Norms, self-interest and effectiveness

Explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

The promotion of democracy has become a key objective of the European Union (EU) in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the ways in which this objective is pursued is by reacting to violations of democratic principles using negative measures: naming and shaming strategies or economic/diplomatic sanctions. Yet the application of negative measures has been criticised as being characterised by ‘double standards’, meaning that similar violations of democratic principles have led to a different response from the EU. This dissertation searches for explanations for these double standards. In-depth comparative studies on the motivations for double standards in the application of negative measures in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-2000 period have been lacking. While double standards have mostly been attributed to the prevalence of self-interested objectives of the EU, this dissertation considers two additional factors: (1) a potential conflict in the EU’s normative objectives (democracy, development and stability) and (2) expectations about the effectiveness of negative measures.

These three explanatory factors (norms, self-interest and effectiveness) are investigated for ten case studies in sub-Saharan Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. It is shown that there have been double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in these countries: similar violations of democratic principles have led to different reactions from the EU (positive measures, low-cost negative measures and sanctions). The motivations for these double standards are then investigated by studying the potential impact of norms, self-interest and effectiveness.

On the one hand, previous studies emphasising self-interest are confirmed. Historical interests related to the desire of member states to maintain their sphere of influence have in some cases led to double standards (Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe). Moreover, the growing concern for self-interested security objectives such as the war on terror has led to increased tolerance for governments that are seen as crucial allies in fighting these security concerns (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad), while sanctions were more easily adopted where this was not the case (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire). On the other hand, the study also found evidence that runs counter to the importance of self-interest: (1) commercial interests were found to have little explanatory value, (2) some countries that can also be considered allies in the security sphere were not shielded from negative measures (Kenya), and (3) the EU also avoided negatives measures in countries that were not allies in the pursuit of security objectives (Eritrea, Rwanda). Furthermore, the EU’s other normative objectives (stability, development) were found to be equally important. Negative measures were more easily adopted in countries where development performance had been weak (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger) or where internal stability was under threat (Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger). In contrast, negative measures were avoided in the case of ‘development success stories’ (Rwanda, Ethiopia). Lastly, the study revealed that expectations about effectiveness were equally taken into account by the EU. Sanctions were more often adopted in case of a coordinated action with the main other actors, and when the domestic position of the government was already weakened. Furthermore, sanctions were avoided where the EU was found to have no leverage (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ethiopia).
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Woord vooraf

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<td>AAMS:</td>
<td>Associated African and Malagasy States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC:</td>
<td>Action Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP:</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, Pacific</td>
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<td>AGOA:</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AMIS:</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM:</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APRM:</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AQIM:</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Maghreb</td>
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<td>AU:</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEC:</td>
<td>Broad Economic Categories</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIC:</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMAC:</td>
<td>Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA:</td>
<td>Communauté française d’Afrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA:</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA:</td>
<td>franc de la Communauté financière africaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP:</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP:</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPC:</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>CNOOC:</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Company</td>
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<td>COREU:</td>
<td>Correspondence européenne</td>
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<td>CNPC:</td>
<td>Chinese National Petroleum Cooperation</td>
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<td>CPDC:</td>
<td>Coordination pour la Défense de la Constitution</td>
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<td>CRS:</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP:</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUD:</td>
<td>Coalition for Unity and Democracy</td>
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<td>DFID:</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DG:</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>DG DEVCO:</td>
<td>Directorate-General Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DRC:</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EEC:</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EC:</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG:</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS:</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF:</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAR</td>
<td>Joint Annual Review</td>
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<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et le Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNJ</td>
<td>Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice</td>
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<td>MNSD</td>
<td>Mouvement National pour la Sécurité et du Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODEN/FA</td>
<td>Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien pour une Fédération Africaine</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Missions des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MORAD</td>
<td>Movement Against the Referendum for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPCI</td>
<td>Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPIGO</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du Grand Ouest</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPJ</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Mouvement Patriotique du Salut</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAK</td>
<td>National Alliances of Kenya</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEEDS</td>
<td>National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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</table>
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
PBS: Protection of Basic Services
PDCI: Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire
PDP: Peoples Democratic Party
PFDJ: People’s Front for Democracy and Justice
PNDS: Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme
PPP: Purchasing Power Parity
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSI: Pan-Sahel Initiative
PUP: Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès
QMV: Qualified Majority Voting
RDA: Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RDR: Rassemblement des Républicains
RECAMP: Renforcement des Capacités Africaines des Maintien de la Paix
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPG: Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SADC: South African Development Community
SPLM: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TNG: Transitional National Government
UEDF: United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UEMOA: Union Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNAMID: United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
UN-Habitat: United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UK: United Kingdom
US: United States
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
USD: United States Dollar
WB: World Bank
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WMD:</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO:</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF:</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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1. Introduction
1. Introduction

1.1. Introducing the research topic and question

‘Why was the Commission so welcoming of President Issaias of Eritrea when President Mugabe, who is also involved in a repressive regime like that of President Issaias, is banned from the EU? Does the Commission feel that consequently it is practising double standards?’ (European Parliament 2007a).

This question posed by Member of European Parliament (MEP) Sajjad Karim at the occasion of the invitation of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to the European Commission clearly illustrates the research puzzle on which this dissertation is based. The MEP is right to point out that Eritrea, a one-party state with the worst press freedom record in the world, is not more democratic than Zimbabwe. Yet Mugabe is subject to a travel ban, while Afwerki is not. If double standards refer to ‘a set of principles that applies differently and usually more rigorously to one group of people or circumstances than to another’, as defined in Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, then the MEP’s claim that double standards are applied to the leaders of Eritrea and Zimbabwe is correct.

Democratic principles have become a key aspect of European Union (EU) relations with sub-Saharan Africa and a condition for receiving aid. The EU now has the instruments to publicly condemn violations of democratic principles, address these issues with the government in regular dialogue, support democratic actors and institutions, or impose negative measures including travel bans, weapons embargoes or the suspension of development assistance. However, the EU has often faced accusations of double standards in the application of these instruments. To start with, the mere focus of political conditionality on economically weak and politically unimportant sub-Saharan African countries already points to such double standards (Fierro 2003: 309). According to Bartels: ‘It is telling [...] that the EU has consistently failed to make public mention of human rights clauses in agreements with the Mediterranean or Central Asian countries, many of which have far from perfect human rights records’ (Bartels 2005: 39). Similarly, Brummer argues that, although sanctions were mostly imposed against countries with severe violations of democratic principles, ‘several other countries that appear equally problematic [did] not face sanctions’ (Brummer 2009: 197).

The true challenge is then to find out what causes these double standards. The above-mentioned studies already indicate that poor, economically weak, strategically unimportant countries, often in sub-Saharan Africa, are more often subject to negative measures than important commercial or strategic partners. This argument seems supported by Human Rights Watch researcher Carina
Tertsakian, who criticised Nigeria’s hosting of the Commonwealth summit in 2003, while Mugabe was not invited:

‘So what’s the difference between Nigeria and Zimbabwe? The former produces large amounts of oil and, with more than 50 million Muslims, counts as a valuable ally in the “war against terrorism”’ (Tertsakian 2003)

However, the example of Eritrea, an extremely poor country, with an isolated government that is under United Nations (UN) sanctions for supporting the Al-Shabaab, shows that this explanation is probably too simplistic. As I will argue, profound, up-to-date comparative research on this question has been lacking. The question of double standards therefore poses a puzzle, which this dissertation will address.

1.1.1. Research question

The main research question is thus the following:

Which factors can explain double standards in the EU’s reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa?

The research question immediately requires further specification and definition. First of all, which ‘reactions’ to violations of democratic principles are we talking about? The most commonly used distinction in instruments of democracy promotion is that between positive measures (often referred to as carrots), and negative measures (often referred to as sticks). Positive measures include ‘normative suasion’ to persuade or convince countries to undertake democratic reform (Warkotsch 2008a; Warkotsch 2009) and capacity-building strategies, where the EU ‘assists’ democracy by providing financial aid to either civil society organisations or to state-driven democratic reform (Burnell 2000: 9; Santiso 2001: 159). Negative measures may range from simple ‘naming and shaming’ strategies including public declarations, demarches, common positions and Council conclusions (Smith 2001: 191; Warkotsch 2009: 254) to negative conditionality where certain benefits (aid, trade, diplomatic visits) are suspended as a punishment for violations of democratic principles (Fierro 2003: 100-101; Smith 1998: 256). Negative measures also include diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes (Kreutz 2005: 6). In this dissertation, the term ‘negative measures’ includes all the aforementioned instruments. Negative measures that go beyond naming and shaming strategies, including development aid suspensions, arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions or any form of economic sanctions, will be referred to as ‘sanctions’.

Secondly, I should establish what I mean by ‘democratic principles’. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to make a critical analysis of the model of democracy pursued by the EU in its relations
with sub-Saharan Africa. Since I am mainly interested in the reasons for double standards rather than in the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion, I will examine the EU’s reaction to violations of two key principles of liberal democracy: electoral democracy and civil-political rights. There is a consensus that liberal democracy is the democratic model that the EU pursues in third countries (Kotzian et al. 2011: 995; Wetzel and Orbie 2011; Burnell 2011: 58). Diamond provides a workable definition of liberal democracy. According to this definition, liberal democracy first and foremost presupposes electoral democracy: ‘a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage’ (Diamond 1999: 10). Liberal democracy further requires the absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors not accountable to the electorate, horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another and extensive provisions for pluralism and individual and group freedoms, secured through the rule of law (Ibid.: 10-11). In its own official documents on EU relations with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the EU mentions the following democratic principles: legitimacy (free and fair elections), legality (the existence of clear-cut rules as guaranteed by an appropriate constitutional, legislative and regulatory system) and effective application (horizontal accountability, respect for the rule of law by state institutions) (European Commission 1998: 5-9). This definition largely concurs with Diamond’s definition of liberal democracy.

Although the above-mentioned definitions suggest that other aspects of liberal democracy are equally pursued by the EU, it can be assumed that the EU’s negative measures will be used mainly as a reaction to violations of (1) electoral democracy and (2) civil-political rights. First of all, these two features are the key elements of liberal democracy, with the adjective ‘liberal’ referring to the respect for civil-political rights, while electoral democracy is mainly embedded in the noun ‘democracy’ (Donnelly 1999). Moreover, it has been argued that political conditionality is mainly applied to induce governments of developing countries to hold elections (Van Cranenburgh 2000: 21; Tomasevski 1997: 163-165; Diamond 1999: 56). Furthermore, donors typically focus on ‘first generation’ human rights (civil-political rights such as the freedom of press, freedom of association, etc.) rather than second generation rights (economic, social and cultural) rights (Neumayer 2003a: 652). This is no different for the EU. It has been noticed that negative conditionality has mostly been applied as a response to sudden deteriorations of the electoral process, including flawed elections or a coup d’état (Laakso et al. 2007a: 16; Portela 2010: 142-143).

Lastly, I should make clear that the dissertation is limited to sub-Saharan African countries. However, throughout the dissertation I sometimes refer to ‘Africa’, or ‘EU-African’ relations. Although this is not entirely correct when mentioning those aspects of EU-Africa relations that are only applicable to

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1 For this discussion, see, for example, Lumumba-Kasongo (2005).
sub-Saharan Africa (as part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific or ACP group), the reason for this is purely to improve fluidity in the text.

1.1.2. EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa

In order to better understand the research question, a short background to EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa is necessary. It is important to mention the context in which democracy emerged as an aspect of EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa, and how this context has changed over the years. At the same time, the overview will introduce the main instruments at the EU’s disposal to react to violations of democratic principles.

The question of how to react to violations of democratic principles in partner countries was already raised in the 1970s, in the context of the severe human rights violations by the Idi Amin regime in Uganda. The European Economic Community (EEC) partially suspended aid to Uganda, and aid programmes were limited to those that directly benefited the population. However, at that time, there was considerable reluctance from the ACP countries to accept references to democratic principles in the association agreements with the EU. The inclusion of civil-political rights was particularly sensitive as it was argued that the Lomé Agreement was an economic agreement. Moreover, there was a fear that the inclusion of human rights could lead to unilateral action and selective and discriminating measures by the Community. As a result, the Lomé III Agreement (1985-1990) did not mention democratic principles, but was limited to economic and social rights, anti-discrimination and human dignity (Arts 2000: 168-181).

Nonetheless, by the time of the signature of the Lomé-IV Agreement (1989), references to democratic principles had become more acceptable, while the pressure for such references had mounted. Human rights had become part and parcel of international, European and even African law. In this respect, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1986) should be mentioned. On the European side, the activism of the European Parliament (EP) on human rights issues is notable, which led to the adoption of a Council statement on human rights (1986), as well as an Annual Report on human rights. At the same time, ACP countries found themselves in a much weaker position compared to the 1970s. The economic crisis and related debt crisis had made them more dependent on foreign aid and loans, while the Soviet Union had become reluctant to support African countries (Fierro 2003: 67). It is in this context that the human rights clause in Lomé IV (1990-1995) was adopted. This clause, to be found in Article 5 of the Agreement, clearly stated that ‘development policy and cooperation shall be closely linked to respect for and enjoyment of fundamental human rights’. In contrast to the previous Lomé agreements, there was now a clear reference to all human rights (civil, political, economic, social, cultural), although there was no specific reference to democratic principles. Nonetheless, the article did not specify what should be done in case human rights were violated. It only mentioned that
financial resources could be allocated to the promotion of human rights (Crawford 2000: 95). On some occasions, however, the Community suspended aid on a purely unilateral basis, namely in Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya and Malawi (Smith 1998: 264-267).

The end of the Cold War further speeded up the adoption of political conditionality in the EEC’s agreements with ACP countries. First of all, ACP countries, after losing their economic negotiating power, now also lost their strategic importance. During the Cold War, many sub-Saharan African countries were seen as clients Western countries should keep close, regardless of the democratic character of their governments (Dunning 2004: 410-411; Stokke 1996: 20; Kraxberger 2005: 51-52).

Secondly, the end of the Cold War also entailed a reorientation towards the Central and East European Countries, which received increased economic aid with a view to incorporate them into the Community. In this enlargement process, political conditionality was applied, since new members had to comply with political criteria, including the rule of law, respect for human rights, a multi-party system and free and fair elections (De Ridder et al. 2008: 244-247). Thirdly, the collapse of communism as an alternative model to liberal democracy also rendered Western countries more powerful vis-à-vis African states, as it was believed that there was no alternative to the Western model (Abrahamsen 2000: 3 and 34). Fourthly, the political competencies of the EEC widened with the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). One of the objectives of the CFSP was ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Smith 1998: 261-263). CFSP instruments have been frequently used to promote democratic principles, including diplomatic declarations, demarches, political dialogue, diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes (Smith 2008: 115-116).

In this context, the Council issued a Resolution on human rights, democracy and development (1991), in which member states expressed their preference for a positive approach, based on an open and constructive dialogue with partner countries and financial assistance in support of democratisation. However, it was added that, ‘in the event of grave and persistent human rights violations or the serious interruption of the democratic processes, the Community and its Member States will consider appropriate responses in the light of the circumstances’. These appropriate responses could range from confidential demarches to the suspension of cooperation. In the subsequent Lomé-IV-bis Convention (1995), conditionality was introduced ‘in its purest form’ (Hilpold 2002: 63). Contrary to the human rights clause in Article 5 of Lomé-IV, the new clause was a true ‘conditionality clause’, as it introduced human rights, democracy and the rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of the agreement and foresaw a procedure in case of violation of these essential elements. This procedure, which was outlined in Article 366(a) of the agreement, stated that consultations could be called in case one of the Parties had violated one or several of the essential elements. Appropriate measures could be taken if no solution was found during consultations. As to these measures, it was emphasised that ‘suspension should be a measure of last resort’. While conditionality was thus established, there was equally an
evolution in the positive measures at the EU’s disposal. As a reaction to an EP request, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was introduced in 1994 as a budget line to finance democracy promotion activities (Santiso 2002: 11).

The Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) further strengthened the political dimension of the Partnership between the European Community (EC) and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (henceforth ACP-EC Partnership). Article 8 introduced a political dialogue with the objective to ‘exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of priorities and shared agendas’. Democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance were explicitly mentioned as topics of the dialogue. At the same time, Cotonou broadened the application of conditionality to include ‘good governance’. The EU had meant to incorporate good governance as an essential element of the Cotonou Agreement, but this was opposed by the ACP group (Holland 2002: 202-203). A compromise was to introduce good governance as a ‘fundamental element’, meaning that ‘only serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery […] constitute a violation of that element’ (Article 9).

Nonetheless, after the signature of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU became less prone to use negative conditionality. A consensus emerged in the late 1990s that conditionality does not work without the commitment of partner countries. This was also the case for the EU’s conditionality clause, which often failed because of a lack of commitment from recipient countries (Hazelzet 2005; Mbangu 2005). Indeed, Laakso and others noted a ‘sanctions fatigue’ after the invocation of Article 96 against Zimbabwe in 2002 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 53). This sanctions fatigue concurred with a number of studies that argued that aid could only have a positive effect on economic growth when interacting with good economic policies, leading donors to adopt ‘aid selectivity’ by focusing on the better performers (Addison and McGillivray 2004: 349; World Bank 1998). Apart from learning effects, the change in Commissioners also played a role. Whereas Commissioner Nielson was still somewhat ‘enthusiastic’ about political conditionality, Commissioner Michel was strongly in favour of positive measures (anonymous interviews, February-March 2008).

Apart from these new ideas on conditionality, the EU’s leverage in sub-Saharan Africa has also diminished, as it is increasingly pushed away by other actors. Firstly, there is the growing presence of the United States (US), which has focused on African oil to diminish dependence from the Middle East and has stepped up military cooperation in the war on terror (Volman 2003). Secondly, newly emerging countries, including the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Arab countries, developed an interest in the primary commodities needed for their growing economies. These actors publicly oppose interference in the internal affairs of their economic partners (Wissenbach 2009). Furthermore, there are signs that the heydays of democracy are increasingly belonging to the past. Indeed, the economic success of non-democratic countries (China, Russia) casts doubt on the link
between democracy and development. On some occasions, these actors have engaged in ‘autocracy promotion’, meaning the deliberate or unintended diffusion of undemocratic norms (Burnell 2011: 254). The financial-economic crisis that has affected European and American economies since 2008 will undoubtedly further add to the diminishing influence of ‘the West’.

In this context, from 2005 onwards, political conditionality has become less important in EU discourse and policy practice. The 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement reinforced political dialogue as a preventive mechanism to discuss violations of democratic principles. Hence, before applying the Article 96 mechanism, a reinforced and formalised Article 8 dialogue should be held to ‘exhaust all options prior to consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement’. Moreover, whereas the original provisions foresaw a maximum duration of 30 days, the maximum terms for consultations were extended to 60 days (Mackie 2008: 147-148). In 2006, the European Commission announced a new incentive mechanism to promote democratic governance\(^2\) in ACP countries. The EU’s approach was different from the aid selectivity applied by most donors, as the EU rewarded countries committed to democratic governance, rather than focusing aid allocation on the better performers. With the Governance Incentive Tranche, €1.2 billion of the 10\(^{th}\) European Development Fund (EDF) was thus set aside to top up the country envelope with 10-35 percent extra aid, depending on the quality of the Governance Action Plan drawn up by the country and the participation in African initiatives on democratic governance (Carbone 2010; Molenaers and Nijs 2009; Molenaers and Nijs 2011).

This is not to say that negative measures have become irrelevant, nor that political conditionality is completely abandoned. The most recent revision of the Cotonou Agreement (2010) has not changed the provisions regarding political conditionality, although in practice the application of Article 96 has mostly been limited to cases of coups d’état. However, other forms of negative conditionality have emerged, namely the suspension of general budget support. The provision of budget support in non-democratic countries has sparked a debate in the EU. The EP has been particularly critical about disbursing budget support on politically sensitive moments, such as in the context of the post-electoral crisis in Kenya (2007). As a result, there have been several unilateral decisions to suspend budget support for political reasons, namely in Ethiopia (2005), Honduras (2009), Nicaragua (2008) and Niger (2009) (Hayman 2011a).\(^3\) This discussion has further been nurtured by the changing international context. Indeed, the Arab spring has increased awareness of the sensitivity of budget support in an authoritarian context. At the same time, austerity measures due to the financial-economic

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\(^2\) ‘Democratic governance’ was used to refer to a wide range of policies deemed positive for a country’s economic and political development. This included democratic principles but also public finance management, sound economic policies, etc. (see Chapter 3).

\(^3\) These are the only examples I could find of EU budget support being suspended on the basis of purely political criteria. In sub-Saharan Africa, there have been similar incidents in Zambia and Mozambique, where the EU used budget support as a leverage to raise political issues (Molenaers et al. 2010). In Uganda, political dialogue was started after the harassment of political opponents in the run-up to the 2005 elections, but eventually aid was not suspended.
crisis have made European donors more wary of the destination of aid funds. In this context, the European Commission and Council of the EU have recently agreed to make general budget support conditional on democracy and good governance by concluding ‘Good Governance and Development Contracts’ with countries receiving general budget support (European Commission 2011a; Council of the EU 2012a). These examples show that the question ‘to suspend or not to suspend’ is still on the table, even in the current context.

1.1.3. Liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa

Promoting liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is certainly a challenge. On the one hand, since the second half of the 1990s, multi-party systems have become the norm on the subcontinent. By 1998, only seven sub-Saharan African countries had not yet experienced multi-party elections (van de Walle 2001: 13). On the other hand, most sub-Saharan African democracies are ‘hybrid regimes’, combining elements of liberal democracy and authoritarianism (Diamond 2002: 23-24). While elections are held in most sub-Saharan African countries, these are often organised in a way clearly favouring the ruling party and accompanied by restrictions on the freedom of opposition, association and press freedom. Most sub-Saharan African regimes fall within what Diamond described as ‘competitive electoral authoritarian’ regimes (van de Walle 2002: 68-69). This means that elections are organised and some competition between parties is allowed, while the liberties, respect for human rights and independent democratic institutions to allow for genuinely competitive elections are lacking (Diamond 2002: 29-33). This can be related to political conditionality: there is just enough democratisation to keep the aid tap running, but not enough to risk losing power (Levitsky and Way 2005: 30; Brown 2005: 184). As a result, there are few cases where elections lead to an ousting of the incumbent (van de Walle 2001: 16). Posner and Young (2007: 131) calculated that incumbents lost only 14 out of 100 elections in sub-Saharan Africa.

As military coups have become unacceptable with the third wave of democratisation, new ways of holding on to power have emerged, involving constitutional procedures rather than suspending the constitution. Especially in countries where the ruling party has more than two thirds of the seats in parliament, the constitution has often been changed to allow the President to run for a third term (Posner and Young 2007: 127 and 134). Constitutional amendments may also prevent opponents from taking part in presidential elections on the basis of nationality requirements, such as in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia (Mulikita 2003: 108). In other cases, such as Gabon and Togo, African Presidents – after turning themselves into Presidents for life – ensured the transfer of power to their sons after their death (Mengara 2010: 57).
1.1.4. Delimitation of the research

This dissertation focuses on EU policies, while taking into account member states’ policies and positions when there is reason to believe that these may influence EU policies, for example the former colonial power, key trade, development, diplomatic or military partners. The positions of the member states should be mentioned because most negative measures are the responsibility of the Council of the EU. Although most of the events described in this dissertation have taken place before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which abolished the pillar structure, I prefer not to distinguish between European Community policies and European Union policies to avoid complication. While many of the policies described here are part of development cooperation and thus in principle an EC responsibility in the pre-Lisbon era, in this dissertation I will nevertheless refer to these as ‘EU’ policies.

The dissertation will take into account the position of other international actors where relevant, as the EU could take this into consideration in its decision on how to react to violations of democratic principles (see Chapter 5). However, the reasons for the positions of other international actors do not form the object of this study. The specific focus on the EU has a number of advantages and disadvantages. A first advantage is that it allowed a thorough review of the academic literature on EU development and Africa policies as well as primary documents, news articles and interviews with EU officials in Brussels. This provided further insight into the potential reasons for double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, by focusing on the EU, I was able to investigate a relatively large number of case studies on a systematic basis and into substantial detail. Thirdly, there are reasons to believe that the EU is different from other donors.

To begin with, colonial history cannot be ignored in EU-African relations. Because of colonial history, Africa is often seen as the backyard of Europe, while the US’s sphere of influence rather lies in Latin America. As noted by Taylor: ‘In terms of sheer power projection, despite all the brouhaha about China’s sudden rise in Africa, the EU (or individual constituent members) remains the key influence in virtually all countries in Africa’ (Taylor 2011: 195). The EU remains the largest trade partner of most African countries and the most important donor (EU and member states combined) (Taylor 2010: 98; Mangala 2010a: 168). Even when only multilateral EU aid is taken into account, the EU was the second largest donor in 2010, after the US.\(^4\) In contrast to the US and the member states, the EU has development cooperation offices (and now diplomatic delegations) in all sub-Saharan African countries, rather than focusing on specific partner countries. In addition, EU-Africa relations can be expected to be more ‘developmental’ when compared to the US. In the field of development aid, the EU tries to appear as a ‘leading and benevolent identity’ towards developing countries, by showing great willingness and engagement to reach internationally agreed development targets (Orbie 2003; Orbie and Versluys 2008). In contrast, US development policies are less in line with new trends in international development cooperation such as the respect for country ownership (Whitfield and Fraser

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When focusing on ‘hard’ policy areas, including security and energy, the EU often focuses on the link with development, by strengthening human security, multilateralism, or the development impact of energy (Martin 2007; Youngs 2009c). In contrast, the US is more keen on enhancing its direct security interests (e.g. the war on terror), as well as its energy supplies (Hentz 2004; Van de Walle 2009; Taylor 2010: 24-34). This image of the EU as a benevolent foreign policy actor is also reflected in the debate on the role of the EU in world politics, which depicts the EU as a different policy actor, variously termed ‘normative’ (Manners 2002), ‘ethical’ (Aggestam 2008), ‘responsible’ (Mayer and Vogt 2006) and many more.

The main disadvantage of focusing on the EU is that generalisation to other actors is difficult. Hence, the dissertation is in the first place a contribution to the literature on EU foreign affairs, democracy promotion and development policies rather than to the more general literature on democracy promotion and political conditionality. However, several conclusions are also relevant for other donors. For example, all donors of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, hence it can be assumed that this has an effect on their approach to negative measures in aid receiving countries, albeit to different degrees. Further remarks on generalisation to other donors are made in the general conclusions.

The dissertation focuses on the period from 2000 until mid-2011. This timeframe mainly applies to the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles and less to the explanations or the democratic record of the cases. Indeed, when information was found preceding or following the period under review that was relevant to answer the hypotheses, this will also be mentioned. Regarding the democratic record of the cases, the period preceding the 2000s is often mentioned to give an idea of when multi-party democracy was introduced or how long the ruling party had been in power.

There are several reasons for this specific timeframe. As will be discussed below, studies on political conditionality have mostly focused on the first applications of conditionality in the second half of the 1990s and – in some cases – first half of the 2000s. However, as I have argued, in more recent years, conditionality has moved to the background. Moreover, the explanations for double standards in the reactions to violations of democratic principles may also be different in this period, when compared to the 1990s. First, after 9/11 security issues moved to the forefront of EU foreign policy, which is reflected in the adoption of the first European Security Strategy in 2003. Second, since the mid-1990s the EU has developed its instruments and capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping, which has become a key aspect of EU-Africa policies. Third, since the 2000s, the EU has increasingly focused on its immediate neighbourhood, where economic and security concerns are most dominant. Fourth, it can be assumed that the expansion of the EU’s diplomatic and economic relations with third countries makes the need to maintain close relations with its former colonies less important. Fifth, the EU’s influence on the African continent is declining due to the growing scramble for African
resources and the emergence of new economic and political powers, as well as the increased US interest in Africa. Sixth, the international development agenda has significantly changed with the adoption of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005. Last, since the 2000s there has been a substantial evolution in regional integration in Africa. Especially the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are playing an increasingly political role, including on democratisation.

1.2. Status quaestionis

After introducing the research topic and question, the academic literature relevant for the research question will be reviewed here. I start by outlining the main theoretical debate informing my research, namely that of norms versus self-interest in EU foreign policy. In reviewing the empirical literature that addresses the research question, I will argue that self-interested explanations are dominant, while expectations about effectiveness are also sometimes mentioned. The third part then argues that these conclusions cannot be simply applied to EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa. The existing literature mentioning potential explanations for double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa is then considered, and the main shortcomings are highlighted.

1.2.1. The debate on EU foreign policy

The EU is often depicted as a ‘special’ foreign policy actor. This distinctiveness has been described in various role conceptions. The most well-known and highly debated is that of ‘Normative Power Europe’. With the idea of Normative Power Europe, Manners argues that the EU’s international identity or role relies mainly on its ideational impact, or its ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ (Manners 2002: 239). The EU’s normative basis consists of three core norms (peace; liberty; democracy, the rule of law and human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance). These norms are diffused in a normative manner, namely through contagion (unintentional diffusion of ideas), informational diffusion (strategic and declaratory communications), procedural diffusion (institutionalisation of a relationship), transference (exchange of goods, trade, aid, technical assistance), overt diffusion (physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations) and the cultural filter (impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organisations). As an example, Manners illustrates the EU’s position on the abolition of the death penalty, where the EU held on to its strong adherence to human rights, despite the absence of obvious material gain from its interventions and in the face of strong international opposition. Notwithstanding the growing concern for national security after 9/11, Manners argues that this does not necessarily put in question the EU’s normative power, as long as the EU takes a fundamentally different approach to the war on terror by addressing
human security and focusing on the root causes of conflict (Manners 2006: 414-415). In this sense, the EU would, rather than defend the nation-state, focus on peace, democracy and human rights. Manners’ ideas led to an enormous flow of reactions. One important contribution was the proposal to shift focus from what the EU ‘is’ to what it ‘does’. Hence, the notion of ‘Ethical Power Europe’ refers to the self-image of the EU as an ethical power ‘doing good’ in the world (Aggestam 2008: 2). Taking up this suggestion, in a more recent contribution Manners focuses on the ‘normative ethics’ of the EU. On the basis of the above-mentioned core and minor norms, he formulated nine substantive normative principles of the EU.5

Some authors have been virulently opposed to the conception of Normative Power Europe. The most well-known reaction came from Hyde-Price (2006; 2008), who argues that neorealism is a better theoretical approach to explain EU policies. He takes as an example the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP), which is and will remain in the hands of Europe’s great powers. Youngs (2004a) makes the case that normative dynamics and strategic interests cannot be easily separated. Indeed, the EU often uses human rights policies to pursue its self-interest, for example by using human rights conditionality when human rights abuses lead to serious instability. Lerch and Schwellnus (2006) point to the fact that the parallel existence of supranational external relations with an intergovernmental foreign and security policy and national foreign policies make EU policies incoherent. Moreover, the EU may also resort to ‘rhetorical action’: the instrumental use of arguments to persuade others of its selfish claims.

The debate about the EU in foreign policy reflects a more general debate in international relations theory on the motivations of the foreign policy behaviour of states and international organisations. These motivations are mostly divided in two main categories: norms and self-interest. The importance of self-interest is defended by proponents of rationalist approaches to international relations, which assume that states pursue their self-interest according to a logic of consequences. Foreign policy behaviour can thus be explained by (1) the expectations actors have of the consequences of their actions and (2) their self-interest (preferences) and resources (March and Olsen 1998: 950). The most widely recognised example of such an approach is realism, which believes that politics function along a conception of human nature that is basically self-centred, self-regarding and self-interested (Jackson and Sørensen 2010: 69). States thus perceive their self-interest, which is conceived in terms of power. States cannot be led by moral concerns as political leaders are responsible for the security and welfare of their citizens. As a result, states will subordinate moral concerns to power politics (Morgenthau 1985: 5-14). Applied to EU foreign policy, such an approach would predict that EU decisions are always the outcome of the national interests of the member states: ‘The EU is not a sovereign actor in

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5 i.e. Sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance.
its own right, but acts as a vehicle for the collective interests of its member states’ (Hyde-Price 2006: 220). Hence, larger member states will use the EU to maximise their interests, for example by making the EU balance against the dominant global power. Moral concerns are only second-order concerns that are subordinated to national security. As long as these do not conflict with their core national interests, member states will use the EU as an institutional repository for their moral concerns (Ibid.: 222-223). In the case of the EU’s Africa policy, former colonial powers may use the EU to defend their sphere of influence, especially when threatened by other international actors (Gegout 2009).

In contrast, states may also act according to the logic of appropriateness. This means that state behaviour is based on identities rather than self-interest, and on rules rather than individual rational expectations. Appropriateness may be cognitive, referring to a particular conception of the self, or based on ethical considerations, referring to behaviour that is considered as virtuous (March and Olsen 1998: 951). This approach fits within social constructivist understandings of international relations. Rather than focusing on material forces, social constructivism believes the international system is constituted by ideas, which may range from ideologies or shared belief systems to normative beliefs about right and wrong, beliefs about cause-effect or policy prescriptions on problem-solving (Jackson and Sørensen 2010: 165). Social constructivists do not deny the importance of interests, yet they challenge the fact that these interests have a material rather than social basis. Hence, while realists see interests as constituted by the distribution and composition of material capabilities, geography and natural resources, social-constructivists believe that interests are primarily based on ideas. In this view, power and interest have the effects they do ‘in virtue of the ideas that make them up’ (Wendt 1999: 135). Finnemore (1996) argues that states are socialised to accept new norms, values and perceptions of interest by international organisations. She takes the example of the consensus that has arisen around the notion of poverty reduction. There was little political benefit for states to suddenly focus on poverty reduction, but the World Bank managed to make the idea widely accepted (Finnemore 1996: 89-127). Applied to EU-Africa relations, this would mean that the EU perceives poverty reduction as a norm it should pursue because it is socialised to do so by the World Bank.

1.2.2. Self-interest and effectiveness

The literature on political conditionality seems to agree with rationalist approaches to foreign policy. The general assumption is that democracy is not on top of donor priorities, and donors will therefore abstain from adopting negative measures when their economic or security interests are at stake. Analysing the implementation of political conditionality by the EU, the US, Sweden and the UK, Crawford found that these donors imposed weaker or no negative measures against commercially important countries such as China, Nigeria, Indonesia and Sri Lanka and/or against geo-strategic partners such as Turkey, Indonesia, Algeria and Egypt (Crawford 2001: 211-227). Tomasevski attributed the fact that France – unlike other donors – did not suspend aid after flawed elections in
Cameroon (1992) to French fears that an Anglophone head of government would be elected (Tomasevski 2000: 186). A study on human rights promotion by the like-minded donors concludes that even these donors – which are often assumed to have a higher profile on human rights issues – will only sustain an assertive human rights policy when costs are believed to be low in terms of other foreign policy objectives. For example, the Netherlands was much more fierce in its approach to Suriname than towards Indonesia. Comparing Dutch and Canadian human rights policies in the Philippines, the Netherlands was more assertive because there were less commercial interests at stake. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, Canada and Norway adopted a coherent and moderately assertive human rights policy because the costs to other vital national interests were low (Gillies 1996).

When looking at the targets of EU sanctions, a similar picture emerges. Analysing autonomous CFSP sanctions, Brummer comes to the conclusion that ‘the EU’s sanctions policy by and large corresponds with neo-realist predictions. When security and welfare interests are at stake, the EU refrains from adopting sanctions. Conversely, sanctions are only imposed when they entail little cost for the Member States’ (Brummer 2009: 193). Portela (2005) argues that autonomous EU sanctions in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia are mostly informed by considerations of human rights and democracy, while in the neighbourhood, these sanctions are more directly related to security objectives. Again, the main reason advanced for this regional bias is the EU’s concern for stability of its immediate eastern neighbourhood.

Research on EU democratisation policies in Central Asia found that the EU has hardly pushed through its declared objective of democratisation out of fear to damage special relations with Russia, to lose allies in the war on terror and to endanger energy supplies. Moreover, there is the risk that democratisation may lead to instability, which could possibly create a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism (Warkotsch 2006; Crawford 2008; Hoffmann 2010). Equally, the EU’s reluctance to use negative measures against Russia has been attributed to the concern of some member states for energy supplies (Fischer 2007). Similar arguments are made by those who study EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. According to these studies, the EU has been more interested in stabilising than in democratising Southern Mediterranean countries, as ousting the regimes in place throughout the 1990s and early 2000s would put energy supplies at risk, cause massive migration to the EU and endanger cooperation in the war on terror (Jünemann 2004: 7; Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Balfour 2005: 126; Youngs 2009a: 911-912). In some cases, ‘authoritarian stability’ has been preferred over a difficult democratisation process that might prepare the ground for Islamist movements. Moreover, when moderately Islamist political parties were excluded from the political process, such as in Morocco, this has been tacitly accepted by the EU (Echagüe and Youngs 2007: 6)

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6 Autonomous sanctions are sanctions that are not a mere implementation at EU level from sanctions taken by the UN Security Council.
326-329; Youngs 2009a: 911-912, Kausch 2008: 13). The EU has also been concerned with illegal migration, especially in these countries bordering the EU. Destabilisation of neighbouring countries might cause massive migration flows into the EU. Moreover, the EU needs the cooperation of certain non-democratic governments to prevent illegal migration, such as Morocco (Youngs 2009a: 911). This approach is believed to have contributed to the stalemate in which Arab populations have lived for years, leading to the Arab revolutions in early 2011 (Scarpetta and Swidlicki 2011). Furthermore, research on EU democracy promotion in South East Asia finds that the fear of risking commercial relations with important trade partners causes double standards. Algieri attributed the EU’s reluctance to take strong sanctions towards China to the member states’ ‘perspectives of securing shares on the Chinese market’ (Algieri 2007: 178). He compares the Chinese case to that of Myanmar, where the EU has imposed negative measures, but which is not an important commercial partner.

To be fair, attempts have also been made to go beyond the norms versus self-interest dichotomy and take other factors into account. Indeed, some studies point to the mere consideration of effectiveness in EU decision-making on which instrument to use for democracy promotion. Smith believes that, along with commercial or political interests, doubts about the effectiveness of negative measures cause inconsistencies in the EU’s application of these negative measures. She points to the north-south division in the position of member states on negative measures: while northern member states are often convinced of the effectiveness of negative measures, southern member states mostly doubt the effectiveness of coercive methods (Smith 2008: 138). Knodt and Junemann suggest that the EU’s response to violations of democratic principles may depend on whether there is cooperation from the state apparatus or civil society (Knodt and Junemann 2007). This proposition has been confirmed by Fischer, and by Echagüe and Youngs. Fischer argues that the EU’s unwillingness to use negative measures against Russia also derives from its inability to do so. Russia has become more and more reluctant to accept political conditionality, which can be explained by economic growth, the EU’s increased dependence on Russian gas and a growing hostility towards the EU due to mounting competition in the post-Soviet space (Fischer 2007: 263). A similar situation has been observed in the case of Saudi-Arabia, where the EU hardly has any leverage in terms of trade or aid incentives, nor any access points such as civil society partners or other interlocutors (Echagüe and Youngs 2007: 322-326). Panebianco notes that the EU prefers positive measures in China because coercion would have little effect as China expresses different interests and defines values and principles differently (Panebianco 2005: 142-146). Warkotsch investigates two related propositions on the influence of considerations of effectiveness on decision-making on negative measures: (1) the degree of economic dependence of the target state and (2) the domestic conditions for democratic change. In his research on negative measures as a reaction to democratic wrongdoing in the post-Soviet space, he finds that the EU applies beyond-rhetoric negative measures less often in economically independent countries, although he adds that it is difficult to judge whether this finding can be attributed to considerations of effectiveness, member states’ interests or the fear of destabilising an already weak state. As to the
selection of ‘easy cases’, namely countries which exhibit conditions for democratic change, he reaches inconclusive results. On the one hand, he finds that the EU does not respond more often to violations of democratic principles in countries with a relatively competitive political system. On the other, the EU is more likely to respond to violations of democratic principles when these are accompanied by opposition mobilisation (Warkotsch 2008a).

1.2.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Between humanitarianism and self-interest?

Nonetheless, the above-mentioned studies were predominantly focused on regions where almost all countries are important to the EU’s commercial and/or security interests. Indeed, instability in the neighbourhood countries has direct consequences for the EU in terms of migration, criminal groups operating in Europe, etc. The European Security Strategy clearly states that ‘Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe’ (European Union 2003: 6). Moreover, in the Middle East and North Africa, the events of 9/11 have had a huge impact on the perception of the EU regarding potential security threats in this predominantly Arab region (Jünemann 2004: 4). Moreover, three out of five North African countries are important oil and gas suppliers: Egypt, Libya and Algeria (Martinez 2008). Similarly, Central Asia’s proximity to Afghanistan has caused a renewed security interest in the region. In addition, three of the five Central Asian republics have important gas reserves, which are crucial as an alternative to the more volatile supplies coming from Russia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group 2006a: 3). Furthermore, studies have often tended to focus on those ‘extreme’ cases where EU commercial interests are clearly dominant, such as China and Russia. These authoritarian superpowers-in-the-making are then compared to isolated ‘rough’ states including Myanmar and Belarus to conclude that the double standards applied by the EU are due to its prioritisation of commercial interests (e.g. Algieri 2007; Brummer 2009).

In contrast, the EU’s commercial and security interests in sub-Saharan Africa are more diverse. Africa has been described as being in between marginalisation and globalisation (Engel and Olsen 2005: 1). This ‘marginal’ status is to a certain degree reflected in the EU’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the EU’s import of energy resources is very small and remains under 5 percent, even if the EU has increasingly prioritised energy relations with the continent. Only Nigeria belongs to the top gas suppliers of the EU (at place 4) (Youngs 2009b: 6). Regarding security interests, because of its geographical location, crises in sub-Saharan Africa do not have such direct consequences for the EU. It is no surprise that sub-Saharan Africa is hardly mentioned in the EU’s Security Strategy or in the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (European Union 2003; European Union 2005: 7).
For this reason, sub-Saharan Africa is often perceived in developmental and humanitarian terms (Cargill 2010: 19-24; Porteous 2007: 65 and 121; Engel and Olsen 2005: 9). This is strengthened by the perception in the public and media of Africa as a ‘hopeless continent’ (Williams 2004: 45), full of ‘failed states’ (Abrahamsen 2005). On the one hand, it cannot be denied that sub-Saharan Africa is home to severe poverty and conflict. It is the poorest region in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Bigsten and Durevall 2008). Despite sustained GDP growth in a number of sub-Saharan African countries, per capita incomes have not increased between 1960 and 2004 due to the declining life expectancy (Callaghy 2009: 61-62). Of the 48 Least Developed Countries as designated by the UN, 33 were located in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at the end of the 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa was the most conflict-ridden region in the world (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 13). A third of all violent conflicts between 1990 and 2003 occurred in Africa (Fukuda-Parr 2010: 17). At the start of the century, 20 out of 45 countries were in conflict, causing an estimated 4,000 deaths per week (Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 251). Of an estimated 20 to 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world, over 10 million are African (Deng 2009: 348). Hence, it may be argued that sub-Saharan Africa presents an opportunity for the EU to appear as a humanitarian, developmental or ethical power.

On the other hand, despite the many continuing problems, an idea of ‘African renaissance’ has emerged with the renewed interest of old and new powers, as well as the high economic growth in a number of sub-Saharan African countries. The growing problem of energy security has brought sub-Saharan Africa back on the foreign policy agenda of the US. At the same time, the declining importance of the West and the rise of new powers has also been reflected in sub-Saharan Africa (Mangala 2010b: 6-7; Pirozzi 2010: 90-91). The Economist, which only a decade ago referred to sub-Saharan Africa as the ‘hopeless’ subcontinent, now refers to a dozen African economies with high growth rates as ‘Lion kings’ – an analogy to the Asian tigers. The Economist points to the fact that sub-Saharan Africa’s real GDP growth rate has been 5.7 percent on average over the past decade, compared to only 2.4 percent over the previous two decades. Forecasts are that sub-Saharan Africa’s economy will grow at an average rate of 7 percent over the next 20 years, slightly faster than that of China (The Economist 2011, January and December). Similarly, Radelet (2010) challenges the predominant view of sub-Saharan Africa as an entire subcontinent mired in failure, conflict and stagnation. His book Emerging Africa refers to the enormous progress made in seventeen emerging sub-Saharan African countries. Five key evolutions have characterised these countries in recent years: democratisation, more sensible economic policies, the end of the debt crisis, the spread of new technologies and the emergence of a new generation of policymakers, activists and business leaders. In

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7 See the website of the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states, http://www.unohrrls.org/en/ldc25/ (last consulted on 18 May 2012)

This African renaissance has also been translated in increased economic and political integration. The most important event in this regard was the creation of the AU as a continental institution to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2001 (Kwasi Tieku 2004). Unlike its predecessor, the AU has developed into a political organisation that increasingly plays a role in peace and security in Africa. Moreover, in 2001 the AU set up the New Economic Partnership on African Development (NEPAD) as an economic development programme with the four primary objectives of (1) eradicating poverty, (2) promoting sustainable growth and development, (3) integrating Africa in the world economy, and (4) accelerate the empowerment of women (De Waal 2002). The AU and NEPAD have been strongly encouraged by donors, which see in these attempts to increased integration an encouraging sign that African leaders are willing to take matters in their own hands. Importantly, both the AU and NEPAD also focus strongly on democratic governance. One of the initiatives of NEPAD was the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) by which countries voluntarily allow peer review in four thematic areas: democracy and good political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development (Hope 2005).

Moreover, sub-Saharan Africa’s strategic importance in global politics has increased since the 2000s. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 have made the international community aware that conflicts in Africa can also be felt within the borders of the EU. So-called failed states, many of which are located in sub-Saharan Africa, are perceived as a threat to global security as these might become a safe haven for terrorists, drugs or human trafficking and other illegal activities (Mangala 2010b: 9). Indeed, since 2003 the US and EU member states have become increasingly active in counter-terrorism activities in sub-Saharan Africa, more particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel which are seen as breeding grounds for terrorism. To this should be added the continuing interest of former colonial powers, which wish to maintain their sphere of influence in sub-Saharan Africa. It has been argued that this continues to play a role in French Africa policies, which is also reflected in EU Africa policies (Taylor 2010: 51; Gegout 2009).

It is in this context that the increased EU attention for Africa in the 21st century should be regarded. This started in Cairo with the first EU-Africa summit in 2000 and culminated in the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, adopted at the second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon. The aim to have an all-encompassing political dialogue with the AU and to enhance cooperation in the field of security, democracy and human rights, the environment, trade, etc. shows the determinacy of the EU to strengthen its cooperation with Africa, and to reaffirm itself vis-à-vis other actors with an interest in sub-Saharan Africa (Mangala 2010a: 172-174).
1.2.4. Double standards in EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa

The question should then be raised whether the proposition that self-interest overrides democracy promotion, observed in strategically important regions and crucial trade partners, is also valid in sub-Saharan Africa. It has been suggested that negative measures are most often implemented in sub-Saharan Africa because of the poor, marginal status of African countries (Smith 2001: 195; Crawford 2001: 210-227; Abrahamsen 2000: 4). Yet only very few studies have investigated the reasons for double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of these confirm rationalist approaches by arguing that double standards can be explained by the prevalence of the self-interest of EU member states. In his research on EU democracy promotion in Africa in the 1990s, Olsen finds that the EU was much softer in its approach to Niger than to Kenya. In Niger, France insisted on the resumption of cooperation after the 1996 coup to secure its supplies of uranium (Olsen 1998). Hence, Olsen states:

‘[...] if a single strong member country of the EU wants to take care of what it considers its national interests, it can do so in defiance of common decisions in the Council of Ministers. And it can do so, in spite of the fact that the Union treaty stresses that promotion of democracy is one of the important aims of the development policy of the EU. Niger does not represent a “security” concern, neither for the EU nor for any of the member countries apart from France, because France is so heavily dependent on the import of uranium’ (Olsen 1998: 360-361).

Similarly, in a study on EU democracy promotion in Nigeria, Khakee states that ‘Democracy promotion is not a top priority in EU-Nigeria relations. Oil is widely regarded as paramount, followed by trade relations’ (Khakee 2007: 4). This is confirmed by Youngs, who stresses that the Article 96 procedure was never instigated towards any of Africa’s big energy producers (Youngs 2009c: 138). Brüne argues that the rather soft approach taken by the EU towards Ethiopia can be explained by the EU’s security concerns. The EU does not want to risk a destabilisation of Ethiopia, which is seen as an important partner in the war on terror (Brüne 2007).

However, these conclusions are contradicted by Hazelzet’s research on EU development aid suspensions in ACP countries and three non-ACP countries9 in the period 1989-2000. Hazelzet found that the severity of human rights violations was more important than the commercial or strategic importance of a country in determining the harshness of EU sanctions. Contrary to what was expected, former colonies were sanctioned more severely than non-former colonies, although French ex-colonies were sanctioned slightly less severely than former British colonies (Hazelzet 2005, 2010).

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9 Burma, Romania and Tajikistan.
While these studies are an important step in the direction of more empirical research on EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa, there remains a large gap in the literature. Olsen uses comparative case study analysis, but focuses on the 1990s. Hazelzet’s research is also confined to the period 1989-2000 and, because of its quantitative methodology, does not provide many details on the specific explanations for double standards. Research by Brüne and Khakee is more recent and includes case study material, but conclusions are only based on one case study. As I have argued earlier, more up to date analyses are therefore needed given the changed context of the post-2000 period when compared to the 1990s.

1.2.5. EU-Africa relations: Norms or self-interest?

The literature on EU-Africa relations and EU development policies raises arguments in favour of both norms and self-interest. On the one hand, a number of studies suggest that norms are an important driver of EU policies. In the EU’s aid allocation, Grilli and Riess found that multilateral EU aid was less influenced by trade interests and more based on recipient needs than the bilateral assistance of member states (Grilli and Riess 1992). Currently, EU development assistance under the EDF is based on a quantitative aid allocation model that is entirely based on recipient needs and past performance. Dearden investigated this aid allocation model for the 9th EDF (2000-2007) and found a correlation of 83 percent with actual aid commitments. EU development assistance in the ACP group is thus strongly related with development indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), in contrast to non-ACP aid allocation which is more influenced by political considerations (Dearden 2009).

In a recent edited volume on EU development policy, Gänzle and others raise the question whether the EU is an ‘enlightened superpower in the making’ (Gänzle et al. 2012). Indeed, many authors see development policies and Africa policies as a field where the EU tries to affirm its normative power, often by emphasising its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other actors. Birchfield argues that, since the gap between rich and poor has widened, development policy provides an excellent opportunity for the EU to show its normative power (Birchfield 2011). Smith and Steffenson refer to the EU as a ‘development superpower’, given its wide-ranging and highly institutionalised relationship with the ACP group and the volume of aid funds, which gives it a comparative advantage over the US (Smith and Steffenson 2005: 353). Orbie and Versluys state that development policy provides a way for the EU to reinforce its internal and external legitimacy by showing itself as a ‘force for the good’ to the domestic and international public (Orbie and Versluys 2008: 86). In relation to its developing partners, the EU tries to appear as a ‘leading and benevolent’ donor by promising generous aid funds (Orbie 2003). According to Bretherton and Vogler, the EU’s policies vis-à-vis the ACP group are a way of promoting its role as a relatively benign ‘patron/mentor’, given the focus on partnership and cooperation and the low percentage of aid tied to commercial interests (Bretherton and Vogler 2006).
A number of recent initiatives and reforms in EU development and Africa policies can also be seen from this perspective. According to Carbone, the Governance Initiative was an attempt of the European Commission to distinguish itself from the World Bank and the US by propagating an incentive-based approach (Carbone 2010). As regards the 2007 EU-Africa summit, Carbone underlines the European Commission’s attempts to launch new initiatives such as the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership, as well as its endeavour to put the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in a central position. Carbone interprets these efforts as an attempt by the European Commission, and Directorate-General (DG) Development in particular, to strengthen the EU’s common identity in international development (Carbone 2011: 210-211). The Commission’s efforts to improve aid coordination and aid effectiveness should also be seen in this light (Carbone 2010). Similarly, Furness believes that the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) could be a way for the EU to enhance coherence, coordination, professionalism and legitimacy in EU development policy and, in this way, establish itself as a ‘development power Europe’ (Furness 2010). A further manifestation of the EU’s normative power in its Africa policies can be found in the cases of the ratification of the status of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol, where the EU managed to build an image of itself as an altruistic actor by empowering African countries (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008).

Similar claims have been made with regard to the EU’s ‘hard’ foreign policy priorities in sub-Saharan Africa: security and energy. The EU’s EUFOR-Congo mission (2006) can be seen as an example of the above-mentioned human security approach. Martin argues that the EU’s focus on human rights and a bottom-up approach in this mission points to the attempt to pursue human security (Martin 2007: 72-73). Similarly, Sicurelli sees in the EU’s conflict management in Darfur an example of how the EU tried to take a distinctive, normative approach, namely by focusing on regional integration, positive conditionality and international law. She claims that the enormous public attention for the Darfur crisis provided an opportunity for the EU to build its identity as an international actor: ‘peacebuilding assistance in Darfur has allowed the EU to craft its image as an ethical player, especially in comparison to China, the US and other external actors in Africa’ (Sicurelli 2010: 71). Moreover, although energy has become more important in the EU’s Africa policies, as could be observed in the adoption of an Africa-EU Energy Strategy in 2007, this strategy mostly focused on the developmental aspects of energy for Africa (Hadfield and Youngs 2008: 4; Youngs 2009c: 131).

This is not to say that the norms that the EU promotes through its Africa policies are necessarily welcomed by or even adequate for its counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the EU’s policies are based on its own constitutive norms, including regional integration, free market economy, etc. These norms have often been pushed through despite the resistance of African governments, as can be observed in the promotion of market mechanisms and security instruments in the case of
environmental protection, and trade liberalisation in the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements (Sicurelli 2010).

At the same time, there are studies that see EU development cooperation and Africa policies as largely determined by the self-interest of the EU and its member states. Despite the EU’s rhetorical commitment to democracy and human rights, research has found that its actual aid allocation has been more concerned with its self-interest than with these normative objectives. Studying the underlying motivations for EU aid allocation in 1980-1995, Zanger found that strategic and economic factors were more important than democracy and human rights (Zanger 2000). Similar conclusions were drawn in a study on the EU’s aid allocation in the 1990s, which concluded that political similarity (e.g. similarities in voting behaviour in the UN) was positively correlated with EU aid allocation, while democracy, human rights and the rule of law did not have a significant effect (Neumayer 2003a). The creation in 2010 of the EEAS, which has obtained considerable competences in the field of development, could also be seen as a move in the direction of a development policy that is dominated by the EU’s security interests (Del Biondo et al. 2012).

Moreover, several studies on the EU’s security policies in sub-Saharan Africa confirm the view that the ESDP has mainly been used to do something good for Europe, rather than to do something good for Africa (Bailes 2008). It has been argued that EU humanitarian interventions such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2003, 2006) or Chad/Central African Republic (2007) are driven by the self-interested objective of the largest member states, and particularly the UK and France, to re-engage with their former colonies (Olsen 2009). Similarly, Gegout (2009) argues that the EU’s interventions in the DRC were an instrument of France to preserve its zone of influence and defend the national prestige. Moreover, the EU’s recent shift to a more securitised development policy is seen as driven by the concern for EU security, rather than that of African countries. Indeed, the inclusion into the Cotonou Agreement of issues with doubtful relevance for development, including cooperation in the war on terror and in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, can be seen as a prioritisation of the EU’s security interests (Hadfield 2007: 63; Vogt 2006: 168-169).

Furthermore, the EU’s trade policies in Africa are seen as serving EU self-interest rather than the needs of African countries. Indeed, whereas under the Lomé regime the EU extended unprecedented trade preferences to the ACP states, the Cotonou Agreement provided that these would be gradually reduced and replaced by reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements. Farrell described this shift as motivated by a ‘trenchant pursuit of what are really neo-liberal goals and the extension of economic liberalisation in the interests of the EU’ (Farrell 2008: 279). Similar opinions have been voiced about the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007), which was seen as restoring the EU’s position in the context of a growing rat race for African resources (Campbell 2008: 91; Schoeman 2011: 45).
1.3. Hypotheses

1.3.1. Analytical framework: Norms, self-interest and effectiveness

In the review of the literature, it became clear that the reasons for double standards in the EU’s reactions to violations of democratic principles are mostly ascribed to the predominance of the EU’s self-interest, in line with rationalist approaches to international relations. However, it was argued that there are both arguments for a normative and for a self-interested EU-Africa policy. I will thus focus on this dichotomy between norms and self-interest. I will take a wide approach to norms, whereby norms refer to those objectives that are predominantly other-focused and meant to meet humanitarian needs, including good governance, economic development and regional and internal stability. On the other hand, self-interest refers to the EU’s objectives that are predominantly self-interested and EU-focused, including the historical interests of member states in preserving their sphere of influence, commercial interests or security interests.

As was mentioned earlier, norms and self-interest cannot easily be separated (Youngs 2004a). First of all, norm promotion can be seen as concealing the EU’s real self-interested intentions. From this perspective, norms are ‘interest in disguise’ (Vincent 1986: 120). In this view, the concern for stability in third countries is mainly self-interested, given the possible consequences of destabilisation of African countries for the EU in terms of migration flows or transnational criminal activities. However, as I have argued, the consequences of instability in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the EU should not be overestimated. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the conception of internal and regional stability as a ‘norm’ came inductively, after observing that countries such as Rwanda were praised for their internal stability, although the EU had few security interests there. Furthermore, democracy promotion may equally be seen as a strategy to serve the EU’s self-interest. Democracy may be exported as a means to promote peace in line with the democratic peace theory, or as a means to further the interests of transnational capital (Holden 2009: 18). In the analysis of the case studies, the distinction between norms and self-interest will be made to the extent possible. In case the EU would have a special, self-interested reason to prefer internal stability in a country (e.g. in the Niger Delta in Nigeria because of commercial interests or in Ethiopia because of security interests), this will be addressed separately in the subchapter on security interests.

A second critique that is often made is that the promotion of norms is a way of self-preservation for norm promoters. From this perspective, if the European Commission favours providing aid to development success stories, this may equally be led by its ‘self-interest’ in spending development funds (its main task) and becoming an effective donor. Furthermore, the European Commission’s attempts to develop a conflict prevention strategy could be interpreted as a way for the Commission to safeguard its bureaucratic influence in EU-Africa policies, in a context where security objectives (and hence the Council) were becoming more and more important (Sicurelli 2010: 66; Gibert 2011a: 180).
While this is certainly a relevant claim, it is not in conflict with the idea of norm promotion. Indeed, while poverty reduction and conflict prevention may be regarded as in the bureaucratic self-interest of the European Commission, the same can be said about all normative, ethical or moral objectives.

A third argument is that ethical or normative foreign policy is essentially self-interested, because it serves to ‘have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief’ (Chandler 2003: 300). This is of course partly true, but does not run counter to the idea of Normative Power Europe. It has been argued that states may follow norms because they want others to think well of them or because they want to think well of themselves (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 8). Normative Power Europe is about exercising power through norms rather than military or economic power, about gaining status on the international scene via normative objectives.

It should be emphasised that normative behaviour is not necessarily ‘good’, nor is self-interested behaviour necessarily bad. Indeed, the pursuit of norms may have detrimental effects for sub-Saharan African countries. For example, the MDGs have frequently been criticised for being too focused on numerical targets (Clemens et al. 2007; Easterly 2008). Equally, it has been argued that good governance is based on the Western ideal state model for an optimal functioning of the market economy that is not necessarily beneficial for sub-Saharan African countries (Kiely 1998; Hildyard and Wilkins 1998). In the same spirit, the emphasis of donors on state failure is believed to be informed by a static, a-historical definition of the state based on European customs, practices, organisation and structures (Hill 2005). Although these studies raise important questions, the focus of this research is not on the feasibility and appropriateness of the norms the EU promotes in sub-Saharan Africa, but on norms as a driver of EU foreign policy. Again, similar critiques can be made about the promotion of liberal democracy as a norm (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005). Furthermore, self-interest may also be ‘good’ for a country. For example, a former coloniser may continue development assistance in former colonies, in order not to lose influence and because of historical links. Although this decision is to a large degree self-interested, especially when the needs in former colonies are lower than in other countries, it also has substantial benefits for the country.

Apart from the norms-versus-interests dichotomy, I will look at a third factor: expectations about the effectiveness of negative measures. As noted supra, the importance of this factor was raised in a number of studies. A concern for the effectiveness of negative measures suggests that the EU behaves as a rational actor, according to the logic of consequences. This presupposes that the EU does not merely use negative measures to ‘do something’ according to the logic of appropriateness, but in the hope that this strategy will actually provoke a change in the target country. It assumes that the EU will not use costly negative measures when it is expected that the benefits of this approach will be low. On the one hand, this motivation is not unrelated to the EU’s self-interest: the adoption of negative measures is avoided because of the risk to hurt diplomatic and commercial relations. On the other, the
EU’s preference for positive measures is also motivated by altruistic motives. Indeed, aid conditionality has been criticised for hurting the poor, despite the aim to change the behaviour of the government (Uvin 1993: 69). Perhaps the most well-known and criticised example is the UN sanctions regime against Iraq in 1996-1998, which caused the death of more than one million Iraqis (Goss 2002). To a certain extent, this is mitigated by the fact that the EU mostly focuses on targeted sanctions or on a reorientation of development assistance from the government to social programmes implemented by civil society. Even so, the suspension of certain development programmes implemented by the government may have negative consequences for the population. Moreover, even if they do not, the government may use the sanctions as a scapegoat for the poor performance of the economy, as has happened in the case of Zimbabwe (Laakso et al. 2007a: 75). In this way, negative measures may hurt the image of the EU, rather than that of the target regime.

Furthermore, while conditionality is seen as an instrument of normative power (Manners 2002: 245), the EU’s foreign policy image and identity are equally built on its preference for ‘soft power’, positive conditionality and political dialogue (Michalski 2005; Carbone 2010; Youngs 2001; Vogt 2006). Indeed, Vogt has argued that ‘dialogue seems to have become a value in itself’ (Vogt 2006: 166). Moreover, Youngs sees in the elaborate consultations in the Article 96 procedure and the emphasis on political dialogue a clear belief of the EU in socialisation strategies, based on partnership and mutual dialogue (Youngs 2001: 42-43). The emphasis on engagement and dialogue is also mentioned by Manners as an example of how the EU can ‘be reasonable’ in world politics (Manners 2008: 58). One can see a clear difference here with the US emphasis on coercion and confrontation. The European Commission is often seen as the driver of this approach. For example, in contrast to the US approach to China, the Commission has propagated constructive engagement with China, rather than pushing through its interests and values (Carbone 2011: 212-214). Applied to the EU’s instruments for democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa, the emphasis on positive measures can be seen in the conception of aid suspension as ‘a measure of last resort’ (Article 9) and on political dialogue as a preferable platform to discuss democratic principles (Annex VII, Article 1).

Similar to the difference between norms and self-interest, the difference between self-interest and expectations about effectiveness may appear dubious. Indeed, low expected effectiveness could also be used by the EU as a scapegoat for situations where negative measures might endanger its self-interest. Hence, when the EU suggests that aid suspensions in oil producing countries would have little effect, this may be an excuse for the EU to protect its own commercial interests. However, this factor was mainly added inductively as it became clear that considerations about effectiveness played a clear role in itself, including in the case of Eritrea and Niger.
1.3.2. Conflicting norms

The EU’s Africa and development policies have been described as ‘holistic’ as they have moved from a purely economic approach to one incorporating issues of stability, democratisation and good governance. In this way, the EU promotes the nine substantive normative principles that constitute its normative basis, according to Manners: sustainable peace, consensual democracy, associative human rights, the supranational rule of law, sustainable development, social freedom, inclusive equality, social solidarity, and good governance (Manners 2008). However, it has equally been recognised that trade-offs may be needed when different norms collide in a concrete context. For example, in a tense security situation, donors often prefer stability to democracy. There are equally examples where donors downsize their democracy promotion agenda in countries with a relatively good development performance. From this perspective, the question arises whether double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa could be explained as a trade-off between (1) democracy and development and (2) democracy and stability.

1.3.2.1. Development

The EU is one of the staunchest promoters of good governance, poverty reduction, the MDGs and aid effectiveness. Poverty reduction is the primary objective of EU development policies. The EU has often defended these goals to the detriment of democracy. For example, unlike most other donors, the EU’s budget support is provided on an apolitical basis. Similar trade-offs have been made by the UK, which equally has ambitions to become a development superpower.

From the African side, it is clear that democracy promotion and development policies may conflict in concrete cases. Indeed, amongst the best performers regarding the MDGs, democratic as well as non-democratic countries can be found. For example, the index of GDP per employed person has increased in countries that are perceived as ‘free’ by Freedom House (Mali, Namibia, Ghana, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Lesotho), but equally in countries that were considered ‘partly free’ (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda) or ‘not free’ (Mauritania, Chad, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea). Amongst the countries with a considerable improvement in the ratio of underweight under-five year olds, there were ‘free’ (Mali), ‘partly free’ (Nigeria, Mozambique, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal) and ‘not free’ countries (Rwanda, Angola) (ECA et al. 2009).

In this light, the following hypothesis will be tested:

**H.1. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against countries that are perceived as development success stories, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries that are not perceived as development success stories.**
1.3.2.2. Stability

Stability has become an important objective of the EU’s Africa policies. Since the 1990s, the EU has been working on national and regional conflict prevention and resolution. EU development funds have increasingly been used to enhance stability (e.g. programmes on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration). The EU has engaged in addressing state fragility and has mediated in intra- and interstate conflicts. Moreover, the EU has built the capacity of the AU and ECOWAS for regional peacekeeping and supports regional powers, including Nigeria and South Africa, in their mediation role in African conflicts.

However, democracy and stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. While authoritarian regimes are often successful in silencing dissent, elections may prove a cause for political violence. The EU may thus be reluctant to impose negative measures on countries that are internally stable. Moreover, non-democratic governments may also play an important role in regional peace-building, for example by engaging in regional peacekeeping or mediating in regional conflicts.

Hence, the following two hypotheses are added:

H.2. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as contributing to internal stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as contributing to internal stability.

H.3. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as contributing to regional stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as contributing to regional stability.

1.3.3. Self-interest

As was suggested in the status quaestionis, sub-Saharan Africa has become more important for the EU’s commercial and security interests, while historical interests may also continue to play a role.

1.3.3.1. Historical interests

As noted by Young: ‘Colonial heritage is the necessary point of departure for analysis of African international relations’ (Young 2009: 19). This has also been the case for EU-African relations. Indeed, the provisions in the Treaty of Rome, the Yaoundé Agreement and the Lomé Agreements have been described as attempts by former colonial powers to put in place an Eurafrique in order to maintain their influence in sub-Saharan Africa via extensive aid and trade benefits and aid allocation based on political judgment rather than needs. While these practices are increasingly belonging to the past, there are still instances where former colonial powers try to influence the EU’s development and Africa policies vis-à-vis former colonies.
These critiques are most relevant for France. Indeed, French Africa policy has been based on maintaining influence in former colonies via politicised development aid, institutional relationships and a patron-client network between French and African leaders, regardless of their commitment to democracy. Although French Africa policies have drifted away from these neo-colonial practices, it is believed that France still sees francophone sub-Saharan Africa as its backyard. For the other former colonial powers, these motivations seem less relevant. The UK’s Africa policies have been noted to be primarily driven by security and commercial interests and by humanitarian objectives, rather than by the desire to maintain a sphere of influence. Belgium’s policies in the DRC have been compared to French neo-colonial Africa policies, but diplomatic relations between the DRC and Belgium have equally been difficult because of criticism about the lack of progress on democracy and good governance. Italy has been described as a minor player in the Horn of Africa, despite its colonial history in Somalia and Eritrea.

The following hypothesis will be tested in the cases:

**H.4. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that protect the sphere of influence of member states, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that do not protect the sphere of influence of member states.**

### 1.3.3.2. Commercial interests

Although, as stated above, the EU’s commercial interests in sub-Saharan Africa are minor when compared to other regions, the increasing scarcity of certain primary resources that are found in sub-Saharan Africa could make commercial interests more important in the 2000s. This has been recognised by former development commissioner Louis Michel: ‘The increasing globalisation of the economy and headlong dash to economic expansion is making the leading economic powers, both traditional and emerging, even more determined to gain access to the immense resources of the African continent’ (Michel 2008b: 9-10). This is first of all the case for energy resources, including oil, gas and uranium (nuclear energy). Moreover, the EU has also become aware of an increased shortage of certain non-energy raw materials, including cobalt, platinum, titanium, chromium, etc. (Ibid.: 9-10).

Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:

**H.5. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where EU commercial interests are important and where governments serve EU commercial interests, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries where the EU only has minor commercial interests or where the government does not serve EU commercial interests.**
1.3.3.3. Security interests

As noted above, the EU’s concerns for security in sub-Saharan Africa have traditionally been perceived as a ‘humanitarian issue’ given the limited direct consequences for European security, compared to the EU’s neighbourhood. Since the 9/11 attacks, however, there has been an increased awareness that insecurity in Africa can also affect EU security. This has been translated in provisions on the war on terror, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and migration in the Cotonou Agreement. Moreover, EU development funds have been used to support the fight against organised crime, illegal migration, human trafficking, etc. The EU’s massive efforts in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, including the military operation Atalanta, are a further manifestation of the fact that the EU’s self-interested security concerns have become more important in sub-Saharan Africa.

The importance of the war on terror has raised concerns that a situation has emerged where violations of democratic principles are tolerated as long as states agree to cooperate in the war on terror. Given the increased role of self-interested security concerns in EU-Africa policies, a similar pattern could be expected in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Africa.

Hence, the hypothesis to be investigated is the following:

H.6. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU.

1.3.4. Expectations about effectiveness

There seems to be an implicit assumption in the literature that the concentration of negative measures on sub-Saharan Africa is due to the fact that these are mostly poor, aid dependent countries, where the EU has some leverage. Nonetheless, even in aid dependent countries, the EU’s leverage should not be overestimated. As I have argued supra, the EU’s influence is declining with the increased interest of new and old powers in sub-Saharan Africa, which are often willing to provide assistance without any political strings attached. At the same time, there is a consensus in the literature that negative measures are more likely to be successful in case of a coordinated action by the main international actors, rather than a unilateral effort. In this sense, it is notable that African regional organisations have become more important in democracy promotion. Related to this, in some countries the EU has more leverage than in others. Economic leverage is more likely in aid dependent countries where the EU is a major donor and where the EU provides budget support. Moreover, political leverage should also be taken into account. Apart from international pressure, the target government may also be under domestic
pressure. From this perspective, EU negative measures are more likely to be imposed against governments that are domestically weakened.

Hence, the following hypotheses will be tested:

H.7. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when there are no or few other international actors prepared to impose negative measures, while it is more likely to impose negative measures in case of a coordinated action by international actors.

H.8. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where it lacks leverage, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when it has substantial leverage.

H.9. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government is strong, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government is weak.
1.4. Methodology

To test these nine hypotheses, I have conducted a qualitative analysis of ten country cases. In the following I will separately address four elements of my approach: (1) the qualitative character of the analysis and the combination of deduction and induction, (2) the number of cases, (3) comparability of the cases and (4) the choice of data.

1.4.1. Qualitative case study analysis

Rather than a quantitative analysis, a qualitative analysis was chosen, because I believe that a certain number of the above-mentioned hypotheses cannot be sufficiently investigated on the basis of quantitative indicators. Case studies enable the improvement of construct validity or the ability to measure the concept one tries to investigate (Bennett 2004: 34-35). For example, historical interests cannot be captured by the available quantitative indicators. Other studies investigating the motivations for aid allocations or sanctions simply included the number of years during which the recipient country was a former colony (Neumayer 2002; Neumayer 2003b; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006) or specified which country was the former coloniser (Hazelzet 2000; Hazelzet 2005). One study is more specific and looks at ‘friendly’ former colonies, although it is not clear how it is decided whether a country is ‘friendly’ or not (Bowles 1989). However, I believe that historical interests should be investigated into more depth to understand their exact impact on the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles. This can only be done on a qualitative basis by looking at the relations between former colonies and colonisers. Another example is the state of liberal democracy in the country cases. Quantitative studies on the motivations for aid allocation or sanctions mostly rely on databases such as Freedom House or Polity IV (Laakso et al. 2007a; Hazelzet 2000; Hazelzet 2005; Neumayer 2003b; Wolf and Spoden 2000). As a result, these studies are based on the available quantitative indicators, which only capture one aspect of democratisation (e.g. political rights and civil liberties in the case of Freedom House). However, the EU’s decision to take negative measures as a response to violations of democratic principles is rather complex and cannot be understood by solely looking at quantitative indicators. Negative measures are used to react to certain events, such as the closure of an independent newspaper, the imprisonment of human rights activists or a flawed electoral process (Laakso et al. 2007a; Portela 2010). Therefore, I will make a qualitative assessment of the situation of liberal democracy in the cases, based on reports by Freedom House, Polity IV, the Bertelsmann Foundation, US State Department, NGOs such as International Crisis Group, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, combined with the available academic literature. To this qualitative analysis, an assessment of quantitative indicators will be added. While such an analysis may still not perfectly reflect the situation on the ground, I believe it will be sufficient to assess how the situation of liberal democracy is perceived by the EU. This is because the EU itself uses this kind of information and is under pressure from human rights organisations making or using these analyses. Another disadvantage of quantitative data is that they can give a distorted picture of
reality. For example, the most commonly used indicator to measure economic growth is the GDP. However, in the case of Chad, looking only at GDP growth would lead to the conclusion that Chad is an economic success story, given that it had spectacular growth rates of over 30 percent in 2004. Qualitative analysis can put this in perspective. The high GDP growth was related to the beginning of oil extraction in 2003, but this extra income hardly benefited the population, as there was severe corruption, an increase in the defence budget, etc.

A second advantage of a qualitative case study analysis is the possibility to generate new hypotheses. In the course of empirical research, new hypotheses may arise from the case studies, on the basis of which the research model can be refined (Bennett 2004: 19; Kacowicz 2004). In quantitative research, on the other hand, the researcher does not know the cases well enough to see factors that are not ‘tested’ in the research design. For this reason, quantitative research is often supplemented by a case study analysis of ‘outliers’. In my research, I used a combination of induction and deduction. Although the investigation of the cases departed from potential explanatory variables, the possibility was left open to include new variables. In interviews as well as in the primary and secondary literature that was consulted, new factors regularly popped up. Hence, whereas my research originally started from the expectation that self-interest would be the main explanatory factor, in the course of the case study analysis I became aware that ‘norms’ were equally relevant. It was only by looking at specific cases (namely Ethiopia and Rwanda), that I started focusing on conflicting norms. Regarding the hypotheses on effectiveness, I had already considered including this factor from the beginning and had gathered some data for a number of case studies. However, it was only after investigating all the cases and taking all factors together, that I was truly convinced of the need to include this factor.

Apart from generating new hypotheses, comparing a certain variable across different cases also allowed to refine the hypotheses (Burnham et al. 2004: 82). For example, regarding commercial interests, I found that the policies of recipient governments sometimes endangered the EU’s commercial interests (e.g. through resource nationalism, selling contracts to non-European firms). As a result, I took up this factor, refined the hypothesis and then tried to see whether this was also applicable to other cases. In the same way, the data selection and operationalisation of the explanatory variables was fine-tuned along with the progression of the research, using the experience from previous cases and applying this to others. For example, regarding a country’s role for regional stability, I noticed that several sources (interviews and reports) noted the presence of refugees from neighbouring countries. I then tried to systematically investigate this factor in other cases.

Of course the main disadvantage of this combination of induction and deduction is the complexity of the research and the limited theoretical contribution that was made. However, I believe it was the best way to address my research question, which was empirical rather than theoretical in nature. The combination of induction and deduction has enabled me to investigate in a relatively objective way.
Until the very last stage of my research, I had not drawn any final conclusions, and tried to continuously challenge my own propositions. Moreover, although the research was originally not theoretically driven, the hypotheses were based on a thorough empirical literature review of all possibly relevant studies. Furthermore, in the last stage of my research, I linked my findings to the theoretical debate on the EU’s foreign policy. By doing this, I was encouraged to structure my hypotheses according to the norms, self-interest and effectiveness trichotomy.

Thirdly, case studies allow to identify causal mechanisms within a case. While statistical methods rely on associations and correlation, case studies allow to look at the whole chain of evidence from the hypothesised cause to the observed effect. When applied very rigorously and carefully, causality can be investigated by process-tracing methods (Bennett 2004: 23-24). Process-tracing tries to follow the chain of decisions by policy-makers linking the independent and dependent variable (Checkel 2008: 125). Given the relatively large number of cases, such a rigorous process-tracing was not possible in this research. Moreover, as most of the decision-making happens behind closed doors, most of the ‘steps’ in EU decision-making were impossible to assess. However, by interviewing officials involved in decision-making, I tried to approach the chain of events as detailed as possible. This was not possible for earlier periods, as the officials responsible at the time were not easily accessible, but was attempted to the extent possible for the more recent time period.

Lastly, case study methods allow to capture complex interaction patterns (Bennett 2004: 38-39). It has been argued that case studies are the ‘middle ground’ between positivists and constructivists and that many authors using case study research adopt a ‘soft positivist’ stance. Case studies often ‘compromise stern methodological premises with the limitations and constraints of the complex reality we want to understand and explain’ (Kacowicz 2004: 108-120). This is also the approach of the present dissertation. I departed from the assumption that there are many potential combinations of explanations, none of which are necessary nor sufficient to predict the outcome. The reality is simply too complex to capture in a small number of independent variables which will with x percent certainty predict the dependent variable. We can only try to make general and tentative assumptions on which factors might be important. This does not mean that explanations are not possible, but that one should be cautious and avoid seeing the variables as deterministic.

1.4.2. A relatively large number of cases

To mitigate the prevalent critique that case study research does not allow for generalisation, I chose to focus on ten country cases, which is a relatively large number. Moreover, given that, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, there appeared to be a large difference between the EU’s reaction to the 2010 elections,

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10 E.g. studies on democracy promotion, international development policies, the position of sub-Saharan Africa in international relations, EU-Africa policies, the Africa policies of the main EU member states, etc.
when compared to the situation in 2000, this country case was divided in two cases, bringing the total amount of cases to eleven. The number of cases is large enough to represent the group of sub-Saharan African countries where violations of democratic principles have taken place since 2000. In 2010, 39 sub-Saharan African countries were considered either ‘not free’ or ‘partially free’ by Freedom House (Freedom House 2010). My selection of ten countries thus includes one fourth of the sub-Saharan African countries in these two groups combined. If a more restrictive selection is followed by looking at those countries considered ‘authoritarian’ by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy index, there are 25 authoritarian countries in sub-Saharan Africa (out of 44 assessed countries). I included nine or more than one third of this group, excluding Kenya which is regarded as a hybrid regime in this index (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).

A number of disadvantages of the research model should also be mentioned. One problem that was difficult to avoid was the possibility that different cases influence each other (Bennett 2004: 43-44). Earlier, I noted that the failure of negative measures in Zimbabwe affected the EU’s readiness to resort to negative conditionality under Article 96. Therefore, in analysing whether the EU has applied double standards, I will try to take this into account and look at whether the EU might have applied other negative measures, such as the suspension of budget support (Ethiopia 2005, Niger 2009) or the adoption of targeted measures (Guinea 2009, Côte d’Ivoire 2010). Another disadvantage of case studies is that it is difficult to assess the causal weight of variables (Bennett 2004: 44). Hence, it will be difficult to generalise which variable has been most dominant in explaining the outcome. Nevertheless, as outlined above, this study does not claim to be able to identify ‘the’ most important variable, but acknowledges the complexity of potential explanations. Thirdly, case study research mostly suffers from the potential indeterminacy of results because a trade-off is made between parsimony and richness in the selection of variables and cases to be studied (Kacowicz 2004: 108). This problem is referred to as the ‘too many variables, not enough cases’ problem. As a general rule, a research design should include one more case than its amount of hypotheses. For this reason, I kept the number of cases rather high, and the number of hypotheses was limited to those thought to be most determinant and interesting to investigate (Burnham et al. 2008: 84). Indeed, my research design respects the general rule given that there are more cases (11) than hypotheses (9). Furthermore, the hypotheses are structured in three main clusters: norms, self-interest and effectiveness.

1.4.3. Comparability

In the selection of the cases, I have tried to ensure that cases are comparable (Gerring 2004: 348). Comparability is first of all enhanced by the limitation of the cases to sub-Saharan African countries. Relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa all take place within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and the related provisions on political dialogue and conditionality. It has been argued that these provisions are much more developed when compared to those in the EU’s agreements with other
regions (Santos Moore 2006: 143-150; Bartels 2005: 84-88). Moreover, the suspension of budget support is most likely to happen in this group given the focus of EU budget support on the ACP group.\(^\text{11}\) The EU thus has the same ‘toolbox’ of instruments at its disposal in all the case studies. Moreover, EU relations with the ACP group were – for the main part of the period investigated here – the responsibility of the European Commission’s DG Development. The latter was regarded as much more poverty focused, compared to the more political orientation of DG Relex, which was responsible for development cooperation and external relations in most other regions (Carbone 2007: 48). Of course there is also a downside to this limitation to sub-Saharan Africa: I will not be able to investigate cross-regional variation of EU motivations and the possible influence of different institutional responsibilities and related cultures.

Comparability is further enhanced by selecting countries that experienced comparable violations of democratic principles. Indeed, in order to identify ‘double standards’, I should choose countries that experienced comparable violations of democratic principles, but where the reaction of the EU has been different. All the cases selected here have experienced one of the following violations of democratic principles in the period between 2000 and mid-2011: mass arrests of opposition members, violence against peaceful demonstrations, a flawed electoral process or a ‘constitutional coup’ (where the president changes the constitution to stay in power). Moreover, while there have been similar violations of democratic principles in the eleven cases, in some cases the EU has adopted or threatened to adopt sanctions (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire 2010, Niger, Kenya), while in others it has been more reluctant to adopt sanctions (Côte d’Ivoire 2000, Eritrea, Ethiopia) and in a third group, only low-cost negative measures were taken (Chad, Rwanda, Nigeria).

Furthermore, in the selection of the cases it was attempted to have maximum variance regarding the explanatory variables, adopting in this way a ‘diverse cases’ research design (Seawright and Gerring 2005: 15-16). By ensuring variance between the variables, I tried to avoid a ‘selection bias’ by only selecting cases that show a strong relevance of one explanation (Bennett 2004: 39). As suggested earlier, it was impossible to assess this completely before the actual research, so at the stage of selection these variables were assessed tentatively on the basis of preliminary research.

Regarding norms, countries vary on internal and regional stability and on development performance. There are countries that are internally relatively stable (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Eritrea, Rwanda) and countries facing instability (Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya). On regional peace, the countries include regional powerhouses (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya), countries that are seen as endangering regional stability (Eritrea), and countries that have hardly played a foreign policy role in

\(^{11}\) Under the 10th EDF, the European Commission aimed to increase budget support (general and sectoral) to 44% of programmable funds (Michel 2008c: 23).
their neighbourhood (Niger, Guinea). Regarding development performance, there are countries that experienced high growth, but relatively low human development (Nigeria, Kenya), countries with high growth and increasing human development (Rwanda, Ethiopia) and countries with low (Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Chad) or negative (Zimbabwe) growth rates.

As regards self-interest, the cases vary on historical, commercial and security interests. Historical interests differ throughout the cases, which include countries without a colonial history (Ethiopia), countries that are former French colonies (Chad, Niger, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire), former UK colonies (Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe), as well as one former Italian colony (Eritrea) and one former Belgian colony (Rwanda). Amongst the former colonies there are countries with which the former colonial power has maintained strong relations (Chad, Niger) and countries with which relations have become troubled (Kenya, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda). Guinea is also particular in the sense that it explicitly chose to break away from the French sphere of influence after decolonisation. Commercial interests also vary. There are significant commercial partners of the EU in Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire), less important commercial partners (Guinea, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia) and negligible commercial partners (Eritrea, Chad, Rwanda, Niger). Furthermore, the countries include important (Nigeria, Niger) and less important (Côte d’Ivoire, Chad) suppliers of oil, gas and uranium to the EU. Regarding security interests, there are countries where the government is a partner in the war on terror (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Chad, Niger), piracy (Kenya, Nigeria), illegal immigration or organised crime (Nigeria), but there are equally governments that have been less capable or willing to cooperate on security issues that might affect the EU (Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea) or countries where these issues were less relevant (Guinea, Zimbabwe, Rwanda).

Lastly, the cases also represent significant variance regarding expectations about effectiveness. The cases include aid dependent countries (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Niger), oil producers (Nigeria, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire), and non-oil producers that are little aid dependent (Zimbabwe, Kenya, Guinea). Moreover, in some countries the EU is one of the few donors (Niger, Chad), while in others, there are many other donors (Rwanda, Ethiopia). There are countries where the domestic position of the government remained relatively strong (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and countries where it had significantly weakened (Chad, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, Niger).

1.4.4. Data

The variables were primarily investigated on the basis of desk research, using a wide variety of sources, including official documents from the EU and other donors, reports and data from NGOs and academic literature where available. Given the large amount of information used and the diversity of the sources, the specific data selection will be further explained in the Chapters when discussing the operationalisation of the hypotheses. In the use of secondary data, there is inevitably a bias towards
cases on which there has been previous research, which can explain why some of the sections contain more information on one country than on others. For example, there has been much more academic research on Rwanda, Kenya and Nigeria when compared to Niger or Guinea.

Apart from desk research, I conducted in-depth expert interviews. Most of these interviews were held at a rather late stage in the research (January-May 2012), with the aim to present the tentative conclusions of my research to the interviewees. The interviews were non-structured, as the questions were meant to fill the gaps that were left after examining all available sources. The questions thus differed from case to case and from interview to interview. Most of the interviews were conducted with EU officials responsible for the countries. In most of the cases, this was either the desk officer at the EEAS or the geo-coordinator in the European Commission’s DG Development responsible at the time of the interview. This means that in most cases, the interviewee had only been involved in EU decision-making for one or two years. In some cases, including Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Chad, it was possible to speak with officials that were responsible in earlier periods. Moreover, interviews conducted for previous research with desk officers for Eritrea, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe (March 2007 and February-March 2009) were also used. In order to obtain information about the reality on the ground, I spoke with Belgian ambassadors and diplomats currently or formerly responsible for the seven countries where there was or had been a Belgian embassy. This excluded Chad, Niger and Guinea, where diplomats based in neighbouring countries indicated to be poorly informed. The main reason for contacting Belgian diplomats was of course accessibility: as a Belgian researcher it was easier to get in touch with Belgian diplomats. Moreover, I was able to interview most of them (except one) face-to-face in Brussels in January 2012. Apart from policy-makers, I interviewed experts on Niger (Jeremy Keenan), Rwanda (Filip Reyntjens) and Côte d’Ivoire (Karel Arnaut). In addition to interviews focused on one country, some more general interviews were held with representatives in the Africa Working Group (France, UK), ACP Working Group (Belgium), the EDF committee (France), two officials within the Belgian Technical Cooperation and five officials within the European Commission’s DG Development working on more horizontal issues related to governance, democracy promotion and conditionality. Counting all these interviews together, I used 46 interviews for this dissertation. In addition, during field research in Ethiopia in January 2011, I spoke with an additional 35 representatives of international and European aid agencies and embassies (EU and member states), as well as Ethiopian representatives of the government, nongovernmental organisations and political parties. The purpose of this field research was not limited to my Ph.D. research, and included work on democracy assistance, but during the interviews the motivations for EU reactions to violations of democratic principles were also repeatedly discussed. There was a significant difference in the length of these interviews. While the standard length was approximately one hour, there were also very short interviews (15 min.), as well as interviews that took several hours. To ensure full anonymity of the interviewees and taking into account the sensitivity of the subject, I
will not refer to their names nor positions, but only mention the month and year in which the interview took place.
2. Double standards
2. Double standards

Although, as stated in the Introductory Chapter, the assumption that there are double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles is widely shared, this claim is often easily made, without going deeper into why exactly one can speak of double standards. This Chapter therefore has two aims: (1) to introduce the cases by discussing the situation of liberal democracy and the EU’s reaction and (2) to make the argument that there are double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. The Chapter will proceed as follows. First, the case studies are introduced, focusing on two aspects: (1) the situation of liberal democracy, focusing in particular on the period since 2000 and (2) the instruments the EU has used to promote democracy since 2000 (negative or positive). The second section then shows that there have been double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles. To substantiate this argument, I will first compare the EU’s reaction in the ten countries, and then the level of liberal democracy. The Chapter will end with a table listing (1) those countries where the EU was most reluctant to impose negative measures and (2) those countries where the EU was least reluctant to impose negative measures, taking into account the gravity of violations of democratic principles.

2.1. An overview of ten country cases

As was explained in the Introductory Chapter, I will concentrate on the EU’s reaction to violations of the two key elements of liberal democracy: (1) electoral democracy and (2) civil-political rights. As regards electoral democracy, this includes whether elections are seen as free, fair and inclusive. Amongst violations of electoral democracy I also count so-called constitutional coups, where the government amends the constitution to run for a third term. Cases of military coups d’état were omitted since there have not been any double standards in these cases: the EU invokes the Article 96 procedure without any exception in case of a military coup (Laakso et al. 2007a: 18). However, in some of the countries, namely Guinea, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire, a military coup preceded or followed the EU’s adoption of negative measures. I will concentrate on those civil-political rights that are mostly assumed as inherent in liberal democracy, including freedom of opposition, freedom of association, press freedom, freedom of expression, etc. (Neumayer 2003b: 20). As stated in the Introductory Chapter, violations of these civil-political rights are most likely to lead to a reaction of the EU.

On liberal democracy the following secondary sources were consulted. First, Freedom House publishes a yearly Freedom in the World report, which is available online from 2002 to 2012. In most cases the 2011 report was used as the 2012 report was not yet available at the time of writing. The reports discuss electoral democracy and civil-political rights. Apart from Freedom in the World, the Freedom of the Press reports were also consulted. Second, the Bertelsmann Foundation publishes reports on the status and evolution of democracy and the market economy. These reports, which were
available for 2002, 2005, 2007 and 2009, were consulted for information on civil-political rights and on electoral democracy. Third, the Polity IV project of the Center for Systemic Peace codes the authoritarian characteristics of states. Country reports are also issued; the latest available at the time of writing dated from 2008. These reports give a description of executive recruitment, the existence of constraints on the executive and the possibility of political participation. Fourth, reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were consulted. Amnesty International provides reports on violations of civil-political rights: imprisoned journalists, opposition members or human rights activists, violence against peaceful demonstrators or the adoption of legislation curtailing civil-political rights. Although reports on all the cases were available, it should be added that some countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire) received more attention than others (e.g. Niger, Chad). Human Rights Watch issues very detailed reports on a limited number of countries, including Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, for a number of countries, including Niger, such reports were not available. Fifth, reports from the International Crisis Group were used where available, namely for Chad, Nigeria, Kenya, Eritrea, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Zimbabwe. Sixth, I consulted press releases from the Committee to Protect Journalists, which reports on the imprisonment of journalists. Seventh, for those cases where the former sources only provided limited information (e.g. Niger), I analysed background notes by the US State Department, leaked US embassy cables and news articles from *Agence France Presse*, using the *LexisNexis* database. Eight, on elections, I used official election observer reports or, when these could not be found, official statements from observer teams. Where available I used the report by the EU-Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), as this was often the largest observer team and because it can be expected the EU will particularly focus on these reports. Lastly, where available I examined academic articles. On the latter it should be added that there is plenty of academic research on certain countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Zimbabwe), while on others there was hardly any academic literature available (Niger, Chad, Guinea).

To assess the EU’s instruments to democracy promotion, I mainly relied on primary data. The online database of the Council of the EU was the first to be consulted and the most important source of information. This database contains Council Conclusions, Commission Communications, Presidency declarations and working documents on Council meetings. Second, to find the final Council Decisions and Common Positions, the Eur-lex database was searched. Third, since the Council online database was not complete on Presidency declarations, I searched for Presidency declarations in the Bulletin of the European Union (online version). Fourth, in some cases I used the Prelex database to find European Commission documents. Fifth, the EU’s press database was searched for press releases.

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12 Available on the following website: [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/)
The 2011 version was used given that this was the most recent version at the time of writing.


Sixth, the answers to parliamentary questions and debates in the EP were analysed, using the online database.\textsuperscript{17} Seventh, I analysed two generations (2002-2007; 2008-2013) of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and Joint Annual Reports (JARs) on EU development cooperation. These three reports are the main source on development projects financed by the EDF. Furthermore, the CSPs and JARs also provide information on political dialogue and, where applicable, earlier aid suspensions. For more information on democracy promotion projects, I used the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which provides a short description of projects reported to the OECD as Official Development Assistance (ODA). For EIDHR projects, information was gathered from the website of DG DEVCO-Europeaid, which contains compendia of projects for 2000-2006 and 2007-2009, as well as a list of projects financed in 2009.\textsuperscript{18} For some countries, further information was provided by evaluation studies prepared for the European Commission. Lastly, these official documents were supplemented with the available information in the press (\textit{BBC News, Agence France Presse, Agence Europe}) and academic literature.

\section*{2.1.1. Eritrea}

\subsection*{2.1.1.1. Liberal democracy in Eritrea}

Eritrea adopted a constitution introducing a multi-party system in 1997. However, this constitution was never implemented. Polls were scheduled for 1998, but have been postponed ever since. In May 2008, the Eritrean president stated that Eritrea would not be ready for elections in the next three to four decades (US Embassy Eritrea 2008a). Eritrea is led by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) which – under the name Eritrea People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) - led the struggle for independence from Ethiopia. Former secretary general of the EPLF Isaias Afewerki has been president since independence (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 3). There is no legal opposition in Eritrea, the PFDJ is the only admitted party. There is some opposition abroad, but these groups are in disarray and their leaders are not taken seriously in Asmara (Reid 2009: 211). Even within the ruling party, there is no room for dissident voices. In May 2001, a group of 15 senior members of the ruling party wrote an open letter to the president in which they criticised the government for acting in an ‘illegal and unconstitutional manner’ and called upon party members and the general public to express their opinion. In September 2001, eleven of them were arrested and charged with treason. They have remained in jail ever since. Moreover, their arrest was followed by a ban on all privately owned newspapers and the arrest of journalists critical of the government (Amnesty International 2001a; Kibreab 2009: 34-38). Other waves of arrests of those expressing criticism on the government have followed, including civil servants, diplomats, military commanders, health professionals and businesspeople (Amnesty International 2004a). An independent civil society is not present in Eritrea.
because of the absolute lack of freedom of assembly and association. In 2005, the government enacted stricter regulations for the registration of nongovernmental organisations working in Eritrea (Freedom House 2011; Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 6).

2.1.1.2. EU democracy promotion

After the crackdown on dissidents in September 2001, the Council Presidency undertook a demarche, during which specific issues such as the arrest of journalists were discussed (European Parliament 2004a). When Eritrea reacted by expelling the Italian ambassador, all EU member state ambassadors temporarily withdrew from the country (The Guardian 2001, October). Although there were no formal sanctions and the Article 96 procedure was not started, new commitments remained frozen until a new CSP was signed in November 2002 (European Commission 2002a; European Community and Eritrea 2003a). Meanwhile, efforts were made to restart political dialogue. In April 2002, the situation of political prisoners was discussed (European Parliament 2002). In early 2003, political dialogue was formally restarted when Commissioner Nielson visited Eritrea (Pretorius et al. 2006: 61). However, whereas the EU hoped to address the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement, Eritrea’s main interest was to discuss foreign affairs, namely the border conflict with Ethiopia (Council of the EU 2003a; European Community and Eritrea 2009: 21). A letter to the Eritrean President was sent by the Council Presidency in September 2003, September 2004 and October 2005, expressing concern about the detention of journalists and requesting to allow a mission of EU ambassadors to visit the journalists and other political detainees. The question was raised by the ambassadors in political dialogue, but President Afewerki refused to discuss the issue and never answered to the letters (European Parliament 2005a; European Parliament 2005b). In 2004-2006, dialogue was put on hold (European Parliament 2006). In 2006, the EU put the imprisonment of the eleven dissidents back on the agenda and issued a public declaration asking the Eritrean government to disclose information on the prisoners and to bring them to court (Council of the EU 2006a). Since then, a declaration is issued each year in September to recall these demands. During President Isaias Afewerki’s visit to Brussels in May 2007, Development Commissioner Michel urged for improvements regarding the situation of democracy (European Parliament 2007d). At the UN General Assembly in October 2007, the EU called on the Eritrean government to comply with its international human rights obligations and to convene a human rights dialogue with the EU (European Parliament 2007b). In July 2008, political dialogue was restarted (European Parliament 2009a). In March 2009, the EU ambassadors in Eritrea handed a list to the government of Eritrea containing the names of political prisoners that the EU would like to see released and have more information about (European Parliament 2009b). During a meeting in May 2010, the question was again raised and in September 2010, a political dialogue session was exclusively devoted to human rights issues (European Parliament 2010a). In April 2009 and despite pressure from human rights organisations and the EP, the Commission signed a new CSP with Eritrea for the period 2009-2013. There has not been any budget support in Eritrea and the EU’s
assistance to Eritrea is very small, due to Eritrea’s limited absorption capacity (European Commission 2009a). Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2008, about €170 million was allocated to Eritrea (European Parliament 2009c).

Apart from its focus on political dialogue, the EU hopes to encourage democratisation in Eritrea through capacity-building. As such, the CSP 2002-2007 identifies governance as a ‘focal area’, and envisages projects to promote the electoral process and the set-up of democratic institutions (European Community and Eritrea 2003b). In addition, Eritrea was a focal country for the EIDHR (European Parliament 2005c). However, government restrictions have made it difficult to support civil society in Eritrea, and the government’s unwillingness to establish democratic institutions or to hold elections has rendered EU support in this sector irrelevant. Moreover, there are no political human rights organisations in Eritrea (Pretorius et al. 2006: 59). As a result, democracy assistance has been limited to a project with the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers, projects on women’s and children’s rights and a project focused on local courts (European Parliament 2010b; Pretorius et al. 2006: 60; European Commission s.d.b.).

2.1.2. Ethiopia

2.1.2.1. Liberal democracy in Ethiopia

In 1992, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the communist junta by Mengistu. Meles Zenawi was appointed prime minister of the transition regime and a new constitution was adopted introducing a multi-party system. In 1995 and in 2000, parliamentary elections were held, but these were dominated by the ruling party. During 2001-2004, protests by students, human rights activists and opposition members were often met with severe police repression. For example, in April 2001, several thousands of students and more than hundred opposition members were arrested after protesting against the lack of academic freedom and police brutality (Amnesty International 2001d). Against this background, the May 2005 parliamentary elections were held in a much more open sphere when compared to previous elections: the new electoral law enhanced competition and parties were given equal access to the broadcasting media (Abbink 2006: 173-181). However, the counting process was marred by irregular practices and a lack of transparency, while there was no adequate complaints and appeals mechanism, leading the EU-EOM to conclude that the elections fell short of international principles (EU-EOM Ethiopia 2005: 1). The official release of the results was postponed several times, feeding suspicions of fraud amongst opposition supporters. Moreover, the government issued a one-month blanket ban on demonstrations right after the elections. In early June 2005, the ban was first defied by a number of university students, who were immediately arrested. This led to protests supported by the opposition, which were severely cracked down by security forces, leading to about 36 deaths. Final results announced in September indicated that the EPRDF had won the elections with 327 of a total of 547 seats. However, the opposition had grown
from 12 to 161 seats (Harbeson 2005: 148-154). The opposition challenged the results, but demonstrations were prohibited and many opposition members were arrested for planning protests. In October 2005, the largest opposition coalition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) refused to take up its seats and blocked parliament. In a new round of manifestations against the election results in early November 2005, the police fired live ammunition on protestors, leading to the death of 193 civilians and nine politicians (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 194-197). This was followed by a country-wide clampdown on opposition supporters, in which an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people were arrested (Abbink 2006: 192). In July 2007, 30 political detainees were charged but pardoned after signing a letter admitting they were guilty (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 197).

After the 2005 elections, civil-political rights were curtailed by a series of laws that clearly envisaged the opposition, the independent media and civil society. The new party formation law stipulated that political parties could not accept funding from abroad. The 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation increased punishment for defamation, allowed prosecutors to halt the publication of pieces deemed a threat to public order and placed restrictions on foreign media ownership. In 2009, the Charities and Societies Proclamation prohibited civil society organisations that receive more than 10 percent of their funding from abroad to work on issues of human rights, democratisation, good governance, conflict prevention, etc. (Ibid.: 200-202). The 2009 anti-terrorism legislation defines terrorism so broadly as to allow prosecution of, for example, journalists who publish articles referring to opposition movements (Human Rights Watch 2010a). Furthermore, the ruling party extended its power base. Microcredit programmes were used as an incentive to attract new members, while government employees were threatened they could lose their jobs and prerogatives if they did not become party members. Party members were then asked to convince at least four friends and family to join the EPRDF. In the meantime, the potential impact of the opposition was weakened by new legislation in parliament and the government-controlled electoral board made registration of opposition members for the 2008 local and 2010 parliamentary elections extremely difficult. Together with the weakening of the opposition, which had become hopelessly divided, this strategy succeeded in re-establishing the EPRDF as the sole party in power: it gained all but a few seats in the 2008 local and 2010 parliamentary elections (Tronvoll 2010; Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). EU observers to the 2010 parliamentary elections again concluded that the elections failed to meet international standards, given the narrowing of the political space preceding the elections and the lack of level playing field between the parties (EU-EOM Ethiopia 2010).

2.1.2.2. EU democracy promotion

Until the 2005 parliamentary elections, the EU had taken a rather low profile on democracy. Concern about the imprisonment of students and opposition activists in 2001 was only expressed behind closed doors in a demarche by the EU Presidency (European Parliament 2001). EU involvement in Ethiopia’s
democratisation process however increased in the context of the 2005 parliamentary elections. A large – 200 member – observer team was sent and voter education by civil society was supported. Despite the critical assessment by the EU-EOM, the EU did not immediately condemn the elections, focusing instead on mediation between the ruling party and the opposition (Abbink 2006: 189; Council of the EU 2005a). Yet when the dispute over the results took a violent turn, the EU – jointly with the US - called on all parties to end the violence (Council of the EU 2005b). Following the mass arrests in early November 2005, the EU called for an end to the violence, the return to dialogue and the release of detainees (Agence France Presse 6 November 2005). In December 2005, the EU froze its funds earmarked for general budget support, as well as €155 million in sectoral budget support for the road sector (European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 33). The decision was taken unilaterally by the European Commission in conjunction with other donors providing budget support, without taking recourse to Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. However, the suspension of aid was only of short duration. In late 2006, sectoral budget support for the road sector was resumed, and in early 2007, the EU joined the Protection of Basic Services programme, by which budget support is transferred to the lower tiers of government and targeted specifically at basic services including health and education (European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 33). Commissioner for Development Michel raised the issue of political prisoners during a visit in February 2006 when he visited the political detainees, and again in December 2006 during a joint visit with the President of the Commission. Moreover, an EU observer was sent to the trials of the political opponents arrested in November-December 2005 (European Parliament 2007c). Yet after the release of most political detainees in July 2007, public criticism about Ethiopia’s democratic record stalled, despite the increasing authoritarianism of the EPRDF regime. A public declaration was issued after the proclamation of the civil society law in January 2009, but it was cautious and focused mainly on the potential consequences of the legislation for development cooperation (Council of the EU 2009a). In December 2009, a public declaration was issued protesting against the closure of a private newspaper and the intimidation of journalists (Council of the EU 2009b). Moreover, the public reaction to the 2010 parliamentary elections was surprisingly weak. Despite the EU-EOM’s concerns about the electoral process, High Representative Catherine Ashton called the elections ‘an important moment in the democratic process in the country’ (Council of the EU 2010a). When the Ethiopian government denied Chief Observer Thijs Berman to present his final report in the capital Addis Ababa, Catherine Ashton made a slightly more critical declaration in which she invited the government ‘to draw on the report and consider carefully its recommendations’ (Council of the EU 2010b). While the large democratic governance envelope (€49 million) of the CSP for 2008-2013 suggests a high priority on these issues in EU cooperation, most programmes (in the justice sector, supporting democratic institutions) are government-led and hence have little impact on democratisation, while support to civil society has recently become focused on less conflictive issues due to the new civil society legislation (anonymous interviews, January 2011). Rather than using coercive strategies, EU representatives raise concerns about violations of democratic
principles in the political dialogue held twice a year with prime minister Meles Zenawi (interviews, January 2011).

2.1.3. Kenya

2.1.3.1. Liberal democracy in Kenya

From independence in 1963 until 1992, Kenya was a one-party state. Under domestic and international pressure, President Daniel arap Moi introduced a multi-party system in 1992, but elections in 1992 and 1997 were marred by intimidation and violence against the opposition, media control and doubtful election procedures (Freedom House 2011). Nonetheless, in 2002, Moi announced his retirement. Main opposition parties National Alliances of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NRC), whose candidate Kibaki won the elections. However, the NRC was soon divided between Kibaki’s NAK and the LDP, which was led by Raila Odinga. The Memorandum of Understanding signed before the elections stipulated that Kibaki would be President and Odinga prime minister once a new constitution was agreed and that minister posts would be divided between both parties. Once in power, however, Kibaki denied the promised cabinet posts to the LDP. Moreover, the negotiation of the new constitution provoked a fierce debate between both parties. The draft constitution proposed after two years of negotiation was unacceptable for Odinga’s LDP, since the position of the prime minister was weakened and the role of the President strengthened, while a single-chamber instead of a two-chamber parliament was foreseen. Odinga’s camp managed to convince most voters and the draft constitution was rejected in the 2005 referendum (Whitaker and Giersch 2009: 5-7).

Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in December 2007, in which Kibaki faced his former ally Odinga, who led the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). While voting and campaigning were considered relatively free and fair, problems emerged in the counting process. This led the EU-EOM to conclude that the elections fell short of international and regional standards (EU-EOM Kenya 2008) and raised suspicions of fraud amongst the opposition. The first results, with 70 percent of the votes counted, pointed to Odinga as the winner. Furthermore, there were delays in the communication of results in areas believed to be strongholds of Kibaki. The opposition also mistrusted the electoral commission, to which Kibaki had unilaterally appointed members just before the elections (Abuya 2009: 133-134; Mueller 2008: 198; International Crisis Group 2008a: 6). As a result, the final results, which declared Kibaki as the winner with a very narrow margin (4,578,034 against 4,352,860), were disputed by the opposition, especially since Odinga’s party lay far ahead in the parliamentary elections, with 99 seats to 43 (Abuya 2009: 135-136). Odinga’s supporters were disappointed and angry about the results, and many turned to violence against whom were believed to be Kibaki supporters. Under mediation by Kofi Annan, a power-sharing agreement was reached in February 2008 with Kibaki as a President and Odinga as prime minister. The agreement foresaw the
creation of two commissions that would look into the conduct of elections (the Kriegler Commission) and into the post-electoral violence (the Waki Commission) (Brown 2009: 8). The Kriegler report (2008) found that, given the lack of independence of the electoral board and electoral malpractices, the electoral process was so flawed that it was impossible to conclude which political party had won the elections. The Waki report (2008) concluded that both the opposition and the ruling party were responsible for the violence (Southall 2009: 445-446). In August 2010, a new constitution was approved by referendum, which imposed new checks on the authority of the president. Moreover, the ICC has recently initiated an investigation into crime against humanity against those believed responsible for the postelection violence (Freedom House 2011). National elections, originally scheduled for 2012, have been postponed until 2013.

2.1.3.2. EU democracy promotion
Given the successful transfer of power from Moi to Kibaki in 2002, the EU focused on positive measures during Kibaki’s first years as a president, including capacity-building for constitutional, electoral and judicial reform as well as support to non-state actors (European Community and Kenya 2007: 15). However, the EU reacted harshly to the flawed elections in December 2007. Following the EU-EOM’s negative report, the EU called on Kenya’s leaders to address the concerns raised by the observers (Council of the EU 2008a). Aid was not immediately suspended, but the EU made clear that ‘business as usual’ was not an option until a solution was found for the impasse (Council of the EU 2008b). The invocation of Article 96 was seriously considered and the EU repeatedly threatened with aid suspension should the government fail to negotiate with the opposition. The disbursement of budget support was delayed until the announcement of the election results, however, due to a technical impossibility to delay the payment until after the end of the year, it was finally disbursed in the midst of the post-electoral violence (Michel 2008a). Commissioner for Development Michel travelled to Kenya several times in January and February 2008 to support the mediation process by Kofi Annan (Agence France Presse 19 January 2008; 7 February 2008). As a deal was struck in February 2008 and a coalition government was formed in April 2008, the EU did not proceed to the opening of Article 96 consultations. Nonetheless, the EU strongly insisted on the implementation of the reforms recommended by the Kriegler and Waki commissions. After the release of the Waki report in October 2008, there were rumours that the EU considered to link the provision of budget support to the implementation of the recommendations of the report (US Embassy Kenya 2008a; Kippin 2009: 12). Council Conclusions in July 2009 called for a prompt implementation of the reforms agreed under the power-sharing agreement, including electoral reform, police and judicial reform and measures to combat impunity (Council of the EU 2009c). In October 2009, the EU showed concern about the failure of the government of Kenya to establish a tribunal on the post-election violence, and called on the government to respect the jurisdiction of the ICC (Council of the EU 2009d). In December 2009, an EU Troika mission was sent to Kenya to push for reform (US Embassy Kenya 2009a). When the
ICC listed six individuals to appear for the Court, Ashton urged the individuals to cooperate fully with the ICC (Council of the EU 2011d).

### 2.1.4. Chad

#### 2.1.4.1. Liberal democracy in Chad

Chad is led by President Idriss Déby and his *Mouvement Patriotique du Salut* (MPS), which took power after a military coup in 1990. Although multi-party elections were introduced in 1993, subsequent elections were seriously flawed (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009f: 7; International Crisis Group 2006c: 3; Freedom House 2011). In the 2001 presidential elections, members from the electoral commission resigned citing irregularities during the polls and the lack of transparency in the management of the elections (*Agence France Presse* 23 May 2001). After challenging the results, six opposition candidates and some thirty opposition activists were detained. Gatherings of more than 20 people were prohibited and a peaceful demonstration against the election results was violently dispersed by the police (Amnesty International 2001b; Freedom House 2011). After the 2001 elections, opposition parties established the *Coordination pour la Défense de la Constitution* (CPDC) which would boycott all further polls, since participating would legitimise a seriously flawed electoral process. Apart from those opposition parties that chose to boycott the elections, most of the opposition either turned to armed struggle or was co-opted by the president (International Crisis Group 2008b: 9-10). In the subsequent legislative elections held in 2002, most opposition parties and members boycotted the elections, in which Déby’s party took 112 of the 155 seats.

Despite earlier promises that he would step down after a second mandate, President Déby pushed through a constitutional amendment in June 2005 to allow him to run for a third term in a referendum that was boycotted by the opposition. The presidential elections in May 2006 – held amidst great turmoil as the government had survived a *coup d’état* a few months earlier - were won by President Déby, which was not surprising given the opposition boycott (International Crisis Group 2006c: 2 and 11). In November 2006, a six-month state of emergency was declared, including a ban on media coverage of sensitive issues (Freedom House 2011). After months of dialogue between the opposition and the presidential majority, a political agreement was reached in August 2007. The agreement foresaw the creation of a new electoral board with strict parity between the opposition and the majority, a revision of the electoral code and adoption of a new electoral list (International Crisis Group 2008b: 10-11). In February 2008, a coalition of rebels launched an attack on N’Djamena and almost ousted Déby. As a reaction, Déby declared a state of emergency, arrested three opposition members and restricted the freedom of the press. One opposition member, Ibni Oumar Saleh, disappeared and was never found (Amnesty International 2008a; Freedom House 2011). Nonetheless, the implementation of the political agreement went ahead. In June 2008, a new prime minister was appointed, who named a new cabinet (US embassy Chad 2008a). In July 2009, the CPDC and the
ruling party created an independent electoral commission (International Crisis Group 2010b: 16-17). However, legislative elections were repeatedly postponed. They were finally held in February 2011 and were won by the presidential majority with 125 of 175 seats. The elections, observed by an EU Election Observation Mission, took place in a relatively open sphere, but the ruling party had a considerable advantage over the opposition as it used state resources in the campaign (EU-EOM Tchad 2011: 4-6). Presidential elections were held on 25 April 2011. The three main opposition candidates boycotted the elections after their demands for electoral reform had not been met (Freedom House 2012).

2.1.4.2. EU democracy promotion
Although the EU has become more strongly involved in the Chadian democratisation process since the mid-2000s, it has remained reluctant to use negative measures. After the 2001 presidential elections, a public declaration was issued in which the EU regretted the irregularities and deplored the restriction of liberties during the electoral period, the use of force against public demonstrators and the brutal questioning of opposition candidates (Council of the EU 2001a). The opening of Article 96 consultations was however not considered (Byrne 2001). The EU did not publicly react to the 2002 legislative elections nor to the 2005 constitutional referendum. After the 2006 presidential elections, Commissioner Michel stated he deplored the lack of peaceful dialogue between government and opposition and the opposition boycott (Michel 2006). From then onwards, the EU took a more proactive stance and mediated a political dialogue between the government and the non-armed opposition, which led to the August 2007 political agreement. The EU also took part in the follow-up and support committee (International Crisis Group 2008b: 11-12). Commissioner Michel travelled several times to Chad in January-February 2008 to encourage the implementation of the agreement (European Commission 2008a). Together with France, the European Commission was involved in the creation of a commission of investigation into the disappearance of opposition member Saleh (Assemblée Nationale de la France 2008). Moreover, to support the implementation of the political agreement, the creation of an independent electoral commission and an electoral census were supported and an observer mission was sent to the 2011 legislative elections (but not to the presidential elections) (European Community and Chad 2007a; European Commission 2008a; EU-EOM Tchad 2011).

2.1.5. Niger

2.1.5.1. Liberal democracy in Niger
Niger turned to multi-party rule with the election victory of Mahamane Ousmane in 1993. In 1996, however, General Mainassara overthrew Ousmane in a military coup. Mainassara was elected in elections that were marred by intimidation and were boycotted by the opposition, but in 1999 he was
ousted in a military coup. A new constitution was adopted and elections in November 1999 deemed free and fair by international observers were won by Mahamadou Tandja. Under the latter’s Presidency, respect for civil-political rights improved, although after an army mutiny in 2002, a human rights activist and journalists were imprisoned. Municipal and presidential elections in July-December 2004 were won by President Tandja and his party and were considered by observers as ‘free from massive fraud’. However, after demonstrations against the rising cost of living in 2005-2006, several journalists were arrested (Freedom House 2011; Agence France Presse 5 August 2006). In 2007, the government resigned after a motion of no confidence over an embezzlement scandal involving prime minister Amadou (Center for Systemic Peace 2008a). After the demission of his prime minister, Tandja concentrated power in his own hands (US embassy Niger 2007a). In May 2009, Tandja asked the National Assembly to approve a referendum proposal to change the constitution to postpone the presidential elections until 2012 and to eliminate term limits on the president. The prime minister would become irrelevant under the new constitution (US State Department 2011a). When lawmakers and the constitutional court opposed the plan, Tandja dissolved the parliament and the courts and declared the state of emergency. The referendum was held in August 2009 and the proposal passed with almost 92 percent of the vote, amidst opposition claims of fraud (Freedom House 2011). Journalists and opposition members who were critical of the referendum were arrested, some demonstrations were prohibited and many of those protesting against the referendum were arrested. The subsequent legislative elections in October 2009 were won by the presidential majority and boycotted by the opposition (US State Department 2011a). In February 2010, Tandja was ousted in a military coup led by Salou Djibo. Elections were held in January 2011, excluding Tandja who was held in custody. The elections were considered generally free and fair by the EU-EOM and resulted in the appointment of Mahamadou Issoufou (EU-EOM Niger 2011).

2.1.5.2. EU democracy promotion

After President Tandja’s election in 1999, the EU fully resumed development assistance, which had been suspended since the coup in 1996. There was no official reaction to the violations of the freedom of press and association in 2002, 2005 and 2006. The EU focused instead on capacity-building, including projects to support civil society, elections and human rights awareness (European Commission and Niger 2008; EIDHR 2006). There was no formal political dialogue under Article 8, but concerns about violations of democratic principles were raised in the regular policy dialogue between the donors and the Nigerien authorities. Nonetheless, the programming dialogue on the CSP for 2008-2013 gave new impetus to political dialogue, and it was agreed in 2007-2008 to make dialogue more frequent and structured (European Community and Niger 2008: 53). However, given the lack of interest from the Nigerien government, the first meeting only took place in March 2009 (anonymous interview, February 2012). After President Tandja’s announcement of his plans to stay in power, the main strategy of the EU changed from dialogue to negative measures. Tandja’s decision to
dissolve the constitutional court and to declare a state of emergency was firmly condemned by the EU (Council of the EU 2009e). The European Commission sent a letter to the president, in which it called for strengthened political dialogue and raised the possibility of Article 96 consultations (European Commission 2009b). In the meanwhile, a request for disbursement of budget support was denied because of ‘governance’ problems (Agence France Presse 12 July 2009). On 24 July, an Article 8 dialogue took place, but the EU found that the willingness of the government to return to the legal constitutional framework was lacking (European Commission 2009b). On the eve of the referendum, the EU reiterated that the continuous violation of the essential elements would have serious consequences for EU development cooperation (Council of the EU 2009f). In October 2009, the European Commission sent a proposal to the Council on the opening of consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement (European Commission 2009b). Consultations were held in December 2009, during which the Nigerien authorities made commitments regarding press freedom, municipal elections and dialogue with the opposition (Council of the EU 2009g). To keep dialogue ongoing, the EU delegation attended Tandja’s New Year’s address in January and did not issue a declaration following the end of Tandja’s second term in December 2009 (US Embassy Niger 2010). After the military coup, the EU refocused on the transition to civilian rule. During a second round of Article 96 consultations, the EU gave its approval to the transition plan presented by the Nigerien authorities and presented a roadmap to move gradually to the resumption of full cooperation. Meanwhile, EU aid was restricted to humanitarian assistance and measures to support the transition to democracy (Council of the EU 2010c). The January 2011 elections were welcomed by the EU and full cooperation was resumed after President Issoufou’s inauguration in April 2011 (Council of the EU 2011a; Council of the EU 2011b).

2.1.6. Nigeria

2.1.6.1. Liberal democracy in Nigeria

After five years of military dictatorship, General Abacha died in 1998, after which General Abubakar prepared the ground for the return to civilian rule. In 1999, presidential elections were held and won by Olusegun Obasanjo, although there were allegations of ballot stuffing and voter falsification (Shola Omotola 2006: 158). Despite improvements to address impunity and press freedom, in the run-up to the 2003 elections, state police and intelligence services attacked journalists, human rights activists, supporters of the opposition and peaceful demonstrators (Human Rights Watch 2003a). Moreover, presidential and parliamentary elections were characterised by serious shortcomings as regards election administration, electoral laws and voter registration. The EU-EOM concluded that the legislative elections were marked by serious shortcomings and delays in the electoral preparations, and that the presidential and gubernatorial elections did not meet minimum standards in a number of states (EU-EOM Nigeria 2003: 2). The results, with 62 percent of the votes won by Obasanjo, were contested by Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People’s Party, but the Supreme Court ruled in
2005 that the documented fraud did not affect the outcome (Freedom House 2011). The 2004 local elections, after having been postponed for two years, were noted to be ‘simply stage-managed by the ruling party’ (Bertelsmann Foundation 2005a: 4). The 2007 presidential elections were so severely flawed that observers from the National Democratic Institute and Chief Observer Max Van den Berg from the EU-EOM concluded that the elections were the worst they had ever observed (International Crisis Group 2007a: 6; Enabulele and Ewere 2010: 185). Several important opposition candidates were excluded as they appeared on a list of officials allegedly involved in corruption (International Crisis Group 2007a: 2). The independence of the electoral board was seriously doubted (Suberu 2007: 98). Furthermore, observers witnessed ballot stuffing, under-age voting, intimidation of voters and a flawed voter registration. The ruling party did little to avoid political violence and used it as a pretext to arrest opposition figures (International Crisis Group 2007a: 4-5; Human Rights Watch 2007: 11-21). The elections were won by President Yar’Adua from the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), who was appointed by Obasanjo as his successor. At his inauguration Yar’Adua acknowledged the elections had been flawed, and immediately promised comprehensive electoral reform. In August 2007, an electoral reform panel was set up, composed of 23 members representing diverse interests. However, doubts about electoral reform soon emerged after the release of the panel’s report in December 2008 (Shola Omotola 2010: 6-7). In 2010, however, after a long period of illness, Yar’Adua was succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan was re-elected in April 2011 in what were believed to be the fairest elections in Nigeria, but also the bloodiest, since political violence instigated by the main opposition candidate resulted in more than 800 deaths (EU-EOM Nigeria 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011a).

2.1.6.2. EU democracy promotion
After Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, the EU lifted the sanctions it had imposed in the early 1990s. In 2001, a Common Position was adopted, outlining the main areas of cooperation between the EU and Nigeria. Democracy-building measures were announced and a close political dialogue was envisaged (Council of the EU 2001b). Following the 2003 presidential and gubernatorial elections, which had been supported with EDF funds, the Council Presidency referred to the elections as ‘an important step for the democratic process in Nigeria’, but noted the ‘serious irregularities and instances of fraud’ observed by the EU-EOM and called on the Nigerian authorities to settle disputes peacefully and prosecute those responsible for political violence (Council of the EU 2003b). Council Conclusions adopted in November 2003 reiterated the predominantly positive approach and congratulated the Nigerian authorities with their efforts to consolidate democracy, while underlining the EU’s willingness to support these processes (Council of the EU 2003c). Political dialogue was relaunched in 2004 in the format of a Ministerial Troika, but it hardly focused on democratisation (Council of the EU 2004a). Besides political dialogue, the EU also invested in capacity-building for democracy. During 2003-2009, numerous macro- and microprojects were financed by the EIDHR to
support civil society in projects regarding freedom of the press, strengthening civil society, promoting human rights, participation in the democratic process, etc. Moreover, an enormous amount was invested in the 2007 elections. A €40 million programme was signed covering the pre- and post-election phase, and the EU delegation took the lead in establishing a joint donor basket fund, which focused on building technical capacity of the electoral board, as well as on the role of civil society in the elections (Adetula et al. 2010: 6). Unlike in 2003, the EU was fairly critical about the 2007 presidential elections, stating its disappointment about the lack of progress in relation to the 2003 elections, the violence, organisational difficulties and irregularities. Nonetheless, the possibility of sanctions was not raised, and the EU underlined its continued commitment to dialogue and engagement (Council of the EU 2007a). High-level political dialogue was relaunched in May 2008 with the new leaders. However, democracy was only a minor topic in the dialogue, and there was little criticism on Nigeria’s flawed electoral process. Instead, the EU took note of the readiness of the Nigerian authorities to address electoral flaws and it was agreed that the EU would finance this process (Council of the EU 2008c). At a Ministerial Troika in May 2009, it was agreed to step up political dialogue and cooperation under a new strategy ‘Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward’, an initiative under the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. Dialogue would be held once a year at Ministerial Troika level, twice a year at Senior Officials level and at least once each Council Presidency at ambassadors level. The EU’s willingness to support the electoral reform process was re-emphasised (Council of the EU 2009h). Moreover, it was agreed to make ‘Governance and human rights’ a priority theme for the EU-Nigeria political dialogue and the EU intended to step up financial support in the governance sector to 50-60 percent of the funds available under the 10th EDF (European Parliament 2009d). The EU sent an observer team to observe the presidential elections in 2011, and Commissioner Barroso immediately congratulated President Goodluck Jonathan on his re-election (European Commission 2011b).

### 2.1.7. Rwanda

#### 2.1.7.1. Liberal democracy in Rwanda

After the 1990-1993 civil war in Rwanda, the Arusha agreements were signed, which established transitional institutions and foresaw multi-party elections in 1999. The transitional government, eventually extended until 2003, was dominated by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the former Tutsi rebel movement in Rwanda. Although individuals from other political parties had been included in the government, they were weakened (Sidiropoulos 2002: 81), leading to the resignation of five Hutu Ministers in 1995, including prime minister Faustin Twagiramungu. In 2000, several other prominent politicians, including the speaker of the parliament and President Bizimungu, were forced to resign (Longman 2011: 32-33). Elections held since 2001 show an immense popularity of President Kagame and the RPF, but this should be seen in the context of restricted civil-political rights. Divergent opinions are dismissed as ‘genocidal ideology’, which is prohibited by the constitution.
Independent newspapers\textsuperscript{19} and human rights organisations\textsuperscript{20} have faced intimidation, arrests and harassment of their members (International Crisis Group 2002a; Reyntjens 2006: 1104-1107; Longman 2011: 28-29). A parliamentary report in 2004 recommended banning five NGOs on the basis of genocidal ideology (Silva-Leander 2008: 1614; Longman 2011: 29-30). Moreover, political parties closely identified with the genocide, as well as parties based on ethnicity or religion, are prohibited (Longman 2011: 33-34). As such, the Party for Democracy and Regeneration was banned in 2001 and its leader, former President Bizimungu, was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment (Reyntjens 2006: 1104-1107; Beswick 2010a: 235). In the context of the 2003 elections, the opposition party with the largest support base, the Hutu-based Democratic Republican Movement, was declared illegal (Longman 2011: 33; Silva-Leander 2008: 1613). In 2009, a controversial press law was signed that allowed the government to regulate journalists and review the content of publications (Longman 2011: 36).

Local elections held in 2001 were criticised by human rights organisations for the lack of pluralism allowed (Ibid.: 38-39). The 2003 constitution was adopted in a referendum in April 2003, but campaigning had been exclusively in support of the text (Reyntjens 2006: 1108). The EU-EOM found numerous instances of fraud and irregularities in the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, there was an uneven competition, with Kagame and the ruling party dominated the campaign (EU-EOM Rwanda 2003: 4). Faustin Twagiramungu, who ran as an independent candidate, faced considerable harassment and intimidation from the RPF and its supporters (Beswick 2010a: 236). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, several irregularities were noted, the campaign was marred by intimidation and there was hardly any debate between contestants (EU-EOM Rwanda 2008: 3-5). In the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, Human Right Watch observed increased threats, intimidation, arrests and violence against opposition candidates or independent journalists (Human Rights Watch 2010b). The vice-president of the Green Party, Rwisereka, was murdered amidst serious suspicions that the government was behind the murder. In the aftermath of the elections, opposition leaders Victoire Ingabire (FDU-Inkingi) and Bernard Ntaganda (PS-Imberakuri) were arrested (Human Rights Watch 2011b; Human Rights Watch 2010c). Regarding the 2010 presidential elections, the Commonwealth observer mission noted a ‘lack of critical opposition voices’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010: 30).

\subsection*{2.1.7.2. EU democracy promotion}
Despite the many violations of democratic principles noted above, the EU has mainly focused on positive measures in Rwanda. This is shown in a 2001 Common Position, in which the EU expressed support for the democratisation process in Rwanda and encouraged the government to ‘guarantee

\textsuperscript{19} E.g. Umuseso, Umuvugizi, Umurabyo and Umuco

\textsuperscript{20} E.g. Liprodhor, Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de la personne et des libertés publique and Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de l’homme
effective protection of the civil and political rights’ (Council of the EU 2001c). The disbursement of electoral support for the 2003 elections was delayed because of the allegations of fraud, but was eventually paid at the end of the year (Hayman 2006: 115). In a public declaration, the EU called the elections ‘a fundamental step in the country’s national reconciliation process’, although the EU-EOM’s observations concerning intimidation and arrests of the opposition were also noted (Council of the EU 2003d; Council of the EU 2003e). Similarly, Council Conclusions adopted in December 2003 congratulated Rwanda with the completion of its electoral process, while calling on Kagame to ensure respect for constitutional rights (Council of the EU 2003f). In 2004, the Council Presidency issued two public declarations about violations of democratic principles in Rwanda. The first concerned the sentencing of Pasteur Bizimungu and stated that the trial had not been fair nor impartial (Council of the EU 2004b). The second followed the parliamentary report on genocidal ideology and raised concern about the interpretation of the term ‘genocidal ideology’, calling on the government of Rwanda to respect the freedom of speech, association and expression (Council of the EU 2004c). Political dialogue under Article 8 started in 2004 (European Parliament 2008). Despite the critical EU-EOM assessment of the 2008 parliamentary elections, Commissioner Michel called the elections ‘important steps towards the consolidation of democracy in Rwanda’ (European Commission 2008b). The EU did not send an observer team to the 2010 presidential elections (EU business 2010, August). However, in July 2010, Catherine Ashton issued a declaration in which she firmly condemned the murder of the president of the Green Party and of three other public figures in July 2010 and urged the government of Rwanda to investigate these murders (Council of the EU 2010d). In August 2010, Ashton noted to be ‘concerned about the serious incidents which marred the pre-electoral period’ and recommended further opening of the political space. However, the suspension of development assistance has not been seriously considered. On the contrary, Rwanda is receiving more and more aid from the EU, which is to a great extent provided by sectoral and general budget support. For example, in 2008, the Rwandan government was rewarded for its progress on the MDGs with an MDG Contract involving €175 million in general budget support (European Commission 2008g).

2.1.8. Guinea

2.1.8.1. Liberal democracy in Guinea
Multi-party democracy was introduced in 1991 under President Lansana Conté who seized power in 1984, but elections organised in 1993 and 1998 were plagued by voter intimidation and government repression. The main opposition candidate, Alpha Condé, was arrested in 1998 and was only released four years later (International Crisis Group 2003a: 4). In November 2001, Conté organised a national referendum in which a constitutional amendment was adopted allowing him to remain in office for a third term. The referendum was boycotted by the opposition and was believed to be seriously flawed, which made the opposition decide to boycott further elections (Center for Systemic Peace 2008b). In the legislative elections that followed in June 2002, votes were not even counted, but simply divided
amongst the ruling party and those opposition parties that did not boycott the elections (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a). Presidential elections in December 2003 were characterised by fraud and vote rigging and resulted in a landslide victory by President Conté (Center for Systemic Peace 2008b). In 2004, several opposition leaders were arrested for alleged coup plots (International Crisis Group 2005: 5). Starting from the end of 2004, however, the government appointed a new prime minister, Cellou Dallein Diallo after the post of prime minister had been vacant for eight months. In 2005, a programme of electoral reform was started. Electoral lists were revised, privately owned radio and television stations were allowed and a new electoral commission was created representing opposition, ruling party, civil society and government bureaucracy. Municipal elections held in 2005 were seen as an improvement from previous elections, with equal campaigning time for the ruling party and the opposition (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a; International Crisis Group 2006b: 2). However, these positive steps were halted in 2006, when Conté dismissed the prime minister. Moreover, peaceful demonstrations against the high cost of living in 2006-2007 were suppressed with brutal police force. In June 2006, at least 13 people were killed and many more injured after security forces fired on unarmed protestors (Human Rights Watch 2006). In 2007, security forces killed more than 130 people when opening fire on protestors (Freedom House 2011). In order to stem the protests, Conté appointed Lansana Kouyaté as prime minister, who was chosen from a list put forward by trade unions and civil society organisations. However, Conté hardly took his new prime minister into account, and in 2008, the prime minister was replaced by a close ally (International Crisis Group 2008c). Legislative elections were repeatedly planned and postponed over 2007-2008. In December 2008, Conté died in office, and a military junta led by Dadis Camara took power. Initial hopes that the junta was committed to democratic transition were dashed when Camara announced he would stand for elections, despite earlier promises that no member of the junta would participate. Moreover, in September 2009, about 160 protestors were killed and many women were raped by security forces in an opposition rally against the flawed transition process (International Crisis Group 2009a). In January 2010, the military junta announced that the military would no longer stand as a candidate in presidential elections. Presidential elections were held in June and October 2010 and were won by Alpha Condé with 52 percent of the vote in the second round. The elections led to political violence, often along ethnic lines, but were deemed legitimate by most observers, including the EU-EOM (Freedom House 2011; Arieff 2011: 8-10; EU-EOM Guinea 2011).

2.1.8.2. EU democracy promotion
Since the early 2000s, the EU has actively pressured President Conté’s regime for democratic reform. After the 2001 referendum, the EU called for ‘observance of constitutional rules, preservation of checks and balances, liberalisation of the media and the establishment of a framework for a fair and transparent electoral process’ (Council of the EU 2001d). A demarche was undertaken to push for the referendum to be held in democratic conditions. In December 2001, Special Representative for the
Mano River Region Hans Dahlgren urged for a postponement of the legislative elections and an invitation of international observers. After an EU mission concluded in April 2002 that the minimum conditions for legislative elections were not respected, EU electoral assistance was suspended. In January 2003, the EU again decided not to support presidential elections after a discussion between Commissioner Nielson and Special Representative Dahlgren and the Guinean authorities (Laakso et al. 2007a: 83; International Crisis Group 2003a: 9). When the new CSP for Guinea was discussed in the EDF committee in June 2003, it was blocked because of the lack of democratic reform (Laakso et al. 2007a: 84). In August 2003, the European Commission proposed to open consultations under Article 96 and in May 2004, the proposal was endorsed by the Council. While consultations first yielded few results (International Crisis Group 2005: 13), finally an action plan was agreed in which the Guinean authorities proposed to liberalise airwaves and to organise local elections in 2005 and parliamentary elections in June 2007. After a follow-up mission, the EU concluded that there was willingness on the part of the Guinean authorities to implement the plan. Nonetheless, the EU suspended all aid, except for programmes to improve the living conditions of the most disadvantaged people and to support civil society or the democratisation process (Council of the EU 2005c). After the set-up of an electoral commission and the liberalisation of media outlets in 2006, the EU partially lifted these measures (International Crisis Group 2007b: 13). After the appointment of a prime minister of consensus in May 2007, the EU started political dialogue with the newly appointed prime minister on the progress made in the framework of the Article 96 consultations (Council of the EU 2007b). At the same time, the EU firmly condemned the death of several protestors in a clash with security forces in June 2006 (Council of the EU 2006b) and during the protests in January-February 2007. Moreover, aid was not fully resumed because there had not been enough progress on legislative elections and Conté was reluctant to cede powers to the prime minister (European Commission 2008c).

Consultations under Article 96 were reopened after the December 2008 coup d’état, and appropriate measures taken in 2005 were extended (Council of the EU 2009i). After the attacks on demonstrators in September 2009, the Council imposed a weapons embargo, targeted sanctions against those responsible for the violence and halted the application of the fisheries agreement (Council of the EU 2009j; Council of the EU 2010e; Council of the EU 2009k). Although the 2010 presidential elections were positively assessed by the EU-EOM and strongly welcomed by Commissioner Piebalgs and High Representative Catherine Ashton (European Commission 2010), it was decided that a new CSP could only be signed after legislative elections (European Commission 2011c).
2.1.9. Côte d'Ivoire

2.1.9.1. Liberal democracy in Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire turned to multiparty democracy in 1990 and subsequent elections were easily won by long-time ruling president Houphouët-Boigny. When Houphouët-Boigny died in office in 1993, he was replaced by Konan Bédié. Bédié introduced the requirement of *Ivoirité* for presidential candidates, meaning that both parents need to be born in Ivory Coast. This provision was meant to exclude Ouattara, the popular former prime minister who was half Burkina, from running for the 1995 elections. Ouattara’s exclusion made him popular amongst the northerners, many of whom had difficulties to prove their origins. In 1999, Bédié was ousted in a coup led by General Robert Guei. Although Guei promised to hold inclusive multiparty elections, he renewed the *Ivoirité* requirement and Ouattara was again prevented from participating in the October 2000 presidential elections. These were won by Laurent Gbagbo with 60 percent of the votes. Guei tried to hold on to power by disbanding the electoral commission and claiming victory, but popular protests forced him to cede the presidency to Gbagbo (Chirot 2006: 68-71). However, northerners, who had seen their candidate Ouattara excluded, called for new elections. This led to severe political violence, in which it is believed Gbagbo’s government was equally responsible (Human Rights Watch 2000). Moreover, the citizenship question remained unresolved under Gbagbo’s presidency. In December 2000, parliamentary elections were held, again excluding Ouattara. In January 2001, citizenship rules were even further restricted (Center for Systemic Peace 2008c). Nonetheless, local elections were held in March 2001 including Ouattara’s party Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), which won most of the seats. In August 2002, Gbagbo formed a government of unity with members of the RDR (US State Department 2011b).

These positive steps were halted in September 2002, when the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), rebellious military personnel exiled in Burkina Faso, attacked government ministries in Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo. After it was suppressed in Abidjan, the rebellion withdrew to the north and the centre of the country. In the west, two other rebel movements, the Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MPJ) fought for western cities. The war led to a complete division of the country, with the MPCI in the north, MPIGO and MPJ in the west and the government in the south (Blé Kessé 2005: 116-118). In December 2002, the three rebel groups formed the Forces Nouvelles. The insurgency was used by Gbagbo to eliminate his political opponents. Without any evidence of their involvement, he accused Ouattara and Guei. The latter was killed by gendarmes, but Ouattara found refuge in the German embassy (International Crisis Group 2003b: 11). Subsequent peacebrokering deals tried to resolve the underlying political problems. The January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement included the revision of the conditions for the eligibility of the presidency and aimed to improve conditions for Ivorians with foreign origin. A prime minister with executive powers would be appointed, and a government of national unity would
rule until general elections in 2005 (Ibid.: 31-32). However, the government fell short in implementing
the agreement. Seydou Diarra was appointed as prime minister but Gbagbo sidelined him in important
decisions. Violence against foreigners mounted under Gbagbo’s presidency and in March 2004,
government forces opened fire on an opposition march, killing about 120 civilians (Klaas 2008: 118).
Furthermore, the freedom of press came under attack as the Young Patriots, youth militia loyal to
President Gbagbo, started attacking opposition newspapers (Amnesty International 2006). Presidential
elections, which were originally planned for 2005, were continuously postponed. In October 2006,
Gbagbo’s presidency was extended and a new prime minister was appointed, Banny, who would
assume full responsibility over the peace process. After a few months, however, Banny was sidelined

A direct dialogue between President Gbagbo and the Forces Nouvelles, mediated by President of
Burkina Faso Blaise Compoaré, led to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in March 2007. The
Agreement reinforced Gbagbo with his constitutional powers, while Guillaume Soro of the Forces
Nouvelles was appointed as prime minister. This interim government would implement a programme
of identification of the population and organise open and transparent elections (International Crisis
Group 2007e: 2-3; US State Department 2011b). In 2009, a new voter list was approved by the UN.
Presidential elections were held in November 2010 and despite the violence and tensions between
the main candidates, international observers concluded they were generally free and fair (Zounmenou
2011: 50). However, after the second round, President Gbagbo refused to recognise the result
announced by the electoral commission that Ouattara had won by 54 percent of the vote. The
Constitutional Council declared Ouattara as the winner, but Gbagbo held on to the presidency, leading
to violent conflict with Ouattara and his supporters (International Crisis Group 2011a: 1-9). Security
forces controlled by Gbagbo as well as militia loyal to him severely cracked down on Ouattara
supporters (Human Rights Watch 2011c). Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 by forces loyal to
Ouattara, supported by French troops.

2.1.9.2. EU democracy promotion

After the 1999 military coup, the EU opened consultations under Article 366(a) of the Lomé
Agreement, and aid disbursements were proceeded only gradually (European Commission 2000).
Although the new constitution adopted in 2000 renewed the provisions on national criteria for
presidential candidates, the EU welcomed the constitution. Moreover, when General Guei announced
his candidacy, there was no official reaction from the EU. Nonetheless, when the Supreme Court ruled
in October 2000 that Ouattara did not meet the nationality rules and could thus not run for elections,
the EU suspended electoral assistance (Council of the EU 2000a; Agence France Presse 18 October
2000; 19 October 2000). When Laurent Gbagbo assumed the presidency, he was supported by the EU,
ignoring claims by Ouattara’s supporters that the elections should be held again. Commissioner for
Development Nielson declared that new elections were desirable, but would not be a condition for EU development cooperation (Agence France Presse 26 October 2000; 27 October 2000; 9 November 2000). However, the EU pushed for the inclusion of Ouattara’s party in the December 2000 legislative elections (Council of the EU 2000b). The failure to do this was regarded as ‘detrimental to the return of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire’ (Council of the EU 2000c) and the EU suspended electoral assistance to the elections (Assemblée Nationale de la France 2000b). On 22 January 2001, the Council opened consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement to discuss the lack of inclusiveness of the October and December 2000 elections, as well as the violence committed against civilians during the transition period. The EU was encouraged by the commitments made by the Ivorian authorities and by some encouraging signs including the inclusive and transparent local elections held in March 2001, the start of a national dialogue and the set-up of a national reconciliation committee (Council of the EU 2001e). For this reason, the EU did not suspend ongoing programmes but approved new programmes on a gradual basis (Council of the EU 2001e). In February 2002, full cooperation was resumed, although Gbagbo still needed to deliver on some of the promises made, including the investigation of violence (Council of the EU 2002a). Moreover, inclusive legislative elections and presidential elections were not yet held.

From then onwards, the EU gave Gbagbo the benefit of the doubt, which was clear in September 2002, when the EU condemned the attacks ‘against a legitimate government’ (Council of the EU 2002b). The EU supported the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the implementation of which was followed up by the Commission’s head of delegation (European Parliament 2004b). However, optimism was scattered after the attacks on an opposition march in March 2004 which was interpreted by the EU as calling into question the reconciliation process (Council of the EU 2004d). Hence, in August 2004 the Commission requested the Council to open consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement (European Commission 2004), but this was refused by the Council. Instead, the EU supported the weapons embargo and asset freezes of the UN (Youngs 2006: 349), as well as mediation efforts by the AU and ECOWAS (Council of the EU 2006c; Council of the EU 2007c). After the appointment in 2006 of prime minister Banny, the EU started to discuss the resumption of development assistance with the newly appointed prime minister (Côte d’Ivoire et Communauté européenne 2008: 27). The Ouagadougou agreement allowed the signature of a new CSP and NIP in 2007, and the EU agreed to support the implementation of the agreement with a view to the 2010 presidential elections. As such, the EU financed the identification process and provided electoral assistance.21 In addition, an EU-EOM was sent to the 2010 elections. Immediately after the December 2010 elections, the EU recognised Ouattara as the winner and called on all parties to ensure a peaceful transition. Targeted sanctions were imposed on President Gbagbo and 124 of his staff, as well as on 13 economic entities that remained in the hands of Gbagbo, such as the Port of Abidjan and San Pedro (Council of the EU

Moreover, several declarations were issued by High Representative Ashton denouncing Gbagbo’s resort to violence and unwillingness to leave power. In April 2011, due to the gravity of the situation, the EU strengthened the sanctions on Gbagbo’s aides, while lifting the sanctions on economic entities (Council of the EU 2011c; European Parliament 2011b).

2.1.10. Zimbabwe

2.1.10.1. Liberal democracy in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has been ruled by Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) since 1980, when Mugabe came to power after a guerrilla against the white minority regime. After years of political unrest in the 1990s, a new constitution was drafted in 1999 and put to a referendum. The constitution was turned down after a successful campaign by the newly formed opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 2000 parliamentary elections, which was marred by intimidation, resulted in a narrow victory for ZANU-PF, which won 62 seats, compared to 57 for the MDC. According to international observers, the elections would have been won by the MDC had the elections been free and fair (Laakso 2002: 437-457). Conscious of the growing success of the opposition, Mugabe’s government turned increasingly violent towards the opposition, civil society and journalists. MDC members were harassed, assaulted, arrested and even killed (International Crisis Group 2002c; Amnesty International 2001c). Moreover, new legislation enabled the government to silence dissident voices. The 2002 Public Order and Security Act allowed the government to interpret criticism on the government or peaceful demonstrations as a threat to public security. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) gave the government increased powers to intervene in the media, required all journalists to register with a government-dominated media commission and banned foreign journalists (Amnesty International 2003). In the 2002 presidential elections, several domestic observers and international observers were refused by the electoral board. According to a Commonwealth observer report, the elections were marred by politically motivated violence and intimidation (Baker 2002: 1145). A few days after the elections, more than 1,400 people were arrested nationwide, most of them poll agents or observers from civil society (Amnesty International 2002a). The local elections in September 2002 were marred by political violence and about 700 MDC candidates were prevented from participating (Amnesty International 2002b). In 2004, a bill was adopted that banned international human rights groups and prevented civil society organisations that received foreign funding from working on human rights (Amnesty International 2004b). In the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, some progress was made with the nomination of an electoral commission and the enactment of a new electoral law. However, the elections, which were boycotted by a large part of the MDC, were marred by intimidation of the opposition. Moreover, the electoral process remained strongly in favour of the ruling party (Human Rights Watch 2005). Intimidation of the opposition continued in 2006-2007. For
example, in March 2007, 50 MDC activists were arrested after attending a prayer meeting, defying a three-month blanket ban imposed by the authorities (Amnesty International 2007).

In the run-up to the March 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections, Mugabe introduced a number of constitutional amendments to increase his chances of victory, including the harmonisation of presidential and parliamentary elections and an increase in seats in ZANU-PF strongholds (International Crisis Group 2007c: 4). Parliamentary elections in March 2008 were surrounded by violence against the opposition, while the campaigning period was dominated by ZANU-PF, and the electoral commission, judiciary and security forces were clearly supporting the ruling party (Badza 2008). Nevertheless, the MDC won with 99 seats to 97 seats for Mugabe. The results of the presidential elections were contested. After initial signs that Tsvangirai had won, the electoral commission found that Tsvangirai secured only 47.9 percent and a run-off vote was needed. Facing increased political violence, Tsvangirai withdrew from the poll. In an attempt to settle the political crisis, in September 2008, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was reached between the MDC and ZANU-PF, which allowed Mugabe to stay president but created the post of prime minister for Tsvangirai and divided minister posts between the two parties. However, Mugabe assured that the most important ministries were held by ZANU-PF. Especially Mugabe’s continuing dominance over the security forces is problematic, as it has allowed the perseverance of arrests and violence against the MDC, human rights activists and trade unions (Werner and Chitiyo 2011: 42).

2.1.10.2. EU democracy promotion
The EU has from 2000 onwards strongly reacted to the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe. In April 2000, the EU threatened to cut €120 million if the 2000 parliamentary elections were to be postponed (Laakso 2002: 450-451). The violent campaigning during the 2000 parliamentary elections was severely condemned by the Council (Council of the EU 2000d; Council of the EU 2000c). After the 2000 elections, the EU made several public declarations condemning the lack of press freedom and the violence against the opposition (Council of the EU 2000f; Council of the EU 2000g; Council of the EU 2001f). In February 2001, an attempt was made to start political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, but this did not get any further than some quarrels about the agenda. In June 2001, the EU stated that urgent progress was needed on the end of political violence, international observation to the 2002 presidential elections, press freedom and the independence of the judiciary (Council of the EU 2001g). In October 2001, the EU opened consultations under Article 96. During the consultations, there was serious disagreement between the EU and the Zimbabwean delegation on whether foreign journalists and EU observers should be allowed to monitor the 2002 presidential elections (Council of the EU 2002c). Furthermore, the EU was discouraged by the political violence preceding the elections and the adoption of laws restricting civil-political rights (Council of the EU 2002d). After the first meeting ended in a stalemate, the EU requested a letter by Foreign Minister
Mudenge outlining the steps to be taken towards meeting EU concerns. The latter proved unsatisfactory for the EU (US embassy Zimbabwe 2002a). When the Zimbabwean authorities revoked the visa of the head of the EU-EOM Pierre Schori, this prompted the EU to adopt appropriate measures against Zimbabwe (Laakso et al. 2007a: 74). All projects, except those in direct support of the population, were suspended and redirected to democracy assistance and projects in the social sectors (Council of the EU 2002e). Moreover, targeted sanctions were taken against those responsible for political violence, including the freezing of their assets and a visa ban. Furthermore, an arms embargo was imposed (Council of the EU 2002f). A few months later, the Council suspended all bilateral Ministerial contact with Zimbabwe (Council of the EU 2002g).

Throughout 2002-2008, the Council made numerous declarations condemning violations of the freedom of association, speech, press and opposition. Since most development aid went through civil society organisations, democracy assistance took place almost entirely within the framework of the EIDHR. Many micro- and macro-projects were approved between 2002 and 2010, in the fields of civic education, freedom of the press, human rights awareness, strengthening civil society, etc. The list of persons subject to targeted sanctions was extended several times as a reaction to continuous violations of democratic principles. In the context of the 2008 parliamentary elections, several declarations and Council conclusions were issued to condemn the conduct of the elections, and the list of people targeted by sanctions was extended by 37 people and four companies (Council of the EU 2008d; Council of the EU 2008e). Although the GPA was welcomed and led to a first high-level visit in September 2009, it was made clear that sanctions could only be lifted before real progress was made in the implementation of the GPA (Hansen 2011: 261). Meanwhile, the EU approved positive measures to encourage the implementation of the agreement. Financial support was provided to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for programmes to strengthen the electoral commission and to support the constitution making process.  In June 2009, a Ministerial troika led by prime minister Tsvangirai took place in Brussels, during which it was decided to restart political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement with the objective to progressively normalise EU-Zimbabwean relations according to the implementation of the GPA. In 2010, appropriate measures were modified to allow support to the implementation of the GPA and for macro-economic stabilisation (European Commission 2012). In February 2012, the negative measures were again eased by removing 51 people from the visa ban and asset freeze list and prolonging appropriate measures under Article 96 for only six months, during which a CSP is prepared (Council of the EU 2012b; Council of the EU 2012c).

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22 Europeaid, online database:
2.2. Double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles?

After the overview of the situation of liberal democracy and the EU’s instruments for democracy promotion in the ten country cases, I will now address the question whether there have been double standards in the EU’s reaction. As noted in the Introductory Chapter, double standards refer to ‘a set of principles that applies differently and usually more rigorously to one group of people or circumstances than to another’. Hence, if similar violations of democratic principles are met by a different response from the EU, this points to double standards in the EU’s reaction. To find out whether this is the case for the ten country cases, I will start by comparing the response of the EU (ranging from positive to negative). In the following section, I will compare the gravity of violations of democratic principles.

2.2.1. Comparing the EU’s reaction

As discussed previously, the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles varies between positive and negative measures. A distinction should also be made according to the costs of these instruments for sender and target, as it is often assumed that international actors are especially reluctant to use costly negative measures in case important interests are at stake. Costs can refer to social costs, in terms of a loss of legitimacy in the case of sanctions, or economic costs, when sanctions entail the reduction of aid, trade, or other benefits. For the sender, costs depend on the expected reaction of the target country and the decision-making costs (Warkotsch 2008b: 228-229). Political dialogue and capacity-building are positive measures that are little costly to sender and target. Given that most of what is said during political dialogue remains behind closed doors, social costs are limited. Moreover, political dialogue does not have economic implications. However, political costs are larger for political dialogue than for capacity-building because it is likely that the EU will express concerns via this instrument. Capacity-building does not inflict any material loss on the target country, nor is there any naming and shaming involved, since democracy assistance is mostly unknown to the general public and does not imply that a regime is regarded as illegitimate (Kotzian et al. 2011: 1003). On the contrary, capacity-building is often voluntary and agreed with the recipient (Youngs 2009a: 898). However, capacity-building is potentially politically intrusive when certain sectors are supported that may endanger the regime, including elections, the free press or human rights organisations. It is no coincidence that most EU democracy assistance in more sensitive areas is funded by the EIDHR, which is implemented without consent of the government (Kotzian et al. 2011: 1003; Börzel and Risse 2009: 46).

Negative measures may range from pure naming and shaming strategies to sanctions. Public declarations or Council Conclusions in which the EU’s discontent about a certain situation is expressed, are less costly than sanctions, given that there is no direct economic cost for sender nor target. For this reason, Kotzian et al. (2011: 999) assess declarations as ‘non-intrusive’ and ‘weak’
negative measures. In terms of decision-making costs, although public declarations are a CFSP responsibility and thus subject to unanimity rule, discussion on their content is mostly smoother when compared to sanctions, given that the implications are smaller (Warkotsch 2008b: 229). Since declarations are issued on a daily basis, discussions are held via the COREU\textsuperscript{23} network on the basis of an initiative by the High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy (formerly the Council Presidency), a member state or the Commission. Public declarations are often issued by the Council Presidency without prior coordination, on the basis of earlier agreed language, in case immediate action is required. Even so, public declarations entail social costs in terms of naming and shaming. For the sender, concern about democratic principles endangers the main function of diplomacy: communication among states and maintaining good relations (Vincent 1986: 132). For this reason, the need to find a common position often results in a weakening of the wording (‘is worried’, ‘is concerned’) or a lowest common denominator (Vončina 2011: 172 and 180).

Sanctions (aid suspension, trade embargoes, CFSP sanctions) are without doubt the strongest and most costly instrument. As sanctions are punitive measures (Kotzian et al. 2011: 1005), they bear the greatest risk for the imposing country in terms of a potential loss of trade relations or market share, countermeasures by the target country or a reassessment of the latter’s relations with the sanctioning country (Warkotsch 2008b: 228-229). Moreover, decision-making costs are high. Sanctions taken in the framework of the CFSP should be adopted on the basis of unanimity (De Vries and Hazelzet 2005: 98). For the suspension of development cooperation under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, however, specific decision-making rules apply. The Council decides on the opening of Article 96 consultations on the basis of a proposal by the European Commission or a member state (Council of the EU 2000h). However, up until today, Article 96 consultations have never been formally proposed by a member state (anonymous interview, February 2012). A partial suspension of cooperation can be decided by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), while full suspension of cooperation is decided on the basis of unanimity (Portela 2010: 29). Since in most cases, development assistance is only partially suspended, QMV applies in most cases. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the member states will search for consensus in the Council (Laakso et al. 2007a: 27). Decision-making costs are a bit lower for the suspension of budget support, given that this can be done unilaterally, while Article 96 is a cumbersome procedure, which requires a Council approval, several months of consultations, etc. A third way of suspending aid is when the adoption of a new CSP is postponed. Decision-making costs are lower here, as it does not involve the cumbersome Article 96 procedure. Moreover, in this case adopting a new CSP amongst controversy about violations of democratic principles entails decision-making costs, as the member states may give a negative opinion via their representatives in the EDF committee, which the Commission is obliged to take into account (Council of the EU 2007f).

\textsuperscript{23} The COREU network is a mailing network used for exchanging information between Member States’ Foreign Ministries and the Commission and consultation on political analyses relating to multilateral questions or third country situations.
However, in the long run postponing a CSP is not sustainable without invoking the Article 96 procedure, as was the case in Guinea (see supra).

Sanctions are also costly to the target country, since they imply both an economic and a social cost (Warkotsch 2008b: 229). The economic cost should not be exaggerated. In the case of aid restrictions, the EU mostly redirects assistance from government to civil society in order to prevent causing hardship for the population (Portela 2010: 131). However, some CFSP sanctions may have the effect of an indirect trade embargo. This was the case in Côte d’Ivoire, where the Port of Abidjan and San Pedro were put on the list of companies which saw their assets frozen, and in Zimbabwe, where several state companies were on the list. For most CFSP sanctions, however, the social cost is more important than the economic cost. Indeed, arms embargoes, the freezing of personal assets or travel bans do not have significant economic consequences. For the sender, the impossibility of exporting arms may have economic consequences, but these do not compensate for the fact that providing arms to an undemocratic regime would be strongly criticised by the public. For the target, the consequences are also predominantly social, although there are limited economic consequences, namely in case bank accounts are blocked. In fact, assets freezes and travel bans are often referred to as ‘smart’ or ‘targeted’ sanctions, which seek to punish those responsible for violations of democratic principles, while minimising the consequences for the population (Kreutz 2005: 6). Moreover, for CFSP sanctions, there are many loopholes in the implementation (Eriksson 2005: 120). The social cost of being regarded as a pariah of the international community is however substantial (Portela 2010: 98). Indeed, there is a lot of media attention for these sanctions. For example, in 2007 Gordon Brown provoked a media storm when he decided not to attend the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon because Robert Mugabe would be present (BBC News 2007, September).

Mentioning decision-making costs, it should be noted that the EP does not have a say in the adoption of negative measures. Regarding the decision to open consultations under Article 96, it is merely provided that the EP will be immediately and fully informed on the opening of consultations and on the adoption of appropriate measures (Council of the EU 2006d). Moreover, the EP does not have a right of approval or scrutiny over the European Development Fund, which falls outside the budget of the EU (Maxwell and Herbert 2012). Similarly, on the adoption of Common Positions, which are at the basis of CFSP sanctions, the EP is merely consulted and informed, while the Lisbon treaty provides that ‘[The High Representative] shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration’ (Treaty on European Union, Article 36). The EP can however exercise pressure on Commission and Council by adopting resolutions and asking parliamentary questions. Nonetheless, there were cases where the EP has been decisive in the adoption of negative measures. After the EP rejected the draft agreement for an EU-Guinea fisheries partnership in the light of the violence in September 2009, the Council and Commission decided to cancel the fisheries agreement, although the EP’s opinion was only advisory (Europolitics 2009, October).
The list in Table 1 thus summarises the EU’s instruments for democracy promotion in the period 2000-mid-2011. In the case of Kenya, there was no suspension of aid, but the threat thereof should be noted. As regards the suspension of budget support, in some cases the EU was not providing budget support and, as a result, it was impossible to suspend budget support.

Table 1: EU reactions to violations of democratic principles, 2000 until mid-2011

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Capacity-building</th>
<th>Political dialogue</th>
<th>Declarations, Conclusions</th>
<th>Budget support</th>
<th>Art. 96</th>
<th>CFSP</th>
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N/A: not applicable

The main distinction is between the countries where the EU imposed sanctions (budget support, Art. 96, CFSP sanctions) and countries where only low-cost negative measures, such as public declarations, were adopted. In Rwanda, Chad and Nigeria, the EU has predominantly focused on positive measures and lost-cost negative measures. In Chad, the EU only used declarations to react to the flawed electoral process, and did not publicly react to a number of key events, including the 2005 referendum. Similarly, in Rwanda, the EU on some occasions publicly reacted to violations of democratic principles (e.g. after the 2003 and 2008 elections and in 2004), but sanctions were never seriously considered. Similarly, in Nigeria the EU has voiced concerns about the electoral process, but the option of sanctions never seemed on the table.

In comparison, the EU has reacted with more costly negative measures in countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia, albeit reluctantly. In Eritrea, the imprisonment of dissident party members in 2001 provoked immediate reaction by the EU. Although there were no sanctions under Article 96 or the CFSP, the EU undertook a demarche, publicly condemned the situation, ambassadors were temporarily withdrawn and a new development strategy was put on hold. However, after the Country Strategy Paper was signed in November 2002, the EU refocused on positive measures combining political dialogue with
capacity-building. A new CSP was thus signed in 2009. In Ethiopia, the EU remained silent during violations of civil-political rights in 2000-2002. After the 2005 elections, the EU seemed reluctant to criticise the elections, despite clear concerns from its observer mission. Budget support was suspended as a reaction to the political violence in December 2005, but aid was resumed in the following year without any guarantee from the Ethiopian government that political prisoners would be released. Moreover, the EU has reacted very cautiously to the closure of political space in recent years and welcomed the 2010 parliamentary elections, despite concerns by its observer mission.

In comparison, in Kenya, Niger, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, the EU has been less reluctant to impose negative measures. Naming and shaming strategies have been used more forcefully in these countries, and the EU has adopted or threatened with sanctions. In Kenya, after the December 2007 elections the EU immediately made clear that development assistance would not continue if no solution was found for the crisis. Moreover, the EU has closely followed up on the implementation of the power-sharing agreement. In the other cases, sanctions were adopted, either under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement (Niger, Guinea 2003, Côte d’Ivoire 2001, Zimbabwe) or under the CFSP (Guinea 2009, Côte d’Ivoire 2010, Zimbabwe). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, there was a serious shift in the EU’s preparedness to adopt costly negative measures. Whereas the 2001 Article 96 consultations only led to a limited and short suspension of aid, in 2010 a wide range of sanctions was taken, including economic sanctions.

In Niger, Guinea and Zimbabwe, all projects were suspended, except those in direct support of the population. Moreover, in these countries, conditionality was applied more strictly compared to Côte d’Ivoire (2001). Full aid could only be resumed if free and fair general elections were held. Hence, in the case of Guinea and Zimbabwe, sanctions were maintained for a long duration, as elections were postponed or were not regarded as free and fair. Moreover, in Guinea (2009) and Zimbabwe, the EU deployed the full arsenal of sanctions: many critical public declarations, suspension of development cooperation, an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against those responsible for political violence.

2.2.2. Comparing liberal democracy

In the previous paragraphs, it was concluded that negative measures were applied unevenly. However, this does not necessarily imply that there are double standards. Indeed, an uneven application of negative measures may also be related to a difference in gravity of violations of democratic principles. As I have indicated in the Introductory Chapter, one can only speak of double standards when a similar situation leads to the application of different sets of principles. Hence, the next step in my analysis is to compare the gravity of violations of democratic principles, and assess whether there is an overlap with the EU’s negative measures. To assess the gravity of violations of democratic principles, a qualitative and quantitative comparison of liberal democracy is made.
2.2.2.1. Qualitative comparison of liberal democracy

2.2.2.1.1. Electoral democracy

In the overview of the cases, it was clear that elections were often characterised by flawed procedures, a lack of level playing field, a partial electoral board, ballot stuffing, etc. The ‘free and fairness’ of elections is not easy to assess, and even the validity of observations from international observers has been questioned (see, for example, Geisler 1993: 617-620; Carothers 1997: 20-26; Baker 2002: 1153-1155; Van Cranenburgh 2000: 30). Moreover, there have been various cases where the EU has been reluctant to criticise elections, despite serious concerns raised by the EU-EOM. The latter are politically independent and as a consequence, there is no legal obligation for the EU to follow up on the reports. However, EU-EOMs raise the expectation amongst voters and other stakeholders (e.g. human rights groups) that the EU fully stands behind these missions and that political consequences are drawn when a negative report is issued (Meyer-Resende 2006: 1-9). Nonetheless, as could be observed in the description of the cases, there are ‘double standards’ in the EU’s follow-up of critical observer reports. Therefore, an overview of parliamentary elections, presidential elections and constitutional referenda is given in Annex 1, indicating which type of elections is concerned, whether EU or non-EU observers monitored the elections and what their main conclusion was. Local elections are not included, since these are not often scrutinised by international observers. The last column quotes the main elements of the official EU reaction, if available. On elections, several sources were used, including the African Elections Database, news articles retrieved via the LexisNexis Database, official reports and declarations by election observer missions, academic articles, US State Department Yearly Human Rights Reports and the DIEM database24. On the EU’s reaction I used EU official documents, most of which were also mentioned in the case study overview.

From this overview, it can be concluded that there were double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of electoral democracy. First of all, in some cases, the EU followed its observer mission and criticised the elections or adopted sanctions, whereas in others it did not. This is shown by the cases of Nigeria, Rwanda and Ethiopia, where the EU-EOM wrote a damaging report about the elections, yet the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures. In none of these cases, sanctions were adopted. The suspension of budget support in Ethiopia in 2005 was a reaction to the assault by security forces on peaceful demonstrators in the aftermath of the elections. On the conduct of the elections, the 2005 public declaration only cautiously referred to the concerns of the EU-EOM. Moreover, despite concerns by the EU-EOM about the 2010 parliamentary elections, the High Representative referred to the elections as ‘an important moment’ in Ethiopia’s democratic process. A similar example is that of Rwanda, where the EU stated it was ‘obliged to point out’ the concerns raised by its observer mission

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24 This is a recent project on data collection to study international election monitoring, led by Professor Judith Kelley. See http://sites.duke.edu/kelley/
after the damaging report about the 2003 elections. Although the EU was less reluctant to criticise the elections in Nigeria (especially those of 2007), sanctions never seemed an option.

To a certain degree, the situation in Rwanda can be compared to that in Côte d’Ivoire. In Rwanda, several opposition candidates were prevented from participating in the elections, such as the main opposition party Democratic Republic Movement which was banned on charges of ‘divisionism’. As in Côte d’Ivoire, the exclusion of certain candidates/parties was clearly motivated by the fear that these parties would become powerful. However, in Côte d’Ivoire, the EU opened consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, while in Rwanda there hardly was any criticism.

Furthermore, there were three cases where a ‘constitutional coup’ was committed by the government: Chad, Niger and Guinea. In all three countries, the president changed the constitution to secure a third term in presidential elections. However, in Chad this event went more or less unnoticed, there was not even an official reaction by the EU. In Guinea, on the other hand, the EU strongly disapproved the president’s decision to prolong his mandate. This also played a role in the decision in 2003 to open consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, as was mentioned in the Commission Communication on the opening of consultations (European Commission 2003a: 2-3). Moreover, in Niger, the EU immediately reacted to President Tandja’s decision to change the constitution, threatening with aid sanctions and eventually opening Article 96 consultations. A further similarity in these three countries is the opposition boycott in the elections. Indeed, in Guinea (2002) and in Chad (2002, 2006), the opposition boycotted the elections out of protest with electoral malconduct. Similarly, in Niger (2009), the opposition boycotted the August 2009 referendum and the October 2009 elections. Yet in Guinea and Niger, the EU reacted with sanctions, whereas in Chad, it did not.

2.2.2.2. Civil-political rights
Moreover, I compared the ten country cases on the situation of civil-political rights in the period from 2000 until mid-2011: freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of opposition. The organisations that report most frequently on these violations of civil-political rights are Amnesty International and the Committee to Protect Journalists. I analysed reports by these NGOs and compiled a list of violations of civil-political rights (Annex 2). It should be recognised that a certain bias is possible. For example, the UK-based organisation Amnesty International reports more often on Anglophone countries and countries of particular interest to the UK such as Zimbabwe. At the same time, I did not find a lot of evidence for other violations of civil-political rights in other sources, namely those mentioned in the overview of cases. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports on every single case where journalists are arrested or intimidated, therefore I only focused on the more severe cases, involving several journalists or editors.
On the basis of this overview, it can be concluded that there were double standards in the EU’s reactions to violations of civil-political rights. On the one hand, taking the case of Zimbabwe it is not surprising that such extensive sanctions were adopted, given the continuous and high-scale violation of civil-political rights in the country. Similarly, in Guinea, the attention for violations of civil-political rights may also be related to the scope of these violations. For example, in 2007 and 2009, more than a hundred people were killed by security forces. On the other hand, while this can certainly explain the sanctions taken in 2009, the EU has from the early 2000s scrutinised Guinea’s civil-political rights record and consultations were opened in 2003, much before these mass-scale events. Moreover, in Ethiopia, security forces equally committed severe violations of civil-political rights, including during student protests in the early 2000s, and especially after the 2005 elections, when more than 200 people were killed. However, in this case the EU was much more reluctant to impose sanctions. In Côte d’Ivoire, more than 160 people were killed when security forces opened fire on an opposition march in March 2004, yet the Council did not agree to start Article 96 consultations.

Furthermore, in a number of countries where the EU adopted or threatened with sanctions, including Niger and Kenya, violations of civil-political rights were much less flagrant. Although violations of civil-political rights increased in the context of the 2009 referendum in Niger, before this date Niger’s record of civil-political rights had been better than in most other countries. Similarly, the respect for civil-political rights improved under President Kibaki, yet the EU did not refrain from threatening with sanctions after the December 2007 elections.

To be fair, it should be added that violations of civil-political rights were not as frequent in Chad and Eritrea. However, this does not make these countries more democratic, on the contrary. In both countries, there are no demonstrations because of the weakness (or absence, in the case of Eritrea) of civil society and the opposition.

2.2.2.2. Assessment of liberal democracy on the basis of quantitative indicators

From the previous paragraphs and tables, it was clear that there is no perfect overlap between violations of liberal democratic principles and the EU’s reaction. Similar violations of electoral democracy and civil-political rights have led to different reactions from the EU: in some cases, sanctions were adopted, while in others the EU did not react or only adopted low-cost negative measures. To strengthen the argument that there have been double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles, I will now compare the cases on quantitative indicators on democratic principles.

The first indicator is Freedom House’s political rights score. This score is based on a checklist of questions grouped into three categories. First, questions are asked on the electoral process: are the
executive and parliament chosen via free and fair elections, are electoral laws fair, is there an independent electoral commission? A second set of questions focuses on political pluralism and participation: the freedom to form political parties, the competitiveness of elections, the freedom of vote, and the political rights of and electoral opportunities for minority groups. A third set of questions addresses the functioning of the government, focusing on whether the government has the effective power to govern, is accountable to the public and free from corruption. Countries are scored between 1 (best score) and 7 (worst score).

To allow comparison, the table orders the countries according to whether the EU has adopted sanctions (the countries in the bottom rows) or not (the countries in the top rows). If there would not be any double standards, the countries in the top rows would have lower scorings, as their political rights score would be better.

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World

This is however not the case: although the countries in the bottom rows (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Zimbabwe) indeed have high political rights scores, these are not higher than the countries in the top rows (Chad, Rwanda). Moreover, the worst scoring countries did not necessarily face sanctions (e.g. Eritrea, Chad, Rwanda), while some of those that did (Kenya, Niger) had a much better score. However, it should be added that Nigeria and Ethiopia, where the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures, scored better on political rights.

Moreover, the case for double standards becomes even stronger when taking into account the time dimension. Although the situation of political rights has deteriorated in countries like Ethiopia (2010), Nigeria (2008) and Chad (2007), the EU remained reluctant to impose negative measures. Moreover,

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26 Note that the year refers to the year on which the report was based, not the year in which the report was issued.
there was not always an overlap between the EU’s adoption of negative measures and a deterioration of the political rights score. In Zimbabwe, the EU imposed sanctions in 2002, although the situation of political rights had remained equal. Similarly, the Article 96 procedure was invoked against Guinea in 2003-2004, but the political rights score did not change in this period. In Côte d’Ivoire, the EU resumed aid in 2002, although the situation of political rights worsened, and did not adopt any negative measures when political rights deteriorated in 2007. Nonetheless, in Niger and Kenya, the EU’s reaction did follow the evolution in political rights. Niger’s political rights score deteriorated in 2009, exactly when the EU imposed sanctions. In Kenya, the political rights score worsened in 2007 and the EU’s position changed accordingly. Moreover, the EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures in Rwanda in the early 2000s could also be related to the relative improvement of the political rights score in 2003.

The Freedom House civil liberties score is based on three categories of questions. One component is ‘freedom of expression and belief’, which includes freedom of the media, religion, private expression and academic freedom. Secondly, ‘associational and organisational rights’ encompasses freedom of assembly, freedom for nongovernmental organisations and the presence of trade unions and professional organisations. Thirdly, ‘the rule of law’ focuses on the independence of the judiciary, respect for the law by the authorities, protection from political terror and the protection of equal treatment. Finally, ‘personal autonomy and individual rights’ are rights to chose a residence, occupation, education, marriage partners and include the right to own property.

### Table 3: Freedom House Civil Liberties score

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World

Again, the worst performers on the civil liberties score were not necessarily those where sanctions were taken. The scores of Chad, Rwanda and Eritrea were comparable to those of Zimbabwe and Guinea, yet the EU imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe and Guinea, but not against Chad, Rwanda and Eritrea. A similar observation can be made in Ethiopia, where the EU seemed reluctant to impose negative measures, although its civil liberties scoring was on the same level as Guinea. On the other
hand, the EU imposed sanctions in Niger and Kenya, despite the relatively good record of these countries on civil liberties.

Moreover, taking into account the time dimension, there are additional reasons to assume double standards. On the one hand, in Zimbabwe (2001), Kenya (2008), Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea (2009) and Eritrea (2001), the EU started focusing on negative measures when the situation of civil liberties was worsening. On the other, the EU did not impose any sanctions when the situation of civil liberties deteriorated in Eritrea (2009), Ethiopia (2010), Nigeria (2001) or Côte d'Ivoire (2004).

Polity IV codes the authority characteristics of states. I used the Institutionalised Democracy indicator, since this is a composite index and thus provides a more general picture of the democratic character of the cases. Four indexes are combined in Institutionalised Democracy. Firstly, ‘Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment’ measures whether citizens have equal opportunities to be elected for the government. This indicator can have three values: (1) selection (hereditary succession or designation), (2) dual/transitional (dual executives, one is chosen by hereditary succession, one by competitive election) and (3) election (competitive elections). Secondly, the ‘Openness of Executive Recruitment’ is assessed. The recruitment of the chief executive can range from closed (hereditary succession) to open (elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements). Thirdly, ‘Executive Constraints’ measures the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of the executive. Executive constraints are rated on a seven-point scale, ranging from (1) unlimited authority to (7) executive authority or subordination. Lastly, ‘Competitiveness of Participation’ codes the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued. Competitiveness is coded on a five-point scale, ranging from (1) repressed to (5) competitive. The Institutionalised Democracy indicator weights these four variables into a ten-point composite index. The higher the score, the more democratic a country (Marshall et al. 2010: 14-27). It should be noted that minor fluctuations in a country’s authority characteristics are not reflected in the data, which can explain that the score has been quite constant over the years.
Table 4. Polity IV Institutionalised Democracy

<table>
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</table>

Source: Polity IV

On the basis of this indicator, it can be concluded that countries with lower scores on Institutionalised Democracy did not necessarily face the most costly negative measures. Rwanda and Eritrea are the worst scoring countries, but have not been subject to sanctions. Moreover, although Chad had similar scores to Guinea and Zimbabwe, Chad did not face sanctions, unlike Guinea and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, Nigeria and Ethiopia scored much better than the other countries on Institutionalised Democracy, which can explain why the EU was reluctant to adopt negative measures. When taking up the time dimension, the case of Niger is notable. Niger had quite a high score on Institutionalised Democracy, but after the constitutional coup in 2009, its score suddenly fell from 7 to 0. Hence, the EU’s imposition of sanctions in the case of Niger can be explained by this sudden drop. This effect could also be noted in the case of Kenya, albeit to a less spectacular degree. After the December 2007 elections, Kenya’s Institutionalised Democracy score decreased by one point.

An indicator that is often used by donors is the ‘Voice and Accountability’ score by the World Bank. As a composite indicator, it relies on a wide array of indicators on electoral democracy and civil-political rights, including Freedom House, the African electoral index, the Reporters without Borders’ index on press freedom, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Economist Intelligence Unit index, the Gallup World poll, etc. The percentile rank in which the country’s scores can be situated is given. The higher the ranking, the more democratic, as this means the country’s Voice and Accountability score is amongst the highest in the world. For example, if Chad’s percentile rank was 9.5 percent in 2009, this means Chad’s score was amongst the 9.5 percent lowest.

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27 Côte d’Ivoire’s Institutionalised democracy score was not available after 2001.
According to the Voice and Accountability indicator, Niger, Kenya and Nigeria were most democratic in 2000-2009, while Eritrea, Chad and Zimbabwe were least democratic in this period. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea have similar scores, ranking somewhere in between the worst and best performers. However, these scores do not concur with the EU’s application of negative measures. Indeed, although Eritrea was counted amongst the 1 percent countries with the worst Voice and Accountability score in 2008, the EU has been reluctant to impose sanctions against Eritrea. In contrast, one of the best scoring countries (Niger) was subject to sanctions. Moreover, although Guinea, Chad, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire and Rwanda had similar scores, the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures in Chad, Ethiopia and Rwanda, but not in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.

Taking into account the time dimension, the argument for double standards becomes stronger. While Chad’s score deteriorated over the years, the EU did not react with negative measures. On the other hand, the EU threatened with negative measures against the Kenyan governemnt (2007), although the Voice and Accountability indicator improved. On the other hand, Niger’s severe deterioration in Voice and Accountability can explain the EU’s focus on negative measures in 2009. The other countries did not show considerable changes.

The Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index is based on a questionnaire with 43 criteria assessing press freedom. The questionnaire includes every possible violation directly affecting journalists (murders, imprisonment, physical attacks) and news media (censorship, searches, harassment, confiscation of publications), as well the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible. Moreover, the indicator also takes into account the level of self-censorship and the freedom of the media to investigate and be critical. Furthermore, the indicator looks at the legal framework in which

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**Table 5. World Bank Voice and Accountability indicator**

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators

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28 2001 score not available.
the media operate and the level of independence of the media. A potential downside of the indicator is that it includes violations of press freedom by non-state actors. The higher the score, the lowest its record of press freedom (Reporters without Borders 2010).

Table 6. Press Freedom Index Reporters Without Borders

<table>
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<td>63.00</td>
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</table>

Source: Website Reporters Without Borders, en.rsf.org

Some of the countries where the EU was reluctant to impose sanctions, including Eritrea and Rwanda, appeared to be the worst performers on the Press Freedom Index. Moreover, although Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have comparable scores on the index, the EU was reluctant to impose sanctions against Ethiopia. Guinea, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya, four countries where the EU was not reluctant to impose negative measures, had similar press freedom scores to Chad and Nigeria, where the EU did not adopt sanctions.

Moreover, whereas press freedom worsened over the years in countries like Eritrea, Rwanda and Nigeria, the EU did not react to this evolution. In Ethiopia (2006), the EU resumed aid while press freedom was deteriorating. However, in Niger (2009), decreasing press freedom was met with sanctions.
2.3. Conclusion

This Chapter provided an extensive analysis of double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles. First, an overview of the cases was given, focusing both on the situation of liberal democracy from 2000 until mid-2011 and the EU’s instruments for democracy promotion. The second part of the Chapter then addressed the question of double standards by investigating whether similar violations of democratic principles led to an even reaction from the EU. This question was answered on the basis of a comparison of (1) the instruments used by the EU to react to violations of democratic principles and (2) the gravity of violations of democratic principles. It was clear that similar violations of democratic principles (electoral democracy and civil-political rights) led to different reactions by the EU.

I will conclude this Chapter by presenting a table listing those countries where the EU has been most reluctant to use negative measures and those countries where the EU has been least reluctant, taking into account the gravity of violations of democratic principles. This table will be used in the subsequent Chapters, as the hypotheses will differ in these two groups of cases.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>EU least reluctant to impose negative measures</th>
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In Chad and Rwanda, the EU can be considered most reluctant to impose negative measures. Firstly, there were clear violations of electoral democracy in both countries. In Chad, elections were boycotted by the opposition and in 2005, President Déby committed a constitutional coup to prolong his rule. Secondly, there have been frequent violations of civil-political rights, including the arrest of the main opposition candidates after the coup attempt in February 2008. This was reflected in Chad’s scores on the quantitative indicators on civil-political rights and electoral democracy, which were comparable to
those of Guinea and Zimbabwe. However, the EU has focused on positive measures and low-cost negative measures, including dialogue, limited naming and shaming strategies and capacity-building.

Rwanda cannot be regarded as an electoral democracy: international observers have assessed all parliamentary and presidential elections held since 2003 as seriously flawed. Moreover, civil-political rights are restricted in Rwanda: genocidal laws have been used to restrict the activities of independent human rights organisations, journalists and the opposition. In many indicators on democratisation, Rwanda was amongst the worst scoring countries, comparable to Guinea and Zimbabwe. However, the EU has mainly relied on positive measures or low-cost negative measures to promote democracy in Rwanda.

Eritrea is probably the least democratic of the ten country cases. There have not been any presidential or parliamentary elections since independence, nor is there a legal opposition, independent press or civil society. Indeed, in all the quantitative scores assessed in this Chapter, Eritrea ranked at the bottom. Nonetheless, the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures, especially after 2002. In 2001, a short diplomatic conflict arose after the EU undertook a demarche to protest against the imprisonment of dissidents and the prohibition of the independent press. However, while the signature of a new CSP was halted, it was signed only a year later, despite the fact that political prisoners had not been released. Moreover, in April 2009, a new CSP was signed, although the situation of electoral democracy and civil-political rights had not improved.

While Ethiopia was not the worst scoring country in quantitative indicators, its record on electoral democracy and civil-political rights has been equally as problematic as, for example, that of Guinea or Zimbabwe. Civil-political rights were most severely violated in the context of the 2005 parliamentary elections, when more than 200 people were killed and several thousands arrested for participating in peaceful demonstrations. Although the EU suspended direct and sectoral budget support as a reaction to this crackdown on manifestations, aid was resumed only a year later. Moreover, there has been a general reluctance to express public criticism about Ethiopia’s democratic record. For example, despite the damaging report of the EU-EOM in 2005 and 2010, the EU downsized the findings of the report.

In Côte d’Ivoire, it is necessary to distinguish the EU’s reaction to the December 2000 elections to that to the December 2010 elections. While the EU was somewhat reluctant to impose sanctions after the 2000 elections, in 2010 the EU adopted a comprehensive package of costly sanctions. Indeed, after Article 96 consultations in 2000-2001, aid was not suspended but gradually resumed. Moreover, after only one year the EU fully resumed cooperation, because the municipal elections and national reconciliation in 2001 were interpreted as positive signals. However, the situation of foreign citizens and their exclusion from the electoral process had not been resolved. Moreover, when 120 civilians
were killed during peaceful protests in March 2004, the EU did not impose sanctions. In comparison, aid suspension in Niger, Guinea and Zimbabwe was of longer duration and was made conditional on free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. However, after the 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, the EU deployed a wide range of sanctions, including sanctions with serious economic implications. To clearly show this in the analysis made below, Côte d’Ivoire will henceforth be split up in two cases, namely 2000-2005 and 2010-2011.

In Nigeria, the main problem was electoral democracy, while the situation of civil-political rights was better than in most other countries. Although the 2003 and 2007 elections were severely flawed, there were no countries with similar violations of democratic principles that were subject to sanctions. Indeed, in most other cases, it was the combination of a flawed electoral process with severe violations of civil-political rights that led to sanctions. As a result, in the case of Nigeria, the argument for double standards is weaker than in the other cases.

Nonetheless, there were equally cases where the EU was less reluctant to adopt negative measures. This was especially the case in Niger, which has been subject to sanctions, although the situation of electoral democracy and civil-political rights was not worse than in other countries. Indeed, it was only with the 2009 referendum that the situation of electoral democracy and civil-political rights deteriorated. Moreover, such a ‘constitutional coup’ had equally been committed by President Déby in Chad, who was not subject to sanctions.

Guinea was subject to sanctions from 2003 onwards. The suspension of EU development assistance in 2003 responded to Guinea’s flawed electoral process and violations of civil-political rights. Elections had been boycotted in 2002 and 2003, and the 2001 referendum eliminated presidential term limits. Moreover, there was a crackdown on demonstrations in 2006, 2007 and 2009. However, the decision to open Article 96 consultations in 2003 remains surprising, as the most flagrant violations of democratic principles took place after this date. Hence, the decision to open consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement was primarily based on the electoral process, most notably the 2001 referendum that eliminated presidential term limits and the opposition boycott of the 2002 and 2003 elections. In this sense, the situation was comparable to that in Chad, where elections were equally boycotted and President Déby ran for a third term after changing the constitution. At the same time, the perdurance of the sanctions can be explained by the fact that the situation was not improving. The 2009 sanctions responded to the violent crackdown on demonstrations in September 2009, but there had equally been such crackdowns in Ethiopia (2005) and Côte d’Ivoire (2004), which did not lead to such costly sanctions.

In Zimbabwe, the EU adopted a comprehensive sanctions package, including not only aid suspension but also an arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze. Moreover, these sanctions have been extended
over the years, and the EU has been reluctant to lift them, although some progress was made with the 2008 Global Political Agreement. Although violations of civil-political rights were most frequent in the Zimbabwean case, the fact that sanctions were already adopted in early 2002 remains surprising.

The case of Kenya after the December 2007 elections has been recognised as one where ‘greater support for human rights and democracy-building’ was possible (Kippin 2009: 12; Brown 2009). Indeed, the EU put significant pressure on government and opposition to accept the power-sharing agreement and made clear that ‘business as usual’ would not be possible unless a solution was found for the crisis. The reason why Article 96 was not instigated is that African mediation quite soon led to a power-sharing agreement. Moreover, the EU followed up on the implementation of the agreement and urged the government to implement the reforms.
3. Conflicting norms
3. Conflicting norms

“The Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP States, of the other part, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties” hereby conclude this Agreement in order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing a stable and democratic political environment’ (Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Article 1, emphasis added).

3.1. Introduction

According to Manners (2008), the EU aims to promote nine normative principles in world politics: (1) sustainable peace, (2) social freedom, (3) consensual democracy, (4) associative human rights, (5) supranational rule of law, (6) inclusive equality, (7) social solidarity, (8) sustainable development and (9) good governance. It is clear that these nine normative principles cover a broad spectrum of objectives. Indeed, it has been argued that the EU conducts ‘structural foreign policy’ by which it tries to ‘influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 25-26). The EU thus aims to thoroughly change third countries, in a similar way as it has ‘transformed’ candidate members in the accession process (Grabbe 2006; Börzel 2010). Gibert clearly sees this approach in the EU’s Africa policies, although she adds that the lack of true diplomatic capacities hampers the EU’s wide ambitions (Gibert 2011b). Hadfield claims that the introduction of political conditionality and security provisions in the Cotonou Agreement has merged two roles of the EU, namely that of a donor and of an actor on the international scene. The holistic approach to poverty reduction has led to what she calls ‘foreign development policy’ (Hadfield 2007: 44 and 52). Holden argues that the EU exercises ‘structural power’ over developing countries via a highly transformative aid agenda including the reform of state, laws and institutions (Holden 2009: 183).

As stressed by Manners, the EU’s development policy ‘became the primary means outside of Europe to promote the normative principles of good governance, sustainable development, social solidarity, rule of law, human rights, freedom and democracy’ (Manners 2008: 415). These normative principles can be structured around the triple objective of democracy, development and stability. As emphasised in a 1996 Commission Communication: ‘the EU policy aims concerning Africa might be summarized as helping to foster peace and stability, development, democracy and the respect for human rights’ (European Commission 1996: 2). Applied to the nine substantive normative principles identified by Manners, ‘democracy’ entails consensual democracy, associative human rights, social freedom, and the supranational rule of law. These are the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement, which are a condition for development assistance and an area of support (as part of ‘institutional development and capacity building’). ‘Development’ encompasses sustainable development, inclusive equality, social
solidarity and good governance. As stated in the first article of the Cotonou Agreement: ‘The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries in the world economy’ (emphasis added). Sustainable development is thus one of the main objectives of EU development cooperation. Moreover, with the focus on poverty reduction, the EU also promotes social solidarity in development cooperation. Inclusive equality refers to combating social exclusion and is inherent in some of the MDGs, including those on child and maternal health and universal primary education. Since the 2005 revision, the Cotonou Agreement states that the MDGs must underpin EU development cooperation. Moreover, the promotion of the fight against poverty-related diseases and the protection of sexual and reproductive health and rights of women was added as a focus of EU cooperation (art. 25). The EU Consensus for Development mentions the pursuit of the MDGs as one of the primary objectives, along with poverty reduction and sustainable development. Good governance is also an important aspect of the EU’s development agenda, as can be noted in the emphasis in the Cotonou Agreement on the fight against corruption and the inclusion of good governance as a ‘fundamental element’ of the Agreement. The substantive principle ‘sustainable peace’ forms the third main objective of stability, and is achieved through conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement is dedicated to peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution.

The idea is that these objectives are mutually enhancing, and therefore should be tackled jointly. Nonetheless, this idealistic belief that ‘all good things go together’ is not substantiated by research nor by concrete country cases. In reality, trade-offs are often made. Hence, in this Chapter I will investigate whether double standards can be explained by such trade-offs. More particularly, the hypotheses will test whether the EU prefers (1) development and (2) stability (internal and regional) over democracy. The democracy-stability dilemma has often been mentioned in scholarly research on democracy promotion (see, for example, Knodt and Jünemann 2007), but is mostly seen as a dilemma of norms versus self-interests, rather than as a dilemma of norms versus norms. Nonetheless, in many cases and especially in conflict-ridden sub-Saharan Africa, the pursuit of stability may also be seen from a humanitarian perspective, cfr. the notion of ‘humanitarian interventions’ (Wheeler and Dunne 2001; Frost 2001). Whereas the democracy-stability dilemma is generally accepted, fewer studies point to the possibility of a democracy-development dilemma. An exception is Carothers (2010), who argues that development personnel are reluctant to see negative measures imposed against developing autocratic regimes.

The Chapter begins by identifying how the EU sees the link between democracy, development and stability in its discourse. It then touches upon the potential conflict between these three normative principles by reviewing the academic literature. In the next section, I will go more deeply into the
pursuit of development and stability in the EU’s policies in sub-Saharan Africa. On the basis of this, three hypotheses will be formulated that will guide the case study analysis.

3.2. The democracy-development-stability triangle in EU discourse

The 1991 Council Resolution on human rights, democracy and development established the link between democratic principles and development by stating that ‘respect for human rights, the rule of law and the existence of political institutions that are effective, accountable and enjoy democratic legitimacy are the basis for equitable development’ (Council of the EU 1991). This belief was further reflected in the introduction of political conditionality in the Lomé-IV Agreement. The conditionality clause in Article 5 of the revised Lomé-IV Agreement (1995) proclaims that cooperation should entail respect for and promotion of all human rights and that development policy should be closely linked to the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. The link between democracy and development is believed to lie in the concept of human development, which conceives of development as the creation of an environment where people can fulfill their full potential (United Nations Development Programme 2001: 9). Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement reiterates these ideas and adds that ‘democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing’.

Since the mid-1990s, stability has been brought more and more in relation to development. The first reflection of this idea was the 1996 Commission Communication on conflict prevention in Africa, which emphasised that sustainable development should not be interpreted in a narrow economic sense, but should have ‘structural stability’ as its ultimate goal (European Commission 1996: 2). The 2000 Development Policy Statement stated that ‘poverty and the exclusion which it creates, are the root causes of conflict’ (cited in Hadfield 2007: 52-53). In line with this thinking, an Article on peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution was included in the Cotonou Agreement (Article 11). The European Consensus on Development (2005) establishes a cyclical link between security and development: ‘without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty reduction no sustainable peace will occur’ (European Union 2006).

This cyclical vision on the relationship between security and development was added to the Cotonou Agreement in its latest revision (2010).

To complete the triangle, the EU also sees democracy and stability as mutually enhancing. The European Security Strategy (2003) reflects a belief in the democratic peace theory, which contends that democracies will not go to war with each other: ‘The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.’ Moreover, the European Commission’s
conflict prevention policies include support for democracy, the rule of law and civil society: ‘In countries showing conflict potential there may be a need to focus external aid on the (re)emergence of a favourable political environment’ (European Commission 2001: 4). The reverse thesis, that stability is needed for democracy, is less pronounced in EU discourse.

The belief in the mutually reinforcing link between democracy, development and stability is further illustrated by a number of concepts inherent in EU discourse vis-à-vis developing countries, including ‘structural stability’, ‘democratic governance’ and ‘human security’. Structural stability was put forward by the European Commission in 1996 with a Communication on ‘The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond’. Structural stability was defined as ‘a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to violent conflict’. In this perspective, economic development and democratic principles are inherent in structural stability.

Similarly, the notion of ‘democratic governance’, introduced in the 2006 Communication on Governance and Development encompasses objectives related to democracy, development and stability:

- Respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms
- Support for democratisation processes
- Respect for the rule of law and access for all to an independent justice system
- Access to information
- A government that governs transparently and is accountable to the relevant institutions and to the electorate
- Effective institutions
- Access to basic social services
- Sustainable management of natural and energy resources and of the environment
- The promotion of sustainable economic growth and social cohesion in a climate conducive to private investment
- Human security (European Commission 2006c: 5).

The recent focus on ‘human security’ should also be seen as part of this conception. A Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities convened at the initiative of High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana recommended the EU to pursue human security as a way to become a full-fledged actor on the international scene while maintaining a ‘normative’ image (Martin 2011: 199). Following this recommendation, in the 2008 follow-up strategy to the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU proposes a ‘people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security’ (European Union 2008). In the 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement, it is explicitly mentioned that Parties will
pursue human security. Human security is based on a comprehensive approach to security, which takes people rather than states as a point of departure. Human security includes physical threats to people (freedom from fear) but also threats caused by human needs (freedom from want). Covering these two components, human security includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Gasper 2005; United Nations Development Programme 1994). Hence, human security clearly encompasses development and stability. Moreover, human rights and democratisation are also crucial aspects of human security. The report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities underlines ‘the primacy of human rights’ and ‘a legitimate political authority’ as two of the five key principles of a human security approach (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004: 14-15).

### 3.3. Conflicting norms

Writing about the security-development nexus in EU policies, Youngs criticises the EU’s discourse for its lack of a clear vision on the exact causality of the relation and its failure to take into account the potential conflict between these goals: ‘The EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach based on the rather easy assumption that “all good things go together”’ (Youngs 2008d: 420). Similarly, Smith points to the lack of prioritisation in the EU’s definition of ‘democratic governance’ (Smith 2008: 155). This problem has also been highlighted by critics of Normative Power Europe. Sjursen argues that, it is one thing to justify a norm, but another to know if the norm is correct in a given context. Different norms may collide in a concrete situation, and it is not necessarily self-evident to judge what is the right action in a given situation (Sjursen 2006: 243). Similarly, Aggestam claims that, when it comes to concrete policies, the ‘altruistic’ goals that the EU pursues, namely democracy, development and stability, may appear conflicting. For example, the promotion of human rights and democracy may have destabilising effects that end up threatening development and stability (Aggestam 2008: 10).

The problem is that the narrative of a mutually reinforcing link between democracy, development and stability is based on idealistic expectations rather than on reality or scientific evidence. There are in fact many examples where these three goals do not go together. First of all, the argument that democracy and development always go hand in hand should not be taken for granted. As White states: ‘While it is common to find Western politicians and political commentators on development waxing eloquent about the positive developmental consequences of democratization, there is by no means a consensus on the issue among development professionals and analysts’ (White 1995: 28). Indeed, the 2002 Human Development Report, despite giving prominence to the centrality of democracy to development, recognised there was no strong evidential basis for this claim (Burnell 2011: 23).
There are three main perspectives on the relation between democracy and development: the conflict, compatibility and skeptical perspective. Studies testing the relation between democracy and development have reached inconclusive results on which of these three approaches is dominant.\(^{29}\)

The conflict perspective claims that economic growth can be hindered by democracy (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). In this view, authoritarian regimes are more able to implement the policies critical for rapid economic growth, because of the social and political stability they foster, their insulation from outside influence and the single-minded strength they can muster. In contrast, democracy entails a number of dysfunctional characteristics for development, such as political instability and the tendency for short-term planning inherent in the electoral system (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 51-55). The belief in the link between authoritarianism and economic development has also been termed ‘Leeism’, after former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew who argued that democracy hindered development by provoking disorder (White 1995: 28-29; Sen 1999: 15).

Those propagating a conflict perspective often refer to the ‘developmental state’ model. This model was proposed in the context of the remarkable economic success of the South East Asian tigers, including Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore, in the 1980s. These regimes possessed two main characteristics that enhanced their developmental success: (1) a developmentalist ideological underpinning, and (2) the capacity to implement economic policies in an effective manner (Mkandawire 2001: 290; Sørensen 1995: 402). Given that many developmental states were authoritarian at the time of their economic success (Taiwan, South Korea) and often had poor human rights records (Indonesia, China, Taiwan), many authors argue that developmental states are incompatible with democracy and human rights (Johnson 1999; Fritz and Menocal 2007). Indeed, several characteristics defining the success of developmental states are more often found in authoritarian countries, including state autonomy and a weak civil society (Leftwich 2000: 161-165).

In contrast, the compatibility (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) or optimistic (White 1995: 28) perspective believes that democracy fosters economic growth. Amartya Sen’s *Development as freedom* is perhaps the most well-known example of this view. Sen argues that democracy contributes to development in two ways. Firstly, if regularly elected, rulers have an incentive to listen to what people want. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, have few motivations to maximise output and to act in the general interest (see also Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 51-57). Secondly, the conceptualisation of economic needs may require the exercise of basic political rights (Sen 1999: 152-153).

\(^{29}\) For three reviews, see Sirowy and Inkeles (1990); Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008).
In this light, the concept of developmental democratic states should be mentioned. Developmental democratic states are both developmental (with a minimum annual GDP growth of 4 percent) and satisfy the basic democratic criteria (regular free and fair elections, respect for political rights and civil liberties) (Leftwich 2000:171-190). Examples are Botswana, Mauritius and Brazil (UNECA and AU 2011: 109). Developmental democratic states retain the autonomous attributes of the developmental state, but add to this an inclusive approach to public policy-making, embracing broad sectors of society (Edigheji 2005). In a recent report, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and AU seem to suggest that democratic developmental states are desirable in Africa: ‘an effective developmental state requires [...] a democratic socio-political environment that endows it with legitimacy and authority’ (UNECA and AU 2011: 8).

Lastly, the skeptical perspective does not believe in a systematic relationship between democracy and development (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). This perspective assumes that it is not the political regime, but the institutional structure and organisations that matter for growth (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008: 63). For example, there is substantial evidence that political stability has positive effects on economic growth (Alesina et al. 1996; Feng 1997; Xu et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 1998). Moreover, studies have proven that good administrative governance, meaning a functioning state administration, regulative framework, adequate public finance management, absence of corruption, etc., is conducive to economic growth (Börzel et al. 2008: 6; Leftwich 1993; Doornbos 2001).

While the relation between democracy and development is thus debated, the same can be said about the relation between democracy and stability. On the one hand, scholarship on the root causes of conflict suggests that democracy may prevent conflict. Rebellions or civil war are mostly motivated by greed or by grievance. The absence of political rights or the political exclusion of certain ethnic or socio-economic groups often causes feelings of grievance, which may be translated into rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 12; Stewart 2000; Stewart 2004: 274-279; Ballentine 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002). Moreover, democratic systems increase the opportunity costs for rebellion. The more inclusive a political system and the more political rights and civil liberties are respected, the higher the opportunity costs of rebellion, and the lower the probability of armed conflict (Reynal-Querol 2001).

Nonetheless, severe authoritarianism may also reduce the likelihood of conflict. Authoritarian regimes are often more effective and forceful in silencing political dissent (Stewart 2004: 277-278; Gupta et al. 2007: 590-591; Reynal-Querol 2002: 35). Moreover, elections can become a source of conflict. Whereas the literature on the root causes of conflict suggests that ballots may substitute bullets, ballots may equally provoke bullets, for example when election results are disputed. In this sense, electoral defeat may become a source of grievance for certain actors. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where party differences are mostly ethnic and politics are characterised by neo-patrimonialism, elections
often exacerbate and complicate social divisions (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000: 36; Höglund 2009; Orji 2010).

Lastly, the link between democracy and regional stability is reflected in the ‘democratic peace thesis’, which assumes that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other. This thesis has become common sense in the discourse of the international community, as well as in scholarly research, based on the observation of the ‘extreme rarity of joint democratic war, after a century of democratization across the globe’ (Mousseau and Shi 1999: 641). There seems to be a general consensus of the positive effects of democracy on peace, even if there remains some debate on the exact reasons for these effects (MacMillan 2003: 241; Zinnes 2004).

3.4. The need for trade-offs
Taking into account the potential conflicts between democracy, development and stability, some scholars have suggested that trade-offs should be made. Sørensen argues that, although developmental states should be legitimate and responsive, in reality, trade-offs are necessary because all these elements cannot be achieved at once. Moreover, he criticises the organisation of elections in conflict-ridden states (Sørensen 2000: 298-301). Similarly, White argues that there is a need for an ‘effective developmental state’ that is not necessarily democratic, but focuses on good governance and state capacity (White 1998: 25). Grindle makes the case for ‘good enough governance’, based on the contextual realities of specific countries and the role of governments in poverty alleviation. She argues that the governance agenda has grown into a list of items that are nearly impossible to achieve all at once, while hardly any attention is paid to potential sequencing or priorities of actions (Grindle 2004; Grindle 2007). Good enough governance is based on the idea that ‘not all governance deficits need to (or can) be tackled at once’ (Grindle 2007: 554). Similarly, Burnell suggests that strategies should be adjusted to the situation: ‘an entrenched authoritarian regime presiding over a functioning state and growing economy poses a (set of) challenges(s) very different from a failed state in an economy devastated by civil war but enjoying an opportunity to make a “fresh start”’ (Burnell 2011: 70).

These trade-offs can also be found in donor practice. This was already the case in the 1990s, when governments with doubtful democratic credentials but willing to implement economic recovery programmes recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, such as Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings and Uganda’s Museveni, were absolved of the requirement to introduce democracy (Cumming 2004: 118). Moreover, when the need for structural adjustment trumped with the objective of democratisation, donors often prioritised economic adjustment to political participation (Abrahamsen 2000: 30; Geisler 1993: 632). Carothers argues that many development practitioners are skeptical of a democracy focus, especially in countries with visible developmental success. Donors fear that to insist on democratisation would endanger their relationship with the
government and thus put at risk development programmes (Carothers 2010a: 24). As regards the dilemma between democracy and stability, it has been argued that donors, although in principle supporting ‘democratic peace’, often downgrade democratisation and try to pursue the ‘least bad government’ by focussing primarily on stability (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 31; Zuercher et al. 2009; Barnett 2010).

Although the above-mentioned notions of structural stability, democratic governance and human security are based on a rather idealistic conception of the EU’s policy goals in sub-Saharan Africa, recent discourse seems to suggest that the EU is aware of the need for trade-offs. In its 2003 Communication on Governance and Development, the European Commission states that ‘Good governance is to be analysed and promoted on a country-specific basis. It cannot be addressed on the basis of [a] one-size-fits-all model but rather on the basis of existing situations’ (European Commission 2003b: 17). The Communication lists three sorts of situations: difficult partnerships, post-conflict situations and effective partnerships. For each of these situations, an adjusted approach is needed. However, in all three situations, democratisation is a key element of this approach (Ibid.: 17-31). Moreover, when it comes to the EU’s development policies, poverty reduction is explicitly noted as the primary objective. The Cotonou Agreement, European Consensus, Treaty of Lisbon and Africa-EU Strategic Partnership all state that poverty reduction is the primary and overarching objective of development cooperation.
3.5. Development norms

As was argued in the introduction to this Chapter, the substantive normative principles sustainable development, inclusive equality, social solidarity and good governance are all embedded in the EU’s development policies. These normative principles are also firmly embedded in the current international development agenda. For example, poverty reduction was put on the agenda of donor countries by the World Bank (Finnemore 1998: 89-127). The same has been argued about good governance (Masujima 2004: 151-152; Abrahamsen 2000: 31). Hence, apart from the EU’s normative basis, one should also take into account the norms that are prevalent in international development cooperation. In what follows, I will discuss three development norms: good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, and poverty reduction. It is mentioned how these norms have appeared on the agenda of donors, and how this was translated into EU development practice. Furthermore, the example of the UK will be discussed as the UK’s Department for International Development has equally strongly focused on international development. Furthermore, I will briefly explain the potential dilemma between development norms and democratisation. On the basis of this, I will formulate a hypothesis that will guide the investigation of the case studies.

3.5.1. Good governance

The emergence of good governance as a development norm should be seen against the background of the structural adjustment programmes that were introduced as a package of measures in return for loans by the IMF and the World Bank in the context of the debt crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the view that the best model is that of a minimal state, with little intervention in the economy, structural adjustment programmes included price stabilisation through devaluation, public expenditure cuts, deregulation, privatisation and slimming down bureaucracies (Leftwich 1993: 607; Kiely 1998: 65). However, by the early 1990s it had become clear that structural adjustment had failed in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries that had implemented structural adjustment did not perform better and in some cases even worse than countries without structural adjustment plans (Abrahamsen 2000: 38-39). At the same time, several strongly interventionist states in East Asia achieved remarkable development performance (Kiely 1998: 65-66). In this context, economists of the New Institutionalist school pointed to the importance for the state to create an institutional environment (laws, rules, conventions) to make markets more effective (Craig and Porter 2006: 101).

These evolutions made the World Bank reconsider its former plea for a minimal state. In a 1989 report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, the failure of structural adjustment was sought in what it called a ‘crisis of governance’ in many African countries. This crisis of governance was characterised by an inefficient, politicised state apparatus, the gradual breakdown of judicial systems and authoritarian governments that were irresponsible to grassroots and nongovernmental organisations (World Bank 1989: 30). However, this does not mean that neoliberalism was completely
abandoned. State interventionism was regarded as acceptable, but only to support the market (Kiely 1998: 68-70; Hildyard and Wilks 1998: 50-51). This became clear in the 1997 World Development Report, *The State in a Changing World*, in which the World Bank emphasised the need for an ‘effective state’ that is able to provide the goods and services, rules and institutions for markets to flourish (World Bank 1997: 1).

Although good governance was part of the wider evolution leading to political conditionality (Moore 2006: 51), the concept as intended by the World Bank was different from liberal democracy. First of all, good governance was a ‘means to an end’, rather than a goal in itself. Good governance was meant to stimulate economic development by supporting the market (Kiely 1998: 68). It was concerned with output and performance, rather than legitimacy. Secondly, the World Bank conceptualised good governance from a predominantly technocratic perspective. In the 1989 report, governance was defined as ‘the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs’. World Bank interventions therefore focused primarily on civil service reform, public finance management, anti-corruption, etc. (World Bank 1992).

The EU, which had followed the emphasis on structural adjustment, adopted a similar approach to the World Bank as regards good governance (Brown 2004). Indeed, the first definition of good governance in Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement emphasised the technocratic aspects of governance, in line with the World Bank view. Good governance was defined as ‘the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development’. Moreover, the introduction of good governance as a fundamental element of the Cotonou Agreement was aimed at providing the EU with the possibility to suspend aid in the case of serious corruption: ‘The Parties agree that only serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery leading to such corruption […] constitute a violation of that element’. It was not until 2006, with the Commission’s Communication on Governance and Development, that the EU sought to merge good governance with democratic principles, in the concept of ‘democratic governance’ (see supra).

3.5.2. Ownership and aid effectiveness

A second shift in international aid policies was that from conditionality to ownership in the late 1990s. In the 1998 report *Assessing Aid. What works, what doesn’t and why*, the World Bank argued that adjustment lending could only work when there was ‘ownership’ or strong domestic support for reforms. The report recommended to focus development assistance on ‘credible reformers’ (World Bank 1998: 4 and 52). Many donors followed these recommendations by linking development assistance to the commitment and capacity to introduce economic reform (Hoebink 2006; Hout 2007).

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30 For an analysis of the two main views on good governance, see Börzel et al. (2008), Leftwich (1993), Doornbos (2001) or Hyden et al. (2004).
The focus on ownership was further materialised in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. PRSPs are national development plans that are drafted by the partner governments on the basis of a broad-based national dialogue (Uvin 2004: 73). The PRSPs emerged in the late 1990s as a condition for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) scheme, but soon became a leading strategy on the basis of which most donors decide their allocation (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 82).

The principle of ownership is at the heart of the aid effectiveness agenda, to which most donor agencies and recipient countries subscribed with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The Paris Declaration is based on five key principles: (1) ownership, (2) alignment, (3) harmonisation, (4) managing for results and (5) mutual accountability (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 83-84). The aid effectiveness agenda has led to a preference for ways of providing aid that respect country ownership. As such, budget support became the preferred aid modality as it enabled governments to implement strategies believed to be most appropriate for their country (based on the PRSP), while reducing transaction costs (Maxwell 2003: 10; Craig and Porter 2006: 110-111; Renard 2006: 17; Unwin 2004: 1510-1511).

The EU has firmly committed to ownership. Ownership is a fundamental principle of the Cotonou Agreement (Article 2) and CSPs and NIPs are drawn up according to a strategy that shows remarkable similarity to the way in which PRSPs are adopted (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 83). Indeed, on the basis of CSPs that are jointly agreed between the delegation of the European Commission and the ACP country concerned, NIPs are drafted by the partner country containing the focal sectors and non-focal sectors (Cotonou Agreement, Annexe IV, Article 4). The respect for ownership is further concretised by the EU’s preference for budget support. Former Development Commissioner Louis Michel was a staunch advocate of budget support, which he saw as the most suitable form of development aid for fulfilling commitments under the Paris Declaration (Michel 2008c: 22). Another example of the EU’s focus on ownership is its commitment to the African Peer Review Mechanism (see Introductory Chapter). The EU strongly supports the APRM, which is one of the elements of the Africa-EU Partnership on democratic governance and human rights. Sub-Saharan African countries can received 5 percent extra aid from the Governance Incentive Tranche if they participate in the APRM (Molenaers and Nijs 2009: 568).

3.5.3. Poverty reduction and Millennium Development Goals

With the emphasis on poverty reduction and the MDGs, a departure was made from the mere emphasis on macroeconomic criteria and privatisation prevalent in the structural adjustment era (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 77). Poverty reduction was inspired by New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ that entailed merging neoliberal market economies and social empowerment. Without questioning the
importance of macroeconomic stability and neoliberal trade regimes, more attention was paid to how
to make markets work for the poor (Craig and Porter 2006: 81-85). The consensus around poverty
reduction culminated at the 2000 Millennium Summit, where 147 member states of the UN signed up
to the eight MDGs, the first and foremost of which was to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger\(^{31}\)
(Maxwell 2003: 7; Clemens et al. 2007: 735). The MDGs soon became blended with the PRSP
process. The PRSPs were seen as the means to achieve the MDGs at country level, while the MDGs
were the universal goals and targets for poverty reduction (Renard 2006: 5).

The EU followed this shift to poverty reduction and the MDGs. Poverty reduction became the main
objective of the Cotonou Agreement: ‘The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing
and eventually eradicating poverty’. This primacy of poverty reduction now has a Treaty basis with
the Lisbon Treaty. Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that:
‘Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the
long term, the eradication of poverty’. On the MDGs, the 2005 Consensus for Development states that
the EU is ‘determined to work to assist the achievement of [the Millennium Development] goals and
the development objectives agreed at the major UN conferences and summits’ (European Union
2005).

\[3.5.4. \text{A democracy-development dilemma?}\]

The dilemma between democracy and development is inherent in political conditionality. The so-
called Samaritan’s dilemma means that donors want to act as a Good Samaritan by giving aid to poor
people (Chhotray and Hulme 2008: 45). When their money is spent relatively well, it is difficult from
a humanitarian point of view to suspend aid, even when there are serious problems related to
democratic principles. Moreover, donors are under pressure to spend the money at their disposal and
to show results (Burnell 2011: 65). This makes them look for success stories and focus on countries
where they have a return on investment (Zorbas 2011: 109-110). There is also the effect of path
dependency. When donors have invested a lot of aid money in a country, it becomes difficult to
withdraw from that country, as this means all the invested money will be lost (interview, Filip
Reyntjens, April 2012). For these reasons, conditionality is not always rigorously applied. As Browne
notes: ‘non-compliance does not always lead to the abandonment of programmes – only the
abandonment of conditions’ (Browne 2006: 48).

Despite the increased attention for political issues in development cooperation, the norms that are
currently defining the aid agenda have equally been blamed for their predominantly technocratic
approach. Indeed, the PRSPs have been criticised for being technocratic and apolitical and for not

\(^{31}\) The other MDGs are: (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower
women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other
diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability and (8) develop a Global Partnership for Development.
paying sufficient attention to the domestic political dynamics that could block or undermine economic progress (De Haan and Everst-Phillips 2007; Lazarus 2008: 1207-1210; Craig and Porter 2003). Moreover, the provision of budget support is controversial in authoritarian countries, as budget support is often perceived as symbolising trust in the overall policies of governments. For this reason, most donors include explicitly political criteria in the underlying principles of budget support, such as democracy and human rights (Molenaers et al. 2010: 13).

These arguments are particularly relevant for the EU’s development policies in sub-Saharan Africa, given that the EU’s foreign policy has developed only recently and the European Commission’s DG Development has maintained its poverty focus (Carbone 2007: 48-49; Dearden 2008: 13; Holden 2009: 41). It has been argued that EU development policy has often been based on a je dépense donc je suis logic. The large aid budget at its disposal gives the European Commission a basis for autonomous action, based on developmental concerns rather than foreign policy. In this sense the Commission may feel the need to affirm its position vis-à-vis the Council of the EU. Moreover, unlike bilateral donors the European Commission is not directly linked to the taxpayers, which increases its possibilities for autonomous action (Molenaers and Nijs 2011: 419-420). In this sense, it should be added that the EDF is not subject to scrutiny from the EP. Moreover, the political expertise at the level of the delegations of the Commission has been noted to be limited and the diplomatic framework insufficiently developed (Gibert 2011b). Whereas the creation of the EEAS was believed to put political concerns to the forefront of external action, this depends to a large degree on the persons in their new functions and their background (anonymous interviews, January 2011, January 2012), although the exact effect can only be seen in a few years.

There are various examples where the EU has mainly focused on a developmental approach. First of all, compared to other donors (the Netherlands and the US), which have adopted aid selectivity criteria with rigid political indicators, with the Governance Initiative the EU developed an approach that is primarily incentive-based and only accounts for a small part of EU development assistance. Moreover, given that the interpretation of governance is so wide (including political, social, economic, cultural aspects), non-democratic countries may still receive an incentive tranche (European Commission 2006c; Molenaers and Nijs 2009: 570-573). Secondly, the EU’s approach to budget support has until recently been primarily technocratic. According to the Cotonou Agreement, countries with transparent, accountable and effective public expenditure management, well defined macroeconomic or sectoral policies, and open and transparent public procurement are eligible for budget support (Cotonou Agreement, Article 61). As a result, the EU has provided budget support to many non-democratic countries, including Vietnam, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Chad. Nonetheless, as was noted in the Introductory Chapter, the EU is planning to adopt a more pro-democratic stance on budget support. General budget support will be changed into ‘Good Governance and Development Contracts’, which can only be concluded with countries that are committed to fundamental values. Nonetheless, the fact
that these conditions do not apply to sectoral budget support implies that a developmental approach has not been abandoned completely (European Commission 2011a: 4; Council of the EU 2012a).

3.5.5. Member state examples: the UK

The EU is not the only donor to have committed to the aforementioned development norms, member states have equally followed this trend. Especially the example of the UK is notable here, which has taken an increasingly developmental approach to Africa since the coming in office of the New Labour government in the late 1990s (Cumming 2004; Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 250). In 1997, the Department for International Development (DfID) was created, independent from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). DfID came to dominate the UK’s policies in sub-Saharan Africa, as its actions were strongly focused on sub-Saharan Africa (Porteous 2008: 20-21). It has to be added that this dominance of DfID was only possible because the FCO was hardly concerned with sub-Saharan Africa: ‘It was only in the area of development policies that Africa was at the forefront of UK concerns’ (Williams 2010: 38). For example, when Tony Blair convened the Commission for Africa in 2005, DfID’s head Hillary Benn was represented, but no one from the FCO (Porteous 2008: 61-63). This evolution was further made possible by the enormous increase in aid spending, which made DfID’s budget much larger than that of the FCO. Particularly for Africa, aid spending increased sharply from £300 million in 1997-1998 to £1.25 billion in 2006-2007 (Vines 2011: 28; Porteous 2008: 103). DfID’s developmental approach was also translated in its strong support for good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, and poverty reduction. A 1997 White Paper, the first White Paper on development policy in over 20 years, explicitly mentioned the elimination of poverty as the overall aim of DfID (Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 255-256). In line with this emphasis on poverty reduction, the UK’s aid allocation was based on the poverty needs of countries, as well as the government’s ability to use aid effectively (Williams 2010: 46). Moreover, DfID became one of the leading advocates of direct budget support and sector wide approaches (Chhotray and Hulme 2008: 38; Porteous 2008: 60). By 2010, budget support accounted for about a quarter of all aid provided by DfID (Williams 2010: 46).

The evolution towards a UK Africa policy that was strongly based on developmental concerns was further nurtured by Prime Minister Tony Blair’s personal engagement. From 2000 onwards Blair started to bring sub-Saharan Africa to the attention of international summits. Under the UK’s Presidency of the G8, 2005 was declared ‘the Year of Africa’ (Taylor 2010: 42). Blair was also the main driving force behind the Commission for Africa, a seventeen-member commission (of which nine Africans) with the assignment to generate new thinking and action on issues of concern to Africa, including conflict resolution and peace-building, human development, natural resources, governance, etc. (Williams 2005: 532; Porteous 2008: 61-63). Blair’s commitment to sub-Saharan Africa has also been translated to the European level: it was under the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in
2005 that the European Commission adopted its Communication the *EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate African Development*, which was the basis of the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007) (Khadiagala 2009a: 312). Furthermore, the UK took the lead on the partnership on the MDGs in the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (Chafer 2011a: 174).

Many commentators have criticised DfID’s leadership on UK Africa policies for being too apolitical, downplaying the role of politics and diplomacy. As stated by Porteous: ‘DfID posed the problems in technical terms and proposed technical solutions’ (Porteous 2008: 132). For example, under pressure to come up with ‘good news stories’ and meet performance targets, as well as to live up to its intentions to respect country ownership, DfID has focused on so-called development success stories, while downplaying the potentially negative internal and external policies of these countries (Ibid.: 117-121). Nonetheless, there was a relatively large consensus in the UK on Labour’s developmental approach, which was supported by the British public, media, NGOs and political parties alike (Porteous 2008: 12-13; Chhotray and Hulme 2008: 38 and 42; Gallagher 2009: 441-442).

### 3.5.6. Hypothesis and operationalisation

Hence, the EU has firmly attached to good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, and poverty reduction. This may pose a dilemma in the case of non-democratic countries that perform well in the development sphere, which can be observed in the discussion on budget support.

This leads me to formulate the following hypothesis:

**H.1. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against countries that are perceived as development success stories, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries that are not perceived as development success stories.**

The emphasis on perception is important because it can be assumed that the EU will base its action on perceptions rather than on an objective reality (Fisher 2012). It should be mentioned that this also applies to the other hypotheses. While it is impossible to ‘measure’ perceptions, I tried to assess this to the best extent possible using academic sources, some interviews with policy-makers and leaked US embassy cables. Moreover, by looking at the evolution of indicators over time, it can be expected that development success is perceived as more impressive when compared to a less successful performance in the past or, on the contrary, development failure is perceived as more detrimental when past performance was good. Furthermore, donor perceptions can be derived from reactions to deteriorating (e.g. development aid suspension) and improving economic governance (e.g. budget support).

‘Development success stories’ will be operationalised as countries where the government has managed to achieve good governance, high economic growth, macroeconomic stability and has attracted foreign
investment. Moreover, these are countries with well-drafted national development strategies (PRSPs) that are progressing in achieving the MDGs and are ‘on track’ with the programmes of the IMF and World Bank, more particularly the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility.

Two quantitative indicators are used to assess good governance: the World Bank’s Governance Indicators ‘control of corruption’ and ‘government effectiveness’. The control of corruption index measures the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The government effectiveness index assesses perceptions on the quality of public services, the civil service, policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The partial reliance on World Bank Governance Indicators is justified by the fact that these are composite indicators and can be expected to be more reliable than other indicators. Moreover, it is certain that the EU also uses the World Bank governance indicators, for example in the assessment of the Governance Action Plans (European Commission 2007b, Annex 7). I will look at the evolution of this indicator between 1998 and 2010. Table 8 and 9 (p. 139) include the scores on both indicators, summarising which countries have made an improvement or deterioration and which countries have remained status quo. Both indicators are presented in percentile ranks, which indicates the rank of countries amongst all countries in the world. In case countries had an extremely low or high rating on other indicators (such as the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International), this will also be mentioned, as this may influence the perception of the EU. More information on good governance was found in qualitative sources, including primary data from European Commission documents (the CSP or JAR) and US embassy cables and secondary data (press, academic articles).

Basic information on programmes by the IMF and World Bank was found on the website of the IMF, in CSPs and in reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation. Where available, secondary sources on economic policies of the governments (academic articles, International Crisis Group reports) were also consulted. Apart from whether countries have a PRSP, I also considered the relations they have with the IMF and World Bank. This is because the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are often seen as the leading organisations determining whether countries are eligible for budget support or not (Santiso 2003).

Given the attachment of the EU to African-owned initiatives for socio-economic and good governance, I also took into account whether countries participated in the APRM. Information on the APRM was found on its website, as well as in secondary literature.

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33 http://maep-ua.org//aprm-map
Where available I also added data on the position of the government vis-à-vis donors. In some cases, the government was particularly hostile towards donors, whereas in others, government policies were particularly forthcoming towards donors.

To measure economic growth I used the following indicators: the GDP growth rate, the GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a percentage of the GDP and inflation rates. These data were retrieved from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2011). In some cases, however, the World Development Indicators were used as information from the IMF was not available or incomplete. GDP growth and the percentage of FDI is represented in Table 10 (p. 140). On foreign investment, Table 11 rates the countries according to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking. Table 12 (p. 141) includes the inflation rates of the country cases. Apart from quantitative data I also assessed reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the International Crisis Group and the Economist Intelligence Unit, as well as academic articles on economic policies and US embassy cables.

To measure progress on the MDGs I assessed official government reports on the MDGs, but in many cases these reports were unavailable or outdated. In these cases, I consulted the MDG Monitor which provides basic information on whether countries are on track, off track or could achieve a goal if changes are made. Lastly, the evolution of the HDI between 1990 and 2010 was considered. Table 13 (p. 141) compares the progress countries have made on the HDI between 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 and 2000-2010.

Given that not only the European Commission but also member states may be led by development norms, it will also be taken into account which member states have bilateral development cooperation programmes. These bilateral donors may try to influence the EU in case of bad or good development performance. Hence, Table 14 (p. 142) summarises the main EU donors per country, as well as the amount of ODA provided in 2000-2010. Data on ODA are retrieved from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System.

### 3.5.7. Case studies

#### 3.5.7.1. Eritrea

Eritrea is not a development success story. Its good governance record has worsened since the 1990s. The control of corruption has dropped significantly since the late 1990s, although Eritrea’s corruption record is still lower than that of most other cases. Eritrea’s score on government effectiveness has equally deteriorated. Eritrea does not have a formal development plan. An interim-PRSP was drawn

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34 http://www.mdgmonitor.org
up, but was never formally approved by the government. There are only sectoral strategies including in the road sector and in education (European Community and Eritrea 2005: 8 and 17). Eritrea is not eligible for budget support as the government does not produce an annual budget. The government of Eritrea is believed to spend a disproportionate share of its budget on military expenditure, even more than on health (Ibid.: 4). In 2006, Eritrea showed willingness to start the process leading to debt relief with the IMF, but this never got started as the requirements on military spending and transparency of the budget were unacceptable for the government (US embassy Eritrea 2006a).

Moreover, the government of Eritrea has been outspokenly hostile towards donors and has tried to become more self-reliant. For example, in 2005-2006, the government seized food aid from the World Food Program under the pretext to become less dependent on donor assistance (US embassy Eritrea 2008b). Donors have little possibility to audit the economic sector and are often prohibited from monitoring their programmes because of restrictions on travelling in the country (International Crisis Group 2010a: 8 and 14). Due to the lack of suitable contractors, the absorption capacity of Eritrean aid is extremely low (1 percent) (US embassy Eritrea 2008c). For example, an EU-funded programme in construction faced difficulties as all the potential implementing companies were either from the military or from party officials (US embassy Eritrea 2008d). NGOs have either been expelled from the country because of increased registration difficulties since 2004, or have left because of government restrictions and lack of access to fuel (US embassy Eritrea 2008e). In more recent years, the government of Eritrea has gradually expelled most remaining donors. In early 2011, the government announced it would only accept projects in the field of health, water and sanitation. In November 2011, the government suspended all ongoing projects under the 10th EDF under the pretext that the national development plan would be revised (European Commission s.d.b.; EU delegation Eritrea 2011). In this context, development assistance from EU member states is largely restricted to humanitarian assistance (anonymous interview, February 2009).

With few exceptions, Eritrea’s economic growth has been minor or even negative since the mid-1990s. Only in 2001, Eritrea’s GDP grew by almost 9 percent which may be related to the end of the border war with Ethiopia. In 2008, Eritrea’s economy shrunk by almost 10 percent. When GDP growth was noted, this was mostly related to the government’s appreciation of the nakfa, Eritrea’s national currency. Moreover, inflation offsets any growth in GDP (US Embassy Eritrea 2006a). Together with the GDP, investments have dropped. Whereas FDI represented 35 percent of Eritrea’s GDP in 2001, by 2010 this was less than 10 percent. According to a 2005 report on the MDGs, Eritrea is below target regarding the eradication of extreme poverty and achievement of universal primary education. The proportion of people living below the national poverty line and the proportion of children below five years suffering from hunger increased between 1993-1995 and 2001-2003 (State of Eritrea 2005: 6-10).
3.5.7.2. Ethiopia

Ethiopia is seen by donors as a ‘projection of hope’ and a flagship country for the new aid agenda (Abbink 2009: 18-19). This perception is shared by academics such as Radelet (2010) who included Ethiopia as one of the seventeen ‘emerging’ African countries, and by the Economist (2011, January), which lists Ethiopia amongst the ‘Lion Kings’, the fastest growing African economies. Ethiopia’s corruption record is traditionally relatively low because a culture of discipline and performance pervades the government and civil service. Service delivery systems function better than in most low-income African countries (Furtado and Smith 2009: 132). Ethiopia’s control of corruption rate has remained stable since 1998. Regarding government effectiveness, Ethiopia’s score improved significantly in the second half of the 2000s, when compared to the late 1990s. The government of Ethiopia is strongly committed to pro-poor growth. The government has adopted three PRSPs since 2000, all of which were well-received by the donor community and particularly the World Bank and the IMF. Ethiopia is also a member country of the APRM.

Ethiopia’s growth strategy has been remarkably successful. GDP growth has been 5 percent on average in 2001-2005 and even above 10 percent in 2004-2009. Ethiopia’s GDP per capita nearly doubled between 2004 and 2010 and foreign investment has been on the rise since 2000. Moreover, Ethiopia has made tremendous progress regarding the MDGs. It is on track regarding MDGs 2-7, while the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger could be achieved ‘if some changes are made’, according to the MDG monitor. The percentage of people living under the poverty line has decreased from 42.8 percent in 2000-2001 to 29 percent in 2009-2010 (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2010: 6). Ethiopia’s HDI score increased by 35 percent in 2000-2010. Taking into account its progress in the past forty years, Ethiopia was the 11th best performer in the world and the first in sub-Saharan Africa as regards the HDI (United Nations Development Programme 2010: 3). Nonetheless, macroeconomic stability is a problem. In 2006-2009, Ethiopia had an average inflation rate of 18 percent. Moreover, despite economic progress, food shortages have remained (Abbink 2009: 18-19). Furthermore, there are indications that aid is politicised in Ethiopia, especially since the 2005 elections. A study by Human Rights Watch found that donor-supported government services, including micro-credit facilities, agricultural inputs and food aid, were often denied to opposition supporters (Human Rights Watch 2010d).

Nonetheless, these problems are largely overlooked by the donor community. The idea is that ‘If things do not succeed in Ethiopia [...], then it will not work anywhere’ (Abbink 2009: 18-19). This approach is strongly visible in the position of the European Commission which, despite the Human Rights Watch report, considered in late 2010 a return to general budget support, arguing that all the

technical conditions (public finance management, national development plan, commitment to development) were fulfilled. However, the member states opposed a return to general budget support, arguing that this would not be appropriate in a climate of growing authoritarianism (anonymous interviews, January 2011). Yet many member states have equally built up their development assistance in Ethiopia, not in the least the UK, which is a larger donor than the EU. Ethiopia is the UK’s second largest development program in Africa with over 250 staff in Addis Ababa. It has been noted that DfID officials are very supportive of the EPRDF’s economic policies, often ignoring political problems (Human Rights Watch 2010d: 84-85). Other major donors include Germany and Italy.

3.5.7.3. Kenya

After years of economic mismanagement under President Moi, President Kibaki’s first challenge upon election was to put Kenya back on track with good governance and sound economic management, which had been the main aspects of his election programme (Shiverenje 2005). First of all, Kibaki tried to cope with corruption, which had been a serious concern of donors. Under Moi, several donors suspended aid because of corruption, including the IMF in 1998 (BBC News 2003, January) and the Netherlands in 1999 (Brown 2007: 320-321). Several improvements were initially made, such as the adoption of two anti-corruption laws in 2003, the set-up of an anti-corruption commission, the suspension of judges suspected of corruption and Kenya’s participation in the APRM (Southwick 2010; US Embassy Kenya 2005c; US Embassy Kenya 2005d). However, after a few years, progress stagnated. In 2005, chief of the anti-corruption commission John Githongo resigned after receiving death threats for revealing the Anglo-Leasing scandal, a procurement scam involving military defence contracts. Kibaki had failed to support Githongo (Southwick 2010). Donor concern over corruption thus continued under Kibaki and led to several suspensions of development assistance. In 2004, the EU froze £83 million (The Guardian 2004, July) and in February 2005, the delegation of the European Commission warned that aid would be conditional upon the government’s anti-corruption efforts (US embassy Kenya 2005e). The UK even went so far as to issue a visa ban on the Minister of Transport in 2005 because of his alleged involvement in corruption (Agence France Presse 5 August 2005). However, Kenya had a moderately good score on government effectiveness, which remained stable under Kibaki’s rule when compared to the period under Moi.

Apart from his efforts in the fight against corruption, Kibaki tried to restore the confidence of the donor community by engaging in the PRSP process. Although an interim-PRSP had been produced in 2001 under Moi, the IMF and World Bank did not immediately resume aid as they perceived the Moi government to be corrupt and unwilling to promote sound economic management. President Kibaki took up the task of updating the PRSP, which resulted in the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation and an investment programme for the period 2003-2007. With these new strategies, Kibaki restored the confidence of the donors (Shiverenje 2005). Moreover, with a
privatisation and public procurement bill in 2005, Kenya paved the way for renewed IMF cooperation (US Embassy Kenya 2005f). In October 2007, only few months before the December 2007 elections, the Kenyan government prepared the ambitious Kenya Vision 2030 programme, which aimed at transforming Kenya into a middle-income country by achieving 10 percent GDP growth annually (Republic of Kenya 2008a).

These attempts were relatively successful. Whereas Kenya’s GDP per capita was declining between 1999 and 2004, after 2004 Kenya’s GDP was on the rise, with growth rates between 4 and 7 percent in 2004-2007. Similarly, foreign investment increased after 2004. Nonetheless, progress on the MDGs has been less impressive as Kenya’s economic strategy is strongly concentrated on GDP growth and wealth creation rather than on poverty reduction (Shiverenje 2005). In 2004, the government introduced MDG-based planning to work towards the realisation of the goals. Nonetheless, whereas a lot of progress was made in the field of primary education with the Free Primary Education Programme, Kenya is unlikely to achieve the other MDGs. It is considered ‘off track’ on the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (Republic of Kenya 2008b), despite its relatively developed economy. On the other hand, Kenya’s HDI improved under Kibaki’s rule (+11 percent in 2000-2010), whereas under Moi the HDI had declined. Despite corruption and resulting aid cuts, EU member states remain engaged in the country. The largest donors are the UK, France and Germany.

3.5.7.4. Chad

Chad cannot be seen as a development success story and President Déby has done little to change this perception. First of all, corruption has increased since 2000. Between 2002 and 2010, Chad moved from the 20 percent to the 5 percent most corrupt countries in the world. The fight against corruption has never been a priority for the government of Chad, since the system has benefited the president and those close to him. A national good governance strategy was never really implemented, although a Ministry of General State Control and Moralisation was created in 2004 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 19; International Crisis Group 2008b: 3; International Crisis Group 2010b: 22; US Embassy Chad 2006b). Government effectiveness equally deteriorated significantly between 1998 and 2010. Chad is not a member of the APRM.

Chad’s relations with the IMF and World Bank have been tense because of the government’s doubtful use of the budget. An interim-PRSP was adopted in 2000 and in 2003, Chad’s first PRSP was approved (Republic of Chad 2003). However, the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility was hampered by arms purchases and corruption (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 4). Similar problems emerged with the World Bank. The latter granted support to an oil pipeline from Chad to the sea via Cameroon, an agreement that was conditional on the implementation of the Revenue Management Law, which provided that most of the oil wealth would go to poverty reduction.
However, in 2005 the government of Chad unilaterally amended the law to spend part of the oil income on defence. The World Bank initially suspended its assistance as a reaction to this decision, but in 2006 an agreement was reached that operations would be restored if the government would devote 70 percent of the budget to poverty reduction (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 17; International Crisis Group 2009b: 4-8). The EU had foreseen budget support to help Chad achieve macroeconomic stability before oil revenues would come in. However, the disbursement of the first tranche, initially foreseen for 2003, was delayed until 2005 as a result of the suspension of the IMF programme, and eventually halted because of the suspension of the World Bank programme (République du Tchad – Communauté européenne 2007: 15-16).

Chad had spectacular GDP growth rates in 2001-2004, but this can be explained by the beginning of oil extraction in this period. After 2005, there was hardly any economic growth and the economy even shrunk in 2008. A similar evolution can be observed in investments, which tripled between 2000 and 2002, but then dropped to previous levels. According to the 2011 Ease of Doing Business ranking, Chad was the worst sub-Saharan African country to do business. Despite oil revenues, Chad’s social indicators have remained amongst the worst in the world (International Crisis Group 2006c: 7). Chad is considered off track on achieving the MDGs, except for universal primary education. Some progress was however made regarding gender equality, the treatment of HIV/AIDS and access to drinkable water (République du Tchad 2010). While Chad’s HDI improved between 2000 and 2005 (most probably because of high GDP growth), it decreased between 2005 and 2010. Chad can be considered an aid orphan, with only few donors present. Besides the EU, only France and Germany have development programs in Chad. Moreover, Germany decided in 2008 to end activities in Chad by 2011-2012 because of concerns about good governance (Federal Foreign Office 2011a; HTSPE Limited 2008: 84).

3.5.7.5. Niger

Under President Tandja, improvements were made in the development sphere, but at the same time there were reasons for concern about Niger’s development performance. On the one hand, its corruption record improved significantly between 1998 and 2010 as a result of the fight against corruption, which included the creation of an anti-corruption commission (République du Niger 2007: 11). Government effectiveness equally improved between 1998 and 2010. On the other hand, there were indications that the fight against corruption was used to neutralise political opponents. A year before the 2009 presidential elections, Tandja’s main rival, prime minister Amadou, was arrested on corruption charges (US Embassy Niger 2008). Moreover, despite improvements, corruption was still rife, and revenues from the extractive industry mainly stayed within Tandja’s inner circle (anonymous interview, February 2012; interview, Jeremy Keenan, January 2012). In addition, public finance management was weak. Although the EU had agreed on general budget support for the period 2009-
2011, a study ordered by the European Commission in 2008 mentioned serious problems regarding public finance management, which the government seemed unwilling to tackle (Bauer et al. 2008: 91-94; anonymous interviews, January-February 2012). In addition, in early 2009, it was clear that the agreed performance indicators regarding education had not been met, which made the EU freeze the disbursement of a tranche of budget support (anonymous interview, February 2012).

A first Interim PRSP was approved by the IFIs in December 2000 (European Community and Niger 2008: 22-23). In 2008, the World Bank approved Niger’s new PRSP, the Stratégie de Développement Accéléré et de Réduction de la Pauvreté, which aimed at reaching the MDGs on the basis of an average annual growth rate of 7 percent (République du Niger 2007). Whereas Niger’s growth rate was volatile in the 1990s, since 2001 there has been constant economic growth at a pace of 5 percent on average. Foreign investments have also increased after the government reduced red tape, made the process of acquiring licenses less demanding and privatised a number of state companies (US Embassy Niger 2006). However, there has been little progress on achieving the MDGs. Niger is considered ‘off track’ with regard to all the MDGs, except for the reduction of child mortality and combating HIV/AIDS. According to a 2007 report, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty hardly decreased between 1993 and 2005, although some progress was made regarding primary education, gender equality and maternal health (Institut National de la Statistique Niger 2007: xi). Niger’s HDI, which is one of the lowest in the world, improved by 35 percent between 1995 and 2010. France, Belgium and Germany are the only EU donors providing significant development assistance to Niger, while Denmark, Spain, Luxemburg and the UK have smaller aid programs.

3.5.7.6. Nigeria

Although President Obasanjo tried to regain the confidence of donors by showing commitment in the fight against corruption and by developing a strategy for growth and poverty reduction, donor concerns on corruption have remained, and progress on achieving the MDGs was limited. After election in 1999, Obasanjo immediately dismissed 99 officials in the notoriously corrupt customs service (Agence France Presse 2 June 1999). An anti-corruption law was signed in 2000 and an anti-corruption commission was set up. In 2002, a second commission was established, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), with the mandate to prevent, investigate and prosecute financial crimes (Lawson 2009: 84). Throughout 2002-2005, almost 900 policemen and two ministers were dismissed (Agence France Presse 23 February 2004; 4 April 2005). In 2006, these efforts led to the removal of Nigeria from the list of countries not cooperating in the fight against corruption (Agence France Presse 23 June 2006). However, Obasanjo’s corruption policies were not reflected in the World Bank Indicators on control of corruption. Although there was an improvement towards 2002, by 2010 Nigeria’s control of corruption was almost on the same level as before 1999. In 2005, Nigeria was one of the three most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (*Agence France Presse* 4 August 2005). Moreover, Obasanjo’s anti-corruption efforts were primarily directed against political opponents, such as Atiku Abubakar. The EFCC became much more effective under chairman Ribadu, when several governors close to the political establishment were impeached. However, Yar’Adua’s decision in 2008 to merge the EFCC with the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission was intended to sideline Ribadu (Amuwo 2009: 51-52; Lawson 2009: 85-86). Government effectiveness remained stable in the first years of Obasanjo’s rule, but worsened in 2009-2010 under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. Obasanjo was one of the founding fathers of the NEPAD and the APRM, and was amongst the first countries to accede to the APRM (Jinadu 2008).

Although an ambitious national development plan was drafted with the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (2003-2007), Obasanjo had several discussions with the IFIs on the pace of privatisations, government spending and inflation. In 2002, Obasanjo pulled out of a standby agreement with the IMF, stating he favoured political stability and democratic consolidation over narrow macroeconomic concerns (*Agence France Presse* 5 March 2002). Despite the absence of a formal IMF programme, almost half of Nigeria’s debt was cancelled by the Paris Club in 2005 (Nwozor 2009: 27-28; US Embassy Nigeria 2005). Moreover, privatisation was speeded up at the end of Obasanjo’s rule, for example in the telecom sector (US Embassy Nigeria 2007d).

While Obasanjo achieved macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Rotberg 2007: 39), the unequal distribution of oil wealth raised concerns (Taylor 2010: 140; Khakee 2008). Indeed, whereas the economy was stagnating under the military regime in the 1990s, since 1999, Nigeria’s GDP has been on the rise. The percentage of FDI, on the other hand, has only marginally improved. Although poverty reduction was ranked as the first of four goals of NEEDS (European Community and Nigeria 2009: 10), Nigeria’s growth strategy has mainly focused on GDP growth. As a result, Nigeria is unlikely to meet the MDGs, despite high oil revenues. It is ‘off track’ regarding the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. The MDGs on universal primary education, maternal health and reducing child mortality could be reached by 2015, but it is unlikely that the MDGs on HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and gender will be achieved (Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010: 4-6). Information on the HDI is only available for 2005 and 2010, during which Nigeria’s HDI increased slightly (by 5 percent). The Niger Delta, which provides about 75 percent of all government revenues from minerals, is severely impoverished, with little access to clean water, electric power, roads, hospitals and schools (Rotberg 2007: 34-35). Excluding debt relief, EU member states are only minor donors in Nigeria. Only the UK is a large development partner, with more than USD 2,294 million provided in 2000-2009. Germany and France have smaller but still substantial envelopes.
3.5.7. Rwanda

Under President Kagame, Rwanda has become a ‘donor darling’ (Marysse et al. 2007) and is perceived as a model for economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, Rwanda has made tremendous progress regarding the control of corruption. It is seen as the ‘Singapore of Africa’ with a civil service largely free from corruption (Zorbas 2011: 108). In the 2009 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Rwanda was placed the ‘least corrupt’ country in East Africa and among the top ten performers in Africa (US Embassy Rwanda 2009a). Equally, Rwanda has made major improvements regarding government effectiveness. The Rwandan administration functions effectively and health and education services are improving, which gives donors the feeling they can ‘get things done’ in Rwanda (Hayman 2009b: 72). This favourable perception of donors is further strengthened by the diplomacy of the government of Rwanda vis-à-vis the donor community. Kagame speaks the language of the donors on aid effectiveness, partnership, alignment and national development objectives. Government officials demonstrate professionalism, dynamism and ambition and respond to the donor community’s emphasis on target-driven development by focusing on very detailed and ambitious performance targets (Zorbas 2011: 108; Ansoms 2011: 247). Moreover, Rwanda strengthened its image in the donor community by being one of the first countries to participate in the APRM (Jordaan 2006).

President Kagame has developed a very ambitious and forward looking development strategy, Rwanda Vision 2020 (1998), which aims to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country with medium human development. The strategy was followed in 2007 by the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Hayman 2009a: 160; Ansoms 2011: 240). With these strategies, Rwanda was able to obtain lending from the IMF, which has commended Rwanda’s strong performance in economic growth, low inflation and build-up of foreign exchange reserves (Golooba Mutebi et al. 2003: 221; Purcell et al. 2006: 8-16). Moreover, the RPF government has brought substantive economic growth to Rwanda, which is notable given the shattered state of the economy after the genocide (Holvoets and Rombouts 2008: 17). During the 2000s, Rwanda’s economy has continued to grow at a pace of nearly 8 percent on average, leading to a doubling of Rwanda’s GDP per capita between 2000 and 2010. Similarly, foreign investments have increased significantly and now constitute almost 25 percent of Rwanda’s GDP. This can be directly related to Kagame’s efforts to improve the business environment and attract foreign capital. In 2010, Rwanda was recognised as the world’s top performer in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking (US Embassy Rwanda 2009b). However, the strong focus on the private sector has also been criticised by those who doubt Kagame’s commitment to pro-poor growth (Uvin 2010: 172; Marysse et al. 2007: 452). Rwanda is not likely to achieve the eradication of extreme poverty. In fact, poverty increased in absolute terms between 2001 and 2006 (Ansoms 2011: 241-242; Abbott and Rwirahira 2010: 11-12; Zorbas 2011: 110). Nonetheless, Kagame has strongly invested in several of the MDG-related sectors, including higher education and gender equality (Bertelsmann Foundation 2005b). The MDGs regarding universal primary education, most of those on
gender equality, child mortality and those concerning HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, are most likely to be achieved. Moreover, Rwanda’s HDI increased by 39 percent in 2000-2010.

For these reasons, donors have increased development assistance, including budget support, in Rwanda (Purcell et al. 2006: 8-16). Member states with development programmes in Rwanda include the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium, while France, Germany and Spain are smaller donors. DFID’s search for success stories and a personal sympathy of DFID’s Clare Short for the reform-oriented Kagame can explain the explosion of the UK’s ODA to Rwanda, despite the fact that the UK had minor economic or security interests to defend (Marriage 2006: 481; Gallagher 2009: 444; Porteous 2008: 21-23; Hayman 2010). Rwanda has been held up as one of the UK’s flagship countries for development in Africa, and DFID officials have been quoted saying UK aid to Rwanda is ‘money well spent’ (Beswick 2011: 1919-1920). Moreover, DFID’s favourable appreciation of the government of Rwanda influences the UK’s foreign policy towards Rwanda, which often downplays human rights violations. For example, the FCO’s 2010 annual human rights report did not include any information on Rwanda (Human Rights Watch 2011d: 4).

3.5.7.8. Guinea

President Conté’s years in power were characterised by severe economic mismanagement. Whereas Guinea’s control of corruption rate was on the same par as Ethiopia in 2002, by 2006 Guinea was amongst the 8 percent countries with the lowest control of corruption. In the 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Guinea as the most corrupt country in Africa (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a). The high corruption rate is related to the liberalisation of the economy under President Conté, which created a system of ‘crony capitalism’ where public property was used for private benefit. President Conté often said his Ministers were ‘thieves’ (International Crisis Group 2007d: 2). An audit into the management of the Guinean administration showed that more than USD 60 million of public money disappeared between January 2006 and March 2007 (International Crisis Group 2008c: 2). Government effectiveness equally deteriorated under President Conté.

In 2001, Guinea adopted its first PRSP. However, the HIPC did not reach the completion point due to Guinea’s failure to meet the requirements, and loans and budget support from the IMF and World Bank were halted in 2002 (Laakso et al. 2007b: 35; International Crisis Group 2005: 12). However, the newly appointed prime ministers Diallo (2004) and Kouyaté (2007) tried to regain the support of the donors. An IMF-monitored economic programme was implemented in 2004-2005 under prime minister Diallo, but the programme was threatened by increasing inflation (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a: 11-12). Under Kouyaté, an emergency socio-economic plan was drawn up to which most donors pledged funding and which led to limited debt rescheduling and reduction. These efforts
however stalled in 2008 when Kouyaté was sidelined by President Conté and Souaré – a close Conté ally – was brought to office (International Crisis Group 2008c: 1-5).

Economic growth slowed down in 2003 when compared to the second half of the 1990s. FDI as a percentage of the GDP fell from 20 percent in the second half of the 1990s to 14 percent in 2005-2010. Although regional instability also contributed to the stagnation of Guinea’s economy, Conté’s economic policies were equally an important, if not the most important, factor (International Crisis Group 2005: 2). The clearest example of Conté’s failed economic policies was inflation. Since 2001, inflation has skyrocketed, with peaks in 2004-2006. In 2006, inflation was 40 percent, one of the highest rates in Africa. The high inflation rate has made the lives of the Guinean population even more difficult than before, given the rise of prices of basic commodities (Ibid.: 14). It is expected that Guinea will not achieve the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger nor the targets concerning gender equality. For the other MDGs, it is believed these could be achieved if changes are made, as some progress was made regarding education, child mortality and maternal health (International Monetary Fund 2011: 7). The HDI is only available starting from 2005. There was a minor improvement between 2005 and 2010. France and Germany are the main donors in Guinea, but Germany decided in 2001 to stop government-to-government negotiations on development cooperation with Guinea, instead working with two-yearly unilateral commitments (Federal Foreign Office 2011b).

3.5.7.9. Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire’s poor economic performance since 1999 is a considerable setback compared to the booming economy under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) (Chirot 2006:63). Whilst corruption had already been a concern amongst donors in the late 1990s, leading to several aid suspensions, it further increased under President Gbagbo. Furthermore, there was a serious deterioration in government effectiveness between 1998 and 2010.

In January 2000, Côte d’Ivoire announced its intention to draft a PRSP. A Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was foreseen for 2002-2005, the implementation of which was initially linked to progress in the Article 96 consultations. However, in 2002 Côte d’Ivoire stopped paying back its debt and the programme was suspended with the outbreak of civil war in September 2002 (European Community and Côte d’Ivoire 2005: 26). The appointment of technocrat Banny as prime minister in 2005 was meant to re-establish the confidence of the donors, but Banny lacked the powers to implement economic reform (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 10-20). Côte d’Ivoire was finally able to re-establish relations with the IFIs after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in 2007. In January 2009, a PRSP was approved (République de Côte d’Ivoire 2009: xi-xii; see also Labertit 2010: 138-139).
Côte d’Ivoire’s economic growth slowed down from 3 percent on average in 1996-2000 to 0 percent in 2000-2005. In 2000, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy shrunk by more than 4 percent. While the civil war blocked economic growth in 2002-2003, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy started growing again in 2004, despite the ongoing civil war (Labertit 2010: 21). Progress on the MDGs has been hampered by poor economic governance and the civil war. Between 1998 and 2008, poverty increased from 33.6 percent to 48.9 percent. School attendance stagnated between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, there has been some progress on child and maternal mortality and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (République de Côte d’Ivoire 2010). Côte d’Ivoire’s HDI improved only slightly (5 percent) between 2000 and 2010. It should be noted that Ouattara had special credentials in the donor community as a former senior official of the IMF who had led the implementation of a structural adjustment programme as prime minister under Houphouët-Boigny (International Crisis Group 2004: 3). France is by far the largest donor in Côte d’Ivoire, while Germany and Belgium are smaller donors.

3.5.7.10. Zimbabwe

In none of the cases under investigation, have government economic policies been so detrimental than in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is one of the world’s clearest examples of a ‘man-made disaster’ (Sollom 2009). Mugabe’s poor economic governance has plunged Zimbabwe in an economic crisis worse than that of countries suffering civil war including Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC or Sierra Leone (Lyman 2007: 91). Zimbabwe’s disastrous economic results since the late 1990s are all the more surprising when taking into account that Zimbabwe was once perceived as an economic success story. First of all, there was an enormous deterioration in Zimbabwe’s control of corruption rate. While corruption was rather low for sub-Saharan African standards in the late 1990s, by 2010 Zimbabwe was amongst the 2 percent most corrupt countries in the world. The public sector has become increasingly politicised: state agencies and enterprises have become filled with ZANU-PF supporters, and official corruption goes unpunished (Bratton and Masunungure 2008: 45-47). In 2005, an anti-corruption commission was set up, but the government’s corruption strategy has become a political strategy to target disloyal or dissenting officials (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 24). There has equally been a significant deterioration in Zimbabwe’s government effectiveness.

Moreover, the government has been hostile towards donors and NGOs. The latter were targeted by the Private Voluntary Organisations Act, which requires all NGOs to register with the Ministry of Social welfare (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2002c). In 2002-2004, there were indications that Mugabe’s government was using food aid as a political tool (Amnesty International 2004c: 43-51; Human Rights Watch 2003b). Zimbabwe does not have a PRSP. An attempt was made with the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (2000-2002) and the Ten Point Plan (announced in 2002), but none of these programmes was published and could thus not be adopted as a PRSP. Zimbabwe stopped
payments to the IMF in 2001. Because of Zimbabwe’s enormous debt with the IMF, the latter withdrew Zimbabwe and suspended its voting rights (World Bank 2005: 8; International Crisis Group 2003c: 3). The compulsory withdrawal from the IMF was ended in 2006, after Zimbabwe cleared its arrears to the IMF. However, the IMF did not restore Zimbabwe’s voting rights nor its ineligibility for IMF general resources, citing the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the lack of an adequate reform package (World Bank 2007: 9). World Bank cooperation was limited due to Zimbabwe’s massive arrears (World Bank 2005: 8).

Economic governance has been used as a political strategy rather than to promote economic growth. For example, the Fast Track Land Reform was introduced to boost Mugabe’s popularity against the background of the economic crisis in the 1990s (Laakso 2002: 445). The programme led to food shortages in Zimbabwe, since 90 percent of farmers (nearly) stopped their work. Furthermore, inflation has increased by enormous salary raises preceding the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2000; International Crisis Group 2002c: 5). As a result, Zimbabwe’s economy shrunk between the late 1990s and 2008. In 2000-2005, Zimbabwe’s GDP shrunk by 7 percent on average. FDI fell by more than 95 percent between 1996 and 2001. Moreover, inflation has skyrocketed, with absolute peaks in 2006 (1,096 percent) and 2007 (24,411 percent). Due to the economic crisis, Zimbabwe’s prospects for the achievement of the MDGs are bleak. Its population living below the poverty line and underweight children increased between 1995 and 2003. Zimbabwe’s child mortality rate more than tripled between 1994 and 2009 and tuberculosis numbers went eightfold between 2000 and 2007. On the other hand, progress was made regarding school attendance and literacy. Zimbabwe is off track regarding the participation of women (Zimbabwe and UNDP 2010). Zimbabwe’s HDI almost halved between 1990 and 2010.

The new unity government which took office in 2008 introduced the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme comprising macroeconomic and governance issues to stabilise the economy. Inflation was halted immediately after the new government released the Zimbabwean dollar (International Crisis Group 2009c: 8). As a result of these measures, the economy started growing again.

From the 1990s, many donors refocused their aid to NGOs. This was a reaction both to the increasing authoritarian characteristics of the Mugabe regime and to the lack of development focus of the government. Hansen gives the example of Denmark which, as a result of aid cuts, had to drop either Zimbabwe or Kenya as a partner country. Although Kenya was equally authoritarian under the Moi regime, Kenya was chosen arguing that – unlike Zimbabwe - ‘Kenya did not let politics totally overshadow economic development’ (Hansen 2011: 250-251). The main donors are UK, Germany and Sweden.
Table 8. Control of corruption: evolution (Percentile rank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Overall evolution*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>Significant improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>Significant improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Improvement/deterioration: +/- >10, <20
Significant improvement/deterioration: +/- >=20

Table 9. Government effectiveness: evolution (Percentile rank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Overall evolution*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>24.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Significant improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>27.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
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<td>16.6</td>
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<td>54.1</td>
<td>Significant improvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>Deterioration</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Improvement/deterioration: +/- >10, <20
Significant improvement/deterioration: +/- >=20
## Table 10. Average GDP growth and Foreign Direct Investment as % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP growth (average)</th>
<th>1996-2000</th>
<th>2001-2005</th>
<th>2006-2010</th>
<th>FDI as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Zimbabwe*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations, on the basis of IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2011

*For Zimbabwe, World Development Indicators were used as the WEO did not provide data on foreign investment.

## Table 11. World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Doing Business 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings](http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings)

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36 The rank is specific for the 46 ranked countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier scorings than 2011 were not available.
### Table 12. Inflation (averages, 1996-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>12754**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations, on the basis of IMF World Economic Outlook 2011

### Table 13. Human Development Index evolution, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0,250</td>
<td>0,287</td>
<td>0,328</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0,437</td>
<td>0,435</td>
<td>0,424</td>
<td>0,443</td>
<td>0,47</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>+11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0,269</td>
<td>0,299</td>
<td>0,295</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+11%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>+10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0,180</td>
<td>0,192</td>
<td>0,212</td>
<td>0,241</td>
<td>0,261</td>
<td>+26%</td>
<td>+14%</td>
<td>+8%</td>
<td>+23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0,402</td>
<td>0,423</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0,215</td>
<td>0,192</td>
<td>0,277</td>
<td>0,334</td>
<td>0,385</td>
<td>+74%</td>
<td>+21%</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0,323</td>
<td>0,340</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0,360</td>
<td>0,369</td>
<td>0,379</td>
<td>0,383</td>
<td>0,397</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0,284</td>
<td>0,262</td>
<td>0,232</td>
<td>0,159</td>
<td>0,140</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations, on the basis of UNDP Human Development Report 2010

N/A: not available

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37 As inflation rates after 2007 were not available, this is the average for 2006-2007. Inflation however decreased significantly in 2009.

38 Eritrea is not included as the HDI for Eritrea was unavailable before 2011
### Table 14. Main EU donors per country and contribution 2000-2010 (USD million, constant 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>735</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>672</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>248</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,437</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System

3.5.8. Analysis

*H.1. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against countries that are perceived as development success stories, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries that are not perceived as success stories.*

The first part of the hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia, where governments are believed to be committed to good governance, poverty reduction, the MDGs and economic development. Besides the EU, other donors, including the IFIs, have positively assessed the economic performance of both countries. This is not to suggest an undivided success: in the case of Ethiopia, a high inflation rate was noted, whereas in Rwanda there was limited progress on poverty reduction. Nonetheless, both countries are ‘relative’ success stories (when compared to most other low-income sub-Saharan African countries) and donors ‘perceive’ the overall socio-economic evolution as positive.

In Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), the hypothesis is partly refuted. Nigeria was not perceived as a development success story, especially in the later years of Obasanjo’s rule. Although there was growth in GDP terms, progress in good governance and social indicators was lacking. In Côte d’Ivoire, the EU resumed aid in 2002 without a significant guarantee that Gbagbo was committed to economic development. Here, it was the IMF that followed the EU, rather than the other way around, given that IMF programmes were linked to the Article 96 consultations. This becomes even clearer when taking into account the 2004 Commission proposal to re-invoke Article 96 consultations. The

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39 Debt relief was deducted from the ODA figures.
Communication mentions as one of the reasons for the proposal the failure of the Ivorian authorities to conduct an audit in the cocoa sector, financed by the EU (European Commission 2004). Nonetheless, despite these concerns about good governance, the Council refused the 2004 Commission proposal.

The hypothesis is strongly refuted by the cases of Chad and Eritrea. In these countries, corruption and government effectiveness have seriously deteriorated, there has been low economic growth, poverty reduction has hardly been addressed, nor has there been much progress regarding the other MDGs. Moreover, Chad and Eritrea have been at odds with the IFIs, and have done little to improve the administration of development assistance. In Eritrea, the government is even openly hostile towards foreign aid.

The second part of the hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the cases of Guinea and Zimbabwe. In both countries, violations of democratic principles were accompanied by poor economic governance, which was reflected in increasing corruption, low or negative economic growth, massive inflation and decreasing FDI. Guinea and Zimbabwe were noted to be hostile towards foreign aid, and did not seriously engage in programmes with the IFIs. In both countries, it can be expected that the EU was less reluctant to suspend development assistance, given that there were serious doubts about how these funds were spent. Indeed, the EU’s development aid suspension followed that of the IFIs. In the case of Guinea, the fact that macroeconomic governance and sectoral reform were discussed during Article 96 consultations further points to concerns of the EU in these areas (Council of the EU 2005c). Moreover, it should be noted that Germany, as one of the main EU donors in Guinea, was at the basis of the Article 96 consultations in 2003. Indeed, Germany was noted to have blocked the adoption of a new CSP in 2003, which led the European Commission to open Article 96 consultations (Laakso et al. 2007a: 84-85). Moreover, in both countries, the continued poor economic governance can explain why sanctions have not been lifted. In Zimbabwe, the economic progress made under the unity government has recently led to a limited lifting of the sanctions (Council of the EU 2012b; anonymous interviews, January-February 2012).

The hypothesis can also be confirmed in the case of Côte d’Ivoire (2010), where development performance had equally been poor, although the civil war also played a role here. However, given that aid was only partially resumed because of insecurity, development performance was less important here, and the EU’s attention was focused on stability (see infra).

In Kenya, the hypothesis is less strongly confirmed. On the one hand, under Kibaki notable progress was made regarding the fight against corruption, the investment climate and economic growth. On the other hand, GDP growth was not spectacular and there was little progress on social indicators. Moreover, it is clear that donors questioned the government’s willingness to tackle corruption, as can be observed in EU and UK aid suspensions over corruption.
In Niger, a particular situation occurred. At first sight, one would say the hypothesis is refuted, as there was progress in terms of reducing corruption, economic growth, the MDGs, etc. However, the EU had serious concerns about the administration of its development assistance. A large part of EU aid was provided via budget support, and there was unease about the administration of this amount, regarding public finance management and performance indicators. Timing is also important here: by that time (2009), there had been serious controversy about budget support in political crises. From this perspective, it can be concluded that the hypothesis is confirmed.
3.6. Stability

‘The European Union is heavily concerned by the issue of conflicts in Africa. This is not only because the international discussion necessitates an adequate response of the Union, not merely because of the moral obligation to reduce human suffering, nor simply the obligation to use its resources in the most meaningful way. For the European Union, the existence of violent conflicts in Africa is increasingly challenging the achievement of its declared policy goals. Fostering peace, stability, democracy and human rights under the conditions of conflicts is a nearly impossible task’ (emphasis added) (European Commission 1996: 1).

3.6.1. Conflict prevention, peacekeeping and fragile states

The emergence of a significant number of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa following the Cold War came under the attention of the European Commission in the early 1990s (Olsen 2009: 245). This prompted the European Commission to develop a conflict prevention agenda for Africa, as some have suggested in an effort to safeguard its role in external relations in Africa, while the Council was increasingly becoming important with the emergence of the CFSP (Sicurelli 2010: 66; Gibert 2011a: 180). Hence, in 1996 the European Commission issued a Communication entitled ‘The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond’ in which a conflict prevention policy was outlined based on the objective of structural stability (see supra) (European Commission 1996). The Commission’s strategy was followed by a Council Common Position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, in which the Council stressed its commitment to use all the instruments at its disposal to prevent and respond to conflict in Africa, including development assistance, diplomatic and even military action (Council of the EU 1997). This policy shift was reflected in the EU’s aid programmes, which came to include security-related programmes such as peace-building programmes, security sector reform, state-building, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Vlassenroot and Hoebeke 2009: 5). The Cotonou Agreement included an article on peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (Article 11) and foresaw that political dialogue would deal with these topics (Article 8). Moreover, conflict prevention was an important chapter of the Africa-EU summit in April 2000 (Smith 2008: 175) and constituted the main pillar of the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (Tóth 2007: 115; Pirozzi 2010: 85).

The focus on internal stability in developing countries can also be seen in the EU’s focus on fragile states. While the concern of the international community for fragile states responds to the perceived threat of these states to global security, there is also a humanitarian aspect. Indeed, fragile states are often the most conflict-prone, home to the worst humanitarian disasters (spreading diseases, malnutrition, refugees), generally have poor economic development and have a destabilising effect on
neighbouring countries (Browne 2006: 59-60; Zoellick 2008: 67-68; François and Sud 2006: 144-145). The 2007 Commission Communication and Council Conclusions on state fragility recognise this dichotomy of norms and self-interest by stressing the risk of fragile states to fail in achieving the MDGs and for regional and global security (European Commission 2007c: 4; Council of the EU 2007e).

Sub-Saharan Africa became one of the main areas where the EU tried to appear on the world stage as a powerful, yet benevolent, foreign actor, using its newly developed instruments in foreign policy (Olsen 2004). Indeed, the first EU Special Representative in 1996 was appointed to the Great Lakes (Grevi 2007: 112; Martinelli 2006: 383) and the first autonomous mission under the ESDP was deployed in the DRC (Operation Artemis, 2003) (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 202; Howorth 2005: 194). Between 2003 and 2011, the EU led ten military missions in sub-Saharan Africa (Gibert 2011a: 182).

Nonetheless, the EU prefers to support African missions, rather than deploying EU missions. Indeed, the norms of African ownership is well established in EU discourse on conflict and security in Africa. The 2001 Council Common Position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa clearly states that ‘The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves’ (Council of the EU 2001h). The EU is the main donor to AU peacekeeping operations. It is also a large donor to operations by ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In order to finance African peacekeeping, the African Peace Facility was created in 2007, to which €250 million was granted from the 9th EDF and €300 million from the 10th EDF (Youngs 2008d: 424-425; Del Biondo et al. 2012). For example, the EU financially supported the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I and II), the hybrid UN-AU mission in Sudan (UNAMID), the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) of the Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) (Mangala 2010a: 182). In November 2008, the EU launched EURO RECAMP, by which AU leaders are trained to establish a continental decision-making plan for crisis management (Sicurelli 2010: 45-51).

3.6.2. Member state examples

Like the EU, the UK has strongly focused on conflict prevention. This was an important aspect of New Labour’s ‘ethical’ foreign policy, which was focused on peace, prosperity and democracy. The 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone to support the elected government of Kabbah from the insurgency of the Revolutionary United Front can to a certain degree be explained by New Labour’s commitment to peace in sub-Saharan Africa (Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 252). Similarly, the UK’s DfID has been committed to address state fragility (Department for International Development 2005: 22).
Furthermore, the emphasis on African peacekeeping has been followed by the main EU member states. A UK-French Joint Declaration in 2004 emphasised the need for peace support operations by African organisations (Gegout 2005: 432). The three military training schools in Mali, Nigeria and Ghana\(^{40}\) are all supported with European funds, including from France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK (Gibert 2010: 158-159). Even Germany, which has traditionally been reluctant to engage in peacekeeping in Africa, provides financial support for the AU’s Peace and Security Directorate, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Peace Support Training Centre (Klingebiel 2005: 37-39).

3.6.3. The democracy-stability dilemma

Democracy promotion is a key aspect of the EU’s approach to conflict prevention and fragile states. As part of the EU’s promotion of ‘structural stability’, support for democratisation is seen as ‘a means of establishing viable mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests’. This includes building a legitimate, effective and representative government (European Commission 1996: 6). The EU’s checklist for root causes of conflict includes several items related to democratisation, including checks and balances, inclusiveness of political power, respect for national authorities and civilian control over security forces (Youngs 2004b: 306-307). Moreover, the EU considers promoting democracy as a key strategy to address state fragility, although dialogue and incentives are preferred over sanctions and conditionality (European Commission 2007c: 8-9; Council of the EU 2007f). In reality, however, democratisation has only been a small aspect of the EU’s policies to address conflict and fragile states. For example, in the DRC and in Rwanda, the EU has favoured power-sharing agreements rather than pushing too hard for free and fair elections (Youngs 2004b). Crawford (2005) has argued that political stability rather than democracy is the main aim of EU Africa policies. By focusing on stability, the EU would save itself the burden of having to contribute to resolving conflicts and providing humanitarian assistance (Crawford 2005: 589). Similarly, in fragile states, the EU has focused on a rather technocratic approach to state-building and has not addressed broader issues of state-society relations or social cohesion (Castillejo 2011: 4; Hout 2010). This corresponds with DfID’s approach to fragile states, which explicitly focuses on ‘good enough governance’ by addressing physical security, service delivery and public finance management, but not democratisation (Department for International Development 2005: 22). This can also be seen in the recent discussion on budget support and political conditionality. While general budget support will only be accessible for countries that respect fundamental values, for fragile states, a case-by-case approach is advocated meaning these states can receive budget support even if fundamental values are not respected (European Commission 2011a: 5-6; Council of the EU 2012a).

\(^{40}\) Respectively the Ecole de maintien de la paix Alioune Blondin Beye, the African Centre for Strategic Research and Training and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
While these examples seem to suggest a trade-off between democracy and stability, there are equally studies that suggest that the EU addresses democratisation precisely as a means to achieve stability. Olsen attributed the EU’s remarkable efforts to support democratisation in South Africa in the early 1990s to the ‘widespread understanding in Europe that a continuation of the apartheid regime would threaten the stability and thereby the security of the whole South African region’ (Olsen 1998: 353). In Yemen, the EU has promoted democracy out of fear it could become the next failed state and destabilise the region (Echagüe and Youngs 2007: 326-329). In Lebanon, the EU focused on democratisation and more particularly on the mediation between various political forces, as a means to maintain stability (Choucair Vizoso 2008). Moreover, Article 96 has been used as a conflict management tool rather than as an instrument to promote democratisation, given its focus on conflict situations (Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, etc.) (Youngs 2008a: 7).

3.6.4. Hypotheses and operationalisation

Stability has thus become a key aspect of EU-Africa policies. The EU and its member states have focused on conflict prevention, fragile states and peacekeeping. Although democracy is seen as condition for structural stability and the prevention of state failure, in practice stability is often preferred over democracy, while the EU is more likely to put democratisation higher on its agenda where democratic deficiencies are causing instability. What these claims have in common is that stability rather than democracy is the main goal of EU policies.

Following this idea, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H.2. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as contributing to internal stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as contributing to internal stability.

I focused on possible ethnic or religious tensions and how these are accommodated by the government. Furthermore, I looked at whether the state has effective monopoly on violence over the territory and whether there has been a threat of a military coup.

On internal stability I mostly relied on secondary sources, such as International Crisis Group reports, academic articles and reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation. Moreover, I used NIPs to see whether there was any financial support from the EU for internal stability. Leaked US embassy cables were in some cases added to provide an idea of how government policies on internal stability were perceived.

Furthermore, one can expect the EU to prefer positive to negative measures vis-à-vis governments that are believed to contribute to regional stability. This preference derives from the EU’s focus on African
ownership in peacekeeping. This will be investigated separately as I observed a serious difference in the ability and willingness of governments to cope with internal and regional stability.

The third hypothesis thus reads as follows:

H.3. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as contributing to regional stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as contributing to regional stability.

I took into account whether a government was seen as contributing to regional stability because of internal stability, for example by accommodating refugees from neighbouring countries. When precisely the contrary was the case, namely where government policies led to increased refugee flows, this was also noted. Moreover, it was investigated whether governments actively contribute to regional peacekeeping by participating in peacekeeping operations or mediating in neighbouring conflicts. I also took into account relations with neighbouring countries and whether governments respect regional peace agreements. To assess the importance the EU attaches to this role, I mentioned EU cooperation on regional peacekeeping, e.g. via development funding or diplomatic support.

A wide range of secondary sources on the foreign policies of the case study countries was consulted, including reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the International Crisis Group, academic articles and news articles by Agence France Presse. To find out about the EU’s position on specific regional conflicts, I consulted official documents, including NIPs or Council documents. On the participation in peacekeeping missions I consulted the UN website on Peacekeeping, as well as US embassy cables. For the accommodation of refugees, I used the Migration profiles added to the CSPs of the 10th EDF and, in case the Migration Profile was not available or did not provide the required information, the 2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook. Moreover, the emigration rate was added (Table 15 on p. 159), which refers to the number of people emigrating as a percentage of the total population. This indicator was taken from the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook (2011).

3.6.5. Case studies

3.6.5.1. Eritrea

Internal stability Despite its ethnic and cultural diversity, Eritrea has been free from serious inter-ethnic and religious violence. There are frustrations about the dominance of the Tigrinya ethnic group in politics, but this has not been translated into violence. The relative peace in Eritrea has by some observers been attributed to intra- and inter-community cooperation at the local level (International

Crisis Group 2010a: 17). The government maintains control over the territory and over the bloated army, although it has been noted that discrepancies and tensions between Afewerki and leading military commanders have increased in 2008 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 4).

Regional stability Given its frosty relations with neighbouring countries, the government of Eritrea cannot be seen as contributing to regional stability. One exception is the conflict in Sudan, where President Afewerki has tried to mediate with support from the EU (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 60-61; US Embassy Eritrea 2007a). Eritrea has a border conflict with Djibouti, which resulted in military confrontation in 2008. Relations with Yemen are also tense because of a 1996 war over the Hanish islands (International Crisis Group 2010a: 20). Moreover, Eritrea is suspected of supporting several rebellions and opposition movements in neighbouring countries, such as Sudan’s opposition coalition movement, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia and Islamist political groups in Somalia. Support for these groups was stepped up in the second half of the 2000s (International Crisis Group 2006d: 20; International Crisis Group 2010a: 22; Connell 2009: 138). With Ethiopia, a border war was fought in 1998-2000, which ended with the Algiers Agreement. In 2002, the Boundary Commission established by the Algiers Agreement ruled that Badme, a city formerly administered by Ethiopia, should be ceded to Eritrea. The ruling was first accepted, but later ignored by the government of Ethiopia (Bereketeab 2009). The EU supported the decision of the Boundary Commission (Council of the EU 2002h) and several EU member states have contributed to the UN mission appointed to monitor the border, including Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Agence France Presse 16 November 2000). Lastly, although there is no violent conflict in Eritrea, the political and socio-economic problems have led to large numbers of refugees. Eritrea has an emigration rate of 18 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2011). It has not received many refugees from abroad, in 2005 there were only 4,418 refugees on Eritrean territory (UNHCR 2005).

3.6.5.2. Ethiopia

Internal stability Ethiopia has enjoyed relative internal stability under EPRDF rule, despite its violent history and ethnical diversity (more than eighty recognised ethnic groups). This relative stability has been attributed to the system of ethnic federalism, by which Ethiopia’s decentralised regions enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy and self-determination (Clapham 2009: 182). There seems to be some admiration within the donor community for the system. As stated by UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide Francis Deng: ‘Ethiopia […] can claim credit for being the only African country that is trying to confront the problem [of ethnic division] head-on by recognizing territorially based ethnic groups […]’ (Deng 2009: 364). Nonetheless, the system has equally been criticised for

42 To give an idea, military expenditure was estimated at 20.9 percent in 2003 according to the World Development Indicators.
being too centralised in the hands of the Tigray elite of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (one of the four parties in the EPRDF coalition) (Chanie 2007; Spears 2007: 19). This has provoked opposition from Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo (Clapham 2009: 183-188). The government of Ethiopia controls the security forces and maintains control over most of the territory, although there are insurgencies by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromia Liberation Front (OLF) in the Somali region of Ogaden and in the Oromia region (Abbink 2009: 20). The government of Ethiopia has denounced these groups as terrorist organisations (Ousman 2004: 85-86; Dagne 2002: 66). After an upsurge of violence by the ONLF and OLF in 2007, Amnesty International reported mass arrests, torture, rape and extrajudicial executions of alleged ONLF and OLF supporters by government forces (Amnesty International 2008b). However, despite these problems, ‘The donor community [...] does not think either that Ethiopia is “fragile” and in fact has bet on its continuity (“it must succeed”’) (Abbink 2009: 20). This perception has actively been nourished by the government of Ethiopia, which has presented itself as the only guarantee to internal stability, for example by warning about the potential effects of supporting the opposition, which are critical of the system of ethnic federalism (EU-EOM Ethiopia 2005: 7-8; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 194; US embassy Ethiopia 2006a). During the 2005 elections, the ruling party accused the opposition parties CUD and UEDF of wanting to abolish the federal system and ‘initiate a Rwandan Interahamwe in Ethiopia, carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocide’ (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 195).

Regional stability On the one hand, Ethiopia is seen as contributing to regional stability because of the belief that a strong, consolidated and relatively stable Ethiopia, with the capacity to maintain regional hegemony, is the best option for stability in the Horn (Borchgrevink 2008: 214). Ethiopia accommodates a rising number of refugees. In 2006, Ethiopia was hosting close to 100,000 refugees from Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and other sub-Saharan African countries (European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 4). The Ethiopian army is one of the main contributors to the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Williams 2011: 15-16) and also contributed to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). On the other hand, Ethiopia has a destabilising influence on some of its neighbours. Indeed, the border war with Eritrea has kept on lingering as Ethiopia refuses to respect the Algiers Agreement on the border demarcation (see supra). Moreover, in 2006 the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the Islamic Courts Union. The intervention was followed by an AU peace force, AMISOM, which remains in Somalia to protect the TFG against Islamist groups. The attack was brutal and caused the death of hundreds of civilians, injuries of several thousands of others and the flight of over a third of the population (International Crisis Group 2011c; International Crisis Group 2008e: 16). Although a number of member states were initially not convinced of supporting the intervention and the AMISOM mission, the EU finally supported the intervention – albeit tacitly - and financially contributed to AMISOM (Porteous 2008: 82-83; Vines 2010: 1099).
3.6.5.3. Kenya

Internal stability Under Kibaki’s presidency, Kenya stood as a model for internal stability. As noted by Brown: ‘political violence [was] consigned to the dustbins of Kenyan history’ (Brown 2009: 391). Ethnic tensions were minor and the government retained its monopoly on violence (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 11). Against this background, the post-electoral violence in 2007 seriously threatened internal stability. The violence left 1,500 Kenyans dead and approximately 300,000 people were internally displaced (Juma 2009: 408).

Regional stability: Kenya is traditionally seen as an active contributor to regional peace. Kenya has been actively involved in peace efforts in Somalia. Several peace conferences were organised under Moi (Dagne 2002: 70). Under Kibaki, Kenya hosted the talks leading to the formation of the TFG in 2004 and allowed the government-in-exile to remain on its territory before repatriation in 2005 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 11; Khadiagala 2009b: 433). The government of Kenya also mediated in the conflict in Sudan. Under Kibaki, Kenya hosted several peace talks in 2002-2005 between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as the chair of IGAD, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Central Intelligence Agency 2011; Khadiagala 2009b: 433). Furthermore, before the 2007 electoral crisis, Kenya was seen as exercising a stabilising effect on its neighbours. It served as a transit point for the supply of energy and basic commodities of its neighbours, including Uganda, South Sudan, Eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (Juma 2009: 424). Furthermore, Kenya hosted many refugees from neighbouring countries: around 240,000 in 2006 (European Community and Kenya 2007: 73). Kenya is also a humanitarian logistics hub for the region: all international assistance programmes for the Greater Horn are organised out of Nairobi (Juma 2009: 423). Lastly, Kenya delivered police personnel to UNMIL.

With the post-electoral crisis in 2007-2008, this regional role was in danger. As stated by Juma: ‘a country that had hitherto basked in the glory of being a peace broker to Africa’s longest, deadliest and most protracted conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, was now in dire need of salvation from itself’ (Juma 2009: 411). Indeed, the violence had an immediate destabilising effect on neighbouring countries, which were short of fuel and essential commodities because the Mombasa Highway was blocked (International Crisis Group 2008a: 1 and 21; Juma 2009: 424; Khadiagala 2009b: 432-437). Moreover, whereas Kenya’s emigration rate was traditionally low, during the crisis more than 30,000 people fled the country (Juma 2009: 408).

3.6.5.4. Chad

Internal stability Chad has faced severe instability most of the time since independence in 1960 (Mattelaer 2008: 6). Security problems emerged from three main sources. First of all, there was a serious risk of a military coup. In May 2004, a delay in payment of the salaries of soldiers led to an
attempted *coup d’état*, followed by a wave of desertions in the highest military ranks (International Crisis Group 2006c: 10; Grawert 2008: 608). Secondly, armed opposition groups, most of which supported by Sudan, repeatedly attacked the government. A first attack took place in April 2006 (Marchal 2006: 473). In January 2008, a coalition of rebels launched an attack on N’Djamena and nearly ousted Déby. Because of internal insecurity, there was a rapidly rising number of internally displaced Chadians (110,000 in 2009) in the east of Chad. Thirdly, there is the spill-over of the conflict in Darfur, which caused cross-border incursions of Sudanese militias and an influx of refugees in the east of Chad (Boggero 2009: 27).

President Déby has been unwilling to seriously address internal instability by entering into dialogue with the armed rebellion. The agreements with the *Front Uni pour le Changement* (FUC) and the Syrte Agreement with the remaining armed groups in 2006-2007 were only vague and there was a considerable reluctance from Déby to implement them (Handy 2008: 4-5; International Crisis Group 2008b: 12). Moreover, the Chadian army was unwilling to protect refugee camps and to address the impunity and banditry permeating the east of Chad (Boggero 2009: 27).

Nonetheless, the donor community feared that an opposition win would result in civil war or clan fighting, giving the weakness and divisiveness of the opposition. Leaked US embassy cables indicate that both France and Germany shared these concerns (US embassy Chad 2006c). The EU’s concern for stability in Chad can be derived from the EUFOR/Chad military mission on the borders with Sudan (2007) and the financial support to the subsequent UN *Missions des Nations Unies au République Centrafricaine et au Tchad* (MINURCAT) police training mission (Tull 2008: 2; Sicurelli 2010: 52).

**Regional stability** On the one hand, President Déby tried to mediate in the Sudanese conflict, particularly in the August 2004 peace negotiations and two peace conferences in January 2006 (International Crisis Group 2006c: 10; Boggero 2009: 26). Furthermore, Chad was part of the peace force of CEMAC in the Central African Republic in 2003 (International Crisis Group 2008b: 29-30). Moreover, Chad accommodated a large number of refugees from Darfur, the number of which was estimated at 250,000 in 2007 (Mattelaer 2008: 11). Although, as noted *supra*, the government of Chad was unwilling to truly protect these refugees, it has been argued that the presence of such a large number of refugees provided the government of Chad with some legitimacy (Boggero 2009: 26). Moreover, Chad has delivered police personnel to the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and military troops to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). On the other hand, Chad has been in a situation of war with Sudan from 2005 until 2010. Throughout 2006-2010, several peace agreements were signed between both countries, but clashes continued. In 2010, however, relations were normalised and both countries expelled rebel forces from their respective territories (International Crisis Group 2010b: 2).
3.6.5.5. Niger

Internal stability After an initial period of relative stability during the first mandate of President Tandja, instability rose during his second mandate with the Tuareg uprisings in the north. The Tuareg argued that Tandja did not respect the 1995 peace deal, most notably the provisions on the equal sharing of uranium wealth. In 2007, a new rebellion took up arms, the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) (Keenan 2008: 454). Tandja’s strategy to contain this rebellion largely consisted in a military solution, depicting the Tuareg as bandits and drug traffickers rather than engaging in negotiations (US embassy Niger 2007b). International human rights organisations accused Nigerien security forces of committing war crimes in the fight against the rebellion (Keenan 2008: 450). Moreover, when UN representative Robert Fowler started efforts to investigate the situation in 2008, he was kidnapped, presumably by a group linked to Al Qaeda. There were indications that the government of Niger, which was aware of the diplomat’s route, ‘shopped’ him to the terrorists to avoid his investigations (BBC News 2009b, September). Although peace talks were held in May 2009, these were believed to be window-dressing by President Tandja (interview, Jeremy Keenan, January 2012). However, later in 2009 the MNJ laid down arms after Libyan mediation (Grégoire 2011: 215).

Regional stability President Tandja has made some attempts in regional peacemaking, for example by mediating in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis in 2004 (Agence France Presse 15 April 2004) and as a chairman of the Community of Sahel and Saharan States. Moreover, during Tandja’s rule, Niger participated in several peacekeeping missions, albeit not as a leading member, including AMIS, UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUSCO and UNAMID. However, Niger does not accommodate a large number of refugees. In 2005, there were no less than 301 refugees in Niger (UNHCR 2005).

3.6.5.6. Nigeria

Internal stability Internal stability worsened under President Obasanjo (Rotberg 2007: 33). With more than 250 ethnic groups, instability has been ascribed to the ‘failing experiment in federalism’ in Nigeria. Obasanjo’s 1999 constitution, which endorsed indigeneity, has increased rather than decreased intercommunal clashes, especially in Plateau state (International Crisis Group 2006g: 11-13). From 1999 to 2007, more than 12,000 people were killed and more than three million were displaced because of such intercommunal clashes (Rotberg 2007: 37). Political violence has also emerged, for example in the context of the local elections in Jos in December 2008 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009e: 17) and even more in the aftermath of the 2011 elections. Moreover, in the Niger Delta, insurgencies have arisen over long-standing grievances about the distribution of oil income. Obasanjo failed to address the root causes of instability in the Niger Delta, for example by ensuring adequate representation in the government or promoting development in the region (US Embassy Nigeria 2007a). Although he increased the share of national oil revenues that flows back to the region, this was seen as insufficient and did not prevent the rise of a new insurgency in 2006, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Rotberg 2007: 34-35). Nonetheless, peace and security was declared a first priority of the succeeding Yar’Adua administration (US Embassy Nigeria 2007b). A Niger Delta Master Plan was set up to securitise the region by promoting rapid economic development (Agbu 2010; Lyman 2009: 296). The EU has provided EDF funds to improve the security situation in the Niger Delta (European Community and Nigeria 2009: 71-72), but overall the EU’s engagement in internal security in Nigeria has been limited (Youngs 2006: 339). DfID has supported the government’s Niger Delta Peace and Security strategy (2006-2007).

Regional stability Under Obasanjo, Nigeria appeared as a peacekeeper in sub-Saharan Africa, and in West Africa in particular. Together with South Africa, Nigeria played an important role in turning the OAU into the AU, and particularly focused on the AU’s potential role for conflict resolution (Kwasi Tieku 2004: 259-260). In West Africa, Nigeria was the driving force behind the ECOWAS peacekeeping operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Economic Community of West African State Monitoring Group or ECOMOG), of which it provided 80 percent in troops and 90 percent in funding. Nigeria also contributed most troops of the AU mission in Darfur (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009; Obi 2008: 190). In 2007, Nigeria had personnel in 12 of 14 UN peacekeeping operations (Khakee 2007: 6). Apart from contributing to African peacekeeping, Obasanjo was also an active mediator in African conflicts. As such, he mediated in conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC and Sudan (US Embassy Nigeria 2001d; Gegout 2009: 236), as well as in the event of military and constitutional coups in Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Sao Tome and Principe (International Crisis Group 2007a: 12; Shola Omotola 2008: 39). The EU has supported Nigeria in its international mandates on conflict prevention under the ‘peace and security’ focal sector of the 10th EDF (European Community and Nigeria 2009: 71-72). Regional issues are also a major part of the EU-Nigeria Ministerial Troikas. It has been noted that the EU has provided more assistance to Nigeria’s peacekeeping role than to internal stability (Youngs 2006: 339).

3.6.5.7. Rwanda

Internal stability The RPF has been relatively successful in stabilising Rwanda after the genocide. Kagame’s policies of national unity, based on the active suppression of ethnic identities, have brought relative peace amongst the Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, the RPF government has tried to provide reconciliation by the revival of the traditional justice system called Gacaca (Silva-Leander 2008: 1609-1610; Spears 2007: 18). The government of Rwanda has control over the entire territory and over security forces. Several analysts however warn for grievances amongst the Hutu population that are aggravated by ethnic favouritism (Silva-Leander 2008: 1609-1610; Spears 2007: 18). Nonetheless, given the legacy of genocide in Rwanda, donors see the current situation as a relative improvement (Marysse et al. 2007; Hayman 2009a: 175; Uvin 2010: 164). Moreover, it is feared that, by pushing

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too strongly on democratisation, internal stability may be put in danger. After the 2008 elections, many donors admitted that fully competitive elections would not be appropriate as they may sharpen tensions and provoke future insecurity (Hayman 2011b: 124-125). The EU’s support for Kagame’s justice and reconciliation policies is clearly shown by EDF-financed projects directed to this aim, most notably for the Gacaca justice system (European Community and Rwanda 2003: 31).

Regional stability The current government of Rwanda has been seen both as a spoiler and as a contributor to regional stability. On the one hand, Rwanda has been criticised by the international community for its role in the DRC, where it supported several rebel movements. In the second Congolese war in 1998-2003, Rwanda supported a rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy, in the city of Goma. A Congolese probe found that Rwanda and Uganda were responsible for the murder of President Laurent Désiré Kabila in 2001 (Hayman 2009a: 172-173). When Kagame openly announced that he was contemplating a renewed intervention in the DRC in 2004, the UK and Sweden halted disbursements of budget support (Zorbas 2011: 112-113; Purcell et al. 2006: 17-18; Hayman 2009c: 592). In 2007-2008, the Netherlands and Sweden suspended budget support as a reaction to Rwanda’s support to Laurent Nkunda’s Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (Hayman 2009c: 592). On the other hand, the joint Rwandan-Congolese arrest of Nkunda in December 2008 significantly strengthened the image of Kagame in the donor community. As noted by Zorbas (2011: 112): ‘Virtually overnight, the government of Rwanda recast itself from a destabilizing to a peacemaking force’. Moreover, Rwanda has actively presented itself as a ‘force for peace’ by engaging in AU peacekeeping interventions. With military support from the UK, the Rwandan army forms the backbone of AMIS (Beswick 2010b: 745-746). Rwanda has not been an important receiving country of refugees. In 2005, the amount of refugees arriving and departing from Rwanda was more or less equal: 43,325 refugees were present in Rwanda, while 55,000 had left (European Community and Rwanda 2007, Annex 4).

3.6.5.8. Guinea

Internal stability Despite some frustrations by the Malinke ethnic group, which felt targeted by Conté’s policies of ethnic division in the 1990s, most analyses agree that Guinea enjoyed relative internal stability in the early 2000s (International Crisis Group 2009a: 5-6; Arieff 2011: 1; International Crisis Group 2003a: ii; Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a). Nonetheless, the political-economic instability in the country, combined with the health problems of president Conté, fed suspicions of a possible military takeover (Yabi 2010: 42).

Regional stability President Conté did not mediate in neighbouring conflicts and had limited foreign policy ambitions. There were few African leaders visiting Guinea under Conté’s presidency, and Conté hardly travelled abroad, his main concern being to preserve the territorial integrity of Guinea.
However, Guinea participated in the ECOMOG force (1990-1996), which was financially supported by the EU (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a; Smith 2006: 421-422; Youngs 2006: 337-341). It also participated in the UNOCI mission. Moreover, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the international community viewed Guinea as a factor of stability in the region, as the only country that was relatively stable surrounded by unstable states, hosting between 300,000 and 500,000 refugees from neighbouring conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. It has been suggested that this is why the donor community gave Guinea carte blanche for its flawed elections in 1998. Moreover, in 2000-2001, Guinea was under attack from Liberian President Charles Taylor’s forces in Guinée Forestière (McGovern 2002: 85-88; Yabi 2010: 37). Nonetheless, by 2005 the UK seemed to consider Guinea’s fragility as a threat to the region’s stability. For this reason, it appointed an ambassador to Guinea (Youngs 2006: 337-341; Gibert 2010: 162). This perception may be related to the sharp increase in emigration from 2003 onwards. Due to the dire life circumstances, Guinea had an emigration rate that was comparable to Côte d’Ivoire (5.2 percent).

3.6.5.9. Côte d’Ivoire

*Internal stability* President Gbagbo failed to improve internal stability, as he appeared unwilling to deal with the root causes of the conflict. Gbagbo was strongly southern-ethnocentric, representative of the Baoule and Bete ethnic groups, with a focus on Ivoirité (Owusu-Sekyere 2009: 17). His decision to exclude Ouattara’s party from the December 2000 elections was a continuation of the exclusion of the northerners in the political system. Moreover, nationality requirements were even further strengthened during his presidency (Bovcon 2009b). Furthermore, Gbagbo was unwilling to implement the peace agreements supported by the EU, such as the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra agreements. As noted by the International Crisis Group: ‘The main obstacles to implementation of the accords continue to be Gbagbo and his party’ (International Crisis Group 2003b: 33). The civil war had severe humanitarian consequences: in 2006, there were 709,000 IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire (European Community and Côte d’Ivoire 2008, Annex 4). With the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement and the creation of the government of national unity, Gbagbo showed some willingness to cooperate in conflict resolution, but the implementation of the agreement was continuously postponed. Hence, by the time of the 2010 elections, it had become clear that escaping from the deadlock was impossible under Gbagbo, and that Ouattara was a better candidate in this respect. While Ouattara indicated he would seek cooperation with the Forces Nouvelles and continue the government of national unity, Gbagbo did not plan to continue with the government of national unity after election (anonymous interview, February 2012; Labertit 2010: 57). The denial of the election results by Gbagbo led to five months of heavy fighting between the troops of Gbagbo and the former rebel forces of the Forces Nouvelles, who rallied behind Ouattara. The violence caused the displacement of 350,000 Ivorians (International Crisis Group 2011b: 1-3).
Regional stability Unlike his predecessor Guei who supported Charles Taylor’s insurgency in Sierra Leone, Gbagbo supported anti-Taylor forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 21; International Crisis Group 2003b: 33). During the civil war, it was impossible for President Gbagbo to play a regional role given internal instability. Moreover, the Ivorian civil war was a serious blow to the region, given its importance as the economic engine of Francophone West Africa and immigration magnet for less developed neighbouring countries (Bovcon 2009b). The post-election fighting in 2010-2011 led to the emigration of 200,000 Ivorian refugees to neighbouring countries (International Crisis Group 2011b: 1-3). Côte d’Ivoire was at odds with its neighbours and particularly with those in the Sahel which have large immigrants communities in Côte d’Ivoire, including Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 21; International Crisis Group 2003b: 33). The 2002 rebellion was supported by Burkina Faso. The 2007 Ouagadougou agreement, negotiated by his rival, was therefore welcomed by the international community (anonymous interview, March 2012).

3.6.5.10. Zimbabwe

Internal stability Ethnic tensions are rather low in Zimbabwe. Although the Ndebele group bears grievances vis-à-vis the Shona-dominated government, this has not led to violent conflict (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 20-25). Discontent in the military has however increased as Mugabe increasingly relied on war veterans and youth militia, which enjoyed more privileges than the security forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 6).

Regional stability In the late 1990s, President Mugabe deployed forces to the DRC to support President Kabila against rebellions (International Crisis Group 2002b: 15; Cilliers 2001: 124). However, Mugabe refused to withdraw his troops as required by the 2001 Lusaka Agreement. In June 2001, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region Ajello met with Foreign Minister Mudenge and was frustrated by his refusal to withdraw troops (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2001). Moreover, regional stability has been threatened by the rising emigration from Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries (especially South Africa) caused by the socio-economic and political crisis in the country (International Crisis Group 2002d: 10). In 2010, Zimbabwe had an emigration rate of almost 10 percent of the population. Zimbabwe is a member of the AU and the South African Development Community (SADC), but has not played an important diplomatic role in these organisations, acting mainly as a stumbling block against intensified cooperation and institutional reform (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 26). Nonetheless, Zimbabwe has contributed to UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa, including UNMIL, UNAMID and UNOCI.
Table 15: Emigration rate (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Emigration rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.6.6. Analysis

**H.2.** *The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as contributing to internal stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as contributing to internal stability.*

The first part of the hypothesis can be confirmed in the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia, and to a lesser degree Eritrea. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, there was relative internal stability, after coming out of genocide or civil war. Even though analysts point to grievances amongst some of the ethnic groups, the perception seems to be that there is ‘relative’ stability and that the situation could be worse under a different government. This is less the case in Eritrea where, despite the absence of violent conflict, the socio-economic and political crisis seems so serious that almost one fifth of the population is leaving the country. Contrary to Ethiopia and Rwanda I did not find any evidence that donors perceived the government of Eritrea as contributing to internal stability. However, it could be expected that, if violent conflict would occur, the EU might be more prepared to impose negative measures.

The hypothesis is contradicted by the cases of Chad and Nigeria, where the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures, despite the fact that the governments were hardly contributing to internal stability. The hypothesis is further contradicted by the case of Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), where the EU resumed aid in early 2002, while the root causes of conflict, namely the exclusion of northerners in the political system, were not addressed. Moreover, in 2004, the Council did not agree to reopen consultations under Article 96, although Gbagbo had failed to implement the peace agreements sponsored by the EU. However, it should be added that there was a clear difference here between the
European Commission, which favoured a more tough line on Gbagbo, and the Council, that wanted to give Gbagbo the benefit of the doubt. In November 2003, Commission President Romano Prodi warned that aid could be withheld if no progress was made on the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (Youngs 2006: 348). Moreover, the lack of progress on Linas-Marcoussis was the main reason for the Commission to try to restart Article 96 consultations in 2004 (European Commission 2004). The proposal was vetoed by Germany and France, which did not want to spoil the ongoing peace negotiations in Accra (anonymous interview, March 2007).

The second part of the hypothesis can be confirmed by the cases of Niger, Côte d’Ivoire (2010) and Kenya. President Tandja had waged a war against the Tuareg rebellion in the north, although the rebellion had ended just before the 2009 referendum. Côte d’Ivoire’s Gbagbo refused to implement the peace agreements that were supported by the EU, and the post-electoral crisis in December 2010 was further destabilising the country. From this perspective, sanctions in 2010-2011 can be seen as a ‘conflict resolution’ tool. Similarly, in Kenya, the post-electoral violence was leading to civil war after a relatively peaceful period under Kibaki. Hence, the EU’s threat with sanctions was motivated by the concern for internal stability. The fact that the international community focused on power-sharing, rather than insisting on a recount or the recognition of the victory of Raila Odinga, can also be explained from this perspective (Brown 2009: 400).

In Guinea and Zimbabwe, however, the hypothesis was refuted, as at the moment the EU chose to focus on negative measures (2003 in Guinea and 2002 in Zimbabwe), these countries were relatively stable.

**H.3. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as contributing to regional stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as contributing to regional stability.**

There is mixed evidence for the first part of this hypothesis. On the one hand, the hypothesis is convincingly confirmed by the case of Nigeria, which is perceived as a key contributor to regional stability and is supported in this role by the EU. On the other hand, the hypothesis is partly confirmed and partly refuted by the cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Chad. In fact, the government of Ethiopia has been more concerned by its national interests than by regional stability, which can be observed in its position in the border war with Eritrea and the 2006 invasion in Somalia. Similarly, Rwanda has defied the donor community with its incursions in the DRC, which were condemned by EU member states. It is notable that some of these member states, and the UK in particular, have been more willing to suspend aid to react to destabilising regional policies than to react to violations of democratic principles. However, the governments of Ethiopia and Rwanda have equally tried to appear as contributing to regional stability by engaging in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, Ethiopia receives
a large number of refugees from neighbouring countries. In Chad, on the one hand, the conflict with Sudan threatened regional stability in 2005-2010. On the other hand, Chad tried to mediate in the Darfur conflict and has accommodated an enormous amount of refugees from Darfur.

However, the hypothesis is refuted by the cases of Eritrea and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005). With its isolated regional position and active support to insurgencies in neighbouring countries, it is unlikely that the EU perceives the government of Eritrea as contributing to regional stability. In Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), the civil war was threatening regional instability and made it impossible for Gbagbo to play a regional role.

The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011) and Zimbabwe. In Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), Gbagbo’s track record on regional stability was doubtful. He did not play a peacekeeping role, and his refusal to truly address internal stability had spillover effects in neighbouring countries. In Zimbabwe, the EU imposed negative measures in a context of frustration with Mugabe’s refusal to withdraw troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, the continued socio-economic and political crisis was causing refugee flows to neighbouring countries. This can further explain why negative measures have not been lifted.

The hypothesis is partly refuted, partly confirmed by the cases of Kenya and Niger. On the one hand, it is surprising that the EU was so strict against Kibaki, who had been involved in mediation in Somalia and Sudan. On the other, the post-electoral crisis was escalating to such an extent that regional stability was threatened. In the case of Niger, there was some evidence that President Tandja tried to play a regional role, but this was only limited and I did not find any evidence of the international community perceiving Tandja as a contributor to regional peace.

The hypothesis is however refuted in the case of Guinea. In the early 2000s, the EU imposed negative measures despite the fact that Guinea was perceived as contributing to regional stability because of its role as a relatively stable country surrounded by unstable states.
3.7. Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have tried to find out whether double standards can be explained by a conflict between the three main normative objectives in EU-Africa policies: democracy, development and stability. Although EU discourse seems to suggest that these three normative goals always go together, there is plenty of evidence that would suggest the contrary. It was argued that double standards may result from two trade-offs: (1) between democracy and development and (2) between democracy and stability. Regarding the first, three main development norms were identified that may guide the EU’s development agenda towards sub-Saharan Africa: good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, and poverty reduction. From this perspective, it was argued that the EU might be more reluctant to use negative measures against countries that are perceived as development success stories, and less reluctant to impose negative measures vis-à-vis countries that are not seen as development success stories. On the trade-off between democracy and stability, I expected that the concern for stability may influence the EU’s position on negative measures in two ways. Firstly, the EU may be more/less reluctant to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived/not perceived as contributing to internal stability. Secondly, the EU may be more/less reluctant to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived/not perceived as contributing to regional stability. These three hypotheses were tested for the eleven cases. The findings are summarised in Table 16.

Table 16. Chapter Summary Table: Conflicting norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU most reluctant to impose negative measures</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Internal stability</th>
<th>Regional stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire 2000-2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU least reluctant to impose negative measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire 2010-2011</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+: hypothesis confirmed
-: hypothesis refuted
+/-: hypothesis partly confirmed, partly refuted
One conclusion that stands out is that development and internal stability are important factors, whereas regional stability is less important. The preference for development seems particularly important in explaining why the EU has not been reluctant to impose negative measures. In all the five cases where the EU seemed willing to impose negative measures, development performance was weak. It is reasonable to assume that the EU would have been more reluctant to impose negative measures if these countries had been development success stories.

However, evidence was smaller in the group of countries where the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures. Only Rwanda and Ethiopia were clearly perceived as development success stories, while Chad, Eritrea and to a lesser extent Nigeria had poor development performance. Hence, in some cases, the EU is reluctant to impose negative measures even when development performance is weak. This suggests that, in these countries, there are other reasons for the EU to prefer positive over negative measures.

Internal stability played an equally important role, both in explaining why the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures in some cases and in why it has not been reluctant to do so in other cases. This is especially clear in Kenya (2007) and Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), where the EU’s threat or adoption of sanctions should be seen as a reaction to the destabilisation of these countries. In this sense, negative measures were used as instruments for peace-building as much as for democracy-building. In the case of Kenya, this can also explain the EU’s choice for supporting a coalition government, rather than a recount or rerun of the election. However, the fact that Guinea and Zimbabwe were relatively stable at the time of negative measures indicates that the EU does not merely impose negative measures on ‘conflict cases’, as suggested by Youngs (2008a: 7).

The preference for positive measures in Rwanda, Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Eritrea should also be seen in the light of the relative internal stability in these countries. It is likely that the EU’s position on the instruments to promote democratisation would be different if these countries were unstable. The cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia are particularly notable as the governments of both countries have convinced the EU that they are the best guarantee for internal stability (Fisher 2011; Fisher 2012), even if there are concerns about ethnic grievances. An example of this was mentioned in the case of Ethiopia, where prime minister Meles Zenawi threatened that the opposition would abolish the federal system, which would result in genocide. It is likely that this perception of the government of Ethiopia as the ‘least bad option’ for internal stability has made the donor community close an eye towards ‘minor’ sources of instability and human rights violations committed by security forces in maintaining internal stability, including in the Ogaden and Somali region. This stands in stark contrast with the Nigerien example, where the donor community did not seem to perceive Tandja’s government as the least bad option. First, this can be explained by the fact that Tandja did not get the Tuareg uprising under control, it was only by outside mediation that the rebellion laid down arms. Second, in the case
of Niger, concerns about development performance also played a role. Third, although further research would be useful here, it seems likely that the government of Niger was less active and less successful in creating donor perceptions that his internal (and foreign) policies were successful.

Surprisingly, the EU has equally been reluctant to impose negative measures on governments that were not successful in achieving internal stability, namely in Chad, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005). However, this does not mean that internal stability played no role in these cases. In Chad, again the EU’s perception of President Déby as the ‘least bad option’ for internal stability seems to play a role. This is because there is mistrust in the donor community about the opposition and fears of what would happen if the government would be toppled by armed forces. In Nigeria, the preference for stability over democracy can be seen in the EU’s focus on non-violent elections, rather than on democratic elections (Khaliq 2008: 265-266). This can explain why the EU was more critical about the 2007 elections than about the 2003 elections. By 2007, the concern had arisen that the faltering democratisation process in Nigeria was threatening internal stability, hence the title of a report by International Crisis Group, ‘Failed Elections, Failing State?’ (International Crisis Group 2007a). However, given that a new government came to power that seemed willing to engage in electoral reform and promote internal stability, this concern was not translated in negative measures. Similarly, the fact that President Gbagbo’s accession to power in October 2000 was accepted and the lack of inclusiveness of the December 2000 elections was ignored, could be informed by the fear that a rerun of elections would provoke internal destabilisation. Indeed, the October 2000 elections were followed by severe political violence, which could have made the EU reluctant to push for a new round of elections.

Lastly, the mixed evidence for the factor of regional stability should be interpreted. The most probable explanation is that only few governments were unequivocally perceived as contributing to regional stability. In countries where the EU was most reluctant to impose negative measures, only Nigeria was without any doubt seen as contributing to regional stability, while the evidence for Rwanda, Ethiopia and Chad was mixed. In countries where the EU was least reluctant to impose negative measures, only Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire were clearly not perceived as contributing to regional stability, while for Niger, it is not entirely clear how the government was perceived. In the case of Kenya, the EU was clearly supportive of Kibaki’s regional role, but at the same time the violence had immediate destabilising effects on neighbouring countries.

However, even in cases where the detrimental role for regional stability was clear, namely in Eritrea and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures. It is notable that these were also countries were developmental performance (Eritrea, Côte d’Ivoire) and internal stability (Côte d’Ivoire) were weak. This suggests that for these cases, other reasons lie at the basis for double standards. Moreover, other reasons should be sought to explain the EU’s decision to impose
negative measures in Guinea (2003), given that the government was at that time seen as contributing to regional stability. Here, however, it seems that Guinea’s poor developmental performance was particularly important. Indeed, it was Germany – the other main EU donor - that blocked a new CSP in 2003, which led to the Article 96 consultations.
4. Self-interest
4. Self-interest

4.1. Introduction

In the previous Chapter, I have explained how negative measures may be avoided vis-à-vis non-democratic governments with policies perceived as ‘good’ by the EU, including poverty reduction, economic growth, regional and internal stability. Nonetheless, there were equally cases where the EU avoided negative measures against governments where the EU’s normative objectives have not been conflicting, including Eritrea and Chad. Moreover, even in those cases where conflicting norms could be noted, including Ethiopia and Rwanda, it was found that policies were not unequivocally problematic. As stated in the Introductory Chapter, there are plenty of reasons to suspect that EU self-interest may also provide an explanation for double standards. In fact, this is the dominant thesis in the literature. Hence, in this Chapter I will investigate the relevance of EU self-interest in explaining double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in the ten country cases. Three forms of self-interest are distinguished: historical, commercial and security interests. For each of these factors, there are strong reasons to believe they may influence the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles. Historical interests, mostly related to the colonial history of member states, are believed to be particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa, where especially France has tried to protect its sphere of influence. Commercial interests may have become more important as a result of the growing scarcity of raw materials and the growing competition with BRIC countries in this field. Lastly, security interests are likely to have an influence because of the growing awareness of the potential impact of African insecurity on European security, particularly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

4.2. Historical interests

Historical interests are key to understanding EU-African relations. Indeed, the very first provisions on aid and trade relations between the European Economic Community and some of the sub-Saharan African countries were based on the colonial relations of the member states. Former colonial powers often see their prior possessions as a ‘backyard’ and, as a result, wish to maintain their influence in these countries. Close relations with former colonies give the former coloniser a sense of status or prestige. This is one of the reasons why former colonial powers often focus development assistance on their former colonies. Although very closely related, it is necessary to distinguish historical interests from commercial or security interests, or those related to development cooperation. Despite the fact that close political relations are often translated in higher flows of development aid, commercial goods or even military cooperation, the motivations to protect former colonies are often different from those related to development, commercial or security interests. There may also be a purely ‘irrational’ reason to protect former colonies, related to personal relations or the motivation to maintain a sphere of influence. This often supersedes commercial or security interests, which can explain, for example,
why France wishes to maintain close diplomatic relations with a strategically insignificant country such as Togo (Cumming 2000a). Although I will mostly focus on the historical interests of the former colonial powers, I prefer to speak of ‘historical’ rather than ‘colonial’ or ‘neo-colonial’ interests, to cover cases in which a country belonged to a sphere of influence without being a former colony. This is the case, for example, with France and Rwanda.

The case study analysis will be preceded by a literature review on how historical interests may influence the position of the EU and member states vis-à-vis former colonies. Although EU-African relations are built on the colonial past, leading to unseen aid and trade benefits, recently there is also a trend in the opposite direction. Indeed, as the foreign relations of both member states and African countries are evolving, the colonial past is becoming less and less important. Hence, I will start by explaining this evolution from a colonial to a more modern relationship. As a second step, I will delve into the literature on the Africa policies of the four former colonial powers that are relevant for this study (France, UK, Belgium and Italy) to find out to what extent historical interests are still relevant.

4.2.1. EU-ACP relations: from colonies to ‘partners’

Historical interests are at the basis of the EU’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa. For the member states with colonial possessions, the Treaty of Rome provided an opportunity to maintain their influence in their colonies by establishing strong development links between the EEC and former colonies. Hence, Article 131-136 established a form of ‘associationism’ between the 22 African colonies and territories of France, Belgium and Italy and the EEC, based on French relations with its colonies (Bickerton 2011: 30). A free trade area was established between the EEC and its colonies, rights of establishment were enacted for citizens and firms, and the EDF was created. This mainly French idea was shared by Belgium and, to a lesser degree, Italy, but opposed by Germany and the Netherlands, which did not have any colonial possessions in sub-Saharan Africa and wanted to have a more global development policy that was not focused on former colonies (Grilli 1993: 8; Cosgrove-Twitchett 1978: 10-11; Ravenhill 1985: 330). Even after decolonisation, the system of associationism survived. In 1962, the Yaoundé Convention was signed with eighteen of the newly independent countries, which formed the Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS). The Convention prolonged the close relations between the EEC and its former colonies by establishing free trade areas between the EEC and each of the AAMS, and by renewing and expanding the EDF. At the same time, the preferential position of the AAMS was diminished to a certain extent by lowering the Common External Tariff towards other countries and abandoning the French colonial system of surprix (whereby an above market price was paid for products coming from the AAMS) (Grilli 1993: 1-11; Cosgrove Twitchett 1978: 17-30; Ravenhill 1985: 47-57).
Although there was a developmental and trade dimension to these provisions, the selectivity of the partners clearly illustrated that they were based on historical ties rather than need (Holland 2002: 27-32). Furthermore, the European Commission became staffed with officials who favoured the idea of prolonged close relations with former colonies. The Commission’s DG VIII – responsible for associationism – included many French and Belgian ex-colonial civil servants who had close relations with African elites. Development Commissioners in this period were all French. Moreover, projects were primarily decided on a political basis, with France – not accidentally the largest contributor to the EDF - actively lobbying for projects presented by its favoured African partners (Cosgrove Twitchett 1978: 35-42; Claeys 2004: 114-115).

Against this background, the 1970 Lomé Agreement was believed to break with colonial history and to build a relationship based on partnership and equality (Holland 2002: 40; Crawford 1996: 504). For many authors, Lomé was the start of a new era in Euro-African relations, based on a more globalist outlook, with the EEC’s relations with developing countries now extended to the whole group of ACP countries. The primary reason for this shift was seen in the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC in 1973, which strengthened the camp of member states favouring globalist development policies (Ravenhill 1985: 330; Dimier 2006; Parfitt 1996). At the same time, Lomé can also be interpreted precisely as the continuation of the EEC’s attempt to maintain its sphere of influence in former sub-Saharan African colonies. Indeed, with the Lomé Convention, the EEC had an agreement with virtually all the independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which entrenched the division of spheres of influence between Europe and the United States (Lister 1988: xiv). According to Kroslak, Lomé allowed France ‘to maintain its influence in “her” part of Africa while sharing the cost with its European Allies and rivals on the continent’ (Kroslak 2004: 72). As such, Lomé can be interpreted as a compromise between the desire of the UK and France to maintain their spheres of influence. The UK wanted to extend the association to its former colonies, but France only agreed to the inclusion of African and Caribbean British colonies as signatories of the agreement, insisting that its own relations with the AAMS and the francophone African countries would not be affected (Claeys 2004: 117; Drieghe 2011: 245-251). Furthermore, development projects were still approved on the basis of political desirability rather than developmental strength, the main function being to provide the Community with a presence in ACP countries (Lister 1988: 134-153). Also institutionally, a separate DG responsible for relations with associated states continued to exist, rather than integrating this DG in DG external relations (Ravenhill 1985: 35-36).

However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the relation with the ACP countries drifted away from the colonial past towards a ‘normal’ partnership. This should be seen in the context of the changed international environment, in which sub-Saharan Africa became less important to the EU. After the Cold War, the EU’s attention shifted to Central and Eastern Europe and subsequently to the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. Moreover, the EU developed partnerships with geographically distant regions such as
Asia and Latin America, thereby entering in direct competition with the US. As a consequence, the unique emphasis on the ACP countries has disappeared and EU-ACP relations have gradually normalised (Smith 2004a; Hugon 1999: 120; Mayall 2005). This can be seen in the distribution of EU development funds: whereas development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa gradually decreased between the 1980s and the early 2000s, there was a strong increase in assistance for European countries and, to a lesser degree, North Africa, the Middle East and North, Central and South America (Olsen 2004: 426). Furthermore, historical interests in sub-Saharan Africa could not avoid that economic and political conditionalities were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. The Lomé IV Agreement (1989) foresaw approximately 10 percent of EDF funding for structural adjustment support, which was linked to the implementation of reform programmes approved by the International Financial Institutions (Brown 2002: 73-114; Holland 2002: 44). In the revision of Lomé-IV, the ‘no strings attached’ policy of Lomé was further eroded by introducing political conditionality (Crawford 1996; Raffer 1998). The Cotonou Agreement put in question the unique position of the ACP countries and the principles of contractuality and equality in ACP-EC relations by gradually replacing nonreciprocal trade preferences by Economic Partnership Agreements, to be negotiated with different regions (Babarinde 2005: 31-32; Holland 2002: 212-213). In this context, there are currently discussions on whether the ACP group should be abolished with the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 (Laporte 2012).

Even in the current context, however, historical interests are believed to influence EU policies vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa. It has been argued that civilian or military interventions under the ESDP in sub-Saharan Africa mostly take place at the initiative of those member states that are concerned about their sphere of influence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 168; Biscop and Coelmont 2010: 16; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 191). According to some authors, the ESDP’s focus on sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by the French desire to remain engaged in sub-Saharan Africa and counter the growing influence of the US, while sharing the costs of military and defence cooperation (Bagayoko 2011: 132-133). In this respect, it should be mentioned that EU intervention stands more chances of being perceived as legitimate than when member states intervene bilaterally (Hyde-Price 2006: 222-223; Gibert 2011a: 192). Furthermore, although aid allocation is now primarily based on needs and performance, EU member states – fully aware of the Commission’s financial resources – continue to use their political weight to influence the European Commission into financing costly programmes in former colonies. Moreover, former colonial powers often prefer to send Africa regional directors to attend the Africa working group rather than to have their Africa specialists in Brussels (Gibert 2011a: 187), which reduces the possibility of socialisation into a more EU-oriented approach (Beyers 2007). At the same time, those member states without a colonial history, including Germany, the Central and Eastern European Countries and Nordic states have never become truly engaged in the EU’s policies in sub-Saharan Africa (Pirozzi 2010: 97).
4.2.2. Member states and their former colonies

From the above, it is clear that historical interests have become less and less important for EU-African relations. But can this also be said about the member states? As has been argued, member states with a colonial history have been particularly active in shaping the EU’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa to maintain their spheres of influence. Nonetheless, there seemed to be a difference in the approach of France, Belgium and Italy on the one hand, and the UK on the other. In the following, I will therefore analyse the Africa policies of the member states with historical interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Most attention will go to France and the UK, which are the main former colonial powers in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the case studies also include former colonies of Belgium (Rwanda) and Italy (Eritrea), I will also discuss potential historical interests of these two member states in sub-Saharan Africa.

4.1.2.1. France

Of all the former colonial powers, France has retained the closest relations with its ex-colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (Taylor 2010: 51; Bourmaud 2011: 43). The continuation of a special relationship with the francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa was a means for France to project its power overseas (rayonnement) and to maintain its international status as a global power (grandeur de la France), especially in the light of a diminishing French influence in non-sub-Saharan African former colonies after the debacles in Algeria and Indochina (Chafer 2002: 345-346). As was underlined by former minister of Foreign Affairs Louis de Guiringaud: ‘Africa is the only continent where with five hundred men France can claim to make History’ (cited in Bourmaud 2000). This desire to maintain influence in sub-Saharan Africa is reflected in a series of concrete aspects of Franco-African relations after decolonisation. One way of spreading French influence in post-colonial Africa was the Franc zone, which pegged the currency of France’s former colonies (the franc de la Communauté financière africaine or CFA) to the French Franc (Chafer 2002: 346). Secondly, France concluded formal defence and military cooperation accords with the newly independent Francophone countries in Africa, which allowed France to intervene militarily to protect French nationals, subdue rebellion and protect pro-French rulers (Gregory 2000: 437-438). Apart from the military bases, the extensive French intelligence services also provided invaluable protection to rulers because of their capacity to monitor opposition groups and to foil potential conspiracies (Young 2009: 30). Thirdly, French development assistance was used as a way to maintain influence in former colonies (Emmanuel 2010: 866; Mayall 2005: 310). Aid was strongly concentrated on the former colonies and was only weakly related to recipient needs (Hugon 1999: 113-114; Neumayer 2003b: 61). Lastly, attempts were made to promote French culture and the French language. The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) plays an important role in this regard (Kroslak 2004: 66).

Apart from these formal aspects of French Africa policies, there is also a personal aspect, related to patron-client relations between French authorities and sub-Saharan African leaders. Françafrique, a
term that was used by former President of Côte d’Ivoire Felix Houphouët-Boigny to describe his close relations with France, refers to the network of relations between French elites and African leaders (Verschave 1999). Many of the post-colonial African elites have been educated in French schools or served as ministers or members of the National Assembly during colonial rule (Chafer 2005: 8). Because of this personal dimension there is also an emotional aspect of Franco-African relations, which has been described as the côté relationnel (Cumming 2000a: 301-304). An important actor in this regard is the French President and his Cellule Africaine, who has the exclusive prerogative over Africa policies (Médard 2008: 316; Cumming 2000a: 321). Furthermore, people like Jacques Foccart, who served as Secretary General for African and Malagasy Affairs under President De Gaulle, developed strong personal contacts with African leaders (les réseaux Foccart) which dominated French Africa policies for years (Gregory 2000: 436-437). With the help of these client leaders, France could claim the rank and prestige of a medium size power. For example, African clients made French influence stronger in international organisations such as the UN or the World Trade Organisation (Emmanuel 2010: 876; Claeys 2004: 120-121; Kroslak 2004: 64-65). Although there clearly is a commercial dimension to la Françafrique (as can be observed in close relations with oil producers like Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville), Françafrique supersedes commercial interests. For example, France had close relations with Togo’s Eyadema or Chad, where France does not (or no longer in the case of Chad) have oil interests (Hugon 2007: 31). The close relations between French leaders and African dictators such as Omar Bongo (Gabon) and Eyadema (Togo) shows that Françafrique was little concerned with democratisation (Chafer 2005: 8).

Nonetheless, similar to EU-African relations, historical interests have become less important for French Africa policies in the 1990s and 2000s. The end of the Cold War downgraded French ambitions to assume global power status. As a result of the accelerating process of globalisation, power shifted from the nation-state, territorial control and military strength to economic, financial and commercial power. In this context, the economic marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa reduced the potential benefits of maintaining a sphere of influence in Africa. At the same time, the debt crisis and the economic and political fragmentation of several West and Central African states made it costly for France to maintain its sphere of influence. Moreover, globalisation increased the need to develop ties based on economic interest, which drew France to the larger economies on the African continent, including South Africa, Nigeria and Angola (Chafer 2005: 12-18; Claude 2007: 916). In the military sphere, European integration and closer cooperation with NATO and the UN brought with it a pressure for increased multilateralism in French Africa policies (Chafer 2002: 353). Furthermore, a change of the guard in France and some sub-Saharan African countries further drifted Franco-African policies towards change. In the late 1990s, the system of cohabitation between French President Chirac and the socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin, who did not have a Franco-African network, further reduced the importance of historical interests in Franco-African relations (Touati 2007: 3; Leymairie 2002). In addition, the 1990s marked the death of some of the protagonists of Françafrique, including former

This was clearly reflected in the formal aspects of Franco-African relations. First of all, like other donors France adhered to political and economic conditionality. In 1990, French President Mitterand gave his famous speech at the Franco-African summit in La Baule, where he declared that French aid would be linked to ‘efforts qui seront accomplis pour aller vers plus de liberté’ (Bolle 2001: 1). Similarly, in 1993 prime minister Balladur proclaimed that French aid would be linked to the structural adjustment policies of the IFIs and would thus become less based on bilateral relations. The decision in 1994 to give in to international financial pressure by devaluing the CFA franc should also be seen in this regard (Médard 2008: 318; Chafer 2002: 347-348; Marchal 1998: 358). Secondly, France increased development assistance to non-African former colonies (Lebanon, Vietnam) and to non-former colonies with which it aimed to have close economic and political relations such as Cuba, Kenya and South Africa (Gabas 2005: 246-247; Chafer 2005: 17). Thirdly, France reduced its military presence in Africa. French troops were significantly reduced and replaced by support to help African states build their own armies and French contributions to UN or EU military missions (Marchal 1998: 363-364; Gregory 2000: 441-442; Bourmaud 2011: 48-49). Fourthly, ‘institutional clientelism’ was reduced with a number of institutional changes. The cooperation ministry, traditionally the privileged ministry of francophone Africans, was integrated in the large Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (Médard 2008: 318; Leymairie 2002).

Despite this evolution, sub-Saharan Africa was still regarded as a key element of French foreign policy. As noted by Bourmaud, in the context of globalisation it was believed Africa was the only way ‘France could still shine’ (Bourmaud 2011: 52). First of all, the informal elements of Françafrique had not lost significance. Indeed, despite the speech at La Baule, President Chirac (1995-2007) maintained friendly relations with non-democratic sub-Saharan African leaders including Bédié (Côte d’Ivoire), Eyadéma (Togo) or Bongo (Gabon). Secondly, despite institutional reorganisation, the Cellule Africaine was not abolished. Thirdly, France still played a large role in military interventions in francophone sub-Saharan African countries, by insisting on EU military missions to the DRC and intervening bilaterally in Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2004) (Claude 2007).

When Sarkozy became President in 2007, observers predicted a radical breach in French Africa policies. In contrast to his predecessors, Sarkozy had little affinity with Africa, and his party’s campaign had propagated an end to the clientelist networks and a transparent Africa policy based on democracy and human rights. This lack of affinity became clear in July 2007, when Sarkozy delivered a speech in Dakar where he referred to Africans as ‘peasants’ and declared that colonialism was not the cause for all of Africa’s problems. The speech was interpreted as an insult by a large part of the

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44 Between 1998 and 2006, military cooperants were reduced from 614 to 282 (d’Ersu 2007: 88).
African elites and led to a freeze in Franco-African relations (Taylor 2010: 60-65). One effort to break with the colonial past was the renegotiation of military agreements with African countries, which were also made public (Tisseron 2011: 102-103). The loss of French interest in sub-Saharan Africa is further reflected in a decline in development aid to former colonies, a reduction of French diplomatic representation, a decrease in high-level visits and a departure of French small businesses in sub-Saharan Africa (Barrios 2010).

However, despite this discursive shift, the informal elements of Françafrique seem to have survived. Indeed, Sarkozy maintained close relations with President Bongo from Gabon (an old friend) or President Nguesso from Congo-Brazzaville (Foutoyet 2009: 47-58). In March 2008, Secretary of State for Cooperation Bockel was replaced after Bongo had complained about his remarks that France should stop providing assistance to oil producing countries where populations live in misery (Bourmaud 2011: 53; Moncrieff 2012: 12). Moreover, Sarkozy’s informal advisor on Africa Robert Bourgi has been described as a ‘new Foccart’. In the context of presidential elections in Gabon after the death of Omar Bongo in 2009, Bourgi publicly declared he supported the candidacy of the former president’s son Ali Bongo (Mengara 2010: 60). Furthermore, the reduction in military cooperation has not impeded the French military from maintaining a significant presence on the African continent. French troops have reconfigured in four bases in different sub-Saharan African regions: Dakar (West Africa), Libreville (Central Africa), Djibouti (East Africa) and La Réunion (South Africa) (Chafer 2011a: 172). Moreover, the amount spent on promoting French culture abroad has not diminished (Barrios 2010: 2). Recent examples such as the military coups in Mauritania (2009), Madagascar (2008) and Guinea (2008) also show the continuing reluctance of French leaders to publicly denounce democratic breakdown in its sphere of influence. Moreover, due to its continuing desire to maintain influence in Africa, France continues to work on regional affairs with those countries where it has good relations with the government (Chafer 2011a: 170). Last but not least, despite the formal shift away from political aid allocation, the top beneficiaries of French aid in sub-Saharan Africa remain francophone countries, as can be observed in Table 17 below.

### Table 17. Top three sub-Saharan African aid recipients of France

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<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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Source: OECD-DAC Peer Review report 2008, OECD-DAC’s Aid at a glance 2009-2010

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45 In 2005, Nigeria was number 1 recipient of French aid in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this is undoubtedly related to the enormous debt cancellation in 2005-2006. For this reason, Nigeria was excluded from the table.
4.1.2.2. The United Kingdom

Despite expectations that it would maintain a permanent role in its vast colonial estates, the UK did not retain a strong interest in its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (Young 2009; Taylor 2010: 35). The UK’s Africa policies following decolonisation have been described as ‘damage limitation’ and ‘reactive rather than proactive’. Sub-Saharan Africa was mainly seen as a source of trouble, instead of opportunity (Williams 2004: 41). This clearly contrasts with the French approach to Africa. As was stated by Cumming: ‘For France, Africa plays a crucial role in enhancing its rank in the international pecking order, while for the UK, Africa is much more centrally a development issue’ (Cumming 2011: 68). The difference between French and British attention for Africa clearly derives from the aid budget: in 1987, sub-Saharan Africa was receiving only $325 million in aid from the UK, compared to $2,046 from France (Cumming 2004: 108). The UK focused instead on Europe, the former Soviet Union and East Asia. African embassies were reduced in size and number, and the UK’s Africa policy came to be perceived as synonymous with aid policy. Only few former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, attracted some interest in the UK’s foreign policy (Williams 2004: 42; Gallagher 2009: 438).

The UK did not cultivate any personal ties with sub-Saharan African leaders equivalent to the French réseaux. The British rationale was that ‘Britain should never hold sentimental or moral relations with other nations as sovereign respected partners, but rather, should develop her own “interests”’ (Engdahl 2004: 6-8). Hence, British colonisation was mainly driven by commercial and material gain, rather than to build spheres of influence. As a result, the UK governed its sub-Saharan African colonies through indirect rule, as opposed to the French direct rule, and did not attempt to form any kind of assimilation with its ex-colonies after decolonisation. During the Cold War, the UK made alliances with African leaders predominantly for strategic and commercial reasons. British leaders often developed personal relations with opposition members, rather than with their sub-Saharan African counterparts. Personal relations only played a minor role in the UK’s aid allocation (Cumming 2000a: 308-326; Mayall 2005: 314).

Another difference with French policies in its former colonies is military cooperation. British disposition for intervention only endured a few years, during which the military intervened to stem mutinies in Uganda, Kenya and Taganyika. However, in 1964 the British commander of the Nigerian army refused to intervene on behalf of Nigerian leaders after scandal-ridden national elections (Young 2009: 27). After this, British military involvement was minor, although there are some British military advisors and training teams working with the armed forces in former colonies (Chafer 2011b: 74).

The increased attention for sub-Saharan Africa of the New Labour government was related to other reasons than historical interests. Rather than a renewed attention for its colonial history, the UK’s re-engagement with sub-Saharan Africa from 1997 onwards can be explained by (1) a growing concern
Indeed, there was little historical perspective in New Labour’s new focus on sub-Saharan Africa. As was argued by Porteous, Africa was regarded as ‘a blank sheet on which for the first time the UK was inscribing a splendid and ambitious design’ (Porteous 2008: 133). Indeed, the renewed attention for sub-Saharan Africa was not confined to the African Commonwealth. Instead, countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda and Mozambique, which were not former colonies, became priority partners of the UK. The latter two countries were even allowed as members of the Commonwealth (Power 2009; Porteous 2008: 60). One exception, however, is the UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 which, besides an example of New Labour’s ethical foreign policy as noted in the previous Chapter, was also noted to be driven by ‘the usual partnership between the former colonial power and the former colony’ (Gibert 2011a: 180). Moreover, with France, the UK seems to have an implicit policy of ‘division of labour’ implying that the UK will focus on its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, while France will be allowed to dominate policies on former French colonies. This can explain the low-profile of France in discussions within the Council of the EU on Zimbabwe and the passive stance of the UK in discussions on former French colonies (Chad, Côte d’Ivoire) (Olsen 2009: 255).

4.1.2.3. Belgium

Belgium is the former coloniser of the DRC (1885-1960) and of current Rwanda and Burundi (1924-1962). Belgium’s policies in the DRC have certainly been inspired by historical interests, to such a degree that Belgian interventions in the country have been associated with the Françafrique system (Mengara 2010: 58). According to Gibert, Belgium is closer to France’s understanding of the EU’s role in Africa than to that of the UK (Gibert 2011a: 181-182). Indeed, Belgium’s long-standing support for dictator Mobutu in the DRC was frequently criticised and Belgian authorities are the main suspect in the assassination of the nationalist former prime minister Patrice Lumumba (Ewans 2003). Despite these neo-colonial characteristics of Belgium’s policies towards the Great Lakes, political conditionality was initially applied quite rigorously by Belgium in its former colonies. In 1990, Belgium suspended virtually all aid to Mobutu’s Zaire in response to the killings of a number of students by security forces at Lumumbashi University (Renard and Reyntjens 1995: 97-98). The liberal-socialist-green coalition government that took office in 1999 reaffirmed Central Africa as a top priority, leading to an increase in development assistance and high-level ministerial visits to the region (Hayman 2010: 343-346; Agence France Presse 9 October 2003). Belgium was strongly involved in conflict resolution during the civil war in the DRC (1998-2003) and played a large role in influencing EU engagement in the country (Nasra 2011).

However, Belgium’s position on political conditionality has depended strongly on the personal strategies of the responsible foreign minister. This can be noted in recent policies vis-à-vis the Kabila government in the DRC. Whereas Louis Michel (1999-2004) favoured an approach of engagement and
was often criticised for being too close to the regime, his successor Karel De Gucht was not afraid to risk diplomatic relations with his public criticism on governance in the DRC. For example, Belgium took the initiative to put pressure on the organisation of elections in 2004 (De Tijd 2004, September). In November 2004, President Kabila refused to meet the Foreign Minister, after the latter had publicly criticised the quality of Congolese politicians (De Morgen 2005, February). The public opinion (especially the Flemish part) seemed supportive of De Gucht’s more confrontational strategies, while the francophone political parties seemed more in favour of engagement (De Tijd 2005, February). However, when relations reached a low when Congo withdrew its ambassador from Belgium in 2008, the Belgian Prime Minister made it a priority to re-establish diplomatic relations (De Morgen 2008, May). His successor Didier Reynders (December 2011-present) seems much less willing to press the Congolese authorities on democracy issues, which could be witnessed in his silent stance after the problematic presidential elections in 2012.

While former colonies remain a priority in Belgium’s development cooperation, their importance has declined in recent years. The DRC’s share of Belgian ODA declined from 19.6 percent in the 1980s to only 4 percent in 2002-2003. The share of Rwanda and Burundi shrunk from 4.7 and 3.6 percent to 1.4 and 1.1 percent (Develtere 2005: 132-133). Nonetheless, of all sub-Saharan African countries, the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi remain the primary recipients of Belgian ODA (see Table 18 on p. 180).

4.1.2.4. Italy

Italy acquired a part of today’s Somalia (Italian Somaliland, 1889-1936) and Eritrea (1890-1936). In 1936, Italy briefly conquered Ethiopia to form Italian East Africa. Italian East Africa was briefly expanded when Mussolini’s troops occupied part of British Somaliland in 1940. However, in 1941, the British-led East Africa Campaign forced the Italian troops into defeat, making an end to Italy’s possessions in the Horn of Africa. After decolonisation, Italy did not maintain significant political influence, although leaving an imprint on the Horn of Africa’s institutional, social and economic structure (Calchi Novati 2009: 236-239). Italy lacked the will and tools to exercise power over client states in Africa. As a result, despite colonial history it has not played a major role in conflicts in the Horn of Africa, such as the Ethiopian-Eritrean war or the Somali conflict (Calchi Novati 1994; Calchi Novati 2008: 44; Calchi Novati 2010: 3-14). Moreover, after the September 2001 attacks, Italy has become less and less relevant in the politics of the Horn of Africa (Calchi Novati 2008: 52). Whereas Italy’s development assistance used to be directed towards its former colonies or occupied territories (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia), since the 1980s and 1990s, development spending has been redirected to Mediterranean countries where it has stronger commercial and security interests (Carbone 2008: 65). Hence, while Eritrea was the third largest receiver of development assistance in 1997-2001, since 2002, neither Somalia nor Eritrea feature at the top of Italy’s aid beneficiaries in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, Ethiopia has remained in the top 3 since the 2000s.
Table 18. Top three sub-Saharan African aid recipients of UK, Belgium and Italy

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Source: OECD-DAC Peer Review reports and the 2009-2010 OECD-DAC’s Aid at a glance donor profiles.

4.2.3. Historical interests and double standards in EU democracy promotion

It is likely that former colonisers play a large role in EU democracy promotion vis-à-vis former colonies, but it is not clear to what extent and in what way. Laakso and others observed that former colonial powers are always the most active member states in discussions on Article 96 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 57-58). However, Jünemann and Knodt point to the double role historical interests may play in democracy promotion. On the one hand, historical interests have resulted in member states taking a low profile in discussions on human rights. On the other, member states with a certain imperial history in a country may also take a higher profile on human rights issues (Jünemann and Knodt 2007: 354-355).

4.2.4. Hypothesis and operationalisation

Following the description of historical interests in the relations of the EU and member states with former colonies in Africa, it can be assumed that member states may be concerned about maintaining their sphere of influence. From this perspective, it can be expected that the EU will be less likely to antagonise governments that are willing to continue the status quo, and less reluctant to antagonise governments that try to break away from this sphere of influence.

Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:

**H.4. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that protect the sphere of influence of member states, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that do not protect the sphere of influence of member states.**
To apply this hypothesis to the case studies, I focused on (1) whether a country belonged to the sphere of influence of one of the member states and (2) whether the government helped to maintain or endangered that sphere of influence. This is investigated by looking at colonial history and bilateral government-to-government relations between former colonial power and former colony. To speculate about the potential role of member states in decision-making on negative measures at EU level, the bilateral reaction of former colonial powers to violations of democratic principles in former colonies was assessed. It is reasonable to assume that, if member states are reluctant to use negative measures in bilateral relations, they will also try to avoid negative measures at the EU level. However, I will also look into broader bilateral relations, for example on regional security or corruption. Indeed, if the former coloniser does not refrain from criticism on issues of corruption or regional security, the same argument could be made about democratisation. Although democratisation is distinct from these other issues, it points to the same logic: historical relations are put at risk by raising concerns about government policies. For France, whether countries belong to its sphere of influence was determined on the basis of colonial history as well as institutionally, by looking at whether a country is part of the CFA zone, is home to a French military basis, and whether its elites have close relations with people in the government.

Given that historical interests are investigated here, I will not restrict myself to the post-2000 period. Indeed, if historical interests played no role in the 1990s, it is unlikely they will in the post-2000 period.

The case study analysis is mainly based on secondary sources, including academic articles and press articles. I also consulted official websites, and in some cases information on the position of former colonial powers was derived from US embassy cables.

### 4.2.5. Case studies

#### 4.2.5.1. Eritrea

Italy is the former coloniser of Eritrea, but after World War II Eritrea was proclaimed an autonomous unit federated to Ethiopia (Calchi Novati 2008: 44; Young 2009: 25). However, Italy did not retain significant political influence over Eritrea after decolonisation. Although Italy supported Eritrean independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea did not receive the support it might have expected in the light of colonial relations. For example, this was clear in Italy’s stance in the border war with Ethiopia, where Italy did not favour one side or another, and was therefore even perceived as favourable of Ethiopia by part of the Eritrean public opinion (Calchi Novati 2008: 43-53). Moreover, after the imprisonment of eleven dissidents in September 2001, historical interests did not prevent Italy from

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representing the EU in a demarche criticising this violation of democratic principles. The lack of close relations between Eritrea and Italy is clearly shown in the reaction of the government of Eritrea to the demarche: Eritrea expelled the Italian ambassador, after which the Eritrean ambassador in Italy was ordered to leave Rome (Associated Press Worldstream 2 October 2001; Africa News 3 October 2001). Relations were however normalised in September 2002 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 10 January 2003). Italy does not have a bilateral cooperation programme in Eritrea anymore and channels all aid through multilateral agencies (anonymous interview, February 2009). Although the Italian embassy in Eritrea is maintained for historical reasons and because there are still some Italian citizens in Eritrea, the Italian interest for Eritrea is limited (anonymous interviews, January 2012).

4.2.5.2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia was never colonised. Italy had been awarded Ethiopia at the Conference in Berlin in 1885 and a protocol of friendship was signed in 1893, but this was unilaterally abrogated by Ethiopian emperor Menelik as he argued that Italians had interpreted the treaty as making Ethiopia a protectorate of Italy. The Italians were finally defeated in the Battle of Adwa in 1896 (Milkias and Metaferia 2005: 16-18). There was a brief Italian occupation in 1936, when Mussolini’s troops annexed Ethiopia to their newly created colony of Italian East Africa, but Italian troops were defeated by the British in 1941.

4.2.5.3. Kenya
Kenya was a UK colony until 1963. However, diplomatic relations with the UK have often been strained. During Moi’s Presidency in 1992-1994, the UK High Commissioner took a robust line on the need for political conditionality and actively established contacts with Kenyan opposition parties (Cumming 2000a: 260). At the end of Moi’s rule, however, the UK was noted to be amongst the donors that pushed least strongly on democratisation (Brown 2007). Under Kibaki, there were often diplomatic disputes because of criticism on corruption. Against this background, during the 2007 elections the UK was seen as anti-government and pro-opposition (US Embassy Kenya 2008b; anonymous interviews, January-February 2012). Moreover, Kenya was amongst the member states that were least supportive of Kibaki’s claim for victory (Youngs 2008a: 8). During the final tally of the vote, the UK tried to put pressure on the electoral commission to conduct a recount before announcing the winner (Brown 2009: 392). In January 2008, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that ‘the UK’s view is that the elections are disputed’ (Agence France Presse 28 January 2008). The UK was the first donor to raise the possibility of an aid cut, and also threatened with the imposition of smart sanctions against those who sabotaged the mediation process (Brown 2009: 394-397). Moreover, the UK was the leading donor in coordinating international support for the Kriegler and Waki Commissions on elections and post-election violence (House of Commons 2009).
4.2.5.4. Chad

Chad was part of the French colonial empire until 1960. Chad is part of the CFA zone and houses a French military base *Epervier*, which is the second largest in Africa after Djibouti (Moncrieff 2012: 20). The presence of this military basis can hardly be justified as necessary for the protection of French citizens on Chadian territory, the number of which amounts to no more than 1,000. Instead, French military presence seems mainly motivated by political reasons, namely to maintain its influence in Chad and protect the Chadian government against insurgencies. Because the French military intervened on many occasions in Chad in the 1960s and 1980s, it feels a certain attachment to the country and friendly relations have developed. President Déby has always been very forthcoming to the French army, granting them free movement on Chadian territory and leaving most of their operations free from taxes (International Crisis Group 2006c: 17-18). Diplomatic relations between France and President Déby have always been close. To begin with, the coming of power of Déby’s *Mouvement Patriotique du Salut* in 1990 was made possible after the withdrawal of French support to his predecessor Habré (May and Massey 2002: 75). In the 1990s and early 2000s, President Déby helped France to maintain its sphere of influence in francophone Africa, by supporting President Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville (1997), Kabila in the DRC (1998) and the military overthrow of President Patasse in the Central African Republic (2003) (International Crisis Group 2006c: 17-18).

Because of its close relations with Déby, France has been reluctant to express criticism about Chad’s democratic record. For example, France provided financial support for elections that were largely fraudulent in 1996 and 1997 (International Crisis Group 2008b: 2-3), although it did not finance the 2001 elections (May and Massey 2002: 84). Moreover, France did not voice any criticism about the 2005 referendum by which Déby secured a third term. Xavier Darcos, Minister of Development, Cooperation and the *Francophonie*, even congratulated President Déby on the outcome of the referendum (Marchal 2006: 474-475). Furthermore, France provided military protection against rebel attacks in April and November 2006 (International Crisis Group 2008b: 17).

However, this changed somewhat from late 2006 onwards. By then, the French had realised that their special relationship with Déby made a solution with the opposition difficult and that an EU approach would be more effective. Moreover, a new ambassador took position, Bruno Foucher, who seemed more willing to abandon the special relationship with Chad in favour of a more Europeanised approach (US Embassy Chad 2006a). Hence, the French supported the 2007 political agreement mediated by the European Commission delegation. Nonetheless, it is believed that the French insistence on the EUFOR Tchad/CAR mission in 2007-2008 was, besides humanitarian reasons, also informed by the desire to support the government against the rebellion by enhancing stability in the east of the country (Chafer 2011b: 79). The French desire to keep Déby in power was further illustrated by the reaction to the attempted *coup d’état* in February 2008. France sponsored a non-binding resolution in the UN condemning the rebel attacks and urging the UN to provide support to
the government (*Agence France Presse* 3 February 2008). Although French troops primarily evacuated French nationals and the intervention was much less robust or partisan than that in 2006 (Barrios 2010: 4), it is believed they also supplied military assistance to the government, as well as intelligence on rebel movement. (Moncrieff 2012: 25). Although the French government – under pressure from certain parliamentarians - asked for clarification about the disappearance in 2008 of opposition leader Saleh, a serious investigation has never been conducted, nor has there been a clear explanation about what the French government knows about the missing opposition leader (Moncrieff 2012: 35).

### 4.2.5.5. Niger

Niger was a French colony until 1958. Niger is part of the CFA zone, but there is no French military basis in Niger, although there is an active military agreement (Gregory 2000: 438). After President Tandja came to power in 2000, France pleaded in the EU and the IFIs to have multilateral aid resumed to Niger (Assemblée Nationale 2000a). France maintained good relations with Nigerien president Tandja. It has been much more reluctant than the EU to condemn the 2009 referendum. In a meeting with the US ambassador in Niger, the French ambassador stated that, although France was concerned about the announcement of the referendum, Paris had asked him to deliver the message in a low-key manner because the situation was too delicate for the French government. Unlike other donors, the French ambassador was in favour of continuing donor support for the 2009 elections (US embassy Niger 2009a) and attended the President’s swearing-in ceremony (US Embassy Niger 2009b). However, after the referendum, a foreign ministry spokesman called Tandja’s moves ‘repeated attacks on democracy’ and warned that the events could lead to European aid suspension given that they were in contradiction with the Cotonou Agreement (*Agence France Presse* 15 July 2009; 4 August 2009). On 10 August 2009, France urged Niger to ‘return to a democratic path’ (*Agence France Presse* 10 August 2009). France, however, did not suspend bilateral assistance (anonymous interview, March 2012).

### 4.2.5.6. Nigeria

Nigeria was a colony of the UK until 1960. Relations with the UK have been volatile since decolonisation. For example, a defence pact signed in 1961 had to be abrogated after mass student demonstrations against the pact (Whiteman 2008: 256-262 and 274-275). Furthermore, Nigerians were angered by the UK position during the Biafra secession in 1967. The UK reacted only belatedly as there was a lot of sympathy in the British media about the secession. This points to an important aspect in UK policies vis-à-vis Nigeria. There is a powerful Nigerian diaspora in the UK, estimated at 151,000 in 2009 (Office for National Statistics 2009). Nigerians lobbied against the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. The UK imposed economic sanctions during General Abacha’s military dictatorship between 1993 and 1999. The UK was reluctant to impose more extensive economic
sanctions, but this was also related to commercial interests. Khaliq observes a change with the Labour government in 1997, when the UK started to take a tougher line against Nigeria (Khaliq 2008: 261-264). Under Obasanjo, there has been close diplomatic cooperation between the UK and Nigeria, for example on Zimbabwe or Nigeria’s hosting of a Commonwealth summit in 2003 (Agence France Presse 6 August 2001; 6 September 2001). The UK was also at the forefront of pushing for debt relief for Nigeria in 2005 (Youngs 2006: 339). However, rather than a consequence of historical interests, these close relations were informed by the belief in Obasanjo as a trustworthy leader. Moreover, the UK has publicly expressed concern about the electoral process in Nigeria. After the 2003 elections, the UK stated it was ‘disturbed by reports of the serious fraud and irregularities in some states’ (Agence France Presse 29 April 2003). Moreover, when Obasanjo tried to solicit a third term in office in 2006, UK and US officials advised him to retire (Sklar et al. 2006: 101). Although there was no severe criticism by the UK on the 2007 elections, Whiteman noted a slight froideur in UK-Nigerian relations (Whiteman 2008: 270-271). The UK was at the forefront of donors pleading for electoral reform to ensure credible elections in 2010, although this remained largely internal to the UK High Commission in Abuja, as there was little attention in the public opinion for Nigeria’s electoral problems (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a; US Embassy Nigeria 2010).

4.2.5.7. Rwanda

Rwanda was placed under German rule in 1884, but was administered by Belgium after the defeat of the Germans in 1924. After decolonisation in 1962, Belgium maintained strong political, cultural, social and economic ties with the regimes of Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana (1973-1994) and was one of the most important donors in this period. However, Belgian-Rwandan relations have soured under RPF rule. First of all, Belgium is seen by the RPF regime as indirectly responsible for the genocide, by constructing artificial ‘racial’ distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi, introducing identity cards and raising the stature of the Tutsi to one of privileged power. Secondly, Rwandans blame Belgium for not having intervened to prevent the genocide. Belgium immediately withdrew its troops after ten soldiers were killed when escorting the prime minister and exerted pressure in the UN to halt an international mission (Hayman 2010: 343). Thirdly, Rwanda’s support to insurgencies in the DRC has been a cause for concern in Belgium. Rwanda’s support to Laurent Nkunda in 2007-2008 was openly criticised by the Belgian Foreign Minister (De Morgen 2008, November).

On the one hand, Belgium has been reluctant to criticise violations of democratic principles in Rwanda, especially under Foreign Minister Louis Michel, who publicly praised the 2003 elections, challenged the concerns of the EU-EOM and, during an October 2003 visit, launched a new aid initiative (Youngs 2004b: 314). On the other hand, even under Foreign Minister De Gucht, who is known for his open criticism about democracy and good governance in the DRC (see supra), there was hardly any public criticism about violations of democratic principles in Rwanda. One exception
was in 2005, when Belgian priest and human rights activist Guy Theunis was arrested (De Standaard 2005, September). This can be explained by the lack of leverage Belgium has in relation to the current government precisely because of the past (Piccolino 2010: 123). It is believed that, if Belgium would speak out too strongly on democratisation, Rwanda would simply break diplomatic relations (interview, Filip Reyntjens, April 2012). Recently, a new strategy on the basis of engagement and positive conditionality has been tried out. The new bilateral cooperation agreement between Belgium and Rwanda includes an incentive tranche, worth €40 million, which can only be granted if there is progress on democracy, human rights and good governance (De Morgen 2011, May).

Although France does not have a colonial past in Rwanda, Rwanda belonged to the French sphere of influence in Africa, at least prior to the genocide. France was the main donor and had a military cooperation agreement with Rwanda (Hayman 2009a: 162; Utley 2005: 27). It has been argued that, at the time of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, France had replaced Belgium as the main partner of the Hutu regime (Cilliers 2001). However, French-Rwandan relations cooled under President Kagame. France was suspected of giving backing to Hutu President Habyarimana and of helping those guilty of genocidal atrocities escape during Opération Turquoise, the controversial French military operation in 1994 (Chafer 2002: 354; Cilliers 2001: 124). Over the course of 2002-2009, mutual accusations were made about the role played by the RPF and France during the genocide (Agence France Presse 15 February 2003; 18 March 2004; 1 August 2004; 24 November 2006; 8 December 2007; 6 August 2008; 29 November 2009). Diplomatic relations were restored with President Sarkozy’s visit to Rwanda in February 2010 (Moncrieff 2012: 14). This has made it easier for France to speak out on democratisation, but – similarly to the Belgian case – such criticism has been responded with fierce criticism (interview, Filip Reyntjens, April 2012). For example, when the French ambassador voiced concerns about the 2003 elections, this was met with a furious response from Kagame (Youngs 2004b: 312).

Under President Kagame, Rwanda has moved closer to the Anglophone camp, and is now considered as an ally of the US and UK (Gegout 2009: 233; interview, Filip Reyntjens, April 2012). Rwanda has joined the East African Community, opened English schools and introduced English as an official language (Agence France Presse 29 November 2009). In November 2009, Rwanda, despite not being a former UK colony, became a member of the Commonwealth (Reyntjens 2010: 2).

4.2.5.8. Guinea

Guinea is a former French colony, but after decolonisation Guinea chose to remain outside the French sphere of influence. When Guinea gained independence from France in 1958, association with France was turned down in a referendum (International Crisis Group 2003a: 2). Consequently, in the first years of independence, Guinea maintained a level of mistrust vis-à-vis its former coloniser. President
Sékou Touré (1958-1984) accused France and other Western powers of plotting against the Guinean revolution (Arieff 2009: 333), leading to a suspension of all aid to Guinea (Smith 2006: 416). Relations improved significantly under President Lansana Conté who, unlike his predecessor, did not take an explicitly anti-colonial stance and re-established relations with the West. However, although France re-engaged with Guinea, the country largely remained outside the French sphere of influence as it was especially the US that started close military cooperation with Conté (International Crisis Group 2003a: 16). As was mentioned supra, the French reaction to the 2008 military coup can be interpreted as informed by historical interests. France did not immediately suspend bilateral aid, as it seemed to confide in the junta’s promise to organise elections as soon as possible (Afrik News 2009, January). It was only after the crackdown of security forces on an opposition rally in September 2009 that France suspended its military cooperation and re-examined its bilateral aid (Gibert 2010: 120). President Condé’s election in 2010 was welcomed by France, which could be related to the fact that Condé spent a large part of his life in France (anonymous interview, February 2012). Several aid projects were immediately resumed in March 2011, at the occasion of a visit of the new president (Jeune Afrique 2011, March).

4.2.5.9. Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire is without doubt one of the most important former colonies of France. It has been described as the ‘epitome of Françafrique’ under President Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled from decolonisation in 1960 until 1993 (Bovcon 2009a: 284). There is a French military basis in Abidjan. However, the French military did not intervene in 1999 to protect President Bédié against a military coup by Robert Gueï, given the policy of non-interventionism of prime minister Jospin (Médard 2008: 320). Gueï was given the benefit of the doubt, and the French reaction to the coup remained limited to a partial suspension of military cooperation (Le Pape and Vidal 2002: 312-317). At an initial stage, France was quite critical about Gueï’s intent to stand in the 2000 presidential elections and to exclude the candidacy of Ouattara. In a public declaration, it was stated that every candidate should have the possibility to run for elections. However, when this was denounced as ‘neo-colonialist’ by the Ivorians, the French Minister for Cooperation declared in the press that France had not wanted to depart from its neutral position: ‘Nous n’entendons pas établir la liste des candidats’. Hence, although Ouattara was excluded from the elections, the French took the position that the elections were legal, given that they were held according to Ivorian laws. Moreover, 800 million francs in budgetary support were set aside on the eve of the elections, thereby breaking the Abidjan doctrine that provided that France would only grant budgetary support to countries with an agreement with the IFIs (Le Pape and Vidal 2002: 318-319; International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29).

The French initially supported Laurent Gbagbo, not in the least President Chirac’s socialist coalition partners, who were keen on having a socialist president in Côte d’Ivoire (Moncrieff 2012: 10).
Personal relations also play a role here: Gbagbo had spent six years in Paris in voluntary exile in the early 1980s. During this time he established close contacts with Guy Labertit, who was at the time member of the anti-colonialist socialist party Parti socialiste unifié, but later joined the Parti socialiste. It is believed that Gbagbo returned France a favour for his acceptance, notably the continuation of economic (see infra) and military cooperation. Despite the fact that the programme of Gbagbo’s party Front populaire ivoirien included the removal of the French military basis, Gbagbo did not raise the issue once in power (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 2012). However, since the December 2000 elections were so flawed, bilateral aid was not resumed until April 2001 (Le Pape and Vidal 2002: 318-319; International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29).

Nonetheless, French diplomatic relations with Gbagbo became strained in subsequent years. After the September 2002 attack, the French protected Abidjan and lent logistical support. In 2003, the UN mandated French forces to support the regional forces of ECOWAS in implementing the Linas-Marcoussis accords. Operation Licorne was established, a 4,000 strong force which created a neutral buffer zone at the demarcation line. In a way, French military involvement in the Ivorian crisis was seen as a breach from former French military policy in Africa. France did not immediately resort to military action and when it did, it sought to avoid imposing internal order and acted on the basis of a UN mandate (Utley 2005: 33). Hence, rather than pushing the rebellion back to Burkina Faso (which it was perfectly capable of), the French military intervention stopped in Bouaké. This allowed the rebellion to establish itself in the north of the country (d’Ersu 2007: 87-89). President Gbagbo and many with him interpreted this limited application of the defence agreements as a sign of betrayal (International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29). This resulted in a violent anti-French campaign by the so-called Young Patriots, who accused the French of supporting Ouattara, launched a violent attack on the French military base in October 2002 and reacted violently to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement by attacking French official buildings, schools, etc. (International Crisis Group 2003b: 27-31). However, Franco-African relations were restored during 2003, and in February 2004 Gbagbo brought a visit to Paris. At that time, it seemed that France would appear willing to allow a re-election of Gbagbo (d’Ersu 2007: 96).

Nonetheless, Franco-Ivorian relations reached a low later in 2004. In April 2004, Franco-Canadian journalist André Kieffer was killed. An investigation later revealed senior members of the Gbagbo regime to be involved in the murder (Moncrieff 2012: 13). In November 2004, the French destroyed the Ivorian air force after the French military base in Bouaké was attacked by two Ivorian air planes. The attack was followed by violent anti-French protests, which were believed to be instigated by President Gbagbo (Bovcon 2009a: 286; Klaas 2008: 118). As a result of the growing hostility against France, the French position in Côte d’Ivoire became untenable. French development cooperation was de facto halted and only one agent from the Agence Française de Développement stayed in the country (Youngs 2006: 348). These events also impacted on the French position in the conflict. By 2005, the
French tried to put forward the person of prime minister Banny, who had clear presidential ambitions, to replace Gbagbo. This strategy however proved unsuccessful as Gbagbo sidelined the French by entering into direct dialogue with the rebels, which eventually led to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (d’Ersu 2007: 100-103). After the Ouagadougou Agreement, France and Côte d’Ivoire normalised relations (development assistance, diplomatic contacts). This was also related to the arrival in power of president Sarkozy, who aimed for a new start after relations between Gbagbo and Chirac had turned hostile (Labertit 2010: 44-45).

However, this changed after the 2010 elections. France immediately recognised the victory of Ouattara on 4 December and was at the forefront of international action to force Gbagbo to step down. For example, it is believed that France convinced the Union Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest to impose sanctions on Gbagbo and his supporters by limiting the authorisation of bank accounts to Ouattara supporters only (anonymous interviews, January 2012). Not surprisingly, after Ouattara took office, France was quick to strengthen ties with the new president and to re-establish its presence in Côte d’Ivoire. Despite the formal closure of the military basis in July 2008, a strong military presence was maintained to organise Ouattara’s personal security and a big aid and relief package was prepared (Jeune Afrique 2012, January; Moncrieff 2012: 22 and 30-31). There are several explanations for this pro-Ouattara approach. Of course, the downturn in Franco-Ivorian relations made France more antagonistic towards the Gbagbo regime. In addition, although Ouattara was traditionally seen as part of the Anglophone camp, he had developed friendly relations with Sarkozy, whom he had known when he was Africa director of the IMF (d’Ersu 2007: 95). The forcefulness of the French approach could be interpreted as a way to gain the confidence of Ouattara (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 2012).

### 4.2.5.10. Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe was a UK colony until gaining independence as South Rhodesia in 1965, when it came under white minority rule by Ian Smith. The UK advocated for international sanctions against the minority regime and mediated the Lancaster House Agreement which ended the civil war in 1979. During the transition period that followed before elections were held in 1980, the UK took over control of the territory. The UK’s relations with Mugabe have from the onset been dominated by the land reform question. This was also the major stumbling block during the Lancaster House Agreement. The agreement provided special safeguards for white Zimbabweans for the first ten years, while the UK government agreed to contribute to the costs of the land resettlement programme (Thomas 2003: 697; Taylor and Williams 2002: 549). In 1998, a donor conference was held during which a land reform programme was agreed, but in 2000, Zimbabwe’s draft constitution provided for land acquisition without compensation unless paid for by the UK. White-owned farms were forcefully invaded by war veterans and in September 2000, Mugabe undertook a fast-track land scheme resettling
150,000 farmers. These decisions were ill-received by the UK, which had from the beginning insisted on a land reform policy based on market principles. The UK therefore refused to meet its promises to fund land reform (Taylor and Williams 2002: 549-550 and 553-554). In September 2001, the Abuja Agreement was signed, which provided that Zimbabwe would end all farm invasions, while the UK agreed to provide funds to compensate resettled farmers (International Crisis Group 2001: 3; Tordoff and Young 2005: 417-418). However, the Abuja agreement was ignored by the Mugabe government, further feeding mistrust by the UK.

The UK has been a key advocate of negative measures as a reaction to violations of democratic principles in Zimbabwe. It took the lead in advocating for negative measures within the Commonwealth group. This led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from its organisation’s councils and targeted sanctions against Mugabe and about 70 of his closest associates after the 2002 presidential elections (Makumbe 2002: 87-88).

This position should first of all be seen in the light of Mugabe’s land reform policies, which had seriously affected white farmers (Porteous 2005: 291). However, to this the unprecedented interest from British NGO’s, the media and the parliament in the situation in Zimbabwe should be added (Porteous 2005: 291; Porteous 2008: 111). As stated by Cargill: ‘From a purely strategic point of view, what happens [in Zimbabwe] is of limited interest to the United Kingdom, yet domestic pressure forces engagement’ (Cargill 2010: 31). The Zimbabwean community in the UK was estimated at 130,000 in 2009 (House of Commons 2010). A Zimbabwe Diaspora Focus Group was established after repeated approaches of UK-based Zimbabweans to the FCO (Cargill 2011: 16).

4.2.6. Analysis

H.4. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that protect the sphere of influence of member states, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that do not protect the sphere of influence of member states.

The first part of this hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the cases of Chad and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005). France has aimed to keep Chadian President Déby in power at all costs. This is mainly related to the traditional close relations between President Déby and France. Although France has recently placed more emphasis on democratisation, negative measures are avoided as the preference is for a continuity of the Déby regime. There is also a link with the previous Chapter here: it is likely that France managed to convince the other EU member states and the Commission that President Déby is the only guarantee for stability. Indeed, diplomatic cables from the US ambassador reporting on meetings with the French ambassador indicate that the latter tried to convince the US ambassador of
this idea. It can be assumed that this was equally tried with the German ambassador and the delegation of the European Commission.

Moreover, the fact that the EU’s aid suspension in Côte d’Ivoire in 2000 was only of short duration is a direct consequence of French historical interests. Indeed, although France attempted to break with its interventionist Africa policies by not intervening directly to protect the regime in power in 1999 and 2002, the French still preferred to give Gbagbo the ‘benefit of the doubt’ rather than to insist on an inclusive democratisation process that could have led to a change in power. The quick lifting of EU sanctions in February 2002 was a direct consequence of French pressure. Indeed, after Gbagbo had lobbied the French government to advocate within the EU for a resumption of aid, Chirac managed to convince Commissioner Nielson to resume cooperation (Le Pape and Vidal 2002: 318-319; International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29). Moreover, the French attempt to improve relations with Gbagbo in early 2004 was translated into the blocking of the reopening of Article 96 consultations in March 2004. Indeed, France and Germany were noted to have opposed the proposal of the European Commission (anonymous interview, March 2007 and February 2012).

However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed by the cases of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda. In Eritrea, Italy risked a break in diplomatic relations by addressing the crackdown on dissent in 2001. Moreover, officials involved in EU decision-making on Eritrea have indicated that Italy did not try to protect Eritrea from negative measures (anonymous interviews, January 2012). In Ethiopia, there was no former colonial power that could have influenced the EU’s position on how to react to violations of democratic principles. Italy has been in favour of engagement in Ethiopia, but was not noted to be a crucial player in interviews with aid officials and diplomats from EU member states in Addis Ababa (January 2011). The UK has not been in favour of negative measures in Nigeria, but I do not believe that this position was informed by the desire to maintain its sphere of influence. In fact, Nigeria had not been part of the UK’s sphere of influence after decolonisation. Moreover, the UK advised Obasanjo to retire in 2007. Rwanda used to be part of the Francophone (Belgian and French) sphere of influence, but is now much more closer to the Anglophone sphere of influence. From this perspective, there is no reason for France and Belgium to decide against negative measures in Rwanda, at least not to protect historical interests.

The second part of the hypothesis is partly confirmed by the cases of Niger and Guinea. French relations with these governments were not as close when compared to the Déby regime in Chad. There is no military basis in neither Niger nor Guinea. Compared to President Déby who has been in power since 1990, President Tandja only assumed power in 1999, hence there were less examples of Tandja ‘rendering services’ to France. Moreover, although Conté was much closer to France than his predecessor, as a US ally Guinea could be seen as part of the Anglophone sphere of influence. This can explain why France, although it was not in favour of sanctions against both countries, did not veto
sanctions at EU level. In the case of Niger, although France was initially cautious to criticise Tandja’s decision to stay in power, by August 2009 it was on the same line as the other member states and the European Commission. While the exact reasons for this shift are unknown, it can be expected that France was convinced because of the wide international consensus on sanctions against Tandja (see also next Chapter). In the context of the Article 96 consultations against Guinea in 2003-2004, France was ‘not keen to use Article 96 but did not press its position at the moment of the Council’s decision in 2004’ (Laakso et al. 2007b: 46). Similarly, despite the fact that France developed close relations with the new president Condé in Guinea, this did not prevent the French from aligning with the position in the Council that full aid can only be resumed after legislative elections (anonymous interview, February 2012).

However, the hypothesis is refuted by the case of Kenya. The UK has not been concerned about the maintainance of a sphere of influence in Kenya. This can be observed in the UK’s vocal criticism on corruption. Moreover, the UK was the first to threaten with sanctions after the elections in December 2007, and was even accused of supporting the opposition.

The hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the case of Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011). Interviews have revealed that France was the main proponent of EU sanctions against President Gbagbo and his government after the December 2010 elections. The fact that the list of people and entities under sanctions was so extensive and included sanctions on the import of cocoa, was primarily the result of French pressure (anonymous interviews, January 2012). As I have argued, the fact that France was so keen on Gbagbo’s removal from power should be seen in the context of the deteriorated bilateral relations between France and Côte d’Ivoire from the mid-2000s onwards.

The hypothesis was confirmed in the case of Zimbabwe. The anti-Western stance of the government of Zimbabwe and the failure to honour the land reform agreement clearly informed the UK’s preference for negative measures. Moreover, this position has been translated to the EU level. The UK has been described as the most active member state in the Council on Zimbabwe and has advocated for tough sanctions. After the September 2001 Abuja agreement, the UK preferred to wait and see, but when progress in the implementation of the agreement stalled, the UK resumed support for meaningful EU action (International Crisis Group 2002b: 15). The UK has also been opposed to lift the sanctions, even though some progress was made after the 2008 GPA. During discussions on the renewal of sanctions in February 2012, the UK was noted to be the main opponent of easing the sanctions (anonymous interviews, January-February 2012).

However, the importance of the land reform question should not be exaggerated. The Zimbabwean case showed that, apart from government-to-government relations, the domestic public may also be a determining factor when it comes to negative measures against a former colony. Similar evidence was
found in the case of Nigeria, where UK policies are influenced by an important Nigerian diaspora. In the case of elections in Nigeria, this does not seem to have reached the Nigerian public as much as the crisis in Zimbabwe. Hence, former colonial relations do not always lead to policies based on the desire to maintain spheres of influence, but may also lead to negative measures to give in to pressure from the public.
4.3. Commercial interests

At first sight, one would expect commercial interests to play a minor role in EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa, given the marginalisation of the subcontinent in the world economy. In 2005, sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the world GDP was only 1.4 percent, although the African population accounted for 11.5 percent of the world total. Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP per capita was the lowest in the world (Bigsten and Duvall 2008: 16). This economic marginalisation is also reflected in the evolution of EU trade with the ACP region. Excluding South Africa, the share of ACP countries in EU imports has been 3.2 percent on average over the last five years, while the ACP’s share of EU exports was only slightly higher at 3.5 percent. By way of comparison, China on its own accounts for 18.8 percent of imports into the EU and 8.4 percent of EU exports. Only South Africa (place 17), Nigeria (21) and Angola (46) figure in the top 50 of countries importing into the EU.47 Moreover, as was argued in the previous subchapter, the marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa in the world economy led to a reassessment of the relations between the EEC, France and sub-Saharan Africa, away from a partnership based on historical interests.

At the same time, commercial interests have been noted to play a role in French policies in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly during the presidency of Sarkozy who, as mentioned supra, saw sub-Saharan Africa more in terms of economic benefit than in terms of historical interests (Barrios 2010: 1). During official visits, Sarkozy was often accompanied by large business delegations. Moreover, Sarkozy had personal ties to the owners of companies active in sub-Saharan Africa such as Bolloré and Bouygues (Moncrieff 2012: 16-17; Mengara 2010: 64). For the UK, however, commercial interests in sub-Saharan Africa were considered to be small: ‘aid rather than trade was the prime focus of British efforts in Africa under the Labour government’ (Vines 2011: 27). In 2006, the UK’s exports to sub-Saharan Africa were only 1.8 percent of total exports and 1.6 percent of total import, and these percentages drop by two thirds when South Africa is removed from the equation (Gallagher 2009: 444).

4.3.1. Raw materials

Despite the relatively low importance of most ACP countries as trade partners of the EU, sub-Saharan African soil possesses many strategic commodities that are becoming increasingly scarce, including coltan, diamonds, gold, uranium, casiterite and wolframite (Williams 2010: 39). This has increased the geopolitical importance of the subcontinent, as can be observed in a growing diversity in economic partners (Hugon 2007: 63). The EU is fully aware of the growing scarcity of certain raw materials and of the increased competition with other international actors in this respect. In 2008, the European Commission developed the raw materials initiative, meant to ensure access to and affordability of

mineral raw materials. The text states that ‘Emerging countries are also pursuing strategies towards resource-rich countries with the apparent aim of securing privileged access to raw materials’, referring to China’s and India’s increased economic engagement with Africa (European Commission 2008c: 5). In a supporting document, the European Commission includes a graph of resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including hydrocarbon-rich countries (oil producers), mineral-rich countries (Guinea, DRC, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa), as well as countries where new oil and mining projects have started (Mali, Niger, the Central African republic, Zimbabwe, etc) (European Commission 2008d: 13). In a 2011 Communication, the European Commission mentions 14 critical raw materials that are at risk of shortage. Sub-Saharan African countries are amongst the main producers of five of these critical raw materials, including antinomy (South Africa) beryllium (Mozambique), cobalt (DRC and Zambia), platinum (South Africa and Zimbabwe) and tantalum (Rwanda, DRC) (European Commission 2011f: 21-22).

4.3.2. Energy sources

Of these raw materials, energy sources (oil, gas, uranium) are of primordial importance. Energy has become a foreign policy priority of the EU, as cheaper oil is becoming less and less easily available, while global demand has boomed (Engdahl 2004: 258-259). The EU will increasingly come to rely on imported oil given that oil production will not keep pace with the growing consumption and North Sea oil reserves will run out by 2030-2050 (Youngs 2008b: 1; European Commission 2002b: 8). Import dependency, at 75 percent in 2002, could rise to 90 percent by 2020 for oil and to 70 percent by 2030 for natural gas. Moreover, EU oil imports are little diversified: the majority comes from the Middle East. Diversification of oil supply is thus a clear priority for the EU (Haghighi 2007: 160; European Commission 2011d). In this respect, the energy potential of sub-Saharan Africa is notable. By the mid-2000s, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of new oil and gas discoveries in the world, while its production increased by up to a third when compared to the mid-1990s. New offshore drilling technology and the rise in oil prices rendered exploration in the Gulf of Guinea more feasible and profitable. Oil from this region is attractive because of its high quality (low sulphur content), easy shipping routes (unlike in Central Asia or the Middle East) and off-shore production, which can be exported straight to Western markets. Moreover, most African governments offer Western investors relatively generous production-sharing agreements (Youngs 2009c: 127-128). West Africa accounts for about 6 percent of global oil supplies and 3 percent of the world’s proven reserves (Hueper 2005: 248-249). For certain member states, Africa is particularly important for oil supply. Because of the many investments in Africa of the Total Group, 20 percent of France’s oil imports comes from the African continent (Hugon 2007: 57).

External energy policies have strongly remained in the hands of the member states (Belyi 2008: 205). At the EU level, external energy policies have only developed very recently. It was only in 2006, when
energy prices began to hit record highs and following a European Commission Green Paper, that the European business community started lobbying for an EU external energy policy (Youngs 2008c: 120; Youngs 2009c: 154 and 164). The EU has mainly concentrated on the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia for its energy supply, while sub-Saharan Africa’s energy potential has been largely overlooked. The EU’s external energy policies mainly focus on developing a ‘Southern Corridor’ for oil and gas in the Caspian and Middle East regions, for example with the planned Nabucco pipeline (European Commission 2006a: 5; European Commission 2011d: 5 and 10). As a result, the EU has been bypassed by more concerted US and Chinese efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. By the early 2000s, the EU’s primary role in African energy was fast disappearing, while the influence of the US, China, Russia and other companies including from Korea, India, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia was on the rise. This is somewhat strange given the comparative advantage of European companies because of colonial history (Youngs 2009c: 126-129; Klare 2009). In recent years, however, the EU seems to have become aware of its declining position in the rat race for Africa’s energy sources. It is in this context that the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership should be regarded (Campbell 2008: 91; Schoeman 2011: 45). The Partnership is meant to re-engage with the continent, including in the energy sphere (Youngs 2009c: 133). With the strategy, an Africa-EU Energy Strategy was established, and the EU increased external assistance in the energy sector. However, it has been argued that, compared to Russia or the Middle East, EU energy policies in Africa are much more development-oriented, focusing on energy poverty, regional interconnections and the increasing use of renewable energy in Africa (Hadfield and Youngs 2008: 4; Youngs 2009c: 131). Furthermore, in contradiction to the proposition that the EU would engage in a rat race with China, pressure from European enterprises afraid of losing contracts to Chinese companies had little effect on the trilateral dialogue between the EU, Africa and China, which emphasised Chinese cooperation with Africa as a major opportunity for Africa (Carbone 2011: 214).

4.3.3. Commercial interests versus democracy promotion

As was argued in the Introductory Chapter, double standards in EU democracy promotion are often attributed to the EU’s commercial interests. Given the increased interest in Africa’s scarce resources, one could expect this to be equally the case in the EU’s reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. As former High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana stated: ‘The scramble for territory of the past may be replaced by a scramble for energy...[...] Thus, our energy needs may well limit our ability to push wider foreign policy objectives, not least in the area of conflict resolution, human rights and good governance ...The scramble for energy risks being pretty unprincipled’ (cited in Youngs 2008b: 6). Similarly, a French policy-maker was quoted saying France was willing to support political reform, ‘with the key exception of oil producing states where European interests would suffer from assertive democracy promotion policies’ (Ibid.). An extreme form of prioritisation of commercial interests is the idea of ‘regime change’ where governments endanger commercial interests, particularly in the oil sector. An early example of this is Congo-
Brazzaville, where France/Elf was accused of plotting a coup in 1992 to oust a government because of its negative influence on oil contracts (Youngs 2009c: 128; Soares de Oliveira 2007: 260). This idea has also resonated in US neo-conservative circles, where some have argued that regime change would be beneficial for energy interests in the case of autocrats who heighten oil prices by introducing nationalist policies. In a less extreme form, however, one could expect energy importers to support democratic reform in oil producing countries where non-democratic rulers endanger Western energy interests (Youngs 2008b: 14). This is especially relevant in the context of an increasing ‘resource nationalism’ in producers of raw materials, oil or other, where governments actively try to enlarge the domestic gains of the extraction of resources. Examples of such policies can be found in Zimbabwe, Zambia, the DRC and Nigeria (The Economist 2012, February; Bremmer and Johnston 2009). Resource nationalism has often been linked to non-democratic politics of producer states (Youngs 2008b: 14).

4.3.4. Hypothesis and operationalisation
In the above, it was noted that the commercial importance of most sub-Saharan African countries for the EU is rather small, but may still play a role for some member states with particular commercial interests and for those sub-Saharan African countries that possess scarce raw materials, particularly energy resources. Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:

*H.5. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where EU commercial interests are important and where governments serve EU commercial interests, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries where the EU only has minor commercial interests or where the government does not serve EU commercial interests.*

To investigate this hypothesis, I looked at trade and investment relations between the member states and the ten case studies. Trade data were gathered from the Eurostat online database, where I retrieved the value of EU trade with the ten countries by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) over the period 2000-2010. On the basis of these data, I calculated the percentage of import and export per member state for the period 2000-2010. The total amount of import and export, as well as the main trade partners within the EU, are listed in Tables 20 and 21 on p. 204 and 205. By taking the total value of trade flows between 2000 and 2010, a general picture is drawn of the main trade partners, rather than the evolution over the years. This is justified by the fact that trade volumes were rather constant over the years. Data regarding FDI were also retrieved from the Eurostat online database. The total amount for 2000-2009 was calculated and the main investors were listed in Table 23 on p. 206. Apart from the overall trade flows, I also took into account the volume of trade in energy sources (see Table 22 on p. 205). For this I used country fiches from DG Trade available for 2005, which included the value of import for each category. These country fiches were also used for information on the main product
imported into the EU. It should be noted that for many member states, data on FDI were missing for specific years. For example, France and the UK did not provide data on FDI before 2003. It was difficult to overcome this problem because the OECD database, to my knowledge the only other database providing data on FDI per partner country, also had these shortcomings. Apart from the quantitative data on trade and investment flows, I also assessed government policies that may or may not serve commercial interests, including legislation on foreign investment, national ownership, diversifying between European and non-European investors, etc. For this I relied on secondary sources, namely academic articles and press articles.

4.3.5. Case studies

4.3.5.1. Eritrea
Eritrea is a negligible commercial partner of the EU. Of the ten country cases, it was the least important partner in terms of trade, and the second least important partner in terms of investment. Furthermore, Eritrea is not an energy supplier to the EU. FDI of the member states in Eritrea was negligible, only Italy had some investments in the period under review (€21 million), which may be related to President Afewerki’s visits to Italy in 2003-2004 to attract Italian investors (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 18 March 2003; 22 May 2004). It should however be added that in 2009, disinvestments were made for €11 million. Italy was also Eritrea’s main trade partner in the EU, counting for almost half of EU exports and imports.

4.3.5.2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia is a medium trade partner of the EU, in terms of trade it is comparable to Guinea. Ethiopia’s exports are dominated by coffee (European Commission 2005). The main destinations for Ethiopian products are Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The main exporting partners were Italy, Germany, France and the UK. Investment has been limited: Ethiopia was only at place 6, although it is the second most populated sub-Saharan African country. Italy, the UK and Germany were the main investors in Ethiopia.

4.3.5.3. Kenya
Of the country cases, Kenya was the third most important trade partner of the EU, after Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. Kenya mainly exports agri- and horticultural products: flowers, coffee, tea, etc. (European Commission 2005). Kenya’s main trade partner in the EU is the UK. In second place comes the Netherlands, which is the main importer of Kenyan flowers. EU investment in Kenya has been substantial: only Nigeria had a larger amount of EU FDI. The UK and France were the main investors. After a visit by China’s president to Kenya in 2006, the government of Kenya granted exclusive rights over six of the eleven available oil exploration blocks to the China National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC), with no competitive bidding. This caused controversy in Europe as European competitors (including Spanish Cepsa and Swedish Lundin International) suspected favouritism. Some blocks were eventually ceded to Cepsa and Lundin, but at a fee to CNOOC (Fiott 2010: 5; Chege 2008: 30). However, in October 2007, Swedish Lundin nonetheless managed to obtain an oil exploration deal (Reuters 2007, October).

4.3.5.4. Chad

Despite the potential of Chad’s oil wealth (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 14), EU-Chadian commercial relations are rather small. In terms of imports into the EU, only Eritrea and Rwanda were smaller trade partners. Given that European firms (Elf, Total and Shell) pulled out of Chad’s oil extraction in 1999-2000 (Youngs 2009c: 149), the amount of Chadian oil imported into the EU is negligible. The main importers of Chadian products are the UK, France and Portugal. Export from the EU into Chad is largely dominated by France. France is also the only member state with some investments in Chad, the amount of which is, however, rather small.

4.3.5.5. Niger

Overall, Niger is a minor trade partner of the EU. Trade relations with Niger are more or less on the same level as with Chad. However, Niger is commercially important to France as one of the world’s largest uranium suppliers. This can be seen in the French dominance in EU imports from Niger (90 percent). France was also the only EU member state with some investments in 2002-2010, although the balance of investments and disinvestments in this period was negative (-€6 million). As a journalist from Der Spiegel noted: ‘Niger is to the nuclear industry what Saudi-Arabia is to the oil industry’. Nigerien uranium provides the fuel of 58 nuclear reactors in France, which is highly dependent on nuclear power. Uranium exploitation in Niger is largely in the hands of the French company Areva, which is almost entirely owned by the French government (Der Spiegel 2010, February; Shaffer 2009: 131). Areva has been mining uranium in Niger since the 1970s. Until 2006, Areva had a monopoly on uranium extraction from Niger, but in 2007, Niger opened up its market to international competition, leading to bids from China, South Africa, Canada, Australia, India, the UK, etc. (Keenan 2008: 457). Moreover, the Nigerien government expelled Areva’s Director of Foreign Operations Dominique Pin in July 2007, accusing him of supporting the Tuareg rebels. A high-level diplomatic mission was dispatched from France to Niger, after which a new agreement on mining concessions was reached (Afrik News 2009, May; Agence France Presse 26 July 2007). Under the new agreement, however, Niger sold its oil at a much higher price than it used to (Agence France Presse 4 August 2007). When Sarkozy visited Niger in March 2009, uranium formed the main topic of his visit (Agence France Presse 24 March 2009). An agreement on a new uranium mine was concluded, which was believed to become the world’s second largest uranium mine, expected to produce 5,000 tonnes of uranium annually (BBC News 4 May 2009; US embassy Niger 2009h). It has been suggested that the French
silence about Tandja’s plans to run for a third term was a trade-off for the new uranium contract. Grégoire believes that Sarkozy, during his visit in March 2009, gave his support to the constitutional coup to ensure the uranium contract (Grégoire 2011: 219-220). Niger is also a 10 percent stakeholder and crucial partner in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project (see infra). Proposals for oil extraction were made in 2008, but none of the European oil companies found them profitable (Augé 2011: 189-196).

4.3.5.6. Nigeria

Of the ten case studies, Nigeria is by far the most important commercial partner of the EU. In 2000-2010, the EU imported almost €100 billion from Nigeria, which is about ten times the amount imported from Kenya. EU exports in the same period were smaller, but still considerable: €77 billion. Moreover, the EU’s imports from Nigeria are dominated by oil and gas: in 2005, 91.2 percent of products imported into the EU were oil and gas products (European Commission 2005). Nigerian gas accounted for 4 percent of total EU imports (European Commission 2011e: 3). EU-Nigerian trade has increased significantly in recent years: between 2004 and 2010, EU imports from Nigeria almost tripled (from €5.2 billion in 2004 to €14.6 billion in 2010). This is largely the result of the EU’s attempts to diversify its energy imports and to reduce dependence on Russia. Nigeria’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 36 billion barrels; natural gas reserves are well over 100 trillion cubic feet; the seventh largest in the world. Nigeria’s current oil production is around 1.6 million barrels a day on average (US State Department 2010; Nigerian Guardian 2011, March).

The main EU member states importing from Nigeria are Spain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal. Exports to Nigeria mainly come from the Netherlands, the UK and France. For the UK, Nigeria is the second largest market for exports in Africa (UK Trade & Investment s.d.). However, due to investments from Dutch Shell and France’s Total and Technip in the oil sector, Dutch and French investments easily surpass those of the UK (see Table 19 on p. 200). French investments in Nigeria are as large as those made in all other West African countries taken together (Khakee 2007: 6-7). French commercial interests in Nigeria have led to a move away from its traditional sphere of influence, which was the main message during the visit in 2009 of French prime minister Fillon to Nigeria (Agence France Presse 19 May 2009). The UK’s investment in Nigeria is dominated by British Gas and Centrica. Smaller investors include Germany and Italy, which is present with its major oil company ENI (Khakee 2007: 7).
Table 19. Top 3 EU investors in Nigeria, 2002-2010, € million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat online database

While energy supply has gained importance, this could become even more important with the planned Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which would be able to transport up to 30 billion cubic metres of Nigerian gas to EU markets (Africa Research Bulletin 2008, September-October; European Commission 2006a). Although investors have been hesitant because of insecurity in the Niger Delta, Repsol (Spain), Gas Natural (Spain) Total (France) and ENI (Italy) have expressed interest in building the pipeline (Augé 2011: 199-201). A Memorandum of Understanding was agreed between Nigeria, Niger and Algeria in July 2009. President Jonathan has confirmed that the pipeline will be operational in 2015 (Energy & Corporate Africa 2011, July). The European Commission strongly supports the pipeline (Council of the EU 2007d), which should be seen in the light of the above-mentioned competition between the EU and the emerging powers over energy supplies. Russia first offered to build the pipeline, but the EU made a counteroffer, thus preventing Russia from gaining control over the potential alternative to Russian supplies of natural gas (Volman 2010: 12; BBC News 2008, September).

However, the governments of Nigeria have not served EU commercial interests to the best extent possible. First of all, the Nigerian government has proved incapable to meet financial commitments in joint ventures (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 243). Secondly, although Obasanjo originally followed anti-nationalist policies of privatisation and liberalisation (Amuwo 2009: 55), during his second term an emerging resource nationalism could be noted. New quotas on minimum Nigerian participation in oil licenses were approved (Youngs 2008b: 14; Obi 2010: 450). His successor Jonathan continued these policies by signing the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development law in April 2010, aimed to increase local content in the oil and gas industry. Moreover, between 2003 and 2007, Nigeria’s main oil contracts went to Asian rather than to European companies (Obi 2010: 451; Youngs 2008b: 14). Thirdly, international companies have faced an ever-rising tax from the federal government: by the mid-2000s the Nigerian government was collecting 95 percent of its profits, the highest take in the whole of Africa (Youngs 2008c: 123-124; Youngs 2009c: 166). Fourthly, President Obasanjo has done little to improve the security situation in the Niger Delta, which has seriously affected Western oil interests. This will further be discussed infra.
4.3.5.7. Rwanda
Rwanda is only a minor commercial partner of the EU; only Eritrea was less important in terms of trade and investment. Although Rwanda produces 9 percent of the world’s tantalum – a scarce raw material according to the EU - exports to the EU have been dominated by coffee (80 percent) (Van Teeffelen 2012; European Commission 2005). Rwanda’s imports from the EU mainly come from Belgium, Germany and France. FDI from EU member states is also minor: only France (€4 million) and Germany (€6 million) had some investments in 2002-2010.

4.3.5.8. Guinea
Guinea is a medium trade partner of the EU, with imports and exports comparable to that of Ethiopia. Given Guinea’s mineral wealth, the main products exported into the EU are aluminium (67.5 percent) and diamonds (9.2 percent) (European Commission 2005). The main importers of Guinean goods were Spain, the UK, France, Belgium and Ireland. EU exports to Guinea mainly came from France, the Netherlands and Belgium. FDI from member states was minor in Guinea: only France (€26 million) and Belgium (€16 million) invested small amounts. Unlike his predecessor Sékou Touré who turned to the Soviets rather than allowing Western companies to invest in the Guinean economy, under Conté, foreign investment was encouraged (Duarte 1999: 7-8). European companies were little involved in Guinean mining, but during the post-Conté transition period, there were attempts to gain important mining contracts (Yabi 2010: 45). France has been at the forefront of these efforts. In early 2011, infrastructure company Bollore won the contract for refurbishing and running the port in Conakry, amidst a controversial procedure given that a Bolloré subsidiary communications company had advised Alpha Condé during the elections (Moncrieff 2012: 17).

4.3.5.9. Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire is the second most important commercial partner of the ten country cases. The port of Abidjan is the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa and Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s main cocoa producer (Labertit 2010: 21). Côte d’Ivoire’s main importers within the EU are the Netherlands and France. Although Côte d’Ivoire is an oil exporter, petroleum only accounted for a minor part of EU imports from Côte d’Ivoire, which were dominated by cocoa beans, paste or butter (50.7 percent) (European Commission 2005). France was also the main member state exporting to Côte d’Ivoire. France and Luxembourg were the main investors in Côte d’Ivoire, with investments over €400 million in the period 2002-2010. Italy (Edison) and Ireland (Tullow) were granted oil concessions in 2007 (Labertit 2010: 50).

Despite Gbagbo’s nationalist and anti-French discourse, French commercial interests were never really damaged. Although several small companies left, the larger companies (Bouygues, Bolloré) managed to maintain their interests (Hugon 2007: 64). France remained the pre-eminent commercial partner of
Côte d’Ivoire and bilateral exchanges increased by 17.5 percent between 2005 and 2006. Most of the contracts of French firms, including Bouygues, Bolloré and France Télécom, were renewed (Bovcon 2009b; Labertit 2010). In 2008, for example, Bolloré won the contract to manage Abidjan’s new port (Moncrieff 2012: 29). Some argue that there was a link between the French business community and Ouattara, based on friendships established during his period as prime minister in the 1990s (Moncrieff 2012: 27-31; Labertit 2010: 24 and 60). It has also been suggested that Ouattara’s past in the IMF made him closer to the new generation of neoliberal French politicians, including President Sarkozy (Bovcon 2009b). Indeed, after Ouattara was invested as the new President of Côte d’Ivoire, France immediately started to discuss new investments in Côte d’Ivoire (anonymous interview, January 2012).

4.3.5.10. Zimbabwe

Once on the same level as Kenya in terms of exports to the EU, the economic crisis has seriously affected Zimbabwe’s commercial relations with the EU. Even taking this into account, Zimbabwe is a medium trade partner of the EU. The main importing partners were the Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Italy. Zimbabwe mainly exported agri- and horticultural products to the EU, including tobacco, sugar and cut flowers. EU exports to Zimbabwe were largely dominated by the UK and Germany, which each accounted for about one fourth of imports from Zimbabwe. FDI came in the first place from the UK, which invested about €276 million in Zimbabwe from 2002 to 2009. However, foreign investors have been discouraged by increased government meddling in how foreign firms operate in the country. The most flagrant example is the 2007 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill that gave the government far-reaching powers regarding how foreign companies operate in the country (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 14-15; International Crisis Group 2007c: 5). Zimbabwe possesses large reserves of platinum and is responsible for 3 percent of world production (European Commission 2011f). In 2006, one of the world’s largest diamond mines was discovered in Marange, but initially the diamonds were not considered compliant with the Kimberley process, which made it impossible for European companies to import them because of human rights and corruption (VOA News 2011, June). In 2008, UK prime minister Gordon Brown discouraged London-based multinational Anglo-American to open a platinum mine in Zimbabwe, stating that ‘where businesses are helping the Zimbabwean regime, they should reconsider their position now’ (BBC News 2010, June).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Main partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Italy (43%), France (8.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Italy (24%), Germany (17%), France (11%), UK (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>UK (24%), France (12%), Netherlands (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>France (49%), Germany (10%), Belgium (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>France (44%), Germany (12%), Netherlands (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Netherlands (22%), UK (18%), France (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Belgium (24%), Germany (22%), France (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>France (28%), Netherlands (20%), Belgium (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>France (50%), Italy (8%), Netherlands (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Germany (25%), UK (24%), Netherlands (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat online database
Table 21. Overview import (2000-2010, €billion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Main partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Italy (49%), France (13.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Germany (31%), Italy (17%), Belgium (11%), Netherlands (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>UK (36%), Netherlands (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UK (26%), Portugal (20%), France (19%), Netherlands (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>France (92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Spain (33%), France (19%), Netherlands (11%), Portugal (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Germany (40%), Belgium (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Spain (25%), Italy (17%), Belgium (15%), France (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Netherlands (23%), France (22%), Germany (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Netherlands (20%), UK (20%), Germany (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat online database

Table 22. Energy producers: import of petroleum and uranium (2005), €billion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission (2005)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total FDI flows</th>
<th>Main investors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Italy, Sweden, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>UK, France, Germany, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>7,826</td>
<td>Netherlands, France, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>France, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>France, Luxembourg, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>UK, Sweden, Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat online database

### 4.3.6. Analysis

*H.5. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where EU commercial interests are important and where governments serve EU commercial interests, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries where the EU only has minor commercial interests or where the government does not serve EU commercial interests.*

The first part of the hypothesis could not be confirmed. To begin with, this appears clearly from the cases where the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures. In most of these countries, EU commercial interests were minor: only Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire were notable commercial partners of the EU, while Rwanda, Eritrea, Chad and Ethiopia were of minor commercial importance. Moreover, in Nigeria, President Obasanjo’s policies during his second term affected EU interests in the oil industry, while in Côte d’Ivoire, upon election there was no guarantee that President Gbagbo would serve the commercial interests of the member states, and France in particular.

The second part of the hypothesis is contradicted by the cases of Niger, Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), Guinea, Kenya and Zimbabwe. First of all, these countries were more important commercial partners than most countries where the EU was more reluctant to impose negative measures. Secondly, the governments that faced negative measures did not significantly put at risk the EU’s commercial interests. In the case of Niger, although some would argue that President Tandja’s uranium deals with the Chinese made him a less trustworthy partner for the French, a new uranium deal was closed only few months before the EU adopted sanctions measures against Tandja. Moreover, the French were initially opposed to negative measures. Although there may have been some frustration about resource
nationalism in Zimbabwe, it is unlikely that this would make the EU more prone to impose negative measures. EU commercial interests in Zimbabwe are – after all – only minor. The main products imported from Zimbabwe did not include any scarce raw materials. From this perspective, historical interests and development norms can be expected to be more important than commercial interests. Similarly, although it may be argued that the 2006 oil contract to the Chinese in Kenya made the EU less reluctant to threaten with negative measures, I did not find those member states of which companies had lost the contract to be more actively pushing for negative measures. Moreover, a few months before the December 2007 elections, one of the companies had gained a new contract. Furthermore, the Netherlands, which was the most important importer of Kenyan flowers, put the implementation of the power-sharing agreement back on the agenda of the Council in May 2009 (Council of the EU 2009; anonymous interview, December 2010). This cannot have been influenced by commercial interests, as there were no signs that these interests were threatened in 2009. Similarly, the French push for sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 seems to have been instigated by deteriorated political relations with President Gbagbo, rather than by commercial relations, as French commercial interests were largely maintained under Gbagbo. In Guinea, new commercial contracts were granted to France under the new government in 2010, yet this did not affect the EU’s position on negative measures, which has been to wait with the lifting of aid sanctions until free and fair legislative elections have taken place.

In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Zimbabwe, another element should be mentioned that is in contradiction with the proposition that commercial interests are dominant. In these countries, economic sanctions have directly harmed the commercial interests of member states. In Côte d’Ivoire, France acted against its commercial interests by supporting far-reaching sanctions against Gbagbo in 2010, including economic sanctions in key sectors of the economy, such as cocoa, the banking sector, Côte d’Ivoire’s two crucial ports and oil. These sanctions also affected French commercial interests and were therefore resisted by the French business community. For example, in February 2011 France closed two Ivorian filiales of the French banks BNP/Paribas and Société Générale. Although some EU member states were opposed to comprehensive sanctions in the cocoa and maritime sector because this would affect their trade interests and would have humanitarian consequences, sanctions were nevertheless adopted in these sectors, although the scope and duration was reduced (anonymous interview, February 2012). In Guinea (2009), a fisheries agreement was halted, which would have allowed European boats to have access to Guinean waters.

An even more recent example is the discussion on the easing of sanctions against Zimbabwe in February 2012. Given that diamonds from Zimbabwe’s Marange mine were declared compliant with the Kimberley Process in November 2011, Belgium, an important diamond importer, pushed to lift sanctions on the Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation, a state company that is on the list of

48 The Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands
companies of which financial assets are frozen. However, due to opposition from the UK and, to a lesser degree the Netherlands and Germany, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation was not removed from the list of sanctioned companies (anonymous interviews, January 2012).
4.4. Security interests
Lastly, I will look at security interests as an explanation for double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that the EU would hardly have any security interests in sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of geographical proximity, sub-Saharan African security does not have such direct consequences for European security, when compared to the European neighbourhood. Indeed, this was the main perception after the Cold War, which can explain why the international community was reluctant to intervene in African humanitarian crises in this period. On the other hand, this perception has changed with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After the attacks, the international community, and the US in particular, started to see specific regions in sub-Saharan Africa as potential fronts in the global war on terror. The war on terror has led to a dichotomy between partners versus enemies or ‘rogue states’, which has been compared to the division of East and West during the Cold War. Moreover, the EU’s extensive military involvement in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden shows that the EU fears the consequences of piracy for its commercial interests. Furthermore, the EU’s increasing concern over migration derives from new provisions in the Cotonou Agreement and specific development projects on the issue. Lastly, the EU is also working on the fight against organised crime. These examples, which will further be elaborated in the following paragraphs, show that self-interested security issues have become increasingly important in EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa.

4.3.1. Sub-Saharan Africa’s security importance
After the Cold War, sub-Saharan African countries, to put it bluntly, ‘were transformed from Cold War pawns, into irrelevant clutter’ (cited in Abrahamsen 2000: 33). Africa became of secondary importance in the security agenda of the EU and the US (Taylor 2010: 25; van de Walle 2009: 4). This resulted in reducing aid volumes to sub-Saharan Africa (Olsen 2004: 426), as well as to the closure of member states’ embassies, such as UK embassies in the DRC, Gabon and Liberia (Abrahamsen 2000: 33). Moreover, the international community was reluctant to intervene in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and where it did, such as in Rwanda or Somalia, troops were immediately withdrawn after some casualties. Mere humanitarianism proved an insufficient motivation for intervention (Porteous 2008: 28-29; Taylor 2010: 26; Kraxberger 2005).

However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed the perception of the international community. Security problems were no longer seen as merely ‘African’ problems, but were increasingly viewed as having a potential global impact. The predominant concern were the many ‘failed states’ in sub-Saharan Africa, which were seen as safe havens for terrorist groups (Picciotto 2004: 543-547; Kraxberger 2005: 55). Moreover, it was believed that the widespread conditions of conflict and poverty, the denial of political rights and the large percentage of Muslims could contribute to a radicalisation of the African population (Herbst and Mills 2003: 30-31; Clapham 2003: 25). As a consequence, sub-Saharan Africa
became a front in the US’s war on terror. Right after 9/11, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated that ‘Africa is critical to our war on terror’, while US ambassador to the UN Susan Rice called Africa ‘the world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism’ (Taylor 2010: 27). As a result, US military presence was bolstered in the two regions that were envisaged as the main breeding grounds for terrorism: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. In 2002, the US launched the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa and the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). With the first, 1,800 US troops were deployed to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti to provide technical assistance to local armies and deter and counter threats in Somalia, Kenya and Yemen (van de Walle 2009: 7-8). In 2003, USD 100 million was announced for the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative, the bulk of which was destined for military and security training (police, border control, aviation) (Kagwanja 2006: 82-83). The PSI focused on enhancing the border capacities of Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania against the movement of international terrorists. In 2005, these efforts were enhanced through the Defence Department’s Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara and the State Department’s Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which is larger in terms of funding and includes, apart from the original PSI countries, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria (Taguem Fah 2007: 105-106; van de Walle 2009: 7-8). In 2007, these activities were brought under a newly created African Command (AFRICOM) (van de Walle 2009: 7-8; Volman 2003: 576-577).

The collapse of the Somali state has facilitated the emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. This poses a particular problem for the EU since the Gulf of Aden is the main trade route between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with approximately 16,000 ships yearly navigating in this area (Pham 2010: 326 and 330). Especially energy vessels are under threat because of their highly valuable cargo and wealthy owners (Weitz 2009: 2). There has been an unprecedented response from the international community to these threats. The most notable are the US’s Combined Task Force 151, NATO’s Operation Open Shield and the EU’s Operation Atalanta, but other nations, including China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Turkey and Russia, have equally conducted anti-piracy operations (Weitz 2009: 3; Stevenson 2010: 30).

African migration has increasingly been perceived as a threat to the international community, and to the EU in particular. Civil war has led to the emigration of millions of persons to the EU. From 1997 to 2005, Somalia has consistently provided the largest numbers of asylum seekers in the UK, while large numbers of asylum seekers have also fled from wars and economic devastation in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Angola and Eritrea (Porteous 2008: 85). Migration into the EU further increased after 2000 because of economic growth and the post 9/11 reinforcement of US migration services (Adepoju et al. 2009: 43-45).

Furthermore, weak states are often conducive to organised crime. This phenomenon is particularly visible in West Africa, where porous borders, widespread corruption, conflict and post-conflict
situations, difficult economic and social conditions and impunity form the breeding ground for illicit cross-border crime with implications for Europe, including drugs trafficking, internet crime, human trafficking and the smuggling of illegal goods. Especially cocaine trafficking from South America via West Africa to Europe has become a lucrative business, since cocaine prevalence has decreased in the US and increased in Western Europe (Philip de Andrés 2008; UNODC 2005; Wannenburg 2005). Hence, those donors affected by organised crime, including the EU and the US, have worked with governments from sub-Saharan African countries to increase their capacity in the fight against organised crime. For example, apart from counter-terrorism activities, the PSI also focuses on enhancing border control to prevent drug trafficking (Taguem Fah 2007: 105-106).

Lastly, African insecurity has also threatened the energy supply of the EU, the US and other energy importers. Oil supplies have been reduced as a result of oil theft, vandalism, seizures of oil facilities and riots (Barnes 2005: 4). As a result, oil importing countries and particularly the US are training the security forces of oil producing states and conduct naval operations in the Gulf of Guinea (Volman 2003: 577; Klare and Volman 2006: 299-301; Taylor 2010: 142-143).

4.3.2. The response from the EU
The increased perception of African security as a threat to global security has also been reflected in EU-Africa policies. This can firstly be seen in the growing use of development money for purposes serving EU interests. The Instrument for Stability (IfS), for example, was set up in 2007 to finance rapid interventions to prevent instability. Its long-term component deals with transnational threats (European Commission 2008h). Furthermore, the transfer of responsibilities and staff from DG Development to the newly created EEAS can also be interpreted as an indication that development funds will be increasingly used for self-interested security purposes (Del Biondo et al. 2012). Moreover, the war on terror has become an element of the Cotonou Agreement after the 2005 revision. According to Article 11a, Parties firmly condemn all acts of terrorism and commit to combat terrorism, exchange information on terrorist groups and on means and methods to counter-terrorism acts. Furthermore, an article on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was added, in which cooperation on the countering of proliferation of WMD was recognised as an ‘essential element’, meaning that development assistance can be suspended if governments do not cooperate in this area (Hadfield 2007: 60-61). Moreover, the EU sponsors counter-terrorism activities by regional organisations. For example, the IfS financed a programme to support the counter-terrorism capacities of the AU (European Commission 2007a).

Both the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 follow-up mention piracy as a severe threat to EU security interests (European Union 2003: 5; European Union 2008: 8). This is reflected in the deployment of EU security forces to stem the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In December 2008,
the EU launched Operation Atalanta as the first naval operation within the framework of the ESDP. Although its main aim was to protect shipments belonging to the World Food Programme and to AMISOM, its mandate also includes activities aimed to deter the capture of fishing vessels, including the deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy and the protection of vulnerable shipping (Council of the EU 2010i). Moreover, under the IFI the EU is financing a project on ‘Critical maritime routes’ aimed at strengthening the governments of countries along crucial piracy hotspots in the fight against piracy (European Commission 2009c: 43-45).

Similarly, organised crime has increasingly been perceived as a security threat to the EU (European Union 2008; Council of the EU 2010g; European Council 2010). In March 2010, a ‘Strategic and concerted action to improve cooperation in combating organised crime, especially drug trafficking, in West Africa’ was adopted. The EU has worked with ECOWAS on organised crime, for example by providing small amounts of the EDF to help ECOWAS with the implementation of its action plan on drugs and organised crime. A special dialogue with ECOWAS takes place on these issues. Moreover, €4.3 million from the IFI has been dedicated to the fight against air and maritime-based trafficking (Council of the EU 2010h).

Furthermore, migration has become entrenched in EU development policies. The Cotonou Agreement foresees in its Article 13 that EU member states and ACP countries will accept the return and readmission of their nationals residing illegally on the territory of an ACP or EU member state and that bilateral agreements governing specific obligations may be concluded (Adepoju et al. 2009: 62-65). A Spanish-British proposal to make development aid conditional on third countries’ cooperation on migration control was rejected at the 2002 Seville Council, but it was agreed that, in case a non-EU state demonstrates an ‘unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration flows’, a reassessment of the relations with that country may follow (Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 445). Moreover, the EU has set up specific projects to support countries in the formulation of an effective migration policy and to combat illegal emigration. A budget line was set up in 2001 specifically dedicated to cooperation with third countries in the field of migration. In 2003, the Aeneas programme was established to assist countries in their efforts to better manage migration flows. The programme stressed in particular on stimulating third countries’ readiness to conclude readmission agreements and on assistance in coping with the consequences of such agreements (Niessen 2004: 4; Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 445).

Further evidence of the increased concern for African security problems affecting the EU can be found in the regional focus of the EU’s Africa policies. Indeed, the EU’s recent strategies on security and development are specifically directed to those regions where security problems have the greatest risk of spill-overs to the EU: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. For the Horn, a Communication on Security and Development, the first of its kind, was approved in 2006 (European Commission 2006b). The
2006 Communication emphasises the geostrategic importance of the Horn and the potential spill-overs of conflict in the region to the EU: ‘Cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and trafficking of arms, drugs and refugee flows, are factors contributing to instability and tensions that spread throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, and could even reach the EU’ (European Commission 2006b: 5). The Communication was followed by an EU Policy on the Horn of Africa in 2009 (Council of the EU 2009m), and a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa in November 2011 (Council of the EU 2011e). Although the focus on the security threat in the Sahel came somewhat later, the EU has recently supported regional conferences on the nexus between security and development in the Sahel (Renard 2010). In October 2011, an EU strategy on security and development in the Sahel was approved, which announced an additional €150 million for the three main countries in the Sahel (Niger, Mali, Mauritania) (European Union External Action Service 2011: 8). A project financed by the IFS in 2009-2011 promotes the capacity of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the Sahel to improve cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism (European Commission 2009c: 41-42).

4.3.3. Member states’ policies
The above-mentioned security threats have equally been recognised by the member states, which have responded with increased military assistance to combat these issues. Even member states that previously had little focus on sub-Saharan Africa have become involved. For example, in response to the perceived security threat in Africa, Spain adopted an Africa Plan in 2006, stepped up bilateral funds to sub-Saharan Africa and opened six new embassies and field offices (Meyer 2010). Whereas the EU has primarily focused on a ‘soft’ strategy to promote terrorism by building capacities of regional organisations and linking security and development, some of the member states have chosen a more direct approach. Indeed, France, Germany, Italy and Spain deployed forces to the American military base in Djibouti (Kagwanja 2006: 82). Moreover, the UK closely works with the US on counter-terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, building alliances with Ethiopia, Kenya and most of the countries in the Sahel (Porteous 2008: 82-83). The Horn of Africa is a particular focus of the UK, given that the four men convicted of an abortive bomb attack in July 2005 in London were all born in the Horn of Africa (Williams 2010: 39). The UK was noted to be ‘discreetly involved’ in US counter-terrorism operations such as the Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti (Porteous 2008: 82-83). The National Security Strategy (2008, updated in 2009) mentions the terrorist threat in East Africa (Williams 2010: 38-41).

In recent years, terrorism has reached the heart of France’s traditional sphere of influence, namely the Sahel, where Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active. AQIM has kidnapped several French citizens in the Sahel. After a failed hostage rescue attempt in July 2010, AQIM declared war on France. As a reaction to this threat, President Sarkozy stated that France was at war with AQIM and
military and intelligence forces were dispatched to the Sahel (Arieff 2012: 21). Although Mauritania is France’s key partner in the war on terror, French security personnel was equally deployed in Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso (Leymairie 2010; Keenan 2010).

Furthermore, the main EU member states have stressed the need to fight organised crime in sub-Saharan Africa. At a summit in Lancaster House (2003), France and the UK issued an Action plan on organised crime in Africa, in which they emphasised that they would support African states in fighting transnational criminal networks (Gegout 2005: 433).

When it comes to migration, the Southern member states are the most affected and thus the most active. Spain, Italy, Greece and France have signed bilateral agreements with several African governments, offering development funds in exchange for a commitment by the governments to combat illegal migration and accept the return of illegal migrants (Adepoju et al. 2009: 62-65).

4.3.4. The link with double standards: non-democratic allies
As noted in the Introductory Chapter, it is generally assumed in the literature that EU security interests are at the basis of double standards in the reaction to violations of democratic principles. To begin with, it was only as the global security threat was reduced in the 1990s, that political conditionality was introduced in the aid policies of most donors. During the Cold War, authoritarian leaders were supported as long as they remained trustworthy partners of the ‘West’ (Dunning 2004: 410-411; Crawford 2001: 12-13; Uvin 1993: 63-64). It has been suggested that the war on terror can explain why non-democratic governments that are perceived as allies in the war on terror, including Ethiopia and Uganda, are tolerated by the West (Christian Aid 2004; Fisher 2012). The same can be argued about governments that present themselves as reliable allies in the fight against illegal migration, organised crime, etc.

4.3.5. Hypothesis and operationalisation
In the above I have identified the following security threats of the EU in Africa: (1) the war on terror, (2) piracy, (3) migration, (4) organised crime and (5) security of energy supply and production. In countries where cooperation with the government on one of these issues is important, the EU may be reluctant to impose negative measures. On the contrary, when the EU does not have cooperation on security issues with a non-democratic government, it may be more willing to impose negative measures.
Hence, the following hypothesis will be investigated:

**H.6. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU.**

Given that these five security issues are not relevant in all ten countries, two aspects will be highlighted: (1) whether security interests are an issue for the EU in a country and (2) whether the government has cooperated with the EU on these issues.

**Terrorism** To assess the relevance of this factor, the potential for home-grown terrorism was considered, depending on the Muslim population and previous experiences with terrorism. The share of the Muslim population was often highlighted in reports and articles as a sign of potential for terrorism. Moreover, I also took regional dynamics into account, namely the country’s location vis-à-vis those areas in Africa that are perceived as terrorist breeding grounds (the Sahel, the Horn). Where relevant, I assessed the cooperation of the authorities in the war on terror. Information on the percentage of Muslim population was retrieved from the CIA World Factbook. On the cooperation of governments in the war on terror, I consulted International Crisis Group reports, academic articles, *Agence France Presse* articles and US embassy cables.

**Piracy** This factor is only relevant in those countries located close to the two ‘piracy hotspots’, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. Countries may cooperate militarily with the EU (e.g. the training of security forces) or by prosecuting suspected pirates. Information on cooperation with the EU in the fight against piracy was found in programmes financed by the IfS. On cooperation with the member states, information could be found in US embassy cables and in academic literature.

**Migration** To measure the relevance of this factor, I tried to find out whether cases were important countries of origin or transit for African migration to the EU. To track migration flows into the EU, I used EUROSTAT data on migration by citizenship. In case EUROSTAT data were incomplete, data from the OECD migration database were added. These data are presented in Table 24 on p. 225. Although the evolution in migration flows is not presented in this table, I will sometimes refer to the evolution, namely in case of large increases. In addition to data on migration flows, when available the migration profiles that are attached to the CSPs were consulted. These migration profiles gave an idea of whether a country was perceived as an important country of origin or transit. To assess cooperation with the EU, I looked at migration programmes with the EU, of which information was available in the NIPs, Migration Profiles or documents from specific budget lines (e.g. ANEAS). On cooperation with the member states, information was found in documents from and websites of the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UN ODC), as well as in US embassy cables.

Organised crime To find out whether organised crime is an issue in the country, I consulted the website and reports of the UN ODC. On cooperation with the EU on these issues, I used the NIPs and documents on the IfS and, where available, information on political dialogue (reports, interviews). Further information was found in US embassy cables.

Security of energy supply and production This factor was only relevant in energy producers and points to the government’s preparedness to ensure the security of Western companies in the oil, gas and uranium sector. I mainly used secondary literature and US embassy cables to investigate this factor.

4.3.6. Case studies

4.3.6.1. Eritrea

Eritrea is a country with an estimated 40 percent Muslim population. Its government is targeted by the Eritrean Islamist Jihad Movement, which the US believes is one of Al-Qaeda’s main allies in the Horn of Africa (Rabasa et al. 2006: 45). Eritrea’s location close to Somalia makes it important in the fight against terrorism. Initially, Eritrea positioned itself as a reliable ally in the war on terror. Eritrea immediately denounced the 9/11 attacks and expressed support to the US government. It was amongst the few African countries to support the intervention in Iraq. An American military base in Eritrea was even considered (Adebajo 2003: 180-181; Reid 2005: 484-485). However, the US focused mainly on Eritrea’s arch-enemy Ethiopia for its counter-terrorism activities in the Horn, which led to a deterioration of US-Eritrean relations. Moreover, because of Eritrea’s alleged support to the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia and its troubled relations with major US allies Djibouti and Ethiopia, Eritrea is now perceived as an unreliable partner in the war on terror. After a UN report gave proof of Eritrea’s support to the Somali militia, the US considered including Eritrea in the list of states sponsoring terrorism. Finally, it was agreed to designate Eritrea as a country ‘not cooperating fully in the fight against terrorism’, which implies restrictions on US military assistance. Eritrea was strongly opposed to Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in 2006 (see supra), which was tacitly supported by the EU and the US because of fears for the emergence of an Islamist regime in Somalia (International Crisis Group 2010a: 24-25; Connell 2009: 139).

Emigration from Eritrea into the EU has more than tripled since 2000, a direct consequence of the dire life circumstances and lack of political freedom in the country. Refugees face heavily patrolled borders, mine-fields and shootings, but the political situation in the country as well as the forced and indefinite conscription have made many refugees take the risk (Human Rights Watch 2009: 65; Reid 2009: 212). The main receiving countries in Europe are Germany, Italy, the UK and Scandinavian
countries (Eritrea and European Community 2009, Annex 4). I did not find any evidence of cooperation between the EU and Eritrea on the fight against organised crime, illegal migration or piracy.

4.3.6.2. Ethiopia

Ethiopia is considered as the key ally of the UK and the US in the war on terror in the Horn of Africa. In contrast to Eritrea, it has been able to retain the confidence of the US and the status of the most reliable partner in the region (Clapham 2009: 189-190). There is a genuine commitment to the war on terror amongst the predominantly Christian Ethiopian elite. First of all, there have been previous terrorist attacks on Ethiopian territory, namely the attack on former Egyptian president Mubarak in 1995 in Addis Ababa (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007:65-66; Dagne 2002: 62). Moreover, the participation in the war on terror provides an opportunity for the government of Ethiopia to prevent anti-Ethiopian Islamist groups from expanding influence (Ousman 2004: 85-86; Dagne 2002: 66). As a result, Ethiopia was one of the five African countries in the US’s ‘coalition of the willing’ and receives US counter-terrorism assistance via the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (Shinn 2005: 111-112). Ethiopian security forces have invaded Somalia to disrupt the activities of Al Ittihad, an anti-Ethiopian Islamist group that is accused by the US of ties with Al-Qaeda (Dagne 2002: 64-67). Ethiopia is also the main backer of the TFG in Somalia established in 2004 and favoured by the EU and the US, which fear a takeover of Islamist groups in Somalia. Ethiopian forces have supported the TFG in its fight against the Islamic Courts Union, which is believed to have been infiltrated by Al-Itihaad and to provide an entry point for Al-Qaeda in the region (International Crisis Group 2006d: 20). Western concerns about the advance of radical Islamism in the Horn have especially increased since early 2006, when a regional war between Ethiopia, the Islamic Courts Union and Eritrea appeared increasingly possible (Borchgrevink 2008: 214). Although member states initially opposed the 2006 Ethiopian intervention to fight the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, the UK managed to convince the other member states, which shows that concerns for terrorism prevailed in this case (Porteous 2008: 82-83; International Crisis Group 2006d: 23; International Crisis Group 2008d: 20-27). A further factor to take into account is Ethiopia’s internal stability. Ethiopia provides an ‘anchor of stability’ in the volatile Horn of Africa. It is believed that, should civil war erupt in Ethiopia, this could have spill-overs to neighbouring countries, which could provoke the spread of radical Islamism throughout the Horn of Africa (Borchgrevink 2008: 214).

Ethiopia’s emigration rate is not particularly high, when taking into account its population: there are less people emigrating from Ethiopia than from Eritrea, despite the fact that its population is about 16 times larger (World Bank 2011). Moreover, the Ethiopian government has an active migration policy and EU-Ethiopian cooperation on illegal immigration has been fruitful. A migration mission was carried out in 2007-2008 and a cooperation platform on Migration and Development was set up, with
the aim to bring together migration and development actors to manage migration more effectively (European Commission s.d.a.; European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 4). As part of the East Africa Migration Route Initiative, the EU is financing a project on the East African Migration Route via the ANEAS budget line, of which Ethiopia is a target country. The UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Malta are co-sponsors of the project (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2008: 7; EuropeAid s.d.). Moreover, Italy has financed a project to tackle illicit drug trafficking through Bole International Airport at Addis Ababa via UN ODC (UN ODC 2012a).

4.3.6.3. Kenya

Kenya is a key target of terrorist attacks because of its long-standing relations with the US, significant tourist sector and large expat community. Nairobi hosts the headquarters of the United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations Habitat Program, a large number of Western embassies and several international businesses (Rosand et al. 2009: 95; Lyman 2009: 286; Juma 2009: 423). In 1998, 200 Kenyans and 12 Americans were killed in a car bomb attack on the US embassy in Nairobi (Whitaker 2008: 255) and in 2002, an anti-Israeli attack on a Kenyan hotel took place (Agence France Presse 28 November 2002). As a result, the government of Kenya has been keen on cooperating in the war on terror: it was quick to condemn the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and immediately pledged to work with the US to combat terrorism (Agence France Presse 12 September 2001; 21 September 2001). Several institutions have been set up by the government, including an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, a Joint Terrorism Task Force, a National Counter-Terrorism Centre and a National Security Advisory Committee (Whitaker 2008: 256-257; Barkan 2004). Kenya has ratified the twelve international counter-terrorism conventions and enacted the Witness Protection Bill in 2004. A Suppression of Terrorism bill, presented in 2003, was however defeated in parliament (Kagwanja 2006: 78-79). Kenya has helped to establish the TFG in Somalia and has maintained support to the TFG. In October 2011, Kenya sent troops to Somalia to fight the Al-Shabaab, which were accused of abductions on Kenyan territory (International Crisis Group 2012). Kenya is part of the US’s East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative. The port of Mombasa is an important base for US marines fighting Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa (Otenyo 2004: 80). There has also been cooperation between Kenya and the UK on counter-terrorism, although this has been hampered by the troubled relations between Kenya and its ex-coloniser (US Embassy Kenya 2005a; US Embassy Kenya 2005b).

Kenya is a crucial EU partner in the fight against piracy along the coast of Somalia, although the government’s willingness to cooperate has diminished over the years. Concretely, Kenya supports the EU naval mission by prosecuting suspected pirates, which is of crucial importance to the EU given the lack of capacity in the region to bring pirates to trial. In March 2009, the EU and Kenya signed an agreement facilitating the transfer to Kenya of suspected Somali pirates detained as part of the EU’s Atalanta mission. The EU financially supports Kenya to support the added burden of the piracy cases
through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (US Embassy Kenya 2009b). However, the memorandum expired in September 2010 and the Kenyan government did not show an interest in concluding a new one (anonymous interviews, January 2012).

Kenyan migration into the EU was comparable to that of Ethiopia. The UK was the main recipient of Kenyan migrants. However, Kenya has emerged as a centre for irregular migration and the government has made weak efforts to address this problem (European Community and Kenya 2007: 75). As a result, Kenya has been recognised – together with Ethiopia - as a key target country of the East African Migration Route Initiative mentioned supra (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2008).

4.3.6.4. Chad

Chad is located in the Sahel region which, as noted supra, is seen as a potential breeding ground for terrorism. Chad has a Muslim population of 53.1 percent. However, Chad is largely secular. For example, it is forbidden for political parties to proclaim an exclusive fundamental religious programme. Moreover, the government of Chad has an ambiguous relation with the Islamic community. As Boggero states: ‘The Chadian stance on Islamic extremism can truly seem sincere rather than rhetorical (Boggero 2009: 26). Chad participates in the PSI and is seen as a US ally in the region. In 2004, the PSI reached its first success when Chadian forces captured and killed members of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which was the predecessor of AQIM (Lyman 2009: 292). Migration from Chad to the EU is negligible (European Community and Chad 2007b: Annexe 9 and Annexe 4).

4.3.6.5. Niger

Niger’s cooperation in the war on terror is important because of its location in the Sahel, porous borders in the north and large share of Muslim population (80 percent). Since the disappearance of European tourists in the Algerian Sahara in 2003, it is assumed that terrorists from the GSPC (now AQIM) are active in Niger (Keenan 2004: 477). President Tandja was receptive to counter-terrorism training and cooperated with the US in the PSI. In 2005, Niger restored a military presence in its desert region in the north with US assistance (Lyman 2009: 292). These efforts were reduced due to the sanctions in 2009, after which the government turned to the Algerian-led counter-terrorist coalition comprised of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania (US embassy Niger 2009c). Even more so than with the US, Niger was inclined to cooperate with France on counter-terrorism. France deployed maritime surveillance aircrafts to Niger and started capacity-building in the justice and security sector in 2009 (France Diplomatie 2010). This cooperation has become more important from 2010 onwards as Areva employees were kidnapped by AQIM in Arlit and AQIM started explicitly attacking the French in its communications (Tisseron 2011: 101-106).
To a certain extent, the Tuareg uprising in the north in 2007-2009 endangered French uranium interests. In 2008, four Areva employees were kidnapped by the MNJ (Augé 2011: 200; Grégoire 2011: 215). As noted in the previous Chapter, President Tandja failed to get this uprising under control, but in 2009 the MNJ laid down arms after negotiations by Libya.

Migration from Niger into the EU is low, but Niger is a transit country for irregular sub-Saharan African migrants on their way to Europe (Styan 2007: 1177). The Nigerien government lacks the capacity to control migratory flows: legislation falls short and institutional and operational capacity is inadequate and limited. Moreover, Tandja’s government was not cooperative in the fight against illegal migration: it perceived illegal migration as a problem of underdevelopment and saw benefits in the transit status because of service delivery on transit routes. Although Niger did not conclude any readmission or return agreement under President Tandja, repatriations were organised with France and the Netherlands. Moreover, Niger received support from several programmes on transborder cooperation, including technical capacity-building under an ANEAS programme and support for regional dialogue, financed by the IOM. Moreover, Italy carried out a project on transborder cooperation with Niger (European Community and Niger 2008, Annexe 4). The 2008 CSP for Niger foresaw a small amount for cooperation on migration (European Community and Niger 2008: 51), but this never materialised because there was no real interest from the government (anonymous interview, February 2012).

4.3.6.6. Nigeria
Nigeria is particularly vulnerable for home-grown terrorism. As stated by Lyman: ‘if there is a prize target for terrorism in Africa, Nigeria should be it’ (Lyman 2009: 293). Nigeria has the largest Muslim population in Africa, over 65 million, representing 50 percent of the population. The introduction of the Sharia law in most northern states has heightened tensions between Muslims and Christians, but the Islam practised in northern states is not radical: there are only few militant groups. However, since late 2003 a militant group referred to as ‘Taliban’ has been involved in attacks on police stations and other government offices. Moreover, given the location of northeastern Nigeria within the Sahel and the southern limits of the Sahara, northern Nigeria is regarded as vulnerable to becoming a terrorist sanctuary (Mikkel 2008: 287; Obi 2006: 99). In addition, a taped message, purportedly by Bin Laden, singled out Nigeria as a new possible theatre for Al-Qaeda operations (Barnes 2005: 6; Keenan 2004: 480 and 491). To a large extent, fears about Nigeria’s terrorist potential have become reality since 2009 with the bomb attacks by the Boko Haram movement. There are suspicions that this movement has links with international terrorist groupings such as Al-Qaeda (Bagaji et al. 2012: 38; Omede 2011). For these reasons, as well as because of Nigeria’s important regional role, Nigeria is considered a priority state in the battle against terrorism (Youngs 2006: 338).
The Nigerian government lent strong diplomatic support to Washington after the September 11 attacks and supported military action in Afghanistan. Nigeria also played a leading role in forging an anti-terrorism consensus amongst sub-Saharan African states (US State Department 2010). Furthermore, the Nigerian government worked with the US to crack down on the financial assets of terrorists and shared intelligence with the US (US Embassy Nigeria 2001a; US Embassy Nigeria 2001b; US Embassy Nigeria 2001c). Nigeria has also been involved in the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (Herskovits 2007: 129; Taguem Fah 2007). The UK has equally focused on counter-terrorism training in Nigeria and was part of the counter-terrorism working group that pushed the government of Nigeria to pass anti-terrorism legislation in 2008 (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a; US Embassy Nigeria 2007c). However, there are equally examples where the government of Nigeria was reluctant to cooperate with the UK and the US in the war on terror. First of all, Nigeria was opposed to the military intervention in Iraq (Adebajo 2003: 187). Secondly, counter-terrorism legislation was repeatedly postponed and was finally adopted in 2011 (Reuters 2011, February).

Nigerian emigration to the EU is much higher compared to that of the other countries under investigation, which relates to the large population in Nigeria, as well as human trafficking in the country. The main destinatories for Nigerian migrants were the UK, Spain and Italy. Various EU programmes have been approved in 2009-2011 to fight illegal migration and to better manage migration flows.49 Moreover, bilateral programmes on human trafficking are supported by Italy and the UK (US Embassy Nigeria 2002b). In addition, the government of Nigeria increased collaboration with law enforcement agencies in the Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal and the UK (US Embassy Nigeria 2009b). Bilateral readmission agreements have been concluded with Italy, Ireland, Spain and the UK (Khakee 2007: 6).

Furthermore, the situation in the Niger Delta has endangered EU oil production. Local protest movements including the MEND (see previous Chapter) often finance their activities by siphoning and selling oil, extorting ‘protection’ funds or kidnapping foreigners for ransom (Klare 2009: 45; Rotberg 2007; Soares de Oliveira 2007: 243). This has seriously affected oil production and exports. Between 2005 and 2006, Nigerian oil exports fell by 25 percent because of the violence (Rotberg 2007: 35). The risk is particularly high for Shell, which has the largest share of onshore activities. In 2004, there were rumours that Shell was planning to abandon its onshore holdings (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 247-252). In 2008, Shell had to close an off-shore oil production vessel after it was attacked by rebels (Youngs 2009c: 166). As noted in the previous Chapter, Obasanjo’s government failed to address the root causes of the insurgencies in the Niger Delta. Moreover, there was evidence that high level political authorities facilitated the illegal export of oil (UN ODC 2008: 8).

Apart from insecurity in the Niger Delta, the shipping of oil to the US and Europe is further affected by the recent upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2008, Nigeria had the highest negative rating for maritime security (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a; Lyman 2009: 297). The Nigerian authorities have been noted to try to counter these attacks (Vrëy 2009: 24). To ensure security in the region, member states with oil interests, including the UK, France and the Netherlands, have supported the US’s Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy (Youngs 2009c: 130 and 141). Moreover, as part of its military cooperation, the UK helped build a maritime facility in Lagos (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a).

Lastly, Nigeria is home to widespread criminal activities including internet fraud and cocaine trafficking (UN ODC 2005: 13 and 24). There have been many improvements in the combat against drug trafficking under Obasanjo, for example in April 2002 a National Drug Law Enforcement Agency was set up (US Embassy Nigeria 2002a). The anti-corruption commission EFCC also has the mandate to prosecute internet fraud (Lawson 2009: 84-90). On the other hand, cooperation on these issues has been hampered by the fact that political actors are often complicit in these criminal practices (UN ODC 2008: 7-8 and 28). The EU financed a regional centre in Nigeria on organised crime and set up several projects to address cocaine trafficking (European Commission 2009c: 35; European Commission 2007a). The UK’s DfID has equally supported the Nigerian government in the fight against drugs trafficking. 

4.3.6.7. Rwanda

Rwanda has not been scrutinised by the international community for its potential for terrorism, nor can it be considered a key ally in the war on terror. It is less strategically located than Kenya and Ethiopia and only has a minor Muslim population (4.6 percent). Nonetheless, Rwanda has cooperated in the war on terror. For example, Rwanda participated in regional initiatives on counter-terrorism cooperation such as the East Africa Standby Brigade and hosted AU meetings on law enforcement issues. Moreover, the government of Rwanda developed counter-terrorism response strategies and cooperates in projects to combat financing of terrorism (US embassy Rwanda 2008; UN ODC 2012a). Migration flows from Rwanda into the EU were noted to be low (Republic of Rwanda and European Community 2007, Annex 4).

4.3.6.8. Guinea

Because of the large Muslim majority in Guinea (80 percent), the government of Guinea has been reluctant to fully align with the US in the war on terror, as could be witnessed in 2003 when Guinea voted against the intervention in Iraq by the US and UK (Glickman 2003: 170). However, compared to the Horn and the Sahel, there has been little emphasis on counter-terrorism in West Africa, at least before the attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Migration flows from Guinea to the EU have been

substantial taking into account its population. In 1998-2010, migration flows were similar to those coming from Ethiopia, which has a population of at least eight times that of Guinea. The rise in emigration flows after 2003 indicates that the political-economic crisis is at the basis of these flows. Guineans mainly migrated to Spain and France, and to a lesser degree to Germany. Moreover, Guinea is an important transit country for irregular migrants due to its porous borders, undeveloped infrastructure, poverty and socio-political crises. It has low operational and administrative capacity to manage these migration flows. The IOM and Belgium have set up pilot projects to help the government to strengthen the management of migration flows (International Organisation for Migration 2010a). Efforts to fight human trafficking have been hampered by the poor capacity and endemic corruption of Guinea’s judicial system (US embassy Guinea 2007). Moreover, during the second term of President Conté’s mandate, the country became a hub for drug traffickers in West Africa. This was the consequence of stronger law enforcement in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, which stood in contrast with the impunity in Guinea (IRIN News 2008, October). Investigations ordered by the military junta in 2009 showed that Conté’s son and numerous top security officials had been involved in drug trafficking (Wyler and Cook 2009: 25). Although an anti-drug unit was created in the police, the unit was marred by corruption (US embassy Guinea 2008a). In 2008, an agreement was signed with Spain to allow Spanish and other European ships to patrol the coast to identify ships trafficking persons and narcotics (US embassy Guinea 2008b).

4.3.6.9. Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire has a 38.2 percent Muslim population. Given that, until the recent attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria, there had been little attention for West Africa in the war on terror, this was not an important issue in EU relations with Côte d’Ivoire. Migration flows from Côte d’Ivoire into the EU have been substantial and there has been a notable increase following the eruption of civil war in 2002. France is the main destination for Ivorian migrants, followed by Italy. Côte d’Ivoire has also been host to organised crime with implications for the EU, including internet fraud, money laundering and drug trafficking. These problems have been exacerbated by the civil war and the political crisis in the 1990s and 2000s (UNODC 2008: 5 and 22). However, because of the security situation there was no cooperation between the EU and Côte d’Ivoire on these issues (anonymous interview, February 2012). For example, Côte d’Ivoire’s migration profile mentions the need to cooperate with the Ivorian authorities on migration but recommends to wait until the situation is stabilised (European Community and Côte d’Ivoire 2008: Annex 4). Other responsible agencies including the UN ODC have equally experienced difficulties in doing their work due to the political division and the absence of sufficient government control in the north (UNODC 2012b).
4.3.6.10. Zimbabwe

With a Muslim minority of 1 percent, Zimbabwe is not scrutinised for potential home-grown terrorism. Paradoxically, despite Zimbabwe’s anti-Western stance and the sanctions, Zimbabwe has cooperated with the US on intelligence-sharing, combating money laundering and other means of financing. An anti-terrorism unit was set up by SADC in Zimbabwe’s capital Harare in 2007. However, Southern Africa is not a major front in the war on terror, and therefore counter-terrorism cooperation has been limited (Lyman 2009: 288-290). Migration from Zimbabwe into the EU more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, and peaked to over 8,000 migrants in 2004. Practically all Zimbabweans go to the UK. The government’s capacity to cope with irregular migration has been lacking. However, since 2006, the government has worked with the IOM on overcoming its weak approach to migration. This has enabled a Draft National Migration Management and Diaspora Policy, which foresees the adoption of legislation that directly addresses trafficking and smuggling and the implementation of joint border management strategies with neighbouring countries (International Organisation for Migration 2010b: 35 and 53).
Table 24. Overview migration into EU, 1998-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Average yearly migration</th>
<th>Main destinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>22,762</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>Italy, Sweden, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>32,959</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>Germany, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>40,029</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>UK, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>7,443</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>208,413</td>
<td>17,368</td>
<td>UK, Spain, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4,422</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>Germany, Netherlands, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>34,093</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>Spain, France, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>58,211</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>France, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>34,269</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat database, completed with OECD database.\textsuperscript{31}

4.3.7. Analysis

H.6. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that are not perceived as important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU.

The first part of the hypothesis is confirmed in the case of Ethiopia and, to a lesser degree, Nigeria and Chad. Ethiopia is perceived as a key ally in the war on terror, and has cooperated in the fight against illegal migration. Security interests are especially important here given Ethiopia’s geostrategic position in the Horn of Africa, where EU security interests are most affected (terrorism, piracy, ...). Apart from Ethiopia’s direct cooperation with the US and the UK on counter-terrorism, its regional role and internal stability (see previous Chapter) are also seen as contributing to prevent an Islamist regime from emerging in Somalia. This has most likely been taken into consideration when partially resuming budget support in 2006-2007, which coincided with the rise of Islamist groups in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{31} Information for Ireland is unavailable before 2008, for UK Eurostat data since 2006 were missing, but could be completed with OECD data for Kenya (2006, 2008) and Nigeria (2007-2009). For the other countries, the amount of migrants to the UK was underestimated for lack of data.
Apart from Ethiopia, Chad and Nigeria are also considered as allies in the war on terror. The role of these countries is however less crucial than that of Ethiopia, given that the EU has only belatedly focused on terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel. In the case of Chad, I tend to believe that French historical interests are more important than Déby’s role in the war on terror in explaining the weak reaction to violations of democratic principles, especially in the period 2000-2006. Nigerian cooperation in the war on terror has been considered as crucial given its regional role and potential for home-grown terrorism. Moreover, the government cooperates on illegal migration, the fight against piracy and organised crime. Although cooperation on some of these issues has been hampered by corruption, the government of Nigeria seemed generally committed to the fight against security issues.

However, the hypothesis is contradicted by the cases of Eritrea, Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005). Especially in Eritrea, double standards cannot be explained by the fear to lose a partner on counter-terrorism issues. In fact, although the government of Eritrea initially showed itself willing to cooperate in the war on terror, it is now regarded as contributing to terrorism by supporting the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia. Moreover, the dire life circumstances and the lack of fundamental freedoms have led to increased migration flows into the EU and there has not been cooperation on these issues. While the reluctance to impose negative measures in 2001 could be seen as informed by concerns over potential cooperation on the war on terror, this seems unlikely given that the EU’s position has remained unchanged over the years. Indeed, despite evidence of Eritrea’s support to the Al Shabaab, the EU signed a new CSP with Eritrea in 2009.

Moreover, although the government of Rwanda has cooperated on counter-terrorism, it is not a crucial ally such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Chad, nor have illegal migration or organised crime been important issues. Furthermore, the reluctance to impose negative measures against Côte d’Ivoire in 2000-2005 cannot be attributed to security interests. When taking office, Gbagbo did not have a track record of security cooperation with the EU or its member states. Similarly, when a reopening of Article 96 consultations was refused in 2004, there had not been any cooperation on security issues.

The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Zimbabwe, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011). In Zimbabwe and Guinea, security interests did not play an important role in relations with the EU at the time the EU considered negative measures in the beginning of the 2000s. Counter-terrorism, piracy, securing energy supply and organised crime are only a minor issue in these countries, although in recent years drugs and human trafficking have become an issue in Guinea. In both cases, the increase in migration flows should also be noted, as these were related to the direct result of the socio-economic and political crisis. This may have made the EU perceive internal problems in both countries as more problematic, as they were equally affecting EU security interests. In Côte d’Ivoire, there were concerns about illegal migration and organised crime, but it was impossible to cooperate with the government due to the security situation. Moreover, the conflict had a
negative effect on these security problems. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the EU adopted sanctions in December 2010, given that there was no important security cooperation at stake.

The hypothesis is however contradicted by the case of Kenya. In Kenya, Kibaki was considered as a key ally in the war on terror, yet the EU did not try to keep him in power when controversy arose about the election results in December 2007. In fact, Kenya’s contribution to the war on terror is equally as important as that of Ethiopia, given its strategic location in the Horn and its vulnerability for terrorist attacks. Moreover, despite Kenya’s cooperation in the fight against piracy from 2009 onwards, the EU did not shy away from criticising the lack of progress in the implementation of the power-sharing agreement.

In the case of Niger, the hypothesis is partly confirmed, partly refuted. On the one hand, Niger cooperated in the war on terror, although it should be added that the threat of AQIM only reached its peak in 2010, after the 2009 referendum. On the other hand, the security of Areva was threatened by the Tuareg rebellion, which was inadequately addressed by President Tandja’s government. Moreover, the government’s commitment in cooperation on illegal migration was doubted.
4.4. Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have tried to find out whether the EU’s self-interest can explain double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. Three forms of self-interest were distinguished: historical, commercial and security interests.

These factors were investigated in separate sections, in which the relevance of each factor was investigated via literature review, leading to an hypothesis to guide the case study research. These hypotheses were investigated separately for each case, and conclusions were drawn for each of the three factors. The question then arises which form of self-interest is most important. I have summarised the conclusions on the validity of the three hypotheses in Table 25 below. From this table, it becomes clear that historical and security interests are an explanatory factor, whereas commercial interests are not. In fact, in none of the cases was the hypothesis on commercial interests confirmed.

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<td>Côte d’Ivoire 2000-2005</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire 2010-2011</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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+: hypothesis confirmed
-: hypothesis refuted
+/-: hypothesis partly confirmed, partly refuted

Historical and security interests have - to a greater or lesser extent - explanatory value in six out of eleven cases. At the same time, even these factors are not ‘necessary’ to explain double standards, given that the hypotheses were contradicted by the cases of Rwanda, Eritrea and Kenya. Historical and security interests are especially important in explaining why the EU has not been reluctant to impose
negative measures, while these factors are less powerful in explaining why the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures. Hence, when the EU does not have a lot at stake in terms of historical or security interests, it is more likely to impose negative measures. The reverse thesis can also be confirmed. When the EU does have historical or security interests that could be threatened by imposing negative measures, it will refrain from negative measures. However, the evidence for this proposition is smaller. First of all, there are two cases where these factors cannot explain the EU’s preference for positive measures: Eritrea and Rwanda. Secondly, the EU’s self-interest in cases where historical and security interests did play a role should not be overestimated: in most cases, only one of the three hypotheses was confirmed. At the same time, the latter points to the strong influence of some factors. Indeed, security interests in itself seemed an important reason for the EU to refrain from negative measures in Ethiopia and Nigeria. The same goes for historical interests, which was shown in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, in the case of Chad, it was noted that historical interests were more important than security interests.
5. Expectations about effectiveness
5. Expectations about effectiveness

5.1. Introduction

The two factors and six related hypotheses investigated in the previous Chapters do not suffice to explain double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in the ten country cases. Eritrea is a case in point. From a normative perspective, there is no clear reason for the EU to be reluctant to impose negative measures. Although there is internal stability, Eritrea’s foreign policies are perceived as detrimental to regional stability and development performance has been weak. Nor does EU self-interest provide an explanation: hypotheses on historical, commercial or security interests largely fell short in explaining the EU’s preference for positive measures. Interviews with EU officials dealing with Eritrea suggested that the main reason why the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures on Eritrea is because it is believed such an approach would not work.

This confirms a number of other studies on EU democracy promotion, which claim that doubts about effectiveness may influence the EU’s choice of instrument for democracy promotion (see Introductory Chapter). It has been argued that the focus of negative measures on sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by the fact that these countries are poor and aid dependent, which makes donors perceive negative measures as most effective (Crawford 2001: 210). As stated by Smith: ‘these are the cases where it is [...] easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights’ (Smith 2001: 193). However, as I have explained earlier, the leverage of the OECD donors has diminished with the advent of non-traditional donors. Hence, in this Chapter it will be argued that even in aid dependent countries, the EU’s leverage should not be overestimated.

To assess the importance of considerations of effectiveness, I will examine the literature on the effectiveness of aid conditionality and sanctions. From these studies, it can be assumed that negative measures will be most effective when (1) the leverage of the sanctioning actor/actors is large and (2) negative measures have some resonance within the country. Regarding the first proposition, in some countries the EU alone may have sufficient leverage to encourage democratisation, whereas in others, the position of other actors is more important than that of the EU. As regards the second proposition, I will look at the domestic position of the government, as it is believed negative measures can only work when the government is already severely weakened.
5.2. Other actors

5.2.1. The literature on other actors

It is generally assumed that negative measures can only work if the country cannot count on any support from third actors: ‘the pressure associated with the usage of a “stick” depends on the third country’s resources and alternatives, both in economic and political terms’ (Kotzian et al. 2011: 997).

For donors, this means that a coordinated action stands more chance to success than unilateral sanctions (Stokke 1995; Mackie and Zinke 2005: 8). Based on observations of political conditionality in 29 countries (1990-1995), Crawford found considerable evidence for this hypothesis. For example, a coordinated action in Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, Guatemala and Haiti was largely successful, whereas unilateral action in the case of Cameroon, Guinea, Syria and Indonesia did not produce the desired effect (Crawford 2001: 205). In another study of 1055 instances of aid sanctions in 158 aid recipients (1990-1999) it was concluded that donor coordination was the most important factor in determining success (Emmanuel 2010: 864).

However, such a coordinated action is not easy to achieve, since donors have their own priorities and interests (Ibid.: 862). As stated by Uvin: ‘unwilling governments can always turn themselves to other bilateral or multilateral donors so as to bypass a too insistent donor’ (Uvin 1993: 73). Most of the larger donors, including Canada, the US, Japan, Norway and the EU member states apply political conditionality in their aid relations (Stokke 1995: 22; Gillies 1996). The main donors in sub-Saharan Africa are the US, the UK, France, the EU and the International Development Association (IDA, the World Bank’s fund for the poorest countries). Within this group of donors, it has been noted that the US is strongly led by concerns about the war on terror and oil supply (Klare and Volman 2006), while the World Bank is prohibited from allocating or suspending assistance on the basis of internal politics of partner countries (Hout 2007: 25).

As regards the member states, it should be noted that, apart from having a say in decisions on EU negative measures, they also have their bilateral policies. Whereas CFSP measures also apply in bilateral relations, in the case of aid suspensions, there is no obligation for member states to suspend bilateral assistance when this is done at EU level (Laakso et al. 2007a: 32). As I have discussed in the previous Chapters, the UK and especially France have on some occasions been hesitant to apply negative conditionality. It should be noted that the French reluctance to use negative measures is not only related to its self-interest but points to a more general aversion to negative measures as a strategy to promote democratisation. Indeed, even in Zimbabwe, which does not belong to the French sphere of influence, France was opposed to the invocation of Article 96 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 70). On the

contrary, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), the Netherlands and Germany, have a tradition in being more active on human rights issues (Olsen 2011: 94).

While coordination amongst the ‘traditional’ donors (those in the OECD-DAC) is already difficult to achieve, this is even more the case with non-OECD donors and economic partners. The BRICs and many Arab countries have been noted as actors that are ready to offer the same carrots without the accompanying threat of sticks (Kotzian et al. 2011: 997). Especially non-democratic powers such as China and Russia often provide economic and political support to countries that are under pressure from Western donors (Burnell 2011: 245-268). For sub-Saharan Africa, the role of China is particularly important. China is now Africa’s second-largest trading partner, after the US and ahead of France. China’s growing presence on the African continent was reflected in November 2006 when a major summit was organised, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, during which major financial and economic support was pledged. (Callaghy 2009: 65-68). Moreover, China has often been ready to position itself as an alternative partner to countries that are regarded as ‘pariah states’, including Sudan and Zimbabwe (Tull 2009: 332).

Furthermore, African organisations have increasingly become actors in their own right when it comes to the promotion of democratisation. In her analysis of three cases of Article 96 consultations (Guinea-Bissau, Togo and the Central African Republic), Mbangu (2005) found that the active involvement of the ACP Group and of neighbouring countries was crucial for the success of the procedure. This factor was also underlined by Mackie and Zinke (2005: 8). Many African regional organisations have evolved from purely economic organisations to political organisations engaged in the promotion of peace and democracy. The replacement of the OAU with the AU in 2002 was crucial in this regard (Manby 2004). At the subregional level, especially ECOWAS has evolved into a political organisation (Yabi 2010: 10-14). Both organisations prohibit unconstitutional changes to power, and a military coup automatically leads to sanctions by the two regional organisations (Clapham 2005). Although there is more reluctance to use diplomatic pressure or impose sanctions beyond clear-cut situations of military coups, the prohibition of unconstitutional changes to power has increasingly been interpreted in a broader sense. For example, in 2005 both ECOWAS and the AU put pressure on Togolese president Faure Gnassingbe, who was imposed by the military after the death of his father (Mac-Ogonor 2009). In contrast, other African subregional organisations including IGAD and SADC have been more reluctant to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states (Weldeasellassie 2011: 26; Hamill and Hoffman 2009).

Lastly, I should mention those organisations bringing together former colonial powers and former colonies, such as the Commonwealth Group of Nations (Commonwealth) and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). The Commonwealth formally underlined its attachment to

53 However, if EU member states are counted together, the EU remains the main trade partner.
democracy and human rights in the 1991 Harare Declaration. Similarly, the heads of state of the OIF declared their belief in democratic values at the 1991 Chaillot Summit. Both organisations provide democracy assistance and electoral observation, and may apply sanctions in case of unconstitutional changes of government, although this has happened only rarely. For example, the OIF suspended Togo from the organisation and suspended assistance after the 2005 succession of the president (Sharma 2011; Julia 2008). Commonwealth sanctions have been applied against Nigeria (1995-1999), Pakistan (1999-2004, 2007-2008), Fiji (2000-2001, 2006-present) and Zimbabwe (2002-present) (BBC News 2009a, September).

5.2.2. Hypothesis and operationalisation

It was noted that negative measures are more likely to be effective when jointly imposed by the most important economic and diplomatic partners. Hence, it can be assumed that the EU will prefer a coordinated action to unilateral measures, given that the first would stand more chances to succeed. When other actors are unwilling to impose negative measures, the EU may be reluctant to go it alone. The first hypothesis thus reads as follows:

*H.7. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when there are no or few other international actors prepared to impose negative measures, while it is more likely to impose negative measures in case of a coordinated action by international actors*

To investigate this hypothesis, I looked at the political and economic support of the main non-EU international actors. First of all, I investigated the position of the donors, focusing on the top five of donors in each country. For this I used the ‘aid at a glance’ profiles of aid recipient countries, which are available on the website of the OECD and include a top 5 of the main donors for 2009-2010. The top 5 for each country is included in Table 26 on p. 243. Apart from the donors, I also took into account the relations of governments with African regional organisations and non-OECD donors. Information on the position of international actors was mostly derived from secondary literature (academic and press). To a lesser extent, primary sources were also used, such as US embassy cables, the African Economic Outlook54 or official sources from the individual actors.

5.2.3. Case studies

5.2.3.1. Eritrea

Eritrea is internationally isolated. First of all, it is not well integrated in African regional organisations. Eritrea withdrew from IGAD in 2007 because of IGAD’s support to Ethiopia’s Somalia policy (International Crisis Group 2010a: 23). In 2009, it suspended its membership from the AU after the

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54 The online version, available on the website: http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/
latter called for sanctions against Eritrea for supporting Al-Shabaab (BBC News 2009, May). Moreover, the AU Commission has condemned Eritrea for violating the African Charter on People’s and Human Rights. In 2002, the Commission ruled that the imprisonment of the eleven dissidents was in violation of the Charter. In 2007, the Commission held that the detention of 18 journalists constituted numerous violations of the Charter and called for release or trial of the prisoners (Human Rights Watch 2009: 79-81). Relations with the US have become tense because of the US’s close relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea’s support to the Al-Shabaab (International Crisis Group 2010a: 24-25). After a new law on NGO activity in Eritrea in 2005, USAID had to halt its activities (BBC News 2005, August). Most donors have scaled down development programmes in Eritrea, either because they were forced to by the Eritrean authorities or because of concern about human rights. Even the UN and the World Bank have recently terminated activities in Eritrea (European Commission s.d.b)

Nonetheless, Eritrea has received economic and diplomatic support from other, mostly non-OECD actors. In January 2002, there were talks on the improvement of economic relations between Eritrea and China (BBC News Monitoring Africa 11 January 2002). In 2007, the government of Eritrea granted licenses to Chinese firms to explore gold and other minerals (Agence France Presse 3 October 2007). A Canadian mining company, Nevsun Resources, started mining gold in 2008.55 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar and Libya have also provided economic assistance to Eritrea (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 18 April 2002; 8 March 2003; 6 July 2002; 4 July 2003; Human Rights Watch 2009: 85). Diplomatic relations with Iran were established in 2006 (US Embassy Eritrea 2006b).

5.2.3.2. Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s main donors and strategic partners are the US and the UK. The US has been reluctant to criticise violations of democratic principles in Ethiopia. In the context of the post-electoral violence in 2005, the US did not suspend aid. Acting Ambassador Vicky Huddleston stated in January 2006 that the US would not follow the EU’s aid freeze, given that US assistance was primarily focused on humanitarian assistance and poverty-oriented development programmes (World Markets Analysis 10 January 2006). The UK, on the other hand, was the first to suspend budget support in 2005 (Agence France Presse 18 January 2006). Moreover, after the 2010 parliamentary elections, the UK issued a declaration that was much more critical than that of High Representative Ashton (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2010). The decision to suspend budget support in 2005 was a joint decision by all budget support donors (World Bank, African Development Bank, Sweden, EU, Canada, Ireland, Germany, UK) (Borchgrevink 2008: 211). The World Bank played a particularly important role in making the EU resume assistance in 2006-2007. As it was uncomfortable with the 2005 aid suspension, it established the Protection of Basic Services programme to compensate for the loss of income (Furtado and Smith 2009: 138). The only donors that did not return to business as usual in

55 See www.nevsun.com (last accessed 27 April 2012).
2006-2007 were Denmark and Sweden. These donors have chosen to remain outside controversial government-led programmes such as the Protection of Basic Services programme, while channelling most aid through UN organisations (Sweden) or focus merely on democracy promotion (Denmark) (Olsen 2011: 98; anonymous interview, January 2011). Most other donors have redirected budget support via the Protection of Basic Services programme (Human Rights Watch 2010d: 29).

Given that Ethiopia is a ‘regional hegemonic power’ (Mazrui 2009: 98) and plays an important role in the AU (of which headquarters are located in Addis Ababa), it is unlikely that the AU will speak out against Ethiopia. Indeed, the AU praised the 2005 parliamentary elections (Agence France Presse 10 August 2005; 15 September 2005). Moreover, Ethiopia strongly dominates IGAD (Weldeselassie 2011: 27). Furthermore, since the early 2000s, Ethiopia has strengthened cooperation with China, Russia, Iran and Turkey, including military assistance (Agence France Presse 16 February 2000; 2 December 2002; 3 April 2003; 8 June 2002; 2 March 2005). China is particularly active in granting investments, cheap tenders for infrastructure, ICT work, business deals, etc. (Abbink 2009: 19).

5.2.3.3. Kenya

The main donors in Kenya are the US, the World Bank and the UK. The US is the first donor in Kenya and a key diplomatic partner (Barkan 2004: 88). In 2009-2010, the US provided over five times more aid than the EU. The US has traditionally played an important diplomatic role in Kenya. For example, it is believed that the US put pressure on the ruling party to cede power to Kibaki after the latter won the 2002 presidential elections (Brown 2007). After the December 2007 elections, donors were initially divided over how to respond to the crisis. The US and World Bank country director Colin Bruce (who had a good personal relationship with Kibaki) initially recognised Kibaki’s victory, but later on pressured Kibaki and Odinga to arrive at a power-sharing deal. When Kofi Annan started to mediate, donors took a coordinated stance by threatening with aid sanctions should the parties not come to an agreement. The US did not favour aid sanctions, but considered travel sanctions against Kenyan politicians and businessmen believed to support the violence (Brown 2009: 394-398; Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 96). Moreover, the US closely followed up on the implementation of the power-sharing agreement and even imposed visa bans against officials who obstructed the reform process (Agence France Presse 4 August 2009; 26 October 2009). The Commonwealth equally supported the power-sharing deal and agreed to provide assistance to its implementation (Commonwealth Secretariat 2008). Apart from the OECD members, China, India and the United Arab Emirates have become increasingly important economic partners. Chinese exports to Kenya have grown at a rate of 2,084 percent between 1996 and 2008. China remained silent about the post-electoral violence (Fiott 2010: 1-7).
5.2.3.4. Chad

The main donors in Chad were the US, France, the EU, the African Development Bank and Germany. France is without doubt the actor with the closest relations with the government and thus the largest potential leverage. However, as was discussed in Chapter 4, France has been reluctant to use negative measures to encourage democratisation in Chad. The US seemed more concerned about the deepening democratic crisis in Chad and, as could be observed in diplomatic correspondence from the US embassy in Chad, was contemplating a scenario without President Déby. However, the US did not impose any negative measures. Germany was a smaller donor and was not particularly in favour of negative measures because it mistrusted the opposition (US embassy Chad 2006c). The AU has not been involved in Chad’s internal affairs, as it generally agrees with the position of the government of Chad that the political crisis was merely an attempt by rebels to topple an elected government (International Crisis Group 2008b: 31). Chad has many non-European economic partners, which are primarily involved in the mineral industry. Oil extraction has been managed by Malaysian and American companies. China has invested in the oil sector, despite the Chadian recognition of Taiwan and China’s close relations with Sudan. China’s investments in the oil sector have further increased after the resumption of diplomatic relations in 2006 (International Crisis Group 2009b: 15). India has also increased investment (AfDB et al. 2011a: 13).

5.2.3.5. Niger

The decision to impose negative measures to react to the 2009 political crisis in Niger was coordinated amongst the main actors. Especially the US and ECOWAS played an important role. The US, the second donor in Niger, denounced the August 2009 referendum, suspended development assistance and imposed travel sanctions on Tandja’s supporters in December 2009 (Agence France Presse 23 December 2009). Apart from the donors, ECOWAS took a remarkably strong stance on the 2009 referendum. In May 2009, an ECOWAS Advisory Body warned about possible sanctions if Tandja went ahead with the referendum (US Embassy Niger 2009d). In June 2009, ECOWAS deployed a mission to Niger to convince Tandja to step down, and in August, a four-member ad-hoc ministerial committee was sent to Niger (Africa Research Bulletin 2009, August). In October 2009, ECOWAS suspended Niger’s membership after Tandja ignored a request to postpone the elections (Afrol News 2010, October). Although France was initially reluctant to criticise the referendum, it finally aligned with the position of ECOWAS, the US and the European Commission, as noted in the previous Chapter. However, as the third largest donor, France did not suspend bilateral assistance (anonymous interview, March 2012). The World Bank, the fourth largest donor, did not suspend aid until the military coup in February 2010 (World Bank 2012). Niger has maintained diplomatic relations with China, Iran and Pakistan. Economic cooperation with China has increased in recent years, not only in the uranium and oil sector, but also in development cooperation (health, infrastructure, education) (AfDB et al. 2011b: 14).
5.2.3.6. Nigeria
The main donors in Nigeria are the World Bank, the US, the UK and the EU. The US is a key diplomatic partner, provides military assistance to Nigeria and is a more important oil importer than the EU (Lubeck et al. 2007: 4; Carmody 2005: 100; Mikkel 2008: 286). The UK and the US are more important diplomatic partners than the EU, which derives from the fact that both actors advised Obasanjo to retire in 2006 (Sklar et al. 2006: 101; Mikkel 2008: 302; Herskovits 2007: 128). The main donors have been on the same line on the EU as regards the 2003 and 2007 elections. In 2003, there was a consensus amongst Germany, France, Canada, the UK and the US that ‘a strict “free and fair” test would doom Nigeria to failure’ (US Embassy Nigeria 2002c). Moreover, the flawed elections in 2007 were endorsed by the US (Herskovits 2007: 128). Furthermore, as a regional powerhouse and the main driver behind ECOWAS, Nigeria enjoys the support from most neighbouring countries. It should be noted that Nigeria’s neighbours share the concern of the donors about stability in Nigeria (Tar 2007). Hence, the 2003 and 2007 elections were endorsed by neighbouring countries. ECOWAS observers were cautious not to criticise the 2007 elections (BBC News 2007, April). Moreover, cooperation with China was strengthened under Obasanjo. A Strategic Partnership was signed between both countries in 2005 (Srinivasan 2008: 343-354). Moreover, oil companies from China, Brazil, India, Norway and Korea have entered the Nigerian oil market (Obi 2010: 446).

5.2.3.7. Rwanda
There is a general reluctance amongst donors to use negative measures to respond to violations of democratic principles in Rwanda (Hayman 2011b: 124-127). The US, which is the largest donor, enjoys close relations with Rwanda, and has refrained from openly criticising Kagame on issues related to democratisation (Zorbas 2011: 110-111). Only smaller donors, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, have used negative conditionality as a reaction to Rwanda’s democratic record (Hayman 2011b: 124-27). Moreover, Rwanda is well integrated in regional organisations, including the East-African Community, the AU and the Commonwealth. Rwanda’s democratic record did not hamper admission into the Commonwealth, despite concerns expressed by a report from the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (Reyntjens 2010: 2). The Commonwealth observer report on the 2010 presidential elections noted some ‘areas of concern’, but pointed to Rwanda’s history of genocide and ‘the understandable need to guard against any such tendencies re-emerging’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010: 30). Rwanda also maintains strong relations with China and has actively sought to attract Chinese investment (Zhan in The New Times 2011)

5.2.3.8. Guinea
At the time of EU aid suspension in 2003-2004, there were no sanctions from other donors or from regional organisations. US assistance increased and in 2003, a new US embassy was opened in Guinea, the size of which surprised many observers. This was related to Guinea’s strategic role as a
supporter of anti-Taylor forces in Liberia with US military assistance (International Crisis Group 2003a: 16; Arieff 2009: 338-340; Smith 2006: 434). Similarly, France, Guinea’s main donor, increased bilateral assistance after EU aid was suspended. Only Germany and Canada suspended bilateral assistance in the early 2000s as a consequence of the bad administration of development assistance by the Guinean government (Laakso et al. 2007a: 86). Moreover, within the ACP group, there was opposition to the invocation of Article 96 consultations in 2003 (Laakso et al. 2007b: 47).

Nonetheless, other actors became more involved from the mid-2000 onwards, and especially after the 2008 military coup. ECOWAS became involved in Guinea’s internal affairs in 2007, when the crisis was worsening because of mass demonstrations. ECOWAS brokered the deal to appoint Kouyaté as a prime minister in 2007. Moreover, ECOWAS immediately suspended Guinea after the military coup in 2008 and imposed an arms embargo after the September 2009 massacre (Yabi 2009: 46-47). The AU suspended Guinea after the military coup in December 2008 (International Crisis Group 2007d: 16). Nonetheless, China was less willing to criticise the military junta. In October 2009, right after the shooting of peaceful demonstrators in September 2009, a huge mining and oil deal was agreed between China and Guinea (BBC News 2009, October).

5.2.3.9. Côte d’Ivoire

Apart from the EU, the main donors in Côte d’Ivoire are France, the IMF, the World Bank and the US. After the 1999 coup d’état, all these donors suspended their development assistance. In Chapter 4, it was mentioned that France was initially supportive of Laurent Gbagbo and set aside budgetary support on the eve of the 2000 elections, but from 2002 onwards, French development assistance was reduced due to the anti-French protests, deteriorating official relations and the security situation. France was without doubt the main force behind the international sanctions after the December 2010 elections. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the programmes of the IFIs were linked to the progress in the Article 96 consultations. Although the World Bank had resumed its assistance by the time of the December 2010 elections, it was immediately suspended again in December 2010 (Cook 2011: 15). The US suspended non-humanitarian aid following the December 1999 coup, and did not lift these restrictions after the 2000 elections, given the lack of credibility of the electoral process. Ivorian eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was withdrawn in March 2004 because of the violent crackdown on demonstrators. These sanctions were not lifted until Gbagbo ceded power to Ouattara in 2011 (US State Department 2011b).

ECOWAS was strongly opposed to the 1999 military coup and mediated the restoration process that led to the October 2000 elections. The September 2002 coup attempt was firmly condemned by ECOWAS, which expressed support and solidarity with Gbagbo and negotiated a ceasefire (Shola Omotola 2008: 39; Blé Kessé 2005: 165-155). In January 2003, an ECOWAS force of approximately
1,500 peacekeeping troops was sent, in implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (US State Department 2011b). Moreover, it was as President-in-office of ECOWAS that Blaise Compaoré mediated the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (Council of the EU 2007c). At a summit in December 2010, ECOWAS endorsed Ouattara’s victory and suspended Côte d’Ivoire from all its decision-making bodies, threatening with military intervention (IRIN News 2011, February).

The AU equally played a role with the mediation of the Pretoria Peace Agreement by South Africa in 2005 (International Crisis Group 2006f: 23). After the December 2010 elections, the AU stood firmly behind Ouattara, urged Gbagbo to step down and suspended Côte d’Ivoire from all its activities. On behalf of the AU, Kenyan prime minister Odinga and AU Chairman Mutharika travelled to Abidjan in January 2011 (Cook 2011: 12-14). By the time of the 2010 elections, Gbagbo had lost the support of African countries, with the exception of Angola and Zimbabwe (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 2012). The Chinese position was not very clear, although China was suspected to be more pro-Gbagbo. Russia, on the other hand, recognised the election of Gbagbo and blocked a UN statement backing Ouattara (Financial Times 2011, January).

5.2.3.10. Zimbabwe

In the case of Zimbabwe, there is a clear division between the position of OECD donors and that of African regional organisations. The main donors in Zimbabwe, including the UK, US and Australia, suspended development assistance and imposed travel sanctions on members of Mugabe’s government. Furthermore, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe from its councils and imposed travel sanctions (Del Biondo 2009: 133). The US has been particularly critical towards Mugabe’s government. In 2005, Zimbabwe was included in the US’s list of ‘outposts of tyranny’. Like the EU, the US refused to lift sanctions after the GPA. Moreover, upon election President Obama called for a new approach to topple Mugabe’s government (Hansen 2011: 263). The IFIs had earlier suspended programmes because of non-compliance with conditions and failure to repay arrears (see Chapter 3). On the contrary, SADC has been reluctant to openly criticise Mugabe and has explicitly opposed international sanctions (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004). This position is related to the fact that most neighbouring countries see Mugabe as a liberation leader (International Crisis Group 2002e: 13). SADC’s position has had a considerable impact on the effectiveness of EU sanctions. For example, in 2007, SADC mobilised other African countries to boycott the EU-Africa summit in case Mugabe was not allowed (Khadiagala 2009b: 315). From 2008 onwards, however, SADC started mediating, which resulted in the GPA.

Zimbabwe has been able to count on the support of Russia and China. In 2008, these countries blocked a UN resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe (Hansen 2011: 253). Especially with China, Zimbabwe has been able to build economic relations (Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2004: 10; Youde
2007: 11). At the same time, the success of Mugabe’s ‘look east’ policy should not be overestimated. For example, when President Hu Jintao did an Africa tour in 2006, he did not visit Zimbabwe (International Crisis Group 2006e: 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Global Fund</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>AfDF</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>AfDF</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Global Fund</td>
<td>AfDF</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Global Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD, aid at a glance

5.2.4. Analysis

H.7. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when there are no or few other international actors prepared to impose negative measures, while it is more likely to impose negative measures in case of a coordinated action by international actors.

The first part of the hypothesis was partially confirmed. Indeed, in Chad, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Nigeria, the main donors, African regional organisations and non-OECD economic partners, have been opposed to negative measures.

However, the hypothesis is refuted by the cases of Eritrea and Côte d’Ivoire. Eritrea is isolated amongst the regional organisations and Western donors, although it still receives some diplomatic and economic support from China and a number of Arab countries. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), some of the key donors, including the US, did not resume their bilateral development assistance in 2002, while the IFIs only did so on the basis of the EU decision to resume assistance. Hence, a coordinated approach for more extensive negative measures would have been possible. Similarly, in 2004, the US imposed sanctions, while the EU did not.

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Note: IDA is the International Development Association, the World Bank’s fund for the world’s poorest countries. The AfDF is the African Development Fund, the concessional window of the African Development Bank. The Global Fund is a public-private partnership dedicated to attract and disburse resources to prevent and treat HIB/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.
The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Niger, Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011) and Kenya. In all three cases, the EU’s negative measures (or threat thereof) were a coordinated action involving the main donors and regional organisations. In Niger and Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS was particularly active. In Kenya, all donors aligned around the mediation mission by the AU.

In Zimbabwe, however, the hypothesis could only partly be confirmed: although the majority of donors and the Commonwealth were on the same line as the EU, regional organisations were opposed to negative measures.

In the case of Guinea, the hypothesis offers no explanation for the EU’s decision in 2003 to invoke negative measures, while it does help to explain why sanctions were adopted in 2009. The EU’s decision to invoke the Article 96 procedure and to suspend aid in 2003 was a unilateral action, as the main donors had not restricted aid, nor had regional organisations become engaged in democracy promotion. The decision to impose negative measures after the September 2009 massacre can however be explained by referring to other actors: all the donors and regional organisations were on the same line regarding the need for a coercive approach.
5.3. EU leverage

5.3.1. The literature on leverage

As was noted supra, it has been suggested that international actors focus negative measures on aid dependent countries because of the leverage they expect to have with their aid. However, the extent of leverage donors have with development assistance depends on the relative importance of aid benefits for the sanctioned country. Stokke hypothesised that aid sanctions are more likely to be effective under the following circumstances: (1) the recipient government is highly dependent on aid, (2) the sanctioning donor provides a large proportion of aid and is strategically important to the recipient, and (3) the sanctioning donor is a large donor and the recipient country is a small country (Stokke 1995: 44-45). Hufbauer and others confirm this hypothesis: they argue that donors mostly impose sanctions against smaller economies in the belief that this stands more chance of success (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 90-91). According to some studies, however, the importance of aid dependency should not be overestimated. Crawford found that domestic factors and the lack of donor coordination were more important than aid dependency (Crawford 2001: 202-203). Emmanuel only found a weak effect of aid dependence, which was overshadowed by the importance of donor coordination (Emmanuel 2010: 864-865). Hazelzet (2005: 12) recognised that aid dependence was a factor, but added that certain governments simply do not care about their population, regardless of the level of development cooperation they enjoy.

The level of leverage through aid may also depend on the modality via which aid is provided. Budget support is generally seen as an instrument providing more leverage over the policies of recipient governments when compared to project aid (Hayman 2011a: 678). Commissioner Louis Michel emphasised this in a 2006 paper on budget support, where he argued that budget support has the advantage of improving dialogue on ‘an overall vision of all the country’s political priorities’ (Michel 2008c). The current plans to transform general budget support into ‘Good Governance and Development Contracts’, including political objectives related to the ‘fundamental values’ of the EU, also point in this direction (European Commission 2011a; Council of the EU 2012a).

Apart from the purely economic conception of leverage, political leverage should also be taken into account. Although not unrelated to economic leverage, political leverage depends on the diplomatic relations between the sanctioning actor and the target country. This points to the ‘foreign policy paradox’: while states have more leverage vis-à-vis allies than adversaries, they are more reluctant to use this leverage, because of the interests at stake (Knodt and Jünemann 2007: 22; Drezner 1999). Indeed, Portela argues that the lack of effectiveness of EU sanctions against Haiti (2001) could be related to the fact that Haiti belongs to the US’s sphere of influence (Portela 2010: 146).
The extent of political leverage of the EU in sub-Saharan Africa is not entirely clear. On the one hand, the EU has only played a limited political role in sub-Saharan Africa, while member states have often followed their own bilateral policies (see supra). From this perspective, one could assume that the EU has less political leverage than its member states, and the former colonial power in particular. On the other hand, the EU may also have more political leverage than former colonisers, as it is perceived as a more neutral actor. As has been mentioned previously, this is exactly why in some cases former colonisers prefer EU action to potentially controversial bilateral policies (Hyde-Price 2006: 222-223; Gibert 2011a: 192). Given that political leverage depends on diplomatic relations, the EU’s position on certain political issues of concern to the partner country (e.g. regional issues) may play a role. In some countries, however, the extent of leverage of international actors can be questioned altogether, as negative measures may have counterproductive effects. Some governments are outrightly hostile towards criticism from external actors, and use negative measures to mobilise nationalist sentiment against foreign intervention, which is known as the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 23; Uvin 1993: 71-73; Fierro 2003: 102).

5.3.2. Hypothesis and operationalisation

The EU’s leverage was noted as a potentially influential factor. If the EU has only minor leverage vis-à-vis a country, it can be expected to refrain from using negative measures. Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:

**H.8. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where it lacks leverage, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when it has substantial leverage**

Firstly, I will focus on the EU’s potential leverage through its aid. I will not take into account the level of trade between the EU and the partner countries, given that trade embargoes are only very rarely adopted. One indicator that was taken into account was the general aid dependence of each country: ODA per capita (which measures the relative amount of aid, taking into account the population) and ODA as a percentage of GDP (which indicates the share of aid in relation to the total income). In both cases, data were retrieved from the World Development Indicators. These data are presented in Table 27 on p. 252. As a second step, I looked at the potential of EU economic leverage, by calculating: (1) EU ODA as a percentage of total ODA and (2) EU ODA as a percentage of GDP. For this I used the OECD Creditor Reporting System for ODA figures, and the IMF World Economic Outlook for data on the GDP. Table 28 (p. 252) includes EU ODA as a percentage of GDP for each year since 2000, while Table 29 (p. 253) includes the average percentage of EU ODA as total ODA and GDP for 2000-2010. Furthermore, I took into account whether general budget support is provided.

The EU’s political leverage is more difficult to assess, but as a proxy indicator I looked at the reaction of the governments to the EU’s various instruments to promote democratisation. Moreover, when difficulties in diplomatic relations with the member states obstruct EU political leverage, this was also noted.

5.3.3. Case studies

5.3.3.1. Eritrea
Eritrea was the most aid dependent country of the ten country cases in 2000 and 2005. Moreover, given that there are few other donors in Eritrea, EU aid represents a large share of its income, although Eritrea does not receive any budget support from the EU. At the time of the diplomatic conflict between the EU and Eritrea over the imprisonment of the eleven dissidents in 2001, EU aid represented no less than 8 percent of Eritrea’s GDP. The share of EU development assistance has further increased since the early 2000s. However, this does not mean that the EU has substantial leverage vis-à-vis the Eritrean government, which has resorted to a policy of self-reliance and is hostile to foreign aid, as was underlined in Chapter 3. Eritrea’s hostile attitude towards foreign donors has resulted in a decrease in aid dependence from 32.1 percent in 2005 to 7.7 percent in 2010.

The EU’s political leverage – and that of any other donor – also seems limited. As Reid argues: ‘It seems unlikely that change will come about through “external” pressure, whether from the opposition abroad or from the “international community” (Reid 2009: 219). The immediate expulsion of the Italian ambassador after the Council Presidency demarche on political prisoners in 2001 clearly illustrates this lack of political leverage (Calchi Novati 2008: 53). Despite the hostility of the government of Eritrea towards external pressure, it has been willing to engage in political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. For the government, political dialogue provides a forum to discuss regional issues, such as the border war with Ethiopia (anonymous interviews, February 2009 and February 2012). In this light, the EU’s political leverage could increase if it would put pressure on Ethiopia to honour its obligations in the border war with Eritrea according to the ruling of the Boundary Commission. However, the EU has not pushed Ethiopia on the issue (Bereketeab 2009: 119).

5.3.3.2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia is an aid dependent country; aid represented about 12 percent on average of its GDP in 2000, 2005 and 2010. However, given that there are many other donors, EU aid does not represent a very large share of its GDP. Over the period 2000-2010, EU ODA represented 11.4 percent of total ODA and 2.1 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP. Nonetheless, before 2005 a large part of the EU’s aid was provided via general budget support. Hence, the decision in 2005 to suspend budget support could have been
motivated by the belief to have some economic leverage vis-à-vis the government. The share of EU aid in Ethiopia’s GDP has reduced over the years, most likely because of an increase in investments from emerging countries and in ODA from other donors. In this sense, the US and UK, Ethiopia’s first donors and diplomatic partners, probably have more leverage than the EU. However, the political leverage of donors, and of the EU in particular, is very small in Ethiopia. As stated by Borchgrevink: ‘the Ethiopian regime is independent-minded, proud, and unwilling to bow to the whims and wishes of donors and the international community in general’ (Borchgrevink 2008: 216). This could be witnessed in the reactions of prime minister Meles Zenawi to external criticism about internal affairs. When donors suspended budget support in 2005, Zenawi reacted they could go home if they were not interested in supporting the development of the country (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 204). Moreover, both EU-EOMs (2005, 2010) have been accused of partiality after releasing their reports. Chief observer of the EU-EOM in 2005 Ana Maria Gomes was called a ‘self-appointed colonial viceroy with a clear bias in favour of the opposition’ (Agence France Presse 1 September 2005). Similarly, after a critical preliminary report, Chief observer of the EU-EOM to the 2010 elections Thijs Berman was prevented from presenting his report in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. This was unprecedented in the history of EU election observation (Council of the EU 2010b). On the other hand, the government of Ethiopia has engaged in political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement (anonymous interviews, January 2011).

5.3.3.3. Kenya

Given its relatively developed economy (compared to most other cases), Kenya is little dependent on foreign aid. Its aid dependency rate has fluctuated around 5 percent. Moreover, the EU is not the main donor. In 2009-2010, the EU was only the seventh donor in Kenya. EU aid represented less than 1 percent of Kenya’s GDP in 2000-2010. Although the EU, as one of the few donors, was providing budget support at the time of the 2007 elections, the pending tranche of €40 million was disbursed because of bureaucratic procedures, as was mentioned in Chapter 2. It is doubtful that the EU has extensive political leverage in Kenya. Kenya’s main donors and diplomatic partners are the UK and, even more so, the US. Indeed, there is currently no Article 8 political dialogue with the EU because of a lack of interest from the Kenyan side. Moreover, the EU was unable to prolong the Memorandum of Understanding on piracy at the time of expiration in 2010 (anonymous interviews, January-February 2012).

5.3.3.4. Chad

Chad’s dependence on EU aid has greatly diminished with the start of oil production in 2002. Nonetheless, aid dependence remains relatively high (comparable to Ethiopia). Moreover, the EU was one of the few donors. Over the period 2000-2010, EU aid represented 22 percent on average of total ODA and 2.7 percent of Chad’s GDP. In contrast to most other countries, there are reasons to believe
that the EU had political leverage in Chad. Gilles Desesquelles, head of the delegation of the European Commission from 2006 until 2011, organised political dialogue in 2006-2007 leading to the 2007 political agreement. Moreover, Desesquelles had regular contacts with President Déby (anonymous interviews, February and May 2012).

5.3.3.5. **Niger**

Despite uranium revenues, Niger is relatively dependent on ODA, with an aid dependency rate comparable to that of Ethiopia. Moreover, the EU is the main donor and aid per capita is relatively low. The EU provided one fifth of Niger’s total ODA in 2000-2010 and 4.3 percent of its GDP. Moreover, a significant share of ODA was provided in the form of direct budget support (€93 million) (European Commission 2008f). However, it is not clear whether this economic leverage was also translated in political leverage. For example, the Nigerien government was reluctant to engage in political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement (anonymous interview, March 2012). Moreover, the government seemed unwilling to give in to the EU’s demands to step down after its second mandate.

5.3.3.6. **Nigeria**

The EU’s economic leverage in Nigeria is negligible. Nigeria is not an aid dependent country: it received USD 2 per capita in 2005, which is fourteen times less than the sub-Saharan African average of USD 28 (Khakee 2007: 2). EU aid as a share of GDP was insignificant in 2000-2010. Moreover, the EU is not the main donor in Nigeria: aid represented only 7 percent of total ODA in 2000-2010, with the UK and US providing much bigger amounts. When interrogated in the EP about the EU reaction to the 2007 flawed elections, Benita Ferrero-Waldner argued that sanctions would be useless given that the EU’s financial funding only represents ‘a mere 0.2 percent of the oil revenue and the total international aid to Nigeria’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2007). Besides economic leverage, political leverage was also limited. For this reason, Khakee questions if the EU could have done more than focusing on election observation and assistance (Khakee 2007: 2-4). It is only recently that the EU significantly upgraded its partnership with Nigeria, namely with the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward that started in 2009 (see Chapter 2).

5.3.3.7. **Rwanda**

Rwanda is highly dependent on foreign aid: of the ten cases under investigation, it was the most dependent on aid. The EU is an important donor and a large share of the EU’s development assistance is provided in the form of general budget support. EU development assistance represented 12.7 percent of total ODA and 3.7 percent of Rwanda’s GDP in 2000-2010. Nonetheless, political leverage is restricted by the role of many member states in the 1994 genocide. This puts donors in a weak
bargaining position vis-à-vis the government given the guilt still felt by some of the donors about the genocide (Hayman 2009b: 71). Because of genocidal history, the US and UK have become the main diplomatic partners of Rwanda, but even the leverage of these donors should not be overestimated. Donors have the idea that positive measures are the most adequate instrument to promote democratisation: ‘in the face of Rwanda’s history and the pride of the government, donors have much more leverage when they act as “friends” of the regime and engage positively with it; there is pressure to democratise, but Rwanda does not take kindly to being pushed’ (Ibid: 71). The lack of donor leverage is not limited to democratisation, but includes Rwanda’s foreign policies. Marriage quotes DfID’s First Secretary: ‘The thing is that the international community will not be able to influence the government of Rwanda on security policy. The government of Rwanda will not compromise its security interests’ (Marriage 2006: 484). Despite this apparent lack of political leverage, Rwanda has engaged in frequent political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, which has been described by several interviewees as relatively fruitful (anonymous interviews, January 2012).

5.3.3.8. Guinea

Guinea is not aid dependent, its aid dependency rate was around 5 percent, comparable to that of Kenya. EU aid only represented about 1 percent of Guinea’s GDP. Moreover, under Conté Guinea was openly hostile towards foreign aid, at one point President Conté was quoted saying he did ‘not need the white man’s money’ (cited in Laakso et al. 2007b: 28). Nonetheless, ODA was an important source of foreign currency. When external aid was decreasing in Guinea, inflation was rising (Ibid.: 27-28). The limited leverage of the EU was shown in the uncooperative attitude of the Guinean government during the Article 96 consultations. Guinea accused the EU of not having respected the requirement to step up political dialogue before resorting to Article 96, and did not appear after the first invitation in April 2004 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 86).

5.3.3.9. Côte d’Ivoire

With an aid dependency rate of around 3 percent in 2000 and 2010, Côte d’Ivoire is not an aid dependent country. EU aid only represented a minor share of Côte d’Ivoire’s GDP, but this may also be related to the fact that EU aid has been reduced in the late 1990s as a response to corruption, the 1999 military coup and subsequently the civil war. Nonetheless, in 1999-2000, Côte d’Ivoire was receiving sizeable balance of payments support under the Stabex programme for its coffee products (around USD 100 million). Moreover, in 2001, the International Financial Institutions linked the resumption of assistance to Côte d’Ivoire to the progress of the Article 96 consultations (European Community and Côte d’Ivoire 2005: 26).

From 2002 onwards, however, EU aid became of minor importance, as it was mainly limited to humanitarian aid and programmes in direct support of the population, given the security situation. A
new CSP and NIP were only signed and implemented after the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (anonymous interview, February 2012). As regards political leverage, it seems that the EU initially had some political leverage vis-à-vis President Gbagbo, who was willing to engage in the Article 96 consultations in 2001, which were described as a ‘success’ because a number of reforms were introduced (Arts 2005: 174). This could be related to the fact that Gbagbo was new in office and sought international legitimacy after a dubious election victory. However, the EU’s political leverage diminished in subsequent years, as Gbagbo, who was the main holder of power in the country, realised ceding to donor pressure would endanger his position. In this context, one of the arguments for the Council to defeat the Commission proposal to reopen Article 96 in 2004 was that Gbagbo was unwilling to negotiate with the EU, while the role of the prime minister was limited (anonymous interview, March 2007). Political leverage was even further reduced in the context of the December 2010 elections. Given that donor demands implied that President Gbagbo would have to step down, he was unwilling to give in to these demands.

5.3.3.10. Zimbabwe

EU aid to Zimbabwe has not been an important part of the country’s income, neither before nor after aid suspension. Zimbabwe was not an aid dependent country, its aid dependence rate was less than 3 percent, the second lowest of the ten cases. Nonetheless, the EU is an important donor in Zimbabwe. In 2000-2001, EU aid represented almost one third of total ODA in Zimbabwe, although there was no direct budget support provided by the EU. Politically, however, the EU lacks leverage in Zimbabwe, as the sanctions are seen as instigated by Mugabe’s arch-enemy: the UK. Mugabe presented the sanctions as a punishment for his land reform policies (Laakso 2002: 452) and the main cause for the economic crisis (Lyman 2007: 92). To a certain degree, this has worked to gain domestic support (International Crisis Group 2007a: 18; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009: 3). The lack of political leverage was clear from the attempt to start political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, which was refused by the government (see Chapter 2). Moreover, the hostility of Mugabe vis-à-vis conditionality was clearly seen during the Article 96 consultations. The consultations were concluded without any satisfactory result as Zimbabwe was opposed to international observers to the 2002 elections. Zimbabwe argued that the EU had no right under the Cotonou Agreement to require the deployment of an EU election observation team (ACP Group and Council of the EU 2002).
Table 27. Aid dependency, 2000-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ODA per capita (USD)</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>46*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
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*The high number for Nigeria in 2005 is related to debt relief
Source: World Development Indicators

Table 28. EU ODA as a percentage of the GDP, 2000-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>5.9</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations, on the basis of OECD creditor reporting system and IMF World Economic Outlook 2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
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<td>20.2</td>
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<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations, on the basis of OECD creditor reporting system and IMF World Economic Outlook 2011

5.3.4. Analysis

H.8. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where it lacks leverage, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when it has substantial leverage.

The first part of the hypothesis can be confirmed. At first sight, one would assume the EU to have substantial economic leverage in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Especially in Eritrea, EU development assistance accounts for a substantial share of ODA and GDP. However, the EU lacks political leverage in these three countries. First of all, the governments of Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea are not open to criticism on internal issues. Moreover, in the case of Ethiopia and Rwanda, both countries are closer to the US and UK in terms of regional cooperation and development cooperation. In Eritrea, the government does not seem concerned about whether donors support the country or not.

The hypothesis is further confirmed by the case of Nigeria, where it is clear that the EU’s political and economic leverage is small.

The hypothesis is however refuted by the cases of Chad and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), where the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures, although it had economic and political leverage. Although Chad is an oil producer, EU aid nevertheless represents a considerable share of its GDP. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the resumption of assistance from the IFIs was linked to the Article 96 consultations. Moreover, in both cases, the EU had some political leverage, but did not use this leverage to push for more thorough democratic reform.

However, the second part of the hypothesis is refuted. In the case of Niger, it could be argued that the EU had more leverage than other donors because it was providing substantial budget support. However, economic leverage was not translated into political leverage given the low interest of Niger in engaging in political dialogue. A more likely interpretation of events is that the EU was
uncomfortable with the budget support programme in the light of the 2009 political crisis, given the risks of disbursing budget support in such a context.

In Guinea, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011) and Kenya, the hypothesis is refuted. These are all countries that are little dependent on aid and where the EU’s political leverage was limited. However, in the cases of Guinea (2009), Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011) and Kenya, the EU’s decision to threaten with negative measures, regardless of its leverage, should be seen in the light of the position of other actors. Given that negative measures were a coordinated act, the EU reasoned that they could be successful. The lack of economic leverage in these cases can explain why the strongest negative measures, including CFSP sanctions with severe economic repercussions, were taken in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011). As aid provided too little leverage in these cases, a stronger ‘stick’ was needed.
5.4. Domestic position of the government

5.4.1. The literature on the domestic position of the government

It is widely recognised that external pressure alone has little effect on democratisation. Democracy is most likely to come from within. What donors can do, however, is ‘tip the balance’ in situations where domestic circumstances are conducive to democratisation. From this perspective, the EU would be more likely to impose negative measures when a government is already under severe domestic pressure to democratise. Stokke identifies four ways in which the domestic position can be threatened: (1) the loss of monopoly on coercive powers, (2) the loss of popular support and the emergence of discontent in influential sectors of society (trade unions, organised businesses, traditional leaders), (3) a deteriorating economy and (4) the presence and strength of an alternative leadership (Stokke 1995: 42-43). Hufbauer and others found a relationship between weaker states and the effectiveness of sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 100). Crawford found that negative measures were more likely to be effective when combined with internal pressure, and less likely to be effective against military-backed governments that are able to resist external pressure. The state of the economy played a less important role, as aid sanctions were ineffective in some economically weaker states. This can be explained by the strong sense of self-preservation of some governments, which often resort to state resources or force in case of a situation of civil strife between government and non-government forces (Crawford 2001: 197-201).

5.4.2. Hypothesis and operationalisation

It was noted that negative measures are more likely to be effective when the government is already severely weakened. From this perspective, it can be assumed that the EU will take into account the domestic position of the government when deciding on whether to impose negative measures.

The next hypothesis thus reads as follows:

_H.9. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government is strong, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government is weak._

The following factors were taken into account: the potential of a military coup or armed insurgencies, the presence of pro-democratic forces (opposition, civil society, dissident voices within the government), anti-government protest and the state of the economy. On the presence of pro-democratic forces, I consulted academic articles and the reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the International Crisis Group. Bertelsmann Foundation reports were also used to identify the possibility of a military coup and armed rebellion. Information on the state of the economy was based on the information from Chapter 3.
5.4.3. Case studies

5.4.3.1. Eritrea
Despite the poor state of the economy and the economic hardship amongst the population, the domestic position of the government of Eritrea remains strong. The population seems to accept that there is no alternative to the ruling regime. There is no legal opposition and there is hardly any independent civil society. The opposition abroad is in wide disarray and few of its leaders are respected in Eritrea (Reid 2009: 211). Dissident voices within the ruling party were imprisoned in 2001 and those who are fed up with the lack of civil-political rights and the economic circumstances tend to emigrate rather than to demonstrate (Reid 2009: 219). Nonetheless, the position of the government may weaken due to the military, as discrepancies and tensions between Afewerki and leading military commanders have increased in 2008 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 4).

5.4.3.2. Ethiopia
The domestic position of the government of Ethiopia and ruling party is strong and has only become stronger in recent years. First of all, it should be noted that the EPRDF is a strong and durable alliance because of its highly-centralised and disciplined internal structure and the absolute dominance of the TPLF and Meles Zenawi in the coalition. The only notable disagreement was on relations with Eritrea in 2001, which was answered by a swift removal of dissenting voices from the party (Fisher 2011: 354). In contrast, the opposition is divided and unstable, and the majority of parties participating in the elections are subsidiary and affiliated parties of the EPRDF (Tronvoll 2009: 462; Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 14). While the opposition joined forces in two broad coalitions in the 2005 elections, after the elections the opposition was divided about the strategy to take, while many CUD leaders were imprisoned (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 195-196). Moreover, the new coalition that emerged in the preparation of the 2010 elections, Medrek, was hindered by the EPRDF from building a base of support in rural areas (Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 15). During the 2005 elections, civil society played an important role by protesting against the elections and engaging in voter education and domestic observation. However, civil society and the independent media have weakened since the 2005 elections, because of a reduced openness to critical voices, as well as new legislation curtailing civil-political rights (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 199-202). Moreover, the EPRDF managed to regain its power base after the 2005 elections. Between 2005 and 2010, the membership base of the EPRDF exploded from 600,000 members to 5 million members (Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 14). This could be observed in the 2008 local and 2010 parliamentary elections, when the ruling party won all but a few seats (Tronvoll 2010). Furthermore, the government has maintained firm control over the security forces since 1995 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 5) and, as was shown in Chapter 3, there has been sustained economic growth, especially since the mid-2000s.
5.4.3.3. **Kenya**
The domestic position of Kibaki’s government was weakened after the December 2007 elections. The parliamentary elections, held together with the presidential elections, were won by Odinga’s ODM, with 102 against 78 seats. The strength of the opposition had already become clear in 2005 when the constitution proposed by Kibaki was rejected in a referendum after a strong campaigning by the opposition and civil society. Civil society organisations are relatively strong in Kenya (Whitaker and Giersch 2009). Despite pressure from opposition and civil society, however, the government had retained its monopoly on violence and there had not been any evidence of a coup threat in previous years (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 11). The economic situation had improved, although corruption remained a serious problem.

5.4.3.4. **Chad**
The constant threat of a military coup or overthrow by rebellion groups severely weakened the government in the 2000s. The non-armed opposition, however, is so fragmented that no party offers a true alternative to President Déby’s *Mouvement patriotique du salut*. Political parties are either associations for the promotion of their leader or factions that on occasion revert to politico-military struggle (May and Massey 2002). Moreover, many opposition leaders have been co-opted by the President, which has reduced their credibility in the eyes of the population. Another strategy of the ruling regime has been to create small parties that are controlled by the government (International Crisis Group 2008b: 9). Moreover, civil society is very weak in Chad (anonymous interviews, March-April 2012; Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 6). The extent of corruption in Chad has contributed to its fragility, as the demands of rebellion groups included an improvement of economic governance (International Crisis Group 2008b: 12-13).

5.4.3.5. **Niger**
The government of Niger had been weakened in the context of the 2009 referendum. There was strong domestic opposition to President Tandja’s plans to seek a third term. In late 2008, 20 NGOs created the *Front Uni pour la Sauvegarde des Acquis Démocratiques* to advocate against a prolongation of Tandja’s Presidency. There were frequent manifestations against the change of the constitution. Moreover, given Niger’s history of military coups (1996, 1999) and a 2002 army mutiny, some observers feared a military coup, although no political interventions by the military or mutinies were noted in the last years of Tandja’s rule. Although the government had access to resources from uranium extraction, the state of the economy had weakened the government’s position. In 2005, mass demonstrations were held against the cost of living, organised by the umbrella group of civil society organisations *Coalition Équité/Coalition contre la Vie Chère* (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009d: 7-8).
5.4.3.6. Nigeria
On the one hand, Nigeria has a vibrant civil society and an assertive parliament (Mikkel 2008: 302; Suberu 2007: 107; Rotberg 2007: 31-32). The first could be observed in the 50,000 strong Domestic Election Observation Group, formed by civil society organisations to monitor the 2007 elections, which called for a cancellation of the results (Amuwo 2009: 53; International Crisis Group 2007a: 6). The latter could be seen in 2006, when Obasanjo’s attempts to change the constitution were defeated in parliament (Mikkel 2008: 302). Nonetheless, the opposition is hampered by the lack of a strong party system. Nigeria’s political parties have been described as ‘weak, faction-ridden, personality-driven institutions’ (Suberu 2007: 101). Competition occurs mostly between factions (often within one party), rather than between parties. Parties lack a clear ideology and focus instead on religion, ethnicity and money politics. Parties are seen as tools for promoting sectionalism and opportunism (Shola Omotola 2009: 628-629; Sklar et al. 2006: 101-102). Moreover, opposition parties hesitate between allying with the PDP or building a challenge to the PDP dominance (Sklar et al. 2006: 112). Hence, in the campaign of the 2007 elections, only very few parties led an issue-driven campaign, while most declared to continue Obasanjo’s policies (Amuwo 2009: 52). The government is weakened by the many upsurges of violence throughout the country, and in the context of the 2007 elections there were rumours that the military might take power (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007d: 7). The lack of equal distribution of oil wealth has contributed to the weakening of the government, given the threat of insurgent groups in the Niger Delta.

5.4.3.7. Rwanda
Given the fact that the main political parties and civil society organisations have been forbidden, political parties and civil society are weak in Rwanda (Longman 2011: 31-34). Moreover, the government has firm control over the security forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009c: 5 and 16), and the growing economy may provide a source of strength for the government.

5.4.3.8. Guinea
At the time when the EU decided to adopt sanctions in 2003, President Conté was seriously ill (Laakso et al. 2007b: 42). The government was further weakened by a potential military coup: in 1996 there had been a tentative of coup d’état and there had been rumours about a next attempt in 2000 (McGovern 2002: 94). The attacks in Guinée Forestière (see supra) and the economic crisis and high food prices provided a further source of instability. However, the opposition was divided, weak and purely ethnically based (International Crisis Group 2003a: 8). Current president and long-time opposition leader Condé was criticised within Guinea for having spent so much time abroad. There was a relatively strong tradition of civil society and trade unions in Guinea, which together with the faltering economy led to the weakening of the government, especially in 2006-2007 when massive demonstrations took place. Civil society organisations joined forces in the National Forum of Guinean
Civil Society Organisations. In March 2006, a National Consultation was held bringing together political parties, civil society organisations, trade unions, women and youth groups, during which a transition was discussed (International Crisis Group 2006b: 3-6). After the military coup, opposition parties formed the Forces Vives, which enjoyed strong support from civil society (International Crisis Group 2009a: 4).

5.4.3.9. **Côte d'Ivoire**

Côte d'Ivoire does not have a strong civil society, which is partly due to the climate of intimidation since 1999 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 16). However, the lack of inclusiveness of Gbagbo’s government when taking power in 2000 was a clear source of weakness, as was reflected in the many protests of supporters from Ouattara’s party RDR. The 2001 municipal elections made clear that Ouattara and his party had more support than expected, notably in Abidjan and in Southern cities, where Gbagbo was believed to stand strong (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 2012). Gbagbo’s government was further weakened after the September 2002 coup attempt, after which he lost control over the north of the country. Despite the civil war, the economy did not entirely collapse, although economic activity in the north was affected by the security situation (Labertit 2010).

Gbagbo’s position was further challenged after the December 2010 elections, which were won by the opposition. After losing the elections, Gbagbo was relying purely on his security forces, which at that time were still loyal to him, as well as a large number of ‘Young Patriots’ (International Crisis Group 2011a: 10).

5.4.3.10. **Zimbabwe**

From the 1990s onwards, the government of Zimbabwe had become increasingly unpopular. This was related to the growing authoritarianism of the government but also to the economic crisis. The National Constitutional Assembly, an umbrella group including trade unions, human rights organisations, church groups and small opposition parties was formed in 1997 (Laakso 2002: 447; Raftopoulos 2009: 210). After repeated trade union protests in the late 1990s, the government was forced to draft a new constitution. The defeat of the government’s proposal for constitution in the 2000 referendum made clear that support for the government was diminishing. Furthermore, in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the MDC nearly won the elections with 57 of 120 seats (International Crisis Group 2000: i). The government’s monopoly on violence has eroded in recent years because of its reliance on war veterans and youth militia, which are better paid and enjoy more privileges than the security forces. This has increased discontent amongst the security forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 6).
5.4.4. Analysis

H.9. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government is strong, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government is weak.

The first part of this hypothesis was confirmed in the cases of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda. In these three countries, the government’s position is strong because of the forceful suppression of dissent and firm control over the security forces. In Ethiopia, although the opposition and civil society appeared stronger than expected in the context of the 2005 parliamentary elections, their position weakened in recent years, and even after the 2005 parliamentary elections, the ruling party had a clear majority. This stands in clear contrast to countries like Zimbabwe (2000, 2002, 2008), Kenya (2007) and Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), where there was a dispute over which party had won the elections.

In Nigeria, Chad and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), the hypothesis was refuted. In these countries, the domestic position of the government was weak, either because of a strong opposition (Côte d’Ivoire), armed insurgencies (Nigeria, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire) or a military coup (Nigeria, Chad). Nonetheless, the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures.

The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by all the cases. In Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), EU negative measures were taken against regimes that had severely weakened, were under severe pressure from the public and from the opposition, and could only remain in power via electoral fraud. In Niger, there were strong protests from civil society organisations and the opposition in the context of 2009 political crisis. The adoption of negative measures in Guinea should be seen in the light of the illness of the president and the possibility of a military coup. Indeed, Laakso and others have emphasised that the EU believed that the regime could collapse quickly (Laakso et al. 2007b: 42). Moreover, when sanctions were adopted in 2009, there were strong protests from civil society and the opposition against the military regime. The situation in Kenya after the December 2007 elections was such that the government’s position was severely weakened: there were signs that the opposition had won, there was severe political violence and protests from opposition supporters and civil society.
5.5. Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have tried to find out whether double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles in the ten sub-Saharan African countries studied in this dissertation can be explained by considerations about the effectiveness of negative measures. It was hypothesised that the EU would take three factors into account when assessing the effectiveness of negative measures: (1) the position of other actors, (2) the potential leverage of the EU and (3) the domestic position of the government. On the basis of these factors, three hypotheses were tested. The validity of the hypotheses for each case is summarised in Table 30. While all three hypotheses had some explanatory value, the position of other actors and the domestic position of the government seems most able to explain double standards.

Table 30. Chapter Summary Table: Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Other actors</th>
<th>EU leverage</th>
<th>Domestic position</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU most reluctant to impose negative measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2005</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU least reluctant to impose negative measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+: hypothesis confirmed
-: hypothesis refuted
+/ -: hypothesis partly confirmed, partly refuted

With some exceptions, the EU imposed negative measures as a coordinated action with the main actors or did not impose negative measures when such a consensus was lacking. While one could argue that the EU could have tried to act as a leader by attempting to provoke a ‘snowball effect’ when consensus was lacking (Stokke 1995: 44; Crawford 2001: 204), the possibility to do this depends on the EU’s leverage as well as on the interests and perception of other actors. Hence, in Chad this was a
possibility, while in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Nigeria, it was not. In the case of Eritrea and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005), however, the EU was more reluctant to impose negative measures than other actors. In both cases, the position of the US is particularly important. This suggests that other factors prevented the EU from imposing negative measures. In the case of Eritrea, the position of other actors did not make EU action more effective given that none of the international actors had an impact on the internal affairs of the government. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, French historical interests provide a better explanation for the EU’s position. As regards the cases where the EU was less reluctant to impose negative measures, it is notable that only in two countries, Guinea (2003) and, to a lesser degree, Zimbabwe, international consensus was lacking. In the case of Guinea, the US and France did not follow, while in Zimbabwe, African regional organisations were reluctant to impose negative measures. This cannot be explained by the EU’s own leverage in these cases, as it was seen that EU leverage was limited. Negative measures in this case seem based on calculations about the domestic position of the government, or on other factors, unrelated to expectations about effectiveness.

As regards the EU’s leverage, it is notable that, with the exception of the above-mentioned examples of Guinea and Zimbabwe, the EU imposed negative measures regardless of its leverage. However, this can be explained by the position of other actors. In Niger, Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), Kenya and Guinea (2009), negative measures were a coordinated act, hence the EU’s leverage was less important.

EU leverage was equally small in countries where no or only limited negative measures were taken. The cases of Rwanda, Eritrea and Ethiopia are particularly interesting as in these countries the EU, despite having some economic leverage, hardly has any political leverage. This is related to the strength of the US and UK as a diplomatic partner in some cases (Rwanda and Ethiopia), but also to the harsh reaction to any attempt of donors to interfere in the domestic process.

The last hypothesis concerned the domestic position of the government. This factor seemed particularly powerful in explaining why the EU did impose negative measures, while it was less able to explain why the EU did not impose negative measures. Indeed, in all the cases where the EU imposed negative measures, the government was weakened, either because of pressure from civil society, the opposition or the general public, an economic crisis, illness of the President, a threat of military coup or armed insurgencies.

This points to a paradox in the application of negative measures. While one would assume negative measures to be applied more frequently in less democratic countries, the contrary seems the case. It is exactly in these countries where civil society and the opposition are strong, that the EU is more likely to impose negative measures. While this can be explained by the increased likelihood of success in case of domestic opposition to the government, it also points to a second effect of prodemocratic forces, namely the ability of these groups to alert Western public opinion and governments (Risse and
Sikkink 1999: 5). In countries where the government manages to silence pro-democratic forces, the democratic process seems to find itself in a deadlock situation. In these cases, donors are likely to refrain from negative measures in the belief such an approach would not work, and at the same time, there is less pressure to do so.

However, in Chad, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire (2000-2005), the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures, although the domestic position of the government was weak. In the case of Chad and Nigeria, this can be explained by the EU’s fear for instability (see Chapter 3). In these cases, the government has mainly been threatened by armed insurgencies, a military coup and ethnic or religious violence. Hence, the EU may fear that, should the government be overthrown, this may result in ethnic clashes. This is however not the case in Côte d’Ivoire where there was little guarantee that Gbagbo’s government would bring stability to the country and there was a strong opposition that proved a threat to the government. Here, the decision to impose relatively light negative measures seems mainly instigated by French historical interests (Chapter 4).
6. General conclusions
6. General conclusions

6.1. Summary

This dissertation has sought to address the following research question:

*Which factors can explain double standards in the EU’s reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa?*

To answer this question, I have started by investigating the degree to which double standards have been applied by the EU in its reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. The main part of the dissertation was then dedicated to the search for explanations for these double standards. Based on an extensive overview of the literature on political conditionality and EU democracy promotion, I have argued that most studies see the EU’s self-interest as the main explanation for double standards in the choice of instruments for democracy promotion. Although some studies suggest that, apart from self-interest, considerations about effectiveness also inspire the EU in its decision to choose positive or negative measures to promote democracy, this explanatory factor has been under-researched.

Importantly, I observed an empirical gap in current research. Existing studies on EU democracy promotion have mostly focused on regions where member states’ security and commercial interests are strong (e.g. the neighbourhood, China, Russia). In contrast, EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa are – more often than elsewhere – inspired by ‘humanitarian’, ‘ethical’ or ‘normative’ objectives. Even ‘hard’ foreign policy issues including energy or conflict are often framed from a developmental perspective in EU-Africa policies. In this sense, it should be mentioned that the European Commission’s DG Development was until recently responsible for EU-Africa policies. At the same time, the EU’s policies in sub-Saharan Africa are often seen from a self-interested perspective, namely when member states try to protect their spheres of influence or in the context of the war on terror.

Although some studies have focused on the motivations for EU negative measures as a reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa, several empirical gaps remain. Generally, there are few recent studies: most research focused on the 1990s. Moreover, in studies focusing on the period since 2000, comparative research has been lacking.

I then advanced three main factors as an analytical framework that could be used to guide my research: norms, self-interest and effectiveness. The norms versus self-interest dichotomy is well-known and has been particularly relevant in studying EU foreign policy, hence the debate on Normative Power
Europe. It also reflects the dilemma posed in the EU’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa, which – as I have just argued – are inspired by both norms and self-interest. However, only few studies acknowledge the possible problematic aspects of the EU’s normative agenda in sub-Saharan Africa, which is centred around the triple objective of democracy, development and stability. Indeed, there are plenty of reasons to doubt the EU’s apparent assumption that ‘all good things go together’. Academic research and country practice show that (1) democracy might collide with development and (2) democracy might collide with stability. How the EU deals with these dilemmas and the possible trade-offs that are made in concrete cases thus formed the first question in the dissertation. A second contribution I have made with my research is to move beyond the norms-and-interest dichotomy by looking at considerations of effectiveness of negative measures. It is emphasised in both EU policy discourse and studies on the application of negative measures that sanctions are an instrument of ‘last resort’. However, this factor had been given little attention, and had never been investigated systematically.

Taking this trichotomy of explanatory factors (norms, self-interest and effectiveness) as an analytical framework for my empirical research, I chose to focus on ten country cases: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. The choice for these cases was first and foremost related to the puzzle on which my research was based: while similar violations of democratic principles have occurred in these countries from 2000 onwards, the EU has reacted unevenly to these violations. Moreover, the countries differ with regard to the three explanatory factors of my analytical framework. The cases include both important and insignificant commercial partners, countries with different colonial histories, key allies and non-allies in the war on terror, development success stories and development disasters, fragile countries and stable countries, peacemakers and peace spoilers, aid dependent and non-aid dependent countries, etc.

After the Introductory Chapter, the second Chapter had the two-fold aim to (1) introduce the ten country cases and (2) to demonstrate the research puzzle: the existence of double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of a wide array of qualitative and quantitative sources, the Chapter showed that similar violations of democratic principles have indeed led to different reactions from the EU. In some cases (Chad, Rwanda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire 2000-2005), the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures, while in others (Niger, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire 2010, Kenya) this was not the case. The rest of my dissertation then tried to explain these double standards, based on the analytical framework outlined above.

In the three subsequent Chapters, I investigated the contribution of each of the three main factors identified in the introduction: norms, self-interest and effectiveness. For each of these factors, three hypotheses were distilled from the literature and then tested on the case studies. In Chapter 3
‘Conflicting norms’, I argued that, although EU discourse seems to suggest that democracy, development and stability are mutually reinforcing, the reality is that democracy may threaten stability, while non-democratic countries may prove developmental and stable. From this perspective, it was hypothesised that double standards could result from the trade-off between (1) democracy and development and (2) democracy and stability (regional and internal). It was concluded that development and internal stability were indeed often preferred over democracy, while the preference for regional stability was less clear. Development norms were especially important in explaining why negative measures were sometimes imposed: the EU was more keen on imposing negative measures when development performance was limited. Nonetheless, there were equally cases where democracy was preferred over internal and regional stability (Guinea 2003) and where positive measures were preferred even if developmental performance and internal stability were weak (Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria).

Chapter 4 then focused on the aspect of ‘self-interest’ and aimed to find out whether double standards were caused by historical, commercial and security interests of the EU and its member states. The main conclusion of the Chapter was that historical and security interests can explain double standards, while commercial interests cannot. However, historical and security interests had more explanatory value in explaining why the EU did impose negative measures than in explaining why it was reluctant to impose negative measures. Although there was less evidence for the thesis that the EU is more reluctant to impose negative measures when there are historical and security interests at stake, this could be explained by the strength of historical (Côte d’Ivoire) and security (Ethiopia, Nigeria) interests in some cases.

Chapter 5 then addressed the question whether expectations about effectiveness can explain double standards. It was hypothesised that the EU would take three main considerations into account when deciding on whether to impose negative measures: (1) the position of other actors, (2) its own leverage and (3) the domestic position of the government. At first sight, the explanatory value of the position of other actors and the domestic position of the government seemed stronger than the EU’s leverage. However, it was argued that the first and second factor were related: the EU may be willing to impose negative measures despite the lack of leverage in case of a coordinated action by the main actors. The domestic position of the government was particularly important in explaining why the EU has imposed negative measures. It seems that negative measures were mainly used when the government had already been weakened. When the domestic position of the government was strong, the EU was unlikely to use negative measures.
6.2. Conclusions

In the empirical Chapters, the cases were analysed on the basis of the hypotheses. The main conclusions were thus based on the analysis across cases, while there was little room for analysing the importance of several factors within the cases. This is what I will do in the following part. The relative importance of each factor is summarised in the following table. On the basis of this overview, I will then move on to the main conclusions regarding the application of the analytical framework on the case studies.

Table 31: Summary of the findings

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+: explanatory value  
-: no explanatory value

In Chad, the EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures is primarily self-interested. Conflicting norms do not provide an explanation, given that the government of Chad did not promote internal stability nor development, while its contribution to regional stability was mixed. Moreover, given the weak position of the government and the potential leverage of the EU, expectations about effectiveness are not an important factor. Within self-interest-based motives, there is a clear dominance of historical interests, namely the French desire to maintain its sphere of influence, while security interests also play a role.
In Rwanda, however, the EU hardly has any self-interested motivations to avoid negative measures. Historical interests play a minor role given the tense diplomatic relations with those member states that formerly considered Rwanda as part of their sphere of influence. Moreover, commercial and security interests are minor. On the contrary, the EU’s approach can be explained by referring to conflicting norms, notably the fear to sacrifice internal stability and development for the sake of democratisation. Moreover, expectations about effectiveness should also be mentioned, given the support Rwanda enjoys from other actors, the limited political leverage of the EU and the strong domestic position of the government.

In Eritrea, there is only one factor that can explain the EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures, namely the EU’s expectation that negative measures would not be effective. EU self-interest is not a good explanation: historical and commercial interests are low, and Eritrea does not cooperate in the fight against terrorism or migration. Moreover, the EU’s normative objectives are not conflicting in the Eritrean case: the country is not performing well economically and is considered to endanger regional stability, although it has been relatively stable internally. Hence, considerations of effectiveness provide a better explanation: the EU hardly has any leverage in Eritrea, and the domestic position of the government is strong.

In Ethiopia, a combination of norms, self-interest and expectations about effectiveness can explain the EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures. There are of course important security considerations given Ethiopia’s role in the war on terror and in the fight against migration. In addition to this, however, there is a clash in normative objectives, and democracy is traded for internal stability and development. Moreover, given the strong domestic and international position of the government, as well as the lack of leverage, it is also believed that negative measures would not work.

Similarly, in Nigeria, a combination of norms, self-interest and effectiveness can explain the EU’s approach. Although the hypotheses emphasising historical and commercial interests were refuted, the EU’s security interests in Nigeria are so important that it cannot be denied that self-interest plays a role here. In the same line of reasoning, although internal stability and development were a concern, Nigeria’s role in promoting regional stability is considered as crucial. Moreover, expectations about effectiveness also play an important role (no support from other actors, lack of leverage).

The EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures against Gbagbo’s government in Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005) was inspired by the French self-interested consideration that President Gbagbo should be given the benefit of the doubt. The other factors provide no clear explanation, given that there were no guarantees that Gbagbo was committed to economic development, while internal stability was severely under threat because of the lack of inclusiveness of the 2000 elections. The hypotheses on
expectations about effectiveness were refuted as other actors had equally suspended aid, the EU had some leverage and the government was weakened.

The case of Niger cannot be adequately explained by referring to self-interest. Although historical interest may have been less important than in other countries, the EU had some security interests (the fight against terrorism), as well as considerable commercial interests (uranium). Normative objectives provide a better explanation for this case, namely the government’s ineffective and inhuman approach to internal stability, its limited contribution to regional stability and problems with the administration of development assistance. Moreover, expectations about effectiveness may play a role, given that there was a consensus amongst the main international actors and the domestic position of the government was weakened.

The case of Zimbabwe can be explained by the combination of norms and self-interest. Apart from the fact that Mugabe’s government was becoming increasingly authoritarian, bad economic governance was provoking an economic crisis and there were concerns about regional stability. Moreover, Mugabe had been challenging historical interests with the land reform programme and there was little cooperation on security issues. However, it is unlikely that the EU seriously considered the expected effectiveness of negative measures, given that African actors were not on the same line and Mugabe was unlikely to give in to Western pressure.

Similarly, the decision in 2003 to impose aid sanctions against Guinea was informed by norms and self-interest. Although Conté’s government was seen as a factor of regional stability, economic governance was very poor. The fact that historical, commercial and security interests were low may have made it easier for the EU to adopt negative measures. Whereas expectations about effectiveness only played a minor role in 2003, the decision to impose sanctions in 2009 can be explained by expectations about effectiveness. Whereas negative measures in 2003 were primarily a unilateral decision, in 2009 they were part of a coordinated act.

The harsh negative measures imposed against Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011 can be explained by self-interested factors, notably the French concern to restore its sphere of influence. Normative objectives also play a role, given that the political crisis was endangering internal and regional stability, and economic progress was halted by the civil war, which was directly related to the political crisis. Moreover, it is likely that expectations about effectiveness were considered. Although the EU in itself had little leverage, the fact that the weak domestic and international position of the government may have made the EU more willing to impose negative measures.

Lastly, in Kenya, self-interest is not a good explanation for the reluctance to impose negative measures. The EU acted somewhat against its self-interest given that Kibaki had been a trustworthy
ally in the war on terror and piracy. In this case, normative objectives should be taken into account, namely the concern for internal and regional stability, which were endangered by the crisis surrounding the December 2007 elections. To a lesser degree, Kibaki’s track record on economic development had not been that impressive. Moreover, the EU may have expected negative measures to be an effective tool in this case: the domestic and international position of the government was weakened after the crisis.

The overarching conclusion is that the adoption of high-cost negative measures seems to be ad hoc: different factors play in different cases. There is no ‘necessary’ condition under which negative measures will take place or not, nor a combination of conditions. In most cases a combination of motives, rather than one single factor can explain the EU’s preference for positive or negative measures. Here I tend to follow Brown (2001) who argues that, while researchers, policy analysts and the general public often expect states to be led by one single motive (e.g. either norms or self-interest), the reality is that in most cases, a mix of motives determine state behaviour. Moreover, in concrete situations there is hardly ever the dilemma between either norms or self-interests, rather ‘they involve striking a balance between different conceptions of the good for oneself and others, and between short-, medium- and long-term conceptions of one’s own interests’ (Brown 2001: 22).

However, while it is not possible to designate one single dominant factor, my research does place the predominant assumption that double standards are almost inevitably self-interested into perspective. Contrary to what was expected, I found that pure self-interest is an insufficient explanation for double standards. Only in Chad and Côte d’Ivoire (2000-2005) was self-interest the only explanatory factor. In other cases, it was rather a combination of self-interest with norms or expectations about effectiveness that offered an explanation for the EU’s behaviour. Indeed, although it cannot be denied that self-interest played a role in Ethiopia, the EU’s preference for positive measures should also be seen in the light of the belief that the current regime is the best guarantee for internal stability and development, as well as the conviction that negative measures would not work. Similarly, the fact that Nigeria is seen as a key partner for regional stability should be added to the self-interested concern about its cooperation in the war on terror, the fight against piracy, organised crime etc. Moreover, the fact that the EU’s leverage is limited, without the support from other actors, should also be taken into account. Furthermore, although the comprehensive sanctions package designed to force Gbagbo to step down in 2010-2011 was clearly driven by the French concern about its sphere of influence, this package would not have been approved if it was not expected that it would actually reach this goal. Furthermore, by 2010-2011 it had become clear that the civil war would not end with President Gbagbo still in function. Similarly, while self-interest played a role in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe’s disastrous economic policies should also be taken into account. If Zimbabwe would have been a development success story, or a key actor in regional stabilisation, there might have been another outcome.
Moreover, the idea of self-interest as an explanatory factor for the reluctance to impose negative measures was contradicted by a number of cases. In Kenya, for example, one would have expected the EU to ‘reward’ Kibaki’s government for his relatively good cooperation in the fight against terrorism and piracy, yet this was not the case. From a purely self-interest-based perspective, it would appear strange that France aligned with the decision to impose sanctions against Niger, a former colony and a crucial uranium supplier. The case of Eritrea further contradicts the dominance of self-interest. If security interests would dominate the decision on whether to adopt negative measures, then there is no reason why negative measures would be avoided against Eritrea, which is believed to endanger EU security interests in the Horn of Africa. Another example where self-interest failed to provide an answer is Rwanda. The EU has been surprisingly mild against Rwanda, although historical interests are threatened under the current regime, and commercial and security interests are minor.

Although self-interest alone is thus an insufficient factor in explaining double standards in the EU’s reaction to violations of democratic principles, some of the cases show a remarkably high importance of historical interests. Indeed, although one could argue that – more than fifty years after decolonisation – historical interests would be substituted by commercial or security interests, this was not the case. Indeed, I found that, where historical interests played a role, they were a crucial factor in explaining the EU’s reaction. This was the case in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. However, this effect mainly seems to play under certain conditions and in colonies that seem ‘important’ for the former coloniser. For Côte d’Ivoire, the fact that it is such a large and relatively developed country plays a role. Moreover, an emotional aspect may play here, given that Côte d’Ivoire was once the heart of la Françafrique under Houphouët-Boigny. Risking diplomatic relations with such a country is much more painful when compared to Guinea, which had traditionally been outside the French sphere of influence. For Chad, its strategic location next to Sudan, combined with the traditionally close relations between France and Déby make it more important. In contrast, relations between France and President Tandja were more recent. For the UK and Zimbabwe, the land reform question makes this case exceptional. However, the case of Zimbabwe also showed that historical interests may work in two ways. On the one hand, member states want to maintain their sphere of influence. On the other, as the former colonial power they often find themselves under pressure (from public opinion, the parliament, civil society, other international actors, etc.) to ‘do something’ about violations of democratic principles. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the most costly negative measures (namely in Zimbabwe, Guinea 2009, Côte d’Ivoire 2010-2011) were those advocated by the former colonial power.

However, this then raises the question why former colonies were able to translate their bilateral position to the EU level. It seems that in most cases where historical interests played a role, member states either lacked a clear preference about the adequate instrument to promote democratisation or they reasoned from a ‘spheres of influence’ perspective by letting the former colonial power dominate
the discussions. Chad is an example of the former, whereas Côte d’Ivoire is an example of the latter. In a meeting with the US ambassador in 2006, French ambassador Berçot explained his attempt to get European governments to take an interest in Chad, ‘but the response had been lack of interest and an instant reflex to leave the costs and burdens to France’ (US Embassy Chad 2006d). Although Germany is represented in N’Djamena, it only has a small embassy, overshadowed by that of France (US Embassy Chad 2010). In terms of development cooperation, Germany maintains a small aid programme that will be ended in 2011-2012 (Federal Foreign Office 2011; HTSPE Limited 2008: 84). In 2009, however, the UK considered posting an officer to Chad, as it was dissatisfied with the full support France provided to Déby and wanted direct, on-the-ground information on the Déby regime and ‘alternatives to it that may emerge’ (US Embassy Chad 2009). This points to the role of embassies in providing intelligence. From this perspective, the relatively small size of Germany’s embassy compared to that of France may explain why Germany seemed to share the French mistrust of the opposition.

In a similar vein, France has been able to dominate EU policies vis-à-vis Côte d’Ivoire. This is more surprising than the case of Chad, given that many other member states, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, Belgium and Denmark have diplomatic representation in Côte d’Ivoire. Hence, the position of these member states seems based on the neo-colonial assumption that France should deal with the issue given that Côte d’Ivoire belongs to its sphere of influence (d’Ersu 2007: 87). This can explain why Germany aligned with the French position to refuse the opening of Article 96 consultations in 2004. A similar logic was followed in Zimbabwe, where France, although favouring positive measures, did not veto negative measures, thereby respecting the agreement made with the UK in Saint Malo about the division of spheres of influence (Laakso et al. 2007a: 71).

It is surprising that, in the context of the growing importance of energy supplies and the ‘scramble for African resources’, commercial interests have not appeared as a significant factor. There may be several explanations for this. First, it may be argued that commercial interests are – after all – not that large in most sub-Saharan African countries. Second, in the one country where commercial interests were most significant, notably in Nigeria, commercial interests were not necessarily in conflict with a democracy promotion agenda. Indeed, the oil interests of European companies have not been served to the best extent possible under the recent Nigerian governments, which have granted many contracts to non-European companies and have demanded greater shares of national benefit from the extraction of oil and gas. This is something one could expect to occur more and more often in the context of the increased scramble for African resources.

Against this background, this dissertation has proposed the aspect of conflicting norms as an additional explanatory factor. This factor seemed particularly powerful. Indeed, the need for
development success stories has without any doubt inspired the EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures against Ethiopia and Rwanda, two countries that have made enormous progress in the development sphere, under forward-looking governments with a clear developmental agenda and a strong focus on internal stability. In both cases the current impression of well-run (one could say well-governed) countries stands in stark contrast with their histories of civil war and – in the case of Rwanda – genocide. Furthermore, the emergence of Nigeria as a regional peacemaker is all the more important when compared to the period under the former military regime. On the contrary, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe went from relatively good development performers to development laggards, which was reflected in growing corruption, reduced government effectiveness, a break with the IMF and World Bank, low or negative GDP growth, reduced foreign investment, low or no progress regarding the MDGs, etc. Moreover, in Guinea and Zimbabwe, the relative internal stability during the Conté and Mugabe regimes was less notable, as internal stability had not been that much of an issue. In these countries, the EU may have been less reluctant to suspend development assistance. This puts the UK’s position on negative measures in Zimbabwe further into perspective. Indeed, the international sanctions against Mugabe and his government have become a flagship example of the UK’s ethical foreign policy, given the impression of Zimbabwe as a state that is failing in all respects (Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 249). Similarly, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire (2010-2011), it may have been more easy to convince member states of costly negative measures because of the situation of civil war, which was causing internal and regional instability and was harming economic growth. Moreover, although there was economic development in Niger during President Tandja’s presidency, it was not considered a development success story, there were indications that EU money was not well spent and Tandja failed to deal with the Tuareg uprising.

The finding that the EU seems prepared to trade democracy for development is notable. On the one hand, it is in line with the idea of the EU as a predominantly ‘developmental’ actor, especially under the responsibility of the European Commission’s DG Development. Although attempts have been made to assume a more political agenda, the lack of diplomatic capacity has hampered this shift (Gibert 2011b). At the same time, the prioritisation of development contradicts the EU’s own narrative that development is not possible without democracy. Does this indicate that there has been a paradigm shift away from the ideal state model of market economies combined with liberal democracy towards other forms of governance, such as the developmental state model? It is notable that precisely these countries where a trade-off between democracy and development was made, namely Ethiopia and Rwanda, have been associated with developmental states, either in research (see Asche and Fleischer 2011; Longman 2011; Hayman 2009a on Rwanda) or by their own governments (see Zenawi 2006). Moreover, these governments openly advocate that liberal democracy does not necessarily fit their developmental state model. Meles Zenawi has indicated that a long period in power is necessary to achieve developmental goals (US Embassy Ethiopia 2006b), while President Kagame prefers ‘performance legitimation’ based on economic results over seeking votes in competitive elections.
There seems to be a genuine admiration for these models in the donor community, namely by aid workers who seem surprised by ‘how good things work’ in these countries, especially when coming from conflict-ridden countries (Carothers 2010a). However, to suggest a paradigm shift is exaggerated. As the new proposals on EU budget support suggest, political conditionality is not off the table, not even in countries with sound economic development. Rather, there has been a trade-off between democracy and development in practice, while discourse has largely remained unchanged.

As mentioned above, the concern for stability somehow played in every case, with few exceptions. This may not be surprising. First of all, there is a linkage here between self-interest and normative objectives. Supporting internal and regional stability is a way of ‘helping yourself while helping others’. It is no coincidence that attention for fragile states has emerged in the context of the war on terror, which coincided with the realisation that African security problems may have an impact on global security. At the same time, perceiving developing countries as a security threat may also be a way of legitimising development assistance in a context of aid fatigue (Abrahamsen 2005). Moreover, there is a clear humanitarian and developmental reason for the preference for stability, given the devastating economic and humanitarian consequences of civil war (see Collier 1999; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). To conclude, the ‘stability first’ principle is shared by development and foreign policy. From this perspective, the concern for stability in Ethiopia and Kenya, two key allies in the war on terror with a crucial location in the Horn of Africa, can be seen from two angles. On the one hand, donors fear the consequences of regional destabilisation for the war on terror, the fight against piracy and migration flows into the EU. Moreover, in Kenya in particular, internal instability may have security consequences for European citizens, given the relatively large number of European citizens (tourists, diplomats, etc.) residing in Kenya. However, even in these countries, the concern for stability is not entirely self-interested. In Ethiopia, donors have high regards of the system of ethnic federalism that seems to hold the country together. In Kenya, the crisis in 2007-2008, as was discussed in Chapter 3, provoked a flow of IDPs and refugees and had devastating economic and security implications for neighbouring countries.

Furthermore, I identified expectations about effectiveness as an explanatory factor for the EU’s reluctance to impose negative measures. In Eritrea, this factor stood out as the main explanation for the EU’s approach. The relative importance of expectations about effectiveness points to the EU’s reluctance to resort to the sanctions weapon. Furthermore, it suggests that the EU does not apply negative measures – and sanctions in particular - merely to ‘do something’ to please the public and send a signal to other norm violators, but because it actually believes in the potential of this instrument. Again, the relatively limited politicisation in decision-making on negative measures in some countries may explain this reluctance to use negative measures. It seems that negative measures were imposed where a tip-the-balance effect was likely to occur, namely in cases where the
government was severely under domestic and international pressure. The position of other actors seems particularly relevant. Regional organisations, in particular ECOWAS and the AU, have become increasingly active in reacting to political crises. Furthermore, in most cases, the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures against governments in a relatively strong domestic position, while it was less reluctant to do so in countries where the government was already weakened. This points to a paradox in the EU’s application of negative measures: the more democratic a regime (in the sense of openness to civil society, journalists, etc.), the less likely that negative measures will be imposed. However, in this regard, international and domestic pressure was also found to affect the outcome. Given the importance of other actors, the question could be raised whether the EU has been under pressure from these other actors to impose or not to impose negative measures. Similarly, it could be argued that the EU’s willingness to impose negative measures when there is domestic pressure from civil society and the opposition is a reaction to pressure from these domestic actors, which are often able to influence donor governments, either directly or indirectly via transnational advocacy.

One finding that superseded the different hypotheses was the importance of perception. The success of countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda in attracting donor funding lies in the effectiveness of their governments in convincing donors that they have to support the foreign policy and internal agenda of the government. If they succeed in doing so, some degree of ‘slippage’ is most likely to be allowed, not only regarding democratisation but also in the field of internal and regional security. Hence, although Rwanda and Ethiopia on some occasions posed a threat for regional stability and despite grievances amongst some ethnic groups, the main idea seems to be that these are strong states and trustworthy allies in regional politics. Recipient governments are no passive bystanders in this process, but actively feed the perception that they are the best guarantee for economic development, internal stability, the war on terror, regional stability, etc. Furthermore, the idea that positive measures are more effective than negative measures is also a perception that is strengthened by the governments’ forceful reaction to criticism. This active image management of partner countries runs counter to the idea that developing countries are weak and donors do as they please. It is surprising that the countries that have been most effective in image management, Ethiopia and Rwanda, are aid dependent. It could even be argued that non-aid dependent countries have fewer incentives to engage in image management (Fisher 2011: 352-353). Apart from the recipient governments, other international actors may equally influence the perception of the EU. As such, the large presence of DfID, USAID and the World Bank in Ethiopia and Rwanda may equally explain why the EU – just like those other donors – perceives these countries as ‘examples’. Similarly, it is no surprise that the EU and France have been taking the same line regarding the position to assume in Chad. It seems that France has convinced the European Commission and other member states (Germany in particular) of the fact that there is no alternative to the current government.
A last element that should be noted is path dependency. The robustness of negative measures in Zimbabwe can be interpreted from this perspective. Mugabe has been depicted so negatively by the donor community, media and civil society organisations that there is no way back. Especially in UK circles, the question of what to do about Zimbabwe is off the table, and the search for an alternative strategy to negative measures is avoided. To quote an FCO official: ‘People in the FCO don’t want to hear about options for what to do with Zimbabwe or to understand what is really happening there – the whole thing is just such a mess’ (cited in: Gallagher 2009: 441). Moreover, this image of Mugabe as a ‘useless dictator’ has also been picked up by the media and public opinion, which makes it more difficult for the UK (and hence EU) to lift the negative measures as long as Mugabe remains in place. This clearly appeared in recent discussions in February 2012 when, despite the position of some member states that sanctions should be eased given the progress in development and the lack of effectiveness of the sanctions, only a limited lifting of the sanctions was agreed. An analogy can be made here with the US embargo against Cuba, which has survived for more than fifty years, despite the clear lack of effectiveness of this strategy (Nincic 2011: 113).

Furthermore, path dependency may also work the other way around. Once developing countries have received the status of ‘success stories’ or ‘oasis of stability’, it is difficult to back away from this rhetoric. Suspending aid would bring attention to all the money already invested in the country, while it is often easier to dismiss small outbursts of criticism in the logic that ‘the show must go on’. Of course, this can only work when donors can keep up the perception of success stories in the public opinion, against the concern raised by human rights organisations, or when there is no real interest from public opinion. In this sense, it is no surprise that the UK’s flagship countries (Ethiopia and Rwanda) are no former colonies, unlike countries that are not regarded as success stories (Kenya, Zimbabwe). These effects of path dependency can help to explain why partner countries can sometimes derive from the norm and still go unpunished.

6.3. The importance of specific actors in decision-making

In the empirical analysis of the cases, I only referred to those member states that hold a particular interest in the countries concerned, e.g. former colonial powers or countries with a commercial or security interest. However, in a number of cases I found that other EU actors equally played a role in the decision-making, often regardless of their self-interest. These other actors included member states, the European Commission or key persons. As regards the other member states, I discovered that in some cases, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany sometimes acted as ‘Normative Powers’. In Zimbabwe, for example, the UK was far from the only member state favouring a hard line. Indeed, a leaked cable from the US embassy in Zimbabwe noted Germany and Denmark as the hardliners on Zimbabwe in 2002 (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2002b). According to Laakso and others, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK all favoured negative measures against
Zimbabwe. Especially the role of Sweden should be noted, given that it held the Council Presidency in the first half of 2001 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 70).

In Guinea, the role of Swedish Special Representative Hans Dahlgren was notable. As was argued by Laakso and others: ‘the concurrence of Denmark’s incumbency as EU President, a Dane in the role of Commissioner, and Dahlgren’s role strengthened the voice of these two member states’ (Laakso et al. 2007a: 84). While these actors have helped to place the political crisis in Guinea on the EU’s agenda, the role of Germany eventually seemed decisive. In June 2003, Germany refused to sign a new Country Strategy Paper in the EDF committee (Laakso et al. 2007a: 84-85). The European Commission then proposed to invoke Article 96 consultations to have a legal basis to suspend development assistance (Laakso et al. 2007b: 46).

In the case of Kenya and Rwanda, the Netherlands played a role in agenda-setting. In Kenya, the Netherlands took the initiative for Council Conclusions in 2009. In Rwanda, the few public declarations the EU has made about violations of democratic principles occurred during the Dutch Presidency in the second half of 2004.

In a number of case studies, the European Commission particularly shaped the EU position on negative measures. This was the case in Eritrea. The lack of strong preferences about what to do in Eritrea amongst member states has enabled the European Commission to take a lead on Eritrea, which can explain why engagement is preferred. It is notable that most of the member states present in Eritrea (UK, the Netherlands, Germany) were frustrated by this approach (US Embassy Eritrea 2007b), but did not express this frustration by strongly opposing the position of the Commission. When meeting President Afewerki on development cooperation in 2008, Louis Michel was criticised by the UK and German ambassadors. Michel reportedly responded that the European Commission is simply the executive branch of the EU and is not in a position to put conditions on foreign aid (US Embassy Eritrea 2008c). Those member states that were most frustrated by the Commission’s approach have long left, including Denmark, whose embassy closed in 2001 (Olsen 2011: 98). Similarly, in Ethiopia, the European Commission is strongly in favour of engagement, even more so than the member states. This was recently seen when the member states opposed the Commission’s plan to return to general budget support (see Chapter 3).

Given that negative measures are rather exceptional, there should be sufficient ‘push (f)actors’ in order to have negative measures. As regards push actors, Smith argues that some member states should push for EU action: ‘EU action depends on member states’ agreement; without it, some countries will not be targeted’ (Smith 2007: 157). However, the role of the European Commission also matters, since it was found to take a lead when development programmes were under threat. This was the case in Niger (2009), as I have argued in Chapter 3.
In sum, individual member states with low self-interest and/or the European Commission can in some cases define the EU’s general approach. As regards member states, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), Germany and the Netherlands have a tradition in being active on human rights issues and have development cooperation offices and embassies in many sub-Saharan African countries (Olsen 2011: 94). The position of Germany is especially important in this regard, as it has diplomatic representation and development cooperation in most African countries (Gibert 2011a: 182). Given the lack of hard economic and strategic interests in most sub-Saharan African countries, values shape Germany’s Africa policy much more than self-interest. This can explain the relatively strict implementation of political conditionality by Germany in the 1990s (Mair 1998; Mair 2002; Hofmeier 2002; Engel 2005). Even writing in 2007, Golaszinski did not expect a ‘realpolitical’ German policy to emerge given the lack of economic relations and military threat with and from sub-Saharan African countries (Golaszinski 2007: 12-13). The importance of Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany was clearly reflected in the recent discussions on EU budget support and political conditionality (see Introductory Chapter). Especially the Netherlands and Germany pushed for increased political conditionality in EU budget support (anonymous interviews, January-February 2012).

However, this ‘push’ by Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany has been exercised unevenly. For example, Germany pushed for negative measures in some cases (Guinea, Zimbabwe), whereas in others (Chad, Eritrea), it did not. Similarly, the Netherlands pushed for negative measures in Kenya and Rwanda, but to my knowledge it has not done so in other cases. This uneven effect can be explained by the role of ambassadors, as well as domestic pressure. According to diplomats accredited to Nairobi, the role played by the Netherlands in EU policies in Kenya was related to the strong interest of the Dutch ambassador. In Guinea, the German ambassador in Conakry was strongly in favour of the decision not to endorse Guinea’s CSP in the EDF committee, while his successor (July 2003-July 2006) was opposed to the decision (Laakso et al. 2007a: 85). In the case of Rwanda, the Netherlands is under substantial domestic pressure, given that the Netherlands engages in development cooperation activities in Rwanda, and Victoire Ingabire, the leader of the Forces Démocratique Unifiées who was arrested when trying to participate in the 2010 presidential elections, spent seventeen years in the Netherlands (Radio Nederland Wereldomroep 2011, September; Zorbas 2011: 111).

The importance of personalities is particularly interesting, given that it played on several levels. At country level, the head of the delegation of the European Commission - now EU - may play an important role. This was the case in Chad, where a change in head of EU delegation in 2006 led to increased efforts of democratisation, although positive measures were still preferred. Whereas his predecessor Cremeur had hardly focused on democratisation, Gilles Desesquelles started political dialogue which led to the August 2007 political agreement. In Ethiopia, the EU was more vocal on
democracy issues when Tim Clarke was head of delegation than under his successor Xavier Marchal. The background of the heads of delegation also plays a role: Marchal’s profile was predominantly developmental (agriculture), while Clarke’s experience included more political issues (anonymous interview, January 2012). In Chad, Desesquelles had previous experience with political dialogue in other countries as head of delegation, while his predecessor had not. The importance of personalities is supported by the research of Gibert, who found a ‘human dimension’ in EU policies in West Africa. She argues that, while EU policies in Africa have become more political on paper, due to the lack of transformation of the delegations from an essentially technical to a more diplomatic mission, their role in political and security matters depends on the willingness and determination of the head of mission to encourage the delegation to acquire capacities in political analysis (Gibert 2011a: 183). Although this may have changed with the transformation from European Commission to European Union delegations, this factor could still play a role given that in many EU delegations, the same head of delegation – often a former Commission official – remained in function, often without additional staff from the EEAS or member states. This was mentioned in several interviews with staff members from delegations and member states’ embassies.

The role of personalities also plays at the highest levels of decision-making, namely the Commissioner responsible for Development and presidents and foreign ministers in member states. Although the changing context and learning mechanisms also play a role, Commissioners Paul Nielson, Louis Michel, Karel De Gucht and Andris Piebalgs had a different view on political conditionality. Under Nielson (1999-2004), conditionality was applied much more enthusiastically when compared to Michel’s time in office (2004-2009). Louis Michel favoured political dialogue and was a staunch proponent of budget support, even in non-democratic countries. Again, the background of these key decision-makers plays a role: as a Belgian Foreign Minister, Michel was known for his pragmatic approach towards Belgian former colonies (e.g. the DRC, see Chapter 4). In comparison, Michel’s successor Karel De Gucht (2009-2010) was known to be quite critical towards African countries that fail to respect human rights and democratic principles, which was shown during his time as Belgian Foreign Minister. The recent Commission proposals on budget support and political conditionality suggest that current Commissioner Andris Piebalgs (2010 onwards) is less reluctant than Michel to apply political conditionality. In the case of France, President Chirac (1995-2007) had a more neocolonial view on French Africa relations. However, the cohabitation between President Chirac and socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) led to a less interventionist approach in the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. President Sarkozy’s lack of affinity with sub-Saharan Africa and his personal preference for a pragmatic approach based on commercial and security rather than historical interests was also believed to play a role in defining his Africa policies. In individual countries such as Chad, Sarkozy’s Presidency concurred with a shift to a more Europeanised approach. In the UK, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s focus on sub-Saharan Africa was also inspired by a personal conviction. Even the leadership of the Department for International Development seemed influential: as was discussed
in Chapter 3, Clare Short’s personal enthusiasm about promising African leaders such as Paul Kagame and Meles Zenawi played a role in the UK’s position towards these countries.

6.4. Validity of the findings

By choosing a relatively large number of cases, I have tried to ensure potential for generalisation to other sub-Saharan African countries where violations of democratic principles have taken place since 2000. However, this then raises the question whether these conclusions are also valid in other regions. As was noted in the introduction, the sub-Saharan African context is quite particular. First, the commercial and security interests of member states in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be smaller than in other regions. Second, as I have argued in Chapter 4, French attempts to maintain its sphere of influence have been more successful in sub-Saharan Africa than in other former colonies, indicating that this particular form of self-interest is more likely to occur in former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Third, there is an institutional difference with other regions (except for the Caribbean and the Pacific), given that the European Commission’s DG Development (now DG DEVCO) is responsible for relations with sub-Saharan Africa, which is more ‘development oriented’ than other DGs. Moreover, Louis Michel’s focus on engagement and dialogue is also particular for the ACP context. This difference, however, may change with the EEAS.

Furthermore, my research focused on the EU, which raises the question whether these conclusions can be applied to other donors. There are many who argue that for the EU, and for the European Commission in particular, development cooperation is its way of affirming Normative Power and appearing as a ‘force for good’ in the world. Compared to other donors, however, the EU is less vulnerable to pressure from public opinion (Molenaers and Nijs 2011: 419-420). Indeed, the Commission (and now EEAS) has important decision-making powers regarding democracy promotion, while it is not directly accountable to the public. Moreover, the EP does not have a say in the spending of EDF funding. Hence, at least in the period investigated in this dissertation, EU decision-making was less politicised than that of most other donors. This is an important difference with, for example, the US, where development cooperation is much more scrutinised by Congress. For this reason, the US – unlike the EU – does not often provide budget support (OECD 2006: 63-67). Compared to the former colonial powers, the EU may be less vulnerable to historical interests, while negative measures at the EU level may be perceived as more legitimate than interventions by the member states (Hyde-Price 222-223; Gibert 2011a: 192). Indeed, although there were many cases where strong historical interests were translated into the EU’s approach, there were equally cases where the position of the EU differed from that of the former coloniser (Niger, Guinea). Former colonial powers are also more likely to be influenced by the public opinion, given that political, economic and humanitarian crises in former colonies are more often picked up by the media. In Chapter 3, cross-comparisons were often made with the UK’s DfID, which is equally seen as little
vulnerable to pressure from public opinion and from the FCO. In the case of Rwanda, the lack of pressure from diaspora has made it easier for DFID to pursue autonomous policies, based on developmental concerns (Zorbas 2011: 111). In this regard, it should be mentioned that current Secretary of State for International Development Andrew Mitchell has publicly voiced his hopes that the UK would become a development superpower (Beswick 2011: 1912).

Moreover, clear differences can be expected between the EU on the one hand and the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany on the other. The latter seem to have concerns over democracy higher up their agenda. Moreover, in some of these countries, decision-making is more politicised. In the case of Germany, for example, the parliament has to agree with each programme of general budget support (anonymous interview, February 2012). In the Netherlands, it seems that the parliament closely scrutinises development assistance, as was the case with Rwanda.

6.5. Suggestions for further research

This dissertation started from the observation that there has only been limited research so far on the possible motivations of donors in the application (or non-application) of negative measures in sub-Saharan Africa. While recent research has focused on individual cases (e.g. Fisher 2012; Reyntjens 2010; Hayman 2009b), comparative studies are still lacking. I would therefore encourage other researchers to fill this empirical gap and conduct comparative research on negative measures against developing countries. Although I have only focused on the EU, there has equally been little comparative research on other donors. It would be particularly interesting to focus on the US, which does not have an explicit ethical or normative foreign policy, is generally seen as a laggard in the aid effectiveness agenda and has a more politicised decision-making process on negative measures. While this dissertation has examined the motivations of EU member states, it has done so only in a limited way, namely to comprehend or speculate about their position within the EU. It would, however, be relevant to look at specific member states’ bilateral decisions on negative measures. As regards aid suspension, this remains a bilateral competence and member states have not always followed the EU’s aid suspension. Although French and UK Africa policies have been discussed extensively in the literature (see Chapter 4), these studies touch on all aspects of French and UK Africa relations, rather than on aid conditionality in particular.

It would even be more original to focus on those member states that are often forgotten in the literature: the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands. Especially Germany is an interesting player, given its wide presence in sub-Saharan Africa, combined with a rather low self-interest in most sub-Saharan African countries. Given that Germany is the largest contributor to the EDF (Council of the EU 2006: 34), research on how it may influence decision-making on EU aid suspensions seems important.
Moreover, the Nordic countries have in other studies also been mentioned as drivers in political conditionality, such as in Kenya in the early 1990s (Olsen 1998: 353-357). It would be interesting to see how and under which conditions these member states may influence the EU’s position on political conditionality. The literature on small member states provides an interesting approach in this regard (Olsen 2011; Nasra 2011).

Apart from those member states that may push for negative measures, those that traditionally pull towards positive measures should not be overlooked. Besides France, these are Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium. With a few exceptions (Calchi Novati 2008 on Italy, Meyer 2010 on Spain), I did not find many studies on the Africa policies of these member states, despite their colonial history in Africa (Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal), potential interest in energy supply (Italy with ENI, Spain with Repsol) and concerns about illegal migration. The new member states, which are starting to establish embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, may also become influential. The history of these member states, which only recently experienced democratic transition, makes them more prone to encourage democratisation abroad. Here, Polish efforts to create a European Endowment for Democracy are notable (Petrova 2012). Still, the interest of these member states in sub-Saharan Africa of course remains relatively small, when compared to the Eastern Neighbourhood.

When trying to analyse the influence of member states on the European level, one should not only take into account decision-making in Brussels but also within the member states. Given that the little politicisation in EU decision-making on some countries has made the EU more prone to focus on developmental concerns, it would be interesting to see whether this is also the case in some of the member states, where public opinion can be expected to be more important. In Chapters 4 and 5, the importance of public opinion, pro-democratic forces and transnational activism came to the fore. In the case of historical interests, it was concluded that former colonial powers are sometimes more likely to impose negative measures when they are under pressure from public opinion. The latter may include the general public, diaspora groups or a vocal parliament. Moreover, in the last Chapter, I found that the EU is more likely to impose negative measures when there is significant pressure from domestic pro-democratic forces. While I have put only limited focus on public opinion and domestic pro-democratic forces, I believe both elements merit further attention in the study on the motivations for the EU (and other international actors) to impose negative measures. There is already an important literature on how transnational advocacy networks may provoke norm diffusion (e.g. Risse et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998), but to my knowledge these theories have not or rarely been applied to the EU’s democracy promotion or to the issue of double standards. Nonetheless, one of the earliest volumes on human rights and foreign policy mentions the role of public opinion as a potential cause for double standards: ‘It is true that this domestic push to include human rights in foreign policy is likely to result in the human rights of some individuals and groups abroad being taken up with more enthusiasm than others’ (Vincent 1986: 142). Studies on individual EU member states have sometimes
taken into account the pressure exercised by public opinion (Feliu 2004; Cumming 2000a). While the EU is an extremely complicated case to investigate the effect of transnational advocacy networks, given the many levels and institutions at which public opinion and advocacy groups may exercise pressure, it seems worthwhile to engage in this endeavour. Research could, for example, focus on two case studies, one where transnational advocacy has had little effect on the policies of donors (e.g. Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and one where advocacy has influenced donors (e.g. Kenya, Zimbabwe). Focusing on a small number of cases would allow to identify the main actors pushing for democratic reform within the country (opposition, civil society, trade unions, etc.) and within the member states (diaspora, NGOs, parliament, media, etc.). In this regard, especially the UK seems an interesting donor to investigate. In Chapter 4, the importance of public opinion and diaspora groups in the UK was underlined when discussing the case of Zimbabwe. Several studies have acknowledged the potential influence of African diaspora groups on UK Africa policies (Cargill 2011: 16; Styan 2007: 1185-1186), but the extent to which this influenced the UK’s democracy promotion has not been sufficiently investigated.

In doing this, it would be useful to take institutional factors into account. Indeed, given the influence of development norms on decision-making on negative measures, it would be interesting to see whether ‘turf wars’ may emerge between development cooperation agencies and Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the influence of nongovernmental organisations and national parliaments deserves further attention. Earlier studies have indicated that the difference between French and UK practices of political conditionality stems from the fact that the UK parliament has a larger say in Africa policies when compared to France (Cumming 2000a). It would be interesting to compare the role of the parliament in the position on negative measures in other member states. Especially Germany stands out in this regard. As I have argued earlier when referring to budget support, the German federal parliament has an important influence on development assistance.

Related to this is the potential impact of institutional changes within the EU. Indeed, the establishment of the EEAS will without any doubt have an impact on the relation between development and foreign policies, and many would argue this will be in the direction of more foreign policy rather than more development. It will be interesting to see, in a few years’ time, whether this will be the case. Moreover, the growing role of the European Parliament in foreign policy could also be considered (Smith 2004b). In the light of current discussions on whether to include the EDF in the EU budget (Maxwell and Herbert 2012), the EP may become more important in the future.

I have indicated that perceptions can be influenced by actors (diplomats, aid workers) in the field. Extensive field work with aid officials and diplomats could reveal how this happens and to what extent socialisation may influence donor perceptions, to the degree that these perceptions might even supersede previous preferences and self-interested motivations. Comparative case study research
would be advisable, comparing countries where intensive donor coordination takes place (more chances to socialisation) to countries where donor coordination is less developed (less chances to socialisation).

Such efforts could also respond to another question raised in this dissertation: is the EU a leader or a follower in the use of negative measures as a reaction to violations of democratic principles? In Chapter 5, this question was raised when discussing the importance of other actors and EU leverage in EU decision-making. In cases where the EU in itself does not have significant leverage, other actors may push the EU towards negative measures, or pull the EU towards positive measures. Similarly, in cases where the EU has leverage, it may push or pull other actors towards its preferred strategy. Comparative research could investigate under which conditions the EU may be successful in influencing the strategy of other actors. In doing this, the position of African regional organisations seems particularly important. Especially ECOWAS has in some cases taken an explicitly pro-sanctions stance. It is most likely that further political integration and the socialisation of norms in these organisations will make this role even more important in the future. While research has mostly focused on EU support for regional integration in the security sphere (e.g. Sicurelli 2010), it seems equally important to focus on how the EU and regional organisations cooperate in democracy and human rights. More specifically, the question could be raised whether ECOWAS has become a ‘leader’ in international sanctions in political crises in West Africa.

Furthermore, my research has revealed that partner countries, even aid recipient countries, are no passive bystanders when it comes to aid conditionality. This reflects earlier research on African agency (Fisher 2011; Fisher 2012; Whitfield 2009). Again, comparative case study research could investigate under which conditions recipient countries are able to influence donor positions on negative measures. Moreover, as many of those countries where negative measures have been applied were located in West Africa, it would be interesting to investigate this particular factor in West African countries: why have these governments not been able to avoid negative measures? These examples of field research should also take into account the possible influence of personal preferences and capabilities. As was noted supra, personal preferences can sometimes explain donor behaviour, but I was not able to systematically investigate this in my research. Comparative case study analysis could reveal under which circumstances this effect is likely to occur.
6.6. Personal reflections on the findings

‘Operating with the term structural stability [...] means to give expression to the fact that working towards economic development alone is insufficient for an effective policy of peace-building and conflict prevention, that the policy goals sustainable development, democracy and human rights, viable political structures, healthy social conditions and healthy environmental conditions are interdependent which implies the need for a comprehensive approach’ (European Commission 1996).

As I have argued, while EU policies rely on a belief in the mutual link between democracy, development and stability, trade-offs are easily made, to the detriment of democracy. The above-mentioned quote from the European Commission’s 1996 Communication on Conflict Prevention in Africa reiterates that democracy is a vital aspect of sustainable peace and development. This quote suggests that downgrading democratisation entails a number of risks that may prove to ‘do harm’ (Manners 2008: 58) in the long term.

It is clear that, by focusing on internal stability and development rather than on democracy, the EU ignores its self-proclaimed agendas of structural stability, human security and democratic governance, which are based on the nexus between democracy, development and stability. Indeed, the notion of ‘structural stability’ sees democracy as one of the root causes of stability. In Chapter 3 it was noted that restrictions of civil-political rights may cause serious grievances amongst the population, which may lead to conflict. Similarly, the EU does not respect its objective of ‘human security’, which entails a focus on human rights and a legitimate political authority (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004: 14-15). Lastly, despite the recent shift towards a more political interpretation of governance (cfr. the recent focus on ‘democratic governance’), the main focus of the EU has been on the technocratic and socio-economic aspects of governance. To the extent that political governance is considered, the EU underlines political stability rather than democracy.

The democracy-stability trade-off is accompanied by some serious risks. I found plenty of examples where civil-political rights were restricted for the sake of stability. The clearest example of this is Rwanda, where liberal democracy is subordinated to national unity and reconciliation and political rights can only be tolerated to the extent that they do not pose a threat to internal stability. However, this entails that governments may dismiss dissenting voices as a threat to national security. In Ethiopia, the violence against demonstrators in 2005 was justified as preventing a genocide in the country. In Chad, the turmoil that followed the February 2008 coup attempt was abused by the government to arrest three members of the opposition. In Côte d’Ivoire, Gbagbo accused his main opponents, Robert Guei and Alassane Ouattara, of having plotted the September 2002 attack. In Guinea, armed attacks in Guinée forestière in 2000 were used to justify the postponement of
legislative elections (McGovern 2002). While for some countries, including Rwanda and Ethiopia, these violations of democratic principles are tolerated for the sake of internal stability, several authors have pointed to the longer-term risks of grievances amongst marginalised ethnic groups (see Reyntjens 2010; Silva-Leander 2008 on Rwanda, Abbink 2009 on Ethiopia).

As regards the prioritisation of development over democracy, there is the risk that development aid is politicised. This seemed to be the case in Ethiopia, where Human Rights Watch found that public services had been denied to opposition supporters. Moreover, governments may also violate democratic principles for the sake of development. This strategy was unsuccessfully attempted by Niger’s President Tandja, who built his campaign around the idea of Tazarche (Let’s continue). As the US ambassador to Niger stated in a leaked cable: ‘Tandja says he wants to leave a clear conscience that he has left the country of Niger in good hands and that the wealth from the nation’s natural resources (oil, uranium) benefits the people’ (US embassy Niger 2009f). Apart from trying to remain in power to continue a developmental project, non-democratic governments also often violate democratic principles in the pursuit of economic development. In Rwanda, a programme of forced villagisation in 1999 led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people (Marriage 2006: 482). A more recent example is Ethiopia, where the government has recently started a drastic programme of forced displacement in the Gambella region (Human Rights Watch 2012).

In both situations of trade-offs, and especially in the trade-off between democracy and development, there is a risk that is inherent in the Normative Power Europe principle, namely that identity politics become more important than altruism, or that ‘being good’ becomes more important than ‘doing good’. One could argue that the EU, by promoting itself as a Development Power Europe, has become more driven by this normative self-image than by the desire to bring development in the world. Vogt refers to this as the bodybuilder problem. For bodybuilders, the size of their muscles becomes more important than what these muscles can be used for, because they believe that the shape of their body will ensure respect in the eyes of the others (Vogt 2006: 173-174). Applied to development assistance, the image created through development activities becomes more important than the impact of these activities. From this perspective, the EU has incorporated development norms and now acts according to these norms, ignoring realities that may run counter to its developmental agenda. Although this argument could also be made about actors that are not generally seen as normative powers, such as the US, the fact that the EU provides such a large part of its aid via budget support makes it more vulnerable to such claims. At the same time, the recent shift to more conditional budget support shows that the tides are turning, albeit to a limited extent. However, the main drive here was public opinion, rather than an acknowledgement of the risks involved in non-political budget support. Furthermore, the EU acts somewhat against its belief in the democratic peace theory by supporting non-democratic governments that are not genuinely committed to peacebuilding in the region. This was observed in
the case of Rwanda, Ethiopia and Chad, where – despite efforts to present themselves as peacebuilders – governments have on occasions exercised a destabilising influence on neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the prioritisation of security interests has potential negative effects. It has been argued that governments have increasingly used terrorism for political ends, defending old security paradigms that prioritise regime stability over human security (Makinda 2006; Kagwanja 2006). Indeed, in several countries anti-terrorism legislation has been introduced, which provides an opportunity for governments to suppress opponents or insurgencies by designating these groups as terrorist organisations. In Ethiopia, for example, anti-terrorism legislation is increasingly being used to stifle the independent press and the opposition. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, both the ONLF and OLF were depicted as terrorist organisations (Kagwanja 2006: 78). An Amnesty International report found that from March to December 2011, at least 108 opposition party members and six journalists were arrested for alleged involvement with terrorist groups (Amnesty International 2011a). The most striking application of the law was in December 2011, when two Swedish journalists were found guilty by an Ethiopian court on charges of ‘supporting terrorism’ after they had met with members of the ONLF (Amnesty International 2011b). Similar tactics were used by Eritrea’s Afewerki, who labelled his dissident party members as terrorists (Kagwanja 2006: 78) and accused the exiled opposition group Alliance of Eritrean National Forces of links with Al Qaeda (Adebajo 2003: 181). When interviewed about the arrest of the dissidents in 2001, Afewerki declared: ‘It had nothing to do with views, ideas, opinion but our national security was in danger. We had to take the appropriate measures to defend the nation and its sovereignty’ (cited in Kibreab 2009: 39). Similarly, Zimbabwe’s Mugabe assigned terrorist status to journalists writing about political violence (Whitaker 2007: 1028).

While the predominance of the former colonial power in EU decision-making on former colonies may seem logical, it is also often problematic. In some cases, the former colonial power may have more leverage than the EU, namely when it enjoys close relations with the government. However, in many situations the opposite occurs: relations are problematic precisely because of colonial history. Moreover, apart from the recipient governments, negative measures may also be perceived as a form of neo-colonialist intervention by the population. This was the case in Zimbabwe, where negative measures were highly unpopular amongst part of the public opinion. Hence, while former colonial powers may try to ‘use’ the EU to address their second-order concerns in the belief that this will be perceived as more legitimate (Hyde-Price 2006), the opposite appears to be true. Because these interventions are so obviously driven by the former colonial power, they are perceived as less legitimate.

Lastly, the EU’s focus on positive measures as the most effective strategy for democracy promotion also entails a number of risks. The EU’s hope that positive measures could be an effective strategy to encourage democratisation has proven to be wrong. In none of the cases where the EU has favoured positive measures (Eritrea, Chad, Rwanda, Ethiopia), has the democratisation record improved. On the
contrary, in countries like Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda, an increased closure of political space has been noted (see Chapter 2). Even in Chad, where the implementation of the August 2007 political agreement is considered as finalised, the electoral crisis has not been resolved: the 2011 presidential elections were again boycotted by the opposition and the share of the ruling party has remained equal in the 2011 legislative elections. This is because the effectiveness of positive measures strongly depends on the political will of target countries to democratise. When this will is lacking, as it is the case in most non-democratic countries, political dialogue is limited to mere rhetoric, while capacity-building will simply result in ‘cosmetic reforms’, for example by supporting partisan ‘democratic institutions’. This is the case in Ethiopia, where the EU finances the ‘Democratic Institutions Programme’, which involves purely technical capacity-building for parliament, judiciary, ombudsman, human rights commission, etc. (Human Rights Watch 2010d: 33 and 70-71). Non-democratic governments are well aware of the potentially threatening aspect of some democracy promotion activities, including support for civil society, election observation or the independent media. For this reason, a growing ‘backlash’ against democracy assistance has been observed in recent years, which has resulted in a reduced *marge de manoeuvre* for democracy assistance in sensitive areas (Carothers 2010b). When it comes to political dialogue, member states’ and EU officials interviewed for this dissertation have been generally sceptical of the potential impact of this dialogue. In the case of Ethiopia, political dialogue is limited to two meetings per year with the Prime Minister, where member states’ representatives were found to sit as ‘chickens in a row’, while Meles counters all the concerns that are raised (anonymous interview, January 2011). In other cases, such as Rwanda, interviewees suggested that dialogue was fruitful, but could only name commitments made, rather than concrete achievements (anonymous interviews, January 2012). Hence, rather than a strategy for change, political dialogue seems confined to a mere ‘Q &A’ between the EU and partner countries.

### 6.7. A look at the future

I have indicated that the time period investigated in this dissertation entails some particularities. This raises the question whether my conclusions could remain valid in the future. Although it is impossible to predict the future, my research has indicated that norms, self-interest and considerations of effectiveness easily change over time. From this perspective, my educated guess is that the conclusions from this dissertation cannot simply be replicated in another timing and context. Indeed, there are already indications that times are changing. A potentially influential factor is the Arab revolutions, which inevitably have an impact on how democratisation processes are interpreted by the EU and on how support to authoritarian regimes is perceived in the public opinion. As noted in the first Chapter, this is already influencing the EU’s position on political conditionality, as was recently shown in the new proposals on budget support. Apart from its effect on the position of the EU, the Arab revolutions may also be interpreted as a ‘fourth wave of democratisation’, which inspires pro-democratic forces in other countries. While the spill-overs of the Arab revolutions in sub-Saharan
Africa are – after all – limited, there have been protests against rising food and full prices in countries like Nigeria and Uganda. In this context it should also be added that African political integration is likely to continue. These conditions may thus create a context where EU negative measures could ‘tip the balance’ towards democratisation and where pressure on the EU to respond to democratisation processes is mounting.

Another aspect to take into account is the financial crisis that has swept across EU since 2008 and continues to lead to austerity measures, including in the development budget. This has made the EU focus more on the impact of aid and deliver accountability to the taxpayers, as can be seen in the 2011 Agenda for Change (European Commission 2011g) and the rather weak position of the European Commission during the fourth OECD High level forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (New Europe 2011, November). The reducing budget and related public scrutiny of development assistance is likely to lead to aid suspensions in non-democratic countries. In this context, the growing influence of the EP should be underlined. The EP is becoming increasingly active on human rights and democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa, although formally it does not yet have a say in the spending of the EDF. At the time of writing, the EP is demanding that EU aid for elections in the DRC is made conditional on democratic reform (De Morgen 2012, June). Moreover, the question of a possible ‘budgetisation’ of the EDF, which would make the EDF subject to approval of the EP, has recently been put on the table by a number of member states (Maxwell and Herbert 2012).

While these examples suggest that political conditionality may come ‘back in fashion’, there are also indications that this will not be the case. The institutional context has drastically changed with the establishment of the EEAS and the new EU delegations in the field. There are already signs of contradictions between the EEAS, which directs the EU’s foreign policy, and DG DEVCO, which is in charge of development objectives (Laporte 2012: 3). Moreover, the war on terror will have an increasing impact on the EU’s Africa policies. Indeed, the interventions of Western actors to fight terrorism and to overcome state failure in Somalia have been counterproductive. A similar effect can be noted in the Sahel, where there has been an upsurge of terrorist activities by AQIM in the last three years, and in northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram has recently started activities. This is already leading to an approach that is more focused on ‘hard’ security issues, similar to that of the US. In January 2012, Catherine Ashton offered counter-terrorism assistance in Nigeria (allAfrica 2012, January). The military coup in Mali in March 2012 has further accelerated this evolution, and EU military advisors have recently been sent to the north of Niger as part of the EU’s plans to provide counter-terrorism training to Nigerien forces (Reuters 2012, June). Although the two recent strategies on security and development (European External Action Service 2011; Council of the EU 2011e) set forth the EU’s specific ‘developmental’ approach to the security-development nexus, they cannot conceal that terrorism has become a crucial issue for the EU in sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the EU, the member states are also increasingly focusing on counter-terrorism in Africa, including France.
in the Sahel. Taking these evolutions into account, security interests may become more important in defining the EU’s position on political conditionality. Lastly, the influence of the BRICs in sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to diminish in the near future. In this context, political conditionality may be further downgraded, out of fear for losing ground to these new actors, and because the extent to which aid can provide leverage is in any case diminishing.

While it is not entirely clear what the future will bring, the question of double standards is likely to remain important. The pressure of public opinion, domestic pro-democratic forces and international actors to ‘do something’ is likely to remain, while self-interest will continue to hamper donors to give in to these pressures. As long as development cooperation is not completely usurped by foreign policy, developmental concerns and democracy promotion will continue to conflict. As Hayman observes in the context of the recent discussions on budget support and political conditionality: ‘Far from diminishing under the aid paradigm of the 2000s, aid conditionality [...] remains as strong as ever’ (Hayman 2011a: 674).
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8. Annexes

1. Overview of elections and EU reaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EU-EOM?</th>
<th>Other observers</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>EU reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>US embassy: generally free and fair in most areas, irregularities in opposition strongholds</td>
<td>518 of 547 votes for EPRDF and affiliated parties</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Carter Center: flawed counting process, postelection violence, delay in finalising election results, ineffective complaints review</td>
<td>373 of 547 seats for EPRDF and affiliated</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘the EU would refer to the comments made by its mission […] concerning both positive aspects and reported irregularities’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>AU: elections reflected the will of the Ethiopian people</td>
<td>545 of 547 seats for EPRDF and affiliated</td>
<td>High Representative declaration: ‘important moment in the democratic process in the country’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Vote Description</td>
<td>Other Details</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Example for other countries in the region</td>
<td>Carter Center: example to the region and Africa as a whole</td>
<td>62.2% for Kibaki, 31.3% for Kenyatta</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Same as presidential</td>
<td>Same as presidential</td>
<td>125 of 210 for NARC, 64 for KANU</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
<td>41.88% 'Yes' votes, 58.12% 'No' votes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Election fell short of international and regional standards, notably regarding secrecy of vote, independence/neutrality of election administration, transparency and disposal of petitions</td>
<td>Commonwealth: elections credible until polling day, but announcement of results raised suspicions, therefore not in line with international standards</td>
<td>46.42% for Kibaki, 44.07% for Odinga</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘The EU calls on Kenya’s leaders to address the concerns about the integrity of the election process raised by EU observers’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Same as presidential</td>
<td>Same as presidential</td>
<td>102 for Orange Democratic Movement (opposition), 78 for ruling party coalition</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>No international observers</td>
<td>68.55% 'Yes' votes, 31.45% 'No' votes</td>
<td>High Representative declaration: ‘historic event for the country’, ‘which demonstrates the commitment of the government to fundamental legal and political change’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>EU observe mission</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Election Turnout</td>
<td>Presidency declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>OAU: voting went without major hitches and without intimidation</td>
<td>63.17% for Déby, 16.35% for Yorongar</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘EU regrets the many shortcomings’, ‘is concerned about the restriction of liberties’…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>113 of 155 for ruling MPS</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>65.75% 'Yes' votes, 34.25% 'No' votes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>AU and international NGOs: 'free and fair', despite minor organisational problems</td>
<td>64.67% for Déby, 15.13% for Coumakoye (boycotted by main opposition parties)</td>
<td>Declaration Michel: ‘the Commission regrets the climate in which the election took place, the lack of open and peaceful dialogue and the opposition’s call for a boycott of the polls’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Free and open campaigning, but ruling party disposes of material benefits, electoral commission mostly independent, but lacks capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>125 of 188 for ruling party coalition</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘welcome the peaceful and serene electoral campaign’, ‘commend the great sense of responsibility of the political parties’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>AU observers: elections conformed to international standards</td>
<td>83.59% for Déby (opposition candidates withdrew)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>EU Observer Mission</td>
<td>OIF: participation rate raises doubts, incomplete distribution of voting cards, no massive fraud</td>
<td>% for Tandja, 34/47% for Issoufou (second round)</td>
<td>AU: few hitches, but did not jeopardize vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>OIF: participation rate raises doubts, incomplete distribution of voting cards, no massive fraud</td>
<td>65.53% for Tandja, 34/47% for Issoufou (second round)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>OIF: same as presidential</td>
<td>47 of 113 seats for ruling MNSD, 25 for PNDS-Taraya, 22 for CDS-Rahama</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>Observers refused to observe the poll</td>
<td>92.50% 'Yes' votes, 7.50% 'No' votes</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>Observers refused to observe the poll</td>
<td>76 of 113 seats for ruling MNSD, 25 seats for parties allied with MNSD, 11 seats for independent candidates (opposition boycott)</td>
<td>Article 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>90.19% 'Yes' votes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Only minor irregularities which did not have an impact on the result</td>
<td>AU: few hitches, but did not jeopardize vote</td>
<td>58.04% for Issoufou, 41.96% for Oumarou (second round)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Same as presidential</td>
<td>Same as presidential</td>
<td>34 of 113 seats for PNDS-Taraya, 25 for MSND-Nassara, 23 for MODEN/FA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Elections were not conducted in a transparent and credible manner</td>
<td>NDI: irregularities, but impact difficult to assess; IRI: inadequate election administration, violence-wracked campaign, numerous electoral fraud, which did not affect electoral outcomes; Commonwealth: major shortcomings in administration, serious fraud and intimidation in some states</td>
<td>223 of 360 seats for PDP and 96 for ANPP in HoFR, 76 of 109 for PDP and 27 for ANPP in Senate</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: 'welcomes the fact that the […] elections were conducted peacefully', 'acknowledges that President Obasanjo has been announced president-elect', 'expresses concern about serious irregularities'</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Serious irregularities and fraud, international standards not met</td>
<td>NDI: irregularities, but impact difficult to assess; IRI: inadequate election administration, violence-wracked campaign, numerous electoral fraud, but these did not affect electoral outcomes; Commonwealth: serious fraud and intimidation in some states</td>
<td>61.94% for Obasanjo (PDP), 32.19% for Buhari (ANPP)</td>
<td>Presidency declaration (see above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Poor organisation, serious fraud and intimidation, not transparent, irregularities, lack of equal conditions for parties, violence, commission not independent, results affected.</td>
<td>NDI: serious irregularities, fraud, intimidation; Commonwealth: lack of transparency, organisational deficiencies fueled suspicions of fraud; IRI: the elections were found to be well below international standards; ECOWAS: shortcomings, logistical failures, irregularities</td>
<td>69.60% for Yar'Adua (PDP), 18.66% for Buhari (ANPP)</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: 'is disappointed that the elections […] did not represent a significant progress in relation to the 2003 election’, ‘deeply concerned that these elections were marred by irregularities’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Same as presidential elections</td>
<td>Same as presidential elections</td>
<td>Presidency declaration (see above)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Organisation, campaigning and pre-election environment relatively free and fair</td>
<td>Commonwealth: presidential elections were credible and creditable and reflected the will of the Nigerian people</td>
<td>High Representative Declaration: ‘successful elections’, ‘significant improvement’, ‘most credible elections’, ‘commends the leadership of the INEC’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Same as presidential elections, but party interference on election day</td>
<td>Commonwealth: elections were credible and creditable and reflected the will of the Nigerian people</td>
<td>Presidency declaration (see above)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>No fraud, intimidation, but lack of a real campaign, and main opposition party was disbanded</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.42% 'Yes', 6.58% 'No' vote</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Rwanda  | Presidential  | 2003 | Uneven competition, not a real opposition, intimidation during campaigning, campaigns dominated by Kagame and ruling party | NORDEM: voters were strongly influenced to vote for ruling party, legislation on campaigning to tight to allow free and open campaigning | 95.05% for Kagame                                                       | Presidency declaration: ‘fundamental step in the country’s national reconciliation process’, ‘European Union is obliged to point out that the election observation mission [found] incidents, acts of harassment and intimidation, disappearances and arrests of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Uneven competition, not a real opposition, intimidation during campaigning, campaigns dominated by Kagame and ruling party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>NORDEM: idem presidential elections</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>40 of 53 seats for RPF, 7 for Social Democratic Party (PSD), 6 for Liberal Party (PL)</td>
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<td>Presidency declaration: ‘the European Union has noted the comments made by its election observer mission in its preliminary statement on 3 October 2003 as regards the obstacles to opposition activities, the intimidation, the threats and the arrests that marked the election campaign’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>No sealing of ballot boxes, omission to check voters’ fingers to prevent multiple voting, non-rigorous verification of voters, consolidation process not transparent, intimidation of opposition, shortcomings in electoral legislation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>East African Community: free and fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42 of 53 seats for RPF, 7 for PSD and 4 for PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Commonwealth: some of the key benchmarks for democratic elections were met, others not; campaigning was free, but opposition was impeded from participating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>93.08% for Kagame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘elections constitute a new stage in Rwanda’s democratic process’, ‘we note that some progress remains to be made in ensuring fundamental freedoms’, ‘concerned about the serious incidents which marred the pre-electoral period’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98.36% 'Yes' vote, 1.64% 'No' vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|         |               |      | Presidency Declaration: 'expresses its concern at the possible implications, for the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>85 of 114 seats for PUP, 20 seats for UPR (boycott main opposition party RPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95.25% for Conté (boycott main opposition parties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>People could vote their president freely, in an environment marked by pluralism in the campaigning period, freedom of expression and movement of candidates</td>
<td>Carter Center: conduct of elections was broadly consistent with country’s international and regional obligations; OIF: despite organisational shortcomings, Guineans have been able to express themselves freely on a new president; High Representative: ‘crucial step in sustaining the country’s democratisation process’, ‘of paramount importance that the Independent National Election Commission ensures transparency […] and publishes as soon as possible the detailed results’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>86.53% 'Yes', 13.47% 'No' vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Report N/A</td>
<td>59.36% for Gbagbo (FPI), 32.72% for Guei (RDR &amp; PDCI-RDA boycott)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 Most election observers withdrew after the announcement by the Supreme Court that Ouattara was excluded. However, there were already some EU observers in the country at that time who were there to assess the security situation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>International observers withdrew</th>
<th>EU observer mission</th>
<th>Carter Centre: essential step in re-establishing constitutional order; OIF: low voter turnout, but peaceful; ECOWAS: some incidents, which do not put to doubt credibility; UEMOA: calm, discipline and order on election day; AU: no violence by security forces; Of 255 seats, 122 for RDR, 76 for PDCI-RDA, 31 for independent candidates</th>
<th>OIF: no significant irregularities, but shortcomings in announcement of results, security of voters not guaranteed</th>
<th>Presidency declaration: ‘it [...] regrets the acts of violence’, ‘considers the fact that a section of voters did not have the opportunity to voice its opinion to be detrimental for the return of democracy’</th>
<th>Council Conclusions, adoption of targeted measures</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Report N/A</td>
<td>96 of 225 seats for FPI, 94 for PDCI-RDA (RDR boycott)</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>Carter Centre: observers saw no evidence of systematic irregularities that would have a significant impact on the results; OIF: no significant irregularities, but shortcomings in announcement of results, security of voters not guaranteed</td>
<td>First round: 38.3% for Gbagbo (FPI), 32.08% for Ouattara (RDR) and 25.24% for Bédié (PDCI/RDA) Second round: 45.90% for Gbagbo (FPI), 54.10% for Ouattara (RDR)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Shortcomings in publication of results, which damaged transparency, lack of press freedom, two polls were positively evaluated but President refused to accept his defeat</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Observers</td>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>ZANU-PF leaders failed to condemn pre-election violence, police unwilling to intervene in intimidation, counting procedures were followed in a proper manner.</td>
<td>Commonweal: political violence, often instigated by ruling party, media coverage in favour of ruling party, polling and counting free and fair; OAU: scattered incidents of attempts to intimidate voters; NDI/IRI observers did not manage to received accreditation</td>
<td>62 of 120 seats for ZANU-PF, 57 seats for MDC</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘welcomes the outcome’, ‘voting was calm and well-organised, inspite of the high levels of violence, intimidation and coercion that marred the election campaign’</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>Commonwealth: while the actual polling and counting process was peaceful and secrecy of voting was assured, the election was marred by politically motivated violence and intimidation, which was not always halted by the security forces</td>
<td>56.2% for Mugabe (ZANU-PF), 42.0% for Tsvangirai (MDC)</td>
<td>Suspension of development aid under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, targeted sanctions, weapons embargo</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td>SADC: poll was peaceful, transparent, credible and well managed</td>
<td>78 of 120 seats for ZANU-PF, 41 seats for MDC (HoPR), 43 of 50 seats for ZANU-PF, 7 for MDC (Senate)</td>
<td>Presidency declaration: ‘concerned by a number of serious shortcomings found in the Zimbabwean electoral system’, ‘reservations about the environment in which the voting took place’</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>SADC: period preceding run-off was marred by political violence, opposition campaigning was disrupted; Pan African Parliament: basic conditions of credible elections were reflected, but results were delayed</td>
<td>47.87% for Mugabe (ZANU-PF) and 43.24% for Tsvangirai in first round, 90.22% for Mugabe and 9.78% in second round after MDC boycott</td>
<td>Council conclusions: ‘strongly condemns the state-sponsored campaign of violence and intimidation’, ‘calls for an immediate end to the beatings, tortures, killings and other human rights abuses’, Extension of sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>No EU observer mission</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 361 |
2. Overview of violations of civil-political rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>What happened?</th>
<th>EU reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>sep/01</td>
<td>Imprisonment of eleven dissidents, closure of independent newspapers and arrest of ten journalists</td>
<td>Démarche, declaration, postponing new CSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>nov/04</td>
<td>Arrest and torture of thousands of people suspected of evading military service</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>apr-may/05</td>
<td>Arrest three trade union leaders</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>apr/01</td>
<td>Two students killed, thousands of students and more than hundred opposition members arrested in and after manifestations against academic freedom and police brutality</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>may/01</td>
<td>Arrest two leading human rights defenders</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>apr/02</td>
<td>Students arrested and shot dead by security forces in antigovernment protests</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>apr/02</td>
<td>Arrest and sentencing of two journalists for writing articles criticising the government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>may/02</td>
<td>About 25 people killed after police opened fire at peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>jun/02</td>
<td>Hundreds of school students arrested after peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>nov/03</td>
<td>Ban on Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Association (EFJA)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>jan-feb/04</td>
<td>Dozens of students and teachers detained after peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>jun/05</td>
<td>Ban on public demonstrations, arrest of thousands of people after anti-government manifestation, leading to 36 deaths, arrest of human rights defenders</td>
<td>Mediation efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>sep/05</td>
<td>Arrest of hundreds of opposition party officials</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>nov-dec/05</td>
<td>Arrests of 30,000 to 40,000 opposition supporters, at least 17 journalists, opposition activists, firing live ammunition on opposition demonstration leading to 193 deaths</td>
<td>Suspension of budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>aug/06</td>
<td>Detention of over 250 civilians in peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>sep/06</td>
<td>Arrest of four members teacher's trade union (ETA)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>dec/06-Jan/07</td>
<td>Detention of 60 officials or alleged supporters of opposition</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>jan/07</td>
<td>Arrest and sentencing of three journalists on old charges</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>sep/07</td>
<td>Arrest of eight human rights defenders, students, teachers, on suspicion of links with rebel group</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>jan/09</td>
<td>Adoption restrictive legislation on civil society</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>aug/09</td>
<td>Arrest two editors on the basis of obsolete press law, for articles critical of the government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>dec/09</td>
<td>Closure of independent newspaper</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>jun/11</td>
<td>Unlawful arrest two journalists and two opposition party members on the basis of anti-terrorism legislation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>apr-jun/01</td>
<td>Ban on public demonstrations, ban on programmes of political nature for non-state radio, violent dispersion of opposition demonstrations, arrests of 6 opposition members and 30 activists and trade unionists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>feb/02</td>
<td>Suspension of radio station FM Liberté for broadcasting information likely to disrupt public order</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>apr/02</td>
<td>Ban on political programming in the context of 2002 legislative elections</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>feb/03</td>
<td>Two reporters convicted for publishing article critical of President's mother-in-law, three month closure of leading independent newspaper</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>jun-aug/05</td>
<td>Arrest four journalists of private newspaper after criticism about referendum</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>sep-oct/05</td>
<td>Arrest three independent journalists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>apr-may/06</td>
<td>Arbitrary arrest thirteen high-ranking army officers after coup attempt, assault and attack on journalist, arrest of radio director</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>nov/06</td>
<td>Censorship on private media for six months</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>jan/07</td>
<td>Arbitrary arrest human rights defender</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>nov/07</td>
<td>Arrest of four opposition members, closure of radio station, arrest and intimidation of five journalists, increasing penalties for false news, defamation and insulting the president, killings of three people from the same ethnic group as the armed opposition</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>dec/07- mar/08</td>
<td>Allegedly politically motivated suspension of private radio station</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>mar/00</td>
<td>Arrest eleven human rights activists for performing theatre for school children</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>jun/00</td>
<td>Two journalists arrested over coverage of police rape</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>aug/00</td>
<td>Violent dispersion of pro-democracy rally, leaving one death and many others injured</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>sep/00</td>
<td>Harassment human rights activists after helping to bring charges against Minister</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>feb/01</td>
<td>Arrest eleven human rights activists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>oct/01</td>
<td>Arrest 71 members of human rights groups</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>nov/05</td>
<td>Allegedly politically motivated suspension of private radio station</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>dec/07- jan/08</td>
<td>Raid on two tabloids after article critical of president; detention of three journalists over article on president; raid on newspaper and television station</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Threat Article 96 consultations and sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>oct/00</td>
<td>Arrest three journalists after publishing on border dispute</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>may-jun/02</td>
<td>Arrest of three journalists for criticising government, arrest human rights activist</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>aug/02</td>
<td>Presidential decree restricting the media, arrest of two journalists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>sep-nov/03</td>
<td>Arrest of two journalists after article criticising government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>mar/05</td>
<td>Arrest of five members of civil society organisations after widespread protests, raids on independent media, closure of independent radio station</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>jul/06</td>
<td>Ban on independent weekly after criticizing president</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>sep/06</td>
<td>Arrests of three journalists after criticizing government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>jul-oct/07</td>
<td>Arbitrary arrest of dozens of civilians, suspension of newspaper Air Info, ban on live broadcasts on Touareg rebellion, arrest of journalists after publishing about rebellion</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>dec/07</td>
<td>Arrest of dozens of civilians as a represaille to attack Touareg rebels</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>aug/08</td>
<td>Suspension of private broadcaster which had given a lot of airtime to arrested Prime Minister</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>aug-sep/09</td>
<td>Ban on public demonstrations, arrests of opposition members (including main opposition leaders Issoufou and Amadou), human rights defenders and three journalists</td>
<td>Article 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>apr/00</td>
<td>State crackdown on independent newspaper</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>dec/02</td>
<td>Intimidation of two human rights activists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>jan/03</td>
<td>Arrest of leader civil society organisation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>jul/03</td>
<td>Four people shot dead in clashes between security forces and civilians in peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>apr/04</td>
<td>Arrest opposition leader who planned anti-government protests</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>sep/04</td>
<td>Arrest of three staff members and editor independent magazine as well as raid on its offices, after publishing stories critical of the government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>aug/05</td>
<td>Arrest of two human rights defenders in their campaign to bring Charles Taylor to justice</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>jun/06</td>
<td>Arrest presenter television station and journalist after criticism about President</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>jun/06</td>
<td>Government dismisses head human rights commission</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>aug/06</td>
<td>Arrest two journalists after criticizing state governor</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>sep/08</td>
<td>Suspension of television station and arrest of staff members after false reporting about president</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>oct/09</td>
<td>Security forces use violence against demonstrators</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>apr/10</td>
<td>Police violence against human rights activists</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>may/10</td>
<td>Adoption prevention of terrorism law, incompatible with HR obligations</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>aug/10</td>
<td>Human rights defender and father of human rights defender attacked by police</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>may/01</td>
<td>Ban on opposition party and arrest opposition leader Bizimungu</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>jun/02</td>
<td>Arrest 20 people allegedly linked to banned opposition party</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>apr/03</td>
<td>Largest opposition party MDR banned by parliament, disappearance three former military officers and prominent members of civil society</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>may/03</td>
<td>Arrest members non-violent political youth group Itara</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>sep/03</td>
<td>Arrest eight opposition supporters</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>nov/03</td>
<td>Arrest six journalists independent newspaper</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>jun/04</td>
<td>Sentencing Bizimungu and seven codefendants</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>jul/04</td>
<td>Parliamentary report accuses independent media and civil society of divisionism</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>nov/04</td>
<td>Arrest two journalists independent newspapers</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>jan/05</td>
<td>Ban on leading human rights organisation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>feb/07</td>
<td>Intimidation independent press, arrest professor on charges of divisionism</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>jun/07</td>
<td>Ban on new independent weekly</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>sep/08</td>
<td>Independent journalists threatened for criticizing the government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>feb-aug/10</td>
<td>Arrests of opposition and suspension independent newspapers, murder of opposition politician and journalist during election campaign</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>oct/10</td>
<td>Arrest two opposition leaders</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>sep/00</td>
<td>Conviction opposition leader Condé and 47 other prisoners of conscience</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>oct-nov/01</td>
<td>Arrest and beatings of demonstrators, arrest of opposition leaders in run-up to constitutional referendum</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>dec/01</td>
<td>Security forces fire live ammunition on protesting students, three killed</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>jun/06</td>
<td>Crackdown of security forces on public demonstration, killing over 13 protestors and injuring many more</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>jan/feb 2007</td>
<td>Crackdown of security forces on public demonstrations, killing over 130 protestors, arrest two staff members of private radio station</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>sep-nov/08</td>
<td>Frequent break-up of anti-government protests by security forces</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>jul/09</td>
<td>Twelve soldiers detained without charge</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Authoritative Actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>sep/09</td>
<td>Security forces opened fire on opposition manifestation, killing over 160 people</td>
<td>Council Conclusions; CFSP sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>oct/10</td>
<td>Security forces use excessive violence in election protests, killing one person, leaving about 60 injured and 100 detained</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>apr/00</td>
<td>Kidnapping and torture of reporter private newspaper to reveal sources</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>sep/00</td>
<td>Soldiers arrested and tortured after attack on private residence Robert Guei</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>oct/00</td>
<td>Government responsible for political violence in elections</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>feb/01</td>
<td>Intimidation of private newspaper</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>oct/03</td>
<td>RFI journalist shot dead by police</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>mar/04</td>
<td>Security forces open fire on opposition march, leading to death of 120 civilians</td>
<td>Declaration, COM proposal for opening Article 96 consultations but refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>feb/07</td>
<td>Four journalists charged for writing articles critical about Gbagbo</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>mar/09</td>
<td>Journalist jailed for writing column critical of the government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>jul/10</td>
<td>Arrest three journalists who refused to reveal sources</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>dec10- mar11</td>
<td>Post-election violence by security forces and militia loyal to president, leading to hundreds of deaths</td>
<td>Declarations, CFSP sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Jun/11</td>
<td>Arrest dozens of Gbagbo supporters without charge</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>apr/00</td>
<td>Violence against peaceful demonstrators</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jun-sep/00</td>
<td>Intimidation opposition and journalists in the run-up to elections, including abduction opposition supporter</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jun/00</td>
<td>Three journalists fined for defamation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jan/01</td>
<td>Bombing of independent newspaper Daily News</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>apr/01</td>
<td>Defamation charges against three journalists</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jul/01</td>
<td>Attack against opposition supporters in the context of parliamentary by-elections</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>aug/01</td>
<td>Arrest seven journalists independent newspaper</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jan/02</td>
<td>Prosecution of two opposition members of parliament and their employees after unfair trial relating controversial case</td>
<td>Council consultations Article 96, CFSP sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>feb/02</td>
<td>Arrest of three opposition members of parliament and 33 MDC supporters</td>
<td>Council consultations Article 96, CFSP sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>feb-mar/02</td>
<td>Introduction of legislation restricting press freedom, freedom of opposition, freedom of association</td>
<td>Council consultations Article 96, CFSP sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>mar/02</td>
<td>Jailing journalists after criticising government</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Month/Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Harassment and assault of opposition supporters by members of ruling party and security forces; arrest four journalists on the basis on new media law</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Jul-Aug 2002</td>
<td>Arrest of opposition members and human rights activists in the context of September 2002 local elections</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Nov 2002</td>
<td>Publication list of human rights organisations 'threatening security'</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Dec 2002</td>
<td>Arrest 10 trade union leaders</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Feb 2003</td>
<td>Arrests of seven MDC MPs and several other MDC officials and supporters, torture of MDC MP, human rights lawyer and three members of civil human rights organisation</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
<td>Arrests of approximately 400 opposition supporters after protest actions</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Jun 2003</td>
<td>Arrest of two independent journalists by ZANU-PF supporters</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Sep 2003</td>
<td>Closure of independent newspaper Daily News</td>
<td>Declaration, Council conclusions, February 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Oct-Nov 2003</td>
<td>Arrest of protestors at two peaceful demonstrations</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Jan 2004</td>
<td>Arrest four journalists for defamation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Feb 2004</td>
<td>Violent clampdown on peaceful demonstration</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Apr 2004</td>
<td>Breakup of demonstration civil society association, arrest youth activist</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Apr 2004</td>
<td>Violence against opposition in the context of Zengeza by-elections</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>Arrest two journalists independent weekly</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Jun 2004</td>
<td>Closure of independent newspaper Tribune</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Dec 2004</td>
<td>Anti-NGO bill</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Jan-May 2005</td>
<td>Approval new repressive media law</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Feb 2005</td>
<td>Closure of new independent weekly</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mar 2005</td>
<td>Arrests and violence against opposition, journalists and human rights defenders in context of parliamentary elections</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Nov 2005</td>
<td>Murder of human rights activist by paramilitary group</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Dec 2005</td>
<td>Arrest three staff members independent news production company</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Jan-Feb 2006</td>
<td>Arrest former journalists independent newspaper</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Sep 2006</td>
<td>Arrest of two trade union leaders and people planning to participate in demonstration</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Two journalists beaten and detained for 48h by police</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Arrest of 50 activists and MDC members at demonstration</td>
<td>Visits to detainees in prison, Council conclusions, sanctions extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>apr-may/07</td>
<td>Several journalists jailed and beaten by police forces</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>may/07</td>
<td>Police violently stops demonstration by civil society organisation</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jan-jun/08</td>
<td>State-sponsored violence against opposition supporters and candidates in context of elections, harassment local election observers, journalists, trade union leaders tortured, arrest human rights activists, over 300 people killed, 11,000 severely injured</td>
<td>Council conclusions, declaration, sanctions extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>oct-dec/08</td>
<td>Violence against opposition, arrest of at least 40 women's rights activists, a human rights activist and trade union leaders</td>
<td>Council conclusions, sanctions extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>feb/09</td>
<td>Arrest and detention of MDC politician Roy Bennett</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>apr/09</td>
<td>Arrest two MDC officials</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>aug/09</td>
<td>Arrest and detention of four student leaders</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>oct/09</td>
<td>Continued violence against the opposition</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>nov/09</td>
<td>Arrest of five trade union members</td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>feb/10</td>
<td>Police raid on trade union leader</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>apr/10</td>
<td>Arrest four members of women's rights organisation</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>jun/10</td>
<td>Arrest four human rights defenders</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>feb/11</td>
<td>Over 60 human rights activists arrested after attending lecture on Arab revolution</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>apr/11</td>
<td>Director human rights NGO convicted for leading illegal organisation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amnesty International, Committee to Protect Journalists, Official databases Council, Bulletin European Union, Answers to parliamentary questions