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Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors

Jeroen Van Cleemput (UGent) , Bart Coppens (UGent) and Bjorn De Sutter (UGent)
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Abstract
This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side channels that relate to data flow. We study the efficiency, effectiveness, portability, predictability and sensitivity of several mitigating code transformations that eliminate or minimize key-dependent execution time variations. Furthermore, we discuss the extent to which compiler backends are a suitable tool to provide automated support for the proposed mitigations.
Keywords
x86 architecture, variable latency instructions, Measurement, Time-based side channels, Security

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Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

Chicago
Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Bart Coppens, and Bjorn De Sutter. 2012. “Compiler Mitigations for Time Attacks on Modern X86 Processors.” Acm Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization 8 (4).
APA
Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Coppens, B., & De Sutter, B. (2012). Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION, 8(4).
Vancouver
1.
Van Cleemput J, Coppens B, De Sutter B. Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION. 2012;8(4).
MLA
Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Bart Coppens, and Bjorn De Sutter. “Compiler Mitigations for Time Attacks on Modern X86 Processors.” ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION 8.4 (2012): n. pag. Print.
@article{2006760,
  abstract     = {This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side channels that relate to data flow. We study the efficiency, effectiveness, portability, predictability and sensitivity of several mitigating code transformations that eliminate or minimize key-dependent execution time variations. Furthermore, we discuss the extent to which compiler backends are a suitable tool to provide automated support for the proposed mitigations.},
  articleno    = {23},
  author       = {Van Cleemput, Jeroen and Coppens, Bart and De Sutter, Bjorn},
  issn         = {1544-3566},
  journal      = {ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION},
  keyword      = {x86 architecture,variable latency instructions,Measurement,Time-based side channels,Security},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {20},
  title        = {Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2086696.2086702},
  volume       = {8},
  year         = {2012},
}

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