- Author
- Freddy Heylen (UGent) and A. Van Poeck
- Organization
- Abstract
- The idea that countries with an independent central bank perform better on price stability is very popular and confirmed by studies investigating the issue empirically. Yet, using the Barro-Gordon model we show that the gains from a more independent central bank are not fixed. They are larger in countries with unstable governments, not committed to fixed exchange rates, and in countries were left-wing parties hold a strong position. The effect of increasing central bank independence is also shown to depend on the level of the natural unemployment rate and the slope of the short-term Phillips curve.
Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-264921
- MLA
- Heylen, Freddy, and A. Van Poeck. “Central Bank Independence: Only Part of the Inflation Story.” ECONOMIST, vol. 144, no. 1, Kluwer Academic, 1996, pp. 45–61.
- APA
- Heylen, F., & Van Poeck, A. (1996). Central bank independence: only part of the inflation story. ECONOMIST, 144(1), 45–61.
- Chicago author-date
- Heylen, Freddy, and A. Van Poeck. 1996. “Central Bank Independence: Only Part of the Inflation Story.” ECONOMIST 144 (1): 45–61.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Heylen, Freddy, and A. Van Poeck. 1996. “Central Bank Independence: Only Part of the Inflation Story.” ECONOMIST 144 (1): 45–61.
- Vancouver
- 1.Heylen F, Van Poeck A. Central bank independence: only part of the inflation story. ECONOMIST. 1996;144(1):45–61.
- IEEE
- [1]F. Heylen and A. Van Poeck, “Central bank independence: only part of the inflation story,” ECONOMIST, vol. 144, no. 1, pp. 45–61, 1996.
@article{264921,
abstract = {{The idea that countries with an independent central bank perform better on price stability is very popular and confirmed by studies investigating the issue empirically. Yet, using the Barro-Gordon model we show that the gains from a more independent central bank are not fixed. They are larger in countries with unstable governments, not committed to fixed exchange rates, and in countries were left-wing parties hold a strong position. The effect of increasing central bank independence is also shown to depend on the level of the natural unemployment rate and the slope of the short-term Phillips curve.}},
author = {{Heylen, Freddy and Van Poeck, A.}},
issn = {{0013-063X}},
journal = {{ECONOMIST}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{45--61}},
publisher = {{Kluwer Academic}},
title = {{Central bank independence: only part of the inflation story}},
volume = {{144}},
year = {{1996}},
}