If you want to cry, cry on the green mats of Kodokan

Aspects of Cultural and National Identity in the Inclusion of Judo into the Olympic Program

Kodokan judo was included into the Olympic programme for the first time in 1964. Efforts to have judo staged as an Olympic discipline had failed in earlier years and its acceptance as such during the 57th IOC meeting in 1960 at the Excelsior Hotel in Rome was tantamount to a fundamental rehabilitation of Japan as a nation and has to be seen as part of the reintegration of the Axis powers into the 'Olympic family' that had already begun to materialize in 1952. The inclusion of judo marked the first time that a non-European sport was adopted as an Olympic event, and the high level of ability and presence of Japanese athletes in three out of four weight classes helped to fulfil Japan’s wish to demonstrate its own strength to the world and to strengthen its national identity. Despite such victories, however, the defeat of the Japanese KAMINAGA Akio to the Dutch Anton Geesink in the open class - ironically - became the lieu de mémoire.

In this article I will address the question, in how far judo as an Olympic sport played a dominant role in the (re)construction of a cultural and national Japanese identity. In a second step I will discuss the Western image of judo and the internationalization or olympification of Kodokan judo.

Road to hosting the Games in 1964

John MacAlloon writes in his article The Turn of Two Centuries: Sport and the Politics of Intercultural Relations: “To be a nation recognized by others and realistic to themselves, a people must march in the Olympic Games Opening Ceremonies procession”.\(^1\) Taking part in the Games is therefore not only a question of being recognized, that is to present the nation to the outside, but is also a question of cultural and national identity. Attesting to the validity of these observations the Olympic Games had play a vital role in Japan’s international rehabilitation as well as restoring Japanese national identity following the nation’s defeat in World War II.

\(^1\) MacAlloon, “The Turn of Two Centuries”, 42.
However the IOC denied Japan the right to “march” in the first post war games of 1948.\(^2\) Japan’s rehabilitation as member of the world community only began when the Japanese Olympic Committee, that had been re-established in May 1948\(^3\), was recognized in 1951 on the Vienna meeting of the IOC – the same year Japan signed the peace treaty and one year later regaining her sovereignty. The reintegration of Japan into the world community was strongly supported by Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in Japan. In a letter addressed to J.-J. Garland, the US IOC member, MacArthur writes: “It is my personal hope that conditions will make it possible for Japan to be a competitor with the other nations of the world in 1952. Performances in swimming during the Occupation indicate that, in this sport particularly, the Japanese may be expected to make outstanding records. Participation in the Games at Helsinki should contribute greatly to a deeply felt and desirable goal of the Japanese people to join again with other nations in peaceful and cultural pursuits.”\(^4\) On 25 June 1950 the Korean War had started, marking a course turn in the politics of the occupational authorities in Japan. Japan became an important factor in the fight against communism. Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution denied the right to have an army, a “Police Reserve Force” was established the same year and with the support of the US, former war time leaders (including convicted war criminals) were able occupy influential positions in government, bureaucracy and industry once again. By the participation of Japanese athletes in the Olympics MacArthur, whose attitude towards Japan had always been a paternalistic one,\(^5\) wanted to show that the ‘bad child’ was allowed to play with the others again. And Japan ‘played’ considerably well in the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki: 72 athletes participated, winning one gold (free style wrestling), six silver and two bronze medals. In the end Japan was placed 17\(^{th}\) in the total medal ranking; one place before Britain and way ahead of Germany that ended up place 28.

\(^2\) “Invitations will be sent out by the Organizing Committee to participate in the 1948 “Games” early in the New Year. Germany and Japan will not be included.” *Bulletin du Comité International Olympique*, No. 4 (April 1947), 15.

\(^3\) Already in January 1947 a “Olympic Preparatory Committee” was established. Cf. Guttman, Thompson 2001, 193. Nagai Matsuzo notified the IOC about the re-establishing of a Japanese Olympic Committee and that information was already announced in the *Bulletin du Comité International Olympique*, No. 8 (January 1948), 1. So actually before the “Preparation Committee” de facto became the National Olympic Committee.


Aware of the symbolical meaning of hosting Olympic Games, the Tokyo parliament decided to apply for hosting the games of 1960 already in 1952. However the election in 1955 chose for Rome, but immediately Tokyo decided to apply for the Games of 1964.\(^6\) When the Japanese decided to apply for the Games of 1964, state organs took the leading role on all levels of decision making. Important meetings of the commission to prepare the games where held in the residence of prime minister Kishi Nobusuke – a convicted war criminal - and the organizational efforts were bundled within the Ministry of Education (Monbushô).\(^7\) Under the guidance of the Ministry of Education the games were programmatically used to re-socialize Japan into the World community as well as to promote and strengthen a Japanese identity, which centered around the terms *hitozukuri* (forming people) and *konjōzukuri* (building spirit, building perseverance). Seki Harunami in his book *Sengo Nihon no supōtsu seisaku* (“Sport politics in Postwar Japan”) shows that Japanese sport politics in Japan after WW II went – under the guidance of the occupational forces - through a short process of democratization only to find a goal that better suited their goals in the 50s: medals. After all, in the end it is not enough to just march in the games; to be recognized among the competing nations it is the medals that count and how can you become more realistic? In order to enhance the chances of medals, sport education and governmental sport sponsoring became centered around the building of athletes that were able to win in international competitions.\(^8\)

The question of the hosting city of 1964 was discussed on the 54\(^{th}\) IOC Session in 1958 that was held in Tokyo. Although the question of the hosting city was postponed to Melbourne, the members of the IOC were able to get a first hand impression of the sport situation in Japan. Especially as they could witness the organizing qualities of the Japanese during the Third Asian Games that - opened, as well as the IOC meeting, by the Japanese emperor – took place at the same time (opened May 24\(^{th}\) in Tokyo, so in fact directly after the IOC meeting). An account in the *Bulletin du Comité International Olympique* summarizes: “They [the members of the IOC] were pondering, while witnessing the Games, whether Japan is likely to be a worthy


\(^7\) Cf. Tagsold, *Die Inszenierung der kulturellen Identität*, 61-63.

\(^8\) Seki, *Sengo Nihon no supōtsu seisaku*, 87-170, esp. 152-154.
successor to Rome in the matter of organizing the next Olympic Games. One can
almost guess that they left Tokyo most favourably impressed.”

The decision for the XVIII Games was thus to be decided in Munich 1959 and the
JOC, especially its president Azuma Ryôtarô, tried to find allies for the Japanese bid
and it was Avery Brundage, who became the most important supporter and actor
behind the scene. During the Munich session the Tôkyô delegate (HIRASAWA
Kazushige and YASUI Seiichirô), presented their bid and answered questions on May
25th from 4.55 p.m. onwards. Tokyo was elected with 34 votes (Detroit 10, Vienna 9,
and Brussels 5) during next day’s session.

The decision for Tokyo meant that the Organizing Committee had considerable
influence on the selection of the sports to be conducted during the games and the
Japanese organizers were able to have judo included into the program for the first
time. Judo’s inclusion into the Olympic program “was”, as Guttmann writes, “clearly a
favour done to the Japanese host’s”. However this statement ignores the fact that
not only Japanese politicians and sport administrators but also sportsmen from
Japan, Europe and the United States pressed for an Olympic Judo. The inclusion of
judo into the Games was thus not a mere generous gesture.

The long way to Olympic judo

Kanô Risei - son of the judo founder Kanô Jigorô - head of the Kodokan and
president of the International Judo Federation (IJF) had asked for including judo into
the Olympic program in 1952 for the first time. The IJF had been recognized by the
IOC only one year earlier (September 15, 1951) as representing international body of
the non Olympic sport judo. The question of an Olympic judo was thus put on the
agenda of the Mexico meeting in 1953. However, during this session it was decided
to postpone the discussion whether judo should be including into the list of optional

11 Guttmann, Games and Empires, 138.
12 Kanô Risei to Avery Brundage, March 18, 1953. If not marked different, all letters cited can be found
sent this letter first to Mon Repos, but decided then to sent it also to Brundage’s address in Chicago
(cf. Kanô Risei to Avery Brundage, March 26, 1953). Obviously Kanô wanted the issue to be
discussed on the April meeting of the IOC in Mexico that year, and therefore could not afford to loose
time. On September 14th 1954 Brundage wrote a letter to Kanô in which he – in more a personal
judgment – mentions three reasons that speak against a successful application. 1. the general
tendency to reduce the program, 2. the notion that judo is “too new a sport internationally” and 3. that
judo has “too few participants”. Avery Brundage to Kanô Risei, September 14, 1954.
sports to 1954. Ironically enough the question was then placed in the agenda under “Reducing the Games’ Program”.\(^{13}\) And the odds were against judo in 1954. The Executive Committee of the IOC decided on their meeting in Athens “that no new sport shall be introduced at the Melbourne Games of 1956”.\(^ {14}\) During the meeting of the IOC Committee which followed that of the Executive Committee the final decision was postponed after the French representative Armand Massard, 1920 Olympic gold medalist in fencing, argued that volleyball, roller-skating and judo could “well be entered on the list of optional sports”.\(^ {15}\) The question of including judo (as well as volleyball, archery and roller-skating) into the program of the Olympic Games was thus discussed again on the 50\(^{th}\) Session of the IOC 1955 in Paris. However none of these four reached the necessary quorum of two thirds (in this case 34 votes). Judo even ended last with only 3 votes (volleyball 26; archery 19, roller-skating 7).\(^ {16}\) It was certainly too early for a Japanese sport to enter the Olympics. It should also not be forgotten, that the Japanese Olympic Committee had only been recognized in 1951 on the Vienna meeting of the IOC and that its members still had reservations towards the Japanese.

But when in 1960 the IJF asked again to include Judo into the program of the Olympic Games (KANÔ Risei to Avery Brundage May 14, 1960), Tokyo was already chosen to host the 1964 summer games, and Kanô Risei could rely on political support in Japan. Besides the strong support of by then Tôkyô governor Azuma Ryôtarô, the motion was supported by the “Judo Federation of Japanese Diet Members” that was formed in 1961. The president of the Federation Shoriki Matsutarô describes as the groups aims “to make the whole nation raise the Olympic movement, to make complete arrangements for the enforcement of judo event at the 18\(^{th}\) Olympic Games to be held in Tokyo” (Shoriki Matsutarô to Otto Mayer, June 6, 1961).

\(^{13}\) Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 39-40 (June 1953), 28. A general reduction of the program had been proposed by Erik von Frenckell, president of the organizing committee of the 1952 Games in Helsinki, during the Rome Session 1949. He lists three important measures in which the second is “Not to admit any new sport.” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 15 (May 1949), 31.


\(^{15}\) Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 46 (June-July 1954), 51. For that the IJF was supposed to provide more material, especially on the affiliated countries. But at this point it was already to late to include judo into the 1956 program, as Mayer explained in a letter to Kanô on February 25\(^{th}\). Therefore he advises Kanô to apply for the inclusion of judo on the list of optional sports. Otto Mayer to Kanô Rised, February 25, 1955. See also below.

When the candidature of the IJF to list judo as an optional sport was discussed during the 57th IOC Session in Rome (1960) it was at the same time connected to the question, whether judo should be included into the Tokyo Games: “This federation [IJF] asks to be recognized as an Olympic sport, and that JUDO [sic] be included in the programme of the Tokyo Games.” The Japanese representative Azuma Ryôtarô strongly supported the candidature of judo during this session and expresses his hope that judo might be included in the program of the Tokyo Games. The assembly after hearing the members – François Piétri, Josef Gruss and Ferenc Mezô - decided to accept the candidature by 39 to 2 votes. Despite this decision it was not yet sure that judo would be on the program.

The decision to accept the candidature left the IOC members as well as the Organizing Committee with the question of how to reduce the program of the games. The plan to limit the sport events had been on the agenda of the IOC for a while and a commission was supposed to propose a change of Rule 30, which stipulated the number of sports for the games. When the question of judo was discussed, Brundage made clear, that “the mere fact of including Judo in the Tokyo Games inevitably calls for an adjunction to the list of sports prescribed in Rule 30”.

During the Session in Rome K. Andrianov and A. Romanov proposed a change of the first sentence of Rule 30 which allows only for 18 sports, and the following change is decided: “The official program shall include minimum eighteen and maximum twenty-one of the following sports…”. However in the end Rule 30 reads as follows: “A minimum of fifteen and a maximum of eighteen of the events enumerated above must figure in the program.”

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18. Ibid. Already on May 19th (thus five days after Kanô had written the official petition) Azuma had written a letter to Otto Mayer to ensure that he is supporting the candidature. Azuma wrote not in his capacity as representative of the JOC, but as governor of Tokyo and the letter-head is that of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government; thereby putting his political power behind the candidature. AZUMA Ryôtarô to Otto Mayer on May 14 1960. Azuma was able to functionalize his success in the bid for the games for his political career. He ran as LDP candidate for the post of the major of Tôkyô. After winning the election he resigned from his post as president of the JOC.
20. Ibïd.: 67. Already in the 56th Session Avery Brundage had stressed the necessity to be more precise on the maximum number of sport events. Minutes of the 56th Session of the International Olympic Committee San Francisco 1960, Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 70 (May 1960), 50.
21. Extracts of the minutes of the 57th Session of the International Olympic Committee, August 22nd to August 23rd 1960, Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 72 (November 1960), 69. However a final decision was not yet reached as M. Bolanaki proposed some minor adjustments. Ibid. A final text that limited the sports to 18 was agreed upon only in 1962. Extract of the minutes 59th Session of the International Olympic Committee Moscow 1962, in Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 80 (November 1962), 50. This change of rule goes in hand with the general tendency to reduce the Olympic program, but takes not into account the decision to include judo into the next program. And subsequently the IOC eliminated judo from the games in 1968.
Already during the JOC Congress in December 1960 the Organizing Committee of the Tokyo Games, which had been organized in September 1959, decided to put judo on the list of sports to be practiced during the Tokyo Games. Following Rule 30 the Tokyo Committee first limited the events of the Tokyo Games to 18: “The Tokyo Committee suggests the elimination of the Modern Pentathlon (owing to lack of horses in Japan) and the rowing events. On the other hand, it asks for including Judo and finally proposes a maximum of 18 sports to figure on the program of the 1964 Games.” However on the next day (June 21) a heated debate around the number of sport events for 1964 arose. Brundage had already one day earlier mentioned that the number of sports did not matter, as long as they were in accordance with the Olympic Rules. After further discussion the final vote decides on 20 events, eliminating handball and archery. But Judo was only an optional sport. And the officials of the IJF already knew in 1963 that judo would not be part of the Games in 1968.

The success of the bid to host the games of 1964 can highly be ascribed to the support of Avery Brundage, whereas the success of the IJF candidature certainly owes to the support of IOC chancellor Otto Mayer. In a letter to Kanô Risei Mayer writes: “You may be assured that I shall do all what is in my power to help you.” (May 28, 1960) To make sure that the members of the IOC are “acquainted with this sport”, he advises his friend Eric Jonas, who at that moment is vice-president of the European Judo Federation, how to proceed: “I helped him a lot and told him how to act. He is now organizing an action so that every member of the I.O.C. here in Europe will be visited by a Judo man in view of having his vote! In our next Bulletin he will give me a text for an article which I shall publish” (Otto Mayer to Azuma Ryôtarô, May 24th 1960). No surprise thus, that Kanô thanked Mayer already on August 23rd for his support (Kanô Risei to Otto Mayer August 23, 1960).

The Japanese organizers – so in fact state organs - were politically pushing for judo as an Olympic sport as it could represent Japanese tradition to the world and could serve as reference for a - yet to be defined - Japanese self-identity. However to

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23 Ibid.: 79.
clearly understand the meaning the inclusion of judo into the Olympics meant for Japan and the Japanese, we have to understand the meaning judo has in the construction of the cultural and national identity of Japan and the formation of ‘Japaneseness’.

Judo and Japanese national identity

Judo was developed by the physical educator Kanô Jigorô in 1882 as a modernization of traditional Japanese jujutsu-styles. For Kanô Jigorô judo was not a mere form of martial fighting, but a form of education. In the late 19th century, under the guidance of the education minister Mori Arinori, we witness a reorientation of Japanese education towards moral education, that was to serve the needs of the state (kokka no tame no kyôiku). Physical education was in this period to provide the state with healthy and patriotic young men that were needed to build a nation with a strong economy and military (fukoku kyôhei). With the development of judo, Kanô reacts to this nation-centered educational philosophy and in 1889 he explains: “Judo is not morality but moral education in the broad sense. If we include judo as subject into the curriculum of our schools throughout the country, it can certainly compensate the weak points of our present educational system, support the character formation of our pupils and strengthen their patriotism. Should we ever have international conflicts, and should we ever be attacked by enemies from all sides, by following the teachings of judo, we not feel fear and will not surrender. And in peaceful times the foreigners will admire the development in our country as well as our customs and habits. If we follow the teachings of judo […] the time in which our country will be one of the strongest civilized countries will be close.” Kanô thus implemented the idea of building patriots through the training of judo into his Kodokan judo and presented his new martial sport to governmental institutions as a tool to build a national identity, which Japan desperately needed to overcome the feeling of inferiority towards the West. Judo was predestined to serve as a metaphor for the Japanese self-image and nation of the Meiji-period as it was seen as a martial art in which a physical weaker men could overcome a physically stronger men, by means of technique and spirit. In Kanô’s autobiographical writings as well as in the biographies Kanô’s ‘confrontation’ with the West plays a prominent role. Kanô is constructed as protector of the nation,

26 Kanô, “Jûdô ippan narabi ni”, 97.
who, through the training of judo, is able to demonstrate the Japanese spirit to the world: A individual's personal history unites the nation's imagined future.

Judo in the early 19th century was far from being a fixed system. It underwent a series of technical, organizational and theoretical modifications. When Kanō came into contact with the Olympic Movement and the Olympic idea after he was elected to become the first Asian member of the Olympic Committee in 1909, his ideas shifted towards a more internationally orientated perspective. Kanō incorporated de Coubertin's sport philosophy into judo and hoped to include Japanese martial arts, especially kendo and judo, into the Olympic program: “I hope that martial arts and athleticism will develop hand in hand. Even though they are different, their goal is still the same: The strengthening of body and mind. It is therefore wise to include kendo and judo and the attitude of bushidō into the Olympic Games.”

In the 30’s and early 40’s judo however became more and more intertwined with Japanese ultranationalism. It had been part of the curriculum in middle schools as early as 1911. In the early 19th century however no clear distinction was drawn between the traditional jûjutsu styles and judo that was merely seen as a form of traditional wrestling. Only in 1926 had judo reached a hegemonial status in education, superseding the traditional jûjutsu-styles. In 1931 judo together with kendô finally became compulsory. During the 30’s and 40’s judo was more and more seen as part of a pre-military education and nationwide mobilisation; reinvented as “a counter to Western values to infuse Japan’s modern sports culture with Japanese spirit”.

As part of the war machinery, judo was held accessory to the Japanese participation in the war and subsequently the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces forbid the training of judo, like that of all other martial arts with the exception of sumô. Only in 1949 / 1950 was judo allowed to be officially taught again. The same year the Zen Nihon Judo Renmei was founded and Kanō Jigorô’s son, Kanō Risei, was elected as president. By this move, the Kodokan was able to control the development of judo in Japan.

In the Japanese discourses of the postwar period - in movies, literature and songs - judo can be seen as a metaphor of Japan as well as a means to transmit post-war

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27 Kanō, “Waga orinpikku hiroku”, 369. Also Kanō Risei in a letter to Brundage mentions that it was a “long-cherished wish of the late Prof. Jigoro Kano to see judo as a Olympic discipline” (May 8, 1961). Kanō's wish to see judo as an Olympic sport, as well as his contributions to the Olympic movement served also as important arguments for the supporters of an Olympic judo. Cf. Eric Jonas' article in Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 71 (August, 1960), 28-29.

28 Inoue, "The Invention of the Martial Arts", 164.
values. In the *enka* (popular) song\(^{29}\) *Sugata Sanshiro* (text by Sekizawa Shinichi) – referring to Tomita Tsuneo’s 1942 wartime novel, made into a movie by Kurosawa Akira one year later - we read:

Keep in your heart the saying
“It is not important to win against others,
but to win against yourself”.
Train hard without complaining
The moon laughs, Sugata Sanshiro

More than the flowering gras
I love the spirit of the gras that has been trampled down
but is still alive
What I love is the love that is forbidden
When I cry it rains
Kodokan.

“Train hard”, one of the major maxims of sport politics in the late 50s and 60s mirrors the spirit of the postwar year, in which the nation’s effort were bundled in the task of rebuilding the country (*kunizukuri*) and putting Japan on the road to economical growth and prosperity. In yet another *enka* song entitled *Jūdō ichidai* (“A Life for judo”, text by Hoshino Tetsurō, 1963) we read: “A life for judo / I throw a light into the darkness of the world.” Rebuilding the country asked stamina as well as personal sacrifice from everybody and this ‘patriotic’ spirit is connected to Kodokan judo. In the metaphorical framework of these popular songs judo and the Kodokan serve as homeland (*furusato*) of a imagined community Japan. It should not be forgotten that judo training had been part of the education for most Japanese men in their 30s and they had incorporated and memorized not only the moves, but also the atmosphere of the training halls and the training spirit. Judo thus became a space of shared nostalgia; a place were the past was connected not only to the present but to the (shining) future as well.

\(^{29}\) For *enka* see Yano, *Tears of Longing.*
Maguire had noticed that male sport "appears to play a crucial role in the construction and representation of national identity"\textsuperscript{30} and also Roche linked male sport cultures to the shaping of personal and group identities.\textsuperscript{31} Despite the fact that women already trained judo in Japan around the 1910’s (first accounts already date from before 1900) and the Kodokan had established a department for women in 1926, Judo remained a male sport (especially the tournaments), containing the modes to construct a masculine identity and embodying the idea of defending the nation. Throughout Japanese history the wrestler had been seen as representative of his home. During the Heian-period (784-1185) at the imperial court and during the Edo-period (1600-1868), wrestlers were granted special status in society. When Commodore Perry came to Japan in 1853 and 1854 sumo wrestlers were present and the Americans invited to throw a punch at their impressive bellies. In the years following the forced opening of Japanese harbors, woodblock prints went on sale in which sumo wrestlers were depicted defeating Western soldiers and sailors - digesting and healing a nation’s cultural shock. Sumo wrestlers during that time were certainly “symbols of Japan’s might in the face of the invaders from the West.”\textsuperscript{32} In the past wrestling fights were thought to show the well-being of a province and the matches between foreigners and Japanese were supposed to show that the nation was up to the foreign ‘threat’. The significance of these matches can be seen in, what is called Santeru jiken (The Santel Incident). In 1914 Itô Tokugorô, a 5\textsuperscript{th} dan in judo, was defeated by the American wrestler Ad Santel. In 1917 Santel also beat the judomen Miyake Tarô and Sakai Daisuke in Seattle. In 1921 Santel came to Japan to challenge the Kodokan. The fights took place at a highly symbolical location: Yasukuni shrine. The shrine where the souls of the soldiers that had died for the emperor during the restoration war and later wars were worshipped. Santel won his fight against Nagata Reijirô and managed a draw against Shoji Hikô.\textsuperscript{33} Another prominent example is the wrestler Rikidôzan, who was able to drew huge masses into the stadiums during the 50s. His specialty were fights against “huge” and dirty fighting foreigners that he usually defeated following a well structured choreography.

\textsuperscript{30} Maguire, \textit{Global Sport}, 179.
\textsuperscript{31} Roche, \textit{Mega-Events and Modernity}, 219-220.
\textsuperscript{32} Bickford, \textit{Sumo and the Woodblock Print Masters}, 144. For examples of prints see ibid., 53 and 145.
These victories certainly helped to soothe the memories of Japan’s defeat.\textsuperscript{34} The expected and anticipated victories in the judo competitions at the Tokyo Olympics were meant to achieve even more. Tagsold has shown that through the Olympics the symbols of Japan’s imperialistic and nationalistic past, the tennô as well as the military, were positively reconstructed and included into the new Japanese national identity.\textsuperscript{35} By including judo into the Olympic program, Japan was thus able to rehabilitate just another of its wartime tools and to show not only to the world, but also to its people the value of its tradition that forcefully had to be denied in the early post war years. 1964 in this sense marks an important year in which tradition was to become a reference of and source for a cultural and national self-identity again. But how traditional was judo in 1964? What did the inclusion of judo meant for the Olympic Movement and its internationalization?

**Internationalisation of judo**

Japanese jujutsu began to spread to the Western World during the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In Seattle a training hall was opened in 1903 and in England jiu-jitsu spread with the arrival of Tani Yukio in 1900 and Koizumi Gunji in 1906. In Germany it was Ono Agitarô, who taught jiu-jitsu as early as 1906 to the military in Berlin. These early figures taught traditional Japanese jujutsu styles and not the newly developed judo. However it was the style Kodokan judo of Japanese wrestling that became dominating not only in Japan, but also in the US and Europe. This success can be ascribed to Kanô Jigorô’s influence as sport administrator and politician, and also by his far-sighted move to sent teacher abroad and to award dan-graduations to key figures in the already established European jiu-jitsu community; thus binding these sportsmen to the Kodokan. This form of friendly take-over can be seen in England, where Tani Yukio and Koizumi Gunji were awarded second dan after they joined the Kodokan, but it was also applied in Germany, France and Austria. Another important factor is that Kodokan judo was highly organized and centralized. As Frühstück and Manzenreiter state: “With numerous schools, ideologies, and masters striving hard to coexist, jujutsu could never establish the strong following that judo did.”\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Cf. Buruma, Inventing Japan, 5.
\textsuperscript{35} Tagsold *Die Inszenierung der kulturellen Identität in Japan*, 73-85.
\textsuperscript{36} Frühstück; Manzenreiter, "Neverland lost", 77.
Although the early teachers were mostly Japanese, European judo went through a process of acculturation and developed along Western sporting traditions (it should however not be forgotten, that the creation of judo itself was based on Western sport concepts and Western sport education). That has partially to with the fact that judo teachers in Europe included their own experiences, won in the – at that time - very popular circus fights. But also fighting rules like weight classes were newly introduced. The system of multicolored belts spread most likely from Paris, where it was introduced by Kawaishi Mikonosuke, in the second half of the 1930’s.

The European development of judo after the war took shape with the foundation of the European Judo Union (EJU) in London on July 28th 1948 – only one day after the formation of the British Judo Association. The EJU was founded under the initiative of the London based Budokwai and representatives from Italy, Holland, and Switzerland participated (one French observer). The first European Championships were held in 1951 - a time in which judo in Japan only started to recover.

The field of judo was in the first post war years dominated by Western sport administrators and sportsmen. The need of a international body became more and more evident and on its fourth meeting in 1951 the EJU was dissolved just to be automatically replaced by the International Judo Federation (IJF). However the written proposal put forward by the Kodokan to place the headquarters in Tokyo was declined, and only on its second meeting in 1952 was the position of president offered to the head of the Kodokan, Kanô Risei.37

Power and dominance are reflected in space and during the 60s as well as early 70s not only was the IJF headquarter situated in Tokyo and its president Japanese, but the first championships in 1956 and 1958 were also held in Japan. In both years Japanese fighters placed first and second.38 The world came (back) to the birthplace of judo, only to be shown that the Japanese were still superior in their fighting skills. In contrast to the European weight classes, the first three world championships only knew one weight category: the open. This meant that the comparable small Japanese fighters had to face bodily stronger European and American fighters.

Fighting in only one weight category went in hand with the idea that ‘a weaker person can overcome a stronger through technique and spirit’. And the Japanese technique and spirit was seemingly better in the 50’s. But already in 1961, when the Championships were held outside Japan for the first time, Anton Geesink won the title of world champion, and the Japanese became aware that technique and spirit might be fine, but that it would still be better to show that in weight classes. The decision to have different weight classes during the Olympics in Tokyo certainly helped Japan to win as many as three gold medals and one silver medal in the four weight categories. But 1961 was also foreshadowing Geesink’s victory at the Olympics and the end of the dominance of the Kodokan in terms of administration, rules and fighting skills.

When judo administrators in the IJF and EJU hoped to turn judo Olympic, a paragraph concerning amateurism was added into the statutes of the IJF in 1961. “Only judokas who are amateurs strictly in respect of the rules defined by the International Olympic Committee can take part in the Olympic Games”, thus adopting judo even more to the modes of Western sports. Guttmann states that “the Olympic program remains essentially Western”, despite the inclusion of judo. It is certainly true, as we have seen, that judo developed along the path of modern sport and according to Olympic rules. However it is not the ‘reality’ we find in changed rules, that governs our perception of cultural phenomena, but the reality of our own cultural history of perception. Who cares about European weight classes, colored belts and the ‘amateur rule’, when on the screen Westerners in white ‘kimonos’ bow to each other to apply ‘mysterious techniques’ the Japanese have developed ‘hundreds of years’ ago? In other words, in order to understand what the inclusion of judo meant for the Olympic Movement, we have to understand the construction of the other, of Asia and more specific of Japan.

**Western construction of judo as Japanese martial art**

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40 Cf. Frühstück; Manzenreiter, “Neverland lost”, 80.
41 Letter from the IJF (P. Bonet-Maury; Kano R.; A. Ertel) to IOC, June 5th, 1961. Already one month earlier the European Judo Union (EJU) had informed the IOC about the changes adopted by the EJU, that were to become the guidelines for the IJF. See letter from EJU to IOC, May 30, 1961.
42 Guttmann, Games and Empires, 138.
The image of Japan in the early 20th century is characterized by exotification. Japan is seen as place of spirituality, of the mysterious, as a paradise long lost to the highly 'technicized' West. Part of the concept of Japan was the image of the small Japanese body (which certainly holds true, when compared to the average size of Europeans). However, this image of the small Japanese was also connected to the idea of the weak Japanese. Therefore we see the fascination with a martial arts system that apparently gave these 'small people' the power to fight against bigger and stronger enemies. When the first jiu-jitsu fighters like Tani Yukio came to Europe, it was exactly this image that determined the reception of the discipline, and when Japan defeated Russia in 1905 it was a deep shock to Western nations. Sports writers of the time claimed that Japan’s military success was connected not only to a hygienic way of living or vegetarian nutrition, but also to jiu-jitsu. Ludwig Bach for example argues in his book *Verteidige dich selbst* (“Defend Yourself”) written in 1928 that the Japanese were able to “compensate for the physical characteristics of their race” by employing jiu-jitsu.  

This approach to the Japanese culture, which is still predominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s is based on a general dichotomy of Western technology and Eastern spirituality. In a speech Avery Brundage gave in Tokyo during the 54th Session of the IOC we read: “Undoubtedly the East has gained from its association with the West in the Olympic Movement and its adoption of Western methods of physical training, in a stronger and healthier people. But, what about the West? What will the West gain from this meeting on the fields of sport, with people of different ideas of life, different customs, and different viewpoints? Well, if the East gains in a physical sense, perhaps the West will gain intellectually and spiritually. The wisdom of the East is proverbial, and Asia, after all, was the birthplace of all the great religions. Fair play and good sportsmanship are a part of all religions as well as of the Olympic Code.”

The question of a Western perception of Asia and judo is mirrored in the struggle for international recognition by representing judo as governing body in the Olympic movement.

The emergence of the new international body meant a economical threat to the already jiu-jutsu clubs in Europe. But only when the IJF started its initiative to have judo included into the Olympic program can we see resistance from the International

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43 Bach, *Verteidige dich selbst*, 3-4, see also Niehaus, „Miushinawareta Kanō Jigorō“, 41-46.
44 Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, No. 63 (August 1958), 44.
World Judo Federation (IWJF), that combined different forms of jiu-jitsu and judo, like judo-do, developed by Julius Fleck in the late 40’s in Austria, under its wings. The IWJF also aimed at being recognized by the IOC. The arguments against the recognition of the IJF put forward by the representatives of the IWJF reflect not only the sport political controversies of the time, but also an ideological frame in which the dominance of the Kodokan was seen as a threat to the cultural and religious identity of the West.

In February 1955 Jack Robinson, president of the IWJF and president of the Johannesburg based Judokwai, asked for affiliation of the IWJF and for the inclusion of judo into the Games of 1956 (letter to Brundage, February 16, 1955). Jack Robinson, a self-awarded 10th dan, had immigrated to South Africa from Britain and started to teach his own form of judo. He had founded the South African National Amateur Judo Association (SANAJA) and worked as instructor for the police and the military.

Already in this first letter to the IOC, Robinson connects the choice of the international body that will present judo sport to an ideological choice between West or Far East (Japan). Robinson argues that in judo “the Western World are superior to Japan” and that the Japanese are avoiding “combat” as their defeat “is a moral certainty”, more over “…I must state there [sic] principles and rules could never be accepted by the Western world, who refuses to bow on there [sic] knees.”

Robinson is seemingly referring to the ritual of greeting, but metaphorically transfers this ritual on an ideological level: the West will not surrender to the East. The matter was handed over to Otto Mayer, who informed Robinson that the IJF was already registered with the IOC and that therefore his application could not be accepted. Additionally Mayer advises Robinson to get into contact with the IJF and form one


Later with the South African Amateur Judo Association (SAAJA) a second body emerged, this organization was recognized by the government of South Africa and taught a judo based on the Kodokan judo. In the late 70’s and the 1980’s Judo in South Africa was controlled on-and-off by a Governing Body, comprising of members of both SAAJA and SANAJA. This committee was called the South African Judo Union (SAJU). Only in 1992, under the guidance of the National Olympic Committee of South Africa did all judo organizations in Africa unite in one association which was called Judo South Africa (JSA).

46 Robinson to Brundage, February 16, 1955. The trustworthiness of the organization is certainly undermined by the fact, that the letter-head of the Judokwai reads like the family register of the Robinson’s: president Jack Robinson; chairman: J.W. Robinson, publicity manager: A. Robinson; Courses & Display Secretary D.B. Robinson and the six member grading panel five members carry the family name Robinson (the names of the Robinson’s in the letter-head are also underlined in the original letter, most likely by Brundage himself).
international body. But the IJF was not willed to merge with the IWJF, an organization that was to diffuse in its administration as well as sporting aims. In his answer letter Robinson turns towards a more or less open “racist” vocabulary - referring to the “white men” and expressing his hope, “that every country will be officially recognized, and not only the yellow race” (Robinson to Mayer, March 2, 1955). Robinson’s approach certainly has to be seen in the perspective of the relationship between South Africa and the IOC during the late 50’s and 60’s. The problem of Apartheid and racism in South African was a sensitive issue for the IOC and the pressure to exclude the South Africans from the Games became stronger and stronger from inside and outside the IOC.

Robinson resurfaces in 1961 and claims again that the Japanese organizations are not willing to form one body and ascribes this to “fear of defeat” (letter from February 23, 1961). Robinson however is not aware of the fact, that in the meantime the "sporting liberal" Ira G. Emery, general secretary of the South African Olympic Association and president of the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC), has written to the IJF describing the situation of judo in South Africa. In this letter Emery distances the South African Olympic Association from Robinson and his organization, as he is in their eyes a professional sportsmen (Emery to IJF, February 20, 1961; actually Robinson in his letter to the IOC from 2nd February 1955 had already characterized himself as being a professional judo teacher for the police and military). That certainly weakened the position of Robinson and his attempt to remain an international sport official despite the growing international isolation of South African sportsmen and sport officials that in 1970 ultimately resulted in the expulsion of South Africa from the IOC. Robinson tries to maintain the image of a international sport administrator, who is writing on behalf of the IWJF, becoming more insisting, by using the media. In an interview to the Johannesburg “Star” (6.6.1961) he announces to go to Athens in order to participate in the meeting of the International Olympic Committee to “demand” that also the members of the IWJF are

47 Mayer to Robinson, February 25, 1955. The same day Mayer also wrote a letter Kanō in which he advises Kanō how to further proceed in his application of having judo accepted into the program of the games and to ask for information about the IWJF. Letter from Otto Mayer to Kanō, February 25, 1955.
48 However Avery Brundage remained - despite growing concerns inside and outside the IOC – supportive towards the South African Government. Keech, “The ties that bind”, 73.
49 Keech, “The ties that bind”, 76.
50 However the president of the IWJF Knud Janson most likely being aware of the isolated position of Robinson, wrote to Mayer: “It is many years ago Major Robinson left us.” (August 7, 1960).
allowed to compete.\textsuperscript{51} As Robinson is not member of an organization that is affiliated to the IOC, he would not be aloud to participate. In his answer to Robinson Mayer – seemingly annoyed – makes clear that he regards ‘Robinson’s organization’ as professional, “…which renders any contact between the IOC and your body more difficult if not impossible”.\textsuperscript{52} Mayer is thus taking the position of Emery and Kanô Risei, who stated in a letter from May 1961: “Except the I.J.F., there are some bodies of which substance is professional, such as the International World Judo Federation, but, serious amateur sportsmen are taking no notice of such bodies” (Kanô to Mayer, May 13, 1961). The accusation of not being an amateur organization had to be taken seriously. During the presidency of Avery Brundage (1952-1972) the attempt to keep the ideal of amateur sportsmen was one of the major issues within the IOC. Brundage like Coubertin saw the Olympic Movement as a religion: “A religion, whose ethical component Brundage summed up in the single word: amateurism”.\textsuperscript{53} The question of amateurism thus was also a welcome argument for the IWJF representatives. And not only Robinson, but also Stefan Aschenbrenner and Knud Janson, a Danish judo-pioneer as well as secretary and later president of the IWJF accused the IJF of being a professional and commercial organization: “Can CIO recognize a body (IJU) which as its presidium has a professionel [sic] Judo highschool (Kodokan)?”\textsuperscript{54} However, personal and sport political ties inside the IOC are strong. And Mayer turns toward Azuma, the former judomen and supporter of Kodokan judo, to ask for clarification. In his answer letter to Janson, we read: “There is no professional amongst the leaders of that Federation in Tokyo. There are of course some teachers, but who are not leaders of the Federation” (August 12, 1960). The Kodokan had in fact already in 1909 been transformed from a private enterprise to a

\textsuperscript{51} This article was sent to Mayer by Emery with a letter dated June 7, 1961. However Mayer had already received a letter by Robinson dated June 5\textsuperscript{th} in which he announced his coming. The letter was answered by Mayer on the 8\textsuperscript{th} in which he makes sure that Robinson will not be received. In this letter Mayer also raises the question of professionalism again. To keep Kanô Risei informed about the moves of the IWJF Mayer makes sure that Emery’s letter as well as the newspaper clipping are forwarded to Kanô Risei. Mayer to Robinson, June 8, 1961 and Mayer to Emery, June 9, 1961.

\textsuperscript{52} Mayer to Robinson, June 8, 1961 and Emery to Mayer, June 7, 1961. 26.9.1961 In a letter Robinson denies that the IWJF is professiona: …this is entirely untrue, it is more than likely that a number of Clubs affiliated to the I.J.F. are professionals, but as far as I am concerned and I feel with my 50 years experience of judo, there is no professionals at all in the world, for there is nothing on record of any Judo exponents fighting and competing for money, since 1923, in the days of Yukio Tani” (September 26, 1961).

\textsuperscript{53} Guttmann, \textit{The Games Must Go On}, 116.

\textsuperscript{54} Janson to Mayer, August 7, 1960. See also the letter by Janson to Mayer from August 20\textsuperscript{th} 1962. The issue of education was also delicate inside the IJF. The Europeans were moving towards a clear definition of judo as a sport, whereas the Japanese stressed the educational value of judo.
foundation. And Kanô Risei could thus state in a letter to Brundage: “The International Judo Federation is naturally an amateur organization, and we will at this time renew the spirit of amateurism” (May 8, 1961). Yet the existence of professional judo teachers could not be denied and in the – already mentioned – IJF letter to the IOC from June 5, 1961, we subsequently read: “It is absolutely clear that judo professors cannot take part in the Games.”

A second issue that was discussed around the recognition of the IJF is connected to the question of religious teachings in judo. The reverse diffusion of judo implied also an exotification of judo, as it was in the West connected to spirituality and Zen-Buddhism. Elements that can not be found back in the writings Kanô Jigoro on judo. Kanô himself, as a typical intellectual of the Meiji-period, was not interested in religion, but in science. Above that we witness a promotion of State Shinto during the Meiji-period, whereas Buddhism was suppressed by the Japanese government. A martial art, based on Zen-Buddhism could not have received governmental support to the extent judo did. The identification of judo with Zen-Buddhism has to be seen as a process that took place with the diffusion of judo into the West. Even in sport history the unity of Japanese martial arts and Zen-buddhism was taken as granted, and a secularisation of judo observed. The question of this esoteric perception of judo is mirrored in the struggle of being international recognized by representing judo as governing body in the Olympic movement: “… Judo for the Japanese [sic] and their followers is not alone a sport, but a “bodily way” for working with Zen-Buddhism (Buddhism of Samurai etc.) and codex of Bushido”; accusing the IJF of “…working on “a cocktail” of Zen-Buddhism, mysticism, Bushido…” (Janson to Mayer, August 5, 1955). The following letters show that the IWJF sees the dominance of Kodokan judo as a threat to the Western world and that it is to protect the Christian world from Buddhist infiltration, and in fact from religious imperialism: “We in IWJF like Judo as a fine sport, therefore we are trying to save it from the grip of mysticism and aggressive Buddhism [sic] missionary work”. In order to solve the question of a religious

57 Letter from Janson to Mayer, January 21, 1956 and Janson to Mayer, January 3, 1956. Stephan Aschenbrenner (general secretary IWJF) and Julius Fleck (Disziplinpräsident IWJF) also argue from the standpoint that judo is promoting religion. However in their letters the argument is based on the notion, that what is called education in judo is nothing more than religious education. Stephan
background in judo Mayer consulted with the Japanese representative in the IOC, Ryôtarô Azuma, who denied any religious dimension in judo. (Mayer to Janson, February 14, 1956). Correspondence between the IWJF and the IOC basically stopped in the following years but was to be resumed after the IJF applied again to include judo into the program in 1960. Subsequently also the issue of Zen-Buddhism surfaced again in the second attempt of the IWJF to be recognized by the IOC. In August 1960 Otto Mayer is pressed by Knud Janson to recognize the IWJF, repeating his accusation of the IJF to be 'infiltrated' by Zen-Buddhist ideology (letter from August 7, 1960). Mayer repeats that there is no connection between Judo and Zen-Buddhism (letter from August 12, 1960). But Avery Brundage, who himself looks “with favor on some of the Zen-Buddhism principles”, inquires more detailed information about any connection between Zen-Buddhism and the “Kodokan Group” (Avery Brundage to Kanô Risei from July 16, 1962). A connection between judo and Zen-Buddhism is again categorically denied by Kanô: “…it is quite clear that Kodokan Judo has no connection with any religion” (Kanô to Brundage, August 30, 1962). The problem is further pushed, when Janson visits Mayer in Lausanne and hands over a memorandum on the issue, in which he warns, that “…the united Buddhism these years is trying to make a great push inside the Christian Western culture” with its “main weapon” Zen-Buddhism. The fact that the members of the IOC might not heard about the synthesis of judo and Zen-Buddhism is in his view, “because a Japanese – f.i. a highgraduated Judoka – does not speak much about Zen-Buddhism, “he lives Zen instead of speaking it” (Letter from Janson to IOC, August 20, 1962). The attempts of the IWJF to be recognized and to discredit the IJF by attacking the Kodokan were without success. But the position of the Kodokan inside the IJF was certainly weakened. Inside the IJF Europeans and Americans strongly moved towards a sport judo, and in 1965 the presidency was taken over by the British Charles Palmer, ending the hegemony of the Kodokan for the following 14 years.

Conclusion
It has been shown that Kodokan judo became a metaphor for the Japanese nation in the post war years and that Olympic judo proved to be fruitful in positively reinventing Japanese tradition and promoting judo as cultural basis for rebuilding Japan and for future economic success.

Aschenbrenner to Comite International Olympique, August 2, 1956 and Fleck to Brundage, August 10, 1956.
The diffusion of judo into the West resulted in incorporating the outer characteristics of Western sporting traditions. The perception of a cultural phenomenon like judo however does not need not refer to any existing reality. The analysis of the West's perception of judo showed that it is deeply rooted in the modes of perceiving the East in general: ascribing to judo a spirituality and a religious dimension. A basis that cannot be found in the writings of Kanô Jigorô, whose concept of judo was pragmatic and based on its value for a moral and physical education of the Japanese youth. Based on this perception the IWJF saw the inclusion of Kodokan judo into the Olympic program not only as threat to Christian sporting traditions, but also as a tool of a religious imperialism that tried to spread Buddhism throughout the world by means of sport.

Considering the significance of the Western exotification of judo, Olympic judo - despite the adoption to Western sporting traditions and Olympic rules - certainly helped to internationalize the Olympic Movement in the eyes of the spectators.
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