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The design of active labour market policies: what matters and what doesn’t?

Bart Cockx UGent (2002) Institutional and financial incentives for social insurance. p.25-50
abstract
A first objective of this paper is to emphasise the role of a correct diagnosis of unemployment persistence for the design of effective active labour market policies. A second is to stress the importance of adequate incentives to programme administrators of active labour market policies, and that this may well be more important than providing adequate incentives to the unemployed. To illustrate this, we summarise two case studies evaluating active labour market policies in Belgium. The first one evaluates a work experience programme for welfare recipients. The second one analyses the short-term effect of vocational training programmes for unemployed workers on the probability of leaving unemployment. Finally, we invite economists to think harder about well designed performance-standards systems. We provide some guidelines for this research programme.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
bookChapter
publication status
published
subject
keyword
unemployment, Active labour market policies, policy design
book title
Institutional and financial incentives for social insurance
editor
Claude d'Aspremont, Victor Ginsburgh, Henri R Sneessens and Frans Spinnewyn
pages
25 - 50
publisher
Kluwer
place of publication
Dordrecht, The Netherlands
ISBN
0792374177
language
English
UGent publication?
no
classification
B2
id
1173382
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-1173382
date created
2011-02-27 18:19:17
date last changed
2017-01-02 09:54:59
@incollection{1173382,
  abstract     = {A first objective of this paper is to emphasise the role of a correct diagnosis of unemployment persistence for the design of effective active labour market policies. A second is to stress the importance of adequate incentives to programme administrators of active labour market policies, and that this may well be more important than providing adequate incentives to the unemployed. To illustrate this, we summarise two case studies evaluating active labour market policies in Belgium. The first one evaluates a work experience programme for welfare recipients. The second one analyses the short-term effect of vocational training programmes for unemployed workers on the probability of leaving unemployment. Finally, we invite economists to think harder about well designed performance-standards systems. We provide some guidelines for this research programme.},
  author       = {Cockx, Bart},
  booktitle    = {Institutional and financial incentives for social insurance},
  editor       = {d'Aspremont, Claude and Ginsburgh, Victor and Sneessens, Henri R and Spinnewyn, Frans },
  isbn         = {0792374177},
  keyword      = {unemployment,Active labour market policies,policy design},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {25--50},
  publisher    = {Kluwer},
  title        = {The design of active labour market policies: what matters and what doesn{\textquoteright}t?},
  year         = {2002},
}

Chicago
Cockx, Bart. 2002. “The Design of Active Labour Market Policies: What Matters and What Doesn’t?” In Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance, ed. Claude d’ Aspremont, Victor Ginsburgh, Henri R Sneessens, and Frans Spinnewyn, 25–50. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.
APA
Cockx, B. (2002). The design of active labour market policies: what matters and what doesn’t? In C. d’ Aspremont, V. Ginsburgh, H. R. Sneessens, & F. Spinnewyn (Eds.), Institutional and financial incentives for social insurance (pp. 25–50). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.
Vancouver
1.
Cockx B. The design of active labour market policies: what matters and what doesn’t? In: d’ Aspremont C, Ginsburgh V, Sneessens HR, Spinnewyn F, editors. Institutional and financial incentives for social insurance. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer; 2002. p. 25–50.
MLA
Cockx, Bart. “The Design of Active Labour Market Policies: What Matters and What Doesn’t?” Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance. Ed. Claude d’ Aspremont et al. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 2002. 25–50. Print.