\(^{149}\) It must be noted that this didn’t always imply a significant loss of influence of foreign capital in the Moroccan economy. Although the Moroccanization law encouraged Moroccans to take over foreign businesses, many of them actually established strategic partnerships with foreign capital, allowing the latter to retain and in some cases even increase its holdings in the Moroccan economy. Nevertheless, the Moroccanization did radically improve the significance of Moroccan private capital in the economic realm (Cammett, 2007: 98; see also Rami, 2007: 68-71).

\(^{150}\) The Fassis were an amalgam of some of the most important elite families in Morocco and their origins lie in the city of Fez. While these families not necessarily lived in Fez – especially, since the economic and political power centers moved respectively to Casablanca and Rabat during the Protectorate – it was the family’s original descent that earned them the label of Fassi. Throughout the period of the Protectorate some of these families had managed to preserve their influence and became powerful political actors after the independence. The Soussis are originally petty tradesmen of the Souss Valley. Throughout the years some of these families managed to built large trade businesses and gained considerable political influence.

\(^{151}\) John Waterbury notes that it were those Fassi families with considerable economic power and commercial networks that managed to preserve their influence during and after the French Protectorate. Their livelihood was assured through commerce and real estate. Other Fassi families, mostly those who depended on the Sultan for important administrative posts, could not fall back on an autonomous economic base. The offspring of the commercial families from the cities were also largely responsible for the founding of the nationalist movement. The Istiqlal party is generally regarded as the Fassi party and the direction of the party has always been in the hands of these economically powerful families (Waterbury, 1970: 94-106). For example, the current prime minister and leader of the Istiqlal, Abbas al-Fassi, is married to the daughter of one of the founders of the party, Mohamed Allal al-Fassi. As mentioned above, the Moroccan monarchy was involved in an extensive power struggle with an important segment of the urban bourgeoisie during the first decades of its rule. It were these latter families that saw great benefit in the partial expulsion of foreign economic participations and the moroccanization of the economy in the 1970s. Some important measures taken by the public authorities in that period can thus be seen as a concession to their needs and interests.
under the wings of the state. Therefore, the Moroccanization should be seen above all as a political manoeuvre. To be sure, it fulfilled the expectations of a rising capitalist bourgeoisie, reinforced their positions, expanded their ranks and led to the concentration and accumulation of private capital, but exactly in such a manner that it could be controlled by those who controlled the state. As such, state power was mobilized to enlarge the monarchy’s support base and helped the economic elites to accumulate wealth beyond the means of mere land property and commerce (as they did mainly in the past).

As a result, private capital depended on the state to improve their economic positions and redefine their relations with foreign capital. Access to the state apparatus and state favours became a necessary condition for success in business. In return, large parts of the bourgeoisie re-invigorated their loyalty to the palace and were brought into the realm of the makhzen (Ben Ali, 1997; Cammett, 2007). Despite the official discourse that the Moroccanization was intended to encourage middle class ownership in the private sector, the policies, together with most other policies of state intervention, allowed a small segment of capitalist families, closely tied to the monarchy, to enrich themselves. A minority of traditional economic elites and the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy managed to enlarge their holdings in the Moroccan economy and gained control over more than 60% of the capital involved (Cherkaoui & Ben Ali, 2007). Approximately 36 capitalist families gained control over roughly 220 million MAD involved in the process (Ben Ali, 1997). And despite the fact that Moroccan rulers always emphasized the inherent liberal ideology behind their economic policies, the state remained the country’s most important entrepreneur, banker and employer until the end of the 1970s. This process or specific mode of production in which the state serves as the primary motor to strengthen and nurture the private sector can be labelled as a form of “state capitalism” (Waterbury, 1991; Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 206-209).

Richards and Waterbury distinguish two forms of state capitalism. First, state capitalism can be a process of accumulation in service of the private sector and private elite interests. Secondly, state capitalism can also be a process of accumulation in which the state undertakes all activities of resource mobilization and infrastructure development and, as such, captures the surpluses to finance its own expansion, often at the expense of the private sector. In the Moroccan case, state capitalism was specifically deployed to service the private interests of the elites. The state transferred surpluses and profits to the private sector and absorbed most of the investment risks. The Moroccan ISI-policies should therefore not be confused with more populist or socialist ISI-policies (such as in Egypt under Nasser). The increasing control of the Moroccan state over the economy did not involve a major shift in the power relations between workers and capitalists. Public ownership or public intervention didn’t mean, in the case of Morocco, that the profit motive had disappeared or that the workers had some significant control over the surpluses generated by their own labour (Ibid.: 207). One of the reasons for the establishment of more socialist inspired developmental state models was exactly a fundamental change in the balance of power between labour and capital, which then led to

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152 However, the benefits of the Moroccanization policies were not exclusively monopolized by the traditional elites. A new emerging group of petty tradesmen and small businessmen from the Souss area also profited from the new economic opportunities (Sater, 2010: 95).
serious policies of redistribution. Additionally, Myriam Catusse notes that, differently from other countries in the region, the Moroccan state had showed itself particularly modest in terms of redistributing national wealth and providing social security for its citizens (Catusse, 2009a: 201).

The absence of durable and extensive rent revenues from for example oil, limited the monarchy’s capacities to articulate public loyalties on the basis of a rentier social contract (Leveau, 1997). The policies of state intervention in the mid-1970s were only successful as long as the rents from the export in phosphate were high. After the oil boom of 1973 prices had quintupled within only three years time and the government could significantly increase its public spending policies. However, by the end of 1975 the international price dropped back to the level of 1973. But, it was just at that time that the king had mobilized the ‘Green March’ and the Moroccan government had to find ways to finance the conflict in the Western Sahara. Overall, government expenditure continued to expand. For example, public investment increased by 340% between 1974 and 1978 and more than 250 public companies were created in that same period (Sater, 2010: 95). Moreover, between 1970 and 1984 current expenditures of the government rose from 14% to 30% of GDP (World Bank, 1987). Consequently, by the end of the 1970s, Morocco’s state interventionist efforts began to crumble. It became clear – after several droughts, a decline in phosphate revenues and the growing cost of the conflict in the Western Sahara – that the Moroccan government could not sustain their public spending spree. The sharp fall in export earnings from phosphates and the crisis in the agricultural sector (with a decline in export earnings in agricultural products) led to a sharp increase of the public deficit. Despite efforts to keep spending under control with the first austerity measures at the end of the 1970s foreign public debt increased from 19.6% of GDP in 1975 to a staggering 85% in 1983 (Cohen and Jaïdi, 2006: 37; see also World Bank, 1987).

Structural adjustment and urban unrest

In 1978 the Moroccan government launched a first three year austerity plan (1978-1980) in order to cope with the increasing deficits. Public investments were cut, some taxes were increased and the salaries of public servants were restricted. In the social sector, spending on health care and housing declined. These measures, however, were felt the most by the poorest social groups in society and under popular pressure the government retreated some of their measures in 1979, granting a 10% raise to average civil servants’ salaries and an increase of the minimum wage by 30-40% (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 244). A second attempt to cut public spending on food subsidies was quickly aborted when a sharp rise in consumer prices led to the first so-called ‘bread-riots’ in spring 1981. The immediate trigger for the disturbances in 1981 was the deci-

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153 In the history of Morocco, shifts in the balances of power, especially those between capital and labour, were less radical and have been integrated relatively easy into the realm of makhzen power (see also below).

154 But even at the height of the phosphate boom, state expansion was still partly financed by foreign borrowing (Richards and Waterbury, 2008: 243).

155 Current expenditures are recurring forms of spending. In other words, those government expenditures that are consumed and only limited in time. These expenses on goods and services are normally consumed within the current year (e.g. salaries, food subsidies, health care, pensions and other welfare benefits, etc.).

156 These riots were also called the first IMF-riots as the government had accepted IMF-austerity measures
sion by the government to raise prices on staple goods between 14 and 77%. The price of milk rose by 14%, oil 28%, flower with 40%, sugar between 40 and 50%, and butter even with 76% (Clément, 1992: 403). To contest these decisions, the Union Marocaine des Travailleurs, the oldest trade union of the country and historically linked to the nationalist movement, called for a general strike in Casablanca on June 18. The Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT) – another one of the biggest trade unions and back then linked to the USFP – called for a nationwide general strike only two days later, on June 20 1981. The first strike was largely successful and the UMT, together with the other unions who joined them, managed to shut down Casablanca (Clément & Paul, 1984). One day later, and in order to keep the situation under control, the government arrested some of the leaders of the CDT in order to anticipate the second strike. But this couldn’t prevent the second strike from taking place also.

In contrast to the previous one, the CDT strike assumed a more militant and radical character and, eventually, the situation got out of control. During the strike social tensions escalated and riots broke out in the peripheries of the city of Casablanca. These quickly expanded to the city-centre. The rioters were mostly young and unemployed inhabitants from the poorer neighbourhoods. In the morning of June 20, cars were set on fire in the peripheries of the city. At noon, some 3000 people coming from the slums and the illegal quarters occupied one of the main highways and raised barricades. Later on, banks were set on fire, and other public and private buildings and vehicles were damaged or even destroyed. The government answered with severe repression and police forces even fired on the demonstrators. The siege lasted for several days, helicopters were deployed to survey the sites of unrest and the army was brought into action. In the end, thousands of rioters were arrested, party newspapers were suspended, local CDT offices were shut down and several leaders of the opposition and the trade unions, amongst them CDT secretary-general Moubir Amaoui, were thrown in prison. Estimates of the amount of casualties varied between 66 deaths (official number) and between 600 and 1,000 deaths (figures from the opposition and international observers) (Ibid.: 403-404; Lust-Okar, 2005: 128-130).

The first attempts by the Moroccan government to push through some serious austerity measures largely failed. The severe social unrests had made the political climate very unstable. Additionally, the agricultural sector had to cope with a series of crises in the early 1980s. Several droughts, bad government decisions and the agricultural competition from new European Community members such as Portugal and Spain worsened the economic condition of the Moroccan agricultural sector and accelerated rural migration (Swearingen 1987). On top of that, the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran caused a second oil shock. As a result, public spending remained high and even increased, and the government saw it necessary to continue their foreign borrowing. Morocco resorted to private loans from the international financial markets to cover the deficits, averaging 800 million USD a year between 1978-1980 (Rhazaoui, 1987). In order to confront the economic challenges, the government launched an ambitious five-year Plan (1981-
1985) based on an estimated GDP growth rate of almost 7% per annum. To achieve this objective, the plan continued to put emphasis on import substitution and an increase of public investments. Yet, no real structural changes were planned. The government probably hoped that the phosphate price shocks were temporarily and attempted to “grow through the recession” (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 243). According to the World Bank the investment plan by far exceeded the available resources and set the stage for a necessary retrenchment (World Bank, 1987). By mid-1983 it became clear that Morocco could no longer service its debts and pay for critical imports. The country was near bankrupt and joined the list of the fifteen most indebted countries in the world (Catusse, 2009b: 62; Sater, 2010: 97). Foreign creditors refused to continue to finance Morocco’s deficits and the government was obliged to turn to the IMF and the World Bank for help.

Between 1980 and 1993 there were nine IMF-interventions, six official debt rescheduling exercises and three commercial debt rescheduling exercises (Pfeifer, 1999; Pennell, 2000: 357; Joffé, 2009). In 1983, the first Structural Adjustment Program was implemented. Morocco obtained rescheduling loans from the Paris Club (1,350 million USD) and from the London Club (630 million USD) (World Bank, 1987). Both the World Bank and the IMF advised the Moroccan government on economic reform, but did so from a different perspective. While the World Bank approach concentrated more on augmenting the supply of foreign exchange and improving the efficiency of resource allocation (i.e. market re-regulation and liberalization), the IMF concentrated mainly on expenditure containment and public deficit reduction (i.e. the implementation of austerity measures). Nevertheless, both the World Bank and the IMF had the same macroeconomic objective (Horton, 1990). In general, this objective of macroeconomic stability was achieved through the different (typically orthodox) means of market liberalization and deregulation: major cuts in public expenditures, investments and consumer subsidies, public wage restraint, the promotion of exports through the devaluation of the national currency, the reduction of import taxes and customs tariffs, fiscal discipline and reform, the liberalization of the banking system (in 1985), the mobilization of domestic capital, the attraction of FDI through the planning of economic free zones, and last but not least the privatization of public assets and the roll back of direct state intervention. In general, the mobility of capital and the means of production were drastically improved and the direct economic control of the state drastically reduced. As a result, budgetary deficits were reduced to around 2% of GDP in 1985. Additionally, Morocco joined the GATT in 1987 and the WTO in 1995.

IMF-promoted stabilization was above all intended to restore macro-economic disequilibria, not to improve the social situation of the poorest among the population.

159 For a detailed discussion of the plan see Rhazaoui (1987).
160 For a detailed World Bank discussion on Morocco’s economic policies of the 1970s and 1980s, the IMF and World Bank interventions and its public deficit increase see Horton (1990).
161 The Paris Club works closely together with the IMF and consists of the representatives of the biggest economies in the world. It brings together debtor and creditor states for negotiations on debt rescheduling. The London club as a forum brings together debtor states and major commercial creditors for debt rescheduling (Joffé, 2009: 163).
162 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established with the Marrakech Agreement of May 1995. The fact that the WTO was founded in Marrakech proved Morocco’s commitment to trade liberalization.
As mentioned above, SAPs hit the middle and low-income groups the hardest. While international financial institutions do not contradict this, they often argued that some sacrifices have to be made in order to secure sustainable growth and welfare in the long term. However, structural adjustment in Morocco has set the stage for a growing uneven development in the country that hasn’t really improved ever since. The economic adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s coincided with a decline in real and relative incomes (Cohen, 2004). In 1970 40.5% of the urban households lived in a two-room flat. In 1985 this number increased to 54.5%. Households who disposed of four or more rooms represented 31% of the population in 1970 while in 1985 this number decreased to only 19%. At the same time the average family size in the city rose from 4.3 in 1960 and 5.2 in 1970 to 5.4 in 1982 (Rachik, 1995: 96). On the human development index of the UNDP, Morocco passed from 117th place in 1995 to the 130th place in 2009. Absolute poverty in Morocco (people living beneath the poverty line) rose during the 1990s from 13% of the population in 1991 to 19% in 1999 (Catusse, 2008: 143). The disappointing economic growth, especially during the 1990s, and the cutbacks in public investment correlated with high rates of poverty and unemployment (Cohen & Jaidi, 2006). Unemployment was estimated at 30% to 40% in the early 1980s and especially affected young educated Moroccans who saw their prospects of working in the public administration shattered (Brand, 1998; Cohen 2004; Cohen & Jaidi, 2006). And as the economic crisis continued in the urban regions, new violent demonstrations broke out on 5 January 1984 in Marrakech. In the days that followed, the violence spread again throughout the country, especially in the North. The disturbances of 1984 were labelled as the second IMF-revolts – due to the rise in prices of consumer goods – and they comprised an accumulation of revolts in more than 50 cities. They had started with a university strike in December 1983 in Marrakech. In total, more than 14,000 people were arrested and casualties were estimated at 200 (Seddon, 1989; Clément, 1992). Six years later, a new general strike on 14 December 1990, set the beginning of another violent explosion. This time, it originated in Fez and then spread to the cities of Tangiers, Kenitra and Meknes (Madani, 1995). The second Gulf war was one of the triggers for disgruntled citizens to come out and protest. Again shops, banks and state buildings had been set on fire and the Moroccan army had to intervene to restore order.

One of the main social consequences of the implementation of the SAP was the dramatic reduction of the recruitment rate in the public sector. Between 1982 and 1983 available public sector jobs dropped dramatically from 50,000 to 5,000 (Akesbi, 2003). During the following years the amount of public sector jobs increased again but never reached the levels of the previous decade. In contrast, the 1970s, with its favourable economic climate, the modernization of the industry and the continuous urban migration had seen the emergence of a growing urban middle class that was largely incorporated into the expanded public sector. As part of the new social pact between the makhzen and the new urban middle class, graduates were practically guaranteed a job in the public sector. Just as in other Maghreb countries like Algeria and Tunisia, public sector employment was one of the main government instruments to redistribute wealth

163 The rate of children per women (total fertility) was still very high in the beginning of the 1980s in Morocco. Rates were 5.65 in 1980 and 5.12 in 1984 (for detailed numbers see: http://www.gapminder.org).
165 Official figures give usually a less worrisome picture.
in Morocco (Catusse & Destremau, 2010). Between 1970 and 1977 university enrolment tripled and the number of public servants grew at an annual rate of 5.5% average (Cohen, 2003). But as a result of structural adjustment, this social pact could not be sustained and a growing group of young graduates struggled to find adequate job opportunities. Since the early 1990s the unemployed graduates (diplômés chômeurs) started to mobilize for the first time and established the Moroccan National Association of Unemployed Graduates (ANDCM). Since then, the unemployed graduates have become a permanent and highly visible feature of the social protest landscape in Morocco (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). They are engaged in almost daily protest actions in front of the national parliament in Rabat and they demand to be employed in the public sector. From the mid-1990s onwards, new groups of unemployed graduates (such as the post-graduates with engineering, master and doctoral degrees) have appeared on stage (Emperador, 2007; 2010).

In general we can conclude that increased global market integration and market liberalization in the 1980s and the 1990s radically reorganized the labour markets in Morocco and elsewhere in the Arab region. As a consequence, it radically altered the position of the urban middle classes. Social inequality between the mainly young lower and middle-income populations and the business and political elites of Morocco increased. After the structural adjustments, a growing mass of urban residents now had to search for a different future (Cohen, 2004). It is than not a surprise, that we have seen an increase of social protest in Morocco over the past decade, especially in the smaller towns where social misery, despair and inequality among the country’s middle classes are even felt stronger than in the largest cities (Bennafia & Emperador, 2009). It were also these deprived middle classes that recently mobilized in the streets of Tunisia and Egypt in January and February of 2011 to chase away respectively Ben Ali and Mubarak. In the end, it was not so much poverty but rather social decline and increasing inequality that pushed these peoples to exceed themselves and become genuine revolutionary forces.

**Accumulation by dispossession**

By the early 1990s, and in spite of the social costs, Morocco was being pushed forward by the World Bank and the IMF as a success story of macro-economic stabilization and text-book economic reform (World Bank, 1990; 1994; for a more critical account see Pfeifer, 1999). However, despite more than a decade of structural adjustment, external debt servicing continued to take a substantial portion of state revenues and public debt even continued to grow (Brand, 1998: 33). In order to service those debts, the privatization of public assets and public companies was the logical next step in the economic restructuring of the country. Privatization was the dominant ‘development’ strategy in the Global South to redeem state deficits after the Third World debt crisis of the early 1980s. Within neoclassical and neoliberal discourses privatization strategies were presented as necessary to roll back highly inefficient public enterprise. In addition, privatization was also presented as necessary to promote a political transition as the personal ‘cash cows’ of rent-seeking state elites would be dismantled. Economic activity would then be a matter of more honest private initiative and independent entrepreneurship.

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166 According to Laurie Brand, overall recovery was still much slower than previously estimated and economic windfalls at the end of the 1980s were due to a sharp rise of productivity and export in the agricultural sector.
Three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco

– the democracy of the market as it was called euphemistically. New social groups would then be empowered and bring forth the necessary political change. However, two important remarks have to take the edge of this neoliberal myth. First of all, the move towards privatization was inspired more by the severe decline of public revenues, especially in the MENA-region, than by the so-called inefficiency of public enterprises and the efficiency of private ones (Ayubi, 1997). In matter of fact, the first companies that were privatized in Morocco were some of the jewels of the public sector and had little or no efficiency or budget problems whatsoever (Khosrowshahi, 1997; Catusse, 2008; 2009a). Secondly, there are multiple political, economic and social causes and consequences that have led to the opening up of the economy for private capital. Indeed, one of the effects was the loss of state-clientilistic means to buy off the loyalty of a rent-seeking elite. Additionally, privatization also implied the end of the social pact between the ruling elite and the urban middle classes via employment in the public sector.

This said, it is true that privatization could disturb the former neo-patrimonial logic of the political regimes in the Arab region. Yet, this didn’t mean that political liberalization was the logical outcome. Privatization policies were still a state-led and state-controlled policy (Ayubi, 1997). Those who controlled the state, also controlled the specific implementation of privatization policies. As a result, we can see that in Morocco, as elsewhere in the region, privatization served also another end besides filling up the state coffers. Privatization became a new source of patronage for the makhzen to reinforce and extend their links with the political and economic elites of the country (Ben Ali, 1997; Khosrowshahi, 1997; Najem, 2001; Catusse, 2008). Nevertheless, as Myriam Catusse and Béatrice Hibou have stressed, while the politics of privatization may have little transformed the sociological fabric of the elites in the beginning, it did significantly transform the modalities of governmental action (Hibou, 2004b; Catusse, 2008; 2009a). Consequently, both structural adjustment in general and privatization in specific, made former networks of state clientilism and neo-patrimonialism inadequate to maintain the political status quo. The opening up of the domestic economies in the region radically changed political practices, leading up to new practices and modes of intervention, and in some cases even to the emergence of new groups and new political actors. For starters, it brought international capital back in the front seat. 45% of all privatizations in Morocco realized between 1993 and 2002 were allocated to foreign investors (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).

Privatization policies in Morocco were not implemented until 1989. In December that year, national parliament validated a new law that set the conditions for privatization. On 11 April 1990 law 39-89 was published and officially kicked off the privatization of public assets. Still, it lasted until February 1993 when the first public company, the Société des Dérivés du Sucre, was privatized. During the whole process of privatizations the state maintained firm control and law 39-89 provided for the creation of three new state-organismsthat had to overview the process: a new ministry, the Ministry of Privatizations, a transfer commission and an evaluation committee (the Valuation Authority).167 The latter had to set the minimum price for a company sale and enjoyed considerable legal autonomy. For example, the government could not oppose the price

167 The Valuation Authority is the name used by Cameron Khosrowshahi (1997: 247).
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set by the Valuation Authority, only advice the committee to revise the price (Catusse, 2008: 77-78). As such, Hassan II kept political control over the sales. Law 39-89 listed an initial 112 businesses (76 companies and 36 hotels). It was striking that in the beginning, most of the more strategic state-led enterprises and state monopolies were missing from the list. As such, the public authorities wished to keep control over the distribution of, amongst others, water and electricity, telecommunications, public transport, mining, the social housing sector, etc… It were above all those companies in which the state participated indirectly – through public holdings such as SNI, ODI and CDG – that were the listed for privatization (El Malki & Doumou, 1992; see also Jaidi, 1992). Accordingly, the initial list called into question what rhetorically and theoretically should have been the main goal of the process, namely the elimination of inefficient public management and the dismantling of excessive and corrupt bureaucratic control (Khosrowshahi, 1997: 244). The firms on the list were not those with major budget problems. On the contrary, those sectors and companies with considerable efficiency problems were exactly those with a significant strategic and political interests. This raises the suspicion that the privatization policies were first of all politically inspired policies. The selling of profitable firms and the control over strategic but inefficient companies not only brought the accusation that the state was “privatizing the winners and nationalizing the losers”, but also demonstrated that the monarchy was reluctant to give up its economic control too fast (Ibid.:246). Moreover, during the 1990s and the 2000s some of these more strategic sectors would also be privatized (e.g. telecommunications) or incorporated into public-private partnerships (e.g. water and electricity).

Most observers agree that the privatization policies have not significantly affected the power of political elites and in reality actually further encouraged the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of a minority. Accumulated wealth was still concentrated around a few powerful families: Benjelloun (banking sector), Kettani (textile), Lamrani, Berrada, Akkhenouch and last but not least the royal family itself who dominates the domestic market with its control over the consortium Omnium Nord Africain. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, privatization did bring forth considerable changes. First of all, the privatization policies, together with other free market policies, entailed a de facto de-maroccanization of the economy as it again permitted the establishment of totally foreign-owned companies. This increased the flow of foreign capital to Morocco. For example, although initially excluded, the telecom business became available for private investors at the beginning of the 21st century and Méditel became a consortium in the hands of one of the primary Moroccan capitalists, Othman Benjelloun, together with important foreign participations of Portugal Telecom and the Spanish multinational-

168 There was also some opposition against the privatization policies from within the government apparatus. The rent-seeking elite and government technocrats, occupying key positions in the state administration, did not want to give up their prerogatives and feared the withering away of their political resources as their careers depended on the monarchy. Indeed, public sector managers were directly nominated and relieved of their positions by dahir.
169 SNI (Société Nationale d’Investissement). SNI was a holding created via the Moroccanization law and is one of the dominant investors in Morocco. ODI (Office de Développement Industriel).
al Telefónica.\textsuperscript{170} As such, Méditel was Morocco’s first private mobile phone operator.\textsuperscript{171} Additionally, the privatization policies implicated above all the dominant return to the forefront of French private holdings. Morocco’s state monopoly in telecommunications, Maroc Telecom, was sold to the French multinational Vivendi in two times (first 35\% in 2002, later 51\% in 2005). Other French companies such as Société Générale and BNP Paribas (banking sector), Axa (assurances), Accor and Club Med (tourism), Suez and Veolia (water and electricity), Alstom (transport), Bouygues (constructions), etc. have now firmly established themselves in the Moroccan domestic market. Overall, between 2001 and 2005, 80\% of FDI was realized by French (66\%) and Spanish (14\%) investors. Only, recently things are changing with the emergence of investors from the Gulf in cities like Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakech (Vermeren 2009: 260-277).

Secondly, economic liberalization since the early 1980s changed the behaviour of the monarchy itself. In 1982, king Hassan II increased his stake in the holding Omnium Nord African (ONA), which is the largest private conglomerate of the country. He bought his share from French owners for a sum of at least 100 million USD (Clément, 1986). From that moment on, the king, as the primary political leader of the country, became also the most important private businessman of Morocco. Through the king’s own private holding SIGER (anagram for REGIS) the royal family is now the majority shareholder of ONA. Catusse (2008) argues that ONA was one of the principal beneficiaries of the privatization policies. Through its different subsidiaries and minority participations, ONA is a major player in the retail market, the banking sector, mining, tourism, real estate, automobiles, the textile industry and high technology. Since 2008, the holding also tries to break the duopoly of Méditel and Maroc Telecom in the telecommunications sector. It was the state regulator, the Agence Nationale de Réglementation des Télécommunications (ANRT), that waved in Wana (owned by ONA) to compete with both Méditel and Maroc Telecom.\textsuperscript{172} The king’s role as both statesman and private investor proves his ambiguous position and regularly creates conflicts of interest – from state subsidies on products manufactured and traded by ONA subsidiaries to the deregulation of the insurance or the banking sector (Sater, 2010: 103). In the beginning of 2010, the royal family even expanded its control over the economy by establishing the fusion between ONA and that other major Moroccan conglomerate, the National Investment Company (SNI). This “royal big bang”, as it was referred to by weekly magazine Telquel, did cost an estimated 24 billion MAD and further consolidated the kings economic power.\textsuperscript{173} The dominance of the royal family in Moroccan capitalism made many other capitalist families little inclined to rebel against one of their most important business partners and main political guarantor (Clément, 1986).


\textsuperscript{171} Newsletter Oxford Business Group (17 March 2009). (See also www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com). This is actually not surprising since the ‘autonomous’ ANRT is controlled by the palace (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).

\textsuperscript{172} 172 Newsletter Oxford Business Group (17 March 2009). (See also www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com). This is actually not surprising since the ‘autonomous’ ANRT is controlled by the palace (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).

\textsuperscript{173} Iraqi, F. & Michbal, M., Big Bang Royal, in: Telquel, n°418 (3-9 April 2010), pp.18-28.
Many elite families, such as for example the Benjelloun family, actually participate in the same holdings and consortiums as the royal family which brings together their interests.

Thirdly, the economic liberalization repositioned and redefined the modalities of state intervention (see below, and more in detail in chapter 4 and 5). The Moroccan state now controls the economy more indirectly through specific forms of regulation, the redistribution of resources (e.g. privatizations), and through concessions and partnerships with the private sector (e.g. the deals concerning the distribution of water and electricity with Suez/Lydec in Casablanca, Veolia/Redal in Rabat, and Veolia in Tetouan and Tangiers). Aside from indirect control, newly established institutions with direct links to the monarchy had to improve the latter’s control in economic affairs. For example – and directly related to the privatization policies – a substantial part of the earnings from privatization (more than 50%) went to the autonomous Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development. This gave new leverage to the monarchy to redefine its patronage politics. The sale of the telecommunication licenses raised much more money than expected and the monarchy did not want the Moroccan government to profit from it all. The established Hassan II fund was to be governed by royal councillors and exempted from parliamentary and government control (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a). The most important mission for the Hassan II Fund was to sponsor those projects that promoted socio-economic development (e.g. the Bouregreg project). But the specific procedures and strategies followed by the Fund Hassan II are very untransparent. As discussed earlier, one of the characteristics of neoliberal economic liberalization in Morocco was the roll out of state power into such types of new institutional and territorial configurations (see also below and chapter 5). According to Hibou and Tozy such agencies – which are becoming a trend in Mohamed VI’s Morocco – prove the superiority of the technocratic structures loyal to the palace over the more politicized and traditional government institutions (Ibid: 114).

Finally, privatization policies had also another specific consequence. To the extent that state property could still be considered to belong to all citizens of that state – even though state wealth was very unevenly redistributed and controlled by a neo-patrimonial elite – the privatization of important public assets could also be considered as a form of dispossession of those public belongings. It becomes all the more ambiguous when primary commodities and services such as water, electricity, public transport and health care are turned over to profit-hungry enterprise. These developments are a key feature of a process which David Harvey has described as accumulation by dispossession. By this he means “the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx

174 Othman Benjelloun has share in both ONA and SNI. (Telquel, n°418: 22)
175 For a detailed discussion on the impact of the water and electricity concessions and the public-private partnerships with the French multinationals Suez and Veolia, see De Miras & Le Tellier (2005).
176 In the beginning the Fund Hassan II was even completely disconnected from the national state budget. As such, part of the public revenues from the privatization of the telecommunication sector wasn’t even inscribed in the state budget. Yet, this was restored quickly after the death of Hassan II following criticism from international actors such as France and the World Bank (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).
177 The case of the ANRT is another example of how the privatization of the telecom business was put in the hands of a specific agency (the ANRT) which operated largely outside parliamentary and government control (Hibou & Tozy, 2002b).
has treated as “primitive” or “original” during the rise of capitalism” (Harvey, 2006: 43). Capitalist accumulation has often been associated with the power balances between capitalists and wage workers, the structure of property rights and commodity exchange. Furthermore, capitalism’s hegemony was considered to be established through class struggle, ideology and manufactured consent which, in the end, mystified and concealed the specific mechanisms of exploitation, presenting these as a normal state of affairs (Bush, 2006). In other words, critical political economy focused mainly on what capitalists do best: production and innovation (through class repression and exploitation) in order to produce and accumulate surpluses. However, accumulation through the expansion of production and reproduction is only one possible avenue through which capitalism can expand (Swyngedouw, 2005). Accordingly, this understanding of political economy often bypasses the question of how capitalism was established in the first place:

The rise of the capitalist class did not depend initially upon its capacity to generate surpluses. It rested, rather, upon its ability to appropriate them, threat them as their own private property and launch them into circulation in search for further surpluses. While commerce, banking and usury provided opportunities to gain profit, capitalism as a social system eventually came to depend upon the formation of a proletariat and the employment of wage labor. (…) For capitalism to become dominant as a social system required that the bourgeoisie emerge victorious over other class forces controlling surpluses (Harvey, 2006: 90-91).

Harvey observed that alongside expanded reproduction, capitalists also accumulated by appropriating activities, people and resources and incorporate these ‘assets’ – which were previously managed by other modes of production – into the capitalist mode of production. For example, the dispossession of land was central to the ways in which the proletarianization of a numerous portion of the rural (poor) population took place (Bush, 2006). In Morocco, this process started during the Protectorate when the French entrepreneurial class desperately needed new work forces in the cities (Le Tourneau, 1955; Abu Lughod, 1980). It meant the beginning of massive rural migration towards the cities and the emergence of the infamous bidonvilles (slums). With regard to neoliberal reform, state-administered austerity programs and privatization policies can also be regarded as a form of accumulation by dispossession. Especially, when it concerns primary goods such as for example water and electricity. To the extent that imperial capitalists and states accumulated through the appropriation of colonies in the 19th and early 20th centuries (i.e. a form of extensive capitalist enlargement), neoliberal capitalists used policies such as privatization, devaluation, WTO-TRIPS, biopiracy and the commodification of culture to dispossess communities, classes, ethnic groups and gender (Chatterjee, 2009).178

Structural adjustment was about using the power of the state and international financial institutions to orchestrate devaluations of (public) assets in order to permit accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003: 151). As such, economic aid from international organizations came not without a price. In return for financial assistance, the restrictur-

178 TRIPS: trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
ing conditions were set in such a way that donors were eventually able to claim a return on their investments (Najem, 2001: 54). Privatization was a way to assure this. According to Erik Swyngedouw privatization was therefore “nothing else than a legally and institutionally condoned, if not encouraged, form of theft” (Swyngedouw, 2005: 82). In the case of Morocco, French historian Pierre Vermeren has called the privatization of Morocco’s financial institutions an example of a “true economic pillage” (Vermeren, 2009: 278). Many companies were sold at dumping prices. Moreover, the revenues of a large part of the privatization policies were transferred to the Fund Hassan II and, as such, controlled directly by the monarchy and its entourage (and not by the publicly accountable state institutions). In a situation of over-accumulation – i.e. the particular situation, according to Harvey, in which surpluses of capital idle with no profitable outlets in sight – processes of orchestrated accumulation by dispossession suddenly release considerable sets of assets (infrastructure, raw materials, labour power) at a very low cost (Harvey, 2003: 149). This is exactly what happened after the crisis of the 1970s and the concomitant oil shocks. Over-accumulated capital could seize, through structural adjustment, new profitable outlets for the accumulation of profits. The neoliberal political project was therefore a global answer to the chronic difficulty of over-accumulation since 1973 which was troubling the capitalist classes worldwide (Harvey, 1990).

As elsewhere, state power in Morocco backed this process of accumulation by dispossession. But the specific outcome of Morocco’s actually existing form of neoliberalism was of course the result of the complex dialectic between territorial and capitalist logics of power (Harvey, 2003), or to put it in the words of Moroccan economist Driss Ben Ali:

The structural adjustment program has placed Morocco before two kinds of logic which appear to be mutually exclusive: a “Makhzenian” logic, founded to a large extent on the administrative allocation of resources and a discretionary power, and a liberal logic based on allocation through the market and a democratic power (Ben Ali, 1997: 206).

The economic crisis derailed the strategies of state-led economic development. As in many other states in the MENA-region, the crisis in Morocco and the following project of the state’s roll back was something that was not necessarily backed by all domestic capitalist elites (Waterbury, 1991). Indeed, they relied on the state for the accumulation of wealth. Structural adjustment was thus predominantly a ‘recommendation’ of international donor institutions and powerful states such as the US. Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that domestic elites were powerless in the eyes of the international capitalist conjuncture and the political demands of powerful institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Without turning their back on the recommendations and requirements of the IMF and the World Bank, the Moroccan officials were careful not to relinquish their own political control and tolerated certain developments on the side in order to soften the social impact of the adjustments and ensure political stability. Some of these territorial logics that coincided with capitalist logics were already mentioned. As such, privatizations and accumulation by dispossession were a source of patronage to buy off the loyalty of powerful elites and state managers, while at the same time the makhzen
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made sure it didn’t give up control too fast over certain strategic companies and sectors. Furthermore, the government often returned to their decision to cut back certain public spending policies under pressure of the violent disturbances during the 1980s. Also, in a response to the urban violence, for example those in Casablanca in 1981, the Moroccan government did not recoil from heavy urban investments. Despite the then pressing economic crisis, considerable public spending went to the city in order to securitize and stabilize the situation. After the ‘successful’ urban restructuring of Casablanca, some of these reforms were equally implemented in other important cities in the country (to be discussed in chapter 4).

Additionally, one of the factors that softened the social impact of structural adjustment in the 1980s was the dynamism of the informal sector. The public authorities thus tolerated the development of the informal sector to absorb the social costs of economic austerity (Ben Ali, 1997; Aksikas, 2007). Many workers were laid off and others had difficulties to find a new job. The privatization of state-owned companies such as Maroc Telecom or Régie des Tabacs were followed by a significant loss of jobs. The gradual withdrawal of the state from direct control over the economy also deprived many former public sector workers from previously gained social protection mechanisms, such as a pension, health insurance and holiday pay.179 As a result, the tolerance of the informal sector provided a buffer. The informal sector now accounts for the livelihood of approximately 40% of the population (Joffé, 2009). According to estimates, small-scale production units without any official record constitute almost 40% of the urban economy in Morocco (Aksikas, 2007). It is undeniable that the informal sector played a vital role to sustain the Moroccan economy since the 1980s. This demonstrates, as Jaafar Aksikas argues, that both the formal and informal sector are two sides of the same coin: “like unemployment, marginal labour is a structural feature of capitalism and of dependent capitalism in particular” (Ibid.: 260). Finally, another element of the makhzenian or territorial logic was the reluctance to seriously fight illegal immigration and drug trafficking (Sater, 2010: 101). At least until the mid-1990s, when the EU started to restrict immigration, migration provided a solution for the unemployed domestic workforce. Their remittances have become crucial for the GDP and the balance of payments of the country. Until today, remittances are the largest source of foreign income for the Moroccan economy (8% of GDP) and that is why the government prioritizes the attraction of these kind of revenues (cf. Achy, 2010).180

In conclusion, although the phase of roll back neoliberalism and the structural adjustment of the Moroccan economy was enforced and required by the IMF and the World Bank in order to solve the country’s deficit problems, the specific ways in which structural adjustments were implemented and administered was above all a matter of state policy. At a certain moment, with the peak of the Third World debt-crisis, states in the MENA-region had little choice but to turn to the IMF and accept global market integration and the liberalization of their domestic markets. But governments in the region

179 This is one of the main reasons why, up until today, the unemployed graduates continue their struggle to be employed in the public sector.
180 Interview with Fouad Ammor from the Groupement d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée (GERM), (Rabat – August 2007 – interview conducted together with Sami Zemni). One of the policies to do that is to encourage Moroccans abroad to invest in the Moroccan real estate sector.
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did had a lot to say about the ways in which these neoliberal policy recommendations would be implemented. As mentioned, two obvious results were that Morocco’s wealth was still largely concentrated in the hands in the hands of a minority and that the traditional elites did not lose their economic power (Catusse, 2008; 2009a; see also Dillman, 2001). As such, neoliberal reforms in North Africa in general, also strongly promoted by the EU through the Barcelona Process and the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), allowed for the “re-concentration of economic power” and a continued political domination over the market (Dillman, 2002: 82).

Related to Dillman’s observation, two last remarks should be added. First of all, in contrast to mainstream neoliberal discourse, structural adjustment failed to obtain its political goals, i.e. the empowerment of other social groups and the transition towards democratization through the termination of state dirigisme and through the promotion of private initiative and individual entrepreneurship. Privatization did not necessarily lead to more competition (politically and economically) between domestic elites, but rather to their increasing interdependence and the intertwining of their economic interests (Catusse, 2008). In a way, we could state that privatization policies further advanced their formation as a genuine capitalist class (see below). Secondly, and maybe more importantly, through the works of critical thinkers on neoliberalism in Europe and the US, we can now convincing argue that this re-concentration of economic power was not due to the “incomplete implementation” of neoliberal reforms, as Dillman argues, but was rather the result of a world-wide phenomenon that is inherent to the neoliberal political project itself. Neoliberal political projects of deregulation have always coincided with projects of re-regulation, almost exclusively beneficial to the capitalist and ruling classes. Of course, social inequality will be more deeply entrenched between North and South and within the societies of the Global South, but critical scholars such as Mike Davis (2006a), Aihwa Ong (2006), Ray Bush (2007) and Ananya Roy (2010) have emphasized that these inequalities are inherent to the hegemonic neoliberal development paradigms that are promoted by the national and international political institutions and actors that control the circulation of capital. Consequently, in the end, structural adjustment may have been just a means to open up and widen the circulation of capital in order to solve the worldwide over-accumulation crisis, find new opportunities for investments and circumvent the limitations and barriers of Keynesian and developmentalists modes of production at the end of the 1970s.

The re-invention of state interventionism: the phase of roll out neoliberalism

As I have argued, economic liberalization and structural adjustment do not necessarily implicate the disengagement of the state or the roll back of the state in general. To the contrary, the roll back of certain developmentalist state functions entailed the roll out of new state forms and new state modes of intervention. In this paragraph, I want to discuss two of the most salient aspects or features of roll out neoliberalism in Morocco. The first one was the re-invention of social policy. With the gradual destruction of the – already limited – social welfare mechanisms, the challenge for the new king, Mohammed VI, existed in the redefinition of social policy and social development conform the global market requirements. This has resulted, amongst other initiatives, in the implementation of prestigious programs such as the National Initiative for Human
Development (INDH) and the Villes Sans Bidonvilles Program (VSBP). Accordingly, these initiatives entailed the redeployment of the state in social policy and the privatization of public policy. Secondly, neoliberal (state) reform in Morocco will be most visible at the urban scale, as the Moroccan rulers look to the urban economy as the motor for economic growth. Over the last decade, we saw some considerable efforts to reshape the image of the Moroccan cities and these efforts inspired some to speak of a genuine “urban revolution”. The state – in its appearance of different state agencies and new state spaces – plays a crucial role in this development. As such, we have to pay attention to the ways in which state action and governmental practices in the economic and social sphere has been transformed in terms of distribution of resources, decision-making and the exercise of power (Catusse, 2009a). On the one hand, we have seen an increasing “privatization of the state”. Public authorities are working closely together with private actors and delegate certain fields of intervention to these actors. The state, in other words, expanded its indirect control by setting the conditions in which societal organizations and private companies intervene. On the other hand, the state has been reconfigured in order to be better equipped to operate in a competitive global market. Consequently, we saw the emergence of new institutional arrangements with considerable public power to coordinate and govern a specific aspect of economic life. In the following paragraphs I will give a brief and more general overview of the two main features of Moroccan roll out neoliberalism. Both the re-invention of public policy and the specific dynamics of the Moroccan urban revolution will be elaborated more in detail in the following two chapters. Evidence will then be presented based on two specific case studies.

The re-invention of the social question

Broadly speaking, and maybe presenting it a bit simplified, the three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco can be divided into three cycles of restructuring. First of all, there was a period of structural adjustment in the 1980s. Subsequently, a decade of “mise à niveau” (upgrading) in the 1990s was followed by a decade of increased attention to the social dimension of economic liberalization in the 2000s (Maghraoui, 2002). These three decades overlap with the two general phases of neoliberal restructuring. While the decade of structural adjustment can clearly be considered as a phase of roll back neoliberalism, the following two decades entailed the gradual evolution towards a phase of roll out neoliberalism. The decade of “mise à niveau” was characterized by the privatization policies and by the political construction of the liberal free-market. Symbolic for the effort to construct the market in Morocco was the signing of economic partnerships and free trade accords with both the EU and the US (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). The political focus in the 1990s went to both further economic integration (the negotiation of the FTAs) and political reform or alternance (which was often a condition for international aid). A European free trade agreement with Morocco, signed in 1996 with the Euro Mediterranean Association Agreement, was embedded within the broad political, social and economic scope of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched at the 1995 Barcelona Conference (hence called the Barcelona Process). The MEDA I and MEDA II programs, the principal financial instruments of the

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181 Of course, the specific boundaries that are drawn here between different decades and phases are by no means absolute and are made only for the sake of comparison and clarification. I want to thank Sami Zemni for pointing out the need to make these classifications more explicit.
EMP, were essentially designed by the European Commission to generate spill-over effects of economic adjustment and growth to stimulate democratic transitions in the partner countries (Youngs, 2004; D Smith 2006). During the period 1995-2006 Morocco received 1,640 millions EUR in the form of MEDA-grants. This made Morocco the largest recipient of MEDA-funds among the Mediterranean partner countries.

In 2004, given the events of 9/11, Casablanca and Madrid, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was inspired by the experiences of the EU enlargement and the European Commission’s support to Central and Eastern European countries during the period of their transition to liberal democracy and free market integration. The ENP was meant to complement the Barcelona process and support democratic reform in neighbouring countries, including the Mediterranean partner countries (Youngs, 2006). It also put a stronger emphasis on bilateral cooperation.182 Since January 2007, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced MEDA for the funding of aid and development programs. The difference with the EMP was that this particular neighbourhood policy was based on differentiation. This means that the countries with the best record on democratic progress receive more aid. Democratic reform was the European condition for aid.183 In 2004, Morocco also concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US. In contrast to the implementation of the Euro Mediterranean Association Agreement which was integrated within the framework of a broader political partnership, the American FTA, was solely based on the principle of “trade not aid”, as it was stressed by one of USAID’s directors in Morocco.184 Through USAID funded programs the US intended to facilitate the transition to a free trade environment. For example, USAID programs focus especially on the agricultural sector because of the predicted negative impact of the FTA on domestic agricultural productivity and the lack of competitiveness of the domestic sector on the international market. Due to the fact that USAID does not have the means to be present everywhere in the field, the financed programs have rather the intention to create some sort of economic models that “show the way” to others in the targeted sector in the hope they would eventually follow the example (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009).185

Yet, the decade of mise à niveau did not bring forth the economic and social results that were hoped for. Poverty rose sharply in Morocco during the 1990s with an increase of 50% of people living under the poverty line (from 13% of the population in 1991 to 19% in 1999) (Catusse, 2009b: 60). Critics also doubted whether further economic integration in the form of FTAs would improve the situation. Very little attention was paid for example to the social impact of the FTAs on ordinary people’s lives. Some experts expected that small-scale domestic economic activity would be the main victim of the newly established conditions under which economic integration was to take place (Dillman, 2001; Martin 2004). A clear sign was that the 1990s and the 2000s were char-

182 Nevertheless, the EMP and its MEDA funds were already strongly based on bilateral cooperation (Hibou, 2003: 126).
183 Interview with Jérome Cassiers, Consultant of Political affairs, Commerce, Information and Culture with the delegation of the European Commission in Morocco (Rabat - 21/09/07).
184 Interview with Mark Parkinson, Director of Democracy and Governance Programs (USAID Morocco) (Rabat - 04/09/07).
185 Interview with James May, Director of the Economic Growth Department (USAID Morocco) (Rabat - 13/09/07).
acterized by a significant rise of new forms of opposition and political instability that can be related to the poor socio-economic results. New forms because first of all, the political disturbances of the 1980s had weakened the traditional trade unions. Government repression and imprisonment during that decade had affected the influence and the organizational capacities of the unions, especially the CDT. Secondly, because the political reforms of the 1990s (*alternance*) opened up more space for other kinds of actors (social movements, civil society associations, etc.) to be politically active (cf. Abouhani, 2006; Iraki, 2006a; 2006b; Emperador & Bennafa, 2009).

As I already mentioned, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of protest actions by the unemployed graduates. Additionally, the Islamists were growing stronger – both the legalized Party for Justice and Development (PJD) and the illegal but tolerated movement around Skeikh Yassine, *al-adl wal Ihsane* – and many observers have been speculating about their political potential in Morocco (cf. Zemni, 2006a). And besides these more moderate and more popular Islamist movements, there was also the looming danger of religious extremism which culminated in the suicide bombings of 2003 and 2007 in Casablanca, killing several people. Finally, more leftist associations such as the *Association Marocaine des Droits Humains* (AMDH) and ATTAC increased their activities and used the new political climate to mobilize around the notion of ‘rights’ (human rights, socio-economic rights,…). AMDH was implicated in the organization of the “movement against the expensiveness of life” and organized several manifestations to denounce the degrading socio-economic conditions. Since September 2006, Morocco experienced a series of organized manifestations against the continuous increase in prices of consumption goods (e.g. water and electricity). These manifestations took place above all in smaller towns and villages of the kingdom where were the population suffered even more from unemployment, poverty and socio-economic marginalization than in the larger cities. Under the impulse of social organizations such as AMDH and ATTAC-Maroc and small leftist political parties, the “coordinations against the expensiveness of life” (the *Tansikiyat*) spread out around the country and even culminated in violent encounters between protesters and police forces in Sefrou (September 2007) and Sidi Ifni (June 2008). In Sefrou, a manifestation to denounce the increasing price of bread ended in riots and confrontations with the police. Even though this riot did not take place in a big city like Fès or Casablanca, government officials were taking this warning seriously. As a source within the Wilaya (governorate) of Fès confirmed: “If these events would have taken place in a big city, the scenario would have resembled to the popular uprisings of Casablanca in 1981 and Fès in 1992”.

These disturbances even prompted the king to gather a committee, presided by his Minister of Interior, to reinstate the price of bread. A year later in Sidi Ifni, a six-day blockade of the port by militants of ATTAC and unemployed graduates ended with severe police repression. The spread of the images on YouTube caused national and even international indignation. These disturbances were then followed by the promise for a regional socio-

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186 According to some members of AMDH and the Tansikiyat there were active local coordinations of the movement against the expensiveness of life in more than 80 villages and cities in Morocco (Interviews with members of AMDH and the Tansikiyat – Rabat-August 2007; Rabat-September 2007; Rabat-30/04/2008; Rabat-21/05/2008; Casablanca-18/06/2008; Rabat-20/06/2008; Rabat-13/04/2009. Some interviews were conducted together with Sami Zemni, others with Montserrat Emperador).

economic development plan and more administrative autonomy (for more details see Gussé, 2009; Bennafla & Emperador, 2009).188

These increased socio-political tensions together with the new political context at the end of the 1990s – both internally with the arrival of a socialist prime Minister in the “alternance” government of 1998 and the accession to the throne of king Mohammed VI, and externally with the appeal of the good governance discourse promoted by international institutions like the World Bank – initiated a reflection on the social dimension of economic reform and generated fundamental changes in the public discourse. As a result, the phase of roll out neoliberalism intensified and was further characterized by a renewed attention for the social dimension of (economic) reform. This moment of intensification can also be placed within a more broader international context. As mentioned above, both in the ‘developing’ world as in the ‘developed’ world the self-regulating capacity of the market to reduce poverty and improve the livelihoods of the poorest populations was put into question. In Europe and the US, we saw the ascendancy of the so-called “third way” and the workfare model. In the South, there was an increased attention to the requirements of good governance. As such, the third decade of neoliberal reform in Morocco was characterized by an increased political attention to and the construction of the “social question” (Catusse, 2005; 2009b; see also Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b; De Miras, 2007). This meant that more government attention was given to the negative social impact of market-oriented reforms and new state-arrangements were rolled out to address specific problems.

The challenge for the new monarch and his entourage was to reform and redefine state policies of social development as the public sector had clearly lost its leverage as a provider and distributor of accumulated wealth. According to Myriam Catusse, new social policy initiatives were taken in two domains: the improvement of social legislation and poverty alleviation. In the first domain, there were some improvements of the labour conditions with a raise of the minimum wage, the adoption of a new labour code in 2003 and initiatives to improve health insurance.189 Only 25% of the qualified population had right to a pension and approximately 85% didn’t have access to healthcare (Catusse, 2009b). However, the results were rather limited and confined to the wage-earning population. Moreover employees in the public sector enjoyed better conditions and more social protection than those in the private sector.190 Secondly,

188 Bennafla and Emperador argue that the social movements that are emerging in the smaller villages and towns retain a largely local and pragmatic focus, demanding foremost social-economic improvements and employment.
189 For a more detailed discussion on the new labor code and other initiatives: see Catusse, 2005; 2008; 2009a; 2009b.
190 Additionally, a typical feature of these kinds of limited improvements was that they were not so much resulting out of a political struggle but rather developed in a depoliticized context. The transition in Morocco from an apparent class struggle instigated by the trade unions and the leftist opposition in the 1970s and 1980s to the institutionalization of a social dialogue in the mid-1990s, transformed both trade unions and national employers into “partners” sitting around the same table, leading to a form of ‘class collaboration’ (Catusse 2008: 252-264). The specific rationality behind the social dialogue can be compared to some extent with the rationality of the third way-politics in Europe and the US that advocated the end of the adversarial forms of politics and aimed to go beyond the classical left/right divide (Mouffe, 2005). Chantal Mouffe (Ibid.: 119) argues that instead of facilitating the establishment of a pacified society, these consensus politics have created the terrain for the rise of right-wing populist movements.
considerable state-led initiatives were taken in the domain of the fight against poverty. After the Casablanca attacks of 2003 the Moroccan government quickly launched two prestigious and very ambitious social development plans: the VSBP in 2004 and the INDH in 2005. I will discuss the VSBP more in detail in the next chapter. Here, I want to elaborate briefly on the INDH to clarify some characteristics of the specific political transformation that occurred during the 2000s. In his royal discourse of 18 May 2005, Mohammed VI presented the National Initiative for Human Development, calling poverty alleviation a major challenge for the Moroccan societal project. Furthermore, he made explicit reference to “extremist tendencies” (velléités extremistes) that found fertile ground in social misery and economic marginalization, thereby clearly setting the political targets and priorities of the INDH in the light of the Casablanca attacks of 2003. This “royal project” specifically aimed to tackle pressing social problems such as unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and social exclusion. To do so, INDH aims to include local authorities and grass-roots organizations in the elaboration and funding of micro-projects all over the country. In the remainder of 2005, 1,104 projects were started within the framework of three broader programs: the fight against rural poverty, the fight against social exclusion in the urban regions and finally the fight against insecurity (précarité).

To this end, 250 million MAD were mobilized (50 million from the national budget and 100 million from both the local governments and the Hassan II Fund). For the next five years (2006-2010) an overall budget of ten billion MAD had been allocated to the INDH. The national state budget mobilized 60% of the resources, the local authorities 20% and the other 20% of the budget was covered in the form of loans and gifts by foreign donors and international organizations (e.g. the World Bank, the EU, Saudi Arabia, etc.). The control over and the distribution of the resources takes place via the Ministry of Interior and the representatives of the state at the regional, prefectural and provincial level. Some observers remain sceptic about the amount of resources made available and consider it way too little to solve the pressing socio-economic problems of the country. Economist Driss Ben Ali called INDH “just a drop in the ocean”. In general, no extra state-funds were allocated to finance the INDH. The individual social projects are financed solely from existing resources that were diverted from other ministries (Sater, 2010: 108-111). Furthermore, James Sater argues that the estimated cumulative loss of state revenues and social costs due to the signing of FTAs with the EU and the US are actually a multiple of the value and the impact of the entire 2006-2010 INDH program (Sater, 2010: 108-111; see also Martin, 2004).

Yet, a critical analysis of the INDH-initiative should go beyond the mere question of numbers. First of all, king Mohamed VI explicitly stressed in his speech of 18 May that

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193 For a complete overview of the foreign financing of the INDH: http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/partenaires.asp
194 Morocco is administratively divided into 16 regions. Every region is divided into prefectures (urban) and provinces (rural). Provinces and prefectures are headed by governors, directly appointed by the King.
195 Interview conducted together with Egon Gussé (Rabat – 26/10/2009).
the increased initiatives in social development did not imply a break with the overall liberal macro-economic direction of the country which is based on economic stability and growth, free market reform and trade liberalization:

If the level of economic growth is insufficient and inequitable in the sense that not all people and regions of our country benefit from its dividends, all the more because some continue to suffer from marginalization and social degradation, it is important to note, at the same time, that the desired level of inclusion should not be considered, according to a simplistic and narrow vision, as a weight that burdens [economic] growth, but rather as its condition and catalyst (own translation).196

Two years later, in his address from the throne on 30 June 2007, the king called “economic liberalism” one of the fundamental pillars of the Moroccan “État de droit” and the Moroccan “national consensus” (Vermeren, 2009: 57-58). It was thus clear for the king and the makhzen that the economic directions the country had taken since the 1980s were not negatively linked to the conditions of poverty and marginalization. What’s more, the king’s discourse insinuated that more (market) integration was required to fight the social and economic problems of his country. Accordingly, and within the logic of this vision, INDH and other social development schemes in Morocco rely strongly on a cooperation between the state and the private sector in order to create alleged win-win situations for both beneficiaries and private investors. For example, the French multinational Suez (with Lydec as its subsidiary in Casablanca) is integrated into the INDH project, via a special program called INMAE, to provide shantytowns in Casablanca with basic services such as water and electricity. Lydec works closely together with state-agencies such as Idmaj Sakan (responsible for social housing) and civil society organizations. The state thus sponsors and stimulates private actors to fight poverty.

Secondly, INDH has a depoliticizing effect which is closely related to the economic vision that underpins it. The philosophy of INDH is based on two popular codewords that are common in contemporary neoliberal development schemes: responsabilization and participation. In his speech, the king emphasized that the program is backed by the contemporary mainstream discourse on development:

We also call on them [the government] to adopt an action plan [INDH] based on the principles of good governance, namely responsibility and transparency, the rules of professionalism, the broad participation of the population, integration and the rationalization of the interventions of public institutions and organisms, as well as the permanent follow up and evaluation of the realizations (own translation).197

Within this framework the final responsibility for social development is passed on from the public authorities to other (individual) actors (e.g. the private sector and the beneficiaries). A perfect example of the responsibilization of the poor man is the increasing

197 Ibid.
reliance on micro-credits as a poverty reduction strategy. With more than 500,000 clients, the impact of micro-credit in Morocco is considerable (De Miras, 2007). Micro-credit encourages the transformation of poor people into small scale entrepreneurs (Catusse, 2009b). The fight against poverty is then turned into a “fight of the poor against their own poverty”, a fight that doesn’t concern the other social classes anymore (i.e. the inherent relation between poverty and class divisions is either denied or ignored) and, as such, disconnects the question of social development from broader political questions (i.e. neoliberalism as a class project) (De Miras, 2007). Social development then comes down to “help the poor help themselves” – the classic neoliberal adage – through all kinds of market-oriented facilitations and the promotion of individual capacities (M Davis, 2006a).

Third, the promotion of participation in social development schemes such as INDH has opened up new spaces for political and social action and brought forth the emergence of new social actors in the field. Yasmine Berriane demonstrates that through the INDH “new actors who were not part of the traditional local notability have been able not only to climb the social ladder but also become part of the local decision making apparatus as political actors” (Berriane, 2010: 98). This confirms a general trend in Morocco and proves a kind of political transformation ‘from below’. Since the end of the 1970s, we have seen a substantial growth of associational life in Morocco and the emergence of new urban neighbourhood associations and other civil society organizations. Several reasons can be given to explain this trend: the increasing rural exodus towards the cities, the emergence of an new urban middle class, important urban reforms which gave more authority to local elected governments (e.g. new Communal Charter of 1976), the process of political liberalization of the 1990s and finally the gradual roll back of the developmentalist welfare functions of the state which obliged citizens to explore alternatives and take matters into their own hands to improve their neighbourhoods and livelihoods in difficult socio-economic situations (cf. Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; Ameur, 2000; Abouhani, 2006; Iraki, 2006a; 2006b; see also chapter 4). The active promotion of cooperation schemes between local authorities, social organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has even accelerated this process during the last decade. Initiatives such as INDH have stimulated the growth of local associations (Berriane, 2010).

However, this doesn’t meant that we are witnessing some kind of burgeoning tendency of democratization. In the end, the Moroccan authorities remain in political control through the distribution of resources and by setting the specific conditions for the actual elaboration of social programs. For example, the coordination of INDH depends on a pyramid structure that includes all levels of decision-making but is ultimately controlled in a centralized matter by the Ministry of Interior. Even though, this state-program encourages participation and the creation of new associations, these new actors are still politically controlled – especially the NGOs – and have to conform to the predefined rules:

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198 Zakoura under the direction of Noureddine Ayouch is one of the main associations that works with micro-credit programs and is supported by the Fund Hassan II, the Moroccan banks and international organizations such as UNDP (for more detailed information on Zakoura, see: Ayouch, 2008).

199 For an overview of the hierarchical structure see: http://www.indh.gov.ma/fr/comites.asp
At the very top of the ladder, the Ministry of Interior oversees NGO activity while at the bottom it is the mqaddem who keeps a close eye on an NGO’s daily activities, taking part for example in general assemblies, conferences and festivities that are organized by associations. Furthermore, a central database designed to contain all the information about each association was launched a few years ago. From this point of view, we could argue that the growing number of NGOs signifies a greater control over society by the state (Berriane, 2010: 100, emphasis added).

As such, INDH exemplifies the reorganization and redefinition of public action. Through different mechanisms, such as the delivery of licenses and authorizations, the allocation of resources, etc., the Ministry of Interior intervenes in associational life, actually increases its social control and has the possibility to filter out those actors and organizations it considers not politically suitable. In reality this means that those associations with a clear political agenda or a certain political affiliation (e.g. al adl wal ihsane) are discriminated and excluded from the distribution of resources (Ibid.). Additionally, due to the INDH, the Ministry of Social Affairs was actually deprived of an important part of its core business. As a consequence, some redistribution policies were recentralized within the ministry that is closest to the monarchy (i.e. the Ministry of Interior). Furthermore, international aid within the framework of INDH, from for example the EU, is also re-distributed via the Moroccan state apparatus and does not affect its control over the space of action outlined by the projects on the ground (Bono, 2007).

In the end, the INDH program is a salient example of what Béatrice Hibou has called the privatization of the state in which certain domains of public action are entrusted to private agents and in which the state opts for an indirect form of government in certain policy domains. Similar social development schemes are also to be found in the rest of the Arab region, such as for example, the National Solidarity Fund or the 26.26 in Tunisia (cf. Hibou, 2006), and the Social Fund for Development in Egypt (cf. Elyachar, 2002). To a similar extent, Catusse speaks of the “privatization of public policy” which consists in the redistribution of responsibilities, the redrawing of the public-private boundaries and the transformation of the state modes of regulating social risks (Catusse, 2009a: 208). The privatization of public action in Morocco is further developed and supported through the establishment of new types of institutions. I mentioned the Hassan II Fund earlier. The establishment of the Mohamed V Foundation for Solidarity is another example. Both agencies were created at the end of the 1990s. They are (semi-public) hybrid structures financed by exceptional resources and directed by private entrepreneurs, close advisers of the king, and a technocratic “state nobility” (Catusse, 2009, 206; Vermeren, 2009: 90). Besides investments in the framework of

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200 The mqaddem is a representative of the state to act as an interface between the citizens and the Ministry of Interior and keep an eye on everyday life in a certain neighbourhood.

201 The name 26.26 refers to the postal account number of the fund. The fund became better known under this name in Tunisia.

202 By 2006, the Hassan II Fund received approximately 31 billion MAD (3 billion Euros). Most of these funds came from the privatization of the telecommunications licenses (e.g. Méditel). Other resources are generated by the Fund’s own activities, donations and as well as contributions from the state budget (Britel, 2008: 277-279)
the INDH-program, the Fund Hassan II also invests in other sectors such as large infrastructural projects (Tanger Med and Bouregreg), social housing, agriculture, cultural and sporting events.\textsuperscript{203} The Mohamed V Foundation has realized projects for an amount of 3,3 billion MAD and invests in social welfare domains such as sustainable development, formation, medical care, education, etc. Powerful elites such as Othman Benjelloun are member of its board of directors.\textsuperscript{204} Officially, such organizations are created in the name of national solidarity and intended to confront the pressing socio-economic problems. In reality, these kinds of agencies not only bypass standard budgetary procedures and controls, they also establish important connections between state elites and private interests groups and alter the mechanisms for patronage and economic intervention as they are placed under the direct authority of the monarchy and its entourage (Hibou & Tozy, 2002a).

These modalities of government and social policy do not imply the restoration of the developmental state-model, but rather the active \textit{redeployment} of the state (the roll out of the state) in institution-building, regulatory re-arrangement and rescaled intervention, in order to consolidate economic reforms, engage with private actors and sustain the workings of a market environment. Furthermore, in contrast to the political goals of the developmental state, the final responsibilities for social welfare are now passed on to private non-state actors (enterprises, NGOs, neighbourhood associations, trade unions, individuals, etc.). They are presented to be responsible for the negotiation of new labour agreements (the social dialogue), and assumed to fight themselves against social inequality and uneven development. In discourse at least, the state is assumed to provide mere technical coordination and to operate as a neutral supervisor over these different civil society actors (Catusse, 2005). The issue of poverty, in this regard, is then reduced to a mere technocratic problem and a individualized matter (cf. chapter 4). As a result, the re-invented social policies in Morocco tend to mitigate and depoliticize the class divisions that are generated by neoliberal market-oriented reforms. What’s more, these new kinds of social policies suggest a false image of formal equality between (all) “citizens” (Wacquant, 2008).

\textit{Morocco’s urban revolution}

A second important feature of Morocco’s phase of roll out neoliberalism are the specific political strategies for urban redevelopment. Despite the radical economic restructurings of the 1980s, the Moroccan economy remained fragile for several reasons. Compared to other regions in the world, foreign direct investments still largely by-passed the Arab region. The MENA-region still obtained a rather subordinated position in the world economy (Bush, 2004; White, 2007; Catusse, 2009b; Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). Furthermore, in the case of Morocco, the general economy was still largely dependent on the agricultural sector for economic growth and employment (D Davis, 2006; Sater, 2010). In order to break these patterns, the Moroccan monarchy tried to redirect its focus on urban development and the urban economy. Within the context of contemporary global market integration, the city has become not only a place to live but also product in itself to attract foreign investments and stimulate economic growth. The city has become a “growth machine” (Molotch, 1976). And even more so than in the days of

\textsuperscript{203} Interview with dr. Charaf Britel, treasurer of CDG (Rabat – 29/05/2008).

\textsuperscript{204} For more information see: \url{http://www.fm5.ma}
Harvey Molotch, local governmental interventions do not only impact on the distribution of economic growth generated by government interventions at the national scale, but also play an active role in the generation and distribution of economic wealth and accumulated capital within global (or glocal) production processes. Cities, or more generally any locality, are becoming primary links or junctions in those global processes, not in the sense that they are entirely disconnected from national decision-making processes, but rather in the sense that they are ‘relatively autonomous’ (cf. chapter 5). As Harvey (1989b) emphasized, local government assumed a more entrepreneurial role.

It was above all under the impulse of king Mohammed VI that the country positioned the city as the prominent site for the promotion of economic development and capital accumulation. Since his reign, Morocco has been busy catching up in preparing its cities to welcome more businesses, tourists and (real estate) investors. At this very moment, massive infrastructural works are being undertaken to upgrade the Moroccan urban areas and to prepare them to globalize. Therefore, the current propaganda around king Mohamed VI goes beyond presenting him as the king of the poor, but focuses even more to present him as a builder (Bargach, 2008). He is attributed to be leaving his mark on the future of a modern Morocco that looks resolutely at the primary (Western) capitalist urban centres as models for socio-economic development. In every local business magazine or newspaper comparisons are made by business experts, technocrats and government officials between the Moroccan cities and global cities such as London, Paris, Rome and Dubai. As mentioned in chapter 2, cities and city-regions are the sites through which the current global economy is coordinated, where surplus value is realized and accumulated, and where new frictions and social conflicts arise. The contemporary “royal managers” are very much aware of that. In a recently published ‘National Strategy for Urban Development’ the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MHUAE) underlines the necessity to prepare the Moroccan cities in order to expand its share of global investments and financial flows (MHUAE, 2009: 30). And with relative success. Although Morocco’s rural economy (agriculture, forestry and fishery) still remains the most important sector for employment (34.3 per cent), the urban economy has become by far the most significant producer of national economic growth. Three-quarters of the national GDP is generated within the urban economy (Ibid.: 21).

In that sense, trade liberalization has accelerated the urbanization of capital. Over the last decade, massive investments flowed into the built environment. Numerous ambitious urban development schemes were launched in the first decade of Mohamed VI’s reign. They are becoming the showcases of an “urban revolution” – as it was referred to in the local press – with striking flagship projects such as the Bouregreg Valley, the Marina in Casablanca, and the Tanger City Centre and the Tanger Med project in the North. The role of the king in these development schemes should not be underestimated. The simple label of “royal project” (e.g. in the case of the Bouregreg project) is very symbolic and means that a project simply cannot fail because of the “moral guarantee”

205 Royal managers is a term used by Pierre Vermeren to describe the current captains of industry and leading elite within the state-administration who are implicated in the most important economic sectors of the country (Vermeren, 2009: 288).
206 MHUAE: Ministère de l’Habitat, de L’Urbanisme et de l’Aménagement de l’Espace
the monarch represents (Bargach, 2008: 108). Furthermore, major infrastructural works – highways, new train stations, tramways (in Rabat and Casablanca), a high-speed train connection (between Casablanca and Tangiers), bridges, mega-malls, marinas, etc. – are put in place in order to prepare the country’s cities for further capitalist integration. After all, the export-oriented shift promoted by structural adjustment needed to be supported by the necessary physical infrastructural conditions. By looking at some of the proposed designs, it becomes clear that over the next 5-10 years Morocco’s infrastructural endeavours will drastically redesign the face of its cities and change their image once and for all. The word Arab city may still evoke a number of stereotypes and preconceived images, as if it were a place full of mosques and minarets, small alleys, crowded cafés and little shops characterized by chaotic planning and informal expansion. Nevertheless, the Arab city is now also becoming a place of skyscrapers, modern shopping malls and unabashed consumerism (Elshestawy, 2008: 3). Dubai is the most obvious example but recent developments in countries as Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon prove that it is a regional phenomenon. As a result, these urban transformations will most likely also change ordinary city-life for the majority of the urban dwellers (rich or poor). However, the main target group for these restructurings is not so much the city-dweller who has lived his whole live in the city, or the poor farmer who looks for a new future. Cities as Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech and Tangiers are put on the global city-map especially to attract outsiders: tourists and investors.

The scale model of the Casa-Marina project with in the background the famous Mosque Hassan II (October 2009)

208 That is of course if all of these projects get funded in the end. Due to the current economic crisis, some of the projects experienced some financing difficulties.
The attraction of “global fixed capital investments” (infrastructural projects) and “circulating capital” (e.g. tourism) are now the components of a “nearly universal economic development strategy” (Paul, 2004). As such, the restructuring of the Moroccan city is inscribed in a global political project that reflects and defends (global) market requirements and connects local business networks with the outside world. Geographical location plays a crucial role in the economic strategies of the kingdom. In 2009, for example, the head of the Casablanca Stock Exchange (CSE) Karim Haji underlined to the international press that Morocco wants to become “a stepping stone for investors from the US, Asia, Europe and the Middle East looking for opportunities to diversify investments”.209 The new determined priorities within this competitive urban logic are real estate development, international trade and investments, offshore activities and of course tourism. Today, several large urban development projects are reshaping the cityscapes of Rabat, Casablanca, Tangiers, Fez and Marrakech. The Tanger Med project, a new international seaport with an industrial hinterland (Tanger Free Zone), is definitely the largest mega-project and the symbol for Morocco’s commitment to global market integration. Designed to exploit the strategic location of Tangiers as a redistribution centre for international trade the project ‘Tanger Med I’ was launched in 2002 and strived for a capacity of 3.5 million containers. This first section of the port became operational in 2007. By the year 2016 the port wants to extend to an estimated capacity of eight million containers (Tanger Med II) and become a nodal point between the African, European and Asian markets.210 When Tanger Med becomes fully operational, it will be the biggest commercial port in Africa, and on the Mediterranean Sea. The project is accompanied by the development of a economic free zone, the Tanger Free Zone (TFZ), which was launched in 1999. It is located only 30 km from the port. With a surface of approximately 500 hectares it is the most important special economic zone of the country. At the moment more than 475 companies are settled in the TFZ and 60 ha are dedicated to the development of the “Tanger Automotive City” to support the further expansion of the Renault holdings in the country.211 According to the Moroccan authorities the TFZ creates 40,000 industrial jobs (manufacturing, textile, electronics, etc.) and 3,600 of them are in service of the port (Vermeren, 2009: 294-295). Two new highways (between Rabat and Tangiers; and between Tetouan and Tangiers) are currently under construction to support the further economic development of the Northern city-region. To complete the transformation of Tangiers, the authorities planned the development of the ‘Tanger City Center’ (TCC), a new business district in the east of the city. On the website of TCC we can read that “Morocco is about to become very big business indeed, so the well informed investor can expect significant returns from this world class destination which is set to return to its former glories”.212

The same competitive logic applies for Casablanca with projects such as Casa Marina, Anfa Park and the Casanearshore park.213 The latter was the first Moroccan offshore park to be officially opened. At the moment it is the largest offshore zone in North Africa.

Promoted as “the dream of every outsourcer” it advertises top-notch, low-cost services to multinational firms (Zemni and Bogaert, 2009: 99). As I mentioned in chapter 2, five city-regions in Morocco developed or are set to develop offshore zones: Casablanca, Rabat, Fez, Tangiers and Marrakech. These industrial free zones and offshore zones are newly reconfigured islets inscribed into the Moroccan national territory, where specific laws and regulations exist from site to site. But besides industry and outsourcing, Morocco’s urban economy and new investment strategies focus particularly on its most valuable sector: tourism. In 2010, approximately 9 million tourists were estimated to have travelled to Morocco. Growth in the tourism industry has averaged a 9% contribution to the GDP in recent years and sustained a growth of 15% over the last decade. The CDG plans to invest 1 billion EUR in tourist projects over the next five years. Currently, several large scale and luxurious projects are being developed, especially in the neighbourhood of Marrakech, targeting specifically the so-called “superconsumers” (Klein, 2007). The prestigious Plan Azur (involving the creation of six sea-side resorts), the development of Casa Marina, the Saphira project which aims to develop the coastline in Rabat, and the planning of the Bouregreg Valley, are but four of the most prestigious endeavours to promote luxury tourism (Barhtel, 2008; Mouloudi, 2009). Resorts and gated communities similar to Chrifa Oasis Resort in Marakech, Royal Resort Cap Malabata in Tangiers and Anfaplace Living Resort in Casablanca are expected to mushroom in the near future and intend to lure the well-off both from inside and especially outside Morocco – at least if the current economic crisis doesn’t slow its pace.

This urban revolution in Morocco would not be possible without state regulation and state interventions. Economic zones such as Casanearshore and TFZ are created by the Moroccan state authorities. The services and products that are manufactured in those zones – and which are mostly intended exclusively for export – benefit from specific government regulations (e.g. tax exemptions, specific legislation, etc.). Furthermore, neoliberal reforms coincide and are intimately intertwined with significant state-institutional reforms (e.g. the new state spaces). Old forms and arrangements are rolled back, new ones rolled out. Consequently, besides more indirect governmental control – through the privatization of the state – the urban transformations were also supported by institutional reform and a rescaling of state power in order to improve state intervention. In 2002, for example, the wali (regional governor) received more competences and responsibilities to develop regional and local entrepreneurial policies and manage local investments. Under the tutelage of the wali, Regional Investment Centers (RIC) were installed to act as one-stop contact points between political authorities and private investors. As such, the monarchy not only recognized the growing economic role of cities and regions, with the expansion of the wali’s competences it also reinforced the power of the makhzen in local economic affairs by transferring some of the economic prerogatives from certain ministries to the governorates (Catusse, 2009a). These governorates are directly accountable to the Ministry of Interior.

Additionally, large-scale development projects such as the Bouregreg project or the
Tanger Med project are placed under the authority of newly established institutional arrangements which have exclusive authorities over their territories: respectively the Agence pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg (AAVB) and the Tanger Med Special Authority (TMSA). Through these institutional reforms the Moroccan ruling elites managed to pull important economic projects and developments out of the realm of control of the national and local elected government bodies (cf. chapter 5). As such, the rapid restructuring of the Moroccan urban economy was state-led, carefully manufactured and controlled by the palace and its entourage. The late Abdelaziz Meziane Belfqih was for example one of the most influential advisors of king Mohamed VI and he played an important role in the new economic direction taken by the Monarchy. As a former member of the Royal Cabinet, he was involved in the planning of several big infrastructural projects and appointed young technocrats as directors of the coordinating governmental agencies. His influence was also important in bringing in investments from the Gulf to the Bouregreg project (Vermeren, 2009: 63). Also in Morocco, the official discourses take example from the narrative of the Post-Washington Consensus and clearly emphasize that the state should actively support private initiatives and interests. The following statement of Hamid Ben Elafadi, director of the RIC of Casablanca, is exemplary for the rationality of Moroccan roll out neoliberalism. In an interview with the economic magazine Challenge, he refers to the different role of both the private sector and the public authorities in order to solve problem of scarcity in the real estate sector for businesses in Casablanca:

First of all, the dynamic of the real estate sector for business, which comprises also the real estate of offices, commercial locations, logistic platforms and industrial parks, is a guarantee for the territorial attractiveness [of Casablanca]. Secondly, we are convinced that the traditional approaches are not adapted anymore to the demands that we experience in the metropolis of Grand Casablanca and only the private sector has the reactivity, the flexibility and the capacity to respond to this demand for real estate for business in a quantitative and qualitative manner. Third, the public authorities, however, cannot leave this sector totally on its own, without strategic orientations, attractive incitements and spatial and temporal regulation.217

 Elite politics and the question of class in Morocco
An important question left to be discussed is the question who rules in Morocco? Although the political dominance of the monarchy is undeniable, we cannot just reduce political authority to one man or one family. From a Marxist perspective, the neoliberal reforms in the Global South involved processes of class formation and class politics. Is it possible, however, to point out a ruling (capitalist) class in Morocco? Generally, in the case of Morocco, the assumption goes that the makhzen (the clique of elites close to the monarchy) controls the country politically and economically. Yet, can we see a change in the constitution of the ruling elite due to the current capitalist transformations in Morocco? Ali Benhaddou (2009) argues that since the 19th century, with the beginning of trade with the Europeans, a small group of powerful merchant families has dominated

217 Cited in a special issue dedicated to the current scarcity of business real estate in weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: p.18.
the political economy of Morocco. Until today, this minority controls the political and economic space. According to Benhaddou, there is little or no social mobility in Moroccan society. Through marriages and personal ties, the Moroccan “aristocracy” has managed to keep control over the country for centuries. In addition, he argues that there is no independent bourgeoisie today in Morocco that could play the same role as did the European bourgeoisie in the 18th century. As such, the Moroccan capitalist system is pictured to be in the hands of a few powerful families with feudal features. In the eyes of Benhaddou, they are the ones that block the democratic transition towards a competitive and modern free-market society. I do not entirely agree. Although Benhaddou rightfully sees political power in the hands of a few powerful actors, I argue nevertheless, that his perspective is a rather a-spatial perspective – as Doreen Massey would call it – on the history of Morocco and Europe. First of all, it suggests that historic political transitions that took place in two completely different time-periods and within different social settings can be simply compared and framed within a timeline of stages. Furthermore, throughout his book, he tends to compare a ‘crony’ capitalist system in Morocco with some kind of ideal type of “democratic capitalism” that is supposed to exist in other parts of the world. In this view, the Moroccan aristocratic families block an (almost logical) evolution towards a kind of more honest and honourable capitalist society. Although he never clearly defines democratic capitalism, Benhaddou gives the following description which might indicate what he means:

> Education, science and technology play an essential role in national development. Yet, their contribution can only be efficient as far as they can be integrated in existing structures and integrated in local tradition and culture. For this, we need men, organizations and modalities of government. Men, above all, who are technologically formed and which possess the qualities that are inherent to the spirit of democratic capitalism (Ibid.: 48, own translation).

Besides a few exceptions, the Moroccan elites do not dispose of these qualities and block the emergence of those who can put that spirit into practice. As he continues:

> Except a minority of very dynamic men, linked to central power [pouvoir politique], the Moroccan entrepreneurs don’t posses these qualities yet because, behind them, there is an education and certain habits of thinking which are difficult to reconcile with the spirit of capitalism in the Weberian sense. Generally, it are the achievements of competitors that force them to undertake and not the spirit of capitalism which brings forth economically rational behaviour, and comprises the sources of financing and the fair redistribution of wealth. Among them, the conservative spirit supplants the spirit of enterprise. [Their] entrepreneurship is not born out of a capitalist vocation, but out of a rentier mentality [un besoin d’acquérir des rentes de situations durables]. They never sacrifice their autonomy for growth. To the contrary, growth has to be the result of the autonomy of family management. Profit, expansion, export are not the aim of enterprising but rather the means to escape the rationality of competition and, as a consequence, the modernization of the economy (Ibid., own translation).

Benhaddou basically argues that the modern capitalist principles of competition and
entrepreneurship are not respected among the Moroccan ruling elite. As a result, they block the transition towards a more democratic capitalism in which both the producers and the consumers have equal powers to influence the future evolution of a the free-market society. In his view, free enterprise driven by profit, expansion and export is what leads a country to a modern and fair society. Despite Benhaddou’s insightful views on the Moroccan political and economic elites, three critical remarks should be added. First, his view entails a liberal and very utopian conception of capitalism. Additionally, if you read between the lines, he suggests that Western societies approach this ideal much better than Morocco. Yet, in reality, he only compares Morocco’s actual existing form of capitalism with some essence or ideal type of something that probably does not exist. In general, if we are to believe that ‘pure forms’ of liberal or neoliberal capitalism can exist, then we would also have to conclude that there exists no example of that kind of (neo-)liberalism in any region or country in the world today. However, Samir Amin has reminded us that conceptions of pure forms of capitalism or “pure economics” reflect only a theory of imaginary capitalism that doesn’t really answer to the actual existing reality of capitalism (Amin, 2003: 16). Secondly, in arguing that the current competitive politics in Morocco are the result of aristocratic politics, while instead, the “spirit of capitalism” would bring forth rational behaviour and a fair redistribution of wealth, Benhaddou ignores the very dynamics that drive (any form of) capitalism: accumulation (often by dispossession) and (class) power. I will further elaborate in chapters 4 and 5 why contemporary political and economic reforms in Morocco suggest otherwise. Third, Benhaddou’s perspective also underestimates the fact that it are the inherent contradictions of capitalism (and not so much certain aristocratic habits of thinking) that lie at the basis of both the social deprivation of the majority of the Moroccan population and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. The capitalist system (anywhere in the world) does not promote competition in the sense that everybody gets an equal opportunity to undertake and enterprise in a free-market and politically neutral space. This is the neo-classical bias that Bush (2004) refers to. To the contrary, capitalism promotes the accumulation of wealth and power, generates the conditions for uneven development and the establishment of monopolies worldwide, and is built and dependent on relations of labour exploitation.

As I discussed in chapter 2, uneven development is the driving force behind capitalism and the processes of accumulation and capital circulation. These are global processes in which local elites are involved. I argue that since the 1980s, with the economic liberalization of the Moroccan economy and the implementation of neoliberal reform, the Moroccan ruling elites adapted to the new neoliberal reality and took reforms both in accordance to the requirements of international donor agencies (World Bank and IMF) and their own private interests. This is the dialectic between the territorial and the capitalist logics of power. As a result of that very dialectic, the same elite families that ruled Morocco for centuries largely succeeded (so far) in maintaining their power during the capitalist transformations of the last three decades. This was not only due to their aristocratic (feudal) practices but equally due to their willingness to adapt to the new situation, to act as a capitalist class and give in to the continuous transformation of their practices into more capitalist class-based practices. Their relations of power transformed together with the necessity to compete in a neoliberal global economy. The mechanisms by which they ‘competed’ are of course not fair and just, let alone that they
are true to some kind of spirit of democratic capitalism. That is just the way by which
the ruling capitalist classes operate everywhere in the world.

The state bourgeoisie

During the protectorate, both the monarchy and the nationalist movement realized that
they needed each other as strategic allies in the struggle for independence. Consequently,
after the independence in 1956, the domestic economy came into the hands of these
Moroccan elites and key economic positions left by the French were taken in by the
most influential urban and rural families (Waterbury, 1970). The alliance between king
Mohamed V and the Istiqlal (the nationalist movement and the first political party in
independent Morocco) was essential for the political stability of the newly established
state. Quickly however, both parties became inevitable competitors for power and the
first two decades after the independence were marked by this struggle to dominate the
domestic political scene (Joffe, 1988; see also Zartman, 1987). As I elaborated earlier,
two strategies were decisive in the establishment of the political dominance of the mon-
archy. First of all, the monarchy reinforced its political base in the rural areas. Thanks
to royal support, the Moroccan “fellah” (in this case the rural landowning elite) became
the primary defender of the throne (Leveau, 1985). These Moroccan landowning elites
had largely lost their political power immediately after the independence due to their
affiliations with the French administration during the Protectorate (see also Pennell,
2000; Holden, 2007). Yet, these elites still disposed over considerable economic power
and the monarchy quickly turned to them for support and loyalty to counterbalance the
urban bourgeoisie. Moreover, at the end of the 1950s, still more than 70% of the Moroc-
can population lived in the rural areas. To ensure this political alliance and control the
rural migration, Mohamed V, and later his son Hassan II, heavily concentrated national
investments in the development of the rural areas and the agricultural sector, thereby
largely ignoring the industrialisation and the planning of Morocco’s urban agglomer-
ates. In doing so, the monarchy, hoped to contain the influence of the urban commercial
elites within the nationalist Istiqlal party. Secondly, the monarchy did not completely
ignore the urban elites and tied the traditional urban families into its patronage net-
works by protecting their commercial interests and making them dependent on state
support (Ben Ali, 1997). As a result, they became dependent on the Moroccan state as
a kind of “comprador bourgeoisie”. In other words, their development was conditioned
by state intervention and state support, by the rhythm and expansion of important state
monopolies (e.g. phosphates) and determined by investment decisions taken elsewhere
– i.e. by foreign capital (mostly French-based) (Oosterlinck, 2007: 112; Rami, 2007:
64). Consequently, the urban nationalist movement balanced between co-optation and
repression (Leveau, 1985: 245).

During those first decades, the considerable control and interference of the state in the
economic field allocated considerable power and influence to the state technocrats. This
was an essential part of the divide and rule strategy of the monarchy. The technocratic
elites are typically opposed to the partisan elite because they occupy important govern-
mental positions without (a clear) party affiliation (Benhaddou, 2009). They are recruit-
ed amongst the powerful families (very often fassi) and because they are not elected
but appointed by dahir (royal decree) they are tied to the monarchy and depend on the
goodwill of the makhzen for their privileged positions within the state bureaucracy.
These elites occupy leading positions in state companies, state agencies and the public administration. They are also often appointed as ministers in technocratic departments (e.g. agriculture, finance, trade and industry) and appointed in strategically important departments (e.g. interior, foreign affairs). Between 1977 and 1985 the technocratic influence on the Moroccan government even increased significantly and the ministerial appointments doubled (Sehimi, 1992). The comparison with what John Waterbury has called the state bourgeoisie is salient. According to Waterbury the state bourgeoisie was the driving force behind state capitalism in the decades preceding structural adjustment and neoliberal reform in the Arab region. They consisted of “those top-level managers and technocrats who are in direct control of the assets owned fully or partially by the state” (Waterbury, 1991: 2). Especially during the Moroccanization process, but also in the years before, the process of state capitalism transformed the state’s high administrative bureaucracy into a state bourgeoisie that dominated the economic activities in the country (Ben Ali, 1997). According to Waterbury this state bourgeoisie cannot be considered as a dominant ruling or state class. First of all, he argues, they do not own the means of production they control. Furthermore, because of this, they cannot really secure their own incumbency or their reproduction as a state class. Waterbury and Richards (2008: 208) that from a classical Marxist perspective the dominant capitalist class will always try to perpetuate its control over the means of production and pass this control on to its offspring through the legal ownership of private property. Members of the state bourgeoisie have no legal claim over their offices and the assets they control. As such, they remain tributary to the state. As Ben Ali argued:

Even though they had a clear idea of their professional interests and clung fiercely to the privileges that they enjoyed at the helm of the public sector, Moroccan technocrats did not attain the degree of homogeneity necessary to forge a social group able to break free from the Makhzen. Since managers were directly nominated and relieved by their posts by dahir, their dependency on the state was complete. Besides, their nomination was not only a function of their competence, but also – indeed, fundamentally – a product of their allegiance; for their tenure at the head of public enterprises was contingent upon support accorded to them by the ruling circle. In sum, being the creation of the state, these technocrats were totally dependent on it. Their existence as an autonomous group is not conceivable at the present time. By allowing them to establish rent-seeking positions as well as benefit from corruption and other gains and facilities, the Makhzen has ensured control over Morocco’s technocrats (Ben Ali, 1997: 204-205).

As such, the monarchy and the makhzen managed the economy through a neo-patrimonial logic in the sense that its goal was not only to accumulate capital through state capitalism, but also to tie an important segment of Moroccan society (the urban bourgeoisie) into a network of clients by distributing positions, privileges and granting them rent-seeking opportunities. This state domination over the economy had some additional effects. Although the private sector was encouraged to play its role in economic development, no Moroccan entrepreneur succeeded in occupying an important economic position without royal consent (Leveau, 1985). Most of Morocco’s current millionaires previously occupied privileged positions in the state administration or public sector before they turned to the private sector (Berrada & Said Saadi, 1992). These
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Neo-patrimonial politics eventually contributed largely to the economic distortions and imbalances at the end of the 1970s. As a result of the debt-crisis, the state bourgeoisie proved incapable to sustain their specific mode of production and had to give up large parts of its direct state-control over domestic economic affairs. The logical question that follows would be whether the neoliberal reforms in Morocco involved the establishment of an autonomous capitalist class that (partly) replaced the state bourgeoisie? While this may not entirely be the case, I still suggest that a class analysis is helpful to understand political agency and power in Morocco. As such, I disagree with perspectives on Morocco that tend to place political power solely in the hands of a “regime” (the makhzen) which controls the state and its state bourgeoisie. In order to move away from such a tendency we should also move away from Waterbury’s perspective on the state bourgeoisie. To begin with, I do not agree with Waterbury’s perspective on class. The important question is not so much whether we can define some set of fixed sociological characteristics in order to categorize and determine a certain class and its degree of autonomy (e.g. by the ownership over the means of production), to the contrary, what matters is whether we can distinguish politics as being class politics, and power as being class power. There is a crucial difference in approach. But let me first elaborate on the emergence of new politically and economically influential groups in Morocco as the result of shifting balances of power that related to neoliberal globalization.

Neoliberal reform leading to capitalist class formation?
The reforms of economic liberalization in the 1980s radically altered the political practices that underpinned the balances of power. New social groups and actors emerged and old forms of power (state clientilism) proved inadequate to maintain the political status quo (Ben Ali, 2005). Once the Moroccan regime had to reduce its mechanisms of wealth and service redistribution, the political basis of its authority would possibly be undermined as well. The economic crisis was therefore a challenge and an opportunity for authoritarian regimes and ruling elites in the whole Arab region to change political coalitions and networks of power (Pratt, 2007: 61). In Morocco, the neoliberal transition entailed important political shifts. First of all, powerful elements within the ruling coalition changed their practices of power. The most obvious example was the king himself. Since ONA purchased the interests of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas in 1980, king Hassan II became the primary private investor in Morocco (Leveau, 1985: 257). This was a first sign that the monarchy redirected its political strategies and tried to establish itself as an undeniable and dominant private actor in the emerging neoliberal market economy. Mohamed VI continued this road and further expanded the ONA-empire to become the country’s undisputed primary capitalist. Much more than his father, who even showed diminishing interest in business at the end of his life, Mohamed VI became known as Morocco’s primary ‘patron’ due to the expanding activities of ONA, but also due to the increasing intervention of (semi-public) state-agencies in large-scale neoliberal urban development projects that were under his control. The dominant perception today is that the monarchy’s grip over the economy is stronger than ever (Denoeux, 2007). Yet, other upper-class elites within the state-administration also had to redeploy their accumulation strategies. The roll back of the state in economic affairs had reduced the capacities of the state bourgeoisie to intervene directly in the economy. Yet, many of them managed to profit from the privatization of public assets and established themselves as the captains of the Moroccan private industry.
Secondly, for decades, a small elite had dominated the economy by relying mainly on personal relations and clientelist networks within the state apparatus. Yet, due to the structural adjustments and economic liberalization, new social groups emerged and gained political influence. Myriam Catusse and Melani Claire Cammett (who focuses more specifically on the Moroccan textile industry) describe in detail how a growing group of *entrepreneurs* gained political influence within the new economic order in Morocco (Cammett, 2007; Catusse, 2008). Neoliberal globalization had brought to the fore a group of export-oriented manufacturers, a relatively new component of the private sector, which sought its fortunes on global markets, largely through subcontracting relationships (Cammett, 2007: 99). Cammett argues that this new export class, especially in the textile industry, managed to delink itself from domestic markets and oriented itself almost exclusively towards the global market:

> Working through the *Admissions Temporaires* (AT) regime, or the in-bond, temporary import regime for export-oriented production, subcontractors and exporters maintained minimal connections to the domestic market and cultivated extensive interests in the global economy. Through the AT system, local export manufacturers could divorce themselves almost entirely from the national market by dealing exclusively with foreign textile suppliers for inputs. Overseas clients and multinationals often supplied all inputs, including cloth, thread, zippers, buttons, and other accessories. As a result, backward linkages were virtually nonexistent and local value-added was minimal (Ibid.: 99-100).

Although the traditional elite families continued to dominate the capitalist economy – they were, after all, the ones who benefited the most from the privatization of public assets – these new actors (e.g. owners of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)) nevertheless tried to have an impact on political decision-making. As such, the rise of a new social group of entrepreneurs did not so much supplant the position of these traditional elites, nor did they necessarily alter the rules of the game – after all, personal networks were still of crucial importance for doing business in Morocco. Yet, nevertheless, they did change the ways in which the Moroccan private sector related to the state and how this sector adopted different patterns of interaction with state officials. These new entrepreneurs often lacked high-level access to the palace and the upper-echelons of the state bureaucracy. In order to establish these necessary connections, they transformed important employers’ associations into powerful lobby groups. Both Catusse and Cammett demonstrate in detail how the increasing importance of business associations in the 1990s marked this changing state-business relation. These lobby groups interacted with the state on behalf of the different economic sectors and their particular interests. They introduced new styles of placing demands on the state. By organizing themselves in professional associations and by restructuring their modes of political action they were able to construct a critical mass of private businessmen and managed to pressure

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218 The AT system allowed producers to obtain duty-free inputs on the condition that they exported the goods made from these inputs within a time-limit of six months. In the mid-1990s a group of apparel exporters, organized in the textile association AMITH, even advocated for the complete abolition of the AT-system, the further liberalization of export-oriented activities and the dismantling of the remaining protective trade barriers. For more details see Cammett (2007).
the state administration (Ibid.: 179-180). The transformation of the Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), is a salient example. It evolved from a “club de patrons”, closely tied to the makhzen, to a broad interest group – a “syndicat patronal” – that pretended to defend the interests of the employers and private business in general (Catusse, 2008). Until the 1990s, its leaders were members of the traditional Fassi bourgeoisie who strongly relied on the state and the monarchy to protect their business interests.

But since the mid-1990s, the CGEM has expanded from four membership federations to over twenty and integrated all kinds of new business elites – albeit the CGEM was still far from representing the whole spectre of the private sector at that time. One of its most powerful members was the Association Marocaine de l’Industrie Textile et de l’Habillement (AMITH). This association assembled a growing group of apparel exporters that had great interest in pressuring the government to further liberalize trade. Characteristic for the transformation of the CGEM was the increasing prominence of “a-typical” business elites. Until the early 1990s, the CGEM was directed by former ministers and controlled by the Moroccan big capitalists (Benhaddou, 2009). A break from this was established with the election of Aberrahmane Lahjouji at the head of the CGEM in 1994 (Catusse, 2008: 214-221). He hadn’t enjoyed his education in one of the Moroccan elite schools and he wasn’t an ex-minister nor did he previously occupy any other high position in the state bureaucracy. In other words, he wasn’t the preferred candidate of the makhzen. His election therefore symbolized the emergence of this new interest group of entrepreneurs. Many of the new entrepreneurs that assembled in the CGEM came from comparatively more modest origins. These so-called “self-made men” now opposed the traditional “fat cats” (to use Cammett’s comparison). The first group contended that they earned their living through honest and hard work rather than through the support of the state and the reliance on a privileged family background. In reality, however, this image should be nuanced. Although many of these so-called self-made men did not have connections within the upper-echelons of the Moroccan political elite, they still were well-connected, affluent individuals (Cammett, 2007: 171-172).

Another turning point in the relation between the private sector and the state was the infamous ‘sanitation campaign’ (campagne d’assainissement) or anti-corruption cam-

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219 Because of their lack of access to the makhzen and the state technocrats, these associations tried to put pressure on elected government officials to influence the decision-making process. Cammett argues that this didn’t entail a trend towards political liberalization. The new entrepreneurs did not sought to alter the political system. Instead, like most businessmen in the world, they just tried to find alternative ways and strategies to pursue their private interests. The press, Cammett adds, was another channel to convey their interests. During the 1990s prominent entrepreneurs relied on press releases, interview and television appearances to express their demands and grievances (Cammett, 2007: 181).

220 The establishment of the CGEM dates back to 1933, during the Protectorate, as the country’s main private sector organization.

221 These traditional elites were the ones who had profited the most from the Marroccanization law (Sater, 2002).

222 Myriam Catusse focuses in her book specifically on the transformations within the CGEM, while Melani Cammett focuses specifically on the AMITH and the growing influence of the apparel exporters.

223 Symbolic was also the change of the name of the CGEM from ‘Confédération Générale Economique du Maroc’ to ‘Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc’ (Catusse, 2008: 201).
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which was started by the government to fight against drug trafficking and tax evasion. The campaign was launched by the Minister of Interior, officially to improve Morocco’s image in the light of the recently signed FTA with Europe. With this campaign the government wanted to prove its willingness to do something about the informal economy and other illegal economic activities. However, many suspected that the makhzen actually targeted specific businessmen and attempted to reinforce its grip on the entrepreneurs. Therefore, according to some observers, the anti-corruption campaign cannot only be understood within the framework of the state’s efforts to fight corruption and fraud but must also, and maybe more importantly, be understood within the framework of the changing balances of power between the makhzen and the Moroccan private sector (Sater, 2002; Hibou & Tozy, 2002b; Cammett, 2007; Catusse, 2008). The eventual signing of a “gentlemen’s agreement” in 1996 between the government and the CGEM drew the boundaries of a new balance of power and further institutionalized the contacts between the professional associations and the Moroccan government.

Consequently, the CGEM had revealed itself as one of the most important political competitors of the makhzen in the 1990s. While the organization was practically in-existent in the 1980s, it grew out to be an influential pressing group over the course of the 1990s. The singing of the gentlemen’s agreement assured the definite inclusion of the entrepreneurs in the Moroccan political space (Catusse, 2008: 241-242). Yet, this didn’t necessarily meant that the Moroccan entrepreneurs succeeded in the end in imposing their will on the established political powers. To be sure, they managed to express their demands and caught the attention of the makhzen, but their autonomy from the latter was still limited. The makhzen remained the most powerful economic and political force or elite network in the country. More accurately, the political struggle between the CGEM and the makhzen revealed that the first had managed to gain important political access, while the latter succeeded in co-opting their contestants. In this context, the gentlemen’s agreement should be understood as a reconfiguration of the assemblage of intermediaries that were allowed to influence and negotiate with the inner-circle of central political power in Morocco (Hibou & Tozy, 2002b). That was the compromise reached after the sanitation campaign. After the singing of the gentlemen’s agreement, the leadership of the CGEM was co-opted and joined the political establishment, not necessarily as a political actor in itself, but more as privileged intermediary (Ibid.: 42). Characteristic of this co-optation was the fact that the three following successors of Lahjouji as president of the CGEM, Hassan Chami, Moulay Hafid Elalamy and Mohamed Horani, were all more closely connected to the palace. In contrast to Lahjouji, who was a manager of a family business in Meknes, Chami came from a respectable Fassi family and occupied important government positions before he became president of the CGEM. Elalamy was the CEO of an important insurance company. He had previously worked for ONA and enjoyed the support of the royal inner circle and economic elite (Catusse, 2008: 220). Finally, Horani was elected president of the CGEM on 23 May 2009. Allegedly, he was the only candidate for the presidency and he enjoyed the support of ONA. Yet, the two actual favourites to win the election, Mohamed Chaïbi and Youssef Alaoui, had withdrawn their candidacy when Horani presented himself.

224 What is striking, according to Hibou and Tozy, is that the Moroccan government (i.e. the political parties) was kept out of these negotiations that led to the gentlemen’s agreement. The negotiations took place directly between the makhzen (through the Ministry of Interior) and the employer’s federation.
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Alaoui, for example, declared that he withdrew “out of respect for ONA”.225

In contrast to the entrepreneurs, the influence of other social actors diminished during the decades of economic restructuring and neoliberal reform. Before the era of structural adjustment, Morocco had a rather unusual political configuration compared to other countries in the region. In contrast to many other authoritarian regimes in the region, some social institutions in Morocco enjoyed a relative autonomy from the state apparatus and often opposed – to a certain extent of course – the repressive regime of king Hassan II. Among these institutions were the press, the political parties (i.e. foremost the historical opposition parties USFP and Istiqlal) and above all, the trade unions (Clément & Paul, 1984). However, despite this unique situation, the policies of economic adjustment brought forth some important political shifts that were more or less characteristic for the whole Arab region. Nazih Ayubi (1997: 159) argues that the traditional political configurations built around the military, the technocratic managerial state bourgeoisie and organized labour was a typical corollary of the famous ISI-strategy. The Moroccan labour unions, for example, proved to be a fierce opponent during the early 1980s (Cherkaoui & Ben Ali, 2007: 752). They had successfully put pressure on the government in several occasions and obliged the authorities to withdraw some of its economic austerity measures. Yet, this specific balance of power embedded in the developmental state regime could not be sustained in a more liberalized economy. In Morocco, the inclusion of the new entrepreneurs was one consequence, the diminishing influence of organized labour another. As such, the unions were one of the main victims of these shifting power balances. Moreover, this trend wasn’t confined to the Arab region. The diminishing power of the organized labour movements manifested itself as a global trend. Harvey argues that it was one of the main political objectives of the neoliberal class project (Harvey, 2006; Harvey, 2010a).

As I discussed earlier, the early years of neoliberal restructuring coincided with fierce strikes and even riots. The Casablanca-riots in 1981 were largely an expression of the increasing social discontent among the poor population of Casablanca, but also an indicator of the influence and mobilization capacities of the trade unions, in particular the CDT.226 Some observers at the time even thought the unions had the potential to inflict a full-scale insurrection. However, in the period that followed, the monarchy managed not only to repress the unions but also to incorporate some of its leadership and that of the allied opposition parties into a general politics of consensus. By November 1983, both USFP leader Abderrahim Bouabid and Istiqlal leader Mohamed Boucetta joined the government. Subsequently both the historical opposition parties and the major trade unions agreed to the new round of austerity measures imposed by the IMF (Clément


226 However, these expressions of discontent cannot be reduced to the working class alone. Violent demonstrations and urban mass protests against the declining standards of living and the removal of basic (food) subsidies were often also carried and supported by the urban lumpenproletariat. This was the case in countries as Egypt (1977), Sudan (1985), Jordan (1989), Tunisia (1978 & 1984), Algeria (1988) and elsewhere (Ayubi, 1997; Bayat, 2002). In Morocco, slum dwellers played a vital role in the violent urban outbreaks in Casablanca (1981) and also during the subsequent violent troubles of the 1980s. In fact, since the early 1950s, the slum population and the lumpenproletariat in Morocco were consistently involved in urban riots (Madani, 1995).
Three decades of neoliberal reform in Morocco

As a result of the repression against the unions and the co-optation of the political opposition, the role of these actors in the subsequent riots in 1984 were marginal at the least (Ibid.; Seddon, 1989). Also in the early 1990s, neither the unions nor the emerging Islamists played a crucial role in the violent uprisings around cities as Fez, Tangiers and Meknes. These events revealed a more general and spontaneous dissatisfaction that went well beyond the influence and scope of the unions (Madani, 1995; Brand, 1998). In the mid-1990s, Catusse argues, the apparent class struggle of the early 1980s was further neutralized when both the unions and the CGEM were brought together as “partners” with the institutionalization of the social dialogue. On 1 August 1996, leading representatives of the CDT, the Union Générale des Travailleurs (UGTM), the CGEM and the Minister of Interior, had signed a joint declaration in Rabat to install a social dialogue between the different social partners in order to find a common ground between their different interests in the future. This was a typical example of the privatization of the state. By bringing the social partners together around the same table, the central authorities had reduced their own role in the arbitration of class conflicts. As such they were able to redistribute responsibilities, regulate the social risks and supervise the process of ‘class collaboration’ they had installed. This new apparatus (dispositif) contributed to the depoliticization of the socio-economic problems in Morocco. In the name of economic growth, securitization and social peace the left-right divide was now, also in Morocco, put aside in favour of the consensus model (Catusse, 2008: 247; see also Mouffe, 2005).

All these evolutions (i.e. the emergence of new social actors and the diminishing influence of others under capitalist liberalization) brings us to the question whether a class analysis is a valuable method to analyze the specific case of the Moroccan neoliberal context? More importantly, if neoliberalism is a (global) class project, who then constitutes the (ruling) capitalist class in Morocco? To be sure, the Moroccan economy remains largely oligarchic. Traditional families with ties leading directly to the monarchy (often through marriage) continue to dominate strategic sectors such as finance and telecommunications. As a consequence some argued that we cannot speak of an autonomous capitalist class in Morocco. The entrepreneurs are a very heterogeneous group with different interests and internal conflicts. The CGEM incorporates both managers of the SMEs and CEOs belonging to the big private consortiums. Furthermore, in the end, political power and influence still depends on close ties with Morocco’s biggest capitalist: the king. The decision, for example, to embark on a structural adjustment program in 1983 was taken by king Hassan II personally and perceived as a sovereign decision (Ben Ali, 2005). Today, it is perceived to be Mohamed VI personally – together with his clique of close advisors – who determines the political economy of Morocco. He launches “royal projects” such as the Bouregreg project, Tanger Med and Casa Marina. Obviously, the current influence of the “royal managers” is undeniable (Vermeren, 2009). They continue to dominate the economy and the development of actually existing neoliberal urbanism in Morocco. The directors of important state agencies such as the AAVB, the TMSA and the CDG are some of today’s most promi-

227 The political reform process of the 1990s (the alternance) had a similar effect. By their definite co-optation into the realm of monarchical power, the historical opposition parties (Istiqlal and USFP) had lost a lot of their appeal amongst the main public and as a result also their capacity to pressure ruling authorities.

228 The UGTM was linked to the Istiqlal.
Comparable to Waterbury’s conception of the state bourgeoisie, these state managers do not own the means of production. They are only appointed by daahir and therefore still depend on their loyalty to the king – and his goodwill – for their personal fortunes. With the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI, some of the country’s leading technocrats under Hassan II were replaced by his own inner circle. Over the past decade, we have witnessed the rising influence and visibility of a young group of assertive and dynamic managers with close ties to Mohamed VI. They now occupy leading positions both in the state apparatus as well as in the private sector (Denoeux, 2007; Tozy, 2008). Consequently, it seems like these managers can as easily be replaced and displaced as they emerged if it suits the political interests of the makhzen. In 2009 for example, just after the municipal elections, Mustapha Bakkoury was replaced by Anass Alami as director of the powerful CDG. Rumour had it that the king appointed Alami because he was a close ally of Mohammed Mounir el Majidi, the CEO of SIGER and manager of the royal fortune.²²⁹ Yet, Bakkoury on the other hand, was an ally of Fouad Ali El Himma, also a close friend of the king and leader of the newly founded (royalist) political Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM).²³⁰ Despite the close contacts between El Himma and Mohamed VI, the king maybe wanted to avoid too much economic and political influence in the hands of the El Himma clan (Boussaid, 2009). Bakkoury was later appointed chief executive of the Moroccan Agency of Solar Energy (MASEN), an agency with far less prestige and influence than the CDG at the moment but, nevertheless, with the potential to grow as solar energy is perceived to be an important sector for the future. Whatever the real reason may have been for the shuffle, this example shows how easily influential state technocrats can be replaced and how dependent they are on the monarchy.

As a consequence, the rising Arab bourgeoisie, in Morocco as elsewhere in the region, during the last three decades of neoliberal reform is, according to Karen Aggestam e.a., by no means a class in itself:

On the contrary, it is more like the compradora bourgeoisie of old colonial times. Together with the new infitah elites, “old” post-independence elites still hold the reins of power. The “state bourgeoisie” or upper echelons of the public administration and security sector elites (army, security forces) are still very important in the power structure, as are old community leaders (…) and local notables. Consequently, the increased elite variety and complexity seem to be mainly the result of a more complex society, rather than the product of new, independent, emerging classes (Aggestam, e.a., 2009: 328-329).

Two remarks are at place here. First, these allegations seem to suggest the non-existence of capitalist class politics – or at least their subordination to neo-patrimonial politics – and consequently, also the pointlessness of a (Marxist) class analysis of political life in the Arab region. After all, there can be no class politics without class agency. At

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²²⁹ SIGER is the Royal company which has a majority share in ONA.
²³⁰ In an interview, a close contact within the CDG confirmed me that the allegiance of Alami to the el Majidi-clan was probably one of the reasons for the dismissal of Bakkoury (Rabat – 17/05/2010).
best, if neoliberalism is taken into account in mainstream political accounts of Arab politics, the nature of its implementation is then mostly considered to be determined by a small clique of neo-patrimonial elites (the regime) and not understood as a class project, which is, I would argue, a much broader and more insightful perspective. Additionally, in a period in which structural adjustment and neoliberal reform clearly aggravated the social living conditions of the majority of the Arab population – and at the same time did not necessarily worsen the conditions for the ruling elite to accumulate capital – the focus of many MENA-studies (both within the transitologist as the post-democratization traditions) did not so much turned to a consideration of emerging or repressed class struggles, but instead, focused on the role that civil society could play in political transition and processes of democratization (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 133-134; see for example Bellin, 1994; Kamrava & O Mora, 1998; Hawthorne, 2004; Cavatorta & Elananza, 2008). No doubt, as I mentioned earlier, Morocco experienced a spectacular growth of local associations and other social organizations during the 1990s due to the new political climate of the alternance (cf. Abouhani, 2006; Berriane, 2010). But the focus on phenomena as civil society can also be seen as the continuous attempt of liberal theory to displace class analyses and class identification in favour of conceptions which present a more contractual relationship with the state (Radice, 2008). Moreover, it was also through the good governance discourse that the World Bank co-inspired the interest in civil society, by emphasizing the positive role civil society can play in processes of transition and democratization (Kapoor, 2008). Although, I do not wish to deny the validity of research on civil society’s potentially political role, mainstream accounts on political change in the Arab region, however, still tend to deny the crucial impact of neoliberal hegemony as a form of class rule. Consequently, Marxist class analyses are largely ignored as valuable critical modes of thought that can produce new insights about the problems of capitalist development in the region.231

Secondly, positivist approaches to class and class analysis are rather limited to draw definite conclusions on the usefulness of such an analysis. As such, the conclusion that the state bourgeoisie or the emerging entrepreneurs cannot be seen as an autonomous class is not particularly illuminating to determine whether we should or should not revert to a Marxist class analysis. To begin with, according to advocates of “global system theory”, we have to turn away from state-centrist analyses of colonial and post-colonial (developmental) states and their grip on the domestic economy.232 Instead, in order to understand the (class) nature of the ruling elite in the Third World and their relationship with capitalism, we should analyse the global capitalist system as a whole and try to capture the definite dynamics of the emergence of a transnational capitalist class, both locally and globally (Skilair & Robbins, 2002; see also Robinson, 2004). While these theorist recognize that this transnational capitalist class is not yet fully developed, they argue that it is just a matter of time. According to them, the economic grip of many Third World states is declining and the economic interests of those who control

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231 A positive exception in this regard is the recent call by Francesco Cavatorta in an article published in the special issue that was edited by Valbjørn and Bank (see chapter 1). He argues that we should look into the insights of Marxism to see how they can broaden our understanding of politics in the region (Cavatorta, 2010).

232 Global system theory argues that national states and national capitalist classes will eventually submerge in transnational states and transnational capitalist classes due to an ever globalizing capitalist system.
and lead the global economy are increasingly intertwined across and beyond national boundaries. Class relations and class identities are therefore globally defined, instead of being rather exclusively local and/or national in origin (Ibid.). But even if we don’t go as far as global system theory to disconnect class relations from national political space, a class analysis is still valuable to understand the nature of political change in the Arab World (and Morocco more specifically). As such, and maybe more importantly, the critical question is not so much whether neoliberal reform in the Arab region has given rise to a new (independent) class (transnational or otherwise), or whether we can define certain fixed sociological categories by which we can determine the apparent (class or non-class) nature of politics. To the contrary, I would like to argue that the crucial issue is to understand how traditional and new emerging elites are gradually transforming their practices even more into capitalist class practices in a context of neoliberal reform. This is important not only to understand how relations of capital and labour are transformed through neoliberal political projects, but also to investigate the particular ways in which neoliberal globalization has brought forth a new social order and transformed the existing balance of (class) forces.233

Adam David Morton, who draws on Kevin Cox, argues that class should be viewed more “as a historical category and employed in a heuristic way rather than as a static analytical category” (Morton, 2007: 117). Authors such as Waterbury and Aggestam view class too much as a rigid sociological category which gives us the illusion that this concept can be used in a positivist method to decide whether someone belongs to a certain class or not (some positivist Marxists have that same tendency).234 One of the important elements that defines this rigidity is the objective category which is dictated by the ownership over the means of production. Yet, this feature of ownership does not necessarily bring clarity. Even in the heartland of neoliberal hegemony, the US, it becomes more and more difficult to attune a class analysis to the simple fact whether one owns the means of production or not. CEO’s and managers of multinational consortiums do not own the means of production (or not all of them) which they control. Additionally, in the contemporary phase of finance capitalism, production has become subordinated to speculation. This brings to the fore all kinds of new actors (stockbrokers, day traders, hedge funds, etc.) who’s class position is not necessarily only determined by mere ownership over the means of production. More closely related to the case of Morocco, the institutions of the European Union have proved on many occasions that they are involved in projects to neoliberalize European political and economic life. Are the politics of commissioners and Eurocrats – this rather particular kind of state bourgeoisie – then not a form of class politics?

Class formation or the existence of a capitalist class are the result of processes that are inherently linked to the uneven geographical development of capitalism worldwide. The continuous extensive and intensive enlargement of capitalism around the globe coincides, irrevocably, with the extension of class relations and class practices

233 A interesting detail in this regard is for example the fact that even ONA had to reconcile with the entrance of new powerful foreign capitalist actors as it could not match the offer of French and Spanish multinationals in the Moroccan telecom deals (Sater, 2010: 104).
234 In contrast, someone like Melani Cammett for example, consistently uses the concept of class when she speaks of the emerging entrepreneurs in Morocco.
everywhere in the world. I do agree with Waterbury when he argues that structural adjustment was forced upon the ruling elites in the Arab region. But I differ from his opinion when he states that in the face of the debt crisis the state bourgeoisie failed to act as a class (Waterbury, 1991: 8). According to Waterbury the state bourgeoisie had no consistent class project (Ibid.: 9). Yet, Waterbury’s conceptualization of the state bourgeoisie as a coherent social category hides internal contradictions. He considers all state personnel – including both elite managers and members of the petty bourgeoisie working in the state-administration – to be part of one social group. In that sense, the state bourgeoisie – or the way he conceptualized it – failed indeed to act as a single class. But that doesn’t mean that the specific political strategies of the state bourgeoisie to respond to the debt crisis did not have a class content.

Nicos Poulantzas is one of those Marxist authors who critiqued rigid conceptualizations of class and analyzed the class status of – what he calls – the “state personnel”. According to Poulantzas, the state personnel has a specific class place but cannot be treated as a coherent, unified social category in the same way Waterbury treats them:

Class contradictions are also inscribed within the State through *internal divisions of the state personnel in the broad sense of the term* (the various administrative, judicial, military, police and other state bureaucracies). This personnel constitutes a *social category* with a characteristic unity that results from the organization and relative autonomy of the State. Nevertheless, it is not a social group existing alongside or above classes: it has a class place and is therefore internally divided. This class place is distinct from the class origin of the state personnel (i.e., from the classes out of which it emerges): it refers to the position of the personnel in the social division of labour, such as it crystallizes in the state framework (in the form, amongst others, of the specific reproduction of the division between intellectual and manual labour at the very heart of the intellectual labour concentrated in the State). It is a question of *bourgeois* class affiliation or place for the upper reaches of this personnel, and of *petty-bourgeois* affiliation for the intermediate and subaltern echelons of the state apparatuses (Poulantzas, 2000: 154).

Poulantzas would have criticized Waterbury for ignoring the obvious class contradictions within the state bourgeoisie. Waterbury does not attribute a different class position to the petty bourgeoisie and thereby ignores the differentiated forms of power and hierarchy within the state apparatus itself from a class perspective. Just in order to maintain political continuity within a neoliberal global environment, former neo-patrimonial relations of power had to be extended with and transformed into more market-oriented class relations of power, relatively autonomous from state-control. Only in this way did the *makhzen* and the state-elite manage not lose its power. Moreover, as I argued in chapter 2, the state still proved an essential and crucial apparatus for the establishment of neoliberal policies. Yet, in contrast to the vision that considers the worldwide spread of neoliberal government a result of a global hierarchy of states – in which certain capitalist states (e.g. the US) would then be the main driving force behind the neoliberal transformations of Third World states – the neoliberal hegemony in Morocco should be first of all understood as a form of class rule that operates within and beyond national boundaries and through the state apparatus (Overbeek, 2005; see also Morton, 2007: 117).
To point out particular class politics is not the same thing as claiming that class is determined in advance, but rather an attempt to explain the specific nature of the interests and conflicts behind wage labour exploitation, accumulation by dispossession and capital circulation. Class as a concept does not exist prior to struggle, but arises out of that struggle (Thompson, 1978). Therefore, Harvey argues that:

A central tenet of Marx’s historical and materialist method is that a concept such as “class” can take on a meaning only in relation to the historical context in which it is to be applied. “Class” has a contingent meaning depending upon whether we are considering feudal, capitalist, or socialist modes of production.

Even more concrete, we could argue in the context of Morocco, as elsewhere in the world, that the meaning of class will vary upon whether we are considering actually existing developmental or neoliberal forms of capitalism. To give a concrete example: global system theory will attribute a transnational character to class forces in contemporary global capitalism, while in contrast, class forces under Keynesianism and/or developmentalism were considered to have a more national character (cf. Sklair & Robbins, 2002; Robinson, 2004). Class theory, Harvey argues, is therefore not “a matter of identifying a fixed set of categories which are supposed to apply for all times and places” (Harvey, 1989a: 111). To the contrary, class configurations are always relational and these configurations are embedded within the dynamics and transformations of actually existing capitalism. The Marxist economist David Ruccio adds an important argument to that. He argues that class can therefore also be interpreted as a process of appropriation of surplus labour (Ruccio, 2011). Marx has distinguished necessary labour (labour necessary to keep oneself alive) from surplus labour. According to the interpretation of class as a process, Marx, building on this distinction, defined class as the particular social process in which surplus labour is appropriated from those who directly produce it (e.g. by buying or exploiting it). In addition, seeing class as a process does not imply that it replaces all other non-class processes. To the contrary:

This process of surplus appropriation is, in turn, complexly determined by the other economic, political, and cultural processes that make up social life. The various modes of surplus labor appropriation or class processes designated by Marx (primitive communal, feudal, slave, capitalist, etc.) are then produced by differing configurations of such nonclass social processes. Each particular class process is understood to exist only as an effect of its own uniquely constituted social context (Ibid.: 223).

If we go back to the basic social relationship that Marx observed within capitalism, the power relation between capital and labour, this relation is expressed through the actual

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235 Edward Palmer Thompson stated that “class struggle is the prior concept to class, class does not precede but arises out of struggle” (Thompson, 1978: 298). Here, his argument resonates with Foucault’s critique that we should primarily be concerned to find out what the (class)struggle is in concrete terms, instead of first being preoccupied with the task to determine what class is (Marsden, 1999: 24).

236 Morton raised some important critical reflections on global system theory, arguing that we should neither accept the dominant fixity of state-centrism nor the assumption that the national state and therefore also national ruling classes are irreversibly merging into transnational structures and class forces (Morton, 2007: 139 & 140-150; see also chapter 2, in particular footnote 104).
existing market mode of economic integration and determined by the outcome of actual class struggle (Harvey, 1989: 111). The capitalist class process, therefore, is determined by the appropriation of surplus labour in the particular form of surplus-value (Ruccio, 2011: 223). Capitalists accumulate by extracting more value from the results of production than the value of labour power to produce these results. Under “normal conditions” this value is generated by the sale of the commodities that were appropriated by the capitalists (i.e. through their control over the means of production). But there are all kinds of other ways to accumulate capital. We can, for example, extend the analysis of the class process to consider the distribution of surplus labour. Once surplus-value is appropriated, it is commonly distributed via specific channels to finance those social processes that are fundamental for the reproduction of the capitalist class process (e.g. via the stock-market, state officials, money-lenders, merchandising, etc.) (Ibid.). Via these channels extra surpluses are generated. Finally, I discussed above, surpluses can also be generated through accumulation by dispossession which is a specific form of exploitation. In this regard, I want to argue that the concept of class should not so much be used as a fixed sociological concept defined by a set of predetermined categories but rather as a political concept which provides new insights on (neoliberal) capitalist transformations. A Marxist analysis of class and class politics is above all an analysis of the nature of politics.

One of the essential features of class rule and class politics are the historical processes of economic exploitation. By focusing on particular examples of such processes (cf. chapter 4 and 5) we can identify some specific examples of how the Moroccan society is organized around and through existing forms of class exploitation. “Bring back exploitation as the hallmark of class, and at once class struggle is in the forefront, as it should be” (de Ste. Croix cited in Morton, 2007: 117). Morton agrees with authors as Erik Olin Wright (see chapter 2) and David Harvey, when he considers exploitation as one of the crucial points of interest for a Marxist perspective on class politics. In Morocco, neoliberal reforms have been the result of various political struggles between representatives of labour (e.g. the unions, the unemployed graduates, the slum dwellers) and capital (e.g. the entrepreneurs, the state bourgeoisie, the makhzen, etc.). These struggles are not always straightforward, let alone logical or rational. They sometimes have an internal character, as for example the struggle between different class fractions (e.g. between the new entrepreneurs and the makhzen). Of course, the variety of these struggles contradicts the existence of one coherent class with clear characteristics and one coherent and rational class project. Yet, class strategies are not necessarily concerted actions, planned to obtain one single aim (Lefebvre, 1996: 77). Let alone that these strategies would be rational. As such, the theoretical and empirical difficulty, if not the impossibility, to fix class in Morocco and elsewhere does not make the nature of political struggle less real (i.e. the struggle between capital and labour, the exploitation, the process of accumulation by dispossession, etc.).

Yet, this doesn’t mean of course that all politics have to be reduced to class politics. The crystallization of social forces in contemporary Moroccan society are also determined by other kinds of power relations that are embedded within religious, ethnic and

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237 I thank Matthias Lievens for this particular insight.
cultural contexts. These relations are to be situated usually within a broader historical framework and they are often ‘residuals’ – as Harvey (2006) would label them – from an earlier political order (tribal, feudal, etc.). For example, the religious authority of the king as ‘the Commander of the faithful’ was and still is a specific, very important power relation that has its historical roots before the emergence of capitalist social relations in Morocco and has little to do with the relation between capital and labour (see Waterbury, 1970). Furthermore, specific neo-patrimonial relations of power (the *makhzen*) are still prevalent in contemporary Moroccan political life. Another example are the specific residuals of relations established through colonialism and through the French cultural and social influence on Moroccan society – aside from its economic influence. Nevertheless, class issues are intimately intermingled with non-class issues such as ethnicity and gender. These other issues are to be seen in relation to class issues in order to understand the complex social realities that are shaped by neoliberal modes of production and accumulation (Morton, 2007: 117-118). The question is then not so much whether class politics supplanted or prevailed over former neo-patrimonial politics, but rather how they are intertwined within Morocco’s actually existing neoliberalism.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I attempted to give a first overview of the neoliberal transition in Morocco and the subsequent transition in Moroccan neoliberalism. The specific changes and political transformations described above testify how authoritarianism in the region has been renewed and reconfigured in the face of economic liberalization (Pratt, 2007). Since the introduction of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1983, Morocco entered a phase of radical economic restructuring. “Roll back neoliberalism” refers to this destructive event and state power was mobilized to complete it. Yet, this implied not so much the roll back of the state per se, but rather the roll back of particular (developmentalist) state functions. Furthermore, through strategies of accumulation by dispossession (e.g. privatization) ruling class formations managed to maintain and even increase their (economic) control, the royal family’s enhanced grip on ONA being of course the most obvious example. The concept of roll out neoliberalism points to a fundamental transformation within neoliberalism itself. According to Peck and Tickell, it refers to a more creative phase of neoliberalism, characterized by new forms of institution-building, new modes of regulation and new configurations of spatially differentiated government. New modalities of roll out neoliberalism in Morocco emerged after three developments; first of all, the disappointing socio-economic improvements after structural adjustment, especially for the majority of the Moroccan population; secondly, the increased social tensions over the last decade, which reached a (first) critical peak with the terrorist attacks of 2003; and finally, the changed global discourse and the new (post-Washington) consensus on good governance. As a result, new political debates and reform processes opened up space for new ways in which state agency was redeployed in social development schemes (e.g. INDH) to fight poverty, but also in large-scale urban development schemes to promote economic growth and redirect strategies of capital accumulation.

Some saw this apparent return of ‘the state’ as evidence for the decline of the impact of neoliberal ideology (cf. De Miras, 2007). I would argue that this is not the case. What
distinguished the neoliberal phase from the developmentalist phase were the changes in class relations and the overall balance of power. If we consider the balances of power of both the roll back and roll out phase of neoliberalism we have to consider that there have been no fundamental shifts. In the previous chapter, I used Harvey’s political definition to describe global neoliberalism as a political project which involved the restoration of capitalist class power. Also in Morocco, the power of the trade unions diminished during the 1980s and the social pact of the Moroccan developmental regime, i.e. the pact between the ruling elites and the urban middle classes, has been gradually dissolved. But the economic power of the makhzen didn’t suffer any setback. To the contrary, despite the emergence of a new entrepreneurial elite that benefited from trade liberalization and despite the return of foreign capital in the domestic market, traditional political elites continued to dominate the economy to the present day. Consequently, during the phase of roll out neoliberalism, it was not so much the state of class power (i.e. the mutual class relations) that has been altered, but rather only the modes of class rule (government). The following two chapters spend specific attention to these new modalities of neoliberal rule.

The evolution of the state’s institutional materiality and the manifestation of new governmental practices are related to the political organization of the dominant classes and the disorganization of subordinate ones (Jessop, 1999). This brings us to the final argument of the chapter. If we consider class as a process of appropriation of capital surpluses, in other words, if we consider class to be a political rather than a sociological concept, than a class analysis proves to be very insightful to understand the political changes in contemporary Morocco. Neoliberal globalization has transformed the balance of class forces – in Morocco notably through the emergence of new entrepreneurs and the implication of foreign capital. This implicated that the national state had to re-organize both nationally-based capital (comprador, export-oriented, or productive) as well as serve the interest of foreign capital with which domestic capitalist actors are affiliated in one way or another (Ibid.: 6-7). On the one hand, the ruling bloc in Morocco can therefore not just be reduced to some endogenously coherent “regime”. The situation under neoliberalism is far more politically complex. On the other hand, however, the traditional ruling class did manage to maintain its political dominance. They reformed the Moroccan state apparatus, changed their governmental practices, adapted to the new neoliberal environment, and finally also contributed to the production of neoliberalism as a global project through the establishment of its particular Moroccan form.
Urban segregation is not a frozen status quo, but rather a ceaseless social war in which the state intervenes regularly in the name of “progress,” “beautification,” and even “social justice for the poor” to redraw spatial boundaries to the advantage of landowners, foreign investors, elite homeowners, and middle-class commuters. As in 1860s Paris under the financial reign of Baron Haussmann, urban redevelopment still strives to simultaneously maximize private profit and social control. The contemporary scale of population removal is immense: every year hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions, of poor people – legal tenants as well as squatters – are forcibly evicted from Third World neighborhoods. (...) And like the sans-culottes driven from their ancient quartiers by Haussman – to whom Blanqui apostrophized a famous complaint – they “weary of grandiose homicidal acts ... this vast shifting of stones by the hand of despotism.” They are also exasperated with the ancient language of modernization that defines them as “human encumberments” (to quote the Dakar authorities who cleared 90,000 residents from central bidonvilles in the 1970s) (M Davis, 2006a: 98).

For the city’s planners the poor were a public danger, their potentially riotous concentrations to be broken up by avenues and boulevards which would drive the inhabitants of the crowded popular quarters they replaced into some unspecified, but presumably more sanitary and certainly less perilous locations. (...) For building entrepreneurs and property developers the poor were an unprofitable market, compared to the rich pickings from the new specialised business and shopping districts and the solid houses and apartments for the middle class, or the developing suburbs (Hobsbawn, 1975: 211).
This chapter looks at the slums of Morocco, and yet, it is not specifically about the lives of slum dwellers. Although it is important to study the everyday lives, and more specifically the political, economic and social strategies of poor people in precarious neighbourhoods, I want to highlight another aspect. In this chapter, I demonstrate the shifting methods of neoliberal government between the 1980s and the 2000s by looking at the slums as spaces to be governed. I will focus more specifically on the changing methods, techniques and rationalities of urban government, economic development and social control, and consider how slums were perceived as a particular governmental problem. As such, this chapter is above all influenced by a Foucauldian perspective on political change and government. In contrast, the next chapter will focus more on the specific state-institutional transformations under neoliberalism and the changing forms of class agency on the field of the state. Evidently, both institutional transformations and facets of neoliberal governmentality are closely intertwined and will be presented in both chapters (only the dominant focus of each chapter will be significantly different). Understanding urban politics requires paying attention to the question of power. However, power should not only be regarded as something that precedes and determines capital accumulation, exploitation and the domination of labour, but also as something productive, something that is implicated in ethics, in the way we imagine our lives and in the techniques that are used to dominate others and to determine our own conduct (Bayart, 2007).

Slums are a worldwide phenomenon and a crucial element of contemporary urbanization and globalization, especially in the Global South (Bolay, 2006; M Davis, 2006a). Consequently, the slums have become a central concern for neoliberal urbanism. Also in Morocco, slums have been an important feature of the Moroccan urbanization process. According to UN Habitat more than 30% of the Moroccan population lived in slums before 2003 (Un Habitat, 2003). For a long time, these informal and in many ways spontaneous forms of urbanization have been tolerated by the public authorities. This changed however after the violent riots of 1981. From then on, the slums and its population would become one of the political priorities of the ruling class in Morocco. The main argument in this chapter is that we can distinguish a particular governmental shift in the ways slums are governed over the last three decades. This shift relates to the specific transition in the Moroccan neoliberal project: more specifically, the transition from a phase of roll back neoliberalism to a phase of roll out neoliberalism. Furthermore, because of two particular violent moments that can be considered as watershed moments that have accelerated this shift, I argue that the privatization and institutional reformation of the state are also closely related to or even determined by the question of security.

A focus on technologies of power: governmentality, sovereign city planning and techniques of security

Besides the economic pressures of the Moroccan crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, some specific governmental methods developed under neoliberalism were intimately re-
lated to and generated by security concerns. The ways in which these security concerns were taken into consideration and gave rise to the development of new governmental methods, reflect and coincide with the transition from a phase of roll back neoliberalism towards a phase of roll out neoliberalism. Building on a brief sketch of longer urban trajectories, this chapter proceeds to an in-depth discussion on the political reactions to two watershed moments of urban unrest that have accelerated the elaboration of new governmental practices. These are: the bread riots of 1981 and the suicide bombings of 2003, both involving slum dwellers, and both occurring in Casablanca. These two moments of violence marked a turning point in time to explain the changing methods and objectives of urban government. Both moments of violence instigated reactions from the public authorities to control the urban environment, and more specifically the populations and spaces that were involved in the disturbances. As such, both moments of violence were followed by specific attempts to securitize the urban scale. But while the methods of control taken after the riots of 1981 were more focused on the physical environment through which people move (the urban territory), the bombings of 2003 reinforced the objectification of the slum population itself as a calculable target for a general strategy of control, trying to convert the slum-dweller into a responsible citizen.

Evidence will be drawn predominantly from the case of Casablanca. First of all, because the white city has been the main stage in numerous eruptions of social unrest which then often spread throughout the country. Secondly, because Casablanca was/is exemplary for Third World urbanization: rapid urban demographic growth without proportional economic growth. The coastal city expanded furiously during the twentieth century to become Morocco’s biggest urban environment. Until 2003, Casablanca was not only the economic centre of the country, at the same time it also accommodated more than 30% of Morocco’s slum dwellers. Because of this specific social situation and because of Casablanca’s dominant position in the national economy, the city has always been a “ville laboratoire”, a test-case and model for other Moroccan cities (Catusse, e.a., 2005). Over the course of the last 30 years, new strategies of social and spatial organization ‘tested’ in Casablanca, were adopted afterwards in other major Moroccan cities. As such, Casablanca’s history of urban government offers valuable insights in the ways in which Morocco’s political elite sought to securitize the city through strategic and politically motivated planning and administration (Rachik, 2002). While current efforts of urban restructuring reflect a specif-

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240 This was also true during the Protectorate (see following footnote).
ic and contemporary neoliberal governmentality, it is important not to lose sight of the ways in which the city also reflects earlier regimes of biopolitical production. In the history of city planning the poor populations were often considered a danger (Hobsbawm, 1975). Since the beginning of the 1950s, the urban poor in Morocco were consistently involved in urban riots (Madani, 1995). This rendered the government and control of the poor a primary concern. One of the arguments of this chapter is that the political consequences and implications of neoliberal urbanism cannot be reduced to the capitalist logic alone. The increasing urbanization of capital and its coinciding contradictions entail a double shift: it reflects not only capital’s preference to guarantee the smooth flow of capital circulation, but also the concern to protect the established political order (and by extension capital’s interests) from possible threats. As Mike Davis stated in the opening quote, “urban redevelopment still strives to simultaneously maximize private profit and social control”. Urban re-structuring and urban re-organization since the 1980s, therefore, equally aimed for the preservation of political stability.

The first important point of convergence of the two logics of power during the period of neoliberal reform, can be situated at the beginning of the 1980s. Back then, Moroccan cities were centre stage for the so-called ‘bread riots’. Today, the dazzling urban street protests of the 1980s seem banished to the recesses of collective memory; a dark period to be recalled more as a warning than a possibility. Nevertheless, these urban riots have set in motion specific methods of urban control which reflect the complex dialectic between capitalist and territorial logics of power. Immediately after the 1981 riots, urban planning in Morocco was oriented predominantly towards the expansion of territorial control. In a way this expansion of control had to compensate for the negative outcomes of structural adjustment and the roll back of state developmentalism. In comparison with the urban strategies of control that were implemented more than 20 years later, these measures of urban planning in the 1980s differed significantly from the objectives of the VSBP – launched directly after the Casablanca suicide bombings in 2003 – which attempted to regulate and manage not so much the urban territory but more specifically the slum population as such, through new modalities of state intervention. Understanding the significance of these ensuing changes requires attention to the link between specific strategies of urban government and the modes of thought and practice that reflect the political rationality underpinning these strategies. To do so, the particular shift in urban governmental practices that targeted the slums between the early 1980s and the early 2000s, can be best explained with the distinction made by Mariana Valverde between “sovereign city planning” and “cities of security”. Drawing on the Foucauldian notions of sovereignty and security, she argues that sovereign city

241 It is beyond the scope of this study to compare the neoliberal phases of urban restructuring with the colonial project of the French. The genealogy of the urbanization process can be traced back to the French administration and colonial urban planning. French colonial urbanism gave way to a politics of design which resulted in the social and spatial segregation of the indigenous and the European populations within the colonial project. The French ‘experimental’ urban planning project laid the foundations for subsequent socio-spatial struggles. Just as in 1981 and 2003, the 1952 urban riots in Casablanca marked a radical shift within the process of urbanization and generated the proliferation of new measures and technologies of government in order to restore the political order (for further information see: Abu Lughod, 1980; Rabinow, 1989; G Wright, 1991; Rachik, 1995; 2002; Cohen & Eleb, 2002; Abouhani, 2005).

242 Even today, in the light of the social upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it still seems rather unlikely that Morocco would follow that same path.
planning relies predominantly on techniques that capitalize a territory and emphasize monumental state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a sovereign. In contrast, a city of security involves planning which assembles techniques that are more concerned with the biopolitical management of the urban population and the future risks related to that population (Valverde, 2007; see also Foucault, 2007: 55-86 for his discussion on town planning). In short, whereas sovereign city planning in the 1980s dealt with individuals as a set of legal subjects within the designated territory, technologies of security developed in the 2000s will precisely constitute and target a specific population, i.e. the slum population in this case study.

The distinction between these two modes of spatial organization is embedded within a theoretical framework which Michel Foucault has introduced as the study of governmentality. He elaborated the history of governmentality in his lectures at the Collège de France in Paris where he had his chair “the history of systems of thought”.243 In his 1977-1978 lectures on “security, territory and population” Foucault introduced the concept of governmentality for the first time. It captured Foucault’s working hypothesis on the reciprocal constitution of techniques of power and forms of knowledge. The semantic linking between government and mentality emphasized the inseparable interrelation between technologies of power and the different modes of thought (the political rationalities) that underpin them (Lemke, 2001: 191). Foucault himself described governmentality as follows:

By this word “governmentality” I mean three things. First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (saviors). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalized” (Foucault, 2007: 108-109, text between brackets in original).

Consequently, governmentality should be understood on three different levels: as an ensemble of governmental techniques, encompassing a dominant form of power (i.e.

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243 Foucault thought at the Collège from 1971 until his death in June 1984. Teaching at the Collège de France was organized by particular rules. Each year, the professors had to present their original research to an audience. Courses and seminars were completely open and no enrolment or qualifications were required. The professors did not had to grade their students. They had no students in fact, only auditors (See foreword by François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana to the 1977-1978 lectures). As a result, Foucault presented largely unpublished research material and new theoretical and methodological research tools. Unfortunately, he never had the chance to publish his findings in a book.
government) which was the result of a specific historic evolution or process. These three components constituted the general framework of biopolitics. Foucault’s interest in modern governmentality can be associated with his interest for the development of technologies of subjectification which were the result of a fundamental shift from a focus on territory (which was the subject of sovereign power and sovereign politics) towards a focus on population as the defining object of government. In his lectures, Foucault traced the genealogy of modern politics which shifted gradually from the pre-occupation of the sovereign ‘prince’ to establish control over his territory (epitomized by Machiavelli’s Prince) to a new art of government in which the control over life itself became central.

While the relation between the prince and his territory used to be key in the Middle Ages, with the population that inhabited the territory in a secondary role, modern governmentality prioritized the government of the population (Rose-Redwood, 2006; Elden, 2007a). Consequently, this shift has led – as Foucault himself pointed out – to the pre-eminence of government over all other types of power (e.g. sovereign power and disciplinary power). Government is therefore a specific form of biopower. Biopower refers to a form of power that “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (Foucault, 1990: 143). In his introductory class on the history of governmentality he defines biopower as:

the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species (Foucault, 2007: 1).

In concrete terms, Foucault argued that this power over life has evolved into two basic forms during the 17th century and replaced sovereign power as the pre-eminent type of power in Western societies. The first form in which biopower emerged was “disciplinary power” which was the object of inquiry in Foucault’s book Discipline and Punish. Disciplinary power included the “methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility” (Foucault, 1979: 137). In his book he specifically discusses the emergence and development of the penitentiary system as a paradigmatic example. Foucault argued that in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries the disciplines (whether employed in prisons, schools, psychiatric institutions, etc.) became the general formulas of domination. The paradigm of disciplinary power he used was the architectural figure of the Panopticon. The major effect of the Panopticon was its capacity to induce in the prison inmate “a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assured the automatic functioning of power” (Ibid.: 201). As such, disciplinary power focused on getting control over the individual body by developing the specific capacities and techniques to manipulate its behaviour within the space of a closed institution. The efficiency of that form of power was embedded within a design that derived

244 Note that Foucault does not state that government completely replaces all other forms of power.
its effectiveness from the capacity to make the targeted life visible, and more importantly, to make that life conscious of being visible. Additionally, the exertion of disciplinary power, its efficiency and its productivity depended also on its own invisibility. Power needed to be designed within architectural configurations and specific procedures, and was centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, etc. (Foucault, 1990: 139).

The second form of biopower, which emerged historically somewhat later than the first, involved a biopolitics of the population, the regulation of entire populations and the biological processes of life: propagation, births and mortality, health, life expectancy, etc. (Ibid.: 139). The difference between the two forms of biopower was that disciplinary power had the individual body as its object within the confinement of a closed institution, while government targeted “populations at risk” and attempted to regulate and manage them (Rose, 1999: 235). The supervision of the population was effected through particular interventions and regulatory techniques. This resulted in the proliferation of all kinds of new technologies of power which concentrated on the “conduct of conduct”. The ensemble of these kind of techniques was a form of power which Foucault (2007) later described as “government”. The Foucauldian reference to government, or rather “the birth of government” in the 18th century, referred not to the institutions of the modern state, but rather to the methods and techniques of regulation and management out of which the modern state was gradually formed (Mitchell, 2002). In this view, “power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death [i.e. the reason of sovereign power], but with living beings” (Foucault, 1990: 143). In contrast to sovereign power, biopower had a positive influence on life. It administers and produces that life.

Since the 17th century, sovereign power, according to Foucault, was gradually supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life (Ibid.: 140). On the one hand, there was a rapid development of various disciplines such as the

245 Consequently, in my own case on the urban restructuring of Casablanca, I first explored the possibility of something like “urban panopticism” when I read Foucault’s discussion on panopticism and the studies of writers as Haim Yacobi who investigated the power of design in the Palestinian case. Just as Michel Foucault indicated that the panoptic schema was much more than just an analysis of the architectural form, the securitization of the urban space is much more than a technical architecture or planning design. It equally reflects and symbolizes the location of bodies in space on which particular forms of behaviour are imposed (Yacobi 2004). However, this conception of urban panopticism is problematic in the case of Morocco (and by extension in the case of most cities in the world). An important distinction to be made was that the panoptic schema was limited beyond the enclosures of total institutions – like for example the prison – in which subjects are confined and subjected to disciplinary technologies (Simon 2005). Therefore, what Foucault meant by discipline cannot be established within and attributed to a more open space; for example the city. In a response Gilles Deleuze (1992) suggested that in modern societies the intention to discipline conduct should be replaced by the intention to control conduct (i.e. the objective of government). As such, I eventually turned away from the conceptualization of something like urban panopticism, finding more nuanced answers in Foucault’s conception of governmentality and in the concept of government as a specific form of biopower.

246 For a detailed discussion on the difference between discipline and apparatuses of security (related to governmental management, see first two lectures on governmentality (Foucault, 2007: 1-49).

247 Reuben Rose-Redwood makes a distinction between disciplinary power and biopower (Rose-Redwood, 2006). Foucault, however, clearly states that both disciplinary power and the biopolitics of the population are forms of biopower (Foucault, 1990: 140). It is only in the courses on governmentality that he describes the second form as government.
university, the prison, the barracks, workshops, secondary schools, etc… On the other hand, there was also an emergence of political problems such as birth-rate, longevity, housing, migration, public health and welfare. Overall, Foucault observed the proliferation of numerous and diverse techniques of power which aimed to subjugate the individual body and control the conduct of populations. The invention of statistics played a crucial role in the constitution of the political problem of population and the development of a new art of government. Statistics enabled specific phenomena related to the population to be quantified and revealed that these were irreducible to the frameworks of earlier modes and models of rule (e.g. the mapping of major epidemics, migration trends, the distribution of wealth, labour statistics, etc.). Consequently, the population became both the new model of government and its final end (Foucault, 2007: 104-105).

Foucault described the new techniques that proliferated out of government as “apparatuses of security”. Security in this sense, refers to “the future-oriented management of risks” (Valverde, 2007: 172). Foucault gave several examples of security apparatuses in his lectures: as for example, town planning and the specific strategies to cope with food shortages and epidemics (e.g. through market regulation and vaccination campaigns).

It was no longer the safety (sûreté) of the prince and his territory, but the security (sécurité) of the population that was now the central problem for government (Foucault, 2007: 65).248

It would be wrong to see the different forms of power, i.e. sovereign power, discipline and government, as mutually exclusive. First of all, Foucault, explicitly stressed that both forms of biopower (discipline and government) are not antithetical. They constitute the two poles around which the administration of life is organized (Foucault, 1990: 139). Furthermore, he does not propose a linear narrative from a society of sovereignty, to a disciplinary society to a society of government (Elden, 2007b). Rather, he tried to expose the interconnected triangle of sovereignty, discipline and government. The latter has become pre-eminent in contemporary capitalist society but not exclusive, especially when we look at non-western societies who haven’t been integrated in the capitalist world system for a long time (Luke, 1996; Elden, 2007b; Dillon, 2007). Questions and problematics of sovereignty did not simply disappear with the emergence of a ‘life-administering power’. Nevertheless, one of the reasons why ‘government’ became pre-eminent over all other types of power, was because biopower in general, and the government of populations in specific, was without a question indispensable for the further development and expansion of capitalism:

[the development of capitalism] would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern (Foucault, 1990: 141).

Consequently, as Harvey argues, Foucault’s analyses can also be read “as continuations

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248 Note that the English meaning of security does not exactly coincide with the French word of sécurité.
of rather than departures from Marx’s arguments concerning the rise of a disciplinary [and administering] capitalism in which workers have to be socialized and disciplined to accept the spatiotemporal logic of the capitalist labor process” (Harvey, 2010b: 149). Additionally, Foucault directly addressed the more Marxist-inspired accounts on the development of capitalism and the role of the state in this development. Instead of rejecting Marx, he actually gives an additional insight on the particularity of their different, or rather complementary, visions on state, and the prominence given to either institutions or methods (techniques):

If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo-[disciplinary power] and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth century as techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony (Ibid.: 141).

In his lectures of 1978-1979 on The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault elaborated on our current systems of knowledge – the governmental regimes of liberalism and neo-liberalism – which he considered central to the understanding of biopolitics (Foucault, 2008). He saw classical liberalism and neoliberalism not as the antithesis of governmental rationality (embedded in the minimal state myth), but rather as forms of governmentality which produced subjects capable of shaping their own conduct through technologies of the self (Lemke, 2001; Rose-Redwood, 2006: 474). Consequently, if capitalism, and more specifically neoliberal capitalism, was made possible in part by the exercise of biopower in its many forms and modes of application, the spread of capitalism around the world would then logically entail the spread of these techniques. As such, we have seen a growing amount of scholars, with different disciplinary orientations, who turned to the study of governmentality to explain the socio-economic transformations in non-Western societies (e.g. Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Hibou, 2004b; Bunnell & Coe, 2005; Ismail, 2006; Bayart, 2007; Zemni, 2007; Ong, 2008; Kapoor, 2008; Roy, 2009). Of course, we cannot forget that these socio-economic transformations take place in completely different political settings (e.g. in a non-liberal-democratic setting). But while the bulk of the governmentality literature still focuses on Western neoliberal rationalities of rule, Mitchell Dean has examined the dynamics of what he called “authoritarian governmentality”. Like (neo-)liberalism, Dean argues that authoritarian governmentality is an articulation of elements of sovereign power and bio-politics (biopower). However, in contrast to more liberal forms of rule, non-liberal and authoritarian forms

249 David Harvey argues that Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power and his analyses of spatially organized disciplinary apparatuses (e.g. the prison, the clinic, etc.) were clearly inspired by Marx’s analysis of the working day. Foucault’s work on disciplinary power and governmentality adopts, according to Harvey, this notion of the moment when people started to internalize a sense of temporal discipline – realized through several technologies and methods of power (Harvey, 2010b: 147).

250 Here I come back to the discussion in chapter 2 on the difference between a Marxian and a Foucauldian perception on the relation between state and capitalism.
of rule seek to operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or at least, seek to neutralize opposition to authority (Dean, 1999: 131). Authoritarian governmentality operates thus through a more intensive and explicit use of sovereignty and sovereign instruments of repression. Additionally, due to the more peripheral position in the capitalist world-system of many states in the Global South, the administration of life will not be as integrated or embedded as in many Western states. Foucault rightfully emphasized that life, especially outside the Western world, constantly escapes (or tries to escape) its integration into the techniques that attempt to govern it (Foucault, 1990: 143). Some states, and even non-state sovereigns, will still use sovereign power to defend and secure their territory – this was clearly the case in the discordant and often violent aftermath of the Cold War – while other (Third World) states take little or no account of their population at all (Luke, 1996; Elden, 2007a).

Nevertheless, in a country like Morocco which becomes increasingly integrated into the global capitalist system and which pretends to draw on a ‘liberal’ regime of government, a governmentality approach provides us with interesting insights on the transformation of its society. King Mohamed VI emphasized in his speech from the throne on 30 July 2007 that the political order in Morocco is founded upon a “national consensus”. Yet, his conceptualization of this national consensus clearly demonstrates how elements of sovereign politics and biopolitics are articulated in the political visions of the monarchy. Mohamed VI defined this national consensus as follows:

It concerns, particularly, the Constitutional State and its institutions, a citizenship based on a respect for human rights and the duties of men, an economic liberalism, and the liberty of entrepreneurship. This besides solidarity, social justice and an openness to the rest of the world. It is up to Us [the Monarchy] to watch over the permanency of these values, whatever the consequences and its fluctuations may be. This is (...) Our conception of la Monarchie citoyenne (own translation).  

He then concludes at the end of his speech:

I will remain, dear people, just like you have always known Me, le roi citoyen, leading the militants who are working on the field, in all regions of the country, just like abroad. Likewise, I commit Myself to consolidate the pillars of unity and democracy, to strengthen the dynamics of development, progress and solidarity, and to reaffirm the capacity of Morocco to act in synergy with the outside world and the changes that occur, without ever abandoning the authentic Moroccan identity (own translation).

251 Free subjects in a liberal democratic society are of course only free within the boundaries delineated by capitalism and liberal democracy.
252 This could be one of the reasons why the use of sovereign power is still more prevalent in those societies. However, further research is needed to explore the validity of this hypothesis.
253 Luke refers for example to the numerous conflict between warlords in Sub-Sahara Africa and the way they use sovereign power to secure their territories and their interests.
255 Ibid.
Here we clearly see how the king, as the symbol of absolute power in Morocco, refers to modern technologies of government which he personally promises to preserve (and/or implement). Sovereign power, in other words, is promised to be used to assure the continuation and efficiency of government (biopower). It gives an indication of how non-democratic political systems constitute their own mixture of sovereign and biopolitical technologies of power (i.e. the constitution of an authoritarian governmentality) to rule their territory and their population.

The governmentality approach becomes especially useful when one studies the political changes in an urban setting. Foucault learned us a great deal about the organization and politics of space (Elden, 2007b: 30). Along with time, he saw space as a constitutive element of the technologies of power and the practices of government (Ismail, 2006: XXV). “To govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised” (Rose, 1999: 36). Power – in the Foucauldian understanding – therefore works to manage human activity in time and space. Power has thus both temporal and spatial dimensions (Massey, 2005; Ismail, 2006). In his lectures on governmentality, Foucault attributed a central role to the city, or rather the town, as a key problem for government and security. It were problems like epidemics, food scarcity, rural migration, etc... that turned public health, market regulation and urban planning (“town planning”) into central mechanisms of security. It was the eventual integration of the town into the central mechanisms of power, or rather the conversion of the town as a primary government problem, that generated the development of new techniques of power (Foucault, 2007: 64). The apparatuses of security that emerged out of that process were not only the fundamental techniques which underpinned government as a form of power, they also demonstrated the specific spatial connotation of security and its biopolitical relation to the population (e.g. in the urban space):

(...)

security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework. (...) the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions – which would be the case of sovereignty – and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances – as in discipline – one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live (Foucault, 2007: 20-21).

With regards to the state, these mechanisms of security are brought together by Foucault, under the general concept of the police. This concept emphasizes one of the key dimensions of state power (Valverde, 2007). It refers to all the mechanisms and/or techniques by which a population or community is regulated by public authority (Elden, 2007a). It is this public aspect that is important. The government of a family cannot be considered police because it lacks a public aspect – a res publica – which assembles the means, the calculative capacities and techniques by which state power maintains its in-

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256 Police in the Foucauldian sense refers to a broad set of regulating mechanisms and is not to be confused with our general more narrow understanding of police and the police forces.
ternal order (Ibid.: 572). Police, according to Foucault, was the necessary condition for the existence of the urban: “it is because there was a police regulating this cohabitation, circulation, and exchange that towns were able to exist” (Foucault, 2007: 336). Again, I think we can distinguish in this concept of police, Foucault’s own process of thinking through and engaging with the Marxist argument (instead of rejecting it) that capitalism and capitalist urbanization depend on state power and state regulation.

Let us now turn back to the distinction made by Mariana Valverde between “sovereign city planning” and “cities of securities”. The first concept refers to specific mechanisms of power in which the objective of urban government is determined first of all by the attempt to seek the submission of urban subjects to a sovereign (e.g. through urban planning and restructuring). In this regard, sovereignty refers to the legitimacy and strength of the sovereign over a bounded territory. The second concept refers to mechanisms of urban planning in which techniques of security are pre- eminent over all other mechanisms of power. The city will then be considered, first of all, as a “complex composed of men and things” in which life must be administered or policed, rather than as a territory which must be controlled (Rose-Redwood, 2006). Consequently, the different technologies related to the notions of sovereignty and biopower (or security) will approach and structure the urban space differently. After what happened in 1981 and 2003 in Casablanca, the slum population – perceived as inhabitants of so-called spaces of “high risk” – became the target of new strategies and technologies of power and spatial organization (Rachik, 1995).257 As I will show, the ways in which the Moroccan authorities dealt with the situation after 1981 and 2003 differed significantly. I also argue that some of the reasons for this different approach can be found within the context of the specific phase of neoliberal restructuring at the time (roll back or roll out neoliberalism). With this specific distinction between sovereign city planning and cities of security – keep in mind that this is a distinction made for the sake of comparison – I do not want to assert that the mechanisms of control in the 1980s were only preoccupied with the urban territory as such, while the mechanisms of the 2000s were only preoccupied with the urban population as such. To the contrary, both set of mechanisms were first of all aiming to control the people living in the space of the city, only the specific strategies to establish social control differed significantly over time.258

In 1981, urban restructuring was oriented predominantly towards the expansion of territorial control just because of the roll back of important policies of state developmentalism – public job creation, food subsidies and health care were, after all, particular apparatuses of security. The specific measures to expand urban territorial control after 1981 were means to compensate for the negative social outcomes of structural adjustment. We do not see this only in Morocco. Loic Wacquant highlighted that the roll back of the welfare-state in the US, has led to new strategies of control and increased efforts

257 We must not forget that 1981 was not a starting point. Already during the Protectorate, after the riots of 1952, the slum population became the target of a whole new government program of public housing, developed by French architect Michel Ecochard (Rachik, 1995; 2002).
258 Furthermore, as I already indicated with the reference to the notion of authoritarian governmentality, I do not want to claim that methods of sovereign city planning in the 1980s in Morocco implied a form of rule that reflected 17th century methods of Western sovereign rule. I use the concept of sovereign city planning to demonstrate how methods of sovereign power became pre-eminent in urban planning strategies within a more broader context and framework of authoritarian government in Morocco at the time.
to securitize the streets. In his case this meant the increasing incarceration of social outcasts in the US as an alternative to social policy (Wacquant, 2006). These kind of strategies which try to compensate the loss of “security”, can be considered expressions of sovereign power by which the primary goal is not so much to control the conduct of a population, that potential had been reduced momentarily by rolling back welfare policies, but to clear the streets of potentially dangerous subjects during the phase of reduced “security”. Hence, Wacquant’s reference to mechanisms of “punishing the poor”.260

The approach after the Casablanca suicide bombings in 2003 was significantly different. The objectives of a social development program such as the VSBP – launched quickly after the bombings – were inscribed in a phase in which new apparatuses of security emerged. The program was an attempt to regulate and manage the slum population through new modalities of state intervention (which were rolled out). The international political context was also different. Structural adjustment had been widely criticized, the World Bank had developed and promoted the discourse of good governance in a response to the criticisms, and the roll out of new state arrangements had to regulate and compensate market failure. Furthermore, in the case of Morocco, specific measures to control the urban territory were already in place to a large extent (due to sovereign city planning in the 1980s). The question was now focused more on how to control and manage the conduct of the targeted population. The discourses, rationalities and technologies that coincided with the new principles of roll out neoliberalism and good governance provided a new set of responses. In chapter 3, I already discussed the re-invention of the social question during the period of roll out neoliberalism, while in chapter 2, I referred to the specific way in which people are subjectified under contemporary neoliberal: i.e. the specific process of turning individuals into entrepreneurs, an entrepreneur of himself in which he is his own capital, his own producer, and his own source of earnings (Read, 2009). Programs such as the VSBP and also the INDH were meant to control and steer the conduct of a particular segment of the urban population through new forms of regulation and the promotion of new techniques of self-regulation. The ultimate goal was then to turn the slum dweller into a “good citizen” (Zemni, 2007).

I do risk here to overdraw the distinction between a focus on urban territory in the 1980s, and one on population in the 2000s. This distinction is far from absolute.261 Ilan Kapoor for example, argued that the period of structural adjustment introduced a new biopolitical dimension to the established forms of power in the Global South (Kapoor,

259 I explicitly use security here in the Foucauldian sense.
260 Once incarcerated of course, these “outcasts” can then be subject to forms of disciplinary power in order to correct and alter misconduct.
261 To begin with, territory is also subject to manifestations of biopower. Stuart Elden, for example, has pointed out how the concept of territory is actually marginalized in the lectures of Foucault on governmentality. Yet, he argues that territory must be understood as more than just land but rather as a vibrant entity, a rendering of the concept of space as a political category. Territory, according to Elden, can be owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled. Therefore the notion of governmentality and the politics of calculation are not only manifested in population but also in territory (Elden, 2007). Furthermore, there is no such evolution as a transition from a “territorial state” to a “population state” because the pre-eminency of biopower does not involve “a substitution but rather a shift of emphasis and the appearance of new objectives, and of new problems and new techniques” (Foucault, 2007: 363).
This biopolitical dimension was introduced by the World Bank and the IMF and in the ways they controlled indirectly some of the Third World states’ collective bodies (e.g. state-institutions) and made them more efficient, flexible and autonomous (Lemke, 2002: 60). Today, in contrast, the specific position of the monarch in Morocco still supports on significant elements of sovereign power. Moreover, biopolitics are not confined to the neoliberal era. Rabinow emphasized that even during the Protectorate, with the introduction of the capitalist mode of production, Morocco was already the scenery for the implementation of new experimental urban governmentalities by the French (Rabinow, 1989). So, as I already mentioned, there is no straightforward linear development from a society of sovereignty to a society of government. Both forms of power (sovereignty and biopower) will continue to shape societies together and the specific implementation of these forms of power will vary in different places around the world. This is exactly what makes neoliberal governmentality not some single unique form of governmental rationality, but rather an actually existing form interrelated to specific location and time.

What I want to highlight with the distinction between sovereign city planning and cities of security is the degree in which either sovereign power or biopower will be pre-eminent as an answer to a specific threat or political problem (e.g. a riot or suicide bombing; or the slum population in general). As such, I want to highlight a shift of emphasis, the emergence of new objectives which ultimately result in the development of new problems and new technologies of power. In this case, the focus on sovereignty and biopower is a particular methodology to determine specific shifts and transformations in neoliberal government. The government of slums are just one example through which the proliferation and implementation of new technologies can be demonstrated. This chapter tries to explain the more technical aspect of neoliberal government which characterizes the way in which issues of violence, political stability and poverty are dealt with in Morocco. This particular analytics of government is a useful and maybe necessary complementation to the analyses of political power and change in the Arab region. The particular technical aspect of government that I discuss here, highlights a particular characteristic of political rule that attempts to complement analyses of party politics, class conflicts, or the specific instruments of sovereignty and authoritarian rule (Rose-Redwood, 2006: 473). After all, the biopolitical (i.e. more technical) apparatuses of government are the specific technologies through which power, class power in many cases, is actually deployed (Ibid.).

**Urban growth and socio-spatial fragmentation: from tolerance to control**

Before elaborating in detail on the two phases of urban restructuring in Morocco, I want to sketch briefly the urban backdrop against which neoliberal restructuring took place. Morocco has experienced rapid urban growth in the twentieth century and many of the current problems, can be related or traced back to earlier periods of urbanization and especially to the years of urban neglect. Decades of uncontrolled urban development have generated many of the difficulties urban planners and administrators face today. Different flows of rural migration have radically changed the constitution of the Moroccan city over the course of the twentieth century. After the independence, the Europeans have gradually left the Moroccan city. Their places and residences in the **ville


Already, in the early days of the Protectorate problems arose when the Moroccan population in the cities increased rapidly. To begin with, the enclosure of tribal farming and herding lands for French agricultural and mining interests pushed indigenous people towards the cities. In the cities, new migrants were employed in the construction of the European cities (villes nouvelles) or incorporated as an industrial or domestic labour force. Consequently, many of the once self-sufficient Moroccan families were obliged to turn to urban wage-labour as their main livelihood strategy (G Wright, 1991). It were, above all, coastal cities such as Casablanca and Rabat, which benefited from increased trade with European cities, that attracted most rural migrants. Especially Casablanca, thanks to its port, rapidly developed as the industrial centre of the country. Ironically, while many of the new rural migrants were gratefully used as cheap urban workforces, the French administration never really anticipated and planned the demographic growth of the colonial city. Moreover, the original Arab cities (medinas) were often encircled by the French colonial city as the French had appropriated the available land around these cities to build their villes nouvelles. As a result, the increasing afflux of Moroccans towards the cities created enormous housing problems (Ibid.; see also Le Tourneau, 1955). For example in Casablanca, the Moroccan population rose from 20,000 in 1900 to almost 72,000 in 1926 and close to 550,000 in 1952. Most newcomers used to seek refuge in the medina as a first option. At the same time, many of the rich Moroccan families left the medinas and managed to establish themselves in sumptuous housing at the edge of the European city. Their places were taken by the newcomers who started to subdivide the former residences of the Moroccan elite into smaller units or apartments. But as the urban population continued to grow, courtyards, little squares and rooftops in the medina were built over and rented or sold.

Little effort was made by the French authorities to improve housing conditions for the Moroccan population. The few modest efforts to foresee in housing facilities for the indigenous people, like for example the new medina (la nouvelle medina) and neighbourhood of Aïn Chock in Casablanca, were quickly saturated and occupied by the petty bourgeoisie – and thus these projects missed their original goal of providing housing for the urban wage-labour force. As a result, the bulk of the Moroccan wage-labourers and lumpenproletariat either stayed in the increasingly overcrowded medinas or settled in vacant areas around the peripheries of the ville nouvelle and built their barracks with everything they could get their hands on (e.g. industrial refuse, tin, scrap wood, etc.).

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262 Before the Protectorate there were very little private landowning titles in Morocco. Most land was either property of the makhzen (what could be considered as state-property, although not in the European sense) or Habous (religious mortmain property – in the Middle East also known as waqf).

263 These numbers are based on official sources from 1975 (schéma directeur) quoted in Cattedra (2001: 92). Similar estimates are to be found in: Le Tourneau (1955), G Wright (1991), Rivet (2004).

264 There was also an important growth of the European population in the Moroccan coastal cities. However, for them the French administration provided more adequate facilities to assure their settlement in the city.
etc.). Hence, the name “bidonville” (oilcan city). The term bidonville refers both to its particular urban character and the materials that were used to construct the barracks. The term became a synonym for provisional and precarious settlement, despite the very permanent character of the bidonvilles in many of the Third World cities. The bidonvilles – which has become the French term for slum or shantytown – appeared as early as 1907 and can be directly linked to the impact of the European presence (G Wright, 1991; Hauw, 2004). However, the first large Moroccan shantytown will appear as soon as the early 1920s. The first one, and very famous because of the role its population played in the riots of 1952, was Carrières Centrales, situated in an industrial zone in the East of Casablanca, in the neighbourhood of Roches Noires. In the early 1950s an estimated amount of 30,000 people lived in Carrières centrales and another 45,000 in Ben ‘Msik which was a second famous shantytown in Casablanca.

With the rapid expansion of the Moroccan cities, urban government became more and more difficult. Urban policy and planning during the Protectorate was unable to respond to the needs and problems of the bidonvillois (shantytown population). As such, the urban uprisings of 1952 would not only demonstrate the growing strength of the Moroccan labour movement and its close ties to the nationalist struggle – Moroccan workers staged large demonstrations on May Day of 1951 which was later followed by a general strike in December in 1952 to denounce the assassination by the French of Tunisian trade union leader Farhat Hached (Clément & Paul, 1984) – but the riots that followed the general strike of 1952 would also demonstrate for the first time, the potential threat of the bidonvilles and its population for the political stability of the Protectorate. Between 6 and 8 December Casablanca was shocked by its first “bidonville-uprisings”. They gave the starting shot for further violence and conflicts all over the country. This violence was usually explained and framed in nationalist terms (i.e. as a struggle against the French). Yet, Jean-François Clément argues that the specific causes and sources for the violence were complex and should not be reduced to merely nationally inspired forms of protest. He claims that little research has been done on the socio-economic background that underpinned the 1952 riots (Clément, 1952). Nevertheless, the specific responses of the colonial administration actually revealed the underlying socio-economic basis. The French realized that the marginalized urban areas had to be taken into consideration, and that a change in urban planning strategy was needed. Not coincidentally, around that period the French started to take a real interest in urban programs of mass housing. Numerous plans and initiatives were elaborated by the famous architect Michel Ecochard.265 The colonial administration initiated, for the first time, an elaborated social housing policy in an attempt to integrate the urban poor and calm the masses (Rachik, 2002).

The goals set by Ecochard were never realized. Only four years after the 1952 riots Morocco gained its independence. During the first decades of independence, the primary objectives of the public authorities moved away from urban development. The Moroccan monarchy didn’t really proceed with an elaborated and all-round urban policy

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265 Although a gradual shift towards a social housing policy for the masses started already in the 1940s, the uprisings of 1952 were a watershed moment that accelerated planned policies and initiatives. This signified a new phase of the politics of French colonial urbanism (for further information see Rachik, 1995; Rachik, 2002; Cohen & Eleb, 2002; Hauw, 2004).
strategy and chose to prioritize the rural areas in accordance with its political coalitions. If there was any formal urban policy and planning vision, it equated essentially with the policies of the French administration of the post-war era (Johnson, 1972). As I mentioned in chapter 3, the public authorities attempted, first of all, to halt the rural exodus during the first two decades of independence in order to limit the political weight of the cities and limit the potential power base of its nationalist bourgeoisie. The king’s political influence was based predominantly on its ties with the rural and tribal elites, the pre-colonial bourgeoisie and the religious leaders of the country. The fast-growing cities and the increasing influence of urban-based political forces – the trade unions and the left-wing intellectuals – were seen as a challenge to the monarchy’s political dominance. Consequently, authorities invested heavily in the agricultural development of the rural areas, and largely ignored the industrialization and planning of Morocco’s urban agglomerates (Naciri, 1984b). Until the mid-1960s the economic policies of the country maintained this particular focus on rural economic growth. Yet, despite the efforts, rural migration continued and rapid urbanization profoundly modified the structure of the Moroccan society. Casablanca is the most salient example of this trend. Its population more than doubled between the 1950s and the 1970s. Today, officially between 3.7 and 3.8 million people live officially in Casablanca which meant that the city grew with more than 500% since the independence. Casablanca attracted on average more than 35% of all rural migrants (Zriouli, 1998). This rapid expansion constituted new challenges for urban government. Issues that had been neglected in the 1950s and 1960s began to bubble to the surface posing new threats to established patterns of rule (Naciri 1984b). For example, between 1956 and 1974, 42% of all urban expansion was informal (Bargach, 2008). Additionally, the 1960s were economically very difficult years. There were several successive crop failures (which caused rural migration to increase even more than usual), unemployment rose sharply, inflation increased and price control over essential commodities became much more difficult. There was also a severe political crisis in which Hassan II saw it necessary to take over the prime ministry and called upon a state of emergency (after urban riots in Casablanca). This was in the year of 1965. The King would then rule by decree (Waterbury, 1970; Zartman, 1987).

The urban riots of 1965 in Casablanca marked a first turning point within a gradual but significant shift in government: a shift from a focus primarily on rural development to a focus directed more on urban planning and urban development. This didn’t mean that the urban centres were completely ignored before the riots. Only, urban government was basically limited to surveillance, authoritarian control and the problem of security – not in the Foucauldian sense – and not so much on development and planning. The riots of 1965 were brutally suppressed by the army, and little mercy was shown to those suspected to be the instigators (Johnson, 1972). Again, the slum population was involved in violent confrontations with security forces. It were the inhabitants of Car-

266 Unofficially the population of Casablanca is often estimated much higher.
267 Interview with Abdelghani Abouhani, former lecturer at the National Institute for Urban Planning (INAU), currently the General Director of Urbanism and Architecture within the Ministry of Housing, Urbanism and Spatial Planning (MHUAE) (Rabat – 21/04/2009, conducted together with Sami Zemni).
268 The 1965 riots could also viewed as a “bidonville-uprising”. The immediate provocation was the prohibition of the education ministry for older students (older then 17) to go to school. In March 1965 rioting students joined the inhabitants of the bidonvilles to set Casablanca on fire (Pennell, 2000: 323; see also Clément, 1992).
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rières Centrales who played a leading part, just as in 1952 (Clément, 1992). Additionally, the census of 1971 revealed a chaotic urban situation and showed that an urban policy based solely on surveillance and harassment was not tenable anymore. Half of the houses in the cities were deemed inadequate (Rachik, 2002: 93). These developments rendered the government of the urban space instable and called for new policy initiatives. With regard to the social problems of urbanization some specific measures were taken. In 1967, the government installed an urban planning and housing department within the Ministry of Interior. This is significant. The Ministry of Interior was the power base of the monarchy, especially during the reign of Hassan II. This transfer thus meant that there was now a stronger political potential for effective urban policy. All matters of urban planning and housing were now supervised by the Ministry of Interior. The extended role of the Ministry of Interior therefore clearly reflected the increasing importance given to urban policy by central powers. Also, in the same year, the establishment of a research and formation centre (CERF), under the direction of the French architect Alain Masson, had to develop new knowledge and strategies related to urban planning and social and low-cost housing.269 The CERF was incorporated in the department of Urban Planning and Housing at the Ministry of Interior.

In 1972, however, urban policy was detached from the Ministry of Interior and an autonomous and technocratic Ministry of Urbanism, Housing, Tourism and Environment (MUHTE) was created. Only a year later, 7 regional agencies (the ERACs) were created to coordinate regional housing policies together with a national fund (FNEAT) to ensure access to property for housing projects.270 With regard to housing projects for the slum population, the Moroccan authorities received the support of the World Bank from the mid-1960s onwards (Naciri, 1987).271 Also, during the 1970s, there were several attempts to elaborate a new Schéma Directeur d’Aménagement Urbain (SDAU) or master plan for the city of Casablanca, a general urban planning strategy which had to determine a coherent vision for the future of the city. A SDAU had to provide a general development plan for the metropolitan area, including a general scheme for land use, zoning provisions, transportation network designs and proposed new public facilities (Johnson, 1972: 86). The master plan had to follow up on the previous SDAU that was elaborated under the coordination of Michel Ecochard and dated back to the early 1950s. However, it was not until after the riots of 1981 that a new SDAU would be put into action.

The rapid urban demographic expansion, specifically in the 1970s, also witnessed the emergence of new pressures and forces at the urban scale. Urban growth brought forth the emergence of new commercial elites who benefited from the economic boom, but

269 In Cattedra (2001:81) CERF is the abbreviation for Centre d’Experimentation, de Recherche et de Formation. The same reference can be found in Johnson (1972:71). However, in Naciri (1989:239) CERF is the abbreviation for Centre d’Etude, de Recherche et de Formation. The CERF was made up primarily of foreign (French) researchers, trained as architects and planners. Certainly in the beginning there was very little mingling with other disciplines such as sociology and economy. In general the plans of the CERF were too ambitious and took little into account the political and economic reality of the country (Johnson, 1972).


271 UNESCO will provide foreign support for the restructuring and renovation of that other typically impoverished urban space: the medina (Naciri, 1987).
also the growth of a lower urban middle class with considerably more means than the urban poor living in the slums. These growing segments of the urban population would become the new political clientele of the Moroccan monarchy and this partly explains the gradual shift in governmental focus from the rural to the urban areas (Naciri, 1984b). The Moroccanization of the economy was one measure to answer to the needs of the first group. The second group (the lower urban middle class), who had mainly benefited from government initiatives to provide mass education, also profited from the economic growth in some ways. For example, many of them were incorporated in the public sector. However, the general growth of this lower middle class was at the same time putting pressure on available public services and recourses in the cities. Furthermore, their growth also exposed pressing challenges for Moroccan housing policies. There was a real shortage of affordable housing in the city-centre for these lower middle classes due to limited availability of building lots and a rise in housing prices. Only about 20,000 social houses were built in Morocco between 1956 and 1965, and virtually all of them still formed part of projects designed by the colonial administration (Johnson, 1972). Although, the government increased their efforts to supply social housing in the 1970s, the shortfall in housing was put at 390,000 units in 1973 and was estimated at 800,000 in 1977. In order to meet the demand, approximately 70,000 new housing units were needed each year to avoid the overcrowding of existing housing and the deterioration of the then present urban living conditions (World Bank, 1981).

As a result of failing efforts to meet these pressing demands, many of the lower middle class residents sought refuge in informal housing and purchased agricultural land in the peripheries of the cities to built their apartments. This gave rise to a phenomenon that would be even stronger than the growth of the slums: the growth of the Habitats Clandestins (HC) or the informal housing neighbourhoods. This was a typical (lower middle class) phenomenon related to more favourable economic times and urban demographic expansion not only in Morocco, but also in other parts of the region like for example Egypt (Ismail, 2006), Tunisia (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002a), or Lebanon (Fawaz, 2009). Adequate housing was one of the most visible and pressing problems of both the increased number of urban residents and their governments in the Arab region (Richards & Waterbury, 2008: 270). Just like the slums, the HC are originally built on lots without public facilities such as electricity connections, paved roads and sewer systems. They are also built illegally, without official public authorization. The big difference is that the HC are built “en dur”, in brick and wood, and, as such, they look a lot like formal and legalized apartments. A lot of the informal houses count two, three or even four flours. Additionally, the owners of the informal houses are also owner of the land – albeit not legally recognized (Lehzam, 1995). This is another difference with the bidonvilles where the inhabitants at best only own their barrack. The land they occupy illegally.

272 It was also the official policy to prioritize public servants’ access to low-cost housing projects implemented by the state. But state efforts never succeeded in meeting these demands either.

273 This distinction is rather important because Moroccan government strategies differed when dealing with either slums or HC. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize the difference because there is a tendency in some literature to classify all forms of informal, dilapidated and precarious housing as ‘slums’. Consequently, the concept of slums remains vague in some of the literature (Milbert, 2006). As a result, some have denounced the use of the concept slum as a container concept (Gilbert, 2007). I, nevertheless, wish to keep using the term ‘slum’ or ‘bidonville’ to distinguish it from other forms of informal housing.
While the increase of slums characterized urbanization in Morocco until the late 1960s, the increase of HC dominated the urban process since the 1970s (Abouhani, 1995c; Ameur, 1995). All large cities will experience a growth of their peripheries largely due to the increase of HC. Surprisingly, this phenomenon was relatively limited to Casablanca. Yet, it applied all the more to cities as Salé (thanks to the proximity of Rabat and the increase of the public sector) and Tétouan (thanks to the increase of the informal sector) (Lhezam, 1995; see also Iraki & Rachik, 2005). Not all inhabitants of the HC came from the rural areas. There was also a lot of internal urban migration. The new owners were often people who came from the city-centre and wanted to escape either the uncertainty of not having a property of their own or the duty of having to pay rent. In general, the population of the HC differs from the population of the slums. Although we should avoid the homogenization of both populations an important distinction can be made. The population in the HC are there to stay. In contrast, the inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* always maintained a temporary and informal status due to the fact that they did not own their land and thus occupied a terrain illegally. The population of the HC are not living in the same uncertain situation. They do not occupy the land illegally but own it informally, which is a significant difference. As a result, they are not as vulnerable to relocation or expropriation as are the inhabitants of the slums. Additionally, the HC population will also often revert to all kinds of agency in order to provide their informal neighbourhoods with the necessary (urban) services and facilities. This occurs in two ways. First, they themselves will try to organize and establish the further integration of their quarter into the urban fabric. The owners will arrange their own collection of garbage, pave their own streets, connect electricity, build sewer systems, etc… In addition, they will fall back on social neighbourhood networks to help each other (Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; 2002a; Ameur, 2000; Iraki, 2006a). The mosque, for

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274 In the beginning of the 1980s more than 45% of the population of Salé lived in HC, 35% in Oujda, 26% in Fez and 25% in Tétouan (Ameur, 1995: 58).

275 Numerous studies emphasize the enormous heterogeneity of both the slum population and the inhabitants of the HC (e.g. Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; 2002c; Abouhani, 1995b; Ameur; 1995; Zaki, 2005; Iraki, 2006a)

276 In many ways the slum population has done the same. Especially in the older slums, barracks were fortified and made more permanent. Dwellers have also tapped electricity and water from the public networks, built sewer systems, etc. Especially the tapping of electricity in Casablanca has resulted in a battle between the private consortium Suez (lydec), the public authorities and the population during the 1990s. In the end,
example, will play a crucial role in the establishment of these social networks (Naciri, 1987; Iraki, 2006b). These activities and networks are some of the particular ways by which inhabitants re-appropriate the urban space and give a political dimension to their everyday life.277

Secondly, the particular relationship between the informal buyers of HC-land and the official landowners can serve as a lever once the latter has the political power and influence to advocate the reconstruction, formalization and integration of the informal neighbourhood. Many of the landowners who parcelled their agricultural lands and sold them to the inhabitants of HC, would also use the loyalty of their ‘clients’ to get elected in the municipal councils. As such, for this landowning elite, the lower urban middle class became an important social base for a political career. In return, the elected officials could lobby for certain public investments or start the necessary administrative procedures to formalize the HC. These new clientilist relations and the increasing influence of a local urban landowning class will eventually bring forth a new municipal reform in 1976 (Chartre Communal) which will transfer a considerable amount of executive power from central government representatives at the local scale (e.g. the qaids and other agents that are directly related to the Ministry of Interior) to the locally elected government bodies. Thanks to the new municipal reform, the municipal council received more competences in social, economic and administrative affairs. As such, the reform of 1976 transferred significant executive power from the traditional elite structures to the municipal council and increased political competition at the urban scale. This decentralization of political power marked another important rupture with the former patronage system based on rural elites and further integrated the emerging urban elites into the realm of decision-making (Abouhani, 1995b; 2006; Iraki, 2006a). According to Abdelghani Abouhani, this reform was a crucial development to explain the governmental shift that occurred in the 1970s. Again, it symbolized the increasing attention given to the urban space and its main actors. Although central power in Morocco (the makhzen) still largely retained its influence and dominance over the future of urban development, Abouhani argued that mainstream accounts on the Moroccan political system have neglected the very real political influence of these local elites (landowners).278 Mainstream accounts had focused too much, according to Abouhani, on institutions and national political forces, while ignoring the particular relation between political power and land property at the urban scale and its influence on the production of the urban space (Abouhani, 1999).279

277 This resonates with what Asef Bayat has termed the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary”, i.e. “the silent, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people [e.g. squatters and informal property owners] on the propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives” (Bayat, 2002: 19).

278 He specifically refers to the works of Remy Leveau (1985) and John Waterbury (1970). However, in their defense, both works were based on research largely conducted before the shift was really observable (the first edition of Leveau’s book dates from 1976). Nevertheless, I do think that Abouhani’s statement is still a valid critique on many other studies that were conducted afterwards (Abouhani, 1999: 6).

279 Abouhani has dedicated most of his academic career on the study of these local urban elites and their political influence on the development of the Moroccan city, more specifically the city of Salé.
Both the slums and the HC were forms of spontaneous urbanization. This is one of the crucial differences between processes of urbanization in the Third World and those in Europe or the US. Cities in Third World countries display different spatial patterns which constitute their specific dynamics of socio-spatial fragmentation. In contrast to European or American cities – where access to the city is normally guaranteed by an access to work – the access to the Third World city is mainly established by an access to property – in the form of land and/or housing (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002a). The majority of the Moroccan population owns their house – whether formally, informally or even illegally. Spontaneous urbanization is therefore the real motor behind urban expansion in countries like Morocco and the Arab region more generally. As such, in those countries, there is a real divergence between ‘planned’ urbanization and ‘actual’ urbanization. The latter is a process driven both from above and below, and directed by both formal and informal social and spatial practices (Navez-Bouchanine, 2005). Access to informal housing was in many cases much easier because complex, often untransparent and very slow administrative procedures could be avoided that way. The informal market could respond much faster to the demands of the urban population, especially in times of scarcity on the formal market. Additionally, fast growth of cities like Casablanca, Salé, Tangiers, Tetouan, etc. also demonstrated that urban growth and economic development were not necessarily related (Balbo & Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; see also M Davis, 2006a). It was often poverty that drove new migrants to the cities and not necessarily the need for new labour forces. The Third World city was/is to a large extent an illegal, informal and in many ways disconnected city. And it has been tolerated as well by public authorities.

To conclude, despite the fact that more government attention was paid to the Moroccan urban regions since the 1970s, particularly in Casablanca, there was still a lack of an overall and coherent urban political vision at the national level (Kaioua, 1996). Moreover, public authorities in Morocco, but also elsewhere, still largely tolerated spontaneous urbanization until the late 1970s – not in the least because of a lack of resources and public services to foresee in the need of a growing urban population. Toleration was a strategy to keep social peace and political stability. Besides toleration, repression was the only other means to keep the city under control. Until the late 1970s government ‘solutions’ were still more based on the premise that “a good repression [meant] ten years of social peace” than on a profound strategy for city-restructuring and planning (Clément, 1992: 402, own translation). Moroccan urban policy was still ad hoc and insufficient to deal with the complexity of increasing urbanization. It failed to provide sustainable solutions for a growing lower middle class looking for affordable housing outside the expensive ville nouvelle. As a result, state officials continued to tolerate the disorganized, chaotic and impoverished informal expansion of its urban peripheries until the “shock” of 1981 urged central power to take a radical turn (Naciri, 1984b; 1989; Abouhani, 1995a; Rachik 2002). Since then, the perception that the informal – thus less controlled – expansion of the urban peripheries could pose a serious threat for the political stability of the country prevailed. After what happened in 1981, the informal urban area’s became the primary focus of a general political urban restructuring strategy which symbolized the transition from an urbanism of tolerance towards an “urbanism of control” (urbanisme de contrôle) (Abouhani, 1995a) or an “urbanism of urgency” (urbanisme de l’urgence) (Rachik, 2002).
Sovereign city planning after 1981

The structural conditions at the beginning of the 1980s marked an end to the benign neglect of the urban periphery, its slums and spontaneous urbanization in general. The riots of 1981 were the starting shot for a radical governmental shift, leading to a tighter control over the urban territory.\(^{280}\) Of course, this didn’t mean that spontaneous urbanization completely stopped. I want to emphasize above all a change in governmental attitude and strategy. The reforms of the 1980s were intended to increase the presence of government agents in the informal neighbourhoods or integrate these urban spaces into governmental techniques. The general strike organized by the CDT signalled the convergence of pressures for structural adjustment and the tensions that were emerging within the city. The social disturbances exposed the growing cleavage between an emerging urban entrepreneurial elite with considerable political influence, benefiting from economic liberalization, and the rest of the urban population bearing the costs of neoliberal reform and the roll back of welfare policies (Clement, 1986; Catusse, 2008). Just as in 1965, the riots that followed the strike of 1981 would be severely oppressed by police and army forces. But in contrast to the disturbances in 1965, the use of physical violence was not the only answer the government had in store. After 1981, the marginalized peripheral urban areas – the slums, the informal housing quarters and the working class area’s – became a primary focus within a general master plan for the restructuring of Casablanca. Urban planning and administrative division were the two core components of this project of urban control.

The deconcentration of state power at the urban scale

The expansion of administrative control after 1981 can be seen in the light of a longer process of administrative politics that characterized the transformation of the Moroccan state and its power structures since the independence.\(^{281}\) In 1956, king Mohamed V came out as the main victor of the independence struggle. There was no doubt that his legitimacy was reinforced considerably due to his stance against the Protectorate and the following negotiations with the French to discuss the terms of independence. Nevertheless, there were other political forces which the king had to take into consideration: i.e. the nationalist movement, primarily based in the cities and the traditional (tribal) elites primarily based in the countryside. One of the main challenges for the monarchy was to reconstruct the Moroccan state and establish the structural foundations of his rule.\(^{282}\) This effort had both an institutional and a socio-political dimension (Rousset, 1992). Institutionally, it came down to the instalment of a new machinery of state power. Socio-politically, this machinery was embedded within social bases that supported the power and legitimacy of the new state and thus also the political dominance of the monarchy. One of the first reforms was the creation of the “communes” (the municipalities) in 1959 as the basic administrative subdivision of the Moroccan state.

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\(^{280}\) This shift did not come out of nowhere. It was due to the gradual changes in the 1970s that the basis existed for more radical changes in the 1980s.

\(^{281}\) And even much earlier. It was the French administration who turned the Moroccan power balance upside down. Not only with the establishment of their own administration but also with their efforts to institutionalize indigenous power structures. The French ruled officially through a Moroccan government apparatus. I mentioned this already briefly in chapter 2. For a discussion on the administrative reforms during the Moroccan Protectorate see: Blanc & Cabanis (1998).

\(^{282}\) Of course one of the most fundamental elements was his status as head of the Moroccan military.
Power and control in neoliberal politics

Two years later, with the Constitution of 1962, the provinces and prefectures were converted into institutions of local authority. As such, the municipalities, the prefectures and the provinces replaced the more traditional sociological power structures of Moroccan society (the tribal structures) as the fundament of the Moroccan state apparatus (Ibid.; see also Naciri, 1987). Consequently, the growth of administrative power centralized political power in Morocco – and this was definitely also the case during the Protectorate – at the expense of the more traditional and rather decentralized power relations between the bilad al-makhzen and the bilad as-siba in the period before the Protectorate. The king’s main social base in the 1950s and the 1960s, the traditional urban bourgeoisie and the rural landowning elites were, of course, incorporated in the new administrative apparatuses.

Nevertheless, the riots of 1965 and the socio-political pressures created by the demographic explosion, especially in the urban centres, will quickly demonstrate the limitations of this administrative division of power. In 1971, the Moroccan authorities created a third administrative territorial level: the region. The multiplication of prefectures and provinces required a higher subdivision, but it was only with the constitutional amendments of 1992 and 1996 that the regions and the regional government obtained the status of local government (Hinti, 2005: 170). The regional government is composed of representatives of the locally elected councils, the professional chambers and indirectly elected blue-collar workers (salariés). The Regional Council is placed under the authority of a governor (wali) who is directly appointed by the king. As such, the administrative entity of the region is characteristic of a complex and often paradoxical double process in which both elected and appointed state officials are engaged. This double process entails the decentralization and deconcentration of state authority (Ca-
Decentralization refers to a process which transfers public competences and resources from the central government to sub-nationally elected authorities. Consequently, in theory, decentralization is based on the democratic principle of subsidiarity. It suggests a reduction of administrative supervision by a central government or administration and a genuine transfer of power to a separate and relatively autonomous government entity. The Communal Charter of 1960 marked the first effort to decentralize government authority to the municipal councils. The subsequent creation of prefectures, provinces and regions, followed by the transfer of public resources and decision-making authority can also be considered as significant decentralization rounds.

Since the municipal reform of 2002 (Chartre Communal de 2002) there are basically three “Moroccan style” decentralized levels. First of all, the local City Council. This council is headed by a president (mayor). However, in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, the urban territory is also divided up in arrondissement councils with limited jurisdiction. The establishment of one City Council in every city meant a significant break with the administrative crumbling of the cities before 2002. Before the municipal reform of 2002 cities were subdivided by several smaller rural and urban municipalities. In 1997 Casablanca counted for example 29 urban municipalities and 6 rural communities, with a total of 1,147 elected officials. Subsequently, in large cities such as Casablanca the presidents and the vice-presidents of the urban municipalities were assembled in a supra-municipal administrative body: the Urban Community. However, with the municipal reform of 2002 the Urban Community Council was abolished at the expense of the City Council. This suddenly and drastically reduced the number of local elected officials. In 2003, after the local elections, Casablanca counted only 131 elected City Councillors anymore (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007). The second decentralized level was the prefectural or provincial assembly. This assembly has limited competences and comprises indirectly elected City Councillors and representatives of the professional chambers (Ibid.). The third decentralized level was the regional council. This council is also indirectly elected.

However, this decentralization of public power stands in close relation – and is more than often subordinated – to the process of deconcentration. This process refers to the shift or displacement (and thus not a transfer) of competences, resources and executive power from the national scale to sub-national governmental scales within the central state-administration. Deconcentration involves a sort of rationalization of state power in order to enforce it more efficiently at different scales. It is thus crucial not to confuse decentralization with deconcentration. The latter was a logical consequence of the former within a context of authoritarian government. In Morocco, deconcentrated state reform is basically associated with the territorial and local agents of the Ministry of Interior. They are the delegated authorities. These agents are seen as the wheels of the state and the representatives of the makhzen. As such, the makhzen was represented at all levels of society. The intention was to bring the “administration closer to those administered” (Ministry of Planning, 1981, cited in Claisse, 1987). The governor is the highest representative of central power at the local level. It is the governor who has the

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288 The arrondissement is an administrative division comparable with those in large French cities such as Paris, Lyon and Marseille (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007).
executive authority within the region, province or prefecture (Planel, 2009). He coordinates all administrative departments and many state agencies within his territory. He presides the decentralized assemblies but he is not elected. On the contrary, a governor is directly appointed by dahir and as the “representative of His Majesty” he or she becomes automatically the most powerful authority within the decentralized government body. Defying the authority of the governor would be considered an act against the king himself and consequently punishable (Claisse, 1987: 41).

Besides the governor, the makhzen is represented at the lower local level by qaids and pashas. They have significant powers at the municipal level as they attend the council meetings and assist the council president in the decision-making process. Also, qaids and pashas disposed of considerable extra powers, especially before the municipal reforms of 1976 and 2002, when it comes to issuing certain administrative permits (e.g. construction permits, financial aid, hawkers’ licences, passports, etc.) (Ibid.: 42). At the lowest levels (street level) the qaids and pashas are represented by khalifas, sheikhs and the mqaddem. The latter is only charged to supervise a few streets. These local representatives perform functions that are not always stated in the law but exist mostly in practice, like for example the function as mediator (Ibid.). In short, qaids, pashas and governors represent the central state administration (i.e. the Ministry of Interior) at different governmental levels. As representatives of the king and officials of the Ministry of Interior they dispose in many situations of more authority than the elected officials. The paradox of deconcentration in Morocco entails that the central authorities maintain the control and initiative over the process of decentralization (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007; Planel, 2009). This was definitely the case after what happened in 1981. This time however, urban planning and the reproduction of the urban space would become a central feature of the deconcentration process and the reorganization of state power at the urban scale.

The reforms implemented after 1981 signified in many aspects a rupture in the modern history of urban planning in Morocco. The riots brought the urban peripheries and the urban poor definitely back at the centre of government attention. Especially the population in the eastern periphery of Casablanca. Since the Protectorate, Casablanca can be roughly divided into two parts. The western part of the city was a more residential area, while industry was mainly concentrated in the east. Until today, the socio-spatial

289 Casablanca has one female governor: Fouzia Imanssar who is governor of the prefecture of Aïn Chock.
290 Qaids are more rural based representatives of the Ministry of Interior. Pashas are more urban based representatives.
291 As I mentioned above, the municipal reform of 1976 was a first reorganization of power in which the upcoming urban elites – and locally elected representatives – received more executive power at the expense of the qaids and the pashas.
292 I have never met the mqaddem who was responsible for the immediate neighbourhood where I lived in Rabat (at least I think I never met him). Neither did my foreign roommates in Rabat. Nevertheless, most of our Moroccan friends assured us that he was perfectly aware of our presence. I also remember one night when I was walking home at three o clock in the morning when a group of young guys, who I had never met or seen before, greeted me with “hey le belge!” (Hey Belgian guy!). I guess, the mqaddem was not the only guy in my neighbourhood who knew who I was.
293 This happened already once in 1952 when the urban poor became a central focus point of the French administration (cf. Rachik, 1995; 2002).
294 This division was planned by Henri Prost, the main architect behind the French colonial urban project
fragmentation of the city reflects this historical east-west divide. In the west you’ll find luxurious residential neighbourhoods like Anfa where the high class of Casablanca resides. They represent approximately 5% of the urban population. This is a more open part of the city. There are a lot of parks, public spaces, and many houses have huge gardens. The architecture is diverse and modern. The east, with districts such as Ben M’sik and Sidi Moumen, is characterized by many bidonvilles, habitats clandestins and low-cost housing blocks. The bulk of Casablanca’s poorest population (approximately 20% of the urban population) lives here. The eastern part of the city is much denser. The architecture is also more monotonous. Many of the numerous apartments blocs located in the east are the result of state-sponsored housing policies and a lot of the former public spaces were taken over by informal housing. This east-west divide is also perceptible in the names given to neighbourhoods and streets. In the west you can find areas with Western names such as Californie, Bourgogne, Gauthier and Racine. In the east, Arab names were more common, like for example Sidi Othman, Ben M’sik, Jamila, Lalla Mériam, Moulay Rachid and Sidi Moumen. It was as if the west of Casablanca was associated with Western modernity and characterized the city’s openness towards Europe, while the east of Casablanca was associated more with Moroccan tradition and its links with the rural hinterland (Nachoui, 1998).

As a result of the riots, security and development became the two (complementary) core objectives of urban state intervention (Kaioua, 1996: 611). State interventions after 1981 implied a double shift in the regulation and organization of the urban space of Casablanca (Zriouli, 1998). First of all, it involved the further expansion and fragmentation of the urban space via new forms of administrative division. Casablanca had expanded significantly and the current administrative division had become inefficient. In 1982, for example, douar Skouila – a bidonville located in the in the east (Sidi Moumen) where many of the perpetrators of the suicide bombings of 2003 came from – was physically integrated in the city, while administratively the neighbourhood was still part of the rural community of Tit Mellil. Secondly, despite the further administrative division of the urban territory, the interventions also assured a recentralization and a strengthening of central power at the urban scale (cf. Naciri, 1989; Rachik, 1995; 2002). This recentralization or deconcentration of state power had to assure the control over emerging and competing political forces at the urban scale (e.g. the trade unions, the political parties, the neighbourhood associations). The creation of the wilaya was one of the main characteristic reforms of this governmental shift. By bringing the “administration closer to those administered”, the wilaya integrated peripheral living spaces into the administrative borders of the city. Only a month after the riots of 1981, the authorities divided the territory of Casablanca into five administrative prefectures (until then in Morocco. The western part of the city was reserved for the European residents. The south for the Moroccans and the east and north-east of the city was developed as an industrial zone. This partition had its effect on the social fabric of the city and this is still visible today (e.g. Rachik, 1995; 2002). 295 There is some confusion about douar skouila in the sources I consulted. According to Mostafa Nachoui Tit Mellil will become an urban community in 1992 (Nachoui, 1998: 115). However, according to Lamia Zaki, Douar Skouila will only be attached to the territory of Casablanca in 2001, as part of the transformation of the rural community of d’Ahl Loghlam into an urban community (Zaki, 2005: 27). The term douar originally refers to an encampment. Later it became a synonym for a rural agglomeration. Within an urban context, the term is used to denote the bidonvilles, more particularly those with a rural background (ibid.).
Casablanca existed out of only one prefecture and five urban municipalities. After this division, the five prefectures were accommodated within a newly established administrative superstructure: the wilaya of Greater Casablanca (the wilaya of Rabat-Salé was created at the same time). The wilaya (Arabic for governorate) became the highest sub-national administrative division in Morocco. It integrated the different prefectures and provinces into one governmental structure. The wilaya is headed by the wali. He is at the same time governor of the main prefecture of the city. The wilaya didn’t had the same juridical status as the prefecture or the province. Officially, it isn’t a separate local government body, but only an inter-prefectural and provincial framework for the coordination of urban policies. The wali had to coordinate the increasing administrative deconcentration – fragmentation – of the urban agglomerate. That is why, technically, the wali has the same administrative rank as the different prefectural and provincial governors. Symbolically however, the wali enjoys far more authority than the other governors. He has much closer ties with the Ministry of Interior and consequently also with the monarchy. He is the direct mediator between the political centre of Morocco and the urban level. The wali, just as the other governors, is appointed directly by the king and it is only the latter who can dispose him of his duties.

The administrative division of the territory of Casablanca and the creation of the wilaya were reforms to strengthen the state’s grip on the urban scale. The wali disposed of considerably more power and competences than the locally elected councils. Today, he has three main tasks. First, he has to coordinate the policies of the prefectures and provinces in his jurisdiction and supervise the local governments. With regard to the latter, the wali, as haut fonctionnaire of the state and the highest representative of the Ministry of Interior within the territory of Casablanca, takes over the supervisory function of the ministry over the locally elected municipal governments. The local City Councils are dependent on the Ministry of Interior for the redistribution of resources and their budgetary, technical and juridical affairs are supervised through the General Direction of the Local Communities (DGCL) (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007). Secondly, the wali was responsible for the preservation of security and public order on his urban territory. He directs and controls the deconcentrated network of the “agents d’autorités” (qaids, pashas, mqaddems, etc.). The wali himself is only directly accountable to the minister of Interior for his actions and decisions. Finally, since 2002, the wali has to coordinate all issues related to economic investment within his territory and supervise the process of urban planning. As such, the wali maintains close contact with other state

296 The five prefectures were Casa-Anfa; Ain Sebaa-Hay Mohammedia; Ben M’Sik-Sidi Othman; Ain Chock-Hay Hassani; and Mohammadia-Zénata.
297 Decree n°2-84-129 (3 July 1984): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1984%5CBO_3740.fr.PDF
298 The DGCL was a department of the Ministry of Interior established by former minister Driss Basri in 1976 in order to maintain control over the extended competences of the local municipal governments established with the Chartre Communal (the municipal reform) of 1976. For example, the local tax system, which dealt mainly with the granting of licenses, urban taxes and the redistribution of TVA fees, depended on the redistribution of the resources by the Ministry of Interior. This deprived the local councils largely of any margin for autonomous decision-making (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007).
299 In 2002, the security tasks of the wilaya were extended with the promotion of economic development and industrialization. In addition to that, the king ordered the creation of Regional Investment Centres (RIC) under the supervision of the wilayas. As mentioned in chapter 3, the RICs were one-stop contact points for Moroccan and foreign economic investors who wished to invest in the region. As a result the
agencies, such as the urban planning agencies and the regional inspection departments who are authorized with the elaboration of particular urban policies. After 1981, the wali thus became the most important political actor within the territory of the city. As a deconcentrated authority and representative of the state, he not only overrules the local elected government but also replaces the national ministries in many policy domains of urban planning and urban government.\textsuperscript{300} The local political control over the urban scale was now located almost exclusively into the hands of the prefectural system.

Casablanca expanded to 6 prefectures in 1985, 7 in 1990 (after the riots in Fez), and 9 in 1997. Today, Greater Casablanca is divided into 12 prefectures.\textsuperscript{301} During that same period, the central authorities also effectively decentralised the urban scale of Casablanca and multiplied the amount of municipalities. In 1976 Casablanca was divided into 5 municipalities. In 1985 there were 23 urban and rural municipalities. And just before the municipal elections of 1992, the authorities effectively almost doubled the amount of municipalities (to 35 – 28 urban and 7 rural)\textsuperscript{302} in order to break up certain political alliances at the local level and weaken the political and territorial strength of the local elected councils. As mentioned above, this was before the 2002 municipal reform fused the multiple locally elected councils into one City Council. The double process of deconcentration – i.e. the reinforcement of central state power at the urban scale – and decentralization – i.e. the crumbling of the municipal constituencies in Casablanca – had a perverse effect on the power balances in the city. It partly reversed the municipal reform of 1976 which had sought to integrate the emerging urban middle class into the realm of decision-making (Naciri, 1987; Kaioua, 1996; Cattedra, 2001). The immediate political strategy was to weaken the alliance (the Koutla) between the two historical opposition parties: the socialist USFP and the conservative Istiqlal (Zriouli, 1998).

Following the perceived effectiveness of the reforms in Casablanca, its administrative model was applied in other cities during the 1980s and the 1990s. After the violent riots of December 1990, three new wilayas were established in the cities of Fez, Marrakech and Meknes.\textsuperscript{303} There were then five wilayas in Morocco (Greater Casablanca and Rabat-Salé being the other two). These five wilayas integrated in total four provinces (rural) and 18 prefectures (urban). In January 1994, another four wilayas were created (Oujda, Agadir, Tétouan and Lâayoune). This time, however, there was no direct provocation. It was more a pre-emptive measure anticipating the creation of regional...

\textsuperscript{300} For a more detailed description of these particular functions of the wali, see the site of Grand-Casablanca: http://www.casablanca.ma/index/portal/media-type/html/user/anon/page/accueil.psm;?noteid=2325 (accessed 25/10/2010).

\textsuperscript{301} For an overview of the different prefectures and provinces of Casablanca and the governors in function: see the official website of the city: http://www.casablanca.ma (accessed 11/10/2010). However, the official websites are confusion about the exact constitution of the administrative division of Casablanca. On the official website of Morocco, Mediouna and Nouaceur are listed as prefectures, while on the official website of the city of Casablanca they are listed as provinces. See: http://www.maroc.ma and http://www.casablanca.ma. (accessed 11/10/2010).

\textsuperscript{302} In 1997 Casablanca counted 29 urban municipalities and 6 rural communities (Catusse, e.a., 2005).

\textsuperscript{303} Also in 1990, the inhabitants of the bidonvilles in Fez had played a major role in the disturbances.
governments in 1996 (Zriouli, 1998). Today, there are 16 regions and 17 wilayas in Morocco (Tétouan and Tangiers have their own wilaya in the region of Tangiers-Tétouan). As mentioned above, the Regional Council is directed by the wali and resides in the prefecture or province of the wali. In general, the multiplication of wilayas coincided with the multiplication of the prefectures and provinces in Morocco. Today there are 27 prefectures and 45 provinces (Hinti, 2005: 170).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decentralized authorities</th>
<th>Deconcentrated authorities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>City Council</em> (in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, the territory is subdivided in arrondissment councils.)</td>
<td><em>Qaids and Pashas</em> (urban district level. At the street level they are represented by mqaddems and khalifas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Prefectural and Provincial assemblies</em> (indirectly elected)</td>
<td><em>Prefecture and Province</em> (headed by a governor. He is the direct boss of the local agents d’autorités, i.e. the qaids and pashas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Regional Council</em> (indirectly elected)</td>
<td><em>Wilaya</em> (headed by a wali. The wali is also governor of the main prefecture. His authority is largely based on his status as direct representative of the king. Officially he has the same status as the other governors. The wali also directs the regional assembly)</td>
</tr>
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Table 1: the decentralized and deconcentrated authorities in Morocco

Besides this specific administrative division of Casablanca, the 1981 riots also triggered the creation of several governmental agencies and new urban planning instruments to enhance control over the urban territory and its process of urbanization. Within a month after the riots, king Hassan II entrusted the French urbanist Michel Pinseau with the elaboration of a new *Schéma Directeur de l’Aménagement du Territoire* (SDAU), a new general masterplan, to map out Casablanca’s future for the next two decades. This was the first fully elaborated SDAU since Morocco’s independence. According to Pinseau, the SDAU had to outline and determine the framework in which the urban population of Casablanca would live and work for the coming 20 years (Nachoui, 1998). With this assignment, however, Pinseau’s team received also the explicit mission to “securitize the city” (Cattedra, 2001: 130-131). The SDAU attempted to formulate a response to three: (1) a solution for the housing problem, (2) the improvement of the quality public spaces and buildings, and (3) the amelioration of the mobility within the city. The planning of a metro line was one of the most salient objectives of the master plan. The new SDAU resembled the original SDAU of Michel Ecochard in the way which it also projected a linear growth of the city along the coastline. This linear growth would then eventually integrate the neighbouring prefecture of Mohammedia. In contrast, the original plans of Henri Prost had anticipated a more concentric growth of the

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304 As such, Michel Pinseau became the third French architect/urbanist, after Henri Prost and Michel Ecochard, to have a great impact on the future development of Casablanca.

305 However, this metro was never realized. Today this plan has been replaced by the plan to built a tramway by analogy with the tramway in Rabat which should be finished in 2011.
city. Additionally, in comparison with the two former master plans of Casablanca, the SDAU of Pinseau was also brought out after a violent crisis. The Prost plan (1917) was elaborated in the middle of a civil war during the first years of the French Protectorate, the Ecochard plan (1952) was designed after the violent riots in Casablanca, and finally, the Pinseau master plan was clearly intended to put things right after the violent disturbances of 1981 (Rachik, 1994).

Following the elaboration of the SDAU, two important agencies were created in 1984 to implement the new urban strategies. The first, the Agence Nationale pour l’Habitation Insalubre (ANHI), was charged with the eradication and re-integration of the slums and the informal neighbourhoods (HC). It was placed under the control of the Ministry of Interior but operated as a financially autonomous public institution because the requirements of structural adjustment implied, after all, a radical decrease of state subsidies for social housing programs. This meant a clear break with some of the state-led housing policies before the implementation of the SAP in 1983. In the following years, the real estate market and the construction sector were largely privatized and the Moroccan state disengaged more and more from direct financial intervention (Philifert & Jolé, 2005). ANHI would work more closely together with the emerging private sector in order to provide social and low-cost housing. Yet, despite the liberalization of the housing market, the deconcentrated authorities still maintained strong control over the urban planning process (Nachoui, 1998; see also below). Additionally, the establishment of the ANHI had another consequence. It implied a return to programs of slum-resettlement which were popular during the final years of the Protectorate (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c). By contrast, during the 1970s, preference was usually given to a restructuring in situ. The restructuring of shantytowns on the spot was back then a policy that was strongly promoted by the World Bank, also in Morocco (Naciri, 1987). However, due to the new economic climate of the 1980s and the rapid expansion of Casablanca – which caused the absorption of many bidonvilles into the urban fabric – some of the leading architects and urban planners at the time considered that the restructuration of the shantytowns would imply the permanent “bidonvillisation” of the city-centre and, as a result, this would negatively impact the future economic development of Casablanca, i.e. within a neoliberal spatial logic (Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005: 66). The experience with Ben M’sik, a large ‘restructured’
slum in the eastern part of the city, was one of the events which probably explained the shift in focus from restructuration to relocation. Ben M’sik was indeed one of the epicentres of the 1981 disturbances and had put the effectiveness of restructuration into question (Naciri, 1987; Hauw, 2004).

A second agency that was created following the SDAU, the *Agence Urbaine de Casablanca* (AUC), was of even greater significance. The AUC was Morocco’s first technocratic urban planning agency. Its main task was the implementation and elaboration of the recommendations in the SDAU. The intention was obvious. Issues of urban planning and urban reorganization had become a top priority and the central administration needed a specific instrument that concentrated the resources, the expertise and the political power to govern the urban terrain from a more technical perspective. The wilaya clearly concentrated the necessary political power at the urban scale, but missed the technocratic baggage to elaborate the technical missions and urban projects delineated in the SDAU. The AUC was established specifically to manage the urban crisis and rationalize the urban demographic process. Furthermore, it would assemble and coordinate all other specialized agencies active at the urban scale (e.g. ANHI, ERAC, etc.). Politically, the creation of the AUC cannot be misunderstood. The director of the AUC has the status of a governor. He is nominated by the king and placed on the payroll of the Ministry of Interior.

This means that he finds himself at the same hierarchical level as the prefectural and provincial governors of Casablanca. As such, the AUC was another example of how the Ministry of Interior established its domination over the urban territory of Casablanca at the expense of all other local actors and forces. The AUC disposed of considerable public powers. It had the right to expropriate, the right of pre-emption and the agency had also the autonomy to expand its own property reserves. As such, the AUC could intervene in the market and influence land prices by selling or buying land on its own account. The AUC-model was subsequently adopted in the other Moroccan cities. A dahir of 10 September 1993 permitted the establishment of urban agencies in every city in Morocco. Nonetheless, the AUC remains particular. Unlike other urban agencies that are now all placed under the political supervision of the MHUAE (the current ministry of housing and urbanism), the AUC still remains, to the present day, a deconcentrated department of the Ministry of Interior. And unlike the AUC-governor, none of the directors of the other urban agencies have the status of governor. As such, the AUC remained the privileged instrument of the Ministry of Interior to control the increasing complexity of Casablanca’s urbanization. In 1985, this political domination of the Ministry of Interior was demonstrated yet another time when the national government transferred the ministerial authority over urban planning back to the Ministry of Interior, at the expense of the more technocratic MUHTE. The latter was reduced to a ministry of housing.

308 For a detailed discussion on the AUC see: Moujid (1989).
309 Dahir n°1-84-188 (9/10/1984): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1984%5CBO_376 2_fr.PDF
310 Dahir n°1-93-51 (10/09/1993): http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO%5Cbulletin%5CFr%5C1993%5CBO_422 0_fr.PDF
311 As mentioned above, in 1972 the government had entrusted the autonomous and technocratic Ministry of Urbanism, Housing, Tourism and Environment (MUHTE) with the competence of urban planning. Over the years the ministry has changed status and names several times.
After the administrative division of the city and the establishment of the wilaya, the AUC and the ANHI, urban planning became an exercise of power to ensure spatial visibility and, consequently, political stability (Rachik, 1994). The specific reforms implied a clear centralization of political power in Casablanca, with the AUC and the wilaya as the local representatives of the Ministry of Interior (Moujid, 1989; Catusse, e.a., 2005). To use a quote of Raffaele Cattedra, after 1981, the Ministry effectively succeeded in “territorializing its own power” (Cattedra, 2001: 142). And despite a retransfer of the competence of urban planning to a renewed and autonomous ministry of housing and urbanism in 1998 under the alternance government, the Moroccan urbanist Abdelghani Abouhani stressed that to the present day “it is the Ministry of Interior who really governs the cities (...) The ministry of urbanism has the possibility to define the norms, but nothing really more than that”. In the end, the reforms of the 1980s had foremost a territorial focus. Other key political and social questions remained unaddressed. Both Kaioua and Cattedra emphasized the particular technocratic character of the SDAU. Additionally, the specific mission of the ANHI and the AUC made it clear that the Moroccan authorities would deal with the increased social tensions in a technical and sovereign way, rather than in a comprehensive social and political way. As a result, the attention given to the urban scale after the riots failed to take into account the social complexity of the city as a whole and avoided the pressing political questions about the future role of the metropolis in the social and economic development of its population. Despite the massive reorganization of the urban space in Morocco, little attention was paid to the root causes of social inequality which was, after all, the basis for the riots in the first place.

Urban restructuring and state architecture in Casablanca

Sovereign city planning in Morocco was characterized by administrative division and new urban planning instruments and institutions, but it had also some significant spatial implications. In spite of the then economic crisis, public authorities invested heavily in the spatial reorganization of Casablanca (cf. Moujid, 1989; Naciri, 1987; Kaioua, 1996; Rachik, 2002). The restraints of the public deficit and the pressures of the IMF to cut back public spending have not held back the Moroccan authorities to intervene in numerous ways in the reorganization of the urban space of Casablanca. No less than two billion MAD were invested in the restructuring of the city. For the first time, the authorities planned the integration of all bidonvilles (at least they talked about it). Additionally, they planned the elaboration of whole new road network for the city (Rachik, 1995: 85). In the following years, new social housing projects, new roads, the installation of police stations in the urban peripheries and above all the construction of the majestic prefectural headquarters gave a face to the state in those neighbourhoods where it was previously absent (Naciri, 1989). Urban restructurings and renovations – especially the renovation of the Mohamed V and the United Nations squares – were meant

312 These three examples were some of the most obvious examples. They are not the only examples. There were other institutions and instruments that were created during the 1980s and 1990s that further exemplify the increased attention given to urban government and planning (e.g. the Regional Inspections, the prefec-
tural departments of urbanism, etc.) (for more information see Zriouli, 1998; Catusse, e.a., 2005; Philifert & Jolé, 2005).
313 Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat-21/04/09).
314 King Hassan II had explicitly denounced the lack of police presence in the urban peripheries in his speech of 8 July 1981, two weeks after the riots (Claisse, 1987).
to give testimony to the greatness and richness of Casablanca (Rachik, 1995: 71-72). To do so, two additional objectives were delineated in the SDAU: (1) the renovation of the city-centre; (2) the construction of new majestic prefectural buildings. As such, the authorities attempted to demonstrate the state’s intention to be overtly and physically present in peripheral districts such as Ain Sebaa, Ben M’sik and Aïn Chock (Naciri, 1987). These buildings, their decoration, their grandeur, and the open space that surrounds them, stand out in stark contrast to the impoverished and monotonous apartment buildings in the immediate surroundings. According to Mohamed Naciri these constructions represented not only the preoccupation of central power with the control of the peripheries of the country’s most important city, but also the desire to implant new beacons of modernity in the midst of degraded urban areas (often depicted as the antithesis of modernity), so they could become new attractive and alternative urban centres within the territory of Greater Casablanca.

At the same time these spatial interventions turned the urban territory into a more calculable and governable space. First of all, the urban restructurings sought to improve the control over urban residents and their movements by emphasizing monumental state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a (or the Moroccan) sovereign. Additionally, in an attempt “to curb the habits of [the] unruly inhabitants”, some specific urban interventions disentangled the densely populated peripheries by linking Casablanca’s impoverished peripheries with the city-centre and improve the connection between different nodes of capitalist accumulation throughout the city (Ossman, 1994: 30). As such new boundaries were drawn within the urban space. For example, the A3-highway between Rabat and Casablanca, finished in the mid-1980s, literally cleaved the city in two, forming a barrier between the predominantly working-class periphery and the city-centre (Ibid.; see also Cattedra, 2001: 143). Today, the urban space of Casablanca is cleaved by large boulevards. This not only improved the mobility of the Moroccan labour force, it also increased the velocity of urban life in general – with the boulevard as its symbolic pinnacle – leading to the constant circulation of goods, capital and people. Accordingly, it reduces people’s capacity to stand still, wonder, think and – if necessary – mobilize. The urban space of the street is a place for communication and movement that can eventually lead to ‘street politics’, but streets – as the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre argued – can also be a repressing place where cars are hunters and pedestrians become the hunted (Lefebvre, 2003: 21). The enlargement and renovation of the road network in Casablanca in the 1980s specifically aimed to make urban circulation more fluid, ensure spatial visibility and improve the physical integration of (and consequently the control over) the urban periphery (Rachik, 1995: 80-82).

Two projects in particular symbolized the rationality of sovereign city planning in the 1980s. These two large-scale “neo-Haussmanian” projects represented the symbolic presence and power of the sovereign, the Moroccan monarch, at the urban scale (Catusse, e.a. 2005). The first one was the impressive Mosque Hassan II, named after

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315 The Haussman period in the 1860s in Paris has become a synonym for specific class strategies aiming at the re-planning of the city without any regard for its original life (Lefebvre, 1996: 76). Moreover, in Haussmans’s case these class strategies were directed against the neighbourhood Belleville which had become a working class neighbourhood which the bourgeoisie had become to fear. The neighbourhood had become impossible to penetrate for police forces and as a result very difficult to regulate by the govern-
the former king. It was a royal project imposed upon the city by a sovereign decision of the king himself. Not even the SDAU elaborated by Pinseau mentioned any plans to build the mosque. The impressive Mosque was also the first project in Morocco that characterized a new vision on urban restructuring and development: waterfront development. For years urban planners had neglected the shorelines of cities like Casablanca and Rabat. In the past, these cities literally turned their backs to the Atlantic ocean. It is only a recent trend in Morocco to take into account the exploitative value of the seashore (cf. chapter 5). The Mosque Hassan II was one of the first projects which opened up to the sea. It was located at the shoreline right in front of the old medina and build partially on the water. It took six years (1987-1993) and 50 million man-hours to build the mosque. Today, it is the second largest mosque in the world and it has the largest minaret (200m). In his study, Raffaele Cattedra shows in detail how the Mosque Hassan II played an important symbolic role in the “reconfessionalization” of the city. It was the showpiece by which central power in Morocco reclaimed the city in a symbolic way and attempted to counter the proliferation of new mosques and the emergence of Islamist movements in the urban peripheries. Additionally, the Mosque Hassan II was supposed to give back the city of Casablanca its image as a Muslim city. During the Protectorate, the French had never provided the space in the ville nouvelle for the building of religious monuments. Consequently the city lacked the necessary infrastructural symbols to be perceived as a Muslim city in the collective imagination (Cattedra, 2001). As such, the Mosque Hassan II...
had to represent the Muslim identity of the residents of Casablanca and re-establish at the same time the religious authority of the king as the ‘Commander of the Faithful’. The mosque’s architectural grandeur is in itself a reflection of the monarchy’s power.

The second characteristic project was the Avenue Royale (Royal Avenue). This urban renewal project involves an axis of 1.5km long and 60 metres wide that connects the coastal area and the Mosque Hassan II with the inner city-centre and the United Nations square, alongside the historical medina. The project had to present another image of Casablanca to the outside world – an image of a vibrant and dynamic city, instead of an image of urban violence and discontent – and redevelop Casablanca’s inner-centre to meet the desires of tourists, investors and high-class residents. The project (still not finished) plans amongst other things the construction of high and middle class apartments, a new commercial centre, a conference centre and a theatre. However, the realization of these plans and constructions implied the relocation of more than 12,000 families (60,000 people) out of the historical city-centre. In 1989, the AUC conducted surveys to identify the population that had to be relocated. Faced with the complexity and magnitude of the project, the public authorities entrusted SONADAC – a semi-public agency created in 1991 and placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior – with the management of the further construction of the Royal Avenue (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010: 219). A first resettlement program was launched in 1995. 530 families were resettled to the urban residential estate of Attacharouk. Since 1997, most of the remaining people are being relocated to the new site of Nassim, almost 10 km from the city-centre (cf. Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005; Anglade, 2005; Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010). Between 1998 and 2002 about 2,000 households were relocated. Since then, however, the pace of resettlement has slowed down considerably due to operational and financial problems. By 2009, no more than 3,000 people were relocated out of the total of the 12,000 households that were planned in the beginning (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010). The detailed studies by Françoise Navez-Bouchanine and Isabelle Berry-Chikhaoui reveal the authoritarian character of this kind of development strategy (i.e. the remodelling of Casablanca’s city-centre according to ‘global market requirements’). Preference was clearly given to the market value of the urban site, while the original inhabitants of the site did not take part whatsoever in the decision-making process. They were little or not informed neither before nor during the course of the project.

Ironically, the project, just like many other projects in Morocco, has often been presented in the media as a social project. Allegedly, the project aimed besides its economic objectives – to provide a new future and decent living conditions for the inhabitants living at the outside of the walls of the medina (by moving them 10 km further away). The justification for this urban renewal project was to be found in the fact that the beneficiaries – 80% of them were tenants – would receive preferable state-subsidized conditions to become home-owners in Nassim (Ibid.). This justification, first of all, directly neglected the fate of the nearly 2,000 households that did own their current apartment. Additionally, in the opinion of many ‘beneficiaries’ the new site was not an improvement of their situation at all. From an economic point of view, Nassim was much less interesting than their current living place because it was located at the periphery of the

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318 This project was also not mentioned in Pinseau’s master plan.
319 These home-owners also denounced the underestimated expropriation fees.
city and it would disrupt a lot of the social and economic links that were established
with neighbouring central districts, and in particular with the souks of the old medina
(Ibid.: 224). As a result, there was a lot of resistance against the project and against the
conditions of their relocation. Local residents used a wide variety of tactics to delay the
advancement of the project (Navez-Bouchanine and Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). If one
takes a walk today along the future Royal Avenue one quickly notices that the project
has been on hold for years.

Nevertheless, the urban renovations of the 1980s with flagship projects such as the
Mosque Hassan II and the (planned) Royal Avenue, but also the construction of the pre-
fectures and the renovations of major squares, symbolized the symbiosis of an increas-
ing territorial control with an authoritarian vision on urban renovation.320 The mosque
and the Royal Avenue were royal projects subject to the decision of the Moroccan sov-
ereign. State architecture thus played a central role in the reorganization of the urban
space of Casablanca. In this view, architecture is not merely about the construction of a
space, it also has “specific expressive-experiential effects” on subjects. The “particular
practice involved in such architecture”, Paul Hirst argues, “is the transformation of hu-
man subjects through geometrically organized space” (Hirst, 2005: 162-164). Lefebvre
goes one step further and stresses that monuments – like the Mosque Hassan II – are
essentially repressive because they have been specifically raised to glorify the power-
ful. As such, they control people, but also brings them together at the same time, by
projecting onto the place where these monuments are implanted a specific conception
of the world (Lefebvre, 2003: 21- 22). The concept of sovereign city planning thus tries
to grasp the political dimension behind certain strategies of urban renovation, i.e. those
strategies that try to capitalize a territory and emphasize monumental state architecture
in order to incite the loyalty of the urban citizens to a sovereign.

Additionally, sovereign city planning in the 1980s was closely intertwined with the in-
terests of capital to guarantee a better circulation. Urban planning was not only focused
on the securitization of the urban space but also on the economic development of the
city. Despite its current operational and financial difficulties, the project of the Royal
Avenue was a prelude to the contemporary context of rapidly changing global com-
petitive conditions in which the Moroccan cities – and Casablanca specifically – try to

320 The construction of the Casablanca Twin Towers, inaugurated in 1998, is another example. It repre-
sents the economic stature of the city.
maintain a favourable position. In 2007, SONADAC was taken over by the semi-public investment bank CDG and as a result the latter now controls all waterfront development projects around the Mosque Hassan II. The prestigious Casa-Marina project, launched in 2007 just on the other side of the medina, is developed by CGI, a subsidiary of CDG (cf. Barthel & Planel, 2010).321 Such urban development schemes fit in a wider project of capitalist restructuring and set the boundaries between those who can afford to invest, live and consume in these newly designed places of consumption and those who fall by the wayside. After the realization of the Royal Avenue and the Marina, the historical medina of Casablanca will be enclosed by two luxury projects. Yet, the medina is a very impoverished urban area with a majority of poor tenants.322 It is most likely that this enclosure will create further socio-spatial tensions and could lead eventually to the gentrification of the historical medina.323 Several other medinas in Morocco could serve as a forerunner. Especially the ones in Marrakech and Fez that are now subject to an influx of rich (foreign) investors who wish to exploit its exotic character. Projects such as the Royal Avenue and Casa-Marina will definitely upgrade the attractiveness of the ancient medina of Casablanca and encourage private investors to take over that space in the future.

**Techniques of security in the 21st century**
The expansion of urban territorial control in the 1980s did, in the end, not bring forth a credible and sustainable solution for the slums in Casablanca and other major Moroccan cities. In general, the resettlement operations of ANHI were quite effective in smaller cities but less successful in bigger cities due to for instance land scarcity, speculation, the reluctance of people to move from their original living place and the inability of slum dwellers to finance the resettlement (cf. Lehzam, 1995; Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c). Many eradication operations were postponed or delayed. Overall, there are three particular strategies in Morocco when it comes to the eradication of slums and the re-integration of its population. The first strategy is ‘restructuration’, which means that the slum space is reorganized on the spot (e.g. by improving access to services like water and electricity, paving roads, fortifying houses, etc.). But as I mentioned earlier, the restructuration of slums in Morocco (slum upgrading) – advocated by the World Bank in the 1970s and the 1980s – was abandoned as the main strategy in favour of resettlement. The second strategy is ‘recasement’.324 In this particular kind of resettlement operation the slum dwellers are allocated a parcel on which they have to build their own house or apartment (very often in co-ownership). The third strategy is ‘relogement’ (rehousing). In this kind of operation, the slum dwellers are transferred to a whole new apartment that has been built for them by a public or private developer.325

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321 CGI: Compagnie Générale Immobilière.
322 Interview with Marie-Pierre Anglade, sociologist (Casablanca-19/05/09).
323 The Moroccan sociologist Aberrahmane Rachik argues that the authorities always adopted a dubious role vis-à-vis the medina. First of all, it would have been politically and socially impossible to simply eradicate the medina – due to its mythical and historical character and due to its densely populated areas – but at the same time public authorities have always neglected the medina with severe social degradation as a result (lack of public services, little renovation, etc.) (Rachik, 1995:73-75). Today, however, we see a renewed capitalist interest in these historical sites.
324 This term comes from the French verb ‘recaser’ which means ‘to reinstall’ or ‘to re-site’.
325 Recasement is the cheapest and most applied solution because the public authorities only had to liber-
One of the reasons for the failure of slum resettlement in the 1980s can be found in the paradox of roll back neoliberalism. Despite the obvious efforts to reorganize the urban space after 1981, the coinciding structural adjustment policies had still deprived the state of the necessary financial means to plan and fund heavy subsidized public housing programs. As such, a kind of paradox arose. On the one hand, the state strengthened its control over the urban territory (e.g. with the wilaya, the AUC, the ANHI, etc.) – and as a result it became increasingly difficult to expand the city informally. On the other hand, this increasing administrative control coincided with a financial disengagement of the state in the provision of low-cost housing (Lehzam, 1995; Nachoui, 1998). One of the results of structural adjustment was the liberalization of the housing market and the emergence of private real estate and construction companies who controlled and even monopolized this market. Yet, the growth of the private sector in the housing market undermined the affordability of legal accommodation, especially in cities like Casablanca, as increasing speculation and ‘laisser-faire’ policies skyrocketed the housing prices. This resulted in a failure to meet the original objectives of the housing projects that were launched in the 1980s and the early 1990s. As a result, many inhabitants of the slums and the HC found themselves unable to buy a house on the formal market and their places were taken by a more well-off middle class residents for whom the housing projects weren’t intended in the first place. One of the results of this paradox was that the already significant density in existing informal settlements (slums and HC) even increased. These areas became more and more overpopulated (Lehzam, 1995).

It was not until the Casablanca suicide bombings in 2003 that the Moroccan government would seriously renew its engagement to eradicate all slums in the Moroccan cities. Two differences can be observed when we compare the new efforts with earlier policies of the 1980s. First of all, the state would now play a more prominent role in the support of slum resettlement operations. In the big cities the resettlement operations had become a real obstacle (due to speculative, financial and/or social reasons) and required more engaged state intervention (Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005: 67). Consequently, new state arrangements were rolled out in order to manage the operations on the ground and coordinate the cooperation with the private sector. Secondly, the contact with and the participation of the slum population was more central in the new operations. In the past, ANHI would establish little contact with the slum residents and pushed through many of their operations in a very top-down manner (Philifert & Jolé, 2005: 393). This changed in the 2000s. The new state arrangements and the increased cooperation with private partners introduced new methods of intervention. These new methods not only increased contact with the slum population, it also implicated, with the assistance of specific social intermediaries, an increasing administration of life in the slums itself. The methods of sovereign city planning that were implemented in the 1980s, which treated the urban poor as legal subjects within a bounded territory, were gradually supplanted or complemented with new methods and

326 For example, in 1994, king Hassan II launched the prestigious plan “200,000 houses” (of which 70,000 were to be built in Casablanca). The private sector (e.g. important companies such as Addoha) played a big role in this project (Hauw, 2004).

327 It was a typical phenomenon, not only in Morocco, that urban middle class residents often supplanted the poorer urban residents in the slum upgrading and resettlement projects when the private sector and market-price mechanisms were involved (cf. Milbert, 2006; Huchzermeyer, 2008).
techniques of government which focused first of all on the population itself. The urban poor, and not so much the urban territory, now had to be administered or policed. As I will discuss, new techniques of social engineering will be developed and characterize this shift from methods of sovereign planning towards techniques of security and risk management. Also, as Foucault had already remarked in the mid-1970s when he published the first volume of the History of Sexuality, the expansion of capitalism and the exploration of new markets required the deployment of biopower in new fields and domains. As such, the new techniques involved in the government of slums were not only intended to enhance social control over the urban poor, or just to improve their quality of housing; these techniques also attempted to integrate the slum dweller into the formal capitalist market. One of the main objectives was to hook in even the poorest citizens into the system of capital circulation.

In 2003, preference was also given to the resettlement of the slum population. Several reasons can be given as an explanation. First of all, there were obvious security reasons. The suicide bombers came from two slums in Sidi Moumen (a district in the periphery in Casablanca). These urban areas were difficult to control. The state had little grip on those who lived within these dense spaces. The bombings had raised awareness about this problematic and pictured the slum space as an ‘ungovernable space’. The relocation of the population to new estates (less dense, with wider roads, better planned, etc.) facilitated the management and control of the slum population. Secondly, slum upgrading – in contrast to resettlement – was less interesting for private companies. Also, the high density of the slums made upgrading either impossible or very costly. Barracks are usually located very close to each other, often on top of each other. In slum areas, virtually every bit of space was used by someone somehow (Werlin, 1999). On top of that, land had become very expensive in the inner-city and thus unaffordable for the inhabitants. Even with significant state-subsidies and guarantees there was no way that many of the urban poor could afford living in the city-centre in a formal and legalized manner. Finally, there were also macro-economic interests that explained the preference given to the resettlement of slum populations to new estates often located in the peripheries of the bigger cities. The city-centre is a central and valuable space in the neoliberal spatial fix (see chapters 2 and 5). As a result, city-planners were more concerned about the city’s unique selling position and the renovation of the inner-city than that they cared about the needs and concerns of the poor population (Navez-Bouchanie & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). Slum populations were often resettled – also before the violent disturbances of 2003 – with the very intention to recover the valuable terrains these people often occupied (Navez-Bouchanie, 2002c; Le Tellier, 2009b).

328 Again, I want to emphasize that biopolitical power did not merely supplant sovereign power. Both forms of power were already implemented since the neoliberal restructurings in the 1980s. After all, as I mentioned earlier, the deconcentration of administrative power was meant to bring the administration closer to the administered. Also, I want to re-emphasize that strategies of sovereign city planning did not attempted to control urban territories/space only for the sake of controlling them. In the end, they attempted to control the population that lived in and moved through the urban territory. Nevertheless, if we compare both periods (the period following the 1981 riots with the period following the 2003 bombings) we can see a clear pre-eminence of sovereign power in urban planning strategies in the 1980s, while forms and techniques of biopower will be more elaborated in the aftermath of 2003.

329 Only about 10% of the operations after 2003 will involve the restructuration.

330 Here, I make the link with Nikolas Rose’s concept of “governable spaces” (Rose, 1999: 31-40).
The increasing administration of life in the slums

While tolerated in the past, the slums always maintained a temporary and informal status due to the fact that the inhabitants occupy a terrain illegally. This created a paradoxical standoff. As Lamia Zaki argues: “by maintaining the inhabitants on the legal margin, the state creates a latent insecurity which sustains the shantytown dwellers’ fragility and limits the assertion of collective demands” (Zaki, 2008: 118). This form of “management by absence” – as Zaki calls it – has resulted in the exclusion of the slum dweller from formal city-life and the social norms city-life involves. Physically, the slum space was clearly separated from the ‘formal’ city (despite the fact that it was often located within the formal city). In the eyes of both the citizens living in the formal city and the slum dwellers, the ‘real’ city was constructed “en dur” (Zaki, 2005: 52). Moreover, this perceived exclusion was not only limited to physical aspects. It was often believed that the slum dweller was excluded from modernity because their urbanization (mostly due to a rural exodus) had not necessarily led to a modern urban life style (Ibrahim, 1975). From this perspective, slums were seen as the emblem of a “ruralization” of the city, because their inhabitants maintained a so-called rural mentality and were not yet adapted to modern city-life (Zaki, 2005: 67-69). The ‘formal’ represented the ordered city – both in terms of its urban and architectural shape as in terms of the cultural, economic, political and social organization of space – while the ‘informal’ was considered to represent the opposite: the shapeless areas of the city where economic and socio-political structures are particularly unstable and where culture is characterized as more “traditional” (Hernández & Kellet, 2010: 1). This perceived tension between formal and informal, this particular social and spatial imaginary not only essentialized the slum as a homogenous and coherent unity threatening the city and its public life, it also constituted the slum as a space to be governed separate from the spatial problematic of the city as a whole, thereby obfuscating its social and structural complexity. However, the formal-informal divide is in many ways only a perception – a powerful one nevertheless – and neglects the many ways in which both parts of the city are socially, culturally, politically and economically connected.331

Nevertheless, this perception of the slum-space has marked and influenced the construction of a “politics of truth” within Moroccan neoliberal governmentality and produced new forms of knowledge, new prejudices, notions and concepts that contributed to the “government” of the slums and the development of new techniques of intervention and regulation (Lemke, 2002). The neoliberal rationality behind these politics of truth often emphasises the lack of (market-)integration in the formal urban economy as one of the main reasons for the deprived conditions of the slum dwellers. On the website of MHUAE the *bidonville* is defined as “an anarchic ensemble of houses, built with anomalous materials, deprived of hygiene and collective services and populated by indigent people or people badly integrated in the urban fabric”.332 The fact that the Moroccan state keeps silent about one of the main characteristics of the *bidonvilles* in

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331 The television, to give an obvious example, is one of the ways in which the bidonvilles are included in the urban universe and characterises their social integration and the attachment to modernity (Ossman, 1994: 57-60).
this definition, namely the illegal occupancy of the land, permits the official discourse to obfuscate one of the basic dynamics behind their “management by absence” of the slums. Furthermore it neglects the structural causes for their existence and pins the responsibility of the lack of integration onto the inhabitants themselves (Zaki, 2005: 53). Two specific events contributed to the shift towards a more active management of the slum space. The first one was the changing international context and the changing international discourse on development. The second event was the domestic political crisis after the 2003 suicide bombings. This last event significantly accelerated an already ongoing governmental shift.

Internationally, there was a general shift from repressive approaches aiming to eradicate slums to an assimilating view of the slum population (Bolay, 2006). As I mentioned in chapter 3, the World Bank had distanced itself from some of the rigid assumptions of the Washington Consensus. The euphoria concerning the so-called “end of history” and the infallibility of free-market capitalism made place for a new engagement to “end poverty” (Roy, 2010). World Bank president at the time, James Wolfensohn, expressed in a key speech in 1998, titled “The Other Crisis”, his concerns about a looming crisis which the world had failed to notice: the crisis of poverty. He called for a worldwide prioritization of poverty alleviation (Ibid.: 16 & 74-83). At the following Millennium Summit in 2000, all 192 member states of the United Nations agreed upon eight general development goals to halve poverty in the world by 2015. The 7th goal aimed specifically at the preservation of environmental sustainability and target 7D (also referred to as target 11) aspired “to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers” by 2020. This target was based upon a global initiative launched a year earlier by Cities Alliance, a global multi-donor coalition of cities and their development partners promoted by the World Bank and UN Habitat. The initiative, known as the Cities Without Slums Action Plan, was endorsed by 150 member states (Morocco was one of them). Within this framework of the seventh Millennium Development Goal (MDG), new types of development had to be promoted which relied on a more outspoken role of state institutions and state-modes of intervention (i.e. the principles of good governance). Herbert Werlin, who worked as a consultant for the World Bank, emphasized that the earlier slum upgrading policies promoted by the World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s were a myth because they exactly minimized the role of the state. In contrast, he indicated that the slum upgrading approach required “a very powerful as well as humanistic bureaucracy to carry it out successfully (Werlin, 1999: 1526). A few years later the Global Report on Human Settlements of UN Habitat confirmed – in the line of the post-Washington consensus – that the slums were not going to be eradicated and integrated based on neoliberal recipes of minimal government and structural adjustment alone:

333 It’s important to note that this discourse of poverty alleviation refers to absolute poverty and not what can be understood as relative poverty. Roy notes that absolute poverty is generally seen as the degradation of the human condition, and therefore demands an urgent response, while relative poverty entails a structural logic of inequality and its mitigation would require a more radical analysis of the power balances that underpin this structural logic and radical means to alter these balances (Roy, 2010: 76).
335 For more information see their website: http://www.citiesalliance.org
An important message of this report is that slums and urban poverty are not just a manifestation of a population explosion and demographic change, or even the vast impersonal forces of globalization. Slums must be seen as the result of a failure of housing policies, laws and delivery systems, as well as of national and urban policies. (…) The failure of policy is at all levels – global, national and local. At the global level, policies that have weakened national governments without any countervailing central control appear to be leading to an un-restrained globalization that is accommodating greater inequality and marginalization. At the national level, liberalization and the sectoral fragmentation of policy and analytical and institutional frameworks have failed to support the urban-rural and cross-sectoral dynamics that are critical both to sustainable economic growth and the distribution of its opportunities. At the local level, a startling lack of capacity to cope with, or manage, the situation has left many slum citizen’s in a no-man’s land of illegality, insecurity and environmental degradation (UN Habitat, 2003: 5-6).

Moreover, UN Habitat argued that policies to address slum conditions must go beyond the mere assessment and improvement of the physical conditions in which slum dwellers live. The underlying causes of their living condition (e.g. poverty) had to be tackled as well (Hernández & Ketlett, 2010: 11). The most important precondition for this objective was the active involvement of the slum dweller himself. Consequently, Un Habitat emphasized that taking into account the slum population and draw them into the elaboration of the specific operations meant a significant break with the period before this turnover:

In earlier years, many internationally driven housing and slum reform projects that simply concentrated on engineering and construction solutions failed because they were not sustainable or appropriate in developing country environments. They failed to consult with and involve the people for whom they were intended. They did not work with their organizations and meet their cultural requirements. In addition, they failed to take sufficient account of good governance issues and political will, without which little can be achieved and nothing sustained once the foreign experts have gone home. Social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Incorporating the poor within the design and implementation of development projects not only helps to produce more appropriate projects, but also ensures that they are better targeted to reach those with the greatest needs. Including the poor from the outset helps to build confidence in, and loyalty to, improvement projects, as it was shown in work on participatory development in Sri Lanka and confirmed in many other projects (UN Habitat, 2003: 71-72).

This increased attention to a participatory approach and the active inclusion of the population into the development schemes, ostensibly seemed to discard earlier centralized decision-making processes, and a break with the harsh and heavily criticized IMF/World Bank-led macro-economic structural adjustment programs, in favour of “bottom-up” politics, participatory development and local empowerment (Kapoor, 2008). The focus on participation had become development’s new orthodoxy (Ibid.: 60). These
new global development paradigms trickled out to the individual countries and affected local development schemes. However, this participation paradigm is not as neutral and bottom-up as it appears to be. To the contrary, I want to emphasize the technologies of power invested in these new participatory development schemes once they are deployed in particular local settings (see below).

Domestically, the suicide bombings of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca really accelerated Morocco’s commitments within the framework of the goals set by international organizations such as the World Bank and UN Habitat. The perpetrators all came from two large bidonvilles in Sidi Moumen, a district in the prefecture of Sidi Bernoussi in the eastern periphery of the city. The events strengthened the stigmatisation of the slums as a breeding ground for radical Islamists (Zaki, 2005). Nevertheless, the specific debates that had led to the reorientation of Morocco’s social development policies had started already a few years earlier during the period of the alternance-government. The new political context at the end of the 1990s – with the appointment of a socialist prime Minister in 1998 and the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999 – initiated a reflection on the social dimension of slum clearance and generated fundamental changes in the public discourse (cf. chapter 3). Before, issues of urban planning and urban intervention were considered to be mere technical and physical affairs. There was little attention given to the social, cultural and economic aspects of urban poverty and the solutions for the problems of the urban poor were reduced to their need of appropriate housing (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). Yet, the changed political climate generated a rupture with earlier conceptions of slum clearance and started a whole new dynamic in which the fight against poverty became a central concern. Several initiatives and workshops were organized in 1999 and 2001, directed by the then ministry of housing, to develop a critical approach on public interventions and discuss the social impact of all the dimensions and aspects of slum clearance and resettlement (Navez-Bouchanine, 2004; Zaki, 2005: 90-91). Specifically, it implicated that the insights and findings of three specific disciplines – urban geography, sociology and economy – were taken into account to construct an understanding of the wider social dimension of the slum space and resettlement operations. This resulted in the elaboration of a new concept launched by the Social Development Agency (ADS)\textsuperscript{336}, i.e. that of the “\textit{maîtrise d'ouvrage social}” (MOS)\textsuperscript{337}. The idea of MOS attempts to conceptualize an integrated approach in which both the technical and the social dimension of slum resettlement projects are equally valued. Furthermore the concept underlines the participation of the local population as a key for success (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). In an interview with Lamia Zaki, Hicham Berra of ADS stated that the idea of MOS:

\begin{quote}
consisted first of all in better understanding the constraints and the ways of action of the [slum] populations in order to develop policies that are better adapted to their needs. As such, ADS adhered to a contextualized conception of public intervention as opposed to a too centralized and standardized planning (Rabat – 21/09/2010, own translation).\textsuperscript{338}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{336} ADS is a public institution created in 1999 and could be considered as one of the first materializations of the new political context of the alternance. ADS has supported above all social development policies in rural areas but intervened also in specific resettlement operations like for example that of Douar El Kora in Rabat.

\textsuperscript{337} Could be translated as ‘social management’.

\textsuperscript{338} I want to thank Lamia Zaki for letting me use some extracts from the interview.
This evolution should not be underestimated and counted as a strong political sign. It proved the willingness of the makhzen to break with the ‘années de plomb’ of the Hassan II-era. The debates on MOS between 1999 and 2001 implied a rupture with the ‘old’ methods (i.e. more repressive) of public intervention. One of the key achievements was the recognition of the central role of intermediation between the public authorities and the local population (Navez-Bouchanine, 2004). This emphasis on the participation of inhabitants in resettlement programs was explicitly recognized and acknowledged by government officials and official documents (e.g. MATUHE, 2002; MHU, 2004, Bennana, 2004). This required of course the formation of new competences within the public administration (e.g. the creation of ADS) and the cooperation with new actors on the ground such as NGOs, local associations, foreign development agencies (e.g. USAID) and even private companies (e.g. Lydec). The idea of MOS, the emphasis on the social dimension, and the creation of new state-agencies such as ADS were closely related to and derived from the new international visions on social development and the renewed engagements of the fight against poverty promoted by the World Bank and UN Habitat. Again, Hicham Berra emphasized that ADS, for example, was founded because:

the World Bank and the UN talked a lot about the importance of the participation of the communities that were to be developed, about their participation in order to identify their needs. We started from this point, emphasizing proximity: we wanted to go to the people and not wait until they came to Rabat. We wanted to demonstrate that we were able to make, to propose the idea of a partnership with the population. It came down to say that even if we represented the state, even if we were the state, the state negotiated, the state contracted with the civil society as peers, equal to each other (Rabat – 21/09/2010, cited in Bogaert & Zaki, 2011: under review, own translation).

The development of new notions and new discourses such as MOS within the context of the specific problematic of slum resettlement can be, of course, situated within the more general process of what Myriam Catusse has called the “re-invention of social policy” (cf. chapter 3). As I mentioned earlier, the INDH program was one of the manifestations of this new orientation on social development. With regard to the housing question, the Moroccan government launched the Programme National d’Action pour la Résorption de l’Habitat Insalubre (PARHI) in 2001. This program, however, concentrated above all on the restructuring of the informal neighbourhoods (HC) and their integration in the urban fabric (e.g. through the provision of water and electricity, the installation of a sewer system, etc.). PARHI aimed at preventing the proliferation of informal housing by strengthening the government’s engagement to provide more social housing (Iraki & Rachik, 2005; Le Tellier, 2009a). However, the events of 2003 will push aside most of the objectives of the PARHI and the focus on HC. The following government efforts would privilege from now on first of all the bidonvilles. The bombings in the city-centre of Casablanca were an immediate starting shot for the launch of the ambitious Villes Sans Bidonvilles program (VSBP) and it implied a multiplication of the actors involved in slum resettlement (see below). In this regard, the bombings of 2003 and the

339 MATUHE (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de l’Environnement) and MHU (Ministère Délégué Chargé de l’Habitat et de L’Urbanisme) were two of the precursors of the current MHUA. The latter was created in 2007.
subsequent launching of the VSBP could be considered as the symbolic shift towards an active management of the slum population in an attempt to include them into formal city-life. In contrast to the measures taken in the 1980s, not the urban territory but the slum population itself now definitely became the ultimate end of urban government. In that sense, the VSBP symbolically broke with methods of sovereign power (e.g. repression) and dedicated government attention to particular techniques of security, i.e. the future management of urban risks.

The VSBP was the first nationwide slum program which tried to deal with slums within a much broader urban perspective (in contrast to the more directed and isolated operations of the past). The program seeks the integration of all bidonvilles in Morocco and prioritises the relocation of its inhabitants (Le Tellier, 2009a). 80% of the cases involve the procedure of recasement. Because of its particular timing, the VSB had specific security objectives. In this view, the VSBP can be compared, according to urban sociologist Abderrahmane Rachik, with the urban restructurings after the 1981 riots. Urban security and social control were still the dominant strategic objectives. But despite this apparent continuity, the specific methods to achieve these objectives have changed. The VSBP explicitly commits itself to the principles of Goal 7 of the MDGs and its target 11 (Al Omrane, 2010a). The program targets 327,000 households, i.e. 1.6 million inhabitants spread over 1000 bidonvilles in 83 Moroccan cities. Furthermore, the program involves 64 city contracts which assemble the central authorities (the Ministry of Interior and the MHUAЕ), the local governments and the public operators in charge of the specific missions. VSBP is funded for a great part by the state via the Solidarity Fund for Housing (FSH) and the mobilization of public land (for resettlement). The resources of the FSH are generated by a 12 USD tax per tonne of cement sold in Morocco. Furthermore, the VSBP is supported financially (through gifts or loans) by various international agencies such as, amongst others, USAID, the European Investment Bank, the French Development Agency (AFD) and the World Bank. By the end of March 2010, 40 cities were declared slum free and some 154,000 households benefited from the program. As such, almost 50% of the program was already realized and, according to official sources, the total slum population decreased from 8.2% in 2004 to 3.9% in 2010 (Ibid.). It is estimated that by 2012 large cities such as Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakech will also be declared slum free. Following these efforts and results of VSBP, Morocco received the 2010 UN Habitat Award.
VSBP relies on a close cooperation with the private sector. Since the 1990s the private sector increasingly participated in social housing projects. Yet, the systematic engagement of private actors distinguishes VSBP from former initiatives. By encouraging public-private partnerships the public authorities wished to intensify the construction of low-cost housing units and the restructuring of existing neighbourhoods. Construction enterprises such as Addoha and Chaabi Lil Iskane benefit from important tax reliefs. Houses built at prices between 16,800 and 30,000 USD are tax-free (Ibid.). But also several foreign companies are brought in as partners in the Moroccan fight against poverty. In Casablanca, Lydec, the subsidiary of SUEZ, was brought into the operations of slum resettlement and restructuration via the INMAE agreement signed with the authorities in 2005. Within the framework of INMAE, Lydec aims to provide informal neighbourhoods with water and electricity. Following the launch of VSBP, ANHI merged with other local public housing agencies to form a new financially autonomous state-agency: *Al Omrane*. This agency, as an official explained, is “the armed force of the Ministry [MHUAE]” in the VSBP.344 In 2007, Al Omrane also absorbed the 7 ERACs (i.e. the regional entities for development and construction). The agency is responsible for the coordination of more than 80% of the slum-resettlements projects. In 2009, Al Omrane invested more than 1 billion dollars and is therefore the biggest public investor in the country (Ibid.).345

Despite the similar social objectives between the VSBP and the INDH, both programs also reveal an inter-institutional rivalry between the MHUAE and the Ministry of Interior. The VSBP is under the supervision of the MHUAE, while the INDH is under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Interior (Toutain, 2011). VSBP is developed independently from the INDH initiative and the minister of the MHUAE, Ahmed Taoufiq Hejira, is reluctant to see his program to be integrated within the framework of the INDH.346 The situation in Casablanca is a result of this rivalry. Despite the fact that Al Omrane is supervising large resettlement operations in the district of Sidi Moumen (e.g. Douar Skouila and Douar Thomas), the city of Casablanca has not signed a city-contract within the framework of the VSB because this would have entailed a decrease of the influence of the Ministry of Interior on Casablanca. Moreover, the operations of Al Omrane in the rest of Casablanca are limited. Most of the operations in Casablanca – concerning approximately 34,500 households – are supervised by another public agency: *Idmaj Sakan*. This state agency was created in 2005 and is supervised by the wali of Casablanca. As a result, the actual political control over most of the slum resettlement operations in the city is in the hands of the Ministry of Interior. Illustrative is that the 2006 action plan of Imdaj Sakan situated its objectives explicitly within the framework of the INDH and not so much within that of the VSBP (Ministry of Interior, 2006). Another example is the INMAE agreement signed with Lydec. This agreement was also integrated in the framework of INDH and not the VSBP. Both Lydec and Imdaj Sakan work closely together in several operations.

(accessed 31/01/2011).
344 Interview with Al Omrane official (Rabat, 04-06-2010)
345 See also interview with Najib Laraichi Bedoui (director of Al Omrane) in weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 47.
346 This would mean, amongst other things, that the MHUAE and Al Omrane would lose direct access to the funds of the FSH.
All this implied that the decision-making process with regard to the slum operations in Casablanca were recentralized into the hands of the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{347} The creation of Idmaj Sakan and the specific contract with Lydec demonstrated yet again the political importance of the city of Casablanca and proved that the Ministry of Interior did not intend to lose its grip on Casablanca.\textsuperscript{348} Finally, in a few other cases, slum resettlement operations are carried out by a third semi-public operator separately from the MHUAE and Al Omrane: \textit{Dyar Al Mansour}.\textsuperscript{349} This operator is a subsidiary of the public investment bank Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG). Douar Al Kora, a major slum at the coastline in Rabat (towards the direction of Temara and Casablanca), was one of the projects that was taken over by Dyar Al Mansour. This project was originally supervised by ANHI, but due to an impasse in the resettlement operation, the king ordered the CDG to take over in 2002. As a result, CDG created the \textit{Société de Développement al Kora}, which than later became Dyar Al Mansour. They are more specialized in operations of \textit{relogement}, while Al Omrane specializes primarily in operations of \textit{recasement}.\textsuperscript{350} Yet, despite this difference, it is still not entirely clear to me as to why exactly Dyar Al Mansour was created. When I asked their technical director, he told me: “we intervene there where the state has difficulties to advance”.\textsuperscript{351}

\textit{Citizen participation and poverty capital: the re-making of development}

Due to the social complexity of resettlement projects and the often fragile and mistrustful relationship between the inhabitants and the public authorities, new governmental methods have been deployed within the framework of the VSBP to intervene more at the level of the individual, trying to facilitate his cooperation and adherence to the

\textsuperscript{347} I attempted several times to speak with the director of Idmaj Sakan and also with one of his employees. Without any luck however. And just as with the Ministry of Interior, Idmaj Sakan does not have its own website. My information on the public agency is does primarily based on interviews with people who worked together with Idmaj Sakan in specific projects or people who know the VSBP project from the inside.

\textsuperscript{348} In several interviews with people who follow the evolutions on the ground from close by, I picked up rumours indicating that the inter-institutional confrontation between the MHUAE and the Ministry of Interior escalated (this was during the spring of 2010). Some suggested that there were talks about transferring the supervision over the urban agencies from the MHUAE towards the Ministry of Interior. Others spoke of a transfer of the department of Urbanism to the Ministry of Interior. Albeit these are just rumours, a transfer of competences would generate new balances of power at the urban scale, most likely in favour of the central authorities and the makhzen. Although, the wali has considerable power over the urban territory, his power has always been counterbalanced by other actors that were controlled by the MHUAE (e.g. the urban agencies (except the AUC of course), Al Omrane, the Regional Inspections, the Department of Urbanism, etc.). Extra transfers of power to the Ministry of Interior would re-install the absolute control of the latter over the urban territory. The MHUAE would then only be able to fall back on Al Omrane.

\textsuperscript{349} Dyar el Mansour has currently three projects under its supervision. One in Rabat (Douar Al Kora) and two in Temara (the Annasr project and the Mers El Kheir project). (See also www.dyaralmansour.com, accessed 28/01/2010).

\textsuperscript{350} Just like the rivalry between Idmaj Sakan and Al Omrane, I got the feeling that both employees of MHUAE and Al Omrane on the one hand, and Dyar Al Mansour on the other hand, do not really like to talk about each other. In quite a few cases they considered each other to be competitors (while they are striving for the same social goals within the objectives that are delineated by the VSBP). As such, a staff member of the cabinet of the Minister of MHUAE entrusted me for example that Dyar Al Mansour “only resettles people that live on land that interests them [i.e. the CDG]” (Interview Rabat – 09/06/2010). When I confronted the Technical Director of Dyar Al Mansour with this statement, he told me: “If CDG is interested in the land and it is advantageous to the CDG then it is also advantageous for everybody” (Interview Rabat – Rabat 01/07/2010).

\textsuperscript{351} Interview (Rabat – 01/07/2010).
project. Specific mechanisms of “social engineering” were implemented to increase the ‘participation’ of the inhabitants and their assent to resettlement (cf. Le Tellier, 2009a; 2009b; Toutain, 2009a). First of all, there was the methodology of “accompagnement social” (social accompaniment) (AS). This method resulted out of the debates on the social impact of slum clearance in the early 2000s and the subsequent conceptualization of MOS (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002b). AS is a specific methodology to enhance the “active participation” of the inhabitants and facilitate the more technical aspects of resettlement (Le Tellier, 2009b). As such, AS is a set of methodological guidelines to accompany (literally) the slum dweller through the whole process of moving to a new place. It aimed to improve the modalities of public intervention in the slums and establish a better contact, a relation of trust, with the inhabitants. Between 2002 and 2008, AS was implemented in 23 resettlement programs (20% of the VSBP), targeting approximately 50,000 households (55% of them live in Casablanca) (Le Tellier, 2009a; Toutain, 2009a).

In the bidonvilles, AS is carried out by cellules d’accompagnement sociale (CAS). The CAS are teams of 3-5 persons that are set up in the bidonville (Toutain, 2009a). They guarantee the “proximity” of the public authorities and mediate between the population and the public operator (Toutain, 2008: 27). Officially, their job includes five different (chronological) steps (Le Tellier, 2009b). The first step is the promotion and communication of the project. This means that the inhabitants have to be informed and sensitized through, for example, the organization of several workshops which assemble the local authorities, the beneficiaries and the neighbourhood associations. The second step is the administrative accompaniment. Households are assisted in all the different administrative stages of the “transfer”, specifically in the setting up and the following up of the allocation of a plot (recasement) or an apartment (relogement). In the process, the slum dwellers are assisted with all the necessary documents (e.g. property titles, etc.) The third step is the social intermediation with and between the different households. Sometimes conflicts arise or inhabitants have specific requests. Normally, the assumption is that every barrack counts for one household and that the inhabitants of that barrack have the right to a plot or state-subsidized apartment (in some cases two). In reality, it happens that several families live within one barrack (the barrack is often split in two or three separate living units). This means that these households will have to divide the allocated plot or apartment between themselves. This can lead to all kinds of conflicts and tensions. Also, in the bidonvilles there are a lot of tenants and technically they do not qualify for an allocation. The fourth step is giving assistance in finding the appropriate financial solutions for every household (i.e. facilitating their access to credit and credit-institutions) so they can finance their part of the transfer. Finally, AS also involves further social and economic accompaniment (i.e. the human development

352 The allocation of a plot or apartment is often determined by drawing lots. While this may sound peculiar, this innovative organization is established to make the whole process of slum resettlement more transparent and permits a break with clientilistic practices of the past (Le Tellier, 2009b).

353 There is also a lot of speculation with barracks. Some people see it as an investment to own several barracks (which they can rent). As such, they technically qualify for an equal amount of state-subsidized plots or apartments. This is a dubious situation. Technically speaking, the owners have built the barracks illegally and benefit from VSBP, while tenants pay their monthly rent and eventually threaten to end up with nothing (interview with Hicham Berra (ADS), Temara – 31/05/2010).
dimension) once the people are transferred to their new site.\textsuperscript{354}

It is important not to confuse AS with MOS. The latter is an integral conceptualization of the social dimension of resettlement operations. It takes into account the social, economic, urban, fiscal and juridical aspects of both the operation and the precarious living conditions of the populations. Despite the fact that MOS has been conceptualized and extensively documented, it has never been implemented on the ground (Toutain, 2011). AS is far less ambitious. According to the methodological guide published by the MHU in 2004, AS refers to a social action that is \textit{“subordinated”} to the technical aspect of the resettlement operation (MHU, 2004: 5). The transfer of the population is the priority and AS is, as I was told by the Al Omrane director of quality, \textit{“meant to accelerate the rhythm of social housing […] , to put in place a measure to proceed more rapidly […] , to put in place an arrangement to facilitate people to move”}.\textsuperscript{355} This means that the social operator within the AS program has to \textit{persuade} the slum dweller of the benefits of the project. In other words, make him willing to move to the assigned location (Navez-Bouchanine/ADS, 2005). As the geographer Julien Le Tellier stated:

\begin{quote}
In reality, on the ground, it mostly comes down to making the slum dwellers \textit{[bidonvillois]} accept the fact that they have to leave their \textit{bidonville} and that they have to destroy their barrack, but also that they have to participate in the financing of the transfer and of their new home. \textit{In fine}, the cooperation in the projects of recasement and relogement materializes above all through the \textit{financial participation} of the beneficiaries in the costs of the operation (Le Tellier, 2009b: 57, own translation, emphasis added).
\end{quote}

This contrasts with the objectives of MOS which aims at an equal valuation of both social and technical aspects of slum clearance. The idea of \textit{‘participation’} is here reduced to its mere economic dimension. AS has to facilitate the technical operation and recover the costs that are imposed upon the slum dwellers. Even the World Bank, one of the sources of inspiration for this new participative methodology, has denounced some of the lacuna (e.g. lack of communication beforehand, lack of social and economic accompaniment afterwards, etc.) in the current participatory approach embedded within the VSBP (World Bank, 2006a). As such, although the \textit{“mediator”} (e.g. the CAS) may portray himself as a neutral and fair arbiter, it is important to emphasize that the whole process of \textit{“participatory development”} is managed top-down and it is not the slum dweller himself who decides upon the different proceedings every step of the way (Kapoor, 2008). The so-called participatory element is subordinated to the mediator’s deciding on the need for, and purpose of, meetings (Ibid.). The initiators of AS decide upon whom to include and exclude, they make up the agenda and most importantly they determine the eventual objective(s) of participatory development, which is in most cases resettlement.

\textsuperscript{354} However, this final aspect of AS really depends on the social operator. NGOs will be more inclined to take this stage seriously. Private consultants, however, are mostly paid based on the amount of transfers they accomplish. For them, there is little reason to stay afterwards (see below).

\textsuperscript{355} Interview (Rabat – 08/06/2010)
There are three sorts of social operators implicated in AS projects: the Social Development Agency (ADS), NGOs and private consultants. The private consultants take on 45% of all households in AS-programs but spent only 28% of the total amount dedicated to AS. In contrast ADS spends 60% of total AS-budget while they are only responsible for 33% of the households (Le Tellier, 2009a). It was ADS that launched the first AS operations hoping to bring forth and set the standards for a comprehensive methodology before other actors would intervene in this field. However, Al Omrane quickly made an appeal to private operators by putting out public contracts based on quantifiable targets. This has not only caused the emergence of new private consultancies trying to compete for these contracts, but also brought about the “commercialization” of the AS-procedure itself (Bogaert & Zaki, 2011). Under these conditions, it is not a surprise that, depending on the type of social operator, the interpretation of the objective of AS and the specific approaches on the ground differed. Le Tellier makes a distinction between minimalistic and maximalistic visions on the method of AS (Le Tellier, 2009b). The minimalistic vision, mostly supported by the public operators (e.g. Al Omrane, Dyar Al Mansour, etc.) and the private consultants, consider AS to be an act of informing people, sensibilization, and technical support. As mentioned above, the primary goal in this view is to persuade the inhabitants and give them the necessary administrative assistance. As such, their vision on participation is limited to a passive conception of the word. Slum dwellers are reduced to a simple audience, or at best, “clients”.

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that for the public operators the problematique of the slums in Morocco still remains a mere technical rather than a political issue. Resettlement is the obvious solution. Moreover, it can be measured. As Olivier Toutain, a French consultant for the VSBP, stressed: “They [Al Omrane] need to make numbers”. When answering some of the critiques about the delays in the VSBP, the director of Al Omrane, Najib Laraichi Bedoui, emphasized in an interview with weekly business magazine Challenge that “Morocco advanced from the resettlement of 5,000 families a year to 30,000, since the start of the program in 2004 until today”. Numbers, more specifically those that represent the amount of transferred people, are very often the preferred way to demonstrate or evaluate the success or failure of the program. This is also one of the reasons why Al Omrane tends to favour contracts with private consultants in AS-programs. They do it “faster and cheaper” and they can be held responsible for results (Le Tellier, 2009a: 205). After all, the remuneration of these private actors depends on results, or in other words, on the amount of people they are able to transfer. Dyar Al Mansour has the same technocratic vision when it comes down to determining their targets and choosing their (business) partners (cf. Barthel & Zaki, 2011). This minimalistic conception of AS was also made clear to me by a staff member of Team Maroc, a private operator working for Al Omrane and Idmaj Sakac in cities like Casablanca, Tangiers and Larache. He compared his role with that of ADS:

356 Fouad Benchakroune, architect, former staff member of the MHUAU and one of the initiators behind the VSPB went even so far to state that the people living in the bidonville have to realize and must be convinced of the fact that they get “only this one chance to move” (Interview Rabat – 22/05/2008).
357 Interview (Rabat-15/04/09)
358 See interview in weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 47.
We are a private operator, we answer to calls for public contracts \(\text{appels d’offres}\). We have to keep ourselves to the public plan \(\text{cahier de charge}\). (…) We don’t do MOS. (…) And actually we don’t do AS either. We rather do administrative accompaniment. (…) I talk in terms of results. We arrive at a number of 300 destroyed barracks per month, while public actors such as ADS arrive at an average of 10 barracks per month. We achieve five times the number of ADS. In four years time we have eradicated more than 4,000 barracks, while ADS only arrived at approximately 1,000 over the same period. (…) We are happy with Al Omrane and Al Omrane is happy with us. (…) We are bound to a cahier de charge. We are obliged to deliver results.

He continued arguing that the public actors are, in contrast, not bound to results and that this was actually a form of discrimination vis-à-vis the private sector. Public actors received assignments without any requirement to account for any specific results. “According to me”, he stated, “that is money thrown out of the window”. Accordingly, following this logic of the private sector, the market and not the public interest is the main motive for their involvement. When I asked him whether the private sector had a role to play in social development, he answered: “That’s the market, it is a question of supply and demand, if there is a demand we try to fulfil it”. A colleague of him, working as a CAS-member for Team Maroc, was a bit more cynical: “what other role do we have than orientate people towards credit institutions?” Several cases, however, have already demonstrated the contra-productive effect of this partnership with private operators. In order to speed up the operation, private consultants sometimes applied the principle “first arrived, first served” in particular cases. As a consequence, they sometimes exhausted the available land reserve before all beneficiaries were resettled (Bogaert & Zaki, 2011).

Social operators such as the ADS and NGOs like ENDA Maghreb usually have a more maximalistic vision on AS. Their vision appears to approach more to the conceptualization and objectives of MOS. One of the crucial differences between the AS and MOS, according to these actors, is that MOS has to be applied \(\text{prior to}\) a resettlement operation, while they are contracted during the operations. Although, all the staff members of ADS and ENDA Maghreb I talked to were critical about the way things are evolving, they are often constrained by the space of manoeuvre they receive from public operators such as Al Omrane. They can for example never question the operation itself. This is explicitly underlined in the methodological guideline of AS published by the public authorities (MHU, 2004: 11). Furthermore, this is also probably why Al Omrane prefers to work with private consultants and why ADS and NGOs are pulling out of the VSBP lately (cf. Toutain, 2011). One staff member of ENDA Maghreb explained me his opinion on the situation:

We care about the people. Al Omrane only cares about the administrative support [we deliver]. That is why they work more with the private sector now. ENDA

\[\text{359 Interview (Rabat – 05/07/2010).}\]
\[\text{360 Interview (Casablanca – 07/07/2010).}\]
\[\text{361 Interview with the coordinator of communications and human development programs of ENDA Magrheb (Rabat – 02/07/2010).}\]
pays attention to women’s rights. We work to find sustainable solutions. We respect the human rights and also help people in generating new revenues, etc. (...) The private sector only does what Al Omrane asks from them. (...) They have only a servicing role [un rôle uniquement de prestataire de service]. They carry out their research, they make an inventory [recensement], they send in their poll-takers [enquêteurs] and focus primarily on quantitative data. (...) When they finish their job, they are gone.362

In general, more political questions related to issues of social welfare and human development are ignored, while the current engagements of the Moroccan authorities related to the fight against poverty are reduced to a housing question for which mere technical solutions are supposed to suffice (Barthel & Zaki, 2011). At the MHUAE they are quite open about this. A staff member of the cabinet of the Minister argued that:

[the MHUAE] is a technical ministry, we deliver houses, (...) All other social aspects should be provided by other ministries. We don’t do education, health care, etc. (...) we limit ourselves to houses [Nous on fait que le logement].363

Ironically, this actually negates the whole philosophy behind the debates on the social dimension of slum resettlement that started during the alternance period. Moreover, as mentioned above, these debates were actually directed by the then ministry of housing. Today, the actual elaboration and results of the VSB seem miles away from the original objectives of social and urban integration that were pushed forward so promisingly at the beginning of the century. The resettlement operations elaborated in the city of Agadir are emblematic for the strictly quantitative approach (cf. Bogaert & Zaki, 2011).364

First of all, one of the destinations for the relocation of slum dwellers, Taddert, an empty site located at approximately 20km from Agadir, experienced a strong growth and a concentration of social apartments due to the fact that the original convention signed in order to resettle 3,200 households had to be readjusted to 5,800. Additionally, the public operator not only ignored the recommendations to provide social mixture in the new site, the necessary public services and infrastructures (schools, transport, hospitals, etc.) are still not put in place due to the fact that the installment of some of these services depend on competences that are not included in the VSBP (the MHUAE only delivers houses) but depend on decisions taken in other ministries (e.g. Ministry of Education).365 Moreover, the construction works could initially not keep up the pace and some beneficiaries had to wait more than three years before they could move into their new apartments. Meanwhile, however, the public authorities had compelled the beneficiaries to destroy their former barracks, so they were obliged to find temporary accommodation. For those who couldn’t rely on family or couldn’t afford a temporary accommodation, a return to precarious and informal housing was, without a doubt,

362 Ibid.
363 Interview (Rabat – 09/06/2010).
364 This paragraph is based on information delivered by Lamia Zaki (cf. Bogaert & Zaki, 2011).
365 Social mixture (péréquation) is an often used strategy in resettlement operations to diversify the population in the relocation sites (e.g. by allowing others, often more well-off urban residents to install themselves in the same place). Additionally, social mixture is often also a strategy to finance resettlement projects. It enables operators to increase their profits or reduce their costs as they can sell a certain portion of the built apartments (usually of a higher standard) at a higher price.
the only solution left. Finally, the specific CAS-team working on the Taddert resettlement operation only worked there for 9 months. Despite these experiences, an expert’s report published by Al Omrane underlined that a poor social mixture in resettlement projects, the absence of additional urban facilities and services, and the repetitive and monotonous spatial planning of urban districts in medium-sized towns (up to a 100,000 inhabitants, e.g. Taddert) are elements that can cause problems in terms of the desired social and urban integration of the population (Al Omrane, 2010b).

A second important aspect of resettlement operations, besides the methodology of AS, was the development of new mechanisms to improve the slum dwellers’ access to finances and pump up his solvability artificially in order to facilitate the purchase of a new apartment. Ownership is central in the VSBP. The intention is not only to transfer people to a new living environment, but also to turn these illegal occupants into legal home-owners. However, one of the main problems is that most of the people who are being resettled dispose of very little means to finance this move. Additionally, for obvious reasons, there is little trust and familiarity between the poor and commercial credit providers. As a consequence, there was an obvious aversion to lending to the urban poor. Therefore, in the wake of the VSBP, new mechanisms were created to solve that problem. One of those mechanisms was the FOGARIM convention.366 This convention permits slum dwellers to obtain a bank loan with a government guarantee up to a maximum amount of 200,000 MAD.367 With the intention to promote low-cost and social housing, FOGARIM was created specifically for those populations “with modest or irregular revenues”. This guarantee fund permits the spread of risk between the commercial credit-institutions and the state in order to break down the metaphorical walls between both commercial banks and slum dwellers. FOGARIM was established in 2004 and guarantees a recovery of 70% of commercially invested capital (World Bank, 2006a: 16). In the following five years more than 50,000 loans, worth approximately 7.3 billion MAD (almost 664 million EUR), were granted within the framework of FOGARIM. More than 250,000 persons in 147 cities and villages have benefited from this program. 38% of those loans went to people living in Casablanca. FOGARIM is not limited to the population of the bidonvilles alone. In fact, the number of bidonville households that profited from FOGARIM remains relatively limited (10%) compared to other populations with limited revenues. Nevertheless, their number is on the rise (Toutain, 2009b).368 One of the problems, however, is that instruments like FOGARIM are still little known among the poorest populations. AS is one of the ways in which the bidonvillois are informed. According to Olivier Toutain, FOGARIM is a very innovative instrument in public housing policies. There is for example no equivalent in the wider MENA-region – albeit there are other kinds of initiatives in Tunisia and Jordan which resemble it (Ibid.). Morocco is for example one of the few countries in the world – if not the only one – where you can obtain such a loan without any proof of a stable income or guarantee of solvability. In fact, the borrower only has to deliver a declara-

366 FOGARIM stands for Fonds de Garantie des prêts au Logement en faveur des Populations à revenus modestes et/ou non réguliers.
367 The interest rate is 6%.
368 The average monthly payment of a loan with a FOGARIM guarantee is between 950 and 1100 MAD. The minimum wage in Morocco was fixed in 2008 at 9,66 MAD per hour or approximately 2000 MAD per month (Toutain, 2009b).
tion with his word of honour where he confirms his average revenue and the nature of his economic activities (Ibid.).

Besides FOGARIM, another innovative financial mechanism was put in place. Since 2004, the Moroccan legislation permitted the involvement of Moroccan microfinance institutions in resettlement and restructuring operations (Le Tellier, 2009b). Since the 1990s, microfinance is a booming business in Morocco, but it was only since the launch of the VSBP that these financial products could also be used for rehabilitation. Four microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Morocco control 90% of the microcredit market: Al Amana, Zakoura, FONDEP and the Banque Populaire Foundation for microcredit (FBPMC) (Ibid.). Micro-credits for housing are still a minority of the portfolio of the Moroccan MFIs: in October 2010, Al Amana counted 49,000 micro-credits for housing on a total of 360,000 loans. FONDEP’s share is 7%. Moreover, the micro-credits for housing are limited to a maximum amount of 50,000 MAD. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of the bidonvilles are a potentially valuable population for the MFIs because only 25% of them has a bank account (Ibid.). Yet, compared to FOGARIM, there are obvious limits to micro-credits. First of all, the amount of money you can borrow is never enough to finance a new apartment or a plot (with the subsequent construction). The price of state-subsidized social apartments (habitat social) vary between 140,000 and 200,000 MAD (recently raised up to 290,000) within the framework of VSBP. A state-subsidized plot still costs around 20,000 MAD, and the construction of a unit at least 40,000 MAD (i.e. the absolute basic construction) (Ibid.). Consequently, the majority of micro-credits are used for renovations. Secondly, the interest rate is much higher (around 12%). As a result, only those people who have a certain creditworthiness qualify for microfinance. The most solvent part of the urban poor have access to these kinds of loans. This is also the case for FOGARIM, where loans are granted to those who are deemed to be able to pay back. As such, the success of these financial mechanisms is still limited and often too expensive for the poorest among the beneficiaries (Le Tellier, 2009a: 206-210).

The development of mechanisms such as FOGARIM and micro-credits for housing are crucial elements in what Ananya Roy calls the alliance that lies at the very heart of “poverty capital”. This alliance brings together those who “control access to the poorest” (e.g. microfinance providers, the CAS teams, even the state, etc.) and those who “control access to capital” (e.g. the commercial banks) (Roy, 2010: 31). The financial architectures behind poverty capital have to explore and exploit “the new frontier of capital accumulation”, i.e. the inclusion of the urban poor in the urban economy; those

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369 Hicham Berra of ADS told me that this had to be signed by a representative of the state (the caid) who often exaggerated the exact revenue in order to make sure the person in question got his loan (Interview, Temara – 31/05/2010).
370 Fondation pour le Développement Local et le Partenariat Microcrédit
374 The latest Finance act has set the maximum price for a social apartment at 290,000 MAD (100sq meters).
people who hadn’t been served by financial systems and markets before (Ibid.: 53; see also Elyachar, 2002). The complex but crucial question at hand, according to Roy, is whether poverty capital will ensure the financial inclusion of the poor on fair and just terms, or whether these financial innovations are just new ways to exploit them? More generally, is the support of the state in the VSBP – via subsidies, tax-cuts and financial guarantees – a way to give the urban excluded a new hope for the future or is state support a rather convenient (class) instrument to privatize benefits and socialize risks and losses?

Morocco’s construction sector, for example, experienced a slowdown in recent years after several years of rapid growth, especially in the sector of high-end urban development. As a result both state officials and private developers are looking to offset the drop in demand for high-end development projects by stepping up their support for social housing projects. The constant high demand for affordable housing offers a reliable alternative to the business in high-end tourist and residential projects which have suffered due to the global financial and economic crisis. To address the demand, the Moroccan government has strengthened its commitment to provide low-cost housing, hoping to promote the building of 150,000 new units a year by 2012. In February 2009, the government signed two new agreements, allocating a total of 52 billion MAD (4,7 billion EUR) for social housing projects and liberating 3,853 ha of public land for the building of 200,000 units in 32 different cities across the country. In January 2011, the king himself has urged to increase the efforts and target 300,000 units a year between 2011 and 2015 as it becomes more and more clear that the original targets of the VSBP are not going to be reached. According to the Oxford Business Group (OBG), a global publishing and consultancy company focusing on emerging markets in the Arab region and Asia, finance programs such as FOGARIM and other private initiatives are essential to enable Moroccans to purchase homes and to “take advantage of the potential in the lower end of the market”. Still, the OBG emphasizes that some officials have argued that even more should be done to encourage private investors if development is to really take off in the “lower end of the market”:

Deputy and parliamentary committee finance member Abdelhamid Mernissi told local media that the state should reduce land prices and increase bonuses from Dh30,000 (€2,665) to Dh40,000 (€3,553) for those who target social housing. Others have called on the government to ease its quantitative measurements for affordable units. Currently, it is defined as properties of 100 sq metres at a price of Dh200,000 (€18,000), while low total property value housing has a price of under Dh140,000 (€12,600) and an area of less than 60 sq metres. With space scarce in major cities, the area could be reduced to 40 sq metres, while the price could be raised to Dh300,000 (€27,000) to increase developers’ profits.

The OBG’s advice is a typical example of a market-oriented development perspective

376 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
in which not so much the social needs of the slum dwellers are the main drive for the urgency and success of programs like VSBP, but market opportunities. OBG continues:

Still, even without these added incentives, investing in the affordable segment seems like a solid option, despite lacking the same potential for high returns as more lucrative, high-end projects. Until the economy improves, and big risks once again offer the prospect of great rewards, social housing, and Morocco’s underprivileged citizens, stand to benefit (emphasis added).\(^\text{380}\)

The 2010 Finance Act aimed to resurrect the sector of social housing. In 2008, some important tax exemptions that supported the sector were revoked. According to the Magharebia press agency this was one of the main reasons for the significant drop in constructions and new projects.\(^\text{381}\) Between 2008 and 2009 the construction of social housing plunged from 129,000 to 35,000 units. The new Finance Act of 2010 and the subsequent Act of 2011 created new tax exemptions in order to stimulate the sector. Also, the new maximum price for a social apartment was set at 290,000 MAD. 40,000 MAD of that amount will be state-sponsored.\(^\text{382}\) The former 200,000 MAD benchmark dated from 1995. According to observers this price raise was justified because the price of land had increased by 50-100% over the last 15 years.\(^\text{383}\) What these new government decisions showed first of all, was that poverty capital is not only accumulated with the support of the state by stimulating the demand-side (e.g. FOGARIM, micro-credit, etc.), but also by stimulating the supply-side (tax benefits, price regulation, etc.).

Development schemes such as VSBP and the reforms they bring forth, can thus be considered as new frontiers where development capital and financial capital merge together and collaborate to delineate and open up new spaces of investment in order to solve future “capital surplus absorption problems” (Harvey, 2010a, see also Roy, 2010). During an interview in August 2007, a staff member of Al Omrane in Rabat explained me and my supervisor that the semi-public company soon wanted to enter the stock-exchange market (which still hasn’t happened). When I interrupted him to ask whether this ambition wouldn’t jeopardize the social dimension of their work – after all, the stock-market is driven exclusively by the profit motive – he answered, a bit excited: “no, on the contrary (…) this social dimension is our competitive advantage (…) The social dimension \([\text{le social}]\) is very profitable.”\(^\text{384}\) Moreover, if we reconsider the AS-program for a moment, we can ask ourselves the question whether it is a methodology to assist the urban poor in finding a better home or rather a (biopolitical) governmental method to enhance the market opportunities of poverty capital and accelerate the inclusion of the urban poor into the circuits of capital accumulation? Didn’t Foucault pointed out to us that the implementation of methods of biopower are crucial for the expansion of capitalism (Foucault, 1990)? This is no different in Morocco. I remember an interview with a staff member of Lydec in which she explained me the objectives of INMAE,

\(^{380}\) Ibid.
\(^{383}\) Ibid.
\(^{384}\) Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat – 27/08/2007).
the social development program based on a PPP with the city of Casablanca and supported by INDH, and in which Lydec has to provide water and electricity to informal neighbourhoods and bidonvilles. It was her task, she explained, to make sure that these people were turned into customers. The social dimension of it all, she argued, was that Lydec, at the moment, didn’t make any profit with INMAE as their products were delivered under the market-price. Instead, INMAE incorporated a long term vision of Lydec, expecting these people to become valuable costumers in the long run.385

The new politics of truth: neoliberal interpretations of participation and integration

The creation of poverty capital is established by methods of political intervention which aim to bring all human action into the domain of the market (Roy, 2010: 32).386 As such, poverty capital fits in the wider and more general trend of the marketization and privatization of the social (Ismail, 2006: 67 & 87). This process implies the relocation of the centre of gravity of welfare and social development to the private sphere and private actors. The role of the state is still important but has shifted from providing welfare (the developmental state) to creating ‘a good business environment’ (the neoliberal state). The underlying idea (ideology) is that the poor are part of the solution and not necessarily the problem. According to influential thinkers such as Hernan De Soto or C.K. Prahalad, the poor dispose of an enormous amount of “dead capital” (De Soto, 2001) and there is a “fortune [to be made] at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad, 2004). Consequently, it is not so much the task of development schemes to provide these poor with charity but to give them the tools and help them to develop the entrepreneurial skills they actually already possess. In this perspective, the poor have assets and they are assets (Roy, 2010: 64). They are the so-called “last market” – here I refer to the documentary on the theories of Prahalad made for the program Tegenlicht on the Dutch national television. In this documentary Prahalad states that he had to draw the attention of the business world by saying and convincing them that the poor people of the world are an opportunity, a commercially viable operation: “I had to use the word fortune [referring to the title of his book] to say there is a real commercial opportunity here”. The poor in the eyes of Prahalad are an emerging consumer base that are both underserved and large. In the same documentary, the CEO of Philips in India stated that exploiting the markets at the bottom of the pyramid is:

not a game of charity at all. It’s a game of finding business-models where transnational companies can repackage their technologies, can repackage their value propositions and find a profitable way of serving the 90% of the global population they are not currently serving, because that is where the future is, that is the economy which is growing.387

Huge profits are thus to be made with the poor. The same development logic can also be found in Morocco today. Social development schemes such as VSBP are thus not only an initiative to improve poor people’s lives, but also political instruments to integrate

385 Interview (Casablanca – 13/05/2008).
386 Here, Ananya Roy draws on David Harvey. It also resonates with what William Robinson has called the “intensive expansion of capitalism” (Robinson, 2004; see also chapter 2).
De Soto states that the poor are unable to access their wealth (i.e. what they own informally) because they do not possess formal deeds or property titles (Davis, 2006a: 72). Their capital is dead capital because “it exists in a universe where there is too much room for misunderstanding, confusion, reversal of agreements, and faulty recollection” (De Soto, 2001: 14). This capital is useless according to De Soto because it cannot be used as collateral to secure a bank loan, nor guarantee the payment of water, electricity and any other infrastructural services. Therefore, he pleads to give the poor legal land-titles and property rights so they can put their assets to work in the capitalist market. De Soto’s idea of land-titling resonates with the idea of the VSBP to turn the slum dwellers into legal home-owners (thus with access to their wealth). But is there not a risk that the VSBP, with its emphasis on the promotion of ownership and resettlement, is actually setting in place the conditions for a future wave of accumulation by dispossession? First of all, the relocation of the urban poor out of the centres of cities like Casablanca, is already a way to reclaim that centre for other (more profitable) kinds of urban development (e.g. the project of the Royal Avenue). Secondly, the conversion of illegal slum dwellers into legal home-owners, which seems laudable at first sight, could have a negative impact in the long term, especially if social development programs don’t take into account the wider social dimension of their living situation – i.e. beyond the narrow focus on the creation of new frontiers of capital accumulation. In the past, it has been demonstrated that low-income populations are particularly vulnerable in processes of capitalist urbanization and urban development. David Harvey gives a rather similar example of what happened in Great Britain under Margaret Thatcher:

In Thatcher’s case, the large stock of social housing was one of the first assets to be privatized. At first blush this appeared as a gift to the lower classes, who could now convert from rental to ownership at a relatively low cost, gain control over a valuable asset, and augment their wealth. But once the transfer was accomplished housing speculation took over, particularly in prime central locations, eventually bribing, cajoling, or forcing low-income populations out to the periphery in cities like London, and turning erstwhile working-class housing estates into centres of intense gentrification (Harvey, 2003: 158).

Timothy Mitchell has critiqued De Soto’s ideas in a similar way, arguing that his conception of how to bridge the so-called boundary between the capitalist economy (the formal economy) and the non-market world (the informal) is neglecting the underlying dynamics of powerful market forces and the effects of speculation. Mitchell argues that in the case of Egypt, the introduction of a modern system of private property (land-titling) has been tried before in the 1850s and actually turned out to be a disaster for the small farmers who faced rapidly rising prices. Property titles were than the legal basis for creditors to seize the assets of those unable to keep up debt payments; this was the new power of foreclosure. According to Mitchell, the foreclosure decisions were a “machine for transferring the land from small farmers to the wealthy”. De Soto, he argues, ignores largely the history of dispossession that accompanied the development of formal property rights. Legality and the legalization of property titles often has the effect and drawback to make land unaffordable (Mitchell, 2004). Legal property rights
not only increases the access of the poor to their own assets, it also makes these assets *visible* and attainable for more powerful players in the market such as property and real estate developers, or simply urban middle classes with more material means than the urban poor (e.g. gentrification). Additionally, the massive influx of legal property titles can involve a shift in the creation of wealth from productive labour (farmers, industry, etc.) to the unproductive labour of a rentier (e.g. real estate investors) (Ibid.). This is something that is already clearly visible in Morocco today. The Moroccan capitalist class is investing heavily in real estate, both in the so-called high-end and the lower end of the market. Consequently, Mitchell warns us that De Soto’s ideas can have the same effect on countries like Egypt or Morocco as in Britain:

De Soto’s plans envisage a vast creation of wealth, by the transformation of so-called dead capital into live capital. In practice, the evidence suggests that this will produce not live capital out of dead, but a transfer of wealth from the less affluent to the more secure, and in particular serve to enrich the more prosperous among the present generation at the expense of the future poor (Mitchell, 2004: no page number)

Although it is still too early to make any final conclusions on the effect of the VSBP, it is probable that the process of ‘turning slum dwellers into legal home-owners’ can generate similar effects and open up opportunities for speculation, for the concentration of wealth and for the accumulation of rents (Ibid.). The assets of the poor are not the source of this process of wealth creation, as suggested by De Soto, but the means through which the reorganization and accumulation of wealth is carried out (Ibid.). The specific strategies to accomplish this are not so much reflecting a free market but rather a political project.

For years, even decades, many slum dwellers in Morocco have lived outside the formal market-economy. Many of them had no property rights, no regular job, no legal water connection, etc. But if the poor were not finding their way to the market, the new methods of *social engineering*, although still not widely applied, are now helping to bring the market *to* the poor.388 And, if necessary, the establishers of market integration will adapt the products to the capacities of the urban poor (and not necessarily their needs). The maximum price for a subsidized apartment is now set at 290,000 MAD (100sq meters) but over past few years the Moroccan government has sought to recruit developers who can built smaller apartments for only 140,000 MAD (60sq meters).389

In May 2010, I had the chance to visit one of these social housing projects (the Annasr project) in Temara, a city close to Rabat, together with militants from the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), a small leftwing party in Morocco. Some inhabitants were so kind to invite me into their homes. Although I am not trained as an architect, I quickly noticed that these houses were constructed at an absolute minimum cost. After only two years in use, nearly all apartments already showed humidity stains everywhere and

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388 Or at least a particular kind of market because, of course, the slum space itself has never been a space free from any market-mechanism: i.e. the informal market, speculation with barracks, etc.
389 Oxford Business Group newsletter on Morocco: collaborative construction (25/08/09). In spring 2009 I met a Belgian businessman who was negotiating at that time with the MHUAJE on a possible contract. I think, in the end these specific negotiations were without result.
numerous cracks in the walls. On top of that, the sewage system was leaking which gave off a really unpleasant smell. The home-owners did the best they could to repair the damage themselves. In some apartments I noticed holes in the walls where they had to re-lay on electricity (while small children were running around). Despite their own inventiveness, the inhabitants assured me that this was normally the responsibility of the public operator – in this case Dyar Al Mansour – according to the agreements they had reached with them.

In a country where the majority of the poor population still doesn’t have a bank account, concepts like debt and credit are introduced amongst the lower classes with instruments such as FOGARIM and micro-credits for housing. What will happen when they are not able to pay their loans anymore? After all, a new apartment implies a lot

390 Until today, the number of people who are unable to repay their debts in housing remains very low (2% until 2009) (Toutain, 2009b). Nevertheless, in general, 2008 and 2009 were difficult years for MFIs with an increase of the high-risk group of clientele who were unsure to be able to repay their loans. In 2010 things seem to recover in the end (see article in l’économiste - Microcrédit: La crise s’éloigne, les impayés baissent, available at: http://leconomiste.com (accessed 19/02/2011). Yet, during my visit to the Annasr project in Temara (spring 2010), I heard that a lot of people stopped paying their loans. The Annasr project is part of the VSBP and provided no less than 17% of all loans that were granted in 2008 (i.e. 2,700 loans in 2008). When I discussed the matter with Olivier Toutain, a French consultant for the VSBP, he taught it was improbable that the public authorities would allow the expropriation of the defaulters. It was unthinkable that people would be evicted in a time where the VSBP was one of the flagship projects to demonstrate Moroc-
of extra costs: property taxes, a legal connection to the electricity and water distribution networks, public transport, etc. This problem hasn’t been addressed properly until now at the political level. Insofar as the bidonville is seen to represent the ruralization of the city, the solution is presented as one of shepherding its inhabitants towards market integration. A staff member of Lydec, a subsidiary of the multinational SUEZ in Casablanca, explained that delivering these people water and electricity also requires putting a lot of effort in education, learning them how to use their new assets and how to pay for them.\footnote{Interview (Casablanca-13/05/08).} Generally, the idea behind this conception of ‘integration’, as I was told by a former official of ADS, is that once people are good customers they will eventually become responsible citizens with a proper job and a proper lifestyle.\footnote{Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat – 16/04/09)} As such, the market becomes the norm by which good citizenship is measured. It fits within the neoliberal dogma of “helping the poor help themselves”, creating an illusion of self-help (Davis, 2006: 72). The VSBP aims to include the slums into the formal urban space where the state can define, defend and regulate the norms and boundaries for social life. Lamia Zaki has shown that this kind of approach creates new forms of exclusion: “It [transforms the slum dwellers] from citizens to consumers by replacing the notion of absolute (human) rights with that of a right to services”. Consequently, she argues that privatization tends to atomize the notion of right by creating conflicting interests between those who are able to afford market-inclusion and those who are simply too poor and thus remain excluded (Zaki, 2008: 134).

Following Zaki’s observation, the new development techniques and development visions that emerged with the debates on the social dimension of slum resettlement, the conceptualization of MOS and the implementation of VSBP (and also the INDH), not simply implied the production of new knowledge about urban poverty and life in the bidonvilles. This knowledge also became ‘the (new) truth’. In other words, these produced forms of knowledge came to be understood as certain, legitimate, and undeniably correct (Roy, 2010: 32). They inform us of the “best-practices” with regard to sustainable and social development, participation, good governance, etc… (cf. Navez-Bouchanine, 2007; Barthel & Zaki, 2011). The above mentioned evolution within the World Bank (from SAP to good governance), the newly created state-institutions and the new modes of state intervention – changes that took place since the mid-1990s – all contributed to the (re-)making or re-invention of social development in Morocco. This process was actively constructed through the deployment of new technologies and methods which I outlined above. It was based on new forms of risk-management. However, as Roy argues convincingly, this process also required the production of knowledge. Of course, global institutions such as the World Bank and UN Habitat play a crucial role in this production, but the neoliberal governmentality that underpinned this process of re-making development in Morocco was, as I have tried to demonstrate, based on two main “accomplishments of truth” (Roy, 2010: 56-62): the idea of the responsible or good citizen and the conception of urban integration.

First, both institutions such as the World Bank as well as influential thinkers such as De Soto, have been promoting the perception that access to land and assets was “essential
for the poor to become “active citizens, good clients and municipal taxpayers (…)” (Werlin, 1999: 1531). With the intensive enlargement of capitalism and the success of neoliberalism in countries like Morocco, the question of poverty has been reformulated along new lines that place the responsibility of getting out of poverty on the poor themselves (Ismail, 2006: 87). This is the principal idea behind the notion of self-help. The market provides the opportunities for the poor to take matters into their own hand and to break away from their dependence on the developmental state. As the USAID director of Democracy and Governance Programs told once me: “we [promote] trade not aid”. This is what neoliberals would euphemistically call “the democratization of social development” (Roy, 2010). The new governmental methods introduced under the VSBP focused specifically on the responsibilization of the slum dweller and aim to turn him into a “good citizen” (Zemni, 2007). Good citizenship can in this sense be regarded as the result of the shift from the developmental state towards the neoliberal state in which the regulatory competence of the state has been complemented with and partly replaced by ‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals who are supposed to be self-regulative (Lemke, 2001: 202). The CAS teams, for example, receive the explicit mission to pay attention to the pedagogical role of their direct communication with slum dwellers: i.e. “the sensibilization and the responsibilization of the inhabitants” (USAID, 2007: 87). As such, it is important to stress that public interventions such as AS involve both intervention and formation (Dikeç, 2007: 279). Slum dwellers are formed to comply with the norms of formal city-life. The eventual objective is to bring the slum dweller into the realm of the market where he would then profit from its advantages and exploit its opportunities.

This bring us to the second accomplishment of truth: the conception of urban integration. As I have argued, the conception of the integration or re-integration of bidonvillois into the urban fabric, or the formal city, is committed to market models and strategies, seeking to promote new circuits of investment, speculation and profit that are embedded within the broader dynamics of capital accumulation (for a similar reasoning on microfinance see Roy, 2010: 43). King Mohamed VI leaves no doubt about it. In his speech at the national meeting of Local Governments on 12 December 2006 in Agadir, he stated:

> Our ultimate goals is not only to have cities without slums, nor is it to replace the latter with blocks of concrete that are soulless and socially insensitive. Rather, we intend to transform our cities into environments that are conducive to good living conditions, conviviality and dignity, to turn these spaces into hubs for investments and production, and into cities that are attached to their specificity and to the originality of their character (cited in Al Omrane, 2010a: 1).

Citizen empowerment is a notion that is often used to legitimate the social development rationality behind programs such as VSBP and INDH (cf. Chikhaoui, 2007). Yet, there is no doubt that the slum dwellers have very little to say in the whole process of their relocation. As a result, the latter obviously resist resettlement in some cases, which often slows down certain projects or even changes the eventual outcome of the resettle-

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393 Interview (Rabat – 04/09/2007).
Power and control in neoliberal politics

ment operation in their advantage (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c; Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005; Le Tellier, 2009b; Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010). In the end, however, slum resettlement has little to do with genuine ‘participation’ or ‘empowerment’. These notions are reduced to something that can be considered particularly relevant for a neoliberal market-oriented strategy of urban development. In the weekly magazine La Vie Eco, Nabil Kerdoudi of Al Omrane in Casablanca left no doubt about what he understood by citizen participation and about the specific practices of slum dwellers to resist resettlement:

The households have retorted by allowing a densification, even inside their barracks. The parents accommodate their children, but also their spouses and their descendents. In fact, while we propose them one plot or one apartment destined for an average household, they refuse and wait for a more interesting opportunity in terms of surface. Despite the action of social accompaniment [le travail d’accompagnement social] provided by the ministry [MHUAE], which intends to convince them to accept resettlement [relogement], we found ourselves obliged, recently, to turn to the judiciary for those cases where beneficiaries refuse the proposed accommodation (own translation).³⁹⁴

In Moroccan slum resettlement operations the participation of the inhabitants in the decision making process is reduced to a minimum, despite the promises that resulted out of the discussions on MOS. The implementation of VSBP is coordinated and imposed from above. Locally the VSBP is coordinated by public operators such as Dyar Al Mansour and Al Omrane, mostly in close cooperation with the walis and the governors. The contribution of local elected officials is minimal and often contradictory because they fear to lose part of their electorate once a slum population is relocated (Zaki, 2005; Toutain, 2008; Le Tellier, 2009a). Additionally, there is a real contempt for the slum dweller amongst the public and technical agencies (Navez-Bouchanine & Berry-Chikhaoui, 2005). The idea of the responsible or good citizen comes with the conviction that the bidonvillois needs to be re-educated. To put it in the words of the technical director of Dyar Al Mansour: “we have to teach them a new way of life, first of all by learning them to live vertically instead of horizontally”.³⁹⁵ When talking to public officials one gets the impression that the slum dweller is not capable of engaging in public life and that he himself is responsible for this situation. As a Dyar el Mansour staff member told me: “we have to guide them and be with them constantly. They are like babies.”³⁹⁶ An official of Al Omrane complained to me that the inhabitants sometimes refuse to move to their new homes because living in a bidonville: “[is] a way of life, it is a social and cultural problem. There are people who like living in the bidonvilles”.³⁹⁷ Another Al Omrane official confirmed this, stating that “the [slum] population is culturally as well as traditionally difficult”.³⁹⁸ One of the objectives of the AS-programs is just to tackle and change this so-called problematic mentality of the slum dweller and learn him to adapt to a new mode of living. As a result, the individual slum dweller becomes

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³⁹⁵ Interview (Rabat – 01/07/2010)
³⁹⁶ Interview (Rabat-28/05/08)
³⁹⁷ Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat-27/08/07).
³⁹⁸ Interview (Rabat-30/06/08).
the politicized subject through programs like VSBP, while his own claims, demands and desires are very much depoliticized and reduced to a question of housing and property right. Fundamental problems that are rooted in class relations and in differences of power are reduced “to purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the political arena” (John Harris cited in Roy, 2010: 68). As such, the right to the (formal) city is an enforced right for slum dwellers in which market-integration and responsibilization are considered crucial elements for success. Real problems like a lack of education, healthcare, employment, etc., are still largely ignored. To conclude with a quote of an inhabitant of Douar Al Kora (a slum on the coastline of Rabat):

In a society the problems are social. In the hospital there are no doctors, no nurses, there is a lack of medicines. (...) In education the teachers receive a very low salary. (...) The classrooms are to numerous, often 50 students. (...) [But] we don’t have a choice. They decide. If they give you two rooms, you don’t argue, you take it.399

The (anti-)political reorganization of the slum space

Before I can conclude this chapter, I want to come back to the issue of social control. The implementation of a program like VSBP is not just a way to exploit the lower end of the market. The specific timing reveals that it was also a new way to control the slum population or at least an attempt to manage the future risks which this population can cause. Therefore, in the beginning of this chapter, I spoke of a double shift. The expansion of capitalism in Morocco went hand in hand with the desire to control potentially “dangerous classes” and manage them more efficiently (Bayat, 2000). As such, the VSBP entailed also a political reorganization of the slum space. The new methods of social engineering facilitated the entrance of governmental agency into the slums and eventually paved the way for the eradication of the slums and the resettlement of its populations. In the past, the bidonvilles had always been impenetrable spaces for various governmental actors. The paths that divide the overload of barracks are very narrow, often unpaved, and therefore inaccessible to fire engines, police cars, ambulances or army vehicles. The crisscross of aisles and barracks make the inhabitants almost invisible. “The bidonville is an uncontrollable site”, argued a Dyar Al Mansour official, “even the police couldn’t enter there”.400 Promoted as a fight against poverty, the VSBP gives the authorities the legitimacy to finalize the deconstruction of these impenetrable and ungovernable spaces. The daily presence of the CAS-teams ensures the embeddedness of governmental structures in the slums and facilitates the bureaucratic control over these populations. The CAS-teams inventory the population, they explain people how the resettlement project will proceed, they inform them of their next steps and assist the population in all the necessary administrative procedures. In other words, the CAS are one of the crucial elements in the process of making the slums more transparent. They liberate the path for the eventual destruction of the slum space. Before people are allowed to move to their new apartment their former barracks have to be destroyed in order to avoid that these will be occupied by newcomers again. Poverty was thus not only a market opportunity, as suggested by thinkers like De Soto and Prahalad, it was also an entry point for the state to enhance its bureaucratic control. James Ferguson

399 Interview (Rabat-15/10/09).
400 Interview (Rabat-27/10/09)
correctly observes that “although “development” discourse tends to see the provision of “services” as the purpose of government, it is clear that the question of power cannot be written off quite so easily” (Ferguson, 2006: 271). “Government services”, he argues, “are never simply services” (Ibid.).

The social effect of the VSBP is rather ambiguous. Despite, the deficiencies I saw in Annasr in Temara, one cannot deny that the physical living conditions of most people who were resettled has improved significantly. Aesthetically, one could argue that the new social housing projects are an improvement for the city’s image compared to the chaotic and miserable image of bidonvilles. Regular access to water, electricity and the construction of sewage systems has obviously improved the conditions of hygiene and security. Yet, the overly positive picture of the social impact of the VSBP, as it is often presented by state-officials and official documents, should be nuanced. In the end, the goal is simply to eradicate the slums and relocate the slum-population. The new housing blocks are carefully parcelled to fit as many people as possible. The apartments are often too small for the larger families. People are often relocated far from their original residence and detached from their original living environments. This brings along new social and economic implications. First of all, many of the inhabitants are dependent on their original living place for petty trade activities and work in the informal sector.401 The new estates are often far less dynamic and economically interesting. Moreover, the presence of a souk in the centre of the city offers a lot

401 Interview with MHUAJE official (Rabat-23/05/08). She had done research on a slum resettlement operation in Salé.
of opportunities to the inhabitants which they miss out on once they are resettled. Secondly, as a mentioned before, moving brings forth new costs which pressure the already modest family budgets. People have to pay new taxes, water, electricity and public transport (if available). As such, the transfer often comes with a decline in revenues and an increase in expenses. As a result, it is not uncommon that families are compelled to cut expenses in for example the education of their children. 402

Thirdly, those people who are beneficiary in an operation of recasement often have to find a transit home to overlap the time between the obligatory destruction of their barrack and the construction of their new apartment (Le Tellier, 2009a). These extra costs are often too much to bare which often causes people to re-sell their plot and find a refuge in another bidonville or an informal neighbourhood (HC); these are what they call the cases of “glissements”, those people who return to the informal urban areas because they cannot afford life in the formal city. 403 Fourth, the transfer often implies the breaking up of solidarity networks that existed in the bidonvilles before resettlement (Iraki, 2006b). Slum dwellers usually don’t want to be displaced: it disrupts existing commercial and social networks, raises housing costs, lengthens commuting times, etc… and this is not only the case in Morocco (on Morocco see Navez-Bouchanine, 2002c; Le Tellier, 2009a; on other cases see Milbert, 2006; Gilbert, 2007; Huchzermeyer, 2008). Finally, aesthetically, socially and geographically there are also some additional considerations to be made. I once drove through Sidi Moumen together with a Moroccan journalist of the weekly magazine Le Reporter who used to live in the bidonvilles. He had experienced the transformations of this neighbourhood over the years. One of the main problems, according to him, was the lack of public space in this district and the lack of attention given to a form of spatial planning that is not only concerned with “fitting in as many people as possible”. “Everything has been build over with apartments”, he regretted, “there is no space provided for green spaces, parks, trees, for playgrounds, youth centres and other places where people can meet each other”. 404 Many of these new social housing projects and resettling operations transform the urban periphery in a monotonous mass of low-cost apartments. A district like Sidi Moumen in Casablanca lacks public space and opportunities for leisure and gathering. According to the Moroccan economist Driss Benali “[Morocco is] making the same mistakes as the French. We are creating banlieues”. 405

If one judges the VSBP for its social development objectives and its actual social impact than it is obvious that serious questions still arise about whether the program really gives the inhabitants of the bidonvilles a better future in the long term. Some critical perspectives will probably argue that this was never the intention in the first place. Others will maybe suggest that the program fails to implement the best practices the way they are supposed to. Either way, whether the social effects of the VSBP are the result of mere unfortunate technical mistakes or whether they are the result of a strategically market-oriented business models put in place to exploit the last market, there is also

402 Ibid.
403 Besides the cases of ‘glissements’, you also have the ‘reliquats’ [remainders]. Those people who refuse to leave or who are unable to start the procedures of moving out in the first place.
404 Interview (Casablanca, 16/05/2008).
405 Interview (Rabat-26/10/09).
another far-reaching and powerful effect related to the VSBP. One of the principal effects of development schemes like VSBP is the expansion and entrenchment of state power (Ferguson, 2006). VSBP was instrumental in establishing new technologies and methods of administration and in strengthening the presence of the Moroccan state in the bidonvilles (there where it was previously absent). Similar to Ferguson’s analysis of the development apparatus in Lesotho, the VSBP apparatus may than not necessarily be a “machine” (to use Ferguson’s word) for eliminating poverty, which incidentally coincided with more state-bureaucratic presence, but rather a machine to reinforce and expand the exercise of bureaucratic state power which incidentally takes poverty as an entry point (Ibid.: 273). The result, Ferguson argues, may be that state intervention has no real effect on poverty, at least not a sustainable effect, but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have concrete other effects. The strategically coherent and/or intelligible whole of these “instrument-effects” of development projects such as VSBP – and by extension INDH – form an “anti-politics machine” (Ibid.: 273). Consequently, far from being implemented to enhance people’s participation or empowerment, such development schemes are taken up, first and foremost, “for institutional aggrandizement” (Kapoor, 2008: 68). The effect is two-fold. Besides the institutional expansion of state power in certain areas and the changing modes of governmental intervention, there is a second effect which involves the depoliticization of both state-presence and the question of poverty (the second effect is mainly the result of the new politics of truth). As such, the picture of the political reorganization of the slum-space becomes a complicated one because within the framework of the VSBP it is never formulated as political:

By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of “development” is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today. At the same time, by making the intentional blueprints for “development” so highly visible, a “development” project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object (Ferguson, 2006: 273).

As I discussed already in the second chapter 3, the so-called period of the of the Post-Washington Consensus is in itself of course a political program or project (Lemke, 2002). Additionally, Ferguson also refers specifically to “bureaucratic state power” because he does not want to refer to a specific entity possessed of power (e.g. the state) but to “a characteristic mode of exercise of power, a mode of power that relies on state institutions, but exceeds them” (Ferguson, 2006: 282).

A final important insight, delivered by Ferguson, is that the expansion of certain forms

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406 Nevertheless, Ferguson refers explicitly to instrument-effects because he thinks it would be wrong to see these development interventions as some kind of conspiracy. According to him, it is just the way things happen to work out: “But because things do work out this way, and because “failed” development projects can so successfully help to accomplish important strategic tasks behind the backs of the most sincere participants, it does become less mysterious why “failed” development projects should end up being replicated again and again” (Ferguson, 2006: 273-274).
of “state power” does not necessarily mean that “the state” as such has more power (Ibid.). The expansion of state-control through biopolitical methods of government does not necessarily imply that the Moroccan state has managed to increase its control over the slum population by integrating them in some kind of totalizing panoptic control project. People do resist resettlement. The ordinary still quietly encroaches upon the ruling classes and the underlying root causes for political instability are still not taken away (cf. Bayat, 2000; 2002). The problem of urban poverty will not be solved by the VSBP, it will just be moved around and away from the city-centre. The question will then be how the management of future risks will continue to look like in the future? Will there be other outbursts of violence that threaten political stability in Morocco? Will this affect the position of ruling elites? Will it affect the capacity of state institutions to control the population or certain segments of that population? Consequently, although schemes such as the VSBP may have provided entry points to expand state control and state presence, this not necessarily means that it will also be effective. As James Ferguson (2006: 282) has pointed out in his own work on Lesotho were he observed expanded bureaucratic state control as an effect of development projects:

The expansion of bureaucratic state power then, does not necessarily mean that “the masses” can be centrally coordinated or ordered around any more efficiently; it only means that more power relations are referred through state channels – most immediately, that more people must stand in line and await rubber stamps to get what they want. What is expanded is not the magnitude of the capabilities of “the state,” but the extent and reach of a particular kind of exercise of power (Ibid.)

In other words, although state control may be expanded through various methods and institutions in a quantitative manner, this does not necessarily means that the methods implemented under VSBP have automatically also a qualitative effect (when it comes to control). This qualitative aspect is of course much more difficult to determine. Ferguson warns us that because of this subtle difference, the way in which power is linked up with the state in different countries (especially in non-Western countries) can differ from the model and impact of biopower that Foucault has described for the modern Western societies (Ibid.; see also Foucault, 2007, 2008). Of course, urban planners, social development agents, and many other agents of the Moroccan state may aspire to control and administer the lives of their population in the same way as in other, more wealthier, capitalist countries and set out to make life more healthy, productive and obliging. But the simple empirical fact is that the methods applied simply don’t always have the same qualitative effect (Ferguson, 2006). Ferguson seems to suggest that the efficiency of control will be greater in more developed Western countries than in the rest of the world. I can only say that in the case of Morocco a program such as the VSBP has certainly expanded bureaucratic control in many ways, but I doubt whether it has enhanced the control (from a security perspective) over the slum population in a qualitative way. The root cause for political instability – inequality – has just been displaced.

407 Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries show that the pressing socio-economic and political problems of many people – especially young people – are driving them to the streets (and with significant success) to openly protest the class politics (not only the authoritarian politics) of the Arab regimes.
Conclusion

The predominant focus of this chapter was on methods, more specifically the different methods of power that were implicated in the control and government of the urban space. Evidence was drawn predominantly from the case of Casablanca. The city has always been a laboratory for new governmental methods. Moments of violence and concerns for security were important accelerators for the generation and introduction of new governmental methods. In order to anticipate future risks these methods intended to open up the urban space and make it more transparent. As such, I argued that contemporary urban restructurings in Morocco reveal – as Mike Davis pointed out in the opening quote – the simultaneous attempt to maximize profit and social control. Yet, the specific methods to achieve these two objectives have differed over time and were determined by the then neoliberal governmentalities. The specific impact of the transition from roll back to roll out neoliberalism in Morocco and its translation into specific methods of urban planning and urban government can be best described with the distinction made by Mariana Valverde between sovereign city planning and techniques of security. Whereas sovereign city planning in the 1980s dealt with individuals as a set of legal subjects within a designated territory and relies predominantly on techniques that capitalize that territory, emphasizing for example monumental state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a sovereign, the technologies of security developed in the 2000s will precisely constitute and target a specific population, i.e. the slum population, and involve specific planning and techniques that are more concerned with the biopolitical management (or administration) of urban life – i.e. the lives of slum dwellers in this case – and the future risks related to that life. Of course the distinction between the two modalities of urban planning is not absolute. It is only a way to distinguish the predominant focus of how power was rationalized and implemented.

The 1981 riots implied the end of a tolerance or benign neglect of informal urban expansion and marked the beginning of a period of expanded territorial control. The political reorganization of urban space after the riots was predominantly concentrated on controlling the physical environment through which people – especially the urban poor – move. The cutbacks on welfare policies and the direct disengagement of the state in the economic sphere were compensated by the strengthening of state control over the urban territory, the introduction of monumental state architecture like the Mosque Hassan II and the deconcentration of state power through for example the wilaya and the AUC (in the case of Casablanca). The centralization of state power on the urban scale and the implementation of sovereign power were inspired both by economic necessities and objectives as well as by the desire to assure political stability. Yet, in the end, the deployment of techniques of sovereign power did not lead to a sustainable solution for the slums. This period of roll back neoliberalism was followed by a rolling out of (state) power into new governmental methods, arrangements and techniques. This transition started already during the 1990s and was inspired by a global transition (i.e. from the Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus). Yet, again, a violent moment – the Casablanca suicide attacks of 2003 – accelerated this particular shift in Morocco. The transition entailed that the exercise of government was now being channelled through a multiplied and different set of arrangements, agencies and networks that intervened more specifically at the level of the individual and targeted the slum population as a whole within a general strategy of administrating life conform
neoliberal ‘market requirements’. State power became more actively involved in the economic sphere to alleviate social inequality caused by market-oriented restructuring (e.g. by supporting and subsidizing both the demand-side and supply-side of social housing). The discussed VSBP is one obvious project that introduced new institutional arrangements and resulted in what Salwa Ismail called in her work on Egypt the increasing “marketization of the social” (Ismail, 2006: 67).

The development of new technologies of power in the beginning of the 21st century, which tried to rationalize the slum-space and make it more governable, was equally inspired by the double shift. First of all, the increasing administration of life in the slums and the focus on citizen participation (under specific top-down conditions), were dictated by the exploitation of poverty capital. If Erik Hobsbawm still referred to the poor as an unprofitable market (see opening quote), biopolitical techniques made them profitable. As such, biopolitics were necessary for the intensive expansion of capitalism. New frontiers of capital accumulation were explored with the development of new methods of social engineering. The intention of the VSBP was to integrate the slum dweller into the formal market, facilitate his access to credit, accompany him during all the steps of this integration and finally, responsibilize him to become a good citizen so he could profit from market opportunities and manage his own development. The emphasis on integration – in the view of integrating the slum dweller into the formal city – is actually quite ironic if we keep in mind the argument of Ray Bush who stated that (urban) poverty was not so much the result of a lack of integration but rather the result of a particular kind of integration (Bush, 2004; see also chapter 2). It is their specific kind of integration that has been refined and redefined by biopolitical techniques and, in the end, these techniques will more likely reproduce, instead of alleviate, urban poverty.

Secondly, the technologies of power invested in the VSBP also re-organized the slum-space and expanded bureaucratic state power over the slums. Poverty was the specific entry point for the attempt to reinforce of social control. The particular shift from sovereign city planning to techniques of security implied that measures of urban restructuring, to use the words of Foucault, were no longer implemented in the name of a sovereign who must be defended (e.g. the monarchical order), but they were now implemented on behalf of the existence of everyone, the welfare of an entire population (e.g. poverty alleviation).408 General welfare, development and social responsibility are the discursive cornerstones of the contemporary neoliberal politics of truth. Furthermore, the focus on “good citizenship” implies the substitution of a political question with a moral question. This distinction between good and bad – especially with regard to the cultural stigmatization of the slum dweller who needs to be “re-educated” – hides the underlying class divisions and depoliticizes class struggle. Consequently, poverty and social inequality are mere technical problems that can be resolved through a market-oriented approach that reflects the requirements of efficiency, expertise and the best cost-benefit

408 Here I based my reasoning on the example which Foucault gave on the difference in waging wars between pre-nineteenth century and post-nineteenth century European politics: “Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital (Foucault, 1990: 137).
analysis. The social problems of slum dwellers have been reduced to a housing problem that can be measured and calculated. Poverty is in this regard a market opportunity. But as I have shown, this evolution itself is far from a-political. In the end, the new governmental techniques are instrumental to specific political strategies as the slum population is being reassembled and re-integrated to suit the conditions of a particular kind of political and social life (Parker & Debruyne 2011). Unfortunately, this often implies that the real reasons for poverty (unemployment, education, health care) are neglected. In the end, the VSBP will probably only succeed in moving the pressing social problems out of the city-centre. And this particular “effect” can be closely related to the subject of the following and last chapter of this project.
Chapter 5

Redesigning urban life and the formation of new state spaces in Morocco

[The city is] man’s most consistent and on the whole, his most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his heart’s desire. But, if the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any clear sense of the nature of his task, in making the city man has remade himself (Robert Park cited in Harvey, 2006: 89).

We have, however, largely surrendered our own individual right to make the city after our heart’s desire to the rights of property owners, landlords, developers, finance capitalists and the state. These are the primary agents that shape our cities for us and thereby shape us. We have abrogated our right to make ourselves to the rights of capital to make us through the passive acceptance or mindless embrace of the restructuring daily life by the projects of capitalist class interests (Harvey, 2006: 89).
This final chapter builds upon issues of neoliberal urbanism that were already elaborated to some extent in chapters 2 and 3. Here, I want to focus on a particular case of actually existing neoliberalism and highlight some of the dynamics of the political structures and agency behind the making of actually existing neoliberalism in Morocco. My case study, an urban development scheme in the Bouregreg river valley between the twin cities of Rabat and Salé, is an extraordinary model of neoliberal urbanism in Morocco. It is one of the flagship projects of Morocco’s urban revolution. Although the particular socio-political configuration of the project may still be an exception in Morocco, it already reveals that the characteristics of political change in the Arab world are not so exceptional as they are often presented. As such, this chapter deals with critical perspectives to rethink the nature of the Arab state and different forms of state agency, this time not so much in terms of its biopolitical methods but rather in terms of its institutional and social character. More specifically, I want to draw attention to the institutional transformation of the Moroccan state and the specific assemblages of power and agency that are gathered within new institutional configurations that are involved in the (re-)production of capitalist space. Also, in contrast to chapter 4, this chapter sheds light on the other end of the Moroccan geography of uneven development: high-end urban development.

By drawing on the case of the Bouregreg project this chapter investigates the dynamics of agency formation implicated in the creation of a new state space and considers what it reveals about state respatialization and the rise of new governmental arrangements outside the scope of traditional state arrangements. The Bouregreg project is a salient example of what Harvey (1989b) understands as urban entrepreneurialism and of how the local can be an agent in the making of the global (Massey, 2005). But Harvey warns us not to reify the city itself when considering the urban process as an active, rather than a passive aspect of political-economic development. It would be a mistake to see the city as an ‘agent’ in itself. In contrast, Harvey views the city as a mere thing and stresses that urbanization should rather be considered as a spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of actors – both foreign and domestic – with different objectives and agendas give shape to the city, and in return, are shaped by the city as well (those who shape the urban are in the end also constrained by their own creations) (Harvey, 1989b). Following up on Harvey, two main questions are central in this chapter. First, where is political power located? And secondly, how is power assembled within particular sites and interlocked through particular combinations of agency? The specific process of establishing new state institutions and new state spaces reveals an underlying feature of modern geopolitical organization that undermines fixed notions of state-territoriality. As in chapter 4, my concern here is to suggest the significance of these changes for the government of people and places in contemporary Morocco; and – scaling up – to think about what these changes might imply for mainstream accounts of Arab political life, which often remain locked in debates on mere endogenous political trajectories of regime change, democratic transition and authoritarian persistence (cf. chapter 1).

409 This chapter is an more detailed elaboration of an article that was accepted for publication in the Journal Urban studies (cf. Bogaert, 2011a).
Beyond nation state-centrism: neoliberal urbanization and the formation of the new state space of the Bouregreg Valley

The period of roll out neoliberalism and political reform (alternance) did not only brought forth new visions on government and new schemes of social development. The post-structural adjustment era in Morocco also involved the mobilization of qualitatively new forms of state intervention in order to enhance growth-oriented and market-driven high-end urban development strategies. Economic growth is often considered as the key for the creation of general welfare and social development. The World Bank recommended an annual economic growth rate of 5-6% in order to reduce unemployment and poverty in Morocco. The absence of such growth, the Bank argued, would potentially increase socio-political tensions (World Bank, 2006b). And as the Moroccan cities had gradually became the centre focus of the makhzen during the 1980s and the 1990s, new approaches of urban government were generated in order to meet the requirements of market-oriented growth. Neil Brenner describes these new approaches as “locational policies”. The essential feature of these policies is their goal to enhance the economic competitiveness of particular places and territories in relation to broader, supranational circuits of capital accumulation (Brenner, 2004: 202-203). Locational policies intend to lure investments to specific places in order to stimulate general or national economic growth. Brenner highlights that it was only since the 1980s that Western European states began to deploy locational policies extensively at the urban scale. Before, such policies were most frequently mobilized and situated at the national scale, in conjunction with the national-developmentalist strategies of industrialization and wealth redistribution under the Keynesian welfare regime. A similar argument can be made with respect to ISI-strategies and the nature of the developmental state in the Third World. Growth-strategies of rapid industrialization, massive public spending and the expansion of state bureaucracies in that part of the world were also organized mainly at the national scale. Yet, since the 1980s, Brenner argues, urban locational policies have been mobilized aggressively in Europe by national, regional and local state institutions in order to promote the specific competitive advantages of strategic cities and regions in relation to global spaces of economic competition (Ibid.: 203). In the third chapter I highlighted already that king Mohammed VI has followed the same path by commanding large-scale urban and regional development programs such as the Tanger Med industrial port; the promotion of offshore facilities in Casablanca, Fez and other major cities; and last but not least, the development of the Bouregreg river valley between the twin-cities of Rabat and Salé. The latter is a typical example of an urban mega-project.

The whereabouts of (state) power: a perspective on the hierarchical powers of reach

As mentioned in chapter 1, there is a tendency in mainstream accounts on political life in the Arab World that typically views the state’s power as something congruent with its cartographic boundaries. Power emerges from an institutional core – the regime – which exerts, via direct intervention, its hegemony over subordinated institutions, spaces and scales. At the core of this particular perspective, the Arab state has been monopolized by the regime. Additionally, the particular territory in which the regime operates has been often reified as a fixed unit of sovereign space (Agnew, 1994; Allen, 2004). As such, the Arab regime presents itself as the privileged site of political formation, intervention and inquiry. Political change – or the lack of change – are then mostly
explained in terms of endogenous political legacies (Parker, 2009). Insofar as the image is maintained that distinguishes between an internal, domestic space, in which national governments exercise power in an orderly fashion and hold the monopoly of violence over a defined territory and its population on the one hand, and an external, rather anarchic and disordered space of inter-state relations on the other hand, the territorial state is represented as a homogenous and endogenous political entity maintained and controlled by an identifiable centre or regime (Allen, 2004: 21; see also Agnew, 1994). This kind of perception of state territoriality and the particular association between the state and the regime often generates two misconceptions. First of all, this dominant image presupposes a clear boundary between the domestic regime on the one hand, and global political actors (intervening from the outside) on the other hand. Secondly, the perception of the regime as a power centre also suggested that the state it controlled was organized as a national state, and, by implication, that state-territoriality and state-sovereignty are consequently bundled together at the national scale (Brenner, 2004: 80).

This kind of “territorial trap” of the nation-state (Agnew, 1994), resulted in a body of scholarship on the Arab state that has largely neglected the locational urban policies of the last decades and the dynamics of new state space formation (Brenner, 2004). However, once we trace the different political practices on the ground, both the boundedness of the Arab regime and the coherence projected by the homogenous state image disappear (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). The privatization of the state, the proliferation of new regulatory state-arrangements and the multiplication of political actors (both domestic and foreign) that influence the Moroccan neoliberal project have made it extremely difficult to actually pin down the institutional geography of power and decision-making (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). The actual modern capitalist state is embodied within an increasingly dispersed ensemble of institutional practices, political agency and techniques of government, not at all matching the commonly perceived and generally accepted idea of the state – or even the regime – as a coherent unit acting upon society (cf. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001). The Bouregreg Vally is a salient case which argues for a more complex understanding of the nature of the Moroccan state, and by extension, the Arab state in general. In other words, the evidence presented here urges upon an understanding of political agency which recognizes the continuous transformative character of the state and the particular ways in which state power can be geographically dispersed and deployed differently.

The political and strategic shift at the end of the 1970s towards neoliberal forms of government had obviously its effect on the institutional organization and location of state power. As I already argued in chapter 2, both in the US and Europe (Keynesianism) and in many former Third World countries (developmentalism) the crisis of state developmentalism in the 1970s and the 1980s gave way to a process of ‘glocalization’ which resulted in a rescaling of politics and a restructuring of the institutional state space from the national scale both upwards and downwards (Swyngedouw, 2004). There are important differences between developmentalism and neoliberalism which have produced their own specific spatial outcomes. In contrast to the more redistributive agenda associated with Keynesianism and the developmental state, the neoliberal state attempted to promote economic growth and welfare by stimulating the competitive advantages of its most strategic territories. The general idea behind earlier modes of capitalist regulation
was thus reversed. While Keynesianism and developmentalism supported the premise that general welfare and a minimum guarantee of social security would benefit capitalist development, neoliberalism was based on the conviction that the prioritization of capital accumulation and profit maximization would eventually lead to general welfare (e.g. through a trickle-down effect). Additionally, developmentalism takes the national economy and the national territory as the target of comprehensive state action and state regulation, while neoliberal state strategies are more dispersed and do not necessarily treat the national territory as a uniform political space (Brenner, 2004; Ong, 2006). Consequently, at the level of the city, the transition towards “urban entrepreneurialism” turned particular strategic localities into self-promoting islands of entrepreneurship (Harvey, 1989b; Brenner, 2004). Today, the urban scale represents the strategic institutional arena in which current neoliberal forms of entrepreneurial government are unfolding. In this process, the state, as the primary institutional mediator of this geography of uneven development, has been rolled out into new institutional arrangements in order to turn urban territories into developable assets and market-opportunities. Just like capitalist companies, urban territories entered into a competitive logic to maximize economic growth and capital accumulation. In Morocco, the coastal cities (Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, etc.), especially because of their location, are now considered to be key sites to generate national economic growth.

“Neoliberal reason”, Aihwa Ong, argues, “has taken economic rationality in a highly flexible direction that does not use the national territory as the overriding frame of reference for political decisions” (Ong, 2006: 76-77). To the contrary, the neoliberal adage of economic and free market “borderlessness” has fragmented the national territory and generated the creation of multiple political spaces and techniques of government spread within the national territory (Ibid.: 77). As a result, some places and regions are systematically privileged over others. Structurally, this (urban) transformation has manifested itself for instance through what Neil Brenner calls “new state spaces”. In order to support and even direct private enterprise, state power has been rescaled and reterritorialized into new institutional configurations of sovereignty which attempt to directly influence the geography of capitalist accumulation. As a result, a more complex geography of state power is presented, where it is seen to be resituated and displaced at various – both sub- and transnational – scales of economic and political activity (cf. Brenner, 1998; 1999; 2004; see also Swyngedouw, 2000; 2004). However, we should not fall into the trap of reifying these new state spaces in the same way that the nation-state has been reified in the past. In that case a rescaling or re-institutionalization of politics would present a picture of state power that has just been exchanged or replaced more or less intact between different scales, territories or zones (Allen, 2004). This view, the new state space framework can seem rather structuralist, allowing little scope for questions of agency, strategy and distinctive local politics (Mackinnon & Shaw, 2010). Yet, the creation of a state space such as in the Bouregreg Valley is more than

410 For Brenner, rescaling refers to hierarchical nesting of state power among different levels of government, while reterritorialization refers to the specific articulation of state policies and institutions across different locations, places and regions within a given territory (Brenner, 2004: 94-104) The “rescaling” literature specifically focuses on the transfer of certain functions and responsibilities between different territorial ‘scales’ of state organization (MacKinnon & Shaw, 2010).
411 This was brought to my attention by one of the anonymous reviewers for my article in Urban Studies (cf. Bogaert, 2011a).
just a top-down transmission of state power to lower or higher echelons or scales. An important critique comes from advocates of relational thinking, emphasizing the openness and multiplicity of space as a product of interrelations (Massey, 2005; Allen & Cochrane, 2010). In contrast to a topographic (scaled) understanding of state power, John Allen and Allan Cochrane advocate a topological account of state spatiality (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). From this point of view, they argue that what states or state spaces possess in terms of power is “reach, not height”:

Topological thinking suggests that the powers of the state are not so much “above us” as more or less present through mediated and real-time connections, some direct, others more distanciated. Indeed, what is arguably novel about the state’s spatiality in the current moment is its ability to exercise its hierarchical powers of reach in ways that reflect a topological appreciation of space and place (Ibid.: 1073)

As such, they argue that new arrangements of state power are to be viewed based upon an assemblage of different actors (public and/or private) “where elements of the central and local state are “lodged” within the region” or new state space (Ibid.). A new state space such as the Bouregreg Valley should not only be viewed in terms of a rescaling of state power but also as a reassemblage of state power in terms of “spatial reach” (Ibid.).

With this approach, Allen and Cochrane do not necessarily dismiss the existence of “a central state apparatus, whether unitary or otherwise, in possession of far-reaching powers” (Ibid.: 1073). To the contrary, central state power has not been undermined, only redefined. This is also important to understand the case of Morocco. A topological view of state power in Morocco does not discard the centrality of the Moroccan monarchy or the significant power of the makhzen. Following Allen & Cochrane’s topological approach to the geography of state power, the redefinition of state power should be understood in two ways. First of all, what they mean by “reach” or “far-reaching powers” should not be understood in terms of a distance that can be measured in kilometres. This (topographic) view would imply an extensive reach of state power. In contrast, they argue that their approach rather looks at the “reach of government” in terms of its ability to permeate everyday life (Painter, 2006), govern “at a distance” (Rose, 1999), and produce “politics of truth” (Lemke, 2002). In this view, reach is understood as an intensive process which cannot be separated from the social relations that comprise it (Allen & Cochrane, 2010: 1074). It is obvious that “reach” refers here to the impact of technologies of government, and that government is understood as a form of power that makes up the “tangled hierarchies of state decision making, where authority is shared between public and private agencies” (Ibid.; see also Foucault, 2007).

412 This critique on Brenner should be considered as a complementation to his valuable insights on new state spaces and therefore I wish to keep his concept of ‘new state space’ to describe the particular transformation of the Moroccan state through the establishment of the Bouregreg project. The new state space framework remains valuable to inform analysis of the historically embedded and changing geographies of state restructuring and government (MacKinnon & Shaw, 2010). Nevertheless, it is very useful to complement this framework with the insights of relational thinking in order to pinpoint the contingency and openness of emerging developments and future strategies. These developments and strategies depend, after all, on the negotiation and cooperation of a multiple and complex set of actors (see also below).
Secondly, considering state power in terms of “spatial reach” does not necessarily imply that power and authority are slipping away from the traditional power centre in times of neoliberal globalization, but rather that state power is subject to constant renegotiation and displacement by the particular actors drawn within reach (Allen & Cochrane, 2010: 1074). Especially, this second consideration will be the framework to interpret the case of the Bouregreg Valley. In the sense that states are important fields of class relations, the globalization of capital not only draws foreign capital to a certain territory (urban, regional or national), but also includes it as a player on the institutional field of the state (local or national) (Panitch, 1998). Therefore, Allen and Cochrane argue that in order to understand the different hierarchies of decision-making and the spatial reach of state power we have to pay attention to its specific and variegated institutional manifestations. What matters is not only the specific scale at which manifestations of state-power take place. To the contrary, what really matters is not so much the scalar configuration of power, but rather the institutional configurations of power which assemble different actors and which are situated of course at various scales.413 These configurations are what Allen and Cochrane describe as “assemblages of state power”. In many ways their view resembles Parker’s conception of “complexes of power”. Parker argues that understanding contemporary political change in the Arab world “requires attention to power effects that arise, inter alia, in the interplay between “globalization” and sub-national structures of accumulation, domination, and legitimation (authority and redistribution)” (Parker, 2004: 6). As a result, both Allen and Cochrane and Parker consider these new assemblages or complexes of power as somehow decentred, but at the same time not disconnected, from the regulatory scope of national state institutions and the institutional hierarchy within the general state apparatus (Ibid.: 35; Allen & Cochrane, 2010: 1075). In other words, a specific assemblage of power within the urban scale will not necessarily be disconnected from national decision-making processes but relatively autonomous (cf. Panitch & Gindin, 2005). The Bouregreg state space is a space where such an assemblage unfolds. Authority is shared and negotiated between state-agents and, in this case, private investors, external consultants, architects and urban designers. While a project such as in the Bouregreg Valley may still be largely state-controlled, the detachment and the displacement of decision-making powers opens up new space for negotiation. Private investors, for example, have their own interests and the Bouregreg project would not be possible without their involvement. Yet, state-agents on the other hand, still have power and control over who they assemble within a certain configuration and in which conditions the negotiations take place.

The (contingent) patterning of place and agency within this process of state reformation results in what Aihwa Ong terms as “graduated sovereignty” (Ong, 2006). It is the effect generated by neoliberal state reformation, flexible management and the reorganization of political spaces in relation to the interests and dynamics of global capital, global production processes and global financial circuits. Forms of graduated sovereignty are state-produced exceptional zones of government to the benefit of private (multinational) capital that exist inside or alongside zones of conventional government (e.g. the national territory, a region, a city). Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Qualified

413 In a way, authors like Neil Brenner have also attempted to grasp this institutional character, but in a specific (scalar) vocabulary which, according to Allen and Cochrane, tends to obscure some of its complexities and different agencies (Allen & Cochrane, 2010; see also MacKinnon & Shaw, 2010).
Industrial Zones (QIZs), free trade zones, offshore zones and urban development zones – to be found in countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, etc – are some of the characteristic territorial and topological products that emerged in the Arab region over the last two decades and resulted in particular regimes of graduated sovereignty in which populations and labour forces are often subjected to diverse modes of government (cf. Davis, 2006b; Sidaway, 2007; Parker, 2009). Sovereignty, defined by thinkers such as Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben as the ultimate power to call a state of exception to the law or norm, should be interpreted here in the positive or productive sense: i.e. as the power to create exceptional opportunities, usually for a privileged minority, to pursue those political goals and enjoy those political advantages that are not valid in the rest of the national territory and which are not granted to the majority of the population (Ong, 2006: 101; see also Agamben, 1998; 2005). As mentioned already above, within this framework of graduated sovereignty, the state or its dispersed state-agents are not the only political actors. Particular privileges, the state-institutional playing field, authority and governmental power are shared and negotiated with non-state actors: e.g. NGOs, private investors, multinational corporations, supranational and interstate institutions (Allen, 2004; Ong, 2006; Allen & Cochrane, 2010).

The creation of spaces of graduated sovereignty were particular neoliberal class strategies to undermine the very class compromises that were embedded in previous developmentalist capitalist regimes. It allows the capitalist classes to connect and seize upon the opportunities of neoliberal globalization and the global mobility of capital. Additionally, this perspective on graduated sovereignty exceeds more simplistic binary conceptions of state power in relation with these capitalist processes; i.e. viewing the state as either the sole sovereign actor within its own territory or as a powerless entity dictated by neoliberal globalization. The real picture is thus more complex. It may be true that weak and debt-ridden economies of many third world countries left political rulers vulnerable and dependent on outside economic forces (e.g. the US, IMF, World Bank, multinational corporations, etc.). Yet, despite their vulnerability and the pressures of global market forces, the ruling political alliances in any state still had the capacity to manipulate and regulate global market relations and remodel these relations to their benefit within their societies (Ong, 2006: 76). As such, the particular ways in which global market integration is established, are still based on particular political choices. The fragmentation of national economies and the establishment of forms of graded of sovereignty are the result of deliberative neoliberal calculations. At the urban scale, these forms of graduated sovereignty should be regarded as spatially grounded social processes in which a wide range of different actors – both domestic and foreign – with different objectives and interests are assembled and interact with each other to impact upon the processes of urbanization and the production of urban space (Harvey, 1989b). The new state spaces that result out of neoliberal calculations are not themselves the agents in globalization, but rather represent the institutional arrangements which assemble particular agents.

In order to better understand and visualize these kinds of state-promoted uneven development at the urban scale, we may have to adjust our image of capital flow in contemporary neoliberal globalization. As James Ferguson stated:
It is worth noting that the movement of capital […] is “global” in the sense that it crosses the globe, but it does not encompass or cover contiguous geographic space. The movements of capital cross national borders, but they jump point to point, and huge areas are simply bypassed. Capital does not “flow” from London to Cabinda; it hops, neatly skipping over most of what lies in between (Ferguson, 2005, p.379).

The hopping of capital between “separately administered enclaves” leads to situations in which some people are exploited, others ignored or even dispelled, and again others able to enrich themselves with state-support. The Bouregreg Valley in Rabat is such an enclave. Chosen to be developed as a tourist and commercial hub, the valley now constitutes a local destination ready to be connected to the global chain of capital. As such, the development of the Bouregreg Valley is a salient example of how cities are redesigned to the desires of property owners, landlords, developers and finance capitalists by transferring particular political powers and competences into a new state space. Additionally, these kind of large urban development schemes create new spatial logics in the regulation of capital, investment and labour. They alter the motion of goods and people in the city permanently. As class projects they tend to privilege global capital interests over the pressing demands and social needs of the majority of its urban residents.

**Mapping the new state space of the Bouregreg Valley**

In her famous book ‘Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco’, Janet Abu Lughod empirically analysed the historical and genealogical roots of urban planning in Morocco and the historical conditions of current uneven urban development (Abu Lughod, 1980; see also Rabinow, 1989). French colonialism and Morocco’s integration into the French capitalist sphere of influence required massive investments in urban development. Back then, (French) investment capital already hopped over certain areas of the city (e.g. the indigenous parts of the city) and accumulation was mainly restricted to the development of the ville nouvelle and the European industrial interests. From the very beginning of Morocco’s capitalist urban development until today, large parts of the city and its population – the bidonville, the informal expansions and in some ways the medina – were either neglected or integrated under specific uneven conditions (in the form of a mass labour reserve force or more recently in the form of poverty capital). One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from Abu Lughod’s work is that the conditions for uneven urban development were politically planned and implemented. This was the case during the Protectorate and is still the case today. The city of Rabat played an important role in the history of urban development and planning in Morocco. Confronted with heavy opposition from the traditional urban elites in Fez, resident-general Lyautey chose Rabat to be the capital of the French Protectorate. As a result the city began to grow at a fast rate and would eventually, many years later, even overtake cities like Fez and Marrakech in size (i.e. if you consider Salé as part of the larger urban agglomeration).

The Protectorate became a crucial factor in the reorganization of the urban hierarchy of Morocco. While former Moroccan capitals Fez and Marrakech had always been much larger than the coastal towns before French rule, the development of colonial centres
in Rabat (as administrative capital) and Casablanca (as economic capital) irreversibly changed the urban hierarchy from the interior cities to the coastal cities (Abu Lughod, 1980).\textsuperscript{414} Ironically, for a long time, urban planning in Rabat, despite its location and despite its connotation as a ‘coastal city’, had turned its back to the seashore and waterfront development. This would radically change with the accession to the throne of Mohamed VI. Under his reign, urban government in Morocco definitely adopted a more business-like character in order to stimulate the urban economy. Especially, the sea-shores of the coastal cities became an important asset in this endeavour. Additionally, Mohamed VI was known to be a real rbati and it was said that he privileged the development of the Moroccan capital over other cities in the country.\textsuperscript{415} For example in the case of the Royal Avenue in Casablanca, it was said that one of the reason for the impasse of this project was that Mohammed VI didn’t have the same interest in the project as his father did. He rather preferred that available state resources went primarily to urban mega-projects he launched, such as for example the Bouregreg project. Mohamed VI wanted to change the image of Rabat from being a rather boring, mainly administrative centre, into a dynamic and vibrant destination which meets the international standards of global city consumption and investment (Bargach, 2008).

In the wake of the urban entrepreneurial transition stimulated by the monarchy, the involvement of the state in urban restructuring has increased rapidly. As I mentioned earlier, the increasing mobility of global capital worldwide implied that investors carefully search out for the most favourable conditions and their intention to capture the best value-added investments has resulted, also in Morocco, in the creation of an “archipelago of specialized ‘clusters’” spread around the national territory (M Davis, 2006b: 62). This “spatial selectivity” is produced by state power by ways in which state policies target particular kinds of investments in particular zones and spaces (Bunnel & Coe, 2005: 834; see also Brenner, 2004). The Bouregreg Valley is one of the icons of Morocco’s commitment to waterfront development and “showcase urbanism” (Barthel and Mouloudi, 2009: 56).\textsuperscript{416} On 7 January 2006, Mohamed VI officially launched the ambitious project for the restructuring of the valley. This royal project is situated strategically alongside the Bouregreg estuary within the valley between the twin-cities Rabat and Salé. It covers a territory of approximately 6,000 hectares (amongst others public beaches and Salé’s former military camps). Before the beginning of the project, the valley was largely unpopulated and left fallow, despite the fact that more than 50% of the territory was privately owned. Moreover, 70% of the area of the project is actually located on the territory of the city of Salé. According to the Bouregreg news brochure the valley constituted a marginalized area between the two cities. Some terrains were used as a dumping ground for household refuse and waste water. Other areas were occupied by bidonvilles and informal housing, etc. From the perspective of the initiators of the project, the accumulation of these “nuisances” caused the severe degradation of the area and had to be fixed (AVVB, 2008). Promoted as an “opportunity (...) for all the actual and future inhabitants” of the two cities, the project tries redevelop this

\textsuperscript{414} Already in 1936 Casablanca, previously a very modest town, became the largest city with more than a quarter of a million residents.

\textsuperscript{415} This is based on perception of course. Other sources argue that Mohamed VI is also particularly fond of Tetouan and that spends a lot of time in and attention to that city.

\textsuperscript{416} In original: “urbanisme de vitrine”.

wasteland and invigorate the capital’s prestige as an attractive destination in the Mediterranean area.\textsuperscript{417}

The whole project will be implemented in six stages. Over the course of these stages, the project foresees the construction for instance of a port for cruise ships, two marina’s, luxury hotels, apartments, villas, commercial centres, a conference centre, a museum, a theatre, offices, an amusement park, a technopolis, a golf course and eco-tourism facilities. The first stage ‘Bab al Bahr’ (gateway to the sea) and the second stage ‘Amwaj’ (the waves) are already elaborated and under construction. The four other stages are still in their study phase.\textsuperscript{418} On 12 May 2009, the construction works of the first stage started and are scheduled to be finished by 2013. Bab al Bahr is located at the mouth of the Bouregreg river. It is bordered by the two ancient medinas of Rabat and Salé and the historical fortress of the Oudaya, which is located in front of the medina of Rabat at the seashore and dates back to the 12th century. This first stage covers a surface of 70 hectares and comprises a real estate program of 540,000 square metres, including 1,700 residential units, hotels and various commercial, tourist, cultural and business facilities.\textsuperscript{419} The total costs of this particular urban development project are estimated at 750 million USD. Bab al Bahr is presented as a city between two cities and it has been designed around seven districts: Marina and River Front, Arts District, Central District, Jewel District, Cultural District, Salé Wall District and the Business District. Since the beginning of 2010, sales are open and apartments can be purchased. On the website of Al Maabar – the international real estate investment company from Abu Dhabi and one of the partners in the Bab al Bahr project – the investor confirmed that following the launch of the sales in February 2010, 40\% of the available units were already sold.\textsuperscript{420}


\textsuperscript{418} For more detailed information see http://www.bouregreg.com (accessed 26/11/2010).

\textsuperscript{419} For more detailed information see http://www.babalbahr.ma (accessed 26/11/2010).

Together with Bab el Bahr, a new bridge (Moulay Hassan), two tramlines and a tunnel underneath the historic fortress of the Oudaya are under construction in order to improve the mobility between Salé and the Moroccan capital and reconcile the twin cities symbolically after centuries of historic rivalry (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980). The public authorities are committed to invest at least 3,25 billion MAD in infrastructural improvements (1.5 billion from the state budget, one billion from the Hassan II fund and 1.25 billion from the General Direction of the Local Communities). These infrastructural endeavours are planned to be finished in 2011. The improvement of the mobility between the two cities formed an important part of the marketing and the promotion of the project. Many residents, especially from Salé who travel every day to the Moroccan capital for their work, consider this part of the project an important step forwards. Every day, 650,000 people cross the Bouregreg river to go to work or for other purposes. In the long term, there are two or three extra tramlines planned to connect the two cities with the subsequent stages of the project. The two existing tramlines will eventually also enlarged to connect the city of Temara with Rabat.

The Bab el Bahr sequence with the new transport infrastructures. 
Source: AAVB (2008: 18-19)

Map of the two current tramlines and the two future trajectories. Source: Dossier de présentation Tramway de Rabat-Salé

421 Lemghari Essakl, director of AAVB, in an interview at the Moroccan television. The interview can be watched on the website of the project (http://www.bouregreg.com/content/showvideo.php?id=22&lang=fr&Ref=14_4) (accessed 26/11/2010).
The second stage (Amwaj) comprises a high class residential islet located right behind the new bridge Moulay Hassan. According to the initial design, the islet will be built — Venetian style — along both sides of the river banks and subdivided in smaller waterways. The residents will be able to reach their villas by boat. The total cost of this stage was estimated at 2.5 billion USD. The excavation works started in 2006. At the moment, however, the project is on stand-by as one of its main investors, Sama Dubai, a subsidiary of the sovereign wealth fund Dubai Holding, withdrew from the project due to the global financial meltdown in 2008.

A mega-project such as the Bouregreg project has to accelerate the rhythm of investments in countries such as Morocco. Especially, after the events of 9/11, the American and to a lesser extent the European suspicions vis-à-vis oil-rich countries and investors from the Gulf has compelled these wealthy and powerful actors to look for new investment outlets. Morocco has willingly presented itself to these investors as a reliable alternative and currently manages to attract 80% of all Middle Eastern investments in the Maghreb region (Vermeren, 2009: 264). The Bouregreg-project is not the only example. The Saphira project for example, also in Rabat, aims to redevelop the 11 km long coastline of the city and involves Emaar properties, another Dubai based real estate developer (Mouloudi, 2009). Other projects in Tangiers, Casablanca and Marrakech have also attracted real estate developers from the gulf (cf. Barthel, 2008; Barthel & Verdeil, 2008; Barthel & Mouloudi, 2009; Zemmni & Bogaert, 2009; Barthel & Planel, 2010; Kanai & Kutz, 2010). The predominant strategy to attract foreign investment is centred on urban infrastructure and real estate. The enhancement of the urban competitive advantage is seen as largely dependent on improving and adapting the built environment to the accumulation strategies of key elites (Swyngedouw, 2007: 61). As such, Swyngedouw argues, the physical reconstruction of the city and strate-
gies of economic growth tend to go hand in hand, and are very often even perceived as a quasi simultaneous process (Ibid.). Strategic locations within cities are appropriated, liberated and reconfigured to be presented as excellent market opportunities for those investors who look for new capital surplus absorption possibilities on the one hand, and those consumers who wish to take advantage of the new cosmopolitan lifestyle on the other hand. The public authorities in Morocco have stimulated FDI with fiscal benefits of approximately 2 billion USD per year between 2001 and 2006 (Vermeren, 2009: 262). As a result of the improved business climate, two private equity funds, Attijari Invest and Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) created a joint venture in December 2006 and established the Moroccan Infrastructure Fund (MIF) in order “to capitalize on the ongoing reforms designed to spur economic growth”.

To secure and maintain the flow of foreign investments and to exploit the strategic locations Morocco has to offer, political facilitation and intervention is required. The preparations for the Bouregreg project started back in 2001 when Mohamed VI expressed his explicit wish to develop the Bouregreg Valley. As such, the project became a royal priority. On the initiative of the late Abdelaziz Meziane Belfiqih, one of the most influential royal advisors, and under the direction of Lemghari Essaker, the ‘Société d’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg’ (SABR) was established with the specific assignment to work out a plan for the future of the Valley. SABR was a branch of the CDG. By then, CDG had become already Morocco’s largest publicly owned investment bank and is currently a major stakeholder in several urban and regional development programs across the country (amongst others the Casanearshore park and Casa-Marina). The monarchy holds firm control over these economic institutions. Both the director of SABR and CDG are directly appointed by the king. However, the actual implementation of the project could create difficulties or at least a delay as the project’s designated territory was part of the jurisdiction of six urban districts (three in Rabat and three in Salé) and fell under the authority of both the locally elected City Councils of Rabat and Salé. After all, with the municipal reform of 2002, local City Councils had gained some considerable control over construction licenses, spatial planning and local government (Catusse, Cattedra & Janati, 2007; see also chapter 4). In order to avoid a potential institutional battle, SABR was resituated and became a branch of a newly created autonomous governmental agency, the Agence pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg (Agency for the development of the Bouregreg Valley) (AAVB).

The AAVB was established by law 16-04 and promulgated by dahir on 23 November

423 http://www.ecpinvestments.com/fund.xml?id=1008&p&d (accessed 26/11/2010). For more information see websites of MIF and ECP: http://www.mif-pe.com and http://www.ecpinvestments.com. Attijari Invest is the private equity arm of Attijariwafa bank, one of Morocco’s largest bank and the 8th largest bank in Africa. ECP is the first private equity group to raise more than 1,8 billion $US for investment companies across Africa and the Middle East. On ECP’s website you can read that the company’s “investment strategy is focused on delivering consistently above-market returns to investors that are uncorrelated to the U.S. and other global economies”. The fund already invests in the Moroccan mining industry and public infrastructure works such as dams, airports, etc.. Eventually, the fund also aspires to take participations in infrastructural and other related services such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, natural resources, public services, etc.

424 Since the 2002 Communal Charter, the separate urban districts in cities of more than 500,000 residents are fused together into one city council with an elected president (Catusse, Cattedra, Janati, 2007; see also chapter 4).
The new state agency received the specific mission to develop the Valley. This reform did not happen without the necessary transfers of political power. Article 26 of law 16-04 dictates that the AAVB “takes all necessary measures for the realization and the honouring of the development plan”.\textsuperscript{425} Basically, law 16-04 further prescribes that the agency has exclusive authority over the project within its legally determined territorial boundaries. Moreover, all public competences related to the Urban Planning Agency of Rabat-Salé (AURS), the prefectures and the local municipalities are transferred to the new state agency. Indeed, the AAVB is responsible for the studies, the ‘Special Development Plan’ and the contracting of investors and partners to finance and develop the different stages of the project. The AAVB autonomously decides how the project has to evolve, what needs to be done and who will be integrated. For example, the particular decision on who would participate as private investment partners in the project (the investors from Abu Dhabi and Dubai) was not based upon a call for tender, but agreed by mutual consent between the agency and the investors (Mouloudi, 2010). The only exception or limitation to its power is that the AAVB does not officially appropriate the territories of the two municipalities and local taxes are still due to be paid to the proper municipality.\textsuperscript{426} However, in a particular case, the authority of the AAVB even extends beyond its legally determined jurisdiction. One of its subsidiaries, the Société du Tramway de Rabat-Salé (Rabat-Salé Tramway Company) (STRS), has officially received a mandate from the two City Councils to coordinate and manage the development of the tramway on the territory of the two cities.\textsuperscript{427} The STRS is responsible for the design, the financing and the realization of the construction works as well as the direct and indirect exploitation of the tramway together with its foreign partners (STRS, n.d.).\textsuperscript{428}

In order to fulfil its mission, the AAVB is authorized to deliver construction permits, regulate all deeds of sale, buy land and expropriate private landowners within its territory. “We are the state in this site”, as the director of Bouregreg Marina, another AAVB branch, made it clear to me.\textsuperscript{429} In some cases the powers of the AAVB even exceed

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{426} Interview with Lemghari Essakl, general director of the AAVB (Rabat – 18/05/2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{427} Interview with the director of the STRS (Rabat – 26/05/2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{428} The AAVB owns a 99.99% share in STRS. The two municipalities each own one symbolic share, the Moroccan state owns two (interview with the director of STRS (Rabat – 26/05/2010)).
  \item \textsuperscript{429} Interview (Rabat, 20/05/2010)
\end{itemize}
those of traditional state institutions that are subjected to public law. The most obvious example is the special expropriation procedure adopted in law 16-04. Before the launch of the Bouregreg project, 44% of the designated territory was publicly owned (10% by the state, 10% by the two municipalities and 24% was Habous).430 This territory was immediately put at the disposal of the AAVB. 56%, however, was in private hands. Morocco’s compulsory purchase act states that expropriation can only occur when its purpose is declared as a public interest (d’utilité publique). In accordance with this act, Law 16-04 (article 34) and decree 2-05-1514 (article 10) make it possible for the AAVB to declare those territories that are integrated in the urban planning zone of the Bouregreg Valley and the Special Development Plan as a public interest. If an agreement with the private landowner cannot be found, the agency can proceed with the expropriation of his property.431 Furthermore, law 16-04 has modified some of the expropriation conditions compared to the normal procedures in order to speed up the process of expropriation.432 The AAVB can wait until 10 years after the announcement of expropriation to proceed with the actual purchase of the expropriated territory (while the normal term is 2 years). Additionally, the indemnification for the expropriated is fixed at the value of the property at the moment of the publication of law 16-04 (1 December 2005).433 Anticipating my question what the public interest was in the construction of a marina, luxury apartments and five star hotels, the Head of Corporate Finance & Partnerships of the AAVB answered: “creating wealth is also a public interest”.434 The question is of course for whom?

According to Mohamed Souafi, a former high-ranked official within the MHUAЕ and currently working for the national Institute of Urban Planning (INAU), the creation of the AAVB had the explicit intention to exclude the locally elected municipal councils and centralize the political decision-making process.435 The AAVB is placed under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Interior, governed by an administrative council and directed by the former director of SABR, Lemghari Essakl, who was appointed by the king.436 The administrative council is represented by all important local and national government officials, amongst others, the Minister of Interior, the wali of the region Rabat-Salé-Zemmour-Zaer, the governors of the prefectures of Rabat and Salé, the director of the AURS and even the presidents of the locally elected City Councils of Rabat and Salé. Nevertheless, according to a former consultant of the Bouregreg project,

430 Habous is an Islamic legal institution of religious mortmain property. The property is administered by the Ministry of Habous.
431 There was a particular case in which the former mayor of Salé was expropriated. He owned a tourist complex (Le temps Vert) which was located on the territory of Salé but within the boundaries of the Bouregreg project. According to Lemghari Essakl, the general director of the AAVB, the constructions of the tourist complex “did not correspond to the architectural orientations and prescriptions” of the project and the AAVB took the decision to acquire the properties of the former mayor of Salé. See television interview with Lemghari Essakl (http://www.bouregreg.com/content/showvideo.php?id=22&lang=fr&Ref=14_4) (accessed 26/11/2010).
433 Interview with AAVB official (Rabat – 20/06/2010).
434 Interview (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
435 Interview (Rabat – 07/05/2009).
this administrative council should be seen as “divided between those members directly appointed by the king who make the important decisions and those who are there just to nod their heads and approve the made decisions”. Whatever the precise balance of power really is in the administrative council, there is little transparency about the final decision-making process. As such, due to its particular legal status, the AAVB is a rather exceptional case of deconcentration. Exceptional in two ways. First of all, there is no identical form of state-agency to be found in Morocco. Secondly, it is also an exceptional form of deconcentration as it leaves room for and depends on negotiation with other specific (non-state) actors within the newly constituted assemblage of (class) power. The Bouregreg state space is not only place-specific and autonomous vis-à-vis all other deconcentrated institutions and spatial scales (e.g. the Wilaya, the prefectures and the provinces), it also involves more than just a top-down hierarchical link to central powers: i.e. the Ministry of Interior and the makhzen (see below).

A common explanation for these kinds of reforms is that Morocco must compete with other countries in the region to attract foreign investments and adapt to a global competitive climate. Morocco cannot afford to standstill and has to take constant measures to maintain and increase the investment flow, especially from France and the Arab Gulf (after 9/11), two of the most important business partners. But in order to secure this flow the AAVB is a salient example of a structure that – to quote the Moroccan geographer Aziz Iraki – “concentrates only on the attraction of capital (...): it’s central power adapting itself to the economic context”. Speed, efficiency, economic necessity and the incompetence of locally elected governments are some of the main, openly admitted, reasons for the legitimation of by-passing more democratic procedures and reforms. As an official of the AAVB argued: “the people that govern [the zone of the project] are not elected and that is why we can work in the long run without indulgences to any political colour”. The former mayor of Rabat, Omar El Bahraoui, emphasized this necessity and legitimized the establishment of the AAVB in a documentary on the Bouregreg project at the Moroccan television:

We consider that it is the only way to proceed more quickly, to proceed very fast [...] and to transcend all the difficulties and the administrative procedures that are very slow. [...] We have seen several projects that are completed, whether in Paris, London, Rome, Dubai... Well, they all have created an institution that enables the concentration of all competences in order to be able to authorize very quickly.

When confronted with this reorganization of state power and the attribution of enormous powers to the AAVB, the general director of the state-agency, Lemghari Essakl, answered, in an interview for the Moroccan television, that:

We have to remember one important thing. We are in a very sensible location. We are in a very complex administrative arrangement: three urban districts on

437 Interview (Rabat – 12/05/2010).
438 Interview (Rabat – 19/10/2009).
439 Interview (Rabat – 18/05/2010).
the right bank, three urban districts on the left bank. To give the opportunity to investors tomorrow, to have just one party to negotiate with, we had to create a unique structure, one single operator. This is the agency [AAVB]. (...) It is going to be the main partner for the investors and it is going to be the facilitator of all the development operations.441

During that interview, the journalist asked Essakl how the two mayors of Rabat and Salé responded to the decision to be dispossessed of some of their prerogatives. Wasn’t the AAVB infringing upon their competences, she asked:

We do not infringe upon their prerogatives. We are going to help the municipalities to do development. Today, we have a particularly good relationship with the mayor of Rabat, the mayor of Salé. In reality, we recuperate ‘some’ prerogatives. The fiscal receipts, for example, that return to the urban districts on the right bank and the left bank will continue to go to these urban districts. We are not going to take possession of the whole territory of Rabat or the whole territory of Salé. We are specifically intervenient in a site well delimited.442

As we can see, displaced forms of state power or reconfigurations of state sovereignty like the example of the Bouregreg are often legally and practically disconnected from the discursive realm of politics and resituated within a more politically-neutral discursive of economic growth and technocratic management. As the director himself stated so clearly, the AAVB only “helps to do development”. Of course, the production of the Bouregreg space is far from a-political or a-ideological. The development zone is not only put into the hands of a separate agency, the project itself will more than likely have vast consequences for the city as a whole. The specific locality of the Bouregreg Valley has been turned into a self-promoting island of entrepreneurship (Brenner, 2004). But the island itself will become a motor and a benchmark for the future development of the two cities (at least if we have to believe the advocates of the project). It is beyond doubt that such an immense project will determine and impact upon future city-life. Nevertheless, there is also little doubt about who gets to participate in this future. The Bouregreg space has become a privileged and almost exclusive space for technocrats and investors and this complicates, in the end, the potential for political struggle and the possibility of those who most immediately depend on the city for their existence to formulate antagonistic demands. Especially in the case of the Bouregreg project there is very little open opposition. As a royal project, opposition would be considered equal to the defiance of the king’s will, which is of course not done in Morocco. The project therefore enjoys extra symbolic prestige and inviolability and the only opposition until now is framed in terms of extra-related issues (e.g. protest against expropriation or the denouncement of the relatively low compensations for expropriation – cf. Mouloudi, 2010).

442 Ibid.
New state spaces and the production of uneven urban development

It is still too early to make final conclusions about the impact of a project such as the Bouregreg project. Nevertheless, there is an extensive body of literature which is highly sceptical about the outcome of these kinds of mega-projects. Before elaborating on some critical observations, there are two important points to remember in order to better understand the dynamics and outcomes of such projects. First off all, by taking into consideration the more complex and relational construction of (urban) spaces, or in other words, the assemblage of different actors (both public and private) that are drawn in and lodged within a particular state space or institutional arrangement, we are confronted with a more complex and variegated politics. Also departing from a topological approach, Doreen Massey argues that we should try to understand how different places are standing in contrasting relations to the global. “On this view”, she argues, “local places are not simply always the victims of the global; nor are they always politically defensible redoubts against the global” (Massey, 2005: 101). To Massey, local places, like for example the Bouregreg Valley, are the sites in and through which neoliberal globalization is produced. Of course, places like the City in London, Manhattan in New York, or even Dubai in the Arab Gulf will have a much greater impact upon the constitution and direction of the processes of contemporary globalization. Yet, if we want to understand and locate the specific agency behind these processes, it is not enough to point to a few global cities, centres, institutions or even a few powerful men to which all other localities are subordinated, left out or rise against.443 What Massey and others denounce is the overwhelming tendency “to imagine the local as the product of the global but to neglect the counterpoint to this: the local construction of the global” (Ibid.). As argued earlier, this local construction is a continuous open production of space, subject to renegotiations and displacements of power and authority by the various different political actors that are drawn within reach (Allen & Cochrane, 2010).

Secondly, when studied more closely, and looking beyond the euphemistic and often dazzling discourses and images that coincide with these kinds of mega-projects, it becomes obvious rather quickly that the local agency behind these projects has little to do with the commitment of “a modern Morocco that fights against poverty” – as I was explained by the director of the Bouregreg Marina – but more with a totally different kind of political choice.444 In the process of producing the city within the capitalist system the use value of the city has often been subordinated to its exchange value (Lefebvre, 1996: 67). Especially, in current times of city-marketing and urban real estate development, the aesthetic qualities of the urban centres play an important role in the strategies of urban development. As Henri Lefebvre remarked long time ago, the city has become “an object of cultural consumption for tourists, for an estheticism, avid for spectacles and the picturesque” (Ibid.: 148). Within this logic, the city-centre or other strategic locations within the city are high quality consumption products for foreign private investors, and therefore need to be inserted in the commercialization of the urban space. Yet, the exploitation of the exchange value of the city has its obvious consequences for those people who are dependent on the city for their daily lives. However, the assemblages of power behind urban mega-projects tend to disregard this latter aspect or at best hope

443 Although cities like Casablanca and Rabat may not be genuine global cities, similar political arrangements as in the world’s current global cities can be situated in “smaller” urban areas as well.
444 Interview (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
for a proportional correlation between urban exchange and use value.

*The privatization of public space: assemblages of (class) power redesigning urban life*

While having an obvious economic purpose, a project like the Bouregreg project, is not just some other vehicle for capital accumulation. These infrastructural endeavours lay down certain patterns and structures within the cityscape that will determine the mobility and movement of people, goods and capital for the coming decades. Once finished, the estuary will be transformed into a space of high-income consumption and tourism. It will attract a specific kind of people, forge new connections and social relations. The tramway, for example, will cut through Rabat and Salé and drastically change the motion and flow within and between the twin cities. The numerous *petit taxis* (city-taxis) will have to compete with this new means of transport or turn to alternative routes. The Bouregreg project will also contribute to the projection of a specific image of the Moroccan capital. As Darel Paul observed, such projects “narrate and advance a particular definition and interpretation of the city”. The political power behind such a project imposes its vision of “cosmopolitanism, global connectivity and wealth embodied in transnational capital” upon urban space and tries to cultivate it in the minds and actions of its residents (Paul, 2004: 575). As such, the planned built environment in the Bouregreg Valley with its specific architecture can be considered a “statement” of a certain discursive formation and its underlying power relations (Hirst, 2005: 156-158). Paul Hirst, draws the connection between a discursive formation, the institutional conditions in which it becomes a practice and the productions of that practice (Ibid.: 158). In this regard, the slogan “redefining skylines, redesigning lifestyles” of Sama Dubai, one of the ex-partners in the Amwaj-project, should be taken almost literally.445 The valley is to represent a “new style of living” according one of the billboard slogans promoting the Amwaj project. Or even a “celebration of life” if we are to believe the discursive imagery behind the Bab al Bahr project.446 As a result, localized versions of neoliberalism are often being aligned with local structures of meaning and become part of a self-cultivating and entrepreneurial version of Morocco’s so-called modern identity. “To be *muthaqaf* (‘cultured,’ ‘civilized’),” writes Ahmed Kanna in the case of Dubai, “is to subscribe and conform to the self-regulating injunctions of neoliberal state institutions” and to discard “those aspects incapable of resolution with the neoliberal universal” (Kanna, 2009: 207,215).

The unique selling position of the city depends thus heavily on an attractive urban imaginary (Harvey, 1989b). It was striking that in several interviews with AAVB-officials, the project was presented as a counterbalance to the image of a “Maroc Islamiste”.447 And this urban attractiveness is not only to be found in material luxury and top-notch architectural design. As the delegate for commercial development of Bab al Bahr told me: “we are not only a real estate project, there is a strong social and economic dimension present [in the project].”448 In the same way as the director of the Bouregreg Marina

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447 Interview with the director of the Bouregreg Marina (Rabat – 20/05/2010), I heard a similar message in interviews with the Head of Corporate and Finance Partnerships and the director of Juridical Affairs (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
448 Interview (Rabat – 28/05/2010).
tried to convince me that the Bouregreg project is much more than just a construction project (it was a fight against poverty), the delegate of Bab el Bahr also tried to legitimate the project by referring to its wider social, economic and even cultural implications for the cities of Rabat and Salé. This was a kind of argument that I heard several times during my interviews with officials of the AAVB:

The project is a fight against poverty, informal housing \textit{[habitats clandestins]}, \((...)\) and for the development of the country. We give Salé a new face. In the past, Salé was only known for its prison, its hospital, the bidonvilles and the habitats clandestins. Even the airport of Salé is systematically referred to as the airport of Rabat. \((...)\) The Bouregreg [project] thus actually serves a noble purpose. [The area] used to be a floodplain which was enormously polluted \((...)\). It was an agricultural area which wasn’t used to its full capacity just because of the pollution. A lot of the housing in the area was also responsible for this pollution. There were no sanitary fittings and people dumped their waste in the river.449

Besides some sceptical remarks that can be added here, it should be clear that in many cases the socio-economic promises that are wrapped up and presented in these discourses are not just part of a woolly discursive picture trying to cover up other and wider interests, but form part of a deeply entrenched governmentality and a politics of truth. Many officials of the AAVB (and beyond) sincerely believe that they are doing something good for the city, the country and the economy. Moreover, they are using their powers and influence, their class status, to defend and produce those believes. Yet, the very “imagineering” of the Bouregreg project cannot be separated from the power behind it.450 Imagineering is a political act (Paul, 2004: 574). The dreams, desires and objectives behind the Bouregreg project are not universal, but represent the ideas and beliefs of a particular group or class that endorses a particular political ideology. Nevertheless, these promoted visions make an appeal to the global and to the universal through their particular linguistic usage.

Four central concepts form part of the project’s vision and are integrated in the logo of the AAVB: environment, citizenship, history \textit{([m\'emoire de lieu])} and transport. The concept of environment refers to the conservation of the site and the fight against environmental pollution (e.g. the clean-up of the dumping ground). Citizenship points to the fact that the project is “first of all a project for the citizens \textit{([un projet citoyen])}” (AAVB, 2008: 28). It is said that the made investments will offer a better future for the future generations, “a clean and pleasant city for the inhabitants of Rabat-Salé” (Ibid.). Part of this commitment entails the rehabilitation of the ancient medina of Rabat – or at least the area in front of the project – and the resettlement of its 152 families, 55 individuals and 52 small businesses. Another objective is to keep the fishermen at the site and built them a new fishing port. The decision was taken because they are a part of the “charm

449 Interview with the Head of Corporate and Finance Partnerships (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
450 The term “Imagineering” was coined by the Walt Disney Studios to combine the way of imagination with engineering (Paul, 2004: 574). “Walt Disney Imagineering is the master planning, creative development, design, engineering, production, project management, and research development arm of The Walt Disney Company and its affiliates” (http://corporate.disney.go.com/careers/who_imagineering.html - accessed 30/11/2010).
Redesigning urban life and the formation of new state spaces in Morocco

of the site”.451 The concept of history refers to the respect and the harmony of the project with the historical sites and monuments in its surroundings (i.e. the Oudaya, the Tour Hassan and the mausoleum of Mohamed V and the Chellah). Several initiatives will be taken to renovate these sites. Additionally, the architecture of the different real estate projects in the Bouregreg Valley all claim to be a harmonious symbiosis between Morocco’s cultural past and its modernizing aspirations. As such, according to its website, the Bab al Bahr project “draws inspiration from the ancestral Moroccan way of life that revolved around community spirit, well-being and serenity”. Through their designs the imagineers wish to pay “tribute to the past and present by creating a synergy between [the] old world and progressive new ideas”.452 This is an example of how local versions of neoliberalism are aligned with local structures of meaning (Kanna, 2009). Finally, the concept of transport refers to the construction of the bridge, the tunnel and the tramway and the desire to increase and facilitate the mobility between the two cities and its populations. The language and images that are reproduced by these four core values of the project are presented in such an a-political and a-ideological way that no one can really object. Yet, underneath this universal and internationalist discourse, the contours of a hegemonic project are being drawn which seeks to attach the valley to the consumerist cosmopolitanism of global neoliberalism (Paul, 2004).

If we look at some of the pictures that present the Bouregreg project, they clearly resemble with other projects in the wider Arab region, for example in Dubai, Amman, Aqaba, Beirut, Algiers, etc. (cf. Davis, 2006b; Parker, 2009; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010; Zitoun, 2010). Moreover, these Arab mega-projects are clearly following a more global trend. Public investments in mega-projects have been going on in the rest of the world for a longer period (Flyvbjerg, e.a. 2003). The produced universalist knowledge that coincide with such mega-projects, “the politics of truth” as it were (Lemke, 2002), are embedded within complex assemblages of power which are stretching beyond the national borders of the Moroccan state and give image to what Perry Anderson meant with neoliberalism’s ‘universalist doctrine’ (cf. chapter 2). This culture of neoliberalism brings forth, amongst other cultural effects, a whole new style of governing (the management style). As a public agency, the AAVB is funded by public money but operates in reality as a private company. The AAVB is permitted by law 16-04, to participate in private enterprises within its designated area when it is conform to the mission statement of the project. As such, the first stage of the Bouregreg project, Bab al Bahr, is developed by the Bab al Bahr Development Company, a joint venture between the AAVB and the Abu Dhabi based property development company Al Maabar. The second stage of the project, the development of the Amwaj residential isle, was a joint venture between a branch of the sovereign wealth fund Dubai Holding, Sama Dubai (50%), CDG (20%), the Moroccan public pension fund (10%) and the AAVB (20%). Due to the financial crisis, however, Sama Dubai could not live up to its commitments. This has caused a conflict between them and the AAVB and resulted finally in the expropriation of the properties (200ha) of Sama Dubai.453 Furthermore, in 2007, the AAVB created a

subsidiary to exploit the marina and in 2009 the STRS was created to coordinate and commercialize the tramway project. Besides public funding, this tramway project is also financially supported by the European Investment Bank, the EU and the French Development Agency (AFD). Additionally, several French commercial firms are involved in the construction of the Tramway (e.g. Alstom). When finished, the Tramway will be exploited by another French multinational: Veolia-Transdev.

As a consequence, government in these urban spaces becomes accountable to investors over and above the citizens whose lives are influenced by their operations (Parker, 2009: 115). This is a salient feature of the neoliberal urban logic. Urban entrepreneurialism typically rests on public-private partnerships focusing foremost on the speculative construction and upgrading of places rather than on the amelioration of the living conditions of the original inhabitants (Harvey, 1989b). In other words, the urban space is reshaped more by the logic of the market then by the needs of its residents (Bayat and Biekart, 2009: 817). Ironically, as Bayat and Biekart (Ibid.: 818) point out, “many of the agents of change (such as global capital) are not even residents of these cities”. Many foreign investors and corporations, from France, Italy (in the case of the tunnel) and especially from the Arab Gulf, are contributing to the spectacular change of the urban landscape between Rabat and Salé and benevolently join in the privatization of public space. As a result, the design of this new urban landscape is foremost determined by private capital and worked out by prestigious architectural firms like for example the UK-based Foster and Partners (consultants for Bab al Bahr). The private interests of for example Al Maabar, a partner in Bab al Bahr, do not necessarily correspond to the public interest. The message of the managing director of Al Maabar on the company’s website is very clear in this regard: “our focus is to create landmark properties which provide a maximum return on investment to our stakeholders”. The buyers guide of the Bab al Bahr sequence, not only recommends the attractive Moroccan tax-system, especially for Moroccans abroad who want to invest in their country of origin, but also promotes the Moroccan real estate market as a reliable alternative to the gloomy investment outlooks of the European markets at this moment. What’s left for the ordinary citizens is the promise of a better world, intimately related to the self-regulating utopia projected by neoliberal theory. While visiting the promotional websites of Bab al Bahr and the Bouregreg project one can see Rabat pictured as a future fairy tale, a real fantasy world. Within this neoliberal dream world, the poor are believed to be dependent on these projects as leverages of economic growth (the notorious trickle-down effect). It is assumed that these projects are to provide jobs and attract tourists, who, for their part, will bring more money in circulation.
Doreen Massey has argued that the decline or the privatization of public space involves the increasing control over urban spaces in the hands of non-democratically elected owners and, subsequently, may involve the exclusion of certain social groups who we might have expected to be allowed there if these spaces were publicly owned. As a result, the Bouregreg Valley may be a globalized space but this doesn’t mean it is an open space (Massey, 2005: 152, 190). In addition, the real socio-political question, according to Massey, “concerns less, perhaps, the degree of openness/closure (and the consequent question of how on earth one might even begin to measure it), than the terms on which that openness/closure is established” (Ibid.: 179). The real estate developers, the designers and architects, the technocrats of the AA VB, etc., are the local agents in globalization. What comes to the fore in the Bouregreg project is less the transmission of state power in a downwards movement, but rather the complex interplay between agents of the state and their non-state partners lodged within a territory of 6000ha. State hierarchies are constituted here together with the investors from Abu Dhabi, France, Italy, etc., and it resulted in a specific configuration of sovereignty, a particular geographical assemblage of distributed authority, which has been continuously negotiated and renegotiated – the struggles between AAVB and Sama Dubai being the most recent example (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). Private investors such as Al Maabar in the Bab al Bahr sequence, reach into the political decision-making process through for example the establishment of a joint venture such as the Bab al Bahr Company. Both the AAVB and Al Maabar are business partners with a significant political outreach on the cities of Rabat and Salé, and by extension, the wider coastal region. While these politics may take place at the local level, they are not local politics at all, “but the localization of wider political games involving regional, national or global actors who have found local venues to mine and local actors to express their interests” (MP Smith, 1998: 40). As a result, the pressures that the ordinary citizens of Rabat and Salé are subject to, pressures of uneven development produced by the Bouregreg project, are not simply emanating from above, from an institutional core, e.g. the “Arab regime”, but are shaped and designed by particular interest groups, private actors, etc. with sufficient reach and influence to engage the assembled political forces in a particular locality, in this case the Bouregreg Valley (Allen & Cochrane, 2010).

There are thus obvious limits to this kind of enclavization of international investments.

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458 Here, the privatization of public space should not be considered in the same way as Hibou’s concept of the privatization of the state. It only refers to the mere appropriation of public property private interests.
While it is still too early to evaluate the overall social impact of the Bouregreg project, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Sala al Moustaqbal (the future of Salé), an association that tries to provoke a critical debate on the project, has gathered a round table on the Bouregreg project in 2005 and formulated some major concerns. First of all, they argue that the project turns its back on the historical medina of Salé and creates a barrier between the city-centre and the riverside. The first stage, Bab al Bahr, is built right next to the ancient medina of Salé. But the height of the planned buildings actually hides the medina from the view of people looking from the quay of Rabat. This is already clearly visible today when one visits the construction site. The Bab al Bahr construction are R+3 (three stories high), probably even going to be R+4, while the urban area just behind it is on average only two stories high. As a result, the constructions of the Bab al Bahr sequence are forming a huge physical wall that separates the medina of Salé from the quays of Rabat and the Oudaya. The Bab al Bahr sequence is not the only stage which incorporates architectural and physical barriers. If one looks closely to the plans of the second sequence (Amwaj), one notices that the project is cut-off from the rest of the urban areas with natural and built in barriers (e.g. the river, roads, roundabouts, colonnades of trees, etc.).

Secondly, the medina of Salé is an impoverished area that lacks access to collective services. When one walks through this medina, one quickly notices that it bears little resemblance to some of the more romantic alleys of the medina of Rabat or the well known medina of Marrakech with their specialized shops in Moroccan arts and artisanal products. In fact, many of the historical medina’s in Morocco, also in Rabat and even in Marrakech, have socially degraded over the years. They have become transit zones for rural migrants and are therefore inhabited by many poor tenants (Balbo and Navez-Bouchanine, 1995; Ameur, 2000). As such, the social constitution of the urban area immediately surrounding the Bouregreg project will contrast strongly with the lifestyle and prestige promoted by the private developers. In the case of the medina of

459 Interview with a French architect working on the Bab al Bahr stage for her masters’ degree (Rabat – 14/04/2009, conducted together with Sami Zemni).
460 Actually, the whole population of the city of Salé is generally much poorer than the population in Rabat. Salé is known for its bidonvilles, informal neighbourhoods (IC) and social housing (Allain-El Mansourï, 2006). The pressing question is what the effect of the prestigious Bouregreg project will be in the long term for the city of Salé and its population.
Salé, it will be literally enclosed by luxury and its corridors, with Bab al Bahr on one side and the bridge and the tramway on the other. Just as the French have built their new modern cities around the Arab medina during the Moroccan Protectorate, imposing a design of spatial and social segregation, the current project imposes an almost similar segregation (cf. Abu Lughod, 1980). As a result, the project “turns its back on the historic patrimony of Salé” and will most likely turn out to be the creation of “heaven next to hell”, as I was told by the Moroccan architect Nabil Rahmouni, one of the initiators behind Sala al Moustaqbal.

Third, according to the latter, the creation of a ‘city of arts’ in Bab al Bahr, where artisanal products will be promoted and sold, will likely cause competition with many small businesses in the medinas of Rabat and Salé who depend on this economic sector for their livelihoods. However, this critique was contradicted by the delegate for commercial development of Bab al Bahr. He stated that the city of arts will only house museums and galleries where artisanal products will be presented. The production of handicrafts would still take place in the medina and its immediate surroundings. Nevertheless, it will be a task for future research to find out what the exact impact will be of the Bouregreg project with its commercial centres and activities, on the small-scale and even informal businesses of the medina. It also remains to be seen whether the informal businesses in the surrounding area will still be tolerated once the project is finalized and its new population settles in.

Finally, some serious questions and scepticism should be put forward about the so-called social and public dimension of the project. Rahmouni denounced the fact that the AVVB also expropriates land for private purposes (e.g. for the construction of hotels, marinas and apartments) because it had little to do with the public interest. This particular form of accumulation by dispossession can also be seen as a way to socialize the risks related to the development of the Bouregreg Valley and privatize the benefits.

It is thanks to public funding that the former marshland area of the first sequence was made suitable for building and that it was provided with all the necessary physical infrastructure (e.g. quays, tunnel, bridge, etc.) in order to make it a profitable site for investment. Additionally, the same principles about re-integration and participation (i.e. accompagnement social) were applied to resettle the bidonvilles and informal neighbourhoods located on the Bouregreg site. As such, 137 households were resettled to make place for a maintenance centre for the tramway on the side of Salé. As mentioned above, a total of 259 households and small businesses in the ancient medina of Rabat were resettled or compensated for their expropriation. In these operations, the AAVB works together with Al Omrane. Also within the AAVB, the vision on ‘participation’

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461 Interview (Rabat – 27/04/2009).
462 Another example is the fact that the AAVB received public support to provide the fishermen with new fishing boats. These boats are largely sponsored by the INDH-program (Interview with official of department of social affairs (Rabat – 30/06/2010)). The Bouregreg project is for that matter not the only large urban development scheme that is partly supported by INDH. Tanger Med has its own department that is allied with INDH (Barthel & Planel, 2010).
463 The tramway alone costs approximately 3,8 billion MAD. Recently, the AAVB announced that they will inject an extra 518 million MAD to finance the constructions. See weekly magazine, La Vie Eco (19/07/2010), article available at: http://www.lavieeco.com/economie/17203-mega-augmentation-de-capital-pour-la-societe-de-tramway-de-rabat-sale.html (accessed 25/11/2010).
in AS-programs resembles a lot to the visions at Al Omrane and Dyar Al Mansour. An official from the department of social affairs gave me his own opinion on AS:

We also do psychological guidance [accompagnement psychologique] [besides administrative guidance]. There are households who are use to live in a barrack. They don’t have the habit to pay for water and electricity. We have to learn them how to live a new live. (…) The end goal is human development. If we hadn’t human development as our objective, why would we otherwise carry out such a project?464

And the Head of Corporate and Finance Partnerships explained to me that:

To solve the problem of the habitats clandestin, the AAVB works closely together with the qualified authorities, like the ministry of housing, the wali and the authorized operators [Al Omrane]. The AAVB even has its own department of social affairs [Direction des affaires socials]. We have to explain it [the project] to the people. It is not that they don’t participate, but sometimes they just don’t understand. In the long term they will realize it. (…) We have to be didactical. (…) We always have to be close to the people, even if the people do not understand.

To my own amazement, I must say, he went on to compare inhabitants of Foundouk Mestiri, one of the informal communities in the ancient medina of Rabat, with the Gaulish village from the comic books of Asterix and Obelix. They had resisted civilization in a similar way, he argued.

In general, the infrastructural project of the Bouregreg project will set out and defend the demarcations between those who can afford to invest, live and consume in these newly created consumption spaces and those who fall by the wayside. The project will be responsible for the creation of new spatial boundaries, including a privileged few and excluding the grand majority of people living in the surrounding areas. According to Jamila Bargach, it is obvious that the whole logic of the project, the marina, the practice of equipment-oriented nautical sports, the high-end luxury apartments of Bab al Bahr, as well as the business facilities “will mark the Bouregreg Valley as a space belonging to the wealthy” (Bargach, 2008: 114). The result will be most likely – and this is becoming clearly visible today – a spatial segregation between an enclave that is tailored to the benefit of international investors and rich tourists, and the average Moroccan citizen who will be largely absent from this area or, at best, be invisible in the role of one of the serving jobs such as waiters, receptionists, cleaners (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). Urban development strategies such as the Bouregreg project lead to the juxtaposition of privileged zones of inclusion where capital can design luxury and grandeur into its space, and the outside spaces where urban poverty and exclusion constitute the flipside of this spatial division of consumption. When talking to local inhabitants about the project, many suspicions bubble up. I once asked a car-park attendant on the construction site of Bab al Bahr what the advantage of the project was for the people of Salé. “We don’t earn money with the bourgeois”, he said, “they want to stay in their

464 Interview (Rabat – 02/06/2010).
hotels with hotelkeepers with diplomas. But we don’t have diplomas. They are not going to come to our hotels”. A young guy who used to live in the Oudaya looking over the Valley, told me that Bouregreg was “a project of false promises (…) it’s a project merely for the rich while the ordinary Moroccan will be victim of this project”. On the other side of the social ladder, the director of the Bouregreg Marina complained that the two cities still didn’t had enough hotels to host all future tourists. “We only have the Hilton in Rabat and Salé has no hotels”.465 When I asked him about some other hotels that came to my mind, he answered “oh yeah… we have also the Tour Hassan and the Golden Tulip is getting there”. The enumerated hotels are very luxurious and it gives some kind of indication of the kind of tourist they want to attract.

A final point that is important to mention when we look at some of the effects of high-end urban development projects in other countries and other regions of the world, is the likeliness of a process of gentrification in the surroundings of the Bouregreg project. Gentrification, a process where working-class areas and poor urban neighbourhoods are invaded by substantially wealthier social classes and, consequently, cause a rise of the cost of living in the neighbourhood (e.g. rising housing prices, new commercial activities directed towards the newcomers, etc.), has been another central and global feature of entrepreneurial urbanism (cf. Smith, 2002). While it is of course still too early to draw any definite conclusions in the case of the Bouregreg project, and while some would claim that the project is not actively gentrifying anyone – as the project is situated largely on unpopulated terrain (the few hundred expropriated households living in informal houses who have been resettled or compensated put aside) – it is not unlikely that a process of gentrification will affect the surrounding urban areas and the neighbourhoods alongside the new tramway. The fact that the AAVVB suspended all private real estate transactions within the developing zone after the publication of law 16-04 until the definite approval of the ‘Special Development Plan’ in 2009, indicates that the state agency wanted to control possible speculation (Mouloudi, 2010). Especially, in the historical fortress of the Oudaya, the AAVVB attempted to stop speculation on the sale of houses.466 The Oudaya is located right next to the project at the mouth of the river. It has an exclusive view on the project and since the announcement of the project in 2004 some houses had already been purchased by foreigners or wealthy Moroccans (Saaid, n.d.). Other indicators are also pointing in the direction of gentrification. Alongside the trajectory of the tramway, new apartments are being build and new shops and restaurants emergence that are clearly targeting a more affluent consumer.467 In any case, the prices of the residences that are being built or planned within the framework of the project leave little or no doubt that within a few years a wealthy class will come to live in the valley. According to weekly magazine, La Vie Eco, prices for apartments in

465 Interview (Rabat – 20/05/2010).
466 Interview with Fatima Zohra Saaid, who has worked on gentrification in the Oudaya (Rabat – 12/05/2008).
467 This is merely based on observations and pictures taken during the four years that I frequented Rabat. No specific research has been done to confirm these observations so they have to be taken with caution. Also, on a specific internet blog you can see a bar-owner complaining about the fact that many former owners have difficulties at the moment to maintain their customers due to the construction works of the tramway and see little options but to sell their business. See: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x93jdh_tramway-a-rabat_travel (accessed 25/11/2010).
Bab al Bahr will vary between 14,000 and 27,000 MAD/m². The smallest surface of an apartment will be 90m² which means that the cheapest possible apartment will cost 1,260,000 MAD (to compare: the cost of a social apartment varies between 200,000 and 290,000 MAD). A former official of the AAVB even told me that the average price for a villa in the Amwaj sequence was estimated to be around one million USD (this was before Sama Dubai withdrew of course).

It looks thus highly probable that the Bouregreg project will follow similar trends that were manifest in other parts of the world. Processes of gentrification, especially since the 1990s, were linked very often to large-scale capital, as large real estate developers reworked entire urban neighbourhoods in cities like New York, London, etc. (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). According to Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith, a typical feature of the gentrification processes of the last 20 years was the return of heavy state intervention in the process, more specifically in the form of PPPs. According to the latter, gentrification had even become one of the central urban policies in some countries, for example to collect more tax revenues from wealthy property owners and consumers (Smith, 2002). It is clear by now that if a gentrification process would develop in the area of the Bouregreg, it would be state-led (i.e. in the form of the politics of the AAVB). It will push poor populations – especially those residing in the two ancient medina’s – further towards the outskirts of the cities of Rabat and Salé. The expected influx of wealthy tourists and high class consumers will, no doubt, push up prices of consumption goods and real estate (for a similar argument see also Hackworth, 2007). As such, despite the fact that the billboards that surround the project announce the advantages of the tramway and project a promising future for the two cities, it is highly probable that many will be excluded from this fortune. The Bouregreg Valley will be in all probability a globalized space but not an open space. The security guards at the gated entrance of the Bouregreg Marina, carefully screening everybody who enters, lift only a corner of the veil of what can be expected in the near future.

Creative destruction and the current urban spatial fix in Morocco

As a specific kind of institution, the AAVB is still an exception. There is no other public institution in Morocco with such a local particularity. However, this doesn’t mean that there are no other forms of graduated sovereignty. The international port of Tangiers, for example, is governed by a comparable powerful institutional configuration, the Tanger Mediterranean Special Agency (TMSA), which was established in 2002 (cf. Planel, 2009; Barthel & Planel, 2010). To a similar degree, TMSA is responsible for the planning, developing and managing of both the Tanger Med complex and the TFZ, the industrial hinterland of the port. Nevertheless, although TMSA has considerable powers and autonomy to govern the port and the surrounding special economic zone, it doesn’t dispose of all the extensive prerogatives that are attributed to the AAVB. TMSA works for example not outside the jurisdiction of the prefectures. To the contrary, to improve the governmental efficiency of the zone, a new prefecture, Fahs-Anjra, was

469 The most expensive apartments will be around 6,7 million MAD.
470 Interview conducted together with Sami Zemni (Rabat – August 2007).
The most important difference between the AAVB and TMSA is that the latter is a public limited company controlled by the state and endowed with public authority prerogatives while the first is a complete public agency that replaces all other governmental institutions. TMSA is indirectly state-owned via the participation of the CDG and the Hassan II fund for social and economic development. According to its website, TMSA is “a public-owned structure based on private companies’ governance mechanisms”. Yet, on the ground both agencies (TMSA and AAVB) represent new state spaces in which governmental resources are mobilized outside more traditional government structures and in which particular assemblages of power unfold to create new opportunities and political goals for privileged corporate interest groups. The specific institutional and practical differences between these two state spaces are the result of rather ad hoc governmental attempts to think about and act upon specific challenges and problems in a particular locale (Ong, 2006). That’s the contingency behind the contemporary “zoning technologies”. In other words, the particular political strategies that attempt to create spatially delineated and distinctive enclaves depending on the specific objectives and strategies that are envisioned for a certain place (Ibid.: 97-118).

Although the specific level of graduated sovereignty applied both in the Bouregreg and the Tanger Med zones haven’t been duplicated (yet) in the rest of the country, other prestigious projects, especially in Casablanca, such as Casa-Marina, the Royal Avenue and Casanearshore are coordinated and developed by some form of case-specific authority, mostly in the form of public-private partnerships. Nevertheless, if the Bouregreg project proves its success, it is not unlikely that its institutional design could become a model for future development schemes, as I was told by several people within the agency. So, despite its still unique configuration, the AAVB gives an indication of how state power in Morocco is being reshaped and respatialized at the urban scale and how real decision-making power is being shifted from more traditional state institutions – that are under pressure for democratic reform – to new state spaces that are not at all subjected to popular control. The local specificity and contextual embeddedness of new state arrangements such as the AAVB and also the TMSA urge for a theoretical rethinking of the modern Arab state (cf. Bogaert & Emperador, 2011). Because, obviously, these zoning technologies are not confined to the Moroccan case, let alone the Arab region. In Jordan, for example, the special economic zone of Aqaba, inaugurated in 2001, is governed by the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) (Debruyne, 2009a; 2009b). Six ministerial-level commissioners, each responsible for a specific area of regulatory or operational activity, govern the special economic zone. Parallel to the Bouregreg Valley, the Aqaba zone is not just a place where mere industrial activities are exploited and where a competitive restructuring of labour regulations have to lure in new investors. The zone is also populated by over 100,000 residents which implies that not only labour, but every aspect of human life in the Aqaba zone is subject to different modes of government and administrative techniques. Similar to

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471 Interview with a former consultant for the TMSA (Rabat – 12/05/2010).
472 See http://www.tmsa.ma/index.php?id=6&lang=en (accessed 03/12/2010). Furthermore, TMSA is subdivided in several subsidiaries (Tanger Med Port Authority, Tanger Free Zone, Med Hub, Cires Telecom and TMSA Holding) who each manage different activities and territories within the development zone of Tanger Med.
the concept of graduated sovereignty, Ong refers to this reality as forms of “graduated citizenship” (Ong, 2006: 78). This is a typical characteristic of the biopolitics of neoliberalism: different populations are subject to different technologies of disciplining, administration, regulation and control, and as a result, also subject to different social fates (Ibid.: 79).

Another well known example, and one of the first products of zoning technologies in the Arab world, was the post-war reconstruction of the historic centre of Beirut in Lebanon. The jurisdiction over the management and planning of the area was given to a private real estate company, Solidere, while at the same time, this company benefited from important public subsidies (Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). In their research, Krijnen and Fawaz demonstrate how, also in Lebanon, the delegation of planning responsibilities are enabling private developers to take part in the making of the city, and in the making of a legislative environment which serves their own interests. Other examples – this time related more to mere industrial activity and labour regulation – are the various SEZs and QIZs in the Arab region that are governed by their own territorial authorities (e.g. ZonesCorp in Abu Dhabi). Given these examples, whether in Morocco or elsewhere, state power cannot just be related to a uniform territorial entity, but participates in the constitution of differentiated state spaces spread around its territory, connecting local places with the outside world in various ways. As such, as I stated already in chapter 2 and demonstrated with the example of the Bouregreg Valley, the growing reliance on market-oriented policies not only entailed processes of deregulation and de-institutionalization – in the form of rolling back certain developmental state functions and privatizing other state functions – but also led to the re-regulation and the re-institutionalization of certain aspects of social and political life across an increasingly variegated landscape of spaces to be governed. These forms of graduated sovereignty give a new content to the notion of authoritarian governmentality (Dean, 1999), and produce new diffuse authoritarian representations of the Arab state (Parker, 2004).

The different configurations of (state-)power within the neoliberal city in the Arab world are radically changing the cityscape. As I mentioned, cities like Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers and Marrakech are being redesigned and restructured to satisfy the desires and interest of global capital. The specific changes that are etched into to the cityscape can best be described by two concepts: first, the neoliberal (urban) spatial fix, and secondly, the process of creative destruction. I mentioned these two concepts already briefly in chapter 2. Let me first elaborate on the neoliberal spatial fix. David Harvey was one of the most prominent thinkers who theorized the spatial fix of contemporary capitalism. The word ‘fix’ or the verb ‘to fix’ can be interpreted in two ways (Harvey, 2001). First of all, it can be interpreted in the meaning of to pin something down and secure it in a particular locus. Secondly, ‘to fix’ can also indicate the attempt to find a (temporary) solution to a problem (i.e. fixing a problem). For example, a typical problem that needs to be fixed by capitalists entrepreneurs is the capital surplus absorption problem (Harvey, 2010a). In this sense the concept of spatial fix refers to “capitalism’s insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring” (Harvey, 2001: 24). After all, according to Harvey, capitalism is addicted to geographical expansion as much as it is addicted to technological change and economic growth. At the larger scale contemporary globalization can be viewed as the
process driven by capitalism’s never-ending search for a spatial fix (Ibid.). Spatial fixes shape both the extensive and intensive processes of capitalist enlargement (cf. Robinson, 2004; see also chapter 2).

With regard to the first meaning of fixity, Harvey has observed that capitalism also has to fix space. In other words, to pin down and secure its contradictions and overcome capitalism’s main problems related to space and distance. Capitalism has to overcome space, ensure the mobility of capital and enlarge the possibilities for accumulation by bringing down the frictions of distance and create the conditions for economic growth (e.g. through urbanization). As such, some (considerable amount of) capital needs to move into the formation of fixed capital (Harvey, 1989a: 64). Fixed capital, Harvey argues, can be produced in the normal course of capitalist commodity production, but they are mostly used as aids to the production process (Ibid.: 64). Examples are investments in transportation and communication networks, road-networks and highways, land, water and electricity supplies, houses and other kinds of physical infrastructure. These investments in the built environment or fixed (immobile) assets are part of a process of capital flow which Harvey describes as the secondary circuit of capital (Ibid.: 64).

The primary idea behind the theory of a spatial fix was twofold. First, Harvey wanted to show that capitalism could not survive without being geographically expansionary. Secondly, in order to expand, major technological innovations and infrastructural investments were required (Harvey, 2001). Hence, the typical emphasis on technologies, methods and procedures to speed up processes of capital accumulation and absorption. This is, of course, also discernible within the discourses and rationalities that support mega-projects such as the Bouregreg project. In most of his work, Harvey has focused upon the urban production of space and the contradictions of capitalism at work in the city (Ibid.). Through the process of urbanization, he sees the dialectical coming together of the two kinds of meanings behind fixity – that meaning which seeks to solve the crisis tendencies through expansion and that notion of ‘fixing’ which is about the tying up and pinning down of large amounts of capital in a particular place through the production of fixed and immobile capital within the secondary circuit of capital; i.e. the built environment (roads, airports, harbours, state buildings, etc.) (Ibid.: 28). Within this dialectic there hides a contradiction:

Here, the two kinds of fixes both feed off each other to stimulate symbiotic forms of accumulation (suburbs need cars and vice versa) and collide to form a potentially serious contradiction. Globalization in its present guise has entailed, among other things, the pursuit of a whole series of spatial fixes to the crisis that erupted around 1973. Capital, most would agree, has since become much more global in all of its forms of production, commerce, merchanting and finance. It has shifted

474 The primary circuit of capital accumulation is capital that moves into and out of manufacturing and industrial production. In order to complete the picture, Harvey describes the tertiary circuit of capital as the process that comprises, first, the investment in science and technology (in service of innovation in order to revolutionize the productive forces and bring down geographical and spatial frictions) and second, a wide range of social expenditures that relate primarily to the reproduction of labour (e.g. education, health care, but also investments in related to the cooptation, integration and even repression of the labour force by ideological, military and other means) (Harvey, 1989a: 59-66).
rapidly (and often with considerable volatility) from one location to another. At the same time massive amounts of capital and labor have been invested in the sorts of immobile fixed capital we see in airports, commercial centers, office complexes, highways, suburbs, container terminals, and the like. Global flows have been in part guided by such investments but at the same time these investments are speculative developments that depend for their profitability upon a certain expansionary pattern of global flows of commodities, capital and people. If the flows fail to materialize, then the fixed capital stand to be devalued and lost (…). The production of space under capitalism proceeds under the shadow of this contradiction (Ibid.: 28-29).

In addition to the kind of investments in the built environment that try to support capitalism as a system, the secondary circuit of capital can also serve as a buffer to crises of over-accumulation in manufacturing and industrial production. In other words, the secondary circuit itself can prove to be a solution, a spatial fix, to capitalism’s inner crisis tendencies. Henri Lefebvre already argued in the 1970s that when the primary circuit of capital slows down, capital tends to shift towards the secondary circuit, the real estate sector, for accumulation and profit purposes (Lefebvre, 2003). “It can even happen”, he argues, “that real-estate speculation becomes the principal source for the formation of capital, that is, the realization of surplus value” (Ibid.: 160). This shift can be observed more and more through the processes of neoliberal urbanization and the global shift towards finance capitalism. Urban space and real estate turned to be a direct opportunity for capital accumulation in order to create “liquidity out of spatial fixity” (Gotham, 2009). Yet, mega-projects in Morocco such as the Bouregreg project, Casa-Marina, Tanger City Centre, etc. are not only profitable avenues for commercial investment, they have also a specific spatial effect on Moroccan cities which is similar to the effect witnessed in other neoliberal cities around the globe, but quite different from the urban effects of earlier regimes of capitalist production and regulation. In contrast to the neoliberal spatial fix, the spatial fix of Keynesian urbanization was predominantly a centrifugal one, implicating massive suburbanization and economic growth on the peripheries (Hackworth, 2007: 95). As a result, economic decline spread in many inner-city locations while locations of heavy industries and suburbs prospered in Europe and the US under the Keynesian welfare regime and its supportive policies of mass consumption. In the case of Morocco, I argued in earlier, that the public authorities didn’t really had a coherent and developed urban development strategy before the 1980s. This makes it difficult to compare Moroccan urbanization in those decades with European or American trends.475

Nevertheless, on a global scale, we could argue that the Keynesian spatial fix largely made place for a neoliberal spatial fix. As I described in chapter 2, the global liberation of capital and the de-industrialization of the urban centres, especially in the advanced capitalist societies, was followed by a spatial reorganization of the city. In contrast to the Keynesian or developmentalist period, the pattern of urbanization has coincided with massive inner-city reinvestment and urban centre renovation (Ibid.: 96). The city centre

475 However, there were some indicators and isolated examples: the planning of the urban neighbourhood of Hay Riad in the 1970s, a high-end residential and governmental district, was clearly inspired by suburbanization policies and a move away from the urban centre of Rabat.
became the primary locus for niche real estate, service sector employment, tourism, and other replacements for heavy industry and manufacturing (Ibid.). Finance capitalism entailed the switch into banking, real estate, etc. which depended largely on the city’s ‘unique selling position’. In the Arab region, this selling position not only focused on the inner (historical) city centres but also on waterfront development. The association with barren desertlike landscapes are an essential part of the marketing strategies which make the architectural endeavours of the Dubai copycat projects seem like oases of peace and prosperity in the midst of a region which has been mainly the seat of a war on terror and the victim of prejudices of cultural backwardness. Prestigious project such as Alger Medina, Lake Tunis, Saraya Aqaba and Solidere in Beirut are promoting the shorelines of some of the most important Arab cities, focusing predominantly on tourism and luxury consumerism to secure a return on investment.

In Morocco, the creation of six residential sea-side resorts (Plan Azur) testifies to this kind of coastal spatial fix. Furthermore, the restructuring of cities like Rabat demonstrate the attention given to coastal redevelopment. The Bouregreg project, and also the planned Saphira project, are definitely going to change the image of the historical centre and its bordering coastline. Casablanca is an even more revealing example. In an interview with weekly business magazine Challenge, Mohamed Charif Houachmi, former associate Sales Manager at Sama Dubai and current partner at the Moroccan real estate firm Business Realities, emphasized the importance of the city-centre and the urgent necessity to rethink the centre of Casablanca according to a global logic:

> The international experience has demonstrated that the city-centre has always represented a secure value, considering its historical and urban importance. This said, the city-centre of Casablanca should be continuously rethought in resemblance to the image of large European metropolises like London and Bordeaux, and Asian ones like Seoul, who are at the moment in the middle of a process of urban revaluation.476

The current master plan for Casablanca (the SDAU of 2008) clearly states the ambition to turn the city of Casablanca into a global city. Inner-city renovation, planning and development are crucial strategies to accomplish this. According to the Casablanca master plan, large-scale urban development projects are crucial to “embellish the image of the city” (SDAU Casablanca, 2008: 146, own translation):

> Big urban projects are powerful instruments for urban regeneration and the creation of a modern offer of housing, facilities, activities and services. These projects are for the cities what the large reforms are for those countries who wish to advance and adapt to the modern world. It is with these kinds of projects that cities like Barcelona, Marseille, London, Berlin and many others have established their mutation and adapted the urban offer to the economic, social and environmental requirements of this early 21st century (Ibid: 163, own translation).

The current restructuring of Casablanca’s coastline is characteristic for the Moroccan

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476 Weekly business magazine Challenge, n°291, 3-9 July 2010: 36.
neoliberal spatial fix. It involves projects like the Marina, Anfaplace Living Resort, El Hank and the Morocco Mall to redesign the entire coastline. With a surface of 10 hectares the Morocco Mall – with the telling slogan “all for you” – is the largest shopping mall project in North Africa.\textsuperscript{477} It is scheduled to contain more than 250 shops and food outlets, additionally featuring a huge aquarium and an IMAX Cinema.\textsuperscript{478} Monuments and real estate spectacles such as the Mosque Hassan II, the Avenue Royale, Casa-Marina, the peninsula of El Hank and the rest of the planned redevelopment of the coastline will form the “hyper centre” of Casablanca; the “constituted city” which will locate the necessary prestige facilities and give the city its international aura (Ibid.: 198). Yet, a closer look at the websites of a few of these projects quickly reveals that ordinary Moroccans are likely to be excluded from this new reality as they are far from being able to meet up with the promoted living standard.\textsuperscript{479}

This kind of consumption of space with the objective to turn it into a space of consumption does not take place without a considerable impact on the city and its social structures. The neoliberal spatial fix therefore also implies a phase of “creative destruction”. First of all, neoliberal restructuring in Morocco has profoundly reworked, and in many cases destroyed, the institutional infrastructures upon which the Moroccan developmental regime or pre-neoliberal state was grounded (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Secondly, these institutional frameworks were than renovated or replaced by new ones, such as for example the new state space in the Bouregreg Vally and many other examples of graduated sovereignty, in order to fix capital. Additionally, the moments of creative destruction can also have a broader meaning when it comes to urban renewal according to

\textsuperscript{477} Mega-malls are the model of how public spaces are privatized. They are designing a new reality (often mixed with a manufactured authenticity – a ‘Moroccan authenticity’), organized and monitored, as it were, on the principles of Bentham’s panopticon (Marsden, 1999).


neoliberal strategies. The process of renewal then often implies the very destruction of actual existing livelihoods and urban landscapes in order to make room for new life and new urban designs that are embedded in the neoliberal spatial fix (Chatterjee, 2009). As such, moments of creative destruction reflect capital's need to create an (urban) landscape adequate to accommodate its own interests and requirements at one point in time, only to revolutionize it at a later point in time in order to maintain the rate of growth and accommodate the possibilities for further accumulation (Harvey, 2010a: 86).

From that perspective, the bidonvilles are not so much excluded from renewal but an essential element of the neoliberal spatial fix. Especially those located in the urban centre. They reveal types of urban infrastructure and built environment which are deemed unsuitable for the commercialization and consumption of urban space. In that sense, the slums represent that part (or a part) of the existing real estate that can also be a barrier for capital accumulation (Gotham, 2009). As a result, the predominant focus on the commercialization of urban space reveals the very tension, embedded within the neoliberal spatial fix and capitalist urbanization, between the exchange value and the use value of urban space (with the first of course being privileged over the second). Consequently, the resettlement and relocation of slum dwellers implies the destruction of their former habitat in order to create something new and more profitable. “Violence is required to build the new urban world on the wreckage of the old” (Harvey 2008: 33). When David Harvey sees violence in the creation of a new urban world, he refers to the Haussmann period where the old Parisian slums were torn down in the name of “civic improvement and renovation”, resulting in the removal of the working class from the city-centre (also because they were a threat to public order) (Ibid.). Before Paris became the ‘city of light’, the great centre of consumption, pleasure and tourism, aggressive and violent public works were implemented, especially during the mid-19th century, to transform the cityscape to its current constellation. This is the dark side of neoliberal urbanization. Moments of creative destruction therefore incorporate nearly always a class dimension, because the urban poor and those marginalized from political power, whether in Paris back then or in Casablanca today, suffer first and foremost from this process (Ibid.; see also Lefebvre, 2003: 160). Creative destruction often goes hand in hand with an accumulation by dispossession. It is the process by which the city-centre is being reclaimed by global capital and the (poor) obstacles are removed because it is not profitable to leave them where they are.

In chapter 4, I already argued that the strategies to relocate the urban poor are not so much resolving the problem of poverty but merely displaces it to other areas. This lies at the core of capitalist urbanization. Harvey, citing Friedrich Engels, argues that, in reality, the capitalist and political classes have only one method of solving the housing question: “that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution continually reproduces the question anew” (Harvey, 2008: 33). The spatial fix of neoliberal urbanism is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond a simple (re-)claim on the urban centre.480 In Morocco (and also in general), suburbanization still continues at a rapid pace under

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480 One remarkable policy is the creation of six “new cities” (villes nouvelles) in the surroundings of large cities such as Rabat, Casablanca and Tangiers. These satellite cities, such as Temesna at 10 km from Rabat, are built entirely from scratch, mainly to unburden the large urban areas from the ongoing demographic pressures.
neoliberal urbanism. Yet, it is quite different from Keynesian patterns. Current urban outgrowth is deeply connected to broader social polarization and uneven development (Hackworth, 2007: 96). On the one hand, the priority given to homeownership in social development projects such as the VSBP and the resettlement of the slum dwellers are a valuable source of poverty capital and a profitable avenue for commercial investment in the mass consumption of social houses. These investments are even a valuable alternative to high-end urban development when the latter is recovering from an economic shock. In that sense, and with the necessary help of the state, suburban growth in the form of mass social housing can fix the capital surplus absorption problem in many Third World countries due to its constant and high demand. On the other hand, other forms of planned suburban growth are often places where second homes, tourist facilities and leisure activities dominate (Ibid.). The tourist resorts and gated communities that are popping up in the periphery of popular attractions such as Marrakech are some of the most obvious examples in Morocco. As a result, in the future, it is possible that the upper classes and the wealthy in Morocco will either reside in the gentrified neighbourhoods of the historic urban centres, or retire in the gated ones of the exurbs and that uneven development will be even more clearly and openly designed into the urban landscape. In the end, the state – through the formation of new state spaces and new configurations of graduated sovereignty – plays a key role in the dialectics of neoliberal spatial fixity and creative destruction. Through new regulations and market-oriented policies public authority in Morocco currently socializes the risks and privatizes the benefits of neoliberal urbanization.

**Conclusion**

Parker concludes that “contemporary theories of transition can accommodate the idea of multiple pathways to the global, but have more trouble with the possibility that the global might refer to a variety of heterogeneous and even contradictory destinations”.

Likewise, he states that “accounts concerned with the non-occurrence of regime transitions in Arab political life typically follow the map of globalist assumptions, but ignore scope and significance of boundaries and connections being etched into the terrain itself” (Parker, 2009: 119). In this chapter, I tried to shed light on the new boundaries and connections that are etched today into Moroccan cities, more specifically Rabat and Salé, and I highlighted the particular political narrative behind its urban metamorphosis. Two important observations can be made. First of all, by drawing on the work of various critical thinkers, I demonstrated that uneven development, inherent to the capitalist system, is not only expressed and manifested socially, but also spatially, through the polarization of development among different territories, places and spaces (Brenner, 2004: 13). Secondly, it is important not to reify the spatial structures and scales through which capitalist transformations takes place, but emphasize the class-bound alliances behind them and assembled within them. The current political transformations in Morocco are intimately related to the power configurations and social contradictions that are embedded within the contemporary neoliberal capitalist logic. As a result Moroccan cities are more and more turned into spaces of extremes and the ruling elites are making this choice consciously. Consequently, in contrast to a notion of globalization that is often presented by neoliberal development discourses as an inevitable force – and hence beyond the scope of national political agency – the various projects involved in its making are actually not so politically neutral as they appear to be (Parker, 2009: 113). Various actors – often extending far beyond national boundaries – are forming new assemblages of (class) power that are involved in the (re)shaping of the urban space and the reconfiguration of the urban economy. If we wish to avoid reifications of the state, seemingly located “up there”, and as a result of certain “state effects” (Mitchell, 1991; 2006; see also Bogaert & Emperador, 2011), we have to trace the different lines of authority, negotiation and engagement, and the ways in which they criss-cross one another through various distinct spatial configurations of sovereignty (Allen & Cochrane, 2010).

Forms of graduated sovereignty, as Ong terms it, are shattering our Weberian model of nation-state sovereignty. From this perspective, sovereignty is not so much a uniform effect of state rule, but rather the result of contingent and differentiated outcomes of various strategies and assemblages of power (Ong, 2006: 100). Following up on Ong, the configuration of sovereignty in the Bouregreg Valley contains that contingent element, as a new way of governing, invented in a rather ad hoc way, based on a royal initiative. In her words, the Bouregreg project is a practical attempt to think about and act upon a specific problem in a particular locale (Ibid.). The AAVB is a salient example of how political power has been resituated and assembled in order to pursue strategic development choices. As an institution and a new state space it replaces traditional state institutions – that are still the dominant focus of studies on Arab democratization – and it greatly impacts on the daily lives of urban residents. In the case of the Bouregreg project, all public competences are gathered – and enforced by law – into one technocratic entity that operates outside the scope of traditional government institutions. The AAVB is at the same time urban planner, developer and private investor. “It is the flexibility of the private sector conjoined with public prerogatives”, as I was told.481

481 Interview with the director of the Bouregreg Marina (20/05/2010).
Its specific modality of state respatialization clearly illustrates the apparent prioritization of economic imperatives over the right to the city of ordinary citizens. Obviously, such schemes of state power transfers are not unique to the Moroccan case. The global reconfiguration of capital and labour produced changing geographical and territorial forms of organization and rescaled forms of government and regulation everywhere in the world (Swyngedouw, 2000). To capture global flows of capital within a globalized production chain, national states are increasingly transferring responsibility and regulatory capacities to new urban and regional governmental arrangements for tasks such as economic development, services, and infrastructural restructuring (Martin, McCann & Purcell, 2003: 115). But the exceptional amount of legal autonomy still makes the Bouregreg case an exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, as I was explained by one official, the model of the AAVB is a test-case, “a laboratory to test certain issues which fail based on private initiative alone.” 482 By examining the various technologies applied to create place-specific configurations of sovereignty, Ong argues that we begin to see a more dynamic process of sovereignty than the abstract picture we often get from mainstream analyses that depict sovereignty in terms of broad labels such as ‘liberal’, ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’ (Ong, 2006: 102).

The neoliberal spatial fix privileges foremost the inner-city centre of the Moroccan coastal cities. Urban renovation and waterfront development are essential components of neoliberal economic growth strategies. Yet, urban development schemes such as the Bouregreg project also strongly enhance and reproduce the urban geography of uneven development that has struck so many developing countries for decades. The economic reforms that are promoted by actually existing forms of neoliberal agency are not leading to more general welfare. To the contrary, they hinder and prevent the progress of all members of a society, for the mode of accumulation that it imposes actually excludes the possibility of the majority of the population to benefit from accumulation strategies. Government in Morocco privileges the desires of private capital at the expense of some of the pressing social needs such as youth unemployment, the crisis in education, (urban) poverty and the poor quality of public health care. In addition, the neoliberal spatial fix also implies a certain violence. The direct and subjective violence in tearing down a building, or even a whole neighbourhood, is obvious. It is incorporated as a form of creative destruction. But the violent aspect of neoliberal urbanization does not end there. Highways, majestic edifices, waterfront luxury estates and other forms of concrete barriers are built on the wreckage of what was there before. Yet after a while, the remembrance of its destruction fades and the new urban structures – as results of struggles and negotiations between different assemblages of power – become the (new) normal state of things. It determines city-life for the coming decades. To draw on the opening quotes, in making the city man has been remade. This is the socio-spatial dialectic (Soja, 1980). Edward Soja argues that space and the political organization of space are the result of particular social relations but also react back on these social relations. In other words, the relationship between man and space is dialectical in the sense that man organizes and produces his environment on the basis of multiple social, economic and political values, norms and conditions that are than inscribed in space. In return, the spatial environment exercises an influence on human behaviour and the

482 Interview with the Head of Corporate Finance & Partnerships of the AAVB (20/05/2010).
human condition (Nachoui, 1998: 119). Power plays a crucial role in this dialectic. As Harvey pointed out, the primary agents that shape the Moroccan cities (property owners, landlords, developers, finance capitalists and the state) are also shaping the residents of that city. Their creations are ‘statements’. Symbols of a specific government and life-style.

But also violence characterizes the socio-spatial dialectic. Once built, the physical infrastructure of the Bouregreg Valley requires a “permanence” of physical form (Harvey, 2006: 147). They are material reflections of the more abstract, objective and anonymous systemic violence inherent to a capitalist hegemony. And while these physical forms are always open to a re-conceptualization of the material form, so that eventually people can experience and live them differently, the sheer materiality of the constructions of the Bouregreg Valley and other materializations of the neoliberal spatial fix will always carry their own weight and authority as forms embedding an objective force, or even “objective violence”. Objective violence, according to Žižek (2008), has an invisible character because its ‘normality’ becomes the standard against which we perceive outbursts of subjective violence. Yet, if one wants to make sense of the social tensions and struggles within contemporary urban space (e.g. a riot, a terrorist attack, etc.), one also has to take into account the objectivity of what I would call, in the case of contemporary urban renewal projects, a kind of spatial violence. According to Michel de Certeau (1984: 98) “a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities (e.g. by a place in which one can move) and interdictions (e.g. by a wall that prevents one from going further)” If, from the perspective of a socio-spatial dialectic, social relations can incorporate a certain violence (e.g. creative destruction), spatial structures and relations can do so as well. As such, the spatial orders of neoliberalism are carrying in them a form of objective violence. The impact of space on man is not only the result of the mere materiality itself, but also of the values, ideologies, discourses, knowledge and images that represent and are represented by space (cf. Lefebvre, 1991). Yet, in the end, the combination of the continuous securitization of urban space, the protection of privileged class subjects and their values, ideas and norms, the roll back of state developmentalism and the particular inclusion of the poor in the form of for example poverty capital can never be a stable and sustainable status quo. It is maybe within this framework of tension between objective and subjective violence, embedded within the neoliberal order, that we should try to understand the dynamics of recent outbursts of social protest in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Because, in many cases, protesters did not just rise up against the cruel dictator, but also against the fundamentals of what many of us would perceive as the “normal state of things”.

To conclude, there is one rather simple question that remains to be answered: who will pay for all the mega-projects currently under way in Morocco? Speaking at the World Economic Forum held in October 2010, the Moroccan minister of equipment and transport, Karim Ghellab, announced that Morocco has earmarked 11 billion EUR for transport improvements alone between 2008 and 2011 (amongst others for the tramway in Rabat and Salé, but considerable investments went also to the tramway project in Casa-

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483 Slavoj Žižek (2008: 2) describes subjective violence as a “perturbation of the “normal”, peaceful state of things” – e.g. the act of demolition – while he sees in objective violence “precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things”.

blanca and the high-speed train rail between Casablanca and Tangiers). According to Ghellab, Morocco quadrupled its investments over the last ten years. He told the press that the country “is capitalizing on infrastructure because improving infrastructure is likely to contribute to both economic and human development”. However, in the summer of 2010, monthly magazine *Entreprise et Economie*, seriously questioned the ability of the Moroccan state and its affiliated investments banks and funds, such as the CDG and the Fund Hassan II to keep financing the enormous infrastructural endeavours in which they are currently involved, especially given the global economic uncertainty since the financial meltdown of 2008 and the hesitancy amidst large foreign financial groups and real estate developers to maintain the current pace of investment. In the case of the Bouregreg project, the withdrawal of Sama Dubai is planned to be taken over (partly) by the CDG, but the latter is already implicated in numerous other projects such as Casa-Marina, the Avenue Royale, Tanger Med, etc. Not surprisingly, in its issue of May 2010, *Entreprise et Economie* critically discussed the recent restructuring within the CDG itself (and the change of directors). Rumours circulated that the CDG experienced financially difficult times and that new strategies were required to keep the bank afloat. In addition, and from a broader perspective, research on preceding so-called megaprojects has shown that in most cases the added-value is heavily overrated (Flyvbjerg, 2005). It thus remains to be seen whether the Bouregreg project will even fulfil its promises to its investors. After all, how many successful competitive cities can there be in the world (Harvey, 1989b)?

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484 Oxford Business Group newsletter: Morocco: Paths to progress (06/12/2010).
485 Ibid.
The large city, monstrous and tentacular, is always political. It serves as the most favorable environment for the formation of authoritarian power. It is characterized by organization and overorganization. Large cities legitimize inequality. Faced with a choice between an overbearing sense of order and the everlasting threat of chaos, power, any power, state power, will always choose order. The large city has but a single problem: number. A mass society is established within its circumference, which implies that these masses be constrained and implies therefore, the existence of a permanent state of violence and repression (Lefebvre, 2003: 92).

But where consumption is the objective, coercive security would be a reminder of the fragility and futility of attempts to consume one’s way to pleasure. Hence control must be designed-in, embedded in the very structuring of time, space and the environment. (…) The Third World proletariat who service these spaces of consumption are herded into ghettos and barrios in the public housing zones that are expelled to the outer rings of the city. And the poor, ‘street people’, the homeless and workless are expelled to spaces outside the urban enclave, spaces which are increasingly avoided and feared by those who used to walk, shop and visit there (Rose, 1999: p.251).
I started this project with a seemingly simple question: how do we interpret political change in the Arab World today? The answer to that question, however, is far less simple. In this study I explored some of the directions and perspectives that enable us to understand political change as a process that is, without a doubt, intimately related to the changes and shifts within global capitalism. As such, this study departed from the argument that the key to understand political change cannot be contained by mere endogenous political legacies or the black box of the “Arab regime” (Parker, 2006). On the other hand, what I tried to outline and explain in this project does not necessarily provide a new definite alternative key or key perspective. In matter of fact, maybe there is no “key” at all? And consequently, there is maybe no key-perspective from which we can depart. Instead of looking for one, we should rather pay attention to both the historical embeddedness and contingent dynamics of contemporary processes of political transformation in a constantly changing world. To do so, our theoretical frameworks and perspectives to understand and explain “change” have to be inherently connected to that historicity and contingency. Critical theory is therefore not necessarily an outside view on society as it is, undoubtedly, a product of society and a result of engagement with society. Theoretical explanation is vital, but its viability lies only in the complexity of the case (or social reality), and is embedded within the particular moment of history.

In order to explore both the historical influences and contingent character of political change in the Arab World today, I suggested critical perspectives which take into account the question of “space”. A critical spatial perspective looks at the relational,interruptive and dislocating consequences of contemporary politics. In this view, politics are not necessarily unpredictable but certainly open-ended. In other words, “transition” cannot be seen as the outcome of a single totalised and predetermined history within which every part is expressive of the whole (Massey, 2005: 41). Critical analysis should not be constrained by – or should try at least to avoid it as much as possible – a reading of history in terms of a-spatial narratives that are framed within temporal sequences or sequential stages (e.g. developing/developed; authoritarian/democratic; traditional/modern, etc.) which ignore to a large extent the contingency of political trajectories. In contrast, a critical spatial perspective preserves the possibility of an open future and attempts to recognize, discover and understand the very politics behind “change”.

This doesn’t mean that we should view politics and change as something that can be reduced to mere contingency. To the contrary, contingency does not mean that understandings of structural causes and logics are inapplicable to explain politics. It only means that politics may be constrained by structural dynamics, but are never reduced to them. Contingency and structure are not mutually exclusive (Parker (2009) also makes this point). If this would be the case, there would be little room for agency (and consequently it wouldn’t be politics) (Massey, 2005). That is why – and here I draw again on Massey – space itself cannot be understood without understanding the “life in space”.

488 That is why I preferred to use the concept of “change” instead of the concept of transition when discussing ongoing processes of formation and transformation.
489 Referring to the importance of considering life in space, Massey writes that “conceiving of space as a static slice through time, as representation, as a closed system and so forth are all ways of taming it. They enable us to ignore its real import: the coeval multiplicity of other trajectories and the necessary outward-lookingness of a spatialised subjectivity. (...) If time is to be open to a future of the new then space cannot be equated with the closures and horizontalities of representations. More generally, if time is to be open
of violence, personal objectives or strategic relations are some of the rather contingent
dynamics of that life that can redirect territorial and/or capitalist logics of power (cf.
Harvey, 2003). As such, this study hasn’t been searching for a timeless truth, only at-
ttempted to provide epistemic gain to understand the political impact of contemporary
globalization in the Arab World (Morocco more specifically).

If we consider the political impact of contemporary globalization, Ray Bush argues
that there seem to be two narratives on the future of the MENA-region. One narrative
proclaims the end of the national economy and the dominance of the globalization.
Often, the story then goes that the benefits of poverty reduction, economic growth,
modernization and democratization can only be delivered if the countries of the region
open up their economies to the virtues of free market trade and financial capital. Press-
ing socio-economic problems related to poverty, unemployment, social exclusion are
often presented as either mere economic problems (e.g. a lack of economic growth, a
question of economic exclusion, not enough trade liberalization, etc.) or as mere tech-
nocratic problems (e.g. institutional failure, ‘bad’ governance, etc.). Another narrative,
one I presented in my work, strongly contradicts the first one and claims that contem-
porary globalization actually entails the continuation and intensification – albeit in new
ways – of capitalist uneven development (Bush, 2004). I demonstrated that, in reality,
the root causes of (and solutions for) the pressing socio-economic problems in a coun-
try as Morocco are in the first place political. Moreover, today, these socio-economic
problems are not so much the consequence of an ‘incomplete implementation’ of neo-
liberal reforms (e.g. Dillman, 2002), but rather an essential part of the inherent logic of
neoliberal politics tout court. To explain this, I have looked at and studied Morocco’s
contemporary urban politics. The urban space is a primary arena of political struggle
in current times of neoliberal globalization. And as the French philosopher Henri Lefe-
bvre reminded us, the material constitution of the urban space is always a reflection of
the current and historical balances of political power (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; 1996; 2003).
The results of that power have been etched into the spatial forms of the Moroccan city.
As such, I considered the Moroccan city as the primary object of a – not necessarily
coherent nor rational – political project of actually existing neoliberalism.

More specifically, I considered two cases of urban politics that exemplify the neoliberal
urban extremes. First of all, I looked at different techniques and methods to govern the
slums. In the history of Moroccan urbanization, the slums and their population have
often posed a threat to the hegemonic political order. During Morocco’s three decades
of neoliberal restructuring, two specific moments of violence in the city of Casablanca
(the 1981 riots and the 2003 suicide bombings) have accelerated and determined the
elaboration of particular techniques of government in order to securitize the city. These
techniques originated within the framework of the then prevalent neoliberal govern-
mentality and have been described as techniques of sovereign city planning (1980s)

490 As I mentioned in the introduction, I followed David Harvey’s conception of urban politics, namely
“the broad sense of political processes at work within a fluidly defined but nevertheless explicit space”
(Harvey, 1989a: 127).
Concluding remarks 

and techniques of security (2000s). Relying on Foucauldian notions of power, Mari-ana Valverde has argued that the conception of “sovereign city planning” describes techniques that capitalize a territory and emphasize monumental state architecture in order to incite loyalty to a sovereign. In contrast, the conception of “cities of security” describes particular techniques that are more concerned with the biopolitical manage-
ment of the urban population and the future risks related to that population. Within the framework of this theoretical distinction, I have shown that the methods developed after the 1981 riots attempted above all to strengthen state power at the urban scale in order to improve social control over the physical environment (the urban territory) through which people move. This coincided with a phase of roll back neoliberalism in which certain functions of the state were rolled back (i.e. the redistributive and welfare providing functions). The negative social outcomes of economic austerity and the roll back of direct state-intervention in economic affairs urged the re-centralization of state power in other domains (administrative territorial control, police control, the power of symbolic monuments and state architecture, etc.).

Subsequently, in the 1990s, the governmental rationalities in Morocco – which evolved together with a global transition from the Washington Consensus to a Post-Washington Consensus – attempted to address the meagre socio-economic results of orthodox neo-liberal recipes (structural adjustment). This has led to a shift in development policies. It was clear that mere economic deregulation was not enough to spur economic growth and the idea grew stronger that a liberal market-economy required strong technocratic state-support. Again, a violent moment accelerated the elaboration of new government-
tal methods and the roll out of new institutional arrangements to support the integra-
tion of slum dwellers in the formal market-economy. Social exclusion and economic marginalization were considered the breeding ground for radicalization and extremism and state-led and state-sponsored market-integration was the obvious solution. New methods to improve the urban citizen’s participation in slum relocation projects (AS) and specific arrangements to improve his access to capital (FOGARIM, micro-credits) were some of the main techniques of social engineering that characterized governmen-
tal intervention at the level of the individual slum dweller. This time, not so much the urban territory but the (slum) population itself became the primary target to improve social control over the urban space. The idea was to responsibilize the slum dweller and turn him into a good citizen. Of course, the market was the main model for individual self-regulation and the exploitation of poverty capital (i.e. the exploration of new fron-
tiers of capital accumulation) equally provided the incentives and rationalities for the invention of new modalities of state intervention.

In a second case study, I looked at an example of an urban mega-project. More precisely, I focused on the Bouregreg project, a high-end waterfront development project of 6,000 ha in the valley of the Bouregreg river between the cities of Rabat and Salé. These kind of urban development schemes are often presented as important strategies to promote economic growth, strengthen the urban competitive position and demonstrate a ‘devel-
oping’ country’s willingness to engage in global capitalism. The Bouregreg project has to accelerate the rhythm of (foreign) investments and promote the cities’ unique selling position. Politically, the Moroccan state intervened in the urban economy by rolling out new institutional arrangements that exemplify, in this particular case, the forma-
tion of “new state spaces”. These state spaces are forms of “graduated sovereignty” in the course of which state power has been displaced to and renegotiated in exceptional zones that exist inside or alongside arrangements of conventional government (e.g. the national territory, the region, the prefecture, etc...). The AAVB is a salient example of such a new state space and demonstrates that state power materializes in diverse ways and gives form to variegated entities which are not necessarily congruent with the national boundaries. The rationality behind the formation of new state spaces and the establishment of new institutional configurations fit within the process of the Moroccan shift from sovereign city planning (embedded within roll back neoliberalism) to forms of “urban entrepreneurialism” in which state agencies are actively involved in the direction of market opportunities and developments (this is the essence of roll out neoliberalism). New state spaces are an outcome of how neoliberal politics produce the urban uneven development. As James Ferguson argued, the capital engaged in these mega-projects hops from place to place and, in the course of this process, it bypasses huge areas and populations (Ferguson, 2005). Consequently, we have seen that neoliberal reform (in whatever form) has not necessarily led to a retreat of the state but more specifically to a redefinition of its modes of intervention and a transformation of its institutional character. Based on the presented evidence from these two case studies, I also argued that the Moroccan political commitments to fight poverty and promote economic growth form an intrinsic part of the neoliberal political project and demonstrate how local politics are not just imposed by neoliberal globalization, but are – to follow up on Massey (2005) – agents in the production of the neoliberal capitalist global. Drawing on Aihwa Ong, the production of these forms of graduated sovereignty are rather ad hoc and practical attempts to think about and act upon a specific problem in a particular locale (Ong, 2006).

Three general remarks can be distinguished here. First of all, as mentioned, the state plays a crucial role in neoliberal projects. This not only affects the particular project but also the constitution of the state itself. As we have seen, the state has altered its modes of intervention (towards a privatization of the state) in which modalities of indirect rule are often privileged over direct intervention (e.g. PPPs, financial support of associations, the private sector and NGOs, etc.). Additionally, the state apparatus has also been subject to processes of re-regulation, re-institutionalization and re-territorialization in order to co-determine the geography of capitalist accumulation. The Bouregreg state space was one example, but many other cases have been mentioned alongside (e.g. Hassan II Fund, TMSA, etc.). This transformation of the Moroccan state has taken place within the framework of an urban political project that has assembled strategies to establish social control with strategies to maximize profit and capitalist integration.

Secondly, besides class power, biopower has been vital to the expansion of capitalism in Morocco. Whereas the first may have been particularly crucial for the “extensive enlargement” of capitalism worldwide, methods of biopower were, above all, crucial for its “intensive enlargement”, i.e. a process where the commodification of social relations has been deepened significantly (Robinson, 2004). Bio-politics are implicated in the making of a world which neoliberal rationality and discourse suggests actually already exists (Lemke, 2002). In general, authoritarian regimes are usually associated with sovereign forms of power. Yet, I demonstrated why an understanding of the dif-
ferent methods of biopower are equally important to understand the functioning of “authoritarian governmentality” (Dean, 1999). The intensive enlargement of capitalism requires careful techniques to integrate particular populations and their assets into the capital circulation process. In the case of the VSBN, the issue of urban poverty was taken up as an *entry point* in order to enhance both bureaucratic control and explore new frontiers of capital accumulation. If we look beyond the specific ideological packaging of social development schemes such as VSBN – e.g. with a focus on participatory development, the virtues of home-ownership, etc. – a political reality is revealed in which not so much poverty alleviation per se really matters, but rather *how* this political objective can be integrated in a neoliberal project. Understanding this reality requires not only attention to the class dimension of contemporary globalization but also to its underpinning and deeply entrenched rationalities.

Third, neoliberal urban politics have given rise to new, wider and more open assemblages of (state-/class-)power. Foreign investors, architects, urbanists, real estate developers, etc. have become new players on the field of the state. This not necessarily means that traditional state elites are losing their power, but rather that new (capitalist) actors are drawn within reach (Panitch, 1998; Allen & Cochrane, 2010). As a consequence, the redesign of urban life and the government of the city has become more accountable to investors (and other ‘outsiders’) over and above the interests of ordinary urban residents. As such, many of the agents of change (such as global capital) do not even reside in the cities they reshape (Parker, 2009; Bayat & Biekart, 2009).

In general, the post-1980s round of political restructuring in Morocco can be characterized by a reconfiguration of government in three ways: (1) the rescaling of government (e.g. by privileging the urban scale); (2) the reorientation of public policy from redistribution (how limited it may have been) to competition (urban entrepreneurialism). After all, neoliberal reform was an attack on the redistribution of wealth and the provision of welfare by public policies and entailed the transfer of social services to market actors, while at the same time it produced individualized subjects responsible for their own well-being (Dikeç, 2006; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010); (3) the displacement and renegotiation of state power into new state spaces and new governmental arrangements (i.e. the respatialization and the privatization of the state). As a result of these restructurings, urban politics generated an evolution in the way authorities looked upon the city. The Moroccan city evolved from being considered predominantly as a political and social burden to be perceived as an opportunity, a dynamic place for generating economic growth. However, it is unlikely that this turnover will lead to a decrease of urban uneven development – although it is often legitimized as such – but rather sustain and reproduce the socio-spatial fragmentation of the city, and consequently, more than likely also produce new political tensions.

I demonstrated that different expressions of political power are implicated in an urban project in which – above all – the city-centre has been reclaimed or brought in as the primary space to be consumed (in order to turn it into a space of consumption). The urban poor – or more generally, all those who cannot afford the promoted style of living – are gradually, and in a way deliberately, pushed out of the city-centre to make place for high-rent speculative urban development. I mention here ‘deliberately’ because the
strategic redesign of the urban centres in Morocco is the outcome of conscious political choices. Yet, the relocation of the poor (either literally with the VSBP or indirectly through processes of gentrification) goes not without exploiting their poverty capital as well.\footnote{To be correct, many of the speculative urban projects in Morocco have not been finished yet. So, the hypothesis of gentrification has not been demonstrated yet. Nevertheless, given the evidence delivered by studies in other countries and regions, the likeliness of gentrification should not be underestimated and even be considered highly probable (cf. chapter 5).} Thanks to methods of biopower the poor are not an unprofitable market anymore (cf. Erik Hobsbawm’s opening quote in chapter 4), but rather a valid (temporarily?) alternative for real estate developers, landlords, capital investors, etc. In the end, the different examples I discussed over the course of this project should not so much be described as strategies for “economic growth” or “economic development”, as these descriptions almost inevitably evoke illusions of trickle down and general welfare. These are the myths of contemporary neoliberal globalization. Instead, we should not fall into the trap of just trusting numbers and data of economic growth and poverty reduction blindly (cf. Achy 2010), without critically investigating the very mechanisms that produce them (Ruccio, 2011). As such, we can discern some of the very mechanisms that actually install and reproduce uneven development and social inequality. Because in the end it is inequality, and not so much poverty, that generates the real trigger behind social unrest, revolt, political instability and maybe, eventually, revolutionary politics (as we have seen in Tunisia and Egypt just recently). Accordingly, the examples discussed in this project should be described and defined as they really are: class strategies of capital accumulation, surplus appropriation, profit maximization and accumulation by dispossession.

Both the high-end urban development projects (e.g. Bouregreg) and the current social development projects (e.g. VSBP) can be viewed as part of the particular neoliberal spatial fix in Morocco. The spatial fix comprises the variegated political strategies that (re-)claim the inner-city and its coastlines and determine the conditions for urban development, design and relocation. On the one hand, this “spatial fix” refers to the ways in which capital is fixed in the built environment in order to support capitalist expansion, but also to the ways in which the built environment provides new solutions for capital surplus problems. On the other hand, this fix refers to the technological, institutional and governmental innovations that are created to assure and promote capitalist expansion. The neoliberal spatial fix is the particular contemporary constellation that keeps worldwide capital flow in constant motion. Yet, despite the promises for a better world that are often trying to legitimize these specific growth strategies, current political-economic restructurings in the urban space disenfranchise urban inhabitants beyond the scope of typical imaginations of the nature of political freedoms and political power that are ascribed to either authoritarian and liberal democratic systems. Whether it concerns contemporary liberal democratic societies or forms of authoritarianism, neoliberal restructurings have decreased the impact of ordinary citizens to co-determine the shaping of their own cities in both kind of societies (Purcell, 2002). For example, the gradual but uncompromising privatization of public spaces through the promotion of high-end urban development projects symbolizes the subtle shift away – everywhere in the world – from human rights and political freedoms towards the rights of private property (Marsden, 1999).
Projects such as the Royal Avenue, Casa-Marina, and the Bouregreg project do not take into account the particular social place and interests of original inhabitants. To the contrary, these projects largely ignore “the ways in which residents are both part of and live within the city” (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2010: 217). According to Berry-Chikhaoui, two opposing representations and perceptions of the city are conflicting here: the economic status of the city and the stakes and interests that coincide with its integration in a global market on the one hand, and the everyday lives of ordinary citizens and their social and spatial interests and experiences on the other hand (Ibid.: 218). This is what Henri Lefebvre called the conflicting difference between the exchange value and the use value of urban space (Lefebvre, 1996). The Moroccan urban project participates and inscribes itself in the making of a world in which “the right of private property and the profit rate trump all other notions of rights” (Harvey, 2008: 33). The valorisation and consumption of urban space has been a key accumulation strategy for capital and property rights have given capitalist developers relatively free reign to produce the urban space according to their own interests (Purcell, 2002). To come back to the case of the VSBP, it is an illusion to believe that formal property rights will automatically enable poor urban residents to empower themselves and enhance their chances in the formal market-economy. Legal property rights not only formalizes and legalizes the assets of the urban poor, it also makes these assets visible and attainable for more powerful market actors. The current spatial boundaries that are drawn with the Bouregreg project and the emphasis on home-ownership within the VSBP reveal the making of a particular kind of political world where consumers (with enough money) instead of citizens have the right to the city. It also reveals the making of a political world where “the rich have state-help and the poor have self-help” (Roy, 2010: 216). The crucial question is: will both the state and the poor be able to continue to pay for the neoliberal projects of the rich?

Morocco was my case study, but the discussed political changes and urban transformations can also be ascribed to the rest of the Arab world. Some scholars have begun to direct our focus to these recent regional changes in different ways (amongst others Hibou, 2006; Catusse, 2008; Parker, 2009; Kanna, 2009; Barthel, 2010; Krijnen & Fawaz, 2010). Of course, the particular political transformations discussed in this study are by no means unique to the Arab World. Although there are important regional and country
specific dynamics (actually existing forms of neoliberalism), I have tried to describe an almost universal kind of political transformation that coincided with the continuing spread of capitalism and the increasing hegemony of the capitalist system (especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall). The examples discussed here open up theoretical and empirical space for a comparison of the political transformations in the Arab region with case studies in the rest of the world. More specifically, the neoliberal inspired processes of state formation, state respatialization and state intervention are subject to the same global trends affecting the rest of the world. These observations, and the political dimension of mega-projects like the Bouregreg project and social development schemes such as VSBP, call into question “the assumption whether the Arab World can still be considered a coherent regional subsystem providing a significant framework of analysis for social sciences” (Aggestam, e.a., 2009: 345). By pinpointing both the universality and the Moroccan or regional specificity of these changes, the Arab region can be liberated from its exceptionalist straitjacket. To do so, we have to move away from explanations of political change that focus only on endogenous political legacies and away from state-centred approaches that tend to lose sight of the complexity of contemporary assemblages of power in times of neoliberal globalization. Additionally, and to conclude, understanding the actual political dynamics of neoliberal globalization concerns less the degree of globalization (and the consequent question whether Casablanca is as global as for example Dubai, or even London), but rather, and more importantly, the form of globalization and the political construction of that form (Massey, 2005). From that perspective we can observe similar and comparable political developments in the whole Arab region, and beyond.
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