for my father

Promotor    Prof. dr. Kristoffel Demoen  
            Vakgroep Letterkunde

Copromotor  dr. Koen De Temmerman  
            Vakgroep Letterkunde

Decaan      Prof. dr. Freddy Mortier

Rector      Prof. dr. Paul Van Cauwenberge
Illustration on cover: gold stater bearing the image of Flamininus, now on display in the British Museum. On the reverse side: image of Nike and identification of the Roman statesman (“T. Quincti”) © Trustees of the British Museum.
Peter Newey

Φιλοτιμότατος καὶ φιλοδοξότατος

Titus Quinctius Flamininus, 
the Man and his Portrayal by Plutarch

Proefschrift voorgedragen tot het behalen van de graad van 
Doctor in de Taal- en Letterkunde

2012
It was nearly fifty years ago as an undergraduate that, following a course of lectures on Livy XXXIII, I first met Titus Quinctius Flamininus. Fascinated by the inextricable blend of historicity and personality that emerges from Livy’s text, I immediately directed my attention toward Polybius 18. Plutarch’s Life of Flamininus was the next logical step. Although I was not destined to pursue an academic career, the deep impression left on me by these authors endured over the following years. Hence, finally, with the leisure and a most gratefully accepted opportunity, my thesis. Κάλλιτο άργα, παρά ποτέ.

My thanks are due initially to Dr T.A. Dorey, who inspired and nurtured my interest in ancient historiography during my undergraduate years in the University of Birmingham. The copious notes I amassed during his lectures and tutorials, (and which I had the foresight to preserve), have provided invaluable help throughout this project. More recently, I am gratefully indebted to prof. dr. Luc François of the University of Gent for providing me with the opportunity of resurrecting work which had lain dormant for some thirty years and acquiring my licentiaatsdiploma. More recently still, I acknowledge the unsolicited help and encouragement I have received from prof. dr. Freddy Decreus, prof. dr. Marc De Groote, prof. dr. Mark Janse, prof. dr. Wim Verbaal and prof. dr. Gunnar De Boel. Prof. dr. Luc Van der Stockt from the University of Leuven has also provided invaluable assistance with his constructive points of criticism and suggestions in response to my various reports to the DBC. I am also grateful to Prof. drs. Koen Verboven and Arjan Zuiderhoek for their advice concerning Roman foreign policy after the Hannibalic War and Roman expansion into the East during the following two decades. This project would not have been possible without invaluable assistance provided by Dr. Koen Temmerman, especially on the notions of character and characterization in ancient Greek literature, moralism, and literary theory. Special thanks must be reserved for my director of studies, prof. dr. Kristoffel Demoen, first for accepting me as a student, but most particularly for the fund of knowledge I have...
acquired under his tutelage, along with the awareness of how best to assess and effectively to apply it.

Last, but not least, I am deeply indebted to my wife, Dominique, for the moral support she has so patiently and selflessly unselfishly provided, especially during the more difficult moments.
# Table of Contents

## Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
   
   Objective ........................................................................................................................................... 1
   Rome in the East, 200-146 B.C. .......................................................................................................... 2
   Titus Quinctius Flamininus in the Research of the Last Century ...................................................... 2
   Plutarch’s Parallel Lives ....................................................................................................................... 17
   The Notion of φιλοτιμία .................................................................................................................... 19

## Chapter 1 FLAMININUS IN WRITERS OTHER THAN PLUTARCH ............................................. 21

1.1 The Literary Sources ....................................................................................................................... 21
   1.1.1 The Major Sources .................................................................................................................. 22
   1.1.2 The Minor Sources ................................................................................................................. 28

1.2 A Reconstruction of Flamininus’ Eastern Career from the above Literary Sources ....................... 35
   1.2.1 Flamininus’ Arrival in Greece and his first Encounter with Philip ........................................ 35
   1.2.2 The Romans invade Thessaly ................................................................................................ 38
   1.2.3 Flamininus and Philip at Nicæa in Locris .............................................................................. 40
   1.2.4 Nabis of Sparta ...................................................................................................................... 47
   1.2.5 Early spring, 197. Nabis takes possession of Argos. First encounter with Flamininus ............ 48
   1.2.6 Cynoscephalae ..................................................................................................................... 51
   1.2.7 Peace Negotiations at Tempe ............................................................................................... 53
   1.2.8 Flamininus and the Assassination of Brachylles .................................................................. 58
   1.2.9 Flamininus proclaims the Independence of the Greek States at the Isthmian Games ............. 69
   1.2.10 Flamininus and the Allied Campaign against Nabis ............................................................ 73
   1.2.11 Early winter, 195: The Nemean Games .............................................................................. 82
   1.2.12 Flamininus announces the Withdrawal of all Roman Forces from Greece ......................... 83
   1.2.13 Flamininus’ Triumph .......................................................................................................... 87
   1.2.14 Flamininus and Antiochus’ Envoys in Rome ...................................................................... 88
   1.2.15 Flamininus and the Aetolians .............................................................................................. 96
Chapter 2 PHILOPOEMEN ................................................................. 119

2.1 A Brief Summary of Philopoemen’s Career before his first Encounter with Flamininus ............................................................. 120

2.1.1 Philopoemen in Crete (221-211/10) ............................................... 121

2.1.2 Philopoemen and the Emergence of Achaean Independence from Macedon ................................................................. 122

2.1.3 The alleged plot by Philip to have Philopoemen assassinated ........ 125

2.1.4 The War against Nabis and Philopoemen’s Second Departure for Crete ................................................................................. 127

2.2 The Rivalry between Flamininus and Philopoemen ........................ 132

2.2.1 Philopoemen and The Achaean War ............................................... 132

2.2.2 The Nature and the Extent of Flamininus’ Resentment ................. 135

2.2.3 Philopoemen’s ongoing Opposition to Flamininus’ Policy in the Peloponnese ................................................................. 139

2.3 Deterioration in Relations between Rome and the Achaean League ......................................................................................... 145

2.4 The Death of Philopoemen ................................................................ 149

2.5 A Jibe by Flamininus, mocking the Appearance of Philopoemen ...... 150

2.6 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................... 152

Chapter 3 FLAMININUS IN PLUTARCH ............................................. 155

3.1 The Life of Titus Quinctius Flamininus ........................................... 156

3.1.1 Introductory Chapter .................................................................... 156

3.1.2 Flamininus’ Consular Campaign .................................................... 163

3.1.3 Flamininus Imperator supersedes Villius ......................................... 166

3.1.4 The Battle for Control of the Aoi Stena .......................................... 169

3.1.5 Military Operations in Northern Greece: Flamininus builds an Alliance of the Greek states and Pergamum for the War against Philip .............................................................................. 173

3.1.6 The Achaeans ally themselves with Rome ....................................... 176

3.1.7 Flamininus occupies Thebes by trickery and forces the Boeotians to enter into an Alliance with Rome ........................................ 178

3.1.8 Flamininus is chosen to remain as Commander in Greece .................. 180

3.1.9 Flamininus defeats Philip at the Battle of Cynoscephalae .................. 181

3.1.10 Aetolian Discontent as Flamininus reaches a Peace Settlement with Philip ............................................................................... 186

3.1.11 The Isthmian Declaration of Greek Freedom and Independence ...... 188

3.1.12 The Virtual Auto-apotheosis of Flamininus ..................................... 190

3.1.13 Confusion, Chronological Distortion and the nonexistent Truce .. 194

3.1.14 The Senate awards Flamininus a Triumph for his Victories over Philip and Nabis ........................................................... 197

3.1.15 Flamininus and Glabrio .................................................................. 198

3.1.16 Flamininus’ Second Departure from Greece .................................. 202
3.1.17 The Arraignment of Lucius Quinctius Flamininus ........................................... 203
3.1.18 Flamininus and the Events surrounding the Death of Hannibal ...................... 208
3.1.19 The Death of Flamininus ................................................................................. 221

3.2 Plutarch’s Synkrisis of Philopoemen and Flamininus ........................................... 223

Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 235

Redressing the Imbalance. ......................................................................................... 235
Plutarch’s Portrayal of Flamininus: an Assessment .................................................. 237

Epilogue: Publius Cornelius Scipio Ï φιλότιμος ......................................................... 243

Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 247
Introduction

Objective

The aim and scope of this thesis, which consists of three main chapters, is to make an assessment of Plutarch’s portrayal of Titus Quinctius Flamininus. The first chapter begins with a review of those extant ancient authorities, other than Plutarch, which contain relevant material, which is then analysed, along with the opinions of modern scholars, from a historiographical and philological perspective, to consider what may be deduced about Flamininus’ character. This applies equally to the second chapter, which examines the contentious relationship between Flamininus and the Achaean Philopoemen. However, Plutarch has been included at this point since it is he who provides by far the most information on this particular topic. The third chapter consists of a perusal of Plutarch’s *Life of Flamininus* with a view to evaluating the manner in which he manipulates his source material, his means of presentation and the resultant plausibility of his portrayal.
Rome in the East, 200-146 B.C.

Rome’s expansion into the East and the policy that directed it have long been a subject of intense scholarly debate. Unsurprisingly, opinions vary, and widely so. Fundamental for this topic in the twentieth century are the works of T. Frank, M. Holleaux and E Badian, who discern what, for want of a better expression, might be described as “defensive imperialism,” under the premise that Rome is either directly attacked or threatened and, in defending herself, acquires her empire more or less by accident. More recent is a highly influential study by W. Harris, who argues that Roman war-making was motivated primarily by the desire for personal enrichment and advancement, and that the senate not only extended Roman power whenever an opportunity presented itself, but was constantly on the look-out for new areas of military conquest. Important insights into Harris’ arguments are provided in an article by North, e.g., his remarks on certain aspects of the Roman constitution. Annual consulships, renewable under normal circumstances only on a ten yearly basis, provided successful candidates with what might well be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity of achieving military success, a tradition tantalizingly held up to them by their ancestors, and for which the ultimate award was the celebration of a triumph.

This view, which has won considerable support in some quarters, has been studiously refuted in a truly monumental study, some ten years in the writing, by E.S. Gruen, in which he pays meticulous attention to the texts of the ancient authorities and pinpoints important material either overlooked, or arguably misinterpreted, by other historians.

On the specific matter of Flamininus’ diplomacy, Gruen argues convincingly that it was founded primarily on Greek models, and his general contention throughout the work is

---

1 Frank, (1914).
2 Holleaux, (1935).
3 Badian, (1968).
4 Harris, (1979).
6 North, (1981), 6. Similarly, Millar, (1984), 4: “In normal times the lot decided which consul or which praetor took which provincia, and the lot thus gave or removed what might be a man's only chance for a famous victory. If the chance were not taken in the year of office, it was either lost for ever to a man's successor (see e.g. Pol. xxxviii, 8, 3, on 147 B.C.), or could only be kept alive by prorogation.”
9 Gruen, (1984), 142: “It can hardly be plainer that the practice of declaring Greek communities, whether in general or in particular, as free, autonomous, and democratic, as at liberty to live under their own laws and ancestral government, as free of tribute and of garrisons, extended in time and space through the Hellenistic..."
that Rome had no overall, predetermined policy to become in any way entangled in internal Greek politics. Roman security, he argues throughout, was paramount, and involvement was kept to an absolute minimum. Moreover, he concludes, “Hellas ultimately fell under Roman authority not because the Romans exported their structure to the East, but because the Greeks persistently drew the westerner into their own structure - until it was theirs no longer.”

Gruen’s work was followed shortly afterwards (1988) by an equally detailed and voluminous study by Ferrary. It consists of three sections, the first of which (pp. 5-218), the most pertinent to this project, deals with the history of Hellenic traditions and the manner in which they were adopted and applied by the Romans to suit their own purposes, particularly the propagation of the notion - of which Flamininus was the greatest exponent - that they were the champions of the “freedom of the Greeks.” On this specific point, Ferrary is broadly in agreement with Gruen, although he frequently disagrees on other matters. The second section (pp. 223-494) deals with the manner in which Roman domination was perceived by Greek philosophers and historians, and the third (pp. 497-615) with cultural philhellenism and the political activity of eminent Romans during the second century. Ferrary repeatedly, and convincingly, provides new perceptions of traditionally held opinions. However, in spite of his exhaustive analysis of Flamininus’ policies, on the matter of his diplomacy, in comparison with other historians he makes relatively few observations about how this reflects his character.

era and through the Hellenistic world. It served as a convenient instrument for rival dynasts to use against one another in the decades after Alexander’s death”. Gruen’s conclusion to this section: “The slogan was a thoroughly Hellenic one.”


For example (p. 94, n. 159), in dealing with the allied campaign against Nabis in 195, in contradiction to Gruen’s statement (p. 455), “Establishment of the Republic’s hold on Hellas was neither an aim nor an outcome of this affair,” he states that Flamininus aspired to construct “une sorte de symmachie informelle et destinée à le rester” with Rome acting effectively “en tant qu’hégémon des Grecs.” Moreover, he claims that the success of the actual campaign was clearly limited, since, “au lieu de rassembler derrière Rome une Grèce unanime, elle [la guerre contre Nabis] fit éclater des divergences, suscita des mécontentements que Flamininus sans doute n’avait pas prévus : refus étolien de voter même le principe de la guerre.” He fails to take into account, however, not only the lingering discontent of the Aetolians with the Romans during the previous two years and Flamininus’ constant determination to restrict their authority, but also the strong resentment they incurred from some of their fellow Greeks for previous misdemeanours, pointedly reflected by the slanted remarks of the Athenian ambassador (Livy XXXIV, 23, 1-4) and by the withering, unbelievably racist attack delivered against them by the Achaean Aristaenus (Livy, XXXIV, 24, 1-4). Put succinctly, the resentment, far from being caused by the war, clearly predated it.
More recently (2004) C.B. Champion has produced a work in conjunction with other scholars which provides a wide range of material dealing with the various difficulties and controversies surrounding the study of Roman imperialism. It examines the Romans’ motivations for acquiring an empire and the various means whereby they justified this from an ideological perspective. Close attention is given to the intricate nature of the Romans’ associations - be they political, cultural or commercial - with “foreign states and peoples in the great age (250-50 B.C.) of the expansion and consolidation of Roman interstate power.” Roman imperial motivations are examined in the first chapter, which consists of three articles by Harris, Gruen and Rich. Harris argues that the quest for personal enrichment and aggressive expansionism were the primary factors, thereby discounting the notion of “defensive imperialism.” This is refuted by Gruen who, while concurring that war-booty and other financial considerations should not be discounted, maintains that the primary consideration was Roman security. Rich argues that the emergence of Roman imperialism was due to a multiplicity of reasons, not just militancy based on greed, as Harris would have it. His remarks on the fear that had resulted from previous military disasters for Rome should be given serious consideration.

Four years later A. M. Eckstein produced an equally comprehensive study which consists of three main sections. In the first he examines Rome’s earliest contacts with Illyria and Macedon during the period 230-205 BC, and in the second what he describes as “The Power-Transition Crisis in the Greek Mediterranean,” namely, the partition pact between the Seleucid monarch Antiochus III and Philip V of Macedon to carve up the overseas dominions of the boy-king Ptolemy V of Egypt. The repercussions were felt initially by the rest of the Hellenistic world and eventually, following the overtures of Egypt, Athens, Pergamum and Rhodes, by the Romans who, concerned primarily for their national security, (rather than seeking a convenient pretext for pursuing a policy of aggressive expansionism), decided to intervene. The third part of this work deals

---

16 Pp. 17-29: On War and Greed in the Second Century BC.
19 Champion, (2004), 61: The Romans were not always successful in their wars and some enemies – the Gauls, Pyrrhus and Hannibal – threatened the very survival of the Republic. Memories of these dangers were real enough, and in my judgement the fear of powerful neighbours, although not, as used to be supposed, the key to Roman imperialism, must remain an important factor in accounting for it.”
21 Cf. Holleaux, (1921), 306-25. Similarly, McDonald and Walbank, (1937), 206: “The intervention in the East was imposed by external circumstances: it took the simple form of preventive action followed by withdrawal, and
specifically with the wars against Philip (200–196) and Antiochus (200–188) and the resultant emergence of Rome as the one and only superpower in the Mediterranean. Eckstein then argues convincingly that, even after the treaty of Apamea in 188, in spite of their overwhelming predominance, the Romans did not actively pursue a policy of empire building. As a clear example, he refers to “the extraordinary scene” in the summer of 198 when Eumenes II and delegates from Rhodes appeared before the Senate, “and the Patres, having loaded them all with gifts (but especially the king) simply asked Eumenes and the Rhodians what territorial rewards they wished from the victory over Antiochus, promising them anything they desired.”22 Moreover, the treaty of Apamea in 188 had been followed by a complete withdrawal of Roman troops back to Italy, (reminiscent of the withdrawals from Greece and Spain in 194).

Strongly reminiscent of Gruen, Eckstein concludes (pp. 377–381) that, in spite of having emerged as an unchallenged superpower as a result of her victories over Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucid empire, the geopolitical situation in the Greece looked much the same as it had during the mid-third century, namely, “a world of independent states – and of states proud and conscious of their independence.”23 Moreover, far from aspiring to build any sort of empire, Rome continued her policy of keeping her involvement with these European Greek states to a minimum. “Meanwhile,” he continues, “east of the Aegean the Roman presence was hardly felt at all.”

Throughout the course of this project it is Gruen’s interpretation of events which has generally been accepted and which I seek to corroborate with the following brief summary for the period 200–146, at the end of which, with the domination of Macedon and Greece, Rome had become the undisputed mistress of the entire Mediterranean.

In early 200 B.C., just a few months after the ratification of the peace with Carthage, the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, to whom the “province” of Macedonia had been assigned by lot, proposed that war be declared on Philip V of Macedon, “on account of his lawless conduct and armed attacks against the allies of Rome.”24 However, the populace was war-weary and traumatised by the severity and long duration of the recent conflict with Carthage; moreover, large tracts of previously fertile agricultural land in Italy lay fallow without the necessary man-power to bring them back into production.25 Meanwhile,
Spain was far from stable and Cisalpine Gaul was in open revolt. Consequently, and to the intense irritation of the senate, Galba’s motion was rejected by a significant majority of the comitia centuriata. Unabashed, the senate instructed Galba to convene a second meeting for his proposal to be reconsidered. Before the actual vote, Galba addressed the people in a speech of which the main theme was that, realistically, the Romans had no choice: they must either take the war to Philip in Macedonia or wait for him to invade Italy. Indeed, he claimed, Philip was already preparing for war on an massive scale both by land and by sea. Next, overtly scaremongering, Galba argued that prompt intervention in Saguntum would have prevented the Carthaginian invasion of Italy, before further piling on the agony in resurrecting the spectre of yet another foreign invader of the Italian homeland, namely, Pyrrhus. At the second time of asking, therefore, the vote was in favour of war.

Superficially, given the mood of the senate, this might well appear to be a war of outright aggression based on a policy of imperialist expansionism, yet, for all its scaremongering, Galba’s rationale cannot be faulted, since the senate’s insistence on war was due exclusively to consideration for national security, as the unfolding events of the next half-century were to prove. Following the initial invasion in 200, Rome withdrew all her troops from Greece for the first time in 194. Reinvasion in 192 was prompted, again purely out of consideration for national security, by the alliance between Antiochus III and the Aetolians, followed by a second complete withdrawal in 188. Another seventeen years were to elapse before the next military intervention, this time against Perseus of Macedon, who had succeeded his father Philip V upon the latter’s death in 179. The Romans withdrew yet again following the defeat of Perseus by the consul L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in 168. Despite the withdrawal, there now occurs a distinct change in the attitude of the Romans, who now decided to read the riot act to all and sundry, clearly illustrated by three instances during the course of Paullus’ campaign. First, although they had been prepared some thirty years earlier to leave both Philip and Nabis at liberty, (albeit with drastically reduced authority), they made a glaring exception of Perseus in taking him back to Rome to be exhibited along with his children in chains during Paullus’ triumph. Thereafter he was kept in custody at Alba Fucens, (about halfway between Rome and the Adriatic coast), where he died two years

---

26 In 222, shortly before the Hannibalic War, the Romans conquered Cisalpine Gaul. Polybius, 2, 32, 1 – 34, 15. This had since been lost and in the spring of 200 Placentia was captured and destroyed by the Gauls. Livy, XXX, 10, 1-11, 3; Dio Cassius, fr. 58, 5; Zonaras, 9, 15, g-h.

27 The senate was undisguisedly bellicose, having already decided to propose a declaration of war even before the allotment of their provinces to the consuls. Livy, XXXI, 5, 9.

28 Polybius, 29, 17, 1-4; Livy; XLI, 37, 10 – 44, 3 and XLV, 37, 9-10 – 41, 4-5; Frontinus, Strat., 2, 3, 20; Florus, 1, 28, 8-9; Appian, Mac., 19, 2; Justinus, 33, 2, 1-4; Victor, Vir. Ill., 58, 1; Eutropius, 4, 7-1; Orosius, 4, 20, 39; Zonaras, 9, 23, e-g.
later from a combination of sleep deprivation and self-inflicted starvation.\textsuperscript{29} Next, over one thousand members of the Achaean League, formerly a major ally of Rome, were deported to Italy under suspicion of having collaborated with Perseus.\textsuperscript{30} When eventually liberated some sixteen years later, with the Romans “considering that their punishment was sufficient,”\textsuperscript{31} no more than three hundred of them had survived. Meanwhile, Macedon had been carved up into four separate republics, the administration of which was delegated to representatives from various towns and villages. Significantly, however, no Roman garrisons were installed nor did the senate seek to exploit the economic resources of the country. Finally, before embarking for Italy, Paullus pillaged Epirus, sacked no fewer than seventy cities and made a haul of one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, who were sold off into slavery.\textsuperscript{32} Above all, this undisguised barbarism, prompted by the senate, gave a clear indication of the aforementioned change in the Romans’ attitude concerning their eastern policy: though still anxious to leave the various states free, be they Macedonian, Greek or whatever, the Romans, without becoming involved in their internal politics, were determined to deny them the least opportunity of causing any further mischief.

Meanwhile, between 191 and 167, although the Romans had never sought to secure a permanent foothold anywhere within the mainland of the Balkan peninsula, this did not apply to the larger islands adjacent to the west coast. They wrested Zacynthus from the Achaeans in 191, Cephallenia from the Aetolians in 188 and Leucas from the Acarnanians in 167. Effectively, therefore, along with Corcyra, on which they had had a base ever since the Illyrian Wars of the third century, they had established a buffer zone whereby they could monitor all naval traffic bound for Greece, guarantee the security of their shipping routes near southern Italy and control access to the Adriatic Sea. These were all purely precautionary measures, however: they were simply not taking any chances.

The next military intervention in Greece did not occur until 149 in the so-called “Fourth Macedonian War”. Some chancer, who usually went by the name of Andriscus, claimed to be Philip, the son of Perseus, raised in secret by foster parents. He rallied a royalist party and succeeded in briefly reuniting Macedonia. Woefully underestimating the gravity of the situation, the Romans hastily sent an inadequate contingent under the praetor Publius Iuventius to hold Andriscus in check. They suffered a heavy defeat and Thessaly was overrun by Andriscus’ gangs. However, the following year a stronger force under the command of Q. Caecilius Metellus chased Andriscus out of Macedonia and ran

\textsuperscript{29} Polybius, 36, 10, 3; Sall., Hist., 4, 67, 7; Diodorus, 31, 9, 5; Velleius, 1, 11, 1; Plutarch, Aem., 37, 2-4; Zonaras, 9, 24e.
\textsuperscript{30} Livy, XLV, 35, 1-2; Pausanias, 7, 10, 1-11; Justinus, 33, 2, 8; Zonaras, 9, 31, a.
\textsuperscript{31} Pausanias, 7, 10, 12: ἄποφροντος κολασθήναι σφᾶς ἤγομένοι.
\textsuperscript{32} Polybius, 30, 15, 1; Livy, XLV, 33, 8 – 34, 9; Appian, Ill., 9, c- 10, a; Eutropius, 4, 8, 1.
him to ground in Thrace. As a result of this campaign, the senate finally accepted that
the time-honoured policy of providing peaceful independence for Macedon was
impractical. Military intervention, however infrequent, had nonetheless been required
since the first withdrawal in 194. Reluctantly, therefore, in 148 the decision was taken to
annex Macedonia, into which Epirus and Thessaly were incorporated as a single
province.

The spirit of rebellion engendered by Andricus spread into Greece. Although Rome
had since liberated the Achaean captives who had been deported to Italy after the third
Macedonian war, these men, having languished for so long in captivity, brought back to
Greece a naturally embittered resentment: retrospectively, therefore, a clear
miscalculation by the Romans. This resentment, compounded by hostilities between
Sparta and the Achaean League, was to prove catastrophic for Greece. In 146, Sparta,
wishing to secede from the Achaean league, appealed to Rome for help. Metellus, who
was still in Macedonia, sent envoys to Corinth, where they were glibly insulted by the
Achaeans, who then made the suicidal error of overrunning central Greece with a
makeshift army under one Critolaus. What had initially been nothing more than just
another disagreement between Greeks, therefore, had unpredictably escalated into a
direct challenge to Rome, and one which, if only out of consideration for her self-
respect, she could simply not afford to ignore. The Achaeans were soon routed by
Metellus and later that year reinforcements were sent from Italy under the command of
the consul L. Mummius, who crushed any remaining resistance. Finally, and reminiscent
of the atrocities conducted in Epirus by Paullus in 167, Corinth, where Metellus’ envoys
had not long since been jeered and hounded out of the assembly, was summarily sacked,
razed to the ground and its inhabitants sold into slavery. There is, however, no evidence
to suggest that any of this was premeditated. The severity of the Romans’ reaction was
undoubtedly due to some fifty years of pent up frustration in failing to find a viable and
lasting settlement for Greece, and the challenge to their military superiority was simply
the last straw. Harsher measures were clearly required, and the annihilation of an entire
city was a lesson understood by everyone.

Following the unanticipated and catastrophic events of 146, the Achaean League was
dissolved into its constituent city-states. This much is clear, but other generally
accepted notions - that Macedonia, for example, was authorised to intervene, whenever
required, on behalf of public peace - rest on decidedly tenuous evidence. Whatever,
another century was to pass before Greece was annexed as a province by Julius Caesar.
Meanwhile, Rome continued to display her characteristic reluctance to become involved
in the internal affairs of Greece.33

---

33 For a detailed examination, see Gruen, (1984), 523-528.
Titus Quinctius Flamininus in the Research of the Last Century.

It would be the quintessential understatement to describe Titus Quinctius Flamininus as a controversial figure. The historical significance of the role he played during the Roman expansion into the East at the beginning of the second century B.C. and, particularly, what this reveals about his character, have long captured the attention of scholars. For the most part, on the matter of his character Flamininus gets a decidedly bad press, portrayed by many as selfishly ambitious and treasonous, having no qualms about selling out his allies or even putting his own interests before those of the Roman Republic. Equalling scathing criticism is rife concerning, among other things, his insufferable arrogance and his gratuitous mischievousness, the worst consequence of which was the unwarranted assassination of the Macedonian Prince Demetrius on the orders of his own father.  

The object of this section, therefore, is to review a selection of material relevant to the distinctive personal qualities of Flamininus. Most of this occurs specifically in the form of articles, and incidentally in full length works dealing with various aspects of the period in which Flamininus was politically active.

Early in the twentieth century Léon Homo published an article dealing with Flamininus’ activity in Greece during the years 198-194. His observations, beginning with the near farcical confrontation between Philip and Flamininus across the width of the River Aous in 198 and concluding with the withdrawal of all Roman troops in 194, are precise and succinct. Contrary to most works, this article is generally favourable to Flamininus. For example, though readily admitting that Flamininus’ talents as a field commander were no exceptional, Homo is quick to praise his strategic and logistic acumen. The most relevant material dealing directly with Flamininus’ character - “La

---

34 Livy, XL, 23, 1-24, 8 and 54, 9-55, 8; Diodorus, 29, 25, 1; Plutarch, Aratus, 54, 6-7; Justinus, 32, 3-10; Trogus, Prol., 32; Orosius, 4, 20, 28; Zonaras, 9, 22 a.
36 Homo, (1916), 1-47.
politique sénatoriale et la personnalité de Flamininus” - is to be found in the second part of section VIII, (pp. 35-45), in which Homo, (albeit quoting liberally at face value from Plutarch with no consideration for that author’s literary objectives), examines his diplomatic skills, his philhellenism, his “ambition” (φιλοτιμία) and his continuous anxiety about being prorogued at critical moments of his campaign. This article by Homo, though less than fifty pages in length, has provided a sound basis for subsequent, more recent scholarship on this particular topic.

Seven years after Homo, another French scholar, Maurice Holleaux, published an article which has since proven to be a milestone on the matter of Flamininus’ character. It deals specifically with the interaction between Flamininus and Philip during the peace conference towards the end of November, 198 on the shore of the Malian Gulf near Nicaea in Locris. The extant source material for this conference, which lasted fully three days, is both complex and abundant, consisting mainly of no fewer than ten extensive chapters from Polybius and five from Livy, with additional, albeit much smaller, contributions from Plutarch, Appian, Justinus and Zonaras.

Holleaux opens with a detailed account and truly exhaustive analysis of the conference in a style that is precise and unambiguous, paying particular attention to the manner in which Flamininus cunningly wins Philip’s confidence by holding out false hope over those territories in Greece from which he would be compelled to withdraw, and to the manner in which he subsequently dupes him into sending an embassy to the Senate, which resulted in severe disappointment and humiliation for the king, yet much to the personal gratification of Flamininus.

Throughout the latter part of his article Holleaux is relentlessly hostile towards Flamininus as an individual, roundly castigating his “amour-propre” and his “âme orgueilleuse et jalouse.” He also focuses on his “pur égoïsme” and, most particularly, on his “vanité.” Next, having rubbished Flamininus’ professed philhellenism, he construes his apparent readiness to sell out the Greek allies as a means to arranging a peace settlement in the event of not being prorogued, rather than conquering Philip on

servir toutes ses qualités de souplesse, d’intelligence, de séduction, toutes les ressources de sa riche et complexe personnalité.”

38 Holleaux, (1923), 115-171.

39 P. 139: “De sa première rencontre avec le consul, Philippe a le droit d’emporter quelque espérance – et c’est précisément ce que le consul a voulu.”

40 P. 157.

41 P. 155: “Dans la physionomie morale de T. Quinctius, le trait dominant est, comme on sait, la vanité, cette vanité immense et petite qui l’induisit souvent en de si noires erreurs. Agité du perpétuel désir de paraître et de primer, assoiffé de gloire et de gloriole, la vanité et « tout son fond et l’étoffe de son âme.‖” For similar castigations of Flamininus, see Scullard, (1951) pp. 101 and 120.

42 P. 165.
the battlefield if he were, as nothing less than treason, since Flamininus, he maintains, clearly considered the interests of the Republic subordinate to his own ambition.\textsuperscript{43} Finally, dismissive of the opinions of contemporary scholars, and seeking to divest Flamininus of the last vestige of credibility, Holleaux does his level best to dismantle his “habileté” (\(\alpha\gamma\chi\iota\nu\omicron\alpha\)), for which he is so generously complimented by Polybius.\textsuperscript{44}

Opposition to Holleaux’s views appeared in an article published in 1939 by Wood.\textsuperscript{45} He examines in particular Flamininus’ recurring anxiety about being replaced by a new commander at Nicaea in 198, at Tempe in 197 and as leader of the allied campaign against Nabis in 195. For Nicaea, he provides a brief summary of the conference, before rejecting the feasibility of Livy’s allegations. The conference, he argues, was a “diplomatic victory far more important than that of Cynoscephalae” insofar as Flamininus had succeeded in isolating Philip from the Greeks and establishing Rome as “the arbiter of the Hellenistic world,” before concluding this section with the statement, “In spite of these significant consequences, the charge of self-seeking has arisen to slander the man who achieved so much for his country by his conduct of these negotiations”.\textsuperscript{46}

Concerning the conference at Tempe, shortly after the Roman victory at Cynoscephalae, Wood strongly refutes Polybius’ claim that it was Flamininus’ fear of losing the credit for all he had achieved to a successor which induced him hastily to conclude peace settlement with Philip.\textsuperscript{47} He is equally dismissive, and rightly so, of an identical claim, this time by Livy, (in all probability Polybian in origin), at Sparta in 195.\textsuperscript{48} Otherwise, and in sharp contrast to Holleaux, he describes Flamininus as a “great Philhellene.” Finally, he convincingly refutes Plutarch’s contention that, driven yet again by selfish ambition, Flamininus was directly responsible for the death of Hannibal, before taking Polybius fully to account for what he considers to be an unjustifiably hostile tradition against Flamininus.\textsuperscript{49}

Just two years after this article, Wood produced a second, equally complimentary to Flamininus, in which he considers the manner whereby Rome secured the loyalty of her allies for the joint purpose of guaranteeing her own security and the independence of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{43} P. 167.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Polybius, 18, 12, 1-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Wood, (1939), 93-103.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} P. 96.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} P. 99, re Polybius, 18, 39, 3-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{48} P. 100, Livy, XXXIV, 33, 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} P. 103: “By the actual evidence of the ancient sources it can be demonstrated that the charge of selfish ambition is false and should not be allowed to depreciate the esteem to which the career of Flamininus justly entitles him.”
\end{itemize}
the Greeks. Within four years of Flamininus’ arrival in 198, Rome, initially just one member of a coalition against Macedon when war had been declared, was tacitly invested by the Greeks with the authority to manage their affairs – thanks exclusively to Flamininus. Furthermore, this transformation, Wood argues, was not purely circumstantial, but rather the result of “a conscious strategy on the part of Flamininus.” Referring to the previous article, Wood iterates the significance of the conference at Nicaea, which effectively served as a springboard for this process, resulting in the defeat of Philip in 197, the Isthmian declaration in 196 and the granting of full autonomy before the Roman withdrawal from Greece in 194. He also focuses on the trust Flamininus inspired in the Epirotes, the Opuntians and, particularly, the Achaeans, who eventually decided to abandon their alliance with Philip and “join the anti-Macedonian coalition - an allegiance which had become advantageous solely by reason of the growth of Roman power and influence under the skilful guidance of Flamininus.”

In 1943 Feyel produced an article on the interaction between Flamininus, Philip and the Greek allies at Nicaea in 198. Following Holleaux and Aymard, Feyel meticulously examines Flamininus’ conduct and speculates about his motivation. Although he generally agrees with Holleaux and Aymard about the negative aspects of Flamininus’ character, (especially his “vanité”), Feyel, decidedly less hostile, questions the reliability of Polybius’ account and concludes this first section with the remark, “Pour moi, j’estime qu’il est de la dignité de l’histoire de réhabiliter sans plus tarder la mémoire du jeune consul.”

In 1963 H. Gundel produced a compilation of Flamininus’ career in the Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Primarily intended as a detailed, fact-based article it provides relatively little in the way of comment and interpretation. It is, nonetheless, an invaluable and easily accessible data-base, well worth checking, and referred to by various scholars some of whose works have been studied and incorporated into this thesis.


Thereby contradicting Holleaux, (1921), 236, n. 1, who claims that this was opportunistic and circumstantial, without giving due consideration to the fact that it was none other than Flamininus who had brought these very circumstances about.

Feyel, (1943).

Holleaux, (1923).

Aymard, (1938).

Feyel, (1943), 244.

Gundel, (1963) 1047-1100; more specifically, on the Macedonian campaign, 1052-76.

Further opposition to Holleaux appeared in 1967 in an article by Balsdon, who contends: “Ascription of motive is not description of fact. It is evidence, indeed, not about Flamininus – for men who act from mean motives do not shout about them; it is evidence that there were people who disliked Flamininus and whose dislike took the form of ascribing discreditable motives to him.” Those who “disliked” him are divided into two categories: a) ancient authorities, notably Polybius, M. Porcius Cato and Plutarch, and, b) modern historians, most particularly Holleaux, whom he bluntly describes as “the cleverest and worst of Flamininus’ enemies.” Balsdon examines in detail the events at Nicaea in 198, the conference at Tempe in 196 and Flamininus’ management of the conference with Antiochus’ envoys in Rome in 193, before finally refuting the view that Flamininus was “a self-interested diplomatic trickster,” the origins of which, he claims, “are to be found in the brilliant but, I am bound to think, utterly mistaken ingenuity of Holleaux.” The ancient sources, he maintains, hostile or otherwise, do not support this view: far better to direct one’s attention to Q. Marcius Philippus, the “diplomatic trickster par excellence,” who, along with his fellow ambassadors, boasted about the way - the so-called nova sapientia – in which they had hoodwinked Perseus by holding out false hopes of peace, and for which they were roundly criticised by the older members of the Senate, who considered this to be a blatant violation of Roman traditional standards. “Flamininus,” Balsdon concludes, “was not Marcius Philippus.”

In 1970 Badian published two lectures which have since claimed equal status with Holleaux’s article of 1923 and of which the title reflects the author’s strictly pragmatic approach. In the first (pp. 3-27) Badian traces “the historiography of my subject,” examining material relevant to Flamininus under entries, (initially under the heading “Flaminius”), in various encyclopaedias from the first half of the eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. This section is followed by a résumé of various scholars who have directed their attention to the period of Roman expansion in the East and, more particularly to Flamininus, whom Badian earlier (p. 4) describes as “its central character”.

This provides the background for the second lecture (pp. 28-57), in which Badian conducts his own examination, albeit apologising in advance for being unable to perform this task to his own satisfaction due to circumstances beyond his control (p.28,
This lecture is divided into six sections, starting with Flamininus’ appointment as consul and concluding with an assessment of his philhellenism and policy. On the matter of the appointment (pp. 28-25), Badian builds a decidedly positive picture of Flamininus, arguing convincingly that his successful candidature, in spite of the considerable technical impediments of being too young and of not having held the prerequisite intermediary offices, was due to the support of influential individuals who had groomed him specifically to assume command of the war in Macedonia. Flamininus had deservedly won this support through his accomplishments, both military and diplomatic, and due to the proficiency he had acquired in Greek since his appointment as *tribunus militaris* to M. Claudius’ Marcellus sometime before 208. So far, so good; but there remained the question of the allotment of provinces between Flamininus and Sex. Aelius Paetus, who had been elected as his colleague. This was the acid test for the true political clout of Flamininus’ supporters. The successful candidates were offered the option of arranging this matter between themselves or settling it through the ballot box. The latter option was chosen and Macedonia was allotted to Flamininus. Since the first option had been refused, which suggests that Paetus, with equally influential connections in high places, might also have aspired to conduct the campaign in Greece, this raises the blindingly obvious question of whether the ballot was rigged. Livy’s phraseology offers no clues, but Badian, pointedly - and quite justifiably - critical of the lack of introspection of “most scholars writing about the incident,” (p. 30) not only makes out a good case that it was, but also refers to a demonstration of how the actual process was operated (p. 31, n. 16), thereby corroborating his argument about the suitability of Flamininus and the measure of support he received.

Badian is equally positive in the two following sections (pp. 35-40). He criticises both the “unsuccessful” and “ill-planned” nature of Galba’s campaign, and his lack of political finesse when military aggression had failed. A change of attitude to the Greeks was required, namely, a diplomatic approach, and the man for the job was Flamininus (p. 37), who fully appreciated that, “What mattered was less the quick defeat of Philip than the winning of the Greeks,” (p. 39).

Next, Badian deals with the thorny issue of Flamininus’ conduct at Nicaea in November, 198 and the resultant quandary in which Philip’ envoys found themselves from the moment they were admitted to the Senate the following month. His approach

---

64 Livy, XXXII, 8, 1-4.
65 His brother, P. Aelius Paetus, had recently been appointed censor. Livy, XXXII, 7, 2.
66 Supported by Briscoe, (1973), 182.
67 Immediately upon his arrival in Macedonia, Galba’s successor, P. Villius Tappulus, was confronted with the unenviable task of suppressing a rampant mutiny in the army which had not been suppressed with sufficient vigour at the outset. Livy, XXXII, 3, 1-7.
68 For chronology, see Walbank, (1940), 342.
is noticeably, and refreshingly, devoid of the idealistic, moralizing tone of Holleaux and his excoriating condemnation of Flamininus on every possible account. This is followed by an examination of Flamininus’ relations with the Aetolians, with particular attention given to the contentious peace conference at Tempe (pp. 48-53), before concluding with a sober assessment of the nature of Flamininus’ philhellenism and policy (pp. 53-57).69 Throughout the entire lecture Badian clearly conveys the notion that foreign policy is directed not by ethics, but rather, by self-interest and expediency.

Opposition to Badian’s view that Flamininus’ previous military experience and diplomatic finesse were the key to his electoral success soon appeared in an article by A. M. Eckstein,70 who maintains that what he describes as “a thesis well on its way to becoming orthodoxy,” (p. 123), requires serious reconsideration. Questioning, albeit accepting, the integrity of the sortition, he argues “that both consuls for 198 owed their early consulships to their own ambitions and political connections, not to their intrinsic and acknowledged military and diplomatic expertise. If one accepts this view, a rather different picture of T. Quinctius Flamininus emerges: not a philhellene with diplomatic and military experience elected in 199 specifically to deal with Philip, but rather a young man with few special qualifications, (at least, as far as the surviving evidence allows us to judge), who owed his election to internal politics, and his opportunity in Greece to luck (the lot).” Moreover, he continues, Flamininus’ management of the campaign was determined primarily by logistics, especially the matter of supplies for the army, rather than by diplomacy and philhellenism. Finally, referring to the protracted military operations in Thessaly and Phocis, (the results of which forced Philip to the negotiating table at Nicaea), Eckstein concludes (p. 142), “Flamininus pursued approximately the same (often brutal) policy towards the Greek allies of Philip as Galba had, although - again like Galba - Flamininus was not averse to diplomatic overtures to strategically valuable neutrals.”

In 2005 Rene Pfeilschifter produced a full-length study of Flamininus in which he minutely examines his policy in the East and the manner in which this reflects his personality.71 After the first chapter, in which he deals dispassionately with Flamininus' early career and his successful, albeit highly controversial, candidature for the consulship,72 Pfeilschifter’s hostility, clearly reflected in his title headings alone,

69 Esp. P. 55: “It is difficult to see how the myth of his being an educated Greek by nature and inclination ever got into the modern tradition. There are simply no facts to give it the slightest support. It would be fairer to say that he was a traditional Roman aristocrat, in that he enjoyed ruling over those who possessed culture – he preferred it to having culture himself (...). This does show a certain respect for Greek culture, which we must grant him, but not exaggerate or misunderstand.”
70 Eckstein, (1976), 119-142.
becomes abundantly clear. Concerning Flamininus’ character, in portraying Flamininus as quick to anger, insufferably conceited, jealous and resentful, Pfeilschifter is decidedly overcritical, readily exaggerating its undeniably unsavoury aspects while failing otherwise to give credit where it is clearly due, and he is similarly, and unfairly, dismissive of Flamininus’ military success,73 his diplomacy and his political achievements.74 On this last point, in fact, it is not just Flamininus, but the entire Roman political establishment which bears the brunt of his criticism.75 This notion of the blind leading the blind is highly questionable, however, with undue consideration given to the contention of Gruen (and others) that Roman involvement in the East, and elsewhere, was restricted to a minimum – witness the total withdrawal from Greece and Spain in 194 – since, for the Romans, the prime consideration was national security, and that Flamininus’ settlement of Greece was simply a matter of carefully calculated expediency.

Thus, there is a broad spectrum of starkly contrasting opinions on every aspect of T. Quinctius Flamininus, be that the feasibility of his Eastern policy, his diplomatic ability, his military competence or, particularly, his much maligned character. Further examination is required, however, particularly of those episodes, from which it is generally considered that Flamininus emerges with his personal reputation in tatters; namely, the assassination of Brachylles, the execution of the Macedonian prince Demetrius and the death of Hannibal. In the first instance, however, as we shall see, a good case can be argued for extenuating circumstances; in the second, Flamininus’ conduct, though wantonly irresponsible, was in no way intentionally malicious, and in the third, there is no conclusive proof that he was personally responsible for the death of Hannibal. Though certainly no saint, Flamininus was far from being the egotistical ogre some would have us believe, and one of the conclusions of this doctoral research will be the redressing of this imbalance.

73 P. 389: “Flamininus errang zwei grosse Siege auf dem Schlachtfeld, am Aoos und bei Kynoskephalai; aber vor der zweiten Schlacht wäre er um ein Haar gefangengenommen worden, und vor Sparta dilittierte er hilflos.”
75 Ibid.: “Das Hauptproblem war eines des politischen Bewusstseins. Flamininus sah die Chancen meist gar nicht, und mit ihm kein anderer Römer, kein Senator, kein Legat, kein Konsul.”
Plutarch’s Parallel Lives

The ravages of time have been particularly kind to the writings of Plutarch. A large number of his philosophical works are extant, along with twenty-two of his Parallel Lives and four single Lives. It would be rash to state categorically whether this is due to mere chance or deliberate intent, but one does not have to look very far for arguments to justify the latter supposition. For although the Lives have no great stylistic merit and their historical accuracy leaves something to be desired, they are still extremely readable having, as they do, a fascination peculiar to biography. This is due, for example, partly to Plutarch’s subtle and frequent use of anecdotes and partly to his fondness for making his points implicitly rather than explicitly, thus creating a much deeper and longer lasting impression. These and other aspects of his work will be analysed later, but that which above all has made the Lives extremely popular is the manner in which Plutarch retains his readers’ interest throughout by confronting them with a multiplicity of ethical issues. It was this aspect of Plutarch’s work which appealed to the French and Italians during the Renaissance and to the English during the Elizabethan era, and particularly during the 1760’s and 1770’s.

More recently, following a spate of activity, mainly by German scholars at the end of the nineteenth century, for the next sixty years or so Plutarch received but scant attention. The recurrent themes in these earlier studies were primarily attempts to identify his source material for the Lives and investigations into his compositional technique. A notable exception was Leo, who directed his attention to ancient biography as a separate literary genre, though it was not for another thirty years that other scholars seriously considered its origins and its eventual evolvement into works produced by the likes of Plutarch. Finally, more recent studies have been directed to Plutarch’s primarily didactic aim in writing the Lives, and the ethical issues they explore, e.g., sagacity, valour, duty, temperance, and, in the case of Titus Quinctius Flamininus, . At this point, therefore, it would be appropriate to consider the current state of the art in studies of Plutarch’s Lives. The corpus is truly immense, however, which means that only a few of the more important recent scholars can be mentioned here.

---

76 Leo, (1901).
77 For example, and arguably the real trailblazer, Stuart, (1928), Barbu, (1934), notable for his observations on characterization and his assessment of historical veracity, and, more recently, Momigliano, (1971).
78 Works dealing specifically with, or incidentally relevant to, the Life of Flamininus will be considered later in the third chapter. Among recent monographs on other particular Lives, (e.g. Georgiadou, (1997), Binder, (2008), Trôster, (2008)), the study by Simon Verdegem, (2010) stands out by its exemplary status quaestionis, (19-96).
C. Jones’ ‘Plutarch and Rome’ consists of two basic parts, of which the first deals with Plutarch’s career. In the second, attention is directed towards the *Parallel Lives*, including sections on Plutarch’s source material and his methods of composition. This is followed by a section which examines his views on Roman history in the *Lives*, concentrating primarily on the *Romulus* and the *Flamininus*. Lamberton’s ‘Plutarch’ gives a detailed account of the circumstances, i.e., Greece under Roman rule, in which Plutarch lived and worked. It examines his background, his education and his literary and political careers. Lamberton also examines the relationship between historiography and biography and shows how the *Parallel Lives* served the ongoing process of cultural accommodation between Greeks and their Roman overlords. The closing section consists of a section on Plutarch’s reputation and his influence on posterity.

The general book on Plutarch's *Lives* by Tim Duff (1999) may be regarded as one of the better introductions to this corpus. It gives a detailed analysis of Plutarch's literary techniques and moral conceptions. The opening section consists of a diligent compilation and examination of all the explicit statements made by Plutarch concerning his motivation for writing the *Lives* and the moralising objectives he seeks to achieve (13-51). Along with its scholastic merit, therefore, this section incidentally provides an extremely useful and readily accessible reference point for this material. In the final section the author deals with Plutarch’s cultural programme, interpreted in part as a form of resistance to Roman supremacy (287-309).

For the last thirty years or so Christopher Pelling has undoubtedly been one of the most significant scholars in modern Plutarchan scholarship. His publications are legion. He deals exhaustively with every aspect of Plutarch’s works, always paying scrupulous attention to the immediate historical context. Of particular interest for this thesis are: *Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives*, *Plutarch's Adaptation of his Source Material*, and *Aspects of Plutarch's Characterisation*, and *Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture*. Equally informative on Plutarch’s various compositional techniques is Anastasios Nikolaidis’ *Plutarch's Methods: His Cross-references and the Sequence of the Parallel Lives*. On the ethical/moralising purpose of Plutarch’s *Lives*, a succinct, yet comprehensive, article is provided by Nikolaidis, *The purpose of Plutarch's Lives and the various theories about it*.

---

81 Duff, (1999), with specific case studies of four paired Lives: Pyrrhos - Marius, Phokion - Cato Minor, Lysander - Sulla, and Coriolanus - Alkibiades. See also Duff, (2011), where he rightly stresses that the moral lessons in the *Lives* are but seldom explicit, and that Plutarch is more 'showing' than 'telling'.
82 For Plutarch’s relationship to the Roman imperium, see also Jones, (1971).
The Notion of φιλοτιμία

Since, as the title of this thesis suggests and has often been noted, the notion of φιλοτιμία is crucial in Plutarch’s portrayal of Flamininus, it would be appropriate briefly to recapitulate the semantology of the word. Consider, as a start, the definitions from the lemma in the LSJ86:

I 1. love of honour or distinction, ambition, freq. in bad sense in early writers (many references); with φιλονυκία, Pl.Lg.860e; also in good sense (several references).
2. conceited obstinacy (two references).
3. ambitious display, ostentation (one reference, “but freq”).
4. lavish outlay for public purposes, munificence (references); pl., occasions for munificence.

II. the object coveted, honour, distinction, credit (references)

From these definitions and from the numerous references, (which are not copied here), two important conclusions can be drawn: (1) the meaning and connotations of the term are ambivalent – although LSJ suggests that the pejorative meaning is predominant in “early writers” –, and (2) the word itself appears only relatively late in time, the earliest occurrence being in Pindar.

Of course, the notion itself of ‘ambition’ or ‘love of honour’ is as old as Greek literature, the Iliadic heroes being driven by this impetus; one might even say that φιλοτιμία is a crucial characteristic of ancient culture. The term and the notion have been the central focus of a conference held in Leuven (2009), the acts of which were published at the final stage of the redaction of this thesis, in early 2012.

Two of the editors of the volume, Maarten De Pourcq and Geert Roskam, aptly open their introductory essay with a 1974 quotation from Ramsay MacMullen: “Philotimia. No word, understood to its depths, goes farther to explain the Greco-Roman achievement. So far as I know, it has yet to receive the compliment of a scholarly treatise.”87 Over the last decades, some attention has been given to the term in scholarly literature,88 yet the Leuven volume is apparently the first volume devoted to it, be it that the focus is limited

88 See e.g. Veligianni-Terzi, Ch. (2007), "Φιλοτιμία", in Christidis, A.-F. (ed.), A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity, Cambridge, 1130-1136. Veligianni-Terzi gives a totally different impression of the term than that emerging from LSJ, as she starts mainly from epigraphic material. For the most complete bibliography, see now, De Pourcq – Roskam – Van der Stockt (2012).
to its use, meaning and connotations in imperial Greek literature. Directly relevant to this thesis are the introductory essay, and the articles by Athanasios Nikolaidis and Christopher Pelling, who both deal specifically with Plutarch’s Lives.\textsuperscript{89}

De Pourcq and Roskam sketch the fundamental ambivalence of the notion of φιλοτιμία, from its first occurrences in Greek literature: they make clear that the positive interpretation was equally widespread, even if it was often challenged. They also recall significant dimensions of the concept, the most important, in the context of a thesis on Flamininus, being the social-political dimension and the moral perspective: political and military achievements are most appropriate for displaying ambition, and the moral assessment of someone’s φιλοτιμία depends on criteria such as moderation, appropriateness, and the protagonist’s objective.\textsuperscript{90} Moreover, it is important to remember that the positive, neutral or negative connotation of the term is primarily determined by the immediate context.

The chapters by Nikolaidis and Pelling both include discussions of the Flamininus.\textsuperscript{91} Inevitably, their observations partly overlap with what was already written in the third chapter of this thesis before the publication of the Leuven volume; their interpretations of particular passages will be given due notice \textit{ad locum}. Here, only some of their general remarks on Plutarch’s overall use of the term will be resumed in brief. In general, the attention bestowed in the \textit{Life of Flamininus} on a concept traditionally so ambiguous as φιλοτιμία is only one example of Plutarch’s recurrent interest in moral ambivalence throughout the \textit{Lives}. More specifically, he tends to dissociate φιλοτιμία from vice; the concept is often linked with both δόξα and φιλοδοξία, which are generally regarded as negative character-traits.\textsuperscript{92} Another frequent pair seems to be constituted by φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία;\textsuperscript{93} the notion is most often used in the earlier parts of the \textit{Lives}, and is apparently judged most fitting for the young.\textsuperscript{94} These, and other observations, will be relevant for the close reading analysis of the \textit{Flamininus} too.

Careful consideration must be given, therefore, both to Plutarch’s literary aims whenever he uses this word, and to the feasibility of his various contentions measured against whatever historiographical evidence is available. This is the prime objective of the third chapter of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{89} For previous discussions of φιλοτιμία in Plutarch, see especially Frazier (1988).
\textsuperscript{90} De Pourcq-Roskam, (2012), 1-8.
\textsuperscript{91} Nikolaidis, (2012), 34-40; on the Philopoemen-Flamininus pair, Pelling, (2012), 60-62.
\textsuperscript{92} Nikolaidis, (2012), 35.
\textsuperscript{94} Pelling, (2012), 58-59.
Chapter 1

FLAMININUS IN WRITERS OTHER THAN PLUTARCH

1.1 The Literary Sources

In spite of the common ground between historiography and biography, they are nonetheless distinct literary genres. Broadly speaking, since the historian writes with little or no preconceived notion of the development and final analysis of any given individual’s character, it is for the reader to draw his own conclusions based on his assessment of that individual’s involvement in the events recounted. There are passages, however, which, either as part of the main historical narrative, or as a diversion, constitute a rich source of biographical information. Sometimes, for example, in considering the importance of a significant event, such as a battle or a peace conference, the historian will add his personal opinion, varying in length from the briefest of remarks to a protracted and carefully argued summation. Of the two historians, Polybius and Livy, to whom we are primarily indebted for information concerning this project, this sort of material is more prevalent in the former, an altogether more flexible stylist, and an erstwhile biographer besides. Concise yet revealing sketches of influential figures - Philip V, Hannibal and P. Cornelius Scipio, to mention but a few - occur sporadically throughout his work.\(^1\) Even so, the narration and

\(^1\) E.g., Philip: 4, 77, 1–4; 5, 18, 5–9; 7, 11–12; 10, 26, 1–10. Hannibal: 3, 48, 1–12; 9, 22–26; 23, 13, 1–2. The meeting between Scipio and Hannibal on the eve of the Battle of Zama Regia: 15, 6–8; Scipio: 10, 2–5; 23, 14, 1–11.
assessment of events, rather than the detailed study of specific individuals, is the historian’s primary objective. With the exception of the sort of personal observations just mentioned, therefore, the assessment of any given individual’s personality requires an acute awareness of the historical context and a careful examination of the available texts.

1.1.1 The Major Sources

Polybius

Along with his stylistic flexibility and an eye for biographical detail, Polybius has two other things very much in his favour both as a historical and biographical source for Plutarch’s Life of Flamininus. The first is the relatively modest scope of his work, i.e., 264-146, which affords him the luxury of his many digressions and observations, including the afore-mentioned biographical sketches. The second, and far more significant, is his contemporaneity with many of the events he describes. At the time of Philip’s defeat at Cynoscephalae in 197 Polybius was somewhere between three and six years of age, and between nine and twelve, therefore, when Flamininus left Greece for the second time in the winter of 191.² Thereafter, according to the surviving accounts, with the exception of a transitory visit on his way to the court of Prusias in 183, Flamininus never returned to Greece. He did, however, further pursue his political career in Rome, where he remained influential until at least 182. By this time, i.e., no later than nine years after Flamininus’ second departure from Greece, Polybius, now in his early twenties, had already become a politically active member of the Achaean League. Given the profound and protracted influence Flamininus had exerted on Greek politics, he would have made a deep and lasting impression on Polybius’ senior contemporaries, Achaean or otherwise, thus providing a valuable source of biographical information. For these reasons, despite the fragmentary nature of his work, (with the obvious exception of the first five books), a clearer assessment can be made of Flamininus’ character from Polybius than from any of the other surviving historians.

However, the magnitude of the lacunae in his text and the resultant frustration cannot be overstated, as is shown by a simple arithmetical assessment. The first, and only intact, pentad averages ninety-five chapters per book; the second, already fragmentary, less than half of this, namely a little over forty-two, and the third averages just twenty-five. The fourth pentad, by far the most relevant to this project, fares a little

² Concerning the date of Polybius’ birth, see Walbank, (1933), 9, n. 3.
better – at first sight, that is, with an average of some thirty-five chapters per book. Unfortunately, books 17 and 19 have been lost in entirety, and doubtlessly along with them a wealth of detailed information material directly relevant to the most significant years of Flamininus’ brilliant career. Book 17 would most probably have covered the period from the Roman declaration of war on Macedon in early 200, down to the prelude of the peace conference at Nicaea at the end of 198. It is equally reasonable to assume that it would have included Polybius’ version of Flamininus’ highly controversial consular campaign, which would have furnished a valuable insight into how Livy and, particularly, Plutarch, have manipulated this material. However, we must at least be thankful for the survival of book 18, providing as it does Polybius’ version of Flamininus’ military campaign, his victory over Philip at Cynoscephalae and the final details of the peace settlement ratified by the ten Roman commissioners after Flamininus’ spectacular declaration of Greek liberty at the Isthmian Games in the spring of 196. Presumably, book 19 dealt with Flamininus’ campaign against Nabis, so pointedly ignored by Plutarch, and the emerging threat of Antiochus. Whatever, from 196 onwards the only continuous, detailed historical narrative is that of Livy, and, wherever Polybius is extant otherwise, little of the information he provides is directly relevant to Flamininus. The same applies for the period following the Roman victories over Philip and Antiochus.

By the time of the defeat of Perseus at Pydna in 168/7, Polybius, now in his mid-thirties, was no longer dependant on the memories of his seniors for information. Moreover, his already useful fund of knowledge was vastly superseded by that he acquired later when, as one of a thousand members of the Achaean League answering for their dubious political activity in the afore-mentioned war, he was deported to Rome. As the protégé of L. Aemilius Paullus, the victor at Pydna, and, eventually, the personal tutor of Scipio Aemilianus, he undoubtedly accumulated during the course of his everyday life a detailed knowledge of recent Roman history an current Roman foreign policy, along with a progressively deep insight into Roman psychology. This, along with (presumably) unlimited access to research material, provided the ideal base for his work. Unfortunately, Polybius’ sixth pentad, averaging no more than twenty-one chapters per book, contains relatively little information about the leading role played by Lucius Aemilius Paullus in the Third Macedonian War. For example, although Polybius’ account of Cynoscephalae is fairly comprehensive, only five, scrappy, disconnected fragments remain of his account of Pydna, compared with six and a half chapters of Livy. Details of Paullus’ diplomatic activity are equally lacking, with nothing to correspond to Flamininus’ constant manipulation of various councils and peace

---
3 Polybius, 18, 20, 2 – 27, 7.
4 Polybius, 29, 17, 1 - 4 and 18, 1.
5 Livy, XLIV, 37, 10 – 44, 3.
conferences. Equally regrettable is the loss of information about the elder Cato, but most regrettable of all is the lost opportunity of being able to study in depth how Plutarch has handled this material.

Livy

Information concerning the life of Titus Livius (Livy, 59 B.C. - A.D. 17) is scarce. He was born in Patavium (modern Padua), where he spent the early part of his life and fathered at least two children, a daughter, who married a rhetorician, Magius, and a son, who may have had literary aspirations. A reference in Quintilian suggests that Livy himself wrote philosophical dialogues, and his advice in a letter to his son, in which he strongly recommends Cicero and Demosthenes as ideal stylistic models, provides a clear example of his literary heritage. In Rome he gave readings of his work to the Imperial literary circle, where Augustus called him, albeit jocularly, "Pompeian" on account of his republican sentiments. Livy also encouraged the future emperor Claudius in his historical studies. According to Pliny the Younger, Livy was held in such esteem by his contemporaries that someone made the journey to Rome all the way from Cadiz just to see him, and, having done so, immediately went back. Fictitious or otherwise, this anecdote undoubtedly makes its point, with the added implication that, even for a remote provincial, the mighty capital contained nothing else so wonderful.

Livy began his historical masterpiece (ab Urbe Condita Libri) in his early thirties and continued working on it for the next forty years. It recounts the history of Rome from the foundation of the city (whence the title) to the death of Drusus (A.D.9). This truly monumental work consisted originally of one hundred and forty-two books, of which only thirty-five are extant, namely, i-x and xxii-xliv. For the lost books we have the Periochae, (except for cxxxvi-cxxxvii), summaries of long, usually chronological, works, applicable in particular to the abridgement of Livy. There are also eighty-five fragments, the most substantial being a palimpsest of book xci and an epitome of books xxxvii-xl and xlviii-lv discovered at Oxyrhyncus. Of the surviving text the first decade (i-x) concludes with what was effectively the final subjugation of the Samnites after Roman

---

6 Sen., Contr., 10, Praef., 2
7 Quint., Inst. Or., 10, I, 39: 'ut quisque esset Demostheni et Ciceroni simillimus' Quintilian later credits Livy with 'eloquence beyond description' in his speeches, Ibid., 10, I, 101: 'cum in narrando mirae iucunditatis clarissimique candoris, tum in contionibus supra quam enarrari potest eloquentem, ---'
8 Tacitus, Annals, IV xxxiv, 15: 'neque id amicitiae eorum offecit.'
9 Suet. Claud., 41
10 Pliny, Epist. II, III, 8
capture of Velia, Palumbinum, Herculaneum, and Saepinum (293 B.C.).\textsuperscript{12} The lost second decade (xi-xx) dealt with the years 294-219, comprising, among other things, the invasion of Pyrrhus and the First Punic War. The third decade (xxi-xxx) covers the period from 219 to 201 and deals comprehensively with the Second Punic War. The fourth decade, the most relevant to this project, and the remaining half of the fifth (xxxi-xlv) deal primarily with the Macedonian and Syrian Wars, book xliv concluding with Prusias II congratulating the senate on the Roman victory at Pydna.\textsuperscript{13}

In the Preface, when stating his purpose, Livy’s personal modesty and the respect he pays to previous historians are in sharp contrast to the undisguised patriotic pride he displays in describing his own nation:

\begin{quote}
\textit{utcumque erit, iuvabit tamen rerum gestarum memoriae principis terrarum populi pro virili parte et ipsum consiluisse.}\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Whatever the case, I too shall find satisfaction in having played my part, to the best of my ability, in giving due consideration to a historical account of the deeds of the greatest people in the world.

His exhilaration is short-lived, however, as he goes on to contrast the virtuous mode of life of the founders of Rome with the moral decrepitude of their descendents. His belief that the importance of history was its applicability to contemporary life is illustrated by his claim that the study of the past provides an infinite variety of examples of what to imitate and what to avoid,\textsuperscript{15} and throughout his work he dwells at length on the social morale of the early Romans, the resolution displayed against Hannibal, and the contrast between republican freedom and Hellenic monarchism. His general purpose, therefore, is clearly an ethical one.

It is fallacious readily to castigate ancient historians for their frequent inaccuracies, of which Livy is guilty on numerous accounts. Sometimes there are mitigating circumstances. For example, among the few details we have of his personal life there is nothing to suggest that he ever held any public office, which probably explains his limited knowledge of Roman institutions. A similar lack of experience in military matters often leads to mistakes in translation.\textsuperscript{16} Less excusable, however, is his

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Livy, X, 45, 9-14
\item \textsuperscript{13} Livy, XLV, 44, 4-21
\item \textsuperscript{14} Livy, \textit{Praef.}, 3
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 11-14
\item \textsuperscript{16} For one of Livy’s most famous howlers, see XXXIII, 8, 13, where he misunderstands Polybius’ terminology \textit{katafiloítei tás saíras}, i.e., the Macedonian phalanx ‘lowering their pikes’ before attacking. Livy has them ‘lay aside their pikes’, then compounds his error in offering his readers some explanation of his own
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
indiscriminate and inconsistent use of source material, making free use of Valerius Antias throughout the first decade, for example, yet having no qualms about criticizing his exaggeration and unabashed mendacity later on. For these reasons alone it would easy to make out a damaging case against Livy if one were to equate his objectives with those of modern historians, for whom accuracy is primordial. The ancients had a very different sense of priorities. Whereas general conformity to facts, presented within an organised structure, was undoubtedly necessary, the prime objectives of ancient historiography were literary and idealistic rather than scientific. It was thus that Livy sought to provide Rome with a prose epic, a counterpart to Virgil’s Aeneid, worthy of her rise from humble origins to imperial greatness, followed by a period of moral decline, from which a recovery was taking place, thanks to the policies and munificence of Augustus.

Given the prominent role that Flamininus was destined to play in Roman politics after the Hannibalic war, Livy is puzzlingly silent on his early career, with but few references towards the end of the third decade. It is only at the beginning of Book XXXII, in Livy’s account of Flamininus’ highly controversial (and successful) candidature for the consulship of 198 that, appearing almost out of nowhere, he becomes pre-eminent. Thereafter Livy provides a detailed account of Flamininus’ military and diplomatic activity, (particularly the latter), throughout the remainder of Book XXXII and then from Books XXXIII-XXX, following which he disappears with the same alacrity with which he had arrived. The final mention of Flamininus, in the form of an incidental reference to his death in 174, is at the end of a decidedly truncated and scrappy Book XLII.

devising over why the Macedonians had abandoned their normal weaponry: et [sc. Philippus] Macedonum phalanget hastis positis, quorum longitudo impedimento erat, gladiis rem gerere iubet.

17 Cf. E.T. Sage, Loeb edition (1961), xiv: ‘I share with most scholars, I think, the belief that Livy is greater as a literary artist than as a historian.’

18 See Cary, (1954), 141: “For the years 220-167 we also possess an unbroken account from Livy (books XXI-XXXIV). In these books Livy fulfilled most successfully what he regarded as his chief task, which was not so much to construct a minutely exact record of the march of past events as to provide living and inspiring exemplars of Roman courage, constancy and fair dealing. It is through Livy’s work that the heroic age of Roman history may best be appreciated.” For an exhaustive study, see Walsh, (1962).

19 E.g., Livy, XXIX, 13, 6, prorogation of his imperium pro praetore at Tarentum. For an admirably detailed study of this, see Badian, 61 (1971), 102-111.

20 Livy, XXXII, 7, 8-13

21 Livy, XXI, 27, 11.
Appian

AfterPolybius and Livy the next historian in order of importance is Appian of Alexandria (c. A.D. 95 – 165), about whom the few surviving pieces of information occur in certain letters of his friend M. Cornelius Fronto, the tutor of Marcus Aurelius, and in Appian’s own historical work, the ‘Ῥωμαϊκά, in the preface of which he says that he held the highest office in his native country. He then mentions a separate account (συγγραφή), frustratingly lost, from which those wishing to know more about him could obtain additional information (τὰ λοιπὰ). He gained Roman citizenship and moved to Rome as a “pleader of causes,” (probably advocatus fisci). With the help of Fronto, he was appointed procurator, which means that at some time he must have acquired at least equestrian rank. It was at this point, during his latter years in the principate of Antoninus Pius (A.D. 138-161), that Appian wrote the ‘Ῥωμαϊκά. The author methodically describes the purpose of his work, which consisted of twenty-four books. In structure it was ethnographical, not chronological, describing in separate parts the Roman conquests of other nations and the Roman civil wars. Of the original twenty-four books vi, vii and xi-xvii have survived in entirety; i-v, viii-ix and xxiv are fragmentary; x and xviii-xxiii have been lost. Fortunately, a considerable proportion of the extant material is relevant to this project:

v) Ἐκ τῆς Σικελικῆς καὶ Νησιωτικῆς - (fragments) concerning Sicily and other islands
vi) Ἰβηρικῆ - Spain
vii) Ἀννίβαϊκη - Hannibal
viii) ΛιμυκῆΚαρχηδονιακή : Ἐκ τῆς Νομαδικῆς - Libya/Carthage : (fragments) concerning Numidia
ix) Ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς : Ἰλλυρικῆ - (fragments) concerning Macedonia : Illyria
x) Συριακῆ : Syria

The identification of Appian’s sources has been an ongoing field of study for more than a century. He mentions specifically Polybius, Hieronymus, Augustus (memoirs), Asinius Pollio, Varro, Fabius Pictor and Cassius Hemina. Although Appian makes no

---

22 Praefatio, 1, 15: ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ἥκων ἐν τῇ πατρίδι.
23 Praefatio, 1, 14.
24 For a detailed study, see Bucher, (2000), 411-458.
25 This is A.H. McDonald’s classification, OCD, 1970, 87. (The most recent edition of the OCD (1996) provides no classification of Appian’s works.)
specific mention of Livy, Sallust and Posidonius, McDonald detects the influence of these authors in the literary tradition of which he was a part (loc.cit.). He proposes, however, that Appian was primarily indebted to the “literary composition of an imperial annalist, writing under Augustus or Tiberius, whom Appian adapted to his ethnographic form.”

Although the rhetorical tradition initiated by Thucydides is clearly present in Appian’s work, his narrative is otherwise written in the plain κοίνή, direct, unpretentious, and a pleasure to read. Rarely reflexive, he is interested primarily in events, especially wars, though, even here, he has often been criticised for his inaccuracies. In any event, given the paucity of material that has survived from antiquity, he constitutes an invaluable source of information, sometimes providing useful additional information and, more significantly, variations from the mainline accounts of Polybius and Livy.

1.1.2 The Minor Sources

Diodorus Siculus (Διόδορος Σικελιώτης) of Agyrium (central Sicily) was a Greek historian who wrote during the time of Caesar and Augustus. His work, entitled Βιβλίον θηκη, was a world history from the earliest times. It consisted originally of forty books, of which i-v and xi-xx are fully preserved and the remainder fragmentary. Books xvii-xl deal with events from the Diadochoi down to Caesar’s Gallic War (54 B.C.). Material relevant to this project occurs only sporadically in the later fragmentary books. Although it provides nothing radically different from the mainstream sources, there are a few pieces of information unattested elsewhere, e.g. Nabis’ assassination of the boy king Pelops.

Pausanias, probably a native of Lydia, was a Greek traveller and geographer, who lived during the times of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. (i.e., A.D. 117-180). His work was entitled The Description of Greece, (Περιήγησις τῆς Ἑλλάδος). He was certainly familiar with the west coast of Asia Minor, yet travelled much farther afield to mainland Greece, Rome, other parts of Italy, and to Palestine and Egypt. His work consisted of ten books, of which four chapters of the eighth, the Ἀρκαδίκα, provide limited, yet extremely valuable, information for this project. Although Pausanias was no historian, concentrating rather on natural phenomena, religious festivals and historical remains, he usually sketched the history and topography of whichever region he intended to describe. In the case of the Ἀρκαδίκα, he felt it necessary to insert a

---

26 Presentation: Greek sources followed by Latin, in chronological order respectively.
27 Diodorus, 27, 1.
separate section on Philopoemen, in itself testimony to his enduring political and historical impact and the reverence in which he was held by future generations. Pausanias’ text on Philopoemen is only a few hundred words in length and, from a historical perspective, provides nothing radically different from the extensive accounts of the historians proper. In terms of biographical material, however, it does contain some interesting variants from Plutarch concerning Philopoemen’s character and facial appearance.

Dio Cassius (ca. A.D.155 - after 229), son of Cassius Apronianus, governor of Cilicia and Dalamatia, was born and educated in Nicaea (Bithynia). He entered the senate during the principate of Commodus (180-92) and became praetor in 193, consul suffectus sometime before 211, and consul again, with Alexander Aurelius Severus, in 229. He wrote a Roman history in Greek, from the arrival of Aeneas in Italy down to 229. This work, comprising eighty books, took ten years to prepare and twelve to write. Books 36-54 (68-10 B.C.) are intact, 55-60 (9 B.C.-A.D. 46) are in abbreviated form, and books 17, 79 and 80 are fragmentary. From book 36 onwards, excluding Antoninus Pius (138-61) and the early years of Marcus Aurelius (161-80), there are epitomes by Joannes Xiphilinus, a monk who lived in Constantinople during the second half of the eleventh century. For the rest, we are dependant on Joannes Zonaras, a Byzantine chronicler and theologian from the twelfth century, who also lived in Constantinople. In books 7-11 of his Έπιτομὴ Ἰστοριῶν Zonaras gives the tradition of books 1-21 and 44-80, following Xiphilinus from the time of Trajan (98-117).28 The narrative appears to be based on Polybius, an early annalistic tradition, Livy, (albeit from 68-30 B.C.), and an Imperial annalistic tradition. His style is rhetorical, following the tradition of Thucydides. The material relevant to this project is scarce, but, as with Appian and Pausanias, he occasionally provides information otherwise lacking in the major sources.

Marcus Porcius Cato Censorius (Cato Maior/Cato the Elder, 234-149 B.C.) is clearly more renowned for his political and military activity than for any contribution to literature. However, among his works was an encyclopaedia for his eldest son, which included passages on medicine, rhetoric, jurisprudence, military science and agriculture, on which he wrote more extensively in a separate work entitled De Agri Cultura. Other works included letters to his son, a Carmen de Moribus, and the Origines, in seven books, spanning the period from the foundation of Rome to the Third Punic War. He also published his speeches, of which Cicero knew more than one hundred and fifty and of which some eighty fragments have survived. By pure good fortune, these include the

28 This also is McDonald’s classification, OCD, (1970), 282.
arraignment and expulsion from the Senate by Cato of Lucius Quinctius Flamininus in 184. Moreover, this fragment is of sufficient length to allow a viable and informative comparison of Livy’s version of this event with two versions by Plutarch, in the Lives of Titus Quinctius Flamininus and of Cato Maior respectively. In view of this bitter enmity between Cato and the Flaminini, it is a safe assumption that any material relative to the brothers, especially Titus, in Cato’s non-extant historical work would have been far from complimentary.

Valerius Antias wrote a history of Rome in the annalistic tradition during the time of Sulla (138–78 B.C.). This work consisted of at least seventy-five books, from the origins of the city down to Valerius’ own times. Livy used him extensively, though both roundly criticizing his credulity and completely flabbergasted at his lies. Other transgressions include elaborating battle-scenes, wildly exaggerating casualty figures, excess rhetoric in his reports of speeches and debates, and overstating the importance of his own gens Valeria. From a literary perspective McDonald admires his style, but his merit as a historian is flatly dismissed by Badian.

Cornelius Nepos (c. 100–25 B.C.), whose prae nomen is unknown, was born probably in Ticinum in Insubrian Gaul. He was a friend of Catullus, who dedicated a book of his poems to him (I, 3), of Cicero, and of Cicero’s great friend and famous correspondent, Atticus. His lost works included the Chronica, a universal history, the Exempla, accounts of great events in Roman history, a geographical treatise, known to Pliny the Elder, and erotic poems, referred to by Pliny the younger. His only extant (and last) work, De Viris Illustribus, consists of twenty-five short biographies, from an otherwise lost and larger work, which consisted originally of at least sixteen books. The surviving evidence suggests that this dealt with eminent figures, including, for example, kings, poets, philosophers, historians and generals, divided into two sections, dealing with Romans and non-Romans respectively, which makes Nepos the first ancient exponent of comparative biography. Of his extant work the first twenty-three lives are classified as De Excellentibus Ducibus Exterarum Gentium, and the final two as Excerptum e Libro de Latinis

29 Fragm. XI
30 XXXIX, 43, 1, on Valerius’ version of the murder committed by Lucius Quinctius Flamininus when serving as consul in Gaul in 192: ‘Valerius Antias, ut qui nec orationem Catonis legisset et fabulae tantum sine auctore editae credidisset, aliud argumentum --- scribit.’
31 XXVI, 49, 3, referring to Valerius’ statistics for the number of scorpions lost by the Carthaginians, ‘adeo nullus mentiendi modus est.’ Silenus mentions a mere sixty, both large and small; Valerius expands this to six thousand large and thirteen thousand small.
32 OCD, (1970), 935
33 Badian in Dorey, (1966), 21: “Valerius Antias, among those whom we can judge, marks the nadir of historiography.”
Historicus. Nepos is clearly explicit in stating his objective as biographical and gives relatively little attention to the historical background, concerning which he has been roundly criticized for frequent omissions and inaccuracies. Relevant to this project are the Lives of Cato Maior and Hannibal, the second of which contains a few intriguing variants from the mainstream accounts of his death. Nepos’ Latin is unadorned and simple, so much so that he has suffered the indignity, along with Caesar, of being singled out as an ideal choice for exercises in unseen translation. In spite of the many in inaccuracies, Nepos’ work is significant in the history of ancient biography, the survival rate of which, in comparison with other prose genres, such as historiography and oratory, is small.

Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus, of the Celtic tribe the Vocontii in Gallia Narbonensis, lived during the time of Augustus (63 B.C.- A.D. 13). His principal work was Historiae Philippicae in forty-four books, presumably so called because the Macedonian empire founded by Philip II is the central theme of the narrative. The original work is lost, but there is an epitomized version by Marcus Iunian(i)us Justinus, (Justin, probably third century A.D). In the preface Justin refers to the voluminous nature of Trogus’ work, (nam totidem [sc. volumina] edidit), and says that he has extracted ‘whatever is most worthy of being known’ to the exclusion of ‘such material neither attractive for the pleasure of enquiry nor necessary by way of example.’ Nothing is known about his personal history. In its original form Trogus’ work undoubtedly contained a good deal of valuable information, especially about the history of the Hellenistic kingdoms from the time of Alexander until their eventual conquest by the Romans. Books 29-34 are certainly the most relevant to this project:

29) The First Macedonian War.
30) The weak rule of Ptolemy IV in Egypt; the Second Macedonian War.
31) The Roman defeat of Antiochus III, king of Syria, and Nabis, tyrant of Sparta.
32) The deaths of Philopoemen, Antiochus, Demetrius, Philippus and Hannibal.
33) The Third Macedonian War and annexation of Macedonia.
34) The Achaean War and the expulsion of Antiochus IV from Egypt.

In Justinus’ severely truncated version, however, references are but transitory, mere iterations of basic facts and devoid of any informative amplification or comment, e.g., book XXXI: the wars which Flamininus and Philopoemen fought against Nabis, the war

---

34 He is clearly explicit in stating this objective: Nepos, Pelop., 1, 1: vereor, si res explicare incipiam, ne non vitam eius enarrare sed historiam videar scribere.
35 Praef., iv: cognitione quaeque dignissima excerpti, et omissis his quae nec cognoscendi voluptate iucunda nec exemplo erant necessaria, ---.
in Greece against Antiochus under Manius Acilius Glabrio and in Asia under the Scipios, Hannibal's eventual flight to Antiochus from Carthage, and Glabrio's campaign against the Aetolians. Book XXXII comprises with equal brevity the defection of the Spartans and the Messenians from the Achaean League, when Philopoemen lost his life, the Roman war in Asia against the Gauls, the defeat of Philip by Flamininus at Cynoscephalae, Philip's resentment towards the Romans because of the cities taken from him, the execution of Philip's younger son, Demetrius, Hannibal's exploits after the death of Antiochus and the death of Hannibal himself.

Valerius Maximus lived during the principate of Tiberius (A.D. 14-37). Little is known about his personal history except that he was from a poor family and that he enjoyed the patronage of Sextus Pompeius (cos. A.D. 14), whom he accompanied during his governorship of Asia in 27. After his return he composed a collection of anecdotes for rhetoricians, Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, in nine books dedicated to Tiberius. In the preface he says that his intention is to provide a synopsis of the memorable deeds and sayings from the history of Rome and foreign (mainly Greek) nations. This, he continues, will obviate the necessity of a long search for those seeking to make use of suitable examples (documenta sumere --- volentibus). This is the closest he gets to any clearly defined plan, since the subject-matter of the nine books, widely diverse in content, is arbitrarily presented under various headings. These range widely from religious topics, social customs, personal conduct, (both virtuous and evil), eloquence, famous lawsuits, and military tactics. Valerius' main sources are Cicero, Livy, Sallust, Trogus, and probably Varro, though there are also indications of the earlier Latin historians, especially Coelius Antipater. With the exception of a few tidy passages of narrative or dialogue, the work is shallow, fraught with rhetorical aphorisms and sensationalistic. Given its objective and arbitrary arrangement, the relevance of Valerius' work to this project is purely coincidental. However, even from a historiographical perspective, it does provide some interesting variants, and a detailed comparison between a passage of Valerius and its corresponding version in, for example, Cicero or Livy, is well worthwhile.

Silius Italicus (A.D. 25/6 – 101) wrote the Punica, a poem consisting of more than twelve thousand verses, on the Second Punic War. Coincidental material is rare, e.g., Hannibal's flight from Carthage in 195, and his suicide in 183.

---

36 E.g., 2, 9, 3, Cato's expulsion of Lucius Quinctius Flamininus from the Senate in 184.
37 13, 878-93. For Hannibal's suicide, see also Juvenal., 10, 163-66.
Sextus Julius Frontinus (ca. A.D. 40-103) was a man of many talents - soldier, politician, engineer and author. *Praetor urbanus* in 70, and *consul suffectus* in 73, he was then appointed governor of Britain (probably 74-78), where he subdued the Silures and other hostile tribes of Wales. He was succeeded as governor by Gnaeus Julius Agricola. After his return to Rome little is known about the next twenty years of his life. He was appointed *curator aquarum* by Nerva in 97, was consul for the second time in 98 and for the third in 100. Of his works, a theoretical treatise on Greek and Roman military science (*De Re Militari*) has been lost. Those works which have survived fall into three categories: 1) *De Aquis Urbis Romae*, in two books, 2) *Opuscula Rerum Rusticarum*, in four sections, and, 3) the only work relevant to this project, *Strategemata*, in four books, a compendium of historical examples illustrating an extensive variety of strategies for military commanders. References are purely coincidental, just a few short passages providing no additional, useful information, e.g., Philip’s ruse to avoid being captured after his defeat in Epirus in 198, and Hannibal seeking refuge with Antiochus in 193.  

Florus, whose *praenomen* and *nomen* are uncertain, was a historian who lived during the time of Trajan (A.D. 53-117) and Hadrian (A.D. 76-138). He compiled a summary of the history of Rome from the foundation of the city to the ceremonial closing of the temple of Janus Geminus by Augustus in 25 B.C. This work, in two books, is entitled *Epitome de Tito Livio Bellorum Omnium Annorum DCC.* Highly rhetorical in style it is a panegyric, not a history, of Rome, in which the author seeks to put the best possible interpretation on significant events in Roman history, including even defeats and disasters of the magnitude of the Caudine Forks and Cannae. By contrast, remarks such as ‘quis crederet?’ or ‘mirum et incredibile dictu’, (possible reminiscences of Virgil and Lucan), are appended to examples of Roman valour. As well as Livy, Florus used Sallust, Caesar and the elder Seneca. The first of the two books traces the rise of Roman military power and the second its decline. In spite of its bombastic style and frequent errors concerning geographical and chronological details, the work still has some value, if only because it provides an insight into the lost portions of Livy. Relevant to this project are chapters 22-25 and 27-32 of the first book, which begin with the Second Punic War and comprise the first, second and third Macedonian Wars, the subjugation of the Aetolians, the war against Antiochus, the Third Punic War and the Achaean War. Although these chapters...

---

38 2, 13, 8 and 1, 8, 7 respectively.
39 Livy, 1, 19, 3; Suet., Aug., 22.
40 1, 11, 9-11
41 1, 22, 15-20, beginning with the observation, ‘ibi in exitium infelicis exercitus dux, terra, caelum, dies, tota rerum natura consensit.’
are at best cursory, little more than basic sketches, and significant material is rare. Florus does occasionally provide intriguing introspection, e.g. Philip’s lack of confidence as a result of his expulsion from Epirus in 198, which accounted in part for his defeat at Cynoscephalae the following year.⁴²

**Eutropius** was a historian who served under Julian the Apostate (A.D. 331-63) and accompanied him on his Persian campaign. He had previously been secretary (ἐπιστολογράφος) to Constantine the Great, and was still alive during the time of Valentinian (d. 375) and Valens (d. 378), to whom he dedicates his work, *Breviarium ab Urbe Condita*, a survey of Roman history in ten books. It begins with Romulus and covers the intervening years until the death of Jovian (A.D. 364). Book III deals with the Second Punic War, and book IV the Roman wars in Spain, Africa and the east. The work is well arranged, but, as its title suggests, succinct. It provides an interesting and fluent narrative, though little in the way of introspection or commentary.

**Sextus Aurelius Victor** was governor of Pannonia Secunda in A.D. 361 and praefectus urbi in 388/9. Four different works are attributed to him, but the only authentic one is the *Caesares*, dealing with the period from Augustus to Constantius (360/1). For this reason the other three works are traditionally classified as “Pseudo” Aurelius Victor. Any material relative to this project is purely coincidental and, on account of its paucity, provides effectively no additional information, e.g., Antiochus’ invasion of Europe and his two successive defeats at Thermopylae and Magnesia, all summarily dealt with in little more than one hundred words.⁴³

**Paulus Orosius** (c. A.D. 385-420) was a historian and theologian from Hispania Tarraconensis. He fled from the invasion of the Vandals to Africa, where he became a pupil of Augustine (A.D. 354-430). He is best known for his *Historiarum adversum Paganos Libri VII*, written to refute the general belief that the fall of Rome to Alaric in 410 had been due to the influence of Christianity. The work is interesting in that Orosius’ sources include a (non-extant) epitome of Livy and Tacitus’ *Histories*, along with Polybius, Antias and Claudius. Orosius’ work is succinct, providing historically little more than a basic narrative. However, he does digress regularly to comment upon such things, for example, as casualty figures and the origins of the Third Punic War.⁴⁴ He also provides an interesting variant on the circumstances of the death of Demetrius, son of

---

⁴² 1, 23, 10.
⁴³ 54, 1. Similarly, 54, 4, the death of Antiochus; 47, 17, the prosecution of Scipio Africanus; 42, 5-6, the death of Hannibal.
⁴⁴ 4, 20, 6 and 4, 23, 8-9.
1.2  A Reconstruction of Flamininus’ Eastern Career from the above Literary Sources

The episodes selected for examination and comment in this chapter contain the greater part of that information relevant to Flamininus’ military and political activity during his two terms of duty in Greece and the intervening period in Rome. For this reason, most of these episodes have long since been the subject of intense scrutiny by previous scholars; for example, the peace conference at Tempe (197), the Isthmian declaration (196), Flamininus’ management of the Syrian embassy to Rome (193) and, most particularly, the peace conference at Nicaea in Locris (198). Certain other episodes, however, merit closer examination, by far the best case in point being Flamininus’ involvement in the assassination of the Boeotian Brachylles. Throughout, I have attempted to assess the evolving state of mind of the young Flamininus, as yet inexperienced both as soldier and politician, as he progresses through the various stages of his first major campaign in what on occasion proved to be the most testing of circumstances. For this reason the material in this chapter is presented in chronological order.

1.2.1  Flamininus’ Arrival in Greece and his first Encounter with Philip

Livy recounts how Flamininus, having assumed his consular duties after his somewhat controversial election, is frustrated in his eagerness to leave for Macedonia (properantem in provinciam) by reports of prodigies and the need to remain in Rome until they are expurgated. Meanwhile, no progress had been made in the war. In fact, to make matters worse, Flamininus’ predecessor, P. Villius, had been confronted on his arrival in

---

45 4, 20, 28.
46 Livy, XXXII, 9, 1-2
Macedonia the previous year by a serious mutiny among the troops. This situation had to be addressed immediately, and Flamininus’ sense of urgency and enthusiasm for the task in hand are amplified by the speed with which he finally leaves Italy and reaches the Roman headquarters, where he encamped in full sight of the enemy. The previous winter Philip had taken up an impregnable position in the narrows of the Aous, (Aoi Stena), effectively blocking the best route into Macedonia and central Greece. In spite of the hazardous nature of the terrain, the Romans decided to attack. Totally perplexed about just how to achieve this, however, they remained inactive for forty days. In view of Flamininus’ anxiety to get on with the campaign, this stalemate must have tested his patience to the limit. Thus the picture begins to emerge of a shrewd commander, enthusiastic to the point of being zealous, yet not to the point of being foolhardy.

The Romans’ failure to launch an attack led Philip to hope that he might reach a peaceful settlement through the mediation of the Epirotes, who duly arranged a conference between the king and the consul at a point where the Aous ran at its narrowest. This raises the question of why Philip should have been so anxious for peace. It may well be that he was anxious to attend to business elsewhere in his kingdom, or simply that he was weary of a situation which had already been dragging on for two years. An added incentive, however, might well have been that the sight of Flamininus’ camp on a daily basis for nearly six weeks on end was a constant reminder of Galba’s camp near Athacus in Lyncestis, of which Philip had so spontaneously and unreservedly admired the orderly layout only the previous year. Philip had been seriously traumatised by the ensuing bouts of skirmishing with Galba and would have been anxious to avoid any repetition:

Ipsum quoque regem terror cepit nondum iusto proelio cum Romanis congressum.

The king also, who had not yet confronted the Romans in a real pitched battle, was struck with fear.

Philip had subsequently fled ignominiously under cover of darkness after requesting a truce from the Romans for the specious purpose of burying his dead. It is a fair assumption that news of this incident had been reported in detail by Galba to his

---

47 Livy, XXII, 3, 1-7.
48 Livy, XXXII, 9, 6-7.
49 Livy, XXXII, 9, 11: Utcumque esset igitur, illo ipso tam iniquo loco adgredi hostem placuit. Sed magis fieri id placebat quam quomodo fieret satis expediebant.
50 Livy, XXXI, 34, 5
51 Livy, XXXI, 38, 9-10, Dio Cass., fr. 58, 1-3.
successor Villius when he assumed command, and in turn by Villius to Flamininus upon his arrival at the Roman camp some two months previously. In fact, the news might already have been common knowledge back in Rome even before Flamininus left for his province. This could well explain his hard-nosed, uncompromising attitude when he eventually confronted Philip across the width of the Aous. Animosity erupted almost immediately as a result of Philip’s prevarication and Flamininus’ response, in which he personally launched a verbal attack on the king. Flamininus’ next pronouncement effectively brought the conference to a riotous conclusion before it had really got going:

Inde cum ageretur quae civitates liberandae essent, Thessalos primos omnium nominavit consul.

Next, when it came to discussing which communities should be liberated, the consul named the Thessalians before all others.

Due to its strategic and economic importance, Thessaly, which had been under Macedonian control for some hundred and fifty years, was arguably Philip’s most treasured foreign possession. By insisting, therefore, that this should be the very first territory from which he withdrew, Flamininus leaves him in no doubt that the Romans were unwilling to accept any sort of compromise, in spite of the fact that Philip was clearly willing to negotiate. According to Diodorus, Flamininus was acting under a senatorial directive, although this in itself is unclear from Livy’s phraseology, (summa postularum consulis erat ). Whatever, it was supposedly up to Flamininus himself to present the Roman conditions for peace however he deemed fit and, in view of what emerges later about him, one should at least consider the possibility of this being the first recorded example of the devilishly mischievous side of his character, whereby, if only psychologically, he had landed the first blow on Philip. Unfortunately, there is nothing on record about his demeanour, be it, for example, deliberately provocative, studiously arrogant, or downright patronizing. Should this be the case, however, he would have been overjoyed at Philip’s explosive reaction:

---

52 Livy, XXXII, 9, 8.
53 Livy, XXXIII, 10, 7.
54 Livy, XXXII, 10, 1 and 4-5.
55 Diodorus, 28,11,1: καὶ διότι παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἑντολὰς ἔχοι ταύτας ὅπως μὴ μέρος τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄλλα ποιοῦν αὐτῶν ἐλευθεροῦν.
56 Livy, XXXII, 10, 3.
57 See Walbank, (1940), 151: “Flamininus’ proposals, however, showed up the conference as being, from his point of view, merely a clever manoeuvre.”
Ad id vero adeo accensus indignatione est rex ut exclamaret, 'quid victo gravius imperares, T. Quincti?' atque ita se ex conloquio proripuit; et temperatum aegre est, quin missilibus, quia dirempti medio amni fuerant, pugnam inter se consererent.  

At this the king was so incensed with rage that he exclaimed, “What harsher conditions could you impose, Titus Quinctius, on someone who had already been defeated?” and so rushed from the conference, and it was only with difficulty, separated as they were in Thessaly than the width of the torrent, that they were prevented from fighting with missiles.

Whatever else, therefore, Flamininus had learned about Philip during this first encounter, he was now at least fully aware of his extreme irascibility and his tendency readily to resort to violence whenever confronted by a situation which did not suit him.

1.2.2 The Romans invade Thessaly

After the eventual expulsion of Philip from his stronghold, a feat which neither of Flamininus’ two predecessors had managed to achieve, the next event of any significance is the peace conference at Nicaea. However, some of the intervening activity also deserves attention. Militarily the overall situation quickly becomes very confused, with first the Aetolians and then the Athamanians keen to take advantage of Philip’s difficulties and plundering at will, notably in Thessaly.  

This only serves to increase the pressure on Flamininus, however, since amidst all this confusion he somehow has to convince both the various non-allied states, along with those states currently under Macedonian domination, of the value and the integrity of the Roman cause. This he achieves by treating the neutral territories through which he passes with respect and by abstaining from plundering. However good for public relations, this policy leaves him short of supplies, a problem further compounded by Philip’s scorched-earth policy as he retreated eastwards before the Romans. This resultant problem is solved through close cooperation with his brother Lucius, who had received a commission as chief commander of the fleet in the same year that Titus was elected consul. Thus it is reasonable to assume that Flamininus deserves credit for anticipating

---

58 Livy, XXXII, 10, 7-8.  
59 Livy, XXXII, 14, 4: Dum Athamanes Aetolique submoto Macedonum metu in aliena victoria suam praedam faciunt Thessaliaque ab tribus simul exercitibus incerta quem hostem quemve socium crederet vastatur, ---.  
60 Livy, XXXII, 15, 5.  
61 Livy, XXXII, 16, 1.
this problem well in advance, since the supplies were available immediately and in abundance.  

The first city Flamininus attacked in Thessaly was Phaloria. A defeat of its garrison of two thousand Macedonians would be of considerable psychological value in terms of convincing the Thessalians that friendship with Rome was preferable to any sort of alliance with Philip. In this his judgement proved sound since, as soon as the city was taken, Metropolis and Cierium also came over to the Romans.

With the city of Atrax Flamininus was less successful. Meeting stronger resistance than expected and with winter approaching, he was forced to abandon the siege, only too aware of the implications for the remainder of the campaign:

Id consul aegre passus nec eam ignominiam ad unius modo oppugnandae moram urbis sed ad summam uniueri belli pertinere ratus, quod ex momentis parvarum plerumque rerum penderet, --.  

The consul, deeply upset and believing that this dishonourable failure not only prolonged the siege of one solitary city, but also affected the entire campaign, which, in his opinion, depended to a large extent on the influence of minor occurrences, --.  

In fact, this unsuccessful siege of Atrax was the only personal failure of Flamininus during the entire campaign against Philip. With Elatea he fared much better. At first the occupying Macedonian troops provided stiff resistance, but the Romans soon gained possession of the city, which they duly plundered. However, rather than slaughtering or enslaving the inhabitants, Flamininus granted them their freedom, and even allowed the defeated Macedonians to retreat unharmed. The political statement in the first of these actions is obvious, i.e., fostering good public relations with the Greeks. The second is open to speculation. Was Flamininus, through this supposedly magnanimous gesture, seeking to establish some sort of rapport with Philip, should he at some time in the future be obliged to renegotiate for peace? Or had his observations during his earlier confrontation with Philip across the Aous, and during the expulsion of the Macedonians from their stronghold, finally convinced him that he could defeat Philip in a pitched battle? If this was the case, the dismissal of the Macedonian garrison unharmed was a masterly stroke, the ultimate gesture of contempt. In addition, Elatea was a valuable

---

62 Livy, XXXII, 16, 4. tarde inde [sc. a Same in Cephalenia] ad Maleum trahendis plerumque remulco navibus quae cum commeatu sequebantur [sc. Lucius] perverit.
63 Livy, XXXII, 15, 1.
64 Livy, XXXII, 7, 9.
65 Livy, XXXII, 24, 1-7; Pausanias, 10, 34, 3-4.
acquisition strategically speaking, effectively providing control over Phocis and Locris, which also meant control of Thermopylae. It also served as a convenient barrier between Thessaly and the Boeotians, who, even after Philip had been defeated, were to prove a constant thorn in Flamininus’ side.

1.2.3 Flamininus and Philip at Nicaea in Locris

The peace conference at Nicaea on the shore of the Malian Gulf near Thermopylae was held in late 198, and provides both a summary of and a clear insight into the status quo of the political and military situation at the time. The main sources are Polybius and Livy. 56 The prominence of the role played by Flamininus speaks for itself, but equally noteworthy is that he spent considerably more time with Philip in private than with all the other representatives in congress. In Polybius’ account a personal rapport, initiated by Philip’s markedly cavalier manner in open debate, quickly develops between the two men. Undeterred by the serious nature of the business at hand, Philip peppers his dialogue with witticisms ranging in intensity from mild ridicule to brutal sarcasm. For example, when severely castigated by Dionysodorus, the representative of Attalus, for, among other transgressions, his destruction of the temple of Aphrodite and the Nicephorium near Pergamum, he glibly retorts that, although he is unable fully to repair the damage, he would at least send along some gardeners with plants to cultivate the place and compensate for the trees that had been cut down. 67 Next, his sarcasm is directed against Phaeneas, the Aetolian strategos, when he equates his defective eye-sight with his refusal to accept the plausibility of his argument. 68 This was all very much to the undisguised amusement of Flamininus, who, finally, cannot resist competing with Philip. Towards the end of the first day of the conference Philip asked for written statements from all the delegates of the conditions on which peace was to be granted, since, being all alone, he said, he had no-one with whom to confer and wanted time to consider these conditions. Polybius continues:-

66 The minor sources, Appian included, are no more than brief summaries, devoid of any nuance offering the possibility of any elucidation or difference of interpretation of the events narrated by Polybius and Livy.

67 Polybius, 18, 6, 4.

68 Polybius, 18, 4, 4: ‘Τούτο μὲν’ ἔφησεν ὁ Φαίνεα, καὶ τυφλῷ δῆλον".
Now Titus found Philip’s scornful banter amusing, but not wishing the others to think so, he retorted by saying, “Of course you are all on your own now, Philip, because you have killed all of those friends who were wont to give you the best advice.” The king smiled sardonically, but remained silent.

Philip’s reaction is more significant than Flamininus’ original rejoinder. Knowing he has met his match he puts on the best possible face, rather than protesting, and the reader is left with the impression of grudging admiration on his part, rather than frustration or resentment. Whatever, this would have been extremely encouraging to Philip, so very different from his initial encounter with Flamininus across the span of the Aous.

Philip had spent the entire first day of the conference negotiating as best he could from on board his ship, suspicious of most of the assembly, especially the Aetolians, and, given that following his defeat at Cynoscephalae the following year they were to demand not merely his removal, but even his execution, it must be conceded that his fears were far from groundless. Following his tardy arrival on the second day Philip brought his ship closer to shore and, at his suggestion, and with the eventual agreement of the rest of the assembly, Flamininus agreed to meet him in private. As a result, Flamininus, nominally just another member of an alliance to date, was effectively elected as its leader. At Flamininus’ request Philip disembarked and conversed with him for some considerable time, after which, since it was getting late, they agreed to continue negotiations the following day on the beach at Thronium. This time, significantly, all representatives were in attendance, (including the Aetolians, presumably, since neither Polybius nor Livy says anything to the contrary). This in itself illustrates the measure of the authority exerted by Flamininus on the entire assembly,

---

69 Polybius, 18, 7, 5–6.
70 For a list of Philip’s alleged murder victims see Walbank, (1943), 4, n. 3.
71 Holleaux, (1923), 138, overstates the severity of Flamininus’ rejoinder: “il a cinglé le roi d’un mot cuisant.” In fact, Flamininus could not on any account afford give the impression that he was becoming too personally familiar with Philip. Contrast Walbank, (1940), 141: “this sally was designed to cover his good humour to his allies rather than to insult Philip.”
72 Livy, XXXIII, 12, 4.
73 See Wood, (1941), 279: “It is imperative to note ---- that in agreeing to the request of Philip upon this point, apparently a natural step in the course of negotiations, the allied Greeks abandoned the administration of their foreign affairs to Rome - the entering wedge of Roman interference and control”. Similarly, Wood, 70 (1939), 94, n. 6: “In consenting to the request of Philip upon this point, apparently a natural step in the course of the negotiations, the Greek allies resigned to Rome leader-ship and guidance of their affairs.”
74 Polybius, 18, 8, 7: διελέγετο καὶ πλεῖον χρόνον.
and it is reasonable to assume that he had forewarned the Aetolians that it would hardly be in their interests should any unforeseen “accident” befall the king.

Although Philip’s trust in Flamininus to guarantee his personal safety was well founded, diplomatically he was soon to be clinically duped. In granting Philip a two months’ armistice to send ambassadors to Rome,\(^{75}\) rather than agreeing on peace terms immediately, Flamininus bought the Romans valuable time in putting matters on hold in anticipation of the new campaigning season. Whatever else was agreed between Flamininus and Philip in private, or between Philip and all the assembled allies the following day at Thronium, none of the surviving sources mention the matter of Chalcis, Demetrias and Acro-Corinth, the aptly named “Fetters of Greece”, currently garrisoned by Philip, yet this proved eventually to be the stumbling point for his ambassadors when they appeared before the senate. When asked if Philip intended to withdraw from these crucially strategic points, they could only reply, confusedly and in all honesty, that they had no mandate to discuss this particular point. They were summarily dismissed and hostilities were resumed. Walbank\(^{76}\) and Scullard\(^{77}\) are just two of many scholars who argue convincingly that during their private parley Flamininus had probably reassured Philip that he would be allowed to retain control of the fetters, the surrender of which would have seriously impaired his situation in Greece. Whatever, it was too late. Philip had clearly been outmanoeuvred,\(^{78}\) and by the time his ambassadors had been summarily dismissed by the patres, the new campaigning season had almost arrived and the conflict on the battlefield he had been seeking so studiously to avoid had become inevitable.

So much for Flamininus’ political expediency, but the ethical and ideological issues raised as a result of his conduct at Nicaea require careful examination, since Livy’s introductory passage to the conference casts serious doubt on his integrity:

\[
\text{Id [sc. colloquium] gravate regi concessum est, non quin cuperet Quinctius per se partim arms, partim condicionibus confectum videri bellum: necdum enim sciebat utrum successor sibi alter ex novis consulis mitteretur an, quod summa vi ut tenderent amici et propinquis mandaverat, imperium prorogaretur; aptum}
\]

\(^{75}\) Polybius, 18, 10, 4; Livy, XXXII, 36, 8. Holleaux, 36, (1923), 147-149, argues convincingly that Flamininus was the instigator of this decision.

\(^{76}\) Walbank, (1940), 162.

\(^{77}\) Scullard, (1951), 103.

\(^{78}\) Holleaux, 36, (1923), 163: “Aussi Philippe est quinaud. La démarche qu’il a faite à Rome ne lui a rapporté qu’une humiliation. A suivre les avis de Titus, tout ce qu’il a gagné, c’est d’être entièrement dépouillé de la Phocide et de la Lokride. Il a le droit de croire qu’à Nikaia et à Thronion le consul s’est impudemment moqué de lui.”
autem fore conloquium credebat ut sibi liberum esset vel ad bellum manenti vel ad pacem decedenti rem inclinare. 79

It was reluctantly that the king’s request was granted, not because Quinctius did not ardently desire to give the impression that the war had been brought to a close by a combination of military activity and diplomacy by himself, for he did not yet know whether one of the newly elected consuls would be sent to replace him or whether his command would be extended, which he had charged his friends and kinsmen to do their utmost to secure. He believed, however, that a conference, would be expedient in leaving him free to tip the balance in favour of war if he were to remain in command, or of peace if he were relieved of his command.

Scullard raises the issue of whether Flamininus, in reaching a peace settlement with Philip, should his imperium not be prorogued, would have been willing effectively to betray the Greeks for the express purpose of personal glorification. 80 On the same point, Walbank delivers a scathing condemnation: “By his readiness to sacrifice both the promised freedom of the Greeks and the proper interests of Rome to his own insatiable ambition, Flamininus had outwitted Philip,” 81 Badian, by contrast, finds nothing reprehensible in Flamininus’ behaviour. 82 In any case, Greek freedom was one thing, but Roman security was paramount, especially for politicians answerable to a war-weary populace which had refused at the first ballot to sanction the proposed declaration of war against Macedon. 83 This can hardly be counted as an ethical issue for Flamininus, therefore, and the same applies to the Romans’ attitude towards the Greek cities in Asia during the course of his negotiations with the ambassadors of Antiochus five years later. 84

The previously quoted passage from Livy, effectively a preamble to the conference, is lacking from Polybius’ account, which begins only with the arrival of the various

---

79 Livy XXXII, 32, 6-8.
80 Scullard, (1951), 103-104.
81 Walbank, (1940), 162.
82 Badian, (1970), 47: “The fact is that there was nothing shocking, to Romans, in seeing a noble politician work for war or peace in accordance with his personal interests.” To exemplify his point, Badian refers to M. Marcellus as “the man who fought hardest against Titus’ prorogation – simply because he was consul for 196 and wanted to fight Philip.”
83 Livy, XXXI, 6, 3.
84 Badian, (1958), 82: “From what we know of Flamininus – his attitude to the Achaean League, whose expansion he controlled and restricted; his Boeotian intrigues and settlement of constitutions; his tortuous policy towards Nabis; his treatment of the Aetolians; finally, his cynical bargaining with Antiochus – all of this does not add up to the picture of a doctrinaire phil-Hellene.” Gruen, (1984), 268: “Flamininus’ philhellenism never got in the way of official duties.”
delegates, followed immediately by the commencement of activities. In reviewing the conference, however, Polybius makes a comment which gives reason to believe that, if the corresponding passage in his text had survived, it would have given a much clearer insight into Flamininus’ state of mind than that given in Livy’s decidedly confused and unbalanced text, from which his legendary clarissimus candor and lactea ubertas are conspicuous by their absence:

tou dé prágmatos tý Títò tou katà tòn sólllogan katà nòin kai katà touz èz árkhèz diarlogismouz prokechorehikotos, parauxtika to sunechês tîs épibolîs ezúfuaine, tâ te kai’ auton úsphalizómenvon épimelîs kai prólempma tu Fílippro poiôn ouðèn.86

When the conference had produced a result which suited Titus and conformed with his original calculations, he set to work immediately in weaving the fabric of his enterprise, in securing his own position and in denying Philip any advantage.

Unfortunately, this comment is retrospective and, presumably because he was satisfied that his earlier observations concerning Flamininus’ original calculations had been adequately illustrated during the course of his narrative, Polybius considered that any repetition would have been superfluous. Despite the loss of this material, however, there is still enough information in his text to indicate what Flamininus actually had in mind. In the above quotation, for example, Walbank construes the phrase katà touz èk tîs árkhèz diarlogismouz as “a clear statement that the embassy to Rome was contrived by Flamininus,”87 thereby concurring with Holleaux’s contention mentioned earlier. Polybius’ final résumé of the conference is equally informative:

85 Quint., Inst Or., 10, I, 101 and 10, I, 32.
86 Polybius, 18, 10, 3.
87 Walbank, (1967), 560.
The senate sent both consuls to Gaul, as I stated above, and voted for a continuation of the war against Philip, giving Titus complete control over affairs in Greece. When this became clear shortly afterwards in Greece, everything turned out just as Titus had planned, due partly to a little good fortune working in his favour, but mainly to his own foresight in managing the entire situation. For if ever a Roman was extremely shrewd, it was he, and the purposefulness and good sense with which he directed not only public enterprises, but his own personal business as well, cannot be overstated. Moreover, he was still quite young, no older than thirty, and the first Roman who had marched into Greece in command of an army.

In this instance the key phrases are κατὰ νοῦν, διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ προνοίας καὶ πάντω γὰρ ἀγχίνου ὕποτεσσαρα, Flamininus makes a shrewd and accurate assessment of the situation and thereby attains his predetermined objective, namely, the opportunity confronting Philip on the battlefield, since this is just how the senate had voted.

Considerable progress had been made in the war since Flamininus’ arrival in Greece. During the inconclusive peace conference across the width of the Aous he had represented the senate admirably in making it abundantly clear to Philip that Roman conditions were non-negotiable. Just two months later, in spite of having been held up for forty days, he had expelled Philip from his seemingly impregnable stronghold at the Aoi Stena, a feat which had proven to be beyond the capability of his two predecessors. Following Philip’s decidedly hasty and undignified retreat, he had directed a gruelling campaign whereby he removed Macedonian garrisons from several strategically important cities in northern Greece. As a result, the Aetolians, having opted as recently as the previous year to remain neutral in the war with Philip, were

---

88 Polybius, 18, 12, 1-3. All previous Roman military activity in the Balkan peninsula had been confined to Epirus, Illyria and Macedonia. Similarly, it was in Epirus that Flamininus disembarked with his supplementary forces, and still in Epirus that he assumed command from Villius of a Roman army which had already been on Balkan soil for no less than two years, (Livy, XXXII, ix, 7-8). This final sentence, therefore, does not in any way refer to Flamininus crossing the Adriatic from the Italian to the Balkan peninsula, hardly a remarkable achievement since this had already been done on numerous occasions. It refers, rather, to his being the very first to penetrate Greek territory proper. Hence the rendition of διαβαίνειν - march into rather than cross over to - in the final sentence, a point generally missed by others who have translated this passage – Paton and Shuckburgh, for example.

89 Livy, XXXII, 10, 1-12; Diodorus, 28, 11, 1.
90 For the chronology, see Walbank, (1940), 341
91 Polybius, 16, 35, 1-2; Livy, XXXI, 27, 1 – 32, 5; Zonaras, 9, 15, c-e.
now fighting alongside the Romans, and only a month or so before the conference at Nicaea the Achaeans had also decided to abandon their alliance with Philip and side with Rome. This latter defection was a serious body blow to Philip, since Rome was now being supported by the two most powerful political entities in Greece. The net was closing in. Meanwhile, Flamininus’ brother Lucius had also been successful in Euboea in conjunction with fleets from Pergamum and Rhodes; Eretria had been taken by assault and Carystus had surrendered. None of this would have gone unnoticed by the *patres*.

However, his prospects depended equally on the persuasiveness of his supporters back in Rome. According to Livy, it was two plebeian tribunes, L. Oppius and Q. Fulvius, who were primarily instrumental in convincing the senate that lack of progress in the war had been due to the lack of continuity of command. In comparison with his predecessors, however, Flamininus had managed things remarkably better and should be given the opportunity therefore of finishing the job, which, if allowed to retain his command, he would probably achieve by the following summer. So much for the spokesmen, otherwise the positive identity of the rest of Flamininus’ team remains speculative. In 201 he served as one of ten commissioners appointed to allocate some *ager publicus* to Scipio’s veterans in Samnium and Apulia. Livy provides a full list of the members, which included P. Aelius Paetus, one of the consuls of that year, and three others of consular rank. Distinguished company, indeed. In 200 Flamininus was appointed to a commission of three to finalise the quota of colonists for Venusia while still serving on the previously mentioned commission of ten. His colleagues were C. Terentius Varro and P. Cornelius Cn. F. Scipio. Clearly a measure of his competence and of the respect he commanded, and which provided invaluable support for his successful solicitation for the consulship the following year. In any event, Flamininus’ assessment of the mood of the senate and his confidence in his supporters are a glowing testimony to his *αγχίνωια*.

---

92 Livy, XXXII, 16, 1 – 17, 3 ; Pausanias, 7, 8, 1 ; Zonaras, 9, 16b.
93 Livy, XXXII, 28, 3-7.
95 Livy, XXXI, 49, 5. On the concurrency of these appointments and their favourable influence on Flamininus’ career, see Badian, (1971), p. 110.
1.2.4 Nabis of Sparta

Although Nabis’ involvement in matters strictly Greek before the arrival of the Romans is well documented in Polybius, this is not the case for his contacts with Rome. The occasional reference in Polybius’ fragmentary book XVIII is but transitory and book XIX has been lost in entirety. This is unfortunate, since it has already been shown that material rich in biographical content is sometimes omitted by Livy – for example, the rapport between Flamininus and Philip at Nicaea. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that such material has also been omitted concerning the personal interaction between Flamininus and Nabis. However, since Appian and the smaller sources are equally uninformative, it is on Livy that we are mainly dependant for information about the entire period covering Nabis’ initial encounter with Rome in the person of Flamininus in early 197, his defeat by Flamininus and the Greek allied forces some time before the Nemean Games in mid-195, and his final encounter with Philopoemen, followed shortly by his assassination at the hands of the Aeolians, in 192.

In 207, as a result of Spartan encroachments on their territory, the Achaean League under the leadership of Philopoemen confronted Machanidas, the regent of the juvenile king Pelops, at Mantinea. Machanidas was slain in hand to hand combat by Philopoemen, and Nabis inherited the regency. Shortly after, on the death of the young Pelops, in which Nabis was incriminated, he seized the crown. In spite of his claim to descent from the Eurypontid king Demaratus (ruler of Sparta 515-491) and styling himself βασιλεύς on his coinage, Polybius and Livy invariably refer to him as “tyrant”, and Diodorus flatly dismisses him as a “ne’er-do-well” (πονηρός). The rapid expansion of Spartan power under his rule resulted in yet further conflict with the Achaean League, and subsequent events reflect the general disorder which had

---

96 A more modern study of Nabis is overdue. Otherwise see Aymard, (1938), 184-255 and Texier, (1975).
97 Polybius, 16, 13, 6-8, 16-17, 25-28, 35-37.
98 Livy, XXXIV, 41, 1-3, where Flamininus, in appreciation of the recent victory over Nabis, was elected honorary president.
99 Livy, XXXV, 35, 1 – 37, 3; Pausanias, 8, 50, 10.
100 Polybius, 16, 36-37.
101 Diodorus, fragm. 27, 1.
102 Diodorus, fragm. 27, 2.
103 Livy, XXXII, 19, 6; Appian, Mac., 7.
104 Since it is the politically hostile Achaean Polybius on whom we are primarily dependant for any surviving information concerning Nabis’ early career, it is difficult to make any accurate assessment of his policies. See Texier, (1975), 104: “La description polybienne et le jugement qui l’accompagne, qu’elle soit pour l'historien moderne le fait de Polybe lui-même ou de Tite-Live, donnent du dernier souverain spartiate une image des plus défavorables jusque dans les termes mêmes qui y concourent. Nabis est présenté comme un tyran sanguinaire,
typified Greek politics in Greece proper ever since the death of Alexander. Alliances between the various fragmented, independent states were regularly formed, broken and then formed yet again, often on the flimsiest pretext, for reasons varying from self-preservation to conquest and expansion. The Romans, by far the predominant power in the region at this time, inevitably became embroiled in these various intrigues, which they in turn exploited to the best of their advantage.

1.2.5 Early spring, 197. Nabis takes possession of Argos. First encounter with Flamininus.

Philip, dislodged and chased out of Epirus in 198, was anxious about maintaining control of the cities he had taken earlier in Achaea, especially Argos. Accordingly, in early 197 he made an agreement with Nabis, who was to receive temporary control of the city, which would duly be returned to Philip if he was successful against the Romans, otherwise it would remain under Nabis’ control. Merciless tyrant or otherwise, Nabis deserves credit for his perspicacity at this point, (and, presumably, for the efficiency of his espionage network). He took fully into account the implications behind Flamininus’ expulsion of Philip from Epirus, and the unprecedented phenomenon of a Roman army securely encamped for the winter in central Greece. Henceforth Philip counted for relatively little, the Romans should not in any way be antagonised, and Nabis’ reluctance fully to commit himself to a likely loser is clearly illustrated by his tacit lack of enthusiasm over the dynastic marriages proposed by Philip between his daughters and Nabis’ sons. Consequently, as soon as he had gained control of Argos he put Philip out of his mind and sent ambassadors to Flamininus in Elatea and to Attalus, who was wintering in Aegina, to inform them that he was now master of the city. The ambassadors were to suggest to Flamininus that, if he came to Argos, Nabis felt sure that a complete understanding could be arrived at concerning his occupation of the city.
Effectively, Flamininus was faced with having to choose the lesser of two evils: it suited him admirably that Philip had relinquished control of the strategically important city, yet he had serious reservations about Nabis as a viable successor. Quite apart from Nabis’ personal reputation, Flamininus’ immediate concern was his protracted aggression towards the Achaean strategos, who had but recently allied themselves with Rome. A conference was arranged at neighbouring Mycenae, at which point, after his successful diplomatic overture, Nabis reverted to type in committing a staggering faux pas which stuck firmly in Flamininus’ craw and for which Nabis was to pay dearly later on. Flamininus and Attalus, now joined by Flamininus’ brother Lucius and by Nicostratus, arrived accompanied by just a few personal attendants and auxiliaries, only to find Nabis waiting with his entire army, wearing armour and attended by an armed personal escort. Nabis proffered the lame excuse that it was the Argive exiles he feared, not the Romans and their allies. This raises the dubious question of whether Nabis’ personal security was always so intense, or this was simply a premeditated, defiant display of military force for the purpose of intimidation, as the next incident suggests, since Nabis refused Attalus’ request that he withdraw his troops and give the Argives the freedom to voice their true opinion about his occupation of their city. In provoking this reaction, Attalus, who obviously did not want Nabis in control of Argos, fully undermined his specious credibility. Yet Nicostratus would have been even more opposed to Nabis’ occupation of Argos, since his nation was at war with Nabis and it was the fate of an Achaean city that was at stake. His failure to protest, therefore, is puzzling. Aymard argues that he was intimidated by the prospect of upsetting the powerful Flamininus, in spite of this apparent betrayal, but one should equally consider the possibility of a personal reassurance previously made in private by Flamininus that eventually, i.e., after Philip had been dealt with, a satisfactory solution would be found, and that meanwhile Nicostratus would just have to be patient. As for Flamininus, his own failure to protest and, particularly, his decision to come to the conference without any substantial military support, clearly illustrate his astute sense of priorities. He could ill afford to dwell for any length of time on this relatively minor affair, and he had purposely left his troops at their ease in Elatea to prepare for the imminent confrontation with Philip. Livy’s brevity and studied choice of vocabulary both admirably corroborate this point. Providing no details about the contents of an

---

108 Livy, XXXII, 39, 3: Quinctius ut eo quoque praesidio nudaret.
109 For Nabis’ cruelty see esp. Polybius, 13, 6-8. Also, Livy, XXXIV, 32, 11; Diodorus, fragm. 27, 1-2.
110 Polybius, 18, 13, 8-10; Livy, XXXII, 19, 1-23, 13; Pausanias 7, 8, 1-3.
111 Aymard, (1938), 146.
112 The Achaean’s fear of Nabis’ hostility and Philip’s inability, or unwillingness, to protect them from it, had been one of the main reasons for their forming their alliance with Rome in 198: Livy, XXXII, 19, 6 and 21, 13.
apparently heated discussion (disceptatio) concerning the disputed ownership of Argos, he pointedly limits himself to just three words - *sine exitu fuit*.

Furthermore, from Livy’s account it appears that this entire business, from the initial encounter of the various parties up to and including the agreements concerning the armistice and the Cretan auxiliaries, was concluded in less than one day, since Flamininus’ prime concern was the stability required to direct his undivided attention towards the as yet undefeated Philip as quickly as possible. Accordingly, reminiscent of his chicanery at Nicaea, he performed yet another one of his balancing acts, already the hallmark of his diplomatic activity, in contracting an *amicitia* with Nabis for the provision of six hundred Cretans to supplement his troops. He then arranged an armistice of four months between Nabis and the Achaeans, and felt sufficiently at ease to make for Thessaly, with preparations for the forthcoming military action against Philip uppermost in his mind. The matter of Argos would be settled only when convenient, but, for the time being at least, it had to be put on hold.

Flamininus immediately pressed home the psychological advantage of having deprived Philip of a prospective ally. Instead of returning immediately to Anticyra, from where he had crossed the Corinthian Gulf on his outward journey from Elatea in Phocis, he made a diversion to Corinth, currently occupied by a Macedonian garrison under the command of Philocles, arguably Philip’s best general. Flamininus marched up to the gate with his newly acquired Cretan cohort in order that Philocles might see that Nabis had severed all connections with Philip. At a conference during which Flamininus exhorted Philocles to change sides at once and surrender the city, he replied in a manner which implied postponement of compliance rather than its refusal. There is no evidence to suggest that Philocles ever betrayed Philip, in which case his non-committal response to Flamininus’ exhortation might have been no more than diplomatic expediency. Even so, consideration must be given to what effect this episode had on the rest of the Macedonian garrison, since Flamininus had surely achieved his objective in planting a lingering seed of doubt, however small, in the Macedonian psyche not long before the eventual confrontation at Cynoscephalae.

113 Livy, XXXII, 40, 3.

114 See Homo, (1916), 12: “Cette négociation, habilement menée par Flamininus et terminée en une seule entrevue, était un véritable coup de maître. Flamininus s’était montré fort modéré dans ses prétentions, non par faiblesse, non par condescendance à l’égard de Nabis, mais parce qu’il n’avait pas besoin d’exiger davantage. L’essentiel — et ce résultat fut atteint — était de neutraliser Nabis pour la durée de la campagne qui allait s’ouvrir : la Macédoine mise hors de cause, il serait à la merci de Rome et de ses alliés.”

115 Aymard, (1938), 152, n. 64

116 Livy, XXXII, 40, 6: Philocles et ipse ad imperatorem Romanum in colloquium venit hortantique ut extemplo transiret ita respondit ut distulisse rem magis quam negasse videretur.
1.2.6 Cynoscephalae

For the Battle of Cynoscephalae Polybius is the primary source, which provides the basis for Livy’s version. By any account, this confrontation was at best a haphazard, disorganised affair, fought on difficult terrain, (especially for the Macedonian phalanx), in poor visibility, and resulting from the accidental discovery of Philip’s camp by a Roman reconnoitring party. This was followed by half-hearted skirmishing which escalated eventually into a confused, full-scale engagement. Consequently there are no signs of any predetermined strategy from either Philip or Flamininus. Though lacking the sheer brilliance of Scipio, however, it has already been illustrated in this chapter that as a commander Flamininus was both competent and reliable. This is also the case in this particular encounter; although he was helped in no small way by the Aetolians and a decisive manoeuvre provided by the inspiration of an unnamed military tribune, both his management of his troops and his personal contribution are beyond reproach.

Although neither general had his troops drawn up in anything resembling battle order at the moment of the original skirmish between the advanced patrols, it would seem that, significantly, Flamininus was the first to react. Hearing that his advanced party was in difficulty, he sent a detachment of five hundred horse and two thousand foot, mostly Aetolians, to their assistance. In spite of the overall confusion and indecisiveness on the part of both generals, Flamininus, according to Polybius, then had the presence of mind to draw up the rest of his troops in line of battle, at which point Philip, apparently still having difficulty in getting to grips with the situation, decided to lead his main force out of camp. Flamininus’ initiative here might just suggest that he deservedly gained a tactical advantage, however slight, leading eventually to the Roman victory. Livy, in direct contrast to Polybius, says that Flamininus felt compelled to draw

---

117 Polybius, 18, 18-27.
118 Livy, XXXIII, 10, 10, when giving the casualty figures after the battle: nos non minim0 potissimum numero credidimus sed Polybium seuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum. For another example of Livy’s respect for Polybius, see XXX, 45, 5, where he describes him as “haud quaquam spernendus auctor.”
120 See Homo, (1916), 42: “Flamininus, sans doute, ne manquait pas de qualités militaires ; il avait du coup d’œil, de la décision — on le voit sur le champ de bataille de Cynocéphales — mais ce n’était pas un grand homme de guerre comme son contemporain Scipion l’Africain, comme ses successeurs Paul Émile et Scipion Émilien.”
121 Wood, (1941), 284: “It is worth while to note that once Flamininus had begun an attack he never ceased or allowed the enemy a moment’s rest until he had obtained his objective. Only once did these tactics fail of victory. This characteristic can be observed in all his campaigns. Flamininus had not the military genius of a Scipio Africanus, but his military tactics were adequate and thoroughly sound.”
up his army in direct response to Philip’s decision to do so. The reasoning behind this might be that, with both antagonists starting from equal positions, the Roman victory would appear more impressive.

The crucial moment in this rather disjointed affair appears to be Flamininus’ decision to leave his faltering left wing to cope as best it could and transfer his command to the right. Here he succeeded in forcing the enemy’s left to retreat, and it was this manoeuvre which gave the afore-mentioned military tribune the opportunity to advance further and, in wheeling round to his left, attack the main body of the Macedonian army in the rear, which resulted in the ensuing rout.

The casualty figures given by Polybius, and copied by Livy, were eight thousand Macedonian dead and five thousand captives, out of an original force of some twenty-five thousand, in comparison with a relatively meagre seven hundred Roman dead. So Philip, who fled in the direction of Tempe with whatever he could muster of his surviving army, though severely incapacitated, was by no means a spent force. Unlike Scipio’s victory at Ilipa in 206, which had effectively put an end to Carthaginian domination in Spain, and his decisive victory at Zama Regia in 202, Cynoscephalae was not yet conclusive for Flamininus and Rome. Although it was ultimately to prove the turning in the campaign, meanwhile a good deal of work, diplomatic rather than military, was still required.

Close examination of the Aetolians’ conduct is required here. On two occasions, first in a skirmish near Pherae some three days before the battle itself, and then with the invaluable support they gave to the Romans’ struggling advanced party before either general fully committed himself to battle, they acquitted themselves admirably. On each occasion, it should be noted, they were acting directly on the orders of Flamininus, who was first relying on their knowledge of the terrain, and then, apparently, counting on the reputation of their cavalry. His judgment proved to be sound, but more significant is that, in spite of their commendable performance, he was anxious to keep a close rein on their authority.

Any good will the Aetolians had earned through their military prowess was soon eradicated by their subsequent plundering of the Macedonian camp, leaving no spoils for the Romans, who were preoccupied in pursuing the defeated enemy. Whereas Livy makes only a passing reference to this incident, Polybius leaves his readers in no doubt about the Roman legionaries’ dissatisfaction and their subsequent complaints to

---

122 Livy, XXXIII, 8, 3: idem et Romanus, magis necessitate quam occasione pugnae inductus, fecit.
123 Polybius, 18, 27, 6; Livy, XXXIII, 10, 7-8.
124 Livy, XXXIII, 10, 6. Romani victores in castra hostium spe praedae inrumpunt; ea magna iam ex parte direpta ab Aetolis inveniunt.
Flamininus, who the previous winter at Nicaea had received an explanation from Philip about Aetolian customs concerning war booty:

The king tried to explain it to him by saying that the Aetolians customarily plundered and ravaged the territory of not only those with whom they were at war, but if certain others who were friends and allies of the Aetolians were at war with each other, it was permissible nonetheless for the Aetolians, without any public decree, to support both antagonists and yet plunder the territory of both. For the Aetolians, therefore, there were no set boundaries of friendship or enmity, but they were prepared to be the enemies of all those engaged in a dispute.

Needless to say, the Roman rank and file were unwilling to accept that this provided any justification for the Aetolians′ conduct, and Flamininus was equally displeased. More significant, however, is the bizarre mentality behind this Aetolian practice, and this in turn provides valuable insight into the complexity of the diplomatic labyrinth in which Flamininus was constantly forced to operate.

1.2.7 Peace Negotiations at Tempe

This episode is noteworthy for the insight it provides into the changed relationship between Flamininus and the Greek allies, particularly the Aetolians, following the

---

125 Polybius, 18, 27, 4.
126 Polybius, 18, 5, 1-3.
127 Polybius, 18, 34, 1. See also Sacks, 95, (1975), 92: “Though at times Polybius considers their behaviour scandalous (iv 27.1-8), he admits that the Greeks have become quite inured to it (iv 16.1-2). The most grievous faults of the Aetolians, however, are their desire for aggrandizement and lust for booty. Plundering and raiding are habitual for them (iv 3.1, 16.2). Their obsession with booty costs them battles (iv 57-8) and friends (iv 29-4-7), and they think nothing of plundering sacred objects (iv 19-4, 62.2) and even allies (iv 7 9.2-3).”
128 Cf. Livy, XXXIII, 20, 13, his own perplexity following his account of negotiations between the Rhodians and Antiochus: non operae est persequi ut quaeque acta in his locis sint, cum ad ea quae propria Romani bellis sunt vix sufficiam.
victory at Cynoscephalae. With only a few variations, Livy’s account is essentially the same in content as that of Polybius. However, Livy’s version begins with a passage missing from Polybius in which he recounts Philip’s thinly disguised request for peace negotiations, willingly granted by Flamininus:

> caduceator eo regius venit, specie ut indutiae essent donec tollerentur ad sepulturam qui in acie cecidissent, re vera ad petendam veniam legatis mittendis. utrumque ab Romano impetratum. adiecta etiam illa vox, bono animo esse regem ut [sc. caduceator] iuberet, quae maxime Aetolos offendit iam tumentes querentesque mutatum victoria imperatorem. 129

While he [sc. Flamininus] was there a herald came from the king, ostensibly to ask for pause in hostilities so that those who had fallen on the battlefield might be buried, but really to ask for permission to send an embassy. Both requests were granted by the Roman, who said besides that he should instruct the king to be of good cheer, which gave great offence to the Aetolians, who by this time were puffed up with pride and complaining that the general had been changed by his victory.

On this occasion, in marked contrast to Nicaea, there is no hesitation, simulated or otherwise, on Flamininus’ part in readily granting Philip’s request, a clear indication that he was equally anxious as the king to reach a peaceful settlement. This is amply conveyed by his manipulative choice of vocabulary in the second sentence of the above passage; first, *ut iuberet* rather than *ut rogaret*, or even *ut suaderet*, for example, to ensure that the message was unambiguous; then, *bono animo*, to reassure Philip that his predicament, though grave, was by no means hopeless. The Aetolians’ reaction, it must be said, was not without just cause, since during the war it was only they who had given any substantial assistance to the Romans, in full expectation of being fittingly rewarded with substantial territorial gains should Philip be defeated. It was this lingering resentment over the meagre portion they eventually did receive which resulted finally in the war between Rome and an alliance of the Aetolians and Antiochus. 130 Their immediate reaction, however, was to attack Flamininus personally, alleging that what they considered to be his unreasonably lenient treatment of Philip was due to bribery, a

---

129 Livy, XXXIII, 11, 3-4. On the matter of Philip’s flimsy excuse, clearly apparent in Livy’s phraseology, the dead of Cynoscephalae were not buried until six years later. It was Antiochus, during his invasion of Thessaly, who arranged for the remains to be buried in what can only be described a cheap public relations stunt aimed at alienating the Macedonian people from Philip, who had never attended to the burial. In the event, this scheme seriously backfired, since Philip’s immediate reaction was to reconfirm his alliance with the Romans. Livy, XXXVI, 8, 3-6; Appian, Syr., 3, 16.

130 Polybius, 18, 39, 1-2.
notion readily dismissed by Polybius, who says that the Aetolians were simply judging Flamininus by their own standards, and by Livy, who rhetorically describes him as “a man of a soul not to be conquered by cupidity of that sort.”

The aspirations of the Aetolians, however, were of more immediate concern to Flamininus than their attempts to besmirch his character, for example, their underhandedness in purloining most of the plunder from Philip’s camp at Cynoscephalae or even the boastful manner in which they claimed equal credit for the victory. Whatever one makes of Flamininus’ conduct at Nicaea, personal glorification was not an issue on this occasion: the last thing he wanted was to see the Aetolians as the predominant power in Greece, which would be the case if Philip were removed and Macedon debilitated. Consequently, says Livy, Flamininus began in many a way unremittingly to cheapen and trivialise the Aetolians in everyone’s eyes.

Flamininus granted Philip a truce of fifteen days and made arrangements for a conference with him. Meanwhile he convened the Greek allies at Larissa to hear their opinions about what peace terms they thought should be made with the king. Only two opinions are on record. The first is from the Athamanian King Amynander, who is anxious about the proximity of his country to Macedon and the possibility of Philip venting his anger on him should the Romans leave Greece. He urges them all to give due consideration to his personal situation; an indirect request, therefore, for sufficiently stringent peace conditions to be imposed on the king. Alexander the Aetolian, addressing Flamininus directly, rather than the whole assembly, speaks next claiming that Flamininus is much mistaken if he believes that by coming to terms with Philip he will ensure either peace for the Romans or liberty for the Greeks. If, indeed, he wants fully to put into effect the policy of his country and fulfil the promises he has given to all the Greeks, the only alternative is for Philip to be deposed or, according to Livy, even executed. This, he concludes, with a singularly smug remark bound to rub Flamininus up the wrong way, should be no problem, provided he did not let the present opportunity slip. This draws an immediate rebuttal from Flamininus, claiming

---

131 Polybius, 18, 34, 7; Livy, XXXIII, 11, 7.
132 Livy, XXXIII, 11, 9.
133 Livy, XXXIII, 11, 9: ob eas causas multa sedulo ut viliiores levioresque apud omnes essent et viderentur faciebat. This statement does not appear in Polybius’ text, nor does Livy pinpoint any specific examples at this juncture; examples abound, however, during the subsequent course of the narrative of both historians.
134 See Sacks, (1975), 102: “At first glance, it may seem strange that ultimately only two Greek states, Athamania and Aetolia, get a chance to speak. But Polybius has employed here a Thucydidean-like portrayal: while only two states deliver their opinions, they represent both sides of the question.”
135 Polybius, 18, 36, 4: ἕξιον γὰρ πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι πάντας, with πάντας, presumably, including not only all the other Greeks but also Flamininus.
136 Polybius, 18, 36, 7; Livy, XXXIII, 12, 4: nisi Philippo aut occiso aut regno pulso.
that Alexander is way off the mark both on the matter of Roman policy and of his own personal proposals, especially where the interests of Greece were concerned. Giving Carthage as an example, he claims that is has never been Roman policy to annihilate their defeated enemies. The same applies to Philip, he continues; moreover, he would gladly have made peace with him before the battle if he had agreed to submit to the conditions imposed on him. He then voices his surprise to the entire assembly that, having taken part in previous peace conferences, they should now all be irreconcilable; totally senseless behaviour, he adds, and just because they had won a battle. His next point is that, in the interests of Greek security, Macedon was required as a buffer zone against any repetition of the lawless violence of insurgent Thracians and the Gauls. Therefore, he continues, if Philip agrees with the allies’ previous conditions, peace should be granted after first consulting the Senate, adding, as a stinging rejoinder to Alexander’s recent smug remark and as a clear indication to the rest of just who is in charge, that the Aetolians were at perfect liberty to pursue their own agenda. The ensuing protest of Phaeneas, the senior Aetolian delegate, is met by a sharp, personal rebuke:


Immediately and without rising from his seat Titus said angrily, “Enough of your foolish talk, Phaeneas! For I shall manage the peace in such a way that Philip, even if he wants to, will be not be able to molest the Greeks.”

Discourtesy apart, the message is abundantly clear to the entire assembly: the matter in hand was no longer negotiable, all very different from the situation in Nicaea when Flamininus eagerly sought the approval of the Greek allies and all parties had complete freedom of speech. Two days later Philip arrived for the peace conference:

πάντων εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ἀφροσιθέντων, εἰσελθὼν ο Φίλιππος εἰστοχῶς καὶ γυνὲς ὑπετέμετο τὰς πάντων ὅρμας· ἔφη γὰρ τὰ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ Ὀρωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἐπιταττόμενα πάντα συγχωρεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν διδόναι τῇ συγκλήτῳ τὴν ἐπιτροπήν. 140

---

137 Polybius, 18, 37, 9; Livy, XXXIII, 12, 10-11. This is an astute point, especially since the new consuls of 197 had both been retained for military service in Italy through fear of the Gauls. Polybius 18, 11, 2.

138 Polybius, XVIII, 37, 12.

139 Aymard, (1938), 170.

140 Polybius, XVIII, 38, 1-2.
When they had all assembled for the conference, Philip entered and with great skill and sagacity undermined the basis of their collective anger, saying that he would comply with and put into effect all the previous demands of the Romans and the allies, and that he would remit any remaining points to the decision of the Senate.

Since Philip, (undeterred apparently by the manner in which he had been so clinically hoodwinked at Nicaea), was so compliant, any further discussion would have seemed pointless. However, after a moment’s silence Phaeneas, unabashed by his recent scolding, intervenes yet again, asking Philip if he is willing to restore Larissa, Cremaste, Echinus and Phthiotic Thebes to the Aetolians. Philip urges (ἐκλαευ) them to take these cities, which draws an immediate objection from Flamininus, who says the Aetolians should receive only Phthiotic Thebes, a Roman prize of war, concerning which, therefore, he had the right to do whatever he chose. Phaeneas indignantly retorts that, considering the part the Aetolians had played in the war, it was only right that they should receive back those cities which had previously been members of their league. A fair point in itself, it must be said, even without his referral to a treaty of 212/11, which clearly stipulated that all movable spoils of war should go to the Romans and all conquered territory and cities to the Aetolians. The treaty was no longer valid, replies Flamininus, since the Aetolians had broken it when they deserted Rome and made peace with Philip, and even if it were, it would apply only to those cities [e.g. Phthiotic Thebes] which had been taken by force of arms, not to those which had surrendered to the Romans of their own free will, as all the Thessalian cities had now done.

The validity of Flamininus’ claim that the treaty of 212/11 was no longer valid cannot be conclusively verified. However, his second contention, that even if the treaty were still in force, its terms distinguished between those cities taken by force of arms and those which had voluntarily surrendered to Rome, is inconsistent with the actual text of the treaty, a fragment of which has survived on stone, and which contains a clause missing from Livy’s version which might well justify the Aetolians’ claim. In view of Flamininus’ devious conduct at Nicaea, scholars have variously raised the question of whether he was deliberately lying or genuinely mistaken on the present occasion. Whatever, this was strictly a political issue, not a moral one, which should be carefully considered from Flamininus’ perspective. The campaign against Philip was by now in its fourth year, the first two of which had proven to be ineffective, and any real progress - the victory at Aous, the wrong-footing of Philip at Nicaea and the victory at

---

141 Livy, XXVI, 24, 1-16.
142 In 206: Livy, XXXI, 1, 9, XXXI, 29, 16 and XXXI, 31, 19; Appian, Mac., 3, 3-4.
Cynoscephalae - had been due exclusively to Flamininus. With Philip now defeated and, by all accounts, equally anxious as the Romans to reach a peaceful settlement, even to the point of acceding without protest to the extra demands made by the Aetolians, Flamininus was fully determined not to let anything get in his way. For this reason, albeit with nothing like complete conviction, he questioned the validity of the peace treaty; for the rest, he simply intimidated the entire allied assembly by the sheer forcefulness of his personality. Flamininus was under no pressure here. At Nicaea he had had to win the Greeks’ confidence before being consensually recognised as the champion of their cause, but by now his situation was immeasurably more secure and he could well afford to dictate rather than negotiate terms. This was clearly an imposition of peace, not a peace settlement. Without the Romans, the Greeks would have again been at the mercy of Philip, amply illustrated by Flamininus’ snide remark to the Aetolians, which would not have gone unheeded by the rest of the assembly. Finally, one should treat with extreme caution Polybius’ claim that Flamininus hastily concluded the peace settlement because he had heard that Antiochus had departed with an army from Syria bound for Europe, which made him fearful that Philip, hoping for support from the Seleucid monarch, might determine to defend his cities, drag out the war and that the recognition for all he had achieved would be credited to his successor.¹⁴⁵

1.2.8 Flamininus and the Assassination of Brachylles

In the spring of 197 Flamininus, seeking to gain support of the various Greek states in the campaign against Philip, had marched with a legion to Thebes with a view to forming an alliance with the Boeotian League. The Boeotians, traditionally supporters of

¹⁴⁵ Wood, 70, (1939), 99, re Polybius, 18, 39, 3: “This statement of the great Greek historian is absurd. There was no reason for Flamininus to prosecute the war. Philip had complied with all the Roman demands to the letter, and, as Flamininus remarked to the rapacious Aetolians, it was not a Roman practice to extirpate a fallen foe. Secondly, although the fear of Antiochus loomed large in the Roman mind, Philip had no hope, no intention and no desire to negotiate under any circumstances with Antiochus, as all subsequent history of the relations between Antigonid and Seleucid was to show”. Cf. Gruen, (1984), 620: “According to Polybius, Flamininus was in a hurry to make peace, having learned that Antiochus had set out from Syria and had prepared an expedition against Europe. The notice has gone unquestioned, a surprising scholarly lapse. Yet in the weeks after Cynoscephalae Antiochus had gotten no further than Cilicia, his targets were Ptolemaic cities on the southern coast of Asia Minor, and his progress was temporarily halted by Rhodes. Even if a report of Antiochus’ movements had reached Flamininus by this time, they could hardly be regarded as a thrust toward Europe – or an authentic reason for hastening peace with Philip. Polybius has anticipated events and imputed motives”.

58
Macedon, and therefore uncertain about which side to take, would have at best made only reluctant allies, so Flamininus had taken possession the of city by trickery. Thereafter, well supported by Attalus of Pergamum and the Achaean Aristaenus, he had eventually succeeded in bringing the Boeotians into the confederacy of Rome and the other Greek states. Except for the Acarnanians, therefore, who were defeated at Leucas shortly afterwards by Flamininus’ brother, Lucius, the Greeks had now all been won over, leaving Flamininus free to direct his undivided attention to the war against Philip.

A year was to elapse before Flamininus had cause to return to Thebes, following which an incident occurred which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it provides a good example of the complexity and unpredictability of Greek politics with which Flamininus had to reckon; witness his humiliating compromise with Nabis over the possession of Argos at the very beginning of 197 and the perennial complaints of the Aetolians. Second, there are throughout clear examples of dubious manipulation of material by both Polybius and Livy for the joint purpose of limiting the damage to Flamininus’ reputation and, by implication, the efficacy of Roman foreign policy.

Flamininus hoodwinked

In early 196 Flamininus was wintering in Elatea when an embassy arrived unexpectedly from the Boeotians begging him to arrange for the restoration of those of their countrymen who had been fighting for Philip. Anxious to retain the support of the Boeotians and the other Greek states, and allegedly suspicious of Antiochus’ reported activity, he was more than willing to oblige. The men were soon returned, including a declared Macedonian sympathiser named Brachylles. The Boeotians, however, far from thanking Flamininus, expressed their gratitude to Philip, as if it was he who had been responsible for the favour. Adding insult to injury they appointed Brachylles Boeotarch and then showed preferential treatment to other known Macedonian sympathisers, to the exclusion of the likes of Zeuxippus and Pisistratus, enthusiastic

---

146 Livy, XXXIII, 1, 1 - 2, 6.
147 Livy, XXXIII, 16, 1 17, 15.
148 Livy, XXXII, 38, 1 – 40, 11.
149 Polybius, 18, 43, 2. See Briscoe, (1973), 300, 6: “For Flamininus it is Greek goodwill, not Roman armed force, that is the best defence against Antiochus.”
150 See Homo, (1916), 23: “L’œuvre diplomatique, qui avait valu à Rome l’alliance de tous les États grecs, était très brillante, mais elle était aussi extrêmement fragile et Flamininus, mieux que personne, s’en rendait compte. Aucun des alliés de Philippe ne l’avait abandonné spontanément. Pour entraîner la ligue Achéenne, il avait fallu la présence de l’armée et de la flotte romaines ; Nabis avait fait ses réserves et pris ses garanties ; la ligue Acarnanienne n’avait cédé qu’à la force, la ligue Béotienne qu’à la ruse. — Le sentiment dominant en Grèce était la défiance.”
supporters of Rome. Fearful for their security in the event of the Romans leaving Greece, these two decided to make arrangements for the assassination of Brachylles.

The Plot thickens

Polybius recounts how they consulted Flamininus on this matter. His immediate response was that, although he personally would have no part in it, neither would he stand in their way. Then, in direct contradiction of his declared impartiality, and in spite of the decided lack of *entente cordiale* between the Romans and the Aetolians, he urged¹⁵¹ Zeuxippus and Pisistratus to consult Alexamenus, the Aetolian commander-in-chief, who had no hesitation in co-operating and duly engaged three Aetolians and three Italians to murder Brachylles.¹⁵² Frustratingly, at this point Polybius’ text expires,¹⁵³ so for the remainder of this episode we are dependent exclusively on Livy, whose account is fairly consistent with that of Polybius up to and including the decision by Zeuxippus and Pisistratus to have Brachylles assassinated, after which serious divergences occur and it must be treated with suspicion:

```
dum Romana arma in propinquo [sc. Zeuxippus et Pisistratus] haberent, tollere
Brachyllem principem fautorum regis statuerunt. et tempore ad eam rem capto,
cum in publico epulatus revertetur domum temulentus prosentibus mollibus
viris qui ioci causa convivio celebri interfuerant, ab sex armat
Italici, tres Aetoli erant, circumventus occiditur. fuga comitum et quiritatia facta
et tumultus per totam urbem discurrentium cum luminibus; percussores proxima
porta evaserunt.¹⁵⁴
```

While they had the Roman forces close at hand they decided to do away with Brachylles, the main supporter of the king. They chose for this an occasion when he had dined out and was returning home the worse for drink, accompanied by a bunch of effeminate creatures who had been laughing and joking at the dinner. He was surrounded and killed by six armed men, three Italians and three Aetolians. His companions ran off screaming and the city was in a total uproar with people

¹⁵¹ Polybius’ choice of vocabulary - ἐκέλευ - leaves no doubt whatsoever that Flamininus fully supported this idea.
¹⁵² Polybius, 18, 43, 1-13. The inclusion of the three Italians also suggests that, in spite of Flamininus’ expressed reluctance to become actively involved, he was nonetheless fully compliant and might well subsequently have discussed the matter with Alexamenus even before Zeuxippus and Pisistratus had had time to contact him.
¹⁵³ Except, that is, for a fragment decidedly moralizing in tone which possibly refers retrospectively to a fit of conscience suffered by Zeuxippus after Brachylles had been murdered. Walbank, (1967), 609, n. 43, 13.
¹⁵⁴ Livy, XXXIII, 28, 1-4.
running to and fro with torches. Those who had struck him down escaped through
the nearest gate.

By failing to mention either Flamininus or Alexamenus, Livy would have the reader
assume that Zeuxippus and Pisistratus arranged the assassination with no outside help. However, as Livy was fully aware, in Alexamenus Flamininus had chosen the ideal
intermediary for the grisly task in hand, since from his detailed account of the leading
role played by Alexamenus in the assassination of Nabis some four years later there emerges a totally ruthless, calculating and forceful individual for whom murder was no
obstacle to achieving his objective. Concerning Nabis, Livy had no qualms about
drawing attention to Alexamenus’ seriously criminal nature. On the contrary, it all made
for stimulating reading, but, significantly, with neither Flamininus nor any other Roman
involved in what was an exclusively Greek affair. However, Livy’s suppression of
Flamininus’ decision to engage Alexamenus in this earlier business concerning Brachylles is clearly a ploy to prevent him from being tainted by association.

Without offering any explanation, Livy says that after the assassination the Boeotians
drew their own conclusions and held Zeuxippus as the primary suspect, but not without
serious consequences for Flamininus:

efferavit ea caedes Thebanos Boeotosque omnes ad exsecrabile odium
Romanorum, credentes non sine consilio imperatoris Romani Zeuxippum
principem gentis id facinus conscisse.  

This murder roused the Thebans and all the Boeotians to a fit of hatred against
the Romans, for they believed that Zeuxippus, a leading figure in the state, would
not have sanctioned such a crime without the compliance of the Roman
commander.

The Boeotians would never have singled out the commander-in-chief of the
predominant military presence in the region without being absolutely sure of their
ground. At first sight the only thing that might suggest that Flamininus was in any way
involved is the mention of the three Italians, but, along with their Aetolian partners in
crime, they managed to escape, unidentified apparently, thereby eliminating the
possibility of a seriously compromising interrogation. For the possible leakage of
incriminating material, therefore, we must examine the rest of Livy’s version, which

155 See Pfeilschifter, (2005), 146: “Flamininus wusste offenbar recht genau, auf welchen Gebieten Alexamenos’
Stärken lagen”.
156 Livy, XXXV, 35, 1 – 37, 3.
158 Livy, XXXIII, 29, 1.
comprises a truly bizarre sequence of events bearing much closer resemblance to a carefully conceived theatrical farce than to a sober, historical narrative, albeit coincidentally, since there is no apparent reason to suppose that Livy was not recounting events as he had found them.

**A true Comedy of Errors**

Shortly after the assassination, Zeuxippus fled from Thebes to Tanagra, about twenty miles to the east. Pisistratus meanwhile, confident in his ability to face down his accusers, remained in Thebes. At this point enters the joker in the pack, one of Zeuxippus’ slaves, who had acted as a go-between in the conspiracy. Pisistratus, fearing that he might turn informer, sent a letter to Zeuxippus advising him to get rid of the slave - in the event, a truly fatal error, since the messenger entrusted with the delivery of the letter, unable to find Zeuxippus immediately, handed it to none other than the very slave in question, believing him to be the most trustworthy member of Zeuxippus’ household. Stricken with guilt this supposedly exemplary underling opened the letter and, terrified by the contents, fled to Thebes, where, in a bid to save his own neck, he laid the whole matter before the magistrates. Pisistratus, therefore, as the result of crassly committing such potentially explosive information to writing, brought about the very thing he had been seeking to avoid. In all probability, therefore, fearing exposure and the inevitably fatal consequences, he had not been thinking clearly when he decided to communicate with Zeuxippus by letter. After all, a far safer option would have been personally to arrange for the disappearance of this bothersome individual, failing which he could have alerted Alexamenus, for whom the removal of a lowly slave would have been but small beer in comparison with the removal of a high-profile politician. In any case, before his execution Pisistratus was interrogated under torture, doubtlessly giving a detailed account of Alexamenus’ and Flamininus’ involvement, which, it is reasonable to assume, had already been established by the testimony of Zeuxippus’ slave.

Admittedly, at first sight this reflects poorly on Flamininus, but before simply condemning him out of hand one must consider his state of mind when unexpectedly approached by Zeuxippus and Pisistratus. Undoubtedly, he was sorely disillusioned and embittered by the pointedly smug triumphalism with which the Boeotians had repaid the favour that they themselves had initially requested. In fact, this matter of Brachylles and the other pro-Macedonians looks very much like a strictly personal vendetta against Flamininus, who was thereby the victim of a pre-hatched plot. The reason for this is unclear, although by far the most likely explanation is that the Boeotians were

---

159 Livy, XXXIII, 28, 11-15.
still seriously smarting from the decidedly cavalier manner in which Flamininus had clearly outwitted them in taking possession of Thebes the previous year. The apparent speed and proficiency with which the pro-Macedonians were appointed to influential positions would have left Flamininus in no doubt that he had been hoodwinked. Moreover, it is easy to imagine the various taunts and witticisms he would have had to endure, including, in all likelihood, a princely contribution from Brachylles himself. This would have been bitter gall for a man of Flamininus' ilk. Having taunted Philip to the point of distraction in Illyria and duped him comprehensively at Nicaea, and having outwitted the Boeotians within the confines of their own capital, he was now very much on the receiving end. Little wonder then that, when a heaven-sent opportunity to redress the balance fell unexpectedly into his lap, he seized it avidly with both hands.\textsuperscript{160}

Flamininus' actions produced a serious backlash. Having neither sufficient forces nor a suitable leader to go to war, the Boeotians resorted to a spate of highway-robbery and murder, during the course of which no fewer than five hundred Roman soldiers were killed in various isolated incidents. Flamininus duly imposed a fine of five hundred talents and ordered the culprits to be handed over.\textsuperscript{161} The Boeotians refused to comply, claiming that none of the atrocities had been committed with official sanction. This specious denial of any responsibility, be it with an irritable, dismissive shrug of the shoulders, or a combination of thinly disguised incredulity and amazement, was the final straw. The Boeotians, quite obviously devoid of any sense of proportion, failed to realise that with this final taunt they were stepping way over the mark, possibly under the fatal assumption that, since Flamininus had not openly retaliated following his first humiliation, he would be equally quiescent following this second affront. However, simply goading the commander-in-chief was a far cry from jingoistically murdering hundreds of his men and expecting to get away with it by virtue of the singularly fatuous excuse they had proffered. Personal considerations aside, Flamininus had no choice other than to take immediate, decisive action, since unquestioned belief in Roman invincibility was essential. If the Boeotians, of all people, conspicuously devoid of their earlier illustrious military prowess, were seen to cock a snoop at the Romans with total impunity, who would be next? Grainger's contention, therefore, that "Flamininus acted with near-hysteria" is ill-considered.\textsuperscript{162} The inevitable retaliation, which anyone in his right mind would have expected and tried at all costs to avoid, saw the devastation of a large tract of Boeotian territory and the besiegement of Coronea.

\textsuperscript{160} It is also worth considering whether Flamininus was in any way influenced by the good fortune he had enjoyed following the unexpected intervention of Charops at the AoI Stena in Epirus in early 198. Livy, XXXII, 11, 1-4; Diodorus, 30, 5, 1.
\textsuperscript{161} Livy, XXXIII, 29, 1-7.
\textsuperscript{162} Grainger, (1999), 409.
Dismayed Boeotian ambassadors were summarily refused an audience, and it was only through a combination of Achaean and Athenian intervention that the siege was lifted, the order to hand over the culprits was reimposed and the fine reduced to thirty talents.\footnote{Livy, XXXIII, xxix.}

Due to the combination of the fragmentary nature of Polybius’ text and Livy’s manipulation, one cannot reconstruct with any certainty what really happened here. From the remaining evidence, however, this entire business reads very much like an unfortunate sequence of events which simply escalated out of control: Flamininus is humiliated, a leading Boeotian politician is murdered, likewise five hundred Roman soldiers, a large tract of Boeotia is devastated and Coronea is besieged. But for the gifted opportunity from Pisistratus and Zeuxippus of simultaneously soothing a severely bruised ego and containing the pro-Macedonian faction, Flamininus might simply have swallowed his pride and sought to solve the problem posed by the restoration of the likes of Brachylles diplomatically rather than by subterfuge, in which case the ensuing, unforeseen mayhem would never have taken place. However, the intense hatred and lingering resentment of the Boeotians were to have far-reaching political repercussions for Rome, resulting eventually in their support for Antiochus.\footnote{Polybius, 18, 7, 5; Livy, XXXVI, 6, 1-5.}

On the matter of Flamininus being duped in the reinstatement of the pro-Macedonians, it would be simplistic to conclude that this was due to a lack of circumspection, hardly typical of an individual who, in spite of his relative youth, had already proved himself as a hardened politician in, for example, successfully bulldozing his way to the consulate and in craftily wrong-footing Philip at Nicaea. The same applies to his clinical assessment of the situation in Epirus in 198 when, controlling his anxiety in striving to achieve what had proved to be beyond the ability of his two predecessors, he had endured the frustration of a six weeks’ delay rather than launching an immediate, risky attack against Philip. This in itself clearly shows that Flamininus was not in any way inclined towards deluding himself about the reality of a situation and allowing himself to be seduced by a softer option. Equally, his ability to think on his feet in perilous circumstances is clearly illustrated by the manner in which at a critical moment he had transferred his command from the left wing to the right at Cynoscephalae. Moreover, political expediency apart, given the previously mentioned threat from Antiochus, there is a remark of Livy’s which leaves little doubt that, even as he granted the Boeotians’ request, Flamininus had no illusions about them:
Quinctius readily granted their request, not because he thought that they deserved it, but because he was anxious, in view of Antiochus' suspicious movements, to win the support and sympathy of the Grecian States.

The Boeotians, meanwhile, well aware of the fact that Flamininus was anxious to garner support from the Greeks, would have approached him under the assumption that his cooperation was virtually a foregone conclusion. This looks, therefore, very much like an informal gentlemen's agreement, and, given his prior assessment of the situation, Flamininus can hardly be blamed for the Boeotians failing to keep their side of the bargain. One is left to surmise, therefore, that either the Boeotians were devilishly convincing, which in itself is wildly inconsistent with the rest of their generally maniacal behaviour, or that, yet again, vital information has gone missing. At worst, in the light of what was to be a brilliant career, Flamininus, clearly more sinned against than sinning, made a rare mistake, the consequences of which in the greater scheme of his campaign, though inconvenient, were far from catastrophic.

**Flamininus' Culpability**

The following matter for consideration is how much personal blame should be attached to Flamininus for what quickly proved to be a poor decision in sanctioning the murder of Brachylles. First, his state of mind when approached by Zeuxippus and Pisistratus has already been mentioned, so one must consider the possibility of his generally sound judgement being momentarily clouded by his emotions. Next, given his anxiety to maintain a low profile rather than personally organize the assassination, one must also discount the notion that, emotional issues aside, he had glibly gone ahead under the assumption that, even if detected, he could still escape with impunity. Already painfully aware of the Boeotians' mood, he would have been anxious not to antagonize them still further. In all probability, therefore, having listened to Zeuxippus and Pisistratus' detailed arguments (πολλοῦς καὶ ποικίλους --- λόγους) in their entirety, Flamininus concluded that they could achieve their objective without being detected. If so, though morally indefensible, this decision was otherwise sound, since Flamininus can hardly be held responsible for Pisistratus' unimaginable stupidity. Whatever the

---

165 Livy, XXXIII, 27, 6.
166 Polybius, 18, 43, 8-10.
167 See Pfeilschifter, (2005), 146: "Man mag die ganze Geschichte, mit Rechte, für moralisch verwerflich halten.”
circumstances, any measures taken by Flamininus to preserve his anonymity can hardly be construed as “weaselling out,” as Grainger contends, in which case he would have simply walked away from the situation altogether.

Far from providing any clues on this topic, Polybius and Livy both do their level best to shield Flamininus from any accusation of personal responsibility for the disastrous consequences of his decision. As already shown, Livy takes the expedient of relegating Flamininus’ involvement in the assassination to no more than a suspicion held by the Boeotians. Polybius, however, having already mentioned Flamininus’ involvement, must have resorted to some other means than the convenient suppression of embarrassing material. Unfortunately, since his account has not survived beyond the point at which Alexamenus organised the assassination, it is impossible to deduce with any certainty how he did this. The most likely answer is by trying somehow to shift the blame on to the Boeotians, a ploy he uses, albeit unconvincingly, some two books (Book XX) and four years later (192), when he spends no fewer than four chapters in describing them as degenerate beyond redemption. Already long in decline after their prestigious victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371, they had been completely demoralized following a heavy defeat by the Aetolians at Chaeronea in 245, and this lingering discontent, Polybius claims, rather than the assassination, was the underlying cause of their intense hatred of the Romans. This contention is implausible. After all, what did any of this have to do with the Romans? In 371, nowhere near Greece, they were still struggling to regain territory lost as a result of the Gallic invasion of 390, and in 245 still fighting the Carthaginians in a war not due to finish for another four years. Even accepting that the Boeotians’ degeneracy and discontent might have been a contributory factor, the anti-Roman sentiment that manifested itself in 196 had not originated in Leuctra or Chaeronea of yesteryear. The reason for Polybius’ resurrection of this subject after a lapse of four years becomes clear from the next topic in his agenda, i.e., the formation of an alliance between the Boeotians and Antiochus. His unconvincing attempt to shift the blame away from Flamininus, therefore, is merely a ploy to exonerate him of any personal responsibility for this potentially serious threat to Rome. Furthermore, Livy gives the lie to all this convoluted logic. In dealing with the same topic, and, on one of the rare occasions that he disagrees on an important point of detail with Polybius, he has no qualms about stating that the murder of Brachylles was indeed the reason for the

---

169 Polybius, 20, 4-7.
170 Polybius, 20, 4; 2-7.
171 Polybius, 20, 7, 3-5. Cf., Pausanias, 8, 11, 9, where he describes the Thebans as fainthearted/lacking in spirit - ἄθλιοις.
172 Polybius, 20, 7, 5; Livy, XXXVI, 6, 1-5.
Boeotians’ animosity. Indeed, unlike Polybius, he can well afford to do so without the risk of damaging Flamininus’ reputation, since, whereas in Polybius’ account his involvement in the assassination is a fait accompli, Livy, in reducing it to a mere suspicion, effectively absolves him of any direct responsibility. Contrary to what Polybius would have us believe, therefore, the murder of Brachylles, far from being merely the catalyst for the ensuing disorder in 196 and the formation of the alliance between the Boeotians and Antiochus in 192, was the direct cause.

**Concluding Remarks**

One of the more intriguing aspects of this affair is the role played by Alexamenus. Murderous villain or otherwise, he would hardly have conspired with Zeuxippus, Pisistratus and Flamininus simply for the gratuitous pleasure of having some unfortunate menial done away with. In spite of Flamininus’ general reluctance to get involved without good reason in the internal politics of individual Greek states, therefore, one must consider the possibility that on this occasion he had made an exception and offered Alexamenus some sort of quid pro quo. In view of the marked deterioration in the relationship between Rome and the Aetolians following Cynoscephalae and the peace agreement with Philip at Tempe shortly afterwards, however, along with Flamininus’ policy of restraining them rather than sanctioning any increase in their sphere of activity, it is difficult to imagine just what this incentive might have been. Whatever, it must have been extremely attractive in order to secure Alexamenus’ co-operation with such apparent ease. If the conspirators had succeeded in concealing their identity and had subsequently been able to put whatever plans they had made into effect, this information might well have come to light. Given their failure to do so, however, and the furious Boeotian backlash, which would have resulted in the cancellation of any previous agreement, it has been lost. Next, when Alexamenus’ part in the conspiracy became apparent after the interrogation of Pisistratus under torture and the testimony of Zeuxippus’ slave, for whatever reason the Boeotians decided to direct their anger exclusively against the Roman intruders rather than their fellow Greeks, with Alexamenus getting off scot free. In the context of the surviving information this makes little sense. It is not unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that Polybius actually provided a detailed explanation, frustrating lost, embarrassing for Flamininus and consequently suppressed by Livy.

---

174 Given the possibility of severe political repercussions and the antipathy between Rome and the Aetolian League, Pfeilschifter,(2005), 146-147, is equally nonplussed about any political advantage to be gained by Alexamenus, especially since it entailed the suppression of anti-Roman elements in Boeotia.
Whatever the embarrassment suffered by Flamininus as a result of this incident, however, there is no evidence to suggest that it impinged in any way upon what was developing into a brilliant career. There is no record of either his competence or his suitability for the task in hand being called into question by his political opponents in the senate. Indeed, the next topics dealt with extensively by the historians are the revision of the peace terms with Philip, followed immediately by the Isthmian declaration, undeniably one of the high points of Flamininus’ entire career. However, the events of spring 196 did return to haunt him for years to come. Following the assassination, Zeuxippus went into self-imposed exile and Flamininus worked continually to get him reinstated in Boeotia. Such was the intensity of the lingering resentment over the assassination of Brachylles, however, that his efforts were doomed to failure. On the positive side, however, this experience would have undoubtedly served as a sharp reminder to Flamininus that, in dealing with Greeks, caution must constantly be exercised and nothing should ever be taken at face value.

Finally, as an afterthought, it is worth considering whether or not Philip played a greater part in these events than can definitively be deduced from the surviving evidence. Had an agreement been made between Philip and the Boeotians, traditional supporters of Macedon, whereby he had guaranteed the safe return of their compatriots even before they approached Flamininus? After all, the notion of Macedonian sympathisers occupying influential positions in the Boeotian administration would have been irresistible, especially in the case of Brachylles, who had already proved a valuable servant of Macedon, first for Antigonus Doson, who, shortly after his victory over Cleomenes in 222, appointed him governor of Sparta, and thereafter for Philip himself. Had Philip, therefore, simply made a show of dutifully bowing to Roman pressure in acceding so readily to Flamininus’ request, in mischievous anticipation of his imminent, humiliating predicament? This in itself would have consoled Philip in some part for the equally humiliating quandary Flamininus had so cunningly engineered for his ambassadors following the conference at Nicaea, but the totally unexpected bonus of the ensuing mayhem would have surpassed his wildest dreams.

---

175 Polybius, 18, 44, 1–45, 12; Livy, XXXIII, 30, 1–31, 11; Zonaras, 9, 16, k-l.
176 Polybius, 18, 46, 1-15; Livy, XXXIII, 32, 1–33, 8; Val. Max., 4, 8, 5; Florus, 1, 23, 13-15; Appian, Mac., IX, 4.
177 Polybius, 22, 4, 4-16. Significantly, Livy makes no mention of this; yet another example of his reticence whenever confronted with embarrassing material.
178 Polybius, 2, 66, 4–69, 11; Pausanias, 2, 9, 2-3 and 8, 49, 5-6; Justinus, 28, 4, 1-10.
1.2.9 Flamininus proclaims the Independence of the Greek States at the Isthmian Games.

In the early spring of 196 ten commissioners arrived from Rome bearing a *senatus consultum* to revise the peace terms that Flamininus had negotiated with Philip after Cynoscephalae some nine months earlier. In the interim the overall situation had become more precarious, as is clearly illustrated by the Brachylles affair, a reminder that since the defeat of Macedon pro-Roman parties had become increasingly unpopular in Greece. Added to this was the ever-present threat of Antiochus, who was planning to take possession of the strategically situated port of Ephesus. 180 There was a clear need, therefore, to reassure the Greeks about the benefits they were enjoying as a result of the defeat of Philip. The main sticking point for the Romans, however, was how to reconcile the ongoing occupation of the “fetters of Greece” with a viable declaration of universal liberty. The Aetolians felt sure that through their constant agitation they had cleverly manoeuvred Flamininus into a quandary, on the assumption that his desire for unalloyed admiration from the Greeks would make it difficult for him to resist their demands for the evacuation of these strategic strongholds. 181 The reality for the Greeks, they claimed, since the Romans had remained in control of the “fetters” following Philip’s defeat, was no more than a change of masters and the freedom gifted them by the Romans was purely illusory. 182 Ironically the Aetolians had been doing Flamininus a favour, since evacuation was precisely what he wanted, 183 and he was now able to reason with the commissioners that, with Aetolian encouragement, Antiochus might well use this as a pretext for interfering in Greek affairs. 184 Yet again, this gives the lie to the notion that self-glorification was invariably Flamininus’ primary motivation. All things considered, his personal situation was more secure than it had been at Nicaea in 198, since there was little reason for him to worry about any imminent expiry of his *imperium*, which had already been extended for the second time during the winter of 197 and which still had some time to run. 185 It is equally inconceivable that he would have

180 Polybius, 18, 41a, 2: ὅτι Ἀντίοχος ὁ βασιλεὺς πάνυ ὄργετο τῆς Ἐφέσου διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν, τῷ δοκεῖν μὲν κατὰ τῆς Ιωαΐδος καὶ τῶν ἔφοιτων πόλεων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσάς ἀκροπόλεως ἔχειν θέσιν, κατὰ δὲ τῆς Ἐυφώπης ἀμυντήριον ὑπάρχειν ἀεὶ τῶν Ἁσίων βασιλεύσιν εὐκαιρότατον.
181 Polybius 18, 45, 8-9; Livy, XXXIII, 30, 8-10.
182 Polybius, 18, 45, 6; Livy, XXXIII, 31, 2. Livy mentions the illusory notion of Greek freedom but chooses to omit the rhetorically incisive clause concerning the change of masters, presumably to disguise an embarrassing reality.
183 Polybius, 18, 45, 7; Livy, XXXIII, 31, 8-10.
184 Polybius, 18, 45, 11.
185 Livy, XXXIII, 25, 11.
recommended the total liberation of any Greek cities, strategic strongholds or otherwise, if this would in any way have jeopardised the entire Roman campaign, now well into its fifth year, when they were but a few days away from achieving a vital objective.

Meanwhile, however, the commissioners' will prevailed and the “fetters” were to remain under Roman control, although, following Flamininus’ recommendation, the city of Corinth proper was singled out for special attention and handed over to the Achaean. Since the Roman objective appears to have been threefold. First, to provide the Achaean with some measure of reassurance, (in marked contrast to Flamininus’ circumstantial helplessness during their joint encounter with Nabis the previous year). Next, to provide an example of Roman altruism and sincerity for the rest of the Greeks. Finally, to reduce - superficially at least - the problematical “fetters” from three to two. In fact, the handing over of Corinth was no more than an empty gesture, given that the Romans were to retain control of the citadel Acrocorinth, yet consideration should be given to what overall effect it actually produced on the goodwill of the Greeks at which it was so pointedly directed. Flamininus was simply testing the lie of the land, insofar as this gesture was just the opening gambit in what eventually emerges as a clear example of carefully premeditated duplicity, which constitutes the stark reality of the much-vaunted Isthmian declaration. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the Greeks’ reaction was positive and provided Flamininus with the confidence to hatch the rest of his plot. The eventual proclamation is carefully phrased specifically to obscure the Romans' true intentions. Polybius states that, among other peoples, the Corinthians, Euboeans and Thessalians, were going to be left free, without garrisons, subject to no tribute and governed by their ancestral laws. So far so good, yet specific mention of any one of the “fetters” by name is studiously avoided and, in spite of Flamininus' protestations to the commissioners, the garrisons were to remain firmly in place for another two years. By means of this contrivance, therefore, and in anticipation of the euphoria resulting from the proclamation itself, Flamininus and the commissioners sought to enjoy the best of both worlds, hoping that the Greeks would consider the precautionary occupation of just three locations to be an acceptable price to pay for freedom throughout the rest of the country. Convincing evidence of this duplicity is provided by Livy. Although he readily concurs with Polybius on all other significant

---

186 Polybius, 18, 45, 12; Livy, XXXIII, 31, 11.
187 Ferrary, (1988), 82: “Quant à la proclamation de Corinthe, elle n’était à proprement parler qu’une déclaration d’intention, un programme d’action qui ne devait être totalement réalisé qu’avec l’évacuation totale de la Grèce par les légions en 194.”
188 Polybius, 18, 46, 5: ἑλευθέρους, ἀφορουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρομένοις πατρίδος. Appian, Mac., 1, 4: [sc. Ελλάδα] ἀφοροῆτων, ἀφορολόγητων ἴδιοις ἠθείς καὶ νόμοις χρήσθαι.
189 Livy, XXXIV, 49, 4-5; Zonaras, 9, 18d.
points of detail, including the Greeks’ immunity from taxation and the restoration of their ancestral laws,\textsuperscript{190} he makes no mention whatsoever of the garrisons; and conveniently so, for to contradict Polybius and thereby draw attention to their still being in place would be totally incompatible with Roman posturing on the matter of freedom for the Greeks and throw the Aetolians’ relentless complaints into sharp perspective.

Concerning the actual declaration, it approaches a sham of monumental proportions, long on propaganda yet, but for a few relatively minor adjustments, short of any new constitutional innovations, since for the most part the Greeks had already been liberated as a result of the peace treaty between Macedon and Rome duly ratified by an earlier \textit{senatus consultum}.\textsuperscript{191} There is no evidence, however, which suggests that the Greeks themselves were aware of this. Consequently, the specious liberation of Corinth was duly followed by a series of carefully disseminated reports directed towards preparing the Greeks to accept the reality of the declaration when it eventually emerged, and all this amid the frenzied carnival atmosphere of a major pan-Hellenic festival:

\begin{quote}
σχεδὸν ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν συνεληλυθότοι διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῶν ἀποβησομένων, πολλοὶ καὶ ποικίλοι καθ’ ὅλην τὴν πανήγυριν ἑνέπιπτον λόγοι, τῶν μὲν ἄδυνατον εἶναι φασκόντων Ἐρμαίους ἐνίον ἀποστήναι τόπων καὶ πόλεων, τῶν δὲ διοριζόμενων ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἐπιφανῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντων τόπων ἀποστήσονται, τοὺς δὲ φαντασίαν μὲν ἔχοντας ἐλάττω, χρείαν δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν παρέχεσθαι δυναμένους καθέξουσι. καὶ τούτους εἰθέως ἐπεδείκνυσαν αὐτοὶ καθ’ αὐτῶν διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους εὐρεσιτεχνίας.\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

The most distinguished men from nearly every part of the world assembled there owing to their expectation of what would take place, and the discussions that abounded for the duration of the festival were both numerous and intricate. Some claimed that it would be impossible for the Romans to withdraw from certain places and cities, whereas others declared that they would withdraw from those places which came readily to mind whilst maintaining control over those considered to be less important but which could be equally adapted to their purpose. What is more, these people even presumed in their ingenious exchanges to pinpoint which particular places were involved.

\textsuperscript{190} Livy, XXXIII, 32, 5; \textit{-- liberos, immunes, suis legibus, \textendash}.  
\textsuperscript{191} Polybius, 18, 42, 1-5. See also Walbank, \textit{Comm. II}, 614, n. 15.  
\textsuperscript{192} Polybius, 18, 46, 1-3. On Flamininus’ choice of Corinth as the venue for the declaration, see Ferrary, (1988), 86-88.
It would seem, therefore, that the Greeks really had been psychologically preconditioned not to expect a complete withdrawal, and their pragmatic and seemingly uncritical assessment of the Romans’ predicament contained in the above quotation clearly gives the impression that, under the circumstances, this was far from unreasonable. Indeed, it is an intriguing notion that the “fetters” might well have been included in whatever places were referred to in the final sentence of the above quotation, though this must remain strictly speculative due the absence of any precise identification. Whatever, Roman expectations that, even when the truth eventually emerged, the ongoing occupation of the “fetters” would be generally accepted proved to be correct, since the only protests came from the Aetolians.

From the surviving evidence the full extent of the role played by Flamininus in all of this is difficult to assess, though two points can be established. First, from a personal perspective, the patres were eager fully to exploit his immense personal popularity resulting from the Macedonian campaign. Consequently, any differences of opinion over the immediate evacuation of the “fetters” were summarily brushed aside and, in receiving the same measure of credit as the entire senatorial order in the prelude to the actual declaration, Flamininus was effectively portrayed as the embodiment of Roman policy in Greece. In the event, this particular piece of stage management almost backfired catastrophically, for in the subsequent fit of euphoria Flamininus only narrowly escaped being smothered by an overenthusiastic, stampeding mob anxious to make contact with the man they considered to be their saviour. Second, from a political perspective, the sum total of his proposals approved and enacted unreservedly by the commissioners was proportionately far greater than any disagreement about the “fetters”, which, however much the Aetolians ranted, was to prove no more than a minor and temporary embarrassment in the greater scheme of things. Such was the comprehensive measure of Flamininus’ achievements thus far, without which the Isthmian declaration would never have taken place.

This much is clear, but any attempt specifically to apportion direct responsibility for these carefully contrived theatrics – the disseminated rumours, the exploitation of the carnival atmosphere engendered by the games, Flamininus’ receiving parity with the senate and, particularly, the mendacious nature of the declaration itself – is less straightforward. The most likely candidate, however, is undoubtedly Flamininus, beginning with the illusory liberation of Corinth. Consideration should also must be given to his linguistic talent, to what by now had become an extensive knowledge of Greek politics and to his insight into the Greek mind, the result of his earlier service in Tarentum, now followed by more than two years of ongoing campaigning in Greece.

193 Polybius, 18, 46, 5; Livy, XXXIII, 32, 5.
same goes for his well attested diplomatic skills - his trickery in duping Philip at Nicaea, for example, and his timely reassurance of Philip at Tempe, designed equally to keep the Aetolians in their place. It is difficult to imagine that any of his contemporaries would have been able to manipulate this delicate situation with equal dexterity. Whatever, as a result of the events at Isthmia, not only did Flamininus’ reputation remain secure, it was considerably enhanced and, yet again, the Aetolians were clearly outmanoeuvred.

### 1.2.10 Flamininus and the Allied Campaign against Nabis

Concerning the severity of the threats posed simultaneously by Antiochus, the Aetolians and Nabis, Livy’s presentation of material leaves much to be desired. First, included incidentally in a chapter recounting the allocation of provinces to the new consuls on the Ides of March, 195, he mentions the prorogation of Flamininus’ imperium, due to the allegedly prevalent uncertainty, with an added stipulation by the senate that the consuls were to make available any reinforcements required to bring his forces up to full strength. In the very next chapter, in decidedly unambiguous language, he stresses the dire implications for the stability of all Greece and the credibility of Roman foreign policy if Nabis should be allowed to retain possession of Argos, then almost immediately relates how the senate chooses not to make any formal declaration of war, opting rather to leave the entire matter to the discretion of Flamininus. Next, and in clear contrast to his previous statement, Livy says that the problem of Nabis is not so pressing after all, and that the Romans had better consider what actions Hannibal and the Carthaginians would take if war were to break out with Antiochus. Shortly afterwards, however, he mentions the delivery to Flamininus of a senatus consultum declaring war against Nabis, at which point the proconsul summoned the Greek allies to a conference at Corinth to discuss this problem, particularly the question of Argos.

---

194 Livy, XXXIII, 11, 4: addecta etiam illa vox, bono animo esse regem ut [sc.caduceator] iuberet, quae maxime Aetolos offendit.
195 See Walsh, (1996), 358: “He was the only Roman bothered by the contrast between its implications and the reality of 196, for only he understood what the Greeks expected of such a declaration, and he himself as architect and declarer was personally responsible for meeting these expectations. The extravagant language used in the proclamation at the Isthmian Games would also serve as leverage against reluctant commissioners for the execution of Flamininus' plans for Greece. Rome, through Flamininus, had stated her intent.”
196 Livy, XXXIII, 43, 6.
197 Livy, XXXIII, 44, 8-9.
198 Livy, XXXIII, 45, 3.
199 Livy, XXXIII, 45, 4-5.
200 Livy, XXXIV, 22, 4-13.
There are two clear indications of Flamininus’ discontent with Nabis remaining in control of the city. The first is the manner in which the agreement had (reluctantly) been made, i.e. on a purely *de facto* basis, without any official sanction. The second, and more significant, is the total absence of any mention of Argos in Flamininus’ Isthmian declaration,\(^\text{201}\) a clear implication that sooner or later this matter would be requiring special attention. Yet again, therefore, a case had to be made to justify Roman intervention in foreign affairs. Due to the Macedonian defeat at Cynoscephalae and the Isthmian declaration, and in spite of the increasing rebelliousness of the Aetolians and the perennial recalcitrance of the Boeotians, northern Greece was now enjoying some measure of stability.\(^\text{202}\) Livy’s contention, therefore, that unless preventative measures were taken, Nabis, currently the tyrant of Lacedaemon, would shortly become the tyrant of the whole of Greece, is both contradictory and exaggerated.\(^\text{203}\) Even so, the combination of Nabis’ reputation and his bellicosity did not bode well for the stability of the Peloponnese. More specifically, as a result of his refusal fully to commit himself to peace with the Achaeans, rather than limiting his commitment to a temporary armistice, the eventual outbreak of hostilities was inevitable.

Flamininus’ presidency of the conference at Corinth is noteworthy for his skilful manipulation of the assembly. Focussing on Argos, he held the Greeks morally responsible for deciding whether, in direct contravention of the liberty currently enjoyed by all other cities in Greece, the city should remain under Nabis’ control. Then, apparently as an afterthought:

Romanos [sc. res] nihil contingit, nisi quatenus liberatae Graeciae unius civitatis servitus non plenam nec integram gloriam esse sinit.\(^\text{204}\)

It makes no difference to the Romans, but for the fact that the servitude of any one city of liberated Greece denies them glory which is both complete and flawless.

By thus playing on the implicit ingratitude of the Greeks, should they refuse to follow a course favourable to their own interests, (and equally advantageous to those of Rome), Flamininus duly secured a unanimous decision in favour of war.

The role played by the Aetolians, smouldering with increasingly bitter resentment over what they considered to be grossly unfair compensation for the invaluable support

\(^{201}\) Gruen, (1984), 450: “The Isthmian proclamation was pointedly silent about Argos, her fate evidently still undecided.”

\(^{202}\) Livy, XXXIV, 22, 4-6.

\(^{203}\) Livy, XXXIII, 44, 8.

\(^{204}\) Livy, XXXIV, 22, 12.
they had given to the Romans, is equally remarkable. A thinly disguised reproach from the (unnamed) Athenian delegate on the grounds of Aetolian ingratitude for the Roman liberation of Greece provided the catalyst for a bitter Aetolian counter-attack by a certain Alexander, along with the contention that Flamininus was hypocritically using the campaign against Nabis as a pretext for remaining in Greece. Moreover, echoing similar Aetolian protests from before the Roman declaration at Isthmia the previous year, Alexander claimed that the alleged Roman liberation was purely fallacious, since they still controlled the strategically important towns of Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth. So it now clearly emerges that the garrisons, all three of them, in direct contradiction to Polybius’ version of the Isthmian declaration, for which Flamininus had shared equal credit with the senate, had still remained securely in place for the better part of a year. However, since it is only the Aetolians who broached this potentially irksome subject, it is reasonable to assume that the rest of the Greeks were generally satisfied with the status quo.

Ever since his victory over Philip in Epirus three years earlier, Flamininus had been taking every measure to restrict the Aetolians’ authority. He would have been not a little perturbed, therefore, by their suggestion that the Romans should return to Italy and leave it to the Aetolians themselves to deal with Nabis. For Flamininus, however, the Aetolians, though officially still allies of Rome, were no more an acceptable alternative for Nabis than they were for Philip. Whatever, he had no cause for concern. Two years earlier when, due entirely to circumstances, Flamininus had been unable to pressurize Nabis on the question of Argos, the Achaean strategos Nicostratus had held his peace. This time, however, with the prize tantalizingly within reach, Nicostratus’ successor, Aristaenus, was in no mood to be frustrated by a third party, and, in riposte to the Aetolians’ proposition that they themselves should be allowed to handle the matter of Nabis, he unleashed a vitriolic philippic, racist in content almost beyond imagination. Quite apart from the question of Argos, the very idea of Aetolian involvement in Peloponnesian affairs following a Roman withdrawal would certainly have caused far greater anxiety to the other Greeks, especially the Achaeans, than to Flamininus. The measure of support he had, therefore, was overwhelming, though possibly not altogether spontaneous. In Livy’s uncritical narrative the Athenian reproach is without any apparent provocation, but the neat juxtaposition of Roman

205 Livy, XXXIV, 23, 8-9;
206 Frustratingly, yet again this is another significant episode of which Polybius’ version has not survived. One can only speculate, therefore, about the content of his account on the matter of this inconsistency.
207 Livy, XXXIV, 23, 11.
208 Livy, XXXIV, 24, 1-5, esp. § 4: linguam tantum Graecorum habent sicut speciem hominum: moribus ritibusque efferationibus quam uli barbari, immo quam immanes beluae vivunt.
altruism and Aetolian ingratitude does admit the possibility that it was premeditated, and the same applies to the sheer extremity of Aristaenus’ rhetoric. It is worth considering, therefore, whether the Athenian and Achaean attacks upon the Aetolians were the result of a *complot* made with Flamininus before the conference specifically to brand them as *bêtes noires*. If so it was extremely effective, since the Aetolians appear to have left the assembly before a unanimous decision in favour of war had been taken and played no further part in the allied campaign against Nabis.  

Having already manipulated the conference on the grounds of moral responsibility to make the declaration of war, Flamininus applied equal ingenuity in deflecting the allies’ attention away from the liberation of Argos towards an attack against Nabis in Sparta. Disturbed by the wretched condition of the citizenry, who were overwhelmed with fear, he questioned the feasibility of attacking Argos; after all, since it was on behalf of the Argives that the war had been undertaken, he could not imagine anything less consistent than to attack their city whilst leaving the real enemy alone. With the exception of Aristaenus the rest of the assembly opposed this notion, albeit momentarily. Livy makes no specific mention of this change of heart, but it should be considered whether Flamininus won round the dissenters by referring to the phraseology he had used when putting the motion for war to the assembly, in which Nabis is clearly pinpointed as the villain of the piece, along with the implication that the problem of Argos would be resolved as a natural consequence of controlling Nabis:  

> referre se dixit quid de Nabidis bello placeret, nisi redderet Achaeis Argos.  

He said he was now addressing the matter of what they would do about a war against Nabis if he did not give Argos back to the Achaeans.  

As with the harangues delivered by the Athenian delegate and Aristaenus, Livy is equally silent about any of this being premeditated, but this time there can be no doubt, given that Flamininus’ brother Lucius, ably supported by Eumenes and the Rhodians, was already making arrangements for extensive naval support off Gytheum. Whatever, once again Flamininus had his way, which might not have been so if he had revealed his true objective immediately.  

---

210 There is no further mention of the Aetolians in Livy’s account until XXXIV, 49, 5, by which time Nabis had been defeated and Flamininus was on the point of withdrawing his forces from Greece.  
211 Livy, XXXIV, 26, 4: *Postquam oppressam metu civitatem vidit, advocate consilium de oppugnandis Argis.*  
212 Livy, XXXIV, 26, 7.  
213 Livy, XXXIV, 25, 6.  
214 So also Aymard, (1938), 1938, 207-8.
Flamininus’ arrival outside the walls of Sparta includes an episode in which his own personal safety was seriously compromised. Lulled into a false sense of security by not having met any resistance during a march through seemingly non-hostile territory, Flamininus, along with the cavalry and the light infantry, had gone on ahead of the main column. Preoccupied with measuring out the site for their camp, they were unexpectedly attacked by Nabis’ auxiliaries. As it turned out, they were rescued, and not before time (tandem), only by the arrival of the main column, which quickly drove the attackers back into the city. Such is the basis of Livy’s account, but for a more telling insight we can be thankful to Dio, who says that when Flamininus drew near, Nabis, contemptuous of the fact that he was still tired from the march and preoccupied with pitching camp, opportunistically ordered a sortie. Unlike Livy, therefore, who excuses Flamininus to a certain degree on account of the totally unexpected nature of the Spartan attack, Dio suggests that this was the result of a certain degree of negligence or lack of concentration. Whatever, one thing emerges undeniably from each historian’s account: a small, and therefore vulnerable, Roman contingent had placed itself dangerously close to the enemy. In defence of Flamininus, it must be conceded that this incident was not serious enough to merit the same degree of contemptuous scorn and damning criticism levelled at M. Claudius Marcellus by Polybius and Livy for the manner respectively in which, quite apart from losing his own life, he had put the entire republic at risk. Even so, it would appear to be a rare mistake by Flamininus, totally inconsistent, for example, with the due caution he had exercised in postponing the attack on Philip’s stronghold in Epirus for nearly six weeks.

Against the considerably superior allied forces Nabis was doomed, and Flamininus clinically removed any possible lingering hope he might have had at the very beginning of the campaign. Rather than negotiating he pointedly devastated a huge tract of Laconian territory extending south from Mount Taygetus to the sea, and shortly afterwards his brother Lucius captured the all important coastal city of Gytheum. Consequently Nabis, isolated on all fronts, had no choice other than to seek an audience with Flamininus, and under markedly different circumstances from their first personal encounter at Mycenae two years earlier.

215 Livy, XXXIV, 28, 3-5.
216 Dio, 9, 18, a-c.
217 Polybius, 10, 23, 7; Livy, XXVII, 28, 11.
218 According to Livy, XXXIV, 38, 3, Flamininus’ combined land and naval forces amounted to fifty thousand.
219 Livy, XXXIV, 28, 11-12.
220 Livy, XXXIV, 29, 1-14.
221 See Texier, (1975), 77: “La partie que s’apprêtait à jouer Nabis s’annonçait difficile. Alors qu’en 197, il avait pu se permettre de convoquer Titus et de procéder à un véritable étalage de sa force et que le Romain avait tenu le rôle de quémandeur, maintenant, la situation était retournée.”
in mediae regionis tumulos modicis copiis sequentibus cum venissent, relictis ibi
in statione conspecta utrimque cohortibus Nabis cum delectis custodibus corporis,
Quinctius cum fratre et Eumene rege et Sosila Rhodio et Aristaeno Archaeorum
praetore tribunisque militum paucis descendit.222

When they had arrived with but few attendants at some rising ground in the
intervening territory, they each left their cohorts in full view of the troops on
both sides. Nabis went down to the meeting with chosen members of his body
guard, and Quinctius went with his brother, King Eumenes, Sosilas the Rhodian,
Aristaenus the captain-general of the Achaeans, and a few military tribunes.

Choosing to speak first, Nabis appeals to the Romans’ sense of fair play. Referring to the
seizure of some Roman transport ships bringing supplies to Scipio from Sardinia in early
202,223 he contrasts the lack of integrity of the Carthaginians in failing to honour the
conditions of peace treaties with the supposedly unblemished reputation of the Romans
in such matters.224 Whatever, this particular ploy failed to produce the desired effect,
and Nabis’ argument that his occupation of Argos had never been considered as an
obstacle to the formation of an amicitia with Rome was also discounted. In fact, the
manner in which Nabis concluded his argument must have severely rankled Flamininus:

at hercule in ea controversia quae de Argis est superior sum et aequitate rei, quod
non vestram urbem sed hostium, quod volentem non vi coactam accepi, et vestra
confessione, quod in condicionibus societatis Argos mihi reliquistis.225

But, by Hercules, on the disputed question of Argos I have the upper hand both on
the grounds of the justice of the situation - for I took possession of a city which
belonged not to you but to the enemy, and by its own consent rather than by force
– and through your own acknowledgement, since it was by the terms of our
alliance that you left Argos to me.

This is a reasonable point, yet Nabis does not do himself any favours, for in attempting
to put Flamininus on the defensive by accusing him of inconsistency, he injudiciously
reminds him of the circumstances - his blustering bravado together with his cynical
exploitation of the more pressing matter of Macedon - when Flamininus was in no
position other than to leave him in control of Argos. Having had involuntarily to make
any sort of concession to someone of Nabis’ ilk must have been a bitter pill for

222 Livy, XXXIV, 30, 6-7.
223 Polybius, 15, 1-14; Livy, XXX, 25, 1-12; Val. Max., 6, 6, 4; Appian, Pun., 6, 34-35; Eutropius, 3, 22, 1.
224 Livy, XXXIV, 31, 3-4.
225 Livy, XXXIV, 31, 9-10.
Flamininus to swallow, and, all else besides, his failure to protest at the time can equally be explained by his wishing to hide his frustration and thereby preserve a modicum of dignity. Before his first encounter with Nabis, Flamininus, by his premeditated taunting of Philip, specifically intended to make it perfectly clear that any compromise was simply out of the question, had undoubtedly bested him in the decidedly raucous slanging match across the width of the Aous, and subsequently he had wrong-footed him at Nicaea. In the interim he had defeated Philip at Cynoscephalae and issued the Isthmian declaration, and all this in dealing with a bona fide monarch of indisputably royal lineage, in sharp contrast to Nabis’ decidedly dubious genealogy. Moreover, although there was undoubtedly some degree of personal rapport between Flamininus and Philip, there is no evidence that this was the case with Nabis, so he could expect no sympathy on that account. On the contrary, Walbank, for example, reads astutely between the lines in sensing Flamininus’ lingering resentment following the conference at Mycenae in 197: “Meanwhile, in Greece, the outstanding problem of Argos offered the chance to settle a private score.”

Undoubtedly relishing the occasion, therefore, and speaking from a carefully crafted, unassailable position, Flamininus dominated the conference in a manner strongly reminiscent of the earlier conference at Tempe with Philip and the Greek allies in 197. Yet again he purposely avoids the central issue before increasing the pressure on Nabis by applying the same blanket argument to Sparta that he had used for Argos at the beginning of the campaign, namely, that it too should enjoy its former freedom, without which the Romans’ glory as liberators of Greece would be seriously impaired. This is yet another clear example of Flamininus’ obduracy in situations of this sort. Impatient, or even contemptuous, of his adversary’s point of view, reinforced by convincing evidence or otherwise, he simply bulldozes his way to achieving his objective by the sheer force of his personality. Moreover, following this clever piece of (undoubtedly premeditated) manipulation, it must have come as a severe shock to Nabis suddenly to be confronted with the notion that his authority was now under serious threat not only in Argos, but even in Sparta!

---

226 For a detailed investigation see Texier, (1975), 16–21.
227 Walbank, (1940), 187.
228 Livy, XXXIV, 32, 3–4
229 Gruen, (1984), 454: “Flamininus’ speech to Nabis fails to meet any of the Spartan’s points.” Also Eckstein, (1987), 229: “Some of Flamininus’ arguments leave much to be desired, not only regarding Nabis’ previous relations with Rome, but also regarding the history of Argos. Yet Flamininus’ speech is far more emotionally focused on the immorality of Nabis’ past behaviour than it is on the legalities of past diplomacy.” For a detailed analysis of this conference and the relative merit of Nabis’ and Flamininus lines of argument, see Mendels, (1978), 38–44.
In the event, to the severe disappointment of the Greek allies, Flamininus refused to pursue the campaign any further on the grounds that he had recently received a report from P. Villius to the effect that the Romans could no longer depend upon maintaining peace with Antiochus, who had landed in Europe with far greater military and naval forces than on the previous occasion. Under these circumstances, he claimed, he could not afford to tie up his troops in a protracted siege of Sparta. At best this can only be described as gross misrepresentation by Flamininus. It had been during the first half of the previous year, 196, that the peace conference, attended by Villius and three other Roman delegates, had taken place, specifically at Lysimachia in the Chersonese on the extreme eastern sea-board of northern Greece. By the time Villius made this alleged report to Flamininus, however, Antiochus had been absent from Europe for the better part of a year. Following a rumour about the death of Ptolemy, Antiochus had called for a temporary postponement of the inconclusive conference and set sail for Egypt, with the intention of exploiting any political instability and, if possible, acquiring the kingdom for himself. Before he had even reached Cyprus, however, his fleet was caught in a storm. Livy dramatically describes the consequences:

multae fractae, multae naves eictae, multae ita haustae mari ut nemo in terram enarit. magna vis hominum ibi interiit, non remigum modo militumque ignotae turbae sed etiam insignium regis amicorum. conlectis reliquis naufragii, cum res non in eo essent ut Cyprum temptaret, minus opulento agmine quam prefectus erat Seleuciam reedit. ibi subduci nauibus iussis—iam enim et hiems instabat—ipse in hiberna Antiochiam concessit.

Many of the ships were wrecked, many ran aground, and many were simply swallowed up by the sea so that no one could swim to dry land. A large number of men perished, and not just the nameless mass of rowers and soldiers, but many distinguished men who were friends of the king. He collected the remnants of his shattered fleet, and since it was no longer possible to try and reach Cyprus he returned to Seleucia with a less powerful contingent than when he had set out. Once there he ordered the ships to be beached, for winter was already coming on, and retired to Antioch for the winter.

---

230 Livy, XXXIV, 33, 12
231 Livy, XXXIV, 34, 1-9.
232 Polybius, 18, 49, 2 –52, 5; Livy, XXXIII, 37, 8 – 41, 4; Appian, Syr., 1-4.
233 Livy, XXXIII, 41, 7-9. Livy is suspiciously vague in referring to the whereabouts of Antiochus a mere four chapters later, specifically XXXIII, 45, 2; quod ad Antiochum attineret, ---, quoniam rex quacumque de causa in Syriam concessisset. However, this does corroborate the evidence that he was not in Greece at this time.
This is sufficiently convincing evidence that, for the moment at least, Antiochus was no serious threat, further corroborated by the senate’s recognition of Scipio’s alarmist statement about an impending war as merely a ploy to replace Flamininus in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{234}

Without commenting on the extremely vacuous nature of Flamininus’ excuse, Livy gives what he considers to be the real explanation, namely, his perennial fear of being replaced by a successor, (and this in spite of already having had his \textit{imperium} extended on no fewer than three successive occasions).\textsuperscript{235} Whereas this might well have been true three years earlier at Nicaea, or even after the victory over Philip at Cynoscephalae, in view of the universally attested adulation Flamininus had received the previous year at Corinth, along with the overall stability he had established in Greece, this contention is far less convincing than previously. Indeed, in the present context, it has to be asked just how much credence Livy deserves, since shortly afterwards the senate not only ratified the peace terms proposed by Flamininus on Nabis, but decided to withdraw its forces altogether, and not just from Greece, but also from Spain.\textsuperscript{236} It is difficult to imagine that Flamininus, having played such an integral role in the management of Roman foreign affairs for almost five years, and, suitably forewarned by his political allies in the senate, had no precognition of what appears to have been a radical change of policy from unspecified expansion to overall consolidation. As a result of the campaign against Nabis, deliberately inconclusive though it was, Sparta ceased to be a major power in Greece, but more noteworthy was the unprecedented degree of cooperation between the Romans and their allies, especially Philip of all people, who, since his defeat in 197, far from remaining a problem for the Romans, had begun to emerge as an extremely useful ally. He provided one thousand five hundred Macedonian troops and four hundred Thessalian cavalry for the campaign against Nabis,\textsuperscript{237} and three years later provided invaluable assistance in the campaign against Antiochus. Therefore, Flamininus’ decision not to debilitate him entirely, or, as the Aetolians had urged, to execute him, had proven to be correct. The same must be said of his decision

\textsuperscript{234} Livy, XXXIV, 43, 4-6.
\textsuperscript{235} Livy, XXXIV, 33, 14 : Haec propalam dicebat: illa tacita suberat cura ne novus consul Graeciam provinciam sortiretur et incohata belli victoria successori tradenda esset. See Wood, 70, (1939), 100: “Livy has chosen to disregard a valid reason for the leniency accorded to Nabis in order to ring again the changes on Flamininus’ lust for glory - a motivation which has been shown to be based on insecure foundations in previous instances. Secondly, the Senate was by this time thoroughly convinced of the ability of Flamininus to handle the Greek situation and had recently demonstrated its reliance upon him by giving him complete authority against Nabis. The possibility of a successor, therefore, was almost non-existent. Flamininus’ tactics on this occasion were dictated by statesmanship and not by selfishness.” Even Scullard, (1951), 115, n. 4, certainly no admirer of Flamininus, remarks that this notion now “wears a little thin by repetition.”
\textsuperscript{236} Livy, XXXIV, 43, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{237} Livy, XXXIV, 26, 10.
seriously to weaken Nabis rather than to remove him, for when he withdrew all his forces from Greece the following year he deliberately left behind a miscellany of states coexisting in varying degrees of cooperation and antagonism, crucially with none of them having either the political influence or the military might to become equally dominant as Macedon had been just three years earlier.  

1.2.11 Early winter, 195: The Nemean Games

On account of the war, the Nemea, normally celebrated in July, had been postponed, but upon the arrival of the Romans the Argives initiated proceedings and did Flamininus the honour of appointing him president. Livy does his best to publicise Roman munificence in recounting the improvement of the lot of those who had suffered at Nabis’ hands prior to the campaign, and Flamininus, anxious no doubt to draw a parallel with the Isthmian declaration of the previous year, duly takes full advantage of his honorary appointment. Seeking to highlight the removal of a conspicuous anomaly to the Roman policy of universal freedom for the Greeks, he ordered the announcement of the liberation of the Argives and the restoration of Argos to the Achaean League. Achaean satisfaction was seriously impaired, however, by the fact that Nabis had been left in control of Sparta, and the Aetolians were quick fully to exploit this with some brief and exceedingly pointed rhetoric:

Aetolí vero eam rem omnibus conciliis lacerare: cum Philippo non ante desitum bellari quam omnibus excederet Graeciae urbis, tyranno relictam Lacadaemonem; regem autem legitimum, qui in Romanis fuerit castris, ceterosque nobilissimos cives in exilio victuros; Nabidis dominationis satellitem factum Populum Romanum.  

---

238 See Scullard, (1970, 191: “He [sc. Nabis] could balance the Achaeans in the south, as Philip balanced the Aetolians in the north.” Similarly, Badian, (1970), 20, who refers to Flamininus’ policy of “establishing a balance of powerless states in Greece: by refusing to increase the power of (at that time) loyal Aetolian allies in the north to the extent that they had expected, (i.e. to enable them to take the place of Macedon), or that of the loyal Achaeans by fighting Nabis to a finish.” Briscoe, (1972), 33: “It may be true that Flamininus’ original attraction towards the Greeks and Greek culture led him to formulate a policy of independence for the city-states. But he also conceived such a policy as suiting Rome’s best interests, and he did not push it to extremes. His aim, rather, was to achieve a balance of power, to prevent any one state, be it city-state, federation or kingdom, from becoming too powerful, and thus to make Roman military presence or intervention unnecessary.”

239 Livy, XXXIV, 41, 5–6.
Indeed the Aetolians savaged this notion at all their meetings: in the case of Philip, they said, there had been no cessation of hostilities until he had evacuated all the cities of Greece, whereas Lacedaemon had been abandoned to the tyrant; moreover, the rightful king, who was in the Roman camp, and other citizens of the highest rank, were destined to live in exile; the Romans had become the lackeys of Nabis’ despotism.

Livy is markedly silent about any conference, or even casual discourse, to resolve this situation, and duly recounts that Flamininus simply led his troops back to Elatea. Effectively, then, this was the end of the matter. Meanwhile, he had firmly grasped the opportunity granted him by the senate with both hands. Effectively, this had been just another episode in a campaign which Flamininus had made his own from its very offset, and senatorial approval is fully reflected in the ratification of his peace treaty with Nabis, undoubtedly accepted in its entirety, since Livy summarily dispenses with the entire business in no more than thirty or so words.

1.2.12 Flamininus announces the Withdrawal of all Roman Forces from Greece.

At the beginning of spring, 194 Flamininus went to Corinth, where he had summoned a general assembly of the Greek allies. His consummate stage-management on this occasion lends considerable weight to the notion expressed earlier that he was primarily responsible for the theatrics at Isthmia. His opening speech, in which he reminded the assembly of the benefits they had enjoyed as a result of the successful Macedonian campaign, was received with great approbation, at least until mention was made of Nabis. It seemed hardly appropriate that the liberator of Greece should have dealt with him so leniently. Hardly in a position to reveal his true objective in not removing Nabis altogether, Flamininus produces the decidedly lame excuse that this

---

240 Identified by Briscoe, (1981), 114, 6, as a certain Aesipolis. Cf. Livy XXXIV, 26, 14: Princeps erat exulum Agesipolis, cuius iure gentis regnum Lacedaemone erat.
241 Livy, XXXIV, 41, 7.
242 See Balson, (1967), 179: “His conduct of negotiations with Philip at Nicaea in the autumn of 198 was shaped by his determination that nobody but himself should have the kudos of ending the second Macedonian war; his anxiety to secure the ratification of the peace with Philip at the end of 197 was due to the same motive; his insistence on a peace settlement with Nabis at the end of 195 again was due to his wanting this to be Flamininus' settlement and nobody else’s.”
243 Livy, XXXIV, 43, 1-2.
244 Livy, XXXIV, 48, 3. On the probable composition of the meeting, see Briscoe, (1981), 124, 3.
would have entailed the destruction of Sparta, a most prestigious city, in which case it was preferable to leave him in his current enfeebled condition. At the Nemean Games the previous year the matter of Nabis had also proved to be an embarrassment, and Flamininus had been left with little choice other than to walk away. This time, however, fully anticipating this problem and with a superb sense of timing, he chooses to reveal his true purpose in summoning the assembly:

praeteritorum commemorationi subiecit proficisci sibi in Italiam atque omnem exercitum deportare in animo esse: Demetriadis Chalcidisque praesidia intra decimum diem audituros deducta, Acrocorinthum ipsius extemplo videntibus vacuam Achaeis traditurum, ut omnes scirent utrum Romanis an Aetolis mentiri mos esset, qui male commissam libertatem populo Romano sermonibus distulerint et mutatos pro Macedonibus Romanos dominos. 245

Following this review of past events he went on to announce that he intended to leave for Italy and take his entire army with him. Within ten days, he said, they would hear that the garrisons had been withdrawn from Demetrias and Chalcis, and, even as they themselves looked on, he would hand Acrocorinth, free of all troops, over to the Achaeans forthwith, so that everyone might know whether it was the Romans who were in the habit of telling lies, or the Aetolians, who, with all their talk had broadcast the notion that it had been a mistake to entrust the cause of liberty to Rome and that the Greeks had merely changed masters, Romans for Macedonians.

This is only the second mention of the retention of the Roman garrisons since the Isthmian declaration. At the first, by the Aetolians, Flamininus, lost for a viable counter and preoccupied with the problem of Nabis, had remained silent, but this time Roman propaganda was ringing true: they had finally squared the circle of ensuring their own security under the guise of altruistically winning freedom for the Greeks. Under no pressure on this occasion to resort to duplicitous phraseology and presentation, therefore, Flamininus is able to exploit the situation to the utmost, for the reality of the total withdrawal spoke clearly for itself. 246 Ethically speaking Flamininus now had the upper hand and he would undoubtedly have relished the opportunity of taunting and humiliating the Aetolians in public, if only to gratify the decidedly mischievous side of his character. Consider, for example, the witticism with which he gently taunted Philip at Nicaea, 247 his simulated surprise at Deinocrates’ predilection for a combination of protracted drinking sessions and terpsichorean transvestism, 248 and the jeering passage

---

245 Livy, XXXIV, 49, 4-6.
246 Similarly the withdrawal of garrisons from Oreus and Eretria in Euboea; Livy, XXXIV, 51, 1.
247 Polybius, 18, 7, 6.
248 Polybius, 18, 10, 1 – 11, 14; Nepos, 23, 12, 1-2.
in his letter to Philip in which he suggested that he should send Demetrius back to Rome - along with all his best men.\textsuperscript{249} By the same token he could be pointedly infuriating – witness the deterioration of his first encounter with Philip into a slanging match, with missiles finally being exchanged across the Aous, a direct result of Flamininus’ premeditated insistence on what he fully realised to be totally unacceptable peace conditions.\textsuperscript{250} This is just the sort of treatment he would have reserved for the Aetolians, nor is there any reason to doubt that he would have been roundly supported by the rest of the Greeks, as had been the case in Corinth at the start of his campaign against Nabis. Not for the first time, therefore, the Aetolians would have been compelled ignominiously to withdraw from a conference, but on this occasion, with no viable case to plead, laughed, rather than shouted, out of court, and to the raucous accompaniment of protracted jeering, booing and catcalls, such jocularity ensuing spontaneously from the euphoria so clinically manipulated by Flamininus.

Any resentment over the matter of Nabis was forgotten,\textsuperscript{251} momentarily at least, and Flamininus, exploiting still further the euphoria he had anticipated as the result of his clinically timed announcement, raised the subject of the liberation of Roman soldiers captured by Hannibal during the Second Punic War and subsequently sold into slavery in mainland Greece. At the time the Romans themselves had not ransomed these men, first because from early times it had never been the practice of the state to show any indulgence towards prisoners of war, next because the sums involved would have put a severe strain on an already over-burdened treasury, and finally because they were reluctant to enrich Hannibal who, according to rumour, was seriously short of funds.\textsuperscript{252} In making his request Flamininus resorts to the same ploy he had used at the start of his campaign against Nabis, in implicitly laying the moral responsibility for compliance with the senate’s declaration of war against Nabis on the Greeks themselves:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ne ipsis quidem honestum esse in liberata terra liberatores eius servire.}\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

It was discreditable even for themselves that the liberators should be slaves in the very land they had liberated.

\textsuperscript{249} Polybius, 18, 3, 8.
\textsuperscript{250} Livy, XXXII, 10, 6-8.
\textsuperscript{251} See Seager, (1981), 111: “Flamininus handled the situation well. His excuses about Nabis were no more convincing than they had been a year before, but he moved from them directly to the long-delayed announcement that Rome was to evacuate the Fetters. In the emotional response to this announcement Nabis was, as Flamininus had no doubt reckoned, forgotten for the moment.”
\textsuperscript{252} Livy, XXII, 61, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{253} Livy, XXXIV, 50, 3
The implication is clear: since the situation is discreditable for the slaves themselves, then for their masters, morally speaking, it should be untenable. Livy, quoting Polybius, refers to the “immense number” (ingens numerus)\textsuperscript{254} of enslaved Romans involved all over Greece, and that the cost to the Achaeans alone would amount to no less than one hundred talents. Yet again, however, Flamininus had manipulated the situation so skilfully that, overwhelmed with gratitude, they immediately consented. At this point, before the assembly began to disperse, right on cue and as an exhilarating finale, the Roman soldiers who had been occupying Acrocorinth for the previous two and a half years descended from the citadel, marched through the gate and began their journey back to Elatea, (and eventually to Italy). Livy provides no graphic details, but it would not be fanciful to suppose that this was indeed a carefully rehearsed spectacle par excellence, with military discipline of the highest order, the troops in perfect step to the accompaniment of a resounding fanfare, and every piece of equipment polished to a brilliant shine. Flamininus followed the column of march accompanied by the assembly proclaiming him, not for the first time, their saviour and liberator.

Those scholars who so readily condemn Flamininus for his obsession with personal popularity, allegedly even to the possible detriment of the republic, would be better advised to stand back and consider the matter of the “fetters” as a single entity rather than as a series of separate episodes. The criticism directed at his duplicity and mendacity is hugely disproportionate to the scant praise he receives for his penetrating introspection and skilful improvisation. First, it was on the issue of the “fetters” that he cunningly wrong-footed Philip at Nicaea for the express purpose of bringing him to the battlefield at the very start of the new campaigning season, on which point he was fully supported by the patres. Next, the available evidence suggests that it was Flamininus who, frustrated by the commissioners’ insistence that the “fetters” should remain under Roman occupation, and unable to envisage any viable alternative, was primarily responsible for the duplicitous Isthmian declaration. Whatever, yet again, he had read the mood of the Greeks perfectly, since the ruse paid off and, when the reality of the declaration eventually emerged, it was contested only by the Aetolians, whose protests were ignored by the rest of the Greeks in spite of the Roman garrisons still being in place.\textsuperscript{255} Finally, by the theatrical manner in which he announced the Roman withdrawal from Greece, (with a military parade thrown in for good measure), he transformed any lingering Greek resentment into undisguised adulation, and achieved a three-fold objective of enhancing the reputation of both himself and the republic, of discrediting the Aetolians and of securing the release of the Romans sold into slavery by Hannibal. Job well done, albeit not without a certain measure of his characteristic

\textsuperscript{254} Livy, XXXIV, 50, 5.  
\textsuperscript{255} Livy, XXXIV, 22, 4-5.
duplicitly. For added effect, in sharp contrast to Isthmia, (and, for that matter, Nemea), he chose to dispense with the services of a herald and made the announcement personally. Moreover, he cunningly couched his announcement in terms that clearly implied that he alone was responsible for this momentous decision, thereby hijacking what in reality was a senatorial directive.256

1.2.13 Flamininus’ Triumph

The surviving accounts of Flamininus’ triumph for his victories over Philip and Nabis in late 194257 are succinct yet sensational, but equally impressive is the manner in which the triumph was awarded:

Postquam Romam adventum est, senatus extra urbem Quinctio ad res gestas edisserendas datus est triumphusque meritus ab lubentibus decretus.258

When he reached Rome, Quinctius was granted an audience with the senate outside the city to receive his report of his achievements and they gladly voted him a well-deserved triumph.

This is not only a clear tribute both to his personal popularity and to the respect he had earned from his peers, but contrasts sharply with the sort of factional in-fighting which had preceded the niggardly denial of triumphs on various technicalities to, for example, Marcellus for his victories in Sicily,259 Cn. Fulvius (cos. 211) for his capture of Capua,260 and P. Cornelius Scipio for his outstanding success in Spain.261 For Flamininus it finally laid to rest the ever-recurring spectre of losing his commission to a successor and, along with it, the considerable credit to which he was entitled for having so successfully conducted what had been an extremely complex campaign of some five years’ duration.

The festivities lasted fully three days, but neither the carnival atmosphere nor the opulence of the booty and prizes on display should distract the reader from a pragmatic evaluation of the proceedings. The sheer volume of precious metals, the greater

257 Livy, XXXIV, 42, 3-12; Val. Max., 5, 2,6; Justinus, 31, 3,2; Eutropius, 4, 2,2; Orosius, 4, 20, 2-3; Cicero, Verr., 2, 4, 129.
258 Livy, XXXIV, 52, 3.
259 Livy, XXVI, 21, 3-4; Val. Max., 2, 8, 5; [Vict], Vir. Ill., 45, 6
260 Val. Max., 2, 8, 4.
261 Livy, XXVIII, 38, 1-4; Dio Cass., fr.57, 56; Amm. Marc., 25, 9, 10.
proportion of which had been taken from Philip, is in itself impressive.\textsuperscript{262} The same applies to the hundred-plus gold coronets awarded by various cities as personal gifts to Flamininus. Next, of the many noble prisoners and hostages, only two, Demetrius, son of Philip and Armēnes, son of Nabis, are mentioned by name, a clear indication that Macedon and Lacedaemon, each of which had been subjugated in turn by Flamininus, were the two states over which the Romans were particularly anxious to maintain tight control. Finally, the presence of the former Roman slaves, conspicuous by their shaven heads,\textsuperscript{263} liberated by the Greeks in grateful compliance with Flamininus’ opportunistic request. At various points in the historians’ narratives there are clear indications of a humanitarian aspect of Flamininus’ character.\textsuperscript{264} Humanitarian issues aside, however, consideration should be given to the political capital Flamininus made from the presence of these former slaves, and with no financial burden on Rome, since it was the Greeks who had met the costs of their liberation.

\subsection{1.2.14 Flamininus and Antiochus’ Envoys in Rome}

Initially, relations between the Romans and the Seleucid monarch had sometimes been sensitive, but never overtly bellicose. For example, in 198 Antiochus is referred to by the senate as \textit{socium et amicum populi Romani}.\textsuperscript{265} In 197, rebutting Rhodian claims that he was seeking to give assistance to Philip, he sent an embassy to Rome to reassure the senate that he had no intention of jeopardising his \textit{amicitia}.\textsuperscript{266} The Romans received and duly dismissed the envoys courteously, but, tellingly, “as the situation demanded,” \textit{ut tempus postulabat}, i.e., the outcome of the war with Philip was still in doubt. Next, in 196, immediately after the Isthmian declaration, the ten commissioners, though intent primarily on finalising the peace settlement with Philip, gave precedence to an embassy from Antiochus, the purpose of which was to reaffirm the aforementioned \textit{amicitia}. On this occasion, however, with Philip now defeated,\textsuperscript{267} the Romans’ response was markedly less compliant:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item See Walbank, (1940), 190.
\item For this custom, see Plautus, \textit{Amph.}, 462; Val. Max., 5, 2, 5 and Petronius, 41, 1-4.
\item E.g., his concern over the terrified citizens of Argos in 195, as a result of which he eventually persuaded the Greek allies to take the war directly to Sparta. Livy, XXXIV, 26, 4-8. Similarly, his distress over the plight of the Aetolians besieged in Naupactus by Glabrio in 191. Livy, XXXVI, 24, 6.
\item Livy, XXXII, 8, 13.
\item Livy, XXXIII, 20, 8.
\item Walbank, (1940), 186: “But after Cynoscephalae the Roman attitude underwent a decided change.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Primi omnium Regis Antiochi vocati legati sunt. Iis eadem fere quae Romae egerant verba sine fide rerum iactantibus nihil iam perplexe ut ante, cum dubiae res incolumi Philippo erant, sed aperte denuntiatum ut excederet Asiae urbis quae Philippi aut Ptolomaei regum fuissent, abstineret liberis civitatibus, neu quam lacisseret armis: et in pace et in libertate esse debere omnes ubique Graecas urbes; ante omnia denuntiatum ne in Europam aut ipse transiret aut copias traieret. 268

The first to be summoned were those from Antiochus. Since they spoke in pretty much the same ostentatious and deceptive manner as they had in Rome, they did not receive the same ambiguous answer as on that previous occasion, when Philip was still a force to be reckoned with and the future was uncertain. Rather, Antiochus was issued a stringent warning to withdraw from the cities in Asia which had belonged either to King Philip or King Ptolemy, to keep away from the free states and to molest none of them by force of arms. All the Greek cities, regardless of location, must enjoy peace and liberty. Above all, he was issued a stringent warning neither to cross over to Europe personally nor to transport any troops there.

Livy’s version of this episode is more expansive than that of Polybius, who mentions neither the earlier embassy to Rome, where Livy claims the ambassadors had displayed the same mendacity as in the present instance, nor the matter of Philip. More significant, however is Livy’s omission of the closing statement of Polybius’ version, namely, that some of the commissioners would go to meet Antiochus, 269 a clear sign that the Romans were willing to keep negotiations open and that this was not a step towards war. 270 It would appear, therefore, that Livy is overstating the situation in order to enhance the Romans’ profile and to lend further credence to the notion that their foremost – and pointedly altruistic – consideration was freedom for the Greeks. Immediately before the declaration they had unequivocally ordered Philip to withdraw his forces from those Greek cities in Asia which had come into his possession. 271 It would seem markedly inconsistent, therefore, if they should fail to do likewise with Antiochus. 272 However, any hopes that these stipulations would have any effect on the

---

268 Livy, XXXIII, 34, 1–4.
269 Polybius, 18, 47, 3: καθόλου δὲ καὶ εὐτόν τινας ἔφασαν ήξειν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον.
270 Gruen, (1984), 621–622: “The posture is less one of belligerence than of maintaining public consistency. The decem legati had neither instructions nor intention to declare an ultimatum. Indeed, they made certain to keep negotiations open by appointing some of their members to meet personally with the king. This was not a step towards war.”
271 Polybius, 18, 44, 4; Livy, XXXIII, 30, 3.
272 621 Gruen, (1984), 621: “-- that the Romans, who had just made a grandiloquent pronouncement of liberty for all Greeks, could hardly exempt the Greeks of Asia from that proclamation.”
Seleucid monarch were frustrated; in fact, he had already crossed over from the Troad and landed in the Chersonese.

He united his naval and military forces at the sea-port city of Madytos. As the citizens had shut their gates against him, he completely invested the city and was on the point of bringing up his siege engines when they surrendered. The resultant fear led the inhabitants of Sestos and other cities in the Chersonese to surrender voluntarily. He then directed his attention to the restoration of Lysimachia, which had been plundered and burned some years previously by the Thracians, against whom he then undertook an expedition, returning to Lysimachia towards the end of the year to receive ambassadors from Rome, the purpose of whose mission was to arrange a peace treaty between Antiochus and Ptolemy.

The Romans told Antiochus that all the cities he had taken from Ptolemy should be restored to him. Furthermore, they could not sanction his occupation of those cities he had seized from Philip since, they claimed, they rightfully belonged to themselves as spoils of war. Moreover, they said, Antiochus should refrain from attacking any autonomous cities. Totally unabashed the king slickly turned the situation to his own advantage by questioning the Romans’ authority in laying down the law about what he may or may not do in Asia, given that he did not presume to tell the Romans how they should conduct themselves in Italy. As for his presence in Europe, he added, the Chersonese was his by ancestral right, and his reconstruction of Lysimachia was to provide a residence for his son Seleucus, who was no threat to Rome. Finally, cutting the ground from under the Romans’ feet, he said that not only were he and Ptolemy already reconciled, but that in addition he had recently concluded a marriage alliance with him.

Back-peddalling frantically, the Romans resorted to calling on envoys from Smyrna and Lampsacus to voice their complaints about Antiochus, but the king shouted them down, saying that he would accept intervention on this matter from the Rhodians, but not from the Romans. The Romans had no grounds for contesting this decision, since the summoning of a third party to act as an honest broker between disputing parties was a universally respected Hellenic custom, besides which the Romans were amici of the Rhodians. Antiochus had clearly defeated them on every point. At this juncture an unauthenticated report arrived from Egypt that Ptolemy had died, so the conference was disbanded inconclusively and Antiochus returned to Asia. In spite of the mutual animosity reported by Polybius, however, there is still no mention of any inclination

273 A custom which the Romans themselves had adopted on more than one occasion: e.g., the Epirotes were invoked to arrange a peace settlement between Philip and the Romans in Epirus in 198, (Livy, XXXII, 10, 1), and earlier in 196 the Athenians and the Achaeans intervened in the dispute with the Boeotians following the assassination of Brachylles, (Livy, XXXIII, 29, 8-12).

274 Polybius, 18, 52, 5.
towards military conflict. Indeed, throughout the entire episode, the Roman ambassadors never even bothered to complain to the king that the conference itself was taking place on ground on which they had expressly forbidden him to tread.

In the spring of 195 Flamininus was in Corinth rallying the Greek allies for the forthcoming campaign against Nabis when a fresh embassy arrived from Antiochus, yet again to negotiate an alliance. Although Flamininus had been dealt a carte blanche by the senate to conduct the allied campaign however he saw fit, he had no mandate on the matter of Antiochus, and duly informed the ambassadors he could express no opinion in the absence of the ten commissioners and that they would have to go to Rome and consult the senate.275 It is impossible to determine whether this embassy ever actually reached Rome or simply returned to Antiochus.276 Whatever, it is clear that by virtue of despatching the embassy the king had shown that he was anxious to keep negotiations alive and that, yet again, military action was not being considered by either party at this point in time.

For the period 195-194 information concerning Antiochus’ activity is relatively scarce. What can be established, however, is that in early 195, unbowed by the Romans’ protestations at Corinth and Lysimachia the previous year, he embarked upon a major expedition by land and sea into Thrace, a large part of which, according to Appian, he occupied by conquest or surrender. He liberated those Greeks cities under Thracian control and hugely ingratiated himself - ἐξαρίζετο πολλά - with the Byzantines, because their city was admirably situated at the outlet of the Black Sea. Turning his attention toward Asia Minor, he brought the Galatians into his alliance,277 presumably with a view to consolidating his position in Anatolia. Yet again, however, none of this activity drew any adverse comment from the Romans, nor were they concerned about reports that Antiochus was colluding with Hannibal with a view, on the latter’s advice, to fighting a war against the Republic on Italian soil,278 and they were similarly unmoved by rumours that Nabis could count on help from Antiochus.279 Most significantly, the Roman’s lack of any anxiety is best illustrated by their decision, in spite of Africanus’ protestations,280 to remove all their forces from Greece in 194.281

---

275 Livy, XXXIV, 25, 2.
277 Appian, Syr., 2, 6.
278 Livy, XXXIV, 60, 1-6.
280 Livy, XXXIV, 43, 4-5.
281 Gruen, (1984), 455: “The following spring of 194 saw the evacuation of all Roman forces from Greece. The patres dismissed arguments about a potential menace from Antiochus and found no further reason for the stationing of soldiers in the East.”
Nonetheless, Antiochus clearly felt the need to reassure the Romans that his recent activity did not in any way threaten their interests. In late 194, therefore, in anticipation of complaints from the ambassadors of the various Greek states who were arriving in Rome, where the senate and the ten commissioners were due to debate and ratify Flamininus' arrangements in Greece, he sent an embassy of his own, yet again for the purpose of forming an alliance. Reminiscent of the situation in Corinth in 196, the arrival of the Seleucid embassy at this particular point in time posed a problem for the Romans, still anxious to avoid armed conflict with Antiochus, yet compelled as purportedly altruistic liberators of Greece to make, at the very least, some sort of conciliatory gesture to the various Hellenic embassies.

Flamininus was appointed by the patres to hear Antiochus' ambassadors in the presence of the ten commissioners. The senior representatives were Hegesianax and Menippus, the spokesman. The latter claimed to be at a loss to understand what difficulty or complications their mission could create, since they had come merely to seek friendly relations and form an alliance, of which, he added, there were three categories; that dictated by the victors to the vanquished in warfare, that arranged by equals after a drawn war and that between states which have never been at war and which unite to pledge mutual friendship sanctioned by a treaty of alliance, with neither party enforcing or accepting conditions. Since it was this third category that Antiochus was seeking, by what right did the Romans presume to impose conditions about which cities in Asia should remain autonomous, which should pay tribute, and, most outrageous of all from the king's perspective, which cities he should be forbidden to enter and garrison? These were terms for the Romans to impose peace upon Philip, their enemy, not to form a treaty of alliance with Antiochus, who was - pointedly - their friend. Effectively, therefore, Hegesianax iterates the same line of argument that Antiochus himself had used two years previously in Lysimachaea. On this occasion, the Roman riposte, delivered by Flamininus, was not only uncompromising, but calculatingly provocative:

Ad ea Quinctius: ‘quoniam vobis distincte agere libet et genera iungendarum amicitiarum enumerare, ego quoque duas condiciones ponam, extra quas nullam

---

282 Strictly in accordance, therefore, with the advice given to Antiochus' envoys by Flamininus at Corinth in 195.

283 Behind closed doors, apparently, since Livy later recounts that it was not until the following day that the other embassies from Greece and Asia were introduced into the senate to learn what had transpired between Flamininus and Antiochus' ambassadors. Livy XXXIV, 59, 4. It is reasonable to suppose that Flamininus was consulted prior to the negotiations in Corinth which, according to Polybius and Livy, were conducted by the ten commissioners, but this is the first, and only, recorded instance of Flamininus being personally involved in the negotiations.
esse regi nuntietis amicitiae cum populo Romano iungendae: unam, si nos nihil quod ad urbes Asiae attinet curare velit, ut et ipse omni Europa abstineat; alteram, si se ille Asiae finibus non contineat et in Europam transcendent, ut et Romanis ius sit Asiae civitatium amicitias et tueri quas habeant et novas complecti."

To this Quinctius replied, “Since you take pleasure in presenting your arguments systematically and in making lists of the various ways of establishing friendships, I too shall lay down two conditions, without which, you can tell your king, there is no way of establishing a friendship with the Roman people. First, if he wants us to take no interest in matters concerning the cities of Asia, then let him keep out of Europe, entirely; and second, if he should fail to confine himself to Asia and were to cross over to Europe, then the Romans will be justified both in protecting those friendships they already have with the cities of Asia and in seizing the opportunity of forming new ones.”

In all the negotiations to date this is the first instance of any sort of threat - albeit implicit at this point - from the Romans. The following day all the other envoys were admitted collectively to the senate and in their joint presence Flamininus restated the Romans’ case, albeit more forcefully, mentioning for the first time the possibility of military intervention:

postulata et regis et sua exposuit: renuntiarent civitatibus suis populum Romanum, qua virtute quaque fide libertatem eorum [sc. Graecorum] a Phillipo vindicaverit, eadem ab Antiocho, nisi decedat Europa, vindicaturum."

He set forth both the king’s demands and his own: let them report back to their states that the Roman people would display the same courage and sense of conviction in protecting their liberty from Antiochus, if he did not retreat from Europe, as they had shown in protecting it from Philip.

Although this in itself is not an open declaration of war, Menippus’ startled reaction clearly shows that he thinks it could be perilously close:

Tum Menippus deprecari et Quinctium et patres institit ne festinarent decernere, quo decreto turbaturi orbem terrarum essent: tempus et sibi sumerent et regi ad cogitandum darent."

---

284 Livy, XXXIV, 58, 1-3.
285 Livy, XXXIV, 59, 4-5.
286 Livy, XXXIV, 59, 6-7. See Briscoe, (1981), 141, 6-7: "Menippus and Hegesianax seem to have been genuinely afraid that the impasse which they had reached would result in an immediate declaration of war, and this they, and Antiochus, clearly wanted to avoid (at this moment at least)."
Then Menippus began to beg both Quinctius and the senate not to make a hasty decision, as a result of which they would throw the whole world into confusion; let them provide time both for themselves and for the king to consider the matter.

Most significant here is the manner in which Flamininus elevated his threat overnight from implicit to direct, pointedly when the Greeks, who roundly applauded this announcement, had been admitted to the assembly; a decidedly clever ruse, therefore, to increase the pressure on the Syrian ambassadors. Meanwhile, he knew full well that his stipulations were totally unacceptable, and it would have come as no surprise when Menippus replied that he and his colleagues had neither the inclination nor the authority to agree to any settlement that would impair the authority of the king. Even so, as things stood Antiochus did not constitute any immediate threat to Roman interests. Flamininus, therefore, in placing Antiochus in a convoluted, no-win situation was simply delivering a strict warning that Roman patience was beginning to wear thin.

To corroborate this point, Appian’s succinct yet pithy version of this incident is well worth quoting:

{oí de tῆς πρεσβείας συνιέντες ἐπὶ διαπείρα σφόν ἀφιγμένης, διὰ βραχέος ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἀντίοχος αὐτονόμως τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἑκ τοὺς ἐν Ἄσιᾳ καὶ τῆς Ἑυρώπης ἀπέχηται, Ῥωμαίοις αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι φίλον, ἄν ἐθέλη. τοσάδε μὲν ἀπεκρίναντο Ῥωμαίοι, καὶ τὰς αὐτίκας τὰς αποκρίσεις ὅλη ἐπέθεσαν.²⁸⁸}

Realizing that the embassy had come to make a test of their disposition, they [sc. the senate] replied curtly that, provided Antiochus allowed the Greeks in Asia to remain independent and kept away from Europe, he would be a friend of the Romans, if he so wished. That was the sum total of the Roman’s response, nor did they offer any explanation for it.

Little more than forty words, yet loaded with implicit meaning: the peremptory nature of the Roman response (ὅτι βραχέος), the totally unacceptable alternatives, the subtle, patronizing indifference concerning Antiochus’ friendship (ἄν ἔθελη) and finally their flat refusal to offer any explanation for their decision. The matter was non-negotiable and, whatever Antiochus decided, it was all the same to the Romans. Even so, this was still not a premeditated step towards war, since, yet again, matters were put on hold and the senate, in line with Menippus’ suggestion, appointed three delegates to go and negotiate further with the king.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Diodorus, 28, 15, 4.
²⁸⁸ Appian, Syr., II, 6-7.
²⁸⁹ Livy, XXXIV, 59, 8.
At this point consideration must be given to the notion that Flamininus was prepared to sacrifice the Greek cities in Asia in exchange for Antiochus’ withdrawal from Europe. In spite of the Romans’ perennial posturing on the matter of Greek freedom, their own security, as always, was paramount. For example, Philip had been seriously weakened and confined, but not removed, let alone executed, as the Aetolians demanded, since a totally debilitated Macedon would have resulted in an influx of barbarian tribes from the north and the east. Similarly, regardless of Greek protestations, especially from the Aetolians, Nabis was left in control of Sparta, a convenient counter balance to the Achaean League. As at Nicaea in late 198, freedom for the Greeks was in reality a secondary issue. It is a fair assumption, therefore, that the Romans would have had few qualms about the autonomy of any Greek cities in Asia - with whom they had no particular affinity anyway - if this would have ensured the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Europe. By 193, however, the question had become purely academic: it was simply too late, as Flamininus of all people would have realised. Antiochus had placed his foot firmly in the door and was not about to remove it. In fact, the very idea of his tamely retreating at this juncture was totally inconceivable. First, and pragmatically, Hegesianax draws attention to the considerable expenditure of work and money Antiochus had put into the restoration of Lysimachia. The implication is obvious; if the king was so concerned about one single city, what was the likelihood of his unquestionably jettisoning the numerous, substantial territorial gains he had been making elsewhere in Thrace during the previous three years? Next, and purely a matter of face, what was the likelihood of Antiochus making such a humiliating climb-down? Clearly none, and the Romans would simply have to learn to live with it. Meanwhile the Romans had rebutted Antiochus’ diplomatic dexterity at Lysimachea, there had been no acceleration towards military conflict and their public image on the matter of freedom for the Greeks remained unblemished.

The final point for consideration is the extent of Flamininus’ personal contribution to the proceedings and how it affected the outcome. Livy’s phraseology in saying that Flamininus had been instructed to hear what the king’s ambassadors had to say and “to reply in a manner that was consistent with the dignity and the interest of the Roman people” clearly implies that he and the commissioners had been given a free hand to conduct the negotiations however they deemed appropriate. Whatever, this entire

---

290 Supported, for example, by Scullard, (1951), 120, and Pfeilschifter, (2005), 249.
291 See Briscoe in Grainger, (2002), 135: “Antiochus had spent three years beating down resistance in Thrace, a longer period than he had spent dealing with any comparable area except Egypt and Asia Minor. To expect him to give up such a conquest was scarcely reasonable.”
episode undoubtedly bears the stamp of Flamininus. His uncompromising obduracy, displayed formerly in virtually every negotiating session with Philip, with the Aetolians and with Nabis, whereby he glibly presents any adversary with unacceptable, non-negotiable stipulations, is apparent throughout. Moreover, the manner in which P. Sulpicius Galba, the eldest of consular rank among the commissioners, intervened in his behalf to bully the hapless, vacillating Syrian ambassadors clearly indicates that he was well supported.293 The most intriguing point, however, is the hardening of the Romans’ stance on the Greek cities in Asia at the beginning of the second day of the conference. There is nothing in Livy’s text which suggests that the decision to ratchet up the tension on the Syrian ambassadors occurred on the spur of the moment, especially since it only became apparent after the Greeks had been admitted to the assembly. It is a fair assumption, therefore, that this decision had been made during a review of the first day’s proceedings by the patres, the commissioners and Flamininus, and, given that the ambassadors of Antiochus now found themselves in the selfsame predicament as those of Philip on the matter of the “fetters” some four years earlier, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the chief mischief-maker, fully in line with previously mentioned examples of this sort of behaviour, was Flamininus.

1.2.15 Flamininus and the Aetolians

By the spring of 192 Roman anxiety concerning Antiochus had increased, but rather than immediately organising a full-scale military campaign, it was decided to send three commissioners, Cn. Octavius, Cn. Servilius and Flamininus, to visit the various Greek states in an attempt to retain their support.294 Not surprisingly, it was Flamininus who played the leading role, but not even his considerable experience and diplomatic skills could dissuade the resentful Aetolians from forming what he correctly predicted would prove ultimately to be a disastrous alliance with Antiochus.295 It is interesting that there is no record of any personal reaction by Flamininus to the Aetolians’ response to his conciliatory approach, first their defiant approval of a decree inviting Antiochus to “liberate” Greece, and then, when Flamininus asked for a copy of the actual decree, their infantile taunt that they would shortly provide one from their camp on the banks.
of the Tiber! At previous conferences Flamininus had never been slow to reply, and with interest, to any provocation, especially where either the Aetolians or Antiochus’ envoys were concerned. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, that he, of all people, was simply lost for words; more likely, he was simply intent on preserving his dignity by refusing to reveal the true extent of his disbelief and irritation. In the event, in spite of Antiochus’ reputation, the rumours about the sheer size of his army, and the Aetolians’ contention that he had enough gold simply to “buy up” the Romans, proved to be groundless. In reality, at this juncture Antiochus was well short of the resources in situ necessary to conduct a protracted military campaign. In the meantime, despite the eventual defection of Demetrias to Antiochus, his overtures to the considerably more powerful Achaean League were rejected and, most significantly, Philip, naturally reluctant to see his former realm occupied by an opportunist from Asia, not only abided by the peace settlement of 196, but freely gave invaluable support to the Romans. Worse still for the Aetolians, they soon began to regret forging an alliance in which it became obvious that each partly was simply using the other for its own advantage. Effectively, therefore, Flamininus’ refusal to react to the Aetolians’ earlier impudence was due to the fact that he was simply biding his time, waiting for the opportunity of throwing it back in their faces, which he does shortly afterwards with obvious relish in an unbroken tirade whereby expresses equal contempt for the Aetolians and Antiochus alike and which occupies an entire chapter of Livy. Even Livy’s relatively sober language leaves one in no doubt of the highly-charged atmosphere as these insults are being traded, and, at the risk of being repetitious, it must be said that the loss of what would undoubtedly have been a far more direct and livelier account by Polybius is to be regretted. Even so, from a biographical perspective, this is yet another example of Flamininus’ introspection, his parliamentary skills and the sheer forcefulness of his personality.

Flamininus’ predictions proved to be correct. A few months later Antiochus was convincingly defeated at Thermopylae by the consul Acilius Glabrio, ably assisted by M.

---

296 Livy, XXXV, 33, 9-11. The speaker was Damocritos, ‘un des plus exaltés ennemis de Rome’, (Aymard, (1938), 246), who, in 199, had persuaded an assembly of the Aetolian League to remain neutral in the Roman war against Philip, (Livy, XXXI, 32, 1-5), and later, in 193, had tried to engage Nabis in an alliance against the Romans, (Livy, XXXV, 12, 6).

297 Livy, XXXV, 32, 4 : tantum advehi auri ut ipsos emere Romanos posset.

298 Flamininus addressing a joint assembly of the Achaeans and the Aetolians shortly afterwards at Aegeum: ‘et utinam subicere oculis vestris, Achaii, possem concursationem regis magni ab Demetriade nunc Lamiam in concilium Aetolorum, nunc Chalcidem: videretis vix duarum male plenarum legiuncularum instar in castris regis, videretis regem nunc mendicantem prope frumentum ab Aetolis quod militi admetiatur, nunc mutuas pecunias faenore in stipendium quaerentem, nunc ad portas Chalcidis stantem et mox, inde exclusum, nihil aliud quam Aulide atque Euripo spectatis in Aetoliam redeuntem. Livy, XXXV, 49, 9-11

Porcius Cato, and though the king himself, along with a personal bodyguard of five hundred men, managed to escape, it was not without the loss of the remainder of his entire army in the retreat. He then evacuated whatever forces he had elsewhere in Greece and promptly retreated to Ephesus, leaving his former Aetolian allies in the unenviable predicament of having to make whatever terms they could with the victorious Romans.

However, in spite of his hasty retreat from Europe, Antiochus was still a threat. The possibility of his returning had seriously to be considered and, even in his absence, he provided financial assistance to the Aetolians. Meanwhile, any sort of effective counter-attack against him could only be considered if Greece was politically stable. Acilius Glabrio, accordingly, having succeeded admirably at Thermopylae, turned his undivided attention to dealing with the Aetolians, only to find himself before long in a diplomatic quagmire.

The Aetolians had been occupying Heraclea, a city some ten miles directly to the west of Thermopylae. After the defeat of Antiochus they defiantly rejected Acilius’ conciliatory request to surrender the city and negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. Their already tenuous position became considerably worse after Acilius had made short work of encircling and capturing the city, and they duly came to terms with Rome through the mediation of Acilius’ military tribune, L. Valereius Flaccus, albeit, without being in any way aware of the stringency of the agreement into which they were about to enter:

οἱ δ’ Ἀιτωλοὶ καὶ πλείω λόγον ποιησάμενοι περὶ τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων ἔκριναν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ὅλα Μανιρ, δόντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει τότῳ, τῷ δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὑπόκειταν ἄρα ἐπικεφαλέντες, ὡς ἄν διὰ τὸ τούτῳ τελειοτέρου σφίναν ἔλοις ἐπάρξαντος, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίως ἴσοδύναμε τὸ τ’ εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτῶν ἐγχειρίσαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι.

The Aetolians, after some further discussion about the current situation, decided to refer the whole matter to Glabrio, and to commit themselves “to the good faith” of the Romans, with no real idea of just what this involved, and misled by the word “faith” into thinking they would be granted greater leniency. However,

---

300 Livy, XXXVI, 17, 1 – 19, 12; Cicero, Sen., 32; Val. Max., 2, 5, 1; Frontinus, Strat., 2, 4, 4; Florus, 1, 24, 11; Appian, Syr., 18a-20a; Justinian, 31, 6, 5; Victor, Vir. Ill., 47, 3; Eutropius, 4, 3, 2; Orosius, 4, 20, 20-21, Zonaras, 9, 19, g-h.
301 Polybius, 20, 9, 10-12. Cf. 36, 4, 1-9, in which he elucidates similarly the terms of surrender imposed on Carthage after the Third Punic War. The legalistic formulae in question are se in fidem [sc. populi Romani] permittere, or se fidei permittere, Livy XXXVI, 27, 8 and 28, 1, 1 respectively, with se in fidei dare also used as an alternative.
with the Romans for someone to commit himself “into their good faith” is the same as surrendering unconditionally.

Realizing that they had committed themselves to total surrender rather than peace negotiations, the Aetolians fled from Heraclea and regrouped at Naupactus, which Acilius also besieged. It was only through the direct intervention of Flamininus that the siege was lifted and peace terms suitably agreed upon. Though generally reliable and level-headed, Glabrio lacked an eye for detail in failing to realize that an unduly harsh Roman policy would undermine the concept of a liberated Greece, idealised by Flamininus on two occasions in Corinth, first in 196 at the Isthmian Games, and then in early 194 before the total withdrawal of his forces. Had Flamininus been present from the very beginning, no doubt his circumspect diplomacy and, especially, his fluency in Greek would have ensured that this unnecessary, time-consuming episode had been avoided.

1.2.16 Flamininus and the Assassination of the Macedonian Prince Demetrius

In 188 Roman forces evacuated Greece for the second time in six years, and another seventeen years were to elapse before the next military intervention. During this period not only did the generally friendly disposition of the various Greek states towards Rome begin to diminish, but the relationship between Rome and Macedon became decidedly frosty. Initially, however, in spite of his defeat in 197, Philip had the sagacity subsequently to support the Roman cause,. In return he was rewarded with the release of his younger son, Demetrius, who had been being held as a hostage in Rome, along with the remission of war indemnity, yet his most valuable contribution was undoubtedly his provision of a safe passage for the Roman legions through Macedonia and Thrace, on their way to confront Antiochus on Asian soil the following year in 190. He then proved himself a valuable ally during the Aetolian war, following which he was allowed to keep several cities he had captured from Amynander in Athamania, along with the strategically important stronghold of Demetrias in Thessaly. Even so,

---

302 This resulted eventually in a third military confrontation and the defeat of Macedon by the consular forces of L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in 168. Although it was not the final conflict between Rome and Macedon, effectively it broke the back of Macedonian power. See, e.g. Walbank, (1940), 223-257, esp. 239-252; Gruen, (1984), 402-419.
303 Polybius, 21, 30, 1-4; Livy, XXXVI, 35, 11-14 and XXXVII, 25, 12.; Eutropius, 4, 3, 1; Zonaras, 9, 19 g.
304 Livy, XXXVII, 7, 7-16; Appian, Mac., 1, 5; Zonaras, 9, 20 a.
305 Livy, XXXIX, 22, 10-12.
Philip’s lingering dissatisfaction with successive Roman peace settlements soon festered into resentment, and by 185 numerous Greek states, along with Eumenes of Pergamum, represented by his brother Athenaeus, were complaining to the senate about his seizure of other territories. When Roman commissioners at Tempe ordered him to withdraw his garrisons, he began to plan for another war with Rome, which ultimately would prove disastrous for the house of Macedon, albeit not in Philip’s own lifetime.

Although Philip could provide a convincing argument for his occupation of certain territories in Thessaly, he proceeded to make an already difficult situation worse by committing further incursions in Thrace, concentrating on the coastal towns and cities. Matters came to a head when, in early 184, the senate ordered Philip to liberate all occupied Thracian territory, and impulsively he vented his anger on the unfortunate citizens of Maroneia. Fearing the consequences, he sent his younger son Demetrius as an ambassador to Rome in the hope that the popularity the young prince had enjoyed during his detention as a hostage in the city would serve to mitigate the senate’s retaliation.

Such is the background to a series of events which led to a bitter quarrel between Demetrius and his elder half-brother Perseus, culminating eventually in the assassination of Demetrius on the orders of his own father. Roman culpability in this dynastic murder, unparalleled in the history of the Antigonids, and its effect on relations between Rome, Macedon and the Hellenistic world have already been examined by previously mentioned scholars. As is to be expected, opinions vary on all aspects of this episode, especially the involvement of Flamininus, one of the principal antagonists, and the measure of his responsibility for the death of the young prince. This requires still further examination.

Polybius and Livy recount in detail the sympathetic reception given to Demetrius by the Roman senators, along with their concerted efforts to lighten the burden of convincingly defending his father against the multitude of charges directed at him, a task which was clearly beyond the young man. Both Philip and Perseus became

---

306 Livy, XXXIX, 23, 6-9.
311 Edson, 46, (1935), 191.
312 Polybius, 23, 21, 2.
jealous of Demetrius’ popularity, and their jealousy was compounded by resentment of the Romans due to the patronising manner in which the senate acquitted Philip, not on his own merit, but out of consideration for Demetrius - a clear slap in the face for the king. As if this were not enough, the Senate glibly added that a commission would be sent to Macedon to ensure that everything was being done “in accordance with its wishes” - κατὰ τὴν τῆς συνεκλήτου βουλήσι - arrogant, even impertinent phraseology, given Philip’s undisputed royal status, with the clear implication that he was at the Senate’s beck and call.\footnote{Polybius, 23, 2, 10; Livy, XXXIX, 47, 11.} For Demetrius, as Livy so ominously predicts, this was the beginning of the end.\footnote{Livy, XXXIX, 48, 1: haec, quae augendae amplitudinis eius causa facta erant, extemplo in invidiam, mox etiam in perniciem adulescenti verterunt.} 

**Intrat Flamininus**

It is at this point in our ancient authorities that Flamininus enters the scene.\footnote{Polybius, 23, 3, 7-9.} Mention of him is relatively scarce for the period between his return from Greece in late 191 and the topic currently under examination. From a purely personal perspective his election to the censorship in 189 was undoubtedly one of the highlights of his career, although his administration was but perfunctory and unremarkable.\footnote{Livy, XXXVIII, 28, 1-4 and 36, 5-10.} He is next mentioned, albeit incidentally, in connection with events in Boeotia in 186\footnote{Polybius, 22, 4, iv, 1-17.} and with the removal of his brother from the senatorial role by Cato Maior in mid 184.\footnote{Polybius, 22, 4, iv, 1-17.} This low profile is easily explained. Since the final defeat of Antiochus in 190, and the conclusion of the peace settlement with the Aetolians in 189 there had been no serious threat from the east. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Flamininus suddenly reappears as soon as a threat does arise in the form of a resurgent Macedon. Concerning his subsequent inveiglement of Demetrius, Edson argues convincingly that “Flamininus was acting in full accord with the Senate”,\footnote{Livy, XXXIX, 43, 5–44, 1 and 52, 1-2; Cicero, *Sen.*, 42; Val. Max, 2, 9, 3; Vict., *Vir. Ill.*, 47, 4-5.} a notion refuted by Pfeilschifter, who claims that Rome did not play any active role in the struggle for power in Macedon.\footnote{Edson, p. 200.} This is a fair point, yet Roman influence was still being exerted in other ways: witness the presence of a pro-Roman faction in Macedon and the close personal association between Demetrius and the entourage of the commissioner Q. Marcius Philippus in the spring of

\footnote{Pfeilschifter, (2005), 360. "Tatsächlich blieb Rom während des makedonischen Machtkampfes untätig."}
Whatever, it is difficult to imagine any direct opposition from the senate, which had never been reluctant to give Flamininus a free hand in using his own discretion. After all, he was the ideal candidate for such an undertaking, either by his own initiative or at the suggestion of his peers, given his unequalled knowledge of eastern politics and, crucially, his undoubted personal familiarity with Philip and, in all probability, other key figures at the Macedonian court. It is a fair assumption, therefore, that, at the very least, Flamininus was acting with the senate’s tacit approval, especially on so weighty a matter as regime change in Macedon, (if this is what the Romans really had in mind). He had always succeeded in getting the better of Philip on previous occasions, and there was no reason to suppose that he would not do so yet again. Indeed, the decision by the senate to patronise and humiliate Philip smacks very much of Flamininus, and this notion is strongly supported by the juxtaposition in Polybius’ narrative, in which, right on cue and relishing the opportunity of rubbing salt into the wound, he picks up where the senate, (acting in concert or otherwise), had left off:

For the Senate, in heaping favour upon Demetrius, buoyed the youngster up with false hopes, and seriously angered Perseus and Philip by giving the impression that it was not on their account that the Romans treated them benevolently, but out of consideration for Demetrius. Titus also contributed in no small way to this assumption on their part, by asking the youngster to join him and drawing him into illicit discussions. In fact, he deceived him into thinking that the Romans intended to help him acquire the kingship in the very near future, and he provoked the king’s entourage by immediately sending a letter in which he asked them to send Demetrius back to Rome with as many as possible of his friends who

---

321 Livy, XXXIX, 53, 9-11
322 E.g., the effective carte blanche granted to him in conducting the Roman campaign against Nabis in 195: Livy, XXXIII, 45, 3.
323 Polybius, 23, 3, 6 – 4, 1.
would prove the most useful. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of these incitements that Perseus shortly afterwards induced his father to consent to the death of Demetrius, but I shall show point by point and in due order how this was brought about.

Concerning Flamininus’ character, the above passage reaffirms what has already been observed: he was devious, manipulative, wantonly confrontational and, given the least chance, mischievous in the extreme. Gruen argues convincingly that it was the historical facts that interested Polybius, with the added observation that, “unlike Livy, he is not concerned to exculpate Flamininus – nor, for that matter, to condemn him”. Even so, in describing Demetrius, who was twenty-three at this point in time, as μειράκιον and νεανίσκος, terms generally applicable to a young man of twenty-one or less, Polybius is undoubtedly referring to his lack of experience and his vulnerability rather than to his physiological age. The implication is clear: Flamininus was taking grossly unfair advantage of Demetrius, and with undoubted success, if Livy’s description of Demetrius’ conduct following his return to Macedon is anything to go by. As for Flamininus’ mischievousness, he surely revelled in the taunt he aimed at Philip when, not content with suggesting that he should send Demetrius back to Rome, he added, to top it all, that he should be accompanied by as many of his friends who would prove the most useful, i.e., the most useful to Rome! However, whereas it was all very fair for Flamininus to have a laugh at Philip’s expense, he would have done better to have given some serious consideration to the effect this could have had on the king, who, already jealous and suspicious of his younger son, might now well have envisaged him as the leader of a covert, rebellious faction within the Macedonian body politic.

As will be shown presently, Livy has edited and relocated this material clearly embarrassing as it is from a Roman perspective. By the same token, the non-survival of the detailed explanation promised by Polybius in the closing sentence of the above quotation is equally unsurprising, all strongly reminiscent of his truncated account in which Flamininus, ever ready to resort to subterfuge, had become involved in the

---

324 E.g., the manner in which he duped Philip at Nicaea in 198, thereby securing the prorogation of his imperium and the opportunity of defeating Philip on the battlefield, rather than negotiating a peace treaty: Polybius, 18, 1, 1 - 10, 7; Livy, XXXII, 32, 1 - 36, 10. Consider also the decidedly cavalier manner in which, without a blow being struck, he secured the possession of Thebes, in early 197: Livy, XXXIII, 1, 1-8.

325 Gruen, (1984), 236.

326 Livy, XL, 6, 4: --- Perseus iam tricesimum annum agens, Demetrius quinquennio minor ---.

327 Polybius makes Demetrius’ youth and inexperience a salient point in recounting this episode throughout the second and third chapters of book 23, variously referring to him as νέον ὄντω (once), μειράκιον (also once) and νεανίσκος (three times).

328 Livy, XXXIX, 53, 8: et ipse iuvenis haud dubie inflator redierat.

329 Livy, XL, 11, 1-4 and 20, 3-4.
assassination of Brachylles in Boeotia back in 196. Whatever, from this point onwards, with the exception of a few minor sources, posterity must yet again make do with Livy’s clearly one-sided version, more noteworthy, it must be said, for its dramatization and rhetoric than for its historicity.

**Flamininus and Demetrius**

The next matter for consideration is the point at which Demetrius became captivated by the notion of regime change and the extent of Flamininus’ responsibility for this. There is no evidence of any personal contact between Flamininus and Demetrius which predates the above passage from Polybius. Such is the case for the short, intervening period between Philip’s defeat at Cynoscephalae and Demetrius’ removal from Greece to Rome, where he next appears in Flamininus’ triumph three years later in late 194, again with no mention of any personal contact. The same applies to the remaining period until Flamininus’ return to active service in Greece in early 192. In fact, this period of some eighteen months was the only time that the two were concurrently in Rome, and though contact, and even the emergence of a greater or lesser personal relationship was indeed possible, there is no specific mention of it. Finally, Flamininus returned to Rome after his second tour of duty sometime between the end of 191 and when the new consuls took up office for the following year. This was shortly after Demetrius had been granted his freedom, but again there was no personal encounter, since he had already been handed over to Philip’s envoys to be escorted back to his father in Macedon immediately after his release.

However, the favourable impression he made on the families of the senatorial order and his resultant popularity leave no reasonable doubt that during the six years he spent in Rome he was admitted to the higher echelons of Roman society. The influence exerted on such a young and naturally impressionable individual over so protracted a period, when normally he would have been receiving instruction in Macedonian statecraft, was both profound and, as later events were to bear out, enduring. Consequently, it would have required little persuasion, either from Flamininus or anyone else, to have him view matters from a Roman perspective. Even so, there is no evidence of any friction between Perseus and Demetrius when the latter returned to Macedon sometime

---

331 Livy, XXXIX, 46, 6 – 48, 5 and 53, 1-16; XL, 5, 1 – 16, 3, 20, 1-6 and 23, 1 – 34, 8.
332 Polybius 18, 39, 5. Livy, XXXIII, 13, 14.
333 Livy, XXXVII, 1, 2.
334 Livy, XXXVI, 35, 13: filius quoque Philippi Demetrius, qui obses Romae erat, ad patrem reducendus legatis datus est.
towards the end of 191, so it would appear that the notion of regime change had never been mentioned at any time during his detention in Rome. Furthermore, it was Philip himself who later decided to send Demetrius back to Rome, hardly a wise decision if there had been even the least suspicion of dubious conduct, and not just for the seven years in Rome, but also for the intervening period of seven years back home in Macedon since his return. It seems, therefore, that no decision to imbue Demetrius with aspirations to the monarchy was taken at any time between mid 197 and early 184. However, given the sheer magnitude of the conference at which Demetrius was due to plead his father’s case, the Romans would have known well in advance which ambassadors would be in attendance, Demetrius included. There was a period of several weeks, therefore, if not months, available to prepare the ground for what eventually amounted to the humiliation of Philip, (albeit in his absence), on a massive scale. The decision to acquit him solely as a favour to Demetrius would have been plausible if the latter had proved himself capable of putting up a reasonable case for his father’s defence. Despite a performance that was woefully inadequate, however, the Romans still arrived at the same verdict. This lends weight to Gruen’s argument that this decision had been made well in advance.

So much for the decision. The next point is the manner in which it is so patronisingly couched. Philip, well known for his volatility, must have been totally apoplectic after opening and perusing the senate’s correspondence. Indeed, one can easily imagine the shared amusement of the assembled delegates as they envisaged Philip’s change of expression and the ensuing verbal outburst. The prime objective, however, was not humiliation per se, but, rather, to keep Philip on the back foot. Publicly conveying the notion that he was tolerated only out of consideration for Demetrius constituted a none too thinly veiled threat, i.e., Roman tolerance was not inexhaustible and Philip should be careful to avoid any further transgressions.

Was regicide ever considered?

None of this amounted to anything other than everyday political cut and thrust and did not in itself constitute interference in Macedonian affairs, but the same can hardly be said for the second topic in the passage from Polybius, i.e., the manipulation of

---

335 Edson, (1935) 192. “Our sources give no indication that there was any bad feeling between Perseus and Demetrius after the latter’s return.”
336 Polybius, 22, 13, 9-11; Livy, XXXIX, 35, 1-3 and XL, 15, 6.
337 Polybius, 13, 1, 1
338 Polybius, 13, 2, 10; Livy, XXXIX, 47, 11; Justinus, 22, 2, 5.
Demetrius. In spite of Polybius' explicit language and the obvious political advantages, Flamininus' intimation that the Romans would secure the monarchy for Demetrius should be regarded with extreme caution, or even outright scepticism, since there is no reference by any of the extant sources to any specific contingency plans made, or even formulated, by the Romans, invariably the most pragmatic of peoples, to bring this into effect. Walbank speculates, "By favouring Philip solely as the father of Demetrius, no doubt the Senate sought to intimidate him into making Demetrius his heir; --." A fair point, and consistent with Polybius' statement that it was pure deception (ἔψωκας ἡγήσεν) when Flamininus assured Demetrius that the Romans would acquire the monarchy for him αὐτικα μάλα. The problem in bringing this about, however, was twofold: Demetrius was only second in line to the throne, but, even if the Romans could contrive somehow to supplant Perseus, Philip was still very much alive.

One must consider, therefore, the notion of premeditated regicide. Walbank produces implicit evidence. In the winter of 183, the same year in which Demetrius had returned to Macedon, Philip ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the children of Admetus, Pyrhichus, Samus and various others he had executed. These executions, believes Walbank, were "the sequel to some kind of conspiracy, and it is not unreasonable to connect this with the faction which favoured Demetrius' policy of collaboration with the senate and had been driven by fear to the desperate scheme of getting rid of Philip". There is no reliable explicit evidence, however, in any of the surviving sources.

On the contrary, Livy states with abundant clarity that it was only after his father's death, post mortem patris, (presumably in the normal course of events), that the Macedonians were hoping to secure the monarchy for Demetrius. Moreover, Philip himself expected to be succeeded only in the natural course of events, as is abundantly clear from a passage in which he remonstrates with Perseus and Demetrius about the gravity of the feud between them:

---

340 Following the peace treaty of 189, (Polybius, 11, 29, 1- 31, 2; Livy, XXXVIII, 8, 1- 10, 2), the Aetolians had remained quiescent. Similarly, ever since the death of Antiochus III in 187 there had been no threat to Rome from his successor, Seleucus IV. In sharp contrast, as a result of Philip's activities since 186, further military confrontation with Macedon, though not imminent, could not be ruled out entirely. The notion of controlling the kingdom through the installation of a puppet regime, therefore, was well worth considering.

341 Walbank, (1940), 240.
342 Polybius, 23, 10, 9.
343 Walbank, (1938), 66.
344 Livy, XXXIX, 53, 2.
You want me to live just long enough to survive one of you, so that in the act of dying I would make the other undisputed king.

In fact, the only mention of any action to be taken against Philip is purely speculative, and that in a highly emotional passage in which Perseus warns his father about Demetrius’ collusion with the Romans:

\[
\text{si me scelus fratris, te senectus absumperit, aut ne ea quidem exspectata fuerit, regem regnumque Macedoniae [sc. Romani] sua futura sciunt.}\]

Should I fall a victim of my brother’s wickedness, and you of old age, or even if they do not wait for your death, they know that the king and the territory of Macedonia will be theirs to control.

In Livy’s account, therefore, the only accusations, with no supporting evidence whatsoever, are put in the mouth of Perseus and directed exclusively against Demetrius, without even the least implication of Roman connivance. Such is the case with Orosius, by whom Demetrius is portrayed as the unfortunate and innocent victim of a needlessly suspicious father cynically manipulated, yet again by Perseus, who succeeds in convincing the king that Demetrius really intended to kill him.\(^{347}\) As for Justinus, regicide is never an issue. In fact, it was his own life, not that of his father, that Perseus was fearful for, otherwise his accusations against Demetrius are limited to friendliness with the Romans and treachery, not murder.\(^{348}\)

There remains Dio’s version:

\[
\text{προσφιλής τοίς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ τῆς ὁμορείας ἐγένετο ὁ Δημήτριος, καὶ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἠλπίζον ὅτι μετὰ τῶν Φίλιππον τὴν βασιλείαν λήμεται, ---.}\]

Demetrius had become endeared to the Romans during the time he was a hostage and hoped, along with the rest of the Macedonian people, to secure the kingdom after Philip.

---

345 Livy, XL, 8, 18.
346 Livy, XL, 10, 6.
347 Orosius, 4, 20, 28.
348 Justinus, 32, 2, 8-9.
349 Dio Cassius, 20, 1, 1-2.
The phrase μετὰ τὸν Φίλιππον is open to interpretation, i.e., either after Philip’s death, be that in the normal course of events or by assassination, or after Philip was no longer in power. However, the second alternative is, to say the least, highly fanciful. Philip, always fiercely independent, was hardly inclined to be put out to grass, or even, as Walbank argues with conviction, to accept the notion of becoming a client king, a “second Eumenes.”

Therefore, since there is no concrete evidence of any plot to assassinate Philip, it is fair to conclude that it was Demetrius’ intention to maintain his popularity with the Romans and the mass of the Macedonian people and to use their support to supplant his elder brother, the natural heir to the throne, after Philip eventually died, be it of old age, from a debilitating sickness, a natural disaster, or whatever.

In the event, it was not until five years after Flamininus’ original overtures to Demetrius that Philip actually passed away, in abject misery resulting from his decision to execute his younger son, and this in itself makes it highly improbable that the Romans had ever entertained the notion of killing him.

**Roman Meddling**

It seems, therefore, that, unless some unexpected turn of events facilitated the promotion of Demetrius to the monarchy, the Romans sought only to increase Philip’s sense of insecurity by disrupting the Macedonian court, with no consideration for the possible consequences for Demetrius. Given the tragic outcome of this episode, Livy is decidedly elusive on this point, since such conduct is hardly consistent with the image of Rome that he was seeking to present. Whereas a genuine, concerted effort to remove Philip, though ethically reprehensible, might nonetheless have been appreciated, and even condoned, for its political expedience, this cannot be said for the crass irresponsibility which cost Demetrius his life. At every step of the way Philip and Perseus are portrayed as the villains of the piece, as Gruen has observed, with Livy resorting to spurious rationale along with the suppression and relocation of material, either to excuse or to mask discreditable Roman interference and intrigue.

Consider, for example, his account of Demetrius’ return to Macedon in early 183:

> vulgus Macedonum, quos belli ab Romanis imminentis metus terruerat, Demetrium ut pacis auctorem cum ingenti favore conspiciebant, simul et spe haued

---

350 Walbank, (1940), 241.
351 Diodorus, 29, 25, 1; Livy, XL, 44, 1-3; Pausanias, 2, 9, 4-5; Justinus, 32, 3, 1-5; Dio, 20, 1, 1-2.
352 Gruen, 15 (1974), 235: “Livy’s silence is, of course, deliberate and counts for little. He found the story in Polybius’ text and chose to omit it. Philip and Perseus are the sole villains; it would not do to transmit a report that implies Roman intrigue.” See Livy, XL, 5, 2-14.
Most of the Macedonians, terrified at the prospect of a war with the Romans hanging over their heads, viewed Demetrius as the author of peace with great enthusiasm and had great hopes of securing the monarchy for him after his father’s death. For even though he was younger than Perseus, he was a legitimate child, whereas Perseus was the son of a concubine. Perseus was born of common stock with no distinguishing characteristic of any particular father, while Demetrius bore a remarkable resemblance to Philip. Accordingly, Perseus was not favoured by the Romans and it was Demetrius they would place on his father’s throne. Such was the common talk.

Perseus is clinically dismembered and then summarily brushed aside as a nonentity, though, significantly, not by the Romans, but by the Macedonian people. Moreover, it is they who are credited with the notion of regime change, and so Roman integrity in this decidedly dubious business remains unimpaired. In fact, Livy is clutching at a straw, as shown by his concluding observation, “haec vulgo loquebantur”, an obvious attempt to impart some degree of respectability to what might well have been construed as unwarranted Roman interference, on the premise that, since their alleged policy was being openly discussed and universally approved, it could hardly be considered discreditable.

Material concerning Flamininus’ part in all this occurs sporadically throughout Livy’s exhaustive account of Perseus’ incrimination of Demetrius, during which no consideration whatsoever is given to the blunt fact that Perseus had very good reason to be afraid and every right to protect himself. Indeed, he and his father are still very much portrayed as bêtes noires. As an opening gambit, Perseus draws his father’s attention to his younger brother’s complete subservience to Rome. He then develops this theme, concentrating specifically on Flamininus’ involvement, in Livy’s carefully doctored version of the previously quoted passage from Polybius:

---

353 Livy, XXXIX, 53, 2-5
354 Livy, XL, 5, 1-16, 1-16, 3.
356 Livy, XL, 5, 12: cuius [sc. Demetrii], ex quo obses Romae fuit, corpus nobis reddiderunt Romani, animum ipsi habent.
What do you think you should make of that letter just sent to you by T. Quinctius, in which he says you made a wise decision in sending Demetrius to Rome, and urges you to send him back with a larger delegation and the most prominent men of Macedonia? T. Quinctius is now the instigator and director of everything he does. He has renounced you and installed him in your place to suit his own purposes. It was there previously in Rome that all the secret plots were hatched. He is looking for people to help him when he bids you to send more eminent Macedonians along with that person. They will leave for Rome untainted and pure of heart, believing that they have a king in Philip, and they will come back stained and infected with Roman blandishments.

This is a perfect example of chronological relocation by Livy. Whereas Polybius attributes Flamininus’ conspiratorial dealings with Demetrius and the subsequent, deliberately provocative letter to late 184, Livy has Perseus refer to these events as contemporaneous – illas litteras ad te nunc missas – i.e., some eighteen months after they had taken place. Equally deceptive is the manner in which Flamininus’ involvement is mentioned, i.e., allegedly by Perseus, rather than factually by Polybius, yet another attempt to clear both Rome and Flamininus of any direct culpability. So far so good, but Livy’s customary sleight of hand clearly backfires when he attempts to excuse Titus’ triumphalist taunt, εξ αυτής τὸν Δημήτριον ἀποστέλλειν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην μετὰ τῶν φιλονόμων πλείστων καὶ χρησιμωτάτων. In Polybius the implications are already clear enough, but in using his rhetorical skills to portray them as nothing more than the rantings of a distraught, paranoid Perseus, Livy draws the reader’s attention to points of detail which might have escaped him if simply left to his own devices.

Livy resorts to the same technique just a few chapters later. Alerted by Perseus’ accusations concerning Demetrius’ aspirations to the throne, in late 182 Philip sent two ambassadors to a senatorial convention at the end of 182:

---

557 Livy, XL, 11, 1-3.
et a Philippo rege Macedonum duo legati venerunt, Philocles et Appeles, nulla super re, quae petenda ab senatu esset, speculatum magis inquisitumque missi de iis, quorum Perseus Demetrium insimulasset sermonum cum Romanis, maxime cum T. Quinctio, adversus fratrem de regno habitorum.\textsuperscript{358}

Two envoys also arrived from Philip the king of Macedonia, namely Philocles and Apelles, not to make any specific petition to the senate, but rather to observe the proceedings and make inquiries into the discussions which Perseus had accused Demetrius of having with the Romans, particularly with T. Quinctius, about the succession to the throne in opposition to his brother.

Livy’s syntax deserves comment here, whereby he relegates what Polybius, in \textit{oratio recta}, clearly records as a fact, to nothing more than accusations, carefully hidden away in a subordinate clause, and all this as much as two years after the actual event. Clever, yet upon closer examination, not altogether convincing, and Flamininus’ culpability remains embarrassingly obvious.

\textbf{Who wrote the Letter?}

Perseus’ persistency paid off and he finally convinced Philip that Demetrius constituted a serious threat. According to Livy, Philip’s decision to order the execution of Demetrius was prompted by two carefully contrived events. Didas, the governor of Paeonia, was induced by Perseus to win the confidence of Demetrius. He duly reported that Demetrius was planning to flee Macedon and seek sanctuary in Rome, and Perseus in turn relayed this information to Philip.\textsuperscript{359} Taking Livy at face value, this would simply be construed as a measure of the success of Perseus’ carefully crafted campaign falsely to incriminate his younger brother. However, although Demetrius was far from blameless, there can be little doubt that his decidedly precarious situation was primarily the result of ill-considered interference on the part of the Romans, with no apparent consideration of the consequences. At no point throughout the entire course of Perseus’ relentless, protracted incrimination is there any mention of Demetrius receiving support, or even encouragement, from Rome, and it was undoubtedly this complete isolation that eventually drove him to despair. Even so, at this stage Philip took no action, opting rather to spend an anxious few months in waiting for the return of Apelles and Philocles. Livy claims that the envoys’ mission was no more than perfunctory deception, since, unbeknown to Philip, even before their departure they had settled beforehand what report they would bring back from Rome. Moreover, upon

\textsuperscript{358} Livy, XL, 20, 3.
\textsuperscript{359} Livy, XL, 23, 1- 4.
their return, continues Livy, to add to all their other impious deeds, they handed Philip a forged letter, allegedly from Flamininus, closed for authenticity’s sake with a counterfeit version of his personal seal:

\[
\text{deprecatio in litteris erat, si quid adulescens cupiditate regni prolapsum secum egressum: nihil eum adversus suorum quemquam facturum neque eum esse, qui ullius impii consilii auctor futurus videri possit. hae litterae fidem Persei criminibus fecerunt.}\]

The letter contained a request for forgiveness, should the young man, misguided by his eagerness to become king, have colluded with him: neither would Demetrius do anything to injure any of his relatives, he said, nor could he personally be considered to have had any impious plans in mind. This letter lent weight to Perseus’ accusations.

In spite of Livy’s claim that this document was a forgery, its authenticity has long been the subject of inconclusive scholarly debate. Walbank questions the feasibility of sending a letter which, by incriminating Demetrius, would have directly impeded Roman interests. Edson argues: “it should be made very clear that the authenticity or falsity of this letter has no bearing upon Demetrius’ guilt, since the letter merely confirmed events which had really taken place in Rome three years before. Demetrius was guilty of listening to Flamininus’ treasonable suggestions and of concealing them from his father, so that the letter, whether authentic or forged, acquainted Philip with an actual fact.” Gruen makes the same point, more succinctly: “Nothing was reported therein that was not already known or rumoured.” This raises an obvious question: then why bother to send the letter at all, especially since the Romans were under no apparent constraint to communicate with Philip in the first place, and for the last two years Demetrius had been anxious to avoid all contact with Rome in order to reduce the credibility of the accusations continually being levelled at him by his brother? However, at first sight, a fair case for authenticity can be inferred from Livy’s statement that when, some months after Demetrius’ execution, Philip suspected that the letter might have been a forgery, Apelles, one of the alleged counterfeiters, fled to Italy, hardly the place to seek sanctuary if he had really forged the seal of one of the most influential and prestigious senators upon a letter which resulted in the assassination of

---

360 Livy, XL, 23, 8.
361 Walbank, (1940), 251; Pfeilschifter, (2005), 359.
363 Gruen, (1975), 244; Pfeilschifter, (2005), 359.
364 Livy, XL, 20, 6.
365 Livy, XL, 55, 6

112
a Roman protégé at the very heart of the Macedonian court. Then again, Livy later recounts how Perseus, with Philip long since deceased, enticed Apelles back to Macedon and had him assassinated. However, although his complicity is referred to - *ministrum quondam fraudis in fratre tollendo* - Livy makes no mention of the letter, so it is impossible to state if this was the specific reason for Apelles’ execution. Perseus had for some time been well established as the undisputed monarch of Macedon, so it must be asked whether he would have felt in any way compelled, long after the event, to conceal the alleged falsification of the letter, or if there was some other reason for Apelles’ removal. Such is a fair sample of how the arguments fluctuate for and against the authenticity of this document, with Edson even considering the possibility that, “the letter was more guarded and less incriminating than reported by Livy.”

Essentially there are two points at issue: a) extreme, and therefore, highly improbable, naïveté on the part of Flamininus, and, b) devilishly clever manipulation by Perseus. The key, emotive phrase, cynically calculated to intensify Philip’s suspicion and fear, and which in all probability sealed Demetrius’ fate, is “*cupiditate regni*”, reminiscent of Perseus’ contention some two years earlier that the Romans were already addressing Demetrius as king even though Philip himself was still alive. Perseus, understandably motivated by genuine fear for his own security and frustrated by Philip’s reluctance to take any definite action, shrewdly calculated that written confirmation of Philip’s long held suspicion that Flamininus, of all people, had been involved in this business, would finally push him over the edge. These men went back nearly twenty years, during which time Philip had experienced at first hand, and witnessed on countless other occasions, just how cunning and manipulative Flamininus could be, rarely failing to achieve his objective. For this very reason, the second part of the above quotation, designed superficially to allay Philip’s suspicions, inevitably produced, as cleverly intended, precisely the opposite effect.

This document also rings false when one considers the relative situations of Flamininus and Philip. Rome had been on the ascendancy in the east ever since the declaration of the war against Macedon in 200, and if Flamininus had thought that it was in the interests of the republic to ensure the safety of the young Demetrius, any letter to Philip, far from being conciliatory in tone, would almost certainly have conveyed a strict warning.

---

366 Edson, (1935), 199-200; Walbank, (1940), 251; Gruen, (1974), 244; Walker, (2005), 149.
367 Livy, XLII, 5, 4.
368 Edson, (1935), 149.
369 Walker, (2005), 150
370 Pfeilschifter, (2005), 359: “Andererseits diente er Perseus’ Plänen so perfekt, dass er selbst ihn nicht besser hätte schreiben können.”
371 Livy, XL, 11, 4.
A crucial point which has been overlooked is that none of this is in any way consistent with what can otherwise be deduced about Flamininus’ character. In fostering Demetrius’ ambitions and then leaving him in the lurch, the Romans were undoubtedly guilty of irresponsible meddling of the highest order. Furthermore, their total lack of concern is poignantly illustrated by their failure to complain about the eventual assassination of their erstwhile protégé and by their readiness to recognise Perseus as king after Philip’s death in 179. Even so, this is a far cry from the composition and dispatch, under no compulsion whatsoever, of a document which would have been tantamount to a death warrant for Demetrius. Flamininus was mischievous, confrontational and manipulative. When provoked he could be vindictive, as in his dealings with the Boeotians in 196 and with Nabis in 195, for example, although even here there are mitigating circumstances. In Boeotia an unsought opportunity for revenge fell unexpectedly into his lap, and whatever personal score he had to settle with Nabis was inextricably combined with his duty to the republic. There is no surviving evidence, however, to suggest that, (unlike Nabis), he was ever gratuitously cruel, or even malevolent.

On the contrary. In 195, for example, it was in part out of pity for the citizens of Argos, occupied by a Spartan garrison, that he summoned a counsel of the Greek allies to consider the wisdom of attacking the city. In 191 he persuaded the consul Acilius Glabrio to raise the siege of Naupactus, this time out of pity for the Aetolians, who, left completely at the mercy of the Romans after the flight of Antiochus from Europe following his defeat at Thermopylae, had taken refuge there. Although Flamininus was undoubtedly motivated by political expediency on both of these occasions, a decidedly compassionate side to his character is nonetheless discernable.

Equally telling is a seemingly off-hand remark by Livy, designed specifically to reflect the mood of the Achaeans during the counsel concerning their disputed claim to the ownership of Zacynthus, also in 191:

eras Quinctius sicut aduersantibus asper, ita, si cederes, idem placabilis.

Just as Quinctius was harsh on those who opposed him, so was he was easily appeased if you submitted to him.

---

372 Polybius, 25, 3i, 1; Livy, XL, 58, 8 and XLV, 9, 3
375 Livy, XXXIV, 26, 4
376 Livy, XXXVI, 35, 3-4.
377 Livy, XXXVI, 32, 5.
Thus, if Flamininus was so well disposed even towards those who were in any way compelled to submit to him, it is difficult to imagine that those who willingly cooperated with him - Demetrius, for example - would be wantonly thrown to the wolves. This suggests, therefore, that the letter was indeed a forgery. Next, in attempting to identify the culprit one should consider who would have been the greatest beneficiary, and, in spite of the decidedly one-sided nature of Livy's account, this was undoubtedly Perseus, probably acting in collusion with Philocles and Apelles. This letter could well have been composed at the same time as the spurious, predetermined report Philocles and Apelles had decided to make even before their departure to Rome, concerning which Livy supplies no details, since any such information would have been fully eclipsed by the incriminatory contents of the letter.

Finally, in spite of Livy's persistent obfuscation, Flamininus' responsibility for the animosity between Perseus and Demetrius and the subsequent assassination of the latter is abundantly clear, as would be the case even without the explicit evidence supplied by Polybius. Even so, as in the case of Brachylles some thirteen years earlier, Flamininus was never held to account. In fact, the support so glibly promised to Demetrius was never provided, and the total lack of Roman concern is clearly illustrated by the senate's choice of Flamininus, Demetrius' self-appointed mentor, for a special mission to Prusias of Bithynia, at the very time that Demetrius' situation in Macedon, thanks primarily to Flamininus, was at its most precarious.

This particular mission, which probably occurred in late 183 and which has been examined at length in Chapter 3, is the final recorded episode of any significance in which Flamininus was involved, after which the ancient authorities fall markedly silent. His death in 174, which is also examined in detail in Chapter 3, is recorded, albeit incidentally, only by Livy at the end of a fragmentary book XL.

Recapitulation

The frustrating scarcity of information about Flamininus' early career has already been considered. Even the extant accounts of a consular election which before long was due

---

378 For a succinct summary of Flamininus' remarkable career, including comment on his immunity from the consequences of his shortcomings and errors, see Gruen, (1984), 220-221.

379 Livy, XL, 28, 11.
to change the political landscape of the entire Balkan peninsular are, in the case of Livy, no more than perfunctory, and, in Plutarch's case, more directed towards sensationalism than historicity.

Whatever, a young, inexperienced Roman aristocrat, given his chance, was now expected to step up to the mark and justify the confidence placed in him by his supporters. Finally free from the bickering and wrangling which typify politics in any day and age, his first real test, the start of a seriously demanding learning curve, came only after his arrival in Epirus and his taking over command of the army, under the guise of the farcical “peace negotiations” with Philip across the width of the Aous. From the very beginning, Flamininus stated his case, and unequivocally: no compromise - Philip was to conform with the senate's demands to the letter. This obduracy proved to be the hallmark of Flamininus' diplomatic posture for the remainder of the campaign. Within only a month or so it was Flamininus' military expertise which was put to the test. Nor did he disappoint. Triumphant where his predecessors had proved inadequate, he dislodged Philip from his seemingly impregnable stronghold in the Aoi Stena and opened up the best route to central Greece. Furthermore, during the fighting he had already seen enough to believe that, if he could somehow acquire the opportunity, he would be able to defeat Philip in a pitched battle. Significantly, it was very shortly after this that the Achaeans, formerly longstanding allies of Macedon, also began to suspect that Philip was a spent force and switched their allegiance to Rome.

Following Flamininus' victory in Epirus and his highly successful Thessalian campaign, Philip had every reason to be concerned, clearly illustrated by his solicitation for a second peace conference. Nicaea was to demand considerably more than the characteristic obduracy exercised thus far by Flamininus in previous negotiations, but, whatever his detractors, be they ancient or modern, may say, yet again he achieved his objective, the true significance of which, with the obvious exception of Wood, has not received anything like the credit it deserves from other scholars.

Given the casualty figures provided by the ancient authorities, (and despite whatever Polybius' says about Flamininus' anxiety over Antiochus' (allegedly) imminent invasion of Europe), Philip was in no position to continue the struggle after Cynoscephalae; hence his readiness to salvage whatever he could from the ensuing peace negotiations at Tempe. Following his trickery at Nicaea, Flamininus reverted to the obduracy so

---

380 Wood, (1939), 95-96: “Thus ended the Conference of Nicaea, which marked a diplomatic victory far more important than that of Cynoscephalae. It was the culmination of the consistent strategy which Flamininus had employed during a whole year's campaign, with the set purpose of isolating Philip from all hope of support from the Greeks and of establishing Rome as the arbiter of the Hellenistic world. In spite of these significant consequences, the charge of self-seeking has arisen to slander the man who achieved so much for his country by his conduct of these negotiations.”
tauntingly displayed during the very first “negotiations” in Epirus. This had been just one year ago, such was the rapidity with which Flamininus had so successfully managed the entire campaign thus far. The salient point about Tempe is the further consolidation of his authority and the resultant stark change in the relationship between, not just Flamininus and the Aetolians, but the other Greeks as well. Consensually, though unofficially, recognised as their spokesman at Nicaea, now at Tempe, with Philip defeated, Flamininus, assuming a dictatorial rather than a diplomatic stance, made it perfectly clear exactly who was in charge. “Take it or leave it,” was his message, the self-same posture he was due to assume with Nabis two years later and with the Syrian embassy in Rome another two years after that. Another salient factor in all of these negotiating sessions is Flamininus’ total disregard for previous peace settlements, pushing through his legislation, all of which was eventually ratified by the senate, by the sheer force of his personality.

At Isthmia in 196, the biggest problem for Flamininus was arguably the ongoing Roman occupation of the “fetters.” In no position to gainsay the patres, he nonetheless managed a suitable compromise and successfully engineered the carefully crafted declaration of freedom and independence for the Greeks.

The following year Nabis was defeated. Seriously restrained, rather than removed, he served as a valuable counterbalance to the increasing authority of the Achaean in the Peloponnese, in just the same way Philip had been left to counterbalance the Aetolians in northern Greece.

The total evacuation of Greece by the Romans in 194 proves beyond reasonable doubt that they had no intention of making permanent conquests in the eastern Mediterranean, although, given the manner in which Flamininus’ arrangements soon began to unravel, one may plausibly argue that they would have been better advised to stay put a little longer, or at least to establish some system of administration controlled by resident commissioners until the liberated cities had proved they could manage their own affairs. Whatever, after just four years’ campaigning, when Flamininus withdrew his forces he left behind a miscellany of states coexisting in varying degrees of cooperation and antagonism and, crucially, with none of them having either the political influence or the military might to become equally dominant as Macedon had been just three years earlier.

In early 192, due to the ever increasing likelihood of an alliance between Antiochus and the Aetolians, Flamininus was sent back to Greece in an attempt to retain the support of the various states which had sided with Rome. When the alliance became a reality, the Romans had no choice other than to invade Greece for the second time in six years. The military campaign was competently managed by Glabrio and Cato, who defeated Antiochus and the Aetolians at Thermopylae in early spring, 191, but it fell to Flamininus to sort out the disorder that resulted from Glabrio’s woeful lack of perspicacity, best exemplified by his folly of continuing a siege of the Aetolians in
Naupactus from which the only person to derive any benefit was Philip. Thanks to Flamininus, Glabrio raised the siege to give the Aetolians the opportunity of sending envoys to Rome to plead their cause before the senate. The Aetolians were not finally brought to heel until the autumn of 189, but meanwhile the political situation was considerably more stable and the Romans could now direct their undivided attention to the Asian campaign against Antiochus. Flamininus' diplomacy was also put to the test in the Peloponnese, where he wrested control of the strategically important island of Zacynthus from the control of the Achaean League.

Flamininus' detractors have received undue attention. Let his record speak for itself: consul in 198, imperium prorogued three times in succession, triumphator in 194, censor in 189. Job well done.
Chapter 2
PHILOPOEMEN

Philopoemen spent forty years in the pursuit of glory in a state which was both democratic and comprised many various elements, never incurring the ill-will of the people on any occasion and in the main pursuing his policies outspokenly, not ingratiatingly, a rare thing indeed.

Such is Polybius’ succinct, yet comprehensive, summary of Philopoemen’s career, written as the conclusion to a seriously truncated epitome of his execution by the Messenians in 182. Though consisting of little more than thirty words, it says a great deal about his character and his level of commitment to the Achaean cause. The objective of this chapter is to attempt to construct a biographical profile of Philopoemen from the evidence provided from the extant authorities, including Plutarch, with particular attention given to that period following his first encounter with the Romans and his rivalry with Flamininus after his second return from Crete, (probably in late 194). On the matter of the decidedly contentious relationship between Philopoemen and Flamininus, it is Plutarch who, in both the paralleled Lives, (particularly in the Philopoemen), provides considerably more information, both directly and implicitly, than other writers. Many episodes are directed to illustrate the comparison between Philopoemen’s φιλονικία and Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία. Plutarch’s

---

1 Polybius, 23, 12, , 8-9.
primary theme in this particular syzygy, in the consideration of which strict attention has been given to historical veracity, (as best as this can reasonably be deduced), which Plutarch, in varying degrees, is never reluctant to modify in order to achieve his literary objectives.

2.1 A Brief Summary of Philopoemen’s Career before his first Encounter with Flamininus

Cleomenes III (c. 260-219) became king of Sparta in 235. His reign was noteworthy both for his attempts at social reform and a concerted effort to re-establish Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese. This second objective resulted inevitably in conflict with the Achaean League, and it was when Cleomenes attacked Megalopolis (223) that Philopoemen first distinguished himself by securing the evacuation of most of its inhabitants. The following year the Achaean forces, supported by Antigonus III (Doson) of Macedonia, comprehensively defeated Cleomenes at Sellasia, and Philopoemen’s personal contribution enhanced his reputation considerably. On the battlefield, despite the harrowing experience of having both thighs pinned together by a javelin, undeterred he snapped and extricated the offensive weapon and rallied the Achaean forces.

---


3 Polybius, 4, 81, 2 and 14, Plutarch, Cleom., 10, 1-11, 5.

4 Polybius, 2, 55, 1-9; 61, 2-62, 12; Livy, XXXVIII, 34, 7; Plutarch, Cleom., 23, 1-25, 1; Phil., 5, 1-5; Pausanias, 4, 29, 7-8; 8, 27, 15-16, 28, 7 and 49, 4.

5 Plutarch, Phil., 5, 1; Pausanias, 8, 49, 4.

6 Polybius, 2, 66, 4-69, 11; Livy, XXXIV, 28, 1; Plutarch, Cleom., 28, 1-29, 4, Phil., 6, 1-7, 2; Pausanias, 8, 49, 5-6; Justinus, 28, 4, 1-10.

7 Polybius, 2, 69, 1-2; Plutarch, Phil., 6, 4-7.
2.1.1 Philopoemen in Crete (221-211/10)

Shortly after the battle of Sellasia Philopoemen left Greece to fight for the Gortynians in Crete. The rationale behind this decision remains speculative, and Plutarch’s proffered explanation, it must be said, is somewhat lacking in conviction:

'Εκ τούτου δόξαν ἔσχεν, ὡσπερ εἰκός, ὁ Φιλοποίμην. καὶ τοῦ μὲν Ἀντιγόνου σπουδάσαντος ὅπως σρητατεύοιτο μετ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ διδόντος ἡγεμονίαν καὶ χρήματα, παρητήσατο, μάλιστα τὴν εαυτοῦ φύσιν καταμαθῶν πρὸς τὸ ἀρχεσθαι δυσκόλα καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχουσαν, ἀργεῖν δὲ καὶ σχολάζειν οὐ βουλόμενος ἀσκήσεως ἐνεκα καὶ μελέτης τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐς Κρήτην ἐπέλευσεν ἐπὶ στρατείαιν.9

Following this Philopoemen acquired great renown, as was only fitting, and Antigonus was eager to enlist him into his ranks, offering him a commission and a salary. Philopoemen declined this offer, mainly because he knew that by his very nature he would find it difficult and irksome to be under the command of someone else. Unwilling to remain idle and inactive, however, he sailed off to campaign in Crete in order to do military training and put it to use.

At first sight, it is difficult to reconcile the contents of the final clause of the above quotation with the precarious situation of the Achaeans at this time. In 220, the year following Philopoemen’s departure, the Aetolians invaded the Peloponnese.10 Aratus, the incumbent Achaean strategos, suffered a heavy defeat near Caphyae.11 and the Achaeans yet again called on Macedon for support, this time under the leadership of the young Philip V, Antigonus having died on his return to Macedon shortly after the Battle of Sellasia.12 Hostilities continued for some three years during the Social War,13 until Philip, having drawn up a peace treaty at Naupactus, returned to Macedon in 217, to attend to unrest on the Illyrian border.14 In 214 Philip returned to Achaea at the invitation of Aratus to control renewed Aetolian aggression, but before long he diverted his attention from assisting his allies to expanding his own dominions. His prime objective was to gain possession of the strong-point of the Messenian citadel Ithome,

---

9 Plutarch, Phil., 7, 1-2.
10 Polybius, 4, 6, 7-12.
11 Polybius, 4, 10, 1 – 12, 14; Plutarch, Aratus, 47, 4. Caphyae was situated in a small plain northwest of the lake of Orchomenos
12 Polybius, 4, 16,1-5.
13 Walbank, (1940), 24-67.
and it was only with difficulty that Aratus persuaded him not to install a garrison.\textsuperscript{15} The following year, however, Philip ravaged the Messenian countryside extensively. His popularity was scarcely enhanced when, under a promise to marry her, he carried off Polycrateia, the wife of Aratus’ son, Aratus Jr., to Macedon, when forced to return there in order to deal yet again with unrest on his north-western border.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, it soon became known that he had abused all rites of hospitality by seducing Polycrateia under Aratus’ own roof.\textsuperscript{17} Shortly afterwards Aratus the elder died, possibly from pulmonary tuberculosis, though many blamed Philip for his death.\textsuperscript{18}

All things considered, therefore, it would seem that Philopoemen would have had every opportunity of achieving those objectives for which he allegedly went to Crete simply by staying put and helping to defend his homeland. Before condemning him out of hand, however, one should consider the \textit{status quo} in Achaea around the time of his departure. First, Cleomenes, decidedly routed, had fled to Egypt and,\textsuperscript{19} on his advice, the city of Sparta had capitulated to Antigonus without any resistance.\textsuperscript{20} Any immediate Spartan threat to Achaea, therefore, had been removed, and, given the convincing nature of the victory, the Achaeans would have presumed that any future request for Macedonian support would be readily granted. Next, there is evidence, albeit slim, that it was in order to serve Macedonian interests that Philopoemen went to Crete\textsuperscript{21} Finally, Philopoemen cannot be held personally responsible for Philip’s subsequent preoccupation with the Social War (220-217), which left Achaea precariously exposed to attack, or for his subsequent abuse of the Achaeans - not that he could have done anything about it, anyway.

2.1.2 Philopoemen and the Emergence of Achaean Independence from Macedon

It was three years after the death of Aratus that Philopoemen eventually returned from Crete.\textsuperscript{22} Elected \textit{hipparchos} the following year (209), he set about a much needed

\textsuperscript{15} Polybius, 7, 10, 1-14, 6; Plutarch, \textit{Aratus}, 50.
\textsuperscript{16} Polybius, 8, 13, 1-14, 11.
\textsuperscript{17} Livy, XXVII, 31, 8 and XXXII, 21, 24; Plutarch, \textit{Aratus} 49, 2.
\textsuperscript{18} Polybius, 8, 12, 2, Plutarch, \textit{Aratus}, 51, 52, 1-4 and Livy, XXXII, 21, 23-24.
\textsuperscript{19} Polybius, 2, 69, 11; Plutarch, \textit{Cleom.}, 29, 3.
\textsuperscript{20} Plutarch, \textit{Cleom.}, 29, 1 and 30, 11.
\textsuperscript{21} Errington, (1969), 28-29
\textsuperscript{22} Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 7, 2.
reorganization of the Achaean cavalry, whose degeneration was emblematic of the lassitude experienced by both the politicians, Aratus in particular, and the people following their defeat by the Aetolians at Caphyae. It was not long before Philopoemen’s reforms were put to the test. In a brief account, consisting of only seventy words or so, and isolated from an otherwise coherent narrative, Plutarch recounts an episode which illustrates Philopoemen’s strategic acumen and physical prowess. In dramatic language he describes how, during a battle between the Achaeans and a coalition force of Aetolians and Eleans at the River Larissus, Philopoemen answered the challenge of Damophantus, the leader of the Elean cavalry, and slew him in single combat, after which the enemy fled. Pausanias also describes these events in an equally brief account, but, frustratingly, the original version, supposedly Polybian, has not survived. However, Plutarch and Pausanias’ accounts, despite their brevity, do contain enough details to put this seemingly isolated event into context, thanks to Livy, who spends two entire chapters describing both the preamble to the battle and its immediate consequences. This confrontation was far more momentous than a local dispute - in fact, nothing less than part of the war between Philip, supported by the Achaeans, and the Romans, in league with the Aetolians and the Eleans, who had previously been enemies of Philip in the Social War.

Ensuing events produced a seriously embarrassing contrast between the relative fortunes of Philopoemen and Philip, very much the senior partner in the coalition, the purpose of whose expedition was to remove an Aetolian garrison from Elis. The Macedonian allied forces spent the day after the Achaeans’ prestigious cavalry encounter plundering and devastating the abandoned countryside. The next day they marched on Elis, supremely confident in full battle formation (acie instructa), but blissfully unaware that during the night P. Sulpicius Galba had completed the short voyage from Naupactus to Cyllene and brought four thousand Romans into Elis. At the

---

23 Polybius, 10, 12, 22, 6-23, 7; Plutarch, Phil., 7, 3-5, Pausanias, 8, 49, 7.
25 Plutarch, Phil., 7, 6.
26 Pausanias, 8, 49, 7.
27 Cf., Polybius 10, 21-24, which otherwise deals extensively with Philopoemen, including an entire chapter on his reforming of the Achaean cavalry.
28 Livy, XXVII, 31-32.
29 Writing from a Roman perspective, Livy might simply have considered that, in this greater scheme of things, a confrontation between two local Greeks was relatively unimportant, which probably explains the omission of the confrontation between Philopoemen and Damophantus from his account.
30 Livy, XXVII, 31, 9.
31 Consul in 211 and proconsul in Greece from 210 to 206.
32 About twenty miles north of Elis.
unexpected sight of Roman standards in the enemy ranks, Philip's first instinct was to retreat, but he was compelled reluctantly to support his men, who were already under serious pressure. In the event Philip was lucky to escape with his life. Thrown over the head of his horse, which had been transfixed by a javelin, he became the centre of a violent conflict, finally leaving the scene of the action in a far from dignified manner, snatched to safety and somewhat unceremoniously slung onto a different horse.  

In sharp contrast,:

λαμπρός ἦν ὁ Φιλοποιήμην, ὡς οὕτω κατὰ χεῖρα τῶν νέων τινὸς οὕτε συνέσει τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἀπολειπόμενος, ἅλλα καὶ μάχεσθαι καὶ στρατηγεῖν ἰκανοτάτατος.  

Philopoemen was in high renown, surpassed neither in hand-to-hand combat by any of the young men nor in sagacity by any of the older, but the most capable both in personal combat and as a general.

The following day Philip acquired some measure of compensation for his humiliating exit from the battlefield with the capture of the nearby Elean fortress of Pyrgon. It was while he was distributing the considerable booty - four thousand prisoners and forty thousand head of various cattle - that a messenger arrived from Macedon with the alarming report that a certain Eropus had taken control of the garrison town of Lychnidos close to the Macedonian border, along with some villages belonging to the local Dassarettii, and was making the Dardanians restless. Philip at once abandoned hostilities with the Aetolians and prepared to return home. His expedition, therefore, had been a complete failure, since Elis remained under the control of the Aetolian garrison, which continued to be a threat to the western border districts of allied Achaea.

Elected strategos for 208/7, Philopoemen directed his attention to completing his reform of the Achaean army, following the reorganisation of the infantry with that of the cavalry the previous year. In the summer of 207 the now fully reformed Achaean army, this time without any assistance from Macedon, was put to the test when Philopoemen assembled his forces at Mantinea to confront Machanidas, the tyrant of Sparta. Philopoemen's leadership, courage and personal contribution in killing Machanidas in hand-to-hand combat, strongly reminiscent of the manner in which he had despatched

---

33 Livy, XXVII, 32, 6: raptus ab suis atque alteri equo iniecut fugit.
34 Plutarch, Phil., 7, 9.
35 Situated on a height on the northern bank of Lake Lychnitis, about one hundred miles west of Pella.
36 Livy, XXVII, 32, 9-11; Silius, 15, 312-314; Justinus, 29, 4, 6-10. Zonaras, 9, 9d.
Demaphontas two years earlier, were again exemplary.\textsuperscript{38} Philip had in all probability supported Philopoemen’s army reforms,\textsuperscript{39} since a greater degree of Achaean military self-sufficiency would lessen his own burden of simultaneously pursuing his expansionist policy in Greece and of fighting a war with Rome. The effectiveness of these reforms, however, exemplified by Philopoemen’s success at Mantinea, came as a rude shock to the Macedonian king. The implications were painfully clear: the creation of a completely independent Achaean League, which would seriously weaken Philip’s authority in the Peloponnese, was not infeasible.\textsuperscript{40}

Philip’s anxiety increased when Philopoemen, re-elected \textit{strategos} for 206/5, paraded his victorious troops at the Nemean Games in the summer of 205, at which the Achaeans indulged themselves in an intense display of nationalistic sentiment, hoping to see the recovery of their ancient dignity, for which the credit was given exclusively to Philopoemen.\textsuperscript{41} Equally irksome for Philip, as Errington astutely points out,\textsuperscript{42} was the complete reversal of the citizens’ sentiment, since there had always been strong support for the Macedonian kings at Argos.\textsuperscript{43} This would have served as a painful reminder to Philip of the Nemea of 209, when he had been compelled to abandon the festivities in order to go to the assistance of the Achaeans, which eventually resulted in Philopoemen’s prestigious victory over the combined Aetolian and Elian cavalry, followed just two days later by Philip’s desperate fight for his life and his humiliating exit from the battle-field.

2.1.3 The alleged plot by Philip to have Philopoemen assassinated

It is at this point that a tradition emerges of an attempt by Philip to have Philopoemen assassinated.\textsuperscript{44} Walbank, compiling a list of Philip’s alleged murder victims, concedes

\textsuperscript{38} Polybius, 11, 11, 1-18, 10; Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 10, 1-13; Pausanias, 8, 1, 2. Given Plutarch’s predilection for parallelism, it is puzzling that he fails to make any reference to Philopoemen’s slaying of Damophantos in hand-to-hand combat just two years earlier, especially since the two confrontations were remarkably similar, i.e., on horseback and with the \textit{coup de grâce} being delivered with a spear thrust. A missed opportunity, it would seem, of further enhancing Philopoemen’s martial prowess.

\textsuperscript{39} Errington, (1969), 63.

\textsuperscript{40} Errington, (1969), 76: “Philopoemen’s success at Mantinea did more than simply destroy the threat to Achaea from Machanidas: it also revealed the possibility of creating a new independent Achaean power in the Peloponnese.”

\textsuperscript{41} Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 11, 1-4: Pausanias, 8, 50, 1, 3.

\textsuperscript{42} Errington, (1969), 76.

\textsuperscript{43} Their ancestral home, according to Herodotus, 8, 137-139.

\textsuperscript{44} Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 12, 2; Pausanias, 8, 50, 8; Justinus, 29, 4, 11.
that “the tradition had a contemporary origin, and some basis in fact is to be seen from Flamininus’ taunt at the conference in Locris,” but without pursuing the matter. Aymard also mentions it in a section in which he examines various other misdemeanours of Philip, namely, the alleged assassination of the Arati and his licentious cavorting at the Nemea in 209, but is not fully convinced of its authenticity, and Errington is equally indecisive. Nonetheless, a reasonable case can be made out for the veracity of this tradition.

From Plutarch it can only be dated to sometime after Philopoemen’s victory at Mantinea in 207, but Justinus places it after Philip had made a peace with the Romans, who were “happy for the meantime to suspend the war with the Macedonians”, (contentis interim bellum Macedonicum distulisse). This is the peace of Phoenice, marking the end of the First Macedonian war in the autumn of 205, i.e., after the Nemea of the same year, which is also the order of occurrence in Pausanias’ brief account. This is significant, since it marks a moment when Philip would have been seriously disgruntled by the cumulative effect of recent events - the sharp contrast between Philopoemen’s success at the River Larissus in 209 and his own frenzied, undignified exit from the battle-field at Elis just two days later, Philopoemen’s even greater success at Mantinea in 207, and finally, the outpouring of Achaean nationalistic sentiment induced by Philopoemen’s military display at the Nemea earlier in 205. As mentioned previously, Achaean independence was not infeasible, which gives credence to Plutarch’s statement that Philip believed that if he could get rid of Philopoemen the Achaians would again become compliant. Depending on the accuracy of a detail unique to Justinus’ account, Philip might have had far greater cause for concern than just the emergence of an independent Achaia:

[sc. Philipus] --- Philopoemeni, Achaiorum duci, quem ad Romanos sociorum animos sollicitare didicerat, insidias praetendit.³³

[Philip] --- laid a plot against the life of Philopoemen, leader of the Achaians, who, he had learned, was inciting some of his allies to join the Romans.

---

³³ Walbank, 37, No.1/2, (Jan.-Apr., 1943), 4, n. 3. See also Walbank, (1940), 124, n. 6.
³⁴ Aymard, (1938), 62-63.
³⁵ Polybius, 10, 26, 1-6; Livy, XXVII, 31, 3-8.
³⁷ In order to give their undivided attention to the war with Hannibal.
³⁸ Livy, XXIX, 12, 8-16; Sallust, Hist., 4, 67, 6; Silius, XV, 317-319; Appian, Mac., 3, 4; Justinus, 29, 4, 11; Trogus, Prol., 29.
³⁹ Pausanias, 8, 50, 4.
⁴⁰ Plutarch, Phil., 12, 2.
⁴¹ Justinus, 29, 4, 11.
The identity of Philip’s allies referred to by Justinus presents no problem, since they are clearly listed by Livy at the conclusion of business in Phoenice. However, other than in the context of spasmodic conflicts with Nabis for the period between Phoenice and Philopoemen’s second departure for Crete, there is little information about the interaction of Achaea with other states and no concrete evidence for Philopoemen’s inciting any of Philip’s allies to defect to the Romans. If Justinus is to be believed, however, Philip would have been horrified by the notion of his sphere of influence being diminished still further. This in itself would have been more than sufficient motivation to rid himself of the source of this discomfort, i.e., Philopoemen. Nor would he have shown the least hesitation. Walbank attaches too little significance to Flamininus’ jibe at Locris a few years later in 198. There is no smoke without fire, and Flamininus would never have taunted Philip publicly had there not been, as Walbank himself concedes, “some basis in fact.” More significantly, Philip made no effort whatsoever to defend himself.

2.1.4 The War against Nabis and Philopoemen’s Second Departure for Crete

In spite of the defeat and death of Machanidas at Mantinea, the following years were marked by yet more Spartan aggression, this time from Nabis, Machanidas’ eventual successor. Nabis’ plans for consolidation and expansion and his alleged anxiety about Achaea are described at length by Polybius. In 204 he was gifted a long awaited pretext for starting hostilities and attacked Megalopolitan territory. No information about the war has survived for the years 203 and 202, and the next recorded episode is Nabis’ attack on Messene in 201, which he abandoned as soon as he heard of the imminent arrival of an independently mustered Megalopolitan force under the command of Philopoemen. Plutarch’s account of this episode provides a fine example of

---

54 Livy, XXIX, 12, 14: ab rege foederi adscripti Prusia Bithyniae rex, Achai Boeoti Thessali Acarnanes Epirotae: ab Romanis Ilienses, Attalus rex, Pleuratus, Nabis Lacedaemoniorum tyrannus, Elei Messenii Athenienses.
55 Nabis never succeeded in attacking Achaean territory per se, but, as Errington, (1969), 77, says, “The first move for an expansionist Sparta was traditionally towards the north.” Naturally, the Achaeans would have been anxious to nip this in the bud.
56 Polybius, 13, 6, 1–7, 8.
57 Polybius, 13, 8, 7: ὅ δὲ πάλαι ξητὸν ἄφορμὰς ἐγκλημάτων καὶ πρόφασιν εὔλογον διαφοράς, τότε λαβόμενος ταύτης εὐθείας ἠλώνε τὰ Προσαγόρου θρέμματα καὶ τινῶν ἔτέρων. εξ ὧν ἐγένετο κυταρχή τοῦ πολέμου.
58 Polybius, 16, 16–17, 1; Livy, XXXIV, 32, 16; Pausanias, 4, 29, 10 and 8, 50, l, 5. According to Plutarch, Phil., 12, 3, the Boeotians were equally fearful of Philopoemen’s reputation.
Philopoemen’s resolution to defend Achaean interests by whatever available means, and of the extent of his personal authority:

On another occasion, when Nabis, who had succeeded Machanidas as tyrant of Sparta, suddenly seized Messene, it so happened that Philopoemen was out of office with no official authority; but, unable to persuade Lysippus, the incumbent Achaean commander-in-chief, to go to the aid of the Messenians, since, he claimed, the city was altogether lost with the enemy inside, Philopoemen did so himself, taking with him his fellow citizens [i.e., Megalopolitans], who did not wait for the sanction of any law or ballot, but followed the man seemingly fitted by nature to be the superior commander.

Possibly as a result of the popularity gained from this unofficial action, Philopoemen succeeded Lysippus as strategos for 201/200, at which point he decided to take the initiative against Nabis at Pellana, only fifteen miles or so north of Sparta, easily getting the better of a contingent of Nabis’ mercenaries in a meticulously planned ambush. Then, after the expiry of his strategia, he accepted a new commission from the Gortynians, left again for Crete, and in doing so laid himself open to serious, though possibly unwarranted, allegations:

However, the Megalopolitans, thinking themselves betrayed, took it so badly that they undertook to have him banished; but the Achaeans prevented this by sending

---

59 Plutarch, Phil., 12, 4-5. Cf. Moralia, 817, E-F.
60 Polybius, 16, 36, 1–37, 7. Polybius provides no precise details about the extent of the casualties, simply saying that some of the mercenaries were cut to pieces and others taken prisoner. For detailed topography, see Loring, (1895), 63-64. Otherwise, for geographical features, J.O. Thomson’s Everyman’s Classical Atlas has been consulted throughout this thesis.
61 Plutarch, Phil., 13, 7.
their general, Aristaenus, to Megalopolis, who, though politically at variance with Philopoemen, would not allow the sentence to be carried out.

In this passage, contrary to the generally positive image which has emerged otherwise, and in direct contrast to the passage from Polybius which introduces this chapter, (πάντη πάντως διέφυγε τῶν τῶν πολλῶν φθόνοι), Philopoemen appears in a bad light. At first sight, the Megalopolitans’ volte-face is indeed remarkable, given that they had been willing to follow Philopoemen wherever he led one minute, only to demand that he be sent into exile the next. It is a fair assumption, therefore, that they had been manipulated by an internal faction hostile to Philopoemen. Moreover, since it required nothing less than the personal intervention of the Achaean strategos to prevent his prosecution, it must have been a faction with some considerable authority. Unfortunately, the only extant source concerning this episode is Plutarch, who, typically, provides little or no background information, concentrating instead for literary effect on the more sensational. The feasibility of the Megalopolitans’ complaint, therefore, remains a matter of speculation. Now, quite apart from the extreme unlikelihood of Philopoemen glibly abandoning his native city in order to pursue personal, selfish gain, it must be considered that, before leaving for Crete, as well as keeping Nabis under control, he had left the Achaean army in good shape and can hardly be blamed, therefore, for the crass stupidity of his successor as strategos, Cycliades, who, by disbanding the Achaean auxiliary forces gifted Nabis the opportunity of resuming hostilities. It was the exile of Cycliades, therefore, that the Megalopolitans should have demanded when, shortly after Philopoemen’s departure, they were attacked by Nabis, forced to live on their battlements and sow their grain in the streets, since their fields were being ravaged by the Spartans, encamped right outside the gates of the city. Moreover, although Philopoemen was out of office, given the sort of independent action he had taken at Messene the previous year, there is no reason to believe that he would not have remained in Greece in order to take similar action again if he had felt that the Achaeans were still under threat from Nabis, or from anyone else, for that matter. However attractive the commission offered by the Gortynians, therefore, concerning which Plutarch is once again frustratingly obtuse, one must reject the notion that Philopoemen would ever have considered the defence of his homeland subordinate to his own personal ambitions.

---

63 Livy, XXXI, 25, 3.  
64 Plutarch, Phil., 13, 1-2, 4.  
65 Errington, (1969), 74-75, argues that this was political manoeuvring by Philopoemen who, in league with Aristaenus, sought to distance himself from the pro-Macedonian Cycliadas because Philip was now at war with Rome.
Contrary to what Plutarch would have us believe, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Philopoemen actually achieved anything worthy of note during either of his interludes in Crete, a combined total of some seventeen years.\footnote{The rank assigned to Philopoemen by Livy, praeffectus auxiliarum, (XXXV, 26, 4) conveys nothing of the kudos with which he is credited by Plutarch in the above passage – ἐφ’ ἵγμαλον διεφθαρε τοῖς Γορτυνίοις.} For example, it is unlikely that τὰς [sc. τοῦ Φιλοποίμενος] ἐπιφανεστάτας πράξεις, mentioned by Polybius in referring to his Life of Philopoemen,\footnote{Polybius,10, 21, 6.} include any of his activities in Crete, otherwise Plutarch, constantly on the look-out for anything sensational, would avidly have seized upon such material.\footnote{On Plutarch’s use of Polybius’ Life of Philopoemen, see Walbank, (1967), 221 - 222 and Errington, (1969), 236 - 237.} As it is, clearly struggling to provide a creditable explanation for Philopoemen’s protracted absences, he makes two sweeping claims. First, that Philopoemen returned from Crete (in 210), with such a brilliant reputation - ἐπανήλθεν οὕτω λαμπρός - that the Achaean immediately appointed him hipparchos.\footnote{Plutarch, Phil., 7, 2.} In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that it was as a result of anything Philopoemen had done in Crete that secured him this appointment. The most probable reason, as Errington argues convincingly and at length, is that Philip simply believed that Philopoemen was by far the best man for a much needed job, and that it might well been for this very purpose that he had asked him to return from Crete.\footnote{Errington, (1969), 51-53.} Next, Plutarch’s praise for Philopoemen is even more ebullient as he recounts his return from Crete for the second time (in late 194) - θαιμισθεὶς καὶ λαμπρός παρὰ τῶν ἐκεί πράξεων - following which he links this to his appointment as strategos to fight the Achaean War against Nabis.\footnote{Plutarch, Phil., 14, 1.} This appointment was most probably due, however, to his fine track record against Sparta, first against Cleomenes back in 222, next against Machanidas in 209 and then, in 201 and 200 against Nabis, who meanwhile had violated the Roman peace treaty of 195 instituted by Flamininus and was now restarting hostilities in the southern Peloponnese.\footnote{Livy, XXXV, 22, 1-2.} Thus, Plutarch makes two claims that two series of seemingly unsubstantiated deeds were duly rewarded by rapid appointment to senior military rank.

Finally, there is a passage in Plutarch which suggests that it might not have been simply out of a desire to improve his military skills that Philopoemen was attracted to Crete, since he and the Cretans, if not exactly kindred spirits, did at least have a good deal in common:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{The rank assigned to Philopoemen by Livy, praeffectus auxiliarum, (XXXV, 26, 4) conveys nothing of the kudos with which he is credited by Plutarch in the above passage – ἐφ’ ἵγμαλον διεφθαρε τοῖς Γορτυνίοις.}
  \item \footnote{Polybius,10, 21, 6.}
  \item \footnote{On Plutarch’s use of Polybius’ Life of Philopoemen, see Walbank, (1967), 221 - 222 and Errington, (1969), 236 - 237.}
  \item \footnote{Plutarch, Phil., 7, 2.}
  \item \footnote{Errington, (1969), 51-53.}
  \item \footnote{Plutarch, Phil., 14, 1.}
  \item \footnote{Livy, XXXV, 22, 1-2.}
\end{itemize}
κάκει συχνόν χρόνον ἐγγυμνασάμενος ἀνδράσι μαχίμοις καὶ ποικίλοις μεταχειρίσασθαι πόλεμον, ἔτι δὲ σώφροσι καὶ κεκολασμένοις περὶ διαίταν.\(^{73}\)

And there [sc. in Crete] he trained for a long time with men who were fighters and familiar with many kinds of warfare, yet at the same time moderate and restrained in their everyday lives.

This notion is supported by two observations concerning his character from Polybius:

\[ \text{ήν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν βίων ἐπιμελής καὶ λιτός κατὰ τὴν περικοπήν.}^{74} \]

Moreover, he was moderate in his manner of life, and simple in dress and other such matters.

\[ \text{κατὰ τὲ γὰρ τὴν ἐσθήτα καὶ τὴν σίτησιν ἄφελὴς καὶ λιτὸς ἦν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν σώματος θεραπείας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, εὐπερίκοπτος καὶ ἀνεπίφθονος.}^{75} \]

For in his dress and eating, as well as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple, and moreover, in his dealings with others, modest and restrained.

As a result of this apparent affinity, therefore, Philopoemen might well have found life in Crete more interesting than back on the Greek mainland. Frustratingly, other than for the introductory chapters and a few other sporadic examples, Plutarch says little about Philopoemen’s private life, as is the case with many of the protagonists of his Lives, unless this provides any important insight into their character or has any significant impact upon historical events. It would be interesting to know, for example, if Philopoemen had an extended family to keep him in Crete.

From the evidence considered thus far, a summation of the salient points of Philopoemen’s character is not difficult. For example, his irrefutable physical prowess, exemplified not only by his slaying of Damaphantus and Machinadas in personal combat, but, particularly, by the fortitude and presence of mind he displayed in rallying the Achaean forces at Sellasia even as he endured excruciating physical discomfort; his dogged determination in following his own agenda, institutionally sanctioned or otherwise, in defending the Achaean cause and hastening to the assistance of those under duress; his military reforms, successful to the point of diverting the Achaeans away from their former, traditional dependency on Macedon, which lends credibility to the notion that Philip attempted to engineer the assassination of Philopoemen. Such

\(^{73}\) Plutarch, Phil., 7, 3
\(^{74}\) Polybius, 10, 22, 5
\(^{75}\) Polybius, 11, 10, 3.
was the individual, redoubtable from every aspect, with whom the Romans were shortly to be confronted and who was to become and remain a thorn in the side of Flamininus until his capture and execution by the Messenians in 183.

2.2 The Rivalry between Flamininus and Philopoemen

For this topic, along with the greater part of other material concerning Flamininus and Philopoemen, the original source was almost certainly Polybius. As matters stand, however, except for three brief passages from Livy and incidental observations by Justinus and Pausanias, we are dependant primarily on Plutarch, who refers repeatedly to it in some detail, albeit writing from a moralistic perspective, of which the main objective is to contrast what he construes as the φιλονικία of Philopoemen with the φιλοτιμία of Flamininus.

2.2.1 Philopoemen and The Achaean War

When Philopoemen returned for the second time from Crete in late 194, the political landscape of mainland Greece was barely recognisable. In 198 Aristaenus, the incumbent strategos of the Achaean League, had finally succeeded, after three days of bitter wrangling, in persuading a majority of the assembly to abandon its current alliance with Philip and support the Romans. Aristaenus’ prime objective was security, but, as an additional bonus, his decision fortuitously provided the Achaeans with the opportunity of massively extending their authority throughout most of the Peloponnese. The following four years had seen, respectively, the overthrow of

---

77 Plutarch, Phil., 14, 1
78 Polybius, 18, 13, 8-9; Livy, XXXII, 19-23; Pausanias, 7, 8, 1-2.
79 Thus realizing a longstanding ambition. Cf. Plutarch, Phil., 8, 3-4 referring to the era of Aratus: της Ἐλλάδος ἀσθενοῦς καὶ εὐδιάλυτον φερομένης κατὰ πόλεις ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ πρῶτον σιστάντες οἱ Ἀχαιοί, καὶ τῶν κύκλῳ πόλεων τὰς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ βοηθεῖν καὶ συνελευθεροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν τυρράνων ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τὰς δὲ ὁμονοία καὶ πολιτείαι καταμιγγύντες εἰς ἑαυτοὺς, ἐνσώματα ἀ καὶ μίαν δύναμιν κατασκευάσαε διδονοῦντο τὴν Πελοπόννησον. Cf. Polybius, 16, 10, 10, describing
Macedon, the declaration of Greek independence by Flamininus, the defeat of Nabis and his confinement to a small part of Laconia, and the complete withdrawal of Roman forces from Greece. The Aetolians, meanwhile, extremely dissatisfied with what they considered to be but meagre rewards they had received for their services to Rome, were now actively encouraging Antiochus to invade Europe, as a result of which the Romans, including Flamininus, returned to Greece in 192.

Nabis, meanwhile, in blatant violation of the peace treaty of 195, had begun to retake possession of the coastal perioecic towns of Laconia and had laid siege to Gytheum in a bid to recover at least some of his former authority. The Achaeans duly installed a garrison in the besieged city in retaliation for which Nabis began to ravage their territory. Consequently, the Achaeans summoned a council to meet at Sicyon then sent a delegation to Flamininus asking his advice. The president of the council was Philopoemen, who had been elected strategos for the year 193/2 after his recent return from Crete. Such were the circumstances under which the first interaction between Flamininus and Philopoemen occurred, albeit without any direct, personal encounter on this particular occasion.

Thus far, with the exception of Macedon, Philopoemen had only dealt with relatively minor political entities, such as the various Greek states and the Gortynians. It now remains to be seen how he would fare in his dealings with a power whose dominion already extended over the entire western Mediterranean basin. Flamininus, anxious to preserve the peace agreement he had made with Nabis in 195, and equally concerned about the activities of Antiochus - the very reason he had been sent back to Greece - had sent a letter in which he advised the Achaeans to wait for assistance from the Roman fleet. Philopoemen, however, claiming that the situation at Gytheum needed to be addressed immediately, chose to ignore Flamininus' advice and duly manipulated the

---

80 Livy, XXXIV, 22, 4.
81 Livy, XXXV, 31, 1-32, 1; Plutarch, Cato Maior, 12, 1-3 and Flam., 15, 1-4; Zonaras, 9, 19c.
82 Livy, XXXV, 22, 2.
83 Livy, XXXV, 25, 2; Plutarch, Phil., 14, 4; Pausanias, 8, 50, 8.
84 Livy, XXXV, 25, 2.
85 Plutarch, Phil., 14, 1.
86 See, Aymard, (1938), 304: “... les Romains n’allaient pas tarder à sentir, dans la politique fédérale, les effets du retour au pouvoir d’un homme qu’ils n’avaient encore jamais eu l’occasion de connaître et qui allait se révéler à eux tout autre qu’un Aristainos.”
87 Livy, XXXV, 25, 5. There is no record of exactly where Flamininus was at this time. Cf. Aymard, (1938), 305, n. 55.
88 See Errington, (1969), 99-100, in which he argues convincingly that the resentment originated initially due to the manner in which Flamininus tried to impose his authority on the council at Sicyon and Philopoemen’s
assembly with very much the same dexterity that Flamininus had employed during the conference of the Roman allies in Corinth in 195.\textsuperscript{89}

As a result, he easily secured a unanimous vote in favour of war, the timing and the direction of which were conveniently left to his sole discretion.\textsuperscript{90}

The start of the campaign against Nabis, an attempt to relieve the Achaean garrison in Gytheum by a naval assault, can only be described as a totally ludicrous failure, for which Philopoemen undoubtedly bore the responsibility. Having refused Flamininus’ advice to wait for assistance from the Roman fleet, he had to make do with whatever vessels were available to him from elsewhere. Choosing as his flagship an old quadrireme, an ungainly rotting hulk long since unsuited to the rigours of battle, which had been captured eighty years earlier when it was conveying Nicaea, the wife of Craterus, from Naupactus to Corinth,\textsuperscript{91} he assumed command of a totally inadequate Achaean fleet. At the very first impact from a sturdy, new Spartan ship Philopoemen’s ailing tub, already leaking at every joint, splintered violently and began to founder. The crew was taken prisoner, although Philopoemen himself had the good luck to escape in a light scouting vessel and did not end his flight till he had reached the Achaean naval base at Patrae.\textsuperscript{92} The rest of the fleet, seeing the commander’s vessel lost, fled the scene of the battle as fast as their oars could propel them.

After the failure of this naval attack by the Achaeans, Nabis decided to close all access to Gytheum by land. He withdrew a third of his army, which was laying siege to the city and encamped a few miles inland at Pleiae in a position which commanded both Leucae and Acriae, anticipating that any attack would come from that direction. Philopoemen launched a surprise night raid on these Spartan troops and succeeded in burning out their camp, with only a few survivors escaping back to Gytheum. He then led his forces to Tripolis in northern Laconia, close to Megalopolis, and before Nabis could send troops from Gytheum to protect the fields, he made off with a vast quantity of booty.

With the morale of his men now fully restored, Philopoemen decided to march on Sparta, since this seemed the only way of drawing the enemy away from the siege of

\textsuperscript{89} Livy, XXXIV, 33, 4-8.
\textsuperscript{90} Livy, XXXV, 25, 9-10: Plus ea oratio momenti ad incitandos ad bellum habuit quam si aperte suadendo cupiditatem res gerendi ostendisset. Itaque ingenti consensu bellum decretem est tempus et ratio administrandi eius libera praetori permissa.
\textsuperscript{91} Plutarch speaks of forty years, albeit without referring to the capture of the ship, but to its relaunch after forty years of disuse. This looks suspiciously like an indirect apology for Philopoemen, since by implicitly reducing the unsuitability of the ship Plutarch also reduces the level of Philopoemen’s blatant incompetence.
\textsuperscript{92} Livy, XXXV, 26, 5-9; Pausanias; 8, 50, 7; Plutarch, Phil., 14, 3.
Gytheum. However, unbeknown to Philopoemen, before he even made contact with the enemy in Laconia, Gytheum had already been taken by the Spartans. This freed up Nabis’ troops to counter the Achaean insurgency, and Philopoemen had recourse to all his previous military expertise in order to extricate his army from an attempted ambush near Sparta. In reply, taking full advantage of detailed topographical knowledge, and thus shrewdly anticipating the enemy’s every move, Philopoemen, according to Livy, succeeded in slaying no less than three quarters of the entire Spartan army. 93 Nabis took refuge in Sparta, and Philopoemen, without even attempting the liberation of Gytheum, the primary objective of the entire campaign, devastated the Laconian countryside for a month before finally returning home.

Although, following the naval fiasco, Philopoemen had succeeded in rescuing his seriously compromised reputation with the night raid on the Spartan camp, the extrication of his army from the ambush and the subsequent shrewd deployment of his forces, strategically very little had been achieved, since both Sparta and Gytheum remained firmly under Nabis’ control. Philopoemen’s campaign, therefore, could hardly be described as a success, in spite of which, as a military commander, he was considered by everyone to be the equal of Flamininus. 94 Indeed, the Achaeans, tauntingly triumphalist, went further and boasted that, in the matter of the Laconian war, Philopoemen was superior. 95 Now, the following year, after the defeat of Antiochus by Glabrio, Philopoemen said, unprompted and repeatedly, that he envied the Romans their victory. 96 It should be considered, therefore, whether he had also been jealous of Flamininus’ victories over Philip and Nabis, which would have made the acclaim he was now receiving even sweeter as a measure of compensation. For Flamininus, however, undoubtedly still smarting from Philopoemen’s blatant defiance earlier at Sicyon, it was a source of intense irritation.

2.2.2 The Nature and the Extent of Flamininus’ Resentment

According to the Aetolians, advising Antiochus how best to build an alliance of the Greeks against the Romans, relations between Flamininus and Philopoemen had

---

93 Livy, XXXV, 30, 11: ita multi caesi captique sunt ut vix quarta pars de toto exercitu evaserit.
94 Justinus, 31, 3, 4: in eo bello tanta virtus [sc. Philopoemenis] enituit ut opinione omnium Flaminino, Romano imperatori, compararetur
95 Livy, XXXV, 30, 13: aequantibus eum gloria rerum Achaeis imperatori Romano et, quod ad Laconum bellum attineret, praeferentibus etiam.
96 Plutarch, Phil., 17, 1: Ρωμαίοις ἐλεγε φθονέαν τῆς νίκῆς.
deteriorated to such a point that a rift between the Achaeans and the Romans was not inconceivable:

placuit <Boeotos>, Achaeos, Amynandrum regem Athamanum temptare. Boeotorum gentem aversam ab Romanis iam inde a Brachylli morte et quae secuta eam fuerant censebant; Achaeorum Philopoemenem principem aemulatione gloriae in bello Laconum infestum invisumque esse Quinctio credebant.97

They decided to test out the feelings of the <Boeotians>, the Achaeans and the Athamanian king, Amynander. They were under the impression that the Boeotians had been estranged from Rome ever since the death of Brachylles, and its consequences, and they also believed that Philopoemen, the chief magistrate of the Achaeans, was an object of dislike and jealousy to Quinctius due to his resentment of the reputation Philopoemen had gained in the Laconian war.

Both before and since Antiochus’ arrival in Europe, a lot of vacuous rhetoric had already been used on numerous occasions by the king’s envoys, the king himself, and the Aetolians in a forlorn attempt to provide much needed mutual reassurance in what thus far had been a decidedly unpropitious alliance.98 In reality, the content of the above passage is tantamount to just so much wishful thinking, since, whatever the nature of the personal relationship between Flamininus and Philopoemen, the Romans had few anxieties concerning the loyalty of the Achaeans generally.99 In fact, but for the above passage from Livy, any specific mention of personal resentment of Philopoemen by Flamininus is confined exclusively to Plutarch, albeit with nothing to match the intense rhetoric – Philopomenem ---- infestum invisumque esse Quinctio – of Livy. For example:

97 Livy, XXXV, 47, 2-4.
98 Livy, XXXV, 49, 4: mentiendo in vicem iactandoque vires quas non haberent, inflasse vana spe atque inflatos esse.
100 Plutarch, Phil., 15, 1-2. Nikolaidis astutely provides some well-deserved justification for Flamininus’ philotimia in this instance (De Pourcq- Roskam, (2012), 36): “Besides the nuances of primacy and jealousy here, Titus’ emotional reaction also reveals another basic aspect of philotimia, namely that of self-esteem or the inner pride based on one’s self-esteem and sense of dignity. In other words, inner pride and sense of...
As a result of this Philopoemen was held in deep affection by the Greeks and conspicuously honoured in the theatres, but not without the secret resentment of Titus, who was always conscious of his own reputation. Indeed, as a consul of Rome he thought that he deserved greater admiration from the Achaeans than an Arcadian, and he considered that his benefactions far exceeded those of Philopoemen, since by a single proclamation he had given freedom to all those parts of Greece which had been held in bondage by Philip and the Macedonians.

Similarly, in a passage in which Flamininus' resentment is almost tangible, yet fully justified, a notion with which even Plutarch sympathizes.

Φιλωποίμην τῷ Τίτῳ κυδαίνοντες ἴχαϊοί καὶ τιμῶντες ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, ἐλύσαν έκείνων, οὐκ ἄξιουντα Ρωμαίων ὑπάτω προπολεμοῦντι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄνθρωπον Ἀρκάδα, μικρὸν καὶ ὀμόρον πολέμων στρατηγὸν, ὀμοία θαυμάζοντοι παρ’ αὐτοῖς.

Flamininus was vexed by the Achaeans glorifying Philopoemen as much as himself and honouring him in the theatres, since he thought it unfair that an Arcadian, a commander in small campaigns and border disputes, should receive the same admiration as a Roman consul who was waging war on behalf of all Greece.

The most salient point in these passages is Philopoemen’s ethnicity, mentioned incidentally by Livy in connection with his abysmal naval campaign against Nabis:

Praetor Achaeorum sicut terrestrium certaminum arte quemvis clarorum imperatorum vel usu vel ingenio aequabat, ita rudis in re navali erat, Arcas,

dignity seem to emanate from self-appreciation, namely, from the overall value which one attaches to oneself and according to which one regulates one’s actions and behaviour at large.”

The Achaeans’ conduct can be imputed to the exhilaration resulting from having for the first time conducted a protracted campaign independent of any larger coalition partner. On the matter of the adulation received by Philopoemen in the (unspecified) theatres, Plutarch is clearly struggling to equate Philopoemen with Flamininus, since no setting was comparable to those of the pan-Hellenic festivals where Flamininus had won virtually universal acclaim from the Greeks.

101 See Errington, (1969), 108: “Honours of this kind to Philopoemen in these circumstances were an insult to Flamininus and to the policy he represented.”

102 Plutarch, Comparison Phil./Flam., 1, 1: Μεγέθει μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰς τούς Ἑλλήνας ἐπερεγεσίων οὗτος Φιλωποίμην Τίτῳ παραβάλλειν οὗτε πάνυ πολλοὺς τῶν Φιλωποίμην ἦμεινόν άνδρῶν ἡξίων εστί. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ Ἑλληνι πρὸς Ἑλλήνας οἱ πόλεμοι, τῷ δὲ οὐχ Ἑλληνι καὶ υπὲρ Ἑλλήνων.

103 Plutarch, Flam., 13, 3.
Although the chief magistrate of the Achaeans was on land the equal in skill and inventiveness of any one of the famous military commanders, he was totally inexperienced in naval matters, for he was a native of Arcadia, a country isolated from the sea, and, with the exception of his military experience in Crete as the commander of auxiliary troops, had absolutely no experience of the outside world.

However, any notion that this comment is in any way chauvinistic or disparaging should be treated with caution, since Livy never displays any reluctance to praise Philopoemen as an individual whenever it is appropriate. This is clearly illustrated, for example, in the first sentence of the quotation in question. Further evidence occurs sporadically both throughout his detailed account of Philopoemen’s impressive terrestrial campaign against Nabis and, particularly, at the end of his account of the events leading up to his capture and execution by the Messenians in 182. This purely matter-of-fact observation, concerning what Livy simply regarded as a parochial side to Philopoemen’s character, merely reflects the Romans’, and, therefore, Flamininus’ view of the Achaeans as relatively minor and inexperienced players in the international political and military arena in comparison with the likes of Philip and Antiochus. This explains the measure of Flamininus’ resentment, or rather, intense irritation, especially since, (if Livy’s statistics are to be credited), in spite of having slaughtered some three quarters of the Spartan army, Philopoemen had achieved precious little. However, even if his campaign had been an overwhelming success, one may be sure that Flamininus would still have considered it a relatively minor achievement in comparison with his own military and political record. Moreover, it would have been in the front of Flamininus’ mind that, whatever Philopoemen had managed to achieve was due in no small way to the serious restrictions he himself had imposed on Nabis some three years earlier. Next, concerning Flamininus’ defeat of Philip, it must be said that the Achaeans had

---

104 Livy, XXXV, 26, 3-4. Cf. Pausanias, 8, 1, 7, quoting Homer, Iliad, 2, 614, on the Achaeans’ traditional ignorance of naval matters: ἔπει οὗ σφι θαλάσσας ἔργα μεμήλειν.
105 Livy, XXXIX, 49, 1-4.
106 See Gruen, (1984), 464: “Philopoemen, despite the inconclusiveness of his campaign, the defeat at sea, the loss of Gytheum, and the inability to take Sparta, returned to a tumultuous welcome in Achaea, honoured for his victories, and hailed as a commander the equal or even the superior of Flamininus.” Errington, (1969), 108, puts it more bluntly: “Philopoemen was receiving these expensive honours for actions in a war in which, for the moment at least, he had failed, both in his political and military objectives.”
107 See Pfeilschifter, (2005), 225: “Das war von der Sache her nicht gerecht, denn um Philopoimen ware es schlecht gewesen, hätte nicht Flamininus vor zweieinhalb Jahren Nabis entscheidend geschwächt.”
conveniently short memories, given that their previous alliance with the king had resulted in nothing less than the death of Aratus, whereas, in sharp contrast, their fortunes had improved immeasurably ever since Aristaenus had persuaded them to form an alliance with the Romans in 198. Finally, although the liberation of Greece by the Romans is a recurrent political slogan in, for example, Polybius, Livy and Plutarch,\textsuperscript{108} from a purely personal perspective, Flamininus, φιλότιμος or otherwise, was extremely sensitive about his legacy. Clear evidence of this is provided by his reaction to an ill-advised, emotional remark by Eurylochus, who, during a council of the Magnesians at Chalcis, claimed that the freedom granted by the Romans was illusory:

\begin{quote}
Quinctius quidem adeo exarsit ira ut manus ad caelum tendens deos testes ingrati ac perfidi animi Magnetum invocaret.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

Indeed, Quinctius was so incensed with rage that he lifted up his hands to heaven and called upon the gods to witness the ungrateful and faithless spirit of the Magnesians.

This could well be construed as pure melodrama, but the telling point is that, for Flamininus, normally under complete control in even the most confrontational of situations, this sort of reaction is seriously out of character. Compare it, for example, with his refusal to show any irritation when, having soberly, and, as events were to shortly to prove, prophetically, warned the council about the dire consequences of a war between the Romans and Antiochus,\textsuperscript{110} he pointedly refused to react to a taunt from the Aetolian Damocritus that a copy of the decree inviting Antiochus to liberate Greece would shortly be handed to the Romans on the banks of the Tiber.\textsuperscript{111}

\subsection*{2.2.3 Philopoemen’s ongoing Opposition to Flamininus’ Policy in the Peloponnese\textsuperscript{112}}

From a biographical perspective, insufficient attention has been given to those confrontations between Philopoemen and Flamininus in which their rivalry is not

\begin{footnotes}
\item[	extsuperscript{109}]Livy, XXXV, 31, 13.
\item[	extsuperscript{110}]Livy, XXXV, 33, 6: nec ullos prius cladem eius belli sensuros quam qui movissent. Haec nequiquam velut vaticinatus Romanus.
\item[	extsuperscript{111}]Livy, XXXV, 33, 10.
\item[	extsuperscript{112}]Examined in detail by Polybius, 24, 11, 1 – 13, 10, the basis for Plutarch’s version, Phil., 17, 2-6. See Pelling (1997), 230, n. 127.
\end{footnotes}
specifically referred to as the cause of Flamininus’ animosity but from which it is still patently obvious. It is simply a question of reading between the lines. Yet again, it is Plutarch to whom we are primarily indebted for this information. For example, when the Aetolians entered Sparta by treachery and assassinated Nabis, only in turn to be killed themselves, or forced to flee, by a popular uprising,\(^\text{113}\) Philopoemen, quick to take advantage of the resulting political vacuum and the absence of Roman forces in the region, seized the opportunity of incorporating Sparta into the Achaean League. With Nabis gone and most of the Peloponnese now under the control of the Achaeans, Flamininus’ authority was seriously depleted, as is abundantly clear in a passage of Plutarch’s *Life of Philopoemen*.\(^\text{114}\) Describing the most dramatic personal confrontation on record between Philopoemen and Flamininus, Plutarch says that Philopoemen attempted to dissuade the Achaean *stategos* Diophanes from punishing the Lacedaemonians, who, in favour of war, were agitating for political change and causing havoc throughout the Peloponnese. Philopoemen urged caution on the grounds that Diophanes’ primary consideration should be the huge Syrian and Roman military presence in Greece rather than a local dispute. Choosing to ignore Philopoemen’s advice, Diophanes, accompanied by Flamininus,\(^\text{115}\) invaded Laconia and made for Sparta. Incensed at this, Philopoemen, though only a private citizen (\(\delta\iota\iota\omicron\omicron\tau\iota\nu\iota\varsigma\)) at the time, yet anxious to protect his own settlement for Sparta,\(^\text{116}\) outpaced them, organised internal opposition and denied them access to the city. He then put an end to the disorder and brought the Lacedaemonians back into the Achaean League, as they had been at the outset.\(^\text{117}\)

It is impossible to determine the precise origin of this episode. Polybius, the most likely candidate, is fragmentary for this period, Livy is silent, and the only other surviving account, that of Pausanias,\(^\text{118}\) offers no clues. The chronology, however, can be deduced with some degree of certainty from Plutarch’s description of the military situation, i.e., the presence of large numbers of Roman and Syrian troops in Greece, which suggests that these events post-date the arrival of Acilius Glabrio at the

\(^{113}\) Polybius, 20, 12, 1-7; Livy, XXXV, 35, 1 – 37, 3; Pausanias, 8, 50, 10.

\(^{114}\) Plutarch, *Phil.*, 16, 1-2.

\(^{115}\) Gruen, (1984), 469: “The Roman here saw an occasion to revive his faltering influence, especially in concert with a political rival of Philopoemen.”

\(^{116}\) Aymard, (1938), 334 – 335: “Le stratège Diophanès, insoucieux de l’immixtion du Romain dont les conséquences lui échappaient ou lui paraissaient acceptables, persista, néanmoins dans sa volonté d’action : ce soldat n’apercevait pas d’autre solution que l’usage de la force. En vain, Philopoimen combattait le projet, sans faire connaître la véritable cause de son opposition, qui n’était autre que sa répugnance à voir T. Quinctius se poser de nouveau en médiateur entre Sparte et la Confédération achaïenne.”

\(^{117}\) Plutarch, *Phil.*, 16, 1-3.

\(^{118}\) Pausanias, 8, 51, 1.
beginning of 191\textsuperscript{119} and pre-date the defeat of Antiochus later in the same year, (probably in May). This notion is supported by the fact that Diophanes succeeded Philopoemen as \textit{strategos} for the period 192-191.

Philopoemen’s claim that, under the circumstances, it would be unwise to stir up any domestic unrest decidedly smacks of hypocrisy, given that he himself, in early 192, opting to ignore Flamininus’ advice to wait for the arrival of the Roman fleet, had attacked Sparta, which was still an independent state at that time. Admittedly, Antiochus did not arrive in Greece until shortly after the conclusion of Philopoemen’s campaign, but the Romans, feverishly engaged in trying to build a Greco-Roman coalition against the Seleucid king, were anxious to prevent the disturbance of the precarious \textit{status quo}. None of this concerns Plutarch, however,\textsuperscript{120} since the point at issue is the illustration of Philopoemen’s courage, motivated by a mighty spirit, in taking such drastic action - \textit{μέγα καὶ μεγάλω φρονήματι τολμήσας}.\textsuperscript{121} Neither does Plutarch have even the least qualms about stating that Flamininus was “the Roman consul,”\textsuperscript{122} an blatantly obvious misnomer, but, linked with his Greek counterpart, Diophanes, “the (authentic) Achaean \textit{strategos},” an excellent ploy, purely for literary effect, to emphasise the extent of Philopoemen’s audacity in blatant defiance of the (allegedly) two highest ranked magistrates in the Peloponnese,\textsuperscript{123} very much to their joint frustration and humiliation.\textsuperscript{124}

Shortly after this confrontation at Sparta, Flamininus and Philopoemen were due to clash again.\textsuperscript{125} Flamininus, accompanied by the consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, attended the autumn \textit{synodos} of the Achaeans in Aegium, where the subjects to be discussed were the entrance of the Eleans into the Achaean League and the repatriation of those

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{119} Polybius, 39, 3, 8; Livy, XXXVI, 3, 13 and 14, 1: Appian, Syr., 17 a.  
\item\textsuperscript{120} Errington, (1969), 218: “he did not understand and was not interested in the political judgements which directed his protagonists’ actions.”  
\item\textsuperscript{121} Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 16, 3.  
\item\textsuperscript{122} Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 16, 1, thereby contradicting his statement in \textit{Flam.}, 15, 2 that he was \textit{προσβεντής}, i.e., \textit{legatus}. Pausanias, 8, 51, 1, describes Flamininus as ‘\textit{Ῥωμαίον τῶν πατή τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἥγεσιν}. In fact, the consuls for 191 were Manius. Acilius C.f. Glabrio and P. Cornelius Cn.f. Scipio Nasica.  
\item\textsuperscript{123} [sc. ο Φιλοποιήμαν] τον τε στρατηγόν των Αχαιών καὶ τὸν ὑπατόν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἵδιότης ἐν ἀπέκλεισί.  
\item\textsuperscript{124} Cf., Aymard, (1938), 337: “Diophanès et T. Quinctius reprisent la route du Nord, très mécontents à coup sur, l’Achaien d’avoir vu son autorité de stratège aussi scandaleusement bafouée, le Romain de n’avoir pas pu s’introduire en arbitre, une fois de plus, dans la question spartiate.” Also, Gruen, (1984), 468 : “It was a matter of prestige and patronage. Philopoemen would not countenance others either upsetting or reimposing the settlement he had made. Diophanes would have to find other outlets for his energy. Flamininus again had to swallow frustration.”  
\item\textsuperscript{125} Their final recorded personal encounter, since shortly before the end of 191 Flamininus returned to Rome. Livy, XXXVII, 1, 1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Spartans who had become exiles as a result of the Achaean War. In spite of his recent humiliation, Flamininus was still very much focussed on asserting his influence on the management of Achaean politics. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the Romans’ request for the exiles to be allowed to return home was vigorously opposed by Philopoemen. Of the three surviving accounts, that of Pausanias consists of just a single sentence, in which, with no mention of Flamininus, it is specifically Manius’ request that is refused by Philopoemen. Livy’s account is equally notable for its brevity, and, although the two Romans are clearly identified - consul cum T. Quinctio - the Achaeans are mentioned only collectively. By contrast, Plutarch attributes the refusal directly to Philopoemen, who, with no mention of Manius, wished to claim the credit for himself and the Achaeans, rather than letting it go to Flamininus and the Romans:

\[
\text{Μανίου δὲ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ὑπὸ τοῦ νενικηκότος μὲν Ἀντίοχον, αἰτουμένου δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὡς οὗ αὐτὸς τοῖς Ἀκαδαιμιονίων φυγάδας κατελθεῖν, καὶ Τίτου ταύτῳ τῷ Μανίῳ περὶ τῶν φυγάδων ἀξιούντος, διεκόλυσεν ὁ Φιλοποιήμ, οὗ τοῖς φυγάσι πολεμῶν, ἄλλα βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἄλλα μὴ Τίτου μιᾷ Ῥωμαίων χάριτι τούτῳ πραξάθηναι καὶ στρατηγῶν εἰς τούπιον αὐτός κατήγαγε τοὺς φυγάδας, οὕτως εἶχε τι πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ φρονήματος δίσερι καὶ φιλόνεικον.}
\]

When Manius, the Roman consul who had defeated Antiochus, asked the Achaeans to allow the Spartan exiles to return home, and Titus joined him in making this request, Philopoemen opposed them, not out of hostility to the exiles, but from a desire that this favour should be granted by himself and the Achaeans, rather than by Titus and the Romans. Indeed, as general for the following year, he brought the exiles back. Such was the quarrelsome and contentious attitude he displayed in the face of authority.

Plutarch was probably using a non-extant passage of Polybius’ fragmentary Book XX here, so it is impossible to know whether this juxtaposition of Philopoemen and Flamininus occurred in that historian’s version or Plutarch simply invented it in order to exaggerate the conflict between them for literary effect, as the above comparison between the various accounts suggests.

Concerning Glabrio, in a military capacity at least, he was undoubtedly a safe pair of hands, as illustrated by his defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae earlier in the year. Otherwise, however, he was lacking in finesse and devoid of any sense of proportion.

---

126 Pausanias, 8, 51, 4.
127 Livy, XXXVI, 35, 7-10.
128 Plutarch, Phil., 17, 6-7.
The first of these shortcomings is illustrated by his attempt to arrange a peace settlement with the Aetolians after the capture of Heraclea. When the Aetolian Phaeneas complained that the Romans’ conditions did not concur with Greek customs, Glabrio glibly warned him against “acting the Greek” - ἐτὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἔλληνοκοπᾶτε - and threatened to have his entire delegation clapped in irons.  

Next, his lack of any sense of proportion is illustrated by his decision to persist with the siege of Naupactus, where the Aetolians had assembled after their rejection of his peace terms, while elsewhere, Philip was busily annexing not just cities, but entire provinces. It was Flamininus who eventually resolved the situation, and with sufficient tact to prevent any personal embarrassment to Glabrio, who, following Flamininus’ advice, granted the Aetolians an armistice to allow them time to send delegates to the senate and then raised the siege. In view of this, it is a fair assumption that Flamininus, in spite of his inferior rank, was effectively the senior partner in this mission in Aegium, and that Glabrio’s presence was intended simply to lend extra authority. Whatever, Philopoemen remained unimpressed, and the result was yet more frustration and humiliation for Flamininus. He was able successfully to manipulate the likes of Glabrio (and Diophanes), but not Philopoemen.

Plutarch’s objective in recounting these episodes at Sparta and Aegium is to build a case for the superiority of Philopoemen over Flamininus. In doing so he has few scruples about the manner in which he attempts to achieve this objective, clearly illustrated by the examples provided in both instances of his readiness to exaggerate and freely to incorporate patently erroneous material into his narrative. Furthermore, one crucial point which Plutarch fails to mention, be it due to a convenient lapse of memory or simply lack of awareness, is that in both instances Flamininus was in a hopeless situation, since Philopoemen knew full well that he had no official mandate from the senate. Finally, as the result of Philopoemen’s flat refusal to comply with the Romans’

129 Polybius, 20, 10, 6-7; Livy, XXXVI, 28, 4-5.
130 See Briscoe, (1981), Comm. XXXIV-XXXVII, 272, 35, 1. Glabrio, unlike Flamininus, was equally remiss in his financial affairs, which resulted in an abrupt end to his political career. In 189 he was a candidate for the censorship, but was forced to withdraw when accused of appropriating a portion of the booty from the Syrian campaign. Cato, a rival for the censorship, claimed that gold and silver plate which he had seen when Antiochus’ camp was taken in 191 had not been on display during Glabrio’s triumph (Livy, XXXVII, 46, 1-6) the following year. For detailed analyses, see Bloy, D, 43, (1998-1999), 49-61 and Churchill, 121, 4, (2000), 549-557.
131 Aymard, (1938), 353: “même lorsque le légat sénatorial s’efface derrière le consul par respect de la préséance protocolaire, M. Acilius ne peut être et n’est que le porte-parole des idées de T. Quinctius.” Similarly, Feyel, (1943), 245: “s’il [Flamininus] entraîne le consul M. Acilius, c’est à la fois pour se couvrir, auprès des Achéens, d’une autorité légalement supérieure à la sienne”.
132 Gruen, (1984), 467-470, and esp. 120, n. 123: ”Flamininus expressed an interest in the exiles at an Achaean meeting about this time, as did the consul M. Acilius Glabrio. But that did not represent senatorial policy, as Philopoemen knew – he successfully blocked them.” Contrary, albeit without producing any evidence,
request, this episode provides more than just an example of what Plutarch portrays as his extreme φιλονικία, since his openly expressed desire to claim for himself the credit for repatriating the exiles constitutes an equally extreme example of φιλοτιμία, i.e., personal prestige, or even self-glorification, in this particular instance.

This, indeed, is the crux of the matter. The motivation behind Diophanes’ invasion of Laconia had been to claim the credit for promoting Peloponnesian political unity under the Achaean League. Philopoemen readily supported this notion, but wanted the credit for himself: hence his drastic, independent action. Flamininus’ presence raises the question of whether he and Diophanes had come to some private arrangement to share the credit for whatever settlement they had agreed to impose on Sparta, or whether Flamininus was simply waiting in the wings looking for any opportunity to exploit the situation and enhance his own prestige by reimposing the conditions of the treaty he had concluded with Nabis following the allied campaign of 195. A similar example is provided by an earlier episode in which Diophanes is laying siege to the Messenians who, favouring the Aetolians, had refused to join the Achaean League. Technically allies of Rome, they appealed to Flamininus for help, saying that they were prepared to open their gates to the Romans and surrender their city to them, but not to the Achaeans. Flamininus, anxious to re-establish his dwindling authority in the Peloponnese, browbeat Diophanes into abandoning the siege and, effectively betraying the trust the Messenians had placed in him, proposed that the problem be resolved by incorporating them into the Achaean League! Gruen argues convincingly that it was a foregone conclusion that the Messenians were destined sooner or later to be coerced into joining the Achaean League, an obvious source of embarrassment for Flamininus. Better, therefore, to accept the inevitable and take the initiative personally to endorse this in advance. Meanwhile, he took it upon himself to order the Messenians to recall their exiles and then presumed to appoint himself as an intermediary should any

---

134 Livy, XXXVI, 31, 1 – 32, 9; Plutarch, Phil., 16, 1-3, Flam., 17, 1-4; Pausanias, 8, 30, 5.
135 Polybius, 23, 5, 2; Livy, 34, 35, 6.
problems arise. The Achaeans were the real winners, but not without a deviously manipulated boost to Flamininus’ personal profile.\textsuperscript{136}

2.3 \textbf{Deterioration in Relations between Rome and the Achaean League}\textsuperscript{137}

Sometime towards the end of 191 Flamininus returned to Rome, after which his only other recorded visit to Greece, in 183, was but transitory. Effectively, therefore, Philopoemen had a considerably freer hand in the affairs of the Peloponnese. In the spring of 188, cynically exploiting an ambiguous and non-committal ruling by the senate, he invaded Sparta, razed its defences, annulled the ancient legal code of the legendary Lycurgus and imposed his own constitution upon the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{138} However, even these drastic actions failed to resolve the problem of the Spartan exiles, which, in combination with a similar conflict of interests at Messene, over the next six years increasingly soured the relationship between Rome and the Achaeans\textsuperscript{139}

In the spring of 185 Q. Caecilius Metellus was one of three special commissioners appointed to investigate Philip’s recent incursions into Thrace.\textsuperscript{140} The commissioners had been instructed to stop over in the Peloponnese on their return journey to Rome. At a conference of the Achaean League in Argos, Metellus, complaining about the undue severity with which the Achaeans had treated the Lacedaemonians, found immediate support from Diophanes:

\begin{verbatim}
ο δὲ Διοφάνης ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, ἀνήρωπος στρατιωτικότερος ἢ πολιτικότερος, ἀναστάς οίχ ὁπον ἀπελογηθῆ τι περὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἄλλα καὶ προσπεδείξε τῷ Καυκελίῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Φιλοποιμένα παρατριβήν ἔτερον ἐγκλήμα κατὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. ἐφη γὰρ οὗ μόνον τὰ κατὰ Λακεδαιμόνα κεχειρίσθαι κακῶς, ἄλλα καὶ τὰ κατὰ Μεσσήνην· ἤσαν δὲ περὶ τῶν
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{136} Gruen, (1984), 468-469.

\textsuperscript{137} Notably between 187 and 183, and passed over by Plutarch.

\textsuperscript{138} Livy, XXXVIII, 33-34 and XXXIX, 36, 3 – 37, 8; Diodorus, 29, 17, 1; Plutarch, Phil., 16, 4-9, Flam., 22, 6; Pausanias, 7, 8, 5 and 8, 51, 2-4.

\textsuperscript{139} Polybius 22, 3, 1-2, 22, 10, 1-15 and 22, 12, 1-10; Livy, XXXIX, 33, 5-8 and 35, 5 – 37, 21..

\textsuperscript{140} Livy, XXXIX, 24, 6-7.
Diophanes of Megalopolis, however, who was more of a soldier than a politician, rose to his feet and, far from offering any defence of the Achaeans, suggested to Caecilius, as a result of the personal friction between himself and Philopoemen, yet another charge that might be brought against them. For he said that not only had matters been badly managed at Sparta, but also at Messene, since there were disputes about Flamininus’ decree concerning the Messenian exiles and the way it had been implemented by Philopoemen.

Equally significant as this criticism is that it was Diophanes who produced it. In spite of having co-operated freely and commendably with Philopoemen during the Achaean campaign against Nabis, and in spite of the rebuke he had received personally from Flamininus during the siege of Messene in 191, he had no hesitation in offering spontaneously to condemn the nationalist party. The implications are obvious: their policies left a great deal to be desired, both in their content and in the manner of their application. Metellus was unable to make any headway, however, when the Achaeans glibly hid behind a constitutional technicality: according to Achaean law, a full meeting of the assembly could not be called, since Metellus had no written request from the senate stating precisely which matters should be discussed. As a result he departed in indignation.

The repercussions of this particular conference resulted in a further acceleration of the deteriorating relationship between Rome and the Achaeans. By the end of the year Metellus was back in Rome as a member of a senatorial party receiving embassies from abroad, Achaea included. The Achaeans, having recourse to the same technicality they had applied previously in Argos, launched an attack on Metellus for his earlier criticism of their policies. In reply, referring to the difficulties in Sparta, Metellus duly condemned the Achaeans, specifically targeting Philopoemen and Lycortas as the villains of the piece. There is unprecedented friction between the respective parties in a passage from Polybius, a thinly-disguised measure of contempt from the Achaeans, duly countered by a clear hardening of their attitude from the Romans, warning the Achaeans that any future legalistic prevarication would not be tolerated:
Having listened to the arguments, the senate answered the Achaeans by saying that they would send a commission to examine the state of affairs in Lacedaemonia. In addition, they strongly advised them to pay close attention to the ambassadors they sent out regularly and to give them a proper reception, as the Romans did in the case of ambassadors who came to them.

In mid-184 the dialogue from the Roman side turned overtly hostile, and, yet again, it was Philopoemen’s conduct which was severely condemned, in carefully selected, emotive language, this time by the consul Appius Claudius Pulcher:

Appius ea, quae apud senatum questi erant Lacedaemonii, dislicere senatui ostendit: caedem primum ad Compasium factam eorum, qui a Philopoemene ad causam dicendam evocati venissent; deinde cum in homines ita saevitum esset, neulla parte crudelitas eorum cessaret, muros dirutos urbis nobilissimae esse, leges vetustissimas abrogatas, inclutamque per gentes disciplinam Lycurgi sublatam.148

Appius pointed out that those things about which the Lacedaemonians had complained were viewed with displeasure by the senate: first the massacre at Campasium of those delegates who had been summoned by Philopoemen to plead their cause, and then, after inflicting this savagery on humankind, to show there was no limit to their barbarity, the destruction of the walls of a most distinguished city, the abrogation of its laws from ages past and the renowned discipline of Lycurgus which had worldwide approval.

Rhetoric of this sort is a regular feature of Livy’s style. The remarkable thing in this instance, however, is that ever since the formation of the alliance between the Romans and the Achaeans, neither party had previously felt the need to direct it against the other. Lycortas was the Achaean strategos and chief spokesman on this occasion.149 His defence, specious at best, was roundly rejected, and for the first time, significantly, with an undisguised threat from Appius:

---

147 Polybius, 22, 12, 9–10.
149 A conference in early 184 at Clitor, a town in the north of Arcadia on a river of the same name, a tributary of the Aroanius.
Appius said that he was strongly advising the Achaeans to court the favour of the Romans of their own free will while this was still possible, rather than being unwillingly compelled to do so before much longer. This statement gave rise to a general murmur, but it spread fear of the consequences of failing to comply with Roman demands.

Appius’ words fell on deaf ears. Early in 183, Deinocrates of Messene, arriving as an ambassador in Rome, was overjoyed to learn that Flamininus had been appointed legatus by the senate to negotiate a peace settlement between Prusias I of Bithynia and Eumenes II of Pergamum. Deinocrates was hoping that Flamininus, due to their personal friendship and to his disagreement with Philopoemen, would en route through Greece settle the affairs of Messene in accordance with his own views. He duly accompanied Flamininus who, on disembarking at Naupactus, wrote to Philopoemen (now in his eighth strategia) and the chief magistrates ordering them to summon a general assembly of the Achaeans. However, knowing that Flamininus, yet again, had no specific mandate from the senate to deal with the affairs of Achaea, they glibly exploited the same technicality they had employed to confound Metellus in Argos in 185, replying that they would summon a general assembly only if Flamininus submitted in writing those points on which he wished to confer with them, in due accordance with the legal restrictions by which their magistrates were bound. Flamininus, (mindful undoubtedly of his previous frustrating, humiliating confrontations with Philopoemen), did not pursue the matter any further and duly resumed his journey to deal with the more pressing business in Bithynia.

---

150 Livy, XXXIX, 37, 19-20.
151 Deinocrates had become a close friend (συμβηθης) when he commanded the Messenian contingent of the allied forces during Flamininus’ campaign against Nabis in 195. Polybius, 23, 5, 2; Livy, XXXIV, 35, 6.
152 Errington, (1969), 262
153 Polybius, 23, 5, 1-18. Edlund, (1977), argues that Flamininus was more concerned about his personal profile as patron of the Greek cities. However, she fails to take into account that Flamininus would have been more than content to see Messene detached from the Achaean League, if only to spite Philopoemen. Moreover, Flamininus knew from the very beginning of this episode that he was on shaky ground, duly reflected in his phraseology in Polybius: “Εγὼ μὲν, ὦ Δεινοκράτη, πάν” ἐρή “ποιήσα τὸ δυσματόν”. From previous experience he feared that, unsupported by any official senatorial mandate, he would not have sufficient authority to resolve the situation to their mutual satisfaction and was, in no position to make a firm promise. Effectively, therefore, he simply reassures his old friend as best he can, yet still takes the trouble to break his long journey and make contact with the Achaeans. Briscoe, (Comm. XXXI-XXXIII, 23), also fails to give due consideration to the long-standing contentiousness of the relationship between Flamininus and Philopoemen,
2.4 The Death of Philopoemen

By the beginning of 182 Messene was in open revolt\footnote{Polybius, 24, 9, 12-13; Livy, XXXIX, 48, 5; Plutarch, Phil., 18, 3; Justinus, 32, 1, 4.} and Achaean ambassadors, begging for Roman assistance, got decidedly short shrift:

When the Achaeans begged them, if it were possible, to send them help in accordance with the terms of their alliance against the Messenians, or at least to ensure that no arms or corn would be imported from Italy into Messene, they answered that the Achaeans should not be surprised if Sparta, Corinth or Argos left the league if they failed to manage it as the Romans wished. Giving this answer full publicity, as a kind of proclamation that those who chose to leave the Achaean League had permission to do so as far as the Romans were concerned, they continued to detain the ambassadors, waiting to see how matters evolved between the Messenians and the Achaeans.

Shortly afterwards in the same year the Achaeans voted for war, devastated the whole of Messenia, sent many distinguished citizens into exile and, after extensive torture, executed others for having sought Roman intervention.\footnote{Polybius, 24, 9, 12-13.} It was during this phase of the war that Philopoemen suffered the misfortune of being captured by the Messenians. Polybius’ account has survived only as a truncated epitome,\footnote{Polybius, 23, 9, 12-14.} and although Livy

\footnote{Polybius, 23, 12, 1-3.}
describes this event in some detail, he says nothing of the circumstances which preceded it. Plutarch’s chronology is, to say the least, somewhat confused, but he describes how, already seventy years of age and anticipating a peaceful retirement, and only just beginning to recover from a long illness, Philopoemen took it upon himself to get involved in the military activity. Seeking to protect Colonis, which was under threat from Deinocrates, he covered a distance of some forty-six miles in a single day at the head of a contingent of Achaean cavalry which included Lycortas. During an unexpected attack from the enemy he was seriously injured in a fall from his horse as it stumbled and taken prisoner. In spite of his awesome reputation and the invaluable assistance he had given to the Messenians in times past when relations had been friendly, the leading politicians eventually voted by a majority for his execution by poison.

Both his sincerity and his commitment are beyond reproach, as are his anxiety over the remainder of the contingent and his relief at hearing that the greater part, including Lycortas, about whom he was particularly concerned, had retreated in safety. Most commendable, however, is his total lack of concern for his personal safety - in coming to the aid of his compatriots in spite of his debilitated condition.

2.5 A Jibe by Flamininus, mocking the Appearance of Philopoemen

For all the surviving accounts of contentious, political interaction between Flamininus and Philopoemen, interaction of a strictly personal nature consists of just one single example in the form of an anecdote in Plutarch:

τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου σώματος τὴν φύσιν ἐπισκόπητον ὁ Τίτος εἶπεν:
"Ω Φιλοποίημην, ὡς καλὰς χείρας ἔχεις καὶ σκέλη. γαστέρα δ᾿ οὐκ ἔχεις."

158 Livy, XXXIX, 39, 1 – 50, 11.
159 Plutarch, Phil., 18, 3 – 21, 4.
160 A village about twenty miles south of Messene.
161 Plutarch names Deinocrates as the instigator of this decision, as does Pausanias, 8, 51, 7. There is also circumstantial evidence in Livy, XXXIX, 49, 12.
162 Plutarch, Phil., 19, 5.
On another occasion Titus, making fun of his exceptional physique, said, “You have splendid arms and legs, Philopoemen, but no belly,” for Philopoemen was rather slender at the waist. This jibe, however, was aimed more specifically at his financial situation, for though he had excellent men-at-arms and cavalrymen, he was often short of money.

An important point, missed by certain translators, is the interpretation of the opening clause of this quotation, since, in the phrase Τῶν δὲ ἄλλου σώματος τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλου does not refer to Philopoemen, (as opposed to Flamininus), in which case the construction would be Τῶν δὲ ἄλλου [sc. Φιλοποίμενος] Τῶν σώματος τὴν φύσιν. It agrees, rather, with σώματος, and therefore the appropriate translation of ἄλλος, (simply an alternative in this instance for ἄλλος), is not “other” but “different”, and different in the sense of unusual, extraordinary, or exceptional and, therefore, impressive, duly confirmed by Plutarch’s description of Philopoemen’s well developed limbs and narrow waistline. (Further evidence concerning his imposing physical presence is provided by Pausanias).

Now, although the more obvious point of Flamininus’ jibe would be lost without Plutarch’s clarification, there is a second, more subtle insinuation here if the double entendre of δύναμις in the sense of material wealth is discarded, and the word is translated in its primary sense of physical strength, since this clearly implies that, however impressive visually, Philopoemen’s fine physique is effectively useless.

It is impossible to determine whether Flamininus’ apparently unsolicited attack on Philopoemen was stimulated by something other than the rivalry concerning their respective military reputations. The wide divergence of their cultural backgrounds and the difference in their ages might well have been contributing factors, and, since mutual antipathy between any two individuals is not uncommon, one should also consider the possibility of their simply not liking each other. Whatever, evidence elsewhere gives good reason to believe that this was more than one isolated incident and that their personal relationship was generally confrontational, for which the prime culprit was Flamininus. Philopoemen is portrayed as defiant and contentious primarily out of pressing military and political considerations rather than for wanton, personal gratification. This must be measured against the decidedly mischievous and

---

163 Plutarch, Phil., 2, 5-6. See also, Moralia, 197, C.
165 Pausanias, 8, 49, 3.
irresponsible aspects of Flamininus’ character, examples of which have been examined in greater or lesser detail in the previous chapter, e.g., his jibe at Philip at Locris and his clearly lackadaisical titillation of Philip’s son, Demetrius concerning the Macedonian monarchy, this latter incident resulting ultimately in the young prince’s unwarranted assassination on the orders of his father. Moreover, Flamininus’ failure to control his tongue would have been further goaded by the intensity of his resentment of Philopoemen, still unabated, apparently, even eight years after their last recorded personal encounter and which Deinocrates felt sure he could readily exploit in order to secure the secession of Messene from the Achaean League.

2.6 Concluding Remarks

Following his second return from Crete, by which time the Achaean league had recently become allies of Rome, Philopoemen pursued his various agenda with the same dogged determination that he had displayed earlier. For the Achaeans, the right independently to pursue their own domestic policy was paramount, and any opposition, be it from the Macedonians, the Spartans, or even the Romans, was treated by Philopoemen with the same blatant defiance. In reality, since its very outset, from the Achaean perspective the alliance with Rome had been little more than a marriage of convenience. It was purely for reasons of national security that they had sought to avoid finishing as allies of the losing side in the conflict between Macedon and Rome. Moreover, their priorities are clearly illustrated by the measure of military support they provided for the Romans – against Philip at Cynoscephalae and against Antiochus at Thermopylae, none whatsoever, in sharp contrast to the unbounded enthusiasm with which they supported the Romans during the allied campaign against Nabis.

Finally, within the Achaean League Philopoemen shines brightly like a beacon amidst what can at best only be considered as a motley group of decidedly mediocre individuals with little sense of purpose and even less personal commitment, the only exceptions being Lycortas, Aristaenus and Diophanes. He did not suffer fools gladly and was undisputedly a multi-talented, ruthless political and military leader who let nothing stand in the way of getting things done. Even the Roman Livy unreservedly gives him

---

166 Livy, XL, 23, 1 – 24, 8; Plutarch, Aem., 8, 9-12, Aratus, 54, 6-7; Pausanias, 2, 9-5; Justinus, 32, 2, 10; Trogus, Prol., 32; Orosius, 4, 20, 28; Zonaras, 9, 22a; Diodorus 29, 25, 1.
credit where he thinks it is due, and it was yet another (unidentified) Roman who complimented him on being “the last of the Greeks.”

---

167 Livy, XXXIX, 50, 7-11.
Chapter 3
FLAMININUS IN PLUTARCH

The objective of this chapter is to evaluate Plutarch’s portrayal of Flamininus’ character in the light of what emerges from the pages of the historians and other writers, which in turn provides an insight into Plutarch’s methods of composition and the historical validity of his text. In fact, this particular Plutarchan Life provides historians and literary critics alike with an excellent opportunity of achieving this objective since the main source, Polybius, has survived for the most critical period of Flamininus’ career (198-196); moreover, where Polybius’ account has been lost or is no more than fragmentary, Livy’s account, primarily Polybian in origin, serves as a valuable substitute.¹

¹ Specifically on Plutarch’s sources for the Flamininus, see Peter, (1965); Nissen, (1863), 290-292; Klotz, (1935), 46-53; Scardigli, (1979), 52-56; Smith, (1940), 1-4 and, especially, (1944), 89: “A study of the sources of a Plutarchan Life may be excused on two grounds: first, a knowledge of the sources is important for a critical evaluation of the Life’s historical worth; and second, such a study is instructive for the understanding of Plutarch’s methods of composition, which, in its turn, helps considerably in the historical evaluation. For this second object the Titus is particularly well suited, since the problem, owing to the survival in large part of his main source, is infinitely simpler than in many of the other Lives, (…); Feyel, (1943), 236: “Or, le document principal, en ce qui concerne l’époque de la conquête romaine, est l’ouvrage de Polybe, puisque la plupart de nos sources remontent à lui; aussi tout livre consacré à l’étude de cette époque est nécessairement un commentaire sur Polybe.” For a more general study on Plutarch’s source material, see Delvaux, (1988), 27-48.
3.1 The Life of Titus Quinctius Flamininus

The basic structure of the Flamininus is not complicated, with material generally presented in a straightforward, chronological order and, although there are a few aberrations, they do not in any way seriously impair the overall unity of the work.

Synopsis:
1) Ch. 1: Introduction
2) Ch. 2: Flamininus’ consular campaign
3) Ch. 3-13: first period of activity in Greece, 198-194.
4) Ch. 14: Flamininus returns to Rome and celebrates a triumph, late 194
5) Ch. 15-16: second period of activity in Greece, 192-191
6) Ch. 17: résumé of Flamininus’ character
7) Ch. 18-19: conflict with Cato
8) Ch. 20-21: the death of Hannibal, and concluding observations

Plutarch directs most of his attention towards what are undoubtedly the five highlights of Flamininus’ career, namely, his controversial election to the consulship for 198, his victory over Philip at Cynoscephalae in 197, his declaration of the independence of the Greek states at the Isthmian Games in Corinth in 196, his triumphal procession in Rome in 194 and his election as censor in 189. For reasons already explained, Flamininus’ crucial role throughout the allied campaign against Nabis in 195 receives scant attention. For the rest, Plutarch develops the theme of the adulation Flamininus sought from the Greeks until, in sharp contrast during the closing chapters of the Life, he systematically dismantles the image he has created by focussing on the expulsion of his brother Lucius from the senate by Cato in 184, and his mission to Prusias I of Bithynia in 183, which resulted in the unfortunate - and unnecessary - death of Hannibal. Thereafter Plutarch effectively consigns Flamininus to oblivion.

3.1.1 Introductory Chapter

The introductory chapter of most of Plutarch’s Lives generally consists of an account in greater or lesser detail of the protagonist’s birth, his family background, his childhood, his education and some assessment of his character. A good example of this is provided by the Life of Philopoemen, the Life paired with the Flamininus, whereas the Flamininus

---

itself is surprisingly jejune in this respect, especially since several members of the gens Quinctia had already distinguished themselves previously. Titus Quintius Capitolinus Barbatus held the consulship no fewer than six times between 471 and 439, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was dictator in 458, Kaeso Quinctius Claudia consul in 271 and, in Flamininus’ era, Titus Quintius Crispinus was consul in 208. Moreover, it is a fair assumption that Plutarch, from his composition of other Lives - the Publicola and the Coriolanus, for example - contemporaneous with the earlier distinguished members of Flamininus’ gens, was familiar with at least some of their achievements. Should it be considered, therefore, that Plutarch has missed the opportunity of enhancing Flamininus’ profile by association in order to compensate for the apparent scarcity of information elsewhere?

Whatever, Plutarch opens his account by referring those of his readers who might be curious about Flamininus’ outward appearance to a bronze statue in Rome. This is followed by a description of the more salient aspects of his character, which will be dealt with presently. Otherwise, Plutarch makes just the briefest of references to Flamininus’ training in the arts of war, his appointment as military tribune under M. Claudius Marcellus and his appointment as governor of Tarentum, where he became highly respected as much for his administration of justice as for his military proficiency. For this reason, says Plutarch, he was appointed governor (ἀρχον) and director-in-chief (οἰκιστής) of the colonists in Narnia and Cosa. Otherwise, the reader receives so little

---

4 Badian, (1970), 28: “Plutarch, who always delighted in digging out information on his heroes’ childhood, found nothing to report.”

5 See Balty, (1978), 669-686. For a gold stater bearing the image of Flamininus see p. 672. This coin was probably issued following the defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae. It is modelled on the traditional gold coinage of Macedonia, initiated by Alexander. Hence the image of Nike on the reverse side. On the obverse, however, the name of Alexander is substituted by “T. Quincti” and his portrait replaces that of Athena. Such portraits were not due to appear on coins minted in Rome until the time of Julius Caesar, some 150 years later.

6 Along with Marcellus, other contemporaries such as P. Cornelius Scipio, M. Porcius Cato, L. Aemilius Paullus, and C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator, the heroes of Metaurus in 207, would all have provided excellent role models for a sound political and military education.

7 Either Plutarch’s memory has failed him here, or he is attributing undeserved credit to Flamininus, since there is no evidence to connect Flamininus with the foundation of these particular colonies. Cf. Gerevini, (1952), 91- 92, n. 5, Pelling, (1997), 284 and Pfeilschifter, (2005), 48, n. 76. Flamininus undoubtedly owed much of his success to his proficiency in Greek, and it would be interesting to know precisely how he acquired it. We have no record of his schooling, but Greek studies were introduced into Rome shortly after the middle of the third century, so it is fair to assume that he had acquired at least some knowledge of the language during his early years. In Tarentum, however, he would have been dealing with Greeks on a regular basis. Along with all the vocabulary and jargon required for political and commercial negotiating, he would also have learned a great deal about the Greek mentality. Badian, (1970), 29: “It must been here [in Tarentum], as has long been recognised, that he acquired his knowledge of the Greek language and character, which was to make him conspicuous among Roman commanders.”
information about Flamininus’ early life, that it is almost as if, prior to his spectacular solicitation for the consulship, he had never existed and had simply mushroomed out of the ground overnight. This is really perplexing, given that, following his controversial election as consul at not even thirty years of age, he was due subsequently to exert such a profound influence on Roman foreign policy in the east throughout the next decade and beyond. One can only surmise, therefore, that this paucity of information in Plutarch’s text is due to a similar paucity in the texts of the historians. In the case of Polybius, this must remain purely speculative. Although the fragmentary Book 16 contains plenty of information about the later years of the final decade of the third century B.C., very little of this is directly relevant to Rome, and none whatsoever to Flamininus, and Book 17 has perished in entirety. Livy, meanwhile, given the strategic value of Tarentum, is roundly castigated by Badian for his “unforgivable carelessness” in being so frustratingly uninformative. One can only surmise, therefore, that, following the recapture of the city from the Carthaginians by Q. Fabius Maximus in 209, it was the scene of no significant military activity and Livy quite naturally directed his attention elsewhere. It could well be, therefore, that from a military perspective Flamininus’ achievements amounted to very little and that Plutarch attempts to give him more credit than he deserves in order to enhance his profile.

Regardless of the availability of factual biographical information or otherwise, however, Plutarch states his case from the very beginning:

tὸ δὲ ἡσος δέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸς ὄργην καὶ πρὸς χάριν, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ’ ἐλαφρός μὲν ἐν τῷ κολάζειν καὶ οὐκ ἐπίμονος, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χάριτας τελεσίουργος, καὶ τῶν ἐυεργετηθεῖσα διὰ πάντος ὅσπερ ευεργεταίς εὔνους, καὶ πρόθυμος ὡς κάλλιστα τῶν κτημάτων τούς ἐν πεπονθότας ἦν’ αὐτοῦ περιέπειν ἀεὶ καὶ σώζειν. φιλοτιμότατος καὶ φιλοδοξότατος ὁν, ἐβούλετο τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ μεγίστων πράξεων αὐτούργος εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς δεσμένοις εἰ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς εἰ ποιῆσαι δυναμένοις ἔχαιρε, τοὺς μὲν ὅσπερ ὑλῆν τῆς ἅρτης, τοὺς δ’ ὅσπερ ἀντιπάλους πρὸς δόξαν ηγούμενος.12

---

8 For a tentative reconstruction of the period before Flamininus’ consulship, see, Badian, (1971), 102-111, esp. 107-110. Also, Ekstein, (1976), 119-121.
9 See Smith, (1940), 1-10, in which he argues, (albeit with no real conviction), that the basic source material for the Flamininus, particularly the two opening and three concluding chapters, was a non-extant biography. 10 Badian, (1971), 109. 11 Polybius, 10, 1, 1-10; Livy, XXVII, 15, 4-16, 16; Plutarch, Cat. Mai., 2, 3-6, Fabius, 19, 5-23, 1; Appian, Han., 49, a-b. 12 Plutarch, Flam., 1, 1-2. For an astute observation on the concluding section of this quotation, see Nikolaidis: “The keyword here is autourgos. Titus desired the greatest and noblest achievements to which he aspired to be the outcome solely of his own efforts.” De Pourcq-Roskam, 35.
As for his disposition, it is said that he was quick both in showing anger and in bestowing a favour, though not in equal measure, for he applied his punishments leniently with no lingering after effects, whereas he always granted favours in full measure, was always well disposed towards his beneficiaries as if they were his benefactors, and eager to treat with respect and to care for those who had ever received a favour from him, as if they were his most treasured possessions. Extremely covetous of glory and distinction, he wanted to take exclusive credit for his best and greatest achievements, and, moreover, he took greater pleasure in those in need of a favour than in those who were able to grant one, considering the former as building material in his pursuit of excellence, and the latter as rivals in the struggle for glory.

This highly condensed, rhetorical passage falls clearly into two contrasting parts, with Flamininus initially portrayed as loyal and generous almost to a fault, only to have this compromised by φιλοτιμία and φιλοδοξία, and seriously compromised, since Plutarch uses the superlative in both of the adjectival derivatives. Although φιλοτιμία and φιλοδοξία are not invariably pejorative, Plutarch leaves little room for doubt that such is indeed the case in the present instance, since the conjunction καί between the first clause and the remainder of the passage - (καί τοῖς δεσμέανοις - - κ.τ.λ.) - is not a straightforward copula simply serving to introduce additional information: rather, it equates all subsequent information with that which has preceded it and thus further corroborates Plutarch’s contention. Hence the rendition “and, moreover.” Flamininus’ notion that his beneficiaries were no better than inanimate objects suggests a certain degree of contempt, and the reader is left with the impression that he was inclined to be insensitive in the pursuit of his ambitions. It would appear, however, that Plutarch has exaggerated somewhat, given that reciprocation at all levels of social interaction was endemic in the Roman psyche. For example, the notions of patronus and cliens, and of beneficium and officium, the latter being the mutually accepted and binding consequence of the former. Whatever, Plutarch has stated his case, since it is around this particular facet of Flamininus’ character that he has decided to construct the Life.

Since Plutarch, at this point at least, provides no examples of those aspects of Flamininus’ character he so roundly praises, it is worth considering where he might have acquired these notions from. Unfortunately, except for Plutarch, direct observations on Flamininus’ character are few and far between. Gerevini refers to a
passage of Polybius', but this is scarcely appropriate, since it deals primarily with Flamininus' political and commercial acumen rather than with those aspects of his character described by Plutarch in the present instance. Next, Gerevini and Pelling refer to an observation in a passage of Livy's:

\[
\text{erat Quinctius sicut adversantibus asper, ita, si cederes, idem placabilis.}
\]

Quinctius was easily appeased if you submitted to him, just as he was harsh on those who opposed him.

However, this brief, transient remark falls far short of Plutarch's detailed description of Flamininus' character in the introductory chapter, and the same applies to a remarkably similar passage with which Plutarch precedes his version of the events preceded by the above quotation from Livy; namely, the manner in which Flamininus deals with the Achaeans concerning their claim to the island of Zacynthus, of vital strategic importance to the Romans since, along with Cephallenia, it controlled access to the Corinthian Gulf:

\[
\text{Καὶ γὰρ εἰ τισὶν ἐκ πραγμάτων ἡ φιλοτιμίας ἐνεκα, καθάπερ Φιλοποίμενι καὶ πάλιν Διοφάνει θερατηγοῦντι τὸν Ἀχαιῶν, ἐροεύρετον, οἷς ἦν βαρὺς οὐδὲ εἰς ἔργα διατείνων οὗ θυμος, ἀλλὰ ἐν λόγῳ παρρησίαι τινά πολιτικήν ἔχοντι πανόμενος. Πικρός μὲν οὖν οὐδένι, πολλοῖς δ’ ὡς ἐβδόμει καὶ κούφος εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰς δὲ συγγενεῖσθαι πάντων ἥσσος καὶ εἰπεῖν ἐπίχαρις μετὰ δεινότητος. Ἀχαιοὺς μὲν γὰρ φιλοτεχνούμενος τὴν Ζακυνθίους νήσον ἔφη κινδυνεύον, ἄν όσπερ αἱ χελώναι πορρωτέρῳ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς Πελοποννήσου προτείνωσι.}
\]

For even if he took offence with any of them over a matter of policy or out of ambitious rivalry, as, for example, with Philoemen and then again with Diophanes, when they were acting generals, his anger was not severe, nor did it prompt him to take drastic action, but always ended in a certain kind of diplomatic outspokenness. He was bitter towards no-one, and though to many he appeared quick to anger and shallow by nature, he was in other respects a most agreeable companion and one who spoke with grace and intensity. For instance, he told the Achaeans that they would be putting themselves at risk if, in laying

---

14 Polybius, 18, 12, 3
15 Gerevini, (1952) 91, n. 3.
17 Livy, XXXVI, 32, 5.
18 Cephallenia was confiscated shortly afterwards from the Aetolians in 189. Polybius, 21, 30, 5; Livy XXXVIII, 11, 7.
19 Plutarch, Flam., 17, 2-3. Cf. Moralia, p. 197B.
claim to the island of Zacynthus, like a tortoise sticking its head out of its shell, they stuck their heads outside of the Peloponnese.

Either through the lost Polybian version and/or that of Livy, Plutarch was fully familiar with the historical context here. Purely for literary effect, however, he opts to ignore it, concentrating instead on Flamininus’ apophthegm concerning the tortoise. We may only speculate about Polybius’ account, but the tone of Livy’s, at least, is markedly different from that of Plutarch’s. Due to lack of support from the senate, Flamininus had been but recently outmanoeuvred, humiliated and frustrated by Philopoemen on his proposed political settlement for Sparta. In no mood to compromise, therefore, confident in the knowledge that on so crucial an issue as Zacynthus he would have the full support of the senate, and revelling in the opportunity to repair his seriously bruised ego, with the silkiest of rhetoric he pretends deftly to cajole the Achaeans – omissa contentione vocis vultusque – before glibly introducing the simile of the tortoise. In sharp contrast with Plutarch’s version, Flamininus’ choice of vocabulary in depicting the tortoise’s vulnerability is vivid and loaded with implication – nulla vobis omnia, quae [sc. Peloponnesi terminos] extra sint, et exposita ad omnes ictus – amounting in reality to nothing less than a very thinly guarded threat: Zacynthus was no place for the Achaeans and, should they make the fatal error of refusing to hand it over to the Romans, Flamininus would not be responsible for the inevitable consequences. Finally, it is abundantly clear from Livy’s text that Flamininus was placabilis conditionally – si cederes – not spontaneously.

There is a further example in Livy of what at first sight appears to be unrestrained, gratuitous clemency on the part of Flamininus when he intercedes on behalf of the Aetolians, besieged in Naupactus by the consul Acilius Glabrio. As soon as the Aetolians caught sight of him, they all rushed to the walls begging for help. Although moved by this appeal – quamquam his vocibus moveretur – he made signs to them that it was not in his power to intervene on their behalf. However, Flamininus eventually succeeded in persuading Glabrio to raise the siege and allow the Aetolians to send an embassy to the senate to negotiate for moderate terms. Although there is no apparent reason to doubt

---

20 Gruen, (1984), 471: “Within the Peloponnese Flamininus failed to curb Achaean expansionism for the simple reason that he could not carry the backing of the senate.”

21 Gruen, (1984), 471: “Achaean expansion in the Peloponnese would not bother the senate; but the islands of the Ionian Sea were off limits to any major Greek power.” Philopoemen is conspicuous by his absence: “Philopoemen a dû sentir à la fois l’impossibilité de toute résistance et, derrière les apparences favorables à sa patrie, le bien-fondé indiscutable de la demande romaine.” Aymard, (1938), 362, n. 20

22 Livy, XXXVI, 32, 5.

23 Livy, XXXVI, 32, 8

24 Livy, XXXVI, 34, 6.
Flamininus’ sincerity, at the same time one should not ignore the fact that there was a large measure of military expediency involved, since Glabrio was tying up the major part of Roman forces over the siege of just one single city. Moreover, the personal relationship between Flamininus and the Aetolians had been far from rosy ever since the latter had snitched all the boodle after the defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae, followed by their claims that they themselves had been primarily responsible for the victory, and their accusation, before the ensuing peace conference at Tempe, that Philip had Flamininus in his pocket. In assassinating Nabis, whom Flamininus had shrewdly left as a counter-balance to the recent expansion of Achaean power in the Peloponnese, they had severely disrupted his carefully formulated plans and Philopoemen had immediately taken full advantage of the ensuing vacuum by incorporating Sparta into the Achaean League. More recently, however, as Flamininus was quick to remind them, he had suffered a crushing personal insult at their hands when, in studied defiance of his advice, they passed a decree right under his nose inviting Antiochus to liberate the Greeks and arbitrate between the Aetolians and the Romans. When Flamininus asked Damocritus, the Aetolians’ chief magistrate, for a copy of the decree, Damocritus summarily brushed him aside with the rejoinder that he had more pressing matters to attend to and that he would shortly give him his reply and the decree from his camps in Italy on the banks of the Tiber. As Livy makes abundantly clear, this is uppermost in Flamininus’ mind when he addresses the leaders of the Aetolians as they surrendered: they had been let off the hook, but there was a price to pay:

quibus provolutis ad pedes 'fortuna' inquit 'vestra facit, ut et irae meae et orationi temperem. evenerunt quae praedixi eventura, et ne hoc quidem reliqui vobis est, ut indignis accidisse ea videantur; ego tamen sorte quadam nutriendae Graeciae datus ne ingratis quidem bene facere absistam.

When they had prostrated themselves at his feet, he said, “Your sorry situation gives me cause to control both my anger and my choice of words. Everything has

25 The Polybian version of this episode has been lost. Compared with Livy’s account, however, Flamininus’ emotions have been exaggerated out of all proportion for literary effect by Plutarch, since Livy’s phraseology - quamquam his vocibus moveretur - provides no reasonable basis for Plutarch’s decidedly melodramatic στραφές και δικρίσεως ἀπελθον. Plutarch, Flam., 15, 5.


27 Livy, XXXV, 33, 8-11. Ironically, it was on the banks of the Tiber that Damocritus was destined to die within a year or so of the events being described, committing suicide in order to avoid the humiliation of being put on display in Glabrio’s triumph, awarded for his successful campaign against Antiochus and the Aetolians. Livy XXXVII, 46, 5-6.

28 Livy, XXXVI, 35, 3-4.
turned out as I predicted, and you do not even have the consolation of believing that this has befallen you undeservedly. Since, however, by some turn of fate I am to be the nursemaid of Greece, I shall not desist from showing kindness even to those who have shown themselves ungrateful.

This is superciliously indulgent behaviour of the highest order, especially the notion that Flamininus’ generally accepted role as the liberator and father figure of the Greeks had ultimately proven inadequate, since what they really needed was a nursemaid! Bitter gall for the Aetolians who, with Antiochus, their supposedly invincible ally, recently defeated and chased out of Greece, simply had to take it, grovelling on their knees. Given that from the very outset of his career Flamininus had been used to having his own way, there is clearly a common factor between his treatment of the Achaeans on the matter of Zacynthos and, most particularly, his treatment of the besieged Aetolians, namely, the welcome release of considerable, pent up frustration. It is unlikely, therefore, that the contents of either of these two episodes provide the basis of Plutarch’s elaborate description of Flamininus’ character in the introductory chapter, in which case one should consider the possibility of Plutarch either having acquired this information from non-extant material, or having carefully collated it himself as a framework around which to construct his text.

3.1.2 Flamininus’ Consular Campaign

As examples of Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία, Pelling cites his eagerness to attack Philip, the ostentatious display he made of protecting vulnerable Greek cities, the determined manner in which he battled for the liberty of Greece, his determination not to be replaced by a successor as commander-in-chief and, finally, his obstinate pursuit of Hannibal. However, far from compiling in like manner a list of examples of φιλοτιμία and/or φιλοδοξία, in many instances Plutarch does not even specifically cite Flamininus’ actions as such, since he has already placed this notion in the reader’s mind, and it is left to the reader himself to judge however he sees fit. Arguably, the best example in the entire Life occurs in the second chapter, in which Flamininus, motivated by the fine reputation he had earned (εὐδοκίμησεν) during his time as governor of Tarentum and his consequent appointment at Narnia and Cosa, presents himself as a

29 Exceptions in achieving this are rare – his failure to take Atrax, for example, after he had driven Philip out of Illyria, and the botched assassination of Brachylles.
30 For a detailed account see Pfeilschifter, (2005), 31-67.
candidate for the consulship for 198. In order further to enhance Flamininus' profile and illustrate his forcefulness of character, Plutarch, following Polybius, makes much of the fact that he was not yet thirty years of age and, not having held the traditional intervening offices of tribune, praetor and aedile, encountered vehement opposition from the tribunes. This situation, however, though unusual, was far from unique. In fact, Flamininus' own colleague in the consulship, Sex. Aelius Paetus, had never been praetor, although he had held the curule aedileship in 200. P. Sulpicius Galba was consul for 211, and again for 200, when he led Roman forces into Illyria after the declaration of war against Philip, yet Livy is quite specific in stating that he had never held a curule magistracy. Similarly, in 212 P. Cornelius Scipio, aged only twenty-four, had encountered strong opposition during his candidacy for the aedileship, which he eventually won, and later, aged only thirty-one, he won the consulship for 205. Even so, none of this detracts from the measure of Flamininus' achievement. These unorthodox appointments were the result of the senate waiving convention and appointing whomever it considered to the best man to deal with a difficult, pressing situation, albeit with varying degrees of success: Galba, for example, failed miserably, whereas Scipio and Flamininus grasped the opportunity with both hands and went on

32 Plutarch, **Flam.**, 2, 2: οὐκ ἡμέρας τριάκοντ’ ἐτη γεγονότα; Polybius, 18, 12, 5: πλείω γὰρ τὸν τριάκοντ’ ἐτῶν οὐκ ἦν. Livy makes no mention of Flamininus' age at the time of his solicitation for the consulship in 199, (XXXII, 7, 8-13), but does mention it three years later at the time of the Isthmian games: erat trium et triginta annorum, (XXXIII, 33, 3).

33 Plutarch, **Flam.**, 2, 1; Livy, XXXII, 7, 8-10.

34 Cf. Scullard, (1951), 97.

35 Livy, XXV, 41, 11: qui nullum antea curulem magistratum gessisset.

36 Polybius, 10, 5, 2-3; Livy, XXV, 2, 6-7; Velleius, 2, 8, 2.

37 Livy, XXVIII, 38, 12. Val. Max., 2, 8, 5; Silius, 16, 595 599; Plutarch, **Marius**, 12, 2; Victor, **Vir. Ill.**, 49, 12; Orosius, 4, 18, 17.

38 See F. Hooper, (1979), 133:“Publius Sulpicius Galba is a revealing example of the worst type of Roman leadership. His record as proconsul in Illyria was stained with wanton thefts by which he enriched himself at the expense of the natives. Nor was his skill as a commander worth even a slight amount of corruption. He was at his best where he could overwhelm the opposition with sheer power – strategy was hardly needed. The Greeks, whom he was supposed to be helping, hated him, as did his own soldiers. The war was not popular in the first place and Galba’s heavy-handedness made it worse. In the winter of 199 his army mutinied. If Galba was one of the worst commanders, Titus Quinctius Flamininus was one of the best.”

39 Livy, XXVIII, 38, 9-10: --- spondebantque animis, sicut C. Lutatius superius bellum Punicum finisset, ita id quod instaret P. Cornelium finiturum, atque uti Hispania omni Poenos expulisset, sic Italia pulsurus esse; Africamque ei perinde ac debellatum in Italia foro prouinciam destinabant.

40 Badian, 61, (1971), 110: “When two tribunes objected (obviously, in view of the irregularities we have noticed, demands for an enforced cursus were already being raised), the Senate persuaded them to drop their objection. Clearly, Flamininus was intended to succeed. There was a job to be done in the East, and it looks as if the Senate was now agreed on the man who was to do it.” Flamininus is similarly described as “the logical candidate” by T. Frank, A History of Rome, New York, 1923, p. 140. See also Briscoe, (1973), 32: “I believe this
to deliver the goods. Significantly, however, there is no direct mention of φιλοτιμία from Plutarch. The situation speaks for itself: in such controversial circumstances, only the most ambitious of individuals would aspire to such an elevated office as the consulship.

Having placed Flamininus' diplomatic skills on a par with his military activity in the penultimate section of Chapter 1, Plutarch further develops this theme in Chapter 2, after his account of the consular elections. His text is tightly packed with unrestrained praise for Flamininus, and he is quick to emphasize the remarkable good fortune of the Romans that the lot assigned to him was the war with Philip. It was Greeks [not barbarians] with whom Flamininus would be dealing, in an attempt to detach the various states from Philip and thereby restrict any further prolongation of the war, which was already in its third year:

'Ἡ δὲ Ἑλλάς οὔπω πολλὰσυνενηγὶμενὴ Ρωμαίοις, ἀλλὰ τότε πρῶτον ἐπιμείνμενη τάς πράξεις, εἰ μὴ φυσεὶ τε χριστός ἢν ὁ ἄρχων καὶ λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἢ πολέμῳ χρόμενος, ἐντυγχάνοντι τε προσθή πιθανότης, καὶ προσόπος ἐντυγχανομένως, καὶ τόνος πλεῖστος ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ράδιως ἀντὶ τῶν συνήθων ἀλλόφυλον ἄρχην ἠγάπησε.42

Greece, however, having had little contact with the Romans up to this point, and now for the first time actively engaged with them, would not so readily have countenanced a foreign power as an alternative to those to which she had been accustomed unless the commander had been a man of native goodness and

was one of the moments in Republican history when an individual sought office with a definite policy: a bold strategy, both militarily and diplomatically, in the war and a clear idea of what would follow victory – the freedom of Greece.” Similarly, Scullard, (1951), 10: “Yet if Rome’s object was to break the power of Macedon and to free Greece, few men could have carried out this programme with less loss of blood and without robbing the Greeks of their remaining self respect. Here was a Roman consul who sought their friendship and promised their freedom instead of spurning their ideals and exposing their weakness.”

41 In using the expression ὅποιος πολλά, Plutarch is referring, presumably, to recent contact between Greeks and Romans on the Greek mainland proper, since it is hardly appropriate in the context of previous contacts dating back some eighty years to the time of Pyrrhus, and followed by radical Roman involvement in Greek politics in Sicily for pretty well the entire duration of the Second Punic War. More recently, the First Macedonian War had dragged on inconclusively for ten years due to no real commitment from either side, especially the Romans, who were currently dealing with the aftermath of Cannae and protracted, expensive military operations in Spain. After the defeat of Hannibal, however, the situation was very different. The Romans, though still militarily preoccupied in northern Italy, Gaul and Spain, were no longer fighting for their very survival and had been in Greece for two years already, fully focused on the task in hand, i.e., the defeat and subjugation of Macedon. Cf. Livy, XXXII, 21, 18-19.

42 Plutarch, Flam., 2, 4. For an interesting comparison, see Tränkle, (1977), 163, where he describes this passage as “sehr nahe an das Bild heran , das Livius von ihm entwirft, etwa wenn er ganz Griechenland non magis in bello virtutem Romani ducis quam in victoria temperentiam iustitiamque et moderationem bewundern lässt (34,22,5).”
inclined towards deliberation rather than warfare, and unless he had been persuasive in seeking an audience, gentle in granting a petition, and paying infinite attention to what was right and just.

So the Greeks, naturally enough, had their reservations; until, that is, they became acquainted with Flamininus. Yet one must also consider the situation from his perspective. Supposedly, in southern Italy he had been dealing for the most part with the descendants of ex-patriot Greeks, educated professionals, such as surveyors, engineers and politicians, along with sharp-witted merchants, bankers and brokers of a variety of services and commodities. It must have been, therefore, with a blend of curiosity and some measure of uncertainty, however small, that he had been anticipating his first contact with indigenous Greeks and others who used Greek rather than their own native language in commerce and politics. Moreover, he was shortly due to be confronted with a wide variety of dialects in different parts of the Greek mainland, where the koine exerted less influence, especially in isolated regions like the central Peloponnese? For example, what would he have made of Philopoemen's broad Doric? (When their personal relationship began to deteriorate, would he have poked fun at him about it, as he did on the matter of his physical appearance)?

3.1.3 Flamininus Imperator supersedes Villius

It is at this point that the objective stated at the beginning of this chapter becomes more attainable, since from Chapter 3 up to and including Chapter 17 for the most part Plutarch’s source material for the Flamininus - primarily Polybius, or, in his absence, Livy’s Polybian version - can be more easily identified. As the action moves from the

---

43 On Flamininus’ Greek, see Armstrong & Walsh, (1986), 32-46. This letter, the subject of which is the restitution of losses incurred to Philip by both the civil authorities and private individuals, shows that Flamininus could write perfect koine and confirms his ancient reputation for philhellenism by means of his expertise in details of contemporary Greek language, politics, and constitutional and civil law. The letter, preserved in its entirety, reads at first sight as an example of formulaic, insipid bureaucracy. By means of a detailed linguistic analysis, however, the co-authors leave one in no doubt that “It is the work of a subtle and sophisticated politician, Flamininus.”

44 Plutarch, Phil., 2, 3.

45 Plutarch, Phil., 3, 3.

46 Livy, XXXIII, 10, 10: Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum. See Flacelière, (1969), 165: “Plutarque ne nomme nul part Polybe dans cette Vie, et pourtant il est évident qu’il a consulté fréquemment cet historien comme il l’a fait pour sa biographie de Philopoemen (où Polybe est nommément cité en 16, 4). Mais bien souvent Polybe, à cause des immenses
political to the military arena, Plutarch recounts how Flamininus’ predecessors, P. Sulpicius Galba and P. Villius Tappulus, consuls in 200 and 199 respectively, had made little or no headway against Philip. Preoccupied with the emoluments of office, says Plutarch, they had frittered away their consular year in Rome before eventually setting out to pursue the war. Plutarch is quick to contrast their mentality with that of Flamininus, who, earnestly endeavouring to prosecute the war while still in office - φιλοτιμούμενος ἐνεργόν τῷ πολέμῳ τὴν ἀρχήν παράσχειν - departed post haste from Rome for Epirus as soon as circumstances allowed.

After assuming command of the army upon his arrival at the Roman camp near the River Aous in the spring of 198 Flamininus’ first action was to send Villius, the incumbent commander, home. In linking the lack of progress made by Galba and Villius with their alleged predilection for social prestige, Plutarch, apparently giving his own interpretation of the basic facts as represented by Livy, (and, presumably, Polybius), clearly implies that, when confronted with the harsh reality of a military campaign, they were unfit for purpose. For Plutarch this is sufficient justification for Flamininus’ summary dismissal of Villius. Given the recurrent notion of φιλοτιμία, however, (an example of which has but recently occurred in the text), and Plutarch’s earlier remarks on the subject of Flamininus’ character, this requires further investigation. Was this simply a routine dismissal of Villius upon the expiry of his term of office, or was there an ulterior motive? Namely, did Flamininus, considering him to be a potential rival for whatever credit might result from the campaign, give priority to his own personal reputation and remove him at the earliest possible opportunity? In other words, did Plutarch intend that his readers interpret this as yet more φιλοτιμία from Flamininus, and, if so, in the light of evidence from elsewhere, what is the validity of this notion?
Livy’s transitory statement - *Villio dismisso* - offers no clues, but an earlier passage, in which he quotes Valerius Antias as his source, must be taken into consideration. Antias claims that the previous year Villius had attacked the Macedonian army, killing as many as twelve thousand and taking two thousand two hundred prisoners. Due to lack of corroboration from other authorities, however, both Greek and Latin, Livy is extremely sceptical about the validity of Valerius’ account, even concluding with the remark that nothing worthy of mention had been done by Villius and that Flamininus effectively took over the entire war from the outset. It would appear, therefore, that Flamininus’ decision to dismiss Villius was purely perfunctory, with no reason to retain him even in an advisory capacity, since the strategic stalemate was startlingly obvious: due to the nature of the terrain, the Macedonians were in an unassailable position, occupying the narrows of the Aous River gorge (the ”Aoi Stena”) in northern Epirus and so blocking the best route to central Greece. On this occasion, therefore, no offence intended, and none taken, apparently, a notion corroborated by the fact that the most recent example (quoted above) of Flamininus’ φιλατμια can hardly be interpreted pejoratively – he was simply eager to get on with the job in hand – and corroborated still further by the equable relationship shared subsequently by Villius and Flamininus as they worked harmoniously together on several important consignments. For example, the following year, before Cynoscephalae, Villius was appointed as legatus to Flamininus, in 196 he served as one of the decem legati to revise and ratify the peace settlement with Philip, and in 192 he and Flamininus were sent to Greece as legati, along with Cn. Octavius and Cn. Servilius Caepio, in an attempt to retain the support of the Greek states before the imminent war with Antiochus.

---

52 Livy, XXXII, ix, 8.
53 Livy, XXXII, 6, 5-8. Apart from anything else, Antias’ typically exaggerated casualty figures, as a result of which Philip’s forces would have been seriously depleted, cast serious doubt on the veracity of his account. Equally suspicious is his contention that Villius hastily bridged the Aous in order to attack Philip’s forces on the opposite bank. In view of the topography as described by Livy (XXXII, 12 7) and Plutarch (Flam., 3 5), however quickly the bridge was constructed, the Roman engineers, even with covering fire from their own side, would have been little more than sitting ducks for the Macedonian archers.
3.1.4 The Battle for Control of the Aoi Stena

In Chapter 4 Plutarch gives his account of the first military activity of any significance conducted under Flamininus’ command, and a comparison with Livy’s version provides some degree of insight into the manner in which he manages his source material. Continuing with the theme of Flamininus’ anxiety to get on with the campaign, and thus succeed where his two predecessors had clearly failed, Plutarch, by linking material from the end of Livy, XXXII, 9 directly with that from the beginning of XXXII, 11, makes two significant omissions: neither does he mention that the Romans remained inactive for as long as forty days in full view of the enemy, nor does he say anything about the inconclusive peace negotiations between Philip and Flamininus, in which the Epirotes acted as intermediaries and which occupies Livy’s entire intervening chapter 10. On the first point, Livy makes it perfectly clear that it was due only to perplexity that the Romans were reluctant to attack Philip’s unassailable stronghold, a clear indication of Flamininus’ sagacity and lack of impulsiveness, points of his character to which Plutarch would supposedly be only too anxious to draw attention. The same can be said for the peace conference, which, thanks to Flamininus’ mischievous obduracy in laying down conditions he knew Philip would never accept, rapidly deteriorated into nothing more than a slanging match which would certainly have been followed by armed combat had the participants not been separated by the width of the Aous. Even so, it was still difficult to restrain the opposing armies from hurling missiles at each other. Flamininus, therefore, in turning Philip apoplectic with rage during their very first encounter, had clearly got the better of him, yet for the second time in succession Plutarch opts to omit material which illustrates one of the more salient aspects of Flamininus’ character, preferring instead to create a false impression of the immediacy of his attack in order to enhance his prestige as a military commander.

As matters stand, therefore, in Plutarch’s text in the opening section of chapter 4, Flamininus, having carefully considered all the options and reluctant to attempt the invasion of central Greece by a circuitous way through the territory of the Dassaretii towards Lyncus, through fear of losing touch with the enemy and of being detached

---

56 Livy, XXXII, 9, 11 – 10, 1: Utcumque esset igitur, illo ipso tam iniquo loco agredi hostem placuit. Sed magis fieri id placet quam quomodo fieret satis expediebant; diesque quadraginta sine ullo conatu sedentes in conspectu hostium absumpserant.
57 See Wood, (1941), 282: “The decision of Flamininus to act was not taken until he had spent considerable time in consideration.”
58 Walbank, (1940), 151: “Flamininus’ proposals, however, showed up the conference as being, from his point of view, merely a clever manoeuvre.”
59 As Sulpicius Galba, to no avail, had done in 199. Livy, XXXI, 34, 4.
from his supply lines, realises that some means had to be found in order to dislodge Philip. An initial assault proved fruitless, due to the unassailable situation of the Macedonian forces. From this point onward throughout the remainder of the chapter there are marked differences between Livy’s and Plutarch’s respective accounts, of which a succinct summary is provided by Hammond,\(^60\) along with the observation that Livy’s account is “much more laudatory of Rome than Plutarch’s.” An examination of two of these differences in particular clearly illustrates that this is entirely due to Flamininus, who plays a decidedly more positive role in Livy’s version.

First, chance intervenes when a scheme is devised to insert a large Roman contingent on high ground behind the Macedonian troops. According to Livy, a solitary shepherd (pastor), who knew every footpath and roundabout track through the mountains, was sent to the Roman camp by Charops,\(^61\) the leader of the Epirotes. Plutarch, by contrast, says that it was several local herdsmen (ἀνθρωποι τῶν αὐτῶν νεμόντων) who approached Flamininus on their own initiative, producing (παρείχοντο) Charops as guarantor of their good faith. More significant by far than these divergent points of detail, however, are the differences in Livy’s and Plutarch’s respective accounts of the manner in which Flamininus subsequently managed the situation:

Haec ubi consul audivit, percunctatum ad Charopum mittit satisne credendum super tanta re agresti censeret: Charopus renuntiari iubet, ita crederet ut suae potius omnia quam illius potestatis essent. Cum magis vellet credere quam auderet mixtumque gaudio et metu animum gereret, auctoritate motus Charopi experiri spem oblatam statuit.\(^62\)

On hearing this the consul sent to Charops to inquire whether he thought the rustic was to be trusted in a matter of such importance. The response, in line with Charops’ instructions, was that Flamininus should place his trust in his own, personal control of the entire situation rather than in that of the rustic. Though wishing, rather than daring, to trust Charops, and with a combination of exhilaration and apprehension, he was persuaded by his advice to try realize his expectations.

\(^{60}\) Hammond, (1966), 52, n. 38

\(^{61}\) For the crucial role played by Charops, see Polybios, 27, 15, 2: Χάρων ἤν Ἡπειρότης ἄνηρ τάλλα μὲν καλός κάγαθός καὶ φίλος τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ὡς Φιλίππουτά κατά τὴν Ἡπείρου στενά κατασχόντος ἀπός ἐγένετο τοῦ Φιλίππου μὲν ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τῆς Ἡπείρου, Τίτον δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἡπείρου κρατῆσαι καὶ τῶν Μακεδόνων.

\(^{62}\) Livy, XXXII, 11, 4-6.
Though not referred to directly by Livy, Flamininus’ highly commendable cautiousness and perspicacity are patently obvious. His actions speak for themselves. Refusing to let his emotions get the better of him, even with the prize tantalizingly in reach, he carefully considers all the options, very different from Plutarch’s version, in which he simply takes Charops at his word (ὁ [sc.Xύροπη] πιστεύσαξ) and, with no more ado, duly sets the proposed scheme in motion.

Next, Livy and Plutarch agree insofar as a special force of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry was dispatched by Flamininus under the command of a military tribune, with a view to reaching the high ground behind Philip’s troops within three days. To avoid detection, they remained under cover during the day, able to advance by night, since the moon was full, says Plutarch, though Livy attributes this precaution to a direct order from Flamininus. At this point, however, yet another significant difference emerges. According to Livy, it was prearranged that the military tribune should send a smoke signal as soon as he had reached his objective, with clinically precise instructions from Flamininus not to raise the battle-cry until he had received in turn a signal of acknowledgement and could judge that the battle had actually begun. The smoke signal was duly observed on the third day, whereupon Flamininus, having formed his army into three divisions, advanced from the bottom of the ravine with his main strength and sent his right and left wings against Philip’s camp. The ensuing conflict swayed first in favour of the Romans then back to the Macedonians, at which point, (albeit without any mention of the prearranged signal of acknowledgement from Flamininus), the latter were attacked from behind by the special force. The bulk of the Macedonian army fled in disorder, though, thanks to the difficulty of the terrain, which seriously hampered the Roman pursuit, their losses amounted to no more than two thousand. Otherwise, remarks Livy, their entire army could have been destroyed (deleri totus exercitus potuit).  

Even so, Flamininus’ prime objective had been achieved: two and a half years after the arrival of Roman forces in Epirus, the gateway to Central Greece had finally been prised open. Moreover, Flamininus had by now seen enough of the Macedonian army in action to give him good reason to believe that he could defeat Philip a pitched battle, and later, on the eve of Cynoscephalae, recalls this episode in his rallying cry to his troops.

Following the plan to position the special force behind the Macedonian army, the most significant difference in Plutarch’s version is the absence, at this point at least, of any prearranged smoke signal. He simply recounts how, on the third day, the Romans were expected to make their presence known on the heights - ἐμέλλον ὑπερφανήσεσθαι τῶν ἄκρων - albeit without providing any information whatsoever about how they were supposed to do so. Flamininus divided his troops up,

---

63 Livy, XXXII, 12, 6.
(exactly as described by Livy), and personally led a contingent in column formation up into the narrowest part of the ravine along the stream. Pelted with missiles, they engaged at close quarters with those who confronted them at each difficult spot. Meanwhile, the other divisions, one on either side, struggling to keep pace with him, grappled tenaciously with the difficulties presented by the rough terrain. Only now does the smoke signal, unmentioned thus far, appear. Not clearly defined initially, but resembling a mountain mist, it nonetheless gave the Romans the incentive to struggle on, despite their uncertainty, in the hope that their wishes would be realized - τὴν ἐλπίδα πρὸς τὸ βουλόμενον λαμβάνοντες. As the smoke intensified and was clearly seen to be a signal from their colleagues, says Plutarch, the Romans raised the battle-cry and pressed home their attack, forcing the enemy into the roughest terrain, while the other contingent sent down answering shouts from the heights.

Throughout Livy’s account, therefore, Flamininus, leaving nothing to chance, both in his dealings with Charops and in leading the attack against the securely entrenched Macedonian army, clearly displays a large measure of cautiousness and perspicacity totally absent from Plutarch’s version. For example, Flamininus is mentioned specifically as giving the special force the order to travel by night. Similarly, it is Flamininus who, whilst promising the guide a very large reward if he proved faithful, mindful of Charops’ advice, nonetheless orders him to be bound before handing him over to the tribune. At this juncture Flamininus’ exposure was limited, and any losses would have been sustainable, especially since, from the very beginning of the war, Philip had been doing his level best to avoid a pitched battle. As Flamininus led the attack up into the ravine, however, the stakes were considerably higher; all the more reason, therefore, to commit himself and his troops only after receiving the prearranged smoke signal, rather than - with no confirmation that the special force was in position and, (to iterate Plutarch’s phraseology), τὴν ἐλπίδα πρὸς τὸ βουλόμενον λαμβάνοντες - to jeopardise the security of greater part of the Roman army and the future of the entire campaign.

Concerning the differences between the two accounts, Hammond comments, “If Livy and Plutarch used only one source, namely Polybius, then we must recognize that either one (and, if one, Livy) or both treated the account of Polybius with considerable freedom.” He is reasoning, presumably, on the premise that Plutarch’s natural inclination to use Polybius as his main, or even exclusive, source, both for linguistic convenience and because his was the original and more authentic version, increases the likelihood of Livy being responsible for any variations, specifically to enhance the Romans’ profile. A fair point, yet strategically all these variations are purely peripheral,
with one glaring exception, namely, the precise moment at which the smoke signal, pivotal to the success or failure of the entire operation, was sighted. Livy’s account is unadorned and direct: the signal was sent and Flamininus went into action. Plutarch, by contrast, reveals the presence of the (previously unmentioned) signal only in stages, clearly seeking to create an aura of suspense in contrasting the Romans’ initial uncertainty with their eventual relief. All things considered, therefore, one should consider the possibility that, on this crucial point at least, it is Plutarch who is at serious variance with the original account, substituting historicity for what appears to be a somewhat crudely crafted piece of melodrama.65

3.1.5 Military Operations in Northern Greece: Flamininus builds an Alliance of the Greek states and Pergamum for the War against Philip

Chronologically chapters 5 and 6 are extremely compact, spanning a period of almost an entire year between the battles at the Aous pass and at Cynoscephalae.66 Those topics selected by Plutarch, therefore, from an already abundant store of information, now roundly supplemented, for events from November, 198 and after,67 by Polybius XVIII, provide a clear insight into his priorities.

Following the Macedonians’ frantic retreat, Plutarch makes much of the contrast between the orderly, restrained conduct of Flamininus towards the Epirotes and Philip’s devastation of Thessaly. However, his contention that this was primarily an opportunistic ploy by Flamininus to blacken Philip’s reputation must be treated with suspicion, if only because there is nothing on record to suggest that, following Philip’s retreat, Flamininus was aware of his precise whereabouts and his activities. In fact, the contrast between the two commanders’ behaviour is purely coincidental and determined exclusively by their respective immediate objectives. Flamininus needed to win the confidence of the Greeks, otherwise the Roman campaign would be doomed to failure. Philip, unfortunately, was reduced to acting out of dire necessity, seeing no alternative to clinically conducting a scorched earth policy as he moved through Thessaly, and his portrayal as a heartless fiend by Plutarch is misleading, given that

---


66 Dated by Walbank ((1940), 321-323) to about June 24th, 198 and late May or early June, 197 respectively.

67 I.e., from the conference at Nicaea in Locris and after. For the chronology, see Walbank, (1967), 548-549.
both Polybius\textsuperscript{68} and Livy\textsuperscript{69} state that he destroyed the Thessalian towns with extreme reluctance.

Plutarch deals with Flamininus’ restraint in Epirus in considerably more detail than Livy, who mentions it only retrospectively in the context of the logistical problems it had caused, since, arriving in Thessaly, the Roman army was completely bereft of supplies.\textsuperscript{70} However, Plutarch makes no reference to another, earlier passage of Livy’s which says much for Flamininus’ perspicacity and clemency and is strongly reminiscent of Plutarch’s detailed character portrayal in the introductory chapter:

\begin{quote}

etsi probe scit cui parti Charopo principe excepto Epirotae favissent, tamen quia ab satisfaciendi quoque cura imera enixe facere videt, ex praesenti eos potius quam ex praeterito aestimat habitu et ea ipsa facilitate veniae animos eorum in posterum conciliat.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

Although he was fully aware of which side the Epirotes, with the exception of Charops, had favoured, nevertheless, seeing that they were eagerly carrying out his orders in their anxiety to please him, he judged them by their present rather than their previous behaviour and, by his readiness to forgive, won over their support for the future.

It is difficult to imagine Plutarch declining the opportunity of exploiting full material of this sort to the maximum, ideally suited as it is to corroborating his point, especially since he was clearly aware that this was undoubtedly the first step to winning the confidence of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{72} One must consider the possibility, therefore, that this information was absent from the Polybian original, (which Plutarch would have been more likely to have consulted), and that Livy, specifically to enhance Flamininus’ profile yet again, either composed and added it himself or incorporated it from a different source. A more likely possibility, however, is that Plutarch, though fully familiar with this material, (either from Polybius and/or Livy, or even somewhere else), chose to

\textsuperscript{68} Polybius, 18, 4, 2:
\begin{quote}

σαφώς γάρ πάντας γινώσκειν ὅτι τοῖς ἰδίους συμμάχους ἐκὼν μὲν οὐδέις διαθέαται, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν κυρίων περιστάσεις πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι τοῖς ἰησοῦμενοι παρὰ τὰς κατόπτων προσωπεῖς. (Aptly described by Walbank, (1940), 154, n. 2, as “Philip’s own statement.”)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{69} Livy, XXXII, 13, 8: haec etiam facienti Philippo acerba erant, sed e terra mox futura hostium corpora saltem eripere sociorum volebat.

\textsuperscript{70} Livy, XXXII, 15, 5: Degressusque in campos Thessaliae, cum iam omnia exercitui deessent, quia Epirotarum perpercerat agris, ---.

\textsuperscript{71} Livy, XXXII, 14, 5-7.

\textsuperscript{72} See Wood, (1941), 283: “Thus Flamininus, by virtue of the friendly relations he had established with the Epirotes and his determination to force the issue, opened his campaign for the overthrow of Macedon and the advance of Roman prestige with conspicuous success.”
ignore it simply because it does not concur with his contention that Flamininus’ prime motivation was ρηλωτήμια. Livy makes it abundantly clear that it was primarily out of political considerations that Flamininus sought the support of the Greeks, and any enhancement of his personal popularity, therefore, however gratifying, was primarily a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Plutarch’s ensuing and highly complimentary account of the results of Flamininus’ astute diplomacy provides yet more valuable insight into his sense of priorities in utilizing his material. For example, his claim that as soon the Romans reached Thessaly the cities went over to them is not strictly true, since they encountered stubborn resistance from those cities garrisoned by Macedonian troops. Phalorium, for example, the first to be attacked, with its garrison of two thousand doggedly resisted a relentless, round-the-clock onslaught before eventually capitulating. Then Atrax, which, in repulsing the Romans, inflicted upon Flamininus his only defeat and seriously damaged his morale. Plutarch’s following contention that Flamininus was enthusiastically received by those cities to the south of Thermopylae is equally misleading, since he was confronted by equally stubborn resistance at Elatea. The same applies to the situation in Opus. Contrary to what Plutarch says, not all the citizens had unreserved faith in Flamininus and committed themselves readily to his charge, since Livy describes a clear division within their ranks, with only the richer and more influential favouring the Romans over the Aetolians to assist them in getting rid of the Macedonian garrison. Moreover, a Roman attack upon the city was averted only at the last moment by the arrival of a herald from Philip seeking a time and place for peace negotiations, and it was not until the final stages of the ensuing conference at Nicaea that Flamininus ordered Philip to withdraw his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. Meanwhile, the Opuntian citadel remained under Macedonian occupation, all of which is of little interest to Plutarch, anxious as he is to move on to the following topic.

---

73 Livy, XXXII, 15, 1-2.
74 Livy, XXXII, 17, 9: Id consul aegre passus nec eam ignominiam ad unius modo oppugnandae moram urbis sed ad summam universi belli pertinere ratus, quod ex momentis parvarum plerumque rerum penderet, ---.
75 Livy, XXXII, 24, 1-7.
76 Livy, XXXII, 32, 2-5.
77 Polybius, 18, 10, 4; Livy, XXXII, 36, 9.
3.1.6 The Achaeans ally themselves with Rome

It is not pertinent to this project to attempt a detailed analysis of the events at the assembly of the Achaean League at Sicyon in October, 198, 78 but a few of the more salient points should be considered in order to put Plutarch’s following contention into perspective. With no more than a fleeting reference, 79 Plutarch would have the reader believe that the formation of the alliance with Rome by the Achaeans was both unprompted and enthusiastic, thereby echoing the erroneous impression he seeks to convey concerning the enthusiastic accession of the various Greek cities. In fact, it was from Flamininus that the initiative came, not the Achaeans, with the incentive that the Achaeans would be rewarded with the reincorporation of Corinth into the Achaean League. 80 Next, as is abundantly clear from five lengthy chapters of Livy, a significant minority of the assembly was anything but enthusiastic, since this council, lasting fully three days, was a rowdy, contumelious affair with tempers frequently fraying throughout. In fact, the Achaeans, frightened as they were by Nabis, absolutely terrified of the Romans (horrebant Romana arma), and at the same time indebted to the Macedonians for favours both past and present, were in a serious quandary. 81 Yet, as Aristaenus, the Achaean strategos, with an onslaught of rhetorical questions was quick to point out, Philip’s temerity was already marking him down as a spent force; 82 and meanwhile the Roman fleet was anchored off Cenchreae, only twenty miles to the east, laden with the spoils of the cities of Euboea, while Flamininus and his legions were overrunning Phocis and Locris. 83 Even so, it was only at the end of the third and final day that Aristaenus eventually secured a majority vote in favour of forming an alliance with Rome – and not before time, says Polybius. 84 Contrary to what Plutarch would have one believe, therefore, for the Achaeans this was a matter of self-preservation; they sided with the Romans for security, not out of adulation for Flamininus, whose success

---

78 For the date, see Walbank, (1940), 342 and Aymard, (1938), 80, n. 49
79 Plutarch, Flam., 5, 3: Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ τὴν Φιλίππου συμμαχίαν ἀκειμένου πολεμεῖν εἰπηφίσαντο τὸ μετὰ Ῥωμαίων πρὸς αὐτὸν.
80 Livy, XXXII, 19, 4.
81 Livy, XXXII, 19, 6-7.
83 Livy, XXXII, 21, 7-8.
84 Polybius, 18, 13, 8: ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ σῶν καὶ τῆς Αχαιών τὸτε μετέρρησε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς Ἀρίσταινος ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίππου συμμαχίας πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων, φανερῶς ἄρδην ἀπολύει τὸ ἔθνος.
thus far had been due primarily to his competence as a commander-in-chief rather than to whatever personal charm he exercised, consciously or otherwise.

Plutarch persists with this theme, however, now heaping unrestrained praise upon Flamininus, albeit beginning with a decidedly strained analogy:

Πύρρον μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν, ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπὸ σκοπῆς κατέδε τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ῥωμαίων διακεκομμένον, εἰπεὶ οὐ βαρβαρικὴν αὐτῷ φανήναι τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων παράταξιν· οἱ δὲ Τίτῳ πρῶτον ἐντυγχάνοντες ἕναγκάζοντο παραπλησίας ἀφιέναι φωνάζει.85

It is said that when Pyrrhus looked down for the first time from a watch-tower upon the Roman army drawn up in battle formation, he said that he saw nothing barbaric in the marshalling of the barbarians’ lines; and so those who met Titus for the first time were compelled to speak in like manner.

Indeed, an odd notion, at first sight, to compare the refinement of military discipline with that of any given individual’s character. Before going any further, however, Plutarch, having already described the Romans as ἀλλόφυλοι,86 now feels the need, by whatever means, to provide them with respectable racial and cultural credentials, essential prerequisites, even as champions and liberators, in dealing with Greeks, more particularly since the Macedonians were saying that the leader of a barbarian army - ἄρχων βαρβάρου στρατιῶς - was on his way, a man given to destruction and enslavement by force of arms.87 On this matter of racial and cultural respectability, any suspicion that Plutarch is being in any way patronizing towards, or even contemptuous of, the Romans must be discounted, since they themselves were pursuing an identical policy at this time. Concerning the foundation of Rome, for example, an alternative version was actively being sought to replace the original tradition of foundling twin infant brothers adopted and suckled by a she-wolf, and it was from Trojan Aeneas that they were now claiming direct descent.88

Plutarch is on safe ground, therefore, and so, yet again, focuses his attention on Flamininus. He mentions his youth, his genial appearance, the articulate manner in which he spoke Greek, and then describes him as τιμῆς ἀληθοῦς ἔραστής

86 Plutarch, Flam., 2, 4.
87 Plutarch, Flam., 5, 5. Possibly an addition by Plutarch, since his particular contention of Philips’ is unattested elsewhere, although in early199 he did equate the Romans with alienigeni and barbari. Livy, XXXI, 29, 15.
88 A prima facie example of what Gruen, (1993), 3, describes as “the manipulation of myths, the reshaping of traditions, the elaboration of legends, fictions, and inventions, the recasting of ostensibly alien cultural legacies with the aim of defining or reinforcing a distinctive cultural character.”
and ἡγεμών τῆς ἐλευθερίας. A little exaggerated, perhaps, but Philip’s contention has to be refuted at all costs: it was one thing for the Greeks to be indebted for their liberation and subsequent independence to men of another race, but not to barbarians.

The concluding section of chapter 5 provides yet another clear example of Plutarch’s selection and manipulation of his material. He has little time for the examination and detailed analysis of protracted, convoluted events, selecting instead material which is directly to the point and which comes in more manageable proportions. Whereas, for example, the scant attention given earlier in the chapter to the lengthy assembly of the Achaean League at Sicyon can readily be explained by Flamininus’ lack of personal involvement,99 this cannot be said for the conference at Nicaea between Philip and Flamininus, at which the latter dominated the proceedings and which occupies fully ten chapters of Polybius and five of Livy. In spite of the abundance of information provided about various aspects of Flamininus’ character, however, Plutarch restricts himself to a brief and pointedly accurate summary of the conditions for peace imposed by Flamininus, which Philip was unwilling to accept.90 Otherwise, the only material elsewhere in Plutarch relevant to the conference consists of the senate’s decision to prorogue Flamininus’ imperium,91 (presently to be examined), and of an anecdote, namely, Flamininus’ glib rejoinder to Philip that he had no right to complain about being alone and without support at the conference, since it was he himself who had killed all his friends and kindred.92

3.1.7 Flamininus occupies Thebes by trickery and forces the Boeotians to enter into an Alliance with Rome

A good example of Plutarch’s preference for material which is more succinct, more manageable and, therefore, more sensational, occurs in chapter 6, in which he deals with a fundamental aspect of Flamininus’ character, namely his craftiness, thus far unattested in the Life but which emerges regularly from the pages of the historians, (throughout the entire conference at Nicaea, for instance). Specifically, Plutarch recounts the decidedly cavalier manner in which Flamininus gained possession of Thebes, the capital of the Boeotians.

99 The Romans were represented by L. Calpurnius. Livy, XXXII, 19, 11
90 Plutarch, Flam., 5, 6: προστείνειν εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας αὐτονόμους εἶν καὶ τὰς φρουράς ἀπαλλάτειν, ὃ δ’ οὐκ ἔδεξατο.
91 Plutarch, Flam., 7, 1-2.
92 Plutarch, Flam., 17, 2; Moralia, 197 A.
According to Livy, (and therefore, in all probability, to Polybius), early in 197 Flamininus led a delegation through Phocis from his headquarters in Elatea and pitched camp some five miles from Thebes, advancing to the city the following day supported by two thousand hastati, who were ordered to follow at a distance of one mile. At about half-distance he was met by Antiphilus, the Boeotian strategos. The citizens, who were on the walls watching the approach of the Roman delegation, saw few weapons and few soldiers, since the hastati were hidden by the windings of the road and the undulating nature of the terrain. As Flamininus came nearer to the city he slackened his pace, as if to greet the approaching crowd which had come out to meet him, but really to allow the hastati to catch up with him. Since the crowd was gathered in front of the delegation the citizens did not see the rapidly approaching armed column up until it had reached the general's quarters. They were totally astounded, thinking Antiphilus had betrayed the city, but realised that any protest would have been both pointless and dangerous. When the council convened the following day, Flamininus, supported unanimously by the other delegates, eventually persuaded the Boeotians, traditionally supporters of Macedon, to form an alliance, albeit reluctantly, with Rome against Philip. He was now able to direct his undivided attention to the campaign against Philip with, except for Acarnania, the support of all northern and central Greece.

It is impossible to deduce definitively from Livy's text if there had been any collusion between Flamininus and Antiphilus, of whom Plutarch makes no mention. He seeks instead to give the impression that this ruse was the result of a brilliant piece of improvisation by Flamininus, and makes much of his apparent total lack of concern as he cleverly distracts the Boeotians long enough to allow the as yet unseen hastati to get close to the city. These details are not mentioned by Livy, who simply says that Flamininus slackened his pace (tardius incedebat) to enable them to do so. Plutarch's notion is lacking in conviction, however, and for two reasons. First, in anticipation of the imminent campaign against Philip, Flamininus' prime concern would have been to minimise the exposure of his troops. Next, it is patently obvious from Livy's account that he did not act upon the spur of the moment. Indeed, his strategy had been carefully thought out, since its success depended entirely upon a detailed knowledge of the terrain, (anfractus viarum vallesque interiectae), which made it impossible even for those Boeotians with an excellent lookout point from their elevated position on the walls of the city to see the following hastati. Flamininus might well have devised his strategy

---

93 See Briscoe, (1973), 249, 7.
95 Livy, XXXIII, 1, 5.
96 Significantly, these details are absent from Plutarch's account, inconvenient as they are for his implication that Flamininus, supposedly acting independently, deserved all the credit for this manoeuvre.
based on information received from a scouting party which had simply conducted a routine patrol. On the other hand, rather than being devised by himself, it could have been suggested to him by persons already in possession of this information, Boeotian politicians sympathetic to the Roman cause, for example. Whatever, this episode says just as much about Flamininus’ sagacity as his trickery, especially since he achieved his objective quickly and - as anticipated - without spilling a single drop of blood.

Significantly, Plutarch makes no mention of the catastrophic consequences of this incident in Boeotia the following year. The more obvious explanation is that, in spite of the various ploys of the historians, certain decidedly unsavoury facets of Flamininus’ character which do not conform to the image that Plutarch is seeking to create are clearly discernable. One should equally consider, however, the image that emerges of the Boetians: totally devoid of any sense of proportion and bordering apparently of the brink of lunacy, an image, indeed, with which Plutarch, himself a Boeotian, would not have wished in any way to be associated. Whatever, Plutarch’s silence is equally unfortunate as the lost Polybian account of this episode, since any comment, however transitory, might just have provided a clue to some of the perplexing elements concerning the assassination of Brachylles, especially the manner in which Alexamenus walked away with apparent impunity.

3.1.8 Flamininus is chosen to remain as Commander in Greece.

At the beginning of chapter 7 Plutarch recounts how the various representatives at Nicaea sent envoys to Rome. Flamininus’ objective was to secure the extension of his consulare imperium, which he eventually achieved through the efforts of his supporters in the Senate. They argued successfully that lack of continuity in command had been the main reason for lack of progress in the war, and that Flamininus looked very much like the first commander truly capable of changing this state of affairs. In fact, he is

97 See Gerevini, (1952), 95, n. 24, who, discounting Livy’s indefinite phraseology, contends that there had indeed been collusion between Flamininus and Antiphilius: “La Boezia gravitava intorno alla Macedonia, ma in seguito alla sconfitta di Filippo all’Aoo e all’avanzata romana, la sua posizione diveniva oltremodo difficile, onde fu facile per Flaminino, aiutato all’interno di Tebe dall’arconte Antifilo, imporre la sua volontà all’assemblea tebana.”

98 Polybius, 18, 43, 1-13; Livy, XXXIII, 27, 5 – 29, 12.


100 Albeit without referring to the conference specifically.

101 The new consuls, C. Cornelius Cethegus and Q. Minucius Rufus, were allotted Italy as their province on a joint basis. Livy, XXXII, 28, 8.
unreservedly complimented by the historians\textsuperscript{102} and, as Plutarch was fully aware, was due subsequently to remain in Greece as commander-in-chief until early 194, finally withdrawing with the approval of the senate, but not before he himself considered Greece to be secure, both from Philip and from Nabis.\textsuperscript{103} Not for the first time, however, such points of detail are discounted by Plutarch who chooses, yet again, though not necessarily with any pejorative implications, to concentrate on Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία,\textsuperscript{104} for such is Plutarch’s interpretation of Flamininus’ perfectly natural anxiety that he might be deprived of the credit due for his achievements by a new commander sent as his replacement.\textsuperscript{105}

3.1.9 Flamininus defeats Philip at the Battle of Cynoscephalae\textsuperscript{106}

Examples of Plutarch’s predilection for manipulating material for the purpose of dramatization have already been noted, e.g., the occurrence of the prearranged smoke signal during the Roman assault at the Aoi Stena and the manner in which Flamininus occupied Thebes. The same applies to his account of the Battle of Cynoscephalae, a crucial turning point which determined not only the success of the immediate Roman campaign, but also the future of the entire eastern Mediterranean. It is, in fact, the first major event in the Flamininus of which Polybius’ account, fully eight chapters in length,\textsuperscript{107} has survived almost in entirety. Combined with Livy’s equally detailed version,\textsuperscript{108} therefore, this provides an ideal opportunity, devoid of the usual frustrating speculation, for analysing the manner in which Plutarch manages his source material. In the event, however, Plutarch uses remarkably little of this considerable fund of information, since it is directed for the most part towards military activity and contains but little biographical material. In an account only about a fifth as long of that of the

\textsuperscript{102} Polybius, 18, 12, 2-3. Livy, XXXII, 28, 6-8
\textsuperscript{103} Livy, XXXIV, 48, 2 – 50, 9; Plutarch, Flam., 13, 4-8; Diodorus, 28, 13, 1; Zonaras, 9, 18, d.
\textsuperscript{104} See Swain, (1988), 341: “Flamininus’ duplicity in the embassy sent after the conference of Nicaea is held to be due to his being φιλότιμος – – ἵσχυρός and concerned for his δόξα (7, 2), and there is no hint that he was ready to betray the Greeks. Plutarch is in no doubt that Flamininus would have made peace had a successor been appointed, but there seems to be no criticism of his motives so far as Greece is concerned, perhaps because Flamininus did make a very satisfactory peace for the Greeks a little later (9. 8).”
\textsuperscript{105} There is a chronological aberration here, since Flamininus’ imperium had already been prorogued at the end of 198, several weeks before the events in Boeotia described by Plutarch in the previous chapter.
\textsuperscript{106} Polybius, 18, 20, 2-27,7; Livy, XXXIII. 6, 8-10, 10, XXXV, 48, 12-13; Strabo, 9.441; Plutarch, Flam., 7, 4-9; Pausanias, 7, 8, 7; Justinus, 30, 4, 5-16; Orosius, 4, 20, 5-9.
\textsuperscript{107} Polybius, 18, 20-27.
\textsuperscript{108} Livy, XXXIII, 6-10.
historians, for example, he deals with the manoeuvres of the two opposing armies on the eve of the battle in just one short sentence, and the decidedly disjointed activity of the following day before the armies finally engaged in full combat occupies no more than two sections of his text. As for the biographical content, more notably in chapter 7, 3-4, intended as a dramatic prelude to the imminent battle, Plutarch gives himself a markedly free hand, not simply manipulating or interpolating material but, it would seem, even resorting to pure invention whenever it suits him.

A clear example of this is his description of the aspirations of the respective combatants on the eve of the battle, with the Romans seeking to conquer the Macedonians, whose reputation for strength and valour had in their view been raised to a high pitch by Alexander, and the Macedonians, who considered the Romans to be superior to the Persians, hoping that, should they be successful, they would prove that Philip was more brilliant than Alexander. This, to say the least, is a decidedly far-fetched analogy. First, the Romans would hardly have taken it as a compliment to be considered superior to the Persians, who, after all, had found themselves in serious difficulty from the moment they were confronted by Greek hoplites well over a century before the birth of Alexander (356), first at Marathon (490) and then, a few years later, at Salamis (480) and Plataea (479). Greeks had in turn been bested by Romans, first in the wars against Pyrrhus (281-275), and then in protracted campaigning throughout the First Punic War in Sicily (264-241), which resulted finally in an effective annexation of the island by Rome. Next, any viable comparison of Philip with Alexander is simply untenable, as Polybius makes abundantly clear:

Although he did his utmost throughout his entire life to prove that he was a descendent of Alexander and Philip (II), he made no effort whatsoever to match their achievements.

In fact, far from respecting the Macedonians, Flamininus had by now begun to hold them in contempt, which is perfectly apparent from both Polybius’ and Livy’s version of his speech to his troops before the battle amplified extensively by Justinus:

109 Plutarch similarly reduces this sort of information to an essential minimum in his account of the Battle of Cannae, (Plutarch, Fabius, 15, 1-16, 5), concluding with the remark

111 ταῦτα δὲ τὰς διεξοδικὰς γράψαντες ἱστορίας ἀπηγγέλκασι

110 Plutarch, Flam., 7, 3.

111 Polybius, 5, 10, 10.
Yet Flamininus, too, the Roman consul, animated his men for the battle by pointing out that Carthage and Sicily on the one hand, and Italy and Spain on the other, had been completely subjugated by Roman valour. Nor should Hannibal, by whose expulsion from Italy they had become masters of Africa, a third part of the world, be considered inferior to Alexander the Great. Moreover, the Macedonians should not be valued by their ancient reputation, but by their present power, for it was not with Alexander the Great, reputed to have been invincible, nor with his army, which had conquered all the east that they were waging war, but with Philip, a youth of immature years, who could scarcely defend the borders of his own realm against his neighbours, and with those Macedonians who not too long ago had been prey for the Dardanians. The Macedonians might well recount the glorious deeds of their forefathers, but he himself could recount those of his own soldiers, for it was by no other army than those very troops which he now had with him in the field that Hannibal and the Carthaginians, along with most of the west, had been conquered.

Justinus wrote probably sometime during the third century AD, but Trogus, whose work he epitomised, dates from the first century BC, so this work at least, (which would have been far more detailed, both in content and interpretation, than Justinus’ redaction), would have been available to Plutarch. If not from Trogus, however, Plutarch, as author of the Alexander, the Fabius, the Marcellus and the Scipio, would still have been familiar

---

112 Polybius, 18, 23, 3-6: Essentially, Flamininus points out to his men that they were going to fight those same Macedonians who had been forced to retreat with heavy losses from Eordaea by Sulpicius (in 200), and whom they themselves had recently chased out of Epirus. Livy’s version, though more compact, has basically the same contents, and is noteworthy for its pithy closing statement, which echoes Aristaenus’ contention that the Macedonians were a spent force: fama stetisse, non viribus, Macedoniae regnum; eam quoque famam tandem evanuisse. Livy, XXXIII, 8, 5.

113 Justinus, 30, 4, 8-14.
with the information contained in the above quotation. Nonetheless, he chooses to ignore it, and, interpolating material not to be found in Polybius, chooses instead to concentrate on the antagonists’ lack of fear and, particularly, their ὀρμὴ καὶ φιλοτιμία, which, he claims, is their true motivation, and which concurs neatly with the underlying theme of the Life. Plutarch manipulates Flamininus’ exhortatory speech to his troops before the battle, (with which he was undoubtedly familiar from Polybius), in like fashion. In his account it takes place on the eve, rather than on the day, of the battle, and since its contents are far from flattering for the Macedonians and, for Plutarch, therefore, equally inconvenient as the information provided by Justinus, he reduces the speech to just a brief summary and, for the purpose of symmetry, introduces a second speech which he attributes to Philip:

ο δὲ Φιλιππος, εἰτ' ἀπὸ τύχης εἰὼ ὕπο σπουδῆς παρὰ τὸν καυρὸν ἀγνοήσας, ἢ γὰρ τί πολυανάριον ὑψηλὸν ἔξω τοῦ χώρακος, ἐπὶ τούτῳ προβας, ἤξεστο μὲν οἷα πρὸ μάχης φιλεί διαλέγεσθαι καὶ παρορμήν, ἀθμίας δὲ δείνης πρὸς τὸν σιωνὸν ἐμπεσοῦσης, διαταραχθεὶς ἐπέσχε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην.

Philip in turn, either through chance or lack of observance due to the urgency of the situation, climbed atop a lofty mound outside the camp, which was in fact a communal burial place, and from here, as is customary before a battle, began a speech of exhortation. However, deeply disturbed by the dreadful despondency that fell upon his men on account of this sinister omen, he refrained from fighting that day.

Opinions vary on this episode, which is unattested elsewhere. Pelling believes that Plutarch has incorporated it into his account specifically to contrast Philip’s despondency with the high morale of the Romans. Hammond, with no consideration for Plutarch’s objectives, claims that he “followed an account not by Polybius, but by a

114 Plutarch, Flam., 7, 3. See Pelling, (1997), 287: “Anche questo si accorda bene con i temi della Vita. Flaminino ha dato l’esempio, con la φιλοτιμία che lo contraddistingue, e ora le truppe da entrambe le parti, si adeguano instintivamente.” For other instances of the manipulation of the troops’ φιλοτιμία by commanding officers, along with references elsewhere in the Lives, see Frazier, (1996), 200: “Aiguillon de la bravoure, la philotimia ne peut jouer qu’un rôle positif au sein des combats, comme en témoigne le héros guerrier par excellence qu’est Coriolan. (Cor. 4. 3 et 22. 2). Tous les grands généraux le savent, qui, à l’instar du grand législateur que fut Lycurgue, s’attachent à entretenir la philotimia de leurs troupes.” (Fab. 25. 3 ; Phil. 7.5 ; Flam. 7. 4 ; Ages. 18. 5 et 20 . 9 ; Caes. 17. 1 ; Cim. 9. 5 et Agis 14.1).

115 Plutarch, Flam., 7, 4. The only other reference to a speech by Philip is in Justinus, (30, 4, 6-7), the few details of which are absent from the above quotation.

Greek writer,” (whom he makes no attempt to identify), and even doubts its authenticity – “the veracity of this detail is uncertain.”117 Gerevini, however, is closest to the mark: “Questo particolare, che non è riferito nè da Polibio nè da Livio, ben risponde al carattere di Plutarco, che non poteva iniziare il racconto di così grande battaglia senza accenare a qualche superstizioso presagio.”118

Thus far, in composing what effectively is a prelude to the battle, Plutarch has by all appearances used a completely free hand. Those events on which he concentrates in his remarkably abbreviated account of the battle itself,119 however, originate from Polybius and provide yet more clear examples of how he manipulates his source material. For example, Flamininus’ timely decision to transfer his command from the struggling Roman left wing and support the right, as a result of which the Macedonian left was driven back in complete confusion.120 All well and good. At this point, however, according to Plutarch, some of the Romans pursued the fugitives, while others attacked the exposed flank of the enemy and began to cut them down, whereupon they threw away their weapons and fled. This proved to be the turning point of the battle, and, by failing to mention that this outflanking manoeuvre was due to the quick thinking of one of the military tribunes,121 Plutarch clearly seeks to give the impression that the credit for the eventual success was due exclusively to Flamininus,122 who receives yet more undue credit through Plutarch’s portrayal of the Aetolians, who in reality made a major contribution to the Roman success at Cynoscephalae in providing vital support when the Romans were being overpowered during the opening stage of the battle.123 Instead, denying the Aetolians any credit whatsoever, Plutarch goes so far as to blame them for Philip’s escape, claiming that, instead of joining the Romans in pursuit of the routed Macedonians, they were more intent on plundering their abandoned camp, much to the

117 Hammond, (1988), 60-82. For the possibility of this episode being founded on oral tradition, see Pelling, (1997), 366, n. 8.
118 Gerevini, (1952), 97, n. 29. Smith, (38, No. 3/4, (Jul.- Oct., 1944)) 91, maintains that chapter 7, 5-7 “are additions of Plutarch from some source or sources to which we have no clue, probably made from memory.”
119 Plutarch, Flam., 8, 1-5.
120 Polybius, 18, 25, 7; Livy, XXXIII, 9, 7-8
121 Polybius, 18, 26, 2-4. See Walbank, (1967), 583-584, where he considers the possibility that the tribune, rather than acting independently and on the spur of the moment, did so on Flamininus’ orders. Polybius, he speculates, might have been using an Aetolian source, which, hostile to Flamininus, would have denied him any credit he deserved.
123 Polybius, 18, 21, 4-8; Livy, XXXIII, 7, 6-8. In an earlier passage, Livy is unstinting in his praise for the Aetolians, especially their cavalry, (XXXIII, 4, 6).
annoyance of the Romans, who, when they eventually returned from the pursuit, found nothing left for themselves. By this time, however, according to Polybius, Philip was already well out of reach, having taken to his heels with whatever troops he could hastily muster together.  

3.1.10 Aetolian Discontent as Flamininus reaches a Peace Settlement with Philip

In chapter 9 Plutarch portrays the Aetolians very much as *enfants terribles*, hell-bent, apparently, on spoiling the party at every available opportunity. Following Polybius, he links their cupidity in appropriating all the booty from the Macedonian camp with their subsequent boasting - even more vexatious to Flamininus - that it was they who deserved the credit for the victory at Cynoscephalae. As a result, they were mentioned in order of precedence in the writings and songs of poets and others in general who celebrated the event, claims Plutarch, who quotes as an example an epigram of Alcaeus of Messene:

"Ακλαυστοὶ καὶ ἄθαπτοι, ὀδοπόρε, τῶν ἐπὶ νότῳ Ἡθοσάλιης τρισσαὶ κείμεθα μυριάδες, Αἰτωλῶν διμηθέντες ὑπ’ Ἅρεος ἡδὲ Λατίνων, οὗς Τίτως εἰρεῖς ἡγαγ’ ἀπ’ Ἰταλίης, Ἱμαθὴ μέγα πῆμα. Τὸ δὲ θρασὺ κείνο Φιλίππου πνεύμα θοῶν ἐλάφων ὀχέτ’ ἐλαφρότερον."  

Unlamented and with no grave, O traveller, we lie on this ridge of Thessaly, thirty thousand in number, conquered by the arms of the Aetolians and of the Latins, whom Titus led from spacious Italy, Emathia’s great bane. And Philip’s brash spirit vanished more quickly than the agile deer.

Although Polybius recounts how the Aetolians seriously irritated Flamininus by “filling the whole of Greece with accounts of their prowess,” it is difficult to reconcile this with the abundant literary output which Plutarch claims their triumphalism produced,

---

124 Polybius, 18, 26, 8.
125 Thereby attempting to deny them whatever credit they genuinely deserved in order further to enhance Flamininus’ profile. It is also worth considering, however, that his hostility might well have been due to lingering resentment of the severe defeat in 245 at Chaeronea inflicted on the Boetians, by the Aetolians. Polybius, 20, 4, 2-7; Plutarch, Aratus, 16, 1.
126 Plutarch, *Flam.*, 9, 2.
127 Polybius, 18, 34, 2: πληροῦντας τὴν Ἐλλάδα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀνδραγαθίας.
otherwise he would certainly have chosen a more suitable quotation to illustrate his point. To begin with, as Plutarch himself admits, this epigram was directed specifically against Philip, brilliantly lambasted in the closing sentence, with the clear implication that he was personally responsible for the stupendous carnage.\footnote{As Plutarch points out, (Flam., 9, 3), Alcaeus has exaggerated the casualty figures, since Philip’s entire army amounted to something like 26,000. See Hammond, (1988), 66-67.} Next, on the matter of the Aetolians being given pride of place, although they are mentioned first, albeit in a single word, it is Flamininus and the Latins who receive the accolade Ἡμιοθη μέγα πήμα.\footnote{On the enmity between Alcaeus and Philip, and for a detailed analysis of the epigram, see Walbank, (1943), esp. 1-3.} The Aetolians, therefore, at the very best, are depicted as no more than equal partners. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, as Plutarch claims, that this particular epigram caused greater annoyance to Flamininus than to Philip.\footnote{Baronowski, (2007), 29, conjectures that Plutarch’s observations “might be taken to imply that Alcaeus deliberately slighted the Romans in this poem. Such an interpretation, however, would overlook the fact that the precedence of the Aetolians in line 3 is conditioned by the metre, and that the appearance of the Romans at the end of this line allowed the poet to devote all of line 4 to emphatic mention of Flamininus and the vast land of Italy. Moreover, Plutarch’s account maybe taken to suggest that Flamininus was annoyed not by the poem itself but by the Aetolians and others who exploited it for their own ends.” An alternative interpretation is to consider πήμα in apposition to the subject of the entire first sentence (verses 1-4); in other words, it is Alcaeus’ depiction of the sorry situation of the thirty thousand warriors, instead of a reference to the Italians led by Titus. Nonetheless, whatever the interpretation, the Aetolians do not appear as the main conquerors.} Plutarch is on even flimsier ground with his contention that it was Flamininus’ ambition to win the respect of the Greeks - φιλοτιμούμενον πρός τούς Ἐλλήνας - that induced him to sideline the Aetolians and negotiate independently a peace settlement with Philip. The Aetolians reacted, continues Plutarch, by spreading rumours that Flamininus did so as a result of bribery, rather than ensuring the safety of the Greeks by destroying Philip’s power, as they would have it.\footnote{Plutarch, Flamm., 9, 4; Polybius, 18, 36, 7; Livy, (XXXIII, 12, 3-4), is unique in mentioning execution as an alternative to expulsion.} Plutarch chooses to ignore vital information, however, of which, given his otherwise comprehensive knowledge of the events surrounding the peace settlement, he was undoubtedly aware. Not only would the Aetolians become the dominant military power in Greece, which Flamininus was seeking to avoid at all costs, if Philip were seriously debilitated,\footnote{Polybius, 18, 34, 1; Livy, XXXIII, 11, 9-10.} but any number of savage and barbarous tribes would pour into Macedon and then into Greece itself.\footnote{Polybius, 18, 37, 8; Livy, XXXIII, 12, 10-11. On the matter of the Aetolians’ resentment, it would seem Plutarch has failed to take advantage of his usual penchant for dramatisation, since, as he was well aware, (Flam., 15, 1), this amounted to much more than just a personal spat with Flamininus and led eventually to their forming an alliance with Antiochus.} Flamininus’ actions, therefore, far from being prompted simply by φιλοτιμία, were also
based on purely pragmatic considerations, directed as they were to ensuring the success of the Roman campaign by creating political stability in Greece. Furthermore, Plutarch states that it was the threat from Antiochus, now being counselled by Rome’s inveterate enemy Hannibal, which induced Flamininus, daunted by the prospect of fighting two wars concurrently, to make peace sooner rather than later with Philip. By this statement alone, therefore, Plutarch contradicts his earlier contention that it was Flamininus’ ambition to win the respect of the Greeks that provided his motivation.

Finally, there are two instances in the Flamininus when Plutarch readily construes as the protagonist’s anxiety about losing the credit for his achievements to a replacement commander. It is perplexing, therefore, to say the least, that he fails to do likewise at this point in his text, given that Polybius clearly states that this was also the ulterior motive behind Flamininus’ hastily reaching a peace settlement with Philip. A chance gone begging, it would seem, considerably more convincing than his untenable claim that was Flamininus’ motivation for winning the respect of the Greeks.

3.1.11 The Isthmian Declaration of Greek Freedom and Independence

Flamininus’ cleverly stage-managed announcement of freedom for the Greeks at the Isthmian Games in mid-196 is undoubtedly one of the highlights of his brilliant career. As described by the historians the events are truly dramatic and are in themselves more than adequate testimony of his prestige. Unable to surpass this, Plutarch seeks to compensate by supplementing the historical narrative with extraneous material chosen specifically to stimulate his readers’ interest even further.

First, festering Aetolian discontent recurs when the Romans, in spite of their grandiose claims about Greek liberation, insist on retaining control of the “fetters of Greece,” i.e., the strategically important strongholds of Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias taken from Philip after Cynoscephalae. Under these circumstances, claimed the Aetolians, Greek freedom was illusory, since they were simply getting a change of

---

134 A chronological error here by Plutarch; either a genuine lapse of memory or, more probably, a deliberate attempt further to dramatize the situation, since Hannibal did not arrive at the court of Antiochus until some eighteen months later in early 195. Livy, XXXIII, 49, 7; Appian, Syr., 4a; Justinus, 31, 3, 5; Orosius, 4, 20; 13; Zonaras, 9, 18, i-j. Nepos, 23, 8, 1, dates Hannibal’s arrival two years later to 193, “L. Cornelio Q. Minucio consulis.”
135 Polybius, 18, 39, 3; Livy, XXXIII, 13, 15.
136 Plutarch, Flam., 7, 1; 13, 1.
137 Polybius, 18, 39, 4.
masters - the Romans instead of Philip. Embellishing Polybius’ account, Plutarch claims that the Aetolians asked the Greeks whether they were content in now wearing fetters which were smoother, albeit heavier, than those they had been wearing before, and whether they admired Flamininus as a benefactor for unshackling the foot of Greece only to put a collar round her neck.

The second instance concerns the sequel to the reaction of the crowd to the herald’s unexpected, sensational announcement. Initially, unable to believe their ears, they sought reassurance through a second announcement, which was immediately followed by unrestrained jubilation and thunderous applause. Incorporating yet again material extraneous to Polybius’ account, Plutarch sensationally describes how ravens flying overhead were stunned by the sheer volume of the applause and dropped from the sky, at which point the delirious crowd, having lost all interest in the games, surged uncontrollably forwards in their anxiety to look upon Flamininus’ face or to grasp his hand, with the greater number showering him with crowns and fillets and, hailing him as their saviour (σωτήρ), a title implying divine honours. In fact, such was the intensity of the onslaught that Flamininus was lucky to escape with his life.

Following on immediately from this highly dramatic episode, the third - and most significant - supplement by Plutarch concerns the reflections of the Greeks on their own previous, unfortunate history. Quite apart from further enhancing Flamininus’ personal profile, this passage undoubtedly displays a measure of independent creativity clearly apparent elsewhere in Plutarch’s text, the sections on the battle for control of the Aoi Stena and Cynoscephalae, for example:

'Ως δ’ ἀπέκαμον περὶ τὴν σκηνὴν αὐτοῦ βοῶντες ἥδη νυκτὸς οὕσης, αὕτης οὐσίας ἱδοεῖν ἢ φίλους ἢ πολίτας ἀσπαζόμενοι καὶ περιπλεκόμενοι, πρὸς δεῖπνα καὶ πότους ἔτρεποντο μετ’ ἀλλήλων. Ἔν θυμός καὶ μᾶλλον ὡς έικός

138 Polybius, 18, 45, 6. ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰδοκότερον ὑπάρχειν πάσιν ὅτι μεταλλαμβάνουσι τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πέδας παρὰ Φιλίππου ὑπομονή, καὶ γίνεται μεθάρμοσις δεσποτῶν, οὐκ ἐλευθεροσυνή τῶν Ἑλλήνων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑπ’ Αἰτωλῶν ἔλλειμεν κατακόρου.

139 Plutarch, Flam., 10, 2. Cf. The De Malignitate Herodoti, 855a, where Plutarch credits this taunt to Philip. It would seem, therefore, that Plutarch has transferred it to the Aetolians specifically to pursue the theme of the ever-widening rift between themselves and the Romans first mentioned by Plutarch at the beginning of chapter 9. The origins of this material, irresistible to Plutarch, are unknown. For the feasibility of oral tradition and other suggestions, see Pelling, (1997), p. 377, n. 99.

140 Although this phenomenon is mentioned elsewhere, (Livy, XXIX, 25, 3-4; Plutarch, Pompey, 25, 7), the only other reference to this particular instance is by Valerius Maximus, (4, 8, 5), writing during the principate of Tiberius more than two hundred years after the event, yet still two generations or so before Plutarch. This at least proves that Plutarch has not just simply invented this extraneous material, but without, unfortunately, providing any clues about its precise origin.

141 Plutarch, Flam., 10, 5; Polybius, 18, 46, 12. On divine honours, see Walbank, Comm., II, 613, 12.

142 Polybius, 18, 46, 12; Livy, XXXIII, 33, 1; Plutarch, Flam., 11, 1.
It was already night by the time they were weary of shouting around his [Flamininus’] tent, after which they greeted and embraced whomsoever they happened to see, be they personal friends or fellow-citizens, and went off to eat and drink together. In doing so, with their exhilaration naturally increasing, they began to take stock of the current situation in Greece and exchange their views on it, saying that however many wars Greece had waged for her freedom, she had never yet obtained anything more stable or sweeter than this present freedom, when others had fought in her behalf, and she herself, almost without a drop of blood or a pang of grief, had carried off the fairest and most fiercely contested of prizes. Valour and wisdom are, indeed, rare things among men, but rarest of all blessings is the man who is just.

Bremer argues, and plausibly so, that Plutarch’s objective in this passage is “to convince us that the Greeks were enthusiastic about their “liberator” Flamininus”. Moreover, continues Bremer, “In reporting all this as the vox populi Graeci, Plutarch follows Polybius and Livy, but in view of Plutarch’s emotional amplification of this theme we may accept that here he himself is speaking, ruminating about the history of his own country.” A good point, since it justly credits Plutarch with the erudition and compositional originality so frequently overlooked, or even considered.

3.1.12 The Virtual Auto-apotheosis of Flamininus

After the events at Isthmia the aggrandisement of Flamininus reaches an unprecedented level as his status is raised effectively from human to quasi-divine. Returning to the

---

143 Plutarch, Flam., 11, 3-4.
144 Bremer, (2005), 262.
145 Similarly, Swain, (1988), 341: “The thoughts put into the mouths of others are Plutarch’s own.”
146 Van der Stockt, (1992), 10: “Apart from the extent of Plutarch’s work and the variety of its themes, its erudition also makes a profound impression. The list of Plutarch’s quotations from other authors fills an entire book: writers from almost all epochs and genres are cited. (....) But constant reference to the ‘eclecticism’ or ‘the sources’ of our author threatens to deny his originality: one must be careful not to ‘disintegrate’ Plutarch and simply reduce him to his sources. For contrary to the attitude of 19th century Quellenforschung, Plutarch’s striving to develop personal views is now receiving growing acknowledgement.”
notion of Roman ethnic respectability, Plutarch recounts how any misgivings previously entertained by the Greeks were now completely dispelled. Embellishing Polybius’ account yet again, in chapter 11 Plutarch maintains that the Greeks had effectively always been their own worst enemies and that it was only through the selfless intervention of ἄλλοφυλοι that now at last they were enjoying the benefits of a political stability they had been unable to achieve themselves. Although this unrestricted praise is directed towards the Romans generally, rather than Flamininus personally, the latter, taking particular pride - μέγιστον ἐφρόνησεν - in his liberation of Greece, had the presence of mind to capitalise on it. Far from displaying any inferiority complex about his ethnicity, he made two votive offerings at no less a shrine than Delphi in order to serve the Greeks a none too gentle reminder that it was under his leadership that the Romans had put their house in order for them. The first of these offerings consisted of some silver bucklers and his own long shield, bearing the following inscription:

Ζηνός ἰὼ κρατυναῖσι γεγαθότες ἵπποσύναισι
κοῦροι, ἰὼ Σπάρται Τυνδαρίδαι βασιλεῖς.
Αἰνεάδας Τίτος ὑμῖν ὑπέρτατον ὅπασε δῶρον,
Ἑλλάνων τεύξας παῖσιν ἐλευθερίαν. 148

"O sons of Zeus, who delight in driving swift horses, O Tyndaridae, kings of Sparta, Titus, a descendant of Aeneas, has brought you a most excellent gift, he who for the children of the Greeks wrought freedom."

Flamininus’ choice of the Dioscuri as recipients of these offerings requires investigation. The cult of Castor and Pollux was pursued from early times by the tribes of Italy, and their association with Rome dated back at least as far as the early fifth century. In 498, at the battle of Lake Regillus, 149 when the Romans were under serious pressure from the Latin League led by Tarquinius Superbus, the recently deposed former Etruscan king of Rome, the Roman dictator Postumius vowed to dedicate a temple to Castor in return for divine assistance. 150 Legend has it that the Romans were duly given the incentive they sought to secure victory by the appearance of both Heavenly Twins as horsemen on the battlefield. After the battle they reappeared in the Roman Forum watering their horses at the Spring of Juturna, thereby announcing the victory. 151 Such an epiphany as

147 Plutarch, Flam., 12, 5.
148 Plutarch, Flam., 12, 6.
149 Located not far from Tusculum, some fifteen miles south-east of Rome.
150 Livy, II, 20, 12.
151 Dionysius, Ant. Rom., 6, 13, 1-3; Val. Max., 1, 8, 1. The temple, which stands on the traditional place of their appearance, was completed in 484, and Postumius’ son was one of the two commissioners appointed to
saviours – σωτήρες - at a moment of crisis is a salient characteristic of the Dioscuri, and
the implications of their actions at Lake Regillus are abundantly clear, since they would
never have intervened on behalf of those they considered unworthy of divine favour.
This in itself, along with the longevity of their association with Rome, is more than
sufficient testimony of Roman ethnic respectability. Flamininus meanwhile was equally
anxious to draw a parallel between himself and the Dioscuri as σωτήρες, a title so
enthusiastically conferred upon him by the Greeks after the Isthmian declaration.
Effectively, therefore, in just the same way as the Dioscuri had saved the Romans in
their time of need, Flamininus had duly returned the favour in saving the Greeks.

Flamininus’ second offering is immeasurably more ambitious:

Τόνδε τοι ἰμβροσίοισιν ἐπὶ πλοκάμοισιν ἔθηκε
κέίσαται Λατοῖδα χρυσοφιάτι στέφανον,
διὸ πόρεν Αἴνεαδᾶν ταγός μέγας. ’Αλλ’, ’Εκάργη,
ἀλκάς τῷ θείῳ κύδος ὀπαξε Τίτῳ.¹⁵²

Son of Leto, it was the great leader of the children of Aeneas who placed this
resplendent gold crown upon thy ambrosial locks. Grant, therefore, O Far-Darter,
the god-like Titus the glory due to his prowess.

On this occasion the addressee is none other than a member of the Olympian pantheon,
and the gift, rather than just sundry military hardware, is intended for the god’s own
personal adornment. Moreover, far from being in any way abashed concerning his
ethnicity, Flamininus requests recognition of his divine status.¹⁵³

This was about far more than Flamininus’ self-glorification, however. In 273 Ptolemy
II of Egypt, impressed by the manner in which the Romans had finally chased off
Pyrrhus at Beneventum two years earlier, entered into a treaty with Rome.¹⁵⁴ Non-
committal though it was, effectively nothing more than gesture of mutual respect, the
implications were clear: one of the major Hellenistic powers had realised that there
were new kids on the block who before long might well play a leading part in the
politics of the ancient world. This notion is far superseded, however, by Flamininus’
gesture, which was not merely an outright dismissal of the notion that the Romans

¹⁵² Plutarch, Flam., 12, 7.
¹⁵³ See Pelling, (1997), 311: “Gli epigrammi di 12, 11-12 sono fieri e orgogliosi, poiché è lo stesso Tito ad
avanzare la sua pretesa a fama immortale.”
¹⁵⁴ Dionysius, 20, 14, 1-2; Livy, Per., 14, b; Val. Max., 4, 3, 9; Justinus, 18, 2, 8-9; Dio Cass., fr. 41, 1; Eutropius, 2, 15, 1.
should any longer be considered as barbarians, but a claim for recognition, not just as a fully fledged member of the civilized world, but rather, as its champions.\(^{155}\)

Chapter 12 concludes with a reference to the Roman emperor Nero’s self-styled proclamation of liberty for the Greeks\(^{156}\) at the Isthmian games in Corinth some two and a half centuries later in 67 AD, thereby making the city for the second time the scene of the (allegedly) same benefaction conferred on the Greeks.\(^{157}\) This brings into question Plutarch’s arrangement of his material, since a more appropriate place for this reference would supposedly have been after Flamininus’ own proclamation in 196 B.C. However, Nero’s proclamation would still have been fresh in the memory of both Plutarch and many of his Greek contemporaries, either as a result of their personal attendance at the event itself or through the various reports of others who had been present. Presumably, therefore, by linking these two proclamations, Plutarch intended that the sensationalism, pomp and ceremony of the latter would be associated subliminally with the former, thereby enhancing Flamininus’ personal profile, arguably already at its zenith, even further.\(^{158}\)

From a historical perspective, this comparison has no effective validity, since at the time of Nero’s declaration the province of Achaea, due to its confederate status, had for some time already been exempt from the payment of any tribute to Rome and was enjoying the benefits of formalised autonomy.\(^{159}\) Moreover, any effect Nero’s declaration might have had on the Greeks was short-lived because it was soon rescinded by Vespasian.\(^{160}\) None of this would have been of any concern to Plutarch, however, concentrating specifically on the sensational to arouse his readers’ interest.

\(^{155}\) See Gruen, (1993), 6: “Flamininus dedicated precious objects at Delphi inscribed with his own verses in Greek, reminding the Hellenes that their liberation had come at the hands of a descendant of Aeneas (Plut. Flam. 12.6-7). That is a significant image. Flamininus had no military goals to achieve with this gesture; Roman martial supremacy had already been established. The conjunction of Greek freedom and Trojan ancestry delivered a different message. Flamininus not only enunciated Rome’s claim to a place in the cultivated community of the Mediterranean but he declared Rome’s centrality as the protector of that heritage.”

Flamininus was not alone in pursuing this policy. In late 190, shortly before the second - and decisive - defeat of Antiochus, the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio offered sacrifices at Ilium, where the consanguinity of the Ilians and the Romans was mutually celebrated. Livy, XXXVII, 37, 2-3; Justinus, 31, 8, 3-4.

\(^{156}\) For a succinct yet detailed account see Gallivan, (1973), 230-234.

\(^{157}\) The text of Nero’s speech is preserved in Greek on an inscription, S.I.G. 3 814 = I.L.S. 8794. For a translation, see Shotter, (1997), 52-53.

\(^{158}\) Similarly Pelling, (1997), 311, who contends that the reference to Nero fits in well as a conclusion to Plutarch’s presentation of the central phase of the Life, amplifying the effect of the various epigrams, particularly those at Delphi.,

\(^{159}\) Gerevini, (1952), 99, n. 47.

\(^{160}\) Suetionius, Vesp., 8, 4; Pausanias, 7, 17, 4.
Finally, one should consider whether Plutarch was attempting to enhance the personality of Flamininus by linking it, again subliminally, with that of Nero. This, however, is unlikely.\footnote{André, (1995), 181, makes it perfectly clear that it is Nero plaguirising by imitation and implicit association the credit of his predecessors, Flamininus included: “Or le parallèle concerne surtout les généraux philhellènes de la République, surtout le Flamininus de 196. Plutarque fera le parallèle dans son Flamininus, X11, 8, avant Pausanias, Périègèse, VII, 17, avant le « prologue » au voyage de Dion Cassius (LXII, 8). Il faudrait analyser au plan juridique le texte fondamental de Tite-Live, XXXIII, 30-32 : l‘imperator, en 196, enjoignait à Philippe V de « libérer » ses cités sujets, d‘évacuer les garnisons « avant la période des jeux isthmiques ». Il donnait une liste limitative des cités « libérées, exemptées de contributions, autonomes » (liberos, immunes, suis legibus). C‘est à cet évergétisme contingenté que Néron fait allusion. Il croit avoir enrichi la tradition du philhellénisme politique.”} For the most part, Flamininus is portrayed favourably throughout the greater part of Plutarch’s text, and it is only during the concluding three chapters that he receives any adverse criticism. In sharp contrast, Plutarch pulls few punches whenever he has cause to mention Nero, e.g., passim throughout the Life of Galba. More specifically, as Pelling points out,\footnote{Pelling, (1997), 388, n. 127: “— nel attegiamento di Flaminino non c‘è nulla che possa competere con la personalità istrionica di Nerone.”} there was nothing in Flamininus’ general demeanour which could compete with the histrionic personality of Nero. Mercifully!

3.1.13 Confusion, Chronological Distortion and the nonexistent Truce

Plutarch divides chapter 13 into two roughly commensurate parts. The first constitutes a genuine hiatus in the laudatory tone witnessed thus far in his text, consisting of a decidedly confused and niggardly account of Flamininus’ campaign against Nabis. Most scholars maintain that Flamininus intervened, either shortly before or shortly after the end of the Achaean war of 192, to negotiate a truce with Nabis\footnote{Briscoe, (1981), 189-190, 12-13; Errington, (1969), 105-106, Aymard, (1938), 309-315.} both in order to prevent Philopoemen from capturing Sparta\footnote{This notion in itself is questionable. Livy spends an entire chapter (XXXIV, 34, 1-9) in which Flamininus convinces his Greek allies of the infeasibility of besieging Sparta and, although he is motivated to some extent by political expediency, the difficulty, the length of time and the expense that would have been required for such an undertaking are all abundantly clear. So, if this would have been a step too far even for the combined Greek and Roman armies, what chance would the unassisted Achaean army have had of dislodging Nabis, in spite of his seriously depleted forces? Philopoemen’s month-long devastation of the Laconian countryside no more than a consolation prize, (Livy, XXXV, 30, 12). Moreover, Raeymaekers, 27, (1996), 268, is mistaken in suggesting, “The termination of the war was apparently his [Philopoemen’s] own initiative.” Realistically, he had no other choice, since his campaign had simply run out of steam. Gruen, (1984), 465, n. 161, and Aymard, (1938), 308-309, also question the plausibility of a siege of Sparta.} and to restore Roman authority. The
authenticity of this truce, however, is dubious. There is no concrete evidence anywhere
to suggest that there was any contact between Flamininus - or any other Roman for that
matter - and Nabis during the period between the end of the Achaean war and the
assassination of Nabis by the Aetolians later in 192.\textsuperscript{165} On this point Livy, in spite of his
otherwise exhaustive account of the Achaean war, is silent, and whatever Polybius,
generally more attentive to detail in matters Greek than Livy, might have had to say, if
anything, is purely conjectural. Indeed, Flamininus had much more urgent business
awaiting his attention. He and his fellow commissioners were in northern Greece
visiting the cities of their various allies, apprehensive lest the Aetolians might have
persuaded them to go over to Antiochus,\textsuperscript{166} after which Flamininus himself attended a
meeting of the Pan-Aetolian council, where he warned them of the disastrous
consequences of supporting the Seleucid monarch.\textsuperscript{167} According to Livy, Flamininus and
his colleagues then “returned” to Corinth,\textsuperscript{168} where, apparently, he remained until after
Philopoemen’s occupation of Sparta following the assassination of Nabis.\textsuperscript{169}

As matters stand, therefore, the decidedly tenuous evidence cited is from Pausanias\textsuperscript{170}
and from Plutarch’s \textit{Philopoemen} and \textit{Flamininus}, concerning which Gruen astutely
observes: “He [sc. Plutarch] has confused the Roman war on Nabis of 195 with the
Achaean war of 192, combining both and mixing up their details, as is plain from \textit{Phil.},
15, 3 and \textit{Flam.}, 13, 1-3. The truce is undoubtedly that of 195. Pausanias is probably guilty
of the same confusion.”\textsuperscript{171} The first passage referred to by Gruen, i.e., \textit{Philopoemen} 15, 3,
simply states that after the Achaean War Flamininus made peace with Nabis and that
Nabis was treacherously slain by the Aetolians. The second (decidedly hackneyed)
passage, in which Plutarch is severely critical of Flamininus’ motivation, is more
detailed:

\begin{quote}
ο δὲ Τίτως τότε καλλίστω καὶ δικαιοτάτω τοῦ πρὸς Νάβιν ἀρξάμενος
πολέμου, τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων ἰξωλέστατον καὶ παρανομώτατον τύραννον, ἐν
tῷ τέλει διεγείρατο τὰς τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἐπιδίδας, ἐλείν παρασχόν ὧν
ἐθελήσας, ἀλλὰ σπεισάμενος καὶ προέμενος τὴν Σπάρτην ἀναζων
δουλεύον, εἶτε δείσας μὴ τοῦ πολέμου μήκος λαμβάνοντος ἄλλος
ἀπὸ ῾Ρώμης ἐπελθόν στρατηγὸς ἀνέληται τὴν δόξαν, εἶτε φιλονικία
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{165} Polybius, 20, 12, 1-7; Livy, XXXV, 35, 1 – 38, 3; Plutarch, \textit{Phil.}, 15, 3-12; Pausanias, 7, 8, 4-5 and 8, 50, 10.
\textsuperscript{166} Livy, XXXV, 31, 1-16; Plutarch, \textit{Cato Maior}, 12, 1-7, \textit{Flam.}, 15, 1-4; Zonaras, 9, 19, c.
\textsuperscript{167} Polybius, 21, 31, 7 & 13 ; Livy, XXXV, 33, 1-11; Zonaras, 9, 19, i.
\textsuperscript{168} Livy, XXXV, 34, 1; Quinctius legatique Corinthum redierunt. Curiously, there is no mention of Flamininus
ever having been in Corinth since returning to Greece at the beginning of the year. Livy, XXXV, 33, 5.
\textsuperscript{169} Livy, XXXV, 39, 1.
\textsuperscript{170} Pausanias, 8, 50, 10.
Titus then began a most honourable and righteous war against Nabis, the most pernicious and lawless tyrant of Sparta, though in the end he cheated the Greeks out of their hopes, unwilling as he was to capture Nabis. He chose, rather, to make peace with him and to abandon Sparta to undeserved servitude, either out of fear that if the war dragged on another commander from Rome would deprive him of his glory, or out of a sense of rivalry and jealousy over the honours being paid to Philopoemen.

In this instance it should be seriously considered whether the misplacement of events is simply due to genuine confusion by Plutarch or a deliberate manipulation of his source material in order to belittle Flamininus in favour of Philopoemen. What connection can there possibly be between, a) Flamininus’ anxiety over being supplanted, a notion expressed by Livy before the Roman assault against Nabis in 195, b) what, in this passage, is undoubtedly the peace treaty of 195 and, c) the nature of the relationship between Flamininus and Philopoemen, who was in Crete between 200/199 and 193? Although Flamininus’ victory over Nabis in 195 does not bear comparison with that over Philip in 197 and with the subsequent declaration of Greek independence in 196, its significance from the Roman perspective in the overall scheme of things should not be underestimated. Whatever Plutarch says to the contrary, Flamininus’ decision not to remove Nabis was in order to leave Sparta as a counterbalance in the Peloponnese to the recently augmented authority of the Achaean League, in the same way that Philip had been left to provide a buffer-zone against the barbarians of northern and central Europe. In every respect, therefore, Flamininus had clearly succeeded where Philopoemen, three years later, was due to fail. For Plutarch, however, the enmity between Flamininus and Philopoemen is more important than the historicity, and, seriously biased towards the Greek Philopoemen, he seeks to tarnish Flamininus’ successful campaign by casting a slur on his motivation and then spuriously linking this up with a situation which was not due to evolve for another three years, as a result of which Flamininus allegedly “cheated the Greeks out of their hopes.” Now, can this really be the same Flamininus whose declaration of Greek independence, just three chapters

---

\[172\] Plutarch, \textit{Flam.}, 13, 1-2.
\[173\] Livy, XXXIV, 33, 14.
\[174\] See Ferrary, (1988), 110: “Pour expliquer la conduite de Flamininus, il [Plutarque] invoque seulement, outre sa crainte de recevoir l’un des consuls de 194 comme successeur, le dépit qu’il aurait conçu de la popularité de Philopoemen \textit{(Philop.,} 15, 1-3; \textit{Flam.,} 13, 1-4). Philopoemen en 195 n’était pas encore rentré de Crète, et cette second explication est une anticipation des événements de 192-191.” Although Plutarch may well be excused for confusing the historical events, it is difficult to make out a good case for his being unaware of Philopoemen’s whereabouts at this point in time.
earlier in Plutarch’s own text, had been answered by a shout of joy so stunningly loud that the resultant sonic repercussions had caused the birds to fall out of the sky?175

3.1.14 The Senate awards Flamininus a Triumph for his Victories over Philip and Nabis

In the second part of chapter 13 the laudatory tone is fully restored as Plutarch gives his version of the liberation of those Roman citizens who had been captured by Hannibal after Cannae and sold into slavery in Greece. He opens with the statement that the Achaeans voted Flamininus many honours - albeit, significantly, without providing any concrete examples.176 None of these, however, he continues, was comparable with the spontaneous ransom of the enslaved Romans, whom the Achaeans gifted - παρέδωκαν - to Flamininus as he was about to set sail back to Italy.177 By contrast, however, Livy clearly states that, far from being a passive recipient, Flamininus was in fact the instigator of this action, asking the Achaeans to seek out the enslaved Romans and send them to him within two months in Thessaly.178 This provides yet another example, therefore, of Plutarch manipulating his source material, even to the point of invention, in order to give Flamininus more credit than he is due.

The liberated Romans provide a neat transition for Plutarch as, moving forward several months, he mentions their inclusion in Flamininus’ triumph, in which, apparently, they were the most glorious feature.179 There follows a brief description of the abundant trophies and considerable booty180 on display, along with the mention of the war indemnity of one thousand talents still owed by Philip, but later remitted, claims Plutarch, primarily through Flamininus' personal intervention.181 The chapter is then rounded off with the joint statements that the Romans officially decreed

175 Plutarch, Flam., 10, 5-6. On this final point, See Pelling, (1990), in which the author illustrates that it is not easy to find consistency throughout the Lives in Plutarch’s manner of dealing with historical material. On the portrayal of individuals in particular, see Georgiadou, (1992).
176 See Errington, (1969), 107, esp. n. 2.
177 Plutarch, Flam., 13, 5.
178 Livy, XXXIV, 50, 3. Cf. Diodorus, 28, 13, 1, albeit with the variant that the Romans were to be liberated and repatriated within thirty days.
179 Plutarch, Flam., 13, 9: ὃ δὲ δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸν θριάμβον αὐτῷ πάντων ὕπάρξαι λαμπρότατον.
180 τὸ τε τῶν χρημάτων πλήθος οὐκ ὀλίγων ἦν. Plutarch, Flam., 14,1.
181 μᾶλλον τῷ Τίτῳ συμπαράξαντος. Plutarch, Flam., 14, 2. According to Appian, Syr., 23, a, the indemnity was not finally remitted until the summer of 190.
- ἐψηφίσαντο - Philip to be their ally, and released his son Demetrius, who had been being held as a hostage in Rome. The syntax, cleverly exploited by Plutarch, clearly implies that these two additional favours were equally due to Flamininus, although there is no evidence in any other extant authority that Philip ever officially became an ally of Rome either at this or any other point in time. This is yet another clear attempt, therefore, of Plutarch seeking to enhance Flamininus’ profile, this time by a combination of what is to all appearances pure invention and the incorporation of later, unrelated material.

Although Flamininus’ triumph was undoubtedly one of the highlights of his distinguished career, Plutarch’s account is decidedly skimpy, consisting as it does of no more than some one hundred and twenty words. Livy’s, by contrast, is not only longer – some two hundred words – but also contains material ideally suited to Plutarch’s purpose. For example, Livy records that the triumph lasted fully three days – triduum triumphavit, supposedly the sort of information that Plutarch would avidly exploit to the full, as he does in his account of Paullus’ triumph in 167, also of three days’ duration and occupying no fewer than three complete chapter’s of his text. The same applies to Plutarch’s failure to mention the numerous noble prisoners and hostages who marched before Flamininus’ chariot, including Philip’s son Demetrius and Armenas, the son of Nabis. One is left, therefore, with the distinct impression that Plutarch’s account of this episode is little more than perfunctory.

### 3.1.15 Flamininus and Glabrio

Flamininus returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph in the autumn of 194, departing for a second tour of duty in Greece in early 192. This intermediary period consisted primarily of diplomatic activity, the most note-worthy point being the decidedly uncompromising manner in which he delivered the senate’s ultimatum concerning a

---

182 Demetrius’ release was not promised to Philip until the following year, in 193. Livy, XXXV, 31, 5. It was not finally effected, however, until 191. Polybius, 21, 3, 3; Livy, XXXVI, 35, 13; Eutropius, 4, 3, 1.

183 Shortly after the Isthmian declaration in June/July 196, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus met Philip somewhere near Tempe and advised him to send an embassy to Rome to ask for an alliance to avert any suspicion that he might be looking to exploit the arrival of Antiochus. Upon Philip’s accepting this advice, Lentulus at once took leave of him and proceeded to Thermae to attend a general assembly of the Aetolians, which was already in session. However, there is no surviving evidence that Philip ever pursued the matter any further. Polybius 18, 48, 3. Livy XXXIII, 35, 1-10.

184 The first case on record; Briscoe, (1981), 128, 4.

185 Plutarch, Aem., 32-34.

186 Livy, XXXIV, 52, 8-9; Eutropius, 4, 2, 2; Orosius, 4, 20, 2.
possible alliance to Antiochus’ ambassadors in Rome in early 193. Material of this sort is of little or no interest to Plutarch: witness the like manner in which he disregards the peace conferences at Nicaea and Tempe, both crucially significant events in themselves, but which fail to arouse any intense interest, curiosity or emotional reaction. For this reason, Plutarch simply ignores it and directs his attention to the military activity in Greece.187

The consuls-elect for 191 were Manius Acilius Glabrio and P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica. In late April of that year, Glabrio, a competent soldier, (albeit totally bereft of tact and diplomacy), defeated Antiochus at Thermopylae. Effectively, therefore, Glabrio steals the show, and Plutarch seeks to redress the balance in favour of Flamininus.

His first ploy is to claim that Flamininus was appointed as Glabrio’s lieutenant - πρεσβευτής - by the senate.188 Perplexingly, there is no surviving account of the consular elections for 191, and the first mention of the successful candidates does not occur until late 192, when the war against Antiochus was officially sanctioned and Greece was allotted to Manius.189 By this time, however, Flamininus had already been in Greece for several months, specifically to canvass support from the various Greek cities in the imminent war against Antiochus and the Aetolians.190

The next point is the alleged rationale behind Flamininus’ (spurious) appointment – διό τούτων Ἐλληνως, claims Plutarch.191 In some cases, he maintains, the mere sight of Flamininus is enough to reaffirm their loyalty to Rome. For the others, infected with the first signs of disloyalty (ἀρχομένους νοσείν) Flamininus has recourse to the good will he enjoys, like a physician administering medicine just at the right time to prevent any deterioration in their condition.192 Yet another extravagant passage from Plutarch, and, reminiscent of chapters 5-7, from a historical perspective, equally simplistic. Whatever

---

188 Plutarch, Flam., 15, 2.
189 Livy, XXXVI, 1, 2-7; Appian, Syr., 15, a-c; Zonaras, 9.19, h-i;
190 Livy, XXXV, 23, 4-5: itaque senatus, etsi praetorem Atilium cum classe miserat in Graeciam, tamen, quia non copiis modo sed etiam auctoritate opus erat ad tenendos sociorum animos, T. Quinctium et Cn. Octavium et Cn. Seruillium et P. Villium legatos in Graeciam misit. See also Plutarch, Cato Maior, 12, 3; Zonaras, 9, 19, c. Plutarch might be excused on the grounds of confusing Titus Quinctius Flamininus with his brother Lucius, concerning whom, Livy, XXXVI, 1, 8, says: L. Quinctium superiors anni consulem legari ad id bellum placuit. There is nothing here to suggest, however, that Lucius’ appointment was specifically as Glabrio’s lieutenant, especially since he remains conspicuous by his absence for the entire duration of the Roman campaign. Moreover, Livy’s precise definition of Lucius as superioris anni consulem, is patently inapplicable to Titus.
192 For the use of the medical metaphor, see Pelling, (1997), 394, n. 155.
the extent of Flamininus’ personal charisma, it was on account of his considerable experience and unparalleled expertise that the senate had decided to send him back to Greece. Moreover, Plutarch shows no appreciation of the complexity of the task with which Flamininus was confronted, leaving the reader with the distinct impression that everything just fell neatly into place. For example, in spite of Flamininus’ personal intervention, the strategically important city of Demetrias, divided by factional infighting, fell by treachery to the Aetolians, and only narrowly did Chalcis escape the same fate.

The same applies to Plutarch’s contention that it was out of pity for the Greeks that Flamininus sailed from the Peloponnese to Naupactus to intercede with Glabrio on behalf of the besieged Aetolians, for whom he secured an armistice and time to send an embassy to Rome to negotiate for moderate peace terms. Although Flamininus was genuinely disturbed by the plight of the Aetolians and irritated by Glabrio’s time-consuming siege of a single city, (with Philip meanwhile making widespread conquests in northern Greece), he was equally motivated by his own personal political objectives. Plutarch, however, chooses to ignore this, (if, indeed, he was even aware of it), and concentrates instead on contrasting what he chooses to represent as two previously unillustrated facets of Flamininus’ character, namely, his leniency and compassion, with Glabrio’s alleged vindictiveness.

In the autumn of 192 Antiochus landed at Demetrias and occupied Euboea. He established his headquarters in Chalcis where, in early 191, he married the daughter of Cleoptolemus, a local magnate. As a result of this marriage, claims Plutarch, the Chalcidians incurred the consul Glabrio’s wrath, since it induced them to support

---

193 See Gerevini, (1952), 100, n. 53: “Veramente preziosa l’azione svolta da Flaminino tra i Greci in questa occasione; oltre a valersi del suo personale prestigio, seppe trarre partito dalle etere rivalità elleniche e dall’azione inizialmente indecisa di Antioco.”
194 Livy, XXXV, 34, 1-12.
195 Livy, XXXV, 37, 4 – 39, 8.
196 Plutarch, Flam., 15, 4: καὶ τριβόμενος περὶ μιᾷ πόλει καθηται ὅπως ὁργήν. Later, in the same section, Plutarch describes Flamininus as καταπάσσεσ τὸν θημὸν αὐτοῦ [sc. Μανιοῦ].
197 Livy, XXXVI, 34, 3-4: ceterum quamquam merito iratus erat Aetolis, quod solos obtrectasse gloriae suae, cum liberaret Graeciam, meminerat, et nihil auctoritate sua motos esse, cum, quae tum maxime accidebant, casura praemonens a furioso incepto eos deterreret, tamen sui maxime operis esse credens nullam gentem liberatæ ab se Graeciae funditus everti, obambulare muris, ut facile nosceretur ab Aetolis, coepit.
198 Cf. the introductory chapter: ἐλαφρός μὲν ἐν τῷ κολάζειν καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμονος. Plutarch, Flam., 1, 2.
199 A detail unattested in any other surviving authority, so either derived from a non-extant source or pure fabrication by Plutarch for literary effect.
200 Livy, XXXV, 50, 6 - 51, 10; Appian, Syr., 12 c; Zonaras, 9, 19 c.
201 Athenaeus, 10, 439c, f; Polybius, 20, 8, 1-5; Diodorus, 29, 2, 1; Livy, XXXVI, 11, 1-4; Plutarch, Flam., 16, 1 and Phil., 17, 1; Appian, Syr., 16, b-c; Dio Cass., fr. 62, 1; Justinus, 31, 6, 3; Zonaras, 9, 19, d.
Antiochus enthusiastically and to allow their city to be used as a base of operations in the war against Rome. Following the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae, (probably in April), and his flight from Greece the Chalcidians found themselves in the same sorry predicament as the Aetolians, completely at the mercy of Rome. Portraying Glabrio yet again as vindictive, Plutarch claims that he marched against Chalcis in a rage and that the city was spared only by a second intercession by Flamininus. Subsequently, as a token of their gratitude, the Chalcidians dedicated to him the largest and most beautiful votive offerings in the entire city.²⁰⁴

Now, although the votive offerings, which still survived in Plutarch’s time, along with the establishment of an eponymous priesthood, the Titeia, are irrefutable proof of contact between the Chalcidians and Flamininus, it is difficult to determine the precise context of the actual dedication. Glabrio’s whereabouts, at least, are easy to establish. According to Livy, he arrived in Chalcis shortly after Antiochus had left the city to sail back to Ephesus; Appian says that while the victory over Antiochus was being celebrated in Rome, back in Greece Glabrio was receiving the supplications of the Phoceans, the Chalcidians, and others who had cooperated with Antiochus, and Zonaras says that Glabrio occupied Boeotia and Euboea immediately after Thermopylae. The only evidence that he was accompanied by Flamininus, however, is extremely tenuous. Livy recounts how the Messenians, under siege from the Achaeans, sent a message to Flamininus in Chalcis requesting his intervention. From this Aymard draws the conclusion that, although Glabrio had since left Chalcis to capture Heracleia and subsequently to lay siege to the Aetolians in Naupactus, Flamininus had meanwhile remained in Chalcis. Whatever, although there is no specific mention of his  

²⁰² Concerning Chalcis, one of the “fetters of Greece”, the citizens would have been very much aware of its military importance and commercial potential, which they would have been able far better to exploit under the aegis of a friendly plenipotentiary. This is a far more plausible explanation for what was, in fact, carefully calculated, albeit misguided, support for Antiochus, rather than what Gerevini, referring to the nuptials, calls “l’episodio sentimentale,” ((1952), 100, n. 55), a condescending, yet singularly apposite, description.


²⁰⁴ Plutarch, Flam., 16, 1-2. Plutarch grossly overstates the difficulty Flamininus had in interceding with Glabrio–πλέιστον δ’ ἀγώνα καὶ πόνον –whom he manipulated with relative ease on several occasions.

²⁰⁵ Appian, Syr, 21 a.

²⁰⁶ Zonaras, 9, 19, i.

²⁰⁷ Livy, XXXVI, 31, 5.

²⁰⁸ Aymard, (1938), 342, n. 17. Similarly, Errington, (1969), 123: “The Messenians, however, in the current situation were more willing to admit the importance of Flamininus’ intervention in any Peloponnesian settlement, and accordingly appealed to him while he was at Chalcis.”
presence,” it might be implied from the leniency with which the victorious Romans treated the various Greek cities who had sided with Antiochus. It must be said, however, that Plutarch does not make matters any easier by locating this episode in his text after Flamininus’ intervention with Glabrio on behalf of the besieged Aetolians in Naupactos some four months later, in spite of saying that Glabrio marched against the Chalcidians immediately - εἰς τὸν ᾿Αντίοχον ἔφυγεν - after Antiochus’ flight from Greece. An astute observation by Pelling, however, leaves little doubt that Plutarch has sacrificed his generally reliable chronological framework in favour of literary effect. After all, this gesture by the Chalcidians, especially the institution of the eponymous priesthood, surpasses in terms of personal prestige the votive offerings at Delphi, dedicated by Flamininus himself, rather than by a second party.

3.1.16 Flamininus’ Second Departure from Greece

Since chapter 17 marks the end of Flamininus’ second term of duty in Greece, some sort of résumé, however brief, of his achievements would hardly be out of place. Though far less spectacular than the direct management of the campaign against Antiochus, which had been given to the resurgent Scipionic group, the importance of Flamininus’ activity between early 192 and late 191 should not be underestimated. The incumbent consul, Glabrio was nominally in charge, but it was undoubtedly Flamininus to whom the Romans were primarily indebted. Although his early attempts to check the pro-Syrian policy of the Aetolians were unsuccessful, after Thermopylae he did manage to procure a truce and thereby restore order in Greece, further consolidated by his aggressive confiscation of Zacynthus. Directing his attention to more sensational material, however, Plutarch opens the chapter in recounting how Greeks other than the Chalcidians paid Flamininus befitting honours, and truly sincere honours were these,

209 Much to the bemusement of Briscoe, Comm., XXXIV-XXXVII: “Livy makes no mention of Plutarch’s (Flam. 16) account of Flamininus assuaging Glabrio’s rage against Chalcis, and the gratitude of the Chalcidians to Flamininus. It is hard to think that the episode was not in Polybius, and it is odd that Livy should have chosen to ignore it.”

210 Livy, XXXVI, 20, 2: ceterum per omnes dies haud secus quam in pacato agro sine vexatione uellius rei agmen processit. Similarly, Livy, XXXVI, 21, 3: et ceterae urbes in Eubea sine certamine traditae; post paucosque dies omnibus perpactatis sine uellius noxa urbis exercitus Thermopylas reductus, multo modestia post victoriam quam ipsa victoria laudabilior.

211 Pelling, (1997), 398, n. 169 : “È probabile che Plutarco conoscesse da Polibio (cfr. ως τάξις μετά τήν μάχην και εἶς τὸν ᾿Αντίοχον in parr. 3-4) la cronologia esatta, ma che abbia preferito rimandare l’argomento di Chalcide per usarlo come ultimo nelle serie degli eventi, in modo che le dediche e il peana fornissero una degna conclusione al periodo greco di Flaminino.”
for such was the extraordinary goodwill engendered in others by his equanimity - ἐνόια θομιστή δι' ἐπιείκειαν ἠθούς. To illustrate this contention Plutarch refers to confrontations with Philopoemen and Diophanes, all resolved equably, he claims, albeit without quoting any examples. \(^{212}\)

The use of anecdotes (χρεία), of which there have already been two examples in the Flamininus, \(^{213}\) is a favourite device of Plutarch’s for stimulating his readers’ interest. However, they usually occur sporadically throughout his texts, so it comes as something of a surprise that, leaving the reader with a distinct impression of overkill, Plutarch now recounts no fewer than four in succession, each rounded off with a terse, pointed apophthegm attributed to Flamininus. Apparently, therefore, as a fitting conclusion to a second highly successful term of duty in Greece, Plutarch is seeking to boost his profile even further by portraying him as a witty, congenial companion, in whose company, supposedly, there was never a dull moment. \(^{214}\)

3.1.17 The Arraignment of Lucius Quinctius Flamininus

With the exception of some misgivings about Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία and his resentment over the honours given to Philopoemen after the Achaean campaign against Nabis, thus far Plutarch has portrayed him in a positive light. This theme is continued in the opening section of chapter 18, in which he readily gives full credit to Flamininus on his appointment as censor in acknowledgement of his achievements in Greece. The censorship, he correctly adds, the highest electoral office in Rome, was the culmination of a political career. From this point on, however, throughout the remainder of this chapter and the final three chapters, there is a distinct change in tone to the detriment of Flamininus. He concentrates on two episodes; the removal by Cato Maior of Flamininus’ brother Lucius from the senatorial roll and his involvement in the events surrounding the death of Hannibal. As a result, Flamininus emerges with his image seriously tarnished.

\(^{212}\) Hardly surprising, since Philopoemen and Flamininus were invariably at loggerheads. Moreover, Flamininus was decidedly authoritarian in forcing Diophanes to abandon the siege of Messene. Livy XXXVI, 31, 1-10.

\(^{213}\) Plutarch, Flam., 5, 6 and 12, 7.

\(^{214}\) See Swain, (1988), 343. None of this, however, is in any way consistent with Plutarch’s contention at the very beginning of the Life that Flamininus regarded the rest of suffering humanity as nothing other than building material (ὑλή) in his pursuit of excellence.
The extant source material for the first of these episodes not only contains a number of variants, but is further complicated by some of the authorities overlapping, as one quotes another in order to corroborate or refute a given point. Essentially, however, Lucius Quinctius Flamininus was elected consul in 192, along with Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, for the Gallic campaign against the Ligures and the Boii. Sometime during the following year Lucius was presiding at a banquet and, to satisfy the whim of his paramour, some unfortunate victim was killed, either by Lucius himself or by one of his lictors at Lucius’ command. This provided the material for Cato, a full seven years later upon his appointment as censor in 184, to have Lucius struck off the senatorial roll. Conservative by nature, renowned for his asceticism and ever mindful of ancestral values, Cato zealously prosecuted any Roman official, regardless of status or rank, whose conduct jeopardised the sanctity of the mos/fides maiorum. Moreover, Cato had always made a point of protecting the rights of provincials and this attack was not the first of its kind, with quite possibly the best example being his comprehensive arraignment for immeasurably more murderous atrocities of the pro-consul Q. Minucius Thermus in 190, whereby Cato deprived him of the triumph he was seeking in recognition of his highly successful campaign against the Ligures. Of equal concern to Cato was the encroachment of external influences on the traditional Roman way of life, especially Hellenism, personified primarily in the likes of the Scipios and Titus Quinctius Flamininus, all of which made the latter’s brother Lucius an irresistible target. Furthermore, along with the considerably more serious charge against Lucius, namely, illegal execution and serious abuse of elevated magisterial rank, Cato entertained a grievance against Titus, implicated in this affair through his failure to take any action

---

215 Cicero, Sen., 42; Livy, XXXIX, 42, 5 – 44, 1; Val. Max., 2, 9, 3 & 4, 5, 1; [Vict.], Vir. Ill., 47, 4–5; Plutarch, Cato Maior, 17, 1–7, Flam., 18, 2 – 19, 4; Cato, Orat., frag., XI, 69.
216 For the most comprehensive work on this topic, see Carawan, 85, No. 4 (Apr.–May, 1990), 316–329.
217 Livy, XXXV, 20, 7 and 22, 3.
218 Livy, XXXIX, 42, 5; Val. Max., 2, 9, 3; Plutarch, Cato Maior, 17, 1 & Flam., 19, 1.
219 Cicero, Sen., 42; Val. Max., 2, 9, 3. See Astin, (1978), 90: "Flamininus’ action was a flagrant misuse of power, with no pretence at formal procedure and very probably in direct and inexcusable breach of fides." Also, Carawan, (1990), 322: “The most serious charge, after all, was illegal execution, the unlawful exercise of the most revered magisterial power.”
220 When he governed Sardinia as praetor in 198, for example: Nepos, Cato, 1, 4; Livy, XXXII, 27, 3–4; Plutarch, Cato Maior, 6, 2–4.
221 Livy, XXXVII, 46, 1–2; Gellius, 10, 3, 17; Cato, Orat. frag., VI, 58. See also, Scullard, (1970), 210–211: “Cato charged him with a wide range of crimes: exaggerating the casualties he had inflicted on the enemy; scourging ten officials of an allied community; killing ten others and ‘cutting them up like bacon’; unnatural vice; and valuing neither ‘fides neque iusiurandum neque pudicitiam.’”
222 Lucius Scipio Asiaticus, struck off the equestrian register, was another one of Cato’s victims. Livy, XXXIX, 44, 1. Plutarch, Cato, 18, 1.
against his brother during his own tenure of the censorship (199-194).\textsuperscript{223} In fact, according to Plutarch, when challenged Titus denied all knowledge of the ill-fated banquet.\textsuperscript{224} This in itself is highly implausible, given that the personal relationship between the two brothers was particularly close,\textsuperscript{225} which in turns gives the distinct impression, initially at least, that Cato’s notion that Titus would even so much as think about punishing his brother was not a little naïve. On the contrary. Political considerations aside, morally speaking Cato’s sincerity is irrefutable: he had seized the high moral ground and goes on to reinforce his point with the blunt implication that even close family ties should be considered subordinate to the integrity of the republic. In any case, it is clear from a passage of Livy’s that Lucius was in a helpless predicament:

\begin{quote}
Catonis et aliae quidem acerbae orationes extant in eos, quos aut senatorio loco movit aut quibus equos ademit, longe grauissima in L. Quinctium oratio, qua si accusator ante notam, non censor post notam usus esset, retinere L. Quinctium in senatu ne frater quidem T. Quinctius, si tum censor esset, potuisset.\textsuperscript{226}
\end{quote}

Indeed, there remain some strident harangues of Cato’s against those whom he removed from their position in the senate or from the equestrian register. By far the most damaging is that against L. Quinctius. If Cato had delivered this even in the capacity of a regular plaintiff before Lucius had been marked down for expulsion, let alone as censor after putting the mark against Lucius’ name, not even his brother T. Quinctius, even if he himself had been censor at the time, would have been able to keep him on the senatorial roll.

Carawan’s hypothesis that Cato’s selection of his own colleague L. Valerius Flaccus as princeps senatus\textsuperscript{227} instead of Flamininus, due to the latter’s failure to take any action against his brother, was meant as a personal insult which incited Titus to challenge Cato before the people,\textsuperscript{228} requires closer examination. Plutarch is the only extant authority who mentions both Flaccus’ appointment and the challenge to Cato by either one or both of the brothers Flaminini, and, on both occasions, he clearly links the challenge

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{223} Cicero, \textit{Sen.}, 42: Hic [sc. Lucius] Tito fratre suo censore, qui proximus ante me fuerat, elapsus est; mihi vero et Flacco neutiquam probari potuit tam flagitiosa et tam perdita libido, quae cum probro privato coniungeret imperi dedecus.
\textsuperscript{224} This contention is unique to Plutarch, \textit{Flam.}, 19, 4.
\textsuperscript{225} Livy, XL, 8, 15 and 12, 17.
\textsuperscript{226} Livy, XXXIX, 42, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{227} Plutarch, Cato, 17, 1.
\textsuperscript{228} Carawan, (1990), 328.
\end{footnotes}
directly to Lucius’ expulsion, not to Flaccus’ appointment.\textsuperscript{229} Besides, there is ample evidence to suggest that Cato’s selection of Flaccus might well have been influenced by personal favouritism rather than antagonism, or a combination of both. Before their joint censorship, Cato and Flaccus went back a long way. It was under Flaccus’ patronage that Cato had initially gone to Rome, where he soon made his mark as an orator. His tenure of the quaestorship for 204 was the start of his political career. He was aedile in 199, praetor in 198 and, together with Flaccus, consul in 195. In 191 both men served the republic together yet again, this time in a military capacity in Greece, either as \textit{legati}\textsuperscript{230} or as \textit{tribuni militum},\textsuperscript{231} under the consul Acilius Glabrio in the war against Antiochus. Therefore, although antagonism, of whatever sort, cannot be definitively excluded, this protracted, amicable relationship with his colleague should at least be considered as reason enough for Cato to select Flaccus, rather than Titus Flamininus, as \textit{princeps senatus}.

Plutarch’s account of Titus’ reaction to Cato’s attack against Lucius should be treated with extreme suspicion, since he is unique among the extant authorities in claiming that Flamininus formed alliances with Cato’s (unspecified) political enemies and eventually succeeded in revoking the greater part of his administration. Moreover, having made this otherwise unattested statement,\textsuperscript{232} Plutarch vacillates, choosing to ignore the highly charged nature of the politics and the intensity of the personal hostility at issue, the true motivation behind Titus’ retaliation. In fact, as will be demonstrated presently, the hatred felt for Cato was widespread, requiring no specific orchestration, as Plutarch himself was well aware.\textsuperscript{233} For the same reason, Plutarch’s description, also unattested elsewhere, of the two brothers abasing themselves before the people “in a suppliant manner and bathed in tears”\textsuperscript{234} as they requested that Cato provide an explanation for the action he had taken against Lucius, should also be treated with caution. Titus was hardly inclined to kowtow to anyone, let alone a political

\textsuperscript{229} Plutarch, \textit{Cato}, 17, 5 and \textit{Flam.}, 19, 1.

\textsuperscript{230} Livy, XXXVI, 17, 1.

\textsuperscript{231} [Vitc.], \textit{Vir. Ill.}, 47, 3.

\textsuperscript{232} Carawan, (1990), 327-328

\textsuperscript{233} Plutarch, \textit{Cato Maior}, 18, 1: Ἡνεγκε δὲ τινὰ τῷ Κάτωνι καὶ Λεόκιος ὁ Σκιπιώνος ἀδελφὸς ἐπισφόνοιν αὕτην, θριαμβικὸς ἀνθρωποῖς ἑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἑπον ἔδειξε γὰρ ὅν έρημβήκον, Ἀφρικανῷ Σκιπιώνι τενηκότι τούτῳ ποίησε. τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἤνιασε μάλιστα τῇ περικοπῇ τῆς πολυτελείας.

\textsuperscript{234} Plutarch, \textit{Cato Maior}, 18, 1: In equitatu recognoscendo L. Scipioni Asiatico ademptus equus. In censibus quoque accipiendidis tristis et aspera in omnes ordines censura fuit.

\textsuperscript{234} Plutarch, \textit{Flam.}, 19, 2: ταπεινοί καὶ δεδακρυμένοι.
enemy of Cato’s ilk, and so any approach to the people would have been made with a strong sense of outrage rather than in supplication.

The next point is the feasibility of Plutarch’s moralistic perspective as displayed in the composition of this episode. Using key words and phrases, he begins by describing how Titus “came into hostile relations” - ἐς ἐχθραν ᾿Ηλ.θε - with Cato due to “the following unfortunate incident” - συμφορητικῷ ἀγαθῳ. The next notion is the τιμία resulting from the events in Gaul, which gifted Cato the opportunity of successfully prosecuting Lucius and for which Titus (supposedly) shared some of the blame - συντιμούσας δὲ τοῦ ἀδέλφου δοκούντος αὐτῷ. This notion occurs twice more in the very next section, as the two brothers request of their fellow citizens that Cato should state the reasons which had led him to inflict so great a disgrace upon a noble house - οἶκον ἑνδοξον τιμίας τοσαύτη περιβελήκεν. However, Lucius is unable to rebut Cato’s accusations, in itself clear proof that his dishonour was fully merited - δικαίως γεγόνα τὴν τιμίαν. This συμφορά, claims Plutarch, affected Titus so deeply that, as described in the previous paragraph, he led a counter-attack against Cato; his motive, expressed in intensified language, “irremediable hatred” - ἀνηκεστος ἐχθρα. Titus, accordingly, has his revenge. Moreover, according to Plutarch, there is also redemption for Lucius. Concluding this episode, again with material unattested other than in his Life of Cato, Plutarch recounts how Lucius, sitting “bereft of honour and dignity” - τιμῶς καὶ ταπεινῶς - somewhere in the back seats of the theatre, was exhorted by the multitude to change his place for one amongst those of consular rank. Plutarch’s implication is perfectly clear; as Lucius rejoins his peers his honour is restored.

Thus, Plutarch builds his case on no fewer than three pieces of evidence unattested elsewhere, (although, it must be said, other than for Livy and Plutarch himself, evidence for this particular episode is frustratingly skimpy). Even accepting the integrity of his evidence, however, it is clearly open to a markedly different interpretation. Just one example will suffice, namely, Lucius’ regaining his customary place in the theatre among his peers of consular rank. The original exhortation, says Plutarch, came from the ordinary people - δῆμος - and the multitude/commons - πλῆθος, an exhortation to which those of consular rank - ὑπατικοί - readily responded. Livy and Plutarch provide clear evidence that bitter resentment towards Cato’s censorial legislation was universal.

235 Plutarch, Flam., 18, 3.
236 Plutarch, Flam., 19, 1.
237 This incident is recorded only by Plutarch, and inconsistently so, since in the Cato Maior, 17, 5, he claims that it was Titus alone who made such an appeal, albeit βαρέως φέρον, very much more in line with his character than ταπεινῶς καὶ δέδακρυμένος.
238 Cicero, Sen., 42; Val. Max., 2, 9, 3 and 4, 5, 1; [Vict.], Vir. Ill., 47, 4-5.
encompassing all classes of society. In this episode these elements combine spontaneously, with the upper classes following the lead provided by the commons, and in so doing cock a snook at Cato. Nor would it be over fanciful to imagine the jeers and catcalls about Cato freely intermingled with the cheers of support and encouragement for Lucius. So, however much Plutarch’s chooses to moralise, the restoration of honour, gratifying though it must have been for Lucius, is not the only point at issue here. By the same token, the murder of some remote, non-descript provincial some eight years earlier, however despicable in itself, would have been of little or no concern whatsoever to the vast majority of the Roman populace, regardless of class.239

Finally, since Plutarch was clearly familiar with Cicero’s text, (with which he contrasts Livy’s version concerning the precise identification of Lucius’ victim - a condemned prisoner or a Gallic deserter, and the precise identification of the executioner - Lucius himself or one of his lictors at Lucius’ command), it must be considered why, in claiming that Titus Flamininus was dishonoured by association with his brother, Plutarch fails to corroborate this point by referring to Cato’s statement that his decision to prosecute Lucius was to rectify Titus’ failure to have done so. Apparently, a missed opportunity, since, as matters stand in Plutarch’s text, Titus’ only connection with this unfortunate affair is due to an accident of birth, for which he can hardly be held personally accountable.

3.1.18 Flamininus and the Events surrounding the Death of Hannibal

Significant events in the lives of individuals who achieve legendary status invariably excite widespread curiosity, and this is equally true of their deaths. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the extant accounts of the death of Hannibal are not only numerous but cover a broad literary spectrum. In spite of this abundance of material, however, the mystique and the sensational nature of this episode, along with the conflicting nature of the surviving authorities, make it impossible definitively to

239 See Gerevini, (1952), 102, n. 65: “Il rilievo morale fatto da Plutarco sull’odio di Flaminino verso Catone, anche se giusto in se stesso, non illumina in sufficienza i motivi profondi dell’ostilità tra i due personaggi. Dietro le ragioni puramente personali, si agitava il contrasto tra due correnti dell’oligarchia romana rappresentate da Scipione Africano e da M. Porcio Catone.” For all intents and purposes, Grevini might just as well have linked Flamininus’ name with that of Scipio.
reconstruct what really occurred. In fact, even how Hannibal actually died remains uncertain.

For reasons which will be considered presently, Plutarch chooses to conclude the *Life of Flamininus* with this particular event in what is the longest and most detailed extant account. He maintains that Flamininus was personally responsible for the death of Hannibal, although this was much debated even in antiquity. Before attempting to draw any valid conclusion, therefore, Plutarch’s account must be carefully considered in the light of the other surviving ancient authorities. For this a tentative reconstruction of the events is required, with prime consideration given to the following topics: the Roman embassy to Prusias I of Bithynia (probably in late 183); the interaction between Prusias and the Romans; prejudicial hostility towards Flamininus in Appian and, especially, Plutarch; and the death of Hannibal, who had been received as a guest by Prusias.

**The Composition and Purpose of the Roman Embassy**

Chronologically the oldest source is Nepos, who recounts how it just so happened (*accidit casu*) that certain ambassadors from Prusias were dining at the house of Flamininus. When, during the course of the conversation, Hannibal was mentioned, one of the ambassadors said that he was in the king’s realm. The next day Flamininus informed the senate, who, thinking that they would never be free of Hannibal’s insidious plots as long as he was alive, sent ambassadors to Bithynia, Flamininus among them, to demand his surrender.

According to Livy, Flamininus was sent as an ambassador to Prusias, who was held in suspicion by Rome because he was sheltering

---

240 R. Pfeilschifter, (2005), 379: “So breit Hannibals Ende überliefert ist, so schwierig ist die Quellenlage.”

241 For examples of the generally accepted view, see, 1) Benecke, (1930), 282: “Flamininus himself was sent to demand the surrender of Hannibal, the king of Bithynia did not dare to refuse, and Hannibal took his own life.” 2) Charles-Picard, (1967) 227, who iterates in some detail what is basically Livy’s version, then adds arbitrarily that Hannibal secreted the poison with which he killed himself under the bezel of his ring, a detail otherwise only to be found in Aurelius Victor, ([*Vict.*], *Vir. Ill.*, XLII, 6) and Juvenal (X, 159-167), who simply mentions a ring, leaving the rest to his readers’ imagination. 3) Lazenby, (1978), 298, n. 14: “Hannibal committed suicide, probably in 183, at the court of King Prusias of Bithynia, whither he had fled after the defeat of Antiochus, rather than be handed over to Rome (Livy, 39, 51).”

Hannibal after the flight of Antiochus and had started a war with Eumenes. Appian says that when Flamininus was on a mission to Prusias about “other matters” (otherwise unspecified), he diverted his attention to Hannibal. Pausanias also mentions Flamininus specifically, saying that he was anxious to capture Hannibal alive, as does the Suda. Eutropius and Hieronymus both say that Flamininus demanded the surrender of Hannibal, with Hieronymus adding that Flamininus did so on behalf of the Senate. Ampelius says it was the ambassadors who demanded Hannibal’s surrender, as do Zonaras and Aurelius Victor, and Orosius simply says that he was demanded “by the Romans.”

At first sight, therefore, except for Appian, the sources agree that the specific purpose of the embassy was to demand the surrender of Hannibal from Prusias. However, quoting Justinus, (who, incidentally, makes no mention whatsoever of Flamininus), Gruen provides convincing evidence that, although Hannibal’s presence at the court of Prusias might well have been a contributory factor, the primary objective of the embassy was the arrangement of a peace settlement between Prusias and Eumenes. The embassy, in fact, was the Romans’ response to complaints from Eumenes, represented by his brother Athenaeus, about Philip’s refusal to withdraw garrisons from certain cities he had occupied in Thrace and about the military aid he had sent to Prusias. Although a reconciliation was eventually reached between the

---

243 Livy, XXXIX, 51, 1.
244 Appian, Syr., II, 11.
245 Pausanias, 8,10, 11.
246 A, 2452, in the Adler numeration.
247 Eutrop., 4, 5, 2.
248 Hieronymus, Chronicle, Olympiad 148, 3 : cum ab Antiocho per legatos Hannibal reposceretur, cuí se a Scipione victus sociaverat, ad Prusiam regem Bithyniae transfugit; quem cum rursus per Flaminium (sic) etiam ab eo Senatus repeteret, et tradendus esset, venenum bibit, et apud Libyssan Bithyniae sepultus est.
249 Ampel., Lib. Mem., 34, 2.
250 Zonaras, 9, 21.
251 [Vic.] Vi.Ill., 42, 6.
252 Orosius, 4, 29, 29.
253 Gruen, (1984), 112. See also, Habicht, 84.1 (1956), 96-97.
254 Justinus, 32, 8, 12: --- missi a senatu legati sunt, qui utrumque regem in pacem cogerent Hannibalemque doposcerent. This was not the first time Prusias had come under scrutiny from Rome. In 190 the consul, L. Cornelius Scipio, sent Prusias a letter, followed by a second letter from Scipio Africanus, advising him against forming an alliance with Antiochus. Prusias’ compliance was eventually secured by C. Livius, the recent commander of the fleet, who was then sent as ambassador to Bithynia. Polybius, 21, 11, 1-13; Livy, XXXVII, 25, 4-14; Appian, Syr., 5, 23b.
255 Polybius, 23, 1, 4; Livy, XXXIX, 6, 9. Justinus, (32, 4, 2), says that it was Prusias who had started the war. Nepos, however, (23, 10, 2), is non-committal on this point – dissidebat ab eo [sc. Prusia] Pergamenus rex Eumenes – yet clearly states that Hannibal was closely involved in every aspect of the war.
two kings, there is no evidence to suggest that this was as a result of Roman intervention, so apparently, other than keeping Prusias in line and reassuring Eumenes of enduring Roman support, the embassy proved to be of no political moment. In fact, apart from Justinus, the only other authority who mentions the conflict between the two kings is Livy, albeit without elaboration. It would seem, therefore, that the very survival of this material is due primarily to the previously mentioned sensationalism and mystique surrounding the death of the legendary Hannibal.

**Prusias and the Romans**

It is at this point that notable divergences occur. Nepos says that, unwilling to abuse the rules of hospitality, Prusias was reluctant to hand Hannibal over and left it to the Romans to take him prisoner, if they could, (si possent, comprehenderent). Hannibal had taken the precaution of constructing outlets on every side of his house, but as soon as he learned that these were all covered by the Romans, he saw no way of preserving his life. Unwilling to have his fate determined by someone else, he took poison, which he had always been accustomed to carry with him. Nepos does not name Flamininus specifically as a member of the detachment deployed to capture Hannibal.

Livy makes a studied effort to shift the responsibility for Hannibal’s death onto Prusias, who, in sharp contrast to Nepos’ account, has no scruples whatsoever about violating the laws of hospitality. Either reacting to Flamininus’ complaint about his giving shelter to Hannibal, or wishing to ingratiate himself, Prusias, claims Livy, took the matter into his own hands. He decided either to put Hannibal to death or to hand him over to Flamininus, and immediately sent his own soldiers to surround Hannibal’s house. Next, concerning Hannibal’s distraught state of mind, Livy makes much of his distrust of kings in general and of Prusias in particular - Prusiae uero leuitatem etiam expertus erat - albeit without any specific example. In view of this, Hannibal had constructed seven exits from his house, some of them concealed, so that they might not be blocked by the guards. Even so, the guards surrounded the house so closely that no one could escape. Already terrified by the news of Flamininus’ arrival, and with his suspicions of Prusias’ fickleness confirmed, Hannibal called for poison, which he had long been keeping at hand for such an eventuality. In a closing soliloquy Hannibal proclaims that the manner of his death will provide no enviable victory for Flamininus, and censures the change in the mores of the Romans, who were now sending a man of

---

256 Polybius, 22, 20, 8; Strabo, 12, 4, 3.  
257 Flamininus was also due to visit Seleucus IV, the successor of Antiochus, who had died in mid-187. Polybius, 23, 5, 1. Nothing else is known about this mission, or even if it ever took place.  
258 Livy, XXXIX, 51, 3-12
consular rank to persuade Prusias to murder his guest, whereas their forefathers had
warned their arch enemy Pyrrhus of an attempt on his life by poisoning.\(^{259}\) Finally,
cursing Prusias and his realm and appealing to the gods who guard the rights of
hospitality to punish his broken faith, he drained the cup. Thus Prusias is clearly
portrayed as the main culprit; in fact, Flamininus is mentioned no more than three
times throughout the entire chapter.\(^{260}\)

**Hostility towards Flamininus in Appian**

Appian’s prime objective is roundly to discredit Flamininus by contrasting the manner
in which he and Scipio Africanus behaved towards Hannibal:

\[\text{Σκιπίωνα μὲν ὁ Ἀννίβας ἐπὶ ἕξειν ἐκάλει, Σκιπίων δὲ ἐλθεῖν ἄν ἐφὶ μάλα προθήμος. Ἐὶ μὴ συνήθηα νῦν Ἀντιόχου πρὸς Ῥωμαίων ἱπόπτως ἔχοντι, ὅδε μὲν ἐκεῖνοι, τῆς στρατηγίας ἄξιοῖς, τὴν ἐχθραν ὁρίζοντο τοῖς πολέμοις. Φλαμινίνος δ' ἀνομίως. ἤτηθέντος γὰρ ὑστερον Ἀντιόχου φεύγοντα τὸν Ἀννίβαν καὶ ἀλόμενον περὶ Βιθυνίαν, πρεσβεύον ἐφ' ἔτερα πρὸς Προυσίαν, οὕτε τι πρὸς τὸ Ἀννίβου προπαθόν, οὕτε Ῥωμαίων ἐντελιμένον, οὕτε φοβερὸν ἐτὶ ἀυτοῖς γενέσθαι δυνάμενον Καρχηδόνος κατεστραμμένης, ἔκτεινε διὰ τοῦ Προυσίου φαρμάκῳ.}\(^{261}\)

--- Hannibal invited Scipio to be his guest and Scipio replied that this would give
him the greatest pleasure but for the fact that Hannibal was collaborating with
Antiochus, who was held in suspicion by the Romans. Thus did they, in a manner
worthy of great commanders, make a distinction between personal enmity and
the business of warfare. Not so Flamininus, for he, at a later period when Hannibal
had fled after the defeat of Antiochus and was wandering around Bithynia, while
acting as an ambassador to Prusias on some other business, had Prusias put
Hannibal to death by poison, in spite of the fact that he had no personal grievance
against Hannibal, had no instructions from the Roman authorities, and that, with
Carthage in complete subjugation, Hannibal could not re-emerge as an object of
fear to the Romans.

This should be treated with extreme caution, however, since, of the accounts examined
thus far, it is the only one which provides no information about the objectives of
the Roman embassy. Moreover, the reason for substituting such information with the
pointedly vague expression ἐφ' ἔτερα is twofold: Appian not only amplifies Flamininus’


\(^{260}\) In a later passage, Livy unequivocally states, - exsul Hannibal, proditus ab hospite -- expiravit. *XXXIX*, 52, 8.

\(^{261}\) Appian, *Syr.*, 2, 11.
alleged wanton spite, he also avoids the difficulty of having to justify his contention that Flamininus was dead set on a course of action which is in direct contrast, with the sole exception of Plutarch, to all the other remaining sources.

**Plutarch’s Version**

Plutarch is equally, or even, more hostile. Recounting a second negative episode, immediately following his attempt throughout chapter 19 to tarnish Flamininus by association with his brother’s crime, in chapter 20 he directs his attention to his alleged involvement in the death of Hannibal. Even without a direct reference to Livy, it would be easy to identify him as Plutarch’s source material here, if only on account of the close similarity between the structure and the contents of their respective versions. However, in sharp contrast to Livy’s attempt to deflect any culpability from the Romans onto Prusias, Plutarch roundly condemns Flamininus and holds him personally responsible for Hannibal’s demise:

Now, the natural ambition of Titus, as long as it had sufficient material to gratify it in the wars mentioned previously, was commendable. Indeed, he served a second time as military tribune after his consulship, even though he was under no compulsion to do so. However, after he had ceased to hold office and was advanced in years, he was treated with contempt because, having nothing with which to occupy himself throughout the portion of life which still remained to him, he was unable to restrain his passion for glory and his youthful ardour. For it was due to some such impulse, it would seem, that he acted as he did in the case of Hannibal, whereby he incurred widespread unpopularity.

The contrasts are manifold in this highly charged rhetorical passage. Flamininus’ φιλότιμῳ, when purposefully motivated, is construed as positive, even commendable - εὐδοκίμει - given that he was (allegedly) under no compulsion -

---


263 Especially the precise numeration of the seven escape tunnels and Hannibal’s closing soliloquy.

264 Plutarch, Flam., 20, 1-3.
οὐδένος ἐπείγοντος - to serve a second term of duty as military tribune after his consulship. The latter part of this quotation, however, is designed specifically to condemn idle and gratuitous φιλοτιμία, a decidedly negative quality and, this time, therefore, worthy of contempt - ἡλέγχετο - with the clear implication that Flamininus, already (allegedly) an aging individual - πρεσβύτερος - is doing himself no favours in behaving like a juvenile - νεώτερος - especially when holding no public office. Such, according to Plutarch, is the motivation behind Flamininus’ vainglorious treatment of Hannibal, now old, weak and no longer a threat to anyone.

Following this piece of amateur psychoanalysis, Plutarch continues:

1) After the defeat of Antiochus, Hannibal seeks refuge with King Prusias I of Bithynia.
2) All the Romans were aware of this.
3) Flamininus, sent by the senate as ambassador to Bithynia “on some completely different business,” is incensed at the very sight of Hannibal, alive and well at

265 Livy, XXXV, 23, 5: Itaque senatus, etsi praetorem Atilium cum classe miserat in Graeciam, tamen, quia non copiis modo sed etiam auctoritate opus erat ad tenendos sociorum animos, T. Quinctium et Cn. Octavi et Cn. Servilius et P. Vellium legatos in Graeciam misit. Livy makes it abundantly clear that this commission was of vital importance, in which case Flamininus, fully aware of the emergent combined threat from Antiochus and the Aetolians, would have required no persuasion whatsoever to accept it. Therefore, Plutarch’s phraseology - οὐδένος ἐπείγοντος - is hardly appropriate.


267 See Pelling, (1997), 314: “Un tempo il pubblico Greco lo acclamava; adesso gli spettatori romani sono colpiti e indignati dalla persecuzione di Annibale. Prima, la φιλοτιμία di Flaminino portava grandi doni a un grande popolo, i Greci, e, di riflesso, credito a lui; ora uccide un grande personaggio, Annibale, e disonora lo stesso.”

268 Plutarch, Flam., 20, 1. Hannibal died in 183, at which time Flamininus was only forty-five, so Plutarch’s choice of vocabulary is, to say the least, far-fetched. Libyssa, near Nikomedia, the ancient capital of Bithynia, is more than a thousand miles from Rome, even as the crow flies, hardly a journey for an implicitly aged, infirm individual. Moreover, Polybius (23, 5, 1) says that, after settling matters with Prusias, the embassy was bound for the court of Seleucus in Syria, in spite of which Flamininus still found time to make a diversion to Achaea in a frustrated attempt to negotiate a settlement with Philopoemen concerning Messene. Polybius, 23, 5, 13-18. Carawan, (1988), 241: “The downfall of elder statesmen through youthful ambition is a familiar theme, but it is irrelevant in this instance - in the year of Hannibal’s death, Flamininus would have been no more than forty-five by Polybius’ reckoning.”

269 Bremer, (2005), 259: “He [Plutarch] stresses the strength of Flamininus’ ambition but does not blame for it at all: as long as his activities were concerned with, first, warfare in Greece and then pacification of Greece, everybody kept admiring him. Flamininus showed the evil side of his ambition only at the end of his life, when he hounded the old Hannibal to his death.”

270 δι’ ἐτέρας δὴ τινας πράξεις.
Prusias' court. In spite of the king's protestations that Hannibal is both a suppliant and a familiar friend, Flamininus supposedly demands his death. (Plutarch's language is decidedly non-committal here, and will be examined presently).

4) Distrusting Prusias and fearing the Romans, Hannibal takes refuge in his private quarters, which he had had the foresight to equip with no fewer than seven secret escape tunnels.

5) Finding all exits blocked by the king's guards, Hannibal, uttering a soliloquy virtually identical with that in Livy's text, commits suicide.²⁷¹

On the matter of Flamininus' personal responsibility for the death of Hannibal, Plutarch is clearly guilty of obfuscation, as can be seen from the following passage:

\[ \text{καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἰδὼν αὐτὸθε διαιτῶμενον, ἡγανάκτησεν [sc. ὁ Φλαμινίνος] ἑξ ζῆ [sc. ὁ Ἀννίβας], καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ Προυσίου δεομένου καὶ λιπαροῦντος ὑπὲρ ἄνδρος ἰκέτου καὶ συνήθους, οὗ παρῆκε.²⁷²} \]

--- and seeing that Hannibal was staying there, was incensed at his still being alive, and although Prusias begged and beseeched on behalf of someone who was both a suppliant and a close friend, he continued to express his anger.

Two points here. First, given that the majority of the extant sources, Plutarch included,²⁷³ state that it was a well-known fact that Hannibal was residing with Prusias, Flamininus' reaction, as described by Plutarch, is disproportionate. Supposedly, Plutarch is trying to convey the notion that it was the stark, visual confirmation of what Flamininus already knew that prompted his outburst against Prusias, yet Plutarch is unique in claiming that Flamininus actually saw Hannibal. The authenticity of this episode, therefore, is suspicious. Next, in claiming that Flamininus continued to express his anger over the fact that Hannibal was still alive, (despite Prusias’ humane protestations - all very different from Livy’s version), Plutarch leaves the reader in no doubt that Flamininus wanted him dead. However, momentarily at least, Plutarch avoids making any clear statement, in direct contradiction of all the other surviving sources, with just the exception of Appian, that Flamininus actually gave the order to have Hannibal killed. This soon changes, however, as Plutarch describes Hannibal’s reaction to Flamininus' protestations:

²⁷² Plutarch, *Flam.*, 20, 3.
Accordingly, when he then heard what Titus’ orders were, he hastened to make his escape through the underground passages, but when he encountered the king’s guards he decided to take his own life.

Now, exactly which πρόσταγμα is Plutarch referring to, given that none appears anywhere in his text? So, an apparently spurious implication that Flamininus insisted on Hannibal’s death has suddenly metamorphosed into a direct order!

Plutarch’s hostility towards Flamininus is sustained for the greater part of the concluding chapter 21, the purpose of which is to contrast the magnanimity of Scipio Africanus with the alleged pusillanimity of Flamininus in their respective dealings with Hannibal.275 Following directly on from the spurious association of Flamininus with the murder committed by his brother, this section is designed to produce a cumulatively detrimental effect. Plutarch is openly explicit this time, roundly condemning Flamininus in language best described as nauseatingly melodramatic. Seeking to reinforce his argument, he resorts to iterating phraseology from the previous chapter, claiming οὐκ ὀλίγοις ἐπαχθής ἐδόξεν ὁ Τίτος on account of having killed Hannibal - τῶν Ἀννίβαν ὑποκείνας - (a claim unattested elsewhere), even though he was under no compulsion to do so - οὐδὲνος ἐπείγοντος.276 Next, in stating that Flamininus was motivated by desire for glory (διὰ δόξαν), since he would be associated (ἐπώνυμος) with Hannibal’s death, Plutarch portrays him as a singularly pathetic figure. Piling on the agony, he now contrasts the ensuing resentment felt for Flamininus with the admiration enjoyed by Scipio due to the clemency with which the latter had treated Hannibal on the eve of the battle of Zama Regia.277 Plutarch reinforces this point with the sort of anecdotal evidence of which he is so fond, illustrating, in spite of all other

274 Plutarch, Flam., 20, 8.

275 At the expense of the historicity: “[--] la visione moralistica, sottolineata dal confronto tra la magnanimità di Scipione e l’ingenerosità di Flaminino, è andata a detrimento della verità storica.” Gerevini, (1952), 103, n. 66.

276 Plutarch, Flam., 21, 1. The expression οὐδὲνος ἐπείγοντος is particularly pointed here. In the previous chapter this is commendable, since the result of Flamininus’ decision is positive, in sharp contrast to the present instance. However, as in the previous chapter, it is hardly applicable, since all the extant authorities, Plutarch, included, (Flam., 20, 9) state that Flamininus, with no explicit ruling to ensure the execution, or even the capture of Hannibal, had received this commission from the senate.

277 Livy, XXX, 29-31.
differences, the deep, mutual respect that had developed between these two great
generals. However, he is not finished yet:

\[
tαυτά δή τού Σκιπίωνος οί πολλοί θαυμάζοντες, ἐκάκιζον τὸν Τίτον,

\]·

ώς ἄλλοτριον νεκρῷ προσενεγκόμεν τάς χείρας.  

Most people who admired such conduct by Scipio reproached Titus for having laid
violent hands on one [sc. Hannibal] who had been brought down by someone else
[sc. Scipio].

Plutarch might well be speaking metaphorically, but subliminally the reader envisages
Flamininus physically assaulting a senile, defenceless Hannibal, an event of which, just
like the fanciful sighting of Hannibal by Flamininus, there is no mention elsewhere.

Next, clearly unsure of his ground, and adding yet more confusion to what is rapidly
becoming a seriously disjointed narrative, Plutarch vacillates in conceding that there
were those who, in consideration of the trauma inflicted on Rome by Hannibal, along
with his subsequent collusion with Antiochus, thought that Flamininus’ actions were
praiseworthy.

This episode then concludes with the statement:

---

Scipio at the expense of the primary antagonist, see *Life of Fabius*, 25-26.


281 See Gerevin, (1952), 103, n. 69: “È curioso come Plutarco, dopo aver presentato la tesi della responsabilità
personale di Flaminino nella morte di Annibale, illustri i molto più convincenti argomenti che confortano la
tesi contraria. Annibale non era poi un rellitto della sorte, se aveva anco-
ra potuto incutere timore ai Romani come consigliere di Antioco e poi di Prusia; essi non potevano mancare di liberarsi alla prima occasione di
questo pertinace nemico. Ma alla visione moralistica di Plutarco e al suo amore del contrasto dramatico meglio
conveniva raffigurare Annibale nelle vesti dell’eroe magnanimo, vinto solo dal tradimento e dalla meschinità
attru: e così la figura di Flaminino ne usciva ingiustamente abbassata.”

282 One might be reminded that for centuries after Hannibal’s death, whenever the Roman state was in danger,
or even when Roman matrons wished to control recalcitrant children, the cry would go up, “Hannibal ad
portas!” Cf. Cicero, *De Fin.*, 4, 9, 22. Also, Cicero, *Phil.*, 1, 11, albeit with extreme sarcasm, since Antony had
forced Cicero to attend a meeting of the senate which he considered to be of no importance.

283 For a well argued, plausible hypothesis concerning Plutarch’s vacillation, see Nikoliadis in De Pourcq-
Roskam, (2012), 38-39: “On this matter Plutarch is rather ambivalent. True, he does mention that to some
senators (οίκα δίλαγοις) Titus appeared to have been odious, officious and cruel, and the subsequent
comparison with Scipio Africanus (who had treated his defeated foe with outstanding magnanimity, 21,2-6) is
at the expense of Titus. Yet, Plutarch also mentions - *in extenso* at that - the opposite view, according to which
Titus’ initiative was an act of political forethought and prudence (cf. *Flam.* 21,7-14). And if the statement
καὶ τά ὑστερά ποιο ἐτi μᾶλλον ἐμφάνισε τῷ Τίτῳ (21,10-13) belongs, as I am inclined to believe, to
Plutarch rather than to his source, we might conclude that his disapproval of Flamininus’ unseasonable
*philotimia* does not necessarily involve disapproval of the latter’s decision that Hannibal had to be dispatched".
--- φασίν ἔνιοι Τίτον οὐκ ὧφ’ ἐαυτοῦ ταῦτα πράξαι, πεμφθήναι δὲ προσβευτῆνε μετὰ Λευκίου Σκιπίωνος, οὐδὲν ἄλλο τῆς προσβείας ἐργον ἢ τὸν Ἀννίβου θάνατον.283

--- there are those who say that Titus did not do these things on his own initiative, but that he was sent as an ambassador with Lucius Scipio and that the exclusive objective of the embassy was the death of Hannibal

The only other authority who mentions a Scipionic presence, albeit without specifying what Plutarch alone claims to be the embassy’s exclusive objective, is Valerius Antias,284 quoted by Livy. If Plutarch had had access to some non-extant source which actually supported his contention, he would certainly have referred to it. Therefore, in spite of his decidedly vague phraseology - φασίν ἔνιοι - which makes it impossible definitely to pin down Antias, it is from Livy that Plutarch has in all probability acquired this material. Nevertheless, whatever the source, Plutarch’s statement concerning the objective of the embassy is a clear case of blatant self-contradiction, in view of his earlier statement, equally vague, that Flamininus had been sent as ambassador to Prusias “on some other business.”285 Plutarch cannot have it both ways. It would appear, therefore, that this is pure fabrication, especially when both Pausanias and the Suda state that Flamininus was anxious to capture Hannibal alive. Moreover, Flamininus, ever the showman, would surely have relished the opportunity of parading Hannibal as a trophy before the populace in Rome.286 Whatever, despite this second devious attempt to inculpate Flamininus without any supporting evidence, even Plutarch baulks at claiming that he was either directly or even partially responsible for the alleged directive of the embassy, i.e., to have Hannibal killed. This is strongly reminiscent of the

283 Plutarch, Flam., 21, 8.

284 On the validity of Antias’ statement, see Gruen, (1984), 226, n. 111: “Two dubious tales about L. Scipio Asiaticus after the war with Antiochus should be noted but carry little weight.” In the first, Antias claims that Asiaticus served as a mediator between Eumenes and Antiochus in 187/6. However, not only does Livy (XXXIX, xxii, 8) fail to endorse the story or mention it elsewhere, but Antias gets his chronology hopelessly wrong. Gruen then describes this second instance as “another variant by Antias, omitted by the rest of our (very considerable) evidence on the affair.” Equally suspicious is the location of this reference in Livy’s text, neither where he initially mentions the embassy nor anywhere else throughout the entire account of this episode, but as a totally detached afterthought, five chapters later. For additional information, see Briscoe, (2008), 38-40, 392.

285 δ’ ἐτέρας δὲ τινας πράξεις

286 Cf., Pfeilschifter, (2005), 382: “Flamininus würde erreichen, was Scipio versagt geblieben war: Roms Todfeind gefesselt in die Haupstadt schaffen und den Römern vorführen.” Scipio had demanded the surrender of Hannibal from Antiochus in early 189, following his defeat at Magnesia toward the end of the previous year. Polybius, 21, 17, 7; Livy, XXXVII, 45, 16. Consequently, Hannibal fled in order to avoid capture, first to Gortyn in Crete, then to Artaxias in Armenia and finally to Prusias. Nepos, 23, 9-10, 1; Plutarch, Luc., 31, 3; Justinus, 32, 4, 3-5.
earlier passage in which Flamininus’ persistent browbeating of Prusias to kill Hannibal puzzlingly transmogrifies into a direct order. The fact is, whatever the evidence to the contrary, for Plutarch’s purpose, i.e. the afore-mentioned condemnation of idle and gratuitous φιλοτιμία, Flamininus’ previously prestigious profile must be dismantled.

**Speculative Content of Polybius’ Version**

The accounts of Plutarch and Appian are similar in significant points of detail not found elsewhere. First, both authors are equally evasive concerning the Romans’ objective, an obvious ploy to demonise Flamininus, who allegedly hijacked the entire embassy in ruthless pursuit of his own discreditable, selfish ambitions. Second, both authors claim that Flamininus was directly responsible for Hannibal’s death, though there is none of Plutarch’s obfuscation in Appian’s account, which is concise and specific.\(^{287}\) The third common factor is the castigation of Flamininus for his discreditable treatment of Hannibal. Given these similarities, the question arises of whether both authors used a common source, and, although this source cannot be positively identified, the general format of Justinus’ brief account suggests that it could have been Polybius.\(^{288}\) When he mentions the Roman embassy, Polybius only states its destination, i.e., the courts of Prusias and Seleucus, intending, no doubt, to explain its objective when eventually he dealt in detail with the non-extant episode about the death of Hannibal. Hypothetically, this information might be provided by Justinus, namely, the arrangement of a peace settlement between Eumenes and Prusias. Unfortunately, Justinus supplies no details concerning the interaction between Prusias and the Romans, but there is nothing hypothetical about the correspondence of the rest of his account with a well known remaining fragment of Polybius’ - specifically, a character sketch of Hannibal, which would have been preceded in Polybius’ text by his account of Flamininus’ visit to Prusias and whatever circumstances surrounded Hannibal’s death.\(^{289}\) If Polybius provided evidence which justifies the seriously hostile accounts of Plutarch and Appian, one must consider the possibility of his having laid the responsibility for Hannibal’s death at the feet of Flamininus for misreading and mishandling the situation.\(^{290}\) On the matter of Flamininus’ earlier involvement in the assassination of Brachylles and the death of Demetrius\(^ {291}\) Polybius’ text frustratingly expires at the moment that Flamininus begins

---

288 So, Briscoe, (2008), 392, albeit with no reference to Justinus.
289 Walbank, (1979), 13, 1.
to appear in a bad light, and Livy, either through the suppression or the alteration of material, does his utmost to shield him from any adverse criticism. Is this more of the same, with Livy being deliberately vague concerning the true objective of the embassy and then tentatively shifting the blame for Hannibal’s sorry demise from Flamininus onto Prusias?

The Precise manner of Hannibal’s Death

The disparity between the extant authorities is not merely confined to material concerning the composition and the purpose of the Roman embassy and the role of Flamininus, but, as mentioned previously, even the manner in which Hannibal died is uncertain. The overwhelming majority state that Hannibal died by drinking poison. Of these, Appian is unique in saying that Flamininus had Prusias poison Hannibal, with the others all claiming that it was Hannibal who poisoned himself in order to avoid being captured.

There are, however, two authorities who provide different, or alternative, versions, the first of whom is Pausanias:

Φλαμινίνων δέ τού Ῥωμαίου ποιημένον σπουδήν ἐλείν ἔδεα αὐτόν [sc. τοῦ Ἄννιβαν], ἀφικόμενος παρὰ Προυσίαν ἱκέτης καὶ ἀπωσθεὶς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀνεπήδα τε ἐπὶ τὸν ἱππόν καὶ γημισθεῖς τὸν ἔξοφος τιτρώσκεται τὸν δάκτυλον. προελθόντι δὲ οἱ στάδια οὐ πολλὰ πυρετός τε ἀπὸ τοῦ τραύματος καὶ ή τελευτή τριταῖρ συνέβη. 294

When Flamininus the Roman was making a serious effort to take him alive, Hannibal came to Prusias as a suppliant. Rejected by Prusias he leapt onto his horse and, since his sword was unsheathed, he wounded his finger. He had proceeded only a few stades when he became feverish from of his wound, and he died on the third day.

It is difficult to assess the validity of this account as a viable alternative to the widely attested contention that Hannibal died of poison in captivity. Equally noteworthy as the different manner of his death are the attendant circumstances, since all the other

---

292 Concerning Brachylles, see Polybius, 23, 42, 1-13, and Demetrius, Polybius 23, 3, 4 – 4, 1.
293 Cf. Tränkle, (1977), 154: “Polybios hätte danach im Vorgehen des Flamininus eine krasse Eigenmächtigkeit gesehen, die auch van einem Teil des Senates missbilligt wurde, während Livius die Sache ins Unbestimmte gerückt und die Hauptschuld eher auf seiten des Prusias, [---] gesucht hätte.”
294 Pausanias, 8, 11, 11. That Hannibal died on the third day is a detail found only in Pausanias. In other respects his account and that of The Suda (loc. cit.) are virtually identical syntactically and vary on just one point of lexicology. One must consider the possibility, therefore, of Pausanias being the model for The Suda.
authorities say that when the Romans arrived on the scene, (with or without Flamininus), Hannibal, rather than having been rejected by Prusias, had been lodging as his guest. However, the remainder of this passage, despite its brevity, is not lacking in conviction. Hannibal’s wound was the result of the panic stricken manner in which he mounted his horse, clearly conveyed by the verb ἀναπηδῶ, rather than the more conventional ἀναβαίνω, and his death was apparently due to septicaemia, which is normally preceded by a bout of fever.

The second authority is Plutarch, who, before mentioning anything about poison, offers two variants; either that Hannibal ordered one of his servants to strangle him with his own cloak, or, imitating Themistocles and Midas, that he drank bull’s blood. Unfortunately, it is impossible to trace the origins of these variants, generally ignored by previous scholars, despite their providing a clear indication that, on the subject of Hannibal, a considerably greater body of biographical material had evolved than the sundry apophthegms and biographical sketches to be found in the likes of Polybius, Livy and Plutarch, material which might well have enabled a more comprehensive reconstruction of this entire episode. However, from whatever material is available, it is abundantly clear, in spite of what Plutarch would have us believe, that the notion of Flamininus being directly responsible for Hannibal’s death does not withstand careful scrutiny. Flamininus neither killed Hannibal nor ordered him to be killed. Well prepared psychologically in anticipation of such a hopeless predicament Hannibal killed himself. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have done likewise totally regardless of the identity of the senior officer in the Roman embassy; a Roman presence in itself was enough to precipitate the enactment of a longstanding, carefully premeditated decision which he enacted defiantly and courageously.

3.1.19 The Death of Flamininus

At this point Plutarch brings the Life of Flamininus to an end with the observation that, after the events surrounding the death of Hannibal, there is no further record of his activity, either as politician or soldier, and that he died peacefully. It is perplexing that Flamininus should disappear from the pages of history just as suddenly as he arrives. At the time of his effective retirement in 183, he was no older than forty-five. Furthermore, with the exception of one relatively brief period, (early 194 till late 193), he had been constantly on active campaign, initially as military tribune under M. Claudius Marcellus, (from sometime before 208 until Marcellus’ death in the same year), and finally in

procuring a peace settlement in Greece after Thermopylae in 191, shortly after which he returned to Rome. After his appointment as censor in 189 there is a marked, but not complete, decline in his activity, although six years later he was able to withstand the rigours of the protracted round trip to Bithynia, even with energy to spare for a diversion to Locris en route. However, between 183 and 174, the year in which Flamininus died, any mention of him in the surviving sources is incidental, e.g. the letter allegedly forged in his name and presented under a counterfeit seal, which eventually led to the conviction and execution of Demetrius. It would seem, therefore, that Plutarch is correct on the matter of Flamininus’ inactivity activity after Hannibal’s death.

Plutarch’s statement that Flamininus died peacefully emanates from material which is no longer extant. Livy, in an untidy and fragmentary Book XLI, mentions in the year 174 an epidemic which caused the deaths of certain contemporaries of Flamininus who had played a far less significant role in Roman politics, but without mentioning Flamininus himself. Given his former prominence, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that a separate account of his death might well have occurred, in greater or lesser detail, in one of the lacunae, but, for what it is worth, at the very end of Livy XLI is the only surviving, albeit indirect, reference which, frustratingly, says nothing about the circumstances in which he died:

Munera gladiatorum eo anno aliquot, parva alia, data; unum ante cetera insigne fuit T. Flaminini, quod mortis causa patris sui cum visceratione epuloque et ludis scaenicis quadriduum dedit.

Not many gladiatorial shows were given that year, with some of them being on a small scale. One stood out before all the others, namely, that which T. Flamininus gave on the occasion of his father’s death, and which during the course of four days he accompanied with a distribution of meat, a funeral feast and scenic plays.

Effectively then, a previously robust, energetic and irrepressible individual dies at the relatively young age of fifty-four after a protracted period of inactivity. Although it is not impossible that Flamininus, otherwise enjoying the very best of health, died suddenly as a victim of the afore-mentioned epidemic which accounted for some of his contemporaries with such devastating alacrity, it must be considered unlikely. As Pfeilschifter shrewdly points out, a normally hale and hearty Flamininus would

296 Livy, XL, 23, 1 - 24, 8.
297 Livy, XLI, 21, 5-9.
298 Livy, XLI, 28, 11.
299 Livy, XLI, 21, 5: qui inciderant, haud facile septimum diem superabant;
undoubtedly have been involved at the very centre of the action, which is totally inconsistent with his inactivity. In conclusion, therefore, Pfeilschifter suggests, and convincingly so, that this inactivity was not optional, but probably enforced by a protracted, debilitating, terminal illness.

3.2 Plutarch’s *Synkrisis* of Philopoemen and Flamininus

**Purpose and Validity**

The express purpose of the *synkriseis* might well have been stated by Plutarch himself in the non-extant, introductory pairing of Epaminondas and Scipio, but this is not difficult to deduce; namely, to stimulate reflection and discussion and thereby better to appreciate and enjoy the *Lives*. This in itself is fully consistent with Plutarch’s predilection for discourse on a wide range of subjects, besides which, the very notion of σύγκρισις is complementary to that of παραλληλισμός, with each pair of Lives intended to be read as a conjoined literary unit, rather than in isolation.

---

300 Of which there was an abundance in the year 174. For example, a third confrontation between Rome and Macedon was looking increasingly likely. Perseus visited Delphi with his army in an attempt to prop up friendly relations with the Greek states. Polybius, 22, 18, 4; Livy, XLI, 22, 4-8; Appian, Mac., 11, 6. He then attempted to establish friendly relations with the Achaean League, but his offer was rejected by the Achaean assembly. Livy, XLI, 23, 1 – 24, 20.


302 See Erbse, (1956), in which he rejects the notion that the *synkriseis* are either artificial or superficial. See also, Pelling, (1986) and Swain, (1992).

303 See Duff, (2000), 243-286, where he stresses throughout the importance of parallelism for a full appreciation and interpretation of the *Lives*, even to the point of criticising scholars who have produced editions or translations of a *Life* without its counterpart, Demosthenes with no Cicero, for example. He also provides an exhaustive examination of the notion of synkrisis, rejecting the various claims of those who believe that the *synkriseis* themselves are in any way inferior to style and content to the main narratives. Also, Alexiou, (2007), 20-21: “ο παραλληλισμός και η σύγκριση παρατηρούνται σε πολλά επίπεδα στις πλουσιότερες βιογραφίες: ο όμως μόνο στις τελικές Συγκρίσεις ούτε αποκλειστικά στα ‘τυπικά’ προοίμια - όπου υπάρχουν - αλλά προεικτικά στις κύριες αφηγήσεις των βιογραφίων, φοβούντας τις ομοιότητες και τις διαφορές ανάμεσα στους δύο ήρωες”.

304 Duff, in Roskam and Van der Stockt, (2011), 72: “The juxtaposition of two *Lives* makes differences between them particularly clear, and this double presentation encourages the readers’ critical involvement, as they
apart, a perusal of the synkriseis raises some interesting questions, the first concerning the sum total of their content. In the case of the two Lives currently being considered, for example, particularly the Flamininus, one’s initial impression is that, in view of the attendant historical background and the resultant far-reaching political changes, the synkrisis is simply too short.\textsuperscript{305} Considered from a moralistic and philosophical perspective, however, this brevity is less remarkable, since Plutarch’s interest in historical events, however momentous, is the manner in which they reflect the character of the protagonists rather than the political consequences. Therefore, rather than composing a protracted, detailed analysis, he sees fit to focus on a few carefully chosen points and offer them to his readers for reflection and consideration,\textsuperscript{306} which requires relatively fewer words.

Next, consideration should be given to Plutarch’s choice of pairings. In many cases the connection between the protagonists can at best be described as no better than tenuous, or even purely arbitrary - Pelopidas and Marcellus, for example. In other cases the rationale behind the pairings requires little explanation, e.g. Alexander and Caesar, and, in spite of the nebulous nature of the source material, Theseus and Romulus. Indeed, in the case of Demosthenes and Cicero,\textsuperscript{307} any other combination would have been inconceivable.\textsuperscript{308} What, then, for the feasibility of the pairing of Philopoemen and Flamininus? Although both men played a predominant role in the direction of their respective national policies for an extensive time, the period during which their activity overlapped was less than two years (early 192 - late 191). Even so, throughout this brief period there was regular interaction between them, mostly of a contentious nature, recounted primarily by Plutarch in the Life of Philopoemen, in which the contrasts between their ethnic origins, their character and their ideology are thrown into sharp relief, as they constantly vie with each other to impose their own political settlement on the Peloponnesian. Moreover, this personal interaction between eponymous antagonists, with each being mentioned in the corresponding text, is a unique occurrence

\textsuperscript{305} In fact, one of the shortest of the eighteen surviving examples, a mere five hundred and fifty words or so. By contrast, the Comparison of the Lycurgus/Numa consists of some one thousand four hundred.

\textsuperscript{306} See Duff, (1999), 245: “This tendency to use synkrisis to provoke thought and raise questions is particularly and distinctively Plutarchan.”

\textsuperscript{307} Also compared by Quintilian, \textit{Inst.}, 10, 1, 105-112.

\textsuperscript{308} For a comprehensive study, see Geiger (1981).
throughout the entire corpus of Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives*.\(^{309}\) All things considered, therefore, Philopoemen and Flamininus could well be considered as ideal candidates for comparison, although, unsurprisingly, opinions vary on this. Gerivini, for example, in consideration of the widely divergent historical circumstances of the Greeks and the Romans at this point in time, refutes the plausibility of any valid comparison,\(^{310}\) and Errington, equally dismissive, considers the pairing to be limited and simplistic.\(^{311}\) Walsh, on the other hand, acknowledges the plausibility of the pairing\(^{312}\) and speculates with some conviction that this was these very differences, along with equally marked differences between the character of the respective protagonists, which inspired Plutarch, writing from a predetermined moralistic perspective, to put these two *Lives* together in the first place, specifically to contrast the φιλονικία of Philopoemen with the φιλοτιμία of Flamininus.\(^{313}\) Raeymaekers suggests that the contemporaneity of the two men and the rivalry between them could explain why Plutarch chose them as subjects for parallelism.\(^{314}\)

\(^{309}\) Swain, (1988), 335: “This pair gains special vitality from the unique appearance of one hero in the *Life* of the other, and the like structure demands careful attention to similarities and differences which Plutarch has introduced in the careers of the two subjects”.

\(^{310}\) Gerevini, (1952), 91, n. 1: “Ma la scelta di questa coppia in Plutarco appare piuttosto infelice. Non bastano vaghe e casuali somiglianze a istituire paragoni fra gli attori della storia; Flaminino apparteneva a un populo in fase di ascesa e avviato alla dominazione mondiale, Filopemene a un mondo politicamente in decline e giunto quasi alla sua fine.”

\(^{311}\) Errington, (1969), 218: “Plutarch’s comparison of Philopoemen with Flamininus is concerned with only two aspects of their careers: their military life and the benefits which they conferred on the Greeks. From Plutarch’s point of view, these were easy issues on which to collect information and on which to write a discussion – he did not understand and was not interested in the political judgements which directed his protagonists’ actions – and on which he could achieve a neatly balanced, if superficial, conclusion”.

\(^{312}\) Walsh, (1992), 217: “How could he have better demonstrated the destructiveness of Greek contentiousness and anger than by juxtaposing a Greek hero with those characteristics with a Roman of the opposite character when Greece was in decline?

\(^{313}\) Walsh, (1992), 222: “The brevity of the two *Lives*, the pervasiveness of this theme, and the fact that he chose to compare a bit player from a less than glorious period of Greek history with the victor of an important war, all seem to suggest that the thematic and moralizing possibilities inspired Plutarch to put them together in the first place. What makes this seem still more probable is the fact that besides being contemporaries, they had virtually nothing in common.”

See also Gossage in Dorey (1967), 61: “The *Comparisons* not only compare similar features in two characters or two careers; they also point out important contrasts, so that a characteristic of one is seen in a clearer perspective from its different appearance in the other.”

Structure and Inconsistencies

The *synkrisis* of Philopoemen and Flamininus, structured primarily around five specific topics, can be tabulated as follows:

1, 1-2: Benefactions of Philopoemen and Flamininus to the Greeks
1, 2-3: Errors
2, 1-3: Military experience and achievements
3, 1-2: Skills of leadership
3, 3: Indecisive conclusion

Reminiscent of a passage in the *Life of Flamininus* in which he describes the Greeks’ indebtedness for their freedom from cruel despots and tyrants to the selfless intervention of ἀλλόφιλοι. Plutarch opens with unrestrained praise for the favours that Titus bestowed on Greece. In contrast, the Greeks themselves, Philopoemen included, made war on each other. Moreover, Philopoemen is singled out for particularly harsh criticism, since, claims Plutarch, unable even to defend his own countrymen from the attacks of their enemies, he departed for Crete at the very time that Flamininus defeated Philip in central Greece and liberated all her peoples and cities. Plutarch’s criticism of Philopoemen continues relentlessly throughout the remainder of this opening section, as he deals with the protagonists’ faults:

Τὰ τοῖνυν ἀμαρτήματα τοῦ μὲν φιλοτιμίας, τοῦ δὲ φιλονεικίας γέγονε, καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν ὁ μὲν εὐκίνητος, ὁ δὲ καὶ δυσσαράιητος.

Now, as for their faults, in the one they were engendered by ambition, in the other by contentiousness; the one quick to anger, the other inexorable.

Examples are then listed, albeit with startlingly different consequences. There were no overtly adverse effects from Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία. Political expediency apart, Flamininus could well afford to massage his *ego* in treating the defeated Macedonian Philip with respect and in showing, initially at least, a conciliatory spirit towards the
Aetolians. In sharp contrast, the consequences of Philopoemen’s φιλονικία are catastrophic, particularly the destruction of Sparta, (which typified the sorry plight of Greece),\(^\text{318}\) and, the ultimate penalty, the loss of his life:

\[\text{Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εὐεργήτης πρότερον ὃν ὑστερον καὶ τὰ τείχη κατέσκαψε καὶ τὴν χώραν περιέκοψε καὶ τέλος αὐτήν μετέβαλε καὶ διέφθειρε τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ τὸν βίον ὕργῆ προεσθεῖ καὶ φιλονικία, μὴ κατὰ καύρον ἀλλ’ ὑστερον τοῦ δέοντος εἰς Μεσσηνὴν ἐπειθεῖς, οὐχ ὀσπερ Τίτος πάντα λογισμῷ καὶ πρὸς ἅσφαλειαν στρατηγήσας.}\(^\text{319}\)

For, although he had previously been a benefactor of the Lacedaemonians, afterwards he razed their walls to the ground, laid waste to their territory and finally changed and destroyed their very constitution. Moreover, it would seem that he threw away his life in a fit of anger and contentiousness by rushing off to Messene inopportune and in unnecessary haste, unlike Titus, who conducted all his military operations rationally and with a regard for safety.

There are more inconsistencies here, which, since they involve those very concepts around which this pair of Lives is constructed, require examination. According to Plutarch, Philopoemen’s defiant blockade of Sparta, whereby he denied access of Flamininus and Diophanes to the city, is attributed to μεγάλον φρόνημα;\(^\text{320}\) and he later destroyed Sparta because was “fed up with” the Lacedaemonians - ἐμπιπλάμενος δὲ τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων.\(^\text{321}\) In fact, only once in the main text of the Life of Philopoemen is his dogged determination, with or without official sanction, to protect or to promote Achaean interests clearly attributed to φιλονικία, namely, his blatant defiance during a personal encounter with Flamininus in refusing immediately to repatriate the Spartan exiles as Flamininus would have wished.\(^\text{322}\) Otherwise, on the matter of Philopoemen’s downfall and subsequent death, unequivocally attributed to φιλονικία here in the synkrisis, in the main text, which is somewhat disjointed concerning this episode, Plutarch is not directly explicit. He recounts how Philopoemen, now seventy years of age, and strategos for the eighth time, sought only to enjoy a peaceful retirement. However, continues Plutarch, some sort of divine displeasure – Νέμεσις τίς - threw him down at the end of his life, and it is clearly suggested that this

\(^{318}\) See Pelling in De Pourcq-Roskam, (2012), 60: “Philopoemen, famously, was “the last of the Greeks” (Phil. 1,7); and it is the quality that he embodies, that quarrelsome φιλονικία that is φιλοτιμία’s more destructive first cousin, that explains why Greece had never been able to achieve the unity that it so needed, and its great days were at an end.”

\(^{319}\) Plutarch, Comp. Phil./Flam., 1, 6-7.

\(^{320}\) Plutarch, Phil., 16, 3.

\(^{321}\) Plutarch, Phil., 16, 7.

\(^{322}\) Plutarch, Phil., 17, 7: οὕτως εἶχε τί πρὸς τὰς ἰξουσίας ὑπὸ φρονήματος δύσεις καὶ φιλότιμον.
was on account of a contemptuous remark - φιλονικία, it would seem - he had made about some other general who, though widely respected as a great commander, was, according to Philopoemen, of no real account since he had been captured alive by his enemies. Shortly afterwards Philopoemen suffers the same fate, followed by his execution, and the arrangement of material in Plutarch’s text clearly implies that he got nothing less than he deserved. This notion is confirmed by Pausanias, who clearly states that Philopoemen’s downfall was due to his contempt.323

The origin of this episode is most probably Polybian:

Philopoemen, the strategos of the Achaeans, was captured by the Messenians and put to death by poison. He was a man second to none of his predecessors in excellence, but was worsted by Fortune, although he was thought in all his previous life to have always been favoured by her. But it seems to me that – as the well-known saying goes – it is possible for a man to be fortunate, but impossible for him to be constantly so.

Unfortunately, Polybius’ fragmentary account of Philopoemen’s death includes nothing about a contemptuous remark, so it is impossible to make any direct, or even implicit, connection between this and his luck running out. Even so, the transition from τύχη το Νέμεσις is not infeasible for the philosophical, moralizing Plutarch, whose account has a decidedly tragic and Herodoteic flavour, strongly reminiscent of the passage about Croesus and Solon325 in which a Nemesis strikes Croesus for his hybris after the famous

323 Pausanias, 8, 51, 5:
γάρ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὁδοιον ἀπεδίσηθε τότε ἡγεμόν, ἀνδρὶ τῶν ἀδόξων ἀνειδίσεων ἀλάναι ζῶντα ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων αὐτῶν. In a similar passage, Philopoemen is equally outspoken about the lasciviousness of Antiochus and the indolence of his soldiers after their arrival in Italy in late 192. Plutarch ascribes these remarks to Philopoemen’s vexation – ἤχθετο – at being out of office at the time, i.e. not being strategos, and his jealousy - φιλονικία - of the Romans’ subsequent victory over Antiochus, i.e. at Thermopylae in the spring of 191. However, the notion of φιλονικία is clearly present, especially since Philopoemen’s outburst was spontaneous and unprovoked. Plutarch, Phil., 17, 1.

324 Polybius, 23, 12, 3-4.

325 Herodotus, 1, 33-34.
discussion with Solon, who warns Croesus that no man should be considered happy before the end of his life – τέρμασθα τοῦ βίου, in Plutarch.

So much for Philopoemen’s ϕιλονικία. As for Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία, however, the most decidedly pejorative example in Plutarch’s main text, pointedly situated in the final two chapters, namely, his relentless pursuit of the senile and defenceless Hannibal, is startlingly conspicuous by its absence. At the conclusion of this opening section, therefore, the Roman is portrayed in every respect as the better man.

Plutarch displays an equally obvious lack of compunction about providing radically different interpretations of earlier contentions, along with a combination of untenable premises and blatant distortion of source material throughout the following one and a half sections, in which he directs his attention primarily to Philopoemen and quickly redresses the balance in favour of the Greek.326 His opening gambit is an assessment of the relative merits of the protagonists as military commanders:

' Αλλὰ πλήθει γε πολέμων καὶ τροπαίων ή Φιλοποίμενος ἐμπείρια βεβαιότερα. τῷ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρὸς Φιλιππον ἐκρίθη δυοῖν ἁγώνοιν, ὁ δὲ μιρίας μάχας κατορθώσας οὐδεμίαν ἀμφισβήτησιν τῇ τύχῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀπολέλουπεν.

However, the sheer number of his wars and trophies is proof of Philopoemen’s superior military experience; for the outcome of the war of Titus against Philip was decided by two battles, whereas Philopoemen, by virtue of his success in countless battles, quashed any claim that this was due to chance rather than skill.

In saying that the war against Philip was resolved by merely two conflicts, Plutarch takes no account of the hard campaigning conducted by Flamininus during the period between the battles of the Aoi Stena and Cynoscephalae whereby he removed the Macedonian garrisons from the cities of northern Greece.328 Furthermore, however many battles were fought by Philopoemen, their numeration as μιρίαι, neatly juxtaposed in the text against an implicitly paltry δῶο, is stretching the limits of semantic credibility. Most significant, however, any implication that Flamininus’ victories were due to good fortune is untenable, since nowhere in either the Polybian or Livian accounts of the afore-mentioned battles do the terms τύχη/fortuna occur, nor, for that matter, in Plutarch’s own account of the Life of Flamininus, and more than adequate testimony to Flamininus’ ἐπιστήμη is furnished by the manner in which he expelled

326 See Barrow, (1967), 59: “Plutarch is at pains to give each hero his due; indeed he sometimes seems anxious to make the score equal.”
327 Plutarch, Comp., Phil./Flam., 2, 1.
328 Walsh, (1992), 224: “Plutarch struggles at times to magnify Philopoemen’s relatively insignificant accomplishments and to demean Flamininus’ historic victory.”
Philip from Epirus and eventually caught up with him at Cynoscephalae, thereby inducing the pitched battle which Philip been doing his level best to avoid.

Plutarch persists in attempting to belittle the achievements of Flamininus in order to aggrandize Philopoemen. For example, his vacuous notion that Flamininus hitched an easy ride to glory on the coat-tails of Rome when she was in the ascendancy, whereas Philopoemen achieved glory even though Greece, her vigour exhausted, was already in decline. No-one gifted Flamininus his brilliant career; it was he and his peers who, far from glibly exploiting Rome’s ascendancy, had been instrumental in creating it. Moreover, ever since the Gallic invasion of 390 and, particularly, the catastrophe at Cannae in 216, Roman security had been primordial; personal glory, however gratifying, was coincidental. The success of Philopoemen, continues Plutarch, was due to his own actions, whereas that of Flamininus was merely the result of a communal effort. Admittedly, a communal effort, yet one which, prior to the arrival of Flamininus in Epirus in 198, had made no progress in the war against Philip for nearly two years. It was Flamininus, succeeding where his two predecessors had palpably failed, who broke the deadlock at the Aoi Stena, thereby becoming the very first general to lead victorious Roman troops into central Greece. Next, Flamininus, says Plutarch, was the commander of good soldiers, but Philopoemen made his soldiers good through the manner in which he commanded them. Even the best soldiers are ineffective unless commanded competently. Furthermore, a sizeable proportion of the soldiers under Flamininus’ command were experienced veterans who had campaigned in Spain and Africa with no lesser a general than the legendary Africanus;329 the sort of men, therefore, who readily recognise the competence, or otherwise, of their commanders and give their respect and loyalty in due proportion. These same soldiers had no compunctions whatsoever about following Flamininus wherever he chose to lead them.

Next, Plutarch’s contention that clear - albeit unfortunate - proof of Philopoemen’s valour was provided by the fact that his conflicts had been with Greeks. Moreover, continues Plutarch, seeking to corroborate his argument, with the most warlike of the Greeks, namely, the Cretans and the Spartans, in spite of which Philopoemen outwitted the former, the most wily, and surpassed the latter, the bravest, in audacity. Given the paucity of evidence elsewhere, it is difficult to substantiate whatever Plutarch says about Philopoemen and the Cretans. By contrast, there is plenty of available information about Sparta, which, by Philopoemen’s time, was only a shadow of its former self. This gives the distinct impression, therefore, that Plutarch is seeking subliminally to equate contemporary Spartans with their legendary ancestors and thereby further to glorify Philopoemen by indirect association. Whatever, Nabis was no

---

Leonidas. He was no better than mediocre as a soldier, and as an individual he was,
among other things, a brute, a wanton killer, a coward and a thief. Moreover, even
though he had already been seriously weakened by Flamininus three years before the
Achaean campaign of 192, Philopoemen was still not able to defeat him. Flamininus left
Nabis in control of Sparta because it suited his political agenda; Philopoemen did so
because he had no other choice. As his next ploy Plutarch attempts to belittle
Flamininus’ achievements insofar as he had a wide variety of equipment and technical
knowledge readily at his disposal, whereas Philopoemen had to use his own initiative in
undertaking extensive military reforms which, admittedly, proved to be a great success.
Highly commendable as they undoubtedly were, however, it is illogical to suggest that
they in any way impinge upon Flamininus’ talent.

Plutarch concludes this section in directing his attention to the relative personal
prowess of Philopoemen and Flamininus as warriors:

κατὰ χείρα τοίνυν Φιλοποίμενος μὲν ἔργα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα, θατέρου
d’ οὐδὲν, ἄλλα καὶ Αἰτωλῶν τις αὐτόν Ἀρχέδημος ἐπέσκωπτεν, ὡς ὅτ’ αὐτὸς
ἐσπασμένος τὴν μάχην ἐθεί δρόμῳ πρὸς τοὺς μακεδόνους καὶ [τοὺς]
συνεστάτας τῶν Μυκεδόνων, τοῦ Τίτου τὰς χεῖρας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑπίας
ἀνατέίναντος ἑστῶτος καὶ προσευχημένου.330

Now, in hand to hand combat Philopoemen achieved much that was great, but
Titus achieved nothing at all. Indeed, an Aetolian named Archedemus made fun of
him since, whereas he himself had drawn his sword and was running at full speed
against the Macedonians who were fighting in serried ranks, Titus stood rooted to
the spot raising his upturned hands to heaven in prayer.

This is a clear case of blatant misrepresentation, easily proven by comparison with a
passage of Livy’s,331 probably Polybian in origin, from which this information is derived.
The Aetolian delegate Archidemus is attempting to persuade the Achaeans to remain
neutral in the impending conflict with Antiochus:

provectus deinde est intemperantia linguae in maledicta nunc communiter
Romanorum, nunc proprie ipsius Quincti, ----. quo enim illum unquam
imperatoris functum officio esse? auspicantem immolantemque et vota
nuncupantem sacrificuli vatis modo in acie vidisse, cum ipse corpus suum pro eo
telis hostium obiceret.332

---

330 Plutarch, Comp. Phil./Flam., 2, 3.
331 Polybian in origin, 20, 1 ff. See Walbank, Comm., III, 64-65.
Then he lost control of his tongue and proceeded to aim abuse first at the Romans in general, and then at Quinctius in particular,---. What duty for which a commander is responsible has he ever performed? He said that he had seen him in the front line taking the auspices, sacrificing and pronouncing vows, just like a lower-ranked priest, whereas he meanwhile was exposing himself to the enemy’s missiles in his defence.

Such is Archidemus’ clumsy attempt to portray Flamininus as ludicrous and ineffective, or even cowardly, though in reality he was doing nothing other than routinely taking the auspices,333 which, pointedly, is not apparent from Plutarch’s text. Plutarch was fully familiar with the historical context of this incident,334 so this is a decidedly cheap way for him to attempt to score a point.335 Admittedly, Philopoemen’s prowess is irrefutable, most particularly his remaining on the battlefield and rallying the Achaean forces under Doson at Sellasia in 222, in spite of having to snap and extricate a javelin which had pierced both his thighs.336 Other examples include his slaying of Damophantus, the leader of the Elean cavalry, in hand to hand combat at the River Larisus in 209, causing the enemy to flee,337 and his slaying in similar fashion of the Spartan tyrant Machinadas at Mantinea in 207.338

Two points here. First, although there is no recorded evidence concerning Flamininus’ physical constitution, it is perfectly clear from both Plutarch339 and, particularly, Pausanias340 that, of all people, Philopoemen was the last man to pick a fight with. In fact, a combination of his formidable physique and his natural contentiousness made him an ideal candidate for one-on-one confrontations, not to mention whatever additional, unattested experience he might have acquired in his regular line of work as a professional mercenary soldier. In comparison, and by Plutarch’s own admission, throughout the entire course of Roman history up to and

333 See Briscoe, (1981), 212-213, 12-13: “The charges in § 13 (also reported by Plutarch, Comparison of Philopoemen and Flamininus 2, 6) are new, and manifestly unfair. J. W. H. G. Liebeschuetz. Continuity and Change in Roman Religion, (Oxford, 1979), cites the passage as an example of Greek inability to understand Roman attention to the details of religious ritual.” Archidemus, therefore, may be excused to a certain degree: not so Plutarch, however, given his extensive knowledge of Roman religious rituals.

334 Plutarch, Flam., 17, 4-5 and Moralia, 197, c. The anecdote in which Flamininus scoffs at the vast multitude and variety of Antiochus’ forces originates from the same conference at which Archidemus is addressing the Achaeans in the above quotation. Livy, XXXV, 46, 3 – 50, 5.

335 Duff, (1999), 268, understates the issue here in describing this passage as nothing more than “a rather unfair accusation against Flamininus.”

336 Plutarch, Phil., 6, 4-7; Polybius, 2, 69, 1-2.

337 Plutarch, Phil., 7, 6; Pausanias, 8, 49, 7.

338 Polybius, 11, 18, 4-5; Plutarch, Phil., 10, 1-13; Pausanias, 8, 50, 2.

339 Plutarch, Phil., 2, 3.

340 Pausanias, 8, 49, 3: μέγεθος μὲν δὴ καὶ σώματος ρώμην ἀπέδει Πελοποννησίου οἰδένος.
including his own time there had been no more than just three recorded instances of Roman commanders slaying their opposite number on the battlefield.\footnote{Plutarch, Marc., 8, 3.} In fact, since the first two mentioned, namely Romulus and Cornelius Cossos, are legendary or semi-legendary figures, it may be said that Marcus Claudius Marcellus was the only Roman ever to have accomplished this feat.\footnote{In winning the \textit{spolia opima} for killing the Gallic military leader and king Vindromanus at the battle of Clastidium in 222. Livy, \textit{Per.}, 20, b; Val. Max., 3, 2, 5; Frontinus, \textit{Strat.}, 4, 5, 4; Eutropius, 3, 6, 1; Orosius, 4, 13, 15.} No disgrace to Flamininus, therefore, for not having done likewise: Plutarch’s notion is both vacuous and unviable. Second, conveniently ignoring the fact that military proficiency is not confined exclusively to the prowess displayed in hand to hand combat, Plutarch conspicuously fails to make any mention of Flamininus’ military record and thereby denies him the credit he justly deserved, if not as an individual combatant, then certainly as a commander. For example, he was at the very centre of the action as the Romans advanced into the ravine at the Aoi Stena in 198, and at Cynoscephalae a year later. In fact, his only (relatively minor) failure militarily was the repulse he suffered at Atrax in late 198.\footnote{Livy, XXXII, 17, 4 – 18, 9.} Depending as it does, therefore, on the cynical perversion and exaggeration of one isolated incident, Plutarch’s contention that Flamininus was in any way inadequate is clearly spurious. Furthermore, his patent abuse of his source material is a clear indication of inadequacy, or even desperation. All in all, it is an extremely poor substitution for being able to find Flamininus genuinely at fault on any significant point from what must have been a fund of information far richer than that available to modern scholars.

Finally, says Plutarch (3, 1-2), it was either as an ambassador or a commander that Flamininus did all his great deeds, whereas Philopoemen served the Achaean cause no less effectively as a private citizen than as a (duly elected) general. As examples he quotes the expulsion of Nabis from Messene and the barricade at Sparta which denied Diophanes and Flamininus access to the city. Plutarch then unconvincingly seeks to provide excuses for Philopoemen’s having achieved this success only by dint of riding roughshod over the Achaean constitution. This entire passage is disproportionate, far-fetched and untenable. Disproportionate due to the summary dismissal of Flamininus in so very few words, far-fetched on account of the notion that his skills of leadership were inferior to those of Philopoemen purely on the grounds that he exercised them only whilst serving as an elected officer, and untenable because of the infeasibility of making any viable comparison between the Achaean League and the Roman republic. The evidence for Flamininus’ success in southern Italy as military tribune under Marcellus prior to his controversial election to the consulship is frustratingly scarce. In Epirus and Greece, however, he soon delivered the goods, added to which the efficacy of his
ambassadorial skills throughout all of his tours of duty can hardly be faulted. Did it
never occur to Plutarch, therefore, that it was precisely in recognition of Flamininus’
qualities of leadership that he achieved his electoral success in the first place?
Moreover, how other than as a constitutionally appointed officer was Flamininus
supposed to exert his authority? In fact, Philopoemen’s authoritarian behaviour is in
many ways reminiscent of the military dictators of the final century of the Roman
republic. At the beginning of the second century, however, any commander who acted
in this manner would have been arrested, issued with a charge of high treason (crimen
maiestatis), convicted and summarily flung down into the Forum from the Tarpeian
Rock.

The concluding section (3,3) is succinct and well composed. Superficially Plutarch
expresses no definitive preference, but invites his reader to reach his own conclusion by
weighing Philopoemen’s military experience and qualities of leadership against
Flamininus’ sense of justice and goodness of heart. This is commendable in every
respect, for in so doing Plutarch achieves the previously mentioned objective of
stimulating reflection and further discussion. Given the structure and the content of the
greater part of the previous sections, however, Plutarch’s apparent impartiality is
questionable. Unrestrained praise for Flamininus in the opening section is soon
cancelled out by a combination of untenable contentions and deliberately perverted
evidence. The prejudice exerted on any reader who takes this at face value, therefore,
leaves him with little chance of reaching any worthwhile conclusion.\footnote{Duff, (1999), 269: “This judgement, as in the other cases where a final judgement is given, is crude and disappointing.”}
Conclusions

Redressing the Imbalance

Given that so much knowledge of the ancient world has been lost, no opportunity must be overlooked of wresting even the tiniest scraps of information available from the relatively few texts and other sources - papyrus and inscriptions, for example - that have survived. Even so, this does not justify the arbitrary lumping together of historiography, the historical monograph, and biography. Despite their communality, they are nonetheless clearly distinct genres of literary art. Unfortunately, Plutarch has too often been treated as nothing more than a convenient repository of information to be plundered by modern historians whenever it suits their purpose. He deserves more respect than this.¹ Of far greater concern, however, are the distorting repercussions of this practice when such material is utilised with undue consideration for Plutarch’s objectives, which he himself might well have explained methodically and in detail as a preface to the non-extant, introductory pair, the Epaminandas/Scipio. However, as no small measure of compensation, Plutarch does otherwise provide an abundance of definitive statements on this matter sporadically throughout the texts of the various Lives,² of which the most pertinent to the matter in hand, and which Plutarch could hardly have stated more unequivocally, is undoubtedly “For it is lives we are writing,

¹ Geiger, (1988), 250: “There is no need to stress Plutarch's achievement as an author nor to emphasize again that his biographies should not be used as quarries that only provide stones to erect the edifices of Greek and Roman history.”
not history.” 3 Those who opt to ignore this do so at their peril; Holleaux, for example, who, obsessed apparently with a hatred for Flamininus bordering on the pathological, attacks him with undisguised relish at the least opportunity. Consider, for example, his previously quoted remarks about Flamininus’ vanité, in itself probably the most salient human characteristic and concerning which the more realistic observations of two of his illustrious forebears are worth noting. 4

It is time, therefore, to make a more sober assessment through the reconsideration of three particular episodes from which it is generally considered that Flamininus emerges with his personal reputation seriously impaired. First, his involvement in the assassination of Brachylles, an episode which has received remarkably little attention by modern scholars. Reading between the lines makes it abundantly clear that a good case can be made for extenuating circumstances. First, with Philip defeated by now, Flamininus could well afford to be generous in acceding to the Boeotians’ request that those of their countrymen who had been fighting for him be restored to them, which clears Flamininus of any possible charge of taking any undue risks. Next, his involvement in the assassination of Brachylles was totally unpremeditated. Clinically duped by the Boeotians, he simply grasps what must have seemed like a heaven-sent opportunity of avenging himself with the totally unexpected intervention of Zeuxippus and Pisistratus. The parallel with the equally unexpected and unsolicited advice of Charops, which should be blatantly obvious and thanks to which he eventually succeeded in dislodging Philip from his seemingly impregnable position in Epirus, has to date been overlooked. Since totally unexpected good fortune had favoured him once already, he might well have reasoned, “Why not a second time?” Admittedly, on this second occasion it did turn out to be a poor decision, for which, however, no blame can be attributed to Flamininus, but rather to the utterly cretinous decision of Pisistratus to commit indisputably incriminating information to writing. Add to this the decidedly perplexing manner in which Alexamenus apparently escaped the frenzied and

---

3 Plutarch, Alex., 1, 2: οὗτος γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφωμεν, ἀλλὰ βίους.
4 Se croire un personnage est fort commun en France :
   On y fait l’homme d’importance,
   Et l’on n’est souvent qu’un bourgeois.
   C’est proprement le mal francois :
   La sotte vanité nous est particulièrè.
   La Fontaine, Book 8, Fable 15, 1-5.
Quant aux mœurs, l’homme est le même partout : partout le combat entre le pauvre et le riche est établi, partout il est inévitable; il vaut donc mieux être l’exploitant que d’être l’exploité; partout il se rencontre des gens musculeux qui travaillent et des gens lymphatiques qui se tourment; partout les plaisirs sont les mêmes, car partout les sens s’épuisent et il ne leur survit qu’un seul sentiment, la vanité ! La vanité, c’est toujours le moi.
Honoré de Balzac, Gobseck.
uncontrolled backlash of the Boeotians with total impunity. Finally, thanks yet again to the frustrating expiry of Polybius’ text at a critical point, it is impossible definitively to assess exactly what happened at this time in Boeotia. Flamininus, therefore should not be condemned out of hand.

Next, the assassination of Demetrius. Flamininus, mischievous and confrontational, never could control his tongue, and this basically is what cost Demetrius his life. However attractive the notion of controlling a resurgent Macedon through a puppet regime, Polybius’ choice of vocabulary leaves no doubt concerning Flamininus’ lack of sincerity on this, since he clearly deluded - ἐνυχυρώγησεν - Demetrius into thinking that the Romans intended to help him acquire the Macedonian kingship. Just so much idle and deliberately titillating gossip from Flamininus, therefore, compounded by his purely gratuitous taunting of the Macedonian court in suggesting that Demetrius be sent back to Rome – along with as many as possible of his friends who would prove the most useful, i.e., the most useful to Rome. Irresponsibility of the highest order, admittedly, since Flamininus had clearly failed to take into consideration the possible severity of the repercussions resulting from his behaviour. Yet nowhere throughout this entire episode, or anywhere else for that matter, is there any suggestion of premeditated, malicious intent on the part of Flamininus. Whatever his other faults, this was certainly no part of his psychological make-up, which lends weight to the argument that the letter which finally sealed Demetrius’ fate was indeed a forgery and that, in all probability, the real culprit, with clearly the most to gain, was his elder brother Perseus.

Finally, the death of Hannibal. Flamininus neither killed Hannibal nor ordered him to be killed. Suitably equipped and psychologically resolved in anticipation of such a hopeless eventuality, Hannibal killed himself. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have done likewise totally regardless of the identity of the senior officer in the Roman embassy; a Roman presence in itself was enough to precipitate the enactment of a longstanding, carefully premeditated decision which he enacted defiantly and courageously.

**Plutarch’s Portrayal of Flamininus: an Assessment**

Throughout the first seventeen chapters of the Life of Flamininus, the protagonist’s φιλοτιμία is generally construed as positive and his personal profile reaches its zenith. Its nadir is reached markedly more quickly in just the concluding five chapters, during the last three of which a markedly pejorative form of φιλοτιμία takes over, which,
according to Plutarch, provides Flamininus’ motivation for his needless, vainglorious pursuit of Hannibal. Due to the ubiquitous intensity of what Plutarch, from the very beginning, presents as Flamininus’ most salient characteristic, therefore, it would seem that he was destined to have little or no control over his own life. Opinions vary on the overall impression left upon the reader as a result of this. For example, Pelling claims that Flamininus emerges as a “one-dimensional” figure, since the emphasis Plutarch places on \( \text{φιλοτιμία} \) results in the exclusion of virtually every other characteristic,\(^5\) whereas Walsh maintains that “Plutarch was not so feeble an artist as to present his reader with one-dimensional characters.”\(^6\) To try and resolve this issue an examination of certain parts of the text of the \textit{Flamininus} is required to consider what other aspects of his character emerge - or fail to emerge - and to assess the validity of Plutarch’s portrayal.

In chapter 2, for example, in contrast to the pejorative, one-sided temper of the introductory section, Plutarch, complimentary in the extreme, concentrates on Flamininus’ personal profile by drawing attention to the good fortune of the Romans in having him appointed to conduct the war against Philip because, in the event, he pursued his objectives by means of persuasion and friendly debate rather than armed conflict. For the same reason, continues Plutarch, the Greeks, now for the first time being drawn into political relations with the Romans, were equally fortunate, adding that unless their commander-in-chief had been a man of native goodness - \( \varepsilon\iota\; \mu\iota\; \phi\iota\varsigma\iota\iota\; \tau\epsilon\; \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\zeta\; \acute{\iota}\nu\; \acute{o}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\; \text{ - Greece would not so easily have been satisfied with a foreign supremacy which now replaced those to which she had been accustomed.} \) These qualities are iterated and amplified in chapter 5. For example, Flamininus’ constraint in Epirus after his first victory over Philip, as a direct result of which, claims Plutarch, many of the Greek states allied themselves with Rome. Next, refuting Philip’s claim that Flamininus was a the leader of an army of barbarians, Plutarch unreservedly praises his youth, his humane appearance, his proficiency in Greek and his passion for true honour - \( \acute{\alpha}n\dot{o}\rho\acute{\iota}\; \tau\iota\eta\; \theta\iota\; \acute{\h}\iota\kappa\iota\acute{\iota}\varsigma\iota\iota\; \acute{n}\omega\varsigma\; \text{ - so much so that the Greeks, utterly enchanted} \) spread the news wherever they went that they were convinced that they had found the champion of their liberty.

---

\(^5\) Pelling, (1997), 249: “Il \textit{Tito Flaminino} non è, a prima vista, una delle \textit{Vite} plutarchee più ricche di sfumature. Flaminino stesso è una figura, per così dire, mono-dimensionale; raramente gli eroi di Plutarco sono riducibili a un’unica caratteristica, ma in Flaminino troviamo ben poco oltre la sua \textit{φιλοτιμία}, cioè « ambizione » o « brama di onori ».”

\(^6\) Walsh, (1992), 208.
In the above-mentioned passages Plutarch is directly explicit throughout. In other passages, (in which he is equally complimentary towards Flamininus), it is for the reader to draw his own conclusions from the manner in which he presents his material. For example, accepting Polybius’ dubious contention that (in mid-197) Antiochus, with Rome as his prime objective – μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀνιστάμενον - had already set sail from Syria with an army directed against Europe, Plutarch praises Flamininus for his timely resolution of the conflict with Philip:

εἰ μὴ τούτῳ προϊδὼν ὁ Τίτος ἐμφρόνως ένεδοκε πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις,

ἀλλὰ τὸν Φιλιππικόν ὁ Ἀντιοχικὸς κατείληφει πόλεμος ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, καὶ συνέστησαν ἵπτ’ αἰτίων ἀμφότεροι κοινῶν οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε καὶ δυνατῶτατοι βασιλέων ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥώμην, ἔσχεν ἀν ἀγώνας ἑς ἱπαρχῆς καὶ κινδύνους τῶν πρὸς Ἀννίβαν οὐκ ἐλάττους. Νῦν δὲ τῶν πολέμων μέσην κατὰ καιρὸν ἐμβάλον τὴν εἰρήνην ὁ Τίτος, καὶ πρὶν ἀρξαθαι τὸν μέλλοντα διακόμας τὸν παρόντα, τοῦ [σε. Φιλίππου] μὲν τὴν ἐσχάτην ἐλπίδα, τοῦ [σε. Ἀντιόχου] δὲ τὴν πρώτην ὑφείλεν.8

If Titus, in anticipation of this, had lacked the prudence to reach a peace settlement and Antiochus had found the Romans still at war in Greece with Philip, and these two, the greatest and the most powerful monarchs of their time, had formed an alliance in a common cause against Rome, the city would yet again have suffered struggles and dangers to match those it had suffered in the war against Hannibal. However, by interposing a peace settlement now at just the right time between the two wars, and by curtailing the ongoing war before the anticipated war had a chance to begin, he snatched away the last hope from Philip and the first from Antiochus.

In this passage the only directly explicit, laudatory vocabulary consists of just one single word - ἐμφρόνως, otherwise, Flamininus’ actions speak clearly for themselves, so much so that any specific mention of concepts such as φρόνησις or ἀγχίνως, for example, is rendered redundant. Plutarch similarly presents his material in the closing section of chapter 12, following his version of the carefully stage-managed theatrics at Isthmia, as he recounts how the Romans selflessly suffered extreme peril and hardship to liberate Greece from oppressive despots and tyrants, something which the Greeks had never managed to achieve themselves. Furthermore, adds Plutarch in the following chapter, Flamininus’ actions soon matched the contents of the proclamation:

7 Polybius, 18, 39, 3.
8 Plutarch, Flam., 9, 10-11.
Going from city to city he established in one single process a system of law and order, abundant justice, concord and universal friendliness. He put an end to seditious political factions, repatriated those who had been exiled, taking no less a delight in the manner in which he won the Greeks over by persuasion and reconciled them than in his conquest of the Macedonians, as a result of which their freedom presently seemed to them the very least of his benefactions.

For reasons already explained, the first four sections of chapter 13 constitute the only hiatus - and a brief one, at that - in the cumulatively laudatory tone of the first 17 chapters of the Life, following which Plutarch is immediately back on course: the spontaneous liberation by the Achaeans of those of Roman soldiers captured by Hannibal after Cannae and sold off into slavery in Greece (13, 5-9), Flamininus’ resplendent triumph (14, 1-3), the manner in which, “out of pity for the Greeks” - ὀικτίρων τοὺς Ἐλλήνας - he interceded with Glabrio, first on behalf of the Aetolians besieged in Naupactos (15, 6-9) and then of the Chalcidians, who had incurred the consul’s wrath by lending support to Antiochus, as a result of which he was gifted divine honours including nothing less than an eponymous priesthood (16, 5-7).

In chapter 17 Plutarch draws a conclusion to Flamininus’ second, and final, tour of duty in Greece, at which point one might reasonably have expected some sort of résumé, however brief, of the measure of his achievements and their importance to the Roman republic. Instead, in a passage strongly reminiscent in both style and content of the previously analysed proem of the Life, Plutarch focuses yet again on Flamininus’ φιλοτιμία, albeit a considerably mollified variety, with no trace whatsoever of his earlier harsh criticism, when Flamininus takes “greater pleasure in those in need of a favour than in those who were able to grant one, considering the former as building material in his pursuit of excellence, and the latter as rivals in the struggle for glory.” In contrast, in this present instance, he is described as “bitter towards no-one, and though to many he appeared quick to anger and shallow by nature, he was in other respects a most agreeable companion and one who spoke with grace and intensity.” Apparently, therefore, the omnipresent, insidious spectre of φιλοτιμία has now, partially at least, been laid to rest.

9 Plutarch, Flam., 12, 6.
Far from it, since from this point onwards, it is first steadily, and then calamitously, downhill for Flamininus. Having softened him up in a decidedly desperate attempt to sully his reputation by spuriously associating him with the callous murder of a Gallic provincial by his brother Lucius, for which the latter was removed from the senatorial roll by Cato, Plutarch does his level best to lay the blame for Hannibal’s death squarely at the feet of Flamininus. He does so by reintroducing the theme of φιλοτιμία and, cleverly juxtaposing the laudable with the pejorative, and in language considerably more extreme than that employed elsewhere in the Life, describes Flamininus, among other things, as worthy of contempt - ἡλέγχετο - and odious - ἐπιχθής.

The Flamininus, therefore, consists of two distinctive parts. Throughout the first, which constitutes by far the greater portion of the Life, consisting as it does of no fewer than seventeen chapters, Plutarch, other than for the brief hiatus in the first part of chapter 13, raises the protagonist’s personal profile to its zenith; moreover, in so doing he even plays down the pejorative aspects of his φιλοτιμία. The contrast between the first and second parts, however, with the latter consisting of a comparatively meagre four chapters (18-21), could hardly be sharper, as Plutarch clinically dismantles the image he has so carefully crafted in effectively knocking Flamininus off the pedestal on which he has so studiously placed him. In all this the undeniably disproportionate factor is φιλοτιμία, from which Plutarch sculpts Flamininus’ entire life with markedly little respite and absolutely no development of character, and although Flamininus, in view of the protracted display of the many highly commendable facets of his character throughout the considerably longer first part of the Life, can hardly be described as onedimensional, such is the severity of Plutarch’s onslaught during the second that these very facets seem at best little more than a dim, distant memory. Plutarch is pushing the bounds of credibility here, since in reality, far from being one-dimensional, the character of Flamininus - highly intelligent, charming, aggressive, persuasive, confrontational, a perfectly competent soldier and a brilliant politician - was clearly multifaceted. The notion of pejorative φιλοτιμία tarnishing a protagonist’s character, particularly towards the end of his life, recurs regularly in Plutarch’s work - Marius and Caesar, for example. Whatever Plutarch says, however, can hardly disguise the fact that both these men, just like Flamininus, had highly accomplished political careers: Marius seized the power he sought and held the consulship no fewer than an unequalled seven

10 Pelling, 13, (1988), 258 : “So often we are left with very little idea of any evolution of the grown man; and, despite those few cases where he [Plutarch] does go in for psychological reconstruction, so often he seems to regard understanding the development of his heroes as a surprisingly low priority.” Swain, (1989), 62: “Plutarch assumes a personality from the outset and maintains and/or develops it throughout the biography. In this sense of development characters change; but it is only rarely that Plutarch admits the possibility of a radical turnaround in a man's character, a complete departure from his earlier characteristics.”
times, and Caesar’s concurrent lifelong tenure of multiple senior magistracies was even more staggering. Even so, in these instances the protagonists’ φιλοτιμία is concomitant, not fundamental, as in the Flamininus, as a result of which, thanks to Plutarch and those modern scholars who fail to take his literary objectives fully into account, Flamininus’ truly prestigious heritage has been seriously - and undeservedly - blighted.
In 204 Scipio was in Syracuse making preparations for the invasion of Africa when an embassy arrived from Syphax, king of the Massaesyles, a tribe from Numidia. In 213 Syphax had formed a tenuous yet amicable alliance with Rome through the mediation of Publius and Gnaeus Scipio.¹ Recently, however, Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, had succeeded in detaching him from this alliance by means of a dynastic marriage to his daughter Sophonisba. The purpose of the African embassy was to dissuade Scipio from invading Africa, much to his consternation, since he did not want his troops to become demoralized by the prospect of having to fight both Syphax and the Carthaginians simultaneously. To prevent this, Scipio sent the embassy back to Africa with a letter addressed to Syphax, claiming meanwhile that the embassy’s objective had been to urge him to start for Africa and start the campaign as soon as possible. All in all, therefore, an irrefutable case of calculated mendacity, as Livy’s choice of vocabulary makes abundantly clear:

\[\text{sc. Scipio} \ avertit \ a \ vero \ falsis \ praeoccupando \ mentes \ hominum.\]

Scipio diverted their minds from the truth by preoccupying them with falsehood.

The following year (203), with the Romans now in Africa, a second incident provides yet a further example of Scipio’s ability cynically to turn unexpected circumstances to his own advantage when, either Syphax personally, or various other intermediaries, arrived at his camp with the proposal that the Romans should withdraw from Africa and the Carthaginians from Italy:

¹ Livy, XXIV, 48, 1-49, 8; Silius, 16, 184-221.
² Livy, XXIX, 24, 4.
Primo eas condiciones imperator Romanus vix auribus admisit; postea, ut causa probabilis suis commeandi foret in castra hostium, mollius eadem illa abnuere ac spem facere saepius ultro citroque agitantibus rem conventuram.¹

At first the Roman commander was reluctant even to listen to these proposals; later, however, in order that his men might have a plausible excuse for visiting the enemies’ camp, he did not reject them so readily and held out hope that after frequent discussions they might come to an agreement which would satisfy both parties.

Scipio did well in biding his time, since, as a result of the information acquired about the location and layout of the enemies’ quarters, he was able under cover of darkness to set Syphax’ camp ablaze, followed by a similar attack on the Carthaginian camp, as a result of which a large part of the combined forces were either burned to death or killed in flight.⁴

Although duplicity is clearly the common factor in these two episodes, in the first instance it is little more than quick thinking by Scipio to invent an expedient “explanation” for the timely dismissal of Syphax’ ambassadors. The second instance is more complex, insofar as Scipio not only succeeds in suppressing his immediate emotions, but cunningly manipulates the situation with an eye to the near future, all clearly reflected in Livy’s syntax: primo ---, postea. Given the devastating consequences, there can be little doubt that if either Hannibal or any other Carthaginian general had acted similarly it would have been denounced as typical Punic treachery,⁵ a concept deeply rooted in the Roman psyche at this time and, given the slightest pretext, invariably used as a political slogan.⁶ However, nowhere is there any adverse criticism of Scipio for this action; in fact, Polybius’ expresses unrestrained admiration.⁷

Shortly after the defeat of Hannibal the following year, an embassy of thirty delegates had an interview with Scipio in Tunis.⁸ The Roman war-council, outraged at a

---

¹ Livy, XXX, 3, 7. Scipio’s true objective in reaching an agreement are eventually revealed to a Carthaginian embassy after the defeat and capture of Syphax: --- et venisse ea spe in Africam se ait, ut spem suam prospero belli eventu auctam, victoriam se non pacem domum reportaturum esse. Livy, XXX, 16, 8.

⁴ Livy, XXX, 5, 1–7, 13; Appian, Pun., 4, 19–23; Polybius, 14, 1,1–6, 5, esp. 14, 1, 6–8 concerning the highly combustible materials with which the Numidians had built their camp.

⁵ Warmington, (1964), 229.

⁶ E.g., Livy XXI, 4, 9, referring directly to Hannibal, “perfidia plus quam Punica”. Similarly, Punica fides, since the Romans considered the Carthaginians to be perfidious by nature, Sallust, Jug., 108, 3; Punica calliditas, used pejoratively, Val. Max., 7, 4 ext. 4; Poenus plane est, “he is a true Carthaginian, “ i.e., full of trickery, Plautus, Poeni, prol., 113.

⁷ Polybius, 14 5, 15: ἔν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν διειργασμένων Σκιπίων Κάλλιστον ἦν μοι δωκέι τότῳ τοῦργον καὶ παραβολώματον τῶν ἑκείνου πεπραγμένων.

⁸ Livy, XXX, 36, 9 – the only surviving source which mentions the location.
recent breach of faith by the enemy, originally proposed the complete destruction of Carthage, only to have second thoughts as soon as they considered realistically the magnitude of this task and the length of time it would require. Most noteworthy, however, is Scipio’s reaction:

tamen cum et quanta res esset et quam longi temporis obsistio tam munitae et tam valuae urbis reputarent, et ipsum Scipionem exspectatio successoris venturi ad paratum victoriae fructum, alterius labore ac periculo finiti belli famam, sollicitaret, ad pacem omnium animi versi sunt.\footnote{Polybius, 15, 1-2; Livy, XXX, 25, 1-12; Val. Max., 6, 6, 4; Appian, Pun., 6, 34-35; Eutropius, 3, 22, 1.}

Since, however, they were having second thoughts about the magnitude of the task in hand and the length of time required to invest such a well fortified and powerful city, and Scipio himself was afraid that a successor might come and claim the glory for terminating the war, after the way had been prepared for it by another man’s toils and dangers, there was a unanimous verdict in favour of peace.

This is reminiscent of Flamininus at Nicaea in 198, at Tempe in 196 and at Sparta after the allies’ defeat of Nabis in 195, episodes which Livy and Polybius unceremoniously present as nothing more than the everyday cut and thrust of political/military activity. One should speculate, therefore, about how Plutarch, given his perennial favoritism towards Scipio, would have handled such material, or even included it in the first place, since moraliically interpreted, a markedly different picture emerges; indeed, more so to the detriment of Scipio than Flamininus.\footnote{Livy, XXX, 36, 10-11.} The incident at Syracuse, though far from sensational, nonetheless provides a clear insight into an unsavoury facet of Scipio’s character, i.e., mendacity, followed by calculated, lethal duplicity at his camp in Africa. Most intriguing, however, is the interpretation, if any, that Plutarch might have placed on Scipio’s intense unease about being superseded during the peace conference at Tunis. He might simply have ignored it, or presented it factually as perfectly natural and fully justified anxiety on Scipio’s part, even claiming that to replace him at this crucial juncture would have been an injudicious decision by the senate. In order to display any degree of consistency, however, and thereby give credence to his portrayal of what he claims to be the most dominant - and unsavoury - aspect of Flamininus’ character, he would have had to interpret it as a clear case of φιλοτιμία. As matters stand, however, in φιλοτιμία, Plutarch has hung a far more grievous burden around Flamininus’ neck than the Ancient Mariner’s albatross.

\footnote{On the nonextant Life of Scipio, see Herbert, (1957).}
The past is part of the human environment and should not be polluted by falsehood. Its people should not be modernised to make an easier read, nor judged by standards irrelevant to their own day, in order to make dishonest propaganda for some modern cause.

Mary Renault (1905-1983)
Bibliography

Alexiou, E. ΠΛΟΥΤΑΡΧΟΥ ΠΑΡΑΛΛΗΛΟΙ ΒΙΟΙ, η προβληματική των 'θετικών' και 'αρνητικών' παραδειγμάτων, Thessalonike, 2007.


Barrow, R. Plutarch and his Times, London, 1967

1 Alphabetical format for authors; chronological format wherever more than one publication by any particular author is listed.
Benecke, P. Rome and the Hellenistic States, CAH, 8, (1930), 279-305.


Eckstein A. M. T. Quinctius Flamininus and the Campaign against Philip in 198 B. C. Phoenix, 30, No. 2, (Summer, 1976), 119-142.


Frank, T. A History of Rome, New York, 1923


Gerevini, S. Plutarco, Vita di Flaminino : Introduzione, Testo, Traduzione e Commento; Milano, 1952.

Gilbert, C. Hannibal, Paris, 1967


Grainger, J.D. The Roman War of Antiochus the Great, Boston, 2002.


Hooper, F. Roman Realities, Detroit, 1979, 90-154.


Leo, F. Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form, Leipzig, 1901; reprinted Hildesheim, 1965.


Pelling, C. Plutarch on Roman Philotimia, in De Pourcq-Roskam-Van der Stockt, (2012), 55-68.


Stuart, D.R. Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography, Univ. of California Press, 1928.


van Hoof, A. From Autothanasia to Suicide, Self-killing in Classical Antiquity, London, 1990


Walbank, F.W. Philip V of Macedon, Cambridge, 1940.


Walsh, P. Livy : His Historical Aims and Methods, Cambridge, 1962.


