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An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts

Mathieu Beirlaen UGent, Christian Strasser and Joke Meheus UGent (2013) JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC. 42(2). p.285-315
abstract
We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP (r) , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A a aEuro parts per thousand O similar to A, O A a aEuro parts per thousand P similar to A or even O A a aEuro parts per thousand a1/4O A. On the other hand, DP (r) still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP (r) interprets a given premise set 'as normally as possible' with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP (r) , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP (r) .
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
keyword
Adaptive logic, Nonmonotonic logic, Inconsistency-tolerance, Paraconsistent logic, Normative conflicts, Deontic logic, DILEMMAS, MORAL CONFLICTS
journal title
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
J. Philos. Log.
volume
42
issue
2
pages
285 - 315
Web of Science type
Article
Web of Science id
000316677000003
ISSN
0022-3611
DOI
10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A1
copyright statement
I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher
id
3152462
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-3152462
date created
2013-02-28 23:47:04
date last changed
2016-12-19 15:38:57
@article{3152462,
  abstract     = {We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP (r) , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A a aEuro parts per thousand O similar to A, O A a aEuro parts per thousand P similar to A or even O A a aEuro parts per thousand a1/4O A. On the other hand, DP (r) still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP (r) interprets a given premise set 'as normally as possible' with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP (r) , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP (r) .},
  author       = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Strasser, Christian and Meheus, Joke},
  issn         = {0022-3611},
  journal      = {JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC},
  keyword      = {Adaptive logic,Nonmonotonic logic,Inconsistency-tolerance,Paraconsistent logic,Normative conflicts,Deontic logic,DILEMMAS,MORAL CONFLICTS},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {285--315},
  title        = {An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3},
  volume       = {42},
  year         = {2013},
}

Chicago
Beirlaen, Mathieu, Christian Strasser, and Joke Meheus. 2013. “An Inconsistency-adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285–315.
APA
Beirlaen, M., Strasser, C., & Meheus, J. (2013). An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, 42(2), 285–315.
Vancouver
1.
Beirlaen M, Strasser C, Meheus J. An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC. 2013;42(2):285–315.
MLA
Beirlaen, Mathieu, Christian Strasser, and Joke Meheus. “An Inconsistency-adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts.” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 42.2 (2013): 285–315. Print.