Introduction

During the Ancien Régime the churches constituted an essential link in the system of social control in almost every Western European country. In certain regions the Catholic Church fulfilled this role until far into the twentieth century. This was, for example, the case in Belgium, and especially in the Flemish part of the country. Here, not only did the clergy succeed in attuning the legal code to its ethical standards (the law on contraception provides a good example) but it also managed to bring a large part of the population into public conformity at least with religious – and therefore not legally obligatory – codes of behavior.

The aim of this essay is to suggest a few reasons for this phenomenon. Our point of departure is the belief that social control has a lot to do with power and enforcing codes of behavior. Therefore our emphasis will focus on a description of the ways in which the Catholic Church succeeded in obtaining a position of power in Belgian society that allowed it to play a crucial role in the system of social control from the creation of the nation state in 1830 until the 1960s.

A Tradition of Clerical Supremacy.

In 1830 Belgium became independent but the development of a strong central state was still in its infancy. Many factors contributed to this. The territory had been found on maps
consecutively as the "Spanish", the "Catholic", and the "Austrian" Low Countries, then briefly as the Départements Réunis, and subsequently as part of the ephemeral "United Kingdom of the Netherlands." For the larger part of its history Belgium was located on the periphery of the countries to which it belonged. In addition to this it was the stepping stone between the Roman and the German cultural spheres. It was part of the "blue banana," of the relatively strongly urbanized, trade-oriented and rich belt that crossed Western Europe from the south to the north, and of which the population had always been able to maintain a certain degree of autonomy against the centralizing and belligerent dynasties.

Last, but by no means least, the territory was a stronghold of the Counter-Reformation in its battle with the heretic North, East and West. The Roman Catholic Church had the monopoly in religiosis and the temporal powers could only hold their ground to the degree that they were legitimized by that Church – something with which Joseph II, as well as the French occupiers and the Protestant Willem I had had to contend. This implied that in everyday life the population had to rely on the collaboration between the religious authorities and the local dignitaries for a number of basic services: education, social welfare, care of the sick and the orphans, to name only three. In rural regions, particularly, the clergy was the expressive leader of the local communities. There was no question of any religious disparity or plurality, which would have given the temporal power the opportunity to develop into an autonomous arbitrator, as was the case in the United Republic: the throne simply could not function without the altar. The Belgian constitution of 1830 – on its adoption, the most liberal in continental Europe – was not designed to alter this relationship in the short term. The Belgian state was a "night watchman state," only operating when local and private initiatives failed.

National historiography has emphasized how this was a continuation of the ancestral tradition, but we may add that this arrangement was also convenient for free entrepreneurs, and that it guaranteed the tax paying voters a minimal tax pressure to ensure that the revenues were wisely spent. There was no question of a separation between Church and
State. The concordat, which stipulated that the State was responsible for the stipend of priests remained valid. In addition, the initially precarious international situation of the early Belgian state militated against any tension between the worldly and the clerical authorities. According to the liberal Lebeau in 1841: "L'union fait la force" and "un curé vaut bien dix gendarmes" ("union yields strength," the motto of the Belgian dynasty, and "one priest is worth ten policemen").

1830 – c. 1850: the Continuation of the Old Order.

Not only Catholic opinion, but also the "king, government and clergy seemed to conspire to increase the Catholic presence ... through the manipulation of appointments and elections." For the king, "Catholicism stood for the principle of authority and the influence of the Church over society was a warrant for disciplined and obedient subjects." The basic assumption was that society could not do without religion, and that, to be effective, churches needed greater independence from the State than eighteenth-century princes had been willing to grant." In short, according to Leopold I: "La nation belge sera d'autant plus facile à gouverner qu'elle est religieuse (the Belgian nation will be all the easier to govern while it is religious)."

The moderate faction of the Liberals also "held religion to be the central knot in the chain of tradition, 'the bond without which all the others are powerless to unite the members of the social body, ever ready to part.' ... The centre gauche, like Guizot in France, considered the Catholic Church as an indispensable ally in his discreet civilising mission" and was "quite willing to leave a large measure of influence to the Church in official institutions of moral relevance such as public education, welfare and the correctional system, provided that the State held the last word. ... [In the 1840s, they] did not lift one finger against the interpenetration of Church and State in these sectors. Often they actively advanced it ... [with the] classic example ...: primary education. ... Most doctrinaires, and at
least some radicals were also not blind to the social issues of the Church of their day in expectation of a broader diffusion of lumières."

The clergy took the opportunities for expansion offered by this liberté comme en Belgique (freedom as in Belgium) with both hands: new or re-established orders and congregations shot up like mushrooms. These provided the manpower, in collaboration with the local authorities, for the establishment of a network of educational and welfare institutions. The clergy played a crucial role in electoral conflicts and assured themselves of the kindly disposition of the parliamentary majority until around the middle of the nineteenth century. Moreover, where necessary, they succeeded in restoring and even expanding their grip on broad layers of the population. They were convinced that, in a parliamentary monarchy, whoever had the support of the people would come off best.

Pulpit and Confessional

Missionary work was the ancient and approved method used by the Catholic Church. This preaching movement achieved its greatest success from the 1830s to the 1870s, and continued until the 1960s. Its role in maintaining the existing social order cannot be overestimated. The preachers, who visited a parish for about seven to ten days, and returned at least once every ten years, were usually members of orders and congregations which, owing to the Belgian freedom of association after 1830, were thriving again. They propagated an ultramontane variant of le christianisme de la peur (the Christianity of fear). In other words they both threatened and comforted at the same time. They preached the legendary and frightening hellfire, but they also stressed that the gates through which one could escape hell were wide open. There was a reconfirmation of rules that could never be followed to the letter, and of the punishments that awaited transgressors now and in the hereafter. But, at the same time, the ways to find redemption were shown, via the sacraments offered by non-rigorous confessors, and by joining a pious society. Most of the preaching
campaigns were followed by the foundation or reestablishment of a pious brotherhood, often specified in terms of sex, age or civil status. At the same time, all social life that had not been approved by the clergy, was systematically obstructed.

The whole enterprise proved very successful; only some traditionally less religious parishes, principally located in the southern part of the country, showed some reluctance. The reasons for this success are easy to find. Because of the upheavals in the past decades many communities had been thrown off balance and wanted to put matters in order; they wanted to get rid of the past. The confessional was often about very concrete matters: the problem of marrying next of kin and of the restitution of church goods bought during the French period was dealt with in the confessional box. The belief in God's punishments continued to be strongly held. At first the threat of war was very real; then, in the 1840s, there was famine in rural areas, and far into the nineteenth century all kinds of epidemics swept through the country. People who did not share the enthusiasm of the majority ran the risk of becoming the scapegoat of natural disasters. Fear of bringing down the community's wrath on oneself by deviant behavior, played a significant role in these relatively small communities. The exhortations of the priests to accept one's fate and one's situation in life, and to secure oneself a place in heaven through an obedient way of life, were taken to heart to such a degree, that one witness did not hesitate to ascribe the fact that Belgium had been spared any serious upheaval in 1848, to the order-confirming influence of the missionary movement.

A comparison with Methodism and other revival movements, which arose around the same period in countries with a Protestant dominance, allows us to point out the specificity of the Catholic missionary movement. John Wesley partly owed his success to the fact that he literally preached from outside the church and anticipated the wishes of a population confused by the beginnings of industrialization. Moreover he encouraged personal conversion, individual responsibility and therefore self-respect. By "dissenting" one distinguished oneself from the "others", and put oneself at a distance from the dominant
elite that was strongly linked with the state church.

The aim of the Catholic missionary movement was firstly a restoration and reintegration, and this was supported by the traditional elite. The emphasis was on the restoration of the community. Whether one belonged to those who were saved could not be deduced from following a good life, but could only be discovered in the hereafter - in the meantime one could only hope that confession would put one back on the right track. Having social ambitions was to be frowned upon; only those with a vocation for the priesthood were able to break loose from the obligations associated with the social class into which they had been born. Over a longer period we can point out the possible importance of abandoning the practice of so-called rigorous confession. Followers of the civilization theory have correctly drawn attention to the fact that the Reformation, as well as the Counter-Reformation enhanced the notion of sin, and consequently also the population's self-control. Every believer had to account for his actions, the Puritan often by keeping a diary, the Catholic to his increasingly severe confessor.

From this point of view the introduction, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, of the non-rigorist moral theology, meant a breach of the trend. "After 1830, the Jesuits played a leading role, together with the Redemptorists, in converting the secular clergy to greater moral flexibility. Missions demonstrated what Liguori's adage 'lion in the pulpit, lamb in the confessional' could achieve. By mid century, souplesse on the part of the confessor had become the norm, involving pragmatism about some offences (like dancing or theatre-going) and discretion about others (notably regarding sex in marriage). ... In 1868, the papal nuncio considered 'the tremendous condescension' of confessors to be a general shortcoming of the Belgian clergy." From then on frequent reception of the sacraments of confession and Holy Communion was propagated, a tendency which continued into the beginning of the twentieth century through papal decrees on multiple- and child communion. In the period between the two World Wars this led to the foundation of organizations such as the Societies of the Sacred Heart, the members of which were obliged
to receive the sacraments at least once a month. Contemporary observers were well aware that this practice turned confession into a routine (or *Veralltäglichung*) which led to a decreasing awareness of sin, and this was an evil to which the Catholic Action reacted.

The widespread notion of the past two centuries, that Catholics have a lower concept of standards than Protestants, might be explained by this important change in the perception of the Catholic Sacraments. However, the confession was one of the major channels through which the clergy could influence behavior before the Second Vatican Council. We should have no illusions about people's behavior in private, but "sinning" in public, such as unmarried couples living together, was virtually impossible in small communities. Stressing the rules, while leaving open the possibility of absolution, and fighting public scandal gave rise to a very specific Catholic guilt management, and this can be very enlightening for the study of social control.

Primary Education

In 1842 a law on primary education was passed. The episcopate had every reason for rejoicing. Religion was now part of the curriculum and the clergy could *de facto* supervise the teachers, who - in most cases - held a diploma of a Catholic normal school. One cannot underestimate the importance of the daily catechism education (because that was what religion came down to in the schools). Year after year, as a preparation for their first communion and confirmation, the pupils were expected to learn the answers to the catechism questions by heart. If and how they understood the catechism, remains an open question, but it is clear that it offered them a vocabulary in which certain relations, self images, tales of origin, and so forth were articulated and introduced into their daily lives. Original sin, hell and damnation, heaven and mercy, sin and forgiveness were parts of the stories by which young people situated themselves in the world. For a long time, these were the only stories at hand, because alphabetization was very gradual and access to the written
word was controlled by the church. In short, through education the church had a firm grip on what could be said and thought, and consequently on what was necessary for an individual to determine his or her attitude to, and way of life. Loss of that control and the pluralization of discourses -which for many groups in Flanders only happened after the Second World War– is, perhaps, one of the causes of secularization, and one which, up until now, has been underestimated.

Summarizing we may posit that, between 1830 and about 1850, the Catholic Church succeeded in restoring and even expanding its ancient key position in the social control system within Belgium. This was also possible because, as a result of a lack in state initiative, the Church was able to acquire a quasi monopoly in central social areas such as education and welfare and it therefore possessed the real monopoly in religiosis.

1850–1950: Growing Polarization, Increasing Control

From the second half of the nineteenth century the clerical hierarchy began to be challenged by several competitors. Until 1884 there were the laic Liberal governments; in the fin-de-siècle period and until after the First World War there was the threat of a Socialist coup; and during the interwar years, there were divisions in the Catholic camp itself and nationalist, extreme right wing movements. These different competitors can be considered as incarnations of the major political problems with which many young states are confronted. The Liberals tried to develop a strong and autonomous laic state. The Socialists trumpeted the demands for better distributive justice and a voice in government; and between the two world wars the Belgian State was confronted by problems of nation-building. This phrasing of the period accentuates the political aspects of the modernizing process, and the clerical hierarchy perceived the problems of modernization in political terms. The clerical hierarchy was convinced that it could only fulfil its pastoral tasks if it could count on the collaboration of worldly powers. Its first priority was to maintain, or to
bring back to power a Catholic majority. As the right to vote was expanded (in 1848, 1893, 1918, and 1949) more, and larger groups had to be controlled, and in the election battles the clergy was forced to use the same weapons as its opponents. In a nutshell this is the logic behind what was later called *verzuiling* (social compartmentalization): the development of an ever bigger and better organized form of Catholicism that gave its followers the opportunity to follow a Catholic way of life, and consequently also a Catholic way in the voting booth.

The foundations of this compartmentalization were laid in the period of the Liberal cabinets (1850–1884). As the regime tended to support clerical initiatives less and less, so the clergy was forced to call upon rich noblemen and citizens for the development of its infrastructure. The key association in this period was the society of St. Vincentius a Paulo, a charitable paternalistic organization in which rich taxpaying voters and militant Catholic laymen met for the purpose of helping the poor. (*Dieu comme but, les pauvres comme moyen* – God as the goal, the poor as the means). Almost every important community had such an association, or "conference" of like-minded people, and they soon began to occupy themselves with matters other than mere welfare initiatives. Support for the pope, youth care, the provision of books, education and the press all came to be included in their area of activities; and often the members of the conference also met in the new Catholic electoral associations. A succession of conflicts between the Liberal State government and the clerical hierarchy resulted in the clerical–anticlerical division coloring the whole of public life. Within a short period there were almost no apolitical societies left: either one was Catholic, behaved like a good Catholic, and was then supported by, for example, the followers of St Vincent, otherwise one should go and beg from the Liberals. This polarization was especially apparent during the conflict over schools, which raged from 1879 to 1884, and when, even in the smallest village, parents were forced to choose between an "official" or "neutral" school, and a Catholic one.

In 1884 the Catholic party won the battle for the taxpaying voter. The Liberal
education legislation was slowly dismantled. However, the agricultural sector was moving through a deep crisis and in 1886 bloody riots occurred in Wallonia between laborers and the police. Socialist leaders offered the authorities a choice: an extension of the franchise or a revolution. A revision of the franchise seemed inevitable, and it was brought to fruition in the beginning of the nineties. But the Catholic majority still managed to maintain itself, and this was due principally to the clergy's success in the field of social work. In the years preceding the first election under the new system (general multiple voting rights for men), the bishops urged parish priests to establish all kinds of social services: co-operatives, insurance funds, labor unions, in short, everything that could improve the material existence of the population, whether they were entitled to vote or not. Radical Liberals and socialists had already established similar practices in the cities. The Catholic government followed the principle of liberté subsidiée (subsidized liberty) by which the state restricted itself to creating social legislation, and left it to the various "social compartments" to carry it out.

This policy led to a unique Belgian situation: services, which in most other countries were undertaken by the state, were carried out by private organizations with community funds. The underlying strategy is not difficult to understand. Catholic opinion was not favourable to a strong state, since it might turn against the Church if it fell into the hands of the wrong party. It was therefore considered much better to use state funds to expand further the Catholic network established in the period of the Liberal governments, thus securing the advances that had been made in certain fields, clawing back territory lost in others. This strategy met with considerable success. Indeed, until 1999 the Catholic Party was almost always included in government, and at the time of writing a majority of the Flemish have attended a Catholic school, or have been members of a Catholic union or health insurance scheme.

This evidence bears out Van Doorn's conclusion, put forward in 1956, that social compartmentalization implied a sharpening of social control. The gradual, but ultimately almost total politicizing of social life has meant that the ordinary Belgian has had to make a
"colored" choice in every aspect of life, and he or she has to profile herself/himself as belonging to a certain fraction. In the 1950s, during the second conflict over schools, a Catholic was even advised against using a certain brand of chocolate. An aspect that has been less highlighted, but which has been just as real as the emancipating, safeguarding and even modernizing qualities attributed to social compartmentalization, is that the latter made conformity to certain codes of behavior increasingly easy to enforce. Before 1850 the Church could only threaten with God's punishment: pestilence and cholera in this life, hell and damnation in the hereafter - the reality of the former increased the credibility of the latter. At the same time the Church appeared to be the only organization capable of mobilizing the staff required for alphabetization and health care for the less-fortunate, services that the State was willing to provide only in a very limited way. In the rural areas it was hard to find any non-religious individuals or public sinners; and if there were some in the cities, it was as a consequence of the failing clerical infrastructure rather than the result of a free choice by those involved. A century later the threat of God's punishment weighed less heavily, despite the fact that the clergy kept representing both world wars as expressions of God's wrath on people's misbehavior. At the same time, however, social services and, not least, the creation of jobs, remained good reasons for staying in the Catholic camp.

Social compartmentalization has ensured that in Flanders the major part of the non-profit or social-profit segment within the tertiary sector remained in Catholic hands. This meant that access to large parts of the labor market was made dependent on conformity to certain standards of behavior. Until very recently in Catholic schools, divorce meant immediate resignation for teachers. Nor was this situation confined to the non-profit sector. In the days of census suffrage leaseholders ran the risk of losing their business if they did not vote for the right candidate. Preachers pleaded for the foundation of Catholic factories in their parish, in which Catholic bosses would employ Catholic workers. One might question the reasoning here once the workers had become members of labor unions, especially since the Belgian labor force became one of the most unionized in the world. A further
consequence was that appointments in the civil service were also politically colored, even at the lowest level; and a "scientific" explanation has even been offered for this practice, namely that a bureaucracy should reflect the people's political opinion in the same way as legislation.

From this perspective the process of secularization, considered as a growing public deviation from the Church's code of behavior, can be summarized in a very simple formula: the Church no longer has the means to enforce this conformity. And the same formula might be expressed as follows: subjectively, the earlier conformity may not have been so much experienced as enforced, though objectively there was simply no alternative for large parts of the population.

This is not the place to relate fully the story of how the Church lost this power. However, to focus on the example of the creation of jobs: after the First World War the Catholic party could only remain in power by forming coalition governments. In practice this meant that the party was unable to keep the policy of compartmentalized job creation in its own hands, but that there had to be room for others. In 2000, of the 10,000,000 inhabitants of Belgium, 900,000 were employed by the government. The increasing importance of the tertiary sector in society brought this sector face to face with the logic of the market, so that the confessional characteristics of the compartmentalized organizations slowly, but gradually disappeared. The autonomy of the compartmentalized segments was strengthened by a massive decline in the number of priests, with the declericalization of personnel as a consequence.

A Few Comparisons

Does the chosen perspective help us to explain the differences between Flanders and Wallonia, and between Belgium and Holland? The Catholic element in Wallonia has never been as strong as it was in Flanders, and many Walloons have therefore lost their religion.
While there may be some reasons for this to be in the Ancien Régime, this phenomenon probably has most to do with the early industrialization of large parts of the Walloon region; it was the first region of continental Europe to experience major industrialization. The Catholic elite and the Liberal employers could only offer a restricted charitable paternalistic response to the miserable conditions of the workers. When the Christian Democratic movement began to develop at the end of the nineteenth century the terrain had already been occupied by the strong anti-clerical Socialist movement. It was the socialists who would subsequently succeed in translating support, first on a local and later on a national level, into political power. In Flanders, which had remained a rural area for much longer, Christian Democracy arrived just in time to curb Socialism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the mines in Limburg opened, the Church was ready to keep the loyalty of the miners.

As long as the parties remained organized on a national level, the Socialist supremacy in the southern part of the country ensured that the Flemish Socialists did not become a minority. And, vice versa, the Flemish Catholics guaranteed the protection of the rights of their Walloon partners. From the 1960s, however, when the country and the parties were federalized, these counterweights disappeared and both parties became dominant in their respective areas. In this period Wallonia also witnessed the downfall of its traditional heavy industry, and this left the government as one of the most, if not the most important employer. Flanders, on the other hand, was able to link up with the third industrial revolution. It became the economic center of gravity of the kingdom, with all the consequences in terms of an increase in welfare provision, differentiation and a relative decrease of the social compartments' share in the labor market - in 2000 25% of the population remained in state services. In the South the Church had never played such a strong controlling role as in the North, since, politically speaking its presence was not as strong, and the social compartmentalization strategy worked to the advantage of its opponent. The consequence of the economic recession in Wallonia was that the role of the dominant compartment as a provider of jobs remained; in 2000 40% were in state services.
Compared to the Netherlands, Flemish public life remained very compartmentalized. Although secularization and autonomy found their way into the Flemish compartment organizations themselves, the outside labels for workers unions, health insurance and even parties remained divided into Christian, Socialist or Liberal. This suggests that the social compartmentalization strategy has a different result, depending on whether it is applied in a country with a predominantly Protestant tradition, or in one with a significant Counter-Reformation past.

Together with other authors I am convinced that confessional differences help to explain differences in political culture. In Protestant countries the worldly powers found it easier to emancipate from religious power than in Catholic countries, and the civil service could more easily be accepted as an autonomous arbitrator in worldly matters. In addition, the Protestant tradition may have contributed to the relatively peaceful nature of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. The installation of a modern regime did not necessarily imply a break with the past, and the polarization between old/religious and new/secular was never as sharp as in countries with a Catholic past. Moreover, the Protestant emphasis on the freedom of conscience and self-control advanced the formation of attitudes other than those inspired by the Catholic perspective, such as the theory that lies have no rights, the possibility of the forgiveness of sins, the principle of immanence, the *compelle intrare*, and so forth.

If one looks at the Flemish–Dutch differences as outlined above, it is understandable that social compartmentalization was able to penetrate deeper into the Belgian state system. The irreconcilability between the two opposing parties lasted much longer. Dutch Catholicism attacked the compartmentalization strategy from a minority position. There social compartmentalization tried to emancipate the Catholic part of the population and to integrate it in a social life dominated by Protestant culture. Once this goal had been reached the compartmentalized organization lost its meaning and all parties agreed to abandon it. Belgian Catholicism started out from a centuries' old monopoly position. The aim of social
compartmentalization was to re-establish and maintain this ancient dominance and to arrive at a modern version of coexistence between throne and altar. In this way it fell back on an ancient clerical-pastoral theory, and the political cultural tradition that followed from it, in which the authority of the state always came second. These ancient roots help to explain why social compartmentalization organizations were able to maintain themselves in a secularized world, albeit under the flag of the intermediary field (in between civilians and the state), and why they often formed a front against the State.

All of this leads to an important, but non-historical question. Within Belgian political culture, Church and State have always been considered complementary; the clerical standard was followed for a considerable period of time. But the weakening of clerical authority in Belgian public life, the fact that compartmentalization organizations continue to exist autonomously, and the fact that central government remains relatively weak, raises the problem - who, in the future, will perform the functions of social control that the Church used to fulfil?
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was only published in the Dutch version (Idem, Politieke geschiedenis van België, 445-464). Boudart et al. ed., Modern Belgium does not give references either. Kossmann’s not so recent work The Low Countries 1780-1840 (1978) does include a selective bibliography, as does the more general History of the Low Countries by Blom and Lamberts. Recently, an important work on the political-religious history has been published: Belgium and the Holy See from Gregory XVI to Pius IX (1831-1859) by Viaene. It includes most of the Dutch literature on the period 1830-1860. Strikwerda, A House Divided, offers an interesting interpretation of the second half of the century. The 20th century is dealt with in great depth in the—often English—publications of religion sociologist Karel Dobbelaere (for his bibliography see Laermans et al. ed., Secularization, 321-338). For the Belgian case in an international context see Mcleod, Religion and the People.


Art, “Pourquoi la christianisation de la Flandre a-t-elle si bien réussi? »: 511-520; Viaene, Belgium and the Holy See, 25-36

Viaene, op.cit., 130.
Ibidem, p. 150-151.
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Art, Kerkelijke structuur, 217. The situation in French-speaking Canada was rather similar. See Hardy, Contrôle social.

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What follows is a personal interpretation of 100 years of Belgian history: the authors cited at the end of this article corroborate the facts I mention, but do not always have the
same view as I and often emphasize other aspects.
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