The European Union as an emerging coordinator in development cooperation

An analysis of EU coordination in Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal

Dissertation submitted by Sarah Delputte in fulfilment of the degrees ‘Doctor in Political Science’ (Ghent University) and ‘Doctor in Development Studies’ (University of Antwerp)

Supervisors:
Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie, Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University
Prof. Dr. Nadia Molenaers, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp

Academic Year 2012-2013
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Abstract

The proliferation of donors and channels and the fragmentation of aid result in huge costs for developing and donor countries and have a detrimental effect on the impact of aid. Aid coordination is presented as a guiding principle to help resolve this problem and has been on top of the international development agenda in the past decade. The EU has at many occasions expressed its ambition to foster the international agenda on coordination and promote its implementation. Simultaneously, the EU has taken several steps to strengthen internal EU coordination, guided by the principles enshrined in the European Consensus (2005). However, the few existing studies suggest that its implementation is fairly low. The objective of this dissertation is to seek in-depth and interpreted understanding of this paradox between the EU’s ambitions and its inability, as suggested by the limited empirical evidence, to effectively act as a coordinator in the field. More specifically, I have aimed to (1) map EU coordination: to what extent does the EU coordinate? (what-question); and (2) understand EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?

For these purposes, a thorough examination of EU coordination in four sub-Saharan countries, (Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal) is performed, making use of a pragmatist research approach. This approach is especially suited for problem-driven research that aims to understand a complex phenomenon. I have investigated the interplay of a wide range of factors that enable and constrain EU coordination in the field. The aim was to take a holistic perspective on what the EU does and how EU policy initiatives are translated at the field level and to go beyond a focus on institutions and procedures. I have considered the internal (between the EU and the Member States) and external dimension (between the EU and other international partners) of EU coordination as well as the potential tension between both dimensions.

The thesis argues that (1) the domestic political and economic context which stimulates the use of development cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy and (2) the existence of different traditions in European development aid, based on different ideas and fostering different identities, are key to understand the generally low level of internal EU coordination. However, this thesis has also found that EU Delegations play different roles in donor-wide coordination processes, ranging from ‘just another donor’ to a coordination ‘facilitator’. This variance can be understood by taking into account (1) different degrees of existing donor-wide coordination, (2) different donor compositions as well as (3) different degrees of power asymmetry between the EU and the partner country which constrain/enable the EU’s coordinator role.
Dankwoord

Mijn doctoraatsproces was een boeiende maar vaak ook complexe zoektocht naar de rol van de EU in de internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Een rode draad doorheen dit proces is ongetwijfeld dat na elk antwoord vele nieuwe vragen rezen. Daaraan gerelateerd is het experimentele karakter van mijn onderzoeksproces, wat resulteerde in een doctoraatsstraject met talrijke kansen en verrijkende ervaringen maar ook met frequente twijfels en beproevingen.

Graag wil ik iedereen bedanken die mij in de afgelopen jaren heeft bijgestaan. Een aantal mensen wil ik echter in het bijzonder noemen.

Eerst en vooral gaat mijn grote dank uit naar mijn promotor Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie. Toen ik zes jaar geleden op zoek was naar een promotor voor mijn masterproef over de Economische Partnerschapsakkoorden, was Jan meteen enthousiast. Het was de aanvang van een boeiende samenwerking, te meer omdat hij ook wel te vinden was voor de experimentele inslag. Mijn onderzoekstraject was origineel en uitdagend, maar ook vaak lastig, en mede dankzij Jan’s professionele begeleiding raakte ik nooit volledig stuurloos.

Jan heeft mij doorheen het hele doctoraatsproces op alle vlakken enorm gesteund. Zijn beschikbaarheid, openheid, geduld en aanmoediging hebben me geholpen om doorheen het proces te groeien, mijn ideeën en inzichten te ontwikkelen en in mijn aanpak te geloven. Zijn kritische houding tijdens de talloze gesprekken en discussies hebben me in staat gesteld om oplossingen te zoeken voor regelmatig opduikende problemen en de complexiteit te verhelderen.

Jan’s toewijding en enthousiasme zijn een voorbeeld voor velen onder ons. Hij is niet alleen ‘een van de collega’s’ maar ook een echte ‘facilitator’ van kritisch wetenschappelijk onderzoek en een toffe werksfeer. Ik kijk er erg naar uit om deze samenwerking in de toekomst verder te zetten.

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Deze inzichten zijn bovendien tot stand gekomen dankzij de bereidwilligheid en de openheid van alle respondenten die ik heb geïnterviewd in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Ouagadougou, Dakar en Brussel. Ook hen wil ik bedanken voor de medewerking aan de realisatie van dit proefschrift.

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<tr>
<td>ACAB</td>
<td>Arrangement Cadre des Appuis Budgétaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>Africa Contingency Operations Training &amp; Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence Française de Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Darstellung der Ziele und der Umsetzung der Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPTF</td>
<td>Consultative Committee of the Technical and Financial Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGAB</td>
<td>Cadre Général d’ organisation des Appuis Budgétaires</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Country Programmable Aid</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Cooperating Partners Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCP</td>
<td>Cooperating Partners Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSLP</td>
<td>Cadre Stratégique de la Lutte Contre la Pauvreté</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Development Partners Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>European Court of Auditors</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>European Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>FED</td>
<td>Fonds européen de développement</td>
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<td>FNDP</td>
<td>Fifth National Development plan</td>
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<td>FTI</td>
<td>Fast Track Initiative</td>
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<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIP</td>
<td>Harmonization in Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoC</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoD</td>
<td>Head of Delegation</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>HYP</td>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Joint Assistance Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAST</td>
<td>Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania</td>
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<td>JASZ</td>
<td>Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low-Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>Lower Middle Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multi-party Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Performance Assessment Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANEA</td>
<td>National Action Plan for Aid Effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEPAM</td>
<td>Programme d'Eau Potable et d'Assainissement pour le Millénaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Financial Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>PRBS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Budget Support</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGCPD</td>
<td>Global Meeting of Consultation of Development Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>RSP</td>
<td>Regional Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCADD</td>
<td>Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRFP</td>
<td>Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>STELA</td>
<td>Secrétariat Technique pour l'Efficacité de L'Aide au Burkina Faso</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>Sector-Wide Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSMIN</td>
<td>System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products</td>
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<td>TAS</td>
<td>Tanzanian Assistance Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>Union Européenne</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-FLEX</td>
<td>Vulnerability FLEX mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHIP</td>
<td>Wider Harmonization in Practice</td>
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**Introduction**

Worldwide, for the 46 bilateral donors included in the statistics of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), there are about 3700 donor-partners aid relationships. One fourth of these relationships are classified as micro-aid relationships, which means that they remain below a country level threshold 0.1 per cent of aid. Countries with most donors and highest fragmentation levels are Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (OECD-DAC, 2010b). All these donors employ their own strategies, procedures and requirements, which translates in a huge burden for the partner government. In addition to this, donors apply their own allocation criteria resulting in overlaps or duplication as well as funding gaps or orphan sectors (OECD-DAC, 2009b). For example, in Tanzania, only 20 of the 34 donors are considered as significant, which means that the other 14 donors cumulatively provide only 10 per cent of total aid (OECD-DAC, 2011c). In between 2000 and 2002, the government had to manage 1300 projects implicating 1000 donor missions per year, and the editing of 2400 reports per trimester (Birdsall, 2008: 523).

Aid coordination is presented as a guiding principle to help resolve the problem of fragmented aid and has been on top of the international development agenda, especially in the past decade, leading to a culmination in 2005 with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (hereafter: Paris Declaration). While no donor will deny the need for better coordination, implementation of the international commitments has proven to be difficult as progress remains slow (OECD-DAC, 2011b). On the one hand, donor coordination requires certain capacities and a set of bureaucratic changes but aid institutions also face countervailing incentives which make it more difficult to promote coordination. On the other hand, as coordination affects the national sovereignty over aid delivery, there are limits to the readiness of donors to engage in coordination and as a result, binding commitments to donor coordination are unlikely. Apart from these, ideational issues also play a role as they can either motivate a donor to coordinate or act as obstacles, for example, in case of disagreement about who should coordinate, what should be coordinated, or with what objective.

The European Union (EU), who plays the leading part in this thesis, has at many occasions expressed its ambition to foster the international agenda on coordination and promote its implementation. Simultaneously, the EU has taken several steps to strengthen internal EU coordination. While the European Commission has shown a remarkable commitment and enthusiasm towards better coordination for many decades, only in the past decade, Member
States engaged themselves to step up efforts, symbolized in the European Consensus of 2005 and the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour of 2007. On the one hand, the EU has been portrayed as a potential leading actor in donor coordination, given its long-standing experience with collective action problems. On the other hand, EU coordination may even get more complicated as identities and national interest may be more sensitive and outspoken than in looser but more encompassing donor-wide frameworks. Moreover, EU coordination can make it more difficult to promote donor-wide coordination while existing donor-wide coordination can make it more difficult to engage in EU coordination.

However, scholarship on the coordinator role of the EU in developing countries is still scarce. Recent studies suggest that implementation of the EU’s commitments remains slow. While the EU code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour is considered as ‘the most demanding normative framework on Division of Labour so far’, ‘on average the performance of European donors is about the same as [other OECD-DAC donors]’ and ‘some European donors are still amongst the poor performers worldwide’ (Bürcky, 2011: 32). However, these studies do not examine in greater depth the areas where the EU is more/less successful1 and no in-depth investigation has been done on the explanations for these findings. In sum, on the one hand the EU emphasizes the aim to engage and lead in coordination exercises but on the other hand the limited empirical evidence suggests she might be unable to effectively act as a coordinating actor in practice. This thesis aims to seek in-depth and interpreted understanding of this paradox, making use of a pragmatist research approach. More specifically, I will investigate how the ambitions of the EU are translated at country level and in which situations the EU coordination is more/less feasible. Thereby, a more diversified spectrum of different coordination roles is proposed, taking into account different contexts. As the research is of explorative nature, it aims to increase the knowledge on what EU coordination means in practice. The focus is on the coordinator role of the EU in four sub-Saharan African countries, namely Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal. I aim to examine how effective the EU is in deploying its coordinator role at the country level and which factors enable and constrain EU countries in the four countries. As such the main research questions of this thesis are:

RQ1: To what extent does the EU coordinate? (what-question)

RQ2: Under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?

1 Success refers to the degree of EU coordination, not to the eventual development impact of EU coordination.
The first part of this thesis (Chapters 1-3) concentrates on the literature review and the analytical approach. In Chapter 1, I will briefly examine the historical context of donor coordination and EU policies and initiatives, leading to the aforementioned paradox and the accompanying research questions. In Chapter 2, I will elaborate on the pragmatist research approach and outline the ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations of the research. Chapter 3 introduces the conceptual foundations, based on the literature on EU development policy and aid coordination, which result in a basic analytical framework that guides the empirical research. The chapter ends with an introduction to the country chapters.

The second part of the thesis (Chapters 4-7) constitutes the empirical analysis of EU coordination at the country level. It consists of four country chapters in which I portray a detailed picture of the EU’s experience with coordination by means of a review of the extent to which the EU coordinates (RQ1) and an analysis of the factors that enable and constrain EU coordination (RQ2) in Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal.

Finally, Chapter 8 draws general conclusions of this doctoral research, based on a thorough review of the main findings of the four country chapters. It also includes reflections on the conclusions and discusses its main contributions, limitations as well as some suggestions for further research.
1 Introduction to the research topic and research questions

This chapter introduces the research topic of this thesis by reviewing the development of the aid effectiveness agenda and the principle of coordination in the international and the EU context. The first section focuses on the international context and briefly examines how the aid agenda increasingly focused on the principles of aid coordination and harmonization. The chapter then proceeds with the EU context, reviewing the interplay between EU integration of development policy and the influence of the emerging international aid effectiveness agenda as well as the EU’s aspirations as a global development actor. It also discusses the findings of recent studies which suggest that implementation of the EU’s commitments at the country level remains slow. Based on all this, the third section formulates and motivates the central research questions that this thesis addresses.

1.1 The international aid effectiveness agenda

Although this thesis focuses on coordination at the country level, coordination occurs within important global contexts (World Bank, 1999: 2), and the current agenda results from the work on aid effectiveness in the 80s and 90s (Barry & Boidin, 2012: 656). Consequently I will start with a brief historical contextualization of the aid effectiveness and coordination agenda.

The attention to the lack of coordination between donors is not new (Aldasoro, Nunnenkamp & Thiele, 2010). Coordination was already an issue in the 1960s and 1970s, but it was then mainly understood as coordination ‘by donors, among donors’, with a central role for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB), since most recipient country administrations lacked the capacity to effectively take a lead in coordination processes (Hayman, 2006). The Consultative Groups chaired by the WB were initiated in the mid-1960s and began as ‘donor clubs’ (World Bank, 1999: 2). At the end of the 1980s more emphasis was put on ‘aid integration’, meaning coordination around national planning and budget systems based on the insight that ownership was required for aid to be effective. Uncoordinated aid was defined as one of the major reasons why African countries had not been able to make better use of development aid (Aldasoro et al., 2010). No forums existed yet to organize the dialogue between the government and donors on procedural and substantive integration of aid into national institutions and priorities (UNDP, 1994). As the governments of recipient countries were considered lacking the capacities to organize such aid coordination forums, it was suggested that donors and especially UNDP should take up this role. The UNDP Round Table Mechanism was established as an instrument for fostering consensus on policies, strategies, programmes and resources amongst developing and donor countries (UNDP, 1999).
In the mid-90s, the international development community had to provide an answer for the ‘aid fatigue’ which had resulted in declining aid levels since the early 90s (Bird, 1999: 1; de Renzio & Mulley, 2006). Aid to developing countries was increasingly criticized as it was doubted whether aid increases economic growth, alleviates poverty, promotes social development, fosters democratic regimes or has any positive sustainable impact for that matter (Bird, 1999: 9-12; Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom, & Shivakumar, 2005: 3-19). The reason for the lack of progress was not only sought in recipient countries’ responsibility but also in the donor countries, which ‘engage in many behaviours that inhibit the effectiveness of aid’ (Gillies & Joseph, 2009: 5). In the influential WB report Assessing aid. What works, what doesn’t and why Dollar and Pritchett (1998) put forward the failures of aid to developing countries. Alongside the questioning of the effectiveness of the Bretton Woods Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) approach, donors started to become more aware of the proliferation of donors and channels and the fragmentation of aid which result in huge costs and have a detrimental effect on the impact of aid (Carbone, 2010b; Rogerson, 2005). At that time, OECD-DAC started to play a central role in calling for more harmonization and simplification of aid procedures (Hayman, 2006). In 1996 the OECD-DAC issued a strategy document Shaping the 21st century: the contribution of development cooperation in which it presents a new approach for making aid more effective, based on the partnership model and the principles of harmonization and alignment. The strategy puts forward the importance of enhanced coordination in international forums and on the ground. It emphasizes that a one-size-fits-all approach would not be appropriate and coordination should be organized in close cooperation, and if possible under the lead of, the partner country governments. However, ‘in cases where local interest or capability is weak, it remains for donors to encourage regular forums for coordination’ (OECD-DAC, 1996: 17).

Since the nineties the amount of donors and number of projects has multiplied significantly and donors tend to operate in many different countries as well as in various sectors within those countries which has resulted in greater aid fragmentation (Birdsall, 2008: 523; Fengler & Kharas, 2011: 4). As each donor has its own reporting requirements, procurement rules and missions, this in turn has led to high transaction and managerial costs for both donors and recipient governments (Aldasoro et al., 2010; Birdsall, 2008: 523). Moreover, these large number of development cooperation actors have their own motivations, priorities and strategies, thereby lacking a demand-driven orientation (Barry & Boidin, 2012: 656). Donors compete for visibility and short term results and ‘treat the limited public sector capacity of recipient countries as a common pool resource’ (Brautigam in Birdsall, 2008: 524), which undermines rather than build up that resource.
The solutions put forward to solve the problem of fragmentation concentrate on better coordination, concentration and specialization. Only increasing the aid budgets would not be sufficient to improve the standard of living in developing countries, so henceforth aid would need to be deployed more efficiently. Better coordination should help to tackle the unsolved problem of ‘too many cooks in the kitchen’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 1) by reducing fragmentation and the accompanied transaction costs, increasing transparency, rationalizing objectives and procedures, improving the quality of the policy dialogue and making better use of different actors’ competences (Barry & Boidin, 2012: 648). Other solutions are that bilateral donors provide more multilateral aid, concentrate on fewer countries and agree on ‘lead donor’ arrangements for the management of dialogue, monitoring and reporting. Ultimately donors might create a common pool through which they ‘buy’ the execution of programs ‘instead of direct provision with their own bureaucracies’ (Birdsall, 2008: 527).

To realize this emerging agenda, these solutions had to be translated to the country level. In the late 90s, with the launch of the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have been introduced as the WB’s renewed strategy for poverty eradication. In exchange for debt relief, countries had to develop a national strategy to reduce poverty which they would have to implement with the newly obtained resources. However, rapidly they were seen ‘as having the potential to be the overarching country-level policy document that would guide all concessional aid flows’ (Hopwood, 2009: 106). PRSPs were supposed to be country-driven, based on a participatory process, comprehensive, results-oriented, partnership-oriented and long-term. They also aimed to stimulate donor harmonization and alignment with national priorities. However, according to Hopwood and others, there is still a wide gap between declaration and practice. For example, in the case of the PRSPS, which had to strengthen alignment and ownership, Hopwood speaks about ‘backstage donorship’, ‘whereby donors seek to ensure that their favourite projects or particular priorities are included’ (Hopwood, 2009: 109).

Especially after the United Nations (UN) Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (2002), aid effectiveness was put on top of the international development agenda and coordination portrayed as one of the leading strategies (Barry & Boidin, 2012: 644; Cassimon, Holvoet, Molenaers, & Renard, 2009). To realize this new consensus, the OECD-DAC has organized four High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness where the international donor community, developing countries and civil society organizations have agreed on international principles and a covering monitoring process. The Paris Declaration (2005) has served as the cornerstone of this agenda, as it was the first explicit agreement between donor and recipient
countries to improve coordination and align aid to the national development strategies. The initial focus of the Paris Declaration was the harmonization of rules and procedures, the development of new instruments to pool resources, and increased shared analysis. However, it has been argued that coordination as such will not be enough to solve the problem of fragmentation: ‘promotion of harmonization and coordination, without concomitant efforts to reduce the number of actors involved, has often tended to aggravate existing problems’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 14). Arguably, there is growing consensus on the need to go beyond mere coordination and focus on specialization and division of labour based on donors’ comparative advantages (Schulz, 2009). Through such a strategy donors concentrate their aid in sectors and countries where they bring added value and complement activities of other donors. This usually involves delegated cooperation, in which a donor, the lead donor, acts with authority on behalf of one or more other donor(s), silent partners or delegating donors. Ever since, donors have taken several initiatives to deal with fragmentation problems for example by initiating harmonization of procurement and reporting rules (Birdsall, 2008: 523). The OECD-DAC financed pilot programs for harmonization at country level to pool financing for budget support or large sector programs.

In general, the Paris Declaration is a consensus-based political document which is perceived as a symbolic start of a new era in international development. The core principles of the Paris Declaration have in general received broad support. However, already since its launch in 2005, criticism on the Paris Declaration has more to do with the interpretation of the principles and the governance and process of the agenda. On the one hand there is criticism of a technical nature, dealing with the effects or the implementation of the principles, such as the contestation of the gravity of the problem of fragmentation and the effectiveness of the solution of coordination. On the other hand, there is more fundamental or systemic criticism which mainly denounces the donor-centred governance structure and the technocratic nature of the agenda.

A first criticism deals with the ownership of the agenda. While the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness can be seen as a global policy space, it is closely linked to the OECD-DAC and the Paris principles have mainly been established by the ‘traditional club’ of OECD-DAC donors (Eyben, 2013). However, in the past decade, new players, such as private actors (Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), foundations and corporations) and non-OECD-DAC donors have emerged as prominent actors in development and fundamentally changed the donor landscape. Since the early 90s, only one third of aid is delivered by OECD-DAC donors, while two thirds comes from new bilateral donors and private actors (Fengler & Kharas, 2011: 6). This has led critics to say that ‘the OECD should give up control of the aid agenda; new governance structures for
aid and greater input from recipient countries are required' (Glennie, 2011b). As such the Paris Agenda 'risks reverting to a pre-Paris Declaration mode in which traditional players will be reasonably coordinated but the overall system will remain fragmented, resulting in sectoral and geographic misallocations of aid' (Fengler & Kharas, 2011: 6). Furthermore, if partner countries are not involved, coordination may also create the effect of a ‘monolithic’ donor group that functions as a cartel, which might reduce the negotiating space of partner governments (Hopwood, 2009: 116).

However, maybe most contested is the eventual feasibility of translating these principles into practice as there is usually an important distinction between high-level global declarations and organizational practice (Hopwood, 2009: 116). Indeed, despite the political declarations, the evaluations of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda reveal that changes at the country level have lagged behind. The latest OECD-DAC monitoring report on the implementation of the Paris Declaration concludes that, while in general the results are ‘sobering’, especially for those indicators where the responsibility for change lies primarily with donor country governments (OECD-DAC, 2011e). The status of EU donors’ implementation of the Paris Declaration is summarized in Table 1-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paris Indicators</th>
<th>EU (Member States and Commission)</th>
<th>2010 Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Aid flows are recorded in countries' budgets</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (EU target; Paris target is 50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Technical assistance is aligned and coordinated</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% (EU target; Paris target is 50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. Donors use Country Systems for public financial management</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50-80 (EU and now Accra global target is 50%, targets for each individual partner country depends on performance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. Donors use country procurement systems</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50-80 (EU and now Accra global target is 50%, targets for each individual partner)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1-1. Monitoring the Paris Declaration: EU status on some of the key targets
Evaluations have primarily focused on institutional constraints. The lack of progress is explained by institutional path dependence which ‘tends to slow down the dynamic of reform’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 13). Moreover, it is argued that, because the Paris Agenda has neglected certain realities in development cooperation, coordination and harmonization processes are driven ‘toward costly bureaucratic patterns of donor-driven planning procedures that hold little promise of sustainable success’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 1). For example, coordination on the ground ‘has often triggered a new surge of planning euphoria among agencies involved in multi-donor sector working groups’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 15). While the Paris Agenda has indeed generated a huge amount of activities among donors, it is not yet clear whether the reform process has led to a comprehensive approach to increasing aid effectiveness or whether the agenda must instead be understood as a list of desirable policies, especially given the well-organized self-interests of any donor agencies involved in the process’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 13).

As will be argued in Chapter 3, this thesis aims to go beyond a focus on institutions and procedures and provide a more profound understanding of the complexity of coordination. Some critics (Armon, 2007; Burrall, Maxwell, & Rocha Menocal, 2006; Wilks, 2010), have emphasized that the Paris reforms are mainly limited to technocratic approaches of efficiency in aid management and delivery, focusing on mechanism and thereby neglecting the political aspects.
of poverty and development aid. As a result it risks to reinforce ‘micromanagement’ and the need for quick results rather than dealing with policy debates in partner countries and other factors that impede ownership (Booth, 2008: 1; Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011: 25).

In the run-up to the High Level Forum in Busan (2011), observers and developing countries increasingly asked to reframe the agenda and put more emphasis on ‘development effectiveness’. The fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan had to give a response to the increasing criticism. As a result, it was to be expected that, apart from the discussions on aid and development, Busan would also be a test case for the emerging world order (Atwood, 2011; Glennie, 2011a, 2011b). Would the ‘traditional’ donors – and the EU - be able to show that the Paris principles were still valid or would the new players be able to put forward their own priorities, as laid down in the Beijing Consensus (Bredesen, 2012)? It came as no surprise that China, India and Brazil only agreed upon the outcome document on the last day of the conference. They already made clear from the outset that they were not going to subscribe to the Paris Declaration principles, designed by the ‘old club’ of OECD-DAC donors.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, agreed upon in Busan, builds on the key principle of country leadership and ownership of development strategies that also constituted the cornerstone of Paris Declaration, but broadens the scope and revises the governance system of the international aid agenda. The monitoring framework developed in the course of 2012 consists of a set of ten indicators focusing on results, the transparency, predictability and untying of aid, sound public financial management, mutual accountability, gender equality, parliamentary scrutiny and the contribution of civil society and the private sector to development. No explicit indicator was set to measure progress on coordination or harmonization. The partnership includes 160 developing and donor countries and 45 organizations including multilateral institutions, civil society the private sector (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2013).

1.2 The EU and coordination

While the previous section has looked at coordination as an aid effectiveness principle in the international development agenda, this section puts the focus exclusively on the EU, which plays the leading part in this thesis. The EU plays a unique double role, typical of the specific European construction (Orbie & Versluys, 2008). On the one hand, the EU is a fully fledged international donor, with a distinct expertise in well-identified areas of preference. On the other hand, since 2000 its key added value is progressively claimed to lie in its ability to coordinate and harmonize the aid policies of the Member States, based on the principle of complementarity.
While this 'federalizing' role in development cooperation between the institutions and the member has always been controversial, since the turn of the millennium observers have referred to a 'new season' (Carbone, 2011: 157) or a 'metamorphose' (Bué, 2010: 43) of European development policy. In this section I will present an overview of the evolution of the EU’s coordinator role, whose origins date back to the creation of the European Development Fund (EDF). The first part of the section will sketch these early initiatives up to the inclusion of EU Development Policy in the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), which we can consider as the precursors for the developments since 2000, discussed in the second part, when EU coordination gained momentum and the EU’s coordinator role has begun to take shape at the policy level. Table 1-2 summarizes the EU policy initiatives that will be discussed throughout this chapter.

### Table 1-2. Historical overview of EU policy initiatives on coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EU initiatives regarding coordination of EU development aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Rome to Maastricht and Horizon 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>- Establishment of the EDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>- Commission Memorandum on a Community Policy on Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>- Council Resolution on Harmonization &amp; Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>- Commission Communication Harmonization and Coordination of Development Cooperation Policies within the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>- Commission Communication Harmonization and Coordination of Development Cooperation Policies within the Community - Council Resolution on Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>- Commission Communication Towards Better Coordination of Development Cooperation Policies and Operations within the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>- Council Resolution on Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>- Treaty of Maastricht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-</td>
<td>- Horizon 2000 package on harmonization and coordination (including several Commission Communications and Council Resolutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>- Commission Communication Complementarity between the Community's development cooperation policy and the policies of Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>- Council Resolution Complementarity between the Development Policies and Actions of the Union and the Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>- Council Communication Guidelines for strengthening operational coordination between the Community and the Member States in the field of development cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Post-2000: a new season?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event/Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Development Policy Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Council Guidelines for strengthening operational coordination between the Community and the Member States in the field of development coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Preparation Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Barcelona Commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonization Report:</em> recommends a joint EU approach for programming aid, common implementation procedures, and more decentralized decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Presentation <em>EU Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization</em> at Paris High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>European Consensus on Development:</em> sets out a common aim and principles for the Commission’s and EU Member States’ development work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Commission Communication: <em>Delivering More, Better, Faster:</em> emphasizes the need to review rules and procedures: introduces common EU framework for programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commission Communication: <em>Joint Framework for Country Strategy Papers (CSPs):</em> sets out a path towards joint programming by the Commission and EU Member States, also including other donors where possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commission Communication: <em>Financing for development and aid effectiveness – the challenges of scaling up EU aid 2006-2010</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council Conclusions <em>Strengthening the European impact: a common Framework for Elaborating Strategy Documents per Country and Common Multi-annual Programming</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Commission Communication <em>EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour:</em> proposes limiting country involvement to three active sectors per donor and five donors per sector. (11 guiding principles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council Conclusions <em>EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><em>Fast Track Initiative (FTI):</em> speed up the implementation of the Code of Conduct in 30 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Entry into force of the <em>Lisbon Treaty</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|      | Council Conclusions *Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness:*  
|      |   - Code of Conduct implementation: ‘accelerate the FTT’.  
|      |   - Joint programming: by ‘facilitating the implementation of the Common Framework for Drafting CSPs and Joint-Multi Annual Planning’.  
|      |   - Cross-Country Division of Labour: annual exchange of information |
| 2010 | Commission Green Paper *EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development. Increasing the impact of EU development policy* |
| 2011 | Commission Green paper *The Future of EU Budget Support to third countries* |
|      | Commission Communication *Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change* |
|      | Commission Communication *The future approach to EU budget support to third countries* |
|      | Council Conclusions *The EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness including commitment to strengthening Joint-Multi-annual Programming* |
| 2012 | Council Conclusions *Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change* |
|      | Council conclusions *The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries* |
1.2.1 **From Rome to Maastricht and Horizon 2000**

Already at the outset of the European integration process, EU Member States discussed the possibility of a common development policy, but because of dissension and opposition of the national governments and aid administrations, it was clear from the very beginning that full integration would never be an option (Carbone, 2010b: 18). This section provides an overview of the evolution of the early initiatives up to the inclusion of EU Development Policy in the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) and the subsequent ‘Horizon 2000’ agenda, which we can consider as the precursors for the developments at the eve of turn of the Millennium. As this thesis primarily focus on the post-2000 period, this section does not go into detail but mainly aims to point at some general trends which arguably continued to play during these more recent developments.

**Early initiatives since the Treaties of Rome**

The first attempt to ‘communitize’ or ‘Europeanize’ development assistance came with the creation of the EDF (Carbone, 2010b: 18; Grilli, 1993: 74) when the then six Member States’ decided to transfer money to the community level in order to share the burden (Carbone, 2010a: 12; Grilli, 1993: 50-51). However, while between the 1950s and the 1980s ever more resources were transferred to the supranational level, bilateral assistance never stopped dominating the total external assistance of the Community (Holland & Doidge, 2012: 46). Moreover, the Treaty of Rome did not provide the Commission with a responsibility in the field of external assistance and aid thus mainly reproduced ‘many of the patterns of the colonial expenditures’ (Grilli, 1993: 58).

While complete multilateralization did not materialize, several forms of coordination have been initiated with the objective to homogenize assistance practices and pursue common aid objectives (Grilli, 1993: 74). In 1972, at the eve of the enlargement (1973) with Denmark, Ireland and the UK, the Commission issued a *Memorandum on a Community policy on development cooperation* including a *Programme for initial actions* in which it presented a first set of proposals on aid coordination (Carbone, 2007). Concretely, the Memorandum proposed to generalize reciprocal information exchange regarding aid allocation, which would be facilitated by the Commission in order to detect and avoid ‘double uses or possible gaps between the aid, and the possible divergences between the specific aims as well as the methods of achieving the latter which might reduce their effectiveness’ (European Commission, 1972: 21). This information could then enable the programming of bilateral aid within a wider community framework. Arguably, this Memorandum can be considered as the precursor of the current coordination policies, focusing on information-sharing and joint programming.

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2 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
However, Member States were not ready for further aid integration. In the Council a division between globalists and regionalists led to debates in a negative atmosphere. Globalists (Germany, Netherlands) advocated more integration if EU development policy would be global and untied. In contrast, regionalists preferred development policy focusing on ex-colonies (France, Belgium) and adhered to tied aid (Italy) (Carbone, 2007). According to Grilli (1993: 82) ‘the reaction must have been so negative that no further action in the field of aid harmonization and coordination was proposed in any of the subsequent documents of the Commission on development policies’. As a result, the final Council resolution (1974) did not include binding commitments but was restricted to recommendations to increase the exchange of information, mutually consult on aid policies and on positions in international organization but without a special mandate for the EU or any reference to technical coordination (Council of the EC, 1974). Despite the reluctant reaction of the Council, in 1975 and 1976 the Commission launched two more communications on the Harmonization and Coordination of Development Cooperation Policies within the Community in which it added the principle of complementarity and put forward effectiveness as the chief objective of harmonization and coordination: ‘a greater degree of effectiveness at Community level will be achieved only when the various policies of the community Member States are made to complement one another very closely’ (European Commission, 1976). On the one hand, the Commission proposed to increase harmonization of ‘general aspects of cooperation’ which are referred to as ‘conception, principles, objectives and methods’ of cooperation policies. On the other hand the Commission also aimed to work on harmonization of ‘operational aspects’ at the implementation level in developing countries, including ‘concerted action at sectoral level’ or ‘coordination of operations in connection with specific projects and programmes’ (European Commission, 1975). However, these proposals did not manifest into concrete steps. The attempts of the Commission were weakened in the Council and resulted in non-binding voluntary statements. This tenor lasted until the beginning of the 80s, when Member States - confronted with the economic recession - were less interested in the integration of aid and shared a ‘tacit understanding to leave things pretty much as they were in the contentious area of aid administration’ (Grilli, 1993: 83).

In March 1984, after a critical report of the Court of Auditors, the Commission (1984) made a new attempt with the Communication Towards Better Coordination of Development Cooperation Policies and Operations within the Community. In this communication the Commission took a more moderate stance and emphasized ad-hoc forms of coordination ‘adapted to the interests and particular sensitivities of each Member State in respect of specific regions, countries or sectors’ (Grilli, 1993: 82-83). The proposed actions mainly dealt with exchange of information, field coordination and more systematic use of co-financing. However, once again the succeeding Council resolution (1984) remained vague and emphasized that ‘strengthening operational cooperation should be approached pragmatically by introducing...
voluntary “à la carte” coordination tailored to the policies of each Member State’ (Council of the EC, 1984). As a result, in the European Act of 1986 coordination of European development policies was not mentioned (Carbone, 2007).

The Treaty of Maastricht and the ‘Triple C’

In the debates that preceded the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Commission proposal for a common development policy was rejected again by the Council (Carbone, 2010b). The UK was most opposed to the proposal, while Belgium was most enthusiastic. In between those extremes were France (preferred status quo), Germany (preferred focus on efficiency and coherence), Netherlands (preferred focus on coherence) and Italy (ambiguous position).

The Treaty of Maastricht provided the EU with a legal basis for development policy and laid down three core principles (the so-called Triple C), namely complementarity3, coordination and coherence (Carbone, 2007). Article 180 constitutes the coordination principle which is not explicit on the level of coordination and thus remains subject to interpretation. The article refers to the exchange of information, harmonized procedures, joint sectoral approaches and joint policy frameworks. A new feature is that the Commission is appointed to take initiatives. Article 177 stipulates the complementarity provisions and is again rather vague. The Commission is expected to offer distinct advantages over the development programmes of the Member States given its global presence, its role in facilitating coordination and harmonization and in promoting ‘best practice’ across the EU and its experience in the areas of governance and democracy promotion (Dearden, 2008: 28-29). Development thus became a shared competence between the Commission and the Member States which inevitably resulted in a problem of division of responsibilities (Lundsgaarde, 2012: 705). The Treaty did not specify the respective responsibilities and tasks of the Community and those of the Member States (Carbone, 2007; Van Reisen, 1999: 61). Individual Member States have remained in the lead of managing and implementing their development aid according to national priorities and preferences (Holland & Doidge, 2012: 184; Söderbaum, 2010: 19). The Treaty of Maastricht raised expectations on improved coordination in development policy and in the next years the Commission launched several initiatives to elaborate its newly acquired role. However, in general the Member States remained reluctant towards a transfer of their sovereignty to the EU-level.

3 The principle of complementarity refers to the shared competence which differs from subsidiarity in the sense that ‘in the case of complementarity both the Commission and the Member States can have competences and tasks at the same level’ (Hoebink, 2004: 7).
The ‘Horizon 2000’ Agenda

The Commission launched a wide range of communications (European Commission, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d, 1995) that were followed by declarations (Council of the EC, 1992), conclusions (Council of the EU, 1993a) and resolutions (Council of the EU, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1995) in the Development Council. This package of initiatives fell under the ‘Horizon 2000’ which was launched in 1992 to prepare European development policy in the run-up to 2000 (Van Reisen, 1999: 61). Several pilot projects were initiated based on the principle that coordination should start at the country level⁴. Other coordination efforts were made in the areas of gender and human rights (Van Reisen, 1999: 64-65). However, these initiatives only produced mixed results. Lack of political will and capacity in the recipient countries, the lack of coordination with initiatives of other donors such as the WB, tensions within the Commission such as communication problems between delegations and headquarters, as well as reluctance in the Member States and especially the British reservation hindered real progress (Agence Europe, 28/05/1996; Van Reisen, 1999: 64-65). On the basis of the experiences gained on the ground, the Council repeatedly discussed operational coordination, but no conclusions were adopted.

Holland (cited in: Carbone, 2010a: 12) states that development mirrored a weak constituency vis-à-vis other policies in the Member States. Global aid reached its lowest level in the late 1990s and EU aid has largely followed this trend (OECD-DAC, 2011d: 222). In 1997 European aid was at its lowest level since 1970, resulting from a 10 per cent cut in the budget for development cooperation (Agence Europe, 19/09/1996). Moreover, with the enlargement of the EU in 1995⁵, the extension of the development programme of the Commission was perceived by the Member States as fragmentation of Commission development programmes and the Commission was considered an ineffective aid bureaucracy. In addition to this, the Commission’s preferred view on subsidiarity as well as the perceived bureaucratic self-interest to expand its own role through the coordination agenda only fostered this reluctance (Holland & Doidge, 2012: 185-186). Member states thus severely questioned the added value of a supranational (European) development (Carbone, 2010b). Coordination in the light of Horizon 2000 thus suffered from EU countries’ ‘general low commitment to the implementation of the resolutions – even if in some cases the principles set out in the resolutions have their support’ (Van Reisen, 1999: 61). Or as the then German

⁴ In October 1994 a first pilot project on coordination between the Commission and the Member States was established in six countries, namely Peru and Ivory Coast (successful pilot exercises), Ethiopia and Mozambique (some success achieved), and Bangladesh and Costa Rica (exercise failed) (Van Reisen, 1999: 62). Other pilot programmes have been set up in seven countries to coordinate a poverty approach, namely in Peru, Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Mozambique (Van Reisen, 1999: 63).
⁵ With this 4th enlargement Finland, Austria and Sweden became EU Member States
Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development Carl-Dieter Spranger (cited in Holtz, 1998) put it: ‘I see nothing that we could not also do effectively at the bilateral level with the money that we give the EU for its development cooperation - and that is 30 per cent of its total budget. And so far no-one has explained to me what the EU can do better than we can’.

1.2.2 Post-2000: a new season?

The following section discusses the post-2000 era and focuses on the developments that led to the adoption of the European Consensus on Development and the succeeding Council Conclusions. The analysis starts from the existing literature, but provides a more in-depth understanding by adding insights gained from a study of Agence Europe documents. The section aims to clarify the shift, referred to as a ‘new season’ (Carbone, 2011: 157) or a ‘metamorphose’ (Buć, 2010: 43), towards better coordination of European development policies.

Progress in the Council

In April 1998 the Council discussed a range of guidelines to enhance coordination between the Commission and the Member States in a Communication Strengthening Community – Member State operational coordination (Council of the EU, 1998). However, the Council adopted these guidelines only in January 2001. The main principle states that this coordination has to ‘strengthen the role of the beneficiary country in the general coordination of aid’. The ultimate goal is to establish a dominant role for the beneficiary state in each stage of the coordination process. Furthermore EU coordination should link up with existing donor coordination mechanisms on the ground: ‘the enhanced coordination may also be extended to other actors in the field of development coordination outside the EU’. The proposal mentions how the specific role and modalities of EU coordination should be determined in each sector/area of development cooperation. First a joint (both beneficiary country and EU) assessment of the situation should be done in which the country priorities and (for each sector) the Community and Member States policies are outlined, as well as coordination mechanisms that include other donors. On the ground, the Commission Delegation should implement this coordination process between the Commission and the Member States, ‘in close collaboration with the presidency’, but this follow-up can be delegated to a Member State. The concrete arrangements or modalities for operational coordination can include regular meetings, exchange of information, joint studies, analyses, evaluations, joint sectoral programmes and harmonization and adaptation of aid arrangements.

At the successive Development Council meetings in 1999 and 2000, progress on complementarity between the cooperation of Member States and the Commission, including the
Commission report on the implementation of the 1998 guidelines, was discussed. The Council of May 1999, under the chairmanship of the German Minister Wieczork-Zeul, focused on improving the efficacy of development cooperation and complementarity was one of the themes discussed, yet without agreement on firm conclusions. However, on the fringe of this Council, seven European Development Cooperation Ministers\(^6\) from socialist parties presented the *New Agenda for European Development Cooperation* in which they call for global social justice and insist on improving the effectiveness of Community development aid and ask for *ambitious reforms in the management of European aid*. Moreover, they made a strong call for better coordination between Community and Member State development policies as well as for a reinforcement of European presence in international bodies (Agence Europe, 28/05/1999).

**First Development Policy Statement and the Monterrey process**

In September 1999, Poul Nielson, former Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, took office as the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid. Among his priorities were increasing the effectiveness of European policy, improving cooperation between donors and enhancing internal coordination between the Community and the Member States to ensure greater consistency (Agence Europe, 16/11/1999). In February 2000 the Commission launched a public consultation on the future development policy. The exercise had to contribute to the definition of a coherent global strategy which should increase the impact and quality of the EU at the international scene (Agence Europe, 02/03/2000). The consultation included four areas: 1) focus on poverty reduction, 2) harmonization of development policy’s framework, 3) focusing interventions in a limited numbers of fields and 4) aid efficiency.

In April 2000, following the results of the consultation and discussions within the college Commissioner Nielson presented his ideas on new European guidelines for development policy. Poverty eradication should be the main objective of Community interventions and coordination with the programmes of the Member States and international donors had to be improved to reach greater effectiveness (Agence Europe, 26/04/2000). To this end he also proposed to define the added value of Community intervention based on its comparative advantages in six areas\(^7\). This vision on the future European development policy was presented to the Development

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\(^6\) Namely Claire Short (UK), Heidemarie Wieczork-Zeul (Germany), Charles Josselin (France), Pierre Schori (Sweden), Eveline Herfkens (Netherlands), Poul Nielson (Denmark) and Rino Serri (Italy)

\(^7\) These are 1) development trade, 2) integration and regional cooperation, 3) macro-economic policies linked to poverty eradication strategies (mainly the strengthening of social sectors such as health and education, reliable and lasting transport which plays a crucial role in access to basic social services); 4) food safety and sustainable rural development strategies; 5) strengthening of institutional capacities; and 6) the good management of public affairs.
Council in May. In the end of that year, ‘for the first time in the history of the Union’s development cooperation’, the Council and the Commission agreed on a political reference text setting the aims of European development policy and introduced the principle of division of labour between the Commission and the Member States based on their comparative advantages (Agence Europe, 13/11/2000). The Development Policy Statement symbolized the ‘European doctrine’ for development and aimed at ‘greater clarity, greater effectiveness of European aid and greater visibility of efforts undertaken by the Union and its Member States in the field’. The Commission elaborated an action plan and a harmonized framework for CSPs to ensure operational implementation of the declaration. Furthermore, the Commission promised to undertake major reforms of its aid management.

In the end of 2001, the EU started with the preparations of the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey which would take place in March 2002 and during which the international community would agree on how to achieve the MDGs. The draft consensus did not include binding commitments or a timetable (Agence Europe, 11/02/2002). During a crisis meeting following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, EU development ministers had already pled for an increase of global aid to development and ‘the duty of the Union’s Member States to show the example by respecting their undertaking to allocate 0.7 per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to that cause was unanimously stressed by the development cooperation ministers’ (Agence Europe, 11/10/2001). However, during the Development Council of November 2001, Member States examined the timetable for reaching the 0.7 per cent of GDP to Official Development Assistance (ODA) but a dividing line hampered agreement. Countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg and Ireland advocated a fix timetable but encountered opposition of countries like France, Spain and Germany. As a result, the Council asked the Commission to dialogue with the Member States on setting a timetable (Agence Europe, 08/11/2001). Only during the last week before the start of the UN conference, on the eve of the European Council in Barcelona, Member States reached agreement on a fixed timetable for reaching the 0.7 per cent target (Agence Europe, 14/03/2002). Apart from the 0.7 per cent target, during the Council in Barcelona, the European Council defined seven other explicit commitments regarding the quality of aid. One of these is the commitment on coordination and harmonization. Consequently, at the Monterrey Conference the EU was ‘able to hold its head high and speak with a single voice’ (Agence Europe, 14/03/2002). It is argued that the process towards Monterrey entailed ‘a remarkable shift towards more integration in European development policy’ (Orbie, 2003: 395). The fact that the EU managed to act as a unitary actor contributed to its ability to shape the international development agenda. This led to the realization that better coordination led to political leadership and influence in international decisions (Carbone, 2007). Moreover, the Commission obtained a
monitoring role in the implementation of the Barcelona commitments as it was agreed that it would supervise the progress made by the Member States. Now that Member States seemed to have become more open towards coordination, the Commission used this occasion to launch several ambitious initiatives. At the Council of June 2004, development ministers ‘stressed the importance they attach to the fact that the Development Commissioner within the future European Commission must be able to speak with a powerful voice’ (Agence Europe, 02/06/2004). The Council established the EU Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonization to enhance EU coordination and harmonization at the country level which resulted in the development of a roadmap indicating the steps the EU would take to improve coordination at the country level (OECD-DAC, 2005: 39).

The Paris Declaration and the European Consensus

In 2005 the new Commissioner Louis Michel took office with a strong mission to revise the 2000 Statement on Development Policy in order to turn it into a political declaration which would not only apply to the EU but also to the Member States. During the Council of February 2005 Michel presented the broad lines of a renewed declaration, and expressed his hope to be able to agree on ‘a real joint development strategy’ which he considered appropriate and feasible, especially ‘after the fashion of the EU’s common security policy’ (Agence Europe, 22/02/2005). ‘I do not see why it would be harder to achieve than a common security strategy, in that one does not aim to steal States’ strategies, but to push for a harmonization of the rules’ (Agence Europe, 22/02/2005), Commissioner Michel argued.

The ambitions to foster internal EU coordination coincided with the developments at the international level. Observers point to the lead role of the EU in the run-up, during and in the aftermath of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in February – March 2005. According to Carbone (2007), partly because of the EU’s increasing internal coordination and its joint position, the Paris Declaration became a reality in 2005. The Declaration did not yet include measurable and time-bound targets to implement the aid effectiveness principles it embodied. However, ‘frustrated at the speed of decision making’ the EU and some bilateral governments put forward their own commitments (Eurodad, 2005). In particular, the EU presented the EU Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization and agreed to some specific targets, amongst others in the field of coordinated capacity building, the increased use of budget support and the reduction of uncoordinated missions. The EU Presidency’s Statement indicated the EU’s ambitions to improve internal coordination and lead in the implementation of the Paris Declaration: ‘we are ready to place the EU in the forefront of increasing aid effectiveness and realizing the benefits of harmonization and alignment. […] Our approach is to be seen as a collective contribution from the EU, but not exclusively for the EU’ (Schiltz, 2005).
The Commission’s vision was that ‘only a united strong Europe speaking with one voice can make the difference’ (Europe, 25/10/2005) which indicates that the EU’s ambitions reached further than only improving the effectiveness of EU aid: ‘it is unacceptable for the Union, whose diplomatic force is made up of over 20,000 ambassadors, three times that of the U.S., should rank second when it comes to influencing political decision-makers’ (Europe, 18/11/2005). In July 2005, after a large stakeholder consultation, the Commission adopted a proposal for the EU’s new Development policy, which would serve as the basis for the first European Consensus in 50 years of development cooperation. The proposal comprised a common framework of objectives, values and principles that the EU should support and promote as a global player (Agence Europe, 13/07/2005). It included a part on the role of the Commission and a controversial part on the role of the EU (Carbone, 2007).

With the framework Commissioner Michel envisaged: ‘not 100 per cent harmonization, but rather to facilitate, through common principles and targets, coalitions of Member States that can provide value added to the implementation of parts of programmes and avoid duplication of effort by sharing out work better’. Furthermore ‘the Commission would be given the role of inspiring and managing, seeking synergy and collaboration for each interest group’ (Agence Europe, 13/07/2005).

However, the proposed political declaration for a genuine common development strategy did not enjoy unanimous approval when it was sent to the Council. On the one hand, ‘the stumbling block was the fear expressed by the UK Presidency and various of the Member States, mainly those which already do the most for poor countries in terms of state development aid […] of seeing excessive harmonization of 26 different development policies (those of the Commission and the 25 Member States), who would be giving centre stage to the Commission’ (Agence Europe, 25/10/2005). Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the UK were against a joint vision and against a coordinator role for the Commission. Germany, the Netherlands and Finland adhered to a joint strategy but did not agree with the Commission as the leading coordinator (Bué, 2010: 205; Carbone, 2007). On the other hand ‘some countries like to go further’ (Agence Europe, 25/10/2005), namely France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, but also the Eastern Member States which together formed a ‘European front’ (Bué, 2010: 205; Carbone, 2007). For example, Belgium was one of the countries that felt that ‘greater coordination and harmonization is the job of the Commission’ and according to the then Belgian Secretary of State for Cooperation Armand de Decker ‘the Commission can make our action more visible’ (Agence Europe, 25/10/2005). The discussions proceed within the Development Working Group and at the informal Council of October 2005 the majority of Member States accepted the idea of a joint declaration and the need for more coordination. The ‘European front’ had a clear majority and the UK Presidency had to admit its defeat (Bué, 2010: 205; Carbone, 2007).
Finally, during the Council of November 2005, the Council agreed on the common development statement. Not only did the EU see this as ‘at historical turning-point in the development policy of the Union’ (Agence Europe, 22/11/2005), the OECD-DAC considers the European Consensus as an important strategic success, particularly because it emphasizes the double role of the EU and the added value of the ‘federalizing’ function (OECD-DAC, 2007b: 13). The major difference with the Commission proposal of January 2005 was that there was no neither a thematic framework nor an action plan but these would appear on the agenda in the near future (Carbone, 2007).

The European Consensus is based on the aid effectiveness agenda, emphasizing the principles of ownership, partnership, coordination, political dialogue, participation, gender equality and coherence. Poverty reduction and the MDGs are the formal joint objectives. The EU engages to provide more and better aid through budget support, untied aid and coordination and complementarity (Carbone, 2007). Moreover, the Consensus commits the EU to take a lead role in implementing the Paris commitments, laying out additional commitments where the EU shows its ambition to do better than the internationally agreed targets. This exposes the growing aspirations of the EU to become an international norm-setter in its own right (Orbie, 2008). According to Carbone (2007) the Consensus changed the role of the EU as an international actor.

**An emerging policy framework on aid effectiveness**

The Consensus has served as the main framework for several policy initiatives to improve aid effectiveness which the Commission ambitiously promoted in the following years. In March 2006 the Commission presented a package of measures to improve aid effectiveness. The first Communication *EU aid – delivering more, better and faster* (2006a) proposes a new action plan on aid effectiveness. The action plan seeks to implement the principles of the Paris Declaration (Schulz, 2007) and consists of three pillars with concrete measures to be implemented before 2010. More specifically it wants to map and supervise Member States’ activities in a transparent manner by means of the EU Donor Atlas through which aid deficits and excesses can be identified (sectors and countries). Secondly, the EU aims to take up a leading role in the implementation of the Paris Agenda and proposes a Joint Multi-annual Programming Framework. The second Communication *Increasing the impact of EU aid: A common framework for drafting CSPs and joint multiannual programming* (European Commission, 2006c) elaborates this in greater detail. The Joint Multi-annual Programming Framework aims to reduce the transaction costs of programming and avoid duplication. It states to provide for a mechanism which is compatible with existing national documents and cycles, and is open to other donors. Starting
with a joint analysis of country situations by both the Commission and Member states, the framework should in the medium term lead to collective response strategies to the challenges raised in the joint country analysis (identification of objectives, priority areas and division of labour) and in the long term to joint programming. Thirdly, the action plan seeks to implement the aid effectiveness engagements of the European vision on donor coordination, elaborated in the European Consensus through improved division of labour, joint activities and co-financing and the promotion of the EU vision for example by the organization of European Development Days and the design of European Development Reports. The third communication Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness – The challenges of scaling up EU aid 2006 – 2010 (European Commission, 2006b) deals with the monitoring of the implementation of the Barcelona commitments.

Arguably, the discourse surrounding the EU initiatives on aid effectiveness in the post-2000 era emphasizes the ambition to become a global player in international development. Commissioner Michel emphasized that ‘I am not calling for any more power in this field of shared competence but I do want a more influential, more visible EU’ (Agence Europe, 02/03/2006). Moreover, whereas the EU is the ‘leading world donor of ODA […] one can be surprised at the little influence that the EU has compared to other donors’, he stressed.


In February 2007, the Commission adopted a Communication recommending a Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy (European Commission, 2007) between Member States and the Commission. According to Schulz (2007) the European Consensus includes a European vision of donor coordination. The Paris Declaration did neither include indicators for Division of Labour, nor a strategy to divide the responsibilities among the donors. Observers therefore considered the EU as ‘fertile grounds for the application and feasibility test of new concepts like complementarity, because of its Member States’ long-standing experience with the supranational modus operandi’ (Schulz, 2007: 2). According to Carbone (2007), the Code not only aimed to improve aid efficiency, but also to strengthen the EU identity in the international development arena. The proposed Code of Conduct laid down operational

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8 Initially, Denmark, Sweden and Finland were ‘reticent’ but they ‘finally allowed, for the needs of this joint programming, the Commission to take initiatives such as creating funds’ (Agence Europe, 11/04/2006).
Division of labour is defined as ‘changing the situation by systematically reducing the number of donors in overcrowded sectors and increasing support for orphan sectors, making use of donors’ comparative advantages in the process to ensure the complementarity of their contributions’ (European Commission, 2011b). In essence, through the Code of Conduct EU donors would commit themselves to focus on maximum three sectors per country (in-country complementarity), in areas where they can bring added value, with a maximum of five EU donors per sector (cross-sector complementarity). This strategy would usually involve delegated cooperation, in which a donor, the lead donor, acts with authority on behalf of one or more other donor(s), silent partners or delegating donors. Furthermore, the EU Member States would agree to concentrate on a limited number of priority countries while assuring adequate funding to aid orphans and fragile states (cross country complementarity).

Division of labour is a very sensitive issue because it ‘implies an extensive revision of the hitherto generalized approach taken by almost all donors to cover almost all aspects of the fight against poverty’ (Schulz, 2007: 4). According to Commissioner Michel agreement on division of labour is delicate ‘mainly because, in this area of shared responsibility, Member States display a reflex action in seeking to hoist their flag over every project they fund – I’ve got nothing against this, but I think that a European flag would provide more visibility – and for historical reasons, and a preferred economic agenda, some countries have given a priority to countries they feel closer to’ (Agence Europe, 28/02/2007). The Council adopted the Code of Conduct in May 2007 (Agence Europe, 15/05/2007). However, while the Code of Conduct included clear indicators regarding in-country division of labour, the debate on comparative advantages needed for cross-sector complementarity was still embryonic and no strategies were formulated yet to deal with the aid deficit in aid orphans (Schulz, 2007).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1-3. Key passages in the code of conduct referring to Division of Labour</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political Commitment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. The Council recognizes that reinforcing the complementarity of donor activities is of paramount importance for increasing aid effectiveness, and thus for a more effective and efficient development assistance. …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Council underlines that EU initiatives on a better division of labour will aim at reinforcing the objective of strengthening the partner country ownership and capacities to take over responsibility for donor coordination processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Council agrees that the EU should act as a driving force for complementarity and division of labour within the international harmonization and alignment process, and that the EU should follow an inclusive approach that is open to all donors, and whenever possible</td>
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</table>
Guiding Principles

1. Concentrate on a limited number of sectors in-country
2. Redeployment for other in-country activities
3. Lead donor arrangements
4. Delegated cooperation/partnership
5. Ensure an adequate support
6. Replicate practices at regional level
7. Establish priority countries
8. Address the ‘orphans’ gap
9. Analyse and expand areas of strength
10. Pursue progress on other dimensions of complementarity
11. Deepen the reforms

Source: OECD-DAC, 2010a: 15

To implement the Code of conduct, in May 2008 the EU launched the **FTI on Division of Labour and Complementarity** in 30 partner countries. The FTI works with supporting and facilitating donors⁹ and implementation is evaluated on a yearly basis. The first monitoring took place in 2008 and included 22 countries. The results served as input for international discussions on Division of Labour, end more specifically for the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, where the EU managed to put division of labour high on the agenda. The second monitoring took place in 2009. This monitoring report served as input for the OECD-DAC Task Team on Division of Labour and Complementarity in February 2010 for the evaluation of the Paris Declaration. In 2009 the Commission published the EU Toolkit for the implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour in development policy. It is no formal document but aims to provide guidance for EU Delegations, Member States’ agencies and embassies and their headquarters to help speeding up the division of labour process.

In November 2009, the Council endorsed the **Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness** (Council of the EU, 2009). In this framework the EU seeks ways to rapidly advance implementation of its existing commitments by establishing a set of practical joint measures in three areas, namely division of labour, the use of country systems and technical cooperation for

⁹ This term is the official label which the EU uses for designing those EU donors which should launch and monitor the implementation of the FTI on Division of Labour in a particular country. The term should not be confused with the ‘facilitator role’ introduced in this thesis as one of the possible roles EU Delegation’s may play in donor-wide coordination (cf. Table 8-3. Spectrum of the EU Delegations’ role in donor-wide coordination p. 280).
enhanced capacity development. The document clearly symbolizes the self-image of the EU as a leading actor in international development: ‘the EU, providing nearly 60 per cent of global ODA, will continue to show leadership in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda and be a driving force in delivering on the commitments made’ (Council of the EU, 2009). It calls on both the Member States and the Commission to start implementing the measures and points to the benefits that this will bring about: ‘joint EU approaches in the implementation of aid effectiveness will collectively leverage more progress than can be achieved individually by Member States and the Commission’.

Concretely the Operational Framework in the area of Division of Labour aimed to further implement the guiding principles and measures of the EU Code of Conduct. In the context of the FTI on Division of Labour steps were already taken to implement the Code of Conduct, but the Operational Framework stresses the importance of necessary measures to improve the monitoring system of the FTI: improving the dialogue on Division of Labour (with partner countries and other donors), clarifying donor decision making structures, improving communication between donor headquarters and country level and collecting necessary information in a more systematic manner. It also underlined the ownership principles by stating that the Commission and the Member states will use existing mechanisms at country level.

**Explaining the emergence of the ‘new season’**

In the post-2000 era the EU was clearly able to manifest its coordinator role at the policy level. The EU’s key added value was progressively claimed to lie in its ability to coordinate and harmonize the aid policies of the Member States, based on the principle of complementarity (Hoebink, 2004). This shift can be explained by a combination of internal and external factors. First, the external context provided for a window of opportunity to let the EU act as a global actor in the field of development by presenting itself as a coherent actor ‘able to hold its head high and speak with a single voice’ (Agence Europe, 14/03/2002). The increased international attention to donor coordination constituted an excellent opportunity for the EU to deepen and strengthen its coordinating role as well as to present itself as a responsible global actor ready to assume leadership in the international aid effectiveness agenda. Member States increasingly realized that in order to influence the global agenda and prevent duplication of effort and maximize the impact of the EU’s aid, coordination should be increased. Surely the events of 11 September 2001 added to the increased support for scaling up the quantity and quality of EU aid and to provide for an alternative of the US approach.
Second, inside Europe the combination of Member States which wanted to project their development values and let the EU act as a force for good (cf. Nordic Plus\(^{10}\)) and Member States for which development policy served as an instrument to establish the EU as a global power, helped to reach a pragmatic European Consensus on Development. The debate preceding the European Consensus represented a more general split within the EU between those who aim for a European solution (the ‘European front’ consisting of France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg) and those who prefer a global solution of donor-wide coordination (the ‘like-minded’ or ‘Nordic Plus’ countries being Denmark, UK, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden) (Bué, 2010: 206). It should be noted that simultaneously, in 1999, four female Development Ministers, namely Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (Germany), Clare Short (UK), Hilde Johnson (Norway) and Eveline Herfkens (Netherlands) had formed the Utstein Group, which the aim to meet regularly and show ‘by example how common goals can be achieved by informal, practical cooperation’ (GIZ, 2003). This resulted in an interesting dynamic of on the one hand the like-minded countries winning ground in the field of the EU’s development policy orientation, and on the other hand the European Front donors which took the lead in the plea for European commitments (Bué, 2010: 210). In his research about donor coordination on good governance Carbone (2010b: 23) refers to a similar division.

Third, the European Commission had initiated several reforms to make its aid bureaucracy more effective. Especially since the Santer Commission resigned in 1999, the Commission focused on modernizing its aid administration (Lehtinen, 2001). Administrative reforms included the introduction of planning documents and instruments to simplify structures and improve coherence. EuropeAid was established as the single implementing agency, CSPs were introduced as a joint planning mechanism, and a move towards ‘deconcentration’ was initiated to shift greater responsibilities from headquarters in Brussels to Commission delegations in partner countries (Rocha Menocal, Handley, & Graves, 2007).

\(^{10}\) The Nordic Plus countries are a group of donor agencies that ‘share a similar aid focus’ (Schulz, 2007) and have their own common action plan on harmonization and alignment. In 2005, Nordic Plus countries adopted principles of complementarity stating that donors should focus on three sectors per country, while assuring that one to three Nordics are present in strategic sectors. This division of labour is operational in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In 2006 they agreed on delegated cooperation which gives a lead donor in a certain sector operational autonomy while the co-donor(s) remain silent.
1.2.3 The post-Lisbon era

With the Treaty of Lisbon\textsuperscript{11}, which came into force on 1 December 2009, and in particular the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU aimed at improving the legal and institutional provisions to enable more coherence and coordination in its external policies. In the case of development policy, the EU should now be better mandated to carry forward the challenges of fragmentation and proliferation of aid. According to Carbone (Carbone, 2010a: 14) the Lisbon treaty has strengthened the principles of complementarity and coordination: ‘while previously the Commission development policy had to complement national development policies, now the two aspects of EU development policy complement and reinforce each other’. Furthermore, with the Lisbon Treaty the EU aimed at strengthening the role of the EU as a global actor by making it a more coherent, efficient and visible especially in the field of development (Van Seters & Klaver, 2011).

Besides embedding poverty reduction as the main objective of development cooperation, Article 210 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that ‘in order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation’. To promote this coordination, the Treaty states that ‘the Commission may take any useful initiative’. The Treaty does not alter the shared competence between the Member States and the EU institutions but reiterates the legal obligation of coordination in EU development cooperation:

‘
1. In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organizations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes.

2. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the coordination referred to in paragraph 1.\textsuperscript{12}

(Article 210 of the Lisbon Treaty)

Yet, the post-Lisbon policies and institutional set-up may have an impact on the on-going coordination efforts in the field. The major institutional changes with potential implications for development cooperation and aid coordination are (1) the creation of the EEAS, led by High Representative (HR) Ashton, which will be co-responsible for the programming of development

\textsuperscript{11} This thesis does not expand on the post-Lisbon development cooperation in general but mainly focuses on the area of coordination in EU development cooperation. Important questions such as Policy Coherence for Development and the focus on poverty reduction are thus left outside the scope of this thesis.
aid together with the newly established Commission’s DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO) and (2) the transformation of Commission Delegations into EU Delegations and the accompanying additional responsibilities.

First, the EEAS became operational on 1 December 2010, one year after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. With the establishment of EEAS, led by HR Catherine Ashton, the EU envisaged more consistent external action. Together, the EEAS and HR Ashton act as a bridge between the institutions and dimensions of the EU external relations in order to improve both coordination and coherence (Furness, 2010). The institutional links with the Council should enable collaboration between the EEAS and the Member States which may help to reduce fragmentation and deliver on the Division of Labour Agenda (Engel, 2011). Within the service, a Development Cooperation Coordination division and a cross-departmental Development Cooperation Task Force have been created (Concord, 2012). The new Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs is responsible for the new DG DEVCO which incorporates the former Development and EuropeAid DGs. DEVCO combines policy formulation and implementation and has ended the geographic split between groups of developing countries, to allow for more coherence.

Together, the EEAS and DEVCO will be responsible for the programming of development aid and will have to take the lead over different phases of the programming cycle. The rationale is that this institutional arrangement should enable the integration of development goals into EU foreign policy and thus allow for more holistic approaches (Kostanyan, 2011; Van Seters & Klaver, 2011). The EEAS will take the lead in the preparations of the programming decisions and sectoral and country aid allocation, by designing the Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs and RSPs) and Indicative Programs (NIPs and RIPs), under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Development, and in collaboration with the Commission. Both the Commissioner for Development and the HR have to agree to any proposal.

Second, with the establishment of the EEAS, the former Commission Delegations have turned into EU delegations. They will now represent the Union instead of the Commission and they will operate under the authority of HR Ashton. Furthermore ‘they shall act in close cooperation with Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions’ (Article 221). The Delegations which had hitherto been primarily occupied with aid and trade matters now have additional political and diplomatic tasks. They will take over the coordination and the lead of the EU political dialogue with developing countries which was previously the responsibility of the rotating presidency. To deal with these additional responsibilities a substantial increase of staff was planned. Commission staff (mainly
from DG DEVCO and DG Trade) remains under the authority of the Commission and further arrangements will need to be elaborated to clarify the chains of command (Missiroli, 2010). Apart from these changes, the Delegations will keep on playing a crucial role in the programming and management of the aid programs and projects and in the coordination of EU donors in the field. While their overall mandate may have been strengthened, the EU Delegations did not gain additional competences in the field of aid coordination. Their role thus remains highly dependent on how the actors in the Delegations and in the other aid agencies will react.

The new provisions generate both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand it was expected that the newly established EU Delegations will be able ‘to engage more strategically with partner country governments and Member State actors than European Commission Delegations have hitherto been able’ (Furness, 2011: 14). The fact that the overall mandate of the Delegations is strengthened could arguably strengthen their profile in the field. If they succeed in fulfilling their new role and acquire a more legitimate political profile in the country, Member States may possibly be more inclined to let them play a coordinating role. However, this may prove difficult in the short-term as Member States might need time to adjust to the new leadership of the EU Delegation (ECDPM, 2010). Another argument which has been put forward is that the presence of EEAS staff and diplomats from the Member States may imply new opportunities for coordination because of the formal links with the Council and because of the fact that the Delegations are supposed to work in close cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States (Ford, 2010). In addition to this meetings between Heads of Delegations (HoD), which are usually focusing on political issues and which are now led by the EU HoDs, may also be used as a tool to foster aid coordination. However, this may arguably be more feasible in countries where strategic and political interests are rather low and this will also to a great extent depend to the personal interest and experience in the field of aid and development of the HoD.

Changing global context and the Agenda for Change

In recent years, several changes in the global and European context have affected the EU’s policy priorities which might influence its commitment to coordination. More specifically, the emergence of new players in development and the economic and financial crisis have challenged the EU’s development agenda and its focus on coordination.

First, new players have (re-)entered the international development arena. Emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil and South-Africa (BRICs) have become key investors in developing countries which changed the balance of power and challenged the legitimacy and leverage of
traditional OECD-DAC donors (Grimm & Hackenesch, 2012: 211). Besides, private foundations have become increasingly important for developing countries’ economies, resulting in that ODA is no longer the main source of external financing for development (Fejerskov, 2013). According to Lundsgaarde (2012: 707) ‘the non-DAC development aid providers offer a direct challenge to the efficiency agenda in European development cooperation’ and especially challenge the EU’s role in international donor coordination, given the competing priorities of these new actors (Grimm, Humphrey, Lundsgaarde, & de Souza, 2009: 12).

Second, the political landscape in Europe was marked by a shift to the (centre-) right and the economic and financial crisis further accelerated the transformations. Aid budgets have been under pressure resulting in a severe cut in development finance. As the impact of aid is questioned, donor governments are under increased pressure to focus on results and show ‘value for money’. The governments which agreed upon the Paris Declaration have changed and in particular those countries which had been recognized for their lead role in fostering the aid effectiveness agenda, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK, have adopted an approach towards development that is based on the mutual interests of dealing with development. According to Fejerskov (2013: 35-36) ‘any approach that pursues the interests of third countries (even those of poverty reduction) at the expense of EU self-interest will face limited political support in the current climate of the euro crisis, as the position of the EU slowly moves in an inward-looking direction’.

These tendencies have affected the EU’s internal policy debates on development as well as the EU’s role in the international aid discussions, and specifically at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.

First, to deal with all these challenges, in 2010 the new Commissioner Andris Piebalgs launched a Consultation Process on the future of European development cooperation and the use of budget support, based on the Commission’s Green Papers "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development. Increasing the impact of EU development policy" and "The Future of EU Budget Support to third countries", which were presented as milestones for modernizing EU development policy. The consultations resulted in 2011 in two Commission Communications on "Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change" and "The future approach to EU budget support to third countries". In May 2012 the Council adopted the new policy package. The Agenda for Change reflects the EU’s answers to the changing global context, and puts the focus on economic growth and the mutual interests related to development, such as security and migration. In the area of coordination, the Agenda reiterates the importance of ‘working together better’ through joint multiannual programming and implementing the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour.
Second, different from its ambitions and the role it played in Paris, in Busan the EU left a different impression. Observers mainly reported on the rather moderate or even weak role the EU played in the run up and during the international round-table (cf. Banks, 2011; Ellmers, 2011; Faletti, 2011). The principal explanations put forward are the shifting international balance of power and the EU’s struggle to remain a key player in the rapidly changing world, the current challenging political and economic context, characterized by the global economic crisis, tensions within the euro zone and the Arab Spring, which have dominated the agenda of the EU and the Member States (Van Seters & Klaver, 2011). However, the Council succeeded to adopt a Common Position in which it reiterates the commitment to strengthening joint multiannual programming.

1.2.4 Slow progress at country level

Some academics (Söderbaum, 2010: 19; Söderbaum & Stalgren, 2008) have started to look at the implementation of the EU coordination strategies on the ground. These studies suggest that there is only limited ‘European’ coordination. While it is recognized that there is an increasing ‘Europeanization’ in terms of Brussels’ made strategies, the situation in the field possibly represents more division than unity among European donors and obstacles and resistance are increasing (Bué, 2010). The 2004 evaluation on the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty (cf. Triple C evaluations) found that EU coordination mechanisms had mainly served to improve the exchange of ideas and the sharing of information on activities, and the introduction of less informed political actors to new, complex dossiers, ‘however, institutional coordination on development-related issues within the EU rarely moves beyond the sharing of views and information’ (Hoebink, 2004: 41).

In a 2007 evaluation, it was found that the EU has a ‘remarkably low level of performance’ when it comes to coordinating and working together (ECDPM, 2007: 35). Where the Commission and/or the Member States seek to coordinate, they tend to favour non-EU frameworks for guiding joint efforts.

The implementation of the Code of Conduct is still embryonic. The third Monitoring Report of the EU FTI on Division of Labour (European Commission, 2011c) concludes that ‘there has been encouraging progress’, but it also states that ‘Division of Labour is demanding and takes time to yield measurable results’. According to the EU’s aid effectiveness agenda, joint programming is the ultimate objective and EU Delegations and Member States will need to draw joint strategic and

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12 While donor mapping (step 1) is now widely used, the comparative advantage assessments (step 2) are done in only one third of the countries and mostly based on self-evaluations. No clear sector definitions are established yet and reprogramming of individual donor portfolios (step 3) are mainly done because of non-Division of Labour related reasons such as political shifts in the partner country.
programming documents. However, discussions on Joint Programming with the Member States had progressed only slowly in the Council. It is thus suggested that the EU commitments have not yet led to spectacular improvements in coordination and complementarity between the Commission and the Member States on the ground, evoking criticism that ‘the rhetoric did not match the reality’ (Carbone, 2010a: 12).

1.3 Formulation of the research questions

This section on the evolution of the EU’s coordination role arguably points at a paradox. On the one hand the EU emphasizes the aim to engage and lead in coordination exercises but on the other hand the limited empirical evidence suggests she might be unable to effectively act as a coordinating actor in practice. However, these studies do not examine in greater depth the areas where the EU is more/less successful and no in-depth investigation has been done on the explanations for these findings.

This thesis aims to seek in-depth and interpreted understanding of this paradox. More specifically, I will investigate how the ambitions of the EU are translated at country level and in which situations the EU is more/less likely to act as a coordinator. As the research is of explorative nature, this thesis aims to increase the knowledge on what EU coordination means in practice. The focus is on the coordinator role of the EU in four sub-Saharan African countries, namely Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal. I aim to examine how effective the EU is in deploying its coordinator role and which factors can explain the overall outcome as well as the subtle variations in between the four countries.

More recently, a number of in-depth studies (cf. Carlsson, Schubert, & Robinson, 2009; O’Riordan, Benfield, & de Witte, 2011) have been published on the lack of progress in EU coordination emphasizing the institutional and procedural barriers. O’Riordan et al (2011) conclude that, despite the existence of various institutional obstacles, EU donors are procedurally able to engage in joint programming. The study recognizes the importance of perceptions and political concerns but does not provide a deeper understanding of their contributions. The EU Division of Labour Strategy is criticized for being a ‘technocratic, naïve and un-strategic approach to development cooperation and aid effectiveness’, mainly because it does not take into account ‘donor self-interest, the power relationship between donor and partner countries, nor the influence of political aspects on development cooperation’ (Schulz, 2007: 1). Therefore this research will seek for a deeper understanding of EU coordination in the field.
More specifically, I aim to:

**RQ1:** map EU coordination: to what extent does the EU coordinate? (what-question)

**RQ2:** understand EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?

The next chapter will outline the research approach and methodology adopted to answer these questions.
2 Research approach and methodology

My research has been of explorative nature and aims to seek ‘in-depth and interpreted understanding’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 22) of the translation of the EU’s emergent coordinator role at the country level. To answer the central research questions presented in the previous chapters, I have made use of a pragmatist research approach. First, this approach is especially suited for problem-driven research that aims to produce practical knowledge. Second, it allows for searching understanding of a complex phenomenon like EU coordination. In this chapter I will outline the philosophical and methodological considerations that have informed the research process. The first section lays out the foundations of my pragmatist research approach, by discussing the ontological and epistemological considerations, the reasoning strategy of abduction, the post-Human vision on causality as well as the cyclical characteristics of the research process. The section motivates the methodological choices that have been made. I have conducted a qualitative research by investigating EU coordination in four African countries, engaging in and in-depth analysis making use of thick-descriptions. The research is to a large extent based on qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted during three field trips and has focused on EU coordination at country-level in the post-2000 era.

2.1 A pragmatist research approach

Although the pragmatist tradition is characterized by a considerable diversity, all pragmatists share the belief in the ‘primacy of practice’ (Hellmann, 2009: 639). Pragmatism aims for (1) problem-driven and (2) complexity-sensitive research (Cornut, 2009: 2). First, by focusing on how problems occur in practice, pragmatic research aims to produce practical knowledge and thus ‘reconnects the de-contextualized (theory-centred) knowledge with life-practices’ (Rytövuori-Apunen, 2009: 642). Second and inherently related to this, where theory-driven research aims to test a theory and the complexity of the problem becomes secondary, problem-driven research aims to understand a complex phenomenon rather than to look for generalizations (Cornut, 2009: 6-7). Pragmatism thus starts from the assumption that in order to explain a certain phenomenon, it might be needed to employ a pluralistic model (Rosamond, 2007: 14-17). In this section I will briefly discuss my ontological and epistemological position, my abductive reasoning strategy, the vision on causality that has inspired the search for understanding EU coordination, and the cyclical research process that is characteristic for my research approach.

2.1.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations

As I have mentioned, the pragmatist tradition is diverse and this translates into ‘nuanced debates over such issues as the relationship between ontology and epistemology’ (Sil, 2009: 648). On the one hand, there
are pragmatists which plead for ontological agnosticism and fallibilism since social and political phenomena can be explained by different theories which might draw on ‘incommensurable scientific ontologies’ that all help to ‘constitute the event’ (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2011: 427-430). As such, they aim to overcome the dichotomy between rationalism and constructivism and go beyond the debate between positivism and post-positivism which build on contrasting logics and philosophies. They do not give a definitive answer to ontological and epistemological questions as these are seen as ‘unresolvable’ (Cornut, 2009: 5). On the other hand Friedrichs and Kratochwill (2009: 704-706) argue that a pragmatist research approach is based on a constructivist ontology which ‘takes the intersubjective quality of social reality seriously’. My research approach shares this constructivist ontology that reality is socially constructed and that each person has his or her own subjective reality (Orbie, 2009: 129-131). My assumption is that social conduct is not just shaped ‘by the environment or a structure’, but also ‘by the way that environment is defined or interpreted by the actors under study’ (Dessler, 2005: 598), hence the importance of perceptions.

The question of epistemology is dissolved by pragmatists as they ‘settle for a belief (as a rule for action) through inquiry. Thinking and acting are two sides of the same coin’ (Hellmann, 2009: 641). Friedrichs and Kratochwill (2009: 704-706) propose ‘epistemological instrumentalism’ as social scientific knowledge production aims to ‘enable orientation in the social world’ and ‘its utility consists in helping to understand complex social phenomena and/or to explain observed social regularities’. In my research I have aimed to (re)construct the relevant information in interaction with the respondents of the research as ‘the conditions of action are what the actors make them to be’ (Dessler, 2005: 607). Thus, in my research I aim to establish intersubjective understandings of the EU’s coordinator role by displaying ‘multiple constructed realities through the shared investigation (by researchers and participants) of meanings and explanations’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 12).

2.1.2 Abduction as a reasoning strategy

In order to produce practical knowledge on the complex phenomenon of EU coordination I have opted for the reasoning strategy of abduction (cf. Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). Abduction overcomes the traditional (dichotomous (Hellmann, 2009: 641)) distinction between inductive and deductive approaches: ‘instead of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or “simply” inferring propositions from facts (induction)’, I have aimed to reason ‘at an intermediate level (abduction)’ (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 709). At this level, the researcher collects ‘pertinent observations’ and at the same time applies ‘concepts from existing fields of knowledge’ (Friedrichs, 2009: 647). Through abduction general claims about the research object are developed and supported ‘by working “upwards” from the details’ of the subject of research ‘to theoretically informed claims that
capture relevant patterns and relevant relationships within them’ while the overall study ‘may contain deductive argumentation’ (Dessler, 2005: 599).

### 2.1.3 Causality beyond Humean interpretation

Rather than a mono-causal perspective on causal relations in the Humean sense, I have adopted a deeper and broader meaning of cause by accepting that multiple causes interact in a complex and unpredictable way and that factors not inevitably ‘push and pull’ but rather ‘constrain and enable’. As Kurki (2006: 202) argues: ‘the central focus of causal analysis is not the analysis of isolated independent variables (through statistical methods), but rather understanding the complex interaction of a variety of different kinds of causal factors (though building of conceptual frameworks)’. This interpretation of causality is consistent with the pragmatic research approach.

Like constructivism and different from rationalism, abduction ‘does not draw on the logic of if-then generalizations’ but looks for ‘constitutive explanations’ (Dessler, 2005: 599). To explain a certain phenomenon the researcher may start from a couple of ‘candidate explanations’ and search for the candidate which bests explains the phenomenon. Therefore, in Chapter 3 I establish a basic analytical framework to analyse EU coordination at the country level and structure the data in each country chapter, based on the existing literature on coordination and EU development policy. During the empirical work, data generation and analysis, other candidate explanations might be added to the original set of candidate explanations (cf. Douven, 2011).

### 2.1.4 Cyclical research process

‘One advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressure for the latter even as the findings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the former, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on each other’ (Rosenau, cited in Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 707).
My research process is characterized by a **cyclical path**, during which literature review, data generation, data analysis and formulation of the research design mutually influenced and succeeded each other, guided by the emergent insights (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 717). In between each period of field research, the focus of the research has narrowed. As a result, the design has been defined gradually and the boundaries of the analytical framework have been redefined by ‘*a procedure of hermeneutic adjustment and educated guesswork [...] to grasp the class of phenomena as it evolves in the process of inquiry*’ (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 715).

As I have explained, the abductive reasoning can be seen as an intermediate between deduction and induction. On the one hand, during the different phases of data generation and analysis I have not applied a priori codes or imposed fixed categories or ideas which I had deducted from the literature review and which I wanted to detect in the data. On the other hand, I have not just let the insights emerge out of the data, but was guided by ‘*some theoretical or background assumption[s]*’ about likely factors ‘*in order to avoid an enormous search through all the logically possible circumstances*’ (Gorham, 2009: 65). Instead, in the analysis I have applied ‘*concepts from existing fields of knowledge*’
based on coordination literature within development and EU studies. These concepts have guided the empirical research and helped to situate the data, but they were no mandatory categories, as I was always looking ‘for patterns and associations derived from observations of the world’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 14). For example, in order to explain the EU’s coordinator role in the four African countries, I first conducted a mapping exercise of where, when and how the EU is coordinating (= RQ1). While prior to the field research, the literature review provided me with definitions of coordination and insights on the role of the EU, I have described and explained the different ways in which the respondents perceived the EU as a coordinator, based on their own definitions of what coordination involves. As a researcher I have tried to reconstruct these definitions and perceptions, in line with a constructivist approach through which relevant information is constructed by the interactions between the researcher and the respondents. In what follows I describe each of the phases in the cyclical process in greater detail.

In the first phase (September – December 2010) I have reviewed the literature on European and international donor coordination. As a result I have started the research process with a number of general research questions and central concepts which allowed me to elaborate a preliminary research design on the EU’s coordinator role and prepare a first explorative field research in Tanzania and Zambia. The second phase (20 January – 10 February 2011) consisted of the first field research in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and Lusaka (Zambia). Subsequently, during phase 3 (February 2011- January 2012) I have conducted a first rudimental analysis of the collected data, and concentrated on developing my basic analytical framework. My data mainly consisted of interview notes and transcriptions as well as additional documents and reports, most of them being acquired during the field research (for example terms of reference of Troika, internal meeting reports, donor matrices, additional policy documents, evaluations…). It became clear that donor agencies regularly encounter similar issues complicating coordination efforts, but also that respondents had different definitions and different attitudes towards the EU’s role. On the basis of this initial analysis I have consulted additional literature and adapted my research design in function of the development of my emerging insights. The basic pragmatist analytical framework centred around the 3 I’s (Interests, Institutions, Ideas) was further developed. The data generation and first analysis was followed by additional interviews in Brussels in order to gain a better insight on my problem definition. In this phase I have also concentrated on validating my preliminary insights by presenting them to peers at conferences. During phase 4 (February – March 2012) I have conducted a second cycle of field research in Tanzania and Zambia but slightly changed the sample in order to further develop my insights. For example, the
respondent category of civil society representatives was dropped while additional respondents within the government where added. The interview guide was more structured and included questions on 1) the EU coordination process and 2) the role of the EU in donor wide coordination. After this second field trip, during phase 5 (April – May 2012), I have again analysed my data and readapted my research design as additional insights were gained. I have strengthened the problem definition and the emergent insights. Because of the insights on the importance of donor landscapes and existing coordination gained in phase 4 and 5, I have decided to do additional field research in two other countries to further validate and expand my insights. Phase 6 (May– June 2012) comprised the third cycle of data generation through field research in Burkina Faso and Senegal. Phase 7 (July – September 2012) included the last phase of data analysis and the final adaption of the basic analytical framework conference. During phase 8 (September 2012 – April 2013) the country studies where written according to the same basic structure. Finally, the findings of the different country studies allowed drawing general conclusions and answering the research questions advanced in this thesis.

2.2 Methodology
The philosophical underpinnings outlined above imply that the quality of this explorative research should not be evaluated along the same criteria as positivist research, related to objectivity and generalizability. Instead, in order to increase the reliability and validity of my research, this section aims to bring elaborated methodological clarity and self-reflection. Pragmatism focuses on methods as research tools that are to a certain extent detached from their philosophical underpinnings: ‘methods provide the central tools for science’ (Hellmann, 2009: 640). However, this may not be confused with methodological rigidity as a researcher needs to find ‘a proper balance between proven techniques based on prior experience with similar problems on the one hand, and innovation based on the novelty of the problem at hand on the other’ (Hellmann, 2009: 640). First, the choice for qualitative research will be motivated. Next, I will discuss the empirically-focused approach of exploring EU coordination by means of four in-depth country studies. In the third section I will consider the specific characteristics of interview research, by outlining the data generation and data analysis processes, ending with a critical reflection on the use of interviews.

2.2.1 Qualitative research
The EU’s coordinator role is emergent and the recent but limited studies available suggest that a gap between the EU’s ambitions and the practices in the field. My research has been of explorative nature and aims to seek ‘in-depth and interpreted understanding’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 22) of the EU’s emergent coordinator role: to what extent does the EU coordinate?
question) and under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate? Therefore I have employed a qualitative research approach as ‘qualitative methods are used to address research questions that require explanation or understanding of social phenomena and their contexts’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 5). Qualitative research is best suited for ‘exploring issues that hold some complexity’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 5) and providing and enabling ‘orientation’ (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 716) and explanation of the emerging coordinator role of the EU and its implementation challenges. For example, to answer the first research question, namely the extent to which the EU is acting as a coordinator, only a qualitative assessment of the situation of coordination in the countries can be done as there are no existing rankings or indicators to measure the level of coordination. Although the Paris Declaration includes quantitative indicators to measure progress on harmonization, these represent a very narrow interpretation of coordination and they have been criticized for being too technocratic (cf. Chapter 1). Coordination is a complex phenomenon which cannot be captured by only looking at quantitative indicators. Moreover, a qualitative research approach enables to put coordination efforts and the role of the EU into perspective. For example, if I would use the existence of a donor matrix as an indicator for the level of coordination, as is done in the monitoring reports of the EU’s FTI on Division of labour, I would neglect the true relevance of such an agreement as this depends on the perceived importance of the different actors. Moreover, I have chosen to look at the process of coordination and not just at the outcome, the level of EU coordination, as this would not lead to useful research results since EU coordination is still emergent and EU coordination and donor-wide coordination are both entangled. Inevitably, a qualitative research strategy determines the nature of the outputs. As such, this thesis aims to produce ‘detailed descriptions’ and ‘rounded understandings’ based on interpreted ‘perspectives’ or perceptions of ‘the participants in the social setting’ by ‘mapping meanings, processes and contexts’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 4). The conclusions of this research are context-bound and far-reaching generalizations about EU coordination are difficult. However, the insights of this study and the basic analytical frameworks developed throughout this thesis may be applied to other countries in order to enable broader generalizations about the factors that enable and constrain EU coordination in the field.

2.2.2 In-depth country studies

The goal of the empirical research is thus to discover factors which enable and constrain EU coordination at country level. This research puts the focus exclusively on sub-Saharan-Africa and EU coordination is investigated from a country perspective as it has been acknowledged that the on-going efforts by both the donor community and recipient governments in coordination varies from country to country. While abduction is fundamentally based on a holistic understanding of
cases, it is possible to set up a unified set of aspects, guided by common concepts outlined in the basic analytical framework, that shall be covered in every narrative (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 715-720). This approach enabled me to conduct in-depth examination of EU coordination in each country and make use thick descriptions.

More specifically I have investigated EU coordination in Tanzania, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal. All the countries selected are aid-dependent countries receiving aid from a large amount of donors. In these countries, coordination becomes much more necessary but the amount of donors also involves a greater challenge. Different kinds of tensions and complex interactions are at play in the coordination processes in the four countries. All countries are part of the EU FTI on Division of Labour, which shows the EU’s commitment towards coordination in these countries. The EU as a whole is a major provider of aid13 in these countries. Besides, the four countries are categorized as countries with more than five EU donors designating priority, which makes EU coordination all the more important according to the EU’s Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (Carlsson et al., 2009: 17-19). Furthermore, the four countries are reasonably stable countries, in order to exclude the possible influence of conflicts or failing governments. According to Hopwood (2009: 117) these relatively well-performing low-income countries which are highly dependent on aid from many different donors form ‘the central battleground for the aid effectiveness agenda’. Unlike failing or conflict-driven states, where the Aid Effectiveness Agenda is seen as less suitable because using harmonized aid modalities such as budget support are considered impossible14, the selected countries have relatively intact state structures and a certain level of democratic participation. However, contrary to countries like Rwanda where the level of governance and the institutional capacity enables the government to take a strong lead in the aid coordination process, the selected countries have limited coordination capacities. They are less capable of organizing the complex donor supply side in a coherent way, which makes the role and responsibility of donors more important in coordinating amongst themselves and strengthening the institutional capacities of the government to enable them to organize aid coordination (Faust & Messner, 2007: 22). However, this research aims to go beyond institutional aspects and explanations of coordination processes, and the findings of the country studies point

13 Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal recently succeeded to differentiate their aid relations which has resulted in increased access to alternative funding from emerging donors (China, India, Arab countries) and private investments. However, these are not included in official statistics.

14 However, at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States developed through the forum of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was presented which included proposals to increase aid effectiveness in fragile states (NewDeal4Peace, 2013).
that the degree of power asymmetry between recipient countries and donors should be taken into account to.

To select countries I have adopted a strategy closely related to sampling methods used in grounded theory, through which countries are selected ‘on the basis of their potential contribution to the development and testing of theoretical constructs’ (Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003: 80). This sampling strategy has been found well suited for exploratory studies where it is harder ‘to identify in advance the groups and characteristics that need to be included in the sample’ (Ritchie et al., 2003: 86). The sampling process was ‘iterative’ as on the basis of the analysis of the data from the first sample, a further sample was selected to refine the emerging insights. Furthermore, in line with the view of Strauss and Corbin I have used different strategies depending on the phase of the research process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

In the first phase I have chosen to explore EU coordination in two ‘critical’ (Ritchie et al., 2003: 80) countries with similar characteristics, namely Tanzania and Zambia. By minimizing the differences in some of the possible key factors in the first phase, I was able to generate ‘much similar data’ but also identify rather ‘subtle differences which would not be caught in heterogeneous samples’ (Ritchie et al., 2003: 81). Tanzania and Zambia have both been portrayed as best practices or model cases for donor coordination. There are several facilitating operational coordination frameworks in place, and at the same time the EU has a clear ambition to play a central role in donor coordination and improve internal EU coordination as both countries had been selected in 2006 together with 12 other countries to pilot joint EU strategies. These countries were possibly ‘pivotal’ to study the specific added value of the EU as findings on the EU’s coordinator role in these countries might be ‘critical to any understanding offered by the research’ (Ritchie et al., 2003: 80). In Tanzania and Zambia all the traditional bilateral and multilateral donors have signed a Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) and are participating in a donor-wide coordination platform. Moreover, in both countries, EU donors are mainly Nordic Plus donors whose participation in the Division of Labour is also guided by specific ‘complementarity principles’. In Tanzania, the UK is the largest EU donor, representing seven per cent of total ODA to the country, followed by the Commission, representing six per cent of total ODA, and the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany (OECD-DAC, 2013). In Zambia, the Commission and the UK both act for seven per cent of ODA, followed by Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark (OECD-DAC, 2013). As I initiated the research process with a broad and descriptive research question (how is the EU’s coordinator role translated at country level?), I have started with the ‘mapping’ of EU

15 The ‘like-minded’ or ‘Nordic Plus’ countries include Denmark, UK, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden (cf. supra, section 1.2.2).
coordination in these countries in order to ‘increase cognitive understanding’ by detecting ‘patterns of similarity and difference that allow for the identification of regularities’ (Friedrichs, 2009). Next, to be able to answer the second research question, I have also looked for patterns of similarity and difference in the explanation of the observations. Lastly, it should be added that, apart from these motivations, also more pragmatic considerations have played a role in the selection of these countries. Tanzania and Zambia have been the subject of several studies on aid effectiveness and coordination (cf. Afrodad, 2007b; COHRED, 2008; Fraser, 2009; Harrison & Mulley, 2009; Menocal & Mulley, 2006; Molenaers & Renard, 2008; Sundewall, Jonsson, Cheelo, & Tomson, 2010; Thomson, Saasa, Chiwele & Gibson, 2010; Wohlgemuth, 2006; Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008). However, these studies did not focus on EU coordination in particular or the specific contributions of the EU to these donor-wide coordination processes. As such, by choosing these countries I could build on existing insights on donor-wide coordination processes in these countries.

The findings of the initial field research in these two countries pointed to a limited coordinator role for the EU. The emerging insights showed that the donor composition and the existing coordination may be important explaining factors. If these educated guesses (cf. Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 715) would be true, EU coordination could be more successful in settings with a ‘European front’ and/or a ‘Commission’-dominated donor landscape and less advanced existing donor-wide coordination. As in Tanzania and Zambia, these factors are too similar to be able to explore possible differences in a valid manner, it was required to select supplementary countries with a different (i.e. ‘European front’ and/or ‘EU’-dominated) donor composition and a different (i.e. less advanced) level of existing coordination. The collection of more diverse data would thus facilitate the disclosure of similarities (Ritchie et al., 2003: 81-86). Consequently, in order to further understand the contribution of these explanations, I decided to look at two Western African Francophone countries where the existing coordination is less advanced and the EU donors represented are mainly ‘European front’ donors. In such countries there might be more opportunities and possible added value for the EU to manifest itself as a ‘coordinator champion’.

The initial idea was to investigate EU coordination in Mali, a country with mainly ‘European front’ donors which, just like Tanzania and Zambia, had been selected in 2006 as a pilot country for joint EU Strategies. However, the military coup that took place on 21 March 2012 after several weeks of protests and the subsequent civil war, forced me to adapt my sampling strategy.

16 The ‘European front’ donors include France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg (cf. supra, section 1.2.2).
and select two new countries in a rather short time. Consequently I decided to select to new Western African Francophone countries. Burkina Faso and Senegal share some characteristics but also differ from Mali and from each other in several aspects. Both countries receive aid from a large amount of bilateral and multilateral donors, which makes coordination an important issue and they are part of the EU FTI on Division of Labour, which indicates the EU’s commitment to coordination and complementarity. Furthermore, in both countries mainly ‘European front’ countries are represented. However, the major difference between both countries constitutes the position of the Commission and the relative size of the other EU donors. In Burkina Faso the Commission is the dominant EU donor, representing 13 per cent of total ODA, followed by France representing ten per cent of total ODA, the Netherlands and Germany (OECD-DAC, 2013). In Senegal on the other hand, France has remained the dominant EU donor, representing 20 per cent of total ODA, followed by the Commission representing six per cent of total ODA, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands (OECD-DAC, 2013). In addition, some interviewees with previous experience in Burkina Faso had mentioned that EU’s coordinator role was more explicit there, and previous research on role of the EU in Senegal had pointed at a potential engine role of the EU in the on-going coordination efforts: ‘the Commission has led efforts to develop frameworks for increasing dialogue amongst donors and between the donor community and the government’ (Van Criekinge, 2009: 100).

In general the four countries represent a good mix of strategically more important (Tanzania and Senegal) and less important (Zambia and Burkina Faso) countries, countries where the EU’s influence is decreasing (Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal) and where the EU has remained the most important donor (Burkina Faso), countries where existing donor-wide coordination is rather advanced (Tanzania and Zambia) and countries where this is less advanced (Burkina Faso and Senegal), and finally Anglophone countries with a dominant Nordic Plus donor composition (Tanzania and Zambia) and Francophone countries with a mainly ‘European front’ donor composition (Burkina Faso and Senegal).

### 2.2.3 Interview research

To generate data on EU coordination practices and explain the EU’s coordinator role at the country level, qualitative in-depth semi-structured expert interviews were judged to be the most appropriate method to gather information on views, attitudes, experiences and perceptions of the EU’s coordinator role (cf. Bogner & Menz, 2009). The aim was to gain understanding of the nature of the EU’s coordination problems in the field and ultimately develop explanations, as well as ideas and concepts about the EU’s coordinator role (cf. Snape & Spencer, 2003: 23).
Consequently, the interviews were used to identify concepts, to provide for information and explanations as well as to verify my emerging insights.

Interviews with officials in the field provide a valid political scientific method, especially in explorative research designs (Bogner & Menz, 2009: 46-48). Experts possess ‘an institutionalized authority to construct reality’ (Hitzler, Honer and Mader, cited in Meuser & Nagel, 2009: 19) and ‘a special knowledge through their activity […] because they have privileged access to information’ (Meuser & Nagel, 2009: 24). By conducting interviews I did not only aim to gain specialist knowledge, but also to acquire ‘tacit specific interpretive knowledge (know-why)’ as well as ‘procedural knowledge (know-how)’ which officials obtained through practice (Littig, 2009: 101). Moreover, the set of images that these officials possess ‘is characterized by the chance to become hegemonial in a certain organizational and functional context within a field of practice and, thus to be influential in structuring the conditions of actions for other actors […] in a relevant way’ (Bogner and Menz, cited in Meuser & Nagel, 2009: 19).

2.2.3.1 Data generation

I have focused on experts ‘in the field’ that are marked by an institutional affiliation to donor agencies and government departments within the selected African countries. Interviews have thus been carried out with representatives from EU Delegations, EU Member States and non-EU aid agencies and partner country aid administrations. The interviewees were identified via the organizations’ directories, prior studies in which contact details were displayed and through ‘snowball sampling’ when people were recommended by informants or other interviewees. To gain access to the interviewees I have used a standard invitation letter which I have sent to all interviewees one month before each field visit. Reminder e-mails were sent in case of non-response. However, for each field research, approximately only half of the eventual respondents had agreed on a meeting before departure. Typically, it was easier to gain access to donor representatives. To be able to conduct interviews with recipient government representatives, access had to be negotiated during the stay in the country, which was often an intensive exercise with no guarantee to success. Also in case of non-response of donor representatives prior to departure, references from interviewees often enabled access to these or additional key persons. In addition to the interviews ‘on the ground’ I have conducted a number of interviews in Brussels, with representatives from the European Commission and the Belgian government.

In the aid agencies interviews were mostly held with the Head of Cooperation (HoC) or the Country Manager and in some cases with the Head of Mission (HoM), a Counsellor, a country or a programme officer. At the Government I mainly talked with senior economists in the Ministries of Finance. All interviews took place at the respective embassies or ministries. The
total sample of 97 interviews is still limited, but, typically for qualitative research, has followed the logic of saturation\textsuperscript{17}. Importantly, the aim of my research is not to generalize these findings. Moreover, the fact that the overall accounts of developments related to EU coordination appeared to be fairly homogeneous amongst interviewees within a country, reinforces the validity of the findings. Whenever clear differences occurred, these are mentioned in the narratives of the country chapters. Besides, three field trips and additional interviews in Brussels were conducted in order to verify the statements made during the interviews and the findings derived from them. Moreover, different interviewees were asked about the same issues, in order to verify the obtained interpretations from different perspectives. For each series of interviews I had prepared an interview guide, but the data have been generated by means of open and flexible questioning, which allowed me to gather emerging, rich and extensive data (cf. Mason, 2002). These semi-structured interviews have covered what role the EU is perceived to play in donor coordination and, how these roles are perceived to perform. The interviews have aimed to identify the range of perceptions of the EU’s coordinator role that exist among these officials, as well as the explaining factors.

Desk research has complemented the insights generated through the interviews, as additional documents were consulted to understand the complexity of EU coordination in the field. For each country study, context-specific data was gathered and a literature review was conducted, with a specific focus on the role of the EU, the Paris Declaration process (cf. OECD-DAC reports), division of labour and budget support. These were primarily analytical documents such as studies and reports but sometimes also more informal sources were used. The results of these data generation processes have informed the emerging analytical framework.

This first series of interviews, conducted in Tanzania and Zambia, were mainly exploratory, fluid and flexible (Mason, 2002: 24) and concentrated on 1) the reconstruction of the coordination process in the country (role of the government, key initiators, evolution of the process, role of the EU), 2) the interpretation of the main concepts (interviewees’ definition of donor coordination, degree of coordination, understanding of internal EU and donor-wide coordination), 3) the role of the interviewees’ institution/agency, 4) the role of the EU and EU Delegation in the coordination process (role in donor-wide coordination (JAS), EU code of Conduct on division of labour, most notable achievements, constraints, role of EU membership, mandate of EU Delegation, comparative advantages, capacities, experiences), 4) general perceptions of/attitude towards the EU (general role concepts, role as a coordinator, added value

\textsuperscript{17} The sample size is determined by the moment very little if any new evidence is gathered through the interviews.
of EU approach), 5) the relationship between political dialogue and aid coordination, 6) coordination around budget support, and 7) constraining factors (visibility, different priorities, bureaucratic factors). For this first field research I have selected my respondents by means of a purposive sampling strategy. Although I had only limited preconceptions, I selected respondents according to my expectation whether they would be able to provide me with interesting information about the subject of my research, the EU as a coordinator. I have chosen to interview people with necessary knowledge and experience to talk about the EU’s coordinator role and who were willing and able to talk about this. I have conducted 34 in-depth interviews with representatives of the government, aid agencies but also of civil society.

For the second cycle of field research in Tanzania and Zambia I slightly changed the sample in order to further develop my insights. As such, the respondent category of civil society representatives was dropped while some additional respondents within the government where added. The interview guide was more structured and included questions on 1) the EU coordination process and 2) the role of the EU in donor wide coordination. For the first series of question I asked respondents to a) assess the current, desirable and feasible level of EU and donor-wide coordination through a coordination spectrum, and coordination at different levels (information sharing, procedural coordination, division of labour), b) to explain which factors they considered most decisive for this degree of EU coordination (factors related to EU bilateral donors, EU institutions, other donors or partner country; political, bureaucratic, ideational, personal factors), c) to evaluate challenges and opportunities for EU coordination compared to donor-wide coordination, and d) to assess EU donors’ attitude towards EU coordination. In the second part of the interview guide I concentrated more specifically on the role of the EU in donor-wide coordination initiatives by asking to describe a) the role of the EU delegation and b) the relation between EU coordination and the processes within the donor-wide coordination platform.

For the third cycle of field research in Burkina Faso and Senegal, similar interview guides were used, although slightly adapted to the country contexts.

### 2.2.3.2 Data analysis

The analysis of the interview data is done through a systematic interpretation of the field notes and the transcribed data, making use of open and axial coding strategies, depending on the phase of the research (cf. Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Throughout the analytical process, I have organized the generated data in the different countries into different categories in order to identify possible patterns.
In the first cycle, the analysis happened through a systematic interpretation of these data, making use of codes. I have employed an open coding strategy\textsuperscript{18} in order to identify categories and their characteristics. These codes can be compared to ‘labels’ which give significance to parts of the interviews on the basis of their theoretical or empirical relevance. As such, I have used codes such as ‘historical factors’, ‘political dialogue’, ‘content EU coordination’, ‘visibility’, ‘attitude towards EU coordination’, ‘new donors’, ‘division of labour’, ‘troika’, ‘sectoral level’, ‘budget support’, ‘role concepts of the EU’, ‘WB’, ‘EU bilaterals’, ‘EU as a donor’, ‘bureaucratic resistance’, ‘political factors’ and so on. This way I gained more insight in the central concepts and their relations in order to better understand what coordination means in practice, how the EU’s coordinator role is translated to the country level, what expectations and perceptions actors have, and which factors influence the EU’s coordinator role.

For example, during this first cycle, I have aimed to describe and explain the different ways in which developing actors in the field perceive the EU as a coordinator. During the interviews I have asked these actors to define for themselves what a coordinator role means. During the data generation process but especially during data analysis, by continuously interpreting and comparing the different constructed realities or narratives of the different respondents, I have then tried to reconstruct these definitions and the perceptions of the EU as a coordinator. After this first research cycle I have also searched for factors that could explain the extent to which the EU coordinates in a certain context, again by interpreting the different experiences and narratives (or perceptions) of my respondents, guided by the conceptual foundations based on the literature review.

During the second and third cycle the coding happened mainly through axial coding\textsuperscript{19} in order to relate different categories. By refining and deepening the different concepts and categories I have tried to elaborate my basic and pragmatic analytical framework, centred around the three I’s (Institutions – Interests - Ideas). Thereby I defined key concepts (which can be compared to variables) which serve as the main axes around which other sub-concepts (which can be compared to values, characteristics or dimensions) were placed. As such I have tried to reduce and integrate the huge amount of codes by combining or deleting different codes and by clarifying relations between the codes. For example, the concept ‘bureaucratic factors’ refers to different institutional factors such as decentralization, administrative flexibility, and human,

\textsuperscript{18} ‘The analytic process through which concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990)

\textsuperscript{19} ‘The process of relating categories to their subcategories termed “axial” because coding occurs around the axis of the category, linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990)
financial and intellectual capacities. The ‘coordinator role of the EU’ on its turn could be further categorized into different role concepts (just another donor, facilitator, initiator cf. infra).

2.2.3.3 Critical reflection

In line with my ontological position I believe doing interviews can never be a neutral practice as it concerns a human interaction. The generated data are thus partly mutually constructed and influenced by the context. I recognize that the researcher and the social world impact on each other and objective, value-free research is thus impossible: ‘our empirical observations are always value-laden, interpretative and contextualized from the very start’ (Kapyla & Mikkola, 2011: 422). While researchers can strive for neutrality and objectivity, we can never attain this aspiration fully’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 20). However, I have tried to be aware of and reflect on the limitations of my own biases as well as those of the interviewees as much as possible.

On the one hand, ‘opportunities for researcher bias to inform analysis are significant’ (Tamás & Sato, 2012: 1515-1516). Empirical engagements are ‘praxis-oriented’, and guided by our own backgrounds, normative and political beliefs, and the expected goals of the research (Kapyla & Mikkola, 2011: 422; Snape & Spencer, 2003: 20). During the interviews I have tried to avoid being directive and aimed for open and non-leading questions. I wanted to avoid being perceived as a potential critic or an evaluator of my respondents work by emphasizing the objectives of my research and my neutral stance. During the analysis I have tried to stay as close as possible to the accounts of the interviewees.

On the other hand, the interviewees’ views are inevitably influenced by their own situation and the context. Take for example the influence of the regular turnovers within the embassies’ and agencies’ personnel or of the level of the respondents’ knowledge on their perceptions. The political context in the recipient country might also have influenced the interviewees’ accounts, especially in Zambia and Senegal, where the field research was conducted early after presidential elections (respectively in 2011 and 2012). Furthermore, perceptions are intrinsically personal and thus influenced by personal characteristics and experiences. A major difficulty in interview research is thus that all of the accounts of the respondents might have been a manner to ‘point out that their work is successful’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 4), to ‘vent personal frustrations’ or to ‘rail against intransigent aid bureaucracies’(Fechter, 2012: 1395).

For example, I detected several narratives about the EU’s coordinator role, sometimes during one single interview. Most EU participants somehow recognized the EU’s coordinator role, as this is often the official line of EU aid agencies. However, in many interviews, instances were
given where the EU’s coordinator role is totally inefficient or irrelevant. Individuals may have different perspectives of looking at the EU’s coordinator role, for example, at one moment they might emphasize political or procedural correctness (in line with the European Consensus or the Code of Conduct) while at another moment they might emphasize the importance of results and outcomes. While at first sight these narratives may seem incompatible, I have tried to distinguish between those different accounts. Often indications are given by the interviewees themselves, pointing to their ‘personal perspective’ versus the ‘perspective of their institution’.

I will conclude with some important ethical considerations. First, the respondents were all interviewed after informed consent. In the invitation letter and at the start of each interview I have briefly explained the purpose of my research, clarified the way I would use their accounts and emphasized confidentiality. A large part of the interviews were audio-taped after approval, while for another amount of interviews I had to rely on written notes. I have guaranteed complete anonymity and to ensure this, in the thesis the interviews will be identified by a number I have assigned to each interviewee. I will thus only refer to the country, a category (EU Delegation and EU Member State Representative (EU), multilateral donor and non-EU bilateral donor representative (non-EU), government representative (GOV) and civil society representative (CS)) and a number. During the analysis and interpretations, I have tried to adhere close to the accounts of the interviewees (cf. the use of quotes) but I share the belief that ‘deeper insights can be obtained by synthesizing, interlocking and comparing the accounts of a number of respondents’ (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 21).

2.2.4 Timeframe

This thesis investigates EU coordination in the post-2000 era up to 2012, with a particular focus on the evolutions at country level since the adoption of the European Consensus in 2005. As I have explained in Chapter 1, the turn of the Millennium, and especially the EU’s unitary position at the UN Conference in Monterrey (2002) marked a shift towards more EU coordination at the Brussels’ level which was felt to translate to more political leadership at the international level. This thesis aims to investigate how this shift translated into the field level. While in the early years of the new decade the Council did not take concrete steps to improve operational coordination, after the agreement on the European Consensus a common framework to facilitate joint EU strategies was adopted as well as a Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (2007) and an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (2009). By adopting these policy initiatives the EU recognized the importance of coordination at country level and confirmed its commitment to be at the forefront of increasing aid effectiveness.
Undoubtedly, this time span is still relatively recent and short, implying that the ‘events and processes are still being played out and their meanings are continuously evolving and still contested’ (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009: 18). First, implementing the coordination agenda takes time as this happens at a slow pace not the least because of donors’ multiannual programs. Some policy obligations may still be valid and programs have to be finalized so I recognize that the EU’s coordinator role might change over time. However, the period covers the whole duration of the 10th EDF, several programming cycles of the EU Member States as well as the early preparations of the 11th EDF. As I have mentioned, the conclusions of my research are context-bound and does not aim to offer testable predictions. However the findings of this period and the basic analytical frameworks developed throughout this thesis may be used to investigate EU coordination in a later timeframe.

Second, within the framework of my PhD research I was not able to study time effects in greater depth as I had to concentrate the data generation in three relatively short fieldwork trips within the timespan of two years. However, although the interviews were conducted in 2011-2012 and consequently the main findings relate to this period, I have tried to take into account changes that occurred in the coordination processes in the past decade to trace back the process as much as possible.
3 Conceptual foundations and analytical framework

In the previous chapter I have motivated the use of a pragmatist research approach which is particularly suited for problem-driven complexity-sensitive research. In this section the central concepts of the research are situated in the literature and a basic analytical framework is developed to study EU coordination at country level. However, it should be emphasized that the field research has influenced the understanding of the different concepts, which will be clarified throughout the different country chapters. This involves a recognition that the human understanding happens in hermeneutic circles (circularity) unlike the positivist view that an operational definition of the concepts should be set from the outset of the research and then remain constant (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 717). The first section presents the central concepts related to the first research question which aims to map EU coordination. Section 2 concentrates on the second research question that looks for understanding of EU coordination. The third section summarizes the basic analytical framework for assessing the two research questions in each country. The chapter ends with an introduction to the country chapters which prepares for the second part of this thesis (Chapters 4-7) which constitutes the empirical analysis of EU coordination at the country level.

3.1 RQ1: Mapping EU coordination

This section provides conceptual distinctions to answer the first research question on the degree of EU coordination. Coordination, harmonization and division of labour are concepts which are closely linked to the new aid agenda. However, despite the long history of coordination efforts and the use of the term, the concepts are interpreted in various ways, both in literature, policy discourse and practice. As such, it represents yet another term on the aid agenda that 'has been used and abused as a blanked covering all sorts of relationships' (Sachs cited in De Feyter, 2011: 35). There is no clarity about what coordination should cover, and different authors, governments and aid agencies use different definitions. In what follows I will first define and categorize coordination in its different dimensions based on an extensive literature review. Next, I will outline how these conceptual foundations have inspired the development of a basic analytical framework to investigate EU coordination. In adopting a more holistic approach to better understand the complexity of EU coordination, I have opted for a broad framework for analysing what the EU does and how EU policy initiatives are translated at the field level. I will clarify that there is both an internal and an external dimension to EU coordination, which might be intertwined in practice. The internal dimension relates to coordination between the EU and the Member States. The external dimension concerns the multilateral perspective and refers to coordination between the EU and other international partners. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, the EU coordination
cannot easily be turned into a simple series of indicators. Consequently, while being guided by the common concepts presented in this section, the country chapters use thick descriptions which further define what EU coordination means in practice.

3.1.1 Defining coordination

A very basic understanding of coordination is that different actors work together to solve a collective problem (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard, & Strand, 2003: 858) but a more suitable definition of coordination is provided by the WB as it captures the process, means and objectives of coordination in basic terms. Coordination refers to ‘the activities of two or more development partners that are intended to mobilize aid resources or to harmonize their policies, programmes, procedures and practices so as to maximize the development effectiveness of aid resources’ (World Bank, 1999: 3). While my research focuses on EU coordination, a broad understanding of coordination would also include the concepts of alignment and ownership (de Renzio, Booth, Rogerson, & Curran, 2004) as ideally partner governments should take up a leadership role in determining the development agenda and the coordination of donors while donors should increase the use of systems and procedures of the partner country. Eventually, the criteria of alignment and ownership should be the final test against which the effectiveness of coordination should be evaluated. However, as the EU is my central subject, such an evaluation is out of the scope of this research but the criteria of ownership and alignment will be taken into account throughout the discussions of the country chapters.

In general the literature on coordination discusses (1) the objectives of coordination, (2) what should be coordinated, (3) the degree of coordination, (4) the level of coordination, (5) the means of coordination and (6) the governance of the coordination process. It should be emphasized that this research looks at coordination as a process of attempts by aid agencies, groups of donors and/or governments to better integrate their efforts, and not primarily at the outcomes. The categorization is summarized in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Categorization of coordination

| Dimensions of coordination | 1. Objectives of coordination | - Partner country related
|                           | - Donor related                |
|                           | 2. Object of coordination      | - Information
|                           | - Policies                     |
|                           | - Procedures                   |
|                           | - Allocation                   |
|                           | - Programming                  |
|                           | 3. Degree of coordination      | - formal and informal information sharing
|                           | - consultation                 |
|                           | - shared/joint analysis and evaluation |
|                           | - coordinated policy/political dialogue |
|                           | - joint strategies             |
|                           | - pooling of resources         |
|                           | - division of labour           |
|                           | - joint programming            |
|                           | 4. Level of coordination       | - general, national-strategic
|                           | - thematic                     |
|                           | - sector                       |
|                           | 5. Means of coordination       | - Aid coordination including institutional arrangements to coordinate policy dialogue, joint monitoring systems
|                           | - Use of harmonized aid modalities |
|                           | 6. Governance of coordination  | - Governance mechanisms (formal & informal)
|                           | - Donor-led or partner-country -led |

First, coordination is primarily put forward as a strategy to reduce transaction costs, particularly for recipient countries. Through coordination donors should primarily aim to avoid overlaps and duplications such as parallel and contradictory projects and programs (Faust & Messner, 2007: 13; Kjellman et al., 2003: 858). By lowering transaction costs, supporting policy dialogue, increasing transparency and strengthening recipient management capacities (Faust & Messner, 2007: 13). Coordination should help to reduce the burden on the recipient country and donor administrations (UNDP, 1994). Additionally, coordination envisages donor-related objectives too as it should also reduce the transaction costs for donor countries. For example, a study ordered by the European Commission found that 2 billion Euro per year could be saved by reducing the fragmentation of EU aid (Carlsson et al., 2009: v-vi). Ultimately, coordination aims to contribute to a better development effectiveness of the aid resources spent.

The second dimension refers to what should be coordinated. Donors and governments can decide to coordinate information exchange, policies, aid allocation, aid instruments, procedures
and/or programming. At a strategic level, coordination implies working towards a consensus on policies, principles, guidelines and strategic objectives and better integrating individual programmes and projects with national priorities (Penh, Medina, & Behrend, 2004). At the sector level, this may involve sectoral policies and priorities (World Bank, 1999: 3). Under strategic coordination, projects and programmes can continue to be financed by separate donors. Coordination of aid allocations may involve the development of uniform allocation criteria, and/or working towards a better division of labour and thus a better allocation across sectors and countries (UNDP, 1994). The coordination of aid instruments, programmes and projects is often referred to as operational coordination, as it involves coordination in the implementation phase, when donors aim to reach agreement on a common program or project to be carried out and financed jointly (World Bank, 1999: 3). Donors and recipients pool resources to conduct joint activities or programs and eventually also joint reviews and evaluations. Lastly, coordination can involve the simplification and ultimately the harmonization of procedures, practices and requirements in planning, implementation, and disbursement mechanisms and evaluations (Faust & Messner, 2007: 13). This can for example also involve a reduction of missions and reports (de Renzio et al., 2004). The latter are more technical forms of coordination than for example the harmonization of goals, which are more political.

Third, coordination takes place in various degrees and becomes more challenging when moving from one level to another (World Bank, 1999: 3). It should be noted that a valid hierarchy of degrees of coordination is a complex exercise, if not impossible. For example, it is perfectly possible that donors engage in division of labour, without using harmonized aid modalities. In turn, donors can make use of harmonized aid modalities without engaging in division of labour. Besides, a donor providing sector budget support to five sectors may have a better impact on aid effectiveness than one focusing on only three sectors but using a project approach. However, we can clearly distinguish between information sharing and consultation on the one hand, and more active forms of coordination requiring adjustments of donors’ practices on the other hand.

Better coordination starts with the sharing of timely, transparent and reliable information about past and future allocations, projects and programmes in the country. This can be done in coordination meetings, through electronic systems or informal contacts. Apart from these data on ‘who does what where’, donors are encouraged to share lessons from the implementation of projects and programs. While information sharing and consultation are necessary steps towards coordination, they lack an active element. A more active step is the conduct of joint analysis and evaluation. These forms of coordination can then enable donors to identify where they duplicate
each other’s efforts in order to adapt themselves. This can lead to ad hoc coordinated responses and to common positions, for example in discussions on policies, priorities and principles in the policy and political dialogue. However, it can also lead towards more systematic agreements on development policies and programme goals such as the development of joint strategies or to the development of common agreements for planning, management and delivery of aid such as joint programming, the pooling of resources through joint funding modalities and a better division of labour. Division of labour is based on the belief that real development-oriented coordination can only be achieved by reducing the number of external players in recipient countries, and thus by cutting the number of donor agencies active in strategic coordination (Faust & Messner, 2007: 21). Division of labour can be done ‘either by splitting up different stages of the work or by operating in different geographic areas’ (Fengler & Kharas, 2011: 6-7) or sectors, on the basis of each donor’s comparative advantages and specialization. Usually, this involves a mapping exercise followed by an agreement of a donor matrix and lead donor arrangements and/or delegated cooperation. Ultimately, donors may speak with one voice but here the question rises whether this is feasible and desirable. Other authors refer to the multilateralization of aid as the ultimate and more effective solution (de Renzio et al., 2004; World Bank, 1999: 3).

Fourth, coordination takes place at headquarters and country level, and within a recipient country at national, sector or thematic, and sub-sector level.

Fifth, there exist different means of how to coordinate. Aid coordination could involve working towards a better planning of aid and better integrating it into the national development goals and strategies (UNDP, 1994). It thus refers to the process in order to support national development goals, priorities and strategies. In order to enable coordination, donors and governments have introduced different kinds of institutional arrangements for ‘doing repair work within aid systems’ (Lundsgaarde, 2012: 705). These include the creation of donor and donor-government working groups, policy dialogue structures, Troikas, sector advisory groups, the development of coordination action plans, the preparation of joint multi-donor country strategies, the creation of monitoring mechanisms of progress in harmonization, the establishment of joint monitoring systems for the implementation of PRSPs, donor matrices and arrangements on lead, active and background donors (de Renzio et al., 2004). Additionally, there are aid modalities that include important mechanisms to improve coordination such as joint policy dialogues and conditionality frameworks. The development of harmonized approaches of budget support operations and sector support such as sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and pooled funding arrangements, have
thus been put forward as important instruments to improve coordination and reduce fragmentation.

Sixth, the governance of coordination varies in two dimensions. On the one hand, there is the question of the governance mechanism for coordination (Kjellman et al., 2003: 858-860). In most cases, coordination refers to a horizontal relationship (Bigsten, 2006: 79) which reflects the capacities, expertise and legitimacy of the different parties involved, and only involves latent power and authority. However, while authority is not the dominant feature of most coordination arrangements, dominant agencies may have more scope to exercise influence by means of control of information or resources or by institutionalized legal means to implement preferences. Moreover, actors may also decide to let a single agency act as a lead or opt for a co-presidency of a troika. A possible drawback is however that this may create rigid hierarchical structures (Kjellman et al., 2003: 868). Apart from these formalized mechanism, coordination may also refer to more informal linkages between actors, based on the shared trust and their capacities for self-organization, therefore also referred to as ‘partnership’. Kjellman (2003: 859-860) defines this concept as ‘two or more actors engaging in a voluntary, self-initiated endeavour that is not governed by formal institutionalized rules or processes. Rather than authority, trust is the mechanism that ensures that actors are in compliance with mutually held interests and objectives, without the need to resort to formalized organizational arrangements’. The coordination amongst Nordic Plus countries could be considered as an illustration of the latter.

On the other hand, the governance of coordination involves questions on who is involved and who is in the lead. According to the spirit of the Paris Declaration, coordination should be led by the government. However, if there is no government leadership, ‘there has been nothing like a single hierarchically organized coordinating authority in the arena’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 17). In most countries, coordination has been driven by donors, usually under the lead of UNDP, the WB or an alliance of like-minded donors.

3.1.2 Basic analytical framework to map EU coordination

The EU strategy to improve the quality of international aid consists of three pillars (European Commission, 2006a). First, the EU wants to map and supervise Member States’ activities in a transparent manner by means of the EU Donor Atlas through which aid deficits and excesses can be identified. Second, the EU aims to take up a leading role in the implementation of the Paris Agenda. This involves questions on the role of the EU in multilateral coordination: does the EU take up a leading role and how does it relate to other big players such as the WB, the UN, and the
US? Third, the commitments of the European vision on donor coordination, elaborated in the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions, need to be implemented.

Consequently, the EU increasingly searches for an autonomous role in donor coordination, by strengthening internal EU coordination and through acting as an engine for donor-wide coordination. As such the coordinator role has both an internal and an external dimension. The internal dimension, henceforth EU coordination, relates to coordination between the EU and the Member States. The external dimension, henceforth donor-wide coordination, concerns the multilateral perspective and refers to coordination between the EU and other international partners, both traditional (OECD-DAC) and emerging donors.

The basic analytical framework summarized in Table 3-2 was developed and adjusted throughout the research process, in line with the abductive approach. As I have explained in Chapter 2, during the first research, the conceptual foundations categorized above had informed the data generation as well as the analysis of the existing donor-wide coordination processes. However, during and after the field research, it became clear that mapping EU coordination required a tailor-made approach. Moreover, although I have aimed to take a holistic perspective on what the EU does and how the EU policy initiatives are translated at the field level, it was impossible to cover all these aspects of coordination, which necessitated making choices on which aspects the research would concentrate.

First, in my thesis I have focused primarily on what the EU Delegations are doing regarding coordination and how they initiate coordination with EU Member States. I am not dedicating equal attention to exploring the practices and motivations of other donor agencies, recipient governments, and headquarters’ actors because that would involve another research project. The result is that bilateral coordination between Member States is not explored in detail throughout the discussion of the country studies, nor the characteristics and motivations of the actors summarized above. However, these issues are to a certain extent taken into account when discussing the context and the enabling and constraining factors in each country.

Second, this thesis does not look into detail at coordination across different sectors. In the different country chapters a number of illustrations will be provided of coordination in certain sectors, when this is considered to reveal insights on the EU’s coordinator role in general. The reason for this choice is that coordination at sector-level is no area where the EU’s policy initiatives have focused on and the field research has confirmed that this is no EU-specific exercise. Moreover, coordination at the political level is also out of the scope of the research.
While aid and politics are not easily separable, I have not concentrated on coordination in political dialogue (article 8, political crises), which is usually done at HoMs level. However, issues related to political coordination will feature throughout the different country chapters when these reveal insights on EU coordination on development cooperation. However, despite these restrictions, I have still engaged in a holistic understanding to allow for conducting complexity-sensitive research by taking into account different aid channels and different stakeholders.

The framework presented below was thus not utilized from the outset of the research process but guided the second and the third cycles of field research. As I will outline in the end of this section, the country chapters largely follow the structure of this framework.

**Table 3-2. RQ1: Mapping EU coordination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal dimension: to what extent does the EU coordinate?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programming phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint multiannual programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is commitment to joint multiannual programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>translated at field level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EDF 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EDF 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent is information exchange institutionalized?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What information is shared?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do EU donors adopt common positions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On what occasions, on which topics?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent is EU coordination taking place in less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutionalized manners? (cf. symbolic events)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTI on Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is the Code of Conduct translated at field level?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonized aid modalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do EU donors engage in delegate cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do EU donors make use of harmonized aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modalities such as budget support? To what extent are these modalities coordinated?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External dimension: to what extent does the EU contribute to donor-wide coordination processes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the EU contributed to the facilitation of information exchange?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the EU contributed to the facilitation of coordinated policy dialogue?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the EU contributed to the facilitation of coordinated monitoring of the PRSP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the EU contributed to the facilitation of division of labour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonized aid modalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent has the EU contributed to the facilitation of a coordinated approach on budget support?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, to assess the internal dimension I have briefly looked at coordination in the programming phase but mainly concentrated on coordination during implementation. There are three reasons for that. The first is that coordination in the programming of the 10th EDF remains overall very limited, and coordination in the programming of the 11th EDF did only initiate the very first phase during the research period. Second, programming is to a large extent conducted at headquarters’ level. Although there are differences amongst EU Member States, the role of agencies in the field is still limited. Third, there is a practical reason that relates to the regular turnovers within the embassies. To trace back the programming process for the 10th EDF in great detail would require interviewing staff members which participated in the exercise. However, on the basis of the EU’s CSPs and the information gained through the interviews, I have aimed to make a general assessment.

To investigate EU coordination during implementation I have focused on coordination at the national/strategic level and more specifically I have looked at information sharing and consultation, the adoption of common positions, the implementation of the FTI on Division of Labour and the use of harmonized aid modalities and more specifically budget support. For each country study I have considered the degree of institutionalization, the agenda, and the main objectives of EU coordination as well as EU donors’ attitude in general towards EU coordination. Apart from the formal structures, also more informal ways of coordination as well as symbolic practices (such as sharing a building or organize joint events) have been taken into account.

Second, for the external dimension, I have focused primarily on the role of EU Delegations in donor-wide coordination. ‘Roles refer to patterns of expected, appropriate behaviour’ and ‘encompass both an actor’s own considerations’ and the ‘expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors’ (Bengsston & Elgström, 2011: 114). Although I am not dedicating equal attention to exploring the practices and motivations of other donor agencies, for this specific question I will to a certain extent try to contrast the role of the EU with other major ‘coordinators’, and in particular the WB and UNDP. Previous research had indicated that the EU was mainly acting as ‘just another donor’ (cf. Söderbaum & Stalgren, 2008) and the first field research in Tanzania and Zambia largely confirmed this perception (cf. Delputte & Söderbaum, 2012). However, there were also instances where the EU had been able to act as an initiator in some areas. Moreover, throughout the research it became clear that there is no such thing in practice as a dichotomy between being a coordinator and just another donor or between being a good or a bad coordinator.
The EU’s coordinator role might thus vary in in each country. To define the EU Delegation’s role in donor-wide coordination in each country, I will concentrate on the EU Delegation’s engagement in the institution-building and development of the local coordination processes by investigating its general contribution to facilitate information sharing, coordination of the policy dialogue (PRSP, budget support), the development of division of labour coordination and to a coordinated approach on budget support.

Third, in addition to the internal and external dimensions of EU coordination in itself, I also aimed to shed a light on the potential tension between EU coordination (internal dimension) and donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension).

3.2 RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

This section provides the conceptual foundations to answer the second research question that seeks to understand EU coordination. To conduct a problem-driven research, ‘one paradigm is not able to grasp the multiple logics of the complex interactions involved’ (Cornut, 2009: 18). As my research has combined insights from different ‘research traditions’ (cf. Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 708-709).

In what follows I will first define and categorize existing explanations for coordination failure and success based on a review of coordination literature as well as scholarship on the coordinator role of the EU in development cooperation. Next, I will outline how these have inspired the development of a basic analytical framework to investigate the factors that enable and constrain EU coordination. The pragmatist approach has allowed me to go beyond a focus on institutions and procedures and provide a more profound understanding of the complexity of EU coordination by investigating the interplay of a wide range of factors that enable and constrain EU coordination in the field.

3.2.1 Explaining coordination

I will first discuss explanations for coordination from two major strands of literature that have inspired the conduct of the empirical research. On the one hand, researchers have given considerable attention to international donor coordination (Aldasoro et al., 2010; Bigsten, 2006; de Renzio et al., 2004; Hayman, 2009; Hyden, 2008; Menocal & Mulley, 2006; Rogerson, 2005; Stern, 2008) and put forward a multitude of factors constraining and enabling coordination exercises. Development studies’ literature on aid effectiveness, donor coordination, aid bureaucracies and institutions thus offers insights on donor coordination in general. In this literature, the EU is at best considered as just another donor. Moreover, this literature tends to put emphasize on institutional aspects. Although the political economy approach has emphasized
to take into account political aspects too, this literature tends to neglect the importance of donor and partner country specific dynamics such as development traditions, histories, identities and perceptions which might shape the incentives to engage in coordination.

On the other hand, scholarship on the coordinator role of the EU in development cooperation is still scarce. Existing studies (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Buč, 2010; Carbone, 2007, 2010a; Hoebink, 2004; Holtz, 1998; Orbie & Versluys, 2008) focus primarily on the general developments in Brussels and on coordination at an abstract level. The EU’s recent policy initiatives have aroused academic interest resulting in policy evaluations (cf. Triple C Evaluations 2004-2008), studies on the link between coordination and ownership in the EU context (Carbone, 2008, 2010b) and on the feasibility of implementation (Alvarez, 2010; Buč, 2010; Carbone, 2007; Carlsson et al., 2009; Dearden, 2008; Gill & Maxwell, 2004; Mürle, 2007; Schulz, 2007). These insights help to understand the specific case of the EU.

In what follows I synthetize the explanations brought forward in the literature in two broader categories. The success/failure of coordination is mainly attributed to (1) partner country-related factors and (2) donor-related factors. The categorization is summarized in Table 3-3. For the sake of completeness, developments at the international or the EU level should be somehow incorporated as ‘pressures and opportunities arising in the international system can stimulate internal change in each donor organization’ (de Renzio et al., 2004: 8). These developments have been discussed in Chapter 1 and will not be resumed in this section.

Table 3-3. Categorization of explanations for coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual foundations</th>
<th>Partner country related factors</th>
<th>Donor country related factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of donor landscape</td>
<td>Donor composition</td>
<td>Political, geostrategic, commercial, security, cultural and historic interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competing coordinators</td>
<td>Visibility towards domestic constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor-government relations</td>
<td>Aid dependency</td>
<td>Visibility within partner country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geo-strategic position</td>
<td>Individual and collective identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of BRICs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic and political performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67
PARTNER COUNTRY RELATED FACTORS

Most research on donor coordination focuses on internal incentives of aid agencies, thereby neglecting the external environment and the specific role of other donors and partner governments which shape the incentive systems of individual donors too. ‘Staff in a country office may respond differently depending both on the incentive structure internal to the agency and on the one created by the external environment.’ (de Renzio et al., 2004: 7).

In this section I will discuss factors related to the context in which donor coordination is taking place. These factors constitute the circumstances of the collective action problem of coordination. Collection action situations have been defined by Ostrom et al (2002: 10-11) as situations where ‘the input of several individuals is required to achieve a desirable joint outcome’. As Hopwood (2009: 106) argues:

‘There are no causal chains that enable us to predict how technical inputs will translate into outcomes on the ground. The same set of inputs can result in very different outcomes, and different inputs can produce similar outcomes, depending on the country context. The variability in contexts makes it difficult to rigidly apply lessons from one country to another. Even among neighbouring countries with apparent similarities, there are often different histories and cultural endowments, different social and political conditions, and different capabilities for managing national resources’.

Contextual factors include (1) the nature of the donor landscape and (2) the donor-government relations and the role of the recipient’s government.

The nature of the donor landscape

The composition of the donor landscape in a certain country may affect the conditions for coordination. Literature suggests that when donors are fewer in number, the conditions for achieving coordination are more favourable. As the number of donors increases, the context
becomes more challenging (World Bank, 1999: x). According to the logic of collective action, ‘unless the number of individual is quite small, or unless there is coercion of some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interest individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests’ (Olson, 1965: 53-56). But also the kind of donors represented in a country does play a role. When donors and agencies have a high development orientation, this is an enabling condition for achieving coordination. However, when non-development motives are dominant in the aid allocation, effective coordination will be problematic (World Bank, 1999: x).

Of particular relevance of my research is the presence of other possible coordinators in the field. As indicated in Chapter 1, the discussion on the ‘right’ forum for coordination clearly plays at the international level. However, this kind of competition is also present at the country level, where agencies want to lead on particular topics and sectors (Hayman, 2006: 27). In the past decade, several facilitating operational frameworks for coordination have been put in place in developing countries. In many countries traditional bilateral and multilateral donors are participating in a donor-wide coordination platform, often under the chairmanship of the WB or UNDP. These donor groups are in general open to any interested cooperating partner. In addition to this, in a number of countries ‘Nordic Plus’ donors are guided by specific ‘complementarity principles’ regarding division of labour and form some sort of informal donor group.

First, the WB invested in aid coordination for a long time. Already in 1969 the influential Pearson report called for better coordination and in 1989 the WB issued an operational directive on Aid coordination groups. A decade later, in 1999, the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) formed the basis for a renewed focus on coordination. The CDF embraces partnership as a basic principle, and aid coordination is closely related to that as in a partnership ‘all partners jointly develop and agree on their objectives, as well as on their respective accountabilities in realizing these objectives’. The WB puts emphasis on country led aid coordination and supporting governments by strengthening their aid management and coordination capacities. In a self-evaluation, the WB concluded already in 1999 that ‘the development community has been well-served by the Bank’s support of aid coordination’, while ‘much remains to be done to achieve the long-standing goal of country-leadership of the process’ (World Bank, 1999: xi). The WB sees itself as a ‘middle-man’ given its role as an organizer and chair of many aid groups. At the international level, the WB has chaired consultation group meetings, and at the country level, it is involved in coordination at sectoral and project level, where it initiates co-financing arrangements (World Bank, 1999: 3).

Messner et al (cited in Faust & Messner, 2007: 22) refer in this context to the Wal-Mart problem: ‘apart from one extremely influential player (the WB), the international aid architecture is made up of a large
number of fragmented and relatively insignificant actors’. A WB’s evaluation of its role in coordination conducted in 1999 revealed that while the WB was seen as ‘dominating the aid coordination process’, this did not mean that donors welcomed this role. Criticism was pointed at consultation group meetings being ‘excessively formalistic, marked by lengthy set speeches and posturing rather than genuine dialogue’ (World Bank: 1999: 9). This relates to the fact that coordination at that time was mostly a donor club issue and meetings were held outside the developing country. Already at that time, the main weaknesses of the WB’s role in aid coordination, perceived by other donors, were the ‘arrogance and insensitivity by visiting Bank missions’, its ‘lack of transparency and timeliness in consultation and the sharing of relevant information’ and the ‘lack of openness to their participation in processes that relate to more effective coordination, such as the strategy-development process’ (World Bank, 1999: 19).

Second, UNDP has initiated Round Tables in the mid-1970s. The survey of the WB already noted UNDP-WB tensions, related to the lack of clarity in their roles in aid coordination. UNDP’s approach is rather directed to providing technical cooperation to core departments in recipient countries’ administrations, as it concentrates on building the capacity for aid coordination and management in core departments of the government. UNDP also sees itself as a potential lead of coordination given its mandate to build capacity in governments for aid coordination and management (UNDP, 1994).

In this context, it is worthwhile to question the specific added value of the EU as a coordinator, which brings us to the question of the desirability of EU coordination (Lehtinen, 2003: 5). In various countries, the way towards coordination was paved by the local donor community before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions were adopted, which suggests that EU policies to promote a more coordinated EU approach in the field came too late and may limit the EU’s coordinator role as the Commission might either participate as ‘just another donor’ (in donor-wide platforms), or might simply be excluded (in a Nordic Plus framework). Consequently, it is doubted whether EU coordination brings any added value for EU donors, non EU-donors and the government as the existence of other donor coordination structures make it questionable whether an extra layer of specifically intra EU coordination is at all desirable. Moreover, EU coordination can even be seen as a hindrance for donor-wide coordination. Gill and Maxwell (2004: 175) questioned ‘how far intra-EU coordination affects other kinds of coordination’ and whether wider coordination and intra-EU coordination should be viewed as complementary, conflicting or competing. This also relates to ‘the trade-off between the EU’s “will to power” and its actual record as a progressive development actor that takes the needs of developing countries to heart’ (Carbone, 2010b: 26).
The EU strategy to improve the quality of international aid includes an ambition to take up a leading role in the implementation of the Paris Agenda (European Commission, 2006a) but at the field level there are other major actors that aim to take a lead in coordination. So how does the EU relate to other big players such as the WB and the UN regarding coordination? As mentioned earlier, at the level of the EU Member States, literature distinguishes between those who aim for a European solution (the ‘European front’ consisting of France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg) and those who prefer a global solution of donor-wide coordination (the ‘like-minded’ or ‘Nordic Plus’ countries being Denmark, UK, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden) (Bué, 2010: 206). In his research on donor coordination on good governance Carbone (2010b: 23) refers to a similar division.

**Donor-government relations**

Fundamental for the realization of more effective aid is the ‘development of trust between the parties in the aid relationship, based on the degree of shared purpose, commitment, reliability, familiarity with local conditions, transparency, and honest and open communications’ (Hopwood, 2009: 104). Literature suggests that the development of trust between donors and the government and their preparedness to better coordinate aid delivery depends on the partner country’s level of aid dependency, their geo-strategic position, the presence of emerging donors which provides for alternatives and the country’s policy performance and institutional quality (cf. Aldasoro et al., 2010; Grimm & Hackenesch, 2012; Hayman, 2009; Rogerson & de Renzio, 2005; Sundewall et al., 2010). For example, in countries with a strong commitment and high institutional quality, coordination might be more likely to be recipient country driven. On the other hand, in countries where the country shows weak commitment and institutional capacity, coordination might be more donor-driven. These factors are key for effective recipient-led aid coordination to succeed. Closely related are the commitment of the country and the institutional capacity to manage and coordinate aid. (World Bank, 1999: x). In countries which are less aid dependent or which have increased access to emerging donors, the government could make use of ‘divide and rule’ tactics and play donors against each other (de Renzio et al., 2004: 7).

**DONOR-COUNTRY RELATED FACTORS**

Most research on coordination focuses on donors’ constraints to engage in coordination. In what follows I have categorized the explanations put forward in the literature on aid agencies and EU coordination into the pragmatic framework centred around the three ‘I’s, namely interests,
institutions and ideas. Inspired by an emerging literature that looks into the contribution of personalities, I will also briefly discuss the role of individuals in the field.

**Interests**

Coordination can be considered as the result of a negotiation between gains and losses. Coordination aims to reduce transaction costs in the long term, particularly for recipient countries, but it can imply several costs for donors both in the short term (for ex. time-consuming exercises) and in the long-term (for ex. loss of individual political influence in the country). According to Hopwood (2009: 117): *‘an aid agency that takes harmonization seriously must be willing to redefine its objectives and subordinate its own activities and outputs to a commitment to joint outcomes and results, thereby contributing to the total effectiveness of the aid effort in a particular country’*. This may require a redefinition and realignment of its individual objectives (de Renzio et al., 2004).

Development cooperation is part of donors’ foreign policy and coordination somehow threatens a state’s sovereignty in aid allocation decisions (Grilli, 1994: 79; Kleibl, 2012; Rogerson, 2005: 539; Schulz, 2007: 6). Apart from a developing country’s needs, donor countries’ political, geo-strategic, commercial, security, cultural and historic interests determine the allocation decisions (de Renzio et al., 2004; Faust & Messner, 2007: 3; Lundsgaarde, 2012: 705). ‘Development is clearly only one among various purposes of aid’ (Lancaster in Hout, 2012: 407) resulting in that other powerful interests compete with the coordination principle (Rogerson, 2005: 534). Donors have a political agenda that includes an interest to remain fragmented instead of engaging in coordination. For example, for the specific case of division of labour and specialization, donors will not easily leave attractive sectors or delegate their portfolio to other donors. Many headquarters ask their delegations to stay engaged in certain sectors because aid allocation is also determined by national interests and visibility concerns. ‘Extending aid is tantamount to asserting national sovereignty’ (Roeskau, 2004: 2) so having projects *‘in many countries maximizes donor countries’ ability to leverage the diplomatic support of small countries for their objectives (and sometimes their candidates for high posts) in the UN and other international settings’* (Birdsall, 2008: 523). On the other hand, if interests are aligned, donor coordination may also serve as a ‘powerful tool with which to exercise leverage over the development process’ (Buse, 1999: 226).

Apart from donors’ material interests and power concerns, some authors (Birdsall, 2008: 523; Hopwood, 2009: 116; Vollmer, F., 2012) also refer to donors’ visibility and identity concerns as a restraint for engaging in coordination. On the one hand, donors have an interest to be visible towards their constituency. Donors have political requirements to show results (de Renzio et al.,
2004) so visibility is important in order to ‘justify aid spending to their domestic audiences’ (Lundsgaarde, 2012: 705) to secure future financing and raise public awareness (Aldasoro et al., 2010: 922). On the other hand, donors also look for visibility within the recipient country, which is seen as an instrument to increase leverage and political influence. According to Birdsall (2008: 523) the incentives for remaining fragmented are too high as ‘managing their “own” projects increases donor visibility’. Furthermore, development cooperation represents a scene for the manifestation of individual donor identities which might compete with the coordination principle, especially when coordination is perceived to merge into a collective identity. Besides, some donors might also be driven by an identity motive to take a lead in coordination processes. The latter has been referred to as the ‘self-promotional side of aid coordination’ (Forster and Stokke, 1999, cited in Hayman, 2009) or the fact that ‘all donors want to co-ordinate but no one wants to be coordinated’ (Whittington and Calhoun, 1988, 307).

For the EU, these interest-related factors might be even more impeding. The EU has become a broader and more political project then the more ‘functionally driven’ WB or UN, resulting in stronger links with other external policies such as trade and security, and less specialized expertise. The EU may therefore be perceived as a more supranational and centralized coordination platform with a central role for the Commission. Research on European development cooperation has frequently emphasized the desire of Member States to privilege an existing bilateral relationship to the detriment of a coordinated collective position as Member States are driven by their national priorities and policies (Hoebink, 2004: 41).

The EU’s pursuit to promote coordination might be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen its international profile. On the one hand, although the Commission may be considered as a more ‘neutral’ donor than the Member States, as it lacks direct national interests, it also has an interest in strengthening its own role in development policy vis-à-vis the Member States (cf. Carbone 2007). On the other hand, the EU’s attention for aid effectiveness may also ‘add legitimacy to development assistance by highlighting efforts to spend resources wisely’ (Lundsgaarde, 2012: 709). The Commission seeks presence not simply as ‘just another donor’ but as a collective and global actor, thereby representing both the EU as a regional polity as well as the EU Member States, aiming at asserting the European identity (versus the other) (cf. Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 138-139). From this perspective, given the ‘differential Europeanization of national identities’ (Risse, 2012: 43), EU coordination may compete with Member States’ identity as donors in a way which other forms of donor coordination do not (Delputte & Söderbaum, 2012: 53).
Paradoxically, within the EU, countries which have been least enthusiastic about integration of EU development policy have been most supportive of the Paris Agenda. These - mainly Nordic Plus\textsuperscript{20} – countries believe that ‘other, non-EU multilateral institutions such as the UN agencies, the WB and the OECD-DAC, as well as minilateral groupings such as the group of Like-Minded Countries in development are better equipped to do the job’ (Orbie, 2012: 27). These Member States ‘emphasized that the EU should support existing coordination efforts, such as the PRSPs and JAS’ (Carbone, 2010b: 23). On the other hand, those countries who aim for a European solution, which have been called the ‘European front’\textsuperscript{21} donors (Bué, 2010: 206) are considered to be less committed to the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (cf. OECD-DAC, 2011). Moreover, Countries like France, Italy and Spain ‘sought to downplay the link between EU-led and international coordination processes’ (Carbone, 2010b: 23). Especially France ‘sees the need for a European coordination in trying to elaborate a particular European vision on development issues in opposition with some of the existing Bretton Woods policies’ (Hoebink, 2004:6).

However, arguably the French preference for the EU does not follow from a preference for European integration of development policy as such. France clearly has its own agenda in Africa which is closely related to its foreign policy agenda. France will only opt for the European path (or the multilateral) when this is in line with its own interests. If considered useful they will support EU coordination, if not, they will safeguard their bilateral relationship with developing countries. Moreover, for decades, European development policy was French-dominated, and the EU thus largely served as an instrument to share its own burden. However, in the post-Lomé era, with the entrance into force of the Cotonou Agreement, European development policy has become more Anglo-Saxon or even Nordic (Claeys, 2004; Olsen, 2011).

Institutions

Most literature on coordination has looked into institutional constraints to coordination. Coordination also reflects a bureaucratic process, in which different organizations decide to solve a collective action problem. This process may conflict with the internal organization and corresponding incentive structures of individual donor agencies as these are faced with ‘a multiplicity of rules, procedures and incentives that have a massive impact on their behaviour and thus on the effectiveness of their interventions’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 1). Institutional factors can explain the gap between high level political declarations and commitments on the one hand and implementation in lower level of the agencies on the other hand (de Renzio et al., 2004). Institutions consist of formal rules as well as of informal constraints (North, 1991: 97).

\textsuperscript{20} Denmark, UK, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden

\textsuperscript{21} France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg
First, the structure of a donor’s aid organization may influence its ability and capacities to coordinate with other actors. The extent to which donors delegate authority from headquarters to the agencies in the field determines their ability to coordinate at country level (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 283; Schulz, 2007; Sundewall et al., 2010). Different donors delegate different levels of responsibility to the country level, so some country offices have more room to manoeuvre than others (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 277) to shape country programmes according to local priorities and systems (de Renzio et al., 2004). Closely related is the institutional link between development and foreign affairs. As argued above, donor countries have specific foreign policy objectives which impact on the coordination efforts. For some donors, the separation between political concerns and the disbursement of aid is clearer than for others. Moreover, donors’ legal and administrative procedures differ significantly (de Renzio et al., 2004). Some donors have more flexible operational procedures than others regarding programme design and evaluation, financial management and procurement (de Renzio et al., 2004). Coordination might thus require reviews of procedural and legal requirements and aid modalities. For example, differing planning cycles in the donor administration can delay the implementation of a division of labour.

Second, while these organizational and administrative features might look ‘technical’, they also create incentive systems which determine individual and collective behaviour and can stimulate or impede harmonization practice (de Renzio et al., 2004; Faust & Messner, 2007: 3). Incentives are ‘the rewards and punishment that are perceived by individuals to be related to their actions and that of others’ (Ostrom et al., 2002: XIV). These ‘bureaucratic politics’ make institutional adaption in favour of coordination a less technical issue (Hopwood, 2009: 112). As a result of the principal agent reality, headquarters for example ‘tend to augment procedural routines, which are meant to impose control and innovation mechanisms on their agents. As a consequence, the incentives for donor organizations to continue on with once-established projects and activities give rise to a pattern of continuous resource flows, combined with project and planning proliferation’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 4). Aid agencies have a major interest to secure their own survival and autonomy, and coordination and especially delegation may be perceived as threats (Hout, 2012: 413). As such, the reluctance to leave a certain country or sector also has a bureaucratic explanation: ‘there is no reason to expect development cooperation agencies to seek solely to realize the collective aims of the policy field and thus to work purposefully for their own elimination’ (Faust & Messner, 2007: 3).

Incentives are also produced by human resource management and the bureaucratic culture of an aid organization. Regarding human resource management, criteria for annual performance assessments and promotion and special awards to successes in coordination may be of particular
influence (de Renzio et al., 2004). This includes recruitment policies, skills and training, staff assessment and career system, and more informal issues such as peer pressure and recognition. For example, the engagement of agency staff may differ significantly when promotion is based on disbursement criteria or on efforts on coordination. According to Ostrom (2002: XXIII) making sure that the allocated budget is spent is a main incentive for staff in aid agencies. ‘Moving the money’ tends to be more important when the size of the staff is small relative to the size of the budget it administers. This tends to lead towards a bias for larger projects that enable staff to move the money as rapidly as possible. A crucial factor for individual staff at the country level is the extent to which senior management supports country based coordination initiatives (Hopwood, 2009). Hopwood also refers to the importance of bureaucratic culture. There seems to be a tension between ‘on the one hand, the classic bureaucratic culture of the aid agency that emphasizes compliance, control and careful management of project inputs, and on the other, the need for a new spirit of innovation that “let’s go” of time-consuming and fastidious controls in favour of managing by and for results’ (Hopwood, 2009: 116). According to Hout (2012: 407-408) such incentive structures that focus on the commitment and disbursement of funds, the management of projects and programmes, and the production of reports and memos ‘brings about an orientation of staff to the technical aspects of their work’ (Hout, 2012: 408). Aid agencies’ ‘institutional ethos’ is focused on ‘making poverty history’, and ‘doing development’ is often understood as ‘implementing projects and programmes successfully’. While donor agencies’ staff might be concerned about donor coordination, they might feel different about actually engaging themselves in coordination.

In the case of the EU, in spite of reforms, the Commission’s financial management and contracting procedures are perceived to be still too complicated and subject to centralized checks. In spite of increased decentralization, authority within the EU institutions remains rather centralized (cf. Figure 3-1). Headquarters’ approval is required for new activities (irrespective of volume) and some programmes are still designed in Brussels (OECD-DAC, 2012b: 6), especially for thematic and regional budget lines. Although the EU Delegations’ play a crucial role in the programming of the EDF by delivering analytical input and engage in consultation with Member States’ agencies, the partner country government and local civil society, final decision making is done at headquarters’ level. Moreover, the European Commission is a rather small bureaucracy and thus characterized by relatively low staff numbers. The latest OECD-DAC peer review of the EU finds that in spite of major improvements, the EU should further devolve more authority to its staff in the field and place ‘enough people in the field to support this devolution’ (OECD-DAC, 2012b: 69). A recent European Court of Auditors (ECA) audit pointed at similar findings and advises that the EU should address the ‘balance between staff working on aid and staff working on political
and trade matters, the skills profile of staff, and the high number of vacancies among contract staff. The number of sectors in which delegations continued to be involved, despite steps to strengthen donor coordination, increases the workload of delegations’ (European Court of Auditors, 2011: 7).

**Figure 3-1. Division of responsibilities between headquarters and delegations in the Commission’s devolved management system**

Although this research mainly focuses on the Commission-led coordination, insights on Member States’ institutional set-up should be taken into account. However recent comparative research on the EU Member States’ aid organisations is not available. To provide for an indication of Member States’ institutional set-up, Annex I includes a number of tables which are based on an OECD-DAC Survey of 2009 (OECD-DAC, 2009a). The level of decentralization in EU Member States’ aid bureaucracies varies from country to country although most EU donors have initialised a decentralization process. The Netherlands, the UK and Denmark have most decentralized aid
management structures. A more recent report commissioned by the EU confirms these varying levels of decentralization amongst EU donors (O’Riordan et al., 2011). On the one hand, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, the UK, Italy, Luxembourg and Austria, are considered most decentralized. On the other hand, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain and Finland have more centralized decision making. When it comes to the decision making on programming, for most EU donors this is primarily done at headquarters’ level, although the specific input of field agencies’ varies from country to country (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 23-24).

However, this report concludes that, despite the existence of various institutional obstacles, all EU donors are procedurally able to engage in joint programming (cf. Table 3-4). The study recognizes the importance of perceptions of these institutional factors as well as political concerns but does not provide a deeper understanding of their contributions. Therefore this research will seek for a deeper understanding of EU coordination in the field and go beyond institutional and procedural explanations for coordination.

Table 3-4. Procedural ability of EU donors to engage in EU joint programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ability to align programming cycle to partner country</th>
<th>Ability to fund activities without bilateral CSP</th>
<th>Ability to make use of rolling strategies</th>
<th>Ability to sign a joint programming document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on O’Riordan et al., 2011: 9.
Ideas

Coordination can also be seen as a norm, which is introduced as a functional approach to maintain order in donor activities in absence of a superior power who would be able to structure aid within a country in function of development effectiveness. However, different actors/donors might have different ideational points of view on aid modalities and development and the ‘right’ level of coordination and have internalized the ideas surrounding aid effectiveness to various degrees. These diverging ideas may influence the construction of problems and solutions that enter the agenda and may legitimize or challenge existing institutions and policies (Béland, 2009: 704-705). Assuming that development actors’ behaviour might not only be driven by interests or institutions but also guided by norms, according to the logic of appropriateness, this thesis aims to shed a light on how EU donors’ ideas about aid and development enable and constrain EU coordination. Ideational differences between donors may constrain coordination. According to Stern (2008: 46) ‘the extent to which donors are willing to harmonize among themselves will depend on the extent that they share development objectives which are not overshadowed by other commercial or political objectives incompatible with development needs’.

We can distinguish between philosophical, policy and programmatic ideas (cf. Schmidt. 2011). Although this thesis does not aim to investigate the true convergence of divergence of EU donors’ ideas, nor their changes over time, a brief discussion should reveal the existence of different ideas about aid and development as well as on the ‘right’ level of coordination, which might be important for studying EU coordination at country level. It should be emphasized that, to my knowledge, there is no recent comparative research on this topic. As ideas change over time, the empirical research might possibly provide new insights.

First, philosophical ideas include ‘worldviews, ideologies, philosophical principles, public philosophies, normative values, or discourses that underpin the core understandings of individuals and society about how the world works and what is therefore appropriate action in the world’ (cf. Schmidt. 2011: 6). Arguably, the European Consensus suggests a convergence of EU donors’ philosophical ideas about development, as it portrays common European values (respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice). However, behind this Consensus, their might still exist different traditions of ‘doing development’, inspired by different worldviews. For example, Nordic countries’ development policies have typically been inspired by ‘international solidarism’ and ‘multilateralism’ (Olsen, 2011) as well as by ‘non-material more altruistic motivations’ as they consider development cooperation as a ‘moral duty’ (Carbone, 2007). On the other hand, donors such as the UK, France, German and Southern
Member States are considered to be driven by a more realistic worldview which translates into the influence of self-interest into their development policies (Carbone, 2007).

Second, programmatic ideas include ‘paradigms, problem definitions, or analytical frameworks that constitute policy programs’ (Schmidt, 2011: 10). As explained in Chapter 1, since the late 90s a new aid paradigm arose which is based on country ownership, partnership and mutual accountability. Fitting in the post-Washington consensus this new paradigm combines the responsibility of partner countries for good governance and development with the commitment of donor countries to increased aid of better quality (Menocal & Mulley, 2006). While the MDGs (2000) serve as the basis for development priorities, the Paris Declaration (2005) sets commitments to improve the quality of aid. All EU donors have formally endorsed the Paris Declaration, which includes preferred solutions and policy instruments to increase aid effectiveness, suggesting a convergence of programmatic ideas. In fact, the EU has even set specific EU targets which are more ambitious than the ones put forwards in the Paris Declaration. Additionally, the EU has also translated these ideas into the Paris Declaration by referring to common principles (ownership, partnership, political dialogue, participation of civil society, gender equality and addressing state fragility) and adopted EU specific programmatic ideas to make its aid more effective, based on the so-called Triple C (complementarity, coordination and coherence, cf. Chapter 1). By adopting the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour and the Operational Framework on Aid effectiveness, EU Member States have at least formally endorsed these ideas.

However, on the one hand, the formal support for the aid effectiveness may compete with the existence of rival programmatic ideas, possibly influenced by philosophical ideas. Progress of the implementation of the Paris Declaration varies across EU donors (cf. Table 3-5) with Nordic Plus countries being recognized for their good performance, especially when it comes to the use of programme-based support and the use of budget support, in contrast to countries like France, Spain, Luxembourg or Spain which still adhere to a larger extent to modalities such as technical assistance and project support. On the other hand, different ideas may exist about the ‘right level’ of coordination, as was illustrated by the discussion on ‘European front’ and ‘Nordic’-plus countries. For example, there is no consensus that coordination at the EU level adds value to what is already done within the donor wide community (Hoebink 2004: 41). Moreover, Member States may lack confidence in the EU Delegation as a centralized and bureaucratic form of coordination. The role that the EU might play in coordination might thus be dependent on the
degree to which actors agree on its functionality and its potential outcomes in terms of aid and development effectiveness.

Third, policy ideas refer to ‘ideas contained in the specific policies, norms, values, and political discourse applied to particular situations which change rapidly when new agendas emerge and “windows of opportunity open up” (Schmidt, 2011: 7). While there might also be convergence in policy ideas, influenced by the programmatic ideas described above, donors might still diverge in their specific policy choices. For example, even amongst budget support donors, which share the programmatic idea that providing budget support contributes to aid and development effectiveness, the specific use of the instrument varies to a great extent, which is visible in different eligibility and disbursement criteria and arguably influenced by philosophical ideas (cf. Molenaers, 2012).
Table 3-5 EU 2010 scoreboard on Paris Indicators

EU 2010 scoreboard on Paris Indicators
(Based on data of 32 participating partner countries which participated in both the 2005 and 2010 Paris Surveys)

For reference:
Paris indicators 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8 9 10a 10b Average
Aid...% reached
Baseline 2005 42% 48% 40% 39% 41% 43% 18% 42%
Global target 2010 85% 50% 55% 50% 66% 71% 87% 66%

EU donors assessed:

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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<td>73%</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>57%</td>
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EU performance per indicator

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<th>36%</th>
<th>28%</th>
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<td>% reached</td>
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<td>51%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU vs Global scores</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission, 2011d
INDIVIDUALS

Most research is still focused on institutions and neglects the personal dimension of development processes, partly because of the academic search for general rather than individual explanations (Fechter, 2012: 1390; Kapyla & Mikkola, 2011: 425). However, more recently, some researchers have paid more attention to personal agency (cf. Blackmore, 2009; Chambers, 1997; Fechter, 2012). They aim to broaden the common view since ‘rather than mechanically implementing policy, […] the role of the development bureaucrats is […] to “marry off” different worlds’ (Tamás & Sato, 2012: 1513) between on the one hand development organizations who need reliable bureaucrats to implement their policies and on the other hand, the context in the field which requires ‘staff who can do what makes sense’ (Tamás & Sato, 2012: 1511). This approach aims to shed a light on how individuals’ relationships, beliefs, values, attitudes and personal characteristics matter for development practice (Fechter, 2012: 1388) as within a certain ‘room of manoeuvre’, individuals can make personal choices within bounds they negotiate (Tamás & Sato, 2012: 1516). De Renzio et al. (2004: 20) highlight for example that an active minister, a group of committed donor representatives, someone with a vision taking leadership, or people willing to talk and to solve problems together may make a difference. Importantly, by acknowledging the personal dimension in the analysis of the country studies I do not aim to ‘supplant the focus on structure’ (Fechter, 2012: 1388) and revert to ‘methodological individualism’ which states that ‘all social phenomena, and particularly the functioning of social institutions, should always be seen as resulting from the decisions of individual actors’ (Piiparinen cited in Kapyla & Mikkola, 2011: 424). Despite their importance, these personal factors should be considered ‘as complementary to political and institutional level factors’ (de Renzio et al., 2004: 17).

Therefore, in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the coordination processes and the role of the EU, throughout the analysis of the country studies, when they are considered to play a significant role, these personal relationships and the role of key personalities or specific innovators are taken into account. To apply these insights specifically to the research question, management literature provides us with some insights on profiles of coordinators or convenors. For example, to be effective, facilitators of coordination should aim to be inclusive, be impartial towards the solutions, direct rather than dominate the discussions, demonstrate ongoing visible commitment by sending signals which shows their on-going interest, and should make sure that there is an outcome (Carlson, 2007: 30).
3.2.2 Basic analytical framework to understand EU coordination

Similar to the approach adopted to map EU coordination (RQ1), the basic analytical framework summarized in Table 3-2 was developed and adjusted throughout the research process, in line with the abductive approach. As I have explained in Chapter 2, this research has been conducted through a cyclical process during which literature review, data generation, data analysis and formulation of the research design mutually influenced and succeeded each other, guided by the emergent insights. The wide range of explanations for coordination put forward in the literature discussed above have been consulted before and after the different cycles of field research.

I have aimed to take a holistic perspective by investigating the interplay of a wide range of factors. As I assumed that each of the possible explanations offered in this section may provide elements to understand the total picture, the analysis of the country chapters will take these factors into account. However, as this is no variable-centric but problem-driven research, this basic analytical framework has been used mainly as a tool to structure the data. This also implies that not all of these factors could be analysed in the same detailed manner. Besides, the research framework is constituted on the basis of the conceptual notions derived from the literature but also on the basis of the interpretation by the interviewees’ accounts. In Chapter 0 conclusions will be drawn based on the findings of the different dynamics in the four countries in order to identify those elements that best explain EU coordination at the country level.

Table 3-6. RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of factors</th>
<th>Factors</th>
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</table>
| (1) Interest-related factors | (1a) EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns  
(1b) EU donors’ influence in the country |
| (2) Institutional factors | (2a) Existing aid architecture  
(2b) Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines  
(2c) Staffing and bureaucratic culture |
| (3) Ideational factors | (3a) Ideas about aid and development and coordination on budget support  
(3b) Ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination |
3.3 Introduction to the country chapters

This thesis will try to involve the reader in solving the research puzzle by presenting the findings through the different country studies, following the logic of the research design (White, Woodfield, & Ritchie, 2003: 295). While the basic analytical framework, presented in this chapter, provides descriptions of the central concepts, based on the existing literature, throughout the country chapters I will identify the different interpretations of EU coordination, as well as the factors that enable and constrain EU coordination at the country level. As I have focused on four different countries I hope to come to a better understanding of what shapes the opportunities and challenges for the EU as a coordinator in development in different country contexts.

As stated earlier, researching EU coordination at country level is not straightforward, but complicated by the ways in which different coordination processes, the aid landscape and the donor-government relations have developed in the past decade. In particular, unravelling what the EU has done, what its contributions are or what is driven by other actors is difficult because of the complexity of overlapping coordination processes, the existence of time effects and the various subjective realities of interviewees, as well as the fact that (at least in principle) coordination does not allow for flag-flying.

However, the qualitative research methods described in Chapter 2 have enabled me to investigate the specific experiences of EU coordination in different countries by focusing on how different actors perceive coordination practices and the specific role of the EU. I have tried to look at both formal and informal practices of coordination and the EU’s interactions with other donors and the government. Moreover, in each country chapter I will present illustrative cases of EU coordination to explore issues in more detail. As such, in the country chapters I will portray a detailed picture of the EU’s experience with coordination making use of thick descriptions.

The order of the four country chapters follows the sequence of the empirical research process, which I have substantially described in Chapter 2. Consequently I will start with Tanzania and Zambia before turning to Burkina Faso and Senegal. An overview of the countries’ contextual characteristics is provided in Annex II.

Each country chapter follows the same structure and includes four sections, namely a context section, a section which maps EU coordination (=RQ1), a section in which enabling and constraining factors for EU coordination are investigated (=RQ2) and a concluding section.

First, as became clear throughout the literature review and through the analysis of the data generated through the field research, the county’s political, economic, development and security
situation, the evolution of donor-government relations, the local donor landscape, the existing donor-wide coordination processes and the EU’s position as a donor might affect the EU’s coordinator role. Therefore, in the context section (section 1) I will start with a description of these issues. I will thereby consider the general aid coordination architecture and donor coordination processes with specific attention for strategic coordination (PRSP, general policy issues, division of labour) and coordination around budget support.

In the main sections (sections 2 and 3) I will look in greater depth at EU coordination. In the second section of each country chapter I provide a descriptive account of EU coordination guided by the basic analytical framework presented in Table 3-2. I will present a picture of the recent EU initiatives to implement the EU’s policy framework and consider both the internal and external dimension of EU coordination as well as coordination at different levels. In doing so, I will also take into account more informal practices of coordination and make use of illustrative cases of EU coordination. In the third section I will take a more analytical stance by exploring the enabling and constraining factors for EU coordination guided by the pragmatic analytical framework based on the three I’s (Interests – Institutions – Ideas), summarized in Table 3-6.

Finally, in the end of each country chapter (section 4) I will form a conclusion about the degree of EU coordination and the key factors that help to understand these findings.
4 EU coordination in Tanzania

4.1 Context

The external environment may shape the opportunities and limitations of EU coordination in the field. In order to understand and interpret EU coordination in Tanzania, this section outlines the country context in which this takes place. I will start with an introduction to Tanzania’s political, economic, development and security situation before turning to a brief overview of the evolution of donor-government relations. Next, the nature of the donor landscape and the general aid coordination architecture and donor coordination processes since 2000 will be discussed. Thereby I will focus specifically on coordination around the PRSP, general policy issues, division of labour and budget support. I will conclude this introductory section with an outline of the EU’s cooperation with Tanzania.

4.1.1 Political, economic, development, and security situation

Tanzania is a least developed, low-income country (World Bank, 2013e) dependent on aid from a large number of different donors (OECD-DAC, 2013). Formerly a German colony, then under a League of Nations mandate (1922-1946) and a UN Trust Territory (1946-1961) administered by the UK, Tanganyika gained independence in 1961. In 1964 the country merged with the island of Zanzibar to become the United Republic of Tanzania.

Since independence the country has been regarded as a darling of both European and international donors which explains the high volumes of aid and high percentages of aid to the Gross National Income (GNI) and government expenditure (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 272-273; Davies & Klasen, 2011: 30). In 2007, Tanzania was a priority country of 10 EU donors22 (European Commission, 2009c). Over the period 2000-2010 aid represented about 13 per cent on average of its GNI and currently Tanzania ranks second in the top 10 ODA recipients in Africa (OECD-DAC, 2012a). Tanzania has been praised for its political stability, its peaceful democratic transitions and more recently for its economic growth figures. While the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has dominated the political system since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992, Tanzania has organized fairly free and fair elections at regular times (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 277). Current president Jakaya Kikwete was elected for the first time in 2005 and re-elected in 2010 for another five years. Within the country his popularity has dropped as he is considered both as ‘the darling of the donor community’ and the ‘tourist Head of State’ while not being able to translate Tanzania’s economic growth into shared wealth (The Citizen, 2012). While former

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22 Namely for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden and France.
President Benjamin Mkapa was seen as ‘a reformer, focusing on market-led growth, public sector reform and the elimination of corruption at all levels of government’, ‘progress in the fight against corruption has also suffered setbacks, constituting the major sticking point in relations between the government and its donor community’ (Mercer, 2003). Especially since 2006 Tanzania’s control of corruption has deteriorated (cf. Table 4-1).

Table 4-1. Estimate of Control of Corruption (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.03</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on WB World Development Indicators

In recent years GDP growth rates have been on average 6 to 7 per cent per year and are expected to reach 8 per cent and 6.4 per cent for 2012 and 2013 respectively but the country has still struggled with relatively high inflation of 8 to 11 per cent (World Bank, 2012b). In recent years Tanzania’s dependency on its traditional donors has diminished. While ODA as a percentage of the government expenditure had risen from 28.2 per cent in 2000/2001 to 42 per cent in 2007/2008, it has dropped back to 28.2 per cent in 2010/2011 (PolicyForum, 2011). As for budget support, while the share of budget support to Tanzania had risen to up to 50 per cent in 2003/2004, when General Budget Support (GBS) represented 20 per cent of Tanzania’s total expenditure, in recent years, the share has risen and it is estimated that budget support now only represents 6 per cent to 8 per cent of total expenditure. As such, ‘the donor funding role in covering government’s expenditure has crashed down’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). Alternative revenues are found in private investments and the emerging donors (Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS)) (cf. infra).

Tanzania’s major assets are its importance as a tourist destination, Dar es Salaam’s see port which serves several neighbouring land-locked countries, the importance of its railways for neighbouring countries, and its relative richness in national resources. Recently natural offshore gas reserves have been discovered (Government of Tanzania, 2012) resulting in a natural resource hype as Tanzania’s resource reserves are still to be unexploited or in exploration phase.

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23 Tanzania is famous for its wildlife and national parks, Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar beaches

24 Including gold, diamonds, coal, iron, uranium, nickel, chrome, tin platinum, coltan, base metals, ferrous minerals, gemstones such as tanzanite, and various industrial minerals such as soda, kaolin, tin, gypsum and phosphate.

25 Tanzania has been described as ‘a virgin play, with all manner of potential targets in different play styles and concepts’ (Thomas, 2011). It is predicted that because of east Africa’s gas reserves ‘the region could become the world’s third-largest exporter of natural gas’ (Ng’wanakilala, Bayoumy, & Baird, 2012). For example, in an article
In the WB’s Ease of Doing Business ranking, Tanzania takes 15\textsuperscript{th} out of 46 sub-Saharan countries (World Bank, 2012a). Moreover, Tanzania has shown a strong resistance to the global economic crisis. Tanzania’s economic prospects are fairly positive, for example it’s real per capita GDP growth is estimated 4.6 in 2013 (compared to the average of 3.3 for Sub-Saharan Africa, or 2.0 for the world) and 5.2 in 2014 (compared to the average of 3.1 for Sub-Saharan Africa, or 2.2 for the world) (World Bank, 2012b).

However, the country’s increased economic growth rates have barely impacted on poverty reduction. Tanzania is still one of the poorest countries in the world, with GDP per capita stagnating at 468 USD (World Bank, 2013e) ranking 152 out of 187 nations in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2011b).

While the EU’s commercial interests in sub-Saharan Africa are relatively small compared to other regions, in recent years Tanzania has attracted more interest of the EU. EU’s trade with Tanzania represents only 0.0 per cent of the EU’s imports and 0.1 per cent of the EU’s exports\textsuperscript{26} and Tanzania ranks 90\textsuperscript{th} on the EU’s list of major trade partners (European Commission, 2012d). However, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Tanzania have increased and while in 2007, EU imports from Tanzania were mainly agricultural products (87.5 per cent) and fuels and mining products represented only 3.3 per cent of total import, in 2009 the share of fuels and mining products had risen to 6 per cent and in 2011 to 23.3 per cent. Moreover, commercial interests vary across EU countries as shown by trade and FDI figures present in Table 4-2, Table 4-3 and Figure 4-1. Arguably, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany have relatively more commercial interests in Tanzania than other EU donors. Of the four countries studied in this thesis, Tanzania represents the relatively most important commercial partner for the EU.

Table 4-2. Major EU trade partners (percentage of EU15 trade 2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

summarizing the top five investment opportunities in Africa for 2012 in the influential Forbes magazine, Tanzania is suggested as a lucrative investment opportunity because it is one of the worlds’ favourite tourism destinations and because of its ‘unexploited high-value reserves’ of mineral resources (Nsehe, 2011).

\textsuperscript{26} For Tanzania, the EU as a whole represents the third major trade partner, after China and India. Tanzania’s main export partners are China (14.2 per cent), India (9.9 per cent), Japan (7.7 per cent), Germany (6.7 per cent) and United Arab Emirates (4.5 per cent), while the country mainly imports from India (19.8 per cent), China (17 per cent), South Africa (6.5 per cent), Kenya (5.8 per cent) and United Arab Emirates (4.6 per cent) (2011).
Germany  17%  France  12%
Belgium  11%  Italy  11%
Italy  7%  Netherlands  11%

Source: based on Eurostat 2012

Figure 4-1. FDI evolution EU donors (2001-2011, USD millions)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years

Table 4-3. Total FDI flows EU donors (2001-2011, USD Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>total FDI flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years
Regarding security, the Tanzanian government has presented the country as an ‘island of stability’ in a turbulent region and as ‘a public supporter of Western security and aid agendas’ and especially as an ally of the US and the UK, with whom the country has maintained long-standing relations on security issues: ‘Tanzania’s ability to manage its borders, maintain order, and cope with its refugee influx weighed heavily and favourably on donors’ considerations throughout the late 1990s’ (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 291-292).

More recently, security interests in Tanzania have increased, especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Tanzania has been portrayed as a model for internal stability and national unity, and constitutes an important ally for regional security issues and the fight against terrorism and piracy, given its location near the Great Lakes and the Horn. While Tanzania’s major security partner is the US, the EU has also intensified security cooperation with Tanzania, especially in the area of migration and piracy. The country has been one of the target countries of the EU’s Cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum instrument (European Commission, 2011a). In the context of the EU’s Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR), the EU’s anti-piracy operation aims to strengthen the coastguard function in Tanzania in the fight against piracy (EUNAVFOR, 2012) and the EU has tried to convince Tanzania to cooperate with the prosecution trial and detention of piracy suspects by negotiating a transfer agreement (US Embassy Tanzania, 2009b).

27 Tanzania has increasingly been confronted with piracy and this might threaten its nascent offshore gas industry. The growing threat is partly due to the increased international naval presence around Somali waters, resulting in a push towards Tanzanian waters (Maplecroft, 2012). The international community has urged East-African coastal countries Kenya and Tanzania to cooperate and accept pirates for prosecution and detention (United Nations Security Council, 2011; US Embassy Tanzania, 2010b) and since the Kenyan Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to try piracy on the high seas, the importance of Tanzania has only increased.

28 Especially since the election of president Kikwete, ‘the US-Tanzanian bilateral relationship has witnessed a sea change’ and ‘warmed significantly’ (US Embassy Tanzania, 2008b). The strong relationship with the US is symbolized by the fact that President Kikwete paid several visits to the US, meeting with President Bush as well as with current President Obama. In the opposite direction, President Bush visited the country in 2008 and Kikwete was the first African president to meet with President Obama in 2009 (Gabel, 2009; US Embassy Tanzania, 2009c). In 1998 the US embassy in Dar es Salaam was the target of a terrorist attack and the Tanzanian government has been keen on cooperating in the war on terror. Tanzania is considered by the US as an important ally in the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa (US Embassy Tanzania, 2006b) and the fight against piracy in East-Africa. Military cooperation between both states has been reinforced over the past decade and is translated into training for the Tanzanian Coast Guard, peacekeeping training through the Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program but also in the deployment of US forces (US Embassy Tanzania, 2007b).

29 In 2010, Tanzania passed anti-piracy legislation which allows for prosecution of pirates caught in Tanzanian waters (The Citizen, 2010). The Tanzanian government had even stated willingness to host a specialized court by making use of the infrastructure from the residual mechanisms of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
4.1.2 Evolution of donor-government relations

As the Paris Declaration is based on the principles of partnership, budget support, policy dialogue and reforms, trust between the government and the donor community has been found a prerequisite for the realization of more effective aid delivery.

Tanzania’s relationship with its donors is marked by long periods of trust and cooperation, interrupted by temporary crises, especially the ones that took place in the beginning of the 1990s and in the end of the 2000s\(^3\), which will both be discussed below.

The dealing with the crisis in the early 1990s is of particular importance to understand Tanzania’s relations with EU donors, as it clearly demonstrates the significance of the group of like-minded or Nordic (-Plus) countries in the history of donor-government relations and the development of a partnership between the parties. In the early 1990s a huge corruption scandal led to concerted aid suspensions and a severe crisis in donor-government relations (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 273-274). As a response, on the initiative of Nordic Plus countries, an independent group of advisors\(^3\) was created to investigate the problems in the aid relationship and suggest solutions. In 1995, the Group published the Helleiner Report\(^3\) which called for more ownership, better aid management by the government, and more alignment and coordination of donors\(^3\).

On the basis of this report, in 1997 donors and the government agreed upon the Agreed Notes, which ‘called for more government leadership and for more transparency, accountability and efficiency in aid delivery’ (Söderbaum, 2010: 10). In short the Notes combined donor commitments to change their practices and government commitments to improve their own systems (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 278). Additionally, in 2000, a group consisting of the German, Dutch, Norwegian and UK...
Ministers of Development Cooperation\textsuperscript{34}, also known as the Utstein group (cf. Chapter 1), visited the country to provide the ‘political push’ for improved donor coordination (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012). During their visit they jointly stated:

\textit{‘We believe that a concerted effort is needed to promote more effective joint working. This should build on existing coordinating systems. A more coherent and action oriented agenda is required to reduce transaction costs and increase effectiveness by strengthening joint programming, and harmonizing appraisal, procurement, funding arrangements, accounting, auditing, monitoring, and evaluation. This would have clear benefits for all’} (OECD-DAC, 2000: 59).

Trust has gradually been rebuilt and several cooperation structures have been initiated. During this period the aid relationship in Tanzania was mainly based on the Nordic countries ‘\textit{with the WB and the UK coming on board a few years later}’ (Tilley, 2011: 20). Ever since, Tanzania has often been portrayed as a ‘\textit{good performer}’ (Söderbaum, 2010: 10) and a best practice of the ‘\textit{new partnership model}’ with a relatively high degree of government ownership, donor alignment and harmonization (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 271). The country has received a considerable share of budget support and for several years the corresponding dialogue has functioned well.

In spite of Tanzania’s image as a donor darling, in recent years donors-government relations have again changed towards a more confrontational nature. This can be explained by concerns and frustrations about stagnation in several reform processes as well as by the changing pattern of aid dependency and power relations between the ‘traditional’ donors and the government. First, the lack of progress on anti-corruption, Public Financial Management (PFM) and business environment has heavily influenced the donor-government dialogue in recent years. Corruption is a main issue in Tanzania’s aid relations, especially since the large scale corruption cases\textsuperscript{35} that were made public in 2007 involving allegations of several senior government officials, including the Minister of Energy, the Minister of Infrastructure and the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania\textsuperscript{36}.

These corruption cases as well as large amounts of unaccounted-for funds aroused critical reactions from the donor community\textsuperscript{37}, and especially from those who provide budget support.

\textsuperscript{34} Also known as the Utstein partners
\textsuperscript{35} The corruption occurred amongst others in the energy sector, in the public procurement for the construction of an oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza in 2006. A company Richmond won the tender and was awarded a dubious contract with Tanesco, the Tanzania public power company.
\textsuperscript{36} All suspected officials were recited in a ‘List of Shame’.
\textsuperscript{37} In 2012, Tanzania was on the black list of the Financial Action Task Force, resulting in even more outspoken criticism towards the government.
Some major donors threatened to reduce medium term assistance in absence of increased transparency and accountability (US Embassy Tanzania, 2008b). Several budget support donors put their 2008-2009 disbursements on hold, pending the commitment of the government to tackle corruption (US Embassy Tanzania, 2007a, 2008c, 2010b). The overall level of trust between the government and the donor community, which had been rebuilt since the beginning of the 2000s, seems to be in decline again.\footnote{See also Annex II for an overview of Tanzania’s governance indicators.}

However, despite the concerns about the deteriorating governance indicators,\footnote{For example, during the Annual National Policy Dialogue of 2009, donors expressed their frustration with the governments’ lack of commitment to reform, especially in the case of anti-corruption, business environment and PFM, as well as with the poor quality of the dialogue (US Embassy Tanzania, 2009a). The IMF and the WB formulated strong criticism towards the government. They even blamed the government for being unfair: ‘the level of trust between GBS donors and the government has been missing for some time now. Donors think that the government treats them without respect. They cancel meetings, they withhold information. During the opening session of the Review donors have formulated this criticism and asked for a dialogue, but the dialogue did not take place’ (EU3-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘We don’t trust that they make the same choices, the right choices, and the level of corruption is so high’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).} donors have continued to provide the country with high levels of support. As such, a new mutual dependency between donors and the government came into existence as both parties have an interest to maintain the image related to Tanzania’s model status (Tilley, 2011: 21). While some aid has been suspended, it has been stated that most donors have maintained their overall support, for example by redirecting funding to projects: ‘privately, some donors have told us that whatever their misgivings about both the process of dialogue with the Government and Tanzania’s somewhat lacklustre achievements, they are unlikely to substantially reduce their support’ (US Embassy Tanzania, 2009a). It is argued that headquarters of the different donors have been pushing to maintain the image of Tanzania as a donor darling as aid investments in the country have been huge. This is line with Tilley’s findings which state that despite breaches or lack of progress on the agreed indicators, since 2000 donors have shown ‘very little resistance to disbursing funds’ (Tilley, 2011: 25).

Second, behind the frustrations about corruption is the more general realization of the changing pattern of aid dependency and power relations between the ‘traditional’ donors and the government. The increasing interest of China and other emergent donors and private investors, who provide support without asking questions or setting conditionalities, goes hand in hand with decreasing political leverage of the ‘traditional’ donors: ‘BRICs’ importance as partners for Tanzania

However, despite the concerns about the deteriorating governance indicators,\footnote{The field research indicated how this has influenced the commitment of the parties to coordination: ‘I’ve seen in the past ten years, maybe in Tanzania 2005-2006 there was a peak time of aid coordination, then gradually the speed of the aid coordination is […] decreasing. One of the reasons is the big corruption case of 2007, this has had a big impact on aid coordination, the donor and government relations were affected by this big corruption issue’ (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012). As a result ‘real policy dialogue, political dialogue with the authorities, difficult issues, painful reforms have all slowed down’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).} donors have continued to provide the country with high levels of support. As such, a new mutual dependency between donors and the government came into existence as both parties have an interest to maintain the image related to Tanzania’s model status (Tilley, 2011: 21). While some aid has been suspended, it has been stated that most donors have maintained their overall support, for example by redirecting funding to projects: ‘privately, some donors have told us that whenever their misgivings about both the process of dialogue with the Government and Tanzania’s somewhat lacklustre achievements, they are unlikely to substantially reduce their support’ (US Embassy Tanzania, 2009a). It is argued that headquarters of the different donors have been pushing to maintain the image of Tanzania as a donor darling as aid investments in the country have been huge. This is line with Tilley’s findings which state that despite breaches or lack of progress on the agreed indicators, since 2000 donors have shown ‘very little resistance to disbursing funds’ (Tilley, 2011: 25).

Second, behind the frustrations about corruption is the more general realization of the changing pattern of aid dependency and power relations between the ‘traditional’ donors and the government. The increasing interest of China and other emergent donors and private investors, who provide support without asking questions or setting conditionalities, goes hand in hand with decreasing political leverage of the ‘traditional’ donors: ‘BRICs’ importance as partners for Tanzania

\footnote{For example, during the Annual National Policy Dialogue of 2009, donors expressed their frustration with the governments’ lack of commitment to reform, especially in the case of anti-corruption, business environment and PFM, as well as with the poor quality of the dialogue (US Embassy Tanzania, 2009a). The IMF and the WB formulated strong criticism towards the government. They even blamed the government for being unfair: ‘the level of trust between GBS donors and the government has been missing for some time now. Donors think that the government treats them without respect. They cancel meetings, they withhold information. During the opening session of the Review donors have formulated this criticism and asked for a dialogue, but the dialogue did not take place’ (EU3-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘We don’t trust that they make the same choices, the right choices, and the level of corruption is so high’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).}
has changed the relative role of the EU and all the traditional OECD-DAC partners’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012) and ‘the Tanzanian government has now alternatives, choice, option. Traditional OECD-DAC donors are no more the only option’ (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012). Moreover, Tanzania’s dependence on foreign aid is expected to diminish even further with the start of gas production. The Government, aware of its decreasing aid dependency, has shown more hostility towards the traditional donors. President Kikwete has focused on ‘re-domesticization’ involving ‘a retreat from the sphere of traditional donors and a more focused international policy’ (Tilley, 2011: 21) and the field research pointed to the occurrence of ‘divide and rule’ tactics of the government: ‘the attitude of our Tanzanian partners has changed, they play off the traditional partners, thus the biggest donors, particularly the Europeans, against the new partners, China, Brazil and South Africa’ (EU14-Tanzania, March 2012). These new realities have especially impacted upon the role of and the relationship with the GBS group of donors and the policy dialogue: ‘it is difficult to dialogue with the government. They are not accessible. They only want to do their own things, they are not really interested in the dialogue’ (EU3-Tanzania, January 2011).

Possibly the ‘period of high-level funding and cordial donor-state relations’ (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 294) might be over and the country may lose its ‘best practice’ status on the international aid coordination agenda: ‘Tanzania is one of the leading countries that support aid harmonization, but now it has been changing […]’ (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012). This may not only be because of its own success in gaining influence with its donors and the changing power relations, the fact that for several years Tanzania has been applauded for its commitment towards the aid effectiveness agenda and its engagement in improving the dialogue with its donors, may have aggravated the pessimistic mood that characterizes the narratives of many of the representatives interviewed: ‘one

41 This can be illustrated by the contested road through the Serengeti which China offered to finance, or by the decision of the Global Fund to finance top-ups and allowances, while donors in the Health sector had agreed not to finance through the basket as this produces perverse incentives (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

42 For example during the 2009 Annual National Policy Dialogue, ‘the principal government interlocutor, Finance Minister Mkulu, was alternately aggressive and conciliatory, calling for an evaluation of donors’ adherence to their commitments but also offering to address areas of disagreement (privately)’ (US Embassy Tanzania, 2009a). Arguably, the changed economic prospects and access to alternatives have changed the position of the government: ‘look at Mkulu, the Ministry of Finance is bashing donors, you can see the self-confidence coming from certain sources’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

43 There were plenty of similar accounts as illustrated by the following quotes: ‘The lead for implementing the aid effectiveness agenda should be for the government but they just want budget support and basket funding without commitments’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). The Tanzanian government perceive the policy dialogue behind budget support as something that is invented by the development partners, it’s a nuisance for them’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘The government has historically been extremely keen in maximizing the amount of budget support. This is seen as country-driven. But now budget support is going back, the project approach is becoming stronger. That means that the general policy dialogue is somehow at a kind of lower level, while the GBS dialogue is continuing, but the amount of resources attached to it is less important than before’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). ‘When the government doesn’t want to talk with us and listen to our suggestions or conditions, they have the possibility to ignore us’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).
of the reasons why the disillusion is so outspoken, is because the expectations were too high’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

4.1.3 Donor landscape

A high proportion of aid to Tanzania has come from multilateral institutions, particularly the WB has contributed significantly as it accounts for almost one third of total ODA to Tanzania (cf. Table 4-4). EU donors together represent also one third of total ODA to Tanzania while Nordic Plus donors represent almost one fourth of total ODA. Tanzania’s large amount of donors has resulted in a high fragmentation rate of 47% (OECD-DAC, 2010b), making coordination all the more needed.

When it comes to the EU donor composition, the UK is the largest EU donor, representing 7 per cent of total ODA to Tanzania. The Commission is the second largest EU donor and represents 6 per cent of total ODA. Next, a group of medium-sized Nordic Plus countries, (namely the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark) and Germany each represent 3 to 4 per cent of total ODA. Finally, a group of small donors, including Belgium, Finland, Ireland and France each represent 1 per cent of total ODA. Spain’s contributions do not reach 1 per cent of total ODA.

European Nordic Plus donors together have contributed two thirds of total EU aid (cf. Table 4-5). Moreover, Nordic countries have their largest development assistance programs in the world in Tanzania. For the Nordic countries cooperation with Tanzania started in the early 60s with the Joint Nordic initiative and the country has ever since been the first development partner of Finland, Denmark and Sweden (EU Donor Atlas, 2011). The UK, the Netherlands and Germany have large programs too, although in 2011 the Dutch government announced it would phase out its total development cooperation programme in the country by 2013. On the other hand, European Front donors in Tanzania have traditionally been weak and represent only 10 per cent of EU aid, which is almost the same share Germany has as an individual donor.

However, the figures presented below do not capture the presence of alternative channels of funding and more specifically the role of non-OECD-DAC actors such as China or India.

44 In the first years of the aid effectiveness agenda ‘there was a lot of low hanging fruit that could be done at the country level, and initially Tanzania has been a frontrunner of the process. Early on, Tanzania had prepared a lot for GBS in its new form, there were a couple of SWAps, and also from the Tanzanian side they have cooperated strongly. Maybe we have advanced too quickly, too ambitiously’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012).
45 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and Norway. Sometimes this group is enlarged to Germany, Switzerland and even the US, but this depends on the issues.
46 The fragmentation rate is the ratio between the number of non-significant donor relations and the total number of donor relations in a country.
47 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and UK
48 Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, Luxembourg
Especially since the second term of President Kikwete, the government has clearly voiced its ambition to reduce Tanzania’s aid dependency to only 10 per cent of the budget by 2025. Tanzania has found increased access to alternative funding, be it domestic, from non-OECD-DAC partners such as China and India, and, especially since the discovery of offshore gas reserves, from private investors. However, the interest of China is not new. Both countries have a deep and longstanding relationship which has translated into strong trade, diplomatic, and development investments. For example, in 2006 Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and President Kikwete signed five agreements on economic and technical assistance. In 2008, Tanzania was the Olympic torch’s only stop in Africa (and the only stop without mass protests) and in 2009 President Hu Jintao visited the country during his Africa trip. In 2008, the trade volume between both countries had risen to over USD 1 billion, of which USD 933 million were Chinese exports, which made Tanzania China’s third-largest African trading partner after Angola and South-Africa. In 2009, Chinese FDI were estimated at over USD 200 million, which is almost 25 per cent more than the UK’s FDI in that year, and it is estimated that this figure has increased considerably during the last years.

Table 4-4. Total donors’ contribution 2002-2010 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>average</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Donors Total</td>
<td>2837</td>
<td>28370</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries, Total</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>13109</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Total</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>15253</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DAC Countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU donors</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8119</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Plus donors</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>5979</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49 This is well illustrated by the following quote: ‘they [the government] know that the expanding of national gas, it’s not so difficult for the governors of Tanzania to find international investors, while when there was not, which is one year ago, it was very different, he couldn’t borrow. Today he can. He has assets to show that. So that’s to reveal how fast these things are evolving in Tanzania. The gas discovered one year ago, people were thinking it’s a joke that Zanzibar has oil and now nobody is thinking anymore it’s a joke. All the BRICs are curious, just look at how the trading has evolved, EU trade has been stable for ten years, all growth has gone to the BRICs’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

50 Since Tanzania’s independence China has maintained diplomatic ties with the Tanzanian government, even when the country’s external relations had slackened under the presidency of Nyerere.

51 Examples of Chinese involvement and highly visible projects are the assistance in rehabilitating the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA), the construction of a second terminal at Zanzibar International Airport, the award to Chinese firms of construction projects in transportation infrastructure and the co-financing and construction of a new National Stadium in Dar es Salaam which meets FIFA and Olympic standards (US Embassy Tanzania, 2006a, 2008a, 2009d, 2010a).

52 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, UK and Norway
<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>9280</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>AfDF</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2164</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>EU Institutions</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1621</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Global Fund</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>GAVI</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>OFID</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Nordic Dev. Fund</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System*
Table 4-5. EU donors’ contribution 2002-2010 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>average per year</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8119</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total European Nordic Plus&lt;sup&gt;53&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5027</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ‘European Front’&lt;sup&gt;54&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Sweden 101 913 11%
2. Germany 78 705 9%
3. Denmark 87 697 9%
4. Ireland 40 364 4%
5. Belgium 32 284 3%
6. Italy 28 248 3%
7. Finland 35 243 3%
8. France 26 233 3%
9. Austria 9 80 1%
10. Spain 9 78 1%
11. Luxembourg 0 3 0%
12. Greece 0 1 0%

Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

<sup>53</sup> Denmark, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and UK
<sup>54</sup> Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, Luxembourg
4.1.4 Existing donor-wide coordination

Donor coordination has been on top of the agenda in Tanzania especially since the 1990s, when the government drafted the Development vision 2025 (1997) and initiated a National Poverty Eradication Strategy (1997) in close cooperation with Nordic donors in pursuance of the Agreed Notes. Table 4-6 presents an overview of the key initiatives on aid coordination in Tanzania which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Table 4-6. Overview of key moments for aid coordination in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Key initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90s</td>
<td>1994: crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995: Nordic Plus: Independent Group of Advisors report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997: Agreed notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multilateral Debt fund, HIPC process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00s</td>
<td>Development of a PRSP: strong cooperation with Nordic Plus countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000: full PRSP: central framework for donor coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001: introduction of Poverty Reduction Budget support (PRBS): EU &amp; Nordic Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002: Tanzanian Assistance Strategy (TAS) by government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003: action plan to implement TAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004: creation of Development Partners Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005/06: 2nd generation PRSP: MKUKUTA (National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006: JAS Tanzania (JAST) driven by DFID and WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009: donor matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011: PRSPIII: Mkukuta II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general Tanzania has been considered one of the most successful examples of recipient-led efforts to manage relations with donors (cf. Menocal & Mulley, 2006) and as a success story for donor coordination (Söderbaum, 2010: 8). According to the OECD-DAC (2007a: 1) ‘Tanzania has been at the forefront of efforts to improve the quality of aid based on ownership, alignment and harmonization’. There are several facilitating operational coordination frameworks in place which are not limited to the EU framework, while the EU has a clear ambition to improve internal EU coordination

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55 According to Harrison and Mulley (2009: 282-287) the Tanzanian government ‘is seen to be taking a more active role in managing its aid than many other aid-dependent countries in Africa’.
and play an engine role in donor-wide coordination. This section provides a general overview of the donor-wide coordination processes with specific attention for strategic coordination in the context of the PRSP, general policy issues, division of labour and coordination around budget support.

Strategic coordination in Tanzania happens around the Tanzanian PRSP (or Mkukuta) and in the context of the JAST\(^{56}\), the Development Partners Group (DPG) and the TAS.\(^{57}\) Moreover, there are several instances of operational coordination, including coordination of aid instruments, programs\(^{58}\) and projects as well as joint evaluations. Several SWAs are in place, funded by common baskets which both EU and non-EU donors are financing. Division of labour across sectors is developed under the JAST. Apart from this major donor coordination structure, there is a network of joint government-donor groups\(^{59}\). Furthermore, in Tanzania, the government and donors have agreed on ‘quiet times’ in order to reduce the burden of missions and reporting.

The DPG is the main platform for donor coordination in Tanzania since 2003/2004\(^{60}\) (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 277) and comprises all ‘traditional’ bilateral and multilateral donors.\(^{61}\) The DPG meets on a monthly basis and is co-chaired by UNDP and a rotating bilateral donor. The Group aims to ‘identify common positions on certain policy issues and to entrust a lead donor to be the main voice in relations with the government in most fields of development cooperation’ (Söderbaum, 2010: 11). While the

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\(^{56}\) Since mid-2004 the government, in collaboration with DFID and the WB, started with an initiative to use the TAS as a basis for a JAST in order to further improve donor coordination. The strategy included an identification of donors’ comparative advantages, the introduction of a single review cycle, the identification of lead and delegating donors in each sector and the replacement of individual country assistance strategies. However, implementation was confronted with limitations (Söderbaum, 2010: 11).

\(^{57}\) In 1998 the government initiated a strategy for managing its aid, which was only formalized in 2002 with the TAS, including commitments of both donors and the government. In 2003 an action plan followed, with specific actions in 4 priority areas (predictability, integration of aid into the budget, rationalization and harmonization, capacity building for aid management), including a mutual accountability framework.

\(^{58}\) For example, in the agriculture sector the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) is a public-private partnership which is co-funded amongst others by USAID, Ireland and Norway.

\(^{59}\) Every year the high level Consultative Group discusses major macro-economic, sector and development policy issues and mobilizes resources. These are also known as the Paris Club meetings, co-chaired by the WB and the Minister of Finance and have since 2001 been held in Dar es Salaam instead of Paris. Next, there are different mixed groups which meet on a monthly basis, such as the sector groups or the PRBS Group, the Public Expenditure Review Working Group or the JAST group (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 277).

\(^{60}\) The DPG replaced the former Tanzania DAC Group.

\(^{61}\) The bilateral development partners are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Japan, Korea and the USA. The multilateral development partners are: EU Institutions, AfDB, WB, IMF and the UN system. The UN engages in the dialogue around aid management with one voice as part of the One UN pilot reform initiated in Tanzania (and 7 other countries)
DPG is in principle open to any interested cooperating partner, over the past years Chinese or Indian representatives have only sporadically participated in meetings or seminars. The DPG is structured around four cluster groups and more than twenty sector and thematic groups (and sub-sector groups). The sector DPGs work on a more technical basis within a certain sector or theme and are in charge of the policy dialogue with the government (OECD-DAC, 2004). This is the level where donors aim to coordinate their messages towards the government (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). Sectors include both EU and non-EU donors and the level of coordination varies according to the sector or theme.

Most remarkable is the long-standing coordination of EU and non-EU budget support donors. The current PRBS grew out of a Nordic Plus initiative in the late 1990s. The Budget Support group is probably the most important donor coordination group in Dar es Salaam and used to consist of 14 donors. However, more recently the Netherlands and Switzerland decided to stop their budget support. PRBS donors are coordinating the policy dialogue, have agreed upon a common PAF and were implementing a joint evaluation of budget support during the period of the field research. The Group is chaired by a Troika which represents PRBS donors in the dialogue with the government. However, despite the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding on budget support, which includes common underlying principles, conditionalities regarding budget support are not harmonized (OECD-DAC, 2004: 123-130) and bilateral agreements with the government keep on determining the actual negotiations concerning

---

62 ‘They haven’t show interests so far to do that and we cannot force them to come to the table’. Moreover, the government ‘is not very strong on forcing them to coordinate’, ‘it’s not in the interest of the government to have China coordinated’ (EUS-Tanzania, January 2011).

63 For example, in the Health and Education sectors, coordination is more advanced, as opposed to the lack of coordination in the water, transport and agriculture sectors (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012).

64 Namely Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.

65 In order to enable Tanzania to be qualified as a HIPC, in the late 90s a group of Nordic Plus countries co-established the Multilateral Debt Fund (1997) with the aim to create a budget surplus to spend in social sectors (Söderbaum, 2010: 10). In 2001 the EU joined the Nordic Plus donors in budget support which was then transformed into PRBS. This budget support aimed to support the PRSP and was directed towards the social sectors. Besides, PRBS aimed to make donor flows more predictable and increase government ownership. Budget support was provided to the national budget (governed by the Ministry of Finance) as well as to specific sector baskets, in the framework of SWAPs (Söderbaum, 2010: 11).

66 These are African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the WB.

67 The PRBS group coordinates the dialogue with the government regarding GBS issues. On the one hand, this concerns more technical issues related to the PAF, but on the other hand, the PRBS group also discusses developments regarding corruption. During the Annual Review donors and the government discuss and review progress on the implementation of Mkukuta and issues related to budget support.

68 These include PFM indicators, external audit and Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) evaluation. The policy matrix identifies the activities and indicators for the sector specific dialogue (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011).
Still, according to a 2004 evaluation, budget support helped to increase coordination, build trust and facilitate dialogue between the government and the donors (Söderbaum, 2010: 11).

The result of all these initiatives is considered mixed. On the one hand there has been an important increase of budget support towards 50 per cent of the aid to Tanzania in 2006/2007, harmonized sector support, improved predictability through more intense information sharing, and improved alignment of calendars to the Tanzanian budget cycle. The ‘quiet times’ should enable the government to focus on budgetary processes (Söderbaum, 2010: 11). On the other hand however, much aid is still provided in the form of project support, the government still receives numerous donor missions and there have been concerns that new coordinated arrangements add new structures to the existing ones, thereby creating more complexity. A critical reading of the success story of Tanzania already warned that ‘this has been largely a procedural process, focused on the modalities and structures of government-donor relations, rather than a political process focused on the substance of development policy’ (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 280). Moreover, critics also question the real nature of partnership and ownership in Tanzania (Harrison & Mulley, 2009: 281). These criticisms have been confirmed during several interviews:

‘Tanzania has one of the most advanced aid architectures. […] The minus of this is of course the high level of transaction costs and it’s very much the development partners talking to each other’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

‘The DPG, gosh, I don’t believe anything that I’ve seen, it’s a waste of time, they have very long meetings, a rather set agenda of issues which don’t really change’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

Apart from the existing donor-wide coordination, it should be noted that Nordic Plus donors, who have a dialogue structure at headquarters level, are guided by their own ‘complementarity principles’. While it was argued that they have made use of their like-mindedness at the field level too (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011), Nordic interviewees emphasized that there is no institutionalized Nordic coordination on development issues at the country level (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). However, up until today ‘there is very strong contact between the Nordic ambassadors. Even after the change of governments it’s still very strong’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

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69 As the PAF is considered a technocratic instrument, it has been complemented by diplomatic negotiation and strategizing and has even led to ‘collaboration between donors and government, and between the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries to achieve satisfactory ratings despite performance being poor’ (Tilley, 2011: 23).

70 Sector support is delivered through different harmonized approaches. SWAps in health and education sectors, an emerging SWAp in the agriculture sector and the financing of programmes such as the local government reform plan through basket funds (OECD-DAC, 2004)
4.1.5 EU cooperation with Tanzania

EU cooperation with Tanzania started in 1975 and currently includes GBS, including an MDG-contract, sector budget support and projects and programmes (European Commission, 2012a). Figure 4-2 illustrates the evolution of the Commission’s aid disbursements, while Figure 4-3 gives an overview of the composition of its aid portfolio. The Commission’s aid represents 6 per cent of total ODA to the country and a large part of it has been provided via GBS. In 2009 the EU made its largest ever financial commitment to the country with a total of € 385 million. € 305 million has been directed to GBS in the form of an MDG Contract\textsuperscript{71}, a predictable financial commitment over a six year period with outcome indicators linked to MDG-related results. Apart from budget support, the EU supports the Road Transport Sector Policy Programme and the development of renewable energy (European Commission, 2009a). Furthermore, Tanzania is one of the eligible countries of the EU’s MDG Initiative and has been appointed an indicative allocation of €51 million to support MDG 7c, regarding access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. In 2010 budget support disbursements were also made under the EU food facility as Tanzania benefited from a €32.4 million commitment (European Commission, 2011a).

Figure 4-2. EU institutions aid 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure42.png}
\caption{EU institutions aid 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)}
\end{figure}

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

\textsuperscript{71} The EU’s MDG contracts were launched in 2009 to speed up progress towards the attainment of the MDGs. Different from the MDG initiative which supports projects in support of off-track targets, the MDG contract comes in the form of budget support with a commitment over a six year period, twice as long as the common budget support agreements (European Commission, 2012b).
4.2 RQ1: Mapping EU coordination

As I have argued in the first part of this thesis, the EU searches for an autonomous role in coordination by strengthening the internal EU coordination (internal dimension) and through acting as an engine for donor-wide coordination (external dimension). In this section I will analyse EU coordination in Tanzania by considering these both dimensions. I will end this section with the most important findings, which will then be further explained in the next section.

4.2.1 Internal dimension

In the following paragraphs the internal dimension of EU coordination will be outlined, including EU coordination in the programming phase, but primarily EU coordination during implementation. Thereby I will consider information sharing and consultation, common positions, the FTI on Division of Labour and budget support. Also more informal ways of EU coordination will be explored. Finally, a sketch of the variety of EU donors’ attitudes towards EU coordination will be provided.

Coordination in the programming phase hardly exists. While for the programming of the 10th EDF the CSP was based on the joint country analysis which was conducted in the context of the JAST, the EU designed a separate response strategy. Whereas in 2006 Tanzania had been selected as one of the 14 pilot countries for the implementation of joint EU strategies (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 16), EU donors will not engage in joint programming for the 11th EDF. The programming
process for the next cycle 2014-2020 had not started yet at the moment of the field research, but the EU Delegation confirmed that: ‘in this country we will not have joint programming’ as ‘joint programming must be a highly political decision at headquarters, at the highest level, and I do not see that happen at the moment. […] it’s s all away from joint programming’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012).

In Tanzania, EU coordination is institutionalized through regular meetings which mainly concentrate on information exchange and ad hoc coordinated initiatives. Since 2008 meetings among EU HoCs are taking place on a monthly basis. The EU HoC chairs these meetings which have a quite clear agenda, namely information sharing, the implementation of the EU FTI on division of labour and other EU specific policies, issues of shared interest and questions related to the boards of the multilaterals.

First, EU coordination is mostly about information sharing. This concerns information about EU donors’ programming, modification of programmes or information about visits. However, mostly ‘information sharing is going in one way’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012), from the EU Delegation towards the Member States, which is explained by Member States’ decision making power in the EDF committee. Furthermore in these EU meetings also issues related to Budget support are discussed (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011; EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). While information sharing should help to avoid overlap and duplication, lower transaction costs, support policy dialogue, increase transparency and ultimately reduce the burden on the Tanzanian government and contribute to development effectiveness, other goals seem to dominate the accounts of interviewees. The perceived objectives are mostly donor-related such as ensuring access to information in the case of smaller donors and facilitating control over EDF funds managed by the Commission.

Second, EU coordination meetings are used to monitor the implementation of specific EU policies such as the EU FTI on Division of Labour, the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness. These are mostly considered technical exercises as there is a need to follow-up on these Council conclusions to which EU donors ‘have to abide’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012) and need to report on: ‘there are specific EU issues that we are supposed to report upon so of course we have to meet among EU and make progress on this’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). In Tanzania the Commission is lead facilitator for the FTI on Division of Labour while supporting facilitators are Germany, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. However, the division of labour process in Tanzania takes place in the donor-wide coordination framework and in the EU framework the FTI is mainly considered as a technical instrument to monitor progress: ‘we need an evaluation of the

72 In Tanzania EU coordination meetings are restricted to EU donors only.
headquarters of the different Member States’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). Within the framework of the JAST (donor-wide) donors have developed a donor matrix with a clear attribution of roles for donors in each sector and EU donors have designed a roadmap to implement the operational framework on aid effectiveness. However, this has not led to major reallocations although there are a number of delegated cooperation agreements in place. For example, in the health sector, the EU has delegated cooperation agreement with Germany and in the education sector with DFID (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011). In 2012 the EU signed a cooperation agreement with the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) to manage and implement programme activities in the water sector (Sebregondi 2012).

Third, EU donors may pre-discuss ‘issues of common interest’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012) which can then be taken to the DPG. Issues under discussion are mainly issues ‘that are very difficult to agree at Development Partners Group level’ because ‘there are too many actors involved’ at that level (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). The objective is to first agree at EU level and then transfer this consensus to the wider DPG. As such, sometimes the EU succeeds to agree on a common position. For example, in 2010 the EU Delegation managed to coordinate an EU position on the draft text of the PRSP/ Mkukuta II so that the EU had a common view and shared general comments on this (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011). These EU comments have then been incorporated as a whole into the formal response of the DPG on the draft PRSP (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). An example where the EU HoCs managed to reach a consensus on a specific policy is in the area of allowances and per diems of trainings and workshop for government officials (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). This was perceived as a successful example of EU coordination where, after ‘serious discussion’, the EU managed to find a common understanding which was then proposed to the DPG (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011; EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

Fourth, occasionally EU coordination meetings are used to coordinate the positions of Member States in the boards of the multilaterals: ‘also for IMF boards or WB boards, there we very often, and that is often among EU partners or among GBS partners, […] where we try to come up with a joint position and then we keep this position back to our headquarters so our colleagues in Washington know that this position is shared’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). ‘Occasionally, if something important is at play, we try to send a shared message to our different Executive Directors to the Board. To what extent they subsequently make use of it,
I have no influence on that, sometimes yes, sometimes no. But the effort is there’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012).\footnote{For example: ‘I have now a WB paper which will be on the board in two weeks, of course I will e-mail this to the EU donors and say, what about you, what is your position, do we have something in common’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012).}

Apart from the coordination meetings EU donors also coordinate or share information via e-mail (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011) and at bilateral level ‘on an individual agency-to-agency discussion rather than sitting collectively’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). ‘We know each other and it’s very easy to take the phone whenever we have a question related to a sector’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). In addition to this, the Umoja House in Dar es Salaam is literally an EU house as it accommodates the EU Delegation and the Dutch, UK and German representation\footnote{In front of Umoja House, Finland and Sweden share a building, in the same street Norway and Canada have their embassies and around the corner sits Denmark. The other EU donors, namely Belgium, Spain, France, Ireland and Italy are spread around the bigger city of Dar es Salaam.}: ‘the great thing is we’re in the same building, that helps a lot’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012), ‘the Umoja House helps a lot, it’s a bit the EU centre somehow’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012).

The largest EU donors (Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and UK), have provided a large share of their aid budget through harmonized aid modalities such as general and sectoral budget support. The smallest donors (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) do not provide budget support. Since 2011 a sub-group of EU donors (EU Delegation, Germany, Denmark and Ireland) has moved towards a more joined up approach by agreeing on a joint assessment framework for their performance tranches based on five PAF indicators. In addition to an annual baseline, an extra tranche becomes available assessed against progress in jointly set benchmarks. Although the eventual disbursements decisions still take place on a bilateral basis, the fact that EU donors agreed on a shared set of indicators and make a joint assessment is considered an opportunity to improve harmonization of GBS activities.

EU donors’ representatives in Tanzania have different attitudes towards EU coordination (cf. Figure 4-4). On one side of the spectrum, the EU Delegation and Belgium are more in favour of EU coordination. On the other side of the spectrum sits the UK as an ‘independent’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012; EU13-Tanzania, March 2012; EU14-Tanzania, March 2012), ‘very much bilateralized’ partner which is ‘not very keen on having EU coordination’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). In between those two ‘extremes’, Ireland and the Netherlands tend towards the UK position emphasizing that there is no need for EU coordination. The Nordics (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) too are somewhere in the middle but tend to be rather critical, while Finland is slightly more supportive. Germany used to support EU coordination but more recently its
engagement has diminished (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012; EU14-Tanzania, March 2012) and ‘it gives priority now to the wider DPG coordination instead of EU’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). Italy and Spain are not involved as they hardly have programmes. France is seen as supportive towards EU coordination but is also very small in Tanzania (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012).

Figure 4-4. EU donors’ attitude towards EU coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>EU Delegation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Less EU coordination                      More EU coordination

4.2.2 External dimension
As I have emphasized in the first part of this thesis, EU coordination and donor-wide coordination may be intertwined. This is also the case in Tanzania, where the different EU donors participate in the local coordination processes of the DPG and the various sub-groups. In order to assess the EU’s coordinator role in Tanzania we should thus also look at this external dimension. In the following paragraphs I will discuss the EU Delegation’s role in the existing donor-wide coordination in Tanzania. In the end of this section I will also explore the relation between the internal and the external dimension.

First, in contrast to the Nordic Plus donors, the EU Delegation has not played a major role in the development of the Tanzanian aid coordination processes. Despite the size of its programmes and its active participation, the EU Delegation is mostly seen as ‘just another donor’ in the DPG and its sub-groups. UNDP serves as the general DPG secretariat and sub-groups are chaired by a rotating sector lead. The JAST was developed in 2006 under the lead of the WB and DFID in close cooperation with the government. In the sectors where the EU Delegation has acted as a lead, it is perceived as a donor who has helped the donor group move through the coordination process, such as on PFM or during its chairmanship of the GBS group in 2011.\(^75\)

Second, regarding division of labour, the cornerstone of the EU’s aid effectiveness agenda, most interviewees emphasized that this process takes place in the context of the JAST, which is not a strict EU affair. The JAST was developed in 2006 under the lead of the WB and DFID in close cooperation with the government and included a chapter on Division of Labour, offering a

\(^{75}\) As mentioned earlier, GBS in the form of PRBS has been provided to Tanzania since 2000/2001. It is managed by a Partnership Framework Memorandum and monitored through a common PAF which determines the discussions in the policy dialogue.
strategy on how to proceed, including proposals on selection criteria and the process (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006: 12-15). When the EU Code of Conduct was adopted, the division of labour process was thus already advancing. The specific contribution of the consisted in developing a proposal on a matrix for EU donors. As such ‘the FTI allowed us to agree among ourselves first about the sectors to which we contribute before going to the DPG’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). However, the exercise was mainly developed in the DPG and in the framework of the JAST in close cooperation with the government. Therefore, most interviews do not attribute further progress to the efforts of the EU. For example ‘within certain sectors there is more and better coordination. But I doubt whether this is thanks to the internal EU division of labour. This is thanks to the broader efforts in which the Commission and the EU Member States have participated’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011). Moreover, ‘FTI countries are mostly countries where there are already processes going on, because there it is judged feasible, it is more risky to agree to do it in country where there is no fertile soil’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012). Although in Tanzania donors and the government have developed a donor matrix, this is mainly a division of labour for the policy dialogue which has not translated into division of labour in operational terms.

Third, PRBS in Tanzania has been initiated by a group of Nordic Plus countries and it has become the most important donor group in Tanzania in which both EU and non-EU budget donors participate. As the EU has been one of the largest providers of GBS, it has been a strategic partner for other EU budget support donors, but overall the EU Delegation plays a role which is similar to that of the bilateral donors: ‘it’s not more or less important than the individual Member States’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

When it comes to the relation between the internal and the external dimension, to the extent that EU coordination takes place, this is perceived to be complementary rather than fostering or hindering donor-wide coordination. EU coordination is mostly focused on information exchange and reporting on internal EU issues, but now and then a coordinated EU position is put forward in the DPG: ‘as EU countries, we come together for perhaps sometimes trying to coordinate a position that they then take into the wider coordination, but the donor coordination is much above EU, which makes sense, as Canada, Switzerland, UN, the banks, so the donor groups are not focused on EU, it would not make sense to try to do that’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). As such, in some instances, the EU framework has been used to initiate a discussion or adopt a common position which was then further developed in the donor-wide DPG. The EU consensus on a the draft policy on per diems, allowances and top-ups for training programmes and workshops, constitutes such an example: ‘since we have done it, we come with a proposal, it’s easier for the wider group to accept it, and it’s also a fact that this after all biggest
group, the EU group had already agree, it’s a fact that it will be an important position in that case for the whole
group’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). It should be added that while the agreement includes a list
of principles\textsuperscript{76} the actual interpretation and practices tend to vary from one agency to another
(Søreide et al., 2012: 35). In other words, this best practice is rather an expression of a shared will
than a genuine policy\textsuperscript{77}.

### 4.2.3 Main findings

Table 4-7 offers an overview of EU coordination in Tanzania. In what follows I will focus on the
main findings which form the basis for the remainder of this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-7. Overview of EU coordination in Tanzania</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal dimension: to what extent does the EU coordinate?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Programming phase</strong></td>
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<td>Joint multiannual programming</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation phase</strong></td>
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<td>Information sharing</td>
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<td>Common positions</td>
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<td>FTI on Division of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget support</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External dimension: to what extent does the EU contribute to donor-wide coordination processes?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{76} Including adherence to government per diem rules and rates for civil servants, avoidance of sitting allowances and other salary top-ups, improvement in the efficiency of training programmes and minimising the number of workshops requiring unnecessary travel (Søreide, Tostensen, & Aagedal Skage, 2012: 35).

\textsuperscript{77} When the DPG letter on allowances was sent to the government, ‘there was a response from the government “what about the next step? How do you develop a common stance on allowances, how do you coordinate in practice”. That’s where you run into practical challenges, those where USAID harmonize their own practices with the WB and so on, that’s where you run into problem. So getting a common position, that’s ok, but to have common guidelines and regulations, that’s a different case’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).
**Information sharing and policy dialogue in DPG and PRBS group**

EU Delegation is an active contributor but mainly ‘just another donor’ + ad hoc EU initiatives which are further developed in DPG (cf. allowances and per diems).

**Division of Labour**

EU Delegation developed a proposal for a donor matrix of EU donors, but division of labour is mainly developed within the DPG in the framework of the JAST.

**Budget support**

EU Delegation mainly ‘just another donor’, PRBS in Tanzania was initiated by Nordic Plus countries.

First, regarding the internal dimension, EU coordination in Tanzania tends to be limited to information sharing and ad hoc coordinated initiatives, while largely lacking an active component, which would require modification of Member States’ aid practices. Informal and bilateral contacts may also offer a valid channel for information exchange as well as to look for opportunities for joint funding or delegated cooperation. It is emphasized that the sector level is the key coordination and dialogue level and the level were real adjustments take place and this is happening in the DPG rather than in the EU framework: ‘the sector level is not up to the EU’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). While Tanzania is a FTI on Division of Labour country and there are a number of instances of delegated cooperation among EU donors, EU donors do not apply uniform allocation criteria and the Tanzanian donor matrix was developed under the JAST. While joint programming is the ultimate envisaged level of coordination in an EU framework, this will not take place in Tanzania in the context of the 11th EDF.

Second, regarding the external dimension, the EU Delegation is mainly ‘just another donor’ in the donor-wide coordination processes: a donor who participates in coordination exercises and shares the responsibility with the other donors over the success of the exercise, but no more than other participants. Tanzania’s existing coordination is rather advanced and the EU Delegation is mainly ‘one around the table’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011) and ‘will not try to coordinate beyond their constituencies’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). In general the EU’s internal coordination efforts are not perceived to hinder or foster donor-wide coordination but from time to time, when the EU has agreed on a coordinated initiative which they want to present to the wider community ‘then the EU Delegation is the interface, the messenger’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).
4.3 RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

In this section a deeper understanding will be sought for the main findings developed in the previous part. More specifically, this part will investigate the factors that help to explain why

a) EU coordination in Tanzania tends to be limited to information sharing and ad hoc coordinating responses, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension)

b) The EU Delegation is mainly ‘just another donor’ in the donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension)

As outlined in the first part of this thesis I will thereby consider interest-related, institutional and ideational factors. In the end of this chapter I will conclude on the enabling and constraining factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Tanzania in order to gain understanding of both opportunities and limitations for EU coordination at country level.

4.3.1 Interest-related factors

‘I think that development cooperation is a good example of how Europe […] would work better, if we would just set aside this stupid national pride, and defence of positions which has nothing to do with the beneficiaries. Development cooperation is foreign policy. But development cooperation should be development cooperation, and ultimately you have to benefit somebody’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012).

In recent years, Tanzania has increasingly raised interest of foreign actors. As outlined in Chapter 3 coordination can be considered as the result of a negotiation between gains and losses. Consequently, donors are required to redefine their individual objectives in order to work towards joint outcomes and results. However, the first part of this thesis has demonstrated that donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns as well as their search for political influence may affect their commitment to actually engage in a coordinated approach. This section will therefore explore to what extent EU donors interests enable and constrain EU coordination.

4.3.1.1 EU donors’ domestic political and policy context and visibility concerns

First, implementation of the EU’s aid effectiveness agenda with its focus on coordination depends on the political support of donor countries’ governments. A major challenge for EU coordination is the current economic and political context, characterized by the euro crisis and the move to the centre-right, which translates into policies which are not necessarily conducive for EU coordination: ‘In each Member State, the political situation has changed in the past year. So from the middle-left wing to the middle-right wing, so each independent European country, they must appear, their
politicians, at the tax payers. So this means [...] the political background has been changing, so now it’s going back, in a less harmonized direction\textsuperscript{78} (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012), ‘some of the donors are changing their mind, they do not agree anymore with the principles of Paris. [...]’. Especially from the new governments in the UK and in the Netherlands [...]’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). The focus on results-based aid management ‘pushes politicians to show certain things, which makes coordination very difficult’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012), ‘we’re not saying that Paris Declaration is not important, but it’s more a shift to results and mutual accountability rather than harmonization and the structures’ (EU15-Tanzania, March 2012), ‘the whole enthusiasm for Paris went down and probably weaker after Busan. I think Busan was not radical in a sense but it still, it shows the departure from Paris becoming less important. Busan is very much about private sector and growth, include China, and talking about new donors’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

The shift is especially visible in the area of budget support as EU donors have become more sceptical about the use of this aid modality ‘GBS is especially a good example of an instrument that is very vulnerable to the political changes at home’ (EU12-Tanzania, March 2012) and currently ‘most countries are less enthusiastic about GBS’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). Illustrations of changing policy preferences in Europe include the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Denmark and Sweden, all countries which had previously supported the use of budget support. For example, Germany ‘is withdrawing from baskets, returning to the project approach and funding German non-state actors. Moreover, Germany was focusing on three focal sectors, but will leave this approach. It had invested in decentralization, but headquarters decided to focus on energy’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). Denmark has also stopped providing GBS ‘as the new minister is against it’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). DFID which was a major GBS provider and supporter ‘because of how Tanzania is managing the aid, and also because of more focus on specific results at home, they go back’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). Sweden too ‘announced that they stop GBS’ (EU12-Tanzania, March 2012).

The Dutch withdrawal of budget support illustrates how domestic politics, and especially a mix of changing policy priorities and commercial interests have influenced their decisions. In 2009 the Netherlands unilaterally decided to suspend the disbursement of a tranche following a dispute between a Dutch company and the Tanzanian government (OECD-DAC, 2011a: 65). One year later, it was decided that the GBS programme to Tanzania would not be continued and in 2011 the Dutch government announced it would phase out its total development cooperation programme in the country. Most other donors argued that this decision was related to the

\textsuperscript{78} For example: ‘all donors are experiencing a shift away from the social sectors towards the productive sectors, economic growth. And this shift is not well aligned at headquarters level’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012).
domestic politics and the increased focus on self-interest in the Dutch development policies rather than a reaction to the Tanzanian performance (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

Second, the image of Tanzania as a good performer and the difficulties with EU coordination are two sides of the same coin. Tanzania’s status as a donor darling has made visibility a primary concern for individual EU donors. Donors feel pressurized to maintain this image and domestic politics request to highlight individual successes in ‘showpiece’ Tanzania: ‘everyone wants its own statistics, its own figures, that is against the spirit of joint programming’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). For example, the Nordic donors, who are considered to be the best performers of the implementation of the Paris Declaration, have their largest development assistance programs in the world in Tanzania resulting in that the country has enjoyed a special status, which has arguably served to strengthen their identity as a responsible group of donors. Given the current economic and political context in Europe, donors need to concentrate even more on visible outputs to the detriment of less visible coordination processes which may only in the long term lead to more effective results for development.

Additionally, according to the interviewees EU coordination also aims to promote joint EU visibility. An example was given of how for the occasion of Europe day the EU Delegation aimed to ‘bring a joint message of how big we are’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). The search for more visibility as EU may threaten EU donors’ individual visibility concerns as well as their image as responsible donors: ‘if the objective is to reach better coordination and eventually better effectiveness of our joint efforts, we should be more pragmatic and ask for example Switzerland to join [EU coordination meetings]. But if it is actually more about portraying the EU as more politically visible and as a more visible player vis-à-vis for example the US, than improved coordination and aid effectiveness is not the main goal’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011). In contrast, coordination in the DPG sector groups is more functionally driven, not aiming to increase donors’ visibility as a common identity.

4.3.1.2 EU donors’ influence in Tanzania

EU donors’ leverage might affect their interest in EU coordination as well as the nature of EU coordination. The EU’s political leverage in Tanzania is decreasing. While it is recognized that the importance of EU coordination may increase in order to maintain influence, currently mainly other coalitions rather than the EU level better safeguard donors’ search for maintaining influence, especially for the UK.

Tanzania’s declining aid dependency on traditional donors has resulted in a perceived loss of political influence of EU donors. The country has not fully engaged in political dialogue under
Article 8 of the Cotonou agreement\(^79\) because of a lack of interest from the Tanzanian side: ‘there are a few meetings and a lot of frustrations from the EU side’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). Furthermore, the government has shown less interest in the policy dialogue, and does not feel itself bound to the reforms agreed upon in the PAF. The government is well aware of its status as a donor darling and has experienced that stagnation in the reform process has not led to considerable loss in ODA. The opposite is true as ‘despite conflict being present, the incentives of donors to disburse dominate’ (Tilley, 2011: 23). It was emphasized in almost all interviews that the EU’s influence is declining with the increased interest of new and old players such as China, who are willing to provide assistance without political strings attached\(^80\). When setting the agenda in the dialogue with the government gets more difficult, coordination amongst donors gets more important\(^81\). In Tanzania, most EU donors realize indeed that coordination will be much more needed ‘because our weight is getting very marginal and very fast’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

However, not all EU donors draw the same conclusion as to which framework best provides leverage for their respective agendas. In contrast to the largest EU donors Nordic and smaller countries tend to believe in increased EU coordination\(^82\): ‘we cannot enforce, we have to negotiate everything. The only way we can negotiate is when we have joint agreement at EU level’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). "When it comes to the political dialogue issues, which is at the HoMs level, where the EU is acting as EU, of course then I think, there I think it really adds’ (EU15-Tanzania, March 2012). Especially smaller donors such as Belgium and Finland realize they need a critical mass: ‘small donors don’t have a weight of doing big things unless there is a critical mass behind those issues’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012) and as a result ‘the presence of the EU is fundamental for them’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). For example ‘as Finland is a relatively small player, it has to use different means to achieve its objectives and has to share weight and therefore for us, different coordination structures play a role’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). Belgium, which has a small local representation, also mentions the need of access to information and of finding partners. As access to the government and policy dialogue in

\(^{79}\) However, it should be added that most issues falling under Article 8 are tackled during the Annual Review. However, some issues, with a more direct political agenda, such as human rights, are not treated during the Annual Review.

\(^{80}\) President Kikwete has publicly welcomed Chinese interest in the country and its approach to development assistance as ‘there is no any hidden agenda in our cooperation with China, it is a relationship based on mutual understanding and equality; they understand our situation’ (The Citizen, 2009).

\(^{81}\) If in such a situation donors react in a dispersed manner, they can be played off against each other. To overcome stagnation in difficult reform processes joint action or an agreement on how to tackle the situation is required: ‘if necessary we can even agree on who will discuss what bilaterally with which person in order to get it back on the agenda’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

\(^{82}\) However, some accounts pointed at growing awareness amongst bigger Member States too, as also larger donors need this ‘critical mass behind them to make something happen’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).
Tanzania is rather difficult, Belgium has few options to have a voice but through coordination with other donors (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012; EU14-Tanzania, March 2012).

Yet, it is doubted whether this coordination is the kind of coordination that is envisaged in the OECD-DAC’s aid effectiveness agenda\textsuperscript{83}: ‘coordination will become more important in the political area, to present itself as a unity, not so much in the interest of the partner country but in the interest of the EU Member States, because our political weight is decreasing. It is clear that, if we don’t act as one, we will be pushed aside. So we have no choice but to create a bigger weight through the EU to be able to counterbalance not only the US but especially the BRICS’s’ (EU14-Tanzania, March 2012).

However, for larger EU donors such as the UK or Germany, the presence of the EU might not be ‘in their interest’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012) or even be ‘disturbing’ as ‘the EU could behave in a way which could not be in favour of their national interest’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). This is especially true for the UK, the second largest bilateral donor with a considerable representation in Dar es Salaam, with ‘very big connections’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012) and thus ‘don’t need information’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). Given the UK’s position as a large donor, they are in the luxury situation to be pragmatic regarding coordination with other donors: ‘they also recognize the need of EU coordination to push things forward, but they just pick the berries, depending on the issue’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). While literature (cf. Cumming & Chafer, 2011) suggests that historical interests have played a minor role in the post-colonial development policy of the UK, there is a perception that ‘there is a need of the former colonial power to show that they are able to influence the political decisions of the government. Of course this goes against the coordination, unless you intend for the coordination to endeavour the decision making to the former colonial power, which in turn would allow the former colonial power to make their position stronger vis-à-vis the national government because they can show that they can influence the decisions of the EU, the WB and the Member States’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012).

The UK has also been looking for partnerships with other than EU actors, such as the WB, the US and even with China. They have ‘more prior relations with other institutions’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012) and ‘they think they can gain more with working with WB or USAID than with the EU’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). In recent years, Tanzania has become a relatively important partner, especially since the events of 9 September 2001. Although the EU has recently reinforced its security cooperation with the country, and aims to enhance political dialogue to

\textsuperscript{83} It is doubted whether there will also be increased support for coordination in terms of aid effectiveness as ‘every single country wants to stay where they are, nobody really wants to stay within the boundaries of the division of labour’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011) and ‘joint programming will never be realized as the country is too important for them’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012).
facilitate further collaboration, Tanzania’s traditional and major security partners are the US and the UK. According to a DFID representative: ‘my own Minister spends more time talking to the US for example, they have a very close relationship, and is increasingly developing relationships with new and emerging donors, such as China. And rather less, I wouldn’t say ignoring, that would be completely untrue, but not giving as much emphasis to working with counterparts in Europe. Some of them are reducing their aid programmes. […] It’s the fact that they are the largest donors, the most influence. It’s about size and importance, it’s not about doing it only because it marries with what else the UK is doing within those particular countries. Because there are other priorities, politically, which are not development. It’s where the two align, that makes more sense’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

4.3.2 Institutional factors

As explained in Chapter 3 coordination may also be considered as an institutional process in which different organizations try to solve collective action problems. Consequently, EU coordination might be both enabled and constrained by formal and informal institutional factors. Although this thesis has aimed to go beyond intuitional explanations, this section analyses how the characteristics of the existing aid architecture, the EU’s organizational structure, procedures, and policy guidelines as well as the EU’s staffing and bureaucratic culture enable and constrain EU coordination.

4.3.2.1 Existing aid architecture

Arguably, despite the criticism on how coordination has evolved in Tanzania, the relatively high level of existing coordination in Tanzania constrains the feasibility of EU coordination. As donor-wide coordination takes place at several levels and in various sectors in the framework of the DPG, the added value of EU coordination is severely questioned. Moreover, in this donor-wide framework the EU Delegation is perceived as one among the other donors, not having a particular coordinating function. The relationship between the existing aid architecture and the attitude towards EU coordination has occurred in almost every interview and is illustrated by the following quotes:

84 This is illustrated by Commission President Barroso’s visit to President Kikwete in July 2012: ‘Tanzania has become one of the EU’s main partners in Africa, and is also playing an increasingly important role in the stability of the whole region. We now want to deepen our regular political dialogue with Tanzania and further increase our cooperation in areas like energy, security, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism or migration; issues which are of concern both for Africa and the EU’.

85 Other illustrations of this argument are: ‘Tanzania has a very elaborated aid coordination system and bureaucracy even. Anything that happens by the EU is within that existing wider system’ (EU12-Tanzania, March 2012). ‘At the country level, division of labour takes place in the larger DPG. The EU often comes late’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘I often ask myself whether EU coordination has added value compared to coordination that takes in place in other frameworks’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).
‘Tanzania has a long history of aid coordination so actually the donor-wide coordination existed before EU coordination started. [...] But it doesn’t mean that the EU coordination would not play a role. It’s that we have formal coordination where also other non-EU members take part’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012)

‘Tanzania is far advanced, like is Zambia. So it by definition affects EU coordination, this is something we always have to, in the EU guidelines, communications coming, we always, over and over again, from the field we have to remind, in our comments say that, listen, in Tanzania there is a very good coordination, donor-wide, so we cannot base EU action on a separate one, so this is, for many years, since Paris we've been saying it. Because in some other countries, where there is no such elaborated system, then maybe number 1 is then the EU coordination, so you must always in Brussels, it must be understood that it’s country by country’ (EU12-Tanzania, March 2012)

‘When the Council has once again decided to do this and that, often, there is already, for example amongst budget support donors or amongst donors intervening in the health sector, there is much more concrete, active and really substantial coordination’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011)

‘Normally it’s not much value added of first finding the EU consensus and then the wider coordination, because the coordination mechanism in Tanzania are quite developed so we can go directly to the wider coordination. It’s no point really in finding EU coordination first’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011)

4.3.2.2 Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines

The structure of donors’ organizations may affect its ability and capacities to coordinate with other donors. Depending on the level of decentralization and its bureaucratic flexibility (in terms of procedures) a donor may be more or less capable to coordinate with others at country level.

First, the extent to which donors delegate authority to their agencies in the field determines their ability to coordinate at country level. More decentralized aid agencies should thus be better capable to coordinate. According to most interviewees, information sharing is the highest possible level of coordination as long ‘as long as you don’t have a decentralized structure, and headquarters does not take coordination as a priority’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012), ‘our organizations are not built to do things jointly’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). However, as we have seen in the Chapter 3 of this thesis the level of decentralization varies across EU donors. In Tanzania, on the one end sit Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands as most decentralized EU donors. While in theory they
should have more flexibility to coordinate, they are less interested in coordination at EU level, which indicates that behind institutional barriers lie other problems. On the other end, countries such as Belgium, Finland and Germany are less decentralized EU donors. The EU sits somewhere in between. It was stated that the EU Delegation’s efforts towards coordination at the country level have been overruled by decisions at headquarters level, resulting in an adverse effect on the local coordination effort. For example, in 2010/2011 EU donors had coordinated their feedback to headquarters level with a recommendation not to pay a performance tranche. However, according to some interviewees the Commission’s Headquarters did not respect this common position because ‘they wanted to spend the money as other countries were doing worse and they needed to spend the money’ (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011).

Second, to be able to implement the EU agenda on aid effectiveness and thus engage in joint programming, EU donors are required to harmonize their procedures. For example, a prerequisite for joint programming is the alignment of programming cycles. Currently, this is not the case as cycles start at different times (cf. Figure 4-5).

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86 On the one hand, ‘once the country strategy is approved, the EU Delegation has many possibilities to look for flexibility’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011). Once there is a decision about the six years’ programme, implementation happens at the local level (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). On the other hand, despite the organizational reforms since 2000, the EU is still perceived as a centralized aid bureaucracy: ‘the EU needs to get a level of flexibility that is much much larger and the best way of doing that of course would be to decentralize decision making’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011).

87 Decisions on budget support are prepared by the Delegation and often coordinated with other GBS donors. However the final decisions are taken in Brussels, and often these are in conflict with the advice of the Delegation: ‘so Brussels doesn’t follow the advice of its Delegations’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012). ‘The EU often disburses aid or grants waivers, even when not all conditions are met, because otherwise they will find themselves in troubles when they cannot spend their money’ (EU3-Tanzania, January 2011).
The Tanzanian development strategy runs from 2011 until 2015, while the EU’s financial framework will start in 2014 and run until 2020. Only the Irish and the DFID programming cycles are aligned to the Tanzanian strategy. Moreover, the EU has a programming cycle of six years under the EDF, while other EU donors have shorter cycles. Although a study commissioned by the EU has found that EU donors are procedurally able to engage in joint programming (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 9), this is no realistic scenario in the near future for EU donors in Tanzania.

Third, the EU’s complex regulations and heavy bureaucratic procedures are not perceived to be conducive for EU coordination: ‘the more flexible, the faster you operate, the easier it is to coordinate’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011). Most interviewees referred to the EU’s heavy administrative burden:

‘The Commission regulations for designing its own programme are not very conducive to coordination. [...] its bureaucratic procedures don’t tend to promote a flexible attitude’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011)

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88 However, it should be noted that all EU donors are committed towards the Tanzania PRSP, and in that sense have reached some form of ‘light joint programming’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011).

89 The EU Delegation confirmed this: ‘all the procedures that surround us, this is very big’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011)
The EU has such heavy and cumbersome procedures, their procedures are less facilitating for coordination. For example they cannot fund through baskets. The Commission has less space, less flexibility to look for joint funding possibilities. Just like the WB’ (EU14-Tanzania, March 2012)

‘The EU format of making joint strategies might not be perceived as the most efficient, flexible and appropriate, so countries say they can do it better themselves’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012)

Fourth, the existing policy framework for EU coordination is voluntary and rather loose\textsuperscript{90} in proportion to the stringent bilateral policy frameworks\textsuperscript{91}: ‘the European Consensus is very general, it doesn’t say anything particularly controversial’, ‘we never use the European Consensus’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011), ‘it’s not far enough, the EU consensus stays at the policy level but when it comes to concrete planning and implementation it is too weak and overtaken by bilateral instructions or guidelines. We don’t get firm instructions to implement the Council conclusions’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). The individual donors’ operational guidelines are thus more demanding and have not fully incorporated the EU’s coordination guidelines: ‘everybody has different manuals, instructions, timeframes’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

4.3.2.3 Staffing and bureaucratic culture EU Delegation

As argued in the first part of this thesis, staff capacities and the bureaucratic culture of an aid organization may influence its engagement in coordination. In what follows perceptions of the EU Delegation staff and bureaucratic culture are discussed in order to verify whether these enable or constrain the EU coordination.

In Tanzania, most EU donors recognized the capacities of the EU Delegation, even the ones who were more critical about EU coordination. The EU Delegation was seen as ‘well-equipped’ and ready to coordinate EU Member States to common positions’ (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘They have a big team with good advisors. They are offering man power, studies, analytical power, like no other bilateral donor could do at the moment’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). The EU is a professionally operating

\textsuperscript{90} This is in contrast to the attitude of the EU Delegation which sees EU coordination as a Treaty obligation and sees a central role for itself: ‘we have of course the mandate for EU coordination which could partially trigger wider donor coordination. And that is an advantage because only we can command the states and find a consensus. [...]’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011).

\textsuperscript{91} However, it should be noted that field staff also argued that coordination should be a flexible country-based process, which is not easily captured in central guidelines and monitoring indicators: ‘when we see the change in reality, we see that coordination is something very natural process, and it happens and must happen formal and informal. And then it’s kind of funny when you hear that people go to Brussels and then they agree on the principles that we should agree on things and setting us joint manuals and stuff, things are already here in place, it’s very natural here, it’s not very natural if you coordinate these things from the HQ level because we have already done these things. And actually we’re not doing that only at the EU level but we need to do the wider coordination, and all that happens very naturally at the country level, if the decision making is sufficient decentralized. So decentralization of decision making is the key problem here of taking the agenda forward’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).
organization’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘They have more capacity than us [donor x], we have relatively less capacity to work out draft positions or analytical work’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). Furthermore, the EU Delegation is seen to have good sector specialists in the areas where it is active, such as in Infrastructure and PFM (EU1-Tanzania, January 2011). Their capacities have also been illustrated by their chairmanship of the GBS donor group: ‘they are used to consulting others and as a result they did a very good job as GBS lead. They were outstanding and consulted every position of the bilateral’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). According to an EU Delegation representative: ‘our job is to put together different views and our chair of GBS was able to obtain important results in terms of reform, for example on the PAF. We managed to gather consensus by the Member States and the other GBS donors because we are dealing without any vested interest. We are a genuine mediator within the group and with the government because it’s our nature of mediating among Member States. Our culture allows us to obtain good results’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012).

From this perspective, the EU Delegation is often contrasted with the WB or UNDP. Although the WB is recognized and rewarded for its financial, human and analytical capacities, and has played an important role in the aid history of Tanzania, and developing aid coordination services (cf. contribution to the JAST), it is also perceived as an actor which is not committed to donor coordination: ‘analytically they are the best because they have resources, they have money, they have staff, capacity to have very efficient analytical work. But when it comes to information-sharing they’re really bad’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). In contrast: ‘the EU is much more active in coordination. WB is not so much into coordination […] On coordination EU has nothing to learn from the WB, we have all the time try to chase the WB’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). This view is also shared by non-EU donors. The other major actor in aid coordination is the UN and today UNDP is the focal point of the DPG as it manages the DPG Secretariat. However, EU donors have doubts about the legitimacy of the UN as a coordinator because it is dealing with internal coordination problems and because of their mandate to work closely with the authorities: ‘they are too much involved with the authorities, they are not

92 Other similar accounts include: ‘The WB is very independent, they don’t show consideration for others. They are participating in the coordination meetings, often they are a chair or a co-chair or part of the Troika. Very often the contact is fairly cordial, but they do what they want. You cannot influence the WB’ (EU14-Tanzania, March 2012). ‘The WB tends to be rather autonomous, they have the tendency not to coordinate, while we, by our nature, we must have the tendency, because every project has to be approved by the Member States. But the WB is not in that situation’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘The WB is absolutely catastrophic in coordination. They don’t want to coordinate, they do the things by themselves, they behave as they are the only players in town’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012).

93 And illustrated by the following quote: ‘If we focus on the macro economic issues, PFM, PER and some of these issues, all of this public reform issues, the WB has a very strong advantages in this area, so automatically WB can lead. If I compare the number of staff in EU, the economic cooperation section and WB, the expertise, of course the WB is strong, so WB takes the leading role. Than I think WB is constant “god of gods”. This kind of a special position. Then the EU is rather, they are very good at coordinating’ (non-EU6-Tanzania, February 2012).
prepared and they don’t have the credibility to ask critical questions on behalf of the donor community. This is not the case for the Commission’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

On the other hand, the EU’s bureaucratic constraints influence its working culture. EU donors in Tanzania are mainly Nordic Plus countries, recognized for their relatively larger degree of bureaucratic flexibility. Perceptions of the EU’s bureaucratic culture are thus rather negative and seen as constraining its coordinator role: ‘the EU would need to develop a much more flexible way of thinking. The bigger bureaucracy you have, the less flexibility you have’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘Everything is pre-conceived when we work with the EU, they are very bureaucratic and have no flexibility’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011). The EU’s approach towards coordination is perceived to be focused on processes and the input level as ‘their success is measured by whether they are participating in this process, even when this is a pointless process’ (non-EU9-Tanzania, March 2012). ‘Within the EU, very often, they develop a system where you need to have a strategy in every country, and then they create an instrument, which they want to monitor every year. These are theoretical things on paper, but this won’t change the work in a certain country’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012). ‘Sometimes I have the impression that people in the first place want to have as a result the paper’ (EU14-Tanzania, March 2012) and ‘those people who have been doing thirty years of projects, they don’t have the knowledge and capacity and they know that’. (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). Therefore ‘I think it [EU coordination] would work better in a framework similar to the Nordic Plus, not make it administratively, cumbersome and binding system, but something that is a flexible framework of doing things together’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

However, field research in Tanzania has also indicated that the high formalization and technocratic approach of the Paris Declaration, and of the EU’s approach towards coordination and division of labour does not always correspond with the reality on the ground, where behind procedural mechanisms are personalities and personal connections: ‘it has to be the person who is here at the country level, who takes the lead’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012). It is mostly recognized that the personal does influence the flexibility of dealing with one’s own institutional restraints rather than main policy decisions. The importance of personalities in the EU delegation was recognized almost unanimously, as witnessed in the following accounts:

‘You must have the capacity to find a consensus among EU donors, which depends very much on the person’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012)

‘Depending on how wide-ranging the person in charge of the EU is, the more the individual Member States may want to give to the EU’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011).
‘My experience here and in other countries is that the biggest factor is the presence of the EU itself, whoever person leading it, can make a big difference. The extent to which they work in practice with, not just organize meetings, but to sort of bring the coordination alive. There is a big personal dimension to this, the HoC or the Ambassador in a country can make a big difference’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

Despite some negative accounts, several EU donors emphasized that despite the Commission’s heavy bureaucracy, its Delegations in the field may make efforts to deploy these regulations as efficient as possible ‘to avoid letting the bureaucracy act as an obstacle’ (EU11-Tanzania, March 2012). For example, the EU Delegation may ask a more flexible donor to finance a certain study in a certain sector, as some donors, like the Nordics are more able to rapidly deploy funds (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

4.3.3 Ideational factors

As I have argued, coordination can also be seen as a norm, which is introduced as a functional approach to maintain order in donor activities in absence of a superior power that would be able to structure aid within a country in function of development effectiveness. EU coordination might thus be enabled and constrained by the degree to which actors agree on its functionality and its potential outcomes in terms of aid and development effectiveness. However, different EU donors might have different points of view on these issues. In this section I will investigate to what extent EU coordination is enabled and constrained by differing ideas about aid and development and the ‘right’ level of coordination. Thereby, I will pay specific attention to the role of the Nordic (Plus) donors.

4.3.3.1 Ideas about aid and development

On the one hand, no interviewee contested the general need for better coordination amongst donors and the government. The EU donors in Tanzania have supported the country with large amounts of budget support. Nordic Plus representatives consider themselves as the major promoters of the aid effectiveness and coordination agenda: ‘in terms of making decisions, in terms of getting people on board, in terms of coordination, in terms of joint approaches, and all that, it’s the like-minded that drives the process, no question. So the like-minded group of the Nordic Plus, it’s much easier to discuss with the Nordic Plus, and also it’s so much easier to refer to the Nordic Plus agreements than it is to refer to the Paris Declaration’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011). This is also recognized by other EU donors: ‘if we talk about the lead donors, the donors who are very committed to the aid effectiveness agenda, then we talk about Nordic Plus’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).
On the other hand, it was emphasized that there are ever more signs of a general ‘coordination fatigue’ and a diminished support for the Paris Declaration: ‘people are posted here in 2004-2005, and I’m quite surprised about the lack of enthusiasm now, they don’t see the real value as in 2004-2005’ (non-EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). These accounts are influenced by frustrations about the technocratic implementation of the Paris Declaration as well as by the current domestic policy and political context. First, the Paris commitments are perceived to have led to a new aid management bureaucracy: ‘donors started focusing on establishing structures. It’s too much aid bureaucracy and our people, technical people spend awfully lot of time in these aid coordination meetings together with other development partners. […] Development partners have become a little bit frustrated because maybe the absorption capacity is not there. Output is not coming. […] When the joint initiatives are not bringing the desired results, then donors go back into their own approach’ (EU12-Tanzania, March 2012). Second, the perceived lack of results of the coordination efforts is linked to domestic political context: ‘there is an increasing gap between the mind-set and discussions at headquarters level and at the country level’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

4.3.3.2 Ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination

As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter (cf. Figure 4-4) Member States’ representatives in Tanzania have different attitudes towards EU coordination. There is no consensus on the added value of EU coordination. Doubts are casted on the functionality of EU coordination because it may not to lead – at least in the short time – to visible results. ‘It would just add more frustration if there was more time spent on sharing information from the EU perspective only, and it wouldn’t give any additional gain’ (EU15-Tanzania, March 2012). Even if Joint Programming in an EU context is expected to lead to better development outcomes, this is not feasible in the short term. As a result, EU coordination may conflict with donors’ adherence to development effectiveness as the ultimate objective and with their individual identity. Apart from these functional assessments there are also more ideological problems with EU coordination. Arguably the attitude towards EU coordination corresponds with the general attitude of Member States towards EU integration.

On one side of the spectrum, Belgium and the EU Delegation are most in favour of EU coordination. Especially the EU Delegation is convinced that there exists added value, especially regarding policy coordination: ‘the DPG is good in terms of information sharing, but not for policy decisions

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94 Other similar accounts include: ‘Coordination is not only the system. Even if the system is existing, and here there is no doubt it is existing, but it has not worked, so now the level of coordination speed itself is weaker in comparison with ten years ago. […] even if the architecture is very beautiful, if nobody considers it as very important, it will not contribute to the impact or effect of development’. ‘There’s probably quite a lot of frustration with the structure, it’s very time-consuming […]’ (EU15-Tanzania, March 2012), ‘we now have experience with coordination and see that it is very time consuming while not always good things come out of it’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012)
simply because the DPG is too diverse as an institution. When you have ILO, UN, US, AfDB, WB it’s very difficult to find a real main common denominator on things like corruption’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). As a result ‘EU coordination could and should be more advanced than at the level of the DPG’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). Also a better division of labour amongst EU donors is recommended as ‘this is becoming very expensive. There is a lot of room for specialization, now we are too many staff doing the same thing’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). However, even the EU Delegation mentions that EU coordination is not always needed because ‘the real work is done at the sectoral level or GBS group level’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011).

On the other side of the spectrum sits the UK as least enthusiastic about EU coordination. This perception lives very strongly among local EU representatives: ‘the problem is we always have the British’ (EU9-Tanzania, February 2012). A DFID representative confirmed these perceptions as it is in line with their self-image: ‘we are completely independent’ and ‘with the UK I don’t see any appetite to, as it were to give responsibility to the EU. We’re generally quite critical on the EU handling of the budget it already has […]’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). However, this is not necessary because of a negative feeling towards the EU. DFID has its own policies and strategies ‘and if that does not comply with the EU, they will do their own thing. They rather have a “we know better but we want to share it with you” attitude’ (EU14-Tanzania, March 2012). Moreover the DFID representative emphasized that coordination is driven by ‘the recognition we have of each other, in terms of the size of the programmes, the shape of the programme, likely flexibility and so on’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012). As such, DFID is also increasingly cooperating with the US ‘because they share some of the result areas that we have, and the intention to deliver the results and the time span, the level of ambition. So we’re doing a lot more with the US as a donor partner’ (EU10-Tanzania, March 2012).

In between those two ‘extremes’, Ireland and the Netherlands tend towards the UK position and emphasize that there is no need for EU coordination as there is already coordination going on in the DPG and on a bilateral and ad-hoc basis amongst interested donors (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). It is thus questioned whether EU coordination has real added value or whether it is ‘just another layer of administration’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012). However, even those more reluctant representatives admit that ‘in a couple of cases it can be useful to coordinate amongst EU donors, there are issues on which we take initiative in the EU framework’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011).

As for the Nordic donors there is a shared understanding that EU coordination at the country level should not be taken for granted as the EU is not necessarily the most functional level: ‘the main coordination structure is the overall dialogue [DPG framework] and I think […] it’s […] not so primarily relevant to have a very very tight information exchange at the sector level or HoC level in EU specific, because it is
more relevant, more useful from an operational perspective to have the broader, the coordination with the actual donors’ (EU15-Tanzania, March 2012). Moreover, they emphasize the presence of non-EU like-minded donors: ‘we strongly think that, since there are other, also like-minded groups which have perhaps more policy coherence, or the same type of policies as the Nordic policies, it’s more efficient for us to use, to try and coordinate in a wider way, which will include sometimes the Commission as like-minded, but we also have important players like Norway, Canada, which we want to coordinate with’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

Nordic coordination happens in a rather flexible and informal manner⁹⁵: ‘the Nordic HoCs we meet ad hoc, more personally, it’s not formal’ (EU15-Tanzania, March 2012) and this cooperation is based on like-mindedness⁹⁶:

‘We are friends, I mean some of us speak the same language, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, so we can discuss. We have lunch together, we talk about also, you know, social things, there is some social cooperation between the embassies here, we also cooperate regarding administrative issues’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

‘We are like-minded, we have agreed on a smaller set of criteria, because we come from the same political background, look at the amount of corruption in the Nordic Plus countries, versus the amount of corruption in the non-Nordic Plus countries, you would see that, we just have different ways of looking at things, we trust people much more because they’re not working on perverse incentives, they are actually working on the right incentives to try to achieve the greater good’ (EU6-Tanzania, January 2011).

‘I think behind the Nordic are ideas about aid and development, this is very much to the core of the Nordic Plus, and that kind of issues brings us together […]. I think ideas about aid and development is on an EU level very difficult’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012).

And it doesn’t stop at the Nordic Plus group: ‘if we even can go beyond that and influence Japan and US to at least take a few steps in our direction, we think that that is more valuable than EU coordination’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). ‘We don’t see very much value added of a strong EU coordination in general terms,

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⁹⁵ As mentioned earlier Nordic Plus is not a strict or formal association. Like any other donor, Nordic donors’ position varies in time and from country to country and in some countries, the position of the donor is much more determined by internal politics. Moreover, it should be emphasized that Nordic Plus is a group of donors that share a like-mindedness on several issues, but that the group has mainly played a role in setting the global agenda, such as in the OECD-DAC rather than at the country level: ‘it’s more at the policy level and at the development of methods that Nordic Plus had played a role at the international level rather than at the country level’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

⁹⁶ However, it must be noted that recently, the role of the Nordic Plus countries ‘changed a lot’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012). ‘On human rights they are still like minded, but on the concrete programmes, or concrete questions of coming to a joint position. Last year it was very difficult to have joint critical position in the GBS group, I think because of their commercial interests’ (EU8-Tanzania, February 2012).
because we have those other groups and it’s in a way more important to have the whole group behind you, rather than only the EU members. [...] There is not really value added of an EU consensus about many of the developmental issues that we are talking about’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). This also explains why their coordination is not institutionalized as they share the idea that ‘there is not much added value of pre-coordination among the Nordic Plus or among the EU. We go directly to the wider group, the GBS group for GBS and the DPG for wider coordination’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

Moreover, EU coordination means that ‘we would have to compromise with countries which don’t have really internalized the EU thinking, the formal documents [Code of Conduct, Operational Framework]. And that would have a negative impact on our joint positions. Coordination with Norway, Canada and Switzerland would have a positive impact on the consensus that we try to find through coordination’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). According to the EU Delegation ‘it is definitely more challenging for EU coordination when there is a strong Nordic Plus presence. For example, it was very difficult to implement or to call Member States to implement the Council conclusion on division of labour, because their first reply was that this is done at Nordic Plus level and we don’t need to do this at EU level. And of course sometimes it’s difficult also to bring them to the table’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011).

Nevertheless, this critical stance towards EU coordination should be nuanced. First, Nordics believe that the EU has added value at headquarters and policy level, in searching for better division of labour for example. Depending on the issue, the Nordic coordination may even be used as an engine for EU and donor-wide coordination:

‘Often what happens is that when you have initiatives, we have Nordic coordination. And the Nordic coordination used to be a very important creative critical mass to the EU on raising issues that might not be that easy to find a joint understanding. And then when the EU has finally come to a joint EU or joint mind-set at least on what are the targets and how to achieve them, so than it’s time to rephrase this issue on the people of the partners group. [...] So there is this kind of formal-informal coordination going band in band to achieve change’ (EU13-Tanzania, March 2012)

‘So we are talking and we meet regularly, […] Nordic Ambassadors. Last time we discussed especially budget support and we met one week before the EU. [...] We wanted to schedule our Nordic meeting one week before the EU meeting, so that Nordics we could a bit coordinate and then, from within the EU’ (EU12-Tanzania, March 2012)

Moreover Nordic Plus countries have been able to use EU policy ‘to put some pressure on our colleagues from Southern Europe to work in a more efficient way’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). It is also stated that EU policy is largely in line with Nordic Plus policies. It is argued that ‘there is rather
strong policy coherence or priorities if you compare the Swedish policies in general with the EU policies in general. […] So we have few problems at the policy level with the EU thinking’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011).

4.3.4 Summary

Table 4-8 offers a summary of the analysis conducted in this section and indicates the complex interplay of different factors that enable and constrain EU coordination. In the concluding section I will focus on those factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Tanzania.

Table 4-8. Overview of constraining and enabling factors for EU coordination in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ2: Understanding EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong> Interest-related factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong> Institutional factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong> Ideational factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Conclusions

Based on the analysis conducted in this first country chapter, this section will draw conclusions on EU coordination in Tanzania.

The chapter has sought to map EU coordination in Tanzania, by considering both the internal and the external dimension. Through the analysis conducted in Section 4.2 I have found that a) EU coordination in Tanzania tends to be limited to information sharing and ad hoc coordinating responses, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension).
b) The EU Delegation is mainly ‘just another donor’ in the donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension)

Based on the analysis conducted in Section 4.3 these findings can be understood as follows.

First, the internal dimension of EU coordination in Tanzania is severely questioned by the largest EU donors present in the country, which are mainly the UK and other Nordic Plus countries. Their opposition towards EU coordination is based on ideational arguments. EU coordination does not offer a valid framework to improve aid coordination in Tanzania as coordination should take place at the most functional level in terms of aid and development effectiveness. This implies coordination in the advanced donor-wide framework structured around the DPG and the JAST, coordination with other actors which may be like-minded and coordination at the operational level. From this perspective EU coordination in general does not offer much added value in relation to the on-going processes. Additionally, Tanzania has been an aid darling of several EU donors and constituted a special position in the Nordic cooperation history. Engaging in more advanced EU coordination would threaten the flexibility of individual donors to portray individual results in ‘showpiece’ Tanzania. The current domestic political and economic context in Europe only adds pressure to focus on visibility. Despite these constraining factors, the increased power asymmetry between EU donors and Tanzania may make EU coordination more attractive in the future, and several interviewees, mainly representatives of smaller and medium-sized donors, recognized the need to maintain leverage by better coordinating their responses towards the government. However, it is questioned whether this would lead to coordination ‘for the right purpose’. Moreover, the UK, which is the largest EU donor in Tanzania, is looking for other partners to maintain or increase leverage. The UK sees an interest in closer cooperation with the US and it also tries to approach China.

Second, the EU Delegation in Tanzania is mainly ‘just another donor’ in the advanced aid coordination architecture. Important steps towards better coordination were initiated by Nordic countries in the end of the 1990s, and in the previous decade several coordination frameworks and initiatives have been set up in close cooperation with the government. At the time the EU’s policy framework on aid effectiveness was adopted, donor-wide coordination in the DPG, centred around the JAST, was already far advanced. Consequently there was no ‘gap’ for the EU to ‘fill’. Moreover, coordination in Tanzania has led to a new aid coordination bureaucracy, which is increasingly criticized in recent years, resulting even in ‘coordination fatigue’. Launching new initiatives in such an environment, may not be well received. Although the EU is recognized for
its capacities and its culture of information exchange and consultation, this has not resulted in a role which is different from other committed donors.
5 EU coordination in Zambia

5.1 Context
EU coordination is both enabled and constrained by the context in which EU donors operate. In this introductory section Zambia’s political, economic context, the evolution of donor-government relations and the characteristics of the donor landscape will be discussed briefly. Subsequently, an overview of the existing donor-wide coordination processes will be provided before summarizing the EU’s cooperation with the country. This will help to understand and interpret EU coordination in Zambia.

5.1.1 Political, economic, development, and security situation
Zambia is a landlocked country that has recently (2011) been re-classified into a Lower-Middle Income Country\(^\text{97}\) (LMIC) (World Bank, 2013f). However, the country still ranks 164\(^{\text{th}}\) in the UNDP’s HDI (UNDP, 2011c).

Zambia gained independence from the UK in 1964 and in the first decade, the country was relatively independent of external aid thanks to the revenues from the copper industry (Fraser, 2009: 304; Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 1). However, in the 1970s and 1980s the economy collapsed because of external shocks\(^\text{98}\) and the country became a large aid recipient (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 1). As a result, in 1984, Zambia was the most indebted country in the world relative to GDP (Fraser, 2009: 305). Given its strategic irrelevance the country had little room of manoeuvre but to accept a wide range of economic and political reforms\(^\text{99}\) and conditionalities of the donor community (Fraser, 2009: 308-309).

However, the SAPs which were implemented during the 80s and 90s deteriorated the situation as the quick and comprehensive privatization process also contributed to a considerable decrease in tax revenues, negative growth rates, deindustrialization, deepening debt, and increasing poverty (Fraser, 2009: 303). Thanks to international assistance Zambia was able to get access to financing for its most pressing balance-of-payments arrears but by the end of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century the country was reclassified from a middle-income country to a LDC (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 2).

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\(^{97}\) Its per capita GNI has been between 1010 and 1490 per year since 2004.

\(^{98}\) After the first oil crisis, commodity prices plummeted and the Zambian economy collapsed. After the second crisis, Zambia was confronted with a massive debt crisis (Fraser, 2009: 302).

\(^{99}\) Zambia had to undertake a wide package of economic reforms under the Bretton Woods institutions’ SAPs and had to democratize its socialist one-party political system (cf. dual transition thesis (Fraser, 2009: 303)) as Zambia’s post-colonial politics were dominated by the UNIP which defended a socialist Zambian Humanism. The country’s priorities were captured in five-year National Development Plans (Fraser, 2009: 309).
Over the period 2000-2010 aid represented about 16 per cent on average of its GNI, the highest share of the four country studies (see Figure 5-1) (OECD-DAC, 2013). However, since 2000, the economy has been recovering and Zambia has succeeded to attract foreign investments. Given its improved macro-economic situation, debt relief, rising copper prices and a rapid expansion of the mining sector, the country’s dependence on aid, and especially on OECD-DAC donors, decreased (European Commission - Government of Zambia, 2007: 11). While ODA as a percentage of central government expense reached almost 140 per cent in 2002, this share has dropped to 32 per cent in 2010 (World Bank, 2013b). As for budget support, there are two diverging trends. On the one hand, the share of budget support as a percentage of ODA had increased. In 2009, budget support accounted for about 20 per cent of total aid and 32 per cent of the grants to Zambia. On the other hand, as a result of the declining aid dependency and increase of domestic revenue the share of budget support in the national budget has dropped ‘from around 30 per cent at the beginning of the last decade to less than 20 per cent in 2010’ (de Kemp, Faust, & Leiderer, 2011: 16; Weingärtner, 2008: 18).

In between 2002 and 2007 its average annual GDP growth was 4.6 per cent and this rate is expected to reach 6.3 in 2013 and 6.0 in 2014. However, despite Zambia’s relatively positive economic performance, Zambia’s HDI value is only 0.43, which is lower than LDC Tanzania (UNDP, 2011a). In 2006, still 68.5 per cent of people in Zambia were living below the poverty-line of $1.25 a day.

**Figure 5-1. Evolution of aid dependency in Zambia 1996-2010**

Mining and especially copper, is Zambia’s main economic attraction and the country is rich in minerals, agriculture and water resources (Kragelund, 2009: 488). Nevertheless, the EU’s commercial interests in Zambia are relatively small. EU’s trade with the country represents 0.0
per cent and Zambia ranks only 110th on the EU’s list of major trade partners (European Commission, 2012e). However, its importance varies across EU Member States. Table 5-2 illustrates that the UK has the largest share in the EU’s FDI in Zambia and these figures have increased in recent years (van der Lugt & Hamblin, 2011: 70).

Table 5-1. Major EU trade partners (percentage of EU15 trade 2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on Eurostat 2012

Table 5-2. Total FDI flows EU donors (2001-2011, USD Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total FDI flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years

In the past decade China has emerged as a leading source of FDI in all sectors of the economy, but especially in the mining sector, as mining-related activities represent three-quarters of Chinese investments\(^{100}\). In 2007, China was the largest foreign investor in Zambia. Moreover, China has installed two Multi-Facility Economic Zones to promote Chinese investments\(^{101}\) (Kragelund, 2009: 482-485; US Embassy Zambia, 2010a).

Zambia has known a stable political environment since independence, with a multiparty system and regular democratic elections since 1991. Current president Sata (People’s Front) was elected in 2011. His election was well received by the international community, given the troubled

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\(^{100}\) Chinese investments have been increasing significantly since the end of the 90s, when a Chinese firm (CNMC) obtained majority share of Chambishi mine in the Copperbelt region. Furthermore, China has also been involved in training and logistics for the Zambia Defence Forces (US Embassy Zambia, 2008).

\(^{101}\) One in Chambishi and one more recently one in Lusaka.
relationship between the donors and the previous president Banda\textsuperscript{102} (MMD) who took office in 2008. A main issue in donor-government relations was that despite the fact that despite donors’ instance to enforce the ruling of a UK Court (2007) which found former President Chiluba guilty of misappropriation of 46 million USD of public finances, under President Banda Chiluba was acquitted of public theft (Norad, 2011: xv). Despite Zambia’s overall positive trend in the governance indicators a number of donors interpreted the corruption problems as a lack of political commitment of the government to fight corruption. Furthermore there have been several instances indicating the Governments’ lack of respect for rule of law and civil liberties\textsuperscript{103} (cf. Freedom House civil rights score in Annex II).

Zambia’s history is marked by peace and stability while it is located in a rather turbulent region. The country has never been involved in an external conflict or war and has good relations with its eight neighbours (European Commission - Government of Zambia, 2007: 18; Sundewall et al., 2010: 124). The country has played an active role in regional peace and security issues in the Great Lakes Region and is committed in the fight against terrorism. Zambia has deployed peacekeepers on UN missions in southern Sudan, Darfur and Congo and the US is providing military training under its ACOTA programme (US Embassy Zambia, 2010b).

5.1.2 Evolution of donor-government relations

Zambia’s history is marked by a strained relationship with its donors as in spite of its dependence on their support, at several points in time the country’s political authorities tried to resist reforms, resulting in several aid suspensions. According to Fraser (2009: 309) the country has mostly faced a quite strong donor ‘bloc’ as bilateral donors have often been aligned with the Bretton Woods institutions\textsuperscript{104}. Therefore, a critical reading of Zambia’s history of aid relations states that ‘since the mid-1980s, Zambia has been identified as an emblematic case of a country dominated by its donors. Massive debt and aid dependency have weakened the government’s ability to negotiate with external actors, to set its own policies, and to act on the wishes of its citizens’ (Fraser, 2009: 299).

However, with the introduction of the PRSP, donor-government relations became more consultative and the confrontational relationship eased. Especially under the Mwanawasa

\textsuperscript{102} Banda replaced President Mwanawasa after the latter’s sudden death in 2008.

\textsuperscript{103} For example, in 2009 Zambia passed a controversial NGO-bill which provides the Zambian authorities with control over NGO Boards and under which NGOs are required to work in ‘public interest’, a bill which provoked strong concerns in the donor community and amongst local civil society (US Embassy Zambia, 2009a).

\textsuperscript{104} For example, in 1987 after popular dissent with liberalization schemes, Zambia refused to go along with IMF programmes and repayments resulting in a donor-wide decision to cut aid (Kragelund, 2009: 489).
administration (2002-2008) Zambia became a donor darling. In 2001 the country implemented an interim PRSP, followed by a more comprehensive PRSP for the period of 2002-2005. In 2005 the country reached the HIPC Completion Point and enjoyed significant debt cancellations through the HIPC initiative, as well as through the G8 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 1-2). Following the debt cancellations, the government announced it would not develop a second PRSP but instead return to development planning. As a result, in 2007, the Fifth National Development plan (FNDP) was officially launched for the period 2006-2010\textsuperscript{105}. In 2011 the government launched the Sixth National Development Plan.

Under the Banda administration (2008-2011) donor government relations severely deteriorated again and became increasingly hostile, especially after some large scale corruption scandals\textsuperscript{106} were made public. More than the corruption itself, the government’s ‘seemingly tepid response’ made donors ever more critical (US Embassy Zambia, 2009b) resulting in ‘a growing distrust between the donor missions and a country that may have grown too complacent as a “donor darling” and recipient of huge amounts of foreign assistance’ (US Embassy Zambia, 2009b). In May 2009, Sweden\textsuperscript{107} and the Netherlands suspended their support to the health sector after the revelation of serious fraud at the Ministry of Health. In October 2009, the government accused foreign diplomats of ‘malfeasance (including alleged efforts to destabilize Zambia) and threats to have capitals recall envoys’ (US Embassy Zambia, 2009d). Two weeks later all embassies received a ‘Note verbale’ from the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs restricting all contacts between foreign diplomats and the government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in that way tried to prohibit contacts between diplomats and line ministries (US Embassy Zambia, 2009d). With the election of current President Sata (2011), the relations have cautiously eased again.

In recent years the changing aid landscape in Zambia has influenced the relationship between the government and its ‘traditional’ donors. With the emergence of new donors such as China, India, Brazil and South-Africa and alternative resources from private actors Zambia has access to

\textsuperscript{105} However, the design process had not been very different from the PRSP process. The FNDP focused on pro-poor growth-oriented sectors and economic infrastructure and human resources development (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 3-4). While some see this as a sign of regained ownership, Fraser calls the FNDP ‘little more than a shopping list’ (Fraser, 2009: 302) and ‘donors are cherry picking those elements they want to pay for’ (Fraser, 2009: 320). It was inspired by the MDGs but also included the macroeconomic policies that were part of donors’ former conditions such as the reform of investment laws and tax regime (Fraser, 2009: 317).

\textsuperscript{106} Corruption scandals included a former Communications and Transport Minister Siliya, corruption in the road sector, Banda’s support for former president Chiluba, and a 2 million USD fraud by a former Human Resources manager in the Ministry of Health Kapoko (US Embassy Zambia, 2009b).

\textsuperscript{107} Sweden temporary suspended a tranche of budget support of 11 million USD (US Embassy Zambia, 2009b).
alternative sponsors, which weakens the leverage of traditional sources and ‘changes the atmosphere for the other donors’ (Fraser, 2009: 320). As stated before, aid dependence has decreased and the relevance of ODA and specifically budget support has declined (Weingärtner, 2008: 18). Consequently, looking at the reinstallation of a National Development Plan, the positive economic indicators, the debt relief and the interest of private investors and China, Fraser (2009: 299-300) argues that Zambia ‘is reclaiming the initiative in its aid relationships’.

5.1.3 Donor landscape

Zambia’s donor landscape is less crowded than the Tanzanian and Zambia’s fragmentation rate of 23 per cent is remarkably lower than that of Tanzania (47 per cent) (OECD-DAC, 2010b). As indicated in Chapter 3, when donors are fewer in number, the conditions for achieving coordination may be more favourable. According to the figures in Table 5-3 Zambia has received a large proportion of multilateral aid but the high contribution of the WB should be nuanced, as this is largely thanks to substantial debt relief in 2005. DFID has been one of the lead bilateral donors together with the US and Germany. EU donors together represent one third of total ODA to Zambia while Nordic Plus donors represent one fifth of total ODA. Zambia is a budget support recipient and there used to be nine budget support donors in Zambia, namely the Netherlands, Norway, DFID, Sweden, the WB, the Commission, Germany, Finland and AfDB. However, the Netherlands and Sweden withdrew in 2010. Within this group, the EU is the largest provider of budget support, followed by the UK, Norway and the AfDB, Sweden, the Netherlands and the WB, and finally Finland and Germany (Leiderer & Faust, 2012: 62-63).

When it comes to the EU donor composition, the Commission, the UK and Germany are the largest EU donors, each representing 6 to 7 per cent of total ODA to Zambia. Next, the Netherlands represents 3 per cent of total ODA followed a group of Nordic Plus countries, namely Sweden, Denmark and Ireland each representing 2 per cent of total ODA and Finland which represents only 1 per cent of ODA. It should be noted that France and Italy have phased out their cooperation programmes. European Nordic Plus donors together have contributed more than half of total EU aid while European Front donors have only represented 7 per cent of total EU aid. As I have indicated in the first part of this thesis, Nordic Plus countries have traditionally taken a more critical stance towards EU coordination. Consequently, the donor composition in Zambia might possibly constrain the scope for EU coordination.

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108 This was confirmed in a couple of interviews: ‘it’s a small country, with just 12 million people and a relatively small group of donors, it’s not so difficult to coordinate’ (EU7-Zambia, February 2011).
109 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and Norway.
110 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK.
111 Belgium, Italy, France and Spain.
Table 5-3. Total donors’ contribution 2002-2010 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All donors total</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>15362</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries total</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>7595</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral total</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>7765</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non OECD-DAC countries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU donors total</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>4927</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Plus donors</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>3114</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. IDA                | 327     | 3269      | 21%   |
2. IMF                | 198     | 1983      | 13%   |
3. United States      | 187     | 1869      | 12%   |
4. Japan              | 115     | 1146      | 7%    |
5. EU Institutions    | 107     | 1074      | 7%    |
6. UK                 | 103     | 1025      | 7%    |
7. Germany            | 93      | 930       | 6%    |
8. AfDF               | 65      | 653       | 4%    |
9. Norway             | 56      | 559       | 4%    |
10. Global Fund       | 47      | 475       | 3%    |
11. Netherlands       | 52      | 515       | 3%    |
12. Sweden            | 33      | 326       | 2%    |
13. Denmark           | 28      | 284       | 2%    |
14. Ireland           | 28      | 284       | 2%    |
15. France            | 22      | 224       | 1%    |
16. Finland           | 12      | 121       | 1%    |
17. Canada            | 13      | 130       | 1%    |
18. Italy             | 9       | 93        | 1%    |
19. AfDB              | 8       | 77        | 1%    |
20. UNICEF            | 7       | 69        | 0%    |
21. WFP               | 3       | 27        | 0%    |
22. UNDP              | 5       | 53        | 0%    |
23. GAVI              | 3       | 32        | 0%    |
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. UNFPA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Nordic Dev. Fund</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Australia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. WHO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. UNAIDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. OFID</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. IBRD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System*
### Table 5-4. EU donors’ contribution 2002-2010 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU donors total</strong></td>
<td>493</td>
<td>4927</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ‘European ‘Nordic Plus’</strong></td>
<td>255</td>
<td>2555</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ‘European front’</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3555</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Institutions</strong></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Luxembourg</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
5.1.4 Existing donor-wide coordination

‘There are other countries in Africa which are trying to come up with a division of labour but I think the Zambian one is probably the more advanced and a very formal process. […] Zambia led the way […] given that we were thinking about this division of labour matrix as from 2005-2006, certainly by the time the JAS was developed and signed upon and in 2007 we already had an operating division of labour matrix. […] We had exchanges with other countries which have come to Zambia to talk to us about how we went about doing this’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011).

Zambia has a long-time experience with aid coordination efforts. Already in the 80s there were discussions on how to improve aid effectiveness (Sundewall et al., 2010: 124) but especially since 2003, following the Nordic Plus initiative Harmonization in Practice (HIP) ‘there has been a major drive towards harmonization’ (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). In general, aid coordination in Zambia is considered quite advanced and fairly recipient-led. The government has adopted an aid policy and strategy and developed local planning processes while donors have agreed on a JAS (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 1). Consequently, building on the educated guesses elaborated in the first part of this thesis, Zambia’s existing donor-wide coordination might constrain the scope for EU coordination. Table 5-5 presents an overview of the key initiatives on aid coordination in Zambia which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Table 5-5. Overview of key moments for aid coordination in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Key Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90s</td>
<td>90s: several SWAps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00s</td>
<td>2000: interim PRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002: full PRSP: central framework for donor coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003: HIP initiative by Nordic Plus donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003: PRBS introduced by EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004: Wider HIP (WHIP) - Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005: Memorandum of Understanding on PRBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006: Cooperating Partners Group (CPG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007: 5th National Development plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007: Aid Policy and Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007: JAS for Zambia (JASZ) 2007-2010 &amp; donor matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011: 6th National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011: JASZII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2003, in response to Zambia’s efforts to take the lead in development planning and guided by the Rome Declaration on Harmonization, a group of seven Nordic Plus countries took the lead in trying to translate what had been agreed at the global level regarding harmonization and alignment into the Zambian aid architecture resulting into the HIP initiative (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 5). The group aimed to harmonize their projects, align their support to the governments’ priorities, increase the use of budget support and better coordinate their inputs in the policy dialogue (Fraser, 2009: 317).

The way towards coordination in Zambia was thus paved by the Nordic Plus countries before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions were adopted: ‘the instigation did come from the Nordic donors’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011) and ‘it was the Nordic Plus that was really the driving force’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011). In 2004, this frontrunners’ initiative was expanded to include all major donors, which led to the creation of the WHIP. Donors signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Harmonization of Government/Donor Practices for Aid Effectiveness in Zambia, with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in which they agreed to harmonize their programmes, increase the share of budget support and better coordinate policy inputs (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 5). They would work towards delegated cooperation, improve information sharing and understanding on donor policies, procedures and practices and establish sector advisory groups and lead donor arrangements (Weingärtner, 2008: 15).

In 2007, the Zambian government adopted an Aid Policy and Strategy in order to better organize and coordinate its aid relations. The aid policy and strategy emphasize Zambia’s sovereignty and are guided by principles like ownership and partnership. The government defined its preferences in terms of ODA, indicating how performance should be monitored and which modality is preferred (GBS) (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 6). Interestingly, the strategy emphasizes the importance of ‘champions’, first within the government, but ‘champions within the donor camps are also important to steer the cooperating partners in the direction that is mutually beneficial to the country’ (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2007: 37).

112 Namely Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.
113 While the Aid Policy and Strategy with its calls to ownership and genuine partnership might be a sign of increased leadership by the government, Fraser (2009: 319) emphasizes that the idea of an aid strategy and the commitments on ownership ‘came as much from donor pressure as a Zambian initiative’.
114 The Strategy includes a paragraph on strengthening the government’s aid appraisal function setting down that external interventions should be in Zambia’s interest, in support of the FNDP, feasible, efficient and sustainable (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2007: 29).
In response to Zambia’s FNDP and its Aid Policy and Strategy 16 donors\textsuperscript{115} initiated the JASZ. The JASZ aimed to better coordinate donors’ assistance in support of the national development goals captured in the FNDP and came into force in 2007\textsuperscript{116}. The objective was to better coordinate donors and let them speak with one voice with the government by developing common visions, principles and priorities. Donors agreed to increase aid predictability, simplify aid management and improve division of labour on the basis of their comparative advantages\textsuperscript{117} (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 7-8). Ultimately the JASZ should replace the separate country strategies of the signatories but this has not yet materialized. Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the UK committed themselves to replace their country strategy with the JASZ while others would align their strategies with the JASZ (Wohlgemuth & Saasa, 2008: 7-8). To implement the JASZ, different instruments were established. Donors organized themselves into the CPG and sector advisory groups, developed a donor matrix, and have initiated a coordinated approach on budget support.

First, donors had organized themselves into the CPG under the lead of a troika, comprising two bilateral and one multilateral donor on a rotational basis for a period of 18 months. In practice the WB has been chairing the Co-operating Partners Group Troika until 2012\textsuperscript{118}. Prior to the WB the UN system was the multilateral representative. The Troika represents the CPG in the dialogue with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning on broad aid coordination and management issues. The CPG and the Troika provide donors with a forum to share information, discuss common concerns and better organize policy dialogue with the government (Weingärtner, 2008: 17). The CPG meets once a month at HoMs or HoC level\textsuperscript{119}.

Second, the concrete elaboration of a Donor Matrix took place in two parallel processes. On the one hand, donors developed a matrix on the basis of self-assessment and peer review (2005-2006). On the other hand, the government proposed a division of labour on the basis of their experiences with donors in the various sectors. After some months of consultations an agreement

\textsuperscript{115} 12 bilateral donors (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, US) and the EU Institutions, UN, WB and AFDB

\textsuperscript{116} There were discussions about whether or not to involve the government in the JASZ so that it would be a government-led strategy but in the end, the JASZ became a donor document that is not legally binding. The process that led to the adoption of the JASZ took more than a year because of disagreements, for example on the preferred aid modality as unlike budget support donors, donors like the US or Japan adhere to project modes, vertical funding and alike.

\textsuperscript{117} Better Division of Labour had to reduce ‘congestion’ in overcrowded sectors such as education and governance, and encourage support to under-funded sectors and thematic areas such as gender and environment (Weingärtner, 2008: 16).

\textsuperscript{118} In 2012 AfDB succeeded the WB as the Troika Chair

\textsuperscript{119} It’s also not unusual for HoCs and HoMs to participate in joint missions. Usually HoCs participate in the CPG though, unless decisions need to be taken.
on a division of labour was reached in June 2006. Sector groups\textsuperscript{120} are chaired by lead donors, co-lead structures or Troika’s. Donors are either be ‘lead’, ‘active’, ‘background’ (or silent) or ‘phasing out’ and Terms of Reference have been adopted to further define these roles. While the government proposal only appointed multilateral institutions as sector leads, the final matrix comprised several lead positions for bilateral donors too (Weingärtner, 2008: 16).

The JASZ also included the introduction of PRBS. There is GBS and sector budget support in education, health, road infrastructure and agriculture. There used to be nine budget support donors in Zambia\textsuperscript{121} but now the group includes only seven donors. The EU started with budget PRBS in 2001 and in 2005 other donors joined and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on PRBS.

One of the drawbacks of these processes is that aid coordination at the government side was left aside. While donors increased cooperation with the central Ministry of Finance, line ministries were not so much involved. Moreover, vertical funds and new actors, such as China have largely remained outside of the process\textsuperscript{122}.

5.1.5 EU cooperation with Zambia

The Commission is active in Zambia through EDF funding since 1973. The Cotonou Agreement provides the framework for development cooperation as well as for the trade and the political dimension of the partnership. The current EU’s CSP for Zambia (2008-2013) focuses interventions in two focal areas: regional integration/infrastructure and transport (24.6 per cent) and Human Development/health (12.4 per cent). Apart from these focal areas, assistance is provided in the form of GBS (48.9 per cent) and through non-focal interventions (14.1 per cent) in agriculture-food security, governance, support to non-state actors and to Economic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Sectoral coordination in Zambia has been introduced already in the late 90s in Zambia. For example, in the health sector there has been a well-established SWAp but in recent years uncertainty about the approach has increased, as donors have suspended shares of their support in response to the corruption scandals.
\item \textsuperscript{121} These are the Netherlands, Norway, DFID, Sweden, WB, Commission, Germany, Finland and AfDB. However, the Netherlands and Sweden withdrew in 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{122} However, given their increased importance, the CPG has invited Brazil, India, China and South-Africa to participate in the meetings as observers: ‘for Zambia it’s quite important, particularly given the investments that China does, we need to bring them into the pool’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). The result is that sometimes these actors do show up ‘but very sort of on and off, depending upon when they have the staff, when they have the interest and so forth’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). Also during the annual dialogue with the government, these partners are invited as observers and ‘they tend to show up’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). However, in the meantime, the Zambian government ‘carries on their bilateral dialogue with China’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). The current government is rethinking the dialogue structure with its donors and is considering a different structure with the new stakeholders, the private sector, the NGOs and the emerging donors like China and India, whereas the traditional donors emphasize that the CPG structure is open for those new stakeholders. As such ‘it seems to become more fragmented’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}

The EU has provided macro-economic support since the 90s, through the Structural Adjustment Facility and SYSMIN funds. In 2003/2004 the EU started with PRBS in the framework of the 9th EDF in order to finance the implementation of the PRSP, thereby focusing on Public Finance Management reform. The EU’s experience has been ‘instrumental in providing sufficient confidence to other donors for their own budget support operations, which started in 2005’ (European Commission - Government of Zambia, 2007: 21-22). Since 2009 budget support is provided under an MDG contract through which it committed 225 million euros for 2009-2014. Zambia was the first African country to benefit from this type of financing (European Commission, 2009b).

**Figure 5-2. EU Institutions aid 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)**

*Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System*
5.2 RQ1: Mapping EU coordination

In order to define and understand EU coordination in Zambia this section will analyse the EU’s efforts to improve EU coordination (internal dimension) as well as the Delegation’s role in donor-wide coordination (external dimension). In the end of this section the main findings will be summarized. This will allow for a conclusion on the extent to which the EU coordinates in Zambia. These findings well then be further investigated and explained in the next section.

5.2.1 Internal dimension

In the following paragraphs the internal dimension of EU coordination will be outlined, including EU coordination in the programming phase, but primarily EU coordination during implementation. Thereby I will consider information sharing and consultation, common positions, the FTI on Division of Labour and budget support. Also more informal ways of EU coordination will be explored. Finally, a sketch of the variety of EU donors’ attitudes towards EU coordination will be provided.

Coordination in the programming phase is limited. For the programming of the CSP under the 10th EDF, the EU Delegation used the FNDP and the JASZ as guiding documents but conducted its own country analysis and formulated its own response strategy, just like all other EU donors did for their programming. Although it was expected that EU donors in Zambia would engage in joint programming for the 11th EDF, as the country had been selected as one of the 14 pilot countries for the implementation of joint EU strategies (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 16), in 2011 it was decided differently. At the time of the field research, the EU did not yet initial the first phase of the 11th EDF programming but it was expected that the programming process of the 11th EDF would take place ‘in close coordination with Member States’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). Consequently the process will mainly be limited to consultation with all stakeholders.

In Zambia EU coordination is not institutionalized as there is no fixed meeting schedule but information sharing and consultation is ad hoc and event-based: ‘there is no first round among EU donors’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011), ‘coordination within Europe is on an ad hoc basis’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011). The EU HoC has tried to increase specific EU coordination since his arrival in August 2008 and ever since the EU ‘started slowly to do more coordination’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011). Thereby more regular coordination is envisaged on specific EU commitments such as the FTI on Division of Labour and joint programming. While the objective is to ‘incorporate this in the existent dimension’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011), it is not clear how this will be achieved. In January 2011, during a mixed HoMs/ HoCs meeting under the lead of the EU Delegation, a working group on the added value of EU coordination was launched in order to ‘look whether there
is scope for more EU coordination’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). However, although a number of concrete proposals have been put forward by the EU Delegation ‘this unfortunately didn’t really follow through […]'. For a number of reasons’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

However, ad hoc meetings take place at several occasions, amongst others to exchange information and consult (1) on issues related to the EDF programme in Zambia, (2) on existing as well as on new EU policy initiatives and commitments, or (3) on specific problems in certain fields. As a result, although a fixed meeting schedule is absent, ‘we had this kind of coordination meetings several times’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012).

First, the EU Delegation has occasionally gathered Member States to brief and discuss issues related to the EU’s programme in Zambia. For example, ahead of EDF Committee meetings in Brussels ‘they [the EU Delegation] […] call the Member States in advance to brief us […] and they would also have meetings around this Joint Annual Report’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011). Like in Tanzania, a large part of the information exchange is dedicated to ‘what the EU is doing because at the country level it still remains a black box, we know they have a large budget, we know that they do a lot, but there are many questions about how that relates to what the Member States do and whether it is done in a good way’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012). EU donors see an interest to monitor how the Commission is spending Member States’ tax money. This is especially true for those who are withdrawing their programmes from Zambia. Not only have Denmark and the Netherlands decided to stop their development cooperation in the near future, other donors too are talking about a horizon of 5 to 10 years. As such it is expected that there will be only ‘a limited club of donors’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012) which will make the position of the EU more important. As a result ‘you want more information about what the EU is doing exactly’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012) or ‘what is happening on the ground’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012). For example, in 2011 Member States found out that the EU was still providing sectoral budget support to the health sector, while two other donors had suspended their support in response of the corruption scandal. As a result, EU donors have been talking about better coordinating the reporting towards Brussels in order to avoid inconsistency between Member States’ and the EU Delegation’s reports about developments in certain sectors.

Second, the EU Delegation has briefed and consulted Member States on existing and new EU policy initiatives such as the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour, the EU plan of action on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development, the Green paper on the future

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123 This is very clear in the case of Germany: ‘We, Germans, we are demanding, we ask for constant coordination. This is quite easy, because 20 per cent of the money which is spent by the EU is from Germany. When they give budget support of 100 million for example, 20 per cent is from Germany. So we are of course interested in what they are doing and what they are planning’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012).
of budget support and the Agenda for Change. In Zambia, Germany is lead facilitator of the EU FTI on Division of Labour and Complementarity, while supporting facilitators are the Commission and the Netherlands. The facilitating donor needs to monitor the process and report back to Brussels where the results of the different FTI countries are compared and recommendations are drawn. In practice the German and the EU HoC have monitored this in close cooperation. However, the monitoring of the FTI was described as being ‘obliged to fill in a questionnaire’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011). The Code of Conduct was adopted at a time when coordination around the JASZ was already advanced and a donor matrix had already been elaborated so ‘instead of being a parallel EU process it made more sense to look at it as integrated processes’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011). Furthermore, there are a number of delegated cooperation with arrangements on lead and silent donors. For example, in the education sector Germany delegated a part of its cooperation to the Netherlands and in the field of access to justice the EU has engaged in delegated cooperation to Germany.

Third, the EU framework is in general not used to speak with one voice, adopt common positions or launch joint initiatives, although this has taken place on an ad hoc basis, exemplified by the EU response to the crisis following the revelation of the large-scale corruption cases. However, at HoMs level more regular EU coordination is taking place on the policy dialogue accompanying budget support and on the political dialogue related to Article 8. In these meetings Member States without development programmes such as France and Italy participate too.

Apart from these formal EU coordination meetings, informal coordination at bilateral level is also taking place: ‘it’s a small group, so at the same time we talk to each other, we see each other’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012), ‘there are a lot of informal coordination meetings. […] I often meet for example with the HoC from the EU Delegation. We know each other, we just phone each other and then we make an appointment, then we come together and then we discuss about things which are important. I’m sure he also does the same with my colleague from DFID or from Denmark or from Sweden or so. This is nothing special. When

124 More specifically ‘they send us a questionnaire, asking us a lot of questions […]’. For example, ‘has a donor mapping taken place’, ‘are lead donor arrangements established’, ‘is reprogramming underway as a consequence’, ‘what has the partner country government and the donor community undertaken to promote implementation of Division of labour’, ‘Participation by donors’. And they expect us to give the answers. My job is just to come up with the answers and then coordinate these answers with the whole CPG group, EU-donors and non-EU-donors and the partner country, and then send the whole thing back to Brussels […]. And then they take a close look, there are a lot of countries, and then they compare the answers and try to accumulate certain points, aggregate certain points and then they will come up with recommendations […]’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011).

125 For example there have been discussions on the conditions in Zambian prisons. While EU donors have been able to reach common positions regarding the human rights situation in Zambia, Art. 8 dialogue with the Zambian government has been difficult.
we talk, this is very effective’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012). EU coordination is also referred to as ‘coordination “à géométrie variable”’ as depending on the sector and the donors involved in that sector, EU donors are ‘trying to see how we can be better coordinated as EU in our dialogue’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). Moreover, the EU Delegation is not always the ‘central hub’ of coordination amongst EU donors. For example, in 2010 Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden organized and funded a joint evaluation of budget support in Zambia, while the EU Delegation was not part of the exercise.

The five largest EU donors (Commission, UK, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden) plus Finland have provided a large share of their aid budget through general budget support. Additionally the Commission and the UK have provided sectoral budget support, the Commission in the health and the roads sector, and the UK in the health sector. Only two smaller EU donors (Denmark, Ireland) do not provide budget support. However, the Netherland and Sweden decided to withdraw of budget support in 2010. In the PRBS group budget support donors have agreed on a PAF but they do not apply harmonized eligibility criteria. In recent years and especially since 2010 EU HoMs try to coordinate a position amongst themselves before meetings take place among all GBS donors: ‘they consult amongst themselves before presenting a certain position’ (non-EU2-Zambia, February 2011). However, reaching a joint position has proven to be difficult. Discussions were on-going about the possibility to increase coordination around budget support by better coordinating the assessments and reporting (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). Especially during the crisis following the large corruption scandals in the road and health sectors, the Delegation gathered the EU budget support donors to the table in order to search for a harmonized position towards the government: ‘so it was playing a role of trying to coordinate, what should be the EU position on budget support, of the member countries, can we come up with a harmonized position?’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). EU coordination has taken place in parallel to other consultation frameworks in order to facilitate a coordinated response. However, although EU donors agreed on a roadmap, they still reacted in a dispersed way as Sweden and the Netherlands decided to suspend whereas others continued with their disbursements.

There is little variation in EU donors’ attitudes towards the current level of EU coordination in Zambia (cf. Figure 5-3). Except for the EU Delegation’s HoC, no interviewee has shown an interest in strengthening EU coordination on development cooperation. According to the EU Delegation representative: ‘when I came here [august 2008], there was not much appetite from the Member States at all, even I would say actually, no real interest to sit together as EU family, to engage in more specific EU
As EU coordination is taking place on an ad hoc basis, the current degree of coordination is not perceived as too intensive. As a result, the EU Delegation is most in favour of increasing EU coordination on development cooperation, although there is a different attitude between the EU HoC and the current EU HoD. While the HoC has been trying to intensify EU coordination, this has been tempered with the arrival of a new HoD. Germany is perceived as ‘accommodating’ as it has shown support for EU initiatives such as the FTI and acts as a lead facilitator for local implementation. The Nordic Plus countries are rather sceptical about EU coordination: ‘there are some Member States who traditionally are not very pro EU coordination, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden the Nordic Plus countries basically’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). Arguably, like in Tanzania, the UK is the EU donor who shows the least interest in EU coordination (EU9-Zambia, March 2012). However, although critical about the added value of increased EU coordination Nordic Plus donors have participated in the ad-hoc coordination meetings and they have also shown interest to better coordinate political messages as EU. No EU donor aims for the total absence of EU coordination.

**Figure 5-3. EU donors’ attitude towards EU coordination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>EU Delegation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Denmark)</td>
<td>(Netherlands)</td>
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Less EU coordination | More EU coordination

5.2.2 External dimension

Apart from specific EU coordination, EU donors participate in the donor-wide coordination processes of the CPG and the various sub-groups. To investigate EU coordination we should take into account this external dimension. I will describe this external dimension by considering the EU Delegation’s role in the development of the CPG processes, including division of labour as well as in relation to budget support. In the end of this section I will also explore the relation between the internal and the external dimension.

First, the EU has actively contributed to the different processes in the CPG framework: ‘they have been an integral part of much of the aid architecture. They are part of the JASZ, they are part of the PRBS’ (CS4-Zambia, March 2012). However, the CPG is chaired by a Troika, which has been presided by the WB until 2012. The way towards coordination in Zambia was paved by the Nordic Plus
countries before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions were adopted. It should be emphasized that, apart from the Troika system, there is no clear hierarchy in the CPG architecture and as a result the Delegation has no formal facilitating role in the overall donor coordination structure, nor a mandate to enforce common positions or to let the donor group speak with one voice: ‘the Commission is one of the other cooperating partners’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). Hence, although the Delegation has shown support for most coordination processes and ‘has been so very vocal in participating in the cooperation partner group meetings’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011), ‘their specific role depends on the sectors they are involved in’ (EU3-Zambia, February 2011). In line with the JASZ and the division of labour in the policy dialogue, the EU Delegation has taken lead roles in sectors where it has a comparative advantage, such as in the road sector, PFM and more recently it has become part of the agriculture Troika.

Second, the EU’s FTI on Division of Labour has not acted as an engine for donor-wide division of labour, as donors were already working on a donor matrix before the EU Council Conclusions were adopted (cf. supra). In contrast, the perception is that ‘the Commission jumped upon the band wagon’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011).

Third, regarding budget support, the EU has played a particular proactive role for both the government and other donors. After the Commission introduced GBS in 2001 as a new approach ‘without conditionalities, but with a focus on results, indicators and tranches, based on a dialogue with the government and the line ministries’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011) the EU Delegation ‘encouraged the Zambian government that that is the right way to go’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011) and its experience has been ‘instrumental in providing sufficient confidence to other donors for their own budget support operations’ (European Commission - Government of Zambia, 2007: 22). As a result ‘other donors like DFID, Finland, Sweden and even Norway agreed that Zambia would be a good country to start with budget support’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). Indeed, in 2005, Norway, Sweden and the UK initiated PRBS too, followed by the Netherlands (2006), Finland and Germany (2007). In short: ‘EU was a leader in budget support and they came in as a leader straight away’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011). Besides, in 2006 the Commission initiated a pilot programme for sector budget support in the health sector which has evolved into a larger programme from 2009 onwards.

Furthermore, according to several interviewees, together with the WB the EU bolstered the development of the PAF\textsuperscript{126}, the monitoring system for PRBS with common indicators defined in the Memorandum of Understanding (CS4-Zambia, March 2012). However, despite the

\textsuperscript{126} In November 2011 the budget support donors signed a new Memorandum of Understanding with a new PAF under the chairmanship of Germany.
Memorandum of Understanding including underlying principles and the existence of a PAF, EU donors still use different eligibility criteria. This was especially visible during the 2009 crisis.

When in 2009 corruption scandals in the Zambian health and road sectors led to a crisis in donor-recipient relations, the Commission was chairing the PRBS group\(^{127}\) and was responsible for keeping the donor group together while at the same time conducting the dialogue with the government. While it is reported that it was extremely difficult to take a unified and harmonized position in the divided donor group, under the lead of the EU Delegation the group managed to agree on a roadmap. However, it should be stressed that the EU’s coordinator role in budget support is not translated into speaking with one voice as donors were still divided in their individual response and disbursement decisions: ‘in the end, each donor made its own conclusions’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011). Hence, ‘the process was there but there were only little results’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

Finally, when it comes to the relation between the internal and the external dimension of EU coordination, the EU coordination on development cooperation is not regarded as a driving force for donor-wide coordination. As outlined above, EU coordination has remained largely an ad hoc and information sharing exercise and EU donors focus their coordination efforts on development cooperation in the CPG and the PRBS group.

### 5.2.3 Main findings

Table 5-6 offers an overview of EU coordination in Zambia. In what follows I will focus on the main findings which form the basis for the remainder of this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programming phase</th>
<th>Internal dimension: to what extent does the EU coordinate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Joint multiannual programming** | EDF 10: no joint programming, joint country analysis of JASZ but separate response strategy  
EDF 11: no joint programming, programming did not started yet |
| **Implementation phase** | Information sharing  
No regular HoC meetings, ad hoc, informal/bilateral Event-based consultation on EDF, EU policies, specific problems  
Common positions  
EU framework not used for coordinated initiatives, although there are efforts at HoMs level to better coordinate the policy dialogue related to budget support |

\(^{127}\) In 2010 the Netherlands took over and in 2011 Germany was the lead.
FTI on Division of Labour

Lead Facilitator: Germany, Supporting: Commission and the Netherlands
Mainly technical reporting exercise
A small number of delegated cooperation agreements
Commission, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland have provided budget support, but Sweden and the Netherlands withdrew in 2010. Denmark and Ireland do not provide budget support. No harmonized eligibility criteria

Budget support

Commission, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland have provided budget support, but Sweden and the Netherlands withdrew in 2010. Denmark and Ireland do not provide budget support. No harmonized eligibility criteria

External dimension: to what extent does the EU contribute to donor-wide coordination processes?

Information sharing and policy dialogue in CPG
Division of Labour
EU Delegation is an active contributor but not more than other committed donors
Division of labour is mainly developed within the CPG in the framework of the JASZ

Budget support
EU Delegation played an initiator role regarding PRBS

First, the internal dimension of EU coordination is not institutionalized and is limited to ad hoc or event-based coordination meetings and informal coordination on a bilateral basis. To the extent EU coordination takes place, this concerns mainly information exchange and consultation, and does not include an active component, which would require modification of Member States’ aid practices. Donor coordination in Zambia takes place in the framework of the CPG, the JASZ and at the sector levels, rather than in the EU framework. In response to the corruption crisis, EU donors intensified coordination in order to better coordinate their individual responses. However, even then, coordination does not imply harmonized action\(^{128}\). While Zambia is a FTI on Division of Labour country and there are a number of delegated cooperation agreements among EU donors, there are no uniform allocation criteria and the Zambian donor matrix is developed under the JASZ. While joint programming is the ultimate level of coordination in an EU framework, this will not happen in Zambia for the programming of EDF 11.

Second, the EU Delegation is more than ‘just another donor’, as especially in the area of budget support, the EU has initiated a new approach and played a particular role in the development of the Memorandum of Understanding and the PAF. Additionally, during its chairmanship of the PRBS group the EU Delegation has been able to take a particular proactive role, showing a

\(^{128}\) Non-EU interviewees’ perceptions of EU coordination confirm the above: ‘that coordination could be there but it doesn’t seem to really come out so clearly’ (GOV1-Zambia, February 2011). ‘There is consensus within the EU that aid has not been effective. But how to best handle this? That is still not very clear. There are countries who believe in budget support, but there are countries that prefer project support. Is that then a policy of the EU? In my view not, that has still to be refined’ (GOV4-Zambia, February 2011). ‘I only observe the coordination aspect in the issue of aid data collection. When we want to know how much the EU will disburse in the next years, we request the Delegation to give us that information, and they help to collect the data from all the Member States’ (GOV1-Zambia, February 2011).
strong willingness to help the donor group move towards a coordinated response to the crisis. However in Zambia’s overall coordination architecture, centred around the CPG and the JASZ emanates from a Nordic Plus initiative in close cooperation with the Zambian government and here the EU Delegation remains largely ‘just another donor’.

5.3 RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

This section aims for a deeper understanding of the main findings developed in the previous section. More specifically, this part will investigate the factors that help to explain why

a) EU coordination in Zambia tends to be limited to ad hoc information sharing and consultation without institutionalization, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension).

b) The EU Delegation plays an initiator role in the area of budget support, although it has been mainly ‘just another donor’ in the overall donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension).

As outlined in the first part of this thesis I will thereby consider interest-related, institutional and ideational factors. In the end of this chapter I will conclude on the enabling and constraining factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Zambia in order to gain understanding of both opportunities and limitations for EU coordination at country level.

5.3.1 Interest-related factors

In general, Zambia is not considered as a strategically important country for EU donors. In recent years though, Zambia has increasingly raised interest of (re-)emerging countries and private investors. As outlined in the first part of this thesis coordination can be considered as the result of a negotiation between gains and losses. Consequently, donors are required to redefine their individual objectives in order to work towards joint outcomes and results. However, the first part of this thesis has demonstrated that donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns as well as their search for political influence may affect their commitment to actually engage in a coordinated approach. This section will therefore explore to what extent EU donors interests enable and constrain EU coordination.

5.3.1.1 EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns

First, as I have argued in the first part of this thesis, foreign aid policies have their origin in donor countries’ domestic politics and interests. This has repercussions for EU Member States’ commitment towards EU coordination. First, Zambia is not considered as a commercially or
strategically important country for EU donors, so commercial or security interests do not offer sufficient explanation for understanding the limited EU coordination in Zambia. However, domestic politics considerations do play a role in donors’ coordination efforts, especially since the benefits of coordination and aid effectiveness are increasingly questioned by several European governments. Second, the EU Delegation is perceived to envisage more joint EU visibility, which conflicts with donors’ individual visibility.

First, domestic politics considerations do play a role in donors’ coordination efforts. Illustrations of how domestic politics influence aid decisions in Zambia enable or constrain a coordinated EU approach are plenty. On the one hand, the current political and economic context acts rather as an incentive not to engage in EU coordination as in several EU Member States, foreign aid is under pressure. Implementing a better division of labour or engaging in joint programming, requires a high-level political decision, but the governments which signed the Paris Declaration, have changed.

‘There is a lot of discussions taking place at several of the EU countries, and a lot of questioning about aid and we have conservative governments in many of the EU countries that are really, they are evaluating how we’re working and they want to see new aid and they are in general quite critical towards budget support and so on’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011).

‘In some sectors, some actors are more driven by their domestic agendas, and they have distanced themselves from Paris and Accra. For example in the health sectors, for a long time they have had an expanded basket, and now they go more in the direction of modalities in which individual donors have more grip on where the money goes, and that has to do with the scarce resources, the increased pressure to show headquarters what we do, what the results are, and whether that is the most efficient way to reach those results’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

‘Even if we agree to better divide the labour, we all have multiannual programmes and we have to wait for the next programming period to be able to implement, but then we all have governments whose composition changes every four years or sometimes earlier, so then there can be political objection against the different approach’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

For example, it is argued that behind Sweden’s decision to withdraw from budget support lie domestic politics as in the wake of the Zambian corruption scandal Sweden’s Minister for International Development Cooperation, Gunilla Carlsson, has called for an open debate over the role of development aid and questioned whether ‘development aid is not a part of a possible solution, but in fact part of the problem’ (Zambian Watchdog, 2009). The scandal at the Health ministry has
been much publicized in Sweden and arguably used to strengthen the perception that aid is ineffective\(^{129}\) (JCTR, 2012). This domestic political situation has influenced the Swedish attitude in the donor coordination process following the corruption scandals and its eventual response. The result of their unilateral approach is ‘they lost all possibilities to go for a dialogue with the government, they lost their chance’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). The Commission is in that sense ‘more able than the Member states to stay engaged. We are not so much under pressure as the Member States’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). Other foreign policy interests such as historical, commercial or security interests are less relevant for Zambia. Apart from the UK, EU donors have in general few interests in the country.

Second, there are examples of EU policies being perceived to strengthen the overall identity of the EU as an actor in international development. For example, different from what we could learn from the EU rhetoric, the FTI is not seen as an engine for donor coordination, but as an example of how the EU capitalizes what has been agreed among all ‘traditional’ donors: ‘the EU came up with the same idea, but gave it a different name’, ‘they seem to be wanting to build something better than the other’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011). The discourse of the EU Delegation representative also suggests a collective identity as he regularly referred to the ‘Europeanization’ of donor messages towards the government and the existence of a ‘European family’ in Zambia. The EU Delegation appears as the first promoter of a common European identity in the field, and thereby actors such as the WB and the US are framed as ‘the other’: ‘I think that pooled together, if we pool together our resources we are quite good. If we stay isolated we would never be able to compete with American colleagues’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

While EU donors’ visibility concerns towards the domestic constituencies tend to be less stringent than in Tanzania, individual visibility concerns may constrain the strengthening of EU coordination. The current political context increases the necessity to show results of tax payers’ money and thus emphasize individual donor successes\(^{130}\) (cf. supra).

\(^{129}\) ‘For basket donors, misappropriation of public funding becomes not merely a governance issue, but a political liability in their home countries’ (US Embassy Zambia, 2009b).

\(^{130}\) For example: ‘as bilateral EU Member States […] , the budgets are under pressure, we all have to show what we have realized with our money, what are the results, so then we engage less quick in the overall alignment, which reduces the visibility as a bilateral donor’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011) and ‘development cooperation is under pressure, the public support is under pressure, we have to show our results more clearly, so we want to have more grip on where the money goes, so we don’t want to limit ourselves and our flexibility by what other donors would think about it’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012)
5.3.1.2 EU donors’ political influence in Zambia

The EU’s political influence in Zambia is decreasing and several interviewees recognized this might facilitate the importance of EU coordination. However, this has not translated into closer coordination (yet) in practice.

The EU’s decreasing influence goes hand in hand with Zambia’s declining aid dependency and the growing presence of China in the country:

‘Our weight has decreased considerably. Zambia’s aid dependence is limited and it has gained access to China which puts money with less strings attached at its disposal, so the government let us hear regularly that we make it very complicated, which shows that our influence is rather limited’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011)

‘Before the government had only had 1 boyfriend, now it can compare the EU with China’ (CS1-Zambia, February 2011)

‘Here in Zambia the EU does not get response from the government, they prefer to give more response to the Chinese. Africans prefer China now on top of Europe’ (EU6-Zambia, February 2011)

‘We have seen in the last two years, we are pretty redundant, if the EU is a big big donor, but the emerging donors, they don’t give assistance in the traditional way, they are not transparent. They do put in a lot of money. They do not so much make us redundant in terms of aid money, we still, the common EU aid money, we are by far the biggest donor. But Zambia is fed up with being a beggar. Why are they still dependent’ (EU7-Zambia, February 2011)

As described earlier, Zambia has close historical ties with China (Kragelund, 2009: 480) and they rather ‘have a very easy access’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011), ‘they are seen as the good ones’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). In contrast ‘we as Europeans we are reputed to be difficult’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011) and despite the EU’s efforts, the Article 8 dialogue in Zambia has been rather ‘miserable’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011): ‘the Article 8 dialogue in Zambia is quite weak, it should work better but the government is not interested’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). Like in Tanzania

131 It is stated that ‘the traditional interaction between donors and the government has simply become out of order now and we are looking for an alternative way’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

132 Apart from China also ‘the US are seen as the good guys here’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011)

133 Other illustrations of this observation: ‘in the Article 8 dialogue the Commission raises difficult issues but achieves as little results as we do’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011) and ‘the Article 8 dialogue in Zambia has had it, we have to put new life in it’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

134 For example, a sensitive issue in EU-Zambia political relations is the situation of prisoners and the death penalty. At the occasion of Europe Day, the EU HoD concluded his speech with some critical words on the death penalty. ‘The President, who got the speech beforehand, had a ready response: “mind your own
access to the government is rather difficult, ‘sometimes it’s very hard for us just to arrange a meeting, apart from the content of the consultation. Having access is often not easy’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

As a result, EU donors have increasingly realized that EU coordination will be required in order to maintain influence, although there is no consensus on the concrete sort and degree of coordination. Especially the crisis in donor-government relations in the aftermath of the corruption scandals in 2009 has been instrumental in finding support for increased EU coordination and it also clearly shows how both the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s coordinator role are entangled. By the end of 2010 budget support donors were still divided on how to respond to the government’s dealing with the corruption scandals. While since 2008 the EU Delegation had to no effect ‘tried on many occasions to argue that there was a real added value to sit together as the EU’ (internal dimension), the impasse and lack of agreement amongst budget support donors (external dimension) on how to deal with the crisis enabled the EU HoCs ‘to use that opportunity’: ‘I tried to get the attention, in particular of the HoMs level, to get some support for myself as a HoC, to basically improve on our coordination’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

It is clear that this coordination is of a more political nature, and rather detached from the coordination and harmonization envisaged in the Paris Declaration. The EU HoC strongly promoted an intensification of coordination on development cooperation at HoCs level, next to the existing political coordination at ambassadors’ level and most EU donors felt that there is a need to better link the political cooperation at Ambassadors’ level and the more technical cooperation at HoC level. However there is no consensus on the concrete elaboration.

On the one hand, Germany strongly defended the idea that EU coordination should aim to achieve common positions and to ensure a stronger political presence and ‘started arguing that this [the EU HoCs proposals on EU coordination] was not sufficiently political, that his understanding is that what

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135 ‘In a way, we were compelled as EU to start sitting together when we had this important crisis in the relations between the CPs and the government in 2009, which continued well in 2011, before the elections, when a number of us who were members of the PRBS group, were actually having different assessments of the situation, different positions, and actually even conflicts in the larger group. So it was felt that this didn’t look good on the EU, and so, at that time I managed to get some EU coordination going, around some critical policy issues, assessments notably when it comes to PFM, joint assessments, and trying to come to at least joint, not having necessarily a sole position, but at least ensuring that if we were to disagree, we agreed to disagree, so that we would not be in the larger groups perceived, or vis-à-vis government, as being completely divided and speaking different languages’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

136 Different from the situation in Tanzania, the divide between small and big donors is less relevant in Zambia. First, the Commission, DFID and Germany are the biggest EU donors and represent almost the same share in ODA to the country and they have all recognized the need of coordination. Second, the remaining EU donors are all Nordic Plus donors which have been rather at the forefront of the coordination processes in the country.
we wanted to do was to improve on the political front, our coordination, basically joint agreed positions in relation to the fight against corruption, governance issues etc.” (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). It should be noted that even the UK tended to support the idea of having a stronger political message as EU, especially in the run-up to the 2011 election. Interestingly, DFID has had a difficult relation with the Banda administration and has been ‘told regularly “you can pack your bags” and “you’re in for a regime change”’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

On the other hand, DFID, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands have also strongly emphasized the importance of avoiding duplication of existing coordination mechanisms and that it was as important as well to adopt a multilateral approach in order to not exclude other like-minded partners: ‘maybe we see possibilities in terms of information exchange and in relation to the Brussels process, but we don’t see added value in speaking with one voice as EU with the Zambian side because we think it’s more important to speak at a much bigger group’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). As a result, because of disagreement on the concrete shape, coordination has still taken place on an ad hoc basis.

Arguably this search for political influence is accompanied by visibility concerns towards the Zambian public. In recent years visibility towards the Zambian population has increasingly been an issue for all EU donors, especially during and after the crisis in donors-government relations of 2009 and the EU donors’ diminishing political influence EU donors have realized the importance of more coherence and visibility as EU:

‘I can conclude that the EU is still struggling with its visibility. Whereas the EU is an actor that spends so much money in Zambia, I think for the average Zambian it’s not clear how important the EU is, that an organization like USAID is much better in terms of public relations’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

The political situation in Zambia has thus enabled the receptivity of EU donors’ to raise support of the Zambian population for the EU and preserve the political influence of EU donors’ in the country. However, there is no agreement on the conditions and the most appropriate tools to

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137 Furthermore ‘also he was saying no we don’t want to get into the Europe Day, because what had happened the year before was that my HoD at the time had organized stands with different cuisines from different Member States, so the German ambassador said, what is this, that’s not what we want to do, we want to get into real political dialogue’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

138 For example, early 2011, DFID was blamed for aiming a regime change when funding the National Institute for Democracy (QFM, 2011).

139 ‘We fought and disagreed, thanks to the temper of the EU ambassador, for example with the German and Italian ambassador. We tried to bridge differences, that tension came out of the changing role of the EU: from just being a multilateral donor, with a lot of money, and now with the restructuring of the EU, it becomes more like a coordinator’ (EU7-Zambia, February 2011)
attain this. Especially the EU Delegation HoC has been a strong promoter of more EU visibility and establishing the EU as a distinct actor:

‘Basically I use the CPG […] and then […] try to Europeanize a bit the messages and change a bit the tone as well […]. You see the thing is - and this is where I see our added value - we can agree to work in the same direction of the CPG because we are member of the CPG, but we can nuance, we don't have to use exactly the same speaking points or approach that the more general group would have’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

In the end of 2010 the EU Delegation launched a range of proposals to increase EU visibility within Zambia, such as joint launches and visits to projects, joint press releases, joint EU fact sheets, EU success stories and Europe Day but not all of these proposals were received with enthusiasm. For example, in 2011 the official opening of the Soweto market, which has been financed by the EU, was attended by all EU ambassadors in order to ‘propagate the idea of “this comes from Europe”’ resulting in criticism of some EU donors that EU coordination is ‘more about the image, I have not yet discovered anything with respect to the content of policies in a joint EU approach’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). Especially Germany has emphasized that EU visibility should be strengthened by promoting the EU as a political actor by strengthening political cooperation and providing joint messages towards the government.

‘The German ambassador […] was saying no we don't want to get into the Europe Day, because what had happened the year before was that my HoD at the time had organized stands with different cuisines from different Member States, so the German ambassador said, what is this, that's not what we want to do, we want to get into real political dialogue’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012)

Others, especially Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and DFID have emphasized that increased EU visibility should not undermine multilateral efforts and that EU coordination should have more added value than only increasing EU visibility in order to gain their support for increased EU coordination.

5.3.2 Institutional factors

If coordination is considered an institutional process in which multiple organizations aim to solve a collective action problem, EU coordination might be enabled and constrained by institutional factors that are of formal or informal nature. In the following paragraphs I will explore how the existing donor-wide coordination processes, the EU’s organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines as well as its capacities and bureaucratic culture affect EU coordination in Zambia.
5.3.2.1 Existing donor-wide coordination

Zambia’s relatively high level of existing coordination impacts on the readiness to engage in EU coordination. Zambia’s coordination process was initiated and developed before the EU coordination was shaped into the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions. Coordination on development cooperation in Zambia is taking place in the context of the JASZ, the CPG and PRBS. All interviewees referred to Zambia’s advanced donor-wide coordination process and the risk for creating parallel structures to explain the limited scope for EU coordination\textsuperscript{140}.

‘In a context like Zambia, where the broader harmonization has advanced and in a way we were ahead of other countries, we have served as a model for other countries, it did not seem useful to install an EU coordination path, unless there are specific objectives’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

‘I think the question is to what extent we need EU coordination if we have a well-functioning broader coordination mechanism’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012)

‘Since you have all these well-functioning coordination which is broad and inclusive of all the donors that have signed the JASZ, it’s a bit of a challenge to not create a parallel structure’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011)

‘In Zambia there were early agreements on donor harmonization and Paris amplified this. In the context of these pre-existing institutions, EU coordination would just be superfluous’ (EU3-Zambia, February 2011)

‘The coordination is done very intensively. It’s done at the CPG, which is the co-called aid architecture here. […] We have a JASZ, so maybe the need for coordination within the EU is not as big as it might be in countries where there is no coordination structure at all’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012)

In the same manner, the absence of intense donor-wide coordination at the political level may help to explain why EU coordination at HoMs level is received with more support\textsuperscript{141}: ‘the [coordinator] role is probably easiest at the HoMs level, because here you don’t have a lot of coordination in other

\textsuperscript{140} Other illustrations include: ‘often, if not always we think of ok, do we need a separate EU process or are we already talking about this with other operating partners’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012), ‘there are coordination structures and kind of this aid architecture is in place and we need to be mindful not to spend too much time on specific EU meetings’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012).

\textsuperscript{141} However, it should be noted that the newly acquired role of the EU Delegation in this regard is still to be further defined and has caused intensive debate too.
forums’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011) and ‘there is only an added value for EU coordination in the political cooperation’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011).

5.3.2.2 Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines

Donors’ institutional organization affects their ability to coordinate with other partners at field level. Depending on the level of decentralization, the institutional link with foreign affairs and the bureaucratic flexibility in terms of procedures and policy guidelines, a donor may be more or less capable to coordinate with others. I will examine these factors for the EU and thereby I will focus specifically on the EU Delegation is supposed to act as a hub for EU coordination at country level.

First, the extent to which donors delegate authority to their agencies in the field influences their ability to coordinate at country level. More decentralized aid agencies should thus be better capable to coordinate. The more decentralized aid agencies in the country, the easier it should be to coordinate. However, as we have seen in the first part of this thesis the level of decentralization varies across EU donors. In Zambia, on the one end sit the UK and the Netherlands as more decentralized EU donors (OECD-DAC, 2009a). Similar to Tanzania, while in theory they should have more flexibility to coordinate, they are not interested in strengthened coordination at EU level. On the other end, countries such as Finland and Germany are less decentralized EU donors. The EU Delegation sits somewhere in between and its limited authority over disbursements of budget support as well as new horizontal or thematic initiatives which are launched at headquarters’ level has hindered on-going coordination efforts. This in turn affects the opportunities for the EU’s coordinator role.

Illustrations include the various so-called EU facilities, such as the water facility, the energy facility or V-FLEX, gender mainstreaming as well as the decision making on budget support disbursements: ‘these political initiatives can be quite disruptive for our work here’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). For example, in 2009, when PRBS donors in Zambia were engaged in a difficult dialogue with the government after large-scale corruption in the road and the health sector was revealed, the Commission launched the V-FLEX initiative to mitigate the impact of the economic crisis in ACP countries, including Zambia, which foresaw extra aid in the form of Budget Support. Moreover, although the PRBS group was negotiating the roadmap, and the Netherlands and Sweden found the situation was serious enough to suspend the EU Delegation was under

142 ‘I think at HoMs and political coordination it’s easier for the Commission because you don’t have a lot of other well-functioning forums. I think for HoMs, they don’t meet in the, for example, the CPG also have a HoMs but they meet quite seldom, so here you have ... the EU coordination that is, I mean the EU coordination is the main force for the political and also for the HoMs’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011)
considerable pressure to disburse, ‘when we acted as chair of the PRBS group, we felt pressure to disburse’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). This attitude provoked fierce criticism amongst others donors: ‘then we said “you cannot come to such a conclusion in Brussels when we just said that we will only continue with budget support under certain conditions”’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

Also in the programming headquarters’ preferences are not always aligned to the local situation and the Commission is still to large extent a centralized aid bureaucracy. For example, although there has been a well-defined donor matrix ‘headquarters has been pushing to be active in agriculture and food security, while we were saying that there were already other donors specialized in these sectors. Now the Commission is spending 30 million euros in the agriculture sector, and we are part of the agriculture Troika’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). Besides, apart from the EDF, the EU supports Zambia through its thematic budget lines, such as in education ‘without having a broader knowledge about the sector’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

Another example is related to the area of gender mainstreaming where the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development is being implemented. This EU coordination process is launched in parallel to on-going coordination in the CPG working group on gender. According to the EU Delegation representative the aim is: ‘to use the work that we've been doing as part of this group [the CPG group on gender], Europeanize it, if I may say, so basically to fit it more to what as EU we believe we can push forward. And then take it, and then have it taken up by the EU HoMs in the policy/political dialogue’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). However, most EU donors questioned ‘to what extent we start pushing this as EU, or to what extent actually we now do that through an existing CPG sector group for gender where we have the UN and other active cooperating partners on gender’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012).

‘My impression is that it is a Brussels agenda, as EU we have put in our constitution that gender is an important principle, but when I look at what we actually achieve in practice, than I think it’s not more than ticking the box, showing on paper that we thought about gender and then maybe we adopt a gender component somewhere in a programme’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

‘UNDP is the cooperating partner lead in the gender group, but then the Commission came through with their gender agenda, and there was real duplication’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011)

Second and akin to the previous donors’ institutional link between development and foreign affairs may impact on the coordination efforts as other foreign policy objectives might influence aid modalities and disbursement decisions but also the search for a common position. For
example, for multilateral entities and DFID, it is usually the same person which attends CPG HoCs and HoMs meetings, whereas for other bilaterals there is a distinction between both. In contrast to most EU bilaterals, the EU Delegation is perceived as a rather apolitical donor: ‘they don’t have this very narrow political perspective, unlike individual bilaterals’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012), ‘they are very very impartial. They don’t take side. [...] They don’t represent any national interest, they represent independent interests’ (non-EU2-Zambia, February 2011). As this should in principle help to act as a coordination facilitator, this does not offer sufficient explanation for the findings.

Third, EU coordination requires the simplification and harmonization of certain procedures such as programming cycles and as well as flexibility for adjusting aid allocation to allow for a better division of labour and eventually joint programming: ‘the problem is the synchronization of programming cycles. We can do some joint analysis sometimes but we have constraints of Cotonou and the EDF’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). Currently, only the UK and Ireland are aligned with the Zambian programming cycle (cf. Figure 5-4). For example, in 2011 the government launched the 6th National Development Plan, while the EU CSP runs until 2013. However, it is found that all EU donors are procedurally able to participate in joint programming. Furthermore Germany and Sweden are able to change their cycle and Finland and the Netherlands are able to operate without a bilateral strategy (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 110). As a result, it was expected that EU donors in Zambia would engage in joint programming for the 11th EDF. However, in 2011 it was decided differently, which shows that behind these procedural barriers lay other factors.

143 ‘There are some disconnections related to the Commission. The first is the disconnection between Headquarters and the Delegation. The second is the disconnection between development programmes and political issues’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011), ‘there exists a strain between the Commission, who is in general more diplomatic, and the EU bilaterals which take a harder stance against government’ (CS1-Zambia, February 2011), ‘they don’t have a narrow political perspective, they have a broader political perspective, which make them perhaps more effective [...] the EU, perhaps takes a much more pragmatic and practical approach, [...]when the EU operates in these countries, I feel they are much, politically more nuanced than the bilaterals’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012).
Furthermore, the EU’s complex aid bureaucracy constrains the Delegation’s role to act as a hub for EU coordination: ‘the Commission is hampered by its internal procedures and administrative delays. In that sense it is the complete opposition from the Nordics’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011). Especially the EU’s decision making procedures for disbursement of budget support as well as its rules and regulations for mobilizing resources and participating in a basket fund are reported burdensome.

‘When we put some basket money in government, or you establish a multi donor trust fund, with bilaterals it is an easy process, you sit together and make some things happen within 3 to 5 months, but when you bring the EU on board, you can forget it, it is either a year or more, and there is no way you can establish some common approach very quickly. And that could be because of all these administrative and legal procedures you have. Unlike the other bilaterals, and the ability to rather coordinate very quickly. And that I know from experience in each one of these countries. Coordination in terms of resource pooling, and responding quickly, might be a barrier because of their procedures’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012)

‘I have the impression that the procedures, and the accountability mechanisms of the Commission are old-fashioned, less sophisticated, also when it comes to financial management of programmes and so on’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012)

‘I think the EU is still too, the bureaucracy in the EU is still there, I think it's a bit difficult for the EU to be in the forefront of creating reforms and so on, it's not an agency that is really in the forefront of creating change. And I wouldn’t say that the EU is able to do that but I think when their own processes,
reforms, I mean when discussions coming in and so on, the EU is normally a supporter of new good ideas and so on, but I think it’s quite difficult for them to be an engine’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011).

The EU’s complex aid bureaucracy arguably influences its working culture, which in turn impedes its capacities to act as a coordinator. The EU is criticized for its ‘spending pressure’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011) as well as for its focus on the EU process rather than on the results in the country144.

‘The EU doesn’t have a very modern way of working, they could learn from some of the Member States. It has everything to do with their heavy bureaucracy, but also with their focus on spending money without asking yourself whether there is a need. They don’t focus sufficiently on the results, what do we need to do differently if the results are not there’145, (EU9-Zambia, March 2012)

Fourth, the policy framework that guides EU coordination is based on voluntary participation whereas the bilateral policy frameworks are more demanding. Consequently, while most EU interviewees recognize the EU’s coordinator role at headquarters level and in international forums - ‘the Commission has always been behind in driving things forward’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011) -, they emphasize the mismatch with the implementation in the field:

‘If you ask someone that is working with policy issues at headquarters I think they would say that the EU has become much more of an engine to driving change and policy issues and so on. But I have not really seen that transmitting to the local level. I have mainly received feedback from my colleagues at headquarters that are part of these working groups in Brussels and I have not seen it transmitted so much to the local level’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011).

A striking example is that, while the Council conclusions are communicated to the agencies, and the EU Delegation shares many of the new policy documents ‘there is no guarantee that these are also read’, ‘we do not read in great detail all the documents that are produced in Brussels’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). This is mainly due to lack of time, but also because these are not considered as guiding the agencies’ behaviour in the field and thus mainly seen as ‘something that has been concluded in

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144 However, the importance of this approach is also recognized: ‘but nevertheless, there must be some monitoring, because without monitoring, the whole issue would be diluted. When you want to steer something, you have to ask questions, and you really have to sometimes ask technocratic questions […] so I wouldn’t say that this is only a technocratic approach, it’s an approach to monitor and evaluate the steps taken to come to more harmonization, so it has advantages, it is not only a technocratic approach’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011).

145 ‘Sometimes I am surprised about how the programming of EU money takes place. And how much money they have, and their spending pressure, I have the impression that it is still a real phenomenon for the EU Delegation, in times when the EU Member States have to deal with big financial and economic problems. […] It is too much focused on putting money in sectors, with good intentions, but where there certainly are very big problems’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).
One EU representative put it like that: ‘we are either not aware of what Commission headquarters is doing, or close to ignoring that’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011).

### 5.3.2.3 Staffing/capacities and bureaucratic culture

Aid agencies’ capacities and bureaucratic culture may influence its engagement in donor coordination. In the following paragraphs I will explore how the EU Delegation’s capacities and working culture may enable or constrain EU coordination.

First, like in Tanzania, the EU Delegation is perceived as a well-equipped agency, with considerable financial resources as well as human resources and technical expertise in the areas in which it is active such as budget support, PFM or infrastructure.

‘They are active in almost all important sectors, they have a lot of knowledge about local processes and they can find connections between different issues’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

‘If you have directions and strategies and so on, it always helps when you have good staff at the ground. And the Delegation here has a very good HoC and they have a very strong economist, the Head of the economic section, she’s been here for five years, so they have a long institutional memory. So I think that has also helped and create a good opportunity for them to really be an active partner’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011)

This view is also shared by non-EU interviewees:

‘Be it infrastructure, roads, energy, water, health, and all that, the EU comes with a lot more technical knowhow, in those areas, because they are much more endowed and equipped, so in that sense they have a lot more credibility, when they speak on any topic, like for instance, they have a strong infrastructure team, which got involved on the policy side, and the real building of roads, and the specific on the technical side. So I think just that aspect makes that a much stronger player’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012).

Their financial and human capacities allow them to spend time on coordination. For example, in 2010, the EU Delegation hosted a workshop for donors on political economy analysis and initiated two political economy analyses under the guidance of Sue Unsworth, the lead author of

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146 The Council conclusions are of no particular interest here. It can be something that is agreed upon in Brussels, but the extent to which it will be applied depends on the local context, and the reality in Zambia is that there is a broader framework in which we coordinate (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

147 The EU has expertise in budget support and PFM and they are good at sharing information about that (EU1-Zambia, February 2011), the EU’s comparative advantage lies in infrastructure and Budget Support (EU2-Zambia, February 2011), the EU has more money than the average bilateral donor. They have more support in terms of technical expertise than most of us, both consultancies and internal (EU1-Zambia, February 2011), when they take infrastructure, they take interest on the policy, on the institution, and in terms of the building the brick and mortal thing. You don’t see them to that extent in other areas (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012)
the Commission background paper on *Using Political Economy Analysis to Improve EU Development Effectiveness*. Moreover the Commission’s impartiality\(^{148}\) as well as its expertise in the sectors where it has a comparative advantage strengthens its credibility\(^{149}\) which in turn helps to let the Delegation act as a hub for EU coordination and a well-respected sector lead\(^{150}\):

‘They have chaired several donor working groups. And they do it very effectively, very very effective. In the road sector they are very actively involved, and also in the agriculture sector’ (non-EU2-Zambia, February 2011)

‘To be able to do an effective aid coordination, like in the Division of Labour, the basic prerequisites is human and financial resources. Because that means the capacity to coordinate donor activities. And the EU, they have’ (non-EU2-Zambia, February 2011).

This is contrast to most bilaterals, which have rather small embassies compared to the EU Delegation\(^{151}\). Consequently, coordination is felt as a time consuming exercise\(^{152}\) and in most agencies the amount of staff was not increased in order to deal with the additional workload: ‘we haven’t got adequate capacity in the embassies to cope with the issues like Division of labour’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011). However, DFID and the WB are perceived to be stronger actors than the EU Delegation in terms of resources and expertise. The WB has been leading the CPG Troika until 2012 mainly because others, including the Commission, ‘don’t feel ready’ (non-EU1-Zambia,

\(^{148}\) ‘We are also well respected. We have a 6 years contract and try to be more predictable’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011).

\(^{149}\) ‘They do a very good job. In aid coordination they are well resourced, both financial and professional in terms of human resources’ (non-EU2-Zambia, February 2011). The multilateralism and the resources both in terms of funds and human expertise make it a much more stronger player’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012).

\(^{150}\) Indeed, with a lead responsibility comes ‘a lot of administrative burden’ and the need ‘to provide leadership’. Therefore in practice it is required that lead donors have ‘the capacity to lead’, ‘the capacity to do the analytical work necessary to lead in the policy dialogue’, ‘the technical skills’, ‘the staffing’ and ‘access to the government’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). Moreover, ‘when you are lead, you really have a much less base to promote your own agency’s thinking and policies and so on. Because then you will take a lead role and you have to coordinate, you have to make sure that everyone is happy and you have actually much less space to flag and to promote the priorities of your own agency. Obviously you have a lot of possibilities of deciding to drive issues, but especially if you have a crisis, you would do, when you do that coordinating role I think you have very little space to promote or to advocate for your main principles and so on’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011)

\(^{151}\) Cf. ‘the EU office here is a big office, compared to many of the bilateral embassies’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012), ‘I mean the problem as well is, you know that teams here are quite small in the Missions, in the embassies. So we have to be also realistic about what we can achieve’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

\(^{152}\) We have installed a wider harmonization, we don’t need to waste our time with internal coordination within the EU’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).
January 2011) to take up that lead role and ‘the WB is the only multilateral that has the capacity to do it’153:

‘The EU is not different from the WB or DFID, but they are in a better position than the smaller donors with a limited scope’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

‘To coordinate you need qualified staff, for example strong economists: the WB has plenty in Washington, DFID has many, and the Commission has one’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011)

‘DFID tends to have sector specialists and they do tend to have the resources to bring in people, to perform the function of being a lead. And so, that combination of having the skills together with the interest is what is deterrent’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011).

Furthermore the EU’s resources are combined with an attitude of active information and knowledge sharing and a habit of searching for coordinated responses, even when they don’t have a formal lead function:

‘Even when they are not lead donors they take a very active role in most sectors looking at actual participation, contributing, ensuring that sector activities are done in line with policy, interact with other donors’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011)

‘The EU Delegation is very active in fulfilling its coordination function, and asking for our contributions to evaluation exercises or to programming exercises, to things regarding budget support and so on’.

(EU12-Zambia, March 2012)

The EU’s capacities are well illustrated by its chairmanship of the PRBS group. In response to the corruption scandals ‘they [the EU Delegation] did a very very good job in informing the other partners, bringing together the opinions of all the other partners. This was not only with regard to the EU donors, but also with regard to the WB and to the other partners. […]’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012). The EU initiated an audit and ‘assisted the sector to address some of the issues by technical assistance, and maintained the dialogue’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011).

‘I think 2009 and 2010 when there were problems with the budget support, we had a lot of meetings with them, and the roadmap, and this was done under a very tough leadership from the EU. The HoC did an

153 Looking at the donor matrix it is indeed remarkable that the WB is lead in multiple sectors as they tend to have ‘the expertise’, sector specialists and ‘financial resources’, which makes it ‘quite naturally for entities like the WB to lead the dialogue in sectors’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011).
extremely good job, and this is, this was in a phase when some of the donors had really big problems to justify their budget support and justify their cooperation’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012)

‘They did a good job, I think they tried really to, you know it’s always a balance to try to take into account all the different agencies priorities. But I think they did a good job, they really managed to listen to all the governments, they managed to get, to hold the group together. I think they were quite, I think it was a good process’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011)

‘When they coordinated Budget Support donors, they did it very well. The road sector in Zambia has been a big problem, but the way it was run by the EU, it was an accepted approach. So they have the financial resources, but what is most important is the subtle political approach, because the EU has that advantage, so it becomes acceptable. A bilateral donor comes in with a political agenda, but the EU normally comes in as an independent, impartial actor. Then it becomes very easy to get its views accepted, amongst the donors or even in the government’ (non-EU2-Zambia, February 2011).

Similar to the Tanzanian country study, the field research in Zambia has revealed that interviewees also believe that individuals can make a difference in the success of coordination: ‘the quality of donor coordination depends on who has the lead’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012). For example, in the Troika of the CPG ‘some chairs are stronger and set their stamp more clearly on what happens than others’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012).

‘At the end of the day the structures are only as good as the people. And if you got a group that is willing to collaborate and work together harmoniously, than these structures work. And I think one reason why in the case of Zambia it’s tended to work, is because it works quite well, there’s lot of peer pressure amongst the HoCs and HoMs to […] behave harmoniously’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011).

‘Unless you have a development understanding if you are a bilateral donor, and for a multilateral as long as I have a political understanding then we may not be able to speak in a common language, and be effective in working together. So for me it is the understanding of people who are representing these agencies in the country, to have this much more comprehensive, and an adaptive approach to enable stronger donor coordination’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012).

154 And ‘it is the people who make the difference. So if you have a person who brings the understanding of both the political and the development dimension to it, then of course, the way they approach issues, the way they see issues, and how they evolve with the rest of the people, and the donor community as well as the client, matter very much’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012).
Similarly, the personality of the EU HoC and the HoM may influence the flexibility of dealing with the institutional, political and ideational factors described above.

‘Of course it is related to the persons that want to make something out of it, it depends on how convincing people can be to show that our fear is groundless that EU coordination would undermine the larger alignment framework’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011)

‘It can make a difference whether someone with authority is able to convey the value added of coordination, and if it is somebody who is able to bring people together, and if he gives the impression that I’s not an afterthought, something like ‘oh yes, we had to do this and that, we have to send a report to Brussels, so we have to show that we have met with the Member States’’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012)

‘But it’s a lot about personalities, it’s a lot about the EU HoD starts pushing things, interacting with the ambassadors’’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012)

On the one hand it is stated that the persons within the Delegation are ‘very active’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012) and ‘keen on sharing information’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). Especially the EU HoC is ‘very active and clear’, ‘really fond of it [EU coordination]’ (EU12-Zambia, March 2012) and ‘keen on developing a kind of EU cooperation’ (EU2-Zambia, February 2011).

Coordination clearly became also the personal mission of the HoC, who sees himself as ‘a strong believer in Division of Labour’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012) and ‘spent so much of my energy on this’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). He believes ‘you need a coordination champion’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012) and this should be the role of the EU Delegation.

‘You need champions, you need people who are going to be prepared to take the time, the energy to push it forward. […] If you don’t have at least one of the two, the HoC or the HoM who is going to carry it, nothing is going to happen. […] it’s very much linked to the individualities of people’’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012)

On the other hand, while the former EU HoD also supported EU coordination on development cooperation, the current EU Ambassador, who arrived in 2011, ‘didn’t buy into it much’ and ‘doesn’t champion the issue of joint programming’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). It is argued that he did not support the intensification of EU coordination at cooperation level and instead aimed to strengthen the political coordination at Ambassadors’ level. For example while Zambia had been preselected as a pilot country for joint programming on the 11th EDF, it is argued that the new HoD renounced this idea
‘arguing that there were only a few Member States that were going to be left here, which I thought was actually quite a good reason to do it. And that he was also concerned about the workload, that could be possibly involved, which is also a bit of a contradiction with the fact that there are few Member States. So we are not going to be doing joint programming with the Member States. I personally think it’s a missed opportunity. It’s not consistent with what we are trying to promote ourselves’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012)

Consequently, the internal personal tension within the Delegation between the HoC and the HoD is neither conducive for EU coordination on cooperation nor for better coordination between the political level and the cooperation level.

5.3.3 Ideational factors

As I have argued, coordination can also be seen as a norm, which is introduced as a functional approach to maintain order in donor activities in absence of a superior power that would be able to structure aid within a country in function of development effectiveness. EU coordination might thus be enabled and constrained by the degree to which actors agree on its functionality and its potential outcomes in terms of aid and development effectiveness. However, different EU donors might have different points of view on these issues. In this section I will investigate to what extent EU coordination is enabled and constrained by differing ideas about aid and development and the ‘right’ level of coordination. I will pay specific attention to the role of the Nordic (+plus) donors. The tensions between different ideas of EU donors arguably correspond with the tensions between EU donors’ attitude towards EU integration in general.

5.3.3.1 Ideas about aid and development and coordination on budget support

First, ideas may affect the ways actors perceive their interests and the environment in which they operate. Ideas may thus influence how EU donors frame problems that occur as well as their subsequent response. However, Member States may have different ideas about aid and development which influences their choice and use of aid modalities. This in turn limits the scope for coordination. The more these ideas differ, the more difficult it becomes to act in a coordinated way.

‘I haven’t faced situations where the EU would have been more kind of like minded, and would have had a shared view which would then be something that the others would not have had, or would not have agreed with. If I think of the budget support discussions for instance, I couldn’t see a clear kind of EU-and-others situation there. On the contrary I could see that some of the EU Member States where not, did not share the same use’. (EU10-Zambia, March 2012)
EU donors have provided a large share of their aid budget through harmonized aid modalities such as general and sectoral budget support which gives an indication of their ideational consensus on the importance of the aid effectiveness agenda. However, there is tension between donors who only use technocratic eligibility criteria and donors who add political eligibility criteria (Molenaers, Cepinskas, & Jacobs, 2010: 14). On the one hand there are donors who clearly separate between technocratic (policy dialogue) and political (political dialogue, issues like human rights, elections, free press and media) issues. On the other hand, there are donors for whom the distinction is less clear. Moreover, for some donors corruption is a technocratic issue which should be dealt with in the policy dialogue, for others corruption is a political problem that should be treated in the political dialogue.

'Some see governance problems as a reason to end budget support, other see this as a reason for getting discussions with government but not to end budget support, so there are different levels of perception' (EU12-Zambia, March 2012).

In Zambia, the Commission’s eligibility criteria are centred on more technocratic issues\(^{155}\). Political issues should be treated in a separate dialogue under Article 8 and aid can only be suspended for political problems under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. As the Delegation cannot attach political strings to budget support, it has aimed to deal with budget support under the political dialogue of Article 8. In contrast, some bilateral donors like Sweden tend to see budget support as a political aid modality and their eligibility criteria also cover democracy and human rights. These different ideas thus result in different interpretations of developmental and political problems. Consequently, some donors perceive the Commission as a ‘champion of technocratization’ who prefers ‘to keep things out of the political sphere’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011), while some of us have a more political approach towards development cooperation, the EU is more hesitant to call a spade a spade’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011). Conversely, the EU Delegation frames its approach as being ‘more predictable, we think it’s better to stay engaged’\(^{156}\) (EU2-Zambia, February 2011).

The result of these diverging ideas is that EU donors may respond in a different way, thereby preventing a coordinated approach: ‘we are not on the same line regarding budget support. And I am even

\(^{155}\) Under Article 61 of the CPA, direct budgetary assistance in support of macro-economic or sectoral reforms may be granted if: a) public expenditure management is sufficiently transparent, accountable and effective; b) well defined macro-economic or sectoral policies established by the country itself and agreed to by its main donors are in place; and c) public procurement is open and transparent.

\(^{156}\) It should be noted though that there was divergence in the opinion of the EU Delegation and the assessment of Headquarters.
putting it mildly. For example, the European budget support donors have different appreciation of local developments. We make different assessments’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

For example, when the large scale corruption cases were revealed in 2009 EU donors were divided in their response. While other factors (cf. supra) certainly played a role, their actions also expressed their diverging ideas about the situation. On the one hand donors like Sweden and Germany interpreted the corruption problems as a lack of political commitment of the government to fight corruption and on the basis of this evaluation they wanted to suspend their support (EU4-Zambia, February 2011). On the other hand the EU Delegation wanted to continue with disbursements: ‘the Commission was convinced that it made sense to go ahead with budget support, at the time when several members of the EU were deciding it differently so it found itself in a rather awkward situation’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). Furthermore, donors also focused on different aspects: ‘while the Swedish Charge and the European Commission representative scolded Banda and his ministers on sector-specific policies and processes related to their development aid, the Head of DFID and the Dutch Ambassador appealed to Banda to demonstrate his commitment to fight corruption and establish the Government’s bona fides as a responsible and responsive government. The Dutch Ambassador also sought to convey that Zambia’s attractiveness as a partner and aid recipient is contingent upon its commitment to upholding the rule of law and its progress on uprooting corruption’ (US Embassy Zambia, 2009b). This lack of agreement on the use of budget support thus impeded a harmonized response thereby failing to present the government with a clear picture of donors’ expectations. Moreover, the situation created ‘a tension between its [the EU Delegation’s] role as a budget support donor and as a coordinator of the EU’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011). As a result the group broke up: ‘during the PRBS discussions, there was sort of a breaking point between Sweden, Denmark157 and Norway, then you had in the middle the Netherlands and Germany to some extent, and then you had the UK and ourselves’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

However, as a chair of the PRBS group the EU Delegation managed to keep the group together, coordinated the formal dialogue on the underlying principles and eventually the group found consensus on a joint roadmap. Nevertheless, in the end there were still different interpretations as only Sweden decided to suspend their budget support. So if the objective of coordination is to reach a common position and act in a harmonized way, the coordination effort failed. But if the objective is to coordinate different responses in a joint dialogue with the government, the coordination effort succeeded. Most interviewees interpreted the coordination process as successful.

157 However, Denmark was not providing GBS.
5.3.3.2 Ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination

EU donors’ ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination influence their commitment to coordination in general as well as their preference for either the EU or the donor-wide/multilateral framework. I will focus first on the ideas about the ‘right’ level of coordination on the one hand, and expectations about the effectiveness of EU coordination on the other hand. Next I will look how these ideas have constrained the development of EU coordination in three main areas namely the institutionalization of EU coordination meetings on development cooperation and the implementation of the FTI on division of labour.

First, as explained earlier, Nordic donors have taken the lead in translating the principles of the emerging aid effectiveness agenda into practice in Zambia. While the HIP was initiated by a group of like-minded Nordic donors it then evolved into the WHIP which included all major donors active in Zambia. This evolution is driven by the Nordics’ interpretation of aid effectiveness, which is based on government ownership and multilateralism, rather than on EU coordination as such.

‘I think that Nordic donors have to be given the credit for, that time I think it was still called Like Minded Group, but I think the feeling was 'how do you translate the Paris Declaration into better aid coordination and harmonization here', and that necessarily meant going beyond the Nordic donors, beyond the EU donors, to see who are all the active donors’ (non-EU1-Zambia, January 2011).

Today, Nordic Plus donors in Zambia still share the idea that the donor-wide platform is the most functional level of donor coordination to reach the objectives of better aid and development effectiveness. Although the EU Delegation too adheres to the idea of multilateralism, and is perceived as an active participant in donor-wide coordination processes, there are also examples of EU initiatives being perceived to strengthen the overall identity of the EU as an actor in international development. As I have argued above, the EU Delegation appears as the first promoter of a common European identity in the field, and thereby actors such as the WB and the US are framed as ‘the other’. This may conflict with the Nordics adherence to an identity which is rather based on like-mindedness and the principle of multilateralism. To the extent they want to establish a common European identity, this should be an identity that includes the principle of partnership and multilateralism. Moreover, this identity should be coupled to certain norms to which Nordics attach great importance: ‘the EU could profile itself a bit

158 ‘By the time that Brussels is passing that policy [European Consensus 2005], the Nordic countries had already started working in that direction’ (GOV3-Zambia, February 2011)
159 Cf. supra and ‘the EU is a strong supporter, it takes an active role’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011)
more strongly when it comes to some thematic issues. Issues like gender, or other issues as well. Human rights if need be, that depends on the country context. I think there is more scope in that regard’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012).

However, to be fair it should be noted that, despite the fact that donor coordination in Zambia is far advanced, more recently its effectiveness has been challenged. As such, while the idea of coordination is still seen as a prerequisite for better aid and development effectiveness, its concrete elaboration has not led to the envisaged objectives. This in turn might influence donors’ adherence to the coordination norm in general, which shows that ideas may change over time.

‘Here in Zambia we’ve kind of felt that there has been so much focus on coordination and on processes, and then we kind of have left the actual results, a bit like on the side, and that actually, in some sectors and of course budget support is a very good example, we have been able to coordinate and organize ourselves quite well. But then, that doesn’t necessary lead to development effectiveness’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012)

‘The DPG are very good in cooperating among themselves, but not necessary with the government’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011)

‘So the fact of donor coordination in the last 4-5 years, where everybody is now sitting around the table and sharing knowledge, sharing some common approach to putting some of the policy dialogue and the sector strategy in the country is actually quite a sensible one. So the concept itself is very very good. I think what we need now to do is, perhaps it got a little too carried away, and this donor coordination became, and that people now sit there for hours to get, talking among ourselves, and so we think we are coordinating well. And I think that’s where now the initial purpose of the coordination was much, but whether it is giving the intended results, now is the time to look at it, I have my doubts’ (non-EU3-Zambia, March 2012).

Second, there is no consensus on the effectiveness of EU coordination (cf. Figure 5-3). On the one hand, the EU Delegation strongly believes in the added value of EU coordination and the promotion of ‘EU family cooperation’ in Zambia. More specifically, the Delegation aimed to improve mutual information and knowledge sharing, increase joint assessments (in the area of budget support), establish the EU as a ‘centre of excellence’, adopting more common position on issues affecting development cooperation and eventually engage in joint programming: ‘I am convinced that until we have joint programming, we will not be able to make much progress on the other issues of enhanced Division of Labour and aid efficiency and effectiveness’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). The EU policy framework thus acts as an opportunity to step up efforts towards because ‘when it's not done
in a sort of more formalized way, the risk is that there is less buying-in’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). With regard to division of labour, the EU FTI could serve as an engine for donor-wide coordination: ‘what we can do as EU is actually help fast track for the entire group the Division of labour. Of course we’re part of the overall CPG, but use our own EU initiative to push for some of the initiatives that are comprised in the FTI’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). To a certain extent Germany follows this vision as it might be that the FTI allows the EU to ‘act as protagonist’ and ‘keep it on the agenda’ because ‘when there is nobody who keeps this on the agenda, it could be seen as a topic that is not so important. But if there are some donors who are constantly putting pressure on that issue, then we might achieve more’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011).

On the other hand, most donors cast doubts on the effectiveness of EU coordination and even challenge the EU’s policy framework in this regard. Donors are moving at different speeds towards the aid effectiveness agenda and like-mindedness seems to be a major factor to determine joint efforts:

‘In general, the like-mindedness is a much stronger basis for doing joint work than belonging to the EU. Among the like-minded countries the coordination happens very naturally’ (EU5-Zambia, February 2011)

‘I think sometimes you could use the EU a bit more to coordinate joint positions, but then you would find maybe that you have more in common with some non-EU members’ (EU4-Zambia, February 2011).

Consequently, EU coordination may conflict with the idea of multilateralism and the functional need for an inclusive coordination process comprising all relevant partners.

‘What is really relevant is coordination among all the donors, including USAID, who is a very big donor’ (EU7-Zambia, February 2011)

‘The aid administration I think is better to be done I think in these existing forums where we have big donors outside the EU and so on’ (EU10-Zambia, March 2012).

‘our point of departure in this embassy is that we try to sit together with all cooperating partners and that it is not necessary to create another subgroup’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

‘If you have a CPG with a coordinating role for the whole partners group, you don’t need to create sub groups’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011)
We have other forums which work and there is this risk of duplication and not very efficient use of time, if we overdo it. These directives [cf. Council conclusions] to do something seem to come from Brussels and not really from locally, since they don’t necessarily respond to a certain need in the country (EU10-Zambia, March 2012).

Arguably, these strong ideas about the usefulness of EU coordination have constrained the development of EU coordination. First, a general lack of support and disagreement on the objectives of EU coordination impeded further institutionalization of coordination meetings, despite the attempts of the EU HoC. EU Member States’ representatives are in general rather pessimistic or at least doubtful towards establishing an intense internal EU consultative structure. Interviewees stated that more intense EU coordination would be ‘a waste of time’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011) and ‘not meaningful’: ‘on the basis of previous experiences I saw a risk that EU coordination would become a parallel circuit, alongside the already existing broader framework, so in such an EU consultation where they talk about closer coordination among Member States you participate with a little bit of mistrust’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012). The daily coordination is taking place in the CPG, which includes all traditional donors: ‘we are not aiming to speak with one voice at EU level, we speak with one voice at the sectoral level’ (EU1-Zambia, February 2011).

Second, these ideas influence the implementation of the FTI on Division of Labour, as division of labour is monitored in the context of the JASZ and a first donor matrix was established before the Council Conclusion were adopted.

‘In the case of the FTI for Division of Labour, initially it was not very well received by most of my colleagues from the Member States here. They used to say, oh this is a Brussels initiative, I needed to tell them, no it’s not a Brussels’ initiative, it’s an EU initiative’ (EU11-Zambia, March 2012)

‘I am a bit cynical about the FTI, I have the impression that, at least in Zambia, with all the sector coordination we have already arranged within the framework of the JASZ, that the EU could not add value, that it remains more a Brussels exercise, quite detached from the reality in the different countries’ (EU9-Zambia, March 2012)

‘To be really frank, I’m asking myself what is the value added. You see, this is donor-wide. The big donors here are the WB, USAID, UN System, and Norway. So they are all non-EU countries. So my question is, why do we start the EU initiative, more or less parallel to an already on-going process. This [donor-wide process] is a process which started in 2006, and it just came to quite some results. And when
we start now a parallel process, only of the EU donors, the question is, what should be the value added?’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011)

‘When you take into account that there are also some new donors, called the BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa, then the question could be asked does this EU initiative really lead to results? Or is it only a fragmented and non-comprehensive picture? We have to do it, we are obliged to answer to questions, but why in a country like Zambia where they can look back on an already on-going process’ (EU8-Zambia, February 2011)

5.3.4 Summary

Table 5-7 offers a summary of the analysis conducted in this section and indicates the complex interplay of different factors that enable and constrain EU coordination. In the concluding section I will focus on those factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Zambia.

Table 5-7. Overview of constraining and enabling factors for EU coordination in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ2: Understanding EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (1) Interest-related factors | (1a) EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns constrain rather than enable EU coordination  
(1b) EU donors’ influence in the country is decreasing which might enable EU coordination in the future but this has not materialized. |
| (2) Institutional factors | (2a) Advanced existing aid architecture rather constrains EU coordination  
(2b) Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines constrain rather than enable EU coordination  
(2c) EU Delegation’s staff capacities are recognized and potentially enabling |
| (3) Ideational factors | (3a) Consensus on aid effectiveness principles and use of harmonized aid modalities enabling rather than constraining, although a shift is taking place  
(3b) Different ideas about the ‘right’ level of coordination constrains EU coordination |

5.4 Conclusions

Based on the analysis conducted in this second country chapter, this section will draw conclusions on EU coordination in Zambia.

The chapter has sought to map EU coordination in Zambia, by considering both the internal and the external dimension. Through the analysis conducted in Section 5.2 I have found that
a) EU coordination in Zambia tends to be limited to ad hoc information sharing and consultation without institutionalization, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension)

b) The EU Delegation plays an initiator role in the area of budget support, although it has been mainly ‘just another donor’ in the overall donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension).

Based on the analysis conducted in Section 5.3 these findings can be understood as follows.

First, all bilateral EU donors, which are mainly Nordic Plus countries, have actively resisted progress in the internal dimension of EU coordination in Zambia, despite the EU Delegation’s efforts to intensify EU coordination. Similar to the findings of Tanzania, their resistance is to a large extent based on ideational arguments. EU coordination is not seen as a functional solution to improve aid effectiveness, as, according to their interpretation of aid effectiveness coordination should include all relevant stakeholders and be driven by a concern to improve aid delivery. From this perspective, the EU Delegation’s initiatives, which are also driven by EU visibility considerations and the bureaucratic need to monitor implementation of EU, are not perceived as bringing real added value to the existing aid coordination framework in Zambia. In addition to this, and also similar to the experience in Tanzania, the current political and economic context in Europe rather acts as an incentive not to engage in more advanced EU coordination, as in several EU member states, foreign aid is under pressure and agencies in the field experience an increased pressure to focus on individual results. Despite these constraining factors, the increased power asymmetry between EU donors and Zambia, resulting from the declining aid dependency and the growing presence of China, may make EU coordination more attractive in the future, and most interviewees, including the UK, recognized the need to maintain leverage by better coordinating their responses towards the government. This is exemplified by the agreement on a joint roadmap amongst budget support donors to overcome the crisis, when EU donors were under pressure to take action in order to prove that their support to Zambia was still meaningful and development aid was spent wisely. At that time, the EU Delegation chaired the PRBS donor group and its capacities, and especially the EU’s key economist, enabled its role as an initiator of coordination. Although it was extremely difficult to take a unified and harmonized position in the divided donor group, under the lead of the EU Delegation the group managed to agree on a roadmap.
Second, different from Tanzania the EU played a particular initiator role in the area of budget support, which has been further developed into a facilitator role in this area. However, the EU Delegation in Zambia is largely ‘just another donor’ in the overall donor-wide coordination architecture. The EU has played an initiator role for coordination between the government and the donors, by introducing PRBS as a new modality different from the WB approach, by establishing and developing the coordination architecture (design of the PAF) and by searching for better coordination in the dialogue with the government, especially during the crisis in 2009-2010, when the EU Delegation was chairing the PRBS group. The ideational consensus amongst Nordic Plus countries in Zambia on the importance of aid effectiveness and the use of harmonized aid modalities, the Commission’s position as a donor providing the largest share of budget support, as well as the Commission’s technical expertise and culture of information exchange and consultation have arguably enabled the Commission's initiator role in budget support. However, the further way towards increased coordination in Zambia was paved by the Nordic Plus countries with the HIP initiative (2003) in close cooperation with the government before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions were adopted. This initiative then evolved into a wider process involving all OECD-DAC donors in Zambia, which resulted in the development of the JASZ. Hence, given the proactive role of Nordic Plus countries there was no ‘gap’ to ‘fill’ for the EU Delegation.
6 EU coordination in Burkina Faso

6.1 Context

In the introductory section Burkina Faso’s political, economic, development and security situation will briefly be outlined in order to provide a general picture of the country in which EU coordination is examined. Next, the evolution of the relationship between the Burkinabe government and the bilateral and multilateral partners is briefly discussed as well as the characteristics of the current donor landscape. Subsequently an overview of the existing donor-wide coordination covers the on-going processes in which the EU participates and against which EU coordination should be interpreted. Finally, the introduction ends with a summary of the EU’s development cooperation with Burkina Faso.

6.1.1 Political, economic, development, and security situation

Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) is a landlocked Sahelian LDC (World Bank, 2013c) which gained independence from France in 1960. The country is one of the poorest in the world and ranks 181st out of 187 in the UNDP’s HDI (UNDP, 2011a). Nevertheless, still 47 per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line.

After independence the country was confronted with a declining economy and continuous political instability (Grimm & Gunther, 2004: 6). The country endured several military coups in the 70s and 80s. Current President Blaise Compaoré, a French-trained former paratrooper, came to power in 1987 after a military coup in which the former President Captain Thomas Sankara was assassinated. Although democratic transformations have been initiated since 1991 and the country has organized elections at regular times, Compaoré is the longest standing Head of State in West-Africa, largely thanks to a disorganized and divided opposition, the extensive patronage network maintained by Compaoré and his party and their control of the state administration and political institutions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012a: 7; Châtelot, 2011). Of the four countries studied in this thesis, Burkina Faso has the lowest political rights score and the country is governed by an authoritarian regime (cf. Annex II). Despite some irregularities, international observers declared the last presidential elections of 2010 as generally free and transparent (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012a: 7). Furthermore Compaoré is known as a regional peacemaker\(^\text{160}\) and his position is claimed to be consolidated by France’s lasting friendship (Châtelot, 2010).

Burkina Faso is now a fairly stable country in a turbulent region. Although in 2011 the country was confronted with student and military protests, the situation has stabilized, especially after the

\(^{160}\) For example Burkina Faso has mediated in crises in Guinea, Togo, Darfur and Ivory Coast.
President decided to cut staple food prices. Thanks to Burkina Faso’s relative progress towards technocratic governance, political stability, economic and financial governance, and some positive evolutions in human development more recently, Burkina Faso has been considered as a development success story. According to some, Burkina Faso has recently even become a new ‘donor’s darling’ (Gotev, 2013), given the combination of high needs and good performance and the large amounts of aid and budget support that the country receives, but this is an overrated label, as shown by the relatively smaller fragmentation rate and the recent exits of the Netherlands and Sweden.

Burkina Faso has few natural resources and it has been dependent primarily on the export of cotton. Therefore, its economy has been vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as climatic conditions and the world market price for cotton. Burkina Faso’s major export partners are China (21 per cent), Turkey (16 per cent), Singapore (8,4 per cent) and Indonesia (6,6 per cent) while its main import partners are Ivory Coast (16,7 per cent), France (15,2 per cent) and Ghana (5 per cent) (CIA, 2013). The EU’s commercial interests in Burkina Faso are small (cf. Table 6-1, Table 6-2 and Figure 6-1). EU’s trade with the country represents 0,0 per cent and Burkina Faso ranks only 126th on the EU’s list of major trade partners, which is the lowest rank of the four countries studied in this thesis (European Commission, 2012g).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium:</td>
<td>France:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark:</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany:</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on Eurostat 2012
In the past decade, Burkina Faso’s economy recovered thanks to a currency devaluation in 1994, a favourable world market price for cotton and policy reforms such as the 2004 revision of its investment code (CIA, 2013). Moreover, in the past years mining has become more important and Burkina Faso has increased the production\(^{161}\) and export of gold. As a result, between 2000 and 2010 its average annual GDP growth was 5 per cent and the rate is estimated at 6.7 and 7 per cent for 2013 and 2014 respectively (World Bank, 2013a). However, in 2011 the country experienced a severe drought causing harmful effects on its economy. In addition, the country is affected by the crisis in neighbouring country Mali and confronted with a huge refugee influx. This has resulted in severe shortages of food and water, especially near the border with Mali (Hirsch, 2012a, 2012b).

\(^{161}\) Between 2009 and 2010 gold mining production has doubled (CIA, 2013).
6.1.2 Evolution of donor-government relations

As will prove to be an important element in this study, Burkina Faso demonstrated a more consensual stance in its aid relations than the other countries under study. Different from Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal, Burkina Faso has not used conflictual strategies to seek for more independence from its traditional partners and aid to Burkina Faso has hardly been suspended. There is a perception that ‘globalement le Burkina-Faso, même entre partenaires, c’est un environnement quand même plutôt apaisé’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Three to four times a year there is political dialogue between the government and the HoMs of all donors in the framework of the review of the national strategy, the monitoring of budget support and there are regular coordination meetings on governance.

The rather consensual aid relationship is also illustrated by the quality of the political dimension of the EU partnership with Burkina Faso, despite Burkina Faso’s restricted political rights situation. Different from Tanzania and Zambia, regular high-level dialogue is taking place by means of monthly meetings between EU HoDs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs where discussions are held mainly on issues related to internal stability, regional security and the agenda of the UN Security Council. Given Burkina Faso’s colonial legacy, France has always maintained a special commercial, political, military and cultural relationship with Burkina Faso. This is epitomized in bilateral political and military cooperation in parallel to the ongoing formal political dialogue during which it coordinates with other EU Member States.

6.1.3 Donor landscape

Burkina Faso has an aid fragmentation rate of 25 per cent (OECD-DAC, 2010b), which is lower than the fragmentation ratio of Tanzania, but slightly higher than the rate of Zambia. As indicated in Chapter 3, when donors are fewer in number, the conditions for achieving coordination may be more favourable. Burkina Faso has received a large proportion of multilateral aid (cf. Table 6-3), mainly thanks to considerable debt relief. EU aid represents almost half of total aid and the Commission is the second largest donors after the WB, while France is the largest bilateral donor. Nordic Plus countries together represent only 11 per cent of total ODA to Burkina Faso. Furthermore, Burkina Faso is a major budget support recipient, and the budget support donor group consists of the EU, the WB, AfDB and six bilaterals, namely France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands (currently phasing out), Switzerland and Sweden (currently phasing out). Within this group, the EU and the WB are the largest providers of

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162 A symbolic expression of this good relationship between the EU and Burkina Faso is the inauguration of the ‘Avenue of Europe’ by Commissioner Piebalgs at the event of the joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers in Ouagadougou in 2010 (European Commission, 2010a).
budget support, followed by the AfDB. The Netherlands have been the largest bilateral budget support, followed by Denmark and Sweden, and finally France, Germany and Switzerland (Danida, 2012).

When it comes to the EU donor composition, the Commission is the largest EU donor, representing 13 per cent of total ODA to Burkina Faso, closely followed by France, representing 10 per cent of total ODA. Importantly, although France has remained the dominant bilateral EU donor, a comparison of the breakdown (cf. Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3) of the types of aid of France and the second largest bilateral EU donor, which is the Netherlands (representing six per cent of total ODA to Burkina Faso) illustrates that the high ODA levels of France originate mainly from debt cancelations, technical assistance and a large share of project-based aid. In contrast, the Netherlands have supported the country mainly through budget support and basket funding.

Next, two medium-sized donors (Germany, Denmark) each represent three per cent of ODA, followed by three smaller donors (Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria) each contributing only two to one per cent of ODA to Burkina Faso. It should be noted that Belgium has phased out its bilateral cooperation programme, the Netherlands decided to phase out in 2013 and Sweden will phase out in 2015. Different from Tanzania and Zambia European Front donors have contributed one third of total EU aid to Burkina Faso and although Nordic Plus donors have still constituted one quarter of total EU aid to Burkina Faso, their position is weaker than in the Anglophone countries where they are joined by DFID. As outlined in the first part of this thesis, I have assumed that in countries where the ‘European Front’ countries are represented more strongly, there might be more scope for EU coordination.
Figure 6-2. France type of aid average 2010-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years

Figure 6-3. Netherlands type of aid average 2010-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years
Table 6-3. Total Donors’ contributions 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Donors, Total</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>10201</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries, Total</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>4098</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral, Total</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>6086</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DAC Countries, Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU donors, Total</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>4402</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Plus Donors, Total</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. IDA</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>2663</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EU Institutions</td>
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<td>1365</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. AfDF</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. France</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Netherlands</td>
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<td>613</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Germany</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. IMF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. United States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Denmark</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Switzerland</td>
<td>28</td>
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</tr>
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<td>11. Japan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Sweden</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>209</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Canada</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Global Fund</td>
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<td>167</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Belgium</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. UNICEF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Luxembourg</td>
<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Austria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Spain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. UNDP</td>
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</tr>
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<td>21. GAVI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Italy</td>
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<td>23. UNFPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. WFP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. IBRD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Nordic Dev. Fund</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Kuwait (KFAED)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. AfDB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. OFID</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. UNAIDS</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. GEF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. BADEA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. WHO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

*Note:* for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years
Table 6-4. EU Donors’ contributions 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Donors, Total</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>4402</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Nordic Plus, Total</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Front, Total</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. EU Institutions</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. France</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Netherlands</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Germany</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Denmark</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sweden</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Belgium</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Luxembourg</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Austria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Spain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
6.1.4 Existing donor-wide coordination

In Burkina Faso aid coordination is less advanced than in Tanzania and Zambia but there are several coordination mechanisms within the government, between government and donors and among donors. Donors are organized in a Troika system with sector groups and there is joint monitoring of the development strategy implementation and of budget support. There is a perception that because of efforts made, the quality of sector dialogue has improved, and that aid across sectors is more rationalized (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 81). Importantly, in general, the Burkinabe government is found committed to and supportive for better aid coordination. The government adopted a National Action Plan for Aid Effectiveness (PANEA 2007-2010 & renewed PANEA 2010-2012) and a series of principles on aid coordination and effectiveness. They are ‘facilitating’ improved division of labour amongst donors (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 81) and there are attempts to improve internal coordination.

‘le Burkina est un pays qui est ouvert à la concertation’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

‘There is a willingness of the government to be at the forefront, for example in the division of labour exercise. The government definitely shows commitment and aims to lead the process. They try but it's no easy’ (non-EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

However, this has not translated into effective leadership, mainly because of its limited capacities and its high aid dependence.

‘Le Burkina n'a pas encore les ressources internes qui lui permettent de se passer des ressources extérieures’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

‘The national minister would never say to a donor, please stop and put the money somewhere else’ (EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘As the country is in need of every euro, they will take every euro and receive every mission […]. Normally coordination should be by the government but the government is too weak. They fear donors will leave’ (EU6-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

Table 6-5 presents an overview of the key initiatives on aid coordination in Burkina Faso which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
In Burkina Faso national development plans have served as the overall framework for development cooperation (Buchert, 2002: 71). As one of the first countries, Burkina Faso elaborated a full PRSP (CSLP) in 2000, which allowed for a common framework around which the donors could provide their aid. The adoption coincided with the shifts in the international development agenda towards aid effectiveness, which placed coordination high on the agenda. Since 2000 Burkina has started to elaborate aid coordination mechanisms, especially around the monitoring of the national development strategy and the use of budget support. The monitoring of the national development strategy is done through annual reviews by donors and the government.

In 2005, following the international trends, a technical secretariat STELA, funded by UNDP and the WB was created to offer technical support on issues related to aid effectiveness, but no mandate was attached to it to let it act as a real coordination mechanism. When the project of STELA finished after three years, partners aimed to put a Troika in place, with a rotating
presidency, instead of the permanent leadership of UNDP and the WB. In 2009, the Troika was launched and three partners were responsible for the donor coordination on the basis of a yearly rotation. The Troika coordinates the follow-up of the CSLP and aims to let donors interact more effectively with the government by representing the donor community as a whole. It also facilitates daily work as it is used as a communication device between both parties.

As Burkina Faso has been a major recipient of budget support, coordination around this modality has been one of the major concerns and is tightly linked with the coordination around the CSLP. In the beginning this was a donors-only issue, driven by the EU and five other budget support donors. The Joint Donor Group on Budget Support for the PRSP (Groupe de Soutien Budgétaire Conjoint au Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) followed a conditionality reform pilot project that ran between 1998 and 2000 under the leadership of the European Commission. Following the results of this conditionality pilot project, six partners, namely the European Commission, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland, concluded a Memorandum of Understanding in order to strengthen their coordination. The WB, which was the largest provider of budget support, did not join in the Memorandum of Understanding but attended the working sessions as an observer. The same applied to France which was not yet providing budget support at the time. The system did not function very well as the government was not involved and the performance framework linked to the CSLP was of poor quality. While the aim was to have common performance indicators as a basis for the release of aid, traditional conditionalities remained determining the disbursements of each donor.

This led to the creation of the CGAB in 2005, an agreement between donors and the government which showed a stronger role for the government. The agreement defined duties and responsibilities for both parties and a common matrix of measures and indicators was attached to it. This protocol included now 9 partners, as the WB, the AfDB, France and Germany joined the group, while Belgium left. The framework functioned well in between 2005 and 2009 and pushed the government to make reforms. However, at the same time, the quality of the monitoring framework of the CSLP remained poor. As a result, from 2006 onwards, the parties reflected on possibilities to have only one framework for performance assessment (for both CSLP and budget support). In 2009, this resulted in a joint review, when a new CGAB (2009-2010) was created and melted with the follow-up framework of the CSLP. GBS monitoring was now done within the

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163 Through the Troika, the government can reach the whole donor community through only one device. Depending on the topic, the Troika will invite donors to give contributions through an internal system. There is a distribution list, planning of events are shared, minutes of the SCADD review are shared and donors can give comments. When for example, the government sends a document and requests donors to amend, the Troika sends it to the network to provide comments.
CSLP monitoring process under the lead of the Troika which also represents donors with a more traditional approach, like UNDP. This led to a weakening of the substance of the discussions and follow-up of the budget support. According to some interviewees (EU8-Burkina Faso, May 2012; EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012) this situation created a vacuum for budget support donors, resulting in increased bilateralism\textsuperscript{164}.

This led very recently to a renewed CGAB, signed in March 2012, which coincided with the development of a new national development strategy, the SCADD (2011-2015). The goal is to better link the follow-up and evaluation systems of budget support and the SCADD so that budget support is seen as an instrument in support of the national strategy and not as an instrument in itself. However, this protocol is not as tight as the Memorandums of Understanding budget support donors have agreed upon in Tanzania and Zambia. It is rather a description of the monitoring process than a strong and binding agreement.

Apart from the coordination around the CSLP/SCADD there are coordination frameworks around sectoral programmes, common baskets and other partnership frameworks such as in primary education, health, gender, transport, rural development, governance, decentralization and the private sector. The quality of the coordination varies across the sectors with on the one hand sectors like education (where there is a well-functioning common basket), PFM and the water sector (sector budget support and basket funding) where coordination is rather tight, and on the other hand sectors like the health sector where coordination doesn't function well (there is a common basket but most of the funds are targeted) or the private sector where there is hardly any coordination.

Furthermore, in 2010 a joint group of government and donors have agreed on a roadmap towards better division of labour, composed of 5 pillars. It was foreseen that the government takes a leadership role. However, progress on division of labour is weak and reprogramming is not yet underway.

\textbf{6.1.5 EU cooperation with Burkina Faso}

EU cooperation with Burkina Faso started in 1959 and currently includes GBS, sector budget support, projects and technical assistance (see Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5). In Burkina Faso, the EU has a major financial weight and it is the largest budget support donor to the government together with the WB. The EU committed 708 million euros under EDF 10 to the country. The

\textsuperscript{164} For example, in the beginning of 2012 there were 4 bilateral missions on budget support, from France, Denmark, Switzerland and Germany.
EU’s assistance is targeted at basic infrastructure such as roads, water and sanitation, interconnectivity, good governance and regional integration. The EU is currently active in fourteen sectors, of which eight through EDF support and the remaining through thematic funds, the energy and water facilities or the regional programme. However, the major share (60 per cent) of its aid portfolio is provided through budget support under the form of an MDG contract with variable tranches related to results in education and health. The Burkina Faso MDG Contract is the largest of the eight contracts the EU has concluded and includes an allocation of 320 million euros. Moreover, in 2010 and additional contribution of 23 million euros was added to this amount, financed from the B-envelope of the 10th EDF (European Commission, 2010b).

Besides, the EU provides sector budget support in water and sanitation.

**Figure 6-4. EU Institutions aid 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)**

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
6.2 RQ1: Mapping EU coordination

Against the context sketched above, this section reflects on the role of the EU in aid coordination in Burkina Faso. To what extent has the internal EU coordination materialized and how does the EU contribute and shape donor-wide coordination (external dimension)? The main findings of this analysis will serve as a basis for the next section, which aims to gain a deeper understanding of the elements that enable and constrain the EU coordination in Burkina Faso.

6.2.1 Internal dimension

In the following paragraphs the internal dimension of EU coordination will be outlined, including EU coordination in the programming phase, but primarily EU coordination during implementation. Thereby I will consider information sharing and consultation, common positions, the FTI on Division of Labour and budget support. Also more informal ways of EU coordination will be explored. Finally, a sketch of the variety of EU donors’ attitudes towards EU coordination will be provided.

Similar to the other country studies, coordination in the programming phase hardly exists. However, for the programming of the 10th EDF a joint analysis by EU donors, Canada, Switzerland and the government served as basis of the EU’s CSP with Burkina Faso. For EDF 11 joint programming will not be implemented in Burkina Faso, although Austria and France have shown interest in sharing the EU’s country analysis for their own programming. Most probably, the national development strategy will be used as a basis for the EU’s programming. In line with
the first phase of the new programming guidelines, the EU Delegation would prepare an analysis of the Burkinabe national development strategy through informal consultation with other donors, the government and the NAO.

In Burkina Faso, the institutionalization of EU coordination at the level of development cooperation in the implementation phase consists of monthly meetings, chaired by the HoC of the EU Delegation. Different from the other country studies, the EU coordination meetings are extended to two non-EU bilateral donors, namely Canada and Switzerland. There is no formal agreement on the agenda of these meetings but its functions are determined by practice over the past years. While others may suggest agenda topics, usually the EU Delegation sets the agenda.

First, these meetings serve as an information sharing device. EU donors are invited to present their bilateral programs in order to increase transparency on who is doing what, where, with whom, for how much and for how long. This information is considered as a precondition for better coordinated aid as it can help to avoid duplication and create possible synergies between EU donors. Apart from mere information on programmes and portfolios, EU coordination also serves as a platform to exchange ideas and analysis. Besides, there is a general interest to discuss issues related to the EDF. On the one hand, the EU Delegation seeks to pre-discuss future plans with local EU partners to avoid opposition in the EDF committee in Brussels. On the other hand, Member States seek to overview how EDF money is spent in the country.

Second, EU meetings are used to discuss issues related to internal EU affairs and monitor and report on EU policy initiatives. Whenever new initiatives are launched in Brussels, such as the Agenda for Change (2011), the EU Delegation coordinates comments of the local EU donor community and tries to come to a harmonized position.

Third, issues related to the FTI on Division of Labour are discussed and monitored. Local lead facilitator for the FTI is Germany while supporting facilitators are Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. While donors are informed about each other’s programmes, considerable steps towards increased division of labour amongst EU donors have not been taken. Moreover, the exit of the Netherlands illustrates that eventual aid allocation decisions are made at headquarters’ without prior consultation at field level. Although at headquarters’ level, there has been some coordination between Denmark and the Netherlands about division of labour at cross-country level, in Burkina Faso, EU donors were informed after the exit decision was made: ‘one day, suddenly we learnt they would leave’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Once the decision was communicated, the Netherlands consulted other partners with a view to limit the budget gap
their exit would cause. While there are a few instances of delegated cooperation amongst EU donors, this is still rather rare. For example, the EU has planned delegated cooperation with AFD in the private sector programme, and with GTZ for a component of a decentralization programme.

Fourth, EU donors increasingly try to establish common positions on issues related to donor-government relations. There is no direct interface between EU donors as an entity and the government on development cooperation, but it was stated that EU coordination could indirectly support dialogue between donors and between donors and the government. Although there is no systematic first round ahead of donor-wide coordination meetings in the Troika or in the sectors, it happens often that preparatory talks are hold first amongst ‘the EU family’: ‘the Troika is not based on the European agenda, but we, as Europeans, have our own ideas on issues that concern the Troika’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). While this does not always result in clear coordinated key messages, these talks can lead to a tentative EU proposal. For example, when a certain government report is in delay, the EU group can decide to pass a letter to the government and agree on the key message. Next, the proposal is taken to the wider group. Interviewees stated that, once there is an agreement within the EU group, there will be less discussion in the donor-wide group.

Apart from formal EU coordination meetings, informal coordination at bilateral level amongst EU donors is also taking place. This is illustrated for example by the close professional relationships between the EU Delegation and AFD, not only between the EU HoC and the AFD Director, but also between several Heads of Sections or sector specialists.

The six largest EU donors (Commission, France, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Sweden) have provided budget support, albeit to differing degrees, as illustrated by the contrast between the composition of the EU, the Dutch and the French aid portfolios (cf. supra). Moreover, Sweden and the Netherlands are currently phasing out. Only two smaller EU donors (Austria and Luxembourg) have not provided budget support.

Different from Tanzania and Zambia, in Burkina Faso no EU interviewee expressed an interest to cut back EU coordination. While the EU Delegation has been the strongest supporter and acted as the central hub of EU coordination, all other EU donors have shown a positive attitude towards EU coordination, despite the existence of criticism. Although France is in general not considered as a locomotive for implementing the aid effectiveness agenda, in Burkina Faso, 165 At the time of the writing it was not yet clear how big this gap would be. While some of the loss of Dutch support in the health sector would be met by UNICEF, the gap in education was expected not to be counterbalanced.
France has worked ‘in tandem’ with the EU Delegation in several coordination initiatives, especially in the area of budget support. France was also perceived to be an active participant of the EU coordination meetings. However, France remains pragmatic in its approach as it also aims to safeguard its special bilateral relationship with the government, which is illustrated by France’s difficulties concerning the mandate of the Troika: ‘la France, jamais. Jamais elle sortira- elle pourra avoir une position appart exprimée, mais jamais elle se mettra en parallèle et sortira de l’UE. C’est vraiment pas dans son habitude’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Apart from France, smaller EU donors such as Luxembourg and Austria have also a rather positive attitude towards EU coordination. Two of the three like-minded countries present in Burkina Faso, the Netherlands and Denmark, were remarkably less critical of EU coordination than in Tanzania and Zambia. Also Germany showed support, although GTZ was rather negative. Sweden is the most reserved EU donor.

**Figure 6-6. EU donors’ attitude towards EU coordination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less EU coordination</th>
<th>More EU coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (phasing out)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France (phasing out)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.2.2 External dimension

Apart from specific EU coordination, EU donors participate in the donor-wide coordination processes of the PTF and the various sector groups. Hence, to assess the EU coordination I will take into account this external dimension by looking at the EU Delegation’s engagement in the institution-building and development of the local coordination processes taking into account the EU Delegation’s role in the development of the Troika and the PTF processes, including division of labour as well as in relation to budget support. Finally I will also explore the potential relationship between EU coordination (internal dimension) and donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension).

First, in general, the EU Delegation is seen as a major pioneer in the field of coordination and an actor which was able to feed the dialogue amongst donors and between donors and the government through its active engagement in the creation and the functioning of the Troika and the monitoring of the national development strategy and budget support. The Delegation has especially been active in the ‘institution-building’ of the donor coordination architecture and in the facilitation of dialogue through the coordination of diverging positions. This is illustrated by
its role in the monitoring of the CSLP, the establishment of a Troika system, in the coordination of budget support and in the process of division of labour amongst donors.

‘l’UE en termes de coordination joue un rôle de moteur. Parce que l’UE essaye de mettre en œuvre tous les principes de la Déclaration de Paris,[…], l’UE était parmi les bailleurs à être dans l’équipe de coordination des Appuis budgétaires, CGAB et aussi était pendant plusieurs années comme chef de file des partenaires de CSLP, la politique globale, avant qu’on mettre en place la Troïka, l’UE était le chef de file des partenaires CSLP pendant plusieurs années’ (EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

The monitoring of the CSLP is done through annual reviews by donors and the government. In the beginning donor coordination on this monitoring process was not institutionalized, but by acting as a ‘rassembleur’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012) of donors’ positions the EU took the first lead in the coordination of the PTF around the national development strategy. While in the 90s the WB had been the main actor in building the aid architecture in Burkina Faso, from 2000 onwards, the EU is seen as the driver for better donor coordination. In absence of a real interlocutor between donors and the government, it is stated that the EU Delegation remained the first partner for the monitoring of the implementation of the CSLP.

The EU is also perceived as a major driver of the creation of the Troika and put much time and efforts in designing the Terms of Reference, in collaboration with the WB: ‘the EU was really concerned about how we could be more effective and less demanding for the government’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Although the first Troika included the WB, UNDP and Switzerland interviewees emphasized that the EU maintained its key role:

‘l’UE a été un partenaire de premier plan en ce qui concerne la coordination des bailleurs, parce que, même quand on, je me rappelle même la première Troïka, avec la Suisse, la Banque Mondiale, nous avons souvent fait recours à l’UE pour des questions spécifiques, parce qu’ils ont un personnel étoffé qui est disponible, et pour l’élaboration des documents spécifique, plusieurs fois on a eu besoin d’élargir la Troïka à l’Union Européenne pour avoir ses avis par rapport à des choses très spécifiques. Il nous est arrivé par exemple pour la finalisation de la matrice unifiée en 2010 de faire appel à l’UE pour participer aux échanges avec le gouvernement. Et également dans l’élaboration de certains documents, il est arrivé qu’en face de la première lecture on fait recours à l’UE avant qu’on donne à l’ensemble des partenaires’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

166 The Second Troika was composed of the EU Delegation, the UN system and the Netherlands. The current Troika consists of Denmark, the WB and the EU Delegation and the next one will be composed of the AfDB, the UN and Switzerland. The Troika is supported by a Secretariat which is financed through a project of the UNDP in which also other partners are putting resources (non-EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).
As a result, in the second Troika the EU replaced the WB and remained part of the Troika for two years. Here, the EU is seen as the donor who tries to bring the other donors to a number of key messages. Even non-EU donors state that the EU has been ‘l’acteur central’ (non-EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012) or ‘le cheval de bataille’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012) of donor coordination. The government confirms this image: ‘le moteur, je peux vous dire vraiment c’est l’UE, parce qu’avec les engagements qu’ils ont pris et les mesures qu’ils sont en train de prendre, c’est vraiment le moteur’ (GOV1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Apart from the EU’s leadership of the general coordination process, the Delegation is participating in coordination processes in several sectors and has taken several sector lead responsibilities over time.

Also regarding division of labour, the Delegation has been an active actor. In 2009 EU donors initiated a mapping exercise which took stock of each donor’s interventions and assessed comparative advantages. On the basis of this study they tried to link up with the government, resulting in the creation of a joint group (Groupe Conjoint) of both government and donors who are represented by the EU, France, UNDP and Germany (who is the local facilitator of the EU FTI on the Division of Labour). In 2010, the joint group agreed on a roadmap towards better division of labour, composed of 5 pillars. It is foreseen that the government takes a leadership role. However, progress on division of labour is weak as reprogramming is not yet underway. Apart from the mapping, there is no joint diagnosis or agreement on a rationalized division of labour.

According to various interviewees, the EU Delegation played a major role in the work on how to integrate better the coordinated monitoring processes of the CSLP and budget support. The government too acknowledges this role: ‘la coopération avec l’UE sert beaucoup à accélérer les dispositifs, les mécanismes des appuis budgétaires’ (GOV1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). For example, the EU Delegation did the pioneering work to redesign the CGAB. The EU Delegation wrote the first draft of the renewed protocol and was coordinating the overall process. The draft was presented to other budget support donors and Germany and France then revised this draft, still in strong cooperation with the EU Delegation. It should be noted that, because the follow-up framework for budget support had weakened, discussion were still taking place at the level of the SRFP (Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques), which became one of the best structured coordination frameworks in Burkina Faso, under the lead of France and with active participation of the EU Delegation.

Second, EU coordination is perceived to be complementary for donor wide coordination and can be used to drive things forward at the donor-wide level. EU coordination remains relatively
modest, as it is mainly complementing on-going coordination and for a great part related to internal EU issues. EU coordination does not intend to replace other coordination processes. Thus, there is no evidence of attempts to downsize the link between EU and donor-wide coordination processes. EU coordination may lead to common positions but these were not perceived as a hindrance for on-going coordination efforts.

6.2.3 Main findings

Table 6-6 offers an overview of EU coordination in Burkina Faso. In what follows I will focus on the main findings which form the basis for the remainder of this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal dimension: to what extent does the EU coordinate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programming phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint multiannual programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF 10: no joint programming, joint analysis by EU donors, Canada, Switzerland and the government, but separate response strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF 11: no joint programming, programming did not started yet, potential interest of France and Denmark to use analysis for their own programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular monthly HoC meetings, which include Switzerland and Canada, + informal/bilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info on EDF, EU donors’ bilateral programs, budget support, exchange of ideas and analysis, EU policy initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU framework not used for coordinated initiatives, although there are efforts at HoMs level to better coordinate the policy dialogue related to budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTI on Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Facilitator: Germany, Supporting: Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly technical reporting exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small number of delegated cooperation agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU, France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have provided budget support, but Sweden and the Netherlands are currently phasing out. Denmark, Luxembourg and Austria do not provide budget support. Common matrix of performance indicators and underlying principles but no harmonized eligibility criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External dimension: to what extent does the EU contribute to donor-wide coordination processes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing and policy dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegation acts as a pioneer in the field of coordination and an actor which was able to feed the dialogue amongst donors and between donors and the government through its active engagement in the creation and the functioning of the Troika and the monitoring of the national development strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, similar to the other country studies, EU coordination in the programming phase is hardly existing, although in the context of EDF 10 a joint analysis of the country situation had been conducted which served as the basis for the EU’s response strategy. Although Burkina Faso had been selected as one of the 14 pilot countries for the implementation of joint EU strategies (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 16), joint programming will not take place for the programming of EDF 11. Coordination in the implementation phase is institutionalized through monthly meetings of EU HoC. Different from the other country studies, the EU coordination meetings are extended to two non-EU bilateral donors, namely Canada and Switzerland. The meetings are used to share information on EU donors’ programmes and portfolios, to exchange ideas and analysis, discuss issues related to internal EU affairs and monitor and report on EU policy initiatives. Although coordination in Burkina Faso does not include an active component, which would require modification of Member States’ aid practices EU donors increasingly try to establish common positions on issues related to donor-government relations. While there are a few instances of delegated cooperation amongst EU donors, this is still rather rare. However, Burkina Faso receives a large amount of budget support and donors have made progress towards harmonization of this aid modality.

Importantly, different from Tanzania and Zambia, in Burkina Faso no EU interviewee expressed an interest to cut back EU coordination. Although France is in general not considered as a locomotive for implementing the aid effectiveness agenda, in Burkina Faso, it has worked ‘in tandem’ with the EU Delegation in several coordination initiatives, especially in the area of budget support. France was also perceived to be an active participant of the EU coordination meetings. However, France remains pragmatic and also aims to safeguard its special bilateral relationship with the government.

Second, different from the other country studies, the EU has served as an engine for facilitating coordination in the field of aid and development and the EU Delegation is seen as an actor which has been able to feed the dialogue amongst donors and between donors and the government through its active engagement in the creation and the functioning of the Troika and
the monitoring of the national development strategy and budget support. The Delegation has especially been active in the ‘institution-building’ coordination architecture and in the facilitation of dialogue through the coordination of diverging positions amongst others by putting its expertise and resources at disposal of the donor community. These services are considered necessary for the coordination exercises to proceed. This is illustrated by its role in the monitoring of the CSLP, the establishment of a Troika system, in the coordination of budget support and in the process of division of labour amongst donors. The EU Delegation has encouraged participation of all actors and EU Member States have in general supported these coordination processes.

6.3 RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

This section aims for a deeper understanding of the main findings developed in the previous section. More specifically, this part will investigate the factors that help to explain why

a) EU coordination in Burkina Faso tends to be limited to information sharing, consultation, exchange of ideas and ad hoc coordinating responses, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension)

b) The EU Delegation acts as a coordination ‘facilitator’ in the donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension)

As outlined in the first part of this thesis I will thereby consider interest-related, institutional and ideational factors. In the end of this chapter I will conclude on the enabling and constraining factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Burkina Faso in order to gain understanding of both opportunities and limitations for EU coordination at country level.

6.3.1 Interest-related factors

In general, Burkina Faso has not been considered a strategically important country for EU donors. Only recently, the country has raised some commercial interest because of its gold reserves, and security interests given its strategic location near Mali and its stability in the unstable Sahel region. Moreover, it should be emphasized that in contrast to the average donor in Burkina Faso, France has maintained close political, military and commercial cooperation with the country. As outlined in the first part of this thesis coordination can be considered as the result of a negotiation between gains and losses. Consequently, donors are required to redefine their individual objectives in order to work towards joint outcomes and results. However, literature suggests that donors’ domestic politics, as well as their search for political influence might
influence donors’ commitment to actually engage in a coordinated approach. This section will therefore examine to what extent EU donors’ interests may affect their attitude towards EU coordination and thus act as enabling or constraining factors.

6.3.1.1 EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns

First, donor countries’ domestic politics and interests may influence EU donors’ foreign aid policies and their commitment towards EU coordination. For example, although EU Member States have agreed to engage in joint programming ‘politics determine the portfolio of a donor, whenever there is new minister, he makes a new policy, which has to be translated in the partner country programs’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Hence, arguably ‘the EU aims to coordinate but its coordinating role is limited by political agendas of the Member States’ (non-EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Domestic politics determine the scope for EU coordination at field level. While EU donor representatives see an interest in EU coordination and for example participate in the EU coordination meetings, engaging in deeper ways of coordination such as joint programming requires supportive domestic political choices.

Similar to the other country studies, this can be illustrated by the Dutch decision to phase out their bilateral cooperation with Burkina Faso. Although concentration and specialization is one of the main foundations of cross-country division of labour, different from the other countries where the Netherlands are phasing out, the exit from Burkina Faso was much criticized since the Netherlands were the first bilateral donor in the health and the education sectors. Despite their importance coordination or consultation at field level did not take place ahead of the political decision. It is widely emphasized amongst all interviewees that the Dutch exit decision is determined by domestic politics, which is not linked to EU coordination or changes in Burkina Faso’s development perspectives. This contradicts the claim of the Dutch government that ‘ending the partner relationship with Burkina Faso was a direct result of consultation with the six other European countries – two other countries were set to increase their aid to Burkina Faso, so the Netherlands decided to pull out’ (Tyler, 2011).

Other bilateral EU donors experience similar political pressure to pursue policies which might not be in line with a coordinated EU approach. For example, although Germany is an important budget support donor, ‘with the right-hand government budget support is totally out. The focus is now on the private sector. This makes it difficult to follow-up coordination, when there is such a radical change at headquarters’ (EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Likewise, following a change in government Sweden has phased out its budget support and recently decided to stop their bilateral cooperation with Burkina Faso by 2015: ‘the new minister doesn’t like budget support, the last disbursement will take place in
2012. That will affect the programme because it’s half of the portfolio. It was also not sure whether Sweden would stay in Burkina Faso. As such we were not able to take active part in certain things’ (EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

The domestic politics also determine the need for visibility. Despite some recent claims and the relatively good performance in recent years in terms of governance, Burkina Faso had previously not been considered a donor darling. However, like in the other country studies, the domestic political and economic context in donor countries seems to have strengthened the concern about their visibility:

‘Chaque pays veut faire savoir que c’est son pays qui finance tel projet, c’est ce qu’on appelle la défense des drapeaux’ (GOV1-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘In the past decade the Netherlands had the aim to be an effective and good partner, and were not so concerned about visibility. But with the last government it’s coming back. The Netherlands used to be quite flexible but now it is more determined by the Dutch government in which sectors we will be. This makes it also more difficult to do joint programming’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

However, these domestic pressures do not seem to pose a constraint on the support of officials in the field to engage in EU coordination in its current form.

As regards the influence of national commercial, political or strategic interests on EU donors’ commitment towards EU coordination, the introductory section has indicated that these are in general negligible in Burkina Faso except for France which has considerable strategic concerns. However, given France’s positive attitude towards EU coordination, interests are arguably no decisive constraining or enabling factors for EU coordination in its current form.

6.3.1.2 EU donors’ influence in Burkina Faso

As the previous country studies have shown, the amount of influence of EU donors might affect their interest in EU coordination as well as the nature of EU coordination. Different from Tanzania and Zambia, where the governments have sought to diversify their partnerships and have increasingly found alternative funding from emerging donors and private investments, this is not the case in Burkina Faso. For example, Burkina Faso has retained diplomatic relations with Taiwan instead of China and Chinese investments are not considered to be significant. The power asymmetry between EU donors and the government has largely remained intact and EU

167 As one donor representative puts it rather bluntly: ‘there is nothing to have here’ (EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Besides, the recent interest in gold production and export concerns mainly Australian, Canadian and UK mining companies.
donors do not perceive a similar loss of leverage as in Tanzania or Zambia. As mentioned earlier, political and policy dialogue with the Burkinabe authorities are taking place at regular times and the relationship between the government and the donor community is not as strained as in the two Anglophone countries. There is no such discourse on aid independence from the partner government and there have been no sever crises in donor-government relations. Consequently, there might be no such compelling incentives to reinforce the EU front to preserve leverage.

However, different from Tanzania and Zambia, the EU and France dominate the aid landscape in Burkina Faso and both have pragmatic interests to engage in EU coordination, albeit to a limited extent in the case of France. Smaller EU donors also have an interest in EU coordination because of specific reasons, and the Nordics, which are rather weakly represented in Burkina Faso, also have shown more interest in EU coordination than in Tanzania and Zambia. These factors help to explain the support for EU coordination in terms of information sharing, consultation and more lately also coordinating issues related to the policy dialogue as well as EU donors’ support for the facilitator role of the EU Delegation in donor-wide coordination processes.

First, the EU Delegation is the biggest EU donor and the largest provider of GBS, which is translated in easier access to information and a rather strong position within the donor community. The EU Delegation’s leverage acts as an enabling factor for EU coordination. Especially smaller donors such as Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden rely on the EU and EU coordination meetings are an instrument to gain access to information. For example, Sweden, which ‘lost credibility because of our uncertain situation’ (EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012), has few leverage in the policy and political dialogue and few resources to effectively monitor its budget support. Consequently, ‘in practical terms Sweden relies on EU comments for our budget support, as we don’t have the capacity to monitor it’ (EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Likewise, for Luxembourg ‘our own political factors or visibility are less important, but the political influence towards the government is important, and therefore we need to cooperate with other partners, to have more leverage’ (EU9-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

Second, there is an institutional dimension related to the MDG Contract which impacts on the EU interest in coordination. The EU Delegation’s need for leverage at the sector level forms an enabling factor for both EU and donor-wide coordination. The EU Delegation itself experiences a strong incentive to strengthen coordination with other donors, in order to gain and maintain influence in the sector policy dialogues, where it has relatively fewer leverage. The EU’s commitment towards coordination should thus also be seen in the light of its accountability needs and the need for information as a budget support donor. The variable tranche of the MDG
Contract is based on indicators related to the national development strategy but also to specific reforms and results in the health and education sectors, which the EU aims to pursue through the policy dialogue. However, as the EU does not directly support the health and education sectors it has little influence in these sector policy dialogues and thus needs to coordinate with other donors in order to access the information it needs. This results from the perverse effect of the EU’s MDG contract and variable tranches. It is argued that the variable tranche is not substantive enough to serve as a credible incentive, taking into account the magnitude of the fixed tranche, which is disbursed on the basis of the eligibility criteria only. Hence, in need of access to information on health and education indicators, the EU has pushed for coordination at sectoral level as well as for the strengthening of the follow-up and evaluation system of the national strategy. As a result, the EU’s accountability and disbursement needs result in an interest to promote a well-functioning central follow-up system complemented by good systems in the sectors: ‘it’s because of a clear necessity to keep control on our big trunk of GBS, not to lose control on that. It’s mandatory, we couldn’t do otherwise than reinforcing coordination among donors, trying to get information on the sectors, trying to improve coordination on the sectors and central ministry of finance so that we get our points through, otherwise we would just lose control in the sector dialogue’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

Third, France’s commitment towards EU coordination offers a mixed picture. Notwithstanding its general positive attitude, ‘they are not a locomotive for harmonization and alignment’ (EU8-Burkina Faso, May 2012) which forms the basis of the aid effectiveness agenda. Arguably the French support for EU coordination does not follow from a preference for better coordinated EU aid as such. France clearly has its own agenda in Burkina Faso which is closely related to its foreign policy agenda: ‘Françafrique, it really exists’ (EU6-Burkina Faso, May 2012). As discussed in the first part of this thesis France will only opt for the European path (or the multilateral) when this is in line with its own interests. If considered useful they will support EU coordination, if not, they will safeguard their bilateral relationship. Despite this pragmatic attitude, they are in general more interested in EU coordination than the UK in Tanzania and Zambia.

On the one hand, this is illustrated by France’s critical stance towards the establishment of a Troika. Different from other EU donors, France (and Canada) did not agree that the Troika would be the ‘interlocuteur unique’ for the political dialogue as ‘there must be some space for the bilateral dialogue’ (non-EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Apart from preserving its bilateral relationship France emphasized the need to have a specific channel for dialogue related to budget support. Moreover, the Troika also includes partners which do not necessarily share the same (often political) concerns. The Troika system asks donors to coordinate their view which the Troika
then represents in dialogue with the government. However, while France has not been part of the Troika during the political reviews of the SCADD with the Burkinabe government, France asked to be represented too. Besides, French also has identity concerns which may conflict with a shared EU identity. Although, similar to Germany, French aid is provided by different institutions, the French ambassador promotes internal coordination and has invested to present a common French identity of ‘l’équipe France’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012): ‘Il y a vraiment une excellente relation entre l’agence de l’AFD locale et l’ambassade de France’, ‘on peut si nécessaire apparaître comme une seule et même structure’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

On the other hand, it is argued that the French supportive attitude towards EU coordination also stems from the imbalance between its strength as a political and economic actor and its relative weakness as a donor. Most donors recognize the importance of the French expertise and leverage in Burkina Faso. For example, their lead role in PFM is much appreciated thanks to their understanding of the Burkinabe governance systems. However, compared to other donors with far less political influence and in relation with the strength of its political, economic and military ties, France’s aid portfolio is rather fragmented (cf. Figure 6-2 p. 194), which acts as an incentive to support EU aid coordination: ‘the French aid budget is decreasing, so they increasingly emphasize how much money they put in the EU, “you are also our money”’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). France thus also sees possible gains from shared EU visibility.

The analysis of EU coordination in Tanzania and Zambia has indicated that the search for influence and leverage is accompanied by visibility concerns towards the beneficiary public and in that sense also related to donors’ identities. Like in the East-African countries, visibility towards the domestic constituencies in Burkina Faso is an issue for every donor, although for some more explicitly than for others. Arguably we could conclude that the visibility concerns do not act as a constraining factor for EU coordination. However, it is not strongly enabling either.

Most EU donors see an interest in having more visibility within Burkina Faso as EU because EU donors’ shared weight in terms of aid contributions is not translated into a corresponding visibility for the Burkinabe government and public: ‘the image of the EU is not clear, it’s fragmented, so there are few people who know how big we are, and how important we are. […] So sometimes it’s good to bring this one-ness, this EU-ness into the limelight. There is a strategic interest to be visible as the sum of our individual contributions is gigantic. But we haven’t found the right form to do that’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). At the political level, there seems to be a parallel observation as there is less opposition from the Member States to search for a common EU position and present the EU as a political entity, represented by the HoD. Importantly, while the EU Delegation aims to strengthen EU
coordination, it is argued that this is not primarily driven by a concern to establish the EU as a collective identity vis-à-vis other donors. It has put much effort in the donor-wide coordination system and the fact that Switzerland and Canada may join the EU coordination meetings shows that ‘l’UE ne cherche pas la visibilité pour la visibilité, […] il n'y a pas cette volonté de recherche de la visibilité, mais elle est visible que par son action sur le terrain et par l'impact que ça peut donner’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

Moreover, different from Tanzania and Zambia there are no such strong competing identities. Although there are three Nordic Plus countries, concentrating on shared visibility as like-minded countries is not as appealing as in Tanzania and Zambia, given its relative weakness. Sweden lost credibility and is not very visible for other reasons too\textsuperscript{168}. Furthermore, competition from bilateral visibility concerns is rather weak. Smaller donors such as Luxembourg and Austria feel they have more to win by a shared EU visibility instead of focusing on their own image. Germany has a rather fragmented image as aid is provided by GIZ and KfW and the understaffed embassy has not been able to take the lead in internal coordination. As argued before, despite its own identity concerns, France also has an interest in shared EU visibility, given its relatively ‘weaker’ aid portfolio. The EU may thus serve as an instrument to share its own burden.

6.3.2 Institutional factors

If coordination is considered an institutional process in which multiple organizations aim to solve a collective action problem, EU coordination might be enabled and constrained by institutional factors that are of formal or informal nature. In the following paragraphs I will explore how the existing donor-wide coordination processes, the EU’s organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines as well as its capacities and bureaucratic culture affect EU coordination in Burkina Faso.

6.3.2.1 Existing aid architecture

In Burkina Faso aid coordination is a more recent phenomenon than in the ‘frontrunners’ of the aid effectiveness agenda in Eastern Africa. Before the adoption of the EU policies on aid effectiveness, coordination was not as advanced as in Tanzania and Zambia. As such, EU coordination and donor-wide coordination have evolved more as simultaneous processes.

\textsuperscript{168} It was stated that, apart from institutional and political factors, the rather aloof attitude of Sweden in Burkina Faso in recent years is said to be related to the fact that the HoC is a rather closed and discrete person who doesn’t speak French, ‘and has its last post…’(EUS-Burkina Faso, May 2012).
Therefore, as I expected, the level of existing coordination arguably constitutes an enabling factor for EU coordination.

First, the absence of a well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanism has enabled the EU to show the value of EU coordination meetings (internal dimension), all the more since from the beginning Switzerland and Canada have been invited too. Once the donor-wide coordination architecture with the Troika system and the sector groups was established, these EU coordination meetings continued to exist as a complementary framework. However, it should be emphasized that this has not enabled more advanced forms of EU coordination, such as joint programming.

Second, the absence of existing coordination and competing coordinators has enabled the EU to act as an engine for donor-wide coordination (external dimension). Different from Tanzania and Zambia, in Burkina Faso there was no group of like-minded countries that initiated the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda at the country level. Moreover, like in Tanzania and Zambia, the WB is perceived as an actor which is not committed to the principles of coordination and harmonization. Instead, the instigation did come from the EU Delegation, in close cooperation with some supportive EU Member States. For example, in Burkina Faso there was no JAS or any other existing framework for division of labour when the EU’s FTI was launched. Germany, the local lead facilitator for the FTI, could thus appeal on the EU policy framework when launching the division of labour process in Burkina Faso. The German embassy hired a consultant to take stock of donors’ interventions in a donor mapping exercise. Later, due to staffing problems in the German Embassy, the EU Delegation took over.

‘It was Germany who really pushed the mapping exercise on Division of Labour. Germany said they had the resources and they hired a consultant’ (non-EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘The division of labour initiative has been promoted especially by the Germans, with a warm interest of the EU Delegation. The subject has been discussed first in the EU family, and the Germans took the initiative to hire a consultant to do a donor mapping exercise. Next, this work had to be presented in the broader donor group and the government had been involved too’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

**6.3.2.2 Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines**

Donors’ institutional organization affects their ability to coordinate with other partners at field level. Depending on the level of decentralization, the institutional link with foreign affairs and the bureaucratic flexibility in terms of procedures and policy guidelines, a donor may be more or less capable to coordinate with others. I will examine these factors for the EU and thereby I will
focus on the EU Delegation since the EU Delegation is supposed to act as a hub for EU coordination at country level.

First, like in Tanzania and Zambia it is emphasized that, given the fact that programming decisions are usually made at headquarters’ level, the EU’s coordinator role in the programming of development is constrained: ‘if we would have joint programming with the EU, the embassy has not the competence to do it, because it’s [at headquarters]. […] Over here, at my level it’s not up to me. I think that even the EU Delegation over here might propose but they can’t decide, the decision will be made in Brussels’ (EU6-Burkina Faso, May 2012). However, the lack of decentralization does not constrain the regular occurrence of EU coordination meetings.

Second, the institutional link between development and foreign affairs may impact on the coordination offers as other foreign policy objectives might influence aid modalities and disbursement decisions and the search for common positions. Following from the absence of considerable commercial or political interests in Burkina Faso, this factor seems to be less important in Burkina Faso. For example, EU donors have regular political dialogue under the lead of the EU Delegation and the EU HoD has been chairing the Troika where it has represented other EU donors in the political dialogue with the government even before the new institutional set-up of the EEAS was implemented.

Third, all EU donors suffer from bureaucratic procedures that make coordination a burdensome task. To engage in more advanced forms of coordination such as delegated cooperation or joint programming, procedures and programming cycles should be simplified and harmonized. Currently, EU donors’ programming cycles have different lengths and start at different times, as shown by Figure 6-7. However, while currently no EU donor is aligned with the national programming cycle, a feasibility study found that all donors are ‘procedurally able to participate in joint programming’ as ‘all EU donors bar one can either change their cycle or operate without a bilateral strategy’ (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 81). However, it was decided that EU donors would not engage in Joint programming for EDF 11, which suggest that other than pure procedural factors constrain more advanced coordination.
Furthermore, although the large share of budget support in its aid portfolio provides the EU with an image of a donor which is committed to the harmonization and alignment, also in Burkina Faso the EU’s complex aid bureaucracy seems to act as a constraining factor for more advanced EU coordination. Like in Tanzania and Zambia, the EU has difficulties to participate in common baskets.

‘The EU sits on two chairs, they are squeezed. On the one hand there is the discourse level, but on the other hand the organization doesn’t follow, their regulations do not allow them to act’ (EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

‘The reason why the Delegation cannot effectively play an engine role in those big issues [division of labour, joint programming] is that it has not the “matière première”, it’s a very cumbersome regulated bureaucracy’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

Fourth, the policy framework that guides EU coordination is based on voluntary participation whereas the bilateral policy frameworks are more demanding. However, it should be added that the existence of the policy framework also foresees an institutional need for EU coordination: ‘there are certain things that we have to do, we receive instructions, independent from other coordination, we just have to coordinate with the Member States. We can’t get away with it, like the FIT’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). However, if Member States’ national operational guidelines and procedures are not adjusted to the implementation of the policy framework, the result is that EU coordination may be perceived a technocratic or top-down issue.
6.3.2.3 Staffing and bureaucratic culture

Aid agencies’ capacities and bureaucratic culture may influence its engagement in donor coordination. In the following paragraphs I will explore how the EU Delegation’s capacities and bureaucratic culture may enable or constrain EU coordination.

First, like in Tanzania and Zambia the EU is recognized for its capacities in terms of human resources, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Most interviewees of bilateral agencies emphasize the time-consuming aspect of donor coordination, and the fact that their human resources policy is not adjusted to the additional workload. However, the EU Delegation seems to have the human and financial resources to carry the burden of coordination and invest in the institutional building processes and the coordination of donors’ positions at both the EU and the donor-wide level. For example, the Delegation has one official which is responsible for donor coordination, a position which bilateral agencies do not have. The EU Delegation is also considered as a knowledge institution, with highly qualified staff and advanced analytical capacities, which smaller bilateral EU donors are usually lacking. Apart from coordinating the ‘EU family’, the EU Delegation spends its capacities on facilitating the dialogue with the government and the other donors. For example, the Delegation has conducted a study on Burkina Faso’s growing gold industry which it has used as a basis to start a policy dialogue with the government and the donor community.

‘Ils ont des ressources humaines assez étoffées et professionnelles, surtout au niveau de la coordination des bailleurs de fonds. Si l’UE n’était pas là, c’était beaucoup plus difficile pour la coordination, parce qu’ils ont mis à disposition leurs ressources humaines, puis leurs ressources financières également pour que la coordination puisse se faire’ (non-EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘L’Union européenne est apparaît comme le partenaire de base pour la mise en œuvre du CSLP, non seulement pour les capacités de l’Union Européenne, parce qu’ils avaient un personnel assez étoffé, mais également l’intérêt qu’ils avaient par rapport à la mise en œuvre de la politique nationale’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘La Délégation a un personnel assez compétent […] de sorte que l’UE soit dans chaque coordination, notamment que ce soit le cadre de dialogue sectorielle ou de façon globale, notamment la troïka, l’UE est toujours dedans, parce que il y a une certaine compétence du personnel ici. C’est une grande Délégation’ (EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘The EU Delegation is good in analytical diagnosis, they do good analytical papers of good quality, because they have good staff’ (EU8-Burkina Faso, May 2012).
‘They have capacities, they have more people and they are less political as they don’t have bilateral interests. They also have the financial weight, they give a lot of aid and they are an important budget support donor. They also ask the right questions, they have a broad and a good strategic vision. So their strategic vision and their financial weight make them a natural engine in the field of coordination, especially in the sense of influencing the dialogue with the government’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

Second, the EU’s working culture is based on participation and coordination. Most interviewees referred to the EU’s commitment, availability, rapid responses, and participative approach:

‘In the different sector groups, the EU Delegation will always send comments, take the lead to try to have a common position. The EU is extremely effective and participates a lot, they almost always give comments. It’s different from smaller bilaterals who don’t have the capacities to read everything and comment on it. Their comments are usually of a very high quality so that we often just agree with what the EU says’ (EU8-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

‘C’est lié à la capacité de l’UE et également c’est lié à une certaine disponibilité, parce que dans la coordination des bailleurs quand il y a une personne qui réagit rapidement vous allez beaucoup plus faire appel à lui avant d’envoyer aux autres pour avoir son avis’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

‘The EU tries to bring the donors to a limited number of key messages in the SCADD review. At this strategic level of the national dialogue the EU is considered as a leading actor. They take the initiatives. There they are very active and successful’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

In this sense, the EU sharply contrasts with the WB, which is described as ‘cavalier seul’ (EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012), an actor who ‘only coordinates at its own convenience’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012) and ‘they don’t feel the necessity to coordinate, their idea is that everyone should align to what they do’ (EU9-Burkina Faso, May 2012). The WB staff does not participate as frequently in all the existing coordination mechanisms and there is a strong perception that the WB follows its own path and is not committed to donor coordination.

‘If you work together with the WB, at a certain point they just continue their own way. Maybe they are pushing and willing to collaborate, but when it comes to finally materialize and sign the thing, that’s where it’s always difficult. With the EU it seems to work better when there are joint operations’ (non-EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

‘Every so often they have another opinion about things and then they do it as they like, there might be discussion but there is no harmonization. The WB is not that present in all these donor rounds. I
appreciate the work of the WB, but when they come to do a finding mission, it's not real, things are all made-up, with some minor changes possible' (EU6-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

When the Troika was created on the initiative of the EU, the WB was the first chair. However, the WB preserved its separate dialogue with the government and as a result, in the second Troika the EU replaced the WB and remained part of the Troika for two years\(^{169}\). For example, after coordination amongst the donors on a joint matrix resulted in an agreement on a number of common indicators and measures, the WB did not align to the joint matrix but instead inserted its own indicators\(^{170}\).

Finally, similar to the other country studies, the field research has also revealed the importance of personalities and personal relationships as ‘everybody puts its personality on the process’ (non-EU3- Burkina Faso, May 2012). Examples where given in which a donor, after a change of key persons (like a key economist or a HoC) may change for example from an active into a neutral or a passive actor: ‘this has nothing to do with policy, but only with the change of the “puppets’” (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Coordination is enabled when key positions in the Delegations are occupied by active people with experience, ideas and strategic insights. On the opposite there are people who are more bureaucratic or passive. The coordination role of the EU Delegation is said to be driven to a great extent by some very active individuals:

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\(^{169}\) For example: ‘Même quand la banque était membre de la Troïka, il est apparu souvent que la banque passe à part’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). ‘La Banque Mondiale, souvent on a l'impression qu'elle s'implique malgré elle. Elle a toujours des trucs à part avec le gouvernement. […] Elle s'implique dans la coordination avec la Troïka, elle est là, mais puis elle négocie des choses avec le gouvernement et puis les gens apprennent ça par la suite’ (non-EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

\(^{170}\) ‘The WB tries to impose its agenda on everybody. To have a joint report for the disbursement, we had an agreement on matrices of measures and indicators with all the partners, we only had to wait for the WB, which came with their measures and indicators’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). ‘On essaie de trouver à un certain moment un accord sur une première matrice et ensuite la Banque revient avec d'autres matrices. Celui-là est arrêté souvent, mais au niveau de l'UE, jamais’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). The attitude of the WB is often related to its bureaucratic culture. Although the analytical capacities of the WB are much appreciated, several interviewees found WB staff ‘pretty arrogant’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012): ‘Analytically they are very strong, they have large services here, but always, while their analytical capacities are strong, their empathy is not’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). ‘The EU starts from the assumption that the partners are equal, until evidence to the contrary is provided, whereas the WB, they are superior, and then you have to prove that you are equal’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012). ‘It’s also a matter of culture. In the WB there is a culture of ‘we are the WB and the rest is the rest’. It’s the Bretton Woods attitude which is still there. You don’t find this in the EU. The European culture is more disciplined. If you work together you need to go through steps, genuinely and frankly’ (non-EU2-Burkina Faso, May 2012). A WB representative confirmed this image by pointing at the lack of internal incentives: ‘I’m not evaluated when I take all my time on this topic. I don’t have an incentive within my performance evaluation, they don’t take into account this activity, I don’t have necessarily support from my management to be involved within that, and they don’t recognize the effort I made in the field on this topic’ (non-EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012).
‘C'était le cas par exemple avec [an EU Head of Section]. Quand vous envoyez le document, très rapidement il réagit, il donne son avis, ça permet d'avoir une idée sur l'avis de l'UE’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

Furthermore, the importance of personal relationships for coordination is exemplified by the close professional relationships between staff of the EU Delegation and the French development agency, not only between the EU HoC and the AFD Director, but also between several Heads of Sections or sector specialists. Moreover, the new EU HoD is a former French Ambassador in Niger.

‘C'est quand même avec l'UE qu'on a le dialogue le plus directe, où il a la plus grande proximité […] On peut avoir des divergences de but de l'intervention, mais il y a une très grande complicité interpersonnelle. Elle peut paraître à première vue interpersonnelle, mais par sa continuité, on va dire, elle est plus que ça’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

However, it should be emphasized that these personal factors can only be a deciding factor when other factors are enabling, as a good personal relationship, will rarely enable the facilitation coordination if other factors are not supportive.

Another element is the lack of continuity in the donor agencies illustrated by the change of seven HoCs in Burkina Faso in 2012/13. For example, what has certainly added to the decision for not having joint programming in Burkina Faso for the 11th EDF is the fact that in 2013 a large staff turnover was planned in several Embassies or agencies, including the EU HoC. As a result, the EU Ambassador ‘was afraid for the workload and the knowledge, you need to know people. And several embassies will have new HoCs, so it is not a good moment. So we certainly wanted to do it [joint programming] but because of the staff turnover we didn’t’ (EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012)

6.3.3 Ideational factors

The role that the EU plays in coordination might be dependent on the degree to which actors agree on its functionality and its potential outcomes in terms of aid and development effectiveness. However, different EU donors might have different points of view on aid modalities and development and the ‘right’ level of coordination. In this section I will investigate to what extent EU coordination is enabled or constrained by differing ideas about its effectiveness. Therefore I will consider EU donors’ ideas about aid and development in general and in relation to budget support as well as their ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination.
6.3.3.1 Ideas about aid and development and coordination on budget support

A broad sense of like-mindedness enables EU coordination meetings which are extended to Canada and Switzerland. Different from the three other countries under study, in Burkina Faso Switzerland and Canada are included in EU aid coordination as they are ‘countries of which we think that they have a rather similar approach, we are a coalition of like-minded’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). It is emphasized that there is a general common ground within the Europe-plus group, especially on things like corruption, good governance and human rights. This like-mindedness is contrasted with non-European who have a different approach towards aid: ‘we mostly coordinate with European countries because we see them mostly in the European meetings and we are also a bit more focused on the Paris Declaration and the Code of Conduct. Others, like Japan or China have not the same approach’ (EU9-Burkina Faso, May 2012). ‘Based on our joint message we can try to convince donors outside of our circle’ (EU8-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

However, behind this rather broad level of like-mindedness there is a further distinction amongst European donors which is based on more specific ideas about aid and development, reflected in their preferred aid modalities: ‘likeminded-ness in the broader donor group is determined by the approach: donors who give budget support have different interests than donors who have a more classic project approach’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). This ideational division may explain why more advanced EU coordination such as joint programming is difficult. On the one hand, France provides mainly technical existence and project support, and Germany mainly project support with budget support being only a small share of their total aid package. Luxembourg and Austria do not provide budget support. Their concerns are related to project implementation and their focus is on the local or micro level.

On the other hand, the Commission, Sweden (phasing out), the Netherlands (phasing out) and Denmark have provided a large share of GBS, resulting in an interest in the national strategic level as they aim to reinforce national procedures and capacities of ministries: ‘amongst budget support donors coordination is more tight as it is more binding to do joint evaluation. This is a different type of coordination than project cycle coordination’ (EU8-Burkina Faso, May 2012). However, it should be emphasized that even amongst donors which adhere to more harmonized forms of aid, differences in ideas exist, which might constrain concrete coordination.

First, within the budget support group donors still have different ideas on the eligibility and disbursement criteria. Denmark for example puts strong emphasis on corruption and external control and links budget support to concrete corruption indicators. Yet, different to the situation
in Tanzania and Zambia, budget support in Burkina Faso is less politicized and budget support suspensions in Burkina Faso have been rare.

Second, donors differ in their ideas about how to best organize coordination at sectoral level. For example, in the health sector several donors are operating through a common basket. However, most of these funds are targeted\(^{171}\), there is no sector policy which is connected to the national budget, and joint planning and harmonization is thus hardly possible. In 2012 the Commission decided to initiate sectoral budget support in the health sector, despite strong opposition from the basket donors. While the EU’s choice for sectoral budget support may arguably be driven by a bureaucratic motive too, it is recognized that the EU aims to improve the health system and the way the Burkinabé administration works by better linking central and sector administrations:

“They try to interest donors in the more systemic dimension of the health sector, which is currently rather fragmented. They decided to start with sector budget support, which is a new modality that no other donor supports. [...] They really want to reinforce the national systems and baskets disrupt the institutions” (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

To conclude, there are several indications that the Commission’s commitment to coordination is based on ideas on how to deliver better aid. The EU is actively in search of improving the aid architecture in Burkina Faso. Regarding budget support, it aimed to improve the ‘distorting system’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012) as there was a separate system for follow-up and evaluation of budget support and for the development strategy: ‘so GBS was not seen as an instrument to support the policy, but as an instrument in itself’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). With its sector budget support in the health sector, the EU aims to align sector priorities with the national budget so that ‘the line ministries can go to the ministry of finance, now this is too difficult, line ministries cannot defend themselves against the ministry of finance’ (EU1-Burkina Faso, May 2012). These ideas might conflict with other donors’ ideas on how to make aid more effective, and in that sense constrain coordination.

6.3.3.2 Ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination

EU donors’ ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination influences their commitment to coordination in general as well as their preference for either the EU or the donor-wide/multilateral framework. I will focus first on the ideas about the ‘right’ level of coordination on the one hand, and expectations about the effectiveness of EU coordination on the other hand. Next I will look how these ideas have influenced the development of EU coordination.

\(^{171}\) Except for the Netherlands, who provide un earmarked support to the basket.
First, as argued earlier, donor-wide coordination in Burkina Faso is less advanced than in the previous country studies. Different from Tanzania and Zambia, the EU Delegation is seen as the driving actor for donor-wide coordination. Whereas in Tanzania and Zambia, aid coordination has been driven by a coalition of like-minded Nordic Plus countries, as expected this has not been the case in Burkina Faso. The Nordic Plus donors present in the country believe ‘it’s a pity DFID is not here’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). They see DFID as a locomotive for harmonization and alignment, a donor which is ready to take risks. As Nordic Plus countries in Burkina are only Denmark, the Netherlands (phasing out) and Sweden (phasing out), their critical mass is smaller. France, which could theoretically play a similar role as DFID does in Anglophone countries, has a different approach towards aid and development. The experience of EU donors is that the donor-wide coordination is often ‘ponderous’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

Second, EU coordination in its current form is less contested than in Tanzania and Zambia, although it has not enabled more advanced forms of coordination such as division of labour and joint programming: ‘the EU is a hotbed of ideas and initiatives. It’s more about coordination of ideas than operational coordination’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Like in the other countries there are doubts about the effectiveness of the EU FTI on Division of labour. The EU approach is criticized for being largely a technical exercise.

Even Nordic Plus countries believe the EU level allows for ‘a genuine debate’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012) and serves more soft effects, such as building relationships between HoCs: ‘ça crée des liens entre les chefs de coopération. Des petits trucs qui peuvent être importants’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012). There is a strong conviction amongst EU donors, and also within the EU Delegation, that EU coordination should be part of existing coordination and not function as parallel circuit, despite the fact that some issues are specific to the EU. The fact that the EU Delegation has adopted a pragmatic approach towards EU coordination, by inviting Switzerland and Canada to the table, and by showing its commitment towards donor-wide coordination may add to the perception that the EU is not just coordinating amongst themselves: ‘it is a forum for exchange of information, what is going on, it keeps you informed. But the EU group here is extended with Canada and Switzerland, so in fact it’s more a gathering of the EU and the bilaterals, and bilaterals have more common issues’ (EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012). EU donors thus believe that EU coordination is complementary: ‘it’s good to have an extra platform […] it’s useful to pre-discuss things, to make a tentative proposal’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). Debate within the EU group is found more genuine: ‘we can really say what we want, we can tell each other the truth, it’s very useful to have a sparring-club, a mini-think
tank’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012). This engine function of EU coordination seems to be very important given the diversity of the donor community: ‘EU coordination is complementary and driving to a certain extent’ (EU5-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

6.3.4 Summary

Table 6-7 offers a summary of the analysis conducted in this section and indicates the complex interplay of different factors that enable and constrain EU coordination. In the concluding section I will focus on those factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Burkina Faso.

Table 6-7. Overview of constraining and enabling factors for EU coordination in Burkina Faso

| RQ2: Understanding EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate? |
|---|---|
| **(4) Interest-related factors** | (1a) EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns constrain rather than enable EU coordination  
(1b) EU Delegation’s and France’s dominance and pragmatism, combined with smaller donors rather enabling than constraining |
| **(5) Institutional factors** | (2a) Less advanced existing aid architecture rather enables EU coordination  
(2b) Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines constrain rather than enable EU coordination  
(2c) EU Delegation’s staff capacities are recognized and enabling |
| **(6) Ideational factors** | (3a) Broad consensus on aid effectiveness principles and use of harmonized aid modalities enabling rather than constraining  
(3b) Less diverging ideas about the ‘right’ level of coordination enabling rather than constraining |
6.4 Conclusions

Based on the analysis conducted in this third country chapter, this section will draw conclusions on EU coordination in Burkina Faso.

The chapter has sought to map EU coordination in Burkina Faso, by considering both the internal and the external dimension. Through the analysis conducted in Section 6.2 I have found that

a) EU coordination in Burkina Faso tends to be limited to information sharing, consultation, exchange of ideas and ad-hoc coordinating responses, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension)

b) The EU Delegation acts as a coordination ‘facilitator’ in the donor-wide coordination processes

Based on the analysis conducted in Section 6.3 these findings can be understood as follows.

First, different from Tanzania and Zambia, the internal dimension of EU coordination, which is enlarged to Switzerland and Canada, in terms of information sharing, exchange of ideas, consultation and coordinating responses regarding the policy dialogue is less contested in Burkina Faso. A rather broad sense of like-mindedness within this group of donors enables them to meet and exchange regularly. Burkina Faso is no strategically important country for most EU donors and although EU donors feel domestic pressure to focus more on visibility, this does not seem to pose a constraint on the support of people in the field to engage in EU coordination in its current form. In contrast, the interest to engage in EU coordination may be larger than in Tanzania and Zambia. This is mainly thanks to the EU Delegation’s dominant position as the largest EU donor and the largest provider of budget support as well as its capacities in terms of human resources, which translate into political leverage and act as an enabling factors to raise EU donors’ support for EU coordination. Additionally, although France is a pragmatic actor when it comes to coordination, it has been more supportive for EU coordination than DFID in Tanzania and Zambia. The Nordics Plus are no strong group in Burkina Faso and smaller donors also have an interest to engage in EU coordination because of specific reasons.

However, despite these enabling factors, engaging in more advanced ways of coordination such as joint programming is not taking place in Burkina Faso. Like in the other country studies, institutional barriers constrain donors, but the fact that all donors are in theory able to engage in joint programming, shows that behind these institutional difficulties lay other problems.
Advancing towards joint programming requires high-level political support but the current domestic political and economic context in donor countries seem to have strengthened the concern about their individual visibility and results. Moreover, the different ideas on the preferred use of aid modalities also help to explain why more advanced EU coordination such as joint programming will not be easy. Donors which mainly provide project support are more concerned about project implementation and focus on the local or micro level while budget support donors concentrate on the national strategic level as they aim to reinforce national procedures and capacities of ministries.

Second, as expected, the absence of a well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanism and competing coordination ‘champions’ has enabled the EU to act as a facilitator of donor-wide coordination (external dimension). The EU Delegation seems to have the human and financial resources as well as the commitment to carry the burden of coordination and invest in the institutional building processes and the coordination of donors’ positions at both the EU and the donor-wide level. Besides, the EU Delegation’s need for leverage at the sector level forms an additional enabling factor for investing time and resources in the process. Additionally, the composition of EU donors has further enabled this facilitating role. The EU Delegation, as the biggest donor and the largest provider of budget support, has in several areas received support from the second largest donor, France, and they have often worked in tandem. Next, the third largest EU donor, the Netherlands, which mainly provides sector and general budget support has been more supportive towards the EU’s role than in Tanzania and Zambia, which indicates that its ideational concern about aid effectiveness may have been more important than its scepticism towards the EU. The smaller EU donors as well as non-EU donors Switzerland and Canada have also welcomed the Delegation’s role. Importantly, the Delegation has worked in close cooperation with the Burkinabe government, which has taken a supportive role towards increasing aid effectiveness and donors’ proposals in this regard.
7 EU coordination in Senegal

7.1 Context
This introductory section will consider the context in which EU coordination takes place. As the context inevitably shapes some of the factors that will be discussed further in this chapter, this section is essential for an informed understanding of EU coordination. Moreover, the context sketch indicates that the aid environment in Senegal is more politicized than in other countries, which has inevitably had an impact on the data gathering process and may have influenced the results of this study.

7.1.1 Political, economic, development, and security situation
Senegal is a small French-speaking West-African country which has been recognized for its political stability and democratic transitions, peaceful politics, regional leadership, strong reform-oriented agenda and religious tolerance (Afrodad, 2007a: 11; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012b). For decades the country had not endured any serious crisis and it has been considered a model within the region. It was the first settlement of French merchants in Africa (in 1659) and the country remained the political epicentre of l’Afrique Occidentale Française until its independence in 1960 (Carr, 2012: 5). Despite the decline in annual GDP growth in the past decade and half of the population living under the national poverty line, the WB elevated Senegal to a LMIC in 2010 (World Bank, 2013d).

The country has organized regular elections and with the election of President Wade in 2000 Senegal also experienced political change after nearly forty years of ruling by the Socialist Party. While Wade’s election raised expectations in terms of democratic and economic developments, during his second term, the government increasingly lost credibility and support and was criticized by both the donor community and the Senegalese population for not having met his promises. Despite Senegal’s model role for democratic tradition, under Wade’s presidency democratic institutions deteriorated\(^\text{172}\) and social unrest has grown slowly, especially in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2007\(^\text{173}\), the local elections of 2009 and the presidential elections.

\(^{172}\) Wade is blamed for having strengthened presidential authority over democratic institutions. For example, parliamentary election had been postponed, the national Senate had been re-established with the majority of the Senators being appointed by the President, constitutional changes were made to reduce the term of the chairman of the National Assembly, etc. Wade was also criticized for trying to put forward his son Karim Wade to succeed him as the President of Senegal and appointed him to a cabinet position in 2009.

\(^{173}\) In 2007 opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary elections after they accused the government of irregularities during the presidential elections earlier that year.
of 2011\textsuperscript{174}. As a result ‘in the past few years Senegal’s political and economic systems are becoming increasingly unstable’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012b). Wade has been blamed by Senegalese citizens for traveling around the world ‘to promote his personal diplomatic and development agendas rather than remain in Dakar to deal with the difficult realities facing the government’ (US Embassy Senegal, 2008). The increased criticism is symbolized by the general outcry of the international community and the Senegalese public over the construction of Wade’s African Renaissance monument\textsuperscript{175}. Besides, in the past decade donors have increasingly expressed concerns about the worsened control of corruption indicators (cf. Table 7-1) and the lack of prosecution of corruption cases as well as about the lack of transparency of public expenditure management, in particular the procurement, budgeting and execution of the government’s large infrastructure projects.

Table 7-1. Estimate of Control of Corruption (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} based on WB World Development Indicators

Despite these developments Senegal has remained an important African diplomatic partner for the international community, especially for the EU and the US. Since independence, France and Senegal have maintained close links although the privileged relationship has changed in the past decade. Especially with the arrival of President Wade in 2000 Senegal has adopted a more independent stance towards France and sought to diversify its relations (Chafer, 2003: 1).

Senegal’s economy is based on services (62 per cent), industry (23 per cent) and agriculture (15 per cent) (CIA, 2013). Fisheries provide a major source of income but the sector suffers from decreased fish stocks as a result of overfishing, mainly by foreign fishing trawlers. Senegal has few natural resources except for phosphate and in recent years some gold reserves have been discovered. Despite Senegal’s political, military and cultural importance, the country never functioned as ‘an economic powerhouse’ (Carr, 2012: 65). Commercial interests and foreign investments have remained limited in Senegal except for France. EU’s trade with Senegal represents 0.1 per cent and although this is still a low figure, Senegal ranks 68\textsuperscript{th} on the EU’s list of major trade partners, which is the highest rank of the four countries studied in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{174} In the summer of 2011, Dakar was confronted with civil unrest and anti-government protest against Wade’s proposed constitutional changes that would allow him to get re-elected and go for a third term as a President. Protracted power cuts and frustrations over backsliding public services strengthened anti-government sentiment and instigated riots.

\textsuperscript{175} The costs of the statue are estimated at 25-35 USD and concerns have been expressed about the sale of land to fund the North-Korean construction firm (US Embassy Senegal, 2009b).
(European Commission, 2012f). However, its importance varies across EU Member States (cf. Table 7-2, Table 7-3 and Figure 7-1) and Senegal is mainly important for France. Senegal represents France’s third largest trading partner in West Africa and French companies are the largest investors in the country (Chou & Gibert, 2012: 419). Besides, Senegal is an important country for the fisheries industries of Spain and France (European Commission, 2012c). In 2011 Senegal’s major export partners were Mali (21.9 per cent), India (12.4 per cent), (France 4.6 per cent), and Italy (4.2 per cent), while its major import partners were France (16.7 per cent), China (9.6 per cent), UK (8.4 per cent), Nigeria (8.3 per cent), Netherlands (5.8 per cent), and the US (4.8 per cent) (CIA, 2013). Senegal’s business environment is considered difficult and the country ranks 166 out of 185 countries in the WB’s Ease of Doing Business ranking (World Bank, 2012a).

Table 7-2. Major EU trade partners (percentage of EU15 trade 2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Netherlands 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Belgium 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Spain 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on Eurostat 2012

Figure 7-1. FDI evolution EU donors (2001-2011, USD millions)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years

235
Table 7-3. Total FDI flows EU donors (2001-2011, USD millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total FDI flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on OECD-DAC, 2013

Note: for several donors data on FDI were missing for specific years

In the aftermath of independence, Senegal benefited economically from the special relationship with France, resulting in a continuous flow of funds and commercial advantages. However, in the 1980s and 1990s the country suffered from an enduring crisis, resulting in growing criticism about the benefits of this special relationship as the gains did not filter down to the general population (Chafer, 2003: 8). However, thanks to an economic reform program backed by the donor community, from the end of the nineties until 2005 Senegal’s economy has been fairly stable with an average growth rate of five per cent and relatively low inflation (World Bank, 2013d). Yet, in 2006 growth fell to two per cent and in 2008 the increased fiscal deficit led to a financial crisis, risking the suspension of the IMF programme. Following a call to donors to disburse pledged budget support, France decided to make an exceptional contribution and intervened with an amount of 125 million euro for the recovery of public finance. Ever since economic growth has slowed down and for the general Senegalese public the economic situation has not improved even though the Senegalese PRSP II (2007) had set a target of a growth rate of seven per cent per year in order to halve poverty by 2015. As a remedy, the government launched an accelerated growth strategy in 2007 (Van Criekinge, 2009: 93-94). In 2009 and 2010 economic growth fell again, mainly due to climate factors (heavy rainfalls and drought), an increase in the oil and food prices, energy supply problems and hesitance of donors to disburse budget support (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012b).

Senegal graduated from the HIPC initiative and profited from considerable debt cancelations in 2005 and 2006 (Afrodad, 2007a: 12). However, today, the country still ranks 155 out of 187 countries and the country remains highly aid dependent (UNDP, 2011a) (cf. Figure 7-2). Poverty in the country is still endemic, in 2005 33,5 per cent of the population lived under 1.25 and 60,4

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176 For example, although the Franc zone safeguarded monetary stability, the over-valued currency also resulted in trade deficits (Chafer, 2003: 8).
per cent under 2 USD (PPP) a day, and especially in rural areas poverty has hardly been reduced (World Bank, 2013d).

Figure 7-2. Evolution of aid dependency in Senegal 1996-2010

![Graph showing the evolution of aid dependency in Senegal](image)

*Source:* based on WB World Development Indicators

Senegal is considered a strategically important country. Although the conflict in the Southern region of the Casamance poses a challenge regarding internal security, Senegal is a fairly stable Muslim country and a strategic ally in a rather turbulent region. The country has played a key role in conflict resolution and regional peacekeeping on the continent. In the past Senegal has deployed troops in the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (US Embassy Senegal, 2007b). Furthermore, the country has a fair amount of influence on other African countries and in the Group 77 (Fall, 2004: 2).

Several foreign actors, and in particular the EU and the US, are driven by significant security interests in Senegal. These security concerns offer opportunities for cooperation between the EU and the US (US Embassy Senegal, 2007c). France used to maintain close military relations with Senegal. The Senegalese army has been trained and equipped by France and France had a military base near Dakar from where it started its military actions in the continent. However, the base is closed since 2010. Senegal also used to support the stance of France on international issues in the UN (Fall, 2004: 8). However, in the past decade this relationship has changed considerably, and Senegal has intensified cooperation with the US who have been training Senegalese troops for peace-keeping operations (Chafer, 2003: 10). Senegal’s stance in the Iraq crisis clearly epitomizes this changing geopolitical reality as

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177 However, the base is closed since 2010.
the country refused to support the French opposition to the attack and instead chose to align with the US.

Senegal is also a source, transit and destination for human trafficking and migration. The EU and particularly top destinations France, Spain and Italy have a major interest in tackling the conditions that breed economic migration, especially since the massive migration wave to the Canary Islands in 2006. For Senegal's youth, confronted with high unemployment rates, Europe forms a major attraction to increase their economic opportunities (Chou & Gibert, 2012: 419). The EU has provided assistance to improve coast surveillance and border control and in 2008 the Commission initiated negotiations on a mobility partnership agreement, with the formal support of France, Italy and Spain. The partnership should have managed migratory flows into the EU but negotiations have been suspended in 2009 (Chou & Gibert, 2012: 409). While Spain has shown interest to ‘multilateralize’ migration cooperation, France has preferred to deal with migration on a bilateral basis (Chou & Gibert, 2012: 419).

For the US Senegal represents a major ally in the fight against terrorism because of the predominantly Muslim population and the country’s good relations in the Muslim world178 (US Embassy Senegal, 2007b). The US has implemented a Muslim outreach program and provided military training and assistance under the ACOTA and IMET program. Dakar also serves ‘as an operational base for every US deployment to the region’ and the country represents its ‘most important francophone partner in Africa’ (US Embassy Senegal, 2007b).

7.1.2 Evolution of donor-government relations

After independence, France has maintained a close relationship with the Senegalese elite and interfered in its internal affairs by means of patronage networks and exploitative economic and political policies (Carr, 2012: 5-6). Hence, France has remained Senegal’s first political and economic partner (Fall, 2004: 2). The strong ties were not limited to the economic and political sphere but were also cultivated in cultural and military cooperation. This relationship has been supported by a warm relationship between Senegalese and French leaders (Chou & Gibert, 2012: 419). Senegal’s first President Senghor maintained close personal relations with French President De Gaulle. His successor, Abdou Diouf who came into power in 1980 largely pursued the special relationship and was a close personal friend of President Chirac (Carr, 2012: 86). Arguably, Senegal’s close relationship with France has contributed to its political stability as well as its prestige on the international scene (Chafer, 2003: 2).

178 For example, in 2008 Senegal hosted the Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
However, in the past decade a switch in the privileged Franco-Senegalese relationship has occurred (Carr, 2012: 5-6). Especially with the arrival of President Wade in 2000, Senegal has adopted a more independent stance towards France and sought to diversify its relations (Chafer, 2003: 1). Moreover, with the election of President Sarkozy, France had become less interested in the close ties with Senegal, all the more because Senegal is no leading commercial power in West-Africa (Carr, 2012: 96). Diplomatic relations between France and Senegal deteriorated, as symbolized by several events, most notably the Dakar speech of Sarkozy in 2007 in which he stated that ‘le drame d’Afrique c’est que l’homme africain n’est pas assez entré dans l’histoire’ (Sarkozy, 2007). Several experts have argued that ‘the era of close alignment between the French and Senegalese stances on major international issues of the day is, it seems, definitely over’ (Chafer, 2003: 11). For example, at the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence, when Wade presented his controversial statue *Le monument de la Renaissance Africaine*, French political leaders were not present.

In contrast, Wade has forged key partnerships with the US and the UK and Senegal is the only West-African country which is part of NEPAD (Carr, 2012: 90). Senegal also sought assistance from non-OECD-DAC countries such as China, India and Gulf States. It is argued that ‘Wade has grown impatient with the conditionality attached to traditional western assistance when he can get quicker results elsewhere. He is convinced that large infrastructure projects are the path to accelerated growth and job creation whereas the western donors push (mostly unsuccessfully) for increased investment through an improved business climate’ (US Embassy Senegal, 2007a). In 2008 and 2009 two crises in the donor-government relations occurred, following the budgetary crisis and the construction of the controversial statue *Le monument de la Renaissance Africaine*. Because of the availability of alternative unconditional assistance, ‘traditional’ donors ‘have less leverage in [their] efforts to improve governance, fight corruption and increase transparency’ (US Embassy Senegal, 2007a).

Unlike Burkina Faso, in the past decade Senegal exerted a stronger sense of ownership over national strategies. Senegal’s second PRSP and the *Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée* (SCA) are considered fairly country-owned (Van Criekinge, 2009: 25). Moreover, the country has adopted a more conflictual approach in its relations with the EU. Debates on development cooperation and politics are very much linked. Political dialogue with the government under Article 8 has hardly existed under the Presidency of Wade. According to EU interviewees the government aimed to

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179 See also (Carr, 2012; Van Criekinge, 2009: 53)

180 However, with the election of Hollande in 2012, the relationship might ease again. During his first trip to Africa President Hollande’s first stop was Senegal where he clearly stated his ambition was to intensify the historic relation between both countries.
limit the relationship with the EU to development cooperation and preferred to deal with political issues on a bilateral basis.

7.1.3 Donor landscape

Senegal is marked by a large and heterogeneous donor composition which results in a fragmentation rate of 30 per cent, which is similar to that of Burkina Faso and thus lower than in Tanzania, but higher than in Zambia. Moreover, donors are in general poorly coordinated and mainly provide aid through project support. With procedures not being harmonized, this results in considerable challenges for the government to implement and absorb incoming aid and manage relations with the multiplicity of donors (Van Criekinge, 2009: 95-96).

Senegal has received a large proportion of multilateral aid (cf. Table 7.4), mainly thanks to considerable debt relief in 2005/2006. EU represents 41 per cent of total aid and France has remained the first EU and the first bilateral donor of Senegal representing an overwhelming twenty per cent of total ODA. However, in the late nineties French aid budgets started to decline and the growing disengagement also translated into changes in the donor landscape as Senegal increasingly sought for partnerships such as the US\textsuperscript{181}, China, India and the Gulf States\textsuperscript{182} (Carr, 2012: 64). The Commission is Senegal’s fourth donor and represents six per cent of ODA to Senegal. Senegal is marked by a dominance of ‘European front’ donors, while Nordic Plus donors represent only three per cent of total ODA to Senegal. Furthermore, although a number of donors (namely AfDB, Canada, the Commission, Germany, France, Netherlands, Spain and the WB) had initiated budget support, donors have remained hesitant to disburse this type of aid because of the lack of transparency and accountability of expenditure and budget support in Senegal represented only 13 per cent of total ODA (Gerster & Faye, 2009: 13).

When it comes to the EU donor composition (cf. Table 7-5), as mentioned, France dominates the aid landscape. The second EU donor is the Commission, followed by a group of medium-sized donors (Spain, Germany) which each representing four per cent of total ODA, and a group of smaller donors (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy) which each contribute only two to one per cent of total ODA to Senegal. Furthermore, a comparison of the breakdown of the types of aid provided by the four largest bilateral EU donors shows that the ODA levels from France, Spain and Germany mainly originate from project-type interventions, technical assistance and scholarships (cf. Figure 7-3, Figure 7-4, and Figure 7-5). In contrast, the Netherlands have

\textsuperscript{181} In 2009 the US signed a 540 million USD Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact with Senegal.

\textsuperscript{182} However, figures are not included in official statistics.
supported Senegal mainly through budget support (cf. Figure 7-6). Different from Tanzania and Zambia and similar to Burkina Faso, European front donors have contributed the largest part of EU aid to Burkina Faso. However, based on the country study of Burkina Faso, indicating French pragmatism, because of the France’s dominant position, its stance towards EU coordination might be less supportive in Senegal than in Burkina Faso.

**Figure 7-3. France type of aid average 2010-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of France type of aid.](chart1)

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

**Figure 7-4. Spain type of aid average 2010-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of Spain type of aid.](chart2)

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
Figure 7-5. Germany type of aid average 2010-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Figure 7-6. Netherlands type of aid average 2010-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

242
Table 7-4. Total donors’ contribution 2002-2010 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All donors Total</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>12129</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries Total</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>5855</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Total</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>6242</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DAC Countries Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Donors Total</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>4977</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Plus Donors Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. IDA 358 3577 29%
2. France 246 2462 20%
3. AfDF 103 1033 9%
4. EU Institutions 79 788 6%
5. United States 64 645 5%
6. IMF 58 460 4%
7. Japan 57 567 5%
8. Spain 51 506 4%
9. Germany 43 433 4%
10. Canada 37 373 3%
11. Netherlands 26 255 2%
12. Belgium 20 198 2%
13. Kuwait (KFAED) 16 32 0%
14. Luxembourg 15 135 1%
15. Global Fund 13 119 1%
16. AfDB 11 53 0%
17. BADEA 8 8 0%
18. Italy 8 79 1%
19. Korea 7 43 0%
20. UNDP 6 50 0%
21. Denmark 5 27 0%
22. GAVI 5 26 0%
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23. UNICEF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Switzerland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
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<td>25. UK</td>
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<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Austria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Nordic Dev.Fund</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. UNFPA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. WFP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. OFID</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. IBRD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. WHO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. UNAIDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
Table 7-5. EU donors’ contribution 2002-2010 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions),
gross disbursements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Donors Total</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>4977</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total European Nordic Plus</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total European Front</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>3245</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2462</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Dev.Fund</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
7.1.4 Existing donor-wide coordination

Senegal has actively contributed to the High Level forums on aid effectiveness in Rome and Paris as well as in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and in particular in the subgroup on the monitoring of the Paris Declaration. Senegal has also been one of the six pilot countries to receive a mission of the Working Party to test its tools (Afrodad, 2007a: 9). Nevertheless, despite efforts in the aftermath of the Paris Declaration and some progress made, coordination and harmonization in Senegal have remained limited and largely based on informal initiatives. Projects represent the main aid modality with budget support being limited to only 15 per cent of total ODA in 2010-2011 (OECD-DAC, 2013) and disbursement have been continuously delayed resulting in high aid volatility. Joint funding arrangements or delegated cooperation are scarce and represent only three per cent of total ODA (OECD-DAC, 2013). The existing frameworks for coordination are characterized by limited participation of the government (Van Criekinge, 2009: 96). Building on the educated guesses elaborated in the first part of this thesis, Senegal’s existing donor-wide coordination may enable the scope for EU coordination. Table 7-6 presents an overview of the key initiatives on aid coordination in Senegal which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

### Table 7-6. Overview of key moments for aid coordination in Senegal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Key Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00s</td>
<td>2000: interim PRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002: PRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003: annual meetings to review the PRSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003: Installation of Global Meeting of Consultation of Development Partners (RGCPD), Groupe Elargi or G 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007: PRSP II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008: Aid Effectiveness Action plan by government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009: Consultative Committee of the Technical and Financial Partners (CCPTF) or G 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 Arrangement Cadre des Appuis Budgétaires (ACAB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009: donor mapping exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Donor coordination in Senegal on national-strategic level is related to the implementation of the PRSP takes place in the G50 (Groupe Elargi des PTF) and the G12 (Comité de Concertation des Partenaires Techniques et Financiers (CCPTF). Donors are organized in thematic donor groups
and there are also joint government-donor working groups at sectoral level (Cadres de concertation). The government has adopted an Aid Effectiveness Action plan (2008-2010), and drafted an aid policy which this has not yet been adopted.

First, Senegal’s PRSP is the principal framework for donors’ interventions. In 2003 donors and the government agreed to have annual meetings to improve coordination on the review the PRSP, which was approved in 2002. Donor coordination was led by UNDP and the WB who used to convene the donor community three to four times a year in the RGCPD, Groupe Elargi or G50. G50 serves as an information sharing platform and aims to implement the principles of the Paris Declaration, to facilitate the dialogue with the government and to coordinate donors’ contributions to the preparations and reviews of the PRSP. However, regular annual reviews had not taken place and the coordination mechanism was found inefficient.

Because of the malfunctioning and mismanagement of the G50, a sub-group of donors consisting of the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada and the US, took the initiative to establish of a more efficient institutional framework to monitor the implementation of the PRSP. These donors were concerned that G50 would not be able to coordinate donors effectively on the preparations of Senegal’s new PRSP and the SCA. They elaborated the design of a formal sub-group, who could prepare common positions for the G50 and work on new terms of reference. In January 2009, the CCPTF or G12 was established to complete the consultation mechanism of development partners. It was designed in order to act as an intermediate device which prepares common positions for the G50. It is stated that G12 worked well towards the preparation of the new PRSP and encouraged the G50 to accept the comments of the sub-group. Simultaneously a small working group (EU, Germany and France) elaborated new Terms of References for the G50, which foresee a rotating double presidency and obliges the presidency to represent the common positions agreed upon by the donor community. Early 2011, the EU and Canada became the first co-presidents of the renewed G50. As a result of the new donor coordination architecture, G50 meetings are not taking place in the WB anymore, but moved to the EU premises.

Second, the new PRSP clearly stated Senegal’s preference for budgetary support, in line with the recommendations of the Paris Declaration. Besides, the Strategy expects the integration of projects into sectoral programs or commons baskets. The government on their part would install a coordination authority in the Ministry of Finance and economy (Afrodad, 2007a: 18). In 2008 seven donors (Germany, EU, France, Netherlands, Spain, WB and AfDB) tried to elaborate a common framework for more harmonized Budget Support (ACAB). The EU used to be the first
chair of the group and had the ambition to agree on a common matrix of indicators which would facilitate the policy dialogue and better align disbursements. However, this did not succeed due to firm disagreement within the donor group, especially between the EU and the WB, and because of the lack of engagement of the government. The group could not coordinate their views on the disbursement cycle nor agree on joint conditions and measures. As a result coordination never took place in a systematic way.

Third, despite the existence of thematic and sector groups, sector coordination in Senegal is in general not rather weak. The groups are mainly of consultative nature and focus on the exchange of information rather than on coordination of actions and interventions (Afrodad, 2007a: 19). The country is not familiar with sector-wide program-based approaches but in recent years Senegal has tested this approach in the areas of education, health and PFM (Afrodad, 2007a: 14). However, it should be noted that there are some good practices, notably in the water sector, where coordination is organized around the Programme d’Eau Potable et d’Assainissement pour le Millénaire (PEPAM) and includes regular dialogue between the government, civil society, donors and the private sector.

Fourth, while a donor mapping exercise has been donor by EU donors, the US, Canada and Japan, no further steps are taken towards better division of labour.

Finally, it should be added that informal and formal political coordination between US and EU diplomats is rather strong and is exemplified by regular joint positions on political issues and regular briefings of bilateral discussions with the government (US Embassy Senegal, 2009a, 2010). Especially in the last years of Wade’s second term, donors have coordinated their efforts to put pressure on the administration ‘by drawing on a common set of talking point condemning corruption to raise the level of intolerance for it’ (US Embassy Senegal, 2010)

Existing studies of aid coordination in Senegal explain the lack of progress by the both the behaviour of donors and problems of internal organization and constraints in the government such as the lack of a clear linkage between PRSP indicators, the action plans and the budget (Afrodad, 2007a: 18; Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2008).

‘Look at the capacity in general of the government, in terms of human resources, in terms of capacities, expertise. It’s very difficult, and sometimes donors forget that. They have to receive all that, different speeches, different agendas, different everything, and different procedures’ (non-EU1-Senegal, June 2012).
Besides the constrained capacities of the government most EU donors tend to emphasize the government’s lack of committed to aid coordination. According to most interviewees, despite Senegal’s formal support to the international aid effectiveness agenda, the government prefers bilateral relationships over a coordinated donor forum. The rather negative donor perception of government’s commitment to aid coordination might also be influenced by the changing pattern in the relationship between the government and the ‘traditional’ development partners. In recent years, Senegal has increasingly looked for diversification in its relations and became less dependent on its traditional partners.

‘Coordination is the business of the government and in Senegal it is more than weak. […] I don’t see one sector where the coordination is led by the government in this country. […] the government has managed to keep the impression, or to build the image that they were a good student, which is totally fake. It’s lip service’. You have lots of work plans for aid effectiveness, for this and that, but in fact there is no ownership. It’s just fake documents’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

‘The government has no role in donor coordination. The previous government preferred projects, as much as possible, from as many donors as possible, so that they were able to go “donor-shopping” and they did not want that donors aligned things. […] They preferred personal relationships, so ministers tried to build a good relationship with a certain donor, to have some sort of unique relationship from which they could extract a lot of money’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

‘The government has unfortunately quite an old-fashioned approach: “diviser pour mieux régner”, if you have more partners and no coordinated approach and no division of labour, it can be easy to get especially money for administrative costs from different partners’ (EU2-Senegal, June 2012).

7.1.5 EU cooperation with Senegal

The EU’s cooperation with Senegal currently includes GBS, projects and technical assistance (see Figure 7-8). Under the 10th EDF the EU committed 288 million euros to Senegal, targeted its

183 For example, at a certain moment, Germany financed a trip to Rwanda for of official of the Ministry of Finance ‘to teach them how you coordinate a donor community’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012). This resulted in a draft Aid Policy in which principles like concentration were put forward. However, the policy was never adopted.

184 Other accounts underlining this include: ‘If the government would say, ok, I don’t want more than 5 active donors in the sector, let’s say in a big sector; I don’t want more than 5 donors in education. If they are 5 I want a lead donor, if they are more than 5, then you give a mandate, I don’t want more than 5 operating donors. Then we will be obliged to do this. But in Senegal it’s not the case’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012). ‘The problem is the government. Because if the government was able to say this is my ten year planning for water, if you want to be in that sector, you will comply with this or you will go out. […] Since the government doesn’t have the lead, donors can play their own agenda’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012). ‘I think the government has an interest to keep the aid fragmented’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012). ‘Up to now the government has never played a role to enforce donors to conduct consequent policies or to further donor coordination and harmonization’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).
assistance at regional integration and trade and sanitation and committed to provide 52 per cent of its total aid package through budget support. Besides, non-focal sectors include migration, governance and cultural actions (European Commission - Government of Senegal, 2007). EU aid is said to be aligned to the government’s national strategy by focusing on growth, social services, good governance and rule of law. However, despite the formal commitment to move away from project support and different from the other country cases, budget support encompasses only 22 per cent of the EU’s total aid disbursements due to continuous suspensions and delays because the conditions were judged to be not met (OECD-DAC, 2013; Van Crickinge, 2009: 95).

Figure 7-7. EU Institutions aid 2002-2011 (Constant prices (2010 USD millions), gross disbursements)

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
7.2 RQ1: Mapping EU coordination

In this section, I will analyse the extent to which the EU coordinates in Senegal by looking at the internal and external dimension of EU coordination.

7.2.1 Internal dimension

In the following paragraphs the internal dimension of EU coordination will be outlined, including EU coordination in the programming phase, but primarily EU coordination during implementation. Thereby I will consider information sharing and consultation, common positions, the FTI on Division of Labour and budget support. Also more informal ways of EU coordination will be explored. Finally, a sketch of the variety of EU donors’ attitudes towards EU coordination will be provided.

Similar to the other country studies coordination in the programming phase hardly exists. For the programming of the 10th EDF no joint analysis amongst EU donors had taken place. Whereas joint programming will not take place in Senegal under EDF 11, Member States have agreed to carry out a joint analysis of the government’s development strategy, which will serve as the basis for the EU’s CSP. The joint analysis will cover nine sectors and each sector analysis is conducted under the lead of one donor. Where possible this analysis is based on existing sector reviews. For example, for the water sector, the analysis will be based on the existing analytical work done by the water sector donors in the framework of the PEPAM programme. However, there are no commitments to engage in a joint EU response strategy or any form of joint programming.

Source: based on OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System
Since 2008, coordination in the implementation phase is pursued through regular meetings of HoCs. Different from Burkina Faso, EU meetings are limited to EU donors only and their frequency is lower as meetings take place every two months on average. Member States without a cooperation programme (like UK, Romania, Portugal) participate in these ‘Groupe Europe’ meetings too and delegate their counsellors or deputy ambassadors. It was stated that these meetings are mostly dominated by contributions of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and to a lesser extent France, which is not very active at this level: ‘the French are rather silent in these meetings’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

Firstly, EU meetings are mainly used to share information. EU donors present their current and expected programs and the EU Delegation renders account for its choices related to the programming and implementation of the EDF.

Secondly, Groupe Europe discusses internal EU issues such as the FTI on Division of Labour or the EU’s annual report on EU cooperation on which Member States’ are invited to comment.

‘Europe is just EU and EU members and we only talk about subjects that interest only us, for example EDF, Division of labour inside Europe, more detailed information about what we do, each of us’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012).

The EU Delegation took the first step to initiate a donor mapping exercise, including an analysis of comparative advantages. However, after the mapping exercise no further steps were taken. While not systemic there are some good practices in terms of operational coordination such as delegated cooperation between the EU and AFD and GIZ and in the near future most probably between Luxembourg and Belgium.185 Besides, different from the other country studies, in Senegal, the exit strategy of the Netherlands was coordinated with the EU. The Netherlands are an important donor in the environmental sector, where they intervene by means of sector budget support. The EU will partly meet the loss of aid in the environmental sector under EDF 11.

Thirdly, EU donors try to come to common positions when tends to happen more regularly than in the other countries. For example, when the EU Delegation wanted to take over the chairmanship of the G50, it was agreed that no other EU donor would submit a candidature, but instead support the candidature of the EU Delegation, a move which was not well received by UNDP. It was emphasized by many interviewees that EU Member States often speak with one voice, especially when it comes to governance issues.

185 Belgium plans to delegate to Luxembourg in the field of vocational training whereas Luxembourg would delegate to Belgium in the water sector.
‘In general we try to provide a consensual position in most of the subjects where Member states are involved. Most of EU donors work together in good governance, good economic governance. So most of us, we need some improvements of this sector, just for telling our Head office in Madrid or Paris to carry on with the support, budget support, project and program support and others. For having this, we have to be consensual. If any of us thinks that improvements are different things, the Senegalese government cannot give different answers to this, so we have to be consensual, and when we have the meetings with the Senegalese government, we decide to make consensual speaking points and normally it's the EU who makes it’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012).

‘Usually Member States they speak with one voice on policy, on governance issues’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012)

This is also perceived to a certain extent from the outside:

‘I think it's less cacophony than before. Before you had less group, the bilaterals were scattered everywhere, now it’s, I don’t know, you have this cooperation meetings with the EU, regularly, I think it has been very beneficial. […] In many instances the EU would take position for the EU and the Member States. From outside it is perceived like that by others. From inside it's probably another story. So it depends where you are’ (non-EU1-Senegal, June 2012).

Furthermore, EU aid is only to a limited extent provided through harmonized aid modalities, such as budget support or joint funding arrangements.

Different from Tanzania and Zambia and similar to Burkina Faso no EU interviewee expressed an interest in cutting back EU coordination. Even the Netherlands, known for their critical stance towards EU coordination in Tanzania and Zambia, were more positive towards EU coordination. However, different from Tanzania and Zambia, where the EU Delegation’s HoC acted as strong believers of EU coordination, in Senegal, the EU Delegation has adopted a slightly more pragmatic stance towards EU coordination. Also, different from Burkina Faso, France is perceived as a rather passive participant of EU coordination meetings and clearly aims to safeguard its bilateral relationship.
### 7.2.2 External dimension

Apart from specific EU coordination, EU donors participate in the donor-wide coordination processes of the G50, G12 and the various sub-groups. To assess EU coordination we should take into account this external dimension. I will describe this external dimension by considering the EU Delegation’s perceived engagement in the institution-building and development of these processes as well as the added value of EU coordination (internal dimension) for the donor-wide coordination process (external dimension).

First, previous research on role of the EU in Senegal has pointed at an engine role of the EU in the on-going coordination efforts: ‘the Commission has led efforts to develop frameworks for increasing dialogue amongst donors and between the donor community and the government’ (Van Criekinge, 2009: 100). The field research confirmed that, although coordination in Senegal remains limited, the EU has at several times initiated initiatives to advance overall coordination.

> ‘Elle joue le rôle d'animateur, ce rôle clé dans le dispositif de concertation des partenaires au Sénégal. Aussi sur certaines secteurs clés, il est très actif, tous ce qui est finances publiques, tout ce qui est appuis budgétaires’ (non-EU2-Senegal, June 2012).

As outlined in Section 7.1.4, before 2009 overall donor coordination was led by UNDP and the WB who used to convene the donor community three to four times a year in the G50. The G50 has served as an information sharing platform and aims to implement the principles of the Paris Declaration, to facilitate the dialogue with the government and to coordinate donors’ contributions to the preparations and reviews of the PRSP. However, both EU and a number of non-EU donors found that communication, exchange of information and coordination was not effective under the lead of the co-presidency of UNDP and the WB. In practice, these meetings consisted of two major briefings by both multilaterals, UNDP on the security situation and WB on the macro-economic situation. After these briefings, many donors left the meetings. As the donor landscape in Senegal is very heterogeneous it was considered very difficult to actually come

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less EU coordination</th>
<th>EU Delegation</th>
<th>More EU coordination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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**Figure 7-9. EU donors’ attitude towards EU coordination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>EU Delegation</th>
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254
to a common position when, for example, donors wanted to react on a policy document of the government. According to interviewees, both multilaterals did not show enough commitment to coordinating donors’ positions: ‘they were only concerned about themselves, they were not engaged to coordinate the bigger group and try to come to common positions’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012). As a result, sub-groups were formed on an ad-hoc basis to prepare a common position, but they did not have a formal mandate. Moreover, some donors (mainly EU) had another concern about the previous co-presidency. As UNDP and the WB are limited by their mandate, they were not able to raise political questions or issues like corruption and pass these messages to the government: ‘the UN was too soft in its declarations’ (EU8-Senegal, June 2012). For example, during the annual review, the G50 had coordinated a key message for the government, but in the end the UN representative gave another speech without conveying these concerns. The WB was criticized for being interested in coordination ‘only when others are align with them’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

Because of the malfunctioning and mismanagement of the G50, some donors, namely the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada and the US, took the initiative to change the situation and established the G12 to prepare the work for the G50. Simultaneously a small working group (EU, Germany and France) elaborated new Terms of References for the G50 and early 2011, the EU and Canada became the first co-presidents of the renewed G50. While it is considered too early to judge whether these changes will lead to more efficient consensus building and dialogue with the government on the long term, both EU and non-EU donors stated that the co-presidency under the EU and Canada in the G50 has facilitated the dialogue: ‘there are more genuine discussions now and not just informative briefings’ (non-EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

G50 now meets on a monthly basis in the premises of the EU and donors succeed to come to some common positions. For example, during the review of the 2nd PRSP, after frank debates, donors agreed on a joint letter to the government with their comments. Also during the preparations for the 3th PRSP, donors agreed on common comments. For example, under the lead of the EU, a common position was reached on the growth scenario, which resulted in an amendment in the final document186. Moreover, the EU coordinated some political joint

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186 In the first version of the new PRSP, the government estimated the growth rate for 2012 at 7 per cent, a figure which was considered unrealistic by the donor community. In the donors’ response they asked the government to include a pessimistic scenario in which the growth rate is foreseen to reach only 4 per cent.
messages, for example on the reform of the Court of Auditors\textsuperscript{187} or on the decision of the government to suspend the Headquarters’ agreement for international NGOs\textsuperscript{188}.

The EU also played a key role in the attempt to better coordinate budget support. In 2008 the EU Delegation, Germany, and the Netherlands worked out a draft protocol defining harmonized disbursement conditions, policy dialogue and a joint working calendar. Proposals were first discussed in this EU framework. Next, the EU group has invited non-EU budget support donors to join. The EU used to be the first chair of the group but the group could not coordinate their views on the disbursement cycles nor agree on joint conditions and measures. According to the EU ‘the WB has been deceiving, they have pretended they were interested to develop a joint matrix but at the end of the day they said they were no longer interested’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012). Moreover, France decided to withdraw as it was not foreseen that they would intervene any longer in the modality of budget support\textsuperscript{189}. As a result coordination never took place in a systematic way. There were no regular meetings, and no joint monitoring or evaluations.

‘Ça a été un échec cuisant, il faut le dire. C’est un instrument qui a été fortement porté par la Délégation de l’UE. Forcément parce que eux ils intervenaient majoritairement à l’appui budgétaire. A l’époque, son poids était composé de 50 pour cent d’appui budgétaire, donc très impliqué dans cet exercice. Ça a été la première désillusionnée on va dire, la Délégation de l’UE’ (EU6-Senegal, June 2012).

However, during the political crises between the Senegalese government and the donor community in 2008 and in 2009 the group raised its voice and somehow acted as the spokesperson of the wider donor community, as they could justify their stance by the fact that they were directly supporting the budget: ‘ACAB’s only function was to further the dialogue with the government but not more than that’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012). The crises also led to internal disagreement amongst EU donors as the EU Delegation’s position was considered too political. The crisis emphasized the differing positions in the donor community

\textsuperscript{187} The reform of the founding text of the Court of Auditors was one of the necessary reforms Senegal had to implement to receive support from the IMF.

\textsuperscript{188} In September 2011 Wade decided to suspend headquarters agreements of NGOs, without prior consultation but the measure was cancelled in October 2011. Wade’s move came after human rights NGOs had actively campaigned against a third mandate for the President and the manifestations in front of the National Assembly on 23 June 2011 (Diene, 2011; Ndong, 15 September; Sarr Diakhaté, 2011).

\textsuperscript{189} However, France did provide ‘exceptional’ (in terms of amount, decision making and implementation) budget support in 2008 and 2012. In 2008, France intervened with an amount of 125 million euro for the recovery of public finance and in 2012 President Sarkozy decided to intervene with a an amount of 130 million euro after the regime change as the previous regime under President Wade had left a huge gap in public finance.
'Les appuis budgétaires enfin, il y a un moment où ça devient une décision politique d’appuyer un pays. […] Si tout va mal et les décisions devient politique de dire, on verse ou appuie, ou on ne verse pas parce que les critères ne sont pas remplis' (EU5-Senegal, June 2012)

As a result, in 2010, the Netherlands were appointed as the chair of the group. While ACAB officially ended in 2010, the donor group was still used to discuss positions on public finance, which results in an overlap with the existing thematic group on public finance, where coordination is considered tight. Recently, in June 2012, Canada took over the chair of ACAB and donors are still negotiating about a new framework.

The EU Delegation also took the first step to initiate a donor mapping exercise, including an analysis of comparative advantages. The mapping exercise was done first among EU countries but the EU then also succeeded to take on board other donors, like Canada, the US and Japan. However, after the mapping exercise no further steps were taken yet.

Finally, the EU has also taken several lead positions in the donor-wide coordination framework. It has chaired the G12 and G50, as well as some sector groups, mainly public finance and more recently environment and energy.

Second, EU coordination is perceived to be complementary to donor-wide coordination. In general ‘the Groupe Europe is more an EU internal coordination group’ (EU2-Senegal, June 2012). It was stated that EU coordination is not used to structure the dialogue with other donors or with the government. There are rarely pre-discussions about the follow-up of the country’s PRSP at this level, as this happens in the framework of the G50, with preparations being done in the G12:

‘Groupe Europe is really about the European process, internal process: division de travail, présentation de coopération, préparation du nouveau FED, c’est peut-être une mauvaise perception que j’ai mais pour moi c’est plutôt sur des actions consensuels qu’une manière de structurer en amont le dialogue’ (EU5-Senegal, June 2012).

However, as outlined in this section, there have been some instances of where the EU framework has served as an instrument to drive things forward at the donor-wide level. This is exemplified by the establishment of the G12 and the Troika system in the G50, the initiation of a donor mapping exercise to facilitate division of labour, and, despite the eventual failure, in the area of budget support, where a coalition of EU donors initiated a process towards further harmonization.
7.2.3 Main findings

Table 7-7 offers an overview of EU coordination in Senegal. In what follows I will focus on the main findings which form the basis for the remainder of this chapter.

**Table 7-7 Overview of EU coordination in Senegal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal dimension: to what extent does the EU coordinate?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programming phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint multiannual programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF 10: no joint programming, no joint analysis by EU donors, but separate response strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF 11: no joint programming, programming did not started yet, but will again be limited to a joint analysis of Senegal’s development strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation phase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular bi-monthly HoC meetings, info on EDF, EU donors’ bilateral programs, monitoring EU policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU framework not used for coordinated initiatives, although there are efforts at HoMs level to better coordinate the policy dialogue related to budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTI on Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Facilitator: Commission, Supporting: France, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly technical reporting exercise, donor mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small number of delegated cooperation agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain have provided budget support, albeit to a limited extent. Netherlands are phasing out. Harmonization of budget support is limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External dimension: to what extent does the EU contribute to donor-wide coordination processes?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing and policy dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegation acts as an initiator for donor-wide coordination, exemplified by the establishment of the G12 and the Troika system in the G50 and dialogue on monitoring of the national development strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegation initiated a donor mapping exercise to facilitate division of labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegation, Germany and Netherlands played an initiator role to improve coordination on budget support but exercise largely failed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, similar to the other country studies EU coordination in the programming phase hardly exists, although in the context of EDF 11 Member States have agreed to carry out a joint analysis of the government’s development strategy. Coordination in the implementation phase is institutionalized through regular meetings of EU HoCs which take place every two months on average. Member States without a cooperation programme (like UK, Romania, Portugal) participate in these ‘Groupe Europe’ meetings too. EU meetings are mainly used to share
Second, the EU Delegation in Senegal is more than ‘just another donor’ and plays an initiator role in donor-wide coordination. The EU has played a key role in the attempt to better coordinate the monitoring of the Senegalese PRSP and budget support. However, different from Burkina Faso, while the EU's initiatives have led to some improvements in the area of the monitoring of the PRSP, its initiatives have not resulted in major improvements of the aid coordination system, as illustrated by the failure to establish a more coordinated approach to budget support, suggesting that its proactive role is not sufficient for the coordination exercise to proceed. As such, in the area of budget support, the EU Delegation has not been able to develop its initiator role into a facilitator role, unlike the Delegation in Zambia.

7.3 RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

This section aims for a deeper understanding of the main findings developed in the previous section. More specifically, this part will investigate the factors that help to explain why

a) EU coordination in Senegal tends to be limited to information sharing, consultation and ad hoc coordinating responses, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension)

b) The EU Delegation acts as a coordination ‘initiator’ in the donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension)

As outlined in the first part of this thesis I will thereby consider interest-related, institutional and ideational factors. In the end of this chapter I will conclude on the enabling and constraining factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Burkina Faso in order to gain understanding of both opportunities and limitations for EU coordination at country level.

7.3.1 Interest-related factors

Literature suggests that donors’ domestic politics, as well as their search for political influence might influence donors’ commitment to actually engage in a coordinated approach. This section
will therefore examine to what extent EU donors’ interests may affect their attitude towards EU coordination and thus act as enabling or constraining factors.

### 7.3.1.1 EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns

First, for several EU Member States political relations with Senegal are considered important and EU cooperation with Senegal is said to be ‘tied to a specific, frequently short-term or election-centred, reading of Member States’ national policy priorities’ (Chou & Gibert, 2012: 420). Whereas Senegal has remained an aid-dependent country with high poverty rates, it has been portrayed as a ‘beacon of democracy and stability’ (Ashton, 2012) and an important diplomatic partner in terms of security (migration, regional security). For example, like in the other country studies, the Netherlands have decided to phase out their development cooperation with Senegal, but, similar to Tanzania, and different from Zambia and Burkina Faso, diplomatic relations will be maintained and the Embassy will not close down. In general EU donors have a shared interest in maintaining the image of Senegal as a success story in terms of democracy and security and have dealt with political and security interests in a European framework. However, France has adopted a rather ambiguous attitude towards donor coordination.

During the field research interviewees were not hesitant to state that development cooperation serves the political objectives of the EU and aid is used as an instrument of their political cooperation. Even the EU Delegation is said to pursue a more political approach and even takes the lead in connecting development objectives to political objectives. While in the other countries the EU was often criticized for being a technocratic donor, in Senegal the opposite occurred as some Member States have blew the whistle on the EU Delegation for having a too political approach. However, in general, Member States welcome this political stance: ‘the approach they have given to the G50 is better than the approach given by the multilateral actors UNDP and WB, who don’t have the political approach’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012).

EU donors in Senegal include three major Member States, namely France, Spain and Germany and, whereas domestic politics and visibility towards the national constituency is important for all donors, different from smaller countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg, these larger Member States have a broader agenda which includes a desire to play a political role in Senegal. For example, Senegal’s geographic location makes it an important hub for migration into the EU and especially France, Italy and Spain have an interest to fight back illegal immigration. As mentioned earlier, while Spain and Italy have shown interest in dealing with these issues at the EU level, France has preferred bilateral cooperation. Although the Franco-Senegalese relation has changed
France’s historic interests in the country remain significant. French companies have also remained the largest foreign investors in the country. France has in general remained more reluctant towards EU coordination: ‘si on se met pas trop dans le groupe on peut avoir une position seule qui va au gouvernement, aider à avoir peut-être quelque chose plus favorable’ (EU7-Senegal, June 2012).

The strategic importance of Senegal facilitates coordination for donor-related objectives, but constrains coordination in terms of aid effectiveness. Similar to the other country studies, the objectives of EU coordination are mainly donor-related. While information-sharing and transparency are considered as the first step towards better coordinated aid and aid effectiveness, other goals seem to overshadow interviewees’ narratives. However, more than in the other countries Senegal, EU coordination on aid is closely linked to coordination on political issues and this level of coordination is perceived to have gained importance. In contrast, references related to development effectiveness were rather scarce.

This is exemplified by the fact that the donor coordination in Senegal differs from the coordination processes in the other country studies, in the sense that it is mainly a forum for political dialogue amongst donors than an attempt to improve coordination of aid delivery.

‘In West-Africa, […], because of the presence, very strong presence of France, you don’t have the same extreme form of donor coordination of common funds. Although we discussed at the meetings, but it was never, […] they created very small baskets of budget support, it was not like what they did in Anglophone countries. Francophone countries, politically are more linked to old colonial power and the donor coordination is more oriented to talking on policies, diplomacy, not like practical discussions on how much, who operates the fund, common baskets and so on, like in Zambia’ (non-EU3-Senegal, June 2012)

This is also visible in the coordination mechanism on budget support, ACAB, which has never worked as a framework to jointly monitor implementation, but instead became a political forum for budget support donors to increase leverage, for example during the crises in the relations with the government in 2008 and 2009.

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190 Arguably, since the nineties, and in particular with the entry into force of President Wade, Senegal has experienced a growing French disinterest in the country (Carr, 2012: 81). This has materialized for example in a decline in the close personal friendship that used to characterize the political relationship between Senegal and France. The shift away from the special relationship is exemplified by the absence of French political leaders at former president Senghor’s funeral, an event that has been interpreted as an insult by both Senegalese leaders and the broader population (Carr, 2012: 82). For example, the relationship between Sarkozy and Wade was very tense, as exemplified by its Dakar speech in 2007. The controversial speech of Sarkozy clearly confirmed the shift in Franco-Senegalese relations.
Furthermore, like in the other country studies, EU donors have an interest to engage in EU coordination in order to monitor how the Commission is spending Member States’ tax money. Especially Germany and the Netherlands have actively supported EU coordination meetings in order to be consulted and have information on how EDF funds are spent. Conversely, the EU uses these donor consultations to generate support for their plans, which Member States have to approve in Brussels. The accountability need also influenced the EU’s push for a reform of the donor coordination architecture which was led by UNDP and the WB, as it was felt by EU donors that those multilateral bodies were not able to represent their concerns in the dialogue with the government.

Second, Senegal’s strategic importance translates into visibility concerns to demonstrate that EU donors’ money is yielding results. Arguably, EU coordination is driven by a need to legitimate and raise support for EU development cooperation with Senegal and show that it contributes to Senegal’s status as one of Africa’s few success stories in terms of political stability, democracy and security: ‘European citizens are knowing about big spending in cooperation, so European politics are saying, don’t worry we are going to coordinate’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012). From the outside, the EU’s commitment to coordination is said to be driven by an interest to be visible:

‘Some donors have more ambition than others in terms of coordination because there institution is asking for more visibility in coordination, so the EU, that is very clear, I can see that very well. Which is fine, but you know, […] that should not be the main objective of coordination, the visibility. […] if you take the WB for example, they are not very active in coordination, but they do a lot in terms of reforms etc. So they are an active donor. But maybe on their agenda coordination is not that strong as it is politically strong as in the EU for example. […] I understand very well the position of the EU, because the Delegation has to represent the EU Member States, and they work hard on the Division of Labour etc. Which is very fine. If you want to have more political leverage and represent more donors, of course you have to have more visibility, that goes with that. But probably a good equilibrium, balance… Here in particular it’s sometimes perceived as it is too much a fight of, you know what I mean, sometimes it’s too much for what it should be. Because at the end of the day what is important is the harmonization of procedures, you know, all the Paris Declaration indicators, and to be a strong voice, representing everybody’ (non-EU1-Senegal, June 2012).

7.3.1.2 EU donors’ influence in Senegal

In the past decade EU donors’ leverage in Senegal has declined which has enabled tighter coordination amongst EU donors at the political level. Different from the other country studies, there are no strong disagreements about whether increased coordination should be pursued in an
EU framework or not, although it should be noted that France has often taken a backseat. In contrast, this has not enabled more coordination of EU donors’ aid delivery to the country, not only because aid is politicized and donors aim to keep flexibility and control of their development cooperation, but also because the government’s preference for dealing with donors on a bilateral basis constrains the impact of coordination efforts.

Under the Presidency of Wade (2000-2012) Senegal has sought to diversify its foreign relations, including with China and the Gulf States, and exerted a stronger sense of ownership. The government has found access to alternative sources of funding without strings attached. Besides, it is argued that the Wade administration preferred to deal with its ‘traditional’ donors on a bilateral basis and did not take a leadership role in the field of aid coordination.

This has forged EU donors to better coordinate their political messages related to political and economic governance in order to safeguard influence, especially because the country’s governance indicators deteriorated significantly in the past decade. This is especially true for the smallest Member States such as Luxembourg and Belgium, but also the Netherlands, Germany and Spain have shown their interest in EU coordination. EU coordination is considered an instrument to maintain leverage by speaking with one voice.

For example, when in September 2011 Wade decided to suspend headquarters agreements of NGOs, without prior consultation, EU donors initiated the process to write a letter to the government on behalf of the donor community. Likewise, in November 2011 they initiated the letter on behalf of the G50 to push for the reform of the Court of Auditors. Furthermore, like in Burkina Faso the EU also sought to improve the existing donor coordination architecture which was co-chaired by the WB and the UN because it was considered ineffective and not able to represent the EU’s political concerns.

‘Il y avait un volonté effectivement, la coordination des bailleurs ne fonctionnait pas de manière satisfaisante, ça c’est un constat que tout le monde fait. Après, la manière que les choses se sont fait, c’est clair que tous les acteurs n’ont pas le même poids, et si l’UE n’avait pas été intéressé à ce que la coordination des bailleurs fonctionnait différemment, effectivement ça n’aurait pas été changé de la même manière’ (EU5-Senegal, June 2012).

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191 For example: ‘there is of course an aspect of burden sharing, which is more important for smaller countries. We have not the same human resources as France for example. So it’s for us of course quite important to gain access to a certain number of informations that are existing on the EU level’ (EU2-Senegal, June 2012)
192 The measure was cancelled in October 2011. Wade’s move came after human rights NGOs had actively campaigned against a third mandate for the President and the manifestations in front of the National Assembly on 23 June 2011 (Diene, 2011; Ndong, 15 September; Sarr Diakhaté, 2011).
This search for political leverage is not translated into action, which can be explained by the dominant position of France, the attitude of the Senegalese government as well as the attitude of the EU Delegation.

First, the ambiguous attitude of France, which is the dominant bilateral donor, towards EU coordination hampers coordination. While France has apparently not actively blocked EU coordination, it seems to have adopted a strategy of passively resisting progress, which is in contrast to its more supportive attitude in Burkina Faso: 'France was not interested [in EU coordination], they want to maintain their own relation' (EU8-Senegal, June 2012). France tends to practise a ‘coordination à la carte’ in Senegal. They will agree to have a joint approach in the EU framework when it has an interest in doing so. It was argued that at several times France ‘clearly tried to push things through the EU which they did not want to give a French flag’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012). A French diplomat confirmed that very often France does not want to be part of formal joint donor initiative, for example, in the area of the reform of government procurement regulations, France contributed to the preparations of a joint letter but in the end did not want to officially sign this letter:

‘Il y a une position exprimé par l'UE, l’Allemagne, USAID et d'autres pays et la France n'était pas dans la prise de position officielle. C'était la position de l'ambassadeur. Moi je participais au groupe de travail et donnai mon opinion personnel, mais l'ambassadeur décidait de ne pas souscrire cette position’
(EU5-Senegal, June 2012)

When the bilateral level is satisfactory there is no reason, in France’s view, for such a coordination to take place. France has thus taken a pragmatic stance towards any form of coordination. For example, it is argued that France’s initial support for ACAB should be explained by the fact that it was expected to become an instrument through which they could exert influence without it being visible. When it became clear that this had work out differently, they did not consider it useful anymore and withdrew. Instead, in 2008 and 2012 France disbursed ‘exceptional’ (in terms of amount, decision making and implementation) budget support which was the result of a high-level political decision. In 2008, France intervened with an amount of 125 million euro for the recovery of public finance and in 2012 President Sarkozy decided to intervene with a an amount of 130 million euro after the regime change as the previous regime under President Wade had left a gap in public finance.

'It is clear that the French are occupied with their own business. They will do it bilaterally when it suits them best, and when they think they could use the EU, they will go through the EU. If they think they
can use ACAB, they will do it through ACAB. That’s how they are, they have it in their mind and they will do it like that. They use the instrument which they consider as the most convenient. They think in a very practical way. [...] It is clear their objective is to pursue the French interests, Françafrique is totally back and alive’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

Second, the Senegalese government arguably tried to handle development cooperation on a bilateral basis, which is exemplified by its attitude towards the harmonization of budget support. When the recipient country clearly stimulates bilateralism over a coordinated donor group, this is not conducive for effective EU coordination in the area of aid.

‘The new reality of aid affects what is donor coordination. We already entered in the new era of donor coordination, and we cannot ignore the presence of funding from non-traditional donors or emerging investors or donors’ (non-EU3-Senegal, June 2012)

‘So what we are discussing based on that kind of table and based upon the approach of PRSP is not real, because there is a big proportion of real development projects, whether it is private or investment or whatever or NGOs etc., I would say, nearly half. So if we really think of development of the country, you have to have an overview of the whole picture. So we certainly face the limitation of traditional donor coordination. During the nineties, investment in Africa by traditional donors represented ninety per cent. So if we in donor group discussed aid, we discussed the total investment in that country, but now only half or 40 per cent. We are talking about half of the total investment in Senegal’ (non-EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

‘Usually the Member States they speak with 1 voice. In a given sector, on a given subject, usually we speak with 1 voice. We can’t really do more. And then with the WB and others, I mean we have no leverage. What is the leverage we have? On the ground we can’t do anything’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

‘If you want to talk concretely it’s this, it’s not the meetings, regular meetings between HoCs, because the real work is there, is we have a dialogue with the government on a number of sectors, we speak with one voice, and we use the frame to have a leverage. And we are not able to do more, there is no coordination. Or there is very limited’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

Third, the EU Delegation is pragmatic too towards EU coordination. In a politicized environment like Senegal, donors’ visibility in the beneficiary country may not primary lay in better coordinated aid, but in conveying clear political messages.

‘Visibility is [...] nice, but [...] it’s a gadget, the EU doesn’t have to coordinate amongst Member States to have visibility. [...] Because we have monthly meetings we have more visibility? No, come on. On speaking with one voice we have no problem, with Member States we have no problem, usually with
USAID we have no problem, and in the G50 we are visible. Visibility in this country is when you voice your concern. Because they are very sensitive to what the press says, and especially what the international community says about Senegal. So when you voice concern, when our Ambassador voices concerns about the independency of the Court of Auditors, this is visibility. Because everybody will echo that, will report that, comment on that. That's visibility. And then when our ambassador talks about the Court of Auditors, it doesn't have to be joined with the US or Germany or others to have more visibility. We have our own. Of course if we do it with others it's better. When we talk about governance in this country in front of the press, we are visible, so we don't need the gadget of EU coordination. We have no problems with being political, maybe in Senegal it's the other way around. The Commission is going too far in governance. But frankly speaking, I think that every time we have a position on governance, we are backed by the Member States. On the big issues' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

7.3.2 Institutional factors

If coordination is considered an institutional process in which multiple organizations aim to solve a collective action problem, EU coordination might be enabled and constrained by institutional factors that are of formal or informal nature. In the following paragraphs I will explore how the existing donor-wide coordination processes, the EU’s organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines as well as its capacities and bureaucratic culture affect EU coordination in Senegal.

7.3.2.1 Existing aid architecture

Like in Burkina Faso, Senegal’s experience with aid coordination is more recent than in Tanzania and Zambia. The existing aid coordination architecture is considered rather weak. This has enlarged the scope for EU coordination, and created opportunities for the EU’s external coordinator role, as exemplified by their role in the reform of the main donor coordination forum to increase coordination on the PRSP and the attempt to harmonize budget support. However, different from Burkina Faso, the impact of the EU’s initiatives have remained low and focus has been put on coordinating on the political level, with limited results in the field of aid coordination.

The absence of a well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanism may have enabled the support for internal EU coordination meetings. However, it should be noted that this has not enabled the EU to engage in more advanced forms of EU coordination.

As outlined above, the EU played a major role to push for a modification of the existing donor coordination framework under the co-presidency of the WB and the UN. As several donors did
found this forum rather ineffective, the EU was able to find a coalition amongst the donors to modify the aid coordination architecture. Arguably, the absence of competing lead coordinators has enabled the EU to play an initiator role.

‘I must say the EU is quite dynamic here and the EU is also one of the co-chairs of this G50. It has been headed for a long time by the UN, it wasn’t efficient, but now under the EU, but also, of course the EU Delegation wanted to play a bigger role in this donor coordination, and the EU Delegation was then pushing, and the Member States also pushing to change the system [...] And so we pushed for change’ (EU2-Senegal, June 2012)

‘Previously the G50 was co-chaired by UNDP and the WB and that was totally ineffective. They were only concerned about themselves, they were not engaged to coordinate the bigger group and try to come to common positions. Since the EU and Canada, and later the US, took over it works much better’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

‘Sur le plan d’animation de la coordination, l’UE est beaucoup plus visible que la Banque Mondiale qui se préoccupe plus de ses projets, de ses programmes, bien que la Banque a coprésidé le groupe élargi, mais l’UE, même si, en dehors de son mandat aussi fait ce travail de coordination’ (non-EU2-Senegal, June 2012)

‘The co-presidency was led by the WB and the UN. And it was the hell, they were hi-jacking, when we said ok, we want this, they said: no no, censor, we censor that, it’s not our mandate, so even if we had a majority, it was the hell. I was the one to have the coup d’état. It was really that. Ok, it will be democratic, but it’s a coup d’état, we were one, and then four and then twelve and go out. And then we were elected, but it was to go out of hell. [...] Ok, it’s nice, compared with where we are coming from, it’s nice, but still it’s not the real work’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

However, in order for coordination to be effective, it needs the engagement of other major actors, especially since the EU is not the major donor in Senegal. As such, the lack of commitment of major donors such as France and the WB has clearly limited the effectiveness and the impact of its efforts: ‘it’s always the same thing, it’s with the WB, which has its own agenda and they are not very keen to play the donor agenda. They are not keen to share [...] It’s not only the WB but it’s one major donor on which we don’t have much influence. Sometimes it undermines the efforts’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012). For example, the absence of an existing coordination mechanism for budget support enabled the EU to take a lead in this area. However, the lack of agreement amongst donors and the ambiguous attitude of France impeded real progress.
'The WB has been deceiving. And I weigh the word. They have been deceiving. For years they have been in the process of coordination of the budget aid, they have pretended that they were interested to develop the same matrix. And at the end of the day they said we are no longer interested, because what we have seen is that, I don’t know how they say that, it’s too straitjacket for what we want to do. And in fact, what they want to do, the WB, is to put targets before they start, or to put measures, conditions, which have been met before the start of the budget aid. So they know that they will disburse. And for those who are struggling to have some measures approved, we have no leverage' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

Likewise, the absence of an existing framework for division of labour amongst donors enabled the EU to make use of the FTI on Division of Labour and launch a mapping exercise. However, as mentioned earlier, after this first step, the process stagnated

7.3.2.2 Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines

Like in the three other countries, the bureaucratic barriers to coordination are obvious and the EU donors’ organizational structures and procedures as well as the voluntary aspect of the EU’s coordination policies arguably constrain progress.

First, the lack of decentralization of EU donors’ aid organizations hampers more advanced forms of EU coordination such as joint programming or division of labour. The major EU donors in Senegal have rather centralized organization structures and decisions about aid allocation are to a great extent influenced by domestic politics, as exemplified by France, but also by Spain, which saw a major decrease in its aid budget because of the financial crisis, and by the Netherlands, which, just like in the other country studies, plans to phase out its bilateral cooperation programme.

Second, and closely related is the institutional link between foreign affairs and development cooperation. For some countries the political and development level are more separated than for others, creating internal coordination difficulties. On the one hand, the Spain and German aid agencies are considered as more independent from their foreign affairs’ office and operate more independently from their embassies, while France, the Netherlands and Belgium have closer institutional links. This has important implications for coordination. For example, regarding migration, an important issue in EU-Senegal relations, the EU is supposed to speak with one voice at the political level but for a Member State like Spain, the accompanying development programs related to migration may not be aligned with the political program of the Embassy. Besides, in Senegal, the influence of the new institutional set-up of the EU Delegation is also
The EU Delegations acts as a hub to coordinate both the political and the development level and increasingly aims to align both levels.

Third, the fact that programming cycles of EU Member States are not aligned hampers coordination at the programming level. However, like in the other country studies all EU donors are procedurally able to participate in joint programming (O’Riordan et al., 2011: 110).

Fourth, the EU mandate to coordinate is weak and the policy guidelines for EU coordination are voluntary. The EU’s policies on coordination are perceived as a tool that can be deployed rather than as a binding policy. For example, the Code of Conduct on division of labour provides EU donors with a voluntary framework but its use depends on the willingness of EU donors.

‘Everybody uses it, we all say we have to concentrate on fewer sectors. We will not decide collectively on sector allocations but in our bilateral discussions with the government we will look at division of labour and try to avoid duplication’ (EU8-Senegal, June 2012).

‘Without these EU guidelines on Division of Labour, maybe we would not have made the choice to withdraw from the water and sanitation sector and give it to Belgium’ (EU2-Senegal, June 2012).

‘The commitment that Member States made in Brussels has not been translated into their bilateral development cooperation policy. If we want to coordinate our programmes, there should be binding regulations which can be enforced’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).
'The thing is the process is asymmetric. The Commission has to show to the Member States its proposal of interventions. The Member States do not have to do it. [...] Do you see Germany, coming to the EDF Committee saying I want to do something in governance in Senegal? No they don't have to. [...] As long as this is in place, we won’t make much more progress and not come to come to joint programming, joint decisions, which is the real thing, the real work. [...] The only thing we can do on the ground is try to convince our colleagues that, [...] please, every time you do some strategic thinking, programming, please come to the Europe group here. And tell others what you are planning, and the only thing is that we can exchange and try to influence them. [...] It's not binding, it's on a voluntary basis. This is why you will not go really further' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

7.3.2.3 Staffing and bureaucratic culture

Aid agencies’ capacities and bureaucratic culture may influence its engagement in donor coordination.

First, like in the other country studies the EU Delegation is perceived as a well-equipped agency, with considerable financial resources and human resources.

‘I think the EU has the capacity, in terms of development, to propose new ideas, new movements, it has become a knowledge institution. So in that sense it probably steer, it has a certain leadership’ (non-EU1-Senegal, June 2012).

In contrast to the WB, the EU delegation ‘does much more try to align the whole donor group, en they understand that this is sometimes a matter of knowing how to give and take’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

‘We have very good colleagues in the EU Delegation, especially in the development cooperation section, they really try to align’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

The Delegation is perceived as a political actor, with a rather pragmatic approach towards aid coordination in the EU framework. This approach has enabled them to find support for their role as a coordinator in the political sphere.

‘I think they have a very pragmatic approach, they don’t have this strong idea about stopping poverty is our goal, stopping poverty and politics are something different. Maybe this pragmatic approach has made it possible to do some coordination’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012).

‘The approach they have given to the G50 is better than the approach given by the multilateral actors, UNDP and WB. Multilateral actors are very important actors but they don’t have the political approach, and without political approach you can do nothing’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012).
On the other hand ‘you have a conflicting aspect in the Delegation day-to-day work. A lot of desk managers are devoting a lot of time in procedures, contracts, and they have less time, a lot of the day-to-day work is dealing with contracts, dealing with a consultant, and less into thinking, into doing the other part which is more important, like policy advice’ (non-EU1-Senegal, June 2012).

Similar to the other country studies at several times interviewees pointed at the importance of individuals. This is also cultivated by the Senegalese government, as it was often argued that partnerships are built on the basis of personal friendships between people in the embassies and people in the ministries. There were several examples of importance of persons that impede (for ex. clashes between the previous EU Ambassador and Italian and Spanish Ambassador\textsuperscript{193}) or enable coordination.

It was stated that in the past there was a very close relationship between the EU and France, but different from Burkina Faso, this close relationship was not judged as being conducive for EU coordination.

‘There used to be a too sticky collaboration between the EU HoD, who was French, and the French Ambassador. Sometimes I had the idea that the EU served too much as a mouthpiece of the French’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

Different from the other country studies, in Senegal the Netherlands have a good working relationship with the EU Delegation, which may have contributed to the effective coordination of the Dutch exit strategy in the environmental sector:

‘We have been cooperating very closely, so therefore we could also talk with them and table our plans, we did not have to beat around the bush, it was just like “this is our idea, what do you think about it, is that something you could do and do you have the people?”’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

7.3.3 Ideational factors

The role that the EU plays in coordination might be dependent on the degree to which actors agree on its functionality and its potential outcomes in terms of aid and development effectiveness. However, different EU donors might have different points of view on aid

\textsuperscript{193} The former HoD was a character, a very interesting man but he had a certain view on the role of the Commission, “together we can strengthen Europe”, and the EU Delegation represents the whole Union, speaks on behalf of the whole Union. But from time to time he forgot to align with the rest of the EU before his statements. And that has led to conflicts with the Italian and the Spanish ambassador. [...] The atmosphere is now more relaxed thanks to the entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provided the EU Delegation with a mandate to represent the EU countries, but also because [the EU HoM] has left and was succeeded by a new EU Ambassador who is also very strong but more relaxed, and the Spain and Italy have new ambassadors too’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).
modalities and development and the ‘right’ level of coordination. In this section I will investigate to what extent EU coordination is enabled or constrained by differing ideas about its effectiveness. Therefore I will consider EU donors’ ideas about aid and development in general and in relation to budget support as well as their ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination.

7.3.3.1 Ideas about aid and development and coordination on budget support

On a rather general level there is a certain consensus amongst EU donors about linking political and development cooperation which enables the adoption of common positions and information exchange. Especially when contrasted to other major actors such as UNDP and the WB, the EU aims to establish itself as a political actor in Senegal. Different from the other country studies, there is a rather surprising coalition of countries in this regard which includes the EU, the US and Canada:

‘It is very bizarre, some people look at me and ask me “what an idea”. But we notice that we have the same ideas on several things. Of course the US will never provide budget support, but we all think that you need to integrate the political and the cooperation into one big package. That you cannot separate development cooperation from things like good governance, corruption, internal and external audit, especially when you give budget support’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

‘Some donors are more oriented in the country political dialogue, if you think about the banks, the WB and the AfDB don’t have such a political drive that the EU has, especially now with their political agenda. If you look at the direction the EU is taking in budget support: AfDB doesn’t have this, so there are different kinds of donors’ (non-EU1-Senegal, June 2012).

However, the use of different aid modalities reveals to a certain extent donors’ ideas about aid and development and might influence donors’ attitude towards coordination. At this level, there are major differences amongst EU donors between donors that provide mainly project aid and donors that provide budget support. These differences might constrain more advance forms of EU coordination.

‘There are a number of Member States that have a very old-fashioned, like Belgium, Italy and France. […] But there are a number of countries that pursue a more modern approach, like the Netherlands, and Germany to some extent. And then there are a number of countries that have no cooperation programme, like Portugal or Romania, who have no expertise in development cooperation. That makes it difficult for the EU to navigate’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).
Budget support is considered as an aid modality to facilitate donor-government coordination but different from the other countries, in Senegal this modality has been used to a rather limited extent and by a limited number of EU donors. Within this group of budget support donors, differences about its use constrained further harmonization. While in 2008 the group of budget support donors initiated an initiative to better harmonize this aid modality, because of disagreements, the group never came to a joint approach and Germany and France decided to leave the group. This exemplifies that behind a shared political agenda are different approaches towards aid. Different from Burkina Faso, budget support has been delayed and suspended continuously on the basis of individual criteria.

‘So in the donor group of budget support, there were really some big problems two years ago, just for making a consensus. And the group was cut in two big opinions, and this avoided us to have a framework’ (EU4-Senegal, June 2012).

‘Budget support is really the pivotal, it's the cornerstone. It's something very fundamental. Because if you had a very simple [...] table about what the government commits to achieve, one to ten reforms. And then you say the disbursement you achieved at, and this is the same for everybody, [...] it's absolutely fundamental. [...] But in Senegal there is a limited use of budget support. We are very few and we are less and less. And this is something which is a very strong limitation. I think that everything everywhere should be budget support if we are consistent, be consistent with national policies, use the national procedures. Everything should be budget support. But we will have less and less, even us. If you put more and more on the plate of budget support, then of course there will be less and less disbursement, less and less predictability, which means that it will not be used’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

For example, in the environment sector, the Netherlands have been the only donor which intervenes through sectoral budget support.

‘They were the only one in the sector to do budget support and the other ones had the project approach. [...] They were the only ones to try to have a policy dialogue. And the other ones they had discussions about their recent projects and how to make it go’ (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

The effective coordination of the exit strategy of the Netherlands with the EU can partly be explained by a shared ideat on the use of budget support between both donors.
7.3.3.2 Ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination

EU donors’ ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination influences their commitment to coordination in general as well as their preference for either the EU or the donor-wide/multilateral framework.

First, although no donor will publicly state that they do not support the aid effectiveness agenda, there are no ‘big defenders’ of the aid effectiveness agenda similar to the Nordic Plus countries in Tanzania and Zambia. Although there have been initiatives of a group of countries to improve coordination, these have mainly been focused on the coordination of political messages. For example, the founders of the G12 could be considered as a group of like-minded countries that aimed to change the inefficient aid coordination architecture in Senegal. Before the establishment of the G12, coordination of the G50 was considered inefficient, for example to react on a policy document of the government. Consequently,

‘Ad hoc groups were set up, but it was always the same people. And those people did not have a mandate so when they prepared something the G50 could easily undo our efforts. At a certain moment a number of donors (notably Germany, the Netherlands, the EU, Canada and the US) said ‘this must change’ so they reflected on the creation of a sub group with a mandate, which can prepare things on behalf of the donor community’ (EU1-Senegal, May 2012).

Second, EU donors in Senegal are the founding Member States of the EU and have been rather supportive for coordinated EU approaches,

‘Countries that are traditionally more in favour of European integration, you have France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg: we are normally working and quite committed towards more European integration’ (EU2-Senegal, June 2012)

However, EU donors are more supportive for strengthening the EU as a political actor than in terms of coordination of EU aid. Moreover, as stated earlier, France rather takes a backseat when it comes to coordination and the EU Delegation itself has also adopted a rather pragmatic stance towards aid coordination while it has actively sought to look for coordination at the political level. Different from the other country studies, where the EU Delegation’s HoC acted as strong believers of EU coordination, in Senegal, the EU Delegation’s representative casted more doubts about the effectiveness and judged that more input in EU coordination will not lead to more or better output.
'What I can do I think we have done. We have achieved what we could achieve. And that's it. Now, every additional effort will be extremely timeful for me, for a very marginal impact' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

'I have regular meetings, we change a lot, and then what's the impact of this? Yes ok, we meet, we discuss, and what's the impact of this? What I can say is that, we have regular exchange. We are quite open, which means that in fact, we do not overlap, that's one important thing. We do not duplicate. The mapping exercise is just a formal thing. The mapping exercise is just to formalize something that we know already. To what extent we influence the programming of each other is another story. When I arrived there was already something about Division of Labour which has started, but basically it was a mapping of interventions and it was a table the synchronization of the programming cycles. Now we have developed this a little bit. We have more information, more precise information about the mapping, the interventions, the amounts, the comparative advantages, the wish to be a lead donor or things like that. So we have a little bit developed this. At the same time when it comes to decision making, I don't think we have really made a significant step, and that's the key point. Because no one is buying in, even between Member States' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

While the lack of coordination in Senegal is obviously explained by a multitude of factors, the lack of government's commitment to aid coordination is perceived as a reason not engage in further coordination:

'So the whole thing around is to substitute the government which I think is not the right approach. So what we have been trying to put in place is definitely not the right approach because it should be led by the government. And it's not here in this country' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

'What we are doing is nice, but it's just a substitute and it will not totally substitute as long as the government does not take lead. And unfortunately the government doesn't want to take the lead' (EU3-Senegal, June 2012).

7.3.4 Summary

Table 7-8 offers a summary of the analysis conducted in this section and indicates the complex interplay of different factors that enable and constrain EU coordination. In the concluding section I will focus on those factors that are key to understand EU coordination in Zambia.
Table 7-8. Overview of constraining and enabling factors for EU coordination in Senegal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ2: Understanding EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **(1) Interest-related factors** | (1a) EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns constrain rather than enable EU coordination  
(1b) France’s dominance constrains EU coordination, although EU donors are increasingly looking for coordination political demarches |
| **(2) Institutional factors** | (2a) Less advanced existing aid architecture rather enabling  
(2b) Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines constrain rather than enable EU coordination  
(2c) (rather limited data but few accounts point to similar findings than other countries) |
| **(3) Ideational factors** | (3a) Broad consensus on using development as a political instrument, not on the use of harmonized aid modalities  
(3b) Less diverging ideas about the ‘right’ level of coordination enabling rather than constraining |

7.4 Conclusion

Based on the analysis conducted in this fourth country chapter, this section will draw conclusions on EU coordination in Senegal.

The chapter has sought to map EU coordination in Senegal, by considering both the internal and the external dimension. Through the analysis conducted in Section 6.2 I have found that

a) EU coordination in Senegal tends to be limited to information sharing, consultation and ad hoc coordinating responses, while largely lacking an active component (internal dimension)

b) The EU Delegation acts as a coordination ‘initiator’ in the donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension)

Based on the analysis conducted in Section 7.3 these findings can be understood as follows.

First, similar to Burkina Faso and different from Tanzania and Zambia, the internal dimension of EU coordination, in terms of information sharing, exchange of ideas and consultation is less contested. Additionally, EU donors’ shared idea to link political and development cooperation, the strategic importance of Senegal, its image as a model function for political stability and democratic values combined with the EU’s decreasing influence enables coordination for donor-related objectives and coordinating political demarches towards the government. EU donors feel the need to work together to maintain influence towards the government and upheld the image
of Senegal towards the domestic constituency. These factors may potentially enable further coordination at the political level, although France’s ambiguous stance as the dominant actor amongst EU donors tends to create limits to EU coordination.

Despite these (potentially) enabling factors, similar to the other countries, EU donors do not engage in more advanced ways of coordination such as joint programming. Like in the other country studies, institutional barriers constrain donors, but the fact that all donors are in theory able to engage in joint programming, shows that behind these institutional difficulties lay other problems. Advancing towards joint programming requires high-level political support but the current domestic political and economic context in donor countries seem to have strengthened the concern about their individual visibility and results. Moreover, the different ideas on the preferred use of aid modalities also help to explain why more advanced EU coordination such as joint programming will not be easy, as demonstrated by the debacle in budget support.

Second, as expected, the lack of efficient donor-wide coordination and competing coordination ‘champions’ has enabled the EU to act as an initiator of donor-wide coordination (external dimension). The EU has sought to improve the system of the G50 and better coordinate donors’ responses on government policies. Likewise, in absence of a coordination system around budget support the EU has also tried to put up a joint monitoring framework. However, different from Burkina Faso, the EU has lacked leverage to realize more effective coordination and there is need for commitment from other major donors, and especially from France, for the coordination exercise to proceed. The donor landscape in Senegal arguably lacks a coalition of like-minded countries who defend the translation of the aid effectiveness principles into the field. EU donors in Senegal mainly provide aid through projects and technical assistance, modalities which do not promote coordination and harmonization to the same extent as budget support. Importantly, the attitude of the Senegalese government under President Wade has not facilitated this neither, given the accounted preference to deal with donors on a bilateral basis.
8. General conclusions

Based on the qualitative narratives of the country chapters, this final chapter draws general conclusions on EU coordination in development aid. The first section summarizes the research puzzle and the analytical approach presented in the first chapters of this thesis. The second section reviews the extent to which the EU coordinates in the four countries, based on the mapping exercise conducted within each country chapter. As the aim of this research was to understand EU coordination, the third section discusses the factors that best explain these findings. Finally, the chapter ends with some concluding reflections on the conclusions, a summary of the main contributions of this research and some limitations to my research approach which offer opportunities for further research.

8.1 Research puzzle

The EU has at many occasions expressed its ambition to foster the international agenda on coordination and promote its implementation. Simultaneously, in the past decade, the EU has taken several steps to strengthen internal EU coordination at the policy and the field level, guided by the principles enshrined in the European Consensus (2005), the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (2007) and the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (2009, revised in 2011). While literature on EU Development has increasingly focused on the EU’s coordinator role, it has left an important question unanswered: how are the ambitions of the EU translated at the country level and which factors enable and constrain EU coordination in developing countries? The few existing studies suggested that implementation of the EU’s commitments remains slow. While the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour is considered as ‘the most demanding normative framework on Division of Labour so far’, ‘on average the performance of European donors is about the same as [other OECD-DAC donors]’ and ‘some European donors are still amongst the poor performers worldwide’ (Bürcky, 2011: 32). However, these studies do not examine in greater depth the areas where EU coordination is more/less successful194 and to my knowledge, no in-depth analysis at the country level has been conducted on the explanations for these findings. This thesis has thus aimed to seek in-depth and interpreted understanding of a paradox that exists between the EU’s ambition to engage and lead in coordination exercises and the inability, as suggested by the limited empirical evidence, to effectively act as a coordinating actor in the field.

More specifically, I have aimed to

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194 Success refers to the degree of coordination, not to the eventual development impact of EU coordination.
1) Map EU coordination: to what extent does the EU coordinate? (what-question)
2) Understand EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?

To answer these questions I have made use of a pragmatist research approach. First, this approach is especially suited for problem-driven research that aims to produce practical knowledge. Second, it allows for searching understanding of a complex phenomenon like EU coordination. I have investigated the interplay of different factors that enable and constrain EU coordination in the field by means of an analysis of four sub-Saharan countries, based on both desk and field research. The aim was to take a holistic perspective on what the EU does and how EU policy initiatives are translated at the field level and to go beyond a focus on institutions and procedures.

Thereby, ‘instead of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or “simply” inferring propositions from facts (induction)’, I have aimed to reason ‘at an intermediate level (abduction)’ (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 709). Consequently, the existing literature on donor coordination and EU development policy has offered conceptual guidance to interpret and understand EU coordination at the country level. In Chapter 3 I have outlined a basic analytical framework for assessing the two research questions.

**In relation to the first question on the degree of EU coordination** in a country, I have considered both the internal and external dimension as well as the potential tension between both dimensions. The internal dimension relates to coordination between the EU and the Member States (and to a lesser extent between Member States). The external dimension concerns the multilateral perspective and refers to coordination between the EU and other international partners. The elaboration of this first research question is summarized in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1. RQ1 mapping EU coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General questions</th>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Internal dimension: to what extent does the EU coordinate?</td>
<td>(1a) To what extent does the EU coordinate in the programming phase?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1b) To what extent does the EU coordinate in the implementation phase?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) External dimension: to what extent does the EU contribute to donor-wide coordination processes?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) To what extent are the EU’s ambitions to strengthen the internal and external dimension of its coordinator role complementary or conflicting?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assess the internal dimension I have briefly looked at coordination in the programming phase but mainly concentrated on coordination during implementation. To investigate EU coordination during implementation I have focused on coordination at the national/strategic level and more specifically I have looked at information sharing and consultation, the adoption of common positions, the implementation of the FTI on Division of Labour and the use of harmonized aid modalities and more specifically budget support. For each country study I have considered the degree of institutionalization, the agenda, and the main objectives of EU coordination as well as EU donors’ attitude in general towards EU coordination. Apart from the formal structures, also more informal ways of coordination as well as symbolic practices (such as sharing a building or organize joint events) have been taken into account. For the external dimension, I have focused primarily on the role of EU Delegations, a choice which I have justified in Chapter 3. I have looked at the EU Delegation’s engagement in the institution-building and development of the local coordination processes, an in particular in the areas of information sharing, general policy dialogue, division of labour and budget support.

In relation to the second question on understanding EU coordination, the existing scholarship has enabled the design of a basic pragmatic analytical framework, based on the three I’s (Interests – Institutions – Ideas) (see Table 8-2).
Table 8-2. RQ2: Understanding EU coordination:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of factors</th>
<th>Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Interest-related factors</td>
<td>(1a) EU donors’ domestic politics and visibility concerns, (1b) EU donors’ influence in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Institutional factors</td>
<td>(2a) Existing aid architecture, (2b) Organizational structure, procedures and policy guidelines, (2c) Staffing and bureaucratic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Ideational factors</td>
<td>(3a) Ideas about aid and development and coordination on budget support, (3b) Ideas about aid effectiveness and the ‘right’ level of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) The personal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this basic analytical framework has been used mainly as a tool to structure the data, as a foundation to derive some ‘educated guesses’ about the possible interplay of different factors that enable and constrain EU coordination in the field and as a guidance to select the countries of this study. The abductive approach has allowed me to search for those constitutive explanations that best explain EU coordination.

In a first phase Tanzania and Zambia were chosen because they were possibly ‘pivotal’ to study EU coordination. Both countries are considered best practices in the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. There are several facilitating operational coordination frameworks in place and the EU has a clear ambition to play a central role in donor coordination and improve internal EU coordination. Findings of these countries might be critical to any further understanding of EU coordination. The initial field research in these two countries pointed to a limited coordinator role for the EU. The emerging insights showed that the donor composition and the existing coordination may be important explaining factors. If these educated guesses (cf. Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 715) would be true, EU coordination should be more successful in settings with a ‘European front’ and/or ‘EU’-dominated donor landscape and less advanced existing donor-wide coordination.

As in Tanzania and Zambia, these factors are too similar to be able to explore possible differences in a valid manner, it was required to select supplementary countries with a different
(i.e. ‘European front’ and/or ‘EU’-dominated) donor composition and a different (i.e. less advanced) level of existing coordination. The collection of more diverse data would thus facilitate the disclosure of similarities. Consequently, in order to further understand the contribution of these explanations, I decided to look at two Western African countries, Burkina Faso and Senegal, where the existing coordination is less advanced and the EU donors are mainly ‘European front’ donors. Moreover, in Burkina Faso the EU is the second largest donor after the WB. Based on the conclusions of Tanzania and Zambia, the expectation was that there are possibly more opportunities in these countries for the EU to manifest itself as a ‘coordination facilitator’.

In general the four countries represent a good mix of strategically more important (Tanzania and Senegal) and less important (Zambia and Burkina Faso) countries, countries where the EU’s influence is decreasing (Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal) and where the EU has remained the most important donor (Burkina Faso), countries where existing donor-wide coordination is rather advanced (Tanzania and Zambia) and countries where this is less advanced (Burkina Faso and Senegal), and finally Anglophone countries with a dominant Nordic Plus donor composition (Tanzania and Zambia) and Francophone countries with a mainly ‘European front’ donor composition (Burkina Faso and Senegal).

At the same time, all countries are aid-dependent countries receiving aid from a large amount of donors. In these countries, coordination becomes much more necessary but the amount of donors also involves a greater challenge. Different kinds of tensions and complex interactions are at play in the coordination processes in the four countries. All countries are part of the EU FTI on Division of Labour, which shows the EU’s commitment towards coordination. The EU as a whole is one of the major providers of aid. Furthermore, the four countries are reasonably stable countries, in order to exclude the possible influence of conflicts or failing governments. According to Hopwood (2009: 117) these relatively well-performing low-income countries which are highly dependent on aid from many different donors form ‘the central battleground for the aid effectiveness agenda’.

8.2 RQ1: Mapping EU coordination

Despite the existence of the conceptual foundations, as I have argued in Chapter 3 and as the field research reveals, the task of determining the degrees of EU coordination is not straightforward, but complicated by the ways in which different coordination processes, the aid landscape and the donor-government relations have developed in the past decade. In particular, unravelling what the EU has done, what its contributions are or what is driven by other actors is
difficult because of the complexity of overlapping coordination processes, the existence of time effects and the various subjective realities of interviewees, as well as the fact that (at least in principle) coordination does not allow for flag-flying.

My assessment of EU coordination in the four countries draws on three periods of field research, available studies and evaluation concerning aid coordination, country-specific literature, primary aid data and policy documents. Although I have each time tried to concentrate on a number of indicators (coordination in programming and implementation phase, information sharing, consultation, common positions, division of labour, aid modalities and for donor-wide coordination: information sharing, coordination around PRSP, budget support and division of labour), the field research has further illustrated the argument made in Chapter 2 that the EU’s coordinator role cannot be turned into a simple series of indicators. Consequently, the country chapters use thick descriptions, while still being guided by these common concepts.

Thus, in the country chapters I portrayed a detailed picture of the EU’s experience with coordination in each country. Each country chapter followed the same structure. First, in order to understand the context in which EU coordination takes place I examined the country’s political, economic, development and security situation, the evolution in donor-government relations, the donor landscape, the degree of existing donor-wide coordination and the EU’s cooperation portfolio with the country. Then I presented a picture of the recent EU initiatives to implement the EU’s policy framework. I examined both the internal and external dimension of EU coordination and looked at coordination at different levels. In doing so, I also took into account formal and informal practices of coordination and made use of illustrative cases of EU coordination. Although the interviews were conducted in 2011-2012 (6-7 years after the adoption of the European Consensus, and 4-5 years after the adoption of Code of Conduct on Division of Labour) and consequently the main findings relate to this period, I have tried to take into account changes that have occurred in the coordination processes in the past decade. Finally, based on all this, I formulated conclusions about the degree of EU coordination in each country.

In the following sections I will compare the findings on the degree of EU coordination in the four countries and discuss their similarities and differences in relation to each other.
8.2.1 Internal dimension: a generally low degree of internal EU coordination

The internal dimension of EU coordination seems to be rather similar in all countries, despite some minor differences.

Finding 1a: in the programming phase, EU coordination remains low

In 2006, Tanzania, Zambia and Burkina Faso were selected together with 11 other developing countries to pilot the implementation of joint EU strategies. A 2010 study of the feasibility of joint multiannual programming in the EU context revealed that in contrast to a series of countries with questionable potential for joint programming, Tanzania had high potential for joint programming, while Zambia, Burkina Faso and Senegal were judged to have some potential for joint programming (O’Riordan, Benfield, & de Witte, 2011: 16). Although individual EU donors may align their individual programmes to the country’s strategy and thus to the country’s own development priorities, and take into account the activities of other donors, based on information gained through coordination processes such as information sharing meetings or a shared/joint analysis, there is no systematic joint programming in any of the countries. For the programming of the 10th EDF consultations have taken place in all countries. However, while in Burkina Faso and Tanzania the analysis was conducted more collectively, in Senegal and Zambia the EU’s CSP is still based on an individual country analysis. In Tanzania the joint analysis was not conducted in an EU-specific framework but in the context of the JAST. Even when a joint analysis has been conducted, EU donors have still designed their individual response strategies. Although at the High Level Forum in Busan (2011) the EU’s Common Position put forward its commitment to joint multi-annual programming (Council of the EU, 2011), the preparations of the 11th EDF have pointed out that, while some form of joint analysis will take place in each of the four countries, and although some bilateral EU donors had informally shown an interest to use these for their own programming, in none of the countries joint programming will take place.

This has also implications for the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour as sector allocation decisions are usually made in the programming phase. While the Code of Conduct may have enabled a trend towards more selectivity and sector concentration, reallocation on the basis of a peer-reviewed (by government and other donors) analysis of comparative advantages as well as the use of delegated cooperation agreements remain rather scarce.
Finding 1b: in the implementation phase EU coordination mainly serves as a communication mechanism

EU coordination allows for information sharing through meetings in which all EU donors participate and for fostering the development of informal relationships between EU donors. In the four countries EU donors have increased the exchange of information, albeit to different extents. While information exchange and transparency are important steps towards better coordinated aid, they represent a limited interpretation of coordination.

In all countries the EU Delegation acts as a convener of HoC meetings. In Burkina Faso and Tanzania information sharing meetings for EU HoCs take place on a monthly basis. In Senegal these meetings are bimonthly, and in Zambia EU coordination is not institutionalized as there is no fixed meeting schedule but information sharing and consultation is ad hoc and event-based. Most of the information that is exchanged at this level is about internal EU issues, and arguably the information is to a great extent asymmetric as it mostly concerns the EDF. Although we should not underestimate the importance of transparency and the value of information on donors programs, objectives and funding, the overall perception in Tanzania and in Zambia is that in absence of coordinated action EU coordination takes away precious time of agencies’ staff. While EU coordination is strongly questioned in Tanzania and Zambia, in Burkina Faso and Senegal there was no interest to cut back EU coordination.

The EU framework is not used in a systematic way to align individual messages towards the partner country’s government and EU donors are not speaking with one voice at the country level. However, there are several examples where ad hoc shared EU positions are adopted. In Burkina Faso, but particularly in Senegal this has taken place more regularly than in Tanzania and Zambia.

Only rarely have EU donors decided to engage in joint decision-making and coordinated action. Although the EU’s FTI on Division of Labour may have speeded up the development of a donor matrix and thus increased transparency about bilateral programmes, this has not led to systematic reallocation decisions to reduce the level of fragmentation of EU aid. Although entry or exit strategies tend to offer good opportunities for EU synchronization at the country level, only in Senegal, the gap caused by the Dutch exit will be partially met by the EU. In none of the four countries coordination amongst EU donors took place before the decision was taken. In the same way, although the EU’s guidelines on delegated cooperation offer guidance for donors to engage in this kind of aid delivery, its use is still rather rare. Furthermore, the use of harmonized
aid modalities such as budget support and basket funding varies over EU donors and the four recipient countries. In Tanzania and Zambia most EU Donors have provided budget support while in Burkina Faso and Senegal only half of EU donors have provided aid under this modality. Besides, the Paris Declaration set the target of the use of programme based approaches at 66 per cent in 2010. In Zambia and Tanzania, all EU donors reached this target, except for Belgium in Tanzania. In Burkina Faso the picture is rather mixed as on the one hand the EU, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden reached this target while Austria, Germany, France, Italy and Luxembourg on the other hand did not. In Senegal only the EU and Italy have reached the target.

8.2.2 External dimension: different roles of EU Delegations

While the previous section has found that the degree of internal EU coordination remains low in all countries, the analysis of the external dimension indicates that the EU plays a different coordinator role in each country. As I have argued in Chapter 3, in each country chapter I have concentrated on the role of EU Delegations. Hereby I have considered the Delegation’s role in the institution-building and development of the donor-wide coordination processes in order to assess whether the EU is only ‘just another donor’ in donor-wide coordination. The research findings have indicated the need for a more diversified spectrum of roles which the EU might play in different situations. Therefore, inspired by management literature, I have come to the distinctions presented in Table 8-3. Importantly, these role concepts are no contain a normative judgement. Besides, the spectrum is by no means an exhaustive list of coordinator roles. First, descending the spectrum there might be situations where the Delegation tends towards a stumbling block for donor-wide coordination. On the other hand, ascending the spectrum the Delegation act as an authorized coordinator with a mandate to take decisions for others. However, based on the findings of this research, both extremes are considered rather unlikely. Second, the spectrum of roles should not necessarily be linear, as the EU Delegation might play different roles at the same time if further distinctions are made. Third, EU Delegations’ roles may change over time. However, this thesis aimed to understand EU coordination at the country level and adopted a holistic perspective on what the EU does. Consequently, although the findings have indicated that EU Delegations’ role might also differ depending on which area is concentrated, the in-depth qualitative assessment of the external dimension of EU coordination in each country, taking into account different coordination processes, has allowed me to draw conclusions on EU Delegations’ role in general.

195 The extent to which EU donors are coordinating in existing donor-wide coordination is described under the Context section of each country chapter.
Table 8-3. Spectrum of the EU Delegations’ role in donor-wide coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just another donor</td>
<td>A donor who <strong>participates</strong> in coordination exercises and shares the responsibility with the other donors over the success of the exercise, but <strong>not more than other participants</strong>. The donor has no authority, is no vital provider of expertise and does not play a particular initiating or facilitating role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>A coordination initiator is a donor who takes a <strong>particular proactive role</strong> and suggests or proposes <strong>new ideas</strong> to initiate new or change on-going coordination processes but <strong>does not provide services</strong> or coordinates the objectives or activities to the same extent as a facilitator nor is its <strong>proactive role sufficient</strong> for the coordination exercise to proceed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>A donor who provides coordination <strong>services</strong> such as information, expertise, resources or a forum and facilitates dialogue among donors (and the government). These services are <strong>considered necessary for the coordination exercise to proceed</strong>. A facilitator assists all donors to focus on achieving the agreed objectives, encourages <strong>participating</strong>, promotes respect for all actors, prepares the agenda and makes suggestions about the process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: inspired by Carlson, 2007*

Although in each country the EU Delegation is recognized as donor who is committed to the aid effectiveness agenda and is an active participant in several coordination processes, we can distinguish between the EU Delegation as ‘just another donor’ or the ‘28th EU donor’ in Tanzania, as a coordination ‘facilitator’ in Burkina Faso and as a coordination ‘initiator’ in Zambia and Senegal.

**Finding 2a: in Tanzania the EU Delegation is mainly ‘just another donor’**

In Tanzania, in contrast to the Nordic Plus donors, the EU Delegation has **not played a major role in the ‘institution-building’** of the Tanzanian aid and donor coordination architecture. In contrast to the WB and DFID, the EU Delegation does **not serve as a main provider of expertise** for the donor community. Despite the size of its programmes and its active participation, the **EU Delegation is mostly seen as ‘just another donor’ in the DPG and its various sub-groups**. In Tanzania, strategic coordination happens around the Tanzanian PRSP (or Mkukuta) and in the context of the JAST, the DPG and the TAS. Moreover, there are several instances of operational coordination, including coordination of aid instruments, programs and
projects as well as joint evaluations. Several SWAps are in place, funded by common baskets which both EU and non-EU donors are financing. EU donors have to a large extent supported the government by making use of budget support which is intensively monitored amongst EU and non-EU budget support donors. Division of labour across sectors is being developed under the JAST. Apart from this major donor coordination structure, there is a network of joint government-donor groups and the government and donors have agreed on ‘quiet times’ in order to reduce the burden of missions and reporting. In all those processes, the EU Delegation participates in an active manner and shares the responsibility with the other donors over the success of the exercise, but not more than other participants. Yet, in some cases the EU can take smaller initiatives (cf. Consensus on Allowances and per diems, see below).

Finding 2b: in Burkina Faso the EU Delegation acts as a coordination ‘facilitator’

In Burkina Faso, the existing donor-wide coordination is less-advanced than in the Anglophone ‘frontrunners’ of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda, creating more scope for the EU’s coordinator role. In general, the EU Delegation is seen as a pioneer in the field of coordination, (cf. ‘acteur central’ (non-EU4-Burkina Faso, May 2012) or ‘le cheval de bataille’ (non-EU3-Burkina Faso, May 2012)) and as an actor which was able to feed the dialogue amongst donors and between donors and the government through its active engagement and by providing expertise in the creation and the functioning of the Troika and the monitoring of the national development strategy and budget support. The Delegation has especially been active in the ‘institution-building’ of the donor coordination architecture and in the facilitation of dialogue through the coordination of diverging positions. This is illustrated by its role in the monitoring of the CSLP, the establishment of a Troika system, in the coordination of budget support and in the process of division of labour amongst donors. EU member states have in general supported these coordination processes which has arguably contributed to the improvements of the aid coordination system. Based on all this I conclude that the EU Delegation acts as a coordination facilitator in Burkina Faso.
Finding 2 c: in Zambia and Senegal the EU Delegations play a coordination initiator role

In between those two, in Zambia and Senegal the EU Delegations’ have played a coordination initiator role, by being proactive and proposing new ideas or changes to on-going processes in important areas. However, this finding is based on specific arguments for each country.

In Zambia, the EU Delegation is more than ‘just another donor’, but no facilitator of the overall coordination processes. Especially in the area of budget support, the EU has initiated a new approach and has been able to maintain a particular facilitating role in the development of the Memorandum of Understanding and the PAF. Additionally, during its chairmanship of the PRBS group the EU Delegation has been able to take a particular proactive role, showing a strong willingness to help the donor group move towards a coordinated response to the crisis. However in Zambia’s overall coordination architecture, centred around the CPG and the JASZ emanates from a Nordic Plus initiative in close cooperation with the Zambian government. In general the EU Delegation is seen as an active supporter of donor-wide coordination but this commitment is not translated into a formal central role for the EU in the Zambian aid coordination architecture but is largely ‘just another donor’. In the sectors where it has acted as a lead (road sector, PFM), it has also taken up a convener role, calling together coordination meetings and trying to better coordinate the policy dialogue with the government, but not differently from other committed donors.

In Senegal, the EU Delegation is more than ‘just another donor’ and plays an initiator role in donor-wide coordination. The EU has initiated change of on-going coordination processes and played a key role in the attempt to better coordinate the monitoring of the Senegalese PRSP and budget support. However, different from Burkina Faso, while the EU’s initiatives have led to some improvements in the area of the monitoring of the PRSP, its initiatives have not resulted in major improvements of the overall aid coordination system, as illustrated by the failure to establish a more coordinated approach to budget support, suggesting that its proactive role is not sufficient for the coordination exercise to proceed. For example, in the specific area of budget support, the EU Delegation has not been able to develop its initiator role into a facilitator role, unlike the Delegation in Zambia.
8.2.3 The internal and external dimension of EU coordination are complementary rather than conflicting

In addition to the internal and external dimensions of EU coordination in itself, I also aimed to shed a light on the potential tension between EU coordination (internal dimension) and donor-wide coordination processes (external dimension). This section argues that the ambitions of reinforcing EU coordination and supporting donor-wide coordination are complementary rather than conflicting.

No evidence of attempts to downsize the link between EU and donor-wide coordination processes are found. In Tanzania and Zambia, the EU’s internal coordination efforts are not perceived to have a considerable value for donor-wide coordination. EU donors’ first focus is the donor-wide coordination processes. The DPG in Tanzania and the CPG in Zambia, as well as the budget support sub-groups are the main coordination platforms and EU coordination is perceived to play only a complementary role. In Zambia, the fact that EU coordination on development is event-based and not institutionalized adds to the conclusion that both dimensions are not conflicting. However, in Tanzania there is a risk that EU coordination is just another layer of administration.

In Burkina Faso and Senegal, where the existing donor-wide coordination is less-advanced EU donors participate in both levels and the EU Delegations are active on the ‘institution-building’ of the donor coordination architecture and on the facilitation of dialogue through the coordination of diverging positions. EU coordination may lead to common positions but these were not perceived as a hindrance for on-going coordination efforts. Especially in Burkina Faso the EU serves as a force for better coordination being able to act as an engine in establishing and furthering donor-wide coordination.

8.2.4 Some good practices of EU coordination within country studies

Hitherto I concentrated on the general conclusions based on the general processes described in the country chapters. However, within the country chapters I also selected some illustrative best practices of EU coordination through which I could explore issues in greater detail and look at similarities and differences in their enabling and constraining factors. Although my aim is not to

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196 In Chapter 3 I have introduced the debate on the desirability of EU coordination and the question whether wider coordination and intra-EU coordination should be viewed as complementary, conflicting or competing.

197 Success refers to the degree of coordination, not to the eventual development impact of EU coordination.
generalize these findings, these individual instances may provide additional and deeper insights on where EU coordination is more successful.

- **Tanzania: Consensus on Allowances and per diems.** In Tanzania EU donors managed to reach a consensus on the use of allowances and per diems for trainings and workshops for government officials. This was perceived as a successful example of EU coordination where the EU managed to find a common understanding which was then presented to the wider donor community and eventually led to a donor wide agreement.

- **Tanzania: 'Variable-geometry' enhanced alignment on performance tranches.** Since 2011 a sub-group of EU donors (EU Delegation, Germany, Denmark and Ireland) has moved towards a more joined up approach by agreeing on a joint assessment framework for their performance tranches based on five PAF indicators. In addition to an annual baseline, an extra tranche becomes available assessed against progress in jointly set benchmarks. Although the eventual disbursements decisions still take place on a bilateral basis, the fact that EU donors agreed on a shared set of indicators and make a joint assessment is arguably an opportunity to improve harmonization of GBS activities.

- **Zambia: agreement on a joint roadmap amongst budget support donors to overcome crisis.** During the crisis following the disclosure of large-scale corruption scandals in the road and health sectors, the Delegation gathered the EU budget support donors to the table in order to facilitate dialogue and search for a harmonized position towards the government. Although EU donors still reacted in a dispersed way as Sweden and later also the Netherlands decided to suspend whereas others continued with their disbursements, the fact that EU donors and the government succeeded to agree on a joint roadmap is to some extent considered a success.

- **Burkina Faso: facilitating joint monitoring of PRSP and budget support.** In Burkina Faso the EU Delegation played a major role in the facilitation of coordinated monitoring and better integration of the monitoring processes of the PRSP and budget support. Although the coordinated approach amongst budget support is not as tight as in Tanzania and Zambia, under the lead of the EU Delegation, and with support of EU budget support donors, the donor community succeeded to better link the follow-up and evaluation systems of budget support and the PRSP so that budget support is seen as an instrument in support of the national strategy and not as an instrument in itself.

- **Senegal: G50 coordination around the Senegalese PRSP.** Because of the malfunctioning and mismanagement of the donor coordination framework under the co-presidency of the WB and UNDP a sub-group of donors took the initiative to establish a
more efficient institutional framework to monitor the implementation of the PRSP. The EU, with support of some non-EU and EU donors, has played an initiator role to change the situation and co-established the G12 to prepare the work for the G50. Simultaneously a small working group (EU, Germany and France) elaborated new Terms of References for the G50. Early 2011, the EU and Canada became the first co-presidents of the renewed G50 which now meets on a monthly basis in the premises of the EU Delegation. While it is considered too early to judge whether these changes will lead to more efficient consensus building and dialogue with the government on the long term, both EU and non-EU donors stated that the co-presidency under the EU and Canada in the G50 has facilitated the dialogue and some coordinated responses. For example, during the review of the 2nd PRSP, after frank debates, donors agreed on a joint response letter to the government. Also during the preparations of the 3rd PRSP, donors agreed on common comments. Under the lead of the EU, a common position was reached on the growth scenario, which resulted in an amendment in the final document.

8.2.5 Summary

Table 8-4. Summary of the conclusions (RQ1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General findings</th>
<th>Sub-findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1) Internal dimension: a generally low level of internal EU coordination</strong></td>
<td>(1a) In the programming phase, EU coordination remains low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1b) In the implementation phase EU coordination mainly serves as a communication mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2) External dimension: EU Delegations play varying roles in donor-wide coordination processes</strong></td>
<td>(2a) EU Delegation as ‘just another donor’ or the ‘28th EU donor’ in Tanzania and Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2b) EU Delegation as a coordination ‘facilitator’ in Burkina Faso EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2c) Delegation as a coordination ‘initiator’ in Zambia and Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3) The EU’s ambition to strengthen the internal and external dimension of its coordinator role are complementary rather than conflicting</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3 RQ2: Understanding EU coordination

This section is concerned with understanding the overall low degree of EU coordination, the variations across countries in the external dimension of EU coordination, as well as the above mentioned good practices of EU coordination within the countries.

As I have outlined in Chapter 2 this research project aimed to understand EU coordination processes by inquiring into the meanings of, and the reasons for coordination activities of EU donors. Rather than a mono-causal perspective on causal relations in the Humean sense, I have adopted a deeper and broader meaning of cause by accepting that multiple causes interact in a complex and unpredictable way and that factors not inevitably ‘push and pull’ but rather ‘constrain and enable’. As Kurki (2006: 202) argues: ‘the central focus of causal analysis is not the analysis of isolated independent variables (through statistical methods), but rather understanding the complex interaction of a variety of different kinds of causal factors (through building of conceptual frameworks)’. This interpretation of causality is consistent with the pragmatic research approach. Instead of being theory-driven or variable-centric, this research is problem-driven. Consequently, the presentation of the explanations will not follow the structure of the basic analytical framework, constructed around the three I’s (Interests – Institutions – Ideas) which was used to structure the data in each country chapter, but instead concentrate on those enabling and constraining factors that best explain the findings outlined in the previous section.

8.3.1 Understanding the generally low degree of internal EU coordination

The previous section has concluded that although in all countries EU donors have increased transparency through information exchange and donor mappings (= finding 1b) and there may be some progress towards more joint or shared analysis for the 11th EDF, in general EU donors’ bilateral cooperation is based on individual priorities and response strategies and EU Joint multi-annual programming remains a dead letter in the four countries (= finding 1a).

As I have argued in Chapter 3 the few existing in-depth studies on the lack of progress in EU coordination at country level have mainly focused on institutional and procedural factors. However, O’Riordan et al (2011) conclude that despite the existence of various institutional obstacles, all donors are procedurally able to engage in joint programming. Although I do not want to underestimate these institutional barriers related to joint programming, as well as the procedural difficulties that complicate donor agencies’ officials’ daily work, this research has sought for a deeper understanding of EU coordination.
This section argues that (1) the domestic political and economic context which stimulates the use of development cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy and (2) the existence of different traditions in European development aid, based on different ideas and fostering different identities, are key to understand the generally low level of internal EU coordination. These help to understand why EU coordination mainly serves as a communication mechanism and more advanced EU coordination such as EU Joint Programming and EU Division of Labour largely remains a dead letter. Although some potentially enabling factors have been identified, which may lead to more advanced EU coordination in the future, they are not as strong as to compensate for the constraining factors. I will first discuss these (potentially) enabling factors before turning to the constraining factors.

(POTENTIALLY) ENABLING FACTORS

Besides the fact that it is the basis for more advanced coordination, information sharing solves information problems (missing information, asymmetric information). Because of the multilateral character of the EU, most EU donors have an interest in information about implementation of the EDF budget, enabling the occurrence of information exchange. The interest in/need for strategic information exchange varies across donors and across countries. Some donors, usually smaller donors are more in need to access important information than larger donors with easier access to information. For example, in Tanzania Belgium has few options to have access to information or to have a voice but through coordination with other donors. In Burkina Faso, smaller donors such as Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden rely on the EU and EU coordination meetings are an instrument to gain access to information. For example, Sweden which has few resources to effectively monitor its budget support ‘relies on EU comments for our budget support, as we don’t have the capacity to monitor it’ (EU10-Burkina Faso, May 2012).

Moreover, if information sharing and dialogue in the wider donor group is difficult or non-existing, the EU framework is an appealing tool for information exchange. This is exemplified by the country chapter of Senegal, where the absence of a well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanism has enabled the support for internal EU coordination meetings. Besides, through information sharing meetings people ‘get to know each other’, can build their network, and develop personal and working relationship: ‘ça créé des liens entre les chefs de coopération. Des petits trucs qui peuvent être importants’ (EU11-Burkina Faso, May 2012). The EU Delegation’s capacities to host information sharing meetings, to prepare the agenda and provide for well-organized and strategic communication as well as its diplomatic skills, dialogue culture foster the participation of EU donors. Likewise, several interviewees stated that joint programming and division of labour may
benefit EU donors as it allows them to save on transaction costs, to spread the risk of potential failures, and to increase their leverage: ‘this is becoming very expensive. There is a lot of room for specialization, now we are too many staff doing the same thing’ (EU2-Tanzania, January 2011). In the current context, where aid budgets are under pressure and where EU donors’ leverage in developing countries is decreasing because of the changing aid landscapes, these considerations might indeed act as enabling factors. In countries like Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal the emergence of non-OECD DAC donors such as China and the decreasing leverage of EU donors were in general recognized as a potentially enabling factor for EU coordination, even by the UK. However, the following constraining factors offer better understanding of why EU donors have not engaged in more advanced coordination.

CONSTRAINING FACTORS BEYOND INSTITUTIONS

First, in all countries field agencies felt the current political context in Europe is not conducive to engage in joint approaches that require a redefinition of their own priorities. The window of opportunity after the turn of the millennium that led to the adoption of the European Consensus and the Code of Conduct seems to be over. The governments that endorsed the Rome and Paris Declarations have changed and even donors that were recognized for their efforts to make their aid more effective have turned towards approaches which allow for more control and the use of development aid as instrument of foreign policy. Aid agencies in the field are under pressure to show individual results, donors’ programming cycles are often aligned to election cycles and allocation decisions are driven by other motives that only peer-reviewed comparative advantages or country needs and priorities. While EU donors’ leverage is decreasing, the field research revealed that this does not necessarily enable more EU coordination as shown by the attitude of the UK in Tanzania and France in Senegal. Moreover, some donors are more reluctant to share information about more sensitive (foreign policy/security related) information (cf. France taking a backseat position in Senegal). Besides, in a context where several coordination processes are on-going, there is a risk of information overload, which adds to the feeling of ‘coordination fatigue’ (cf. Tanzania, Zambia).

Second, despite the existence of a broad European Consensus on Development, including common objectives (poverty reduction, MDGs), values (respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice) and principles (ownership, partnership, political dialogue, participation of civil society, gender equality and addressing state fragility), EU donors have different traditions of development cooperation, based on different ideas about the balance between commercial,
security, political and historical self-interests and the promotion of these objectives, values and principles, as well as about how to best promote these objectives, values and principles. As such, behind the European Consensus there are differences in programmatic ideas as exemplified by the varying degrees of adherence towards the aid effectiveness agenda in general ('well performing' Nordic Plus versus ‘underperforming’ ‘European Front’), the composition of the aid portfolios (project support, technical assistance versus programme support and budget support) as well as in the use of these modalities (cf. technocratic versus political conditionalities).

Moreover; this research exposes the existence of a paradox that exists between EU donors’ support for EU integration and support for aid coordination in general. On the one hand, in Tanzania and Zambia, most EU donors (mainly Nordic Plus) have engaged in more harmonized aid modalities. However, these donors do not necessarily aim to coordinate in an EU framework. On the other hand, in Senegal (mainly ‘European Front’) donors have been more averse to make use of such approaches, while they have been more willing to coordinate political demarches. In Burkina Faso, where the EU is the dominant donor this paradox was less visible.

Closely related to the previous, is the pursuit of a collective EU identity through EU coordination and the existence of competing identities within the EU. Apart from the EU’s commitment to make EU aid more effective and its positive contributions to donor-wide coordination processes, there are several accounts that indicate that EU coordination also aims to strengthen a common European identity (cf. ‘Europe House’ in Tanzania, the ‘European Family’ in Zambia, ‘Avenue Europe’ in Burkina Faso, ‘Groupe Europe’ in Senegal). Arguably, apart from the EU’s good intentions, EU coordination has also become a goal in itself, and is instrumental to build the image of a responsible donor and differentiate EU donors from more coordination-averse donors (WB, US, UNDP). Especially in Tanzania and Zambia other identities compete with the construction of this European identity, be it because of national identity (DFID: a well-respected influential and responsible donor on its own) or a collective identity (‘altruistic’, ‘principled’, ‘flexible’, ‘multilateral solutions’ Like-Minded-Countries or Nordics (-Plus) versus a ‘bureaucratic’ Commission and ‘self-interested’, ‘old-fashioned’ EU donors). In Burkina Faso and Senegal the EU has been more pragmatic and EU coordination is no categorical imperative. Its coordination efforts are not primarily/only driven by the concern to establish a collective EU identity in the field, which reduces the potential for competition. In Burkina Faso, the EU Delegation actively facilitates donor-wide coordination processes and internal EU coordination meetings include also non-EU ‘like-minded’ countries. In turn, this approach does not conflict with the aim of France to protect is own identity (‘l'équipe France’). In Senegal, the EU’s close
cooperation with the US, and the fact that the Delegation also tries to strengthen its own role also reveals a more pragmatic approach.

Finally, the field research confirmed that procedures and institutions alone cannot sufficiently explain the lack of progress in EU coordination. The aforementioned constraining factors clearly indicate that the barriers to more advanced EU coordination are more complex than institutional and procedural constraints. For example, although an analysis of the feasibility of joint programming in Tanzania found that there was ‘High Potential’ (O’Riordan et al. 2011: 9) in terms of procedures, the country chapter indicated that, in order to understand why EU donors will not engage in joint programming, we should also take into account the importance of the country vis-à-vis domestic constituencies, the interest of the UK to seek for other non-EU partnerships or the pressure to focus on results and maintain flexibility to allow for political priorities. These findings are further explored by looking at illustrations of coordination without institutionalization as well as institutionalization without coordination.

First, the illustrative ‘best practice’ of EU coordination in Zambia shows that even when internal EU coordination is not institutionalized, EU donors are able to overcome the disadvantageous conditions for coordination. The origins that have accounted for the EU’s ability to successfully coordinate and reach an agreement on a joint roadmap amongst budget support donors to overcome the crisis in donor-government relations can be found in the combination of the specific characteristics of the context, namely a sudden crisis, preceded by a gradual loss of trust between the partners and a decreased leverage by all EU donors, and the capacity of the EU Delegation to function as a trustworthy mediator.

The revelation of the large-scale corruption cases, which were much politicized within Zambia as well as in some donor countries, functioned as a trigger for EU coordination as EU donors were under pressure to take action in order to prove that their support to Zambia was still meaningful and development aid was spent wisely. Zambia’s declining aid dependency and the growing presence of China had reduced EU leverage. EU donors felt that in order to maintain some leverage, there was need for a common position. At that time, the EU Delegation chaired the PRBS donor group and its capacities, and especially the EU’s key economist, enabled its role as an initiator of coordination. Although it was extremely difficult to take a unified and harmonized position in the divided donor group, under the lead of the EU Delegation the group managed to agree on a roadmap. This also raised support to elaborate more coordinated reporting towards the different headquarters.
Second, even in contexts where institutional coordination is advanced, this is no guarantee for successful coordination. In Tanzania, where several coordination mechanisms exist, these are perceived to have led to a new aid management bureaucracy which is not resistant to political or ideational changes. For example, the monitoring of budget support, considered as the ultimate form of harmonization, is institutionalized by a Memorandum of Understanding and a PAF, but it is also an instrument which is highly vulnerable to political and ideational changes in donor countries. Illustrations of changing policy preferences include the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Denmark and Sweden, all countries which had previously supported the use of budget support. Moreover, institutional coordination may function as a legitimization for donors’ aid practices. Tanzania has been portrayed as a best practice of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda and donors agreed on a Division of Labour for the policy dialogue by agreeing on lead donor arrangements. However, the division of labour is less advanced at the operational level and still allows for the protection of individual donors’ priorities.

8.3.2 Understanding variation in EU Delegations’ role in the external dimension

The findings on the role of EU Delegations in donor-wide coordination indicate that although they are generally recognized as committed to the aid effectiveness agenda and as active participants in several coordination processes, they play a different role in each country. Throughout the research it became clear that there is no such thing in practice as a dichotomy between being a coordinator and just another donor or a good or a bad coordinator. There is a spectrum of different roles regarding coordination which the EU can deploy in different situations. I have distinguished between the EU Delegation as ‘just another donor’ in Tanzania, as a coordination ‘facilitator’ in Burkina Faso and as an ‘initiator’ in Zambia and Senegal.

On the basis of first field research, I expected that the existing coordination as well as the donor composition may be identified as best explaining factors for the role of EU Delegations in donor-wide coordination. Thereby I expected that advanced donor-wide coordination and a dominance of Nordic Plus countries restrict the role of EU Delegations, while less advanced or absent donor-wide coordination and a dominance of European Front donors may be enabling. However, as I will clarify in the following paragraphs, while the degree of the existing coordination is key to understand the EU Delegation’s role, the donor composition should be further specified. Moreover, the research has found that the power asymmetry between the EU and the partner country should be added as a third explanation to specifically understand the facilitator role in Burkina Faso.
EXISTING DONOR-WIDE COORDINATION

First, the analysis of the EU Delegations’ role in the four countries confirmed my expectation that existing donor-wide coordination is a key factor to understand their specific role as it defines the ‘gap’ that the EU Delegation may ‘fill’.

In Tanzania the rather advanced donor-wide coordination constrains the EU Delegation to act as an initiator or a facilitator in the overall process. The EU Delegation is not playing a different role than other committed donors such as the Nordic Plus countries, they are ‘one around the table’ (EU5-Tanzania, January 2011). Important steps towards better coordination were initiated by Nordic countries in the end of the 1990s, and in the previous decade several coordination frameworks and initiatives have been set up in close cooperation with the government. At the time the EU’s policy framework on aid effectiveness was adopted, donor-wide coordination in the DPG, centred around the JAST, was already far advanced. Consequently there was no ‘gap’ for the EU to ‘fill’. Moreover, coordination in Tanzania has led to a new aid coordination bureaucracy, which is increasingly criticized in recent years, resulting even in ‘coordination fatigue’. Launching new initiatives in such an environment, may not be well received.

In Zambia the specific ‘gap’ in the area of budget enabled its ‘initiator role’ although, similar to Tanzania, the advanced donor-wide coordination has constrained its overall facilitator role in donor-wide coordination. In Zambia, the EU initiated budget support as a new approach, which constitutes for its initiator role. When it comes to the overall aid architecture though, the way towards better aid coordination was paved by the Nordic Plus countries and the WB before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions were adopted. The Nordic Plus initiatives then functionally evolved into a wider platform, including most of the traditional donors, resulting in the preparation of a Joint Assistance Strategy. This coordination mechanism led to a Division of Labour matrix in which all OECD-DAC bilateral and multilateral donors are participating.

In Burkina Faso, the absence of a well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanism and competing coordination ‘champions’ has enabled the EU Delegation to act as a coordination facilitator. In Burkina Faso aid coordination is a more recent phenomenon than in the ‘frontrunners’ of the aid effectiveness agenda in Eastern Africa. Before the adoption of the EU policies on aid effectiveness, coordination was not as advanced as in Tanzania and Zambia. As such, EU coordination and donor-wide coordination have evolved more as simultaneous
processes. The existing ‘gap’ created more scope for the EU’s coordinator role which it has used to facilitate the development and the functioning of the Troika and the monitoring of the national development strategy and budget support.

In Senegal, the absence of a well-functioning donor-wide coordination mechanism and competing coordination ‘champions’ has enabled the EU Delegation to act as a coordination initiator. Similar to Burkina Faso, the lack of efficient donor-wide coordination and competing coordination ‘champions’ has enabled the EU to act as an initiator of donor-wide coordination (external dimension). The EU has sought to improve the system of the G50 and better coordinate donors’ responses on government policies. Likewise, in absence of a coordination system around budget support the EU has also tried to put up a joint monitoring framework.

**DONOR COMPOSITION**

Second, when it comes to the donor composition, the explanation is more complex. On the one hand, the educated guess offers a valid explanation in order to understand the EU Delegation as ‘just another donor’ in Tanzania (clear Nordic Plus dominance) and a ‘facilitator’ in Burkina Faso (Commission and France dominance, combined with a group of medium-sized and small Nordic Plus and European Front donors). However, to understand the EU’s initiator role in Zambia and Senegal, two countries with a different donor composition, there is need for further diversification as the presence of Nordic Plus and European Front donors may work in different directions.

In Zambia, the EU Delegation’s initiator role was attributed to its specific initiatives in the field of budget support. The EU is the largest provider of budget support and in this specific case the presence of Nordic Plus countries, known for their stronger adherence to aid effectiveness and harmonized aid modalities, has enabled the EU to further maintain its facilitating role in this area. This suggests that Nordic Plus’ countries ideational adherence to coordination is more important than their aversion for EU initiatives in this regard.

In Senegal on the other hand, the EU Delegation’s initiator role was attributed to its initiatives in the field of the G50 and the monitoring of the PRSP, division of labour and budget support. Different from Burkina Faso, the European Front, but specifically the dominance of France, has worked as a constraining factor to move towards a facilitating role. This confirms the pragmatic stance of France, namely that the French preference for the EU does not follow from a preference for European integration of development policy as such. France clearly
has its own agenda in Africa which is closely related to its foreign policy agenda. France will only opt for the European path (or the multilateral) when this is in line with its own priorities.

POWER-ASYMMETRY

Third, in order to understand the specific facilitator role of the EU Delegation in Burkina Faso we should also take into account the degree of power asymmetry between the EU donors and the government. Different from the other countries under study, EU donors are still dominant and the government has not experienced increased access to alternative funding, be it from emerging donors or private investments. The Burkinabe government is considered a good performer and tends to agree with donors’ proposed policy reforms, as exemplified by the high disbursements in budget support. There are two points to be raised which supports this argument. On the one hand, Burkina Faso recognizes the problem of fragmented aid, which produces high transaction costs, but its limited capacities impedes an effective leadership role in aid coordination processes. On the other hand, as budget support has represented 25 per cent of government’s expenditure over the period 2005-2011, with an annual increase of 18 per cent on average, the country has an interest in supporting the facilitator role of its largest budget support provider.

In contrast, in Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal, the increased access to funding from private investors and emerging donors combined with a decreased interest in a coordinated donor bloc which tries to impose the development agenda restricts the coordinator role of the EU Delegations in these countries.

8.3.3 The role of the personal

Finally, the field research in the four sub-Saharan African countries has revealed the importance of personalities and personal connections behind the coordination mechanisms. Rather than influencing main policy decisions, personal characteristics and personal relationship may influence the flexibility of dealing with one’s own institutional and political restraints. It seems that persons can only enable EU coordination in combination with other enabling factors. Personal assets in favour of coordination are experience from other countries and with harmonized approaches and capacities such as leadership, negotiation skills, diplomatic skills and the ability to balance between organizational restrictions and the local context. If key positions in the Delegations are occupied by active people with experience, ideas and strategic insights this might is an additional enabling factor.

‘You need champions, you need people who are going to be prepared to take the time, the energy to push it forward. […] If you don’t have at least one of the two, the HoC or the HoM who is going to carry it,
nothing is going to happen. [...] it's very much linked to the individualities of people (EU11-Zambia, March 2012).

For example, the facilitator role of the EU Delegation in Burkina Faso is said to be driven to a great extent by some very active individuals. In the same vein, there is room for personal links and relationships, as illustrated by the informal coordination among Nordic countries in Tanzania and Zambia which cultivates their collective identity, or by the close professional relationships between staff of the EU Delegation and the French development agency in Burkina Faso.

In turn, given the largely voluntary aspect of EU coordination, persons can easily constrain further advancement of EU coordination. For example, in Zambia, while the former EU HoD also supported EU coordination on development cooperation, the current EU Ambassador, who arrived in 2011, 'didn't buy into it much' and 'doesn't champion the issue of joint programming' (EU11-Zambia, March 2012). Similarly, what has added to the decision for not having joint programming in Burkina Faso for the 11th EDF is the fact that in 2013 a large staff turnover was planned in several Embassies or agencies, including the EU HoC.
8.3.4 Summary

Table 8-5. Summary of the conclusions (RQ1 & RQ2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ1: Mapping EU coordination: to what extent does the EU coordinate? (what-question)</th>
<th>RQ2: Understanding EU coordination: under which circumstances (how-question) and for what reasons (why-question) does the EU coordinate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General findings</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sub-findings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Internal dimension: a generally low level of internal EU coordination in all countries</td>
<td>(1a) In the programming phase, EU coordination remains low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1b) In the implementation phase EU coordination mainly serves as a communication mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) External dimension: EU Delegations play varying roles in donor-wide coordination processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2a) EU Delegation as ‘just another donor’ in Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2b) EU Delegation as a coordination ‘facilitator’ in Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2c) EU Delegation as a coordination ‘initiator’ in Senegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2c) EU Delegation as a coordination ‘initiator’ in Zambia

Facilitator role in budget support enabled by

(1) absence of advanced donor-wide coordination in budget support
(2) presence of ‘Nordic Plus’ donors

Overall facilitator role constrained by

(1) advanced donor-wide coordination
(2) dominant representation of Nordic Plus countries
(3) relatively smaller power asymmetry between EU and Zambia

(4) The EU’s ambition to strengthen the internal and external dimension of its coordinator role are complementary rather than conflicting

8.4 Concluding reflections

By answering the research questions put forward in this thesis I have aimed at a better understanding of the EU as a coordinator in development. In this section I will end with three main reflections on the conclusions.

7.4.1 Beyond institutions and procedures

As I have argued, rather than a mono-causal perspective on causal relations in the Humean sense, I have adopted a deeper and broader meaning of cause by accepting that multiple causes interact in a complex and unpredictable way and that factors not inevitably ‘push and pull’ but rather ‘constrain and enable’ (cf. Kurki, 2006, 2008). This interpretation of causality is consistent with the pragmatic research approach.

The Aristotelian definition of cause distinguishes between material, formal, efficient and final causes which each cause in different manners. Thereby, material and formal causes are constitutive causes while efficient and final causes are active causes (Kurki, 2008: 220-222). This interpretation of cause argues for a ‘multifaceted understanding of causal powers in the social world’ (Kurki, 2008: 223).

‘The active powers of agents (efficient causes) must always be related to final causes (purposes, intentionality) and, crucially, be contextualized within the “constitutive” conditioning causal powers of rules and norms (formal causes) as well as material conditions (material causes)’ (Kurki, 2008: 296-297).

This interpretation of cause has inspired my research as I have aimed to go beyond a focus on institutions and procedures and provide a more profound understanding of the complexity of coordination by taking into account a wide range of factors that may enable and constrain EU
coordination. Importantly, my conclusions do not contradict the importance of procedures and institutions in coordination processes, nor the importance of individual agency. However, I have found that these are shaped by (1) donors’ domestic political and economic context, and (2) the existence of different traditions in European development aid, based on different ideas and identities.

Table 8-6. Broader interpretation of causality applied to the conclusions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broader interpretation of the conclusions</th>
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**Material causes 'out of’**
- Political & economic context inside & outside Europe
- Donor identities
- EU donors' philosophical ideas
- Existing coordination & donor composition in country
- Power asymmetry EU donors - government

**Formal causes ‘according to’**
- EU donors' programmatic & policy ideas about aid
- EU donors' procedures and institutions

**Efficient causes 'by which’**
- Agency by EU Delegations' & Member States' staff

**Final causes 'for the sake of’**
- Aid effectiveness
- EU leverage

### 7.4.2 Possible implications of the conclusions

Despite the EU’s growing role in Brussels, development cooperation between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa continues to occur largely at the bilateral level. Development cooperation is a shared competence and the constraining factors for EU coordination at the country level are strong and appear quickly. Arguably, the paradox of the EU’s ambitions and its inability to act as a coordinator at the country level follow from the contradictions in the EU’s development multi-level governance system. The European Consensus on Development conceals the diversity that exists in EU Member States development aid when it comes to concrete approaches to development, resulting in different interpretations of the EU’s policies. This results in what could arguably be recognized as ‘coordination light’ or restricted to a certain degree in order to maintain
consensus, which might not be enough from an aid effectiveness perspective. As Birdsall (2008: 542) argues for example, the challenge of coordination failures is fundamental ‘and may not yield to minor fixes’. According to her (and others) the major fix would be the establishment of a true common pool of donor funds.

On the one hand Member States agree to design policies and engage in EU processes that claim to facilitate recipient-led aid coordination (European Consensus, Code of Conduct, Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, Joint Multi-Annual Programming). On the other hand, these initiatives remain mostly voluntary and are designed in such a way that they allow for portraying progress (donor-mappings, designing roadmaps) while at the same time safeguarding the possibility of partial implementation and thus the protection of individual development traditions and identities. Member states emphasize that development cooperation and aid allocation is an area of national competence and despite the existence of a European Consensus on Development and a Code of Conduct, the Commission does not dispose of a regulatory competence. The voluntary aspect facilitates the vulnerability of the EU’s coordinator role and its liability to domestic politics.

First, this research has indicated that the EU’s intentions and ambitions to promote coordination are a blend of development/functional/normative and identity/realist motives. While coordination should contribute to improving governments’ capacities to manage aid flows, and harness the detrimental effects of fragmented EU aid, the EU’s promotion of coordination is also a way of legitimizing the EU’s role in international development towards EU citizens as well as towards the international community. The four countries in this study are in one way or another portrayed as development success stories, albeit to different degrees and for different reasons (economic growth, democracy, stability...). In these countries, the EU has an interest in presenting itself as a responsible donor and show that it spends development funds effectively.

The EU concept of aid effectiveness, with its focus on division of labour and complementarity, may also be directed at raising support for the EU as a development actor and development as such. Although the agenda of division of labour and complementarity may be inspired by ‘noble’ principles, and the mere fact that the EU promotes coordination may ensure that issues such as duplication and fragmentation take centre stage in aid discussions, the concrete elaboration shows that it is to a large extent directed at internal EU affairs (cf. accountability). As European citizens are aware about the large budget that is spent on development cooperation, and aid has been under pressure and politicized in several European countries, the focus on aid effectiveness is a way to show the EU citizens that their tax money is spent wisely. However, this also entails
several risks which are inherent to the design of the EU’s coordination policy framework. This is exemplified by the fact that donors’ comparative advantages, on which the division of labour is based, are mainly determined by means of self-evaluations and not primarily by the recipient government or other donors. This is well illustrated by the Dutch government decision to concentrate its development cooperation from 33 to 15 partner countries. The decision was legitimated by presenting it as an attempt to make development aid more efficient but is also driven by other motives, as shown by the exit out of Burkina Faso, a highly aid dependent country where the Netherlands were one of the first bilateral donors. The field research revealed that no country-level consultations took place prior to the decision (let alone a peer-reviewed analysis of its comparative advantages) which indicates the unilateral character of the concentration decisions of the Netherlands.

Besides, the EU’s coordination agenda may help to establishing itself as a relevant power in the world and confirming or maintaining its actorness, as by presenting itself as a single unitary actor; outsiders’ may believe that the EU is able to act consistently (Van Criekinge, 2009: 50-51). In the field, the EU is recognized for its culture of dialogue, information sharing and consultation, especially when compared to other major actors such as the WB, UNDP, the US and China. Dialogue seems to have become a value in itself which raises the question whether the EU is actually driven by results or whether it is rather counting on its status as the world’s largest aid donor and its self-image as a responsible donor (cf. Vogt, 2006). The changing landscape, with the emergence of China, India, South-Africa, Brazil and other non-OECD–DAC players, risks decreasing the leverage of the EU’s development policies. Consequently, the cost of non-implementation of the EU’s higher coordination ambitions might increase and possibly enable more advanced coordination in the future.

However, in countries like Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal, in the past decade, the interest in donor-led coordination has decreased and the advantages of donor competition may be more appealing. This also applies to coordination of policy dialogue accompanying budget support as it is perceived as an instrument that increases donors’ oversight over the national budget. In turn, EU donors experience a loss of leverage which may enable the need for coordination, driven by domestic accountability concerns as well as broader political objectives such as influence in the country/region or economic interests. The EU’s ambition to strengthen coordination may thus also conflict with partner country-led aid coordination. The internal dimension of EU coordination has no direct link with the partner countries’ governments. EU coordination meetings deal with the internal EU agenda and the need to report and follow-up on the
implementation of European policies, such as the FTI on Division of Labour. EU coordination is perceived as a top-down approach requiring the production of action plans, roadmaps and reports of consultation exercises. The EU ambition to engage in Joint Multi-Annual Programming, although reaffirming the importance of country ownership, simultaneously puts the focus on coordination with Member States, involving a risk to reduce the space for developing countries’ involvement. The EU’s coordination policies seem to be rather pre-written with few built-in mechanisms for consultation with the partner country’s government. This underlying proposition may undermine partner country-driven coordination.

In short, the context within and outside the EU offers opportunities for more coordination, which is also recognized by the officials interviewed for this thesis. However, hitherto these have not manifested themselves (and thus only remain potential).

Second, I have argued that the European Consensus on Development conceals the existence of different traditions of development cooperation. This also explains the existence of different perceptions of the Commission which is sometimes seen as a ‘modern’ donor promoting aid effectiveness and providing budget support, and sometimes as an ‘old-fashioned’ donor which is inflexible and focuses on roadmaps, action plans, and ticking the box. In many ways internal EU coordination processes are similar over the four countries, suggesting a ‘one size fits all’ and ‘top-down’ approach which is not always adapted to the local context. Arguably the EU approach to coordination is characterized by a focus on the input side and the process rather than on the results. The EU works on a step by step basis with a focus on mid-term delivery of products such as a donor matrix, an action plan or a roadmap. These deliveries are important and help to keep coordination on top of the agenda. However, if these institutional steps do not contain a strategy to combine the strengths of the different development traditions, they may risk stranding at the stage of information sharing and transparency.

7.4.3 Is EU coordination ‘good’ or ‘bad’?

The aim was not just to answer the question whether what the EU does is good or bad, but to develop a framework to better understand the complexity of EU coordination. Consequently, the focus of this research has not been on the appropriateness of the coordination the EU promotes, but on coordination as an aspect of EU development policy. From this follows that I do not tend to defend that more EU coordination is necessarily good for development. First, it is perfectly possible that EU donors do not coordinate in a specific EU framework, but coordinate in a donor-wide framework, as exemplified by the findings of Tanzania and Zambia. Second, EU coordination is often perceived as top-down and guided by a one-size-fits-all approach which
might pass government leadership and add to duplication and coordination-fatigue. Coordination may be used as an instrument to maintain or strengthen EU leverage, resulting in donors ganging-up, with negative effects on partner country ownership of aid coordination. Third, coordination is important but it should not be a goal in itself and it is also not enough for good cooperation. However, the research findings suggest that dialogue sometimes seems to have become a value in itself for the EU.

Yet, this perspective does not contradict that the EU framework could be used to make coordination and alignment more binding and less subject to donors’ goodwill and the political context in the member states and to make free-riding and non-implementation more difficult. Clearly, EU coordination at the country level is not based on a ‘grand strategy’ as was envisaged by the European Consensus on Development. The ‘best practices’ summarized in the previous chapter indicate the importance of the local context, ‘coalitions of the willing’ and the capacities of the EU Delegations. As one interviewee put it: ‘In each country the implementation of the Paris agenda has a different story’ (EU4-Tanzania, January 2011). Consequently, coordination requires political awareness and a balanced understanding of different dynamics at play. After all, this research has also shown that there are multiple paths to ‘better’ coordination and ‘best practices’ are subject to change, as exemplified by the case of Tanzania, where coordination fatigue has entered the stage but donors are still under pressure to upheld its image. Although there are constraining factors which have remained constant over all the country chapters in this study, this research has also pointed at country-specific barriers to more effective coordination. Arguably, instead of promoting a ‘one-size fits all’ approach the EU may move away from preconceived models towards a more pragmatic approach and even towards coordination at different speeds.

### 7.4.4 Main contributions of this study

In the following paragraphs I highlight three main issues this thesis offers to studies on EU development cooperation.

First, the research was constructed as an exploratory study. To my knowledge, there are no published studies that have thoroughly looked into the EU’s coordinator role in the field, whereas EU coordination at the policy level or donor-wide coordination in the field has received much more attention. I have conducted a problem-driven and practice-oriented research based on the analytical strategy of abduction. The first added value of my research thus lies in its empirical character by gathering data on EU coordination at the country level.
Second, apart from the empirical knowledge that this research has produced, the added value of this research lays also in the pragmatist approach which has allowed me to take a holistic perspective on what the EU does and how EU policy initiatives are translated at the field level. It has allowed me to go beyond a focus on institutions and procedures and provide a more profound understanding of the complexity of EU coordination by investigating the interplay of a wide range of factors that enable and constrain EU coordination in the field. By clarifying the factors that constrain and enable EU coordination at country level and pointing at challenges, tensions and conflicts as well as at opportunities, I have contributed to the studies on the role of the EU as a development actor.

Third, by contextualizing EU coordination in the broader coordination processes I have to some extent tried to avoid an EU-centric account. The factors leading up to the limited progress in EU coordination at country level are not exclusively European. When studying the EU we should look at the broader picture of engagements with other actors, including other OECD-DAC donors, emerging donors and partner country governments.

7.4.5 Limitations of this study and suggestions for further research.
This PhD research is the result of several methodological and analytical choices which have been made throughout the process. Inevitably, this involves several restrictions which at the same time result in ideas for further research.

First, while I have emphasized the added value of the pragmatist research approach which allowed me to take a holistic and broad perspective on EU coordination by focusing on the country level, the downsize of this choice is that a number of specific issues were not investigated in great depth. For example, more research could be conducted on the specific content of what is being coordinated. The research has shown that ideational differences do not necessary concern broad policy goals, but rather specific sequencing and priorities of policy instruments to achieve these goals. Further research could focus on coordination around specific themes or in specific sectors.

Second, the choice to focus primarily on what EU Delegations are doing regarding coordination implies that I have not dedicated equal attention to exploring the practices and motivations of other donor agencies as well as headquarters’ actors. Although these differences are to a certain extent taken into account in the narratives of the country chapter, further research could investigate more thoroughly the characteristics and implications of these different development
traditions and identities through an analysis of a selection of bilateral donors as well as by an in-depth analysis of their developments at headquarters’ level.

Third, investigating evolutions over time should provide insights on issues like convergence and divergence. While I have tried to take into account possible changes over time, I have not studied this in greater depth. Although I point at the existence of different research traditions in the development policies of EU Member States, they might also be converging. Further research should also look in greater detail into this question of convergence and divergence of interests, ideas and policies. For example, within the country chapters I have indicated the shift in development policies of the Nordic Plus countries. It would be interesting to further investigate these claims.

Fourth, although the aim of my research was not to generalize the findings, it would be interesting to extrapolate the findings to other countries with similar characteristics but also to other regions or countries with different characteristics to see whether they hold out. This could include EU coordination in fragile states. Moreover, at the time decisions on the country studies had to be made, it was not clear yet in which countries EU donors would engage in joint programming for the 11th EDF. Therefore further research could be conducted in countries such as Ghana, where EU donors have decided to engage in this more advanced form of EU coordination, to investigate the factors that have enabled this decision.

Fifth, through the abductive research approach the conclusions of this research have indicated the importance of ideas, identities and the domestic context. Further research should focus on a deeper conceptualization and theorizing of these findings in order to gain a more profound understanding.

Sixth, this PhD thesis is to a large extent based on qualitative in-depth interviews to generate data on coordination practices and explain the EU’s coordinator role. This was judged to be the most appropriate method to gather information as the aim of this explorative research project was to gain understanding of the nature of the EU’s coordination problems in the field. However, the downside of interview research is that ‘we don’t see things as they are, we see them as we are’ (Anais Nin). Moreover, the data were gathered in relatively short periods of field research. Although I have aimed to increase the validity and reliability of my findings by continuously interpreting and comparing the diverging constructed realities, narratives and experiences of the different respondents, as well as adding methodological clarity and self-reflection, it could be useful to
make use of other methods of data gathering, for example by making use of the method of participant observation.
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CS2-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with Civil Society Representative, Lusaka].
CS3-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with Civil Society Representative, Dar es Salaam].
CS3-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with Civil Society Representative, Lusaka].
CS4-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with Civil Society Representative, Dar es Salaam].
CS4-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with Civil Society Representative, Lusaka].
CS5-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with Civil Society Representative, Dar es Salaam].
EU1-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Ouagadougou].
EU1-Senegal (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].
EU1-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].
EU1-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].
EU2-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Ouagadougou].
EU2-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].
EU2-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Dar es Salaam].
EU2-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Lusaka].
EU3-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Ouagadougou].
EU3-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Dakar].
EU3-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].
EU3-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].
EU4-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU4-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].

EU4-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU4-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

EU5-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU5-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].

EU5-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU5-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

EU6-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU6-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].

EU6-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU6-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

EU7-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU7-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].

EU7-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU7-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

EU8-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU8-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dakar].

EU8-Tanzania (February 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].
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EU9-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU9-Tanzania (February 2012). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU9-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

EU10-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU10-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU10-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

EU11-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Ouagadougou].

EU11-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU11-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with EU Delegation Representative, Lusaka].

EU12-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Dar es Salaam].

EU12-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with EU Member State Representative, Lusaka].

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GOV2-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with Zambian Government Representative, Lusaka].

GOV3-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with Zambian Government Representative, Lusaka].

GOV4-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with Zambian Government Representative, Lusaka].

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non-EU1-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Ouagadougou].

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non-EU1-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU1-Zambia (January 2011). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Lusaka].

non-EU2-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Ouagadougou].

non-EU2-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with PTF Secretariat Representative, Dakar].

non-EU2-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU2-Zambia (February 2011). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Lusaka].

non-EU3-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Ouagadougou].

non-EU3-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Dakar].

non-EU3-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with DPG Secretariat Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU3-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Lusaka].
non-EU4-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Ouagadougou].

non-EU4-Senegal (June 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Dakar].

non-EU4-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU4-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Lusaka].

non-EU5-Burkina Faso (May 2012). [Interview with Troika Secretariat Representative, Ouagadougou].

non-EU5-Tanzania (January 2011). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU5-Zambia (March 2012). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Lusaka].

non-EU6-Tanzania (February 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU7-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with DPG Secretariat Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU8-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with non-EU Bilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

non-EU9-Tanzania (March 2012). [Interview with Multilateral Donor Representative, Dar es Salaam].

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**Annexes**

**Annex I: Data on decentralization of aid management in EU Member States**

Table 1. Policy commitment to decentralization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Formal commitment</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Written Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC, 2009a

*Notes:* MS = Member States, BE =Belgium, DK = Denmark, EC = European Commission, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom

Table 2. Financial authority at field level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Decentralization of bilateral aid</th>
<th>Financial authority at field level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Disbursement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>partly</td>
<td>USD 47000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>USD 1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Contracts: unlimited Financing decisions: USD 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>partly</td>
<td>USD 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>GTZ: yes; BMZ, KfW: partly</td>
<td>USD 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>unlimited within budgetary limits and if in line with the strategic plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>USD 15,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC, 2009a

*Notes:* MS = Member States, BE =Belgium, DK = Denmark, EC = European Commission, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom
Table 3. Staff distribution between HQ and field (including expatriates and local staff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Share of staff in field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC, 2009a

*Notes:* MS = Member States, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, EC = European Commission, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom

Table 4. Decentralization of bilateral aid tasks and responsibilities (I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decentralization of country strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on OECD-DAC, 2009a

*Notes:* MS = Member States, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, EC = European Commission, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom, HQ = headquarters
### Table 5. Decentralization of bilateral aid tasks and responsibilities (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decentralization of programming</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formulation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Approval</strong></td>
<td><strong>Accountable for delivery</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: based on OECD-DAC, 2009a

*Notes*: MS = Member States, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, EC = European Commission, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom, HQ = headquarters

### Table 6. Decentralization of bilateral aid tasks and responsibilities (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decentralization of projects (Monitoring results/financial data, Contracting, Financial management)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formulation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Approval</strong></td>
<td><strong>Accountable for delivery</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>field</td>
<td>field + HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: based on OECD-DAC, 2009a

*Notes*: MS = Member States, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, EC = European Commission, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom, HQ = headquarters
### Annex II: Overview context factors of country chapters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY SITUATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL AND GOVERNANCE SITUATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Index 2012 (Economist Intelligence Unit)</td>
<td>Hybrid regime Republic Score: 5,64</td>
<td>Flawed democracy Presidential system, representative democracy Score: 6,19</td>
<td>Authoritarian regime Semi-presidential system, republic 3,59</td>
<td>Hybrid regime Semi-presidential system 5,44</td>
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<td>Political rights score (Freedom house)</td>
<td>2012 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2010 21</td>
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<td>2009 4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2008 4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (weak) / 1 (strong)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights score (Freedom house)</td>
<td>2012 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2010 36</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (weak) / 1 (strong)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability (WB Governance Indicators)</td>
<td>2010 -0.01</td>
<td>+0.48</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006 -0.32</td>
<td>+0.33</td>
<td>+0.16</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 -0.56</td>
<td>+0.01</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2002 -0.37</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2.5 (weak) / 2.5 (strong)</td>
<td>1998 -0.51</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability (WB Governance Indicators)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness (WB Governance Indicators)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption (WB Governance Indicators)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law (WB Governance Indicators)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability of country public financial management systems (WB CPIA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECURITY SITUATION

| Donors’ security interests | Location near the Great Lakes and the Horn, relatively important partner for regional security, and in the fight against terrorism and piracy | Location near the Great Lakes and Zimbabwe, relatively important partner for regional security, no primary security interests for EU countries | Location in the Sahel, relatively important partner for France for regional security, less for other EU countries | Fairly stable Muslim country in a rather turbulent region, a source of migration, strategic ally for the US and France |

### ECONOMIC SITUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation consumer prices (annual %) (WB 2012c)</td>
<td>2011 12,7</td>
<td>2010 6,2</td>
<td>2009 12,1</td>
<td>2008 10,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 6,4</td>
<td>2010 8,5</td>
<td>2009 13,4</td>
<td>2008 12,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 2,8</td>
<td>2010 -0,8</td>
<td>2009 2,6</td>
<td>2008 10,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 3,4</td>
<td>2010 1,3</td>
<td>2009 -1,1</td>
<td>2008 5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investments (% of GDP) (WB 2012c)</td>
<td>2011 4,6</td>
<td>2010 4,5</td>
<td>2009 4,5</td>
<td>2008 6,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 10,3</td>
<td>2010 10,7</td>
<td>2009 5,4</td>
<td>2008 6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 0,1</td>
<td>2010 0,4</td>
<td>2009 0,7</td>
<td>2008 0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 2,0</td>
<td>2010 2,1</td>
<td>2009 2,6</td>
<td>2008 3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance (USD millions) (WB 2012c)</td>
<td>2011 -3,951,381,023</td>
<td>2010 -1,923,586,084</td>
<td>2009 -1,797,024,738</td>
<td>2008 -2,564,114,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 215,388,000</td>
<td>2010 1,143,710,000</td>
<td>2009 537,472,000</td>
<td>2008 -1,038,720,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 N/A</td>
<td>2010 N/A</td>
<td>2009 -380,038,564</td>
<td>2008 -963,132,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 N/A</td>
<td>2010 -600,017,742</td>
<td>2009 -853,754,139</td>
<td>2008 -1,883,713,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total debt service (% of GNI) (WB 2012c)</td>
<td>2011 0,6</td>
<td>2010 0,9</td>
<td>2009 0,8</td>
<td>2008 0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 1,1</td>
<td>2010 1,0</td>
<td>2009 1,4</td>
<td>2008 1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 0,7</td>
<td>2010 0,6</td>
<td>2009 0,5</td>
<td>2008 0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011 2,5</td>
<td>2010 2,4</td>
<td>2009 1,6</td>
<td>2008 1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Relatively rich in natural resources, recent discovery of gas and gold reserves</td>
<td>Relatively rich in natural resources, copper mining</td>
<td>Relatively poor in natural resources, recent discovery of gold reserves</td>
<td>Relatively poor in natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB ease of doing business ranking (Africa) (2012)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EU commercial interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU commercial interests</th>
<th>Relatively more important commercial partner for UK, Germany and Netherlands</th>
<th>Relatively less important commercial partner for EU countries</th>
<th>Relatively less important commercial partner for EU countries</th>
<th>Relatively more important commercial partner for France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### DEVELOPMENT SITUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>LDC</th>
<th>LMIC (since 2011)</th>
<th>LDC</th>
<th>LMIC (since 2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP - per capita (PPP) &amp; Poverty ranking in terms of GDP per capita (out of 228) (2012)</td>
<td>$1,700</td>
<td>$1,700</td>
<td>$1,400</td>
<td>$1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and ranking (out of 187 countries) of Human Development (2011)</td>
<td>Low - 0,47</td>
<td>Low - 0,43</td>
<td>Low - 0,33</td>
<td>Low - 0,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>46 million</td>
<td>13 million</td>
<td>17 million</td>
<td>13 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid as % of central government expense</td>
<td>Av. 2002-2004: N/A</td>
<td>Av. 2002-2004: 114</td>
<td>Av. 2002-2004: 121</td>
<td>Av. 2002-2004: N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards reaching MDG goals</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Achieve universal primary education</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Promote gender equality and empower women</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Reduce child mortality</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Improve maternal health</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Off track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</td>
<td>Very likely to be achieved, on track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
<td>Possible to achieve if some changes are made</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. EVOLUTION DONOR-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

**Partnership characteristic**


- Despite authoritarian regime rather consensual donor-government relations. Because of performance in technocratic governance

- From peaceful to strained donor-government relations under Wade’s second term and especially after crisis in 2008. From privileged towards
Power asymmetry EU - government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis in 2007</th>
<th>Crisis in 2009</th>
<th>Some argue it has become a 'donor darling'</th>
<th>Relatively tense relationship with France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing power asymmetry EU – government since Government is successfully seeking diversification (BRICS and private investments)</td>
<td>Decreasing power asymmetry EU – government since Government is successfully seeking diversification (BRICS and private investments)</td>
<td>Power asymmetry EU - government has remained intact. Unlike Tanzania and Zambia, Burkina Faso has not sought for diversification</td>
<td>Decreasing power asymmetry EU – government since Government is successfully seeking diversification (BRICS, US and Arab countries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Partner country role in aid coordination

| From facilitating role (Tanzanian Assistance Strategy) towards decreased interest | Facilitating role (Aid policy & Strategy) | Supporting role (National Action Plan for Aid Effectiveness) | From facilitating role in the first years of the past decade towards decreased interest |

3. DONOR LANDSCAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major bilateral and multilateral donors (2002 – 2010)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<p>| Number of donors (2012) | 38 | 37 | 40 | 41 |
| EU donors that indicated the country as a priority country (2007) | BE, DK, IE, FI, DE, NL, UK, SE, FR, PL (10) | CZ, DK, IE, FI, DE, NL, UK, SE (8) | DK, DE, LU, NL, SE, FR (6) | BE, DE, LU, NL, ES, FR (6) |
| EU share in total ODA (2002 – 2010) | 32% | 32% | 43% | 41% |
| Commission share in total | 6% | 7% | 13% | 6% |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ODA (2002-2010)</strong></th>
<th>23%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>11%</th>
<th>3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Plus share in EU Aid (2002 – 2010)</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of BRICs</td>
<td>Increased presence of emerging donors: China, India</td>
<td>Increased presence of emerging donors: China</td>
<td>Emerging donors relatively less present</td>
<td>Increased presence of China, India, Arab states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid fragmentation ratio (2010) (number of non-significant relations/number of donors)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. EXISTING DONOR-WIDE COORDINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>General</strong></th>
<th>Advanced donor-wide coordination</th>
<th>Advanced donor-wide coordination</th>
<th>Relatively less advanced donor-wide coordination</th>
<th>Relatively less advanced donor-wide coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At forefront of implementation of aid effectiveness agenda</td>
<td>At forefront of implementation of aid effectiveness agenda</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>‘Engines’ of coordination</strong></th>
<th>Nordic plus and WB</th>
<th>Nordic Plus (HIP – 2003)</th>
<th>EU Delegation</th>
<th>Coalitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Joint strategy to align aid to national priorities</strong></th>
<th>JAST</th>
<th>JASZ aligned to FNDP (2007)</th>
<th>/</th>
<th>/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>But JASZ does not replace individual country strategies</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Joint monitoring of development strategy implementation</strong></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Partly</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Budget support</strong></th>
<th>From 14 to 12 BS donors</th>
<th>From 9 to 7 BS donors</th>
<th>From 6 to 9 BS donors</th>
<th>From 7 to 5 BS donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated approach on</td>
<td>Coordinated approach on</td>
<td>Coordinated approach on</td>
<td>No coordinated approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRBS, MoU, PAF but no harmonized eligibility criteria</td>
<td>PRBS, MoU, PAF but no harmonized eligibility criteria</td>
<td>PRBS, Protocol, no harmonized eligibility criteria</td>
<td>on PRBS, no MoU or protocol, no harmonized eligibility criteria</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of GBS as % of ODA: 50% (2006/2007)</td>
<td>Increase of GBS as % of ODA: 20% (2009)</td>
<td>Annual increase of GBS as % of government expenditure by 18% in 2005-2011 with an average of 25% per year</td>
<td>Decrease of GBS as % of ODA</td>
<td>Low disbursement levels of GBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of GBS as % of government expenditure to only 6-8%</td>
<td>Decrease of GBS as % of government expenditure 20% (2009)</td>
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</table>

**Coordination of policy dialogue**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DPG co-chaired by UNDP and bilateral. Sector and Thematic groups with lead/silent donor arrangements</th>
<th>CPG under lead of Troika and Sector Groups with Lead/silent donor arrangements</th>
<th>Troika and joint groups for sector discussions, no lead/silent donor arrangements</th>
<th>Groupe 50 and 13 thematic coordination groups, ACAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Division of labour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Donor matrix, self-assessment and peer review Division of Labour in policy dialogue</th>
<th>Donor matrix, self-assessment and peer review Division of Labour in policy dialogue</th>
<th>Donor matrix, self-assessment, peer review Limited Division of Labour in policy dialogue</th>
<th>Donor matrix, self-assessment Limited Division of Labour in policy dialogue</th>
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</table>

5. **EU COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRY**

**Aid portfolio composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRBS under EDF 9 &amp; EDF 10 MDG Contract (305 mln euros) Disbursements: 52% GBS, 14% SBS</th>
<th>PRBS under EDF 9 &amp; EDF 10 MDG Contract (225 mln euros) Disbursements: 48.9% GBS</th>
<th>PRBS under EDF 9 &amp; EDF 10 MDG Contract (320 mln euros) Disbursements: 59% GBS, 6% SBS</th>
<th>GBS under EDF 10: (commitment 52% of total envelop) No MDG contract Disbursements: 22% GBS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Focal areas EDF 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infrastructure, communications, transport Trade &amp; regional integration</th>
<th>Regional integration, infrastructure, transport Human development, health</th>
<th>Basic infrastructure, interconnectivity Political &amp; local governance</th>
<th>Regional integration &amp; trade Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>