Ghent University Academic Bibliography

Advanced

Ethical consistency and the logic of ought

Mathieu Beirlaen UGent (2011) THEORETICAL & APPLIED ETHICS. 1(3). p.45-51
abstract
In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of 'ought'. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams’ characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams’ solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of 'ought' is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of 'ought', it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that "ought implies can".
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
keyword
moral dilemmas, deontic logic, Bernard Williams
journal title
THEORETICAL & APPLIED ETHICS
Theor. appl. ethics
volume
1
issue
3
issue title
The moral philosophy of Bernard Williams
pages
45 - 51
ISSN
2156-7174
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A2
copyright statement
I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher
VABB id
c:vabb:335512
VABB type
VABB-1
id
1970192
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-1970192
date created
2011-12-19 16:11:22
date last changed
2016-12-19 15:40:05
@article{1970192,
  abstract     = {In  Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of 'ought'. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams{\textquoteright} characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams{\textquoteright} solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of 'ought' is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of 'ought', it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that {\textacutedbl}ought implies can{\textacutedbl}.},
  author       = {Beirlaen, Mathieu},
  issn         = {2156-7174},
  journal      = {THEORETICAL \& APPLIED ETHICS},
  keyword      = {moral dilemmas,deontic logic,Bernard Williams},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {45--51},
  title        = {Ethical consistency and the logic of ought},
  volume       = {1},
  year         = {2011},
}

Chicago
Beirlaen, Mathieu. 2011. “Ethical Consistency and the Logic of Ought.” Theoretical & Applied Ethics 1 (3): 45–51.
APA
Beirlaen, M. (2011). Ethical consistency and the logic of ought. THEORETICAL & APPLIED ETHICS, 1(3), 45–51.
Vancouver
1.
Beirlaen M. Ethical consistency and the logic of ought. THEORETICAL & APPLIED ETHICS. 2011;1(3):45–51.
MLA
Beirlaen, Mathieu. “Ethical Consistency and the Logic of Ought.” THEORETICAL & APPLIED ETHICS 1.3 (2011): 45–51. Print.