Work, Version, Text and Scriptum: High Medieval Manuscript Terminology in the Aftermath of the New Philology

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This article reviews the terminological framework used to describe manuscripts. The Lachmannian terminology allows scholars to classify manuscripts as versions or variants of a work on a purely textual basis, but lacks a rigid designator to indicate a (part of a) manuscript as a unit of text and material considerations. Conversely, scholars who adopt Dagenais’s solution to renounce the work and concentrate on the material scriptum gain a rigid designator, but threaten to lose the ability to classify manuscripts at all. Proceeding from a case study, the article argues that the twelfth-century view of a work’s ontological status enables medievalists to keep classifying their scripta on both textual and material grounds. It explores the possibility of using Dagenais’s scriptum as the foundation for a Neo-Lachmannian terminological framework that allows scholars to study manuscript variance and materiality without losing the ability to classify them.

There is an increasing consensus in medieval studies that manuscripts need to be studied from a material perspective. It is argued that scholars should analyze manuscripts in terms of their parchment or paper support, binding structure, quires, and layout, because this material view constitutes the necessary foundation for any form of textual analysis. However, one basic requirement for this form of material analysis has not yet been met: a clear and unambiguous terminological framework.

The absence of clear terminology in the field of manuscript studies has everything to do with a conceptual problem that has haunted manuscript scholars since the days of Karl Lachmann (1793–1851). In the wake of his editions, of which the 1850 publication of Lucretius’s De rerum natura has become the most famous, philologists largely agreed
that their job was to study the work of an author as it was preserved in handwritten, and therefore defective, manuscripts. If two or more manuscripts contained the exact same error, it was assumed that they shared a common ancestor that introduced that particular mistake. By tracing these errors back to their sources, philologists could try to reconstruct an ideal urtext or archetype of the text they were studying. This urtext was considered to be the text as the author had meant it to be, without the noise introduced by the scribes.²

To this day, the terminology that medievalists use to describe manuscripts derives from this Lachmannian model. It posits that a particular author (such as Lucretius) produced an urtext, or work (such as De rerum natura), which was subsequently copied by various scribes into manuscripts, which were then copied by still other scribes into new manuscripts, and so on. The preserved manuscripts are classified according to the closeness of their relation to the author’s original work. For example, a manuscript that was produced by very conscientious scribes and remained very close to the urtext would be called a variant of De rerum natura, whereas a severely modified text (with, for example, the addition of some extra chapters) would be called a new version of that work.

This model of manuscript analysis always had its share of critics. It was first challenged by Bédier’s best text approach, and then quickly evolved into a more flexible Neo-Lachmannism (Timpanaro). Yet the (Neo-)Lachmannian method was only seriously called into question in the 1990s, when Speculum published a special theme number that introduced the Material or New Philology (Nichols, “The New Philology”).³ This movement was inspired by Bernard Cercquiglini’s observation that medieval manuscripts cannot be neatly classified as variants (or versions) of one work or another, but display an inescapable and at times overwhelming amount of variance.⁴ Spearheaded by Stephen G. Nichols, the New Philologists maintained that philologists now needed to abandon their attempts to create urtext editions and return instead to the study of manuscript materiality. They further argued that errors in a manuscript do not obscure the author’s message, but are valuable additions by a scribe who took on the role of an author.⁵ As the traditional distinction between author, scribe and reader became blurred, the ideal of the urtext edition was replaced by an expressively voiced wish to study all manuscripts as absolutely unique objects of equal merit.

In spite of these various critiques, the Lachmannian terminology to classify manuscripts has remained firmly in place. The present article
aims to re-evaluate that terminology as a tool to describe high medieval manuscripts. I start with a short case study of manuscript layout that can serve to further illuminate the nature of the terminological framework, then switch to a broader theoretical discussion of that terminology. I argue that scholars are forced to describe manuscripts in Lachmannian terms even though they might not subscribe to that paradigm. One radical solution to this problem has been to completely abandon the existing terminological framework, from the urtext to the work, the version, the variant, and the copy. As this seems to create an unpalatable terminological vacuum, some kind of compromise needs to be found. In the final section, I propose that for medievalists the most sensible way to approach this problem lies in a return to medieval practices. Instead of trying to reason our way out of modern and quite complex debates on the nature of a work, we ought to pay close attention to high medieval views on the relation between universal ideas (such as the work) and the material unicity of particular objects (such as a manuscript). The theories of Peter Abelard (1079–1142) can be used to establish an alternative conceptualization of the work, which could lead to a re-conceptualization of the terminological framework that is linked to it.
1. The role of layout in the conceptualization of a work: a case study based on chapter titles

For the monastery of Marchiennes, near the present-day city of Douai in Northern France, the year 1024 marked a turning point. On the orders of the Bishop of Cambrai and the Count of Flanders, Benedictine monks now replaced the women who, according to hagiographical legend, had inhabited the monastery since the seventh century (Ugé; Vanderputten and Snijders). The new monks immediately occupied themselves with the expansion of their monastic library, which would eventually grow into one of the more important book collections in the region.

Figures 1 and 2 show two of the manuscripts that were produced by these monks. Both of them are Passions of St. Lucia. The manuscript on the left, Douai Bibliothèque Municipale (henceforth BM) 867 was written in the eleventh century, and the one on the right (Douai BM 838) in the late twelfth or thirteenth century. The text in both manuscripts is (roughly) identical so that it is reasonable to assume that the Douai BM 838 was directly copied from Douai BM 867. (Note that I use the word ‘text’ here and henceforward to indicate the physical alternation of letters and punctuation marks on a piece of parchment, and not in any of its broader meanings). Even though the text of the Passion of St. Lucia is very similar in Douai BM 867 and Douai BM 838, the
The layout of the two Passions looks profoundly different. Douai BM 838 is laid out in columns, contains significantly more words per page and is almost twice as large as Douai BM 867. It is also striking that the initial in Douai BM 867 is no more than six lines high, whereas the initial in Douai BM 838 measures thirteen lines.

Nevertheless, the changing layout will not have changed the interpretation of the Passion for the monks of Marchiennes, because the adjustment was not done to change this Passion in particular, but in response to much broader conventions about the proper mise-en-page of a codex. Hagiographical manuscripts that were produced around 1200 were generally larger than their eleventh-century predecessors, contained more words per page, and were laid out in columns—the mise-en-page of Douai BM 838 simply conforms to these newer standards of manuscript layout (Snijders, “Ordinare & Communicare”; Bozzolo et al). Furthermore, the initials in both manuscripts may differ in absolute size, but relatively speaking they are both about average for their respective manuscripts. From an artistic point of view, the two initials even look somewhat alike. Even more importantly, neither Passion has been subdivided into chapters or paragraphs. They do not contain chapter titles, rubrics, lombards, or a table of contents. To summarize, we should conclude that the scribe who copied Douai BM 867 adapted its layout to the most recent practical and aesthetical standards—he modernized the layout—but he did not attempt to modify it in such a way that the structure or meaning of the work was changed.

The example of St. Lucia indicates that some patterns of layout could be preserved when a manuscript was copied, whereas other elements were routinely changed (Nix, “Manuscript Layout”). This presents a very interesting parallel with the conclusions that were drawn by the adherents of the New Philology in the 1990s. Working from a strictly verbal paradigm, they concluded that scribes almost never made “xerox copies” of a manuscript, but that some elements of a text would be preserved whereas others would usually be rewritten. Different ways to rewrite a story have been investigated, and scholars have found that some genres were changed or rewritten more often than others, that there were various ways of rewriting a story, and that there was a field of tension between continuity and discontinuity when a story was copied. The two Passions of St. Lucia indicate that a systematic study of layout rewrites (or, perhaps more aptly, the re-presentation or re-visualization of a story) could probably yield similar conceptual improvements. It may therefore be relevant to include layout as a factor in a typology of manuscript classification.
The dynamics of layout transmission—the way in which layout changed when a scribe copied a story—in high medieval manuscripts can illustrate how layout could be used as a way of classifying manuscripts. To really understand these dynamics would require a broad investigation that is obviously beyond the scope of this article. However, one easy way to give some preliminary answers is to investigate how often a scribe changed the number of chapters in the story that he was copying. A change in the number of chapters was one of the most fundamental changes a scribe could make, because it changed the *ordinatio* of a story—its subdivision into books, chapters, and paragraphs. Medieval scribes considered the *ordinatio* of a tale to be its formal cause, and essential for understanding the narrative. Thus, in changing the *ordinatio* of a story, they changed the way it was read. Take the *ordinatio* of the *Life of Anselm of Canterbury* as an example. This *Life* was copied by a twelfth-century monk from the monastery of Anchin, who conscientiously subdivided the story into chapters (Douai BM 352, ff. 115r–142v). These chapters vary in length quite profoundly. The short chapters result from the scribe’s desire to begin a new chapter whenever he considered a part of the story to be particularly relevant for the daily life of his fellow monks—for example, when the story explained Anselm’s views on proper behavior in the oratory and during matins. If interesting fragments followed each other in close succession, those chapters could be very short indeed: one chapter counts only thirteen words. Yet when extensive fragments did not relate anything of particular interest in the eyes of the scribe, he did not bother to introduce chapters to it. As Anselm’s *Life* is quite long—counting more than 26,000 words in the *Acta Sanctorum* edition—some of those chapterless fragments encompass more than thousand words. As a result, the *ordinatio* served as an interpretation of the *scriptum*, determining how quickly the monks had access to particular pieces of information, and thereby determining how the monks could approach the story. This is why medieval authorities considered the *ordinatio* of a *scriptum* as one of its most important characteristics. It has led Joseph-Claude Poulin to argue that high medieval readers may have regarded two manuscripts with a largely identical text but a different *ordinatio* as two very different versions of the work (Poulin 329).

Chapter divisions are not only an important aspect of manuscript layout, they are also relatively easy to study. The presence of chapters in a manuscript is easily quantifiable—one can simply count the number of initials and/or rubrics in a manuscript. Even more importantly, a scribe could freely incorporate chapters into a story without needing to apply
for expensive paints, talented artists, or model books. It can thus be assumed that he could make a fairly autonomous decision about the number of chapters in a story. Compare this, for example, to the presence of miniatures or gold leaf in initials—another way of focusing a reader’s attention to a specific part of a story. It is difficult to be sure that the absence of such devices was a conscious decision, and not simply due to changing economics in a monastery, or to the absence of a skilled illuminator who could assist the scribe. Such possibilities make the presence of intricate initials or the use of pigments or gold leaf a dangerous basis for an analysis of layout transmission.

The following paragraphs will analyze the number of chapter titles in hagiographical manuscripts that were written in Latin between the tenth and the twelfth centuries by Benedictine monks from the Southern Low Countries, which encompassed the bishoprics of Liège, Cambrai/Arras, Tournai, and Thérouanne, and is roughly equivalent to present-day Belgium and Northern France.11 Within this corpus, approximately 69 percent of the works are preserved in two or more manuscripts that show varying *ordinationes*.12 The *Life of St. Anselm of Canterbury*, for example, has been subdivided into 15 chapters in Douai BM 878, 53 chapters in Douai BM 840, and 71 chapters in Douai BM 352.

It can be difficult to investigate the reasons for these changes, as it is often unclear whether scribes were consciously changing the number of chapters, or whether they were simply copying a manuscript from another monastery that has not been preserved. To partially circumvent this problem, I will focus solely on monasteries that possessed two or more manuscripts of the same work (such as the *Passion of St. Lucia*), as it can be assumed that if a monastery required a copy of a hagiographical story that they already possessed, they would actually copy that manuscript instead of travelling elsewhere. It should be noted that it was not that usual for a monastery to want to possess two largely identical copies of one hagiographical narrative: most communities preferred to fill their libraries with many different stories, and not with facsimile copies (Snijders, “Ordinare & Communicare”). Some of the doubles in monastic libraries might therefore be the result of accidents (such as a scribe who did not realize that he was copying a work that his community already possessed) or gifts. Yet copies could be made deliberately as well, as is shown by the monastic community of St.-Sépulcre in Cambrai. At the end of the eleventh century, its scribe Fulbert and his colleagues created a manuscript that contained 90 saints’ lives. One century later, another scribe from St.-Sépulcre decided to copy this manuscript almost in its entirety, so that the community now possessed two
manuscripts with largely identical texts (MSS. Cambrai BM 809 and 863).

Scribes such as the twelfth-century monk from St.-Sépulcre, who copied a hagiographical legend almost word for word, also tended to copy the general structure of that legend's layout. Sixty-five percent of the legends that were copied within monasteries were largely identical in respect to both their text and their number of chapters. Conversely, when a scribe rewrote the text of a saint’s life, he would usually tweak the number of chapters in the process. Obviously, this high correlation between changes in text and *ordinatio* is no coincidence. Both kinds of interventions required a profound knowledge of the legend. A scribe who was familiar enough with the tale to be able to consciously adapt it would have been able to play around with its structure as well, and vice versa. As a result, both changes must have often been elements in a larger project to rework the text.

Yet we should be careful not to equate the two working methods, as 35 percent of the legends that show a changed *ordinatio* was not accompanied by a significantly changed text. Those cases may represent Poulin’s hypothesis that a changed *ordinatio* equaled a different version in the eyes of a medieval audience. In other words, wanting to change the number of chapters in a legend may have been the reason to copy that legend in the first place. For example, the eleventh-century legendary from St.-Sépulcre had incorporated most stories as continuous texts. As we saw, the twelfth-century scribe who copied them did not significantly change the texts, but he did subdivide most legends into chapters. Similarly, the monastery of St.-Vaast possessed two manuscripts with the *Life of St. Maurus* that showed a virtually identical text, which in the oldest manuscript was subdivided into nine chapters and in the other into eighteen. Such decisions were probably made out of changing practical requirements—for example, if a new manuscript was meant for the liturgy it would not need an extensive *ordinatio*, whereas a sourcebook for preaching would benefit from the most sophisticated *ordinatio* available as this enabled the reader to thumb through the *scriptum* and find specific passages to illustrate some moral precept. The change in *ordinatio* and the context of use that the new *ordinatio* enabled may have been an argument for these monks to copy the legend, and to have held onto both manuscripts in the centuries to follow.

It is well known that the textual transmission of hagiographical legends cannot usually be described as complete continuity (a xerox copy of a narrative) or discontinuity (a legend that is rewritten so profoundly that it can no longer be recognized as the same tale), but tends to hover
in between the two. The challenge is to investigate this balance and understand the mechanics behind it. The very preliminary results sketched above seem to indicate that the transmission of manuscript layout may have known a similar balance. Scribes did not routinely change the entire layout of a legend when they copied it, but neither was a specific work always copied with the same layout. The large majority of scribes found a balance in between the two and changed some elements of textual layout while leaving others untouched. Again the challenge is to comprehend the mechanics of that balance, which presumably resulted from a range of elements ranging from artistic talent to monastic wealth to structural components (such as the customs of a particular age or region). If we can learn to understand those mechanics, we are likely to find that layout was transmitted in much the same way as text, and that medieval audiences did not only classify manuscripts based on their textual contents, but made very similar classificatory models based on their layout. Manuscript layout should therefore be incorporated as an element into the terminology to describe and classify high medieval manuscripts.

2. Lachmannian terminology and its problems

Both text and layout are partially discontinuous, and both are likely to have played a part in the medieval classification of manuscripts. The current terminological framework, based on Lachmann’s theories, is inadequate in both respects. In order to evaluate the terminology’s performativity, it is necessary to delve deeper into the Lachmannian method.

Paul Eggert showed in a 1998 article that the Lachmannian method distinguishes between physically observable manuscripts and transcendent (not directly observable) works (Eggert, “The Work Unravelled” 45–46). Manuscripts are directly cognizable. We can, for example, have many views of a saint’s Vita in a high medieval manuscript, looking at one folio or another, stumbling over writing errors, examining the binding, or even counting words—yet all of these views give us but a partial understanding of what that Vita really is. The manuscript Vita is, as Husserl would say, directly knowable, but never in its entirety. The “entire” or “full” Vita can only be postulated by the mind, which gathers the memories of various partial reading experiences and merges them into one transcendent postulate. This postulate represents the text in the most ideal form possible, and hovers behind the manuscripts as if it were a Platonic form, giving life to the shadows in the cave. Old-style Lachmannian researchers turn their minds towards this postulate, which
they call the work. Diligently weeding as many errors as possible from the preserved manuscripts, they attempt to rise above them in order to (re)construct the work, which they understand as the original authorial intention.\textsuperscript{17}

This nineteenth-century approach has been criticized for many decades and from many different angles. I already touched upon the well-known objection that manuscripts should not be described in terms of errors at all, because the modern distinction between authors as the composers of original pieces of writing, scribes as persons who diligently copied an author’s work, and readers as persons who passively consumed the scribe’s work has but little explanatory power for the study of the medieval period. It has been shown many times that medieval authors were not required to be original, and that medieval scribes were not limited to making faithful copies of existing texts.\textsuperscript{18} Most authors and scribes steered a middle course between originality and straightforward copying. Monk Rainerus from the monastery of St.-Peter in Ghent provides a concrete example. Around the year 1000, he read through the old \textit{Vita prima} of St. Ghislain and started to expand on the existing text (Helvétius 332). He added new dialogues to the story and incorporated new anecdotes about the saint, functioning as an author for all intents and purposes. The results of his efforts are usually called the \textit{Vita secunda}. Somewhat later, another monk added two further miracles to this \textit{Vita secunda}, and around 1035 Rainerus decided to rewrite his work and incorporate these new miracles into the story. Several other monks then started to make idiosyncratic compilations of Ghislain’s deeds and miracles, and one monk from the monastery of St.-Amand combined the prologue of the old \textit{Vita prima} with the main text of the \textit{Vita secunda}.\textsuperscript{19} It is practically impossible to neatly separate these diverse monks into authors and scribes. As a result, it is highly problematic to claim that the alterations that were made to the original story by these monks are degenerative errors. On the contrary: they were conscious adaptations of the original story by author-scribes. The monk from St.-Amand, for example, did not combine elements from the \textit{Vita prima} and the \textit{Vita secunda} by accident, but tried to communicate a different message about St. Ghislain to his intended audience. As a result, it is distinctly unhelpful to regard the end result of his work as a degenerate version of either the \textit{Vita prima} or the \textit{Vita secunda}: it is an entirely new entity. Examples such as these have led scholars to argue that we ought to study every manuscript as equivalent, without projecting anachronistic judgments about authors and errors onto the material, as this is the only way to do justice to the medieval situation.
A second and far more abstract objection to the Lachmannian method is that it conceives of the work as an ideal object that can be compared to a Platonic form (Eggert, “The Work Unravelled” 41–60). An ideal object in a philosophical sense designates something unchanging, an object that always keeps its form, whatever the circumstances. Classic examples of ideal objects are mathematical phenomena such as circles or parallelograms, which cannot change their shape without ceasing to be themselves. Ingarden and other scholars have argued that contrary to circles and parallelograms, a work can and does change its form over time (Ingarden 8). Rainerus’s *Vita secunda* is a prime example of a work that appears to alter its form as the author himself tried to improve upon his work, as did multiple other author/scribes. Yet if the *Vita secunda* is not an ideal object, it follows that this work exists only in its readings (Ingarden 9, 14). In other words: if the *Vita secunda* is neither physically observable nor an unchanging concept such as a circle, it follows that the *Vita secunda* exists only as the sum of the manuscripts that are recognized as containing a text that is very close to the narrative that Rainerus has worked on. As a result, people can get a notion of some part of the *Vita secunda* when they are reading through a manuscript, or when they are actively thinking about the manuscripts that contain it. However, that notion can be no more than an incomplete work in bits and pieces, gleaned from partial readings and existing only in a person’s memory. It is practically impossible to have a complete mental image of all the manuscripts that contain the *Vita secunda*, and it is always possible that one day, a new manuscript with a different version of the *Vita secunda* will be discovered. This means, according to Ingarden, that a work does just not have the stability to support true statements about its nature, such as “the *Vita secunda* of St. Ghislain contains eighteen chapters” or “the *Iliad* is written in hexameter” (Ingarden 12–13).

These are only two of the many problems that haunt the Lachmannian work. They illustrate the fundamental nature of both the practical and the philosophical issues that have arisen during the last century. Less frequently discussed, but just as fundamental, are the problems with the terminology derived from the idea of a work.

Although the work is no longer accepted as uncontroversial, much of the terminology to describe manuscripts still derives from it. This is best shown by means of an analysis of Denis Muzerelle’s *Vocabulaire codicologique*. This is one of the most authoritative guides to manuscript terminology, and almost universally used and cited by medievalists. In the chapter “Tradition du texte,” Muzerelle defines the five most
common terms to describe medieval manuscripts: *copy*, *witness*, *recension*, *variant*, and *version*. Each of these terms is shown to define a relation between manuscript and work.

First of all, a *copy* is defined as “exemplaire dont le texte a été reproduit d’un autre”, which may be translated as, “a manuscript, the texte of which is reproduced in another manuscript,” or “every manuscript that presents the same texte.” Unfortunately, the exact meaning of the texte remains unclear. It does not seem to refer to a text in its most basic sense as a series of words and punctuation marks in a particular order, as both New Philologists and Lachmannians subscribe to the notion that scribes always commit errors and/or make conscious changes when they are copying a text. Therefore, a copy of a text in the sense of a medieval xerox or facsimile is virtually impossible. As a result, we have to interpret the definition in the *Vocabulaire codicologique* as “every manuscript that presents the same work.” This means that the copy is defined in terms of its relationship to a work. Yet in view of the fundamental problems to define a work, it is hard to pin down what it means for two manuscripts to do so.

The same objection can be raised to the other terms. First of all, a *witness* is defined as “every copy of a texte, considered as a stage in the transmission and transformation of a texte.” Once again, the texte cannot refer to a xerox copy of the text but must refer to a work. This makes a witness virtually synonymous to a copy, with the sole difference that a witness is a copy “considered as a stage in the transmission and transformation of that work.” This makes it even harder to establish its exact sense, for what does it mean for two manuscripts to present the same work, yet be a stage in that work’s transformation? Secondly, the less common *recension* is defined as “all the different forms of a texte, as they are presented in different manuscripts.” As one text cannot have different forms in different manuscripts, the definition again denotes forms of one work in various manuscripts. Once again we are left with the question of how an ideal work can have different forms.

Finally, a *variant* is defined as “every reading that differs from a standard reading,” and a *version* is a variant that differs more profoundly or more characteristically from the standard reading. This *standard reading* is the form of the text that the researcher considers to be the best text or the copy text, usually because it is judged to approximate the intentions of the author most closely. In other words, the terms version and variant serve to indicate how close a manuscript is to a work. A variant contains only minor variations vis-à-vis the work, whereas the word version is usually reserved for a state of a work “that
may be distinguished as a separate entity” and is explicitly linked to discernible authorial intentions (Beal 430, 432). In other words, variants are written by scribes, whereas versions are created by authors. Of course, many researchers struggle to distinguish variants from versions. Hans Zeller, for example, argues that a variant can express changed authorial intentions just as well as a version, whereas others maintain that “equal valorization of variant and version [. . . ] tends to reduce all versions to an indiscriminate continuum of intentionality that impedes rather than furthers the study of versions” (Bryant 71–75).

Obviously, all these terms share the same, very profound problem: they do not describe a manuscript as an object in and of itself, which has a stable identity irrespective of all circumstances. A text in a manuscript is always described as a copy/recension/witness/version/variant of a work, which is to say that the manuscript is described in terms of its relation to something external to itself. To give an analogy: imagine that it would not be possible to refer to human beings by their proper names, but that we could only describe them in relational terms such as a brother, a father or even a clone. Instead of calling someone John Smith, we would have to label him “a brother,” describing him in terms of his family ties. Quite apart from the moral implications, this would be problematic because the applicability of words such as brother or father is subject to change. To give an example: Smith might have a baby and subsequently undergo transgender surgery. Smith has now transformed from a brother into a sister and a mother. To borrow a term from Kripke: brother and father are not rigid designators that refer to a stable object, whatever happens to it and “in all possible worlds,” in the same way that a name always refers to the same person. This is the problem that haunts designations such as witness or version: they do not rigidly designate a specific part of a manuscript, whatever its relation to the rest of the manuscript, other manuscripts, or ideological constructs. Instead, the meaning of these terms is related to our knowledge of other manuscripts that contain a similar text. In other words, the entire manuscript terminology serves to classify manuscript texts within a tradition, instead of designating them as objects.

This terminological framework is not satisfactory for three separate reasons. First of all, because it forces researchers to treat manuscripts as the physical manifestations of a work, so that it is all but impossible to discuss a manuscript without implying an intertextual relation between the object of research and the notion of an ideal work.

A second, well-known problem is that the terminology forces researchers to compartmentalize manuscripts, whereas Cerquiglini and
others have argued that medieval manuscripts are characterized by variance and are therefore unsuited to rigid classifications (Cerquiglini; Nichols, “The New Philology”). Consider the *Vita secunda* of St. Ghislain, or the common example of a manuscript with paragraphs of inserted and/or rewritten text that effectively makes it dangle between two works. Such variance is fundamentally at odds with the existing terminology. Of course, ad hoc solutions can always be found, so that the manuscript in question could be designated as “a version of two works” or similar, but this does not solve the fundamental problem that our manuscript technology serves to negate manuscripts’ essential variance.

Last but not least, the existing terminology is exclusively text-based. As we saw, manuscripts are classified on the basis of their textual similarities, whereas considerations of layout or codicology have no role whatsoever in this Lachmannian system. Yet we have also seen that medieval intellectuals considered a narrative’s *ordinatio* as that narrative’s formal cause, and an essential element to improve understanding. It is likely that high medieval monks had a similar attitude with respect to a manuscript’s illumination and codicology. A good example is provided by two copies of the *Vita Vedasti*, the Life of the patron saint of the monastery of St.-Vaast. The first copy is incorporated into Arras, Bibliothèque Municipale 734, which is an extravagant manuscript that is entirely dedicated to Vedastus, illuminated with full-page miniatures that are distinguished by their craftsmanship, exuberant colors, and gold leaf. This codex was a highly prized possession of the monastic community of St.-Vaast. The second copy is tucked away among the lives of multiple saints in a soberly executed codex from a neighboring monastery. One could reasonably ask whether it is valid to describe these two manuscripts as copies only because their text is largely identical; for it is highly likely that medieval readers would have interpreted the two copies in very different ways: one was the centerpiece of an immensely important codex that was devoted to monastery’s patron saint, central to the monks’ daily existence, and their spiritual and ideological status; the other was simply a tool for the correct celebration of the liturgy. The text-based terminology makes it very hard to articulate such problems, and therefore hard to research them.

As a result, medievalists need an emended terminological framework to describe and research medieval manuscripts. Most importantly, we need a word that allows us to refer to a narrative or message that a manuscript presents as self-contained, usually because visual elements or terms such as *incipit* and *explicit* signal its beginning and end. The
word should thus refer to a (part of a) manuscript that is defined on the basis of its physical boundaries, rather than its contents. The word can refer to a narrative such as a saint’s life, but it can just as easily denote some administrative document that is presented as self-contained in the manuscript (such as a chronology of popes, or a listing of donations to a specific institution). Furthermore, this word should refer to this (part of a) manuscript as a material unity of text, layout, and codicology. Finally, it should not automatically relate that (part of a) manuscript to a work, or to other manuscripts.

The importance of this physical approach to the boundaries of a narrative unit can again be illustrated with Arras BM 734, which contains three works about the ninth-century miracles of St. Vedastus on ff. 35v-49r. Each of these works was composed at a different moment in time, yet the scribe saw them as one long story. He grouped them under the title of “On the miracles of Vedastus, saint and bishop, which were revealed at various moments in time, but were recently ‘collected as one’ by a brother from this monastery” (MS Arras BM 734, f. 35v). Even though the scribe conscientiously distinguished between the prologue and the various miracles in his manuscript by means of rubrics and initials, he did not indicate where one work ended and another began—the works were literally “collected as one.” Since this was an important scribal decision, scholarly terminology should be able to honor it and refer to the end product of his efforts as a coherent whole. It should similarly be able to refer to other kinds of scribal products that are incorporated into manuscripts and are treated as internally coherent narrative units by its scribes, such as charters, bills, or lists of relics.

3. From work to scriptum: a viable solution?

The most radical solution to this need has been proposed by John Dagenais, who wanted to “free the manuscript from the idea that it is a sign for something else, that it ‘represents’ the [work].” He introduced the term scriptum (pl. scripta) for a (part of a) manuscript and defined it as “a concrete, unduplicatable, physical manuscript together with the writing, both textual and trivial, it contains” (Dagenais 20).

Other words for roughly the same phenomenon have been suggested as well, such as document and material text. However, they tend to concentrate on the physicality of manuscripts without attempting to cut the ties between manuscript and work. The document is generally used to indicate “the physical material that bears a text”, and the material text to denote “the text of a work as found in a document.” These terms
do not rigidly designate a material unity of text, layout, and codicology, but instead encompass the performance of a work as a material text on a document. Other scholars, uncomfortable with the harsh dividing line between document and material text, merge the two into one entity that they define as “the physical material, paper and ink.” However, this does not do away with the Lachmannian terminological framework, because the material text is subsequently characterized as the place where authors, scribes, and readers meet while “translating” or “performing” a work. As such, both definitions regard the material text as the physical performance of a work, much like the witness. More precisely, the material text is the textual performance of a textual work in a material context (Muzerelle sec. 442.05). In practice, of course, manuscripts do not invariably use text to convey a certain message. For example, Valenciennes BM 500 contains a comic-like series of miniatures that illustrate the life of St. Amand on ff. 53r–68r. The drawings tell a complete story of St. Amand, yet they can hardly be called a material text.

The word scriptum evades these problems. First of all, it concentrates on the manuscript’s materiality. The text (if present) gets its meaning in dialogue with elements such as the quality of the parchment, the ordinatio, the manuscript’s codicological composition and so on. Furthermore, a scriptum does not necessarily contain text—a series of miniatures or even a blank folio can also be understood as a scriptum, as long as it has clear boundaries and there is reason to think that the scriptum was meant to convey some kind of message to the intended audience. As the scriptum is defined by its physical boundaries rather than by its contents, scribal decisions about the beginning and end of the scriptum take precedence over editorial practices. Finally, there is no presupposed relation between a scriptum and other scripta, or a work. One can use the word scriptum in a general sense to indicate a part of a manuscript without much further definition (“the first scriptum in this manuscript”), like one could use the word person to indicate an individual within a group of people (“that person over there”). Alternatively, the word scriptum can be used in combination with a call number and folio numbers, such as “Scriptum Arras Bibliothèque Municipale 734 ff. 35v–49r,” or “Scriptum Valenciennes Bibliothèque Municipale 500 ff. 53r–68r.” Used as such, the scriptum is a rigid designator that points to a very specific part of a manuscript in much the same way that “John Smith” points to a particular individual. This gives researchers the chance to discuss scripta and manuscripts without presupposing intertextual relationships, an essential requirement for historians and philologists alike.
However, Dagenais never intended to coin a valuable addition to the existing terminology. He wanted to fully replace it, as he argued that every \textit{scriptum} is unique and cannot be compared to other \textit{scripta}, let alone be related to a work—his \textit{scriptum} is concrete, unduplicatable, and physical. As a result, it has been objected that Dagenais’s views are far too radical and have drastic consequences for historical and philological research, “to the point where we can hardly deliberate on three extant copies of [one work] or even discuss them as three manuscript versions” (Altschul 124). If we accept that the work is a fairytale, as Stackmann put it, and that an editor should do no more than publish an adequate picture of the \textit{scriptum}, we are in the middle of a crisis, not only of medieval philology but of medieval history as well; for if we can no longer compare two \textit{scripta} to one another without doing injustice to their unicity there is a great part of the medieval world that can no longer be studied (Stackmann 29). Dagenais himself admitted that “I frankly do not know how the concept of ‘same’ text will work itself out in a study of medieval literature based on \textit{scripta}” (129).

An example from the monastery of Marchiennes illustrates the consequences of this approach. In the twelfth century, a scribe was copying the monastery’s old Bible. He did his very best to create an almost identical copy: he imitated the style of the miniatures, the new manuscript had similar dimensions (50x35 cm versus 49x33 cm), and he copied the texts and codicological composition without many changes (MSS Douai BM 3 and 1). A radical interpretation of Dagenais and the New Philology might argue that there can be no such thing as comparing two manuscript Bibles to one another, and might judge it pointless to ask why the scribe may have wished to create an almost identical copy of an existing manuscript. Taken to such a manifestly absurd extreme, the philological movement that started out as an attempt to refocus attention on the historical context in which medieval manuscripts functioned threatens to turn into a position that vetoes the contextualization of any manuscript.

Strong arguments against such an extreme interpretation can be found in the manuscripts themselves. As is evident from the Marchiennes Bibles, eleventh-century scribes are known to have attempted to copy an existing \textit{scriptum}, even if they could never achieve a perfect copy in practice. It would seem that such an obvious attempt to create a copy is enough of a reason in itself to admit that a relation between these manuscripts exists and can be studied. Even more importantly, medieval scribes were very well aware of the difference between \textit{scriptum} and work, even if the terms they used to describe them were different. An
example of this awareness can be found in the twelfth-century *scriptum* Douai BM 840 ff. 110r–112v, which describes the life of St. Juliana. Halfway through the story, a long fragment of text is copied into the margin, with the title “this was added in another *scriptum*” (the actual words are *hoc additum est in alio exemplari*, which may also be translated as “in another copy”). Apparently, a high medieval reader/scribe had been reading through Juliana’s life and noticed that it lacked a paragraph of text that was present in another *scriptum* which contained a very similar story. This indicates that the scribe had made a mental comparison between two *scripta*—in other words, the scribe had judged the *scripta* as two witnesses of a work, and mentally distinguished between the physical manuscripts and the story they had in common.

Such examples—and many more could be given—indicate that to drop the concept of a *work* in its entirety together with the traditional terminology that springs from it, is untenable from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective. Therefore, the question we ask ourselves should not be: “was there a work in the Middle Ages?” but “how might a (high) medieval reader/scribe have defined a work?”

4. Towards a reconceptualization of the work

The debate surrounding the Lachmannian work is perhaps one of the few issues in modern historical research that a medieval intellectual would follow with interest, as it comes down to that most famous of medieval discussions: the problem of universals. At the turn of the eleventh century, any medieval intellectual would have made some kind of distinction between a material object in front of him, and that object’s idea, nature, or essence. The debate over the ontological statute of such essences went back all the way to Plato, but was fuelled anew as the *logica nova* grew in popularity in the course of the eleventh century. On the one hand, bishop Odo of Cambrai (1050–1113) and William of Champeaux (1070–1120) were arguing that universals were *essentialiter* present in every individual of the species—applied to the matter of manuscripts, that comes down to saying that the work was essentially and totally present in every *scriptum* that performed it. Two *scripta* that performed the same work differed from each other in accidents, but were essentially of one nature. However, Peter Abelard (1079–1142) dealt a death blow to this view by explicating its absurdity—for how can one nature be in two places at once?—and proposed that a universal was no more than a name that was produced in the mind through an active process of abstraction. Basing himself on Aristotle, he reasoned that the
human mind focuses on one aspect that multiple manuscripts (or other material things, such as humans, trees, or houses) have in common. For example, two or three manuscripts might be very much alike in their textual aspects, though they might be very dissimilar in layout. By focusing on one such aspect, the mind forms a vague and somewhat confused image that can be applied to multiple manuscripts. In other words, the work is not a different thing from a *scriptum* (*non aliud*), but it is the *scriptum* viewed from a different perspective (*sed aliter*).43

This high medieval conceptualization of the relation between the universal (the work) and the particular (the *scriptum*) can be highly valuable to medievalists, because it can be used to reconsider the Lachmannian terminological framework. Of course, there must necessarily be a difference between the present-day understanding of a medieval work (such as the *Vita secunda* of St. Ghislain) and the medieval concept of that work. A researcher in the digital era has the means to compare pictures of multiple *scripta*. He or she can use critical editions and lists with *incipits* and *explicitis* to help define a *scriptum* as one work or the other. The present-day scholar is able to collect all these reproductions and tools on a desk, and base the definition of a work on them, delimiting its boundaries quite clearly. In contrast, the average medieval scribe was probably forced to recognize works from memory, realizing that one *scriptum* looked or sounded similar to something he previously read or heard. The process of recognition is certainly the same, but the conception of a work will have been less clearly delimited in medieval times. For a medieval scribe, we could assume that every new *scriptum* of the *Vita secunda* that he encountered over the course of his career—which could span 30 years or more—would cause him to subtly adjust the work he had in mind.44 As a result, the medieval work was no less real than ours, but certainly less stable.

As we saw earlier, Ingarden would object that the idea of a work that exists only in its readings results in a work that is fundamentally unstable, so that it cannot support true statements about its nature (such as “the *Iliad* is written in Hexameter”). Yet I would argue that this objection is valid only from a very radical point of view that presupposes that only ideal objects such as circles have the stability that support a true description of their essence. This almost Platonic philosophical position was not that of Abelard and his many followers, who would define the work as the recognition of similarity between multiple *scripta*. Hypothetically, they could have looked at a number of *scripta* that were all written in hexameters and told a story about Achilles’s grudge during the Trojan War. They would have recognized the similarity between
these *scripta*, and the hexameters would have been one of the aspects that caused this recognition. As a result, the hexameters would have been an essential part of Abelard’s mental definition of this work. As such, the statement that “this work, called the *Iliad*, is written in hexameter” becomes a statement as necessarily true as “this circle is round.”

Proceeding from this essentially medieval conceptualization of the work, the terminological framework that we rejected earlier can be re-built, with one crucially important difference. In a Lachmannian context, the work was an ideal object that was at the basis of the entire terminology. A work could be subdivided into versions, which could be subdivided into more or less authentic variants, and so on. However, if we proceed from a high medieval point of view, it is the *scriptum* and not the work that is at the basis of it all. Everything starts with the *scriptum*, the material object in front of a reader/researcher. The *scriptum* can, if so desired, be broken down into a *text* with a *layout* and *illuminations* on a *document*, and these analytical elements can be further compared to another *scriptum*’s text, layout, illuminations, parchment, and so on. Based on such comparisons, it becomes possible (though not always necessary) to judge them as relatively similar to one another on a textual level (as variants or even attempted copies) or as more profoundly or characteristically different from one another on the textual plane (versions). If, in the end, it is concluded that the text of a small group of *scripta* is profoundly similar, there is no objection to designate these *scripta* as witnesses of a work; as long as the work is not unduly idealized and its remains the very last step in the heuristic method. Next to the text of these *scripta*, their layout and codicology could equally cause recognition of similarity. For example, seven of the high medieval *scripta* from the Southern Low Countries with a *Life of St. Agnes* present the story as a continuous text, whereas two others subdivide the story into three chapters. It could be argued that those two present a different version with respect to the layout of this story—perhaps we ought to call this a *material version* of the *Life*.

A cursory glance over this redefined terminology might give the impression of a meek return to Lachmannian views; but in fact it is not. By putting the *scriptum* as the terminology’s central element and foundation, researchers gain the critical opportunity to discuss *scripta* without being obliged to classify them on the basis of their textual similarity to an urtext. The word *scriptum* serves as a rigid designator that allows researchers to look at *scripta* as material objects, unhampered by a priori assumptions about textual relationships. Simultaneously, the twelfth-century view of the ontological status of a work enables modern
scholars to keep classifying their *scripta*, either on textual or on material grounds. Future research might even attempt to construct a manuscript typology based on material considerations, which is comparable to textual typologies in terms of accuracy and practicability.

5. Conclusion

This article was about the terminological framework to describe manuscripts. In the early twentieth century, Karl Lachmann posited the work as an ideal and fully textual object. This perspective on the work was first attacked in 1928 and the criticism reached an all-time high in the 1990s with the New Philology, a movement that strongly emphasized the importance of studying manuscripts rather than works. Although this debate is quite well known, there has never been much attention paid to the terminological consequences of these two positions. On the one hand, the Lachmannian framework allows scholars to classify manuscripts but lacks a rigid designator to indicate “a (part of a) manuscript as a unit of text and material considerations.” On the other hand, those who renounce the work and concentrate on the material *scriptum* gain a rigid designator, but threaten to lose the ability to classify manuscripts at all. I have argued that instead of choosing between these two philosophical positions, medievalists could proceed from high medieval practices and build up an epistemological scheme from there.

High medieval scribes seem to have taken the *scriptum* as the starting point of their activities, even though they called it by different names, such as *exemplar*. It cannot be doubted that they distinguished the *scriptum* from its essence (the work), but it is unlikely that they continued to view this essence as an ideal object after the turn of the eleventh century, when radically realist views became less common. Instead, the dominant philosophical position was to regard an essence as the recognition of similarities between individual things (such as *scripta*) by a human being who was focusing on one specific aspect of these *scripta*. Of course, the aspect that they focused on could be textual; but it might also revolve around *ordinatio*, illumination, codicological composition, or any other material element that caught their attention.

If we follow medieval practices, we gain an epistemological framework that combines the use of materially defined rigid designators (as defended by the New Philology) with the notion of sameness (as practiced in centuries of philological research). Even more importantly, it opens up a terminological opportunity to research layout transmission with the same nuance and pertinence as textual transmission. A prelimi-
nary investigation of high medieval hagiography indicates that changes in layout and changes in text probably influenced each other and were subject to similar mechanics of transmission. Last but not least, the ability to pose and investigate such questions finally allows us to touch on the core of medieval manuscript culture as the transmission of visual experience.46

Notes

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1. See for example Nichols, “The New Philology”; Dagenais; Ornato; Verweij.

2. This method is generally ascribed to Karl Lachmann (1793–1851), although he never succinctly formulated it himself—see Timpanaro. The best exposition of the Lachmannian method is generally considered to be Paul Maas’s Textkritiek. The idea of a scribe introducing noise to the author’s message is based on the famous model of communication by Shannon, who modeled it on the working of a phone. For a discussion of the term work, see note 17.

3. The New Philology based itself on the ideas of scholars such as Paul Zumthor in his Essai de poétique médiévale, and Bernard Cerquiglini in his Éloge de la variante.

4. “L’écriture médiévale ne produit pas des variantes, elle est variance”; Cerquiglini 111.

5. Pickens and others have noted that the New Philology codified and popularized long-standing philological practices. The difference between medieval authors and scribes had been discussed in Minnis. An evaluation of New Philology’s contribution to medieval studies can be found in Löser.

6. The Passion of St. Lucia v. m. Syracusis (BHL 4992) is edited in Sanctuarium seu Vitae Sanctorum (Mombritius 107–09). For the BHL-numbers, see Bibliotheca hagiographica latina antiquae et mediae etae; Henryk Fros, Bibliotheca hagiographica latina antiquae et mediae etae: Novum supplementum; and Bibliotheca hagiographica latina manuscripta.

7. This version of BHL 4992 has been preserved in three manuscripts from the high medieval Benedictine Southern Low Countries: Douai BM 867 from eleventh-century Marchiennes, Douai BM 838 from twelfth- or thirteenth-century Marchiennes, and Brussels Royal Library II 932 from twelfth-century Saint-Bertin.

8. The letters I and N in the left margin of Douai BM 867 f. 73v are not initials, but litterae notabiliores that were projected into the margin for aesthetic reasons. See Snijders, “Ordinare & Communicare” 101–02.
9. In the words of Nicolas of Paris: “causa formalis tractatus que est ordinatio librorum partialium et capitulorum” (Parkes). John of Garland stated ca. 1240 in his *Parisiana poética* that the formal cause of a manuscript is “per libri dispositionem et litterarum pro tractionem” (Aubrey 291, n. 10). For the doctrine of the four causes (material, formal, efficient and final) see Aristotle’s *Physics* bk. 1, pt. 3; 194b17–20.

10. They also made a partial copy of the same work in Douai BM 878, ff. 109r–112v + 114r, which contained the exact same chapter divisions.

11. For a more detailed investigation of this corpus see Snijders, “Ordinare & Communicare.”

12. The corpus consists of *scripta* that were used in high medieval Benedictine monasteries from the bishoprics of Arras/Cambrai, Tournai, Thérouanne, and Liège. For a more detailed examination of this corpus, see Snijders, “Re-writing Hagiography.”

13. MSS Cambrai BM 863 (1076–1092) and Cambrai BM 809 (of which the different parts were produced in 1150–1200, 1170–1250, and 1234–1235 respectively). The number of chapters was changed in the Lives of Bartholomaeus ap. (BHL 1002), Iacobus Maior (BHL 4057), Iacobus Minor (BHL 4094), Iacobus ap. et ev. (BHL 4320), Mattaeus ap. (BHL 5690) and Philippus ap. (BHL 6814). No changes were made to the legends of Paulus ap. (BHL 6569), Petrus ap. (BHL 6655 & 6657) and Thomas ap. (BHL 8136). The legend of Simon and Iudas (BHL 7750 & 7751) was rewritten in both text and *ordinatio*.


15. The need for an *ordinatio* in matins readings is discussed in Snijders, “Celebrating with Dignity”; the preaching context is discussed in Rouse and Rouse. This is usually called *consultative* or *scholastic* reading (Fichtenaus; Saenger). The *Life of Basilius ep. Caesareae* (BHL 1023, Saint-Omer BM 794 ff. 76v–82v and Brussels *Royal Library* II 932 ff. 33r–45r) is edited in Corona.

16. Compare the conclusions of Nix (“Early Medieval Book Design in England”), who studies a limited number of manuscripts from very different genres.

17. There is no straightforward and commonly accepted term for the phenomenon that I call the *work*. One much-cited definition is that of McGann’s, who states that a *work* is a series of texts (or “a series of specific acts of production”), which constitutes an assembly of texts, or a *polytext* (McGann 52). Greetham reasons that “since a text [work] may originate as a mental state in the imagination of its designer but need [sic] ‘performers’ (actors, musicians, compositors, weavers) in order to be recognized and appreciated as a work by its intended audience, the textual theorist and practitioner must confront the question of whether this work can be said to exist independently of, or to be embodied by, its physical manifestation” (Greetham 26–27). Other terms that have been used for the work are “(transhistorical) verbal text” (Nichols, “Philology and Its Discontents” 130); “authorial literary text” (Dagenais 129); a “reified text” or “objectified text” (Innes 14; Illich). There does not seem to have been a properly medieval term for this phenomenon.
18. This idea derives largely from Barthes’s “La mort de l'auteur.” A specifically medieval perspective on authorship and originality is expounded in Mennis. A large-scale hagiographical case study can be found in Goulet. See also Guyotjeannin 128–29.


20. See for instance Derrida’s introduction to his translation of Edmund Husserl’s L’Origine de la géométrie.

21. Ingarden’s opinions are discussed by Eggert, who notes that they are essentially founded on Boethius’s second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, where he states that a universal should be common to several particulars, in its entirety, simultaneously, and that it should constitute the substance of its particulars (“The Work Unravelled” 47).

22. See also Nichols, “Philology and Its Discontents” 133–44.

23. Muzerelle sec. 441.07, copie or copy (“Exemplaire dont le texte a été reproduit d’un autre”). Exemplaire, also called copy in English, is defined in sec. 441.01 as “Chacun des volumes présentant un même texte” and volume in sec. 143.03 as “Unité constituée par un ensemble de feuillets unis par la reliure, que cet ensemble soit homogène ou hétérogène, indépendant ou partie d’un tout.”

24. For this definition see Shillingsburg, “Text as Matter” 52–53; Resisting Texts 72.

25. Muzerelle sec. 442.05, temoin or witness (“Chacun des exemplaires d’un texte, considéré comme une étape dans la transmission et la transformation d’un texte”).

26. Muzerelle sec. 442.06, recension (“Chacune des différentes formes d’un même texte présentées par différents manuscrits”).

27. Muzerelle sec. 443.07, variante or variant (“Chacune des autres leçons, par rapport à une leçon considérée”). A leçon or reading is defined in sec. 443.06 (“Chacune des différentes formes données à un mot ou groupe de mots, en un point du texte, par différents manuscrits”); sec. 442.07, version (“Recension comportant des différences profondes ou caractéristiques avec le texte original—notamment à la suite d’une traduction ou d’une adaptation”).

28. Muzerelle sec. 443.05, manuscrit de base or base manuscript (“Manuscrit dont le texte est préféré par l’éditeur et dont il reproduit le texte sauf erreur manifeste, les leçons des autres exemplaires étant rejetées en variantes”).

29. Also, version is a “specific form of the work” which “the author intended at some particular moment in time” (Scholarly Editing 44–45).

30. To paraphrase Kripke’s famous example: the name Otto von Bismarck stably refers to one person and there is nothing that can change that—even if history would have been very different, the word would still refer to the same person. Say that Bismarck suffered from severe hallucinations, or that he died as a young man and never had significant power in the German Empire; still the name Otto von Bismarck would refer to the same person. Therefore, the name
Otto von Bismarck is a rigid designator. On the other hand, the phrase “the first Chancellor of the German Empire” does not refer to Otto von Bismarck in all possible worlds. If, for example, Bismarck was put away in a mental institution or had died in his twenties, the phrase “the first Chancellor of the German Empire” would no longer refer to Bismarck, but (in all probability) to someone else. Therefore, “the first Chancellor of the German Empire” is a non-rigid or flexible designator. Similarly, terms such as copy, version, or witness are flexible designators.

31. A prime example of such a manuscript from the period under discussion is Douai BM 857 (Snijders, “Handschriftelijke productie”).

32. It should be noted, however, that codicologists have their own highly developed terminological systems; see Gumbert.

33. MS Arras BM 734 ff. 1v–23v (BHL 8506); MS Douai BM 857 ff. 33r–51v (BHL 8508, corrected to BHL 8506 in 1024)—there are many other copies, versions, and variants of BHL 8506 from the area surrounding the monastery of St.-Vaast.


35. It is important not to confuse this narrative unit with a production unit or codicological unit, which often encompass more than one narrative unit, see Gumbert; and Kwakkel.

36. I substituted “work” for “authorial literary text”; see Dagenais 129.

37. See Beal 126. Document for Beal is “any kind of material bearing text” (126). For Eggert, documents are defined as “the physical bearers of text” (‘Document and Text” 2, n. 4). Document in this sense is not to be confused with Zumthor’s document (natural and cultural primary structures such as hands, written supports, and language), which is opposed to monument (textual and modal structuration); see Zumthor, “Document et monument.” For Shillingsburgh, the material text is “the text of a work as found in a document” (Shillingsburg, “Text as Matter” 41) and “the evidence that a conceptual text (i.e., “the signs an author intended to inscribe”) was formed and uttered as a representation of a version of the work” (52–53). There are yet other terms for the same basic phenomenon such as the visual text, the production text, the physical text, the concrete text, the manuscript matrix, and so on; see Dagenais 20.

38. See Shillingsburg, “Text as Matter” 47. “The document, whether handwritten or printed, is the textual site where the agents of textuality meet: author, editor, copyist, typesetter, reader. In the acts of writing, copying or reading, document and text dynamically interrelate: they can be seen as a translation or performance of one another. They are, in this sense, on another’s negative constituting principle. Their relationship is thus dialectical.” (Eggert, “The Work Unravelled” 56–57).
39. The only texts included in the miniatures are a few short labels such as *monachus* next to the protagonists.

40. See also Pickens 53–86; and Deploige 80–84.

41. The literal translation of *exemplar* is “copy,” “model,” “example,” “original.” Because modern definitions use *exemplar* as synonym for *model* and define it in terms of textual transmission (“exemplaire dont le texte est reproduit par le copiste”), I chose not to use *exemplar* instead of *scriptum* (Muzerelle sec. 441.10).

42. For an overview of the medieval problem of universals, see for example Libera.

43. It should be noted that Abelard did subscribe to the thought that universals (such as works) existed as more than just concepts of the human mind, because they must equally be the objects of the divine mind. As such, they are quasi-things that exist independent of human mental activity and are the reason for the likeness between individual objects. However, Abelard did not think this has important ramifications for the way humans construct their universal concepts (Libera 148–158; Abelard). I took the *non aliud/sed aliter* description from Decorte 107. See also Bedos-Rezak 1499–502.

44. The length of high medieval scribal careers is discussed in Gullick 43.

45. *Agnes v.m. Romae*, BHL 156. Manuscripts from Benedictine monasteries (tenth to twelfth centuries, bishoprics of Arras/Cambrai, Thérouanne, Tournai and Liège) that present this work as continuous, are Arras BM 178 (St.-Vaast, ca. 1095–1105), Arras BM 569 (St.-Vaast, ca. 1100–1180), Brussels *Royal Library* 9810–14 (St.-Laurent, ca. 1125), Brussels *Royal Library* 14924–34 (Lobbes, ca. 1095–1110), Cambrai BM 863 (St.-Sépulcre, 1076–1092), Douai BM 840 (Marchiennes, ca. 1134–1200) and Douai BM 867 (Marchiennes, eleventh century). Those that subdivide the *Life* into three chapters: Brussels *Royal Library* II 1181 (Stavelot, ca. 1100–1150) and Douai BM 854 (Anchin, ca. 1125–1200).

46. The characterization of medieval literature as a visual experience is based on Nichols, “Philology and Its Discontents” 135.

**Manuscripts Cited**

MS 1. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 3. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 178. Bibliothèque municipale, Arras.
MS 199. Bibliothèque municipale, Arras.
MS 352. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 569. Bibliothèque municipale, Arras.
MS 734. Bibliothèque municipale, Arras.
MS 794. Bibliothèque municipale, Saint-Omer.
MS 809. Bibliothèque municipale, Cambrai.
MS 840. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 854. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 857. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 863. Bibliothèque municipale, Cambrai.
MS 867. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 868. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS 878. Bibliothèque municipale, Douai.
MS II 932. Bibliothèque royale, Brussels.
MS II 1181. Bibliothèque royale, Brussels.
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