Ghent University Academic Bibliography

Advanced

Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors

Jeroen Van Cleemput, Bart Coppens UGent and Bjorn De Sutter UGent (2012) ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION. 8(4).
abstract
This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side channels that relate to data flow. We study the efficiency, effectiveness, portability, predictability and sensitivity of several mitigating code transformations that eliminate or minimize key-dependent execution time variations. Furthermore, we discuss the extent to which compiler backends are a suitable tool to provide automated support for the proposed mitigations.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
keyword
x86 architecture, variable latency instructions, Measurement, Time-based side channels, Security
journal title
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION
ACM Trans. Archit. Code Optim.
volume
8
issue
4
article number
23
pages
20 pages
Web of Science type
Article
Web of Science id
000299995000006
JCR category
COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
JCR impact factor
0.684 (2012)
JCR rank
62/100 (2012)
JCR quartile
3 (2012)
ISSN
1544-3566
DOI
10.1145/2086696.2086702
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A1
copyright statement
I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher
id
2006760
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-2006760
date created
2012-01-27 15:37:05
date last changed
2016-12-21 15:42:24
@article{2006760,
  abstract     = {This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side channels that relate to data flow. We study the efficiency, effectiveness, portability, predictability and sensitivity of several mitigating code transformations that eliminate or minimize key-dependent execution time variations. Furthermore, we discuss the extent to which compiler backends are a suitable tool to provide automated support for the proposed mitigations.},
  articleno    = {23},
  author       = {Van Cleemput, Jeroen and Coppens, Bart and De Sutter, Bjorn},
  issn         = {1544-3566},
  journal      = {ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION},
  keyword      = {x86 architecture,variable latency instructions,Measurement,Time-based side channels,Security},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {20},
  title        = {Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2086696.2086702},
  volume       = {8},
  year         = {2012},
}

Chicago
Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Bart Coppens, and Bjorn De Sutter. 2012. “Compiler Mitigations for Time Attacks on Modern X86 Processors.” Acm Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization 8 (4).
APA
Van Cleemput, J., Coppens, B., & De Sutter, B. (2012). Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION, 8(4).
Vancouver
1.
Van Cleemput J, Coppens B, De Sutter B. Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION. 2012;8(4).
MLA
Van Cleemput, Jeroen, Bart Coppens, and Bjorn De Sutter. “Compiler Mitigations for Time Attacks on Modern X86 Processors.” ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ARCHITECTURE AND CODE OPTIMIZATION 8.4 (2012): n. pag. Print.