
An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind
- Author
- Farah Focquaert (UGent) , Johan Braeckman (UGent) and Steven M. Platek
- Organization
- Abstract
- The evolutionary claim that the function of self-awareness lies, at least in part, in the benefits of theory of mind (TOM) regained attention in light of current findings in cognitive neuroscience, including mirror neuron research. Although certain non-human primates most likely possess mirror self-recognition skills, we claim that they lack the introspective abilities that are crucial for human-like TOM. Primate research on TOM skills such as emotional recognition, seeing versus knowing and ignorance versus knowing are discussed. Based upon current findings in cognitive neuroscience, we provide evidence in favor of an introspection-based simulation theory account of human mindreading.
- Keywords
- self-awareness, simulation theory, theory of mind, ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX, NEURAL MECHANISMS, SOCIAL COGNITION, CHIMPANZEES KNOW, MIRROR NEURONS, YOUNG-CHILDREN, RECOGNITION, EMPATHY, SIMULATION, ARGUMENT
Downloads
-
(...).pdf
- full text (Published version)
- |
- UGent only
- |
- |
- 3.09 MB
Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-397482
- MLA
- Focquaert, Farah, et al. “An Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Human Self-Awareness and Theory of Mind.” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 21, no. 1, 2008, pp. 47–68, doi:10.1080/09515080701875156.
- APA
- Focquaert, F., Braeckman, J., & Platek, S. M. (2008). An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 21(1), 47–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080701875156
- Chicago author-date
- Focquaert, Farah, Johan Braeckman, and Steven M. Platek. 2008. “An Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Human Self-Awareness and Theory of Mind.” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1): 47–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080701875156.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Focquaert, Farah, Johan Braeckman, and Steven M. Platek. 2008. “An Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Human Self-Awareness and Theory of Mind.” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1): 47–68. doi:10.1080/09515080701875156.
- Vancouver
- 1.Focquaert F, Braeckman J, Platek SM. An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 2008;21(1):47–68.
- IEEE
- [1]F. Focquaert, J. Braeckman, and S. M. Platek, “An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind,” PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 47–68, 2008.
@article{397482, abstract = {{The evolutionary claim that the function of self-awareness lies, at least in part, in the benefits of theory of mind (TOM) regained attention in light of current findings in cognitive neuroscience, including mirror neuron research. Although certain non-human primates most likely possess mirror self-recognition skills, we claim that they lack the introspective abilities that are crucial for human-like TOM. Primate research on TOM skills such as emotional recognition, seeing versus knowing and ignorance versus knowing are discussed. Based upon current findings in cognitive neuroscience, we provide evidence in favor of an introspection-based simulation theory account of human mindreading.}}, author = {{Focquaert, Farah and Braeckman, Johan and Platek, Steven M.}}, issn = {{0951-5089}}, journal = {{PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}}, keywords = {{self-awareness,simulation theory,theory of mind,ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX,NEURAL MECHANISMS,SOCIAL COGNITION,CHIMPANZEES KNOW,MIRROR NEURONS,YOUNG-CHILDREN,RECOGNITION,EMPATHY,SIMULATION,ARGUMENT}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{47--68}}, title = {{An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind}}, url = {{http://doi.org/10.1080/09515080701875156}}, volume = {{21}}, year = {{2008}}, }
- Altmetric
- View in Altmetric
- Web of Science
- Times cited: