GOVERNANCE EFFECTIVENESS:
Assessing and explaining the effects of third party implementation arrangements

Abstract proposal for the 8th Transatlantic Dialogue on transitions in governance

Workshop 1: New public governance: complex systems and networks

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Governance – third party implementation – effects – services

ABSTRACT:

Despite the impressive amount of conceptual and empirical research about the governance-paradigm, the effects of specific governance arrangements remain underexposed (Klijn, 2008). In this regard, governance literature still lacks evidence about its assumption (see: Löffler, 2009; Bovaird & Löffler, 2002) that cooperation between public and private for- and non-profit organizations would be more effective than public action.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of third party implementation arrangements as a specific governance configuration. Third party governance is the extension of the state or jurisdiction by contracts or grants to third parties (Frederickson, 2004: 21). In particular, we will discuss the consequences for the services that are delivered by and the problems that are addressed within these third party implementation settings.

As governance theory often fails to distinguish between types of policy and the nature of the interests at stake in different policy sectors (Laffin, Mawson & Ormston, 2011) we drew on the results of two case studies concerning two different policy domains.

The first case concerns the cooperation between private “business counters” that function as one-stop-shops for starting businesses and the Belgian federal government that contracted out a number of public processes towards these “business counters”.

The second case relates to the “community development-sector” (in Dutch: vzw Samenlevingsopbouw). This private sector initiative promotes the interests of disadvantaged groups of local residents. The regional Flemish government recognizes and subsidizes this sector and there is additional financing from local authorities (Dezeure & De Rynck, 2010).

The first part of our empirical analysis is descriptive. For both cases we analyze the historical background, the institutional setting and the formal characteristics (“Rules in form”: see Dezeure & De Rynck, ibid.) of the relationships between these private and
public organizations. Existing theoretical insights about policy instruments (see Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2005), regulatory regimes (see May, 2007) and accountability regimes (see Bovens, 2007) are used to systemically analyze these formal characteristics.

In the second part we report about the effects on to the delivery of services and/or the policy problems being addressed in both governance settings. For each case, we conducted a number of interviews with key actors participating in both third party implementation settings.

The third part is aimed at providing explanations for the effects identified by comparing the “rules in form” and “rules in use” (e.g. accountability shortfalls: see May, ibid.).

References


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