- Author
- Dries Lesage (UGent) , Peter Debaere (UGent) , Sacha Dierckx (UGent) and Mattias Vermeiren (UGent)
- Organization
- Abstract
- The global financial crisis moved the International Monetary Fund (IMF) back to the center stage, after some years of disengagement by major emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). Neo-liberal institutionalism predicts that crises in a highly interdependent world induce states to strengthen multilateral institutions. In the case of the IMF, many observers believed that a more effective IMF was contingent on giving EMDCs a larger voice. However, the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform at the IMF fell below expectations in this regard. On the basis of an analysis of the ex ante preferences and power relations of the major players, we show that this should not come as a surprise and that the 2010 reform agreement has reached the boundaries of the politically possible. Hence, this empirical case study brings in power and preferences to qualify the more optimist neo-liberal institutionalist accounts against the backdrop of an increasingly multipolar world.
- Keywords
- BRICs, multilateral reform, POLITICS, POWER, IMF, MULTILATERALISM, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
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Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-3185405
- MLA
- Lesage, Dries, et al. “IMF Reform after the Crisis.” INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, edited by Michael Cox, vol. 50, no. 4, 2013, pp. 553–78, doi:10.1057/ip.2013.17.
- APA
- Lesage, D., Debaere, P., Dierckx, S., & Vermeiren, M. (2013). IMF reform after the crisis. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 50(4), 553–578. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.17
- Chicago author-date
- Lesage, Dries, Peter Debaere, Sacha Dierckx, and Mattias Vermeiren. 2013. “IMF Reform after the Crisis.” Edited by Michael Cox. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 50 (4): 553–78. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.17.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Lesage, Dries, Peter Debaere, Sacha Dierckx, and Mattias Vermeiren. 2013. “IMF Reform after the Crisis.” Ed by. Michael Cox. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 50 (4): 553–578. doi:10.1057/ip.2013.17.
- Vancouver
- 1.Lesage D, Debaere P, Dierckx S, Vermeiren M. IMF reform after the crisis. Cox M, editor. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. 2013;50(4):553–78.
- IEEE
- [1]D. Lesage, P. Debaere, S. Dierckx, and M. Vermeiren, “IMF reform after the crisis,” INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 553–578, 2013.
@article{3185405,
abstract = {{The global financial crisis moved the International Monetary Fund (IMF) back to the center stage, after some years of disengagement by major emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). Neo-liberal institutionalism predicts that crises in a highly interdependent world induce states to strengthen multilateral institutions. In the case of the IMF, many observers believed that a more effective IMF was contingent on giving EMDCs a larger voice. However, the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform at the IMF fell below expectations in this regard. On the basis of an analysis of the ex ante preferences and power relations of the major players, we show that this should not come as a surprise and that the 2010 reform agreement has reached the boundaries of the politically possible. Hence, this empirical case study brings in power and preferences to qualify the more optimist neo-liberal institutionalist accounts against the backdrop of an increasingly multipolar world.}},
author = {{Lesage, Dries and Debaere, Peter and Dierckx, Sacha and Vermeiren, Mattias}},
editor = {{Cox, Michael}},
issn = {{1384-5748}},
journal = {{INTERNATIONAL POLITICS}},
keywords = {{BRICs,multilateral reform,POLITICS,POWER,IMF,MULTILATERALISM,GLOBAL GOVERNANCE}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{553--578}},
title = {{IMF reform after the crisis}},
url = {{http://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.17}},
volume = {{50}},
year = {{2013}},
}
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