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Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?

Erik Weber UGent and Leen De Vreese UGent (2012) PHILOSOPHICA (GENT). 84. p.123-148
abstract
In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
journal title
PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)
Philosophica (Gent)
volume
84
pages
123 - 148
ISSN
0379-8402
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A2
copyright statement
I have retained and own the full copyright for this publication
VABB id
c:vabb:337339
VABB type
VABB-1
id
2985552
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-2985552
date created
2012-09-12 12:56:49
date last changed
2012-09-14 14:30:09
@article{2985552,
  abstract     = {In a paper {\textquoteleft}Causation in Context{\textquoteright} (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.},
  author       = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen},
  issn         = {0379-8402},
  journal      = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {123--148},
  title        = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?},
  volume       = {84},
  year         = {2012},
}

Chicago
Weber, Erik, and Leen De Vreese. 2012. “Causation in Perspective: Are All Causal Claims Equally Warranted?” Philosophica (gent) 84: 123–148.
APA
Weber, E., & De Vreese, L. (2012). Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted? PHILOSOPHICA (GENT), 84, 123–148.
Vancouver
1.
Weber E, De Vreese L. Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted? PHILOSOPHICA (GENT). 2012;84:123–48.
MLA
Weber, Erik, and Leen De Vreese. “Causation in Perspective: Are All Causal Claims Equally Warranted?” PHILOSOPHICA (GENT) 84 (2012): 123–148. Print.