LET'S WORK TOGETHER! ECONOMIC COOPERATION, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND CHANCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

Marloes Deene

Greece & Rome / Volume 61 / Issue 02 / October 2014, pp 152 - 173
DOI: 10.1017/S0017383514000035, Published online: 12 September 2014

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0017383514000035

How to cite this article:

Request Permissions : Click here
In the early fourth century BC, a slave of possibly Phoenician origin, called Pasion, was owned by the Athenian bankers Antisthenes and Archestratos (Dem. 36.43). During the course of his slavery, Pasion quickly rose to become the trusted manager of his owners’ money-changing and banking firm in Piraeus. After having been manumitted (Dem. 36.48), he took over the running of this bank (Isocr. 17, passim), became a very successful banker, and established a shield factory. His businesses prospered to the extent that by the time of his death in 370/369 he had assembled a fortune estimated at around 70 talents. With this money, Pasion made a number of generous benefactions to the Athenians, as a reward for which the Athenians passed a decree in his favour granting him a gold crown and the right of citizenship to him and his descendants (Dem. 59.2). As soon as he received his grant of citizenship, Pasion started to make use of his citizen rights and invested in real property. Although he was probably never actively involved in politics, he is known to have been a close friend of several members of the political elite, such as Agyrrhius of Collyte (Isocr. 17.31) and Callistratus of Aphnida (Dem. 49.47). Moreover, he had dealings with important public figures, such as Timotheus, son of Conon (Dem. 49, passim).

In short, the tale of Pasion is one of increasing riches and success. Not only did he, initially a humble slave, considerably improve his economic, legal, and social status within Athenian society during his own lifetime. He also managed to be freed from slavery and to receive the honour of being an Athenian citizen, which was extraordinary for a

---

foreigner – let alone for a former slave.\footnote{As noted by D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metec* (Cambridge, 1977), 114–16, freedmen were, although of identical legal status to other metics, generally regarded as a distinct group. For naturalization in classical Athens, see Osborne (n. 2); M. Deene, ‘Naturalized Citizens and Social Mobility in Classical Athens: the Case of Apollodorus’, *G&R* 58.2 (2011), 159–75.} But to what extent does Pasion’s life story tell us something about social mobility as a significant phenomenon in classical Athens?\footnote{As recognized by the German sociologist H. Kaelble, *Historical Research on Social Mobility. Western Europe and the USA in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, 1977), 113, ‘social mobility’ is a vague concept, which for the benefit of historical research requires not only a precise definition but also precise contours. In this article, the term ‘social mobility’ is interpreted as being ‘the movement in time of social units between different positions in the system of social stratification of a society’. As social stratification can be conceived of in many dimensions, social mobility is thus a multifaceted concept, which should be studied as such. For the definition, see W. Müller, ‘Mobility, Social’, in N. J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Amsterdam, 2001), 9918.} Traditionally, social mobility has been considered a characteristic feature of modern meritocratic societies, whereas pre-industrial societies have been categorized as static, hierarchical, and rigid. This opinion – clearly a legacy of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century economists and sociologists such as Smith, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim – has during the last few decades been challenged by ancient, medieval, and early modern historians, who, drawing on historical data from a wide variety of sources, have been able to cast doubt on the presumption of relatively little mobility in pre-industrial societies.\footnote{Social mobility as a subject of historical research became important in the ‘golden age’ of the so-called new social history in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, scholars were above all seeking to study the history of equality of social opportunities, by discussing the history of social mobility in a comparative view. Major contributions in this field were brought forward not only by sociologists and political scientists but also by historians. *Past & Present* (1966), the *journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1976), and *Historical Methods* (1998) dedicated special issues to social structures and social mobility in past societies, while the *journal of Economic History* published numerous articles in the 1970s and early 1980s on social structures, inequalities, and mobility.} However, while extensive studies of social mobility exist for Rome,\footnote{See K. Hopkins, ‘Social Mobility in the Later Roman Empire: The Evidence of Ausonius’, *CQ* 11 (1961), 234–49; K. Hopkins, ‘Eunuchs in Politics in the Later Roman Empire’, *PCPhS* 9 (1963), 62–80; K. Hopkins, ‘Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire’, *P&P* 32 (1965), 12–26; K. Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (Cambridge, 1983); R. MacMullen, ‘Social Mobility in the Theodosian Code’, *JRS* 54 (1964), 49–53; P. Weaver, ‘Social Mobility in the Early Roman Empire: The Evidence of the Imperial Freedmen and Slaves’, *P&P* 37 (1967), 3–20; B. Dobson, ‘The Centurionate and Social Mobility During the Principate’, in C. Nicolet (ed.), *Recherches sur les structures sociaux dans l’antiquité classique* (Paris, 1970), 99–116; H. Pleket, ‘Sociale stratificatie en sociale mobiliteit in de Romeinse keizerijd’, *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 84 (1971), 215–51; T. P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.—A.D. 14* (London, 1971); P. A. Brunt, ‘Nobilitas and novitas’, *JRS* 72 (1982), 1–17; N. Purcell, ‘The Apparitores: A Study in Social Mobility’, *PBSR* 51 (1983), 125–73; E. Frézouls, *La Mobilité sociale dans le monde roman* (Strasbourg, 1992); R. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge, 1994); W. Waldstein, review of J. M. Serrano Delgado, *Status y promoción social de...
considered, and then mostly incidentally.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, despite the obvious importance of this topic for our understanding of classical Athenian society, we still lack a specific study of Athenian social mobility. This can be explained by the fact that, for a long time, the different major schools of thought in Greek social and economic history were united in their belief that Athenian society was essentially static and rigid. Remarkable indications of social mobility and attestations of individuals undergoing dramatic changes of socio-economic status, such as Pasion, have generally been dismissed as exceptions. Many Athenian scholars have clearly taken the elitist and moralist Athenian texts, which plainly testify to the lack of an ideology emphasizing the possibility and merit of mobility (so important in modern, Western capitalist society), at face value.\textsuperscript{8}

One of the most important reasons for minimizing non-citizens' chances of social mobility in classical Athens was the standard belief that Athenian society was characterized by a rigid demarcation line


\textsuperscript{8} Thus, in [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 2.18, the so-called Old Oligarch reports how Attic comedy attacks not only well-born Athenians but also common citizens seeking to rise above their standing. Similarly, Aristotle describes how men tend not to be made indignant and envious by attainable virtues, such as courage and justices, but rather by attributes which they cannot hope to acquire, especially wealth and power (\textit{Rhet.} 1387a6–15). Eur. \textit{Suppl.} 176 and Thuc. 2.40.1 are notable exceptions, stating it to be wise or honourable to seek economic advancement through honest, hard work.
between its various legal status groups. Characteristic is Raaflaub’s assertion that
the success of the democracy in securing the loyalty and devotion of the vast majority of citizens rested largely on its insistence on a marked distinction between citizens (whatever their social status) on the one hand, and all categories of non-citizens on the other hand.9

In the same way, Todd defined the three legal status groups in Athenian society as ‘sharply distinguished not simply as concepts but in actuality’.10 A reality like this would indeed have had profound repercussions for those non-citizens attempting to improve their social status in Athenian society.11 Since the early post-Second World War period, research on social mobility has largely turned to the study of social opportunity, specifically to the extent to which in certain societies individuals and groups have different chances of movement between positions of unequal advantage, providing their holders with unequal power, material or symbolic assets, and privilege. This concern had its roots in the prevalent interest in the degree of ‘openness’ – a concept denoting the relative fluidity or rigidity of a stratification system – and from curiosity about the individual, institutional, and societal factors responsible for it.12 Much attention has been paid to potential opportunities for creating social networks, through which the acquisition of resources for social mobility is facilitated. In a seminal article from 1973, the sociologist Granovetter convincingly ascertained a division between weak-tie-linked and strong-tie-linked networks of social relationships, arguing that weak ties promote ‘bridging’ across those networks that commonly operate as small and closed cliques, and have a special role in a person’s opportunity for social mobility, as long as

11 Just as social mobility is referred to in this article as a multifaceted concept, so the concept of social status should be interpreted as the position which one holds in a given society and which can be influenced by birth, wealth, honorific assets, legal status, social standing or connections, etc. Contrary to how the concept has been used in V. J. Hunter and J. C. Edmondson, Law and Social Status in Classical Athens (Oxford, 2000), it should not be equated with legal status.
12 Müller (n. 4), 9918–24.
they connect him or her to high-status individuals, by exposing him or her to opportunities beyond his or her immediate social status group. The use of strong ties, associating family members and close friends within a condensed network, however, restricts the chances of social mobility. Since the members of these social networks are likely to possess the same amount and types of advantages, there is limited opportunity for the kinds of social interaction that could potentially lead to upward social mobility.\(^{13}\)

If indeed Athenian society was characterized by a rigid demarcation line between citizens and non-citizens, this would, using Granovetter’s model as a framework for analysis, imply that non-citizens’ network opportunities were restricted to strong ties among themselves, without access to more heterogeneous forms of social capital (that is, ‘bridging capital’ as opposed to ‘bonding capital’),\(^{14}\) which would be able to create ‘bridges’ across legal status. However, the notion that non-citizens were socially isolated from Athenian citizenry, with few connections to social resources facilitating mobility, is clearly wrong.

Recent attempts have been made to demonstrate that Athenian society was far more complex and multifaceted than the prevailing tripartite oversimplification.\(^{15}\) The most devastating attack on the traditional view has been offered by Cohen in *The Athenian Nation*.\(^{16}\) However, by focusing on arguably untypical and non-representative examples, such as slave entrepreneurs living separately from their masters, and wealthy prostitutes, Cohen’s attack on the traditional view of Athenian society has not attracted broad support from the academic

\(^{13}\) M. Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’, *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (1973), 1360–80.

\(^{14}\) From Granovetter’s basic distinction, R. D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York and London, 2000), identified two kinds of social capital: bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to relations between homogeneous groups, bringing the possibility for negative consequences, most prominent among which is the exclusion of outsiders. Bridging social capital, which is most likely to create social inclusion, refers to relations between people differing on crucial personal characteristics, such as ethnicity, socio-economic status, or – when referring to classical Antiquity – legal status.


Admittedly, several references in the ancient texts can be found, which, when taken at face value, may serve to legitimate the old orthodoxy. Nevertheless, despite the common portrayal of non-citizen residents in Athens as being outside the Athenian (citizen) community, tolerated only because of their significance for Athens’ superior economic performance, scholars have never been able to ignore totally the various passages in the sources which give the impression of social life in Athenian society being characterized by a fairly easy intermingling of persons of diverse origin and legal status. Recall, for example, the extraordinary stories of individuals such as Pasion and Phormion, who, both before and after their naturalization, ‘moved into the highest social circles and integrated into the Athenian élite’, as well as the curious setting of Plato’s Republic in the house of the elderly metic Cephalus, following Socrates’ visit to a festival honouring the Thracian goddess Bendis, whose cult had recently been introduced into Piraeus. After all, it is remarkable that, rather than stressing a dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens, Plato describes the metic hosts, that is to say Cephalus, friend and confident of Pericles (Lys. 12.4), and his adult sons Polymarchus, Euthydemus, and the orator Lysias, as ‘friends and nearly kinsmen’ (Resp. 328d6) of their citizen guests, both Athenian aristocrats and more humble members of the Athenian citizenry.

Yet how representative are such instances? Might it be possible that such interactions between citizens and non-citizens were mainly limited to the social elite? Some scholars have thought so. Whitehead, for

---

17 For a detailed discussion of The Athenian Nation, see e.g. R. Osborne’s review in CPh 97 (2002), 93–8.
18 See, for example Dem. 22.55, 59.122; Arist. Pol. 1326a18–22.
19 See especially Whitehead (n. 3).
21 For the phrase, see M. I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (London, 1985), 48.
22 Lysias’ family property was worth 70 talents before 404 BCE, which gave him the reputation of being ‘the richest metic in Athens’ (P.Oxy. XIII, 1606, line 30, 153–5).
23 Among them were, for instance, Charmantides of Paeania (Davies [n. 1], no. 15502); Plato’s own brothers Euthydemus and Glaucon (Davies [n. 1], no. 8792 X), who were descendants of Solon, close relatives of the oligarchic leaders Charmides and Critias, and stepsons of the Periclean democratic eminence Pyrilampes; Nicaretus; the impoverished Socrates; the sophist Thrasymachus; and Cleitophon son of Aristonymus, who is usually identified as a supporter of the oligarchic regime of 411 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 34).
instance, concluding his discussion of the consequences of Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/450 on the ideology of the metic, asserted:

we may point to Aspasia, Anaxagoras and the rest; but Perikles (like Plato) may not have seen any connection between his intellectual foreign guest-friends and the immigrant artisans and labourers now congregating in Piraeus and the urban demes, their presence valued in economic terms but their social mobility in the most obvious sense now completely blocked.24

In this article, I will re-examine this claim, which denies any scope for social mobility by the average non-citizen in classical Athens. I will examine to what extent the peculiar nature of Athenian business life, now commonly recognized as having been characterized by enduring cooperation between citizens and non-citizens, provided opportunities for non-citizens to cross boundaries and ascend the social scale; in other words, what the repercussions of this peculiar aspect of Athens’ economic system were for the scope of upward social mobility in classical Athens. I will make a suggestion for an alternative model regarding social mobility, by arguing that the enduring cooperation between citizens and non-citizens in Athenian business life – the recognition of which surely weakens the plausibility of a rigid demarcation line having supposedly physically segregated the various legal status groups – had important implications for the scope of social mobility in Athenian society. Most importantly, this cooperation provided opportunities for non-citizens to create networks across the boundaries of legal status. These networks could be brought into play in a variety of ways and contexts, and hence could plausibly function as important channels for social circulation.

II

It has already been recognized in modern scholarship that personal contact between citizens and non-citizens was in the usual course of events guaranteed by what have been called ‘democratic spaces’ or ‘free spaces’ in classical Athens: public places where citizens would necessarily have contact not only with one another but also with non-citizens and even slaves, hence creating common experiences and shaping new forms of identity. Most prominent among the ‘democratic’ or

24 Whitehead (n. 3), 150, and see also 120.
‘free’ spaces was undoubtedly the Athenian agora,25 the major zone of personal interaction in Athens. Indeed, as described by the speaker in Demosthenes’ speech Against Aristogeiton 1 (Dem. 25.51), every single Athenian citizen frequented the marketplace on some business, either public or private. But they were certainly not the only ones. On the contrary, non-citizens had no less reason for passing time in the agora. As colourfully described by Millett – in a style matching the contemporary portrayal by Eubulus26 – the classical agora was, apart from the prime location in Attica for the business of buying and selling, also

the setting for administration, publicity, justice, ostracism, imprisonment, religion, processions, dancing, athletics and equestrian displays. In addition to persons passing through, individuals might gather there to get information (official or otherwise), gather a crowd, gamble, torture a slave, get hired as labourers, bid for contracts, accost a prostitute, seek asylum, have a haircut, beg for money or food, fetch water, watch a cock-fight and find out the time.27

This mixing of functions, and, more importantly, the legitimate reason that it provided for both citizens and non-citizens and people of low status to be present in the agora and interact with Athenian citizens, ostensibly troubled conservative thinkers. Thus Plato in his Nomoi proposed moving the political function elsewhere, holding the assemblies in religious sanctuaries (738d) and electing magistrates in temples (753b). Aristotle, for his part, advised that, in addition to and separate from the agora for buying and selling, which he named the ‘necessary market’ (anagkaia agora), the Athenians should lay out a ‘free agora’ (agora eleuthera), devoted to schole and where no commercial transaction would take place and no artisan or farmer would be allowed to enter, unless summoned by the magistrates (Pol. 1331a30–b14).

But the agora was certainly not the only location where citizens and non-citizens – regardless of their origin, profession, wealth, or influence –

25 For the agora as respectively a ‘democratic’ or ‘free space’, see P. Millett, ‘Encounters in the Agora’, in P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. von Reden, Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2002), 220; Vlassopoulos (n. 15), 38. For the deep politicization of Athenian culture as a result of this particular ‘free space’, see Vlassopoulos (n. 15), 45–7.

26 See Eubulus in Ath. 12.640b–c (= Kock ii.190).

inevitably and unrestrictedly intermingled with each other. It has, for instance, not always fully been recognized that at least some sort of personal interaction between citizens and non-citizens must have taken place within the mutual neighbourhood. In spite of prevailing assumptions, non-citizens were present in significant numbers in virtually every *deme* throughout Attica, rather than living as an isolated community within one specific area. 28 Although metics were normally not allowed to buy a house or a plot of land, they could rent a house, apparently wherever they wanted. An example is provided by an inscription from 343/342 BC (IG II² 1590), indicating that, at that time, the house adjacent to the *agora* of the *deme* Cydathenaeon was rented by a metic, while the next houses were rented by Athenian citizens. 29 Within the individual *demes*, non-citizens might have generated and expressed unity with neighbouring and more remote demesmen, 30 while numerous citizens might have felt related to non-citizens living within their own community.

The same might have occurred in social centres such as the Athenian *gymnasia*, where both citizens and metics appear to have exercised. 31 This can be attested by Plato in Euthydemus (271a–c), and can also be concluded from a passage in Aeschines’ *Against Timarchus* (1.138), in which a law is mentioned forbidding slaves to exercise in the Athenian *gymnasia*, as it would have been out of place to permit supposedly inferior beings, using the words of Roberts, ‘to enjoy the

---

28 Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of surviving records, metics are attested in more than forty separate *demes* scattered around Attica, including many rural, while fewer than 20 per cent appear to have lived in the Piraeus: see D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica*, 508/7–ca. 250 B.C. A Political and Social Study (Princeton, NJ, 1986), 82–5; Cohen (n. 16), 122–3, esp. n. 106. For a detailed account of the *demes*, see – in addition to Whitehead (this note) – the complementary study by R. Osborne, *Demos. The Discovery of Classical Attika* (Cambridge, 1985).

29 IG II² 1590.


physical and moral benefits conferred by athletic activity'. According to the speaker, the lawgivers did not go on to command that ‘the free man shall anoint himself and take exercise’, as they, seeing the good that comes from gymnastics, thought that, in prohibiting the slaves, they were, by the same words, inviting ‘the free’. The speaker does not make any distinction between citizens and non-citizens, nor does he mention any special regulation for metics or xenoi (‘foreigners’). This suggests that both citizens and non-citizens were allowed to use the Athenian gymnasía, where they could interact with each other in a way which is illustrated by the encounter between Socrates and the Chian brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the Lyceum, as described in Plato’s Euthydemus.

The same applies to the Athenian cemeteries, where gravestones of citizens and metics stood together indiscriminately. Against the views of Morris that formal burial was a privilege indicating and dependent upon citizenship, and that ‘classical Athenians put great emphasis on formal, bounded cemeteries as symbols of membership of the citizen body as a whole’, voices have been raised to deny both the reality of burial as a citizen privilege and the existence of exclusive citizen cemeteries at Athens. As a consequence, citizens and non-citizens can be supposed to have mourned their loved ones side by side, which provided the latter with an extra opportunity to mingle with certain members of the Athenian citizenry and thus create for themselves opportunities for social enhancement.

Citizens and non-citizens might also have associated during a shared participation in socio-cultural and religious activities of the polis or the individual demes. In an analogous way to their access to the central Panathenaic ritual, the procession at the City Dionysia, the Lenaia, the Hephaisteia, and the Eleusian Mysteries, metics are, for instance, known to have visited deme religious shrines and to have participated

33 The assertion in W. Miller, Greece and the Greeks. A Survey of Greek Civilization (New York, 1941), 133, that the Cynosarges, one of the three gymnasía in Athens, was reserved for nothoi (those of illegitimate birth) and metics, thus suggesting that metics were not allowed in other gymnasía, is based on no evidence at all. On the contrary, not only do foreigners appear to have visited other gymnasía, but well-born Athenians are also known to have visited the Cynosarges (And. 1.61; Ps.-Plut. Ax. 364a).
along with Athenian citizens in the worship of local deities. Moreover, citizens participated in alien cults that had been imported along with and for the sake of foreign non-citizens, as the participation of Socrates in the celebration of the newly introduced Bendis, described above, demonstrates.36

All this demonstrates that non-citizens resident in Attica were anything but socially isolated from the Athenian citizenry, and that in many circumstances they had occasions to intermingle with Athenian citizens. Of course, although this intermingling might have diluted the rigid demarcation line which supposedly physically segregated the various legal status groups, it may not have been sufficient to ensure the creation of weak ties between citizens and non-citizens, which could be used as a social resource by non-citizens attempting to improve their status in Athenian society. Such relationships, however, can reasonably be supposed to have been created in those settings where citizens were most inclined to build long-lasting relationships with non-citizens, as their mutual achievements depended on it – settings such as Athenian business life.

III

Around 345 BC, a certain Euxitheus appeared before an Athenian court to appeal against the decision of his deme Halimous, taken during a re-examination or diapæphisis, to remove him from the official deme register (Dem. 57). Euxitheus asserted that he met the requirements for Athenian citizenship, being descended from both an Athenian father and an Athenian mother. He claimed that the man allegedly responsible for his expulsion, Eubulides, acted out of personal enmity, having no real evidence against him except for some unconvincing and dishonourable indications, such as his father’s foreign accent and his mother’s humble employment, selling ribbons and working as a wet-nurse. By doing so, Eubulides had allegedly slandered him, in

36 The participation of metics in Athenian polis religion has recently been scrutinized by S. Wijma, ‘Joining the Athenian Community: The Participation of Metics in Athenian Polis Religion in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Utrecht, 2010). In this excellent study, Wijma has demonstrated that, both at polis and at deme level, the Athenians tried to incorporate metics into the citizen or deme community by having them share in the polis or deme rites, while articulating their position in that community by having them participate in a specific way.
violation of a *nomos* stating that people who insulted a male or female citizen about his or her work in the *agora* were liable to a charge of slander. The *nomos* mentioned by Euxitheus (Dem. 57.30) not only suggests that slander based upon occupation had at one time been common enough to become a source of concern for lawmakers, but also denotes the reality of citizens ‘working in the *agora*’ in classical Athens.

For quite a long time, scholars have supported Hasebroek’s claim, following the insights of Bücher and Weber, of a deep-rooted economic dichotomy in classical Athenian society between a citizenry mainly living on income generated from landed property and occasionally providing bottomry loans to shipping merchants, while in every other respect leading the life of landowners, and a group of non-citizen residents, largely operating in trade and manufacturing. This picture can no longer be maintained, as various studies have shown that, especially in the fourth century, numerous Athenians pursued commercial activities. In fact, men such as Apollodorus, son of the former slave and naturalized citizen Pasion, who did everything to distance himself from the metic community he originated from by profiting himself as a landowner in order to assert his citizenship, can reasonably be considered as rather anachronistic figures. After all, as demonstrated by

37 In Athenian law, the truth of an allegation was not a sufficient defence. See Todd (n. 10), 260.
41 Apollodorus moved from Piraeus to the countryside after his father’s death (Dem. 53.4) and seems to have embraced the rather extravagant lifestyle and ideology of the long-standing landed Athenian elite (Dem. 36.8, 45). See Trevett (n. 1), 164–79; Deene (n. 3), 169–74, for discussion.
Davies, in the fourth century it became increasingly normal for citizens to have a mixed holding, consisting of real property in land and houses, manufacturing property in the form of revenue-earning slaves, and liquid investments.\footnote{Davies (n. 7), 37–8. The mixed holdings of Apollodorus’ own father, Pasion, of Arizelus of Sphettus (Aeschin. 1.97–101), of Ciron (Davies [n. 1], no. 8443), and of Euctemon of Cephsia (ibid., no. 15164) appear to have been standard for the fourth-century propertied class, while those of men such as Demosthenes the elder (ibid., no. 3597.XIII) and of Diodotus (ibid., no. 3885) were probably exceptional.} Nevertheless, some scholars persisted in maintaining that citizens and non-citizens practiced their profession in separate areas: that is to say, for instance, that trade by non-citizens was concentrated in the harbour of Piraeus, while market exchange in the \textit{agora} in Athens was protected against foreign merchants and dominated by citizens. This opinion, however, has lost all support, and it is now commonly believed that citizens and non-citizens closely cooperated in commercial activities.\footnote{See S. von Reden, ‘The Piraeus: A World Apart’, \textit{G&R} 42.1 (1995), 24–37, for discussion.}

This reality unmistakably worried contemporary critics with prejudices against trade and commerce. In Aristotle’s sociology of the \textit{polis}, for instance, the residents obtaining their income through ‘working in the \textit{agora}’ ideally form a distinct ‘illiberal’ group (\textit{Pol.} 1291b14–30; 1289b26–34). In what he terms the best constituted (namely, oligarchic) \textit{poleis}, those pursuing the ‘market life’ (\textit{agoraios bios}) would not be citizens (1328b34), while those democracies admitting ‘market people’ (\textit{agoraioi anthropoi}) are considered as substandard. Regarded as more acceptable are the Thebans, who had a law which barred from office anyone who had been actively engaged in the \textit{agora} in the preceding ten years (1278a25; cf. [\textit{Rh. Al.}] 1424a25–31).\footnote{Aristotle’s disapproval of the so-called ‘market mob’ (\textit{agoraios ochlos}), allegedly based on the grounds that their low-status lifestyle does not encourage proper virtues (\textit{Pol.} 1328b40), reverberates in several texts written by and for the Athenian elite, assuming that men operating outside the norms of \textit{philia} relationships were inclined towards deceit (e.g. Pl. \textit{Resp.} 289e and 371c; \textit{Prt.} 347c; Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 1.2.3; \textit{Mem.} 3.7.5). See Millett (n. 25), 218–19.} One might at first sight suspect Aristotle’s disapproval of citizens ‘working in the \textit{agora}’ to be caused merely by the fact that those activities were incompatible with the notorious nostalgic idea of the self-sufficient \textit{oikos}. However, the nature of Plato’s insistence on the minimalization of commercial interaction between citizens and non-citizens, by letting them deal with non-citizens through slaves or other non-citizen mediators and then only on pre-set days in each month (\textit{Leg.} 925b), indicates an anxiety about the mingling of diverse sorts of people who allegedly...
ought to be kept apart. Indeed, Plato might possibly have recognized that this mingling, obviously an unavoidable consequence of not only the joint work of but also the cooperation between citizens and non-citizens in commercial activities, undoubtedly had profound effects on the supposed demarcation lines between the various legal status groups in Athenian society. After all, it was in Athenian business life, more than in any other context,\textsuperscript{45} that Athenian citizens were probably most inclined to build sustainable – and, more importantly, beneficial – relationships with non-citizens, as the success of their business depended on it. The development of sustainable boundary-crossing networks connecting citizens with non-citizens in cooperative environments provided opportunities for and access to shared experience and common interests and advantages, which plausibly might have served, inter alia, as instruments by which both legal status groups were persuaded to make more cooperative choices than they would have done in a so-called game-theoretic ‘state of nature’.

The denser the network, the more likely that both citizens and non-citizens would have cooperated for mutual benefit, even in the face of persistent problems of collective action, such as the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’, ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, and so forth.\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, the constructed ties would have been an important instrument for organization and interaction, and would have functioned as channels through which information about the honesty and reliability of both citizen and non-citizen could be verified.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, they would have supported prevailing norms of reciprocity by creating expectations that favours would be returned and by increasing for those who behaved opportunistically the potential danger that they would not share in the benefits of future transactions. All these mechanisms would automatically have reduced transaction costs, most comprehensively described by North as ‘the costs of measuring the valuable

\textsuperscript{45} An exception is without any doubt the Athenian army. For the participation by metics in the Athenian armed forces, see Whitehead (n. 3), 83–6; Cohen (n. 16), 73–4; Adak (n. 15), 67–72; D. T. Engen, \textit{Honor and Profit: Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415–307 B.C.E.} (Ann Arbor, MI, 2010), 197–202.

\textsuperscript{46} For ‘the tragedy of the commons’ as a sociological concept, see G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, \textit{Science} 162 (1986), 1243–8. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ as a fundamental problem in game theory was originally framed by Flood and Dresher in 1950. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence payoffs and named it the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (see W. Poundstone, \textit{Prisoner’s Dilemma} [New York, 1993], for discussion).

attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements’, and thus enhanced not only the individual’s business performance but also Athenian efficiency and productivity.

Athens’ superior economic performance during this period has recently – in the light of the currently prevalent ‘transaction cost economics’ – been credited to the fact that the Athenians were particularly successful in developing institutions that fostered exchange and reduced transaction costs. Ancient historians working with the concept ‘transaction costs’ have (presumably with the proposals in Xenophon’s Poroi in mind) mainly focused on the most apparent elements in the transaction cost/productivity equation, such as monetary systems and laws which sought to improve the economic climate for foreign tradesmen and entrepreneurs in Athens. As important as these innovations may have been, the practical need of sustainable boundary-crossing networks in Athenian business life cannot be overlooked. It is hard to believe that Athens’ economic performance would have been as high-class as it is known to have been without the necessary social networks between the most important parties involved.

---

51 As early as 1985, M. Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’, *American Journal of Sociology* 91.3 (1985), 481–510, condemned ‘new institutional economics’ because of its failure to acknowledge the importance of solid personal relations and networks of relations – what he called ‘embeddedness’ – in generating trust, in establishing expectations, and in creating and enforcing norms.
52 It is known that the Athenians were remarkably prosperous on a per capita basis, and much wealthier than they had formerly been: I. Morris, ‘Economic Growth in Ancient Greece’, *Journal of the Institute of Theoretical Economics* 160.4 (2004), 709–42; I. Morris, ‘Archaeology, Standards of Living, and Greek Economic History’, in J. G. Manning and I. Morris (eds.), *The Ancient Economy. Evidence and Models* (Stanford, CA, 2005), 91–126; G. Kron, ‘Anthropometry, Physical Anthropology, and the Reconstruction of Ancient Health, Nutrition, and Living Standards’, *Historia* 54 (2005), 68–83; S. von Reden, ‘Consumption’, in Scheidel, Morris, and Saller (n. 49), table 15.1. By the 330s, Athenian revenues appear to have been equal to or higher than what they had been in the 430s, at the height of the empire (for Athenian fourth-century
Considering the importance of reducing transaction costs (such as information searching, negotiation, and monitoring and enforcing transactions) for the facilitation of transactions in Athenian business life, and consequently for the enhancement of Athenian trade, it is highly unlikely that this business life was deficient in intensive boundary-crossing social networks between citizens and non-citizens. In order to achieve and sustain such a level of economic performance, citizens and non-citizens cooperating in Athenian business life needed to be brought into association with each other and to come to function as a single, extended network. In some instances, the long-standing connections between citizens and non-citizens might have evolved into a more formalized form of association, employable for economic purposes. An illustration of such an association is a relief of the mid-fourth century dedicated to the nymphs and all the gods, by what appears to have been a professional association of fullers (Berlin SK 709). The names of the dedicators attested in the inscription point to a fraternity between citizens and non-citizens, both male and female, who were drawn together by means of shared occupational interests. The available material is perhaps a little too scanty to make real conclusions about the frequency and functions of such associations, but it is

prosperity and its relationship to overseas trade, see E. M. Burke, ‘Lycurgan Finances’, *GRBS* 26 [1985], 251–6; E. M. Burke, ‘The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to the Primitivist Model’, *TAPhS* 122 [1992], 199–226). Moreover, the *polis* again actively financed building projects and provided welfare benefits for its citizens (Ober [n. 47], 65–6, 254–58), while the earnings of both skilled and unskilled labourers were remarkably high when compared to other pre-industrial societies (W. Scheidel, ‘Real Wages in Early Economies: Evidence for Living Standards from 1800 BCE to 1300 CE’, *JESHO* 53.3 [2010], 425–62).


54 Although all of these associations had some connection to cult worship, M. Leiwo, ‘Religion, or Other Reasons? Private Associations in Athens’, in J. Frösen (ed.), *Early Hellenistic Athens. Symptoms of Change* (Helsinki, 1997), 103–18, considers their main purpose to have been not religion but synousia, with common meals, and social and financial support. According to him, the connection to a cult was necessitated by the lack of any (legal) model for other kinds of associations. Others scholars persist in believing that the religious meaning of these associations must have been primary, while other aims, such as economic or social support, were of minor importance: see J. Vondeling, *Eranos* (Groningen, 1961), 261; Millett (n. 7), 151. Nevertheless, even if their primary purpose was not necessarily economic in nature, membership of these religious
hard not to see such groupings, which appear in our sources towards the end of the fourth century, as forerunners of the professional associations that we encounter in the Hellenistic and Roman period.

One might wonder whether the Athenians acknowledged the importance of those boundary-crossing networks for both their own individual businesses and Athens’ economic performance. They were, of course, familiar with the fact that making use of long-standing networks for the circulation of goods decreased the danger of deceit, excessive valuing, or violence. By tradition, they had made use of reciprocity or mutual exchange between (usually socially equal) philoi. Moreover, contemporary thinkers unquestionably acknowledged the pragmatic value of association. Aristotle, for instance, believed that most of the koinonai which the polis encompassed were founded for the advantage of its members (Eth. Nic. 1160a4–6). This makes it plausible to assume that the Athenians might have been truly aware of the advantage of associating with those non-citizens actively involved in their business life, and that they strategically accepted the existence of boundary-crossing networks in their society, thus pragmatically being more liberal and inclusivist than has been taken as read in the past. As important as society is in determining individual economic action, I believe, with Granovetter but contrary to Sahlins, in the existence of a conceptual middle ground between the often non-pragmatic cultural basis of social structures, as described in the works of Athenian theorists such as Plato and Aristotle, and in the reality of individuals associations which cut across economic strata and class boundaries might still have been economically fruitful.


acting contrary to such structures for practical needs, thus having a crucial role in moulding society in keeping with these practical needs.

IV

The business, social, and associative connections between the various legal status groups active in Athenian business life automatically created opportunities for social capital accumulation, and thus had important effects on the scope of social mobility for non-citizens. On the broadest level, they might have had important effects on the scope of social mobility for the total group of non-citizens in Athenian society. After all, the net of constructed weak-tie bridges between the existing strong-tie networks of citizens on the one hand and non-citizens on the other is very likely to have resulted in a comprehensive intermingling of the members of both legal status groups, producing opportunities to create and assert social status, and providing a channel through which movement between or access to the different positions of unequal advantage might have been possible.

Moreover, while the social capital accumulating from the weak-tie bridges between citizens and non-citizens benefited the community of non-citizen Athenian residents as a whole, the bridge-builders themselves – namely the non-citizen artisans, traders, and businessmen forging contacts and friendships with their citizen colleagues – might have done especially well. First, precisely because of their ability to bring together otherwise less well-connected contacts and because of the prestige which their citizen contacts as social assets conveyed, they were liable to become increasingly well-respected members of the

58 For a detailed discussion of the implications of this kind of intermingling in Athenian society, see M. Deene, Aspects of Social Mobility in Classical Athens (Ghent, 2013), 221–52.

59 An impression of the kind of intermingling which this state of affairs may have resulted in, might most vividly be obtained when considering the deme Rhamnous, where the arguably exceptional circumstances, particularly well attested for the latter half of the third century, present a vivid picture of the mingling of highly different individuals, which, as acknowledged by R. Osborne, ‘must have been an invariable characteristic of life in classical and Hellenistic Athens’. In Rhamnous, the continuously changing population seems to have formed groups and taken corporate actions easily, despite being unclassifiable in terms of conventional legal or social categories. While connecting in order to cooperate, residents at Rhamnous openly disregarded both the formal and informal divisions within Athenian society, such as divisions of legal status (most importantly between citizen and non-citizen), wealth, occupation, etc. See R. Osborne, ‘The Demos and its Divisions in Classical Athens’, in O. Murray and S. R. F. Price (eds.), The Greek City. From Homer to Alexander (Oxford, 1990), 284–5, for discussion.
non-citizen community and more attractive to other high-profile non-
citizens as a contact in their own networks, resulting in turn in further
networking reinforcement as well as a higher social position within the
non-citizen community.

Secondly, and presumably more importantly, functioning as a broker
within the extensive social network of weak and strong ties constituting
Athenian society, they are above all to be expected to have managed to
acquire vital social capital, through their building of bridges to citi-
zens, and thus to have been capable of bringing this social capital
into play for personal enhancement on the social scale. Positioned at
a crossroads of social organization and having more diverse contacts,
the so-called bridge-builders were most of all likely to be candidates
discussed for inclusion in new opportunities and consequently able to
transfer their social capital assets to other kinds of assets crucial for
achieving a rise in status.

One example of this is the way in which social connections to citizens
might have been not only useful but also essential for those non-citizens
attempting to obtain Athenian timai, ranging from mere honours
through functional privileges even to full Athenian citizenship. Although metics considering themselves to be worthy of honours in
return for their services towards the Athenian demos could pass a

---

60 For the assertion that in a networked structure, the holes between solidly linked sub-networks
are points of entrepreneurial opportunity because the individuals who bridge those holes gain
social capital, see R. S. Burt, Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge,
Science Quarterly 42 (1997), 355–73; R. S. Burt, Brokerage and Closure. An Introduction to Social

61 The amount of information that we have concerning the granting of timai to both citizen and
non-citizens is relatively abundant. Decisions of honour-granting institutions, such as the council
or the assembly, phylai, demes, and other associations, to honour certain individuals for their ser-
vices towards the state can be traced down in honorary decrees, private dedications established by
former honorands, and literary texts. For collections of fifth- and fourth-century honorary decrees,
see A. S. Henry, Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees. The Principal Formulae of Athenian
Honorary Decrees (Hildesheim and New York, 1983); C. Veligianni-Terzi, Werbung in den
attischen Ehrendenkmälern der klassischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1997), 14–151; S. D. Lambert, Athenian
State Laws and Decrees 352/1–322/1: I. Decrees Honouring Athenians, ZPE 150 (2004), 85–
112; S. D. Lambert, Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring
Foreigners. A. Citizenship, Proxeny and Euergety’, ZPE 158 (2006), 115–58; S. D. Lambert,
Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring Foreigners. B. Other
Awards’, ZPE 159 (2007), 101–54; S. D. Lambert, Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1–
322/1 bc (Leiden, 2012). For an overview of the private dedications recording grants of honours
and privileges, see Veligianni-Terzi (this note), 152–62. For recent discussions of the granting
of timai to non-citizens (including metics), see in particular Adak (n. 15); Engen (n. 45);
Deene (n. 58), 144–62.
written request (*aitesis*) to the *boule* (council of citizens),
their interests had to be defended by citizens. After all, in normal circumstances non-citizens had no access to the honouring institutions, unless granted the right of *prosodos* (privileged entry). There is some scant evidence which has caused some scholars to believe that foreigners were allowed to appear in the *boule* or *ekklesia* (principal assembly) to state their case. If so, this might only have happened through the mediation of an Athenian citizen, who (as he is known to have done in their absence) spoke for them and recommended them to these institutions. It is possible that some metics relied on the support of their own *prostates* (sponsor) for this, but as the relationship between a metic and his *prostates* appears to have developed ‘from a strict original requirement to a virtual dead letter’ by the fourth century, it is very likely that many of them will have had to bring into play their most influential citizen contacts, just as the other foreigners did.

This is only one of the many situations in which non-citizens’ contacts with Athenian citizens, and the social capital which these contacts entailed, could be used in order to acquire other forms of capital that were crucial for social advancement. Of course, the nature and intensity of the weak-tie contacts established in Athenian business life might have affected the extent to which these contacts were fruitful for non-citizens.

---


63 According to Zelnick-Abramowitz (n. 62), 557, official requests differed from private requests in that official emissaries according to the customary law had access to the *boule* and to the *ekklesia*.

64 For grants of *prosodos*, see IG I*²* 28.16–18 (450–440); I*¹* 55.18 (c. 431); I*¹* 70.9–11 (c. 430–420); I*¹* 159.20–7 (c. 430); I*¹* 65.17–20 (c. 427/426); I*¹* 73 (424/3); I*¹* 101 I.37–9 (410/409); I*¹* 1.72–3 (403/402); I*¹* 145 L.4–5 (403/402); SEG 14.36.6–7 (c. 400); IG I*²* 86 (early fourth century); I*²* 24b.10–12 (c. 387/386?); Pecirka 29/31.9–13 (c. 380–370); IG I*²* 74 (ante 378/377); I*²* 180.10–15 (c. 375–350); I*²* 103 (369/368); I*²* 107 (368/367); I*²* 151 (ante 353/352); I*²* 185 (ante 353/352); I*²* 660 I.13–15 (c. 350–300?); I*²* 579.8–12 (c. 350–300?); I*²* 1186 (mid-fourth century); I*²* 226.14–17 (c. 343/342); I*²* 238.b (338/337); I*²* 426 (336–334); SEG 19.119.15–20 (c. 334–330); Hesp. 29.81–157 + IG I*²* 564 (c. 329–322); IG I*¹* 549 + 306 (323/322?); I*²* 448 II (323/322); I*²* 456b.19 (307/306); I*²* 505 (302/301); I*²* 571 (late fourth century).

65 See IG I*²* 109, line 9 (363/362); I*²* 226, lines 34–5 (342); I*²* 408, lines 6–8 (ante 330).

66 Zelnick-Abramowitz (n. 62), 555–62; Gauthier (n. 62), 181 f. Gauthier believes that, since some of the inscriptions do not refer to the involvement of citizens, foreigners could also appear on their own in the *boule* or *ekklesia* in order to submit or defend their requests (ibid., 183 f., 187 f.). See also the criticism by R. Zelnick-Abramowitz, *Not Wholly Free. The Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World* (Leiden, 2005), 560.

67 For the citation, see Whitehead (n. 3), 90. On connections between Athenian politicians and foreigners and on the motives for moving proxeny decrees, see S. Perlman, ‘A Note on the Political Implications of *Proxenia* in the Fourth Century B.C.’, *CQ* 8 (1958), 185–91.
seeking social advance. Presumably the most fruitful were multiplex relationships, linking citizens and non-citizens in more than one context, allowing the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in others, such as the possibility of calling upon a person who had obligations in one context for aid when having problems or needs in another context. The fact that banking, for instance, was, more than any other business sector, so intensely personalized that business and social relations were inclined to coalesce, might have automatically provided bankers with an extensive and intensive social network of often influential Athenian citizens as social backing. In addition, those relations which were endorsed in a more or less formalized association might have contained a more coercive power and thus a greater assurance of the transferability of the social capital assets obtained within these associations. After all, a member of an association would have been expected to do everything possible to help any member of the same group – whatever their socio-economic or legal status – in their capacity as members of that group. Examples of this characteristic of Athenian associations are far from few, but [Lysias] undoubtedly provides the most vivid account of what might – and above all what might not – have been expected from fellow-members of an association (sunousia).

68 For multiplex relationships, see J. Coleman, ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’, American Journal of Sociology 94 Suppl. (1988), 95–120. The fact that membership to an association cut across both economic strata and legal status groups has led some scholars to consider corporate entities and associations as being characterized by clientelistic relationships: see T. W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy (Cambridge, 1991), 143–69; I. Arnaoutoglou, ‘Associations and Patronage in Ancient Athens’, AncSoc 25 (1994), 5–17. However, the fact that the business success of Athenian citizens depended on the cooperative attitude of and sustainable corporate networks with their non-citizen colleagues refutes the assumption that all of these relationships between citizens and non-citizens were automatically of asymmetrical nature.

69 Cohen (n. 15), 65–6.

70 This may be one of the explanations behind the observation that, although bankers were not the only businessmen who successfully used their gains in order to obtain Athenian citizenship (e.g. the salt-fish seller Chaerephilus: see Davies [n. 1], no. 15128), they above all appear – if one is allowed to make any conclusion concerning the matter from the scant amount of evidence – to have been likely to be candidates for this rarest and most valuable of all timai that could be conferred upon non-citizens. See, for instance, the lives of Pasion (ibid., no. 11672; Osborne [n. 2], T30), Pasion’s ex-slave Phormion (Davies [n. 1], no. 11675.IX; Osborne [n. 2], T48), Conon (Osborne [n. 2], T81), and Epigenes (ibid., T80). Additionally, it has been presumed that the trierarch Aristolochus of Erchia was the same man as the banker Aristolochus of Dem. 45.63 (Davies [n. 1], no. 1946), and that the victorious choregos Timodemus is to be identified with the banker Timodemus of Dem. 36.29, 50 (ibid., no. 13674). See also Davies (n. 7), 65–6; Cohen (n. 15), 88–9; Osborne (n. 2), iv.196.

71 [Lys.] 8 was presumably never intended for a law court, but may have been composed to address the members of the association of which the speaker (i.e. possibly Lysias himself) was a member.
In conclusion, it can definitely be suggested that the peculiar nature of Athenian business life, characterized by the joint work of and cooperation between citizens and non-citizens, had a significant impact on the scope of social mobility in Athenian society. This joint work and cooperation provided opportunities for non-citizens in creating networks across the boundaries of legal status, networks that could be brought into play in a variety of ways and contexts, and hence could plausibly function as important channels for social circulation.

Consciously crossing the boundaries of legal- and politico-centric history, this model exposes an important social mechanism, through which (inter alia) a reasonable case can be made for the existence of social advancement of non-citizens in classical Athens. Needless to say, it would be fascinating to take this conclusion a step further, by mapping the various networks to which non-citizens belonged, and by examining to what extent they actually managed to make use of these channels in order to enhance their social status. That, however, is clearly beyond the scope of this article, and hence remains as an important question for future research.

MARLOES DEENE
Marloes.Deene@UGent.be