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And so on: two theories of regress arguments in philosophy

Jan Willem Wieland UGent (2013)
abstract
This PhD dissertation is on infinite regress arguments in philosophy. Its main goals are to explain what such arguments from many distinct philosophical debates have in common, and to provide guidelines for using and evaluating them. Two theories are reviewed: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreed-upon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly well-developed, and this dissertation provides the Failure Theory with the same tools.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
promoter
UGent and UGent
organization
year
type
dissertation (monograph)
subject
keyword
schema, supertask, regress, philosophy, paradox, logic, infinite regress, argument, vicious regress, failure
pages
IX, 219 pages
publisher
Ghent University. Faculty of Arts and Philosophy
place of publication
Ghent, Belgium
defense location
Gent: Het Pand, zaal rector Vermeylen (Onderbergen 1)
defense date
2013-02-25 16:00
ISBN
9789070830847
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
D1
copyright statement
I have retained and own the full copyright for this publication
id
2973816
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-2973816
date created
2012-08-22 09:50:56
date last changed
2013-09-16 11:19:50
@phdthesis{2973816,
  abstract     = {This PhD dissertation is on infinite regress arguments in philosophy. Its main goals are to explain what such arguments from many distinct philosophical debates have in common, and to provide guidelines for using and evaluating them. Two theories are reviewed: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreed-upon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly well-developed, and this dissertation provides the Failure Theory with the same tools.},
  author       = {Wieland, Jan Willem},
  isbn         = {9789070830847},
  keyword      = {schema,supertask,regress,philosophy,paradox,logic,infinite regress,argument,vicious regress,failure},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {IX, 219},
  publisher    = {Ghent University. Faculty of Arts and Philosophy},
  school       = {Ghent University},
  title        = {And so on: two theories of regress arguments in philosophy},
  year         = {2013},
}

Chicago
Wieland, Jan Willem. 2013. “And so on: Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy”. Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University. Faculty of Arts and Philosophy.
APA
Wieland, J. W. (2013). And so on: two theories of regress arguments in philosophy. Ghent University. Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent, Belgium.
Vancouver
1.
Wieland JW. And so on: two theories of regress arguments in philosophy. [Ghent, Belgium]: Ghent University. Faculty of Arts and Philosophy; 2013.
MLA
Wieland, Jan Willem. “And so on: Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy.” 2013 : n. pag. Print.