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An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts

Mathieu Beirlaen (UGent) , Christian Strasser (UGent) and Joke Meheus (UGent)
(2013) JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC. 42(2). p.285-315
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Abstract
We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP (r) , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A a aEuro parts per thousand O similar to A, O A a aEuro parts per thousand P similar to A or even O A a aEuro parts per thousand a1/4O A. On the other hand, DP (r) still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP (r) interprets a given premise set 'as normally as possible' with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP (r) , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP (r) .
Keywords
Adaptive logic, Nonmonotonic logic, Inconsistency-tolerance, Paraconsistent logic, Normative conflicts, Deontic logic, DILEMMAS, MORAL CONFLICTS

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Chicago
Beirlaen, Mathieu, Christian Strasser, and Joke Meheus. 2013. “An Inconsistency-adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285–315.
APA
Beirlaen, M., Strasser, C., & Meheus, J. (2013). An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, 42(2), 285–315.
Vancouver
1.
Beirlaen M, Strasser C, Meheus J. An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC. 2013;42(2):285–315.
MLA
Beirlaen, Mathieu, Christian Strasser, and Joke Meheus. “An Inconsistency-adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts.” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 42.2 (2013): 285–315. Print.
@article{3152462,
  abstract     = {We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP (r) , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A a aEuro parts per thousand O similar to A, O A a aEuro parts per thousand P similar to A or even O A a aEuro parts per thousand a1/4O A. On the other hand, DP (r) still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP (r) interprets a given premise set 'as normally as possible' with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP (r) , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP (r) .},
  author       = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Strasser, Christian and Meheus, Joke},
  issn         = {0022-3611},
  journal      = {JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC},
  keyword      = {Adaptive logic,Nonmonotonic logic,Inconsistency-tolerance,Paraconsistent logic,Normative conflicts,Deontic logic,DILEMMAS,MORAL CONFLICTS},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {285--315},
  title        = {An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflicts},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3},
  volume       = {42},
  year         = {2013},
}

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